The evolution of Norms in International Relations: Intervention and the Principle of Non-intervention in Intra-African Affairs

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ABSTRACT

This thesis is about the co-evolution of non-interventionist norms and interventionist practice among African states in the post-colonial era. To understand this co-evolution, this study begins from the year 1957, when the first post-colonial state emerged, and is divided into three phases: the early post-colonial period (1957-1970), the post-independence period (1970-mid 1980), and the post-Cold War period (1990-April 1998). Each phase looks at examples of African involvement in internal disputes to consider how the practice of intervention has evolved alongside the clause of non-intervention in Article 3(2) of the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU).

The cases studied illustrate the view that African leaders, to justify intervening in internal disputes, have often cited two persistent and recurrent themes: “African exclusivity” (often defined as “African solutions for African problems”) and “African Unity” (often called “solidarity”). These however are not the only themes that explicate how intervention has evolved in African affairs. There are complex regional political realities and sensitivities and factors such as the problem of regional instability posed by internal disputes, the spread of arms and the overflow of refugees into neighbouring countries that impinge on the thinking of intervention and non-intervention.

While there is an apparent contradiction between non-interventionist norms and interventionist practice in the history under investigation, the thesis concludes that instead, it represents a careful and pragmatic balance of coping with short-term contingencies (through intervention) and longer-term security (through strengthening the norm) without undermining the undoubted interest of African leaders to secure non-interventionist norms for Africa.
In memory of my dear Father,
Dr Gilbert A. Ayaru-Ero
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAFC</td>
<td>Allied Armed Forces of the Community (ECOWAS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BAKO</td>
<td>Association des Bakongo pour l'Unification, l'Expansion et la Défense de la langue Kikongo</td>
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<td>ACR</td>
<td>Africa Contemporary Record</td>
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<td>ACRF</td>
<td>African Crisis Response Force</td>
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<td>ACRI</td>
<td>African Crisis Response Initiative</td>
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<td>AFDL</td>
<td>Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Kinshasa</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFL</td>
<td>Armed Forces of Liberia</td>
</tr>
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<td>ALC</td>
<td>African Liberation Committee</td>
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<td>ANAND</td>
<td>Accord de Non Aggression et d'Assistance en Maitiere de Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAA</td>
<td>Bureau of African Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEAO</td>
<td>Communauté Economique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest</td>
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<td>CMC</td>
<td>Conflict Management Centre</td>
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<td>CNL</td>
<td>Conseil National de Libération</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>Economic Community (of West African States') Monitoring Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FNLA</td>
<td>Frente Nacional de Libertção de Angola</td>
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<td>FNLC</td>
<td>Congolese National Liberation Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>FROLINAT</td>
<td>Front de Libération Nationale Tchadien (du Tchad)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GUNT</td>
<td>Gouvernement d’Union Nationale Transitoire</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Inter-Governmental Authority Development (formerly Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development - IGADD)</td>
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<tr>
<td>INPFL</td>
<td>Independent National Patriotic Front (Liberia)</td>
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<td>LPC</td>
<td>Liberia Peace Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINURCA</td>
<td>UN Mission in the Central African Republic</td>
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<td>MISAB</td>
<td>Mission InterAfricaine de Surveillance des Accords</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNC</td>
<td>Mouvement National Congolais</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPLA</td>
<td>Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAM</td>
<td>Non-Aligned Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organisations</td>
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<td>NMOG</td>
<td>Neutral Observer Group in Rwanda (OAU)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPFL</td>
<td>National Patriotic Front of Liberia</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCAM</td>
<td>Organisation Communé Africaine et Malgache</td>
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<tr>
<td>OMIB</td>
<td>Observer Mission in Burundi (OAU)</td>
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<td>ONUC</td>
<td>Opération des Nations Unies au Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDD</td>
<td>Presidential Decision Directive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RECAM</td>
<td>Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix</td>
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<td>RPF</td>
<td>Rwandese Patriotic Front</td>
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<td>RUF</td>
<td>Revolutionary United Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<td>SANDF</td>
<td>South African National Defence Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMC</td>
<td>Standing Mediation Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPLA</td>
<td>Sudanese People's Liberation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAM</td>
<td>Union Africaine de Malgache</td>
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<tr>
<td>UAR</td>
<td>United Arab Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ULIMO</td>
<td>United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO-K led by Alhaji Kromah and ULIMO-J led by Roosevelt Johnson)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMIR</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNITA</td>
<td>União Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>United Nations Protection Force (in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOSOM</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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INTRODUCTION

This study is concerned with the practice of intervention in the internal affairs of African states by other African states. At the start of the post-Cold War era, African leaders took action to deal with internal conflicts on the African continent. Most notable was the intervention by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Liberia in 1990 and the creation of mechanisms within the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) since 1990-1991 to respond to internal conflicts on the continent. We generally thought of both events as 'new' or innovative, signalling a kind of proactiveness by African leaders in responding to, and taking charge of, internal conflicts on the continent. The idea that these acts were 'new' was linked to the belief that the African continent was facing increased marginalisation from the major powers of the international community. Consequently, it appeared that the continent was re-examining its institutional mechanisms within the area of peacekeeping and conflict resolution.

Main Questions and Thesis Argument

It is, however, the contention of this study that while these two events may have signalled some kind of proactiveness within the continent, they were not necessarily 'new'. Rather, we should see them as forming part of, or belonging to, a tradition of intervention as practised by African states. The central aim of this thesis is to try to identify and understand this tradition. How has intervention evolved alongside the principle of non-intervention since the end of colonial rule in Africa? More important for this study, is it possible to find sources from which to understand the practice of intervention in Africa by African states?

This study attempts to identify underlying themes, justifications and reasons for what they might tell us about the nature of intervention in intra-African affairs. This study argues that alongside the principle of non-intervention, there are other norms and values used to

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1 Within this study, intra-African affairs, refers to affairs within the African continent. Furthermore, because our principle discussion is with rules governing the conduct of states when dealing with internal rather than inter-state disputes, we use the term intra-African affairs as opposed to inter-African affairs which refers to rules governing relations between states.
justify or legitimise intervention by African states. While non-intervention is a well-established (though not wholly clear) norm among the member-states of the OAU, Sam Nolutshungu observes that it 'operates alongside other emergent [equally ambiguous] norms and values that are often in conflict with it, producing a convoluted discourse in which contradictory actions can be justified according to some principle or shade of emphasis.' It is these other emergent norms and values that this study focuses on to understand how the practice of intervention exists alongside non-intervention on the African continent. The study thus draws on the approach used by Martin Wight in his article 'Western Values in International Relations.'

Wight remarked that his discussion on Western values was not to be limited to 'the record of [Western] practice, nor even in the simple doctrines which,...are mainly a codification of practice, as in the history of ideas.' Rather, there is 'a certain coherent pattern of ideas that may be detected from time to time in Western statesmen, political philosophers and jurists.' Wight observed that these ideas were 'persistent and recurrent.' Although they might at times seem 'eclipsed and distorted', these ideas have 'constantly reappeared and reasserted [their] authority, so that it may even seem something like a consensus of Western diplomatic opinion.' Western leaders and policymakers have translated these ideas into normative thinking on aspects of international relations. By normative, we mean an established standard of behaviour, pattern or a value that is frequently asserted and recognisable by statesmen. As Wight’s article illustrates, a range of ideas, values, rules (i.e. normative thinking) has developed over time in the West in relation to questions concerning international order, intervention, and international morality.

If we follow Wight’s approach of understanding how a ‘pattern of ideas’ or normative thinking has evolved in Western thought, what are ‘African’ ideas on intervention? This at once prompts the question: how does one know what these ideas are, since there is scarcely any large-scale theorizing by Africans themselves on these matters? According to Ali Mazrui,

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ideas, at least African ideas, are 'not merely...what African leaders say.' We need also to consider the 'general behaviour' of African states and the 'emotional orientation [of African leaders] in specific situations.' Large parts of African thought, diplomatic opinion and attitudes on world politics are still written from the perspective of the colonial experience. Analysis must therefore start with the anti-colonialist thought of the liberation movements of the late 1950s and early 1960s. We therefore need to expand Wight's 'persistent and recurrent' ideas to include diplomatic opinion and the record of 'African' practices.

Purpose of study

By exploring if there are 'persistent and recurrent' ideas by African leaders on the question of intervention, the purpose of this study is to present another way of categorising the history of intervention within the continent beyond the usual perspective of North-South relations. This study may also provide useful insights into the nature of the debates that were taking place at the OAU, particularly at the level of the Secretariat, in the post-Cold War era. An analysis of African thought on intervention, as opposed to non-intervention, has received little attention in the field of international relations. There are, to be sure, many studies on the subject of foreign intervention in African states. However, none of these has as their primary purpose an examination of the evolution of intervention as practised by African states, nor the development of a 'pattern of ideas' or normative thinking. Much of the literature tends to start from the point of view of non-intervention and the traditional debate of the sovereign equality of states when presenting non-Western attitudes to intervention. These studies have also focussed on how developing countries perceive intervention by the North and the sets

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of associated problems with such perceptions. Throughout the continent’s forty years post-colonial history, and especially during the 1970s and 80s, observers noted that African states held on to the sanctity of non-intervention while conflicts spread throughout the region.

In the past, there has often been criticism of the continent’s own regional organisation, the OAU, for failing to maintain peace while shoring up the principle of sovereignty. The OAU Charter itself prohibits the practice of intervention in the domestic affairs of states, and in this sense, the OAU has been unable to involve itself in the resolution of internal conflicts. However, bearing this in mind, a few writers have opened the door for further research on how the practice of intervention evolved alongside the principle of non-intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa and more will be said about such work in Chapter One. The literature on Africa’s involvement in internal conflicts has usually, however, tended to focus on the nature of the operations, and their success or failure. Similarly, analysis of the OAU’s earlier efforts to establish mechanisms for conflict management has focussed on the organisation’s successes or failures.

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Two notes of caution as to what this thesis is not about. First, this thesis is not suggesting that there is something exceptionally African about the idea and practice of intervention within the continent. The study does not assume that there is something uniquely African about dealing with problems of intervention in internal conflicts. *Pace* James Mayall, we need to avoid any note of exceptionalism attached to African attitudes and approaches in resolving conflict situations. Having said this, the use of heads of state in resolving conflicts is a feature said to be unique to African mediation. The involvement of heads of state is seen as being ‘in accordance with Africa’s traditional and pre-colonial methods of dispute settlement whereby elders, regarded as wise, and commanding [the] respect and confidence of their respective societies, intervened to resolve differences.’

Second, and more important, while the principle aim of this thesis is to try to find a ‘pattern of ideas’ or normative thinking, this alone is not enough to understand the practice of intervention on the continent. We can examine intervention by states from two levels. The first level involves an examination of what states ‘really do’, or the ‘real’ motivations of states when they choose to intervene. This level concentrates on state action and the behaviour of states, (i.e. *realpolitik*). The second level focuses on the justifications or normative aspects of the intervention. On this level, states tend to invoke, respond and appeal to other recognisable norms and justifications such as self-defence or protecting the territorial integrity of another state. This second level generates manifold scrutiny, focussing as it does

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on the reasons given by states for intervening in the affairs of another state. As Sam Nolutshungu states,

The interest of norms and values in international as well as domestic politics does not lie only in how they compete with realpolitik or whether and when they outweigh realist concerns. It is not necessary to resolve the interminable debate between realism and idealism, in order to recognize that they are important in other ways. They may shape desires and interests by suggesting to each actor the range of objectives that others might tolerate, provide a shared language of claims and counter claims, help to define the terrain of possible agreement among allies and antagonists in conflict, and, at the lowest estimate, provide each side with cues for propaganda.

At best, the normative aspects of intervention are dealt with post facto, within official statements or press releases from the intervening state. It is this normative level that this thesis concentrates on, but it is not necessarily simple to separate it or distinguish it from the first level. The normative level can be used as a ‘political strategy’ or a means from which to pursue a particular act by the intervening state. Again, Nolutshungu proves instructive when he states that:

However skeptical one might be about their independent force, norms and values are so intricately interwoven with political action that most political events are unintelligible when their discursive context is ignored.

From this point of view, it is necessary to consider how states have used normative justifications as a cloak in which to hide their political motives or ‘true’ intentions. It is by using this second level that we can see if a ‘pattern of ideas’ is recurring among African statesmen. This study does not attempt to separate state action from the level of normative

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14 There is a third level, although it is not discussed in this thesis, which focuses predominantly on the nature of the operation and considers the successes, failures and capacity of the interveners.


16 See I. W. Zartman, (1968), p. 188 who disagrees with this and suggests that a distinction should be made between ‘normative judgements’ and ‘empirical observations.’

17 I am indebted to Bruce Jones for suggesting this point in response to a presentation of an earlier version of this Chapter and to members of the 1996-97 Conflict and Peace Workshop at the Department of International Relations, London School of Economics for discussions on the same subject.

thinking; rather, both levels are interdependent. Furthermore, the normative level serves not only as a political strategy, but also as an umbrella of legitimacy for states performing acts that are at best frowned upon by African states and the wider international community. Why the focus on this second level?

The reason some states intervene in another country’s internal dispute depends on a whole series of factors that occur simultaneously. We argue that generally the reason states intervene is from a perception of national interest or the fact that conflicts impinge on the security and political-military issues of states. This study however argues that there are other justifications and norms that leaders cite to explain how the principle of intervention existed alongside that of non-intervention. These norms and justifications are largely dormant and raise their head on specific occasions. In this study, the suggestion is made that there are two persistent and recurrent themes that are useful to our understanding of how the practice of intervention has evolved in intra-African affairs. These are African exclusivity (often defined as “African solutions for African problems”) and ‘continental’ or African Unity (often referred to as ‘solidarity’). This study shows how African leaders have used these ideas and broadened their meaning to justify intervening in the internal affairs of states on the continent.

Finally, although this thesis is in search of a ‘pattern of ideas’ or normative thinking on African thoughts on intervention, this is undertaken without passing judgement on the act of intervention itself or questioning the merit of the intervener’s goal. Put another way, this study does not make any ethical nor normative judgement for or against the act of intervention. The present discussion makes no inroad into the question of how or when to intervene; neither does it question the desirability of intervening to maintain world order, nor the implications of pursuing such an act. We consider the goals of the intervener only to the extent that they might provide some insight on how the principle of intervention operates in intra-African affairs.

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**Scope of Study**

The geographical location of this study is Africa south of the Sahara, although we will make reference where appropriate to North African states (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt). However, omitting the northern parts of Africa from this study does not remove the insurmountable task ahead of any researcher who attempts to understand how the practice of intervention has evolved in a region as vast as Sub-Saharan Africa. Even in the West, we still need to make inroads into a complex subject like intervention that combines various schools of thought and opinion that have evolved over the centuries. There are deep divisions and much ambivalence between the major political (e.g. liberals and conservatives) and ethical (e.g. utilitarians, Kantians and Rawlsians) traditions in the West on the issue of intervention. The African continent also plays host to a diverse array of cultures, political systems and differing historical experiences. The only similarities are that the states share the experience of subjugation under colonial rule and are among the poorest countries in the world. However, to define or view the African continent (and the West) as having one singular homogenous thought on intervention or any aspect of international affairs would be misleading. On occasion, however, and this is one of them, the conventional forms of address have to be used for convenience of exposition, and on such occasions, the ‘West’ means the tradition and practice of Graeco-Judaic-Christian thought, and ‘Sub-Saharan Africa’, a combination of Occidental, Islamic and indigenous thought.

**Methodology**

The analysis of ideas or principles relating to international relations in a continent as varied and complex as Africa raises other fundamental methodological problems as well. To understand how the practice of intervention has evolved in Sub-Saharan Africa, this study will in large part be historical. That is to say that it focuses on instances of African intervention within the historical context of internal disputes. However, with forty years and several examples of internal disputes to cover, a comprehensive historical analysis is impossible. We will look at cases of African involvement in internal disputes (e.g. the Congolese and Chadian civil wars) for what they might tell us about the practice of intervention in intra-African affairs.
As the approach we adopt is largely historical, much of what is written here needs to acknowledge the wider international context in which these interventions took place. Most of the case studies fall within the context of Cold War politics. However, while the impact of the Cold War is relevant to understanding the development of African international relations, this study attempts to isolate its impact to examine how the practice of intervention evolved within the African continent. On this point, it is worth repeating what Fred Northedge and Michael Donelan said in their study of post-Second World War intervention in international disputes:

To understand as fully as possible why the Soviet Union countered Belgian intervention in the Congo in 1960, or why it intervened in Hungary in 1956, it is necessary to consider the wider setting of international politics that preceded and accompanied and followed the outbreak of the dispute. We have not been seeking here to give a history of post-War intervention and counter-intervention. We have sought to isolate and discuss the general factors that explain any intervention...We must leave to historians the work of showing how each intervention in its unique circumstances and setting came about.20

However, it should be noted that this isolation is not to disregard the importance of international politics and the Cold War within Africa. As Robert Good notes, ‘...the post colonial era coincides with the era of the Cold War. The two are closely related.’21 Where necessary, we will discuss the politics of the Cold War as a factor contributing to the understanding of African thought on intervention and African international relations in general.

Structure of the thesis

To identify a ‘pattern of ideas’ and a record of historical practices, this study divides the period between the end of colonialism through to the post-Cold War period into three historical phases: the early liberation and post-colonial period (1957-1970), the period of


post-independence (1970-to the mid 1980s) and the post-Cold War period (1990-April 1998).

The opening Chapter of this study is divided into three parts. Part one gives a general account of intervention. Part two is designed to give an overview of how intervention and non-intervention are traditionally discussed within the African continent, while part three provides a brief review of work already conducted on intervention by African states in internal disputes of other African states. While there exists no definite philosophical or theoretical framework from which to direct the discussion of intervention by African states, Chapter Two sets the debate within the context of Pan-Africanism. It argues that two themes within Pan-Africanism - 'African Exclusivity' and 'African Unity' - can be used as a normative foundation to discuss the principle of intervention in intra-African affairs. The successive Chapters of this study throw light on whether these themes can answer the questions: How has the principle of intervention evolved alongside the principle of non-intervention since the end of colonial rule in Africa? Is it possible to find sources from which to understand the evolution of the practice of intervention in Africa by African states?

Chapter Three argues that the early stages of the liberation movement and the dilemmas posed by independence (1957-1970) are areas from which to explore how the principle of intervention evolved on the continent. Within this Chapter, specific reference is made to the civil war in the Congo and apartheid South Africa as areas from which to note emerging thought on intervention. It considers what themes or norms were used by individual African states to justify their intervention. It also notes the arguments about intervening in the Nigerian civil war.

Chapter Four examines the period between the 1970s and the mid-1980s. Africa witnessed a simultaneous rise in internal conflicts and regional insecurity. It was during this time that the doctrine of non-intervention was seriously challenged by the foreign policy activities of some African leaders, most notably in Uganda (1978-1979) and Chad (1979-1981). This is a period when the politics of the Cold War was more pronounced on the African continent. More specific, it was a period where African states were confronted with the question of foreign military assistance in African conflicts.

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22 It is worth noting that during this period, other non-western states were challenging this doctrine, most notably India in East Pakistan (1971) and Vietnam in Kampuchea (1978-1979).
Chapters Five and Six consider discussions that emerged among African leaders in the post-Cold War era on intervention and non-intervention within the continent. The post-Cold War discussion of interventionary practices by African leaders in Africa was informed by ECOWAS in Liberia between 1990-1997, (Chapter Five), and the OAU in Rwanda and Burundi (Chapter Six). What was significant about the discussions in the post-Cold War period, was that they were described as representing a period of ‘new thinking’ among African leaders in response to internal conflicts. However, the aim of Chapter Six is to suggest that this period be seen as part of a continuum of the thinking on intervention that existed in African international relations, but was never easily identifiable in the same way as we would identify the evolution of interventionary thought in Western international relations.

The concluding Chapter (Seven), is split into two parts. In part one, we consider again the claim that there is a ‘pattern of ideas’ that has developed and might prove useful in understanding the how intervention and the principle of non-intervention evolved in intra-African affairs. In part two, we point to future research when we consider the question of outside assistance in post-Cold War Africa. While this study is not suggesting that African interventions in internal conflicts are more likely to succeed than Western interventions, this study ends by arguing that attempts to prevent widespread internal conflicts are also dependent on help coming from the international community.

Conclusion

In sum, the purpose of this study is twofold:

1) to examine how intervention has evolved alongside the principle of non-intervention, and through such examination,

2) to try to identify if there exists ‘pattern of ideas’ or ‘persistent and recurrent’ themes that can help us understand African thought on this subject matter.
CHAPTER ONE
INTERVENTION AND THE VIEW FROM SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Introduction

This Chapter is divided into three parts. In Part One, the purpose is to define how intervention will be used in this study. Part One is further divided into four parts. It begins by defining the type of conflicts with which this study is concerned. We then draw on the various debates between Western states and the ‘new’ countries of Africa and Asia in the United Nations (UN) during the 1960s and early 1970s on intervention and non-intervention. This is primarily because the various meanings attached to intervention by these ‘new’ states prove instructive in understanding the principles that govern intra-African affairs. This is followed by a discussion on how the debate on intervention and non-intervention continued in the post-Cold War era. It however concludes that no single definition on intervention exists; rather a spectrum of activities is defined as intervention in this study. Finally in this part of the Chapter, we examine the host of motives and justifications given for intervening in the internal affairs of other states as another way of understanding intervention and the principle of non-intervention. In Part Two, we consider in more specific terms how the norm of non-intervention has evolved and has traditionally been discussed among African leaders. Part Three of the Chapter provides a short review of existing work on African states intervening in the internal affairs of other African states.

I. Intervention and the Principle of Non-Intervention

*Intervention in Internal Conflicts*

This study is primarily concerned with intervention in the internal dispute of a state, or as Fred Northedge and Michael Donelan say, ‘conflicts within states.’¹ This study is not

concerned with intervention in 'conflict between states.' So for example, we exclude intervention in conflicts such as the Algeria-Morocco border dispute (1963-1964) or the Ethiopia-Somalia war (1964-1965 and 1977-1978). Most of the disputes on the African continent since the beginning of decolonisation in 1957 have been within states. As Sam Amoo remarks, they are 'the most heinous source of human misery' and 'by far the most common and the bitterest of conflicts in Africa.' It is because of this that this study is concerned with examining the response of African states to internal disputes.

Northedge and Donelan define three situations that can lead to internal dispute: situations where men do not have the same opportunities such as in employment; where man's desire for possessions can lead to a conflict of interest between those who have and those who do not have; and finally where man not only seeks power, but desires to be honoured or esteemed by members of a society. These points of conflict may not necessarily affect society as a whole and may amount to 'disputes in which particular individuals or groups or sides of some sort are in conflict about a particular thing which may be addressed through law.' In the end, these can be called 'private disputes' though as Northedge and Donelan remark, they may 'in some way or other have a public significance.' We are, however, concerned with internal disputes which affect the whole of society and which can lead to the breakdown of society and unfold into a violent fission. Again, Northedge and Donelan prove instructive in the definition they provide. Such disputes they argue, 'involve most of the interests of the members of the groups' within the society and may result in the overthrow of an established government, the disintegration of civil order, and other violent acts. What is of interest to us here is the role of external intervention in these internal disputes.

More specifically, we are interested here in the intervention of African states in these internal disputes. One state may perform the intervention, thus making it a unilateral action. For example, the Tanzanian intervention in Uganda in 1978 can be defined as unilateral intervention.

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intervention. A collection of states such as a sub-regional group, or an international organisation or a multinational force that acts under the authority of the international community may also perform interventions. Here, we may include the intervention by ECOWAS in Liberia (1990), as subregional, the OAU Inter-Africa Force in Chad (1981-82) as regional, and the UN in the Congo (1960) as an international organisation intervening on behalf of the international community. The various analyses in Chapters Three to Six will consider intervention in terms of unilateral state intervention, sub-regional intervention and intervention by regional organisations.

The debate on Intervention and Non-intervention at the UN: seeking a definition

On the definition of intervention and the principle of non-intervention, this Chapter will not add to the innumerable definitions or give the reader a critical exposition of what writers have said in the past. Instead, it discusses intervention and the principle of non-intervention within the context of two UN resolutions: General Assembly Resolution 2131 (XX) on the Declaration on Inadmissibility of Intervention in Domestic Affairs of States and Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty (1965) and General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) on the Declaration on Principle of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (1970). These two documents are central to this study because the 'new' states of the African continent that emerged to take their place in the international system of states largely advocated the main tenets of both resolutions with the support of Asian, Eastern European and Latin American countries and the Soviet Union. Furthermore, several key principles and definitions within both resolutions are relevant to our understanding of how the practice of intervention evolved alongside the principle of non-intervention on the African continent. The aim of this section will only be to draw out the essential ingredients of both

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texts, and, will not immerse itself in a critical examination of the debate at the UN. Before we focus on these documents, we need to consider the nature of the international political arena at the time that these UN resolutions were introduced.

The establishment of the 1965 declaration was, according to the Soviet Union and other Communist states, a response to a series of events that were of pressing concern in the international arena during the 1960s. In explaining why a declaration on non-intervention was necessary beyond the ruling in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, Mr Fedorenko of the Soviet Union declared, 'the question had become urgent...because...certain Western Powers were intervening by force in the domestic affairs of States', particularly in the newly independent nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America. The main 'Western Power' who had caused the Soviet Union to seek further clarification on the principle of non-intervention was the United States (US). The 'proof' of US intervention, argued Mr Fedorenko, 'could be seen in the tragic events' of Vietnam, the Congo and the Dominican Republic. The Soviet delegation also cited the use of armed force by some Western governments to suppress the movement of national liberation in South Rhodesia, Mozambique and Angola. The Soviet delegation felt it was imperative that a declaration reaffirming the key principles enshrined in the UN Charter be produced as certain members 'were defying and violating the principles of international law.'

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9 Statement by Mr Fedorenko, para 4, p. 243. Various parts of Article 2 of the UN Charter sets out the rules governing the relations between member states of the UN. Article 2(4) require all members to 'refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purpose of the United Nations.' Article 2(7) declares that 'nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State or shall require Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter.'

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It was in this context that the Soviet Union requested that the question of 'The Inadmissibility of Intervention in Domestic Affairs of States and Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty' be placed on the agenda of the twentieth session the UN General Assembly in 1965 so that it might 'help give more concrete form to the principles of the [UN] Charter.' The Soviet Union, Africa, Asia and Latin American submitted four draft resolutions during the twentieth session, all of which were rigorously debated by the 'First' (Political) Committee of the UN. In fact, the 'new' countries of Africa and Asia formed a powerful bloc in the UN and became known as the Afro-Asian bloc.

The Soviet Union draft declaration set the tone of the debate within the First Committee. Two proposals are of interest to us: (a) the 'demand that acts constituting armed or any other type of intervention in the domestic affairs of States, as well as those against the just struggle of peoples for national independence and freedom, should be halted forthwith and not be permitted in the future', and (2) that all States should 'abide by the principle of mutual respect and non-intervention in domestic affairs for any reason whatsoever.' States from Latin America, Africa and Asia submitted two other draft declarations supporting the Soviet Union. African states supported the rule on the inadmissibility of armed intervention stating that not to do so would pose a threat to international peace and security, and encourage the possibility of counter-intervention and further violence. The ruling on armed

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10 Statement by Mr Fedorenko, para. 21, p. 246.

11 The Afro-Asian bloc emerged as a distinct group in 1950s during the decolonisation process. It was part of a loose association of 'third world' or under-developed states known as the non-aligned who declared cooperation on principles of inter-state relations and the promotion of international peace and security. The main activists were Egypt, India, Indonesia and Yugoslavia. In 1955 an Afro-Asian conference was called at Bandung (Indonesia) to declare inter alia 'abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country.' See the Declaration of the Bandung Conference in I. Brownlie, (ed.) Basic Documents on African Affairs (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), p. 456. In the early 1960s, these states formalised their association into the 'Non-Aligned Movement,' (NAM) and included many of the newly independent states of Africa, Asia and Latin America.


13 18 Latin American states sponsored the Soviet declaration, while the third draft was submitted and sponsored by 16 Africa states which included states from the Middle East and Asia: Algeria, Burma, Burundi, Cameroon, Cyprus, India, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Togo, Uganda, the United Arab Republic, the United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen, Yugoslavia and Zambia

intervention was not only intended to protect states, but also as the United Arab Republic (UAR) asserted, 'peoples and movements whose efforts were directed towards achieving and exercising an inherent right of self-determination and independence.'\(^{15}\) The UAR felt that this point was particularly relevant to those Western governments who threatened the progress of those peoples, particularly in South Rhodesia, who were trying to free themselves from the aegis of colonialism on the African continent.

On this very point, some African states sought to qualify what did and did not constitute intervention. Regarding 'oppressed peoples struggling under colonialism', the delegation from Tanzania asserted that external assistance was justified when aimed at granting freedom and justice. This, Mr Seaton of Tanzania argued, was recognised at the Second Conference of Heads of State and Government of Non-Aligned Countries held in Cairo, Egypt from 3-10 October 1964. African states could also rely on General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) on the Declaration on the Granting of Independence of Colonial Countries and Peoples (1960) which had, among other things, condemned colonialism, but also regarded the policy of apartheid and racial discrimination as a threat to fundamental human rights.\(^{16}\)

In the debate that followed in the First Committee, Mr. Idzumbuir of the Democratic Republic of the Congo wondered, however, why the UAR did not include the whole question of subversive activities in its draft declaration, especially as the OAU Assembly of Heads of State had adopted a solemn declaration against this problem at its meeting in Accra, Ghana on 24 October 1965.\(^{17}\) Many African leaders feared that they were particularly vulnerable to subversive activities that foreign states organised or financed. Directly related to this were what African and Latin American states described as new forms of intervention that emerged since the end of the Second World War.\(^{18}\) These included acts of sabotage, infiltration,
terrorism, training, financing or supporting movements that threatened the political existence of newly independent states, and indirect forms of intervention aimed at the overthrow of legitimate governments in an attempt to impose another political system on independent states. All these were defined as either subtle forms of aggression or new forms of intervention.

In an attempt to widen the definition of intervention, a fourth draft declaration was introduced on 18 December 1965. The African, Asian and Latin American states largely wrote this draft, which the First Committee later adopted and which formed the basis of the 1965 declaration. The preamble to the draft declaration incorporated the existing principles of the UN and those from other regional arrangements, notably the Charters of the Organization of American States, the OAU and the League of Arab States. The draft declaration stated that 'armed intervention is synonymous with aggression,' that 'all other forms of interference or attempted threats against the personality of the State' or 'the use of economic, political or any other type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of exercise of its sovereign right' or the attempt to 'organize, assist, foment, finance, incite', were contrary to the basic principles of international co-operation between States and consequently a violation of the Charter of the UN. In the end, the draft declaration, which became General Assembly Resolution 2131 (XX), was a mixture of political and legal concepts.

The resolution revealed the realities that lay behind each argument presented by the 57 states that participated in the discussions. It covered issues that vexed the Soviet Union and the 'new' nations of Africa and Asia, while still reaffirming the core principles of the UN Charter. The discussion and adoption of the draft resolution clearly illustrated that states were concerned with new forms of intervention - subversion and terrorism - and attempts by outsiders to interfere with the political, economic, social and cultural systems of particular

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19 The declaration was sponsored by Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Democratic Republic of the Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dahomey, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Iran, Iraq, the Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Syria, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, the United Arab Republic, the United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia and Zambia. See the Yearbook of the United Nations, (1965), pp. 92-93.

states. Its aim was to go beyond the narrow definition that the use of military force alone is intervention. It was felt that there were other forms of intervention that did not require the use of military force, hence the inclusion on a prohibition on subversive activities. The significance of the 1965 declaration lay in the fact that those states who sponsored, supported and agreed on the final text were mainly ‘new’ states who were adding to norms and principles established before they emerged on the international stage.\(^\text{21}\)

Five years later, on 24 October 1970, the UN General Assembly passed another resolution entitled ‘Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States.’ The whole question of principles relating to friendly relations had been assigned for study to the Sixth (Legal) Committee in 1962, three years before the 1965 declaration on the inadmissibility of intervention and eight years before member states finally passed it in 1970. Again, it was influenced by the efforts of the strong Afro-Asian bloc who had gradually gained prominence in the UN. These states argued that they ‘had been confronted with a pre-existing social, political and economic order based on established rules and principles of international conduct’, none of which they had formulated. So, they contended that they were ‘not to be expected to accept these rules and principles as irrevocable’, but look at some areas that were in need of revision and development in a new international environment.\(^\text{22}\) Essentially, what these ‘new’ states wanted was to find another way of ensuring an effective application of the instruments governing friendly relations among states as set out in the UN Charter.

Consequently, the preamble to General Assembly Resolution 1815 (XVII) of 18 December 1962 noted the ‘significance of the emergence of many ‘new’ States and of the contribution which they are in a position to make on the progressive development and codification of international law.’\(^\text{23}\) To this end, member states resolved to study seven fundamental principles of international law concerning friendly relations and co-operation among states. On 16 December 1963, General Assembly Resolution 1966 (XVIII) gave further priority to the study of four of the seven proposed principles because they not only

\(^{21}\)The full text of Resolution 2131 (XX) can be seen in *Yearbook of the United Nations*, (1965), pp. 94-95.


'constituted corner-stones of peaceful relations among States,' but were 'binding upon all States as general principles of law.' The four principles were: the prohibition of the threat or use of force, peaceful settlement, non-intervention, and sovereign equality. We are primarily concerned with the principle of non-intervention. A Special Committee was set up with the mandate to study these four principles. Resolution 1966 expressed the view that the composition of this Special Committee should take 'into consideration the principle of equitable geographical representation and the necessity that the principle legal systems of the world should be represented.' Between 1964 and 1970, the Special Committee met on six occasions, with its first meeting at Mexico City from 27 August to 2 October 1964.

Although it is seen as a fundamental principle within international law, no consensus was reached on the question on non-intervention in the 'domestic jurisdiction' of any state. The issue was particularly important to newly independent states who had just emerged from colonial domination. Consequently, their aim was to produce a document that not only guaranteed their sovereign independence, but as Edward McWhinney notes, complemented the 'principle of self-determination.' Just like the 1965 declaration, 'new' states argued for a categorical statement prohibiting intervention, and then went on to enumerate the main types of actions which they felt constituted intervention. The fundamental issues raised by the 'new' states were contained in the combined proposal submitted by Ghana, India and Yugoslavia which noted that:

24 The other three principle were: (a) The principle that States shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations; (d) The duty of States to co-operate with one another in accordance with the Charter; (e) The principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples; and (g) The principle that States shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance in accordance with the Charter.' Thirty-seven states, many from Africa, submitted the draft principles before they were approved by the General Assembly. These states were: Afghanistan, Algeria, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, the Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chile, the Congo (Leopoldville), Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Denmark, Ethiopia, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Liberia, Mali, Mongolia, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, Poland, Romania, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Syria, Tanganyika, Turkey, the United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia.

25 General Assembly Resolution 1966 (XVIII), 16 December 1963. The full text is in Yearbook of the United Nations, (1963), p. 518. Twenty-seven states were appointed by the President of the General Assembly: Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Cameroon, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, France, Ghana, Guatemala, India, Italy, Japan, Lebanon, Madagascar, Nigeria, Poland, Romania, Sweden, the USSR, the United Arab Republic, the United Kingdom, the US, Venezuela and Yugoslavia.

1. No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatsoever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State; nor interfere in the right of any State to choose and develop its own political, economic and social order in a manner most suited to the genius of its people.

2. Accordingly, no State may use or encourage the use of coercive measures of an economic or political character to force the sovereign will of another State and obtain from it advantages of any kind. In particular, States shall not:
   (a) organize, assist, foment, incite or tolerate subversive or terrorist activities against another State or interfere in the civil strife in another State;
   (b) interfere with or hinder, in any form or manner, the promulgation or execution of laws in regard to matters essentially within the competence of any State;
   (c) use duress to obtain or maintain territorial agreements or special advantages of any kind; and
   (d) recognize territorial acquisitions or special advantages obtained by duress of any kind by another State.  

This proposal reflected the concern among 'new' states of Africa that in the world of 1964, subversion was perhaps the most common and dangerous form of intervention, whether it consisted of hostile propaganda, or incitement to revolt or the violent overthrow of the established order. While subversion was an ancient act, 'new' states argued that its usage was more frequent and had come to characterise the ideological struggle that divided the world into East versus West or Capitalism versus Communism.

Representatives from the 'new' states also noted when intervention was permissible. Intervention was permissible in response to the problem of apartheid in South Africa, the denial of the right to self-determination, and other colonialist and neo-colonialist practices. The argument was that there were some exceptions to the rule of non-intervention, and that they should take precedence over the sovereignty rights of a state. In situations of self-defence, intervention was also considered permissible.

Not all states were satisfied with the broad definition of intervention proposed by the


'new' states. Some representatives, in particular from the West, felt that it was not only 'unwise', but impossible 'to turn every apparently useful political idea into a legal formula.' There was a risk, the United Kingdom (UK) delegation argued, that defining intervention in such broad terms could 'thwart progress by categorizing as intervention what was in fact part of normal diplomacy.' These delegates had in mind 'normal' activities like political, economic or material pressure. On this basis, the UK delegation concluded that it would 'be impossible to give an exhaustive definition of what constitutes 'intervention.' It further noted that the new forms of intervention, such as 'the use of clandestine activities to encompass the overthrow of the Government of another State,' illustrate the dangers of trying to elaborate a broader definition.

These were some of the contentious issues raised during the lifetime of the Special Committee. They not only illustrated that there was no consensus to be had among states of differing political, historical and legal backgrounds, but also reflected the political sensitivities that were confronting states in the 1960s. When it came to outlining the central tenets of the resolution in 1970, the preamble noted the necessity of states maintaining 'strict observance...of the obligation not to intervene in the affairs of any other State' as this was 'an essential condition to ensure that nations live together in peace with one another, since the practice of any form of intervention not only violates the spirit and letter of the Charter, but also leads to the creation of situations which threaten international peace and security.' The preamble also noted that military, political, economic and any other form of pressure constituted 'coercion aimed against the political independence or territorial integrity of any State,' a clause which was largely welcomed by the Soviet Union and the 'new' states of Africa and Asia.

The section of the resolution dealing with 'non-intervention in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any States', read like the 1965 declaration. Member states declared that 'no State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State.' 'Armed intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats,' constituted a 'violation of

29 Report of the Special Committee, para 231 and 245, p. 120 and 122.

30 Proposal by the United Kingdom, A/AC.119/.8 in Report of the Special Committee, paras. 204(4) and (5), p. 116. Also see para. 205(3).
international law.' The resolution included parts of the Ghana-India-Yugoslavia proposal, notably on the problem of subversion and other new forms of intervention.\textsuperscript{31}

To summarise, both the 1965 and 1970 resolutions emerged from a desire on the part of the ‘new’ countries of Africa who wanted to review, and where necessary, add to the basic instruments that were contained in the UN Charter. The countries of Africa with the support of Asia, East European states, Latin America and the Soviet Union, based their arguments for a reworking of international law on a number of practices rooted in the relations among states. By arguing for a stricter definition of the prohibition on intervention, these states hoped that international law would clarify the duties of states in their relations with one another. We shall discuss these resolutions again in Part Two of this Chapter. In the end, there was no agreement on the meaning of intervention. Instead, the concept reflected the deep anxiety felt by the ‘new’ countries and remained relevant in the practice of international relations throughout the Cold War period.

\textit{The debate on Intervention and Non-Intervention in the Post-Cold War Period}

By 1989 and the end of the Cold War, another debate emerged on intervention and the principle of non-intervention. The definitions and the issues raised in the 1965 and 1970 UN declarations were not made redundant because of the collapse of one international system. These were principles to guide states in their relation with one another. However, the collapse of the Cold War and with it the ideological confrontation between the East and West, advanced new opportunities to discuss and find ways to tackle major issues of international relations. A pressing concern that was not adequately addressed during the Cold War era was the number of civil wars and how to resolve them.

In the post-Cold war era contemporary discussion on intervention began to locate itself around mechanisms to resolve internal conflicts. The discussion was not solely based on the question of the military use of force as a response to internal conflicts. Instead, discussion focussed on a combination of military and non-military options and the participation of a broad spectrum of actors beyond the intervening state in resolving internal

conflicts. Discussion on these types of intervention can be found in the literature on third-party mediation and conflict resolution which, according to Bruce Jones, 'allow us to consider a wide variety of different processes and actions as interventions.' This approach provides an all-embracing and inclusive approach to the resolution of internal conflicts. Put another way, as opposed to the traditional method of high-level and power driven diplomatic mediation, this process is more multilateral in its approach. As Tom Woodhouse states, it involves 'a range of intervention strategies from peacekeeping to problem-solving workshops.' The aim is to tackle the root causes of a particular conflict, and through 'problem-solving workshops', third-party mediators facilitate dialogue and negotiation among the warring factions.

As stated above, conflict resolution involves the use of peacekeeping and peacemaking, both defined by Lori Fisler Damrosch 'as forms of intervention.' Peacekeeping is a form of third party intervention - a peaceful act that seeks to prevent not just an escalation of armed conflict, but also the intrusion of other external forces in a conflict situation. In essence, it is the inter-positioning of military personnel between warring parties. The aim is to prevent fighting, maintain the cease-fire, and provide stability while negotiations are going on. This type of peacekeeping was present during the UN operation in the Congo from 1960-1964. Peacekeeping, however, depends on the prior consent of all parties to the conflict even if such an act may still consist of the use of armed personnel. It is for this reason that a question mark hangs over whether peacekeeping should be defined as a form of intervention. What was distinctive about peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era was the

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inclusion of the use of armed forces to assist and protect UN humanitarian agencies and other international aid agencies in the safe delivery of food and medical treatment to victims and refugees of civil wars. This, for example, became a predominant feature of the UNPROFOR mandate in Bosnia. Another significant aspect of peacekeeping in the post-Cold War period was the expansion of its mandate to include the supervision of elections, assistance in drafting constitutions, creating a new government and police force, national reconciliation and rebuilding civil society through the disarmament of warring factions and the reintegration of rebel forces and refugees into ‘normal life.’ These latter activities form what is defined as ‘peacebuilding’ (or ‘post-conflict reconstruction’), and the UN operations in El Salvador (ONUSAL, 1991-1995), Cambodia (UNTAC, 1992-1993) and Mozambique (ONUMOZ, 1992-1994) serve as examples.37

One of the more interesting aspects of the post-Cold War debate on intervention and non-intervention had been the idea of preventive intervention or measures taken to detect the possible outbreak of conflict and to avert its escalation into armed conflict. This form of intervention is largely dependent on an early warning regime which informs states of impending conflicts in other regions, and in turn encourages the intervening agents to take preventive action before conflicts descend into full-scale civil wars. The deployment of troops in Macedonia in 1995 serves as an example of preventive intervention. A more relevant example of preventive intervention was the OAU’s attempts to forestall the outbreak of a full-blown conflict in Rwanda when it took part in the Arusha Peace Process (1991-1994). Action there involved the use of various third parties, ranging from political leaders, diplomats and international organisations placing themselves between the parties to the conflicts ‘in order to produce a negotiated, peaceful settlement to the issues causing the conflict.’38 Although the peace process failed and led to the genocide of April 1994, preventive intervention sheds a spotlight on the options and actions available to interveners beyond a military solution. Unfortunately, the tragedy of Rwanda undermined the potential of preventive intervention as an instrument to create lasting peace.


So far we have concerned ourselves with the definition of intervention and non-intervention in the Cold War and post-Cold War era. We have noted that there was not a break with the Cold War thinking on intervention and non-intervention; rather what was noticeable in the post-Cold War period was the range of actors beyond the state that were involved in resolving a conflict. Also significant was the nature of intervention in the post-Cold War era. Intervention did not stop at interposing troops between warring factions, but also involved a range of activities such as election monitoring, rebuilding socio-political institutions of a war-torn society and providing humanitarian assistance. We can further define intervention by outlining some of the aims or reasons used to justify intervention in internal disputes. An examination of the reasons given by states for intervening allows us to consider how the practice of intervention has evolved beside the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of states.

**Justifying Intervention**

When states intervene, there are often a host of motives or justifications given. The threat posed by an internal dispute to international peace and security is often cited as a reason for intervening. On occasion, the UN Security Council authorises action under Chapter VII of the Charter if it recognises the existence of a threat to international peace and security. In Somalia, the ‘threat to international peace and security’ was cited as the primary purpose for UN intervention in 1992. The Security Council mandate stated that it was taking action to prevent the likely spill over of the conflict or its causes to other neighbouring countries.

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39 Article 39 states that ‘The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression....’

40 See C. Ero and S. Long who state that the phrase “international peace and security” is now the ‘magic formula’ used by the UN Security Council to justify certain acts of intervention by the United Nations. ‘Humanitarian Intervention: A New Role for the UN?’ *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 2, No. 2, Summer 1995, p. 151 and 153. In a report to the UN Security Council, the former Secretary-General, Boutros-Boutros Ghali stated that the civil war in Somalia posed a threat to international peace and security under Article 1 of the Charter since ‘[the countries of the region - Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and the Sudan - some more than others, are beset by problems that are largely common to all. As a result, the exacerbation of conflict in one of the countries of the region could have serious consequences in one or more of the others.’ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, ‘The Situation in Somalia: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Security Council Document S/23693, 11 March 1992, para. 12.
According to Fisler Damrosch, some internal conflicts contain 'transboundary elements', either as contributing factors (for example cross-border arms transfers or ethnic affinities) or as effects of the crisis (for example, refugee flows) which can pose a threat to the surrounding region. Some internal conflicts may also generate friction and instability, either political or economic, in neighbouring countries. There are vivid examples of how an internal crisis in one country can affect another country or an entire region and consequently spark off regional insecurities. For example, the African continent has witnessed the problem of refugee overflows in neighbouring countries coupled with regional insecurity and economic instability. The conflicts in Burundi and Rwanda in the 1990s not only affected both countries, but also had devastating effects on Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo, DRC), and to a lesser extent, Uganda and Tanzania. The Liberian civil war not only had a negative impact on the countries that maintained troops there for seven years, but was said to have contributed to causing a deadly civil war in Sierra Leone. These transboundary elements have been used by states to justify intervention in certain internal disputes, claiming that civil wars are a threat to regional and international peace and security. Furthermore, the phrase 'failed' or 'collapsed' state, where no central authority is present, added to the plethora of justifications available to the intervening agent(s).

Two other inter-related motives that are often cited are national interest and self-defence. Self-defence is given added weight because it is enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter. In the official statements provided by the Indian and Tanzanian governments in their interventions in East Pakistan and Uganda respectively, the justification was said to be self-defence, although some commentators regard both as humanitarian action. Counter-intervention is said to be another justification for intervening, where the decision of one state to enter an internal dispute in favour of one side may provoke the entry of another to support

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43 Article 51 of the United Nations Charter states that 'nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations.'

the other side to a conflict. Richard Little suggests that the purpose of this type of intervention is not to undermine the principle of non-intervention, but rather to reinforce it. The aim is to forestall the likelihood of intervention by outside states interested in helping either the government in power or other warring faction(s) in an internal conflict. States may also wish to counter intervention that is undertaken by their rival(s). As Northedge and Donelan remark, counter-intervention occurs when State A believes that the initial intervention by State B poses a threat not only to ‘world security’ but to its own security.\(^{45}\) In this context, we can refer to Nigeria’s decision to intervene in the Chadian civil war in 1978 to counter French and Libyan intervention, which will be discussed in Chapter Four.

States sometimes argue that intervention is also justified when the purpose is to rescue one’s own nationals or protect humanity and redress violations of human rights.\(^{46}\) Intervention could be permissible in the internal affairs of a state where there is widespread human suffering that so ‘shocks the conscience of mankind.’ It is often designated humanitarian intervention - intervention for the sake of humanity. This type of intervention gained prominence in the early years of the post-Cold War period. There is no agreed definition of what constitutes humanitarian intervention, but in essence it has traditionally been defined as action directed at preventing or halting serious violations of fundamental human rights with the threat or use of force. The nineteenth and early twentieth century definition of humanitarian intervention was frequently attached to the idea of rescuing one’s own nationals who were caught in an internal conflict, beyond the provision of helping those in distress in general. The protection of one’s own nationals was also cited by the US when it intervened in Grenada in 1983.

Increasingly however, and more so in the mid-1990s, human rights was used by some academics and practitioners as a tool for justifying many acts of intervention.\(^{47}\) It is important to note however that there is as yet no overall consensus as to whether humanitarian intervention is permissible or recognised by all within the international society of states. UN

\(^{45}\) F. Northedge and M. Donelan, (1971), p. 120.


Security Council Resolution 794 (1992) illustrated the lack of consensus among member states over the meaning of humanitarian intervention. The Resolution authorised ‘all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.’ However, the preamble to Resolution 794 stressed the ‘unique character of the present situation in Somalia’ and the ‘complex and extraordinary nature’ which ‘requir[ed] an immediate and exceptional response.’ While recognising the gravity of human suffering in Somalia, member states were reluctant to establish a precedent on intervening for humanitarian reasons.

Finally, there is another area of motives or justifications for intervention that is relevant to this study. In explaining motives for intervening, Northedge and Donelan suggest that some states either intervene to help a government that faces internal overthrow or to support an internal rebellion. Let us take the first situation. The intervening state may have involved itself in an internal dispute because it supports the government or leadership in power. More important, if that leadership is an ally or promotes a policy line that is favourable to the intervening state, then the latter may see intervention as a ‘right’ or duty. A ‘right’ in the sense that the overthrow of a particular leadership with an unknown quantity may prove troublesome not only to the world, but to the security of another state if it chooses not to intervene. In this context, Northedge and Donelan mention American and British attempts to resist the spread of communism, ‘because the victory of the [communist] uprising would represent the extension of an alien social philosophy in the world.’ Hence, the US acted in South Korea (and later Vietnam) in response to its fear of spread of the communism, although this was justified as resistance to Soviet aggression.

On the other hand, the intervening state may give support to an opposition group which may be promoting a ‘social philosophy’ that is in line with its own thinking. Such support is linked to a sense of ‘brotherly solidarity’ with similar social philosophies that exist in other countries. In this context, Northedge and Donelan mention revolutionary states like the former Soviet Union and Egypt who supported movements in other states that promoted communism and Arab nationalism, respectively. According to Northedge and Donelan, these revolutionary states felt that they had a right or an ‘over-riding legitimacy’ to interfere in the

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internal dispute of another state. This had nothing to do with maintaining the ‘status quo or state sovereignty’ but instead was concerned with promoting justice against the Western capitalist system which they believed was a threat to their advancement.\textsuperscript{50} Certainly, as we will discuss in Chapter Four, the policy of the Soviet Union towards some African liberation movements was not only to promote Marxist-Leninist ideology, but to prevent the expansion of Western ideology. Indeed, research indicates that there were certain instances of intervention by African states who were seen as supporting ideological or revolutionary movements that corresponded to their particular world view.\textsuperscript{51}

\textit{Conclusion}

The aim of this first part of the Chapter has been to provide a definition of intervention. We focussed on the definitions contained in the two UN declarations of 1965 and 1970, because the definitions given then were largely influenced by the views and expressions of the newly independent states of Africa and Asia. In both declarations, intervention meant not only armed intervention, but it included what these states called new forms of intervention: subversion, terrorist acts, propaganda, infiltration, supplying of arms or war material for aiding rebellions in another state, and financing, training or supporting movements aimed at overthrowing a regime. This is rather a broad definition, but one that is important for understanding how intervention has existed alongside non-intervention among African states in the conduct of their relations with one another. These declarations are not technically binding upon states as the UN General Assembly cannot make binding decisions upon member states. However, it was felt by the states who participated in the discussions that member states should abide with the ‘spirit’ contained within international law and the UN Charter: that is to maintain international peace and security and ensure friendly relations among states. We also touched upon the discussion on intervention and non-intervention in the post-Cold era and noted how a range of military and non-military options and actors were used to tackle internal conflicts. We ended by paying particular


\textsuperscript{51} The claim that some African states intervened to support other groups or regimes that shared similar world views is discussed throughout this thesis. Existing work has also shown that this motive was widespread in Sub-Saharan Africa. See A. Hughes and R. May, (1986) and I. W. Zartman, (1968), pp. 188-197.
attention to the various motives and justifications often cited by states when intervening. These are some of the points that will be useful to us in our study of how the practice of intervention evolved alongside the principle of non-intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa.

II. The evolution of the Principle of Non-Intervention in African International Relations

The aim of this next section is to review African diplomatic thought on the subject of intervention and non-intervention in internal disputes. We use resolutions and documents that were drawn up in the early days of post-colonialism to explain the traditional attitude towards intervention and non-intervention. This section also considers several cases to illustrate how the principle of non-intervention has evolved, largely unopposed, in African international relations. The discussion on African views on intervention and in turn, the continent’s lack of response in dealing with its internal disputes, usually takes place in the context of the OAU as it is seen as the symbol of African diplomacy.

As we noted in the previous section, the ‘new’ states of the African continent that emerged to take their place within the international system of states held onto and safeguarded the norms of state sovereignty, non-intervention and territorial integrity. The desire to adhere to these existing norms of the international system was largely reflected within the context of the Charter of the OAU when it was established in 1963. The first five of the seven principles of Article 3 sought to ensure the sanctity of the state:

1. the sovereign equality of all Member States;
2. non-interference in the internal affairs of States;
3. respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its inalienable right to independent existence;
4. peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration; (and)
5. unreserved condemnation, in all its forms of political assassination as well as of subversive activities on the part of neighbouring States or any other State.\textsuperscript{52}

Each of these principles will be discussed within this section.\(^3\)

The experience of great power colonialism ensured that these principles became necessary tools in maintaining the effectiveness of the state-system within the African continent. Rather than develop principles that were indigenous to them, African leaders aligned themselves to what already existed, by making the modern European state-system applicable to Africa. Furthermore, as we have already discussed, they also ensured that the principle of non-intervention was rigorously adhered to by all. The attempts taken by the African leaders to adhere to existing norms are striking. As Mohammed Ayoob confirms:

The globalization of European power and of its attendant norm of international intercourse introduced colonized territories...to the notion of state sovereignty, which is the fundamental defining characteristic of the modern system of states. Along with the notion of state sovereignty came its corollaries: rigidly demarcated and sacrosanct boundaries, mutual recognition of sovereign political entities, nonintervention in the internal affairs of other states. Third world state elites have internalized these values to an astonishing degree.\(^4\)

The principle of non-intervention is not something specific and unique to Africa and other developing countries; the principle is a cornerstone of the UN Charter and guides the relations of states. The strict observance displayed by developing or weaker states towards the principle of non-intervention was a reflection of the order which prevailed in the international system prior to the emergence of newly independent states in the late 1950s. Through the OAU Charter, African leaders were merely supporting what was seen as an essential ruling to preserve the dominance of the sovereign state and the associated principle of the right and equality of states within the international system. As James Mayall states,

The signing of the African Charter in 1963, with its implicit endorsement of the territorial status quo, and its explicit denunciation of subversion and political assassination and intervention in the domestic affairs of other states, was more...a reassertion of traditional principles evolved outside Africa than a major attempt to establish a new and specifically African order of

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\(^3\) The principles contained in Article 3 of the OAU Charter reflect the primary purpose and principles set out in the UN Charter. In fact, African leaders were influenced by the UN Charter in drawing up their own principles concerning the obligation of member states to maintaining peace and security.

international relations.\textsuperscript{55}

The extent to which African states, and also other states from the developing world, had adopted the norms and principles of the modern European state-system can be seen in the UN declarations of 1965 and 1970. Although we noted that they were not technically binding, they nonetheless illustrate the normative inclination of its signatories and the negative connotations that intervention carried within the countries of the developing world. These declarations were not only symbols of the ending of colonialism, although the 'psychological imprint' of colonialism remained 'fresh in the minds of the developing world.'\textsuperscript{56} They also served as examples of the determination of the developing countries to prevent outside intervention in their region. They sought to link the problem of intervention with colonialism and to this end held that a reversal of colonial policies would inevitably lead to a principle of non-intervention in the affairs of other states. The link between intervention and colonialism was again made apparent in a statement given by the spokesman of the Group of 77 in 1991 when he cautioned 'against broadening the definition of humanitarian intervention' in relation to the rise of internal conflicts since the end of the Cold War. In a debate on the \textit{Strengthening of the Coordination of humanitarian emergency of the United Nations}, Mr Awoonor stated that:

\textbf{[T]he Group of 77 is slightly worried that some...may not be sensitive to certain pleas for an abiding respect for the sovereignty of nations. Our concern stems from our historical past, when many of us, as colonial subjects, had no rights. The respect for sovereignty which the United Nations system enjoins is not an idle stipulation that can be rejected outright in the name of even the noblest gestures....And an essential attribute of the sovereignty is the principle of consent, one of the cornerstones in the democratic ideal itself.}\textsuperscript{57}

African countries gave little support to the idea that intervention in the internal affairs of states could be permissible, whatever the moral or legal justifications for such an act. Thus, intervention must be regarded as 'suspect' as it still evokes memories of great power


imperial dominance, 'racism and national humiliation.'\(^5^8\) It is partly for this reason that developing countries uphold the principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention. It is also because a majority of these states are economically and politically vulnerable, thus making them easy targets for intervention, that Africa and developing countries in general give strong support to these norms and principles. Directly related to this latter point is the belief of some African states that intervention generates a culture of dependency and consequentially undermines national sovereignty. In an article written in 1983, S. Neil MacFarlane made the following point on intervention in Africa:

> The view that intervention compromises national sovereignty...rests on the argument that intrusion on behalf of a party to a civil war creates a relationship of dependency such that the local client is incapable of independent action in internal and international affairs where his interests or preferences diverge from those of his patron. In other words, intervention constitutes a new kind of colonialism.\(^5^9\)

Certainly, as MacFarlane states, the history of assistance received by Francophone states from their French colonial masters was an indication of this culture of dependency, but even here, 'it is probable that political and economic ties are far more important in accounting for dependency in much of Francophone Africa than is French military activity.'\(^6^0\)

The principle of sovereignty and non-intervention was not only directed towards North-South relations, but was also applicable in intra-African affairs. In fact, the first three principles of Article 3 of the OAU Charter signified African states' determination to ensure that the norm of non-intervention was upheld throughout the continent. The doctrines of independence, territorial integrity and non-intervention were frequently asserted and confirmed within the context of declarations issued by numerous conferences, from the First Conference of Independent African States in Accra, Ghana (1958) to the Summit Conference

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\(^6^0\) S. N. MacFarlane, (1983/4), p. 59. Even after the end of colonisation, France maintained an interest with its former colonies, providing both military and economic assistance which were designed to ensure French interests on the African continent. Chapter four of this study focuses on French intervention in African affairs in the 1970s. On French interventionist policies, see A. Clayton, 'Foreign Intervention in Africa', in S. Baynham, (ed.), (1986), pp.205-215.
of Independent African States in Addis Ababa (1963). As a consequence, 'there has been a tendency to consider the use of violence to force one state's will on another as "un-African."' Three areas of intra-African affairs throw a spotlight on the OAU's position on the question of intervention: a) the problem of boundary disputes, b) the problem of subversion, and c) internal conflicts within member-states.

The problem of boundary disputes

Instead of renouncing the structures stemming from colonialism, African leaders wanted to preserve existing territorial entities and thus secure the integrity of the state system. This in essence meant developing policy to maintain the existing status quo. Border disputes were engulfing regions of Africa before the creation of the OAU. For example, conflict emerged between both Somalia and Ethiopia, and Somalia and Kenya. Somalia made claims over the validity of the borders it had with both countries on the grounds of ethnic nationality, suggesting that certain regions belonged to it. So for example, it contested a part of the Ethiopian territory known as the Ogaden, claiming that the region was ethnically Somali on the basis that Somalis were inhabitants in the area. The argument then for maintaining the existing colonial borders was to avert potential conflicts and instability that would erupt on the continent if boundaries were redrawn or reclaimed. Moreover, African leaders feared that any boundary changes would undermine the political power they had amassed within their own countries. The legality of existing boundaries were upheld in a resolution at the OAU Cairo Summit Conference in 1964 which adopted the international law principle of *uti possidetis*, a concept that asserts that all member states were committed to

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respecting the frontiers existing at the time of their independence. The resolution of the Cairo Summit stated that the borders from the colonial era constituted 'a tangible reality' and to this end, member states 'pledge[d] themselves to respect the borders existing on their achievement of national independence.\textsuperscript{64}

\textit{The problem of subversion}

As with boundary disputes, the problem of subversive activities predated the creation of the OAU. The constant claims and counter claims of subversive activities by individual African states heightened the OAU's anti-interventionist standing, but also its desire to promote a policy of 'good neighbourliness.'\textsuperscript{65} The problem of subversion was particularly intense in West Africa. Ghana had been accused of subversive activities in Côte d'Ivoire as early as 1959 and later in January 1963 when she was accused of taking part in the assassination of Sylvanus Olympio of Togo. However, Ghana was not alone in pursuing subversive activities. Togo and Nigeria were also said to be harbouring political exiles and opposition groups, mainly from Ghana, within their borders.\textsuperscript{66} However, rather than openly criticise individual member-states, the founding fathers of the OAU entrenched the problem of subversion and political assassination in the context of Article 3 of the Charter.\textsuperscript{67} Its position, which was further reflected in the 1965 'Declaration on the Problem of Subversion' at the Second Session of the Assembly of Heads of State, also dealt explicitly with non-intervention when members 'solemnly' declared:

1. Not to tolerate in conformity with article 3, paragraph 5, of the OAU Charter any subversion originating in our countries against another Member

\textsuperscript{64}The full text on the 'Border Disputes Among African States' can be found in the 'Resolutions of the First Assembly of the Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity' in C. Legum, (1965), pp. 303-308, esp. p. 303.


State of the Organization of African Unity,\textsuperscript{58}

2. Not to tolerate the use of our territory for any kind of subversive activity directed from outside Africa against any Member States of the Organization of African Unity;

3. To oppose collectively and firmly by every means at their disposal every form of subversion conceived, organised or financed by foreign powers against Africa, the OAU or its member states individually;

4. (a) To resort to bilateral or multilateral consultation to settle all disputes between two or more member states of the Organization of African Unity;
   (b) To refrain from conducting press or radio campaigns against any Member States of the Organization of African Unity; and to resort instead to the procedure laid down in the Charter and the Protocol of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration of the Organization of African Unity.

5. (a) Not to create dissension within or among member states by fomenting or aggravating racial, religious, linguistic, ethnic or other differences.
   (b) To combat all forms of activity of this kind.\textsuperscript{69}

We shall discuss the problem of subversion Chapter Two

\textit{Internal conflicts in a member state}

This area deals directly with the question of intervention and non-intervention within the continent. Since the beginning of the post-colonial era, many of the conflicts that emerged on the African continent have been internal. Throughout the OAU's thirty-five year history, member states were reluctant to sanction intervention in the internal dispute of other member-states. The only occasion that could warrant some form of intervention was the struggle for liberation. As Zartman remarked, '[t]he only justification for warfare so far has been anticolonialism.'\textsuperscript{70} Apart from this, the OAU is widely seen as placing the resolution of internal conflict in a secondary position, preferring instead to give primacy to the practice of

\textsuperscript{58} Article III, paragraph 5 stated that member states declared, 'unreserved condemnation, in all its forms of political assassination as well as of subversive activities on the part of neighbouring States or any other state.'


maintaining a reasonable level of harmony among the majority of member states.'71 So for example, in cases such as the secessionist movements in Biafra, Eritrea and Southern Sudan, the OAU remained silent, preferring to be bound by the principle of non-intervention.72 Two reasons exist as to why ‘new’ states of Africa subscribe to the principle of non-intervention, especially in their response to internal conflicts or civil wars that occur on the continent. First, intervention is seen as having a negative impact (especially) on security. The argument usually provided is that to intervene is to prolong the conflict. Hence, rather than being a solution, intervention becomes a problem. This view was expressed by critics of the ECOWAS peacekeeping force - ECOMOG - intervention in Liberia.73 MacFarlane gives an accurate account of how intervention is depicted by African leaders in the following statement:

This conclusion is apparently based upon several implicit or explicit judgements with respect to the effect of external military interference on African core values: that intervention both prolongs and intensifies the conflict which provoked it, increasing the number of casualties and refugees and the level of physical destruction in the target environment; that it thereby jeopardizes economic development; that it erodes national sovereignty; and that it is politically destabilizing.74

In other words, the intensity of a conflict can also undermine socio-economic development in terms of agricultural or industrial exports. It can also disrupt physical infrastructures such as roads, rail power lines and factories. Furthermore, the intensification could also have adverse effect on social infrastructures such as school, medical facilities, and health care provision. An intensification of a conflict can also lead to the displacement of thousands of peoples.


72 Eritrea finally gained independence in 1991 after many years of fighting with Ethiopia over its right to secede. Yet, it was only in April 1993, following a referendum on independence that one could say that it achieved ‘de jure’ sovereignty. I thank Dominique Jacquin-Berdal for this point of clarification.

73 At the early stages of the conflict in Liberia, Charles Taylor, leader of the National Patriotic and Liberation Front (NPLF) and the main opposition to the regime of Samuel Doe criticised ECOMOG and in particular Nigeria for its perceived lack of impartiality. The Liberian civil war will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Five.

Second, it is important to note that most African leaders are reluctant to intervene in the internal affairs of other states especially on questions related to the political legitimacy of a state or its human rights record. A policy of intervention would not only open the intervening states up to scrutiny from other states, but many African leaders also lack the moral standing to intervene in a crisis which concerns political legitimacy or human rights, because they too are ‘mired’ with these problems.75

The three areas mentioned above explain the emergence of the key principles within the OAU Charter: non-interference in the internal affairs of states; respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states; and condemnation of subversive activities. As Amadu Sesay, Olusola Ojo and Orohola Fasehun state, all three ‘are interrelated and are meant to reinforce each other.76 In addition, all three principles reflect the legitimacy of the African state system that had been erected by the various leaders within the continent during the period of decolonisation. However, the decision to establish such principles within the OAU Charter needs to be understood within the context of the OAU’s inception. By 1963, there were already accusations that certain African states were conducting subversive activities and supporting attempts at political assassination. Such problems were to define the position to be adopted by African states who came together in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia to create an institution for intra-African affairs.

Conclusion

On gaining independence from their colonial masters, African states incorporated the principles of international law that were enshrined in the UN Charter within the OAU Charter. However, despite the declared assertion of non-intervention, a history of normative thinking about when intervention is justified, combined with the actual practice of state intervention, exists beside the principle of non-intervention.

The final part of this Chapter, provides a short review of existing research on intervention by African states in internal conflicts in Africa. These various works have opened

the door for further research on how the practice of intervention evolved alongside the principle of non-intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa.

III. Research on African intervention in internal disputes

The research being conducted here fits in with existing work, especially that done by Caroline Thomas, Arnold Hughes and Roy May, S. Neil MacFarlane, and I. William Zartman. The aim is to briefly explain each author’s contribution to the debate on the practice of intervention among African states, although reference will be made to each work throughout this study. With the exception of Zartman, all make specific reference to the use of military force and/or situations which involve a military dimension without the necessary use of armed force. What follows is a brief analysis of Caroline Thomas’ work, as what she has to say on Tanzania’s intervention in Uganda is relevant to Chapter Four.

Caroline Thomas’ work questioned whether the principle of non-intervention had been challenged, extended or modified by ‘new’ states as they entered the European system of international relations. The purpose of her study was ‘to examine the practice of intervention in contemporary international politics, in order to see whether the traditional legitimate justifications offered for breeching the non-intervention norm have been extended.’ In relation to Africa, she outlines how intervention is perceived by African states. Thomas provides a history, not only of how the core principles of the OAU Charter evolved, but also of how they were defended on several occasions by African leaders. The main example was the condemnation of Tanzania’s intervention against Uganda in 1978. With the exception of the struggle against apartheid in South Africa, Thomas argues that African states did not undermine the principle of non-intervention, even in situations of human rights atrocities and the massacre of civilians as was seen in Uganda in the 1970s.

Even in the case of Tanzania, Thomas argues that while Julius Nyerere could have justified his actions in terms of humanitarian intervention, official statements declared the

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77 I. W. Zartman, (1968) and (1987). Since Zartman’s work is particularly relevant to Chapters Two and Three which deal with the early years of intra-African affairs in the post-colonial era, I will not discuss it until then.


situation to be a case of self-defence. To this end, Thomas argues that Tanzania’s actions fell ‘within the categories of the traditional debate’ on non-intervention. However, as will be discussed in Chapter Four, Tanzania’s actions did open up a debate within the continent, (though it was somewhat limited and done to prevent accusations of a double standard by supporters of Nyerere) about the shortcomings within the OAU and the whole question of human rights on the continent.

Of all the authors mentioned, the work done by S. Neil MacFarlane and Arnold Hughes and Roy May seeks to explore the practice of intervention in intra-African affairs. MacFarlane’s main interest is with interventions initiated from outside the continent. In two articles, MacFarlane is concerned with the impact of intervention on regional security in Africa: ‘the regional causes of intervention and, from the perspective of African states, what its implications are for regional security.’ This aspect of his argument is not entirely relevant to this study. What is relevant, is what MacFarlane says about African attitudes, perceptions and policies towards intervention.

MacFarlane suggests that some African leaders may see intervention as permissible if it is aimed at preserving and enhancing state sovereignty as when Soviet and Cuban troops defended Ethiopia’s territorial integrity against Somali aggression between 1977 and 1978. Intervention is also seen by some African states as justifiable if directed at the ‘struggle for liberation,’ a point which Caroline Thomas also noted. Both these incidents are discussed in further detail in Chapters Three and Four. MacFarlane argues that both incidents demonstrate ‘mutually incompatible positions’ among African leaders on the question of intervention and non-intervention in African conflict, and then concludes that the increase in the number of intervention in the late 1970s and early 1980s ‘not only reflects but fosters [the] erosion of previously accepted norms.’ Unfortunately, MacFarlane stops short in both articles of explaining what these ‘mutually incompatible positions on intervention’ are,

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beyond his observation that support was given by some African states to foreign intervention.

MacFarlane’s work does not have much to say about the involvement of African states in various internal conflicts. When he does mention it, it is set in the traditional discussion of how the OAU responded: resolutions and declarations which condemned intervention. Furthermore, he defines the involvement of regional powers (e.g. Algeria, Ethiopia, Libya and Nigeria) in the internal affairs of other states in the traditional terms of military capabilities or national interest: ‘[t]he growing disparity of military power in the region gives some regional actors a capacity which they did not previously possess to respond to or take advantage of these conditions or to pursue their interests through the projection of force.’ MacFarlane does not, however, consider whether there are other contributing factors beyond military capability and hegemonic power to explain the interventions that were occurring on the continent by African states. On this point, the work of Hughes and May not only adds to that done by MacFarlane, but it is notable for its research in explaining the use of African armies in particular conflicts, between and within states on the continent.

Of all the works discussed here, that of Arnold Hughes and Roy May’s is not only relevant, but represents the most serious systematic research on African military involvement in the internal affairs of other African states. Over a period of 25 years (1960-1985) they discuss cases of military intervention by African states in the affairs of their neighbours. In their own words Hughes and May are concerned with ‘the deployment of elements of the armed forces in open support of foreign policy objectives on the territory of other countries in the [African] region.’ Their focus is on the ‘loaning’ of military resources: troops, training, funding, and equipments.

Between 1960 and 1985, Hughes and May categorize at least thirty cases of military intervention by African states as regime supportive, regime opposing, or state supportive. Regime supportive refers to situations where some states intervened in support of the

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leadership within a particular country. The leadership may have shared a similar foreign policy outlook to the intervening state, but the aim was to provide 'military assistance...to a threatened regime or government.' In situations where the intervention was regime opposing, Hughes and May argue that states sought to assist in the overthrow of a particular regime. Finally, in situations where the intervening agent’s motives were state supportive, intervention was aimed at ensuring the survival of state sovereignty as opposed to preserving the ‘authority-structure’ (i.e. the regime). Hughes and May argue that intervention aimed at supporting another regime accounts for the majority of the thirty cases they examined, while those seeking to overthrow the regime or government were less frequent. Such an argument is no different from that reached by Christopher Clapham who, writing a year earlier, spoke about ‘The Foreign Policy of State Preservation’:

In the context of the state-centred politics of [Africa], external intervention on behalf of regimes established in power at the centre acquires legitimacy which similar intervention on behalf of their opponents lacks. This is logical enough: in an area of potentially very high stability, one is stabilising, the other destabilising; governments which themselves are heavily dependent on external assistance, are quick to denounce any such assistance to their opponents, and to claim that essentially domestic opposition...is externally directed. Hughes and May outline a number of reasons for the interventions that they consider. These include: ideological solidarity among states that are said to be radical; threats from a common enemy; racial solidarity against the white colonial regimes of Southern Africa; ‘personal friendships between national leaders’ and ‘personal or national aggrandisement.’ Such justifications are similar to those outlined by Northedge and Donelan when they suggest that states tended to intervene because they have some shared affinities or social philosophy with other states. States everywhere have particular world views and ambitions that they want to promote, and in turn want to support those who share similar views. What makes the interventions by African states distinctive for Hughes and May, is that a majority were

conducted by economically weak states such as Tanzania and Guinea: 'Compared with this somewhat ostentatious resort to external intervention by these poorer countries, the richer states of the sub-continent (such as the Ivory Coast and Kenya) have a pallid record.'

All the works mentioned above are beneficial in that they do not characterise intra-African affairs in the traditional sense of non-intervention in the internal affairs of member states. What, however, distinguishes this present study from these works, especially those done by MacFarlane and Hughes and May? One of the concerns of this study is to ask if it is possible to detect a 'pattern of ideas' or 'persistent and recurrent' thinking by African leaders about whether or not to intervene in the internal affairs of states. To this end, there are similarities with the research already conducted by Hughes and May. In fact, while they do not promote these categories as somehow representing normative thinking by African leaders, they do open the door for further research on the act of intervention by African states. However, while their categories are useful, this study shifts the focus and develops other areas which will perhaps serve to reinforce or to refine the analyses developed in the work of writers like Hughes and May.

We have already argued that this study presents a broader definition of intervention beyond the use of military force, but this itself is not an immediate and distinguishing feature. What distinguishes this present study is the starting point it chooses to examine how the practice of intervention evolved alongside non-intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa. For this study, the starting point is Pan-Africanism and the two themes contained within it: African exclusivity and African unity. Both, it will be argued, shed light not only on how intervention evolved, but also on the general practice of intra-African affairs.

Without anticipating too much, Chapter Two of this study argues that the underlying philosophy of Pan-Africanism - the quest for freedom and independence on the one hand, and the desire to protect and defend the continent against the outside world on the other hand - had implications for intra-African affairs. The ideas and expressions on the principles governing state relations as articulated in the various versions of Pan-Africanism allow us to say something about African views on intervention. To this end, this study argues that to understand how African views on intervention evolved, research should trace its development and other rules governing intra-African affairs to the debates that took place between the...
'new' African governments in the various pan-African conferences and meetings from the 1960s. In this way, we might be able to say something about African views on intervention, just as Martin Wight did on Western thought on intervention. We might also be able to say something about the wider context of the African normative order and interventions that have sometimes challenged that order which is based on the system of statehood. However, at the end, a crucial question needs to be asked: how far can African exclusivity and African unity enable us to understand the evolution of intervention on the African continent? Are they 'persistent and recurrent themes'?

Conclusion

The purpose of this Chapter has been to define what is meant by intervention in this study and from here to provide a review of African thought on intervention and the principle of non-intervention. We began by defining intervention through two UN declarations - General Assembly Resolution 2131 (XX) on the Declaration on Inadmissibility of Intervention in Domestic Affairs of States and Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty (1965) and General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) on the Declaration on Principle of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (1970). This was because the 'new' countries of Sub-Saharan Africa advocated the main tenets of both resolutions with the support of Asia, Eastern European and Latin American countries and the Soviet Union. More important for this study, several key principles within both resolutions are relevant to our understanding of how the practice of intervention evolved alongside the principle of non-intervention on the African continent.

The definition on intervention in this thesis is therefore broad to reflect the thinking of the states who participated in the UN debate. Intervention not only means armed intervention, but it also means subversion, terrorist acts, propaganda, infiltration, supplying of arms or war material for aiding rebellions in another state, and financing, training or supporting movements aimed at overthrowing a regime. We further defined intervention by outlining some aims or reasons used to justify intervention in internal disputes.

The aim now is to explore how the practice of intervention has evolved on the African continent, and in turn, consider whether there are 'persistent and recurrent themes' that will
allow us to note a ‘pattern of ideas’ about the thinking of intervention in Africa. Put another way, the aim is to consider whether it is possible to notice if there are any close and interconnecting factors involved in the particular interventions that we analyse. This is a task that Northedge and Donelan set for themselves in their analysis of external intervention in international disputes during the 1950s and 1960s. More important, and here Northedge and Donelan prove instructive again, the purpose is to address the following question: do the motives for intervening work at every stage and belong to some continuous thinking about intervention by African states?

CHAPTER TWO

PAN-AFRICANISM: A FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING AFRICAN THOUGHTS ON INTERVENTION?

Introduction

The purpose of this Chapter is to explain how African leaders understood intervention and non-intervention through various Pan-African meetings in the early 1960s. This Chapter argues that the ideas and expressions on the principles governing state relations as articulated in the various versions of Pan-Africanism and its central themes, are useful in understanding how the practice of intervention evolved on the African continent. Two central themes of Pan-Africanism are African autonomy or exclusivity (better known as “African solutions for African problems”) and African Unity (often called “solidarity”).

Part One of this Chapter begins by briefly examining two key determinants of foreign policy in African states in the early 1960s. These are national interest and ideology. Both are crucial not only for understanding the foreign policy outcome of African states, but also for discerning the norms and principles that guided intra-African affairs in the early post-colonial period. In Part Two of this Chapter, we examine Pan-Africanism, asking what it is, what it represents and arguing that it is about both unity and exclusivity. In Part Three, we examine closely the notion of African exclusivity. The notion of African exclusivity is tied to the creation of the OAU, and we ask if this organisation represents a useful starting point in understanding the debate on intervention and non-intervention. Part Four and Five focus on the notion of African unity because there are various versions of it that are significant for understanding how the norms and principles that guided intra-African affairs developed. Two distinct schools of thought emerged in the post-colonial era that held different views on the notion of African unity. These schools were often labelled the ‘radical’ and the ‘moderate-conservative’ school. Their various interpretations contributed to an understanding of African foreign policy and norms and principles that guided intra-African affairs. We discuss the views of both schools in Part Four. In Part Five, we consider how the notion African unity as expounded by both schools serves as a source in which to place African thoughts on

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1 Appendix II sets out the various associations and blocs that developed in post-colonial Africa.
intervention and non-intervention. The aim is to conclude that the various meanings attached
to the notion of African unity shed light on the co-evolution of the non-interventionist norms
as set out in the OAU Charter and the interventionist practice among African states.

I. The nature of Foreign Policy in early Post-Colonial Sub-Saharan Africa.

Before explaining Pan-Africanism and the position of the various groups that formed
in the early stages of post-colonial African politics, it is important to briefly say something
about the nature of the foreign policy of African states in general during this time. It is
difficult to state that one factor determines the foreign policy of any particular country. There
are series of factors that work alongside one another or against each other in explaining the
outcome of any foreign policy decision. It is the task of the student of foreign policy analysis
to observe what factors are predominant over time and exert the most influence on the
decision-making process. This study is not however an examination of the foreign policy of
African states, but the subject matter is such that a few general words are necessary on the
nature of the foreign policy of African states.²

What makes understanding the foreign policy of African states so difficult is defining
the national interest of a particular state. The term 'national interest' is however a misnomer
in understanding the foreign policy outlook of African states. When the early post-colonial
leaders spoke about national interest, it usually inferred policies which were directed against
colonialism. However, we can best understand the term as the interest and vision of the
particular leader, although the idea that the national interest represents the vision of a leader
is not something specific to Africa.

Ideology also played an important role in the foreign policy of African states in the
early post-colonial years.³ The particular ideology or political philosophy of a leader often
has an important place within the context of foreign and domestic policy making. As Zartman
notes, 'every state nurtures a number of dreams and hopes about the world in which it would

² On African foreign policy, see O. Aluko, (ed.) The Foreign Policies of African States (London: Hodder and
Stoughton, 1977) and D. Thiam, The Foreign Policy of African States: Ideological Bases, Present Realities,

³ See M. Radu 'Ideology, Parties, and Foreign Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa' in R. Bissell and M. Radu,
like to live.' In explaining the place of ideology in the West African region between 1957 and 1964, Zartman notes that '[i]n one group of West African states, however, these aspirations [i.e. ideologies] are dominant over other considerations...in determining foreign-policy actions. In other states, these aspirations are more distant matters.' Sometimes, these ideological aspirations are used by states to justify certain foreign policy decisions. Zartman argues that ideological considerations are likely to be more distant to the 'realist' who feels that it should remain in the background while it is 'making discrete choices for immediate needs.' For the 'idealistic' however, ideological criteria are not only necessary, but should remain 'high on the list of policy criteria and must be kept untainted.'

There is a limit to how far one can argue that ideologically based criteria determines all foreign policy in Africa. Certainly, as we noted above, other factors exist to determine a state's foreign policy: various internal forces in a country can affect foreign policy making; the structure of a country's internal security; the military power of a particular state; its relations with its neighbours and its regional alliances, the influence of former colonial masters and the desire for territorial expansion. These factors intertwine in countless ways and, over time, reveal not only a state's behaviour, but also the interests of that particular state. Again Zartman proves instructive when he cautions against the use of ideology as a point from which to understand and locate African foreign policy.

While no single factor exists to explain the nature of the foreign policy of African states, to a certain extent, it is possible to suggest that Pan-Africanism became a significant vehicle in the foreign policy of some African states. Pan-Africanism was a strong ideologically force in the struggle for independence in the 1950s and was often referred to by African leaders who came together at various Pan-African meetings in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Pan-Africanism is just one way of understanding aspects of African foreign policy, especially the debate of intervention and non-intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, our concern is not to explain individual state foreign policy from the point of view of Pan-Africanism, but to analyse how it has been used by some African leaders to justify

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their foreign policy activities, such as intervention in the internal affairs of other countries.\(^7\)

II. Pan-Africanism

The ideas and opinions on intra-African affairs that emerged in Sub-Saharan Africa during the decolonialization process in the late 1950s largely came from those leaders who established their thoughts within the context of various Pan-African movements. What we intend here is not a detailed examination of the contents of Pan-Africanism, as there are many variants of this movement. Instead, we are primarily concerned with those aspects that enable us to understand how the practice of intervention evolved on the African continent.

Pan-Africanism, at least that which existed before Ghana’s independence in 1957, began as an ideological movement led by black Americans against slavery and racial discrimination. We can trace the movement back to at least 1900 when the first Pan-African Congress was held in London. Its main concern was with achieving freedom and emancipation for all negroes. Pan-Africanism evolved into a cultural, political and racial ideological movement of black consciousness. The main advocates of this movement from outside the continent - W.E.B du Bois, Marcus Garvey and Jean Price-Mars - came to represent these various aspects of Pan-Africanism.\(^8\) Within Africa, the main proponents of Pan-Africanism - namely President Leopold Sédar Senghor of Senegal, President Félix Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d'Ivoire, President Sékou Touré of Guinea and President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana - embraced the various strands of Pan-Africanism, seeing them as necessary components for establishing an African continent free from great power

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domination. For this study, the main focus is on the political aspects of Pan-Africanism, although as Doudou Thiam notes, it is difficult to distinguish between the political and cultural aspects of the movement. In fact, the division is a matter of convenience for those analysing an extensive ideology which was seen as symbolising African thought in the early days of decolonialization.

The main elements of this political strand of Pan-Africanism may be described in the following terms: a) a quest for autonomy in solving African problems (i.e. African exclusivity); b) liberation of all of Africa from alien rule and racial discrimination and c) the knitting together of independent states into a form of association to build African unity. These three elements sum up the aspirations among African politicians at the early stage of decolonialization; and as we shall see in this study, they had implications for how the idea of intervention evolved within the continent.

A brief summary of the political strand of Pan-Africanism suggests that the main driving force were the notion of unity and exclusivity. It was widely agreed by African leaders that unity and exclusivity were to be guiding principles in the struggle to liberate the continent from colonialism and racial discrimination. African states believed that they should work towards political, social and economic development so that the continent had the means to take its place on the international stage. In addition, African leaders argued that they had to unite and guard their independence against future colonialism. More important, it meant ensuring unity and solidarity among African leaders in solving African problems. Ensuring unity was paramount not only if African leaders wanted to avoid ‘negative foreign influence,’ but also if they wanted to ensure autonomy in solving African problems.

Most states agreed on the notion of African autonomy or an exclusive right to tackle
the continent’s problems. However, as we shall see in Part Four, not all states agreed on what form African unity should take. While African states worked for the same goal of freedom, independence, and African exclusivity over its affairs, the notion of unity became controversial and divided Africa leaders among themselves as they developed norms and principles to guide intra-African affairs.

Of all the three elements in the political strand of Pan-Africanism, the notion of African exclusivity was a major concern for the ‘new’ states of Africa as they entered the international system in the late 1950s. A major problem for them was how were they going to prevent new forms of great power colonialism entering the continent? It was because of this desire to protect the continent that the idea of African exclusivity emerged out of the Pan-Africanist movement. Other writers call this exclusivity ‘continental jurisdiction’, meaning that states within the continent had ultimate jurisdiction over their own affairs.\textsuperscript{13} African leaders did not express the idea, but leaders like Nkrumah and Touré frequently spoke about the ‘right’ African states had to freely conduct their affairs without outside interference.

In Chapter One, we discussed how African states advocated the signing of several international declarations at the UN to prevent outside interference. Closer inspection of the structures surrounding African diplomacy will show that the idea of African exclusivity, which was an expression of anti-colonialism, emerged in response to the fear of great power intervention. As Yolamu Barongo states, it became a mechanism or a ‘device for keeping African affairs free from foreign interference.’\textsuperscript{14} Put another way, having attained political independence, African states gave ultimate expression to the rights of sovereign states to conduct their own relations.\textsuperscript{15}


\textsuperscript{14} Y. Barongo, (1980), p. 70. See also C. Thomas, (1985), p. 64.

\textsuperscript{15} Some writers linked the idea of African exclusivity or continental jurisdiction to the US Monroe Doctrine. For example, Ali Mazrui defined the ‘closest analogue’ of African exclusivity as the ‘diplomatic system of the American states’, that is the Organization of American States (OAU), which was founded upon the nineteenth century Monroe Doctrine. See A. Mazrui, (1969), p. 118-122 and D. Thiam, (1965), p. 17. The Doctrine guided regional politics in the Americas from the nineteenth century. The Monroe Doctrine was based on the US’ aspiration to conceive of an apparatus that would preserve its independence and the rest of the American continent from European domination. It is however worth noting that there are problems with
In the following part of this Chapter, we focus on the Pan-African notion of African autonomy (i.e. exclusivity) and consider whether it serves as a framework in which to place African thoughts on intervention and non-intervention. Since African states argued that the continent had an exclusive ‘right’ or autonomy over its affairs, what implications did it have for African affairs, especially in situations where conflicts arose within states? Does African exclusivity represent other norms and principles that evolved alongside the traditional norms of sovereignty, non-intervention and territorial integrity? What does it tell us about the practice of intervention by African states?

III. African exclusivity and the ‘right’ to intervene

It seems reasonable to think that the notion of ‘African exclusivity’ would be helpful for understanding how the practice of intervention evolved on the continent. On the one hand the notion of exclusivity meant limiting or where possible, preventing outside interference, while on the other hand, and because of the former, it referred to the establishment of a system of self-help and self-regulation to address conflicts on the continent. However, as we argue below, its significance in understanding the practice of intervention by African states is not readily apparent in the early years of post-colonial intra-African affairs. This is because the whole notion of exclusivity was tied to the creation of the OAU, an organisation that was supposed to represent a system of self-regulation. This third part of the Chapter is about why such a seemingly obvious starting point does not work, and why we have to look elsewhere to understand how the practice of intervention evolved on the continent. Nevertheless, we discuss it now because it partly explains how African states came to establish the OAU. More important, as we shall see when we discuss the radical states in Part Four, the notion of exclusivity and unity was interrelated: African unity was only possible if African states had

associating the idea of African exclusivity with the Monroe Doctrine. The Doctrine became a symbol of US’ hegemonic power within the region of Central America. The idea that this doctrine was to prevent outside interference was gradually extended to give the US sole jurisdiction over inter-American affairs and a right or duty to protect other American states. And while American leaders never defined this ‘right’, it nonetheless signified America’s power within that region. As Martin Wight notes, the Monroe Doctrine went beyond protecting Latin America. It also protected American commercial and financial interests, ‘the policy which became known as ‘dollar diplomacy.’ Furthermore, it also reflected the US’ paternalistic attitude when it intervened against other political systems in that it objected. M. Wight, Power Politics, edited by H. Bull and C. Holbraad (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1978), p. 195. Also see C. Thomas, (1985), who refers to the paternalism of America towards Latin America, pp. 22-33, esp. pp. 23-24.
an exclusive right to direct their affairs, and to achieve this, a system of self-regulation was necessary.

In Part Two of this Chapter, we stated that one major area of Pan-Africanism was the desire to protect the continent from future outside interference. The wish by Africans to have control over their own destiny was very much in line with the idea of acquiring self-governance over their internal affairs, including the maintenance of law, order and security.\(^{16}\) In one sense, African states were advocating self-sufficiency, although it is not clear whether this translated into a desire to isolate the continent from the rest of the world. As a consequence of wanting control over their own affairs, the following question was often asked in the early years of the decolonization movement: "Now that the Imperial Order is coming to an end, who is going to keep the peace in Africa?"\(^{17}\) The thinking among Africa’s leaders was to build a system of self-regulation to oversee African affairs and ensure African exclusivity. In a sense, the African’s ambition was to be his own policeman and govern himself.\(^{18}\) The history of Africa’s colonial experience at the hand of the European powers legitimised the position of those forces who favoured Africans taking the lead in confronting the continent’s problems without recourse to outside help.\(^{19}\) Hence African exclusivity was usually referred to as “African solutions for African problems.” The OAU was created in 1963 to be a symbol of African exclusivity, not only to protect the continent from outside intervention, but to regulate African affairs and develop home-grown solutions. The question we need to ask is how far can the OAU contribute to our understanding of African attitudes to intervention, especially when addressing the internal conflicts of other African states?

**The OAU and African Exclusivity**

Africa’s colonial experience made it inevitable that the OAU would make it a priority to try to solve conflicts without involving outsiders. The founding fathers of the OAU


ensured that their objectives were explicitly stated in the preamble of the Charter: Africans had an ‘inalienable right...to control their own destiny.’ This ‘inalienable right’ had implications for how Africa would deal with conflicts on the continent, especially those within states. Underlying this ‘inalienable right’ was the OAU’s determination to ensure that it had ‘the prerogative of subjecting African problems to African solutions.’ The phrase “African solution for African problems” is a well-established principle on the continent and asserts that only Africans had an exclusive right to deal with their own problems. Mazrui argues that the founding fathers of the OAU wanted to create a ‘unit of exclusiveness’ by which only those within the continent had some form of “family” right to interfere in the affairs of other African states. This notion of exclusiveness was necessary to ensure and maintain the ‘keep out’ clause that the OAU had created as a mechanism against former colonial powers. Yet, as we will come to see in Chapter Four, the phrase “African solutions for African problems” became a mechanism not only for preventing outside interference, but also for justifying collective intervention by African states within the continent. It championed the idea of a collective self-defence which was the preferred option instead of intervention which was frowned upon within the OAU.

The reason for wanting to develop “African solutions for African problems” was because African leaders wanted to develop a diplomatic system that would not only enable the continent to deal with conflicts initially before allowing outside forces to influence the outcome of particular conflicts, but ensure that the continent did not become entangled in the superpower struggle. The need for a forum that would allow the continent to deal with its problems and prevent outside interference was expressed in a speech at the UN General Assembly in 1961 by the Ethiopian representative, Mr Yifru, when he called upon his ‘sister States in Africa’:

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24 It is however worth noting that although Africans wanted to ensure they had an exclusive right in dealing with their own problems, they all signed the UN Charter and therefore gave up some of their right to the Security Council.
to join in the creation, under Article 52 of the United Nations Charter, of a regional organization of African States, the basic fundamental task of which will be to furnish the mechanism whereby problems which arise on the continent and which are of primary interest to the region could, in the first instance, be dealt by Africans, in an African forum, free from outside influence and pressure. 25

In response to Mr Yifru’s speech, when the OAU was created it dealt with two types of conflicts.

First, there were territorial, boundary or other disputes between neighbouring states, for example, the disputes between Morocco-Algeria and Somalia versus Ethiopia and Kenya which broke out in the same year that the OAU was created. 26 Both cases were dealt with in the OAU Commission on Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration whose remit was to settle disputes involving member-states. The Commission was not established by the OAU Charter but in Cairo in July 1964 at a meeting of heads of state.

The second type of conflict was what Berhanykun Andemicael calls ‘certain exceptional situations within individual African states brought about by ethnic, religious, political, or ideological differences which might create inter-state tensions or give rise to such problems as charges of foreign intervention and the overflow of refugees’. 27 These types of conflicts were frequent because ethnic groups cut across boundaries and one state may lay claim to the territories that these ethnic groups were in. Furthermore, refugees based in a neighbouring country could use that country as a base from which to launch an attack against their state. Andemicael cites the friction between Rwanda and Burundi in 1963 and 1972 as examples of this second type of conflict. 28 The OAU took a lead role in these disputes to signify that it had ‘undisputed jurisdiction as a forum for the initial consideration of African disputes,’ although it is worth noting that the OAU did not successfully intervene to stop the

25 Speech by Mr. Yifru, General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, 1020th Plenary Meeting, 2 October 1961, GAOR, para. 136. Also see B. Andemicael, (1976), p. 10. Article 52(2) of the UN Charter allows for the resolution of conflicts by a regional organisation before states refer to the Security Council, although Article 54 states that regional arrangements and agencies must inform the Security Council about actions taken in the context of international peace and security.


conflict between and within both countries. In the end, the OAU positioned itself 'as a body of first instance', but was unable to resolve the actual conflict. Similarly, the OAU did not succeed in resolving the dispute over the Ogaden or as we shall discuss in Chapter Four, conflicts like the Angolan civil war. As William Foltz remarks, the OAU initially 'kept crises like Angola and the Ogaden out of the United Nations', even though it had no institutional capacity to undertake the management of these conflicts.

According to Foltz, there are five 'concerns' that underlie this 'principle of African exclusivity' of which two are relevant here. The first relates to the general uneasiness surrounding outside intervention, even if the motive is well intended. While individual African states may seek the support of outside help, African collective judgement invariably emphasizes the negative externalities of intervention. "We cannot afford to bring bulls into our china shop," as an OAU official assigned to the United Nations once put it.

The second relates to the fear of 'setting a precedent' or making non-African intervention an acceptable policy. As Foltz states, 'once Africa officially and collectively invites outsiders in, ambitious great powers will find it that much easier to return when their intervention may be less welcome.' Of course, this did not prevent some African states calling upon former colonial powers to help them in resolving some of their conflicts as when Côte d'Ivoire, Chad and Gabon sought assistance from France or when Great Britain helped to put down mutinies in Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya in 1964. In such a situation, it is worth noting some of the reasons why states either call for or support outside assistance in resolving their conflicts, and among these cases, Gabon is particularly interesting in this regard. Instead of condemning the French action, some states praised the intervention at the OAU meeting held in Lagos,


Nigeria between February 24 to 29 1964. This should seem surprising, especially to those who considered that membership of the OAU meant strict observance of its core principle on non-intervention, especially from non-African forces. However as Immanuel Wallerstein explains, support for the French intervention flowed from several logical reasons:

what seemed to be most important was the consideration that the Gabon coup was getting to be one too many and there might now be a quick series throughout the UAM states, all moving their governments toward a...revolutionary position in African affairs and cumulatively creating a powerful reinforcement for the revolutionary [radical] core of the movement.34

Wallerstein's observations will become more apparent when we discuss the various African groupings in Part Four and Five. While some states gave support to the French intervention, the President of Tanganyika, Julius Nyerere, called an emergency session of the OAU Council of Ministers in Dar-es-Salaam on February 14th 1964, to have the British troops he initially requested replaced by an African force.35

Conclusion

To sum up, the OAU was established to solve local problems locally, and to keep foreign powers from meddling in African affairs. Although the notion of African exclusivity (or the phrase "African solutions for African problems") was expressed in the OAU, we argued at the outset of this section that it is difficult to suggest it as an immediate source for understanding how intervention evolved alongside non-intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa. One reason exists. Primarily because of its Charter, the OAU ruled itself out of dealing with internal conflicts. In the end, as Pelcovits notes, the idea of 'first instance' or 'try OAU first' was a failure: 'In Africa,...regional [or continental] primacy came to mean that intra-African


35 A communiqué was issued by the Council of Ministers to reflect the request made by President Julius Nyerere. See the African Research Bulletin (Political, Social and Cultural), February 1964, p. 21A. (Hereafter ARB).
disputes that might have been contained or managed by the UN were in effect left untreated' by the OAU.\textsuperscript{36} This is not to dismiss the notion of African exclusivity. Its usefulness is more apparent when we focus in later Chapters on how Africa states, working outside the framework of the OAU, used it to justify their interventions in internal conflicts.

In Part Four and Five of this Chapter, we consider how the other strand of Pan-Africanism, that is African unity, serves as a framework in which to understand how the practice of intervention evolved alongside the principle of non-intervention. We begin by arguing that there is no single definition of African unity, rather it has to be understood in the context of two distinct schools of thought that formed within the political strand of Pan-Africanism.

IV. Pan-African Unity

In Part Two of this Chapter, we discussed how Pan-Africanism came about. We also noted that while African states worked for the goal of freedom, independence and autonomy, the notion of unity became controversial and divided Africa leaders among themselves as they developed norms and principles to guide intra-African affairs. Two schools formed on the notion of African unity: the ‘radical’ and the ‘moderate-conservative’ school.

In analysing both groups, Wallerstein argues that the differences ‘were not differences over the stated common objective of unity. They were differences over the meaning of unity, its rationale, and its import. These differences were not formal but ideological.’\textsuperscript{37} Robert Good, however, argues that these groupings can be seen as an attempt by Western scholars to conveniently develop categories to explain the various African voices and perspectives that were emerging, especially in relation to foreign policy. As Robert Good, who uses such categories, explains, we can criticise the use of such categories for being ‘inadequate because they derived more from Western than from African political experience.’\textsuperscript{38} However, Good points out that in the early days of post-colonial politics in Africa, researchers had ‘yet to

\textsuperscript{36} N. Pelcovits, (1983), p. 258.


develop a vocabulary fully descriptive of African orientation.’ To this end, Good states that such categories gave a simplified view of assessing the position of various African issues in foreign policy:

In fact, the use of any label or category suggests a certain hardness and permanence of the point of view it is meant to describe, and so tends to obscure the fluidity of the phenomena we are trying to understand and to belie the pragmatism that often dominates the approach of African leaders to the enormous problems they face.\(^{39}\)

There is however some usefulness in drawing up categories and labels to explain the position of African states in relation to the various issues concerning foreign policy. Except for the Pan-Africanist desire for liberation and independence for all states on the continent, it was impossible to claim that a single voice represented the foreign policy position of African states. The number of events that occurred in the early years of independence on the continent contributed to the nature and complexity of the African position on international relations, and to this end, researchers needed to establish methods to understand what was taking place. Good notes the usefulness in using such categories when he remarked that ‘during the latter half of 1960, there was ample justification for attempting to differentiate among several views of the newly independent states of Africa, at least insofar as their foreign policies were concerned.’\(^{40}\) One such justification for using these categories was because analysts needed to discern the various views on the norms and principles that guided intra-African affairs. The different views generated by the radicals and moderate-conservatives on principles to govern intra-African affairs were significant in understanding the idea and practice of intervention on the continent in the early years of post-colonial Africa.

The differences on how African states should conduct their relations did not however cause any immediate or serious rift among the independent states. In fact, as we shall see in Part Five and also in Chapter Three, it was a series of events in the latter half of 1960 that intensified the ideological differences among the competing blocs: the differences over the meaning of African unity, Ghana’s support for radical dissident organisations undermining


governments in the West African region, and the civil war in the Congo.

Prior to this period, the independent states of Africa came together at Accra, Ghana for the first Conference of Independent African states between April 15-22, 1958 and later at the second conference held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on June 14 1960. Liberia, together with the newly independent states of Ghana and Guinea upheld the principle of 'non-interference' in a joint declaration in Sanniquelle, Liberia on 19 July 1959.

The 'Radical' States

The main proponent of Pan-African unity was the 'radical' group. This group is sometimes defined as the 'radical-nationalists' or the 'revolutionary movement'. It was later called the Casablanca Group after it held a conference in Casablanca, Morocco from January 4 to 7, 1961 to deal mainly with issues arising from the Congo crisis. In this Chapter, we will call this group the radical group. The radical group fits into Zartman's definition of those groups of states, particularly in West Africa, who were not only 'idealists' but also held onto an ideological position or a socio-political philosophy that determined their foreign policy outlook. This group advocated the idea of sovereign statehood, the maintenance of security and autonomy in solving African problems. However, it could be said that its radicalism stemmed from its 'extreme militancy in the struggle to eradicate remnants of colonialism, neo-colonialism, and white supremacy from the African continent.' For radical leaders, Pan-Africanism served as a strong ideological base for domestic and foreign policy objectives. Internally, radical leaders preached national unity to fight against colonialism and drew on historical sentiments of white oppression against black people. Externally, these leaders called

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for African unity and the creation of a formal political union and an African government. These leaders took as their starting point the common history and the long struggle for independence for African unity. This justification, they claimed, was to prevent and guard against those outside forces who aimed at dominating Africa's affairs.

Kwame Nkrumah headed this group in the first half of the 1960s. There were three central themes within the radical movement: 1) the removal of colonial structures and its newer version, neo-colonialism; 2) African autonomy in solving African problems; and 3) African unity defined as political unification or a Pan-African political federation. For the radicals, this vision of political unification and the possibility of African autonomy was threatened by neo-colonialism, defined as an expression of the old colonial structure dressed up in a new guise. Leaders of radical states did not coin the term neocolonialism, what they did was to give the term greater significance in African politics. The All-African peoples’ Conference defined neocolonialism as 'the survival of the colonial system in spite of formal recognition of political independence in emerging countries.' For the radicals, the survival of the colonial system was apparent in those states that sought to maintain strong links with their former colonial masters. Radicals saw these states as preventing the development of an autonomous and self-governing African continent. As a consequence of their perceived fear of neo-colonialism, these radical states saw their ‘foreign policy as an extension of their domestic commitment to the creation of a “new order”’ that preached national unity at home, and continental unity among African states.

This new order was bound by Nkrumah’s idea of a closer form of association with those Africa states who had achieved independence. For Nkrumah, such an association was important if African states were to achieve self-governance. In an address to the National Assembly of Ghana, Nkrumah stated that there were three alternatives open to African states in respect of their future: ‘Firstly, to unite and save our continent. Secondly, to disunite and


disintegrate. Or thirdly, to sell out. In other words: either to unite, or to stand separately and disintegrate or to sell ourselves to foreign powers. The formation of a tight-knit association would be an expression of the union that Nkrumah called for in his famous phrase and book, 'Africa Must Unite.' This expression of unity stemmed from a realisation among leaders like Nkrumah that they needed collective guarantees to preserve and strengthen the liberated countries of Africa.

Nkrumah was not the only leader who argued that the presence of some independent African states was meaningless unless the rest of Africa was free and African unity became a reality. Apart from Nkrumah, President Sékou Touré of Guinea was the most vocal Pan-Africanist. He too equated independence with unity when he stated that the move towards liberation was not to be an end in itself, but was to serve as a necessary basis for progress towards a 'United States of Africa.' In a statement made in Accra, Ghana on 4 July 1960, President Touré argued that:

The United States of Africa, which a few years ago was only a vague fancy, an aim that then appeared over-ambitious or hardly credible, is now a possibility that seems capable of fulfilment. It is already inscribed in the hearts and minds of our people. It is chronicled in song in our villages and schools. Our peasants, workers, the housewives, old men, and above all the younger generation, dwell upon the idea with unrelenting zest...

Has there ever existed anywhere else but in Ghana and Guinea a people who have endowed themselves with a constitution explicitly providing for the partial or total surrender of sovereignty in the interests of a wider Union of States? In this connection we must affirm quite definitely that our people are ready here and now to carry this out in practice.

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In fact, movement towards formal union was slow, and when union was achieved between Ghana, Guinea and Mali it did not amount to anything concrete.\footnote{Ghana and Guinea signed a joint declaration on 1 May 1959 and were later joined by Mali in April 1961 to form a Charter of the Union of African States. Guy De Lusignan defined it as nothing more than an ‘administrative fiction’ in \textit{French-Speaking Africa Since Independence} (London: Pall Mall Press, 1969), p. 273.}

In explaining the main driving force of this radical movement, Rupert Emerson states that for this group, ‘the case for African unity rests not only on such utilitarian grounds as the need to collaborate and to establish a common front against Africa’s enemies but also on the...conviction that Africans are born to share a common destiny.’\footnote{R. Emerson, (1963), p. 7.} Certainly, one key aspect of Pan-Africanism, at least that promoted by Nkrumah and Touré, placed emphasis on establishing a greater sense of \textit{oneness}, solidarity and political integration.

The determination to seek formal unity among African states was bound by a belief that there existed some kind of continental identity or fellow feeling, a feeling linked entirely to the shared experience of colonialism and of having the same racial distinction. Underlying this continental identity was a sense that Africans in some way symbolised a form of ‘brotherhood.’ So when leaders like Nkrumah used phrases like ‘Africa Must Unite’, it not only symbolised a sense of brotherhood, but a kind of fraternal solidarity across the continent. Radical states hoped that this idea of brotherhood would help to generate the realisation in different regions that their interests were in many respects the same.

It is possible that this sense of fellow-feeling or brotherhood was only an ideal that lasted until individual regions obtained independence from their colonial masters. That is to say that it was only relevant during the struggle for liberation. Once they had acquired independence, some leaders were more concerned with ensuring the security of their position at a domestic level than with the wider concern of enhancing the notion of African brotherhood with their neighbours. More important, the concept of the state which radicals like Nkrumah wanted to downplay and to replace with the idea of a greater African ‘commonwealth’ or union, did not transform itself into an effective policy.

To a certain extent, the Pan-Africanism that the radicals expounded was an expression of African nationalism. On one level, it was a nationalism that saw African interests as paramount and which sought to create an alliance with black peoples throughout Africa on
the basis of a shared history of oppression at the hands of white Europeans. On another level, it spoke of creating a high order which would replace the nation-state and territorial affiliation with a United States of Africa. The 'moderate-conservative' school of Pan-Africanism upheld the first part of this view as a necessary principle for the future political independence of the African continent, but there the similarities ended.

The 'Moderate-Conservative' States

The 'moderate-conservative' group was formed in 1961 at the Monrovia Conference and from then on it became known as the Monrovia Group. Before this merger there were two separate schools known as the 'moderate' school and the 'conservative' school. What brought the moderates and conservatives together in 1961 was the Congo crisis and an attempt to act as a counter-balancing force to the radical bloc's policy over that crisis.

Both the moderates and conservative school shared a belief in maintaining African independence, and upholding the principle of sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-intervention in the internal affairs of another state and ensuring autonomy in solving African problems. What distinguished both schools from the radicals was their rejection of the continental approach, or 'the ideal of a wholly unified continent through a series of inter-linking regional federations within which there would be a limitation on national sovereignty.' Both groups paid lip-service to the idea of African unity. The main difference between the moderates and conservatives, lies mainly in the colonial heritage of the camps.

Except Guinea, Mali and Togo, the conservative group was made up mainly of states that had been ruled by France. Many were in West and Equatorial Africa. The conservatives were also known as the Brazzaville Group after a meeting of heads of state in Congo (Brazzaville) from December 15 to 19, 1960, although they were formally known as the

54 On African nationalism, see George Shepherd, who states that Pan Africanism or African nationalism, as it is often referred to, took on various forms and 'posed many enigmas, making it difficult to generalize' about the political expressions and actions of African leaders. Aside from the position advocated by Nkrumah, Shepherd notes the following forms of African nationalism: 'the resurgent tribalism of the Ashanti, the fanaticism of the Mau Mau in Kenya, the blind bigotry of the Afrikaners in South Africa..., and the self-sacrificing determination of the will of Algeria to win independence at any price are all manifestations of the varied faces of African nationalism.' The Politics of African Nationalism: Challenge to American Policy (New York: Frederick A Praeger, 1962), p. 5. (Emphasis in original).

Union Africaine et Malgache (UAM) and later the Organization Commune Africaine et Malagche (OCAM). The conservative states were Cameroun, the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Côte d'Ivoire, Dahomey, Gabon, Madagascar, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Upper Volta. We will continue to call this group the ‘conservatives’ in this Chapter. Briefly stated, this group emphasised: (1) strong links with their former colonial masters, notably France and close ties with other European countries; (2) the maintenance of structures and boundaries inherited from their colonial masters. To this end, they were seeking to preserve the status quo. For most of the French-speaking states that formed this group, the unity expressed within the Pan-Africanist movement was not about developing an African government or political unification, but was about cooperation, especially economic, with other African states.

The moderate camp was not far removed from some positions expressed by the conservatives. Good calls them the ‘in-between group’ for they were not as extreme as the conservatives or the radical group, but instead positioned themselves as neutral states. Their aim was to ‘establish an all-inclusive organization’ that would transcend the ‘existing divisions within Africa.’ Such a body would seek to build cooperation and not an African ‘super-state.’ Again like the conservatives, they wanted to maintain links with the West, although they emphasised that this link was not to make them reliant on Western assistance. Finally, they upheld the principle of sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-intervention. The main states within the moderate camp in the early years of independence were Ethiopia and Liberia, later joined by Nigeria when it gained independence in October 1960. Somalia, Sudan and Togo also joined this group. Finally, like the conservatives, the moderates defined unity to mean nothing more than an alliance of states coming together to cooperate on economic or social issues.

Conclusion

56 The OCAM was established in May 1965 as a subregional economic group. On the establishment of the UAM see A. Tévoédjrè, Pan-Africanism in Action: An Account of the UAM, Occasional Papers in International Affairs, Number 11 (Harvard University Center for International Affairs, November 1965), esp. Chapter Two. Tévoédjrè was the first Secretary-General of the UAM.


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Those who were labelled radical states sought to promote unity to ensure the future of African independence. They were labelled radical in the sense that the impulse for such a policy was far stronger from this group than from the moderate-conservative group who only sought cooperation. We should note that the pattern of alliances was not only based on those who had a strong emotional commitment to unity versus those who were only concerned with remaining unchanged. There were, as Catherine Hoskyns notes, other 'marked regional and cultural differences (and embryonic ideological ones)' between these groups.\(^58\) However, despite these other differences, in Part Five of this Chapter, we use the divergent views of unity as a way of understanding how the practice of intervention evolved on the continent.

We should however note that membership within the radical or moderate-conservative group was not static, and changed according to the ruling elite within a particular state, geographical developments, international politics and ideological situations. Leaders aligned themselves with other states holding the same foreign policy perspective, common views or 'social philosophy' as themselves. We should therefore see these associations as fluid and constantly changing. More important, being in the same group did not mean that there was a consensus on all issues. As we shall see in Chapter Three, the Ghanian and Guinean split over the Congo crisis made it difficult and confusing to make sense of the relevance of these groupings for understanding intra-African affairs. Rupert Emerson notes the fluidity of the groups especially in the early days of post-colonial politics when he states that:

although it is tempting to read a deep and long-lasting ideological conflict into the split between these two major groups, many observers are inclined to be sceptical of the solidarity of each of the groups within itself and of the depth and sticking power of the ideological divergence. Certainly it is premature to assume that any political situation in Africa has as yet had time to achieve real stability. Both within each of the states and in the relations between them forces are at work which sharply challenge the existing order and may end by overthrowing it.\(^59\)


In sum, the raison d’être of Pan-Africanism is the attainment of freedom and independence on the one hand plus unity, peace and security, economic and social development on the other hand. As an ideology, Pan-Africanism was used by African leaders in the development of norms and principles that were to guide African international relations. While Africans on the continent took up the Pan-Africanist struggle of ensuring exclusivity, autonomy and independence for all states, not all of Africa’s leadership supported the radicals’ idea of unity. Rather, some leaders saw it as an ideal or as Albert Tévoédjrè states, a ‘glorious myth.’ However, despite this, the idea of African unity that was promoted by the ‘radical’ states of Africa had implications in the immediate period of the post-colonial era for how intervention and non-intervention were understood in intra-African affairs.

V. Intervention for the sake of Pan-African Unity

The main advocate of Pan-African unity within the radical group was Ghana. To understand the core of the radical position, this section will draw heavily on the role of Ghana. President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana can be seen ‘[a]s the primary architect of Pan-Africanism,...[believing] that Ghana had a special mission in Africa’s emancipation from colonialism and its political unification.’ The emotional commitment that Ghana and its supporters had for political unity was sufficiently strong in the first six years after independence for us to note its significance in intra-African affairs. In addition, the notion of unity serves to explain the particular view and action of certain states on the African continent especially in relation to problems of intervention in the internal affairs of another state. Finally, leaders used it as a ‘justifying slogan’ to sell their policies either to their domestic audiences or other African leaders.


61 G. Shepherd, (1962), p. 95. We also focus on Nkrumah’s own thinking on Pan-Africanism because there is a lack of available material written in English on other radical states, notably Guinea and Mali.

There were implications attached to the radical states’ notion of unity and the related theme of brotherhood. To a certain extent, it is possible to state that this sense of brotherhood led to an interventionist policy in order to achieve the goal of a formal political union. While trying to pursue political union, advocates of the radical school extended the meaning of brotherhood and unity to incorporate some notion of a right to influence the politics of another state, or more explicitly stated, to intervene in the affairs of other states. More important, it is possible to suggest that this sense of brotherhood, or more specifically, the slogan “We are all Africans” led to a policy of influencing the politics of various regions, especially where dissident movements who supported the ideology of unity were prominent. In addition, radical states supported those dissident movements in their attempts to overthrow their governments who they argued were neocolonialist or not “African” enough.\(^{63}\)

If a state was criticised for not being “African”, it meant that the leadership of that state still had strong links with its former colonial master. This, according to radical states undermined any possibility of ensuring unity and more important, Africa’s exclusivity over its affairs. Indeed, when Guinea, a radical state, gained its independence from France, Sékou Touré ensured that all links with France were severed. In the same way, Touré, along with Nkrumah, argued that African states, upon achieving independence should relinquish their links with their former colonial masters. Where states were still reliant on their former colonial masters, radical states supported dissident groups that were critical of their government’s policy claiming that their support to these groups was a “continuation” of their efforts at African liberation.\(^{64}\) Radical states did not see their actions as interference in the internal affairs of another state. Instead, they argued that the appeal to solidarity, unity or brotherhood, cut across state territory and consequently there was no notion of interference. Zartman accurately pinpoints what this sense of brotherhood, or “We are all Africans” means in the following sentence: ‘an African born in Guinea, can take part in Camerounian politics


with no...presumption of illegitimacy....There is likely to be some...criticism for carpetbagging, but not enough feeling of illegitimate interference in sovereign states politics to cause rejection.  The assistance given to dissident movements was an indication of how states were prepared to interpret principles of inter-states relations, especially the principle of non-intervention that had been agreed upon in Sanniquelle, Liberia on 19 July 1959 and at the Conference of Independent African states in Accra, Ghana between April 15-22, 1958 and later in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on June 14 1960.

It is not however surprising that radical states did not see their actions as intervention in the internal affairs of another state. Indeed, such thinking was logically arrived at. According to what Nkrumah preached, the idea of the state was a relic of colonialism, and in this new African order, there were no boundaries separating brothers from each another. Hence, there could be no sense of interference since radical states were transgressing no territory. Yet, it was a form of interference, at least from the perspective of those states who did not share Nkrumah’s brand of African unity.

States who were critical of Nkrumah’s Pan-Africanism argued that his activities were subversive. In fact, subversion, which African states (including Ghana and Guinea) described as a new form of intervention in the 1965 and 1970 UN declarations, became an important issue in the early days of post-colonialism, especially as it soon became intertwined with the idea of a supranational government in Africa. During the first conference of Independent African States in Accra (April 15-22, 1958), the Liberian Ambassador, Mr Simpson, described subversion as ‘undemocratic actions in overthrowing governments. He equated undemocratic actions with subversive acts.’ Simpson referred to the anxiety Liberia had expressed in relation to what she saw as Ghana’s ‘subversive and destructive ideologies’ of political union. Liberia, being a moderate-conservative state, advocated cooperation rather than the integration of states into a formal association of the kind advanced by Nkrumah. When a resolution was put forward on issues of intra-African affairs, the moderate-

\[\text{\textsuperscript{65}} I. W. Zartman, (1987), p. 189.\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{66}} I. Wallerstein, (1967), p. 92.\]

conservative states made implicit references to subversion when leaders affirmed their respect for territorial integrity and ‘abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country.’

Those who were critical of Nkrumah felt that there was enough evidence to justify their attacks against him. They focussed on the various institutions and agencies set up by Nkrumah for fulfilling the goal of unity. In fact, the aim of these agencies was to build up an alliance with other groups who supported the idea of Pan-African unity. At best, non-radical states throughout the West African region claimed that these institutions advocated subversive activities in other states, with the intent of weakening the target government. The most prominent institution set up in Accra, Ghana in 1958 was the Bureau of African Affairs (BAA) which was described as a ‘half-government, half-party organism.’ Alongside the BAA was the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute and the African Affairs Centre which Nkrumah established in 1961. According to Dr. Michael Dei-Anang who was Principal Secretary at the Ghanaian Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1959-1961 and Head of the Africa Affairs Secretariat from 1961 until the overthrow of Nkrumah in 1966, the BAA was to be the ‘sole instrument’ for Nkrumah’s strategy against colonialism. Its main function was to provide assistance in terms of financial aid and training to freedom fighters who were under colonial rule in other African states. However, in addition to this function, the BAA also provided asylum to opposition politicians from other independent African states, including the Kingdom of Sanwi (in Côte d'Ivoire), Cameroon and Niger. It was this latter function of the BAA that led many states and opponents of the radical group to conclude that Nkrumah’s action amounted to interference in the internal affairs of other states.

In their own research on Ghana’s external activity under Nkrumah, Arnold Hughes

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71 In this context, it is however worth noting that the radical states were not alone in pursuing subversive activities or providing asylum and assistance to opposition groups. Conservative states like Côte d'Ivoire harboured anti-Nkrumah movement groups who had fled from persecution in Ghana. However in an interview with the Ivorian Ambassador to Ghana, Zartman was informed that the Ivorian President, Felix Houphouët-Boigny, denied supporting attempts to overthrow Nkrumah, suggesting instead that the aim was to grant the exiles asylum, with the proviso that they support themselves. I. W. Zartman, (1987), p. 98.
and Roy May conclude that while his 'conservative neighbours' accused him of 'plotting their overthrow by providing clandestine military training and support to dissidents,' no concrete evidence existed to suggest that Nkrumah sent his troops to other countries, except for when troops fought for the United Nations in the Congo as we shall discuss in Chapter Three.  

Although no evidence was forthcoming, a report written by the military government that overthrew Nkrumah in 1966 gave details of supposed subversive activities by the BAA. In a section entitled 'Subversion against Independent African States', the report highlighted the use of the BAA to overthrow independent African governments with the hope of replacing them 'with regimes that would be subservient to the policies of Nkrumah.' The report went on to provide what it defined as evidence to support its claim that Nkrumah had established an elaborate organisational structure not only to support opposition groups living in exile, but also to infiltrate regional territories like Côte d'Ivoire, Togo and Upper Volta in the pursuit of his objective of African unity. Of all these, the most serious allegation was that Ghana participated in the assassination of the President of Togo, Sylvanus Olympio on 13 January 1963, although no adequate evidence was provided to prove this allegation.  

Although there was no concrete evidence supplied in this report to suggest that Nkrumah did send troops to support dissidents groups, it was largely Nkrumah's militant brand of Pan-Africanism and his vocal support for a radical ideology that led many to believe that he pursued subversive activities.

In addition to Ghana, other radical states such as Algeria, Guinea and Mali were said to give aid to local opposition groups in neighbouring states as part of their foreign policy agenda. As Vernon McKay states, '[m]ilitant [i.e. radical] states..., which seek to convert other states to their views, [found] subversion a useful tool for achieving certain foreign-policy objectives.' However, we need to understand two important points about the nature of the interventionist policies that the radical states advocated in the early stages of post-


colonial African politics. First, although intervention as a policy was a significant tool that was available to Nkrumah in the pursuit of his objective of political union, according to W. Scott Thompson, 'he never decided specifically to adopt it as his policy.' Rather, intervention came largely 'by accident and in response to specific challenges' notably over the Congo, as we shall see in the following Chapter. Second, although '[t]he broader goal of Pan-Africanism, referring either to political unification or to political alignment, constitutes a temptation to use military force,' the method applied and supported by radicals, but in particular Nkrumah, was not the threat or use of military force, but the alternative method of subversion for intervening in the policy-making process of other neighbouring states. This method was employed not because it was better, but because it was cheaper, easier to deny and, more important from the radicals' perspective, they maintained that it never explicitly contravened Article 3 of the OAU Charter.

In addition to subversion, another form of intervention in Africa during this time was propaganda. Zartman states that propaganda is typical of the type of intervention pursued by African states. Propaganda became a useful tool for radical states to question the policies adopted by other governments whose policies were somehow deemed 'wrong.' According to Zartman, '[p]ropagandistic support finds its way into the target country through opposition (often clandestine) press and tracts, and through radio broadcasts.' Under the presidency of Nkrumah, Ghana was said to have helped various groups and movements by supplying them with ideological material and information to use against to their governments. For example, Ghana was accused of helping groups like the Sawaba in Niger, the Action Group in Nigeria, the Sanwi movement in Côte d'Ivoire, and the Togolese opposition

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78 Zartman states that the use of military force was excluded from intra-African affairs 'for essentially negative reasons: the means for such a venture [were] lacking, and Africa’s ideological values and Cold War positions inhibit[ed] the use of military force,' (1987), p. 9.
80 I. W. Zartman, (1987), p. 87. In addition to subversion and propaganda, other activities regard as intervention in Africa were conspiracy, terrorism and guerilla warfare, (p. 94).
Many states belonging to the moderate-conservative group became suspicious of the interventionist tendencies contained in the foreign policies of the radical states. It is mainly because they suspected the radical states' foreign policy that as early as the first conference of independent African states and the second held in Addis Ababa in 1960, the principle of non-interference was asserted by those already moderate independent states. The radical states also supported these principles, however, their desire to create a formal association of states and the pooling of sovereign states into a political union, implicitly established them as favouring or supporting a policy of intervention to meet their objective. Vincent Thompson notes the reasoning behind the inclusion of non-intervention in the early stages of intra-African affairs when he states that,

The interesting point is that underlying these declarations of 'non-interference' was the fear that the then 'radicals' in the Pan-African movement as represented by Ghana-Guinea-Mali, Algeria and the United Arab Republic...might attempt to influence, through organisations or by other means, the citizens of the less radical African states. A formality of this kind as stated in 'non-interference' could make political unification more difficult to achieve.  

Wallerstein also comes to a similar conclusion when he analysed what the principle of non-intervention meant for the moderate-conservative school:

the second principle of the OAU Charter, “noninterference in the internal affairs of States”, which all signatories were bound to uphold, was clear and straightforward. It required that independent African states refrain from active support for opposition movements in other states, aside from [bare] asylum, and even the right to asylum was occasionally questioned.  

However, those who advocated the need for a formal political union regarded their activity in a different manner. Again, as Wallerstein observes:

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84 I. Wallerstein, (1967), p. 98. The idea of African unity was placed in the OAU Charter, although the term was never properly defined. Article II (i) of the Charter states that one of the purposes of the organisation is to "(a) promote unity and solidarity of African states."
The proponents of unity as movement (i.e. the radicals) were equally indignant about interference by outsiders. But for them the significant unit was Africa as a whole. Within Africa, all were brothers and one could aid brothers. Outside interference was action by non-African powers in African independent States - or the continuation of colonial rule.85

Judging by Wallerstein's interpretation of the views of both groups, it seems that there was certainly a moral strain about what was perceived as legitimate and illegitimate interference. What Wallerstein's interpretation of the radical view meant was that the act of supporting parties to an internal dispute, either by indirect (e.g. the provision of aid) or direct means (i.e. military participation), was justifiable if Africans pursued the action. Radicals only labelled it intervention if the actors involved were from outside the continent. Therefore, radical states like Ghana viewed their actions differently: when Ghana intervened in a neighbouring state's affairs, that action was not to be attacked as Ghanian subversion or intervention, rather it was defended as African solidarity and unity. Interestingly enough, intervention was not justified in the traditional notions of self-defence, rather as Zartman observes,

[r]evolutionary or ideological universalism [became] important as an additional justification for interference because it authorizes far more intense types of intervention than mere regional identification....

...the need to explain state intervention in terms stronger than the mere confusion of geographic identities leads to the use of ideological justifications. The state becomes a base for a broader political movement of extended national dimensions; the ideological movement takes over territorial units of the extended nation and comes to the aid of its believers in other such units for the supposed good of the believers, units, and the entire expanded nation.86

This corresponds to Northedge and Donelan's claim that we noted in Chapter One that leaders who shared the same social philosophy with other leaders felt that they had some 'right to intervene' to protect and defend that view. While they do not go on to examine in depth the supposed ideological positions that existed among the various groupings on the

continent, Hughes and May suggest this as one way of explaining transnational military intervention among black African states.

We can see a further sign of the seriousness that states were giving to the problem of subversive activities in the decision taken by some to boycott the OAU Heads of State Summit meeting held in Accra, Ghana in 1965. We can quote a number of speeches and statements given by many OCAM states (i.e. the conservatives), and an outline of the charges levelled against Ghana at a special Council of Ministers meeting in Lagos, Nigeria on June 10-13 1965 to illustrate how some states were taking the issue of subversion seriously. These states discussed the allegations against Ghana within the context of the wider issue on the ‘Prohibition of Intervention as a Norm.’ In a communiqué from the Afro-Malagasy Organisation Conference held at Nouakchott, Mauritania, President Ould Daddah of Mauritania summed up the feeling of some member-states:

They strongly condemn the action of certain States, notably Ghana, which offer a welcome to agents of subversion and organize training camps on their territory. They have consequently decided to bring the matter to the O.A.U’s attention, and to appeal to the...feelings of all continental Heads of State so that a climate of co-operation in equality may replace...the present climate of mistrust and of leadership by intervention in the internal affairs of other States.*^

During the session, Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa of Nigeria (a moderate state) argued that:

It was in the month of February that I learned with grave concern that fourteen of our member states had decided to boycott the second ordinary session of the Heads of State and Government scheduled to be held next September in Accra. Subsequently on 22 April, a delegation of six members...came to Lagos and expostulated with me along the same line....

In subscribing to the principles of the Charter, as Ghana and other member states did, every single one of them pledged not to interfere in the domestic affairs of one another. They also pledged that they would not allow their capitals to become headquarters of subversion against one another.

But contrary to the undertaking, the fourteen states had found that Ghana had become the headquarters of subversion against several African states; that Ghana had established training camps for subversive elements from African states; and that Ghana provided very generously every possible facility to dissident elements from African states to overthrow the legitimate governments of their home countries. Opposition elements from African

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*^ Cited in *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, p. 20893, August 7-14, 1965.
states were being sent to train abroad and they were returning to training camps in Ghana, to further their subversive interests. In realization of this, the fourteen heads of state resolved at Nouakchott that, as long as Ghana continued to harbor these dissidents and subversive elements and promote in concrete terms their subversive intentions, they would not go to Accra. 88

In response to these allegations, Ghana defended itself by stating that:

There has been a string of attacks, of abuses, of calumnies, and insinuations all against Ghana, and in particular against our President, Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah because it is said that we are harbouring people engaged in subversive activities against our neighbours....

No country can, on very serious ground, refuse to accept people who for one reason or other disagree with their governments and therefore decide to leave their countries...

Therefore, far from charging Ghana as being a haven, a harbour for refugees, one should rather compliment and congratulate Ghana for its humanitarian decision to open its doors to people who say they have fears for their lives and are fleeing from their countries.... 89

While members of the OCAM cited subversion as their main reason for wanting to boycott the heads of state summit meeting, Zdenek Červenka noted that 'the roots of the hostility of the OCAM states towards Ghana went deeper than' the accusations of subversion. 'The [F]rancophone States had always resented Ghana's militant posture in African politics... in particular Kwame Nkrumah's criticism of OCAM's support for Moise Tshombe, the secessionist leader of Katanga who later became the Prime Minister of the Congo.' Hence their aim was 'to use the OAU Summit in Accra to drive Ghana into political

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88 'Prohibition of Intervention as a Norm', Fifth Extraordinary Session of the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity, Lagos, 10-13 June 1965. Full text in W. Thompson and I. W. Zartman, 'The development of Norms in the African System' in Y. El-Ayouty, (ed.) The Organization of African Unity After Ten Years: Comparative Perspective (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), pp. 24-31, esp. pp. 24-25. Niger's accusations against Nkrumah can also be seen in the same text, pp. 28. Niger provided evidence to substantiate its claims that Ghana was training exiles from Côte d'Ivoire, Dahomey and Nigeria and assisting them on infiltrating their respective territories. Niger issued a communiqué on October 14th which accusing Ghana of subversion, details of which can be found in the ARB, October 1-31, 1964, p. 166BC. Also see the statement of allegation made by Niger against Ghana's subversive activities on January 12th when Ghana was said to be part of the subversive activity that the exiled Sawaba leader, Djibo Bakary, is alleged to have been conducting in Ghanian territory, ARB, January 1-31, 1965, p. 220C and February 1-28, 1965, p. 244C. The charges of subversion were made by the members of the OCAM in particular by Côte d'Ivoire, Dahomey and Upper Volta.

isolation. Despite this, the accusations made against Ghana, fuelled the decision to reinforce Article 3 of the OAU Charter on subversion. As stated in Chapter One, member-states established the 'Declaration on the Problem of Subversion' at the Second Session of the Assembly of Heads of State, in Accra Ghana in October 1965. Ironically, three months after he had also signed this declaration, Nkrumah's government was overthrown in a coup. The inclusion of subversion as one of the norms that guided intra-African affairs was in response to the particular nature of relations between African states. Many states in Africa were weak and politically unstable, thus making them susceptible to outside intervention. Certainly, the norm did not exist in the UN Charter before the OAU declaration and was instructive in the UN declaration on the 'Inadmissibility of Intervention' in December of the same year.

Conclusion

The purpose of this Chapter has been to consider whether Pan-Africanism and its central tenets of exclusivity and unity serve as a source of the evolution of intervention alongside the principle of non-intervention in intra-African affairs. Although the notion of exclusivity is relevant for understanding intervention, we argued in Part Three that its usefulness was not apparent for understanding how the practice of intervention evolved in the immediate years of post-colonial Africa. However, we focussed on the notion of exclusivity because it partly explained why the OAU was created. More important, as we have argued, the notion of exclusivity and unity was interrelated. African unity was only possible if African states had an exclusive right to solve their problems, and to achieve this, a system of self-regulation was necessary. The OAU became that system of self-regulation. Furthermore, as we shall note in more detail in Chapter Three, the OAU was a symbol of African exclusivity and unity over its affairs.

We said that a more useful source to begin our investigation on how the practice of intervention has evolved is the notion of African unity. This is because the diverging groupings that developed on the form of unity had implications for how norms and principles

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90 Z. Červenka, The Unfinished Quest for Unity: Africa and the OAU (London: Julian Freidmann Publishers, Ltd., 1977), pp. 74-75. The support given to Tshombe by the OCAM will be discussed in further detail in the following Chapter.
of intra-African affairs developed. Although the notion of unity was only an aspiration that a few leaders shared, it has been worth analysing because it became divisive in the early days of post-colonialism, especially in the various foreign policy approaches and methods radical states pursued in ensuring this unity. Certainly, as we argued, the notion of African unity became a ‘justifying slogan’ among a group of states who, in the end, objected to the identity or political philosophy of regimes in neighbouring states. The fact that leaders like Nkrumah and Touré alluded to it to justify their support for dissident movements raised suspicion among the moderate-conservative states that unity was synonymous with intervention. Therefore, the moderate-conservative states passed a series of resolutions in the early days of post-colonialism on the rules governing intra-African affairs, most notably on the problem of subversion.

In sum, we had tried to address the question we posed at the start of this study: is it possible to find sources from which to understand the practice of intervention in Africa by African states? We have argued that Pan-Africanism and its central themes (especially African unity) serve as a useful starting point and useful framework in which to place African thoughts on intervention and non-intervention. By focussing on cases of African involvement in internal disputes in the next Chapters, we consider in specific detail how the central themes of Pan-Africanism are useful in understanding the practice of intervention in Sub-Saharan African.
CHAPTER THREE

1957-1970: THE EARLY POST-COLONIAL ERA AND INTRA-AFRICAN CONFLICTS

Introduction

Having suggested in the previous Chapter that there are two themes within Pan-Africanism that can help us understand how the practice of intervention evolved, the purpose of this Chapter is to consider their usefulness in the context of internal conflicts on the continent. More specifically, the aim is to consider how far individual African states used them to justify or support intervention in the internal affairs of other states. If most states did accept the idea of unity and exclusivity, they would have been impelled to intervene against those states who threatened the possibility of both. An underlying theme of this Chapter is to consider whether the particular interpretation of Pan-Africanism adopted by individual states led them to be either pro or anti-interventionist in their foreign policies.

This Chapter is divided into three parts. Part One introduces the Congo civil war (1960-1965) and asks if the idea of unity and exclusivity are useful for understanding why some states intervened in this internal conflict. The Congo crisis is a pivotal case study in this Chapter as it was the first serious conflict that showed how African leaders developed norms and principles to govern intra-African affairs. Many issues raised in the previous Chapter reassert themselves again, most notably the divisions between the radical and the moderate-conservative states and the creation of the OAU in 1963. Indeed, both events, (in particularly the division into various groups) were largely influenced by the Congo crisis.

While the main focus of this Chapter is on the Congo, other events within the historical range of this Chapter are considered for what they might tell us about how the practice of intervention evolved on the continent. In Part Two of this Chapter, we look brief at the response of African states towards the Nigerian civil war that broke out in 1967.

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1 Although the Congo represented an instance of Cold War politics played out on the African continent we try to isolate its impact on the conflict so that we can understand the position of African states towards the subject of intervention and non-intervention in internal disputes. Certainly, both superpowers (US and the Soviet Union) became active participants in African politics in the post-colonial era. Their presence along with other non-Africans and the UN ensured that the Congo crisis became an international conflict. For a comprehensive analysis of non-African participation in the Congo and other African conflicts see in K. Somerville, (1990), esp. pp. 11-21.
Finally in Part Three, we consider the position adopted by African leaders over the Union of South Africa and the particular question of apartheid. We stated in Chapter One that internal disputes can arise in situations where individuals or groups felt that they were not being treated equally or where they felt that their interests or honour was being challenged. Using the definition provided by Northedge and Donelan, we also stated that internal disputes arise in situations where 'groups within the society are in conflict over how activities or possessions shall be allotted to them.' These types of disputes 'take the form of a struggle to make or change a rule delimiting the scope of the group.' It is based on this definition that we consider South Africa in this study. Both the Nigerian civil war and South Africa illustrate how other factors beyond the notion of unity and exclusivity impinge on the thinking on intervention and non-intervention by African states.

I. The Congolese civil war and African states: Defining the rules of intra-African affairs

The year 1960 not only marked the emergence of eighteen new African states in the international system, of which thirteen were former French colonies, but it also highlighted the difficult transition that faced newly independent states as they left the colonial fold. The Congo was the first complex civil war to emerge in post-colonial Africa, and more important, it clearly illustrates the role played and the policies adopted by various African states. It became a symbol of the problems facing newly independent states who were trying to adjust to life after gaining independence from their colonial masters. As Robert Good states, '...the Congo crisis permits a relatively undistorted examination of the competing positions of the


3 As we shall see later in this Chapter, these newly independent states from the French colonies became prominent players in the policy adopted by African states over the Congo crisis. The states were closely linked to Paris and were to take decisions over the Congo and later the Algerian question that would cause bitterness and division among the various alliances in Africa.

new statesmen on some of the basic issues of postcolonial politics. Similarly, Francis Singleton points out that the crisis in the Congo serves as ‘an excellent prism’ through which to examine the development of African attitudes towards the ‘rules of the game for relations between African states.’ The ‘rules of the game’ were issues concerning the legitimacy of secession and rebellion, intervention by foreign powers, the criteria for legitimacy of an African government, the legitimacy of an African state aiding an opposition movement, African intervention in the internal affairs of another state, and the role of the OAU in intra-African affairs. The notion of African unity and exclusivity cuts across all these areas. The Congo is a significant case study, for not only did it force Africans to consider the pattern of relations among themselves, but it vividly drew out the differences of opinion that existed among African states on how to respond to internal conflicts. The various views, as stated in the previous Chapter were bound by the politics of alliance and cooperation (i.e. the moderate-conservative view) versus the politics of unity and union (i.e. the radical view). This Chapter uses these divergent views as a source through which to reveal how the idea and practice of intervention evolved on the continent.

It is not the purpose of this section to provide an account of the conflict in the Congo, although it does provide a brief and simplified version of the central characters and the main problems. Neither does it concentrate solely on the specific role of each state, but rather on the broad positions and manoeuvres of the competing groups. Having said this, we shall, on occasion, draw out the specific policies of those states that took a prominent lead in trying to solve the Congo crisis. To this end, we will pay particular attention to Ghana’s role.


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was among the first African states to provide military and technical aid in support of the leader of the central government of the Congo, Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba.8

Our discussion of the various views that existed concerning the Congo and which revealed the interventionist language of some African leaders can be found in the first phase of the crisis: 1960-1962. By the end of the first phase, the divisions were still apparent, but African states were promoting a more unified voice within the OAU. When the civil war broke out again between 1964-1965, the unity that Africans had found in the OAU was shattered and some states developed a strong interventionist line in resolving the crisis in the Congo.

Phase one of the civil war, 1960-1962: The diverging views of the parties to the conflict

The Congo was granted independence on 30 June 1960, thus signalling a successful beginning to the liberation movement, with Patrice Lumumba as Prime Minister and Joseph Kasavubu as President. However, the rejoicing at the birth of another new African state was halted when conflict broke out in July of the same year. We can define the main parties to the conflict and the dividing line between them according to the following categories developed by Robert Good.9

a) The ‘nationalists’, led by Premier Patrice Lumumba, leader of the Mouvement National Congolais (MNC) and Vice Premier Antoine Gizenga sought a unified Congolese state under the leadership of a strong central government. The emphasis was upon unity as opposed to the break up of the Congolese state. For the nationalists, the presence of Belgium, their previous colonial master, was a major impediment to the creation of a centralised system of government that would no longer be dependent upon external powers for its survival. The aim was to remove the Belgians from the region as they represented the politics of neocolonialism. Lumumba was however deposed by President Kasavubu in September 1960

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and arrested by Colonel Joseph Mobutu in December of the same year. He was subsequently murdered in January 1961. However, some of Lumumba's supporters led by Gizenga, established *de facto* control in the northeastern region, with Stanleyville as their "capital."

b) The 'secessionists' were led by Moise Tshombé. The secessionist argued that the present structure of the Congo was a hallmark of colonialism; instead the political order of the state should be reconstructed along tribal lines as opposed to a single unified state which the Belgian colonialists artificially constructed. On 11 July 1960, Tshombé declared Katanga, said to be the richest province, independent and ruled as president.10

c) The 'moderates' included several prominent figures: President Joseph Kasavubu, leader of the Association des Bakongo pour l'Unification, l'Expansion et la Défense de la langue Kikongo (ABAKO), Colonel Joseph Mobutu and Cyrille Adoula. Like the nationalists, this group advocated the idea of a unified Congo, but there the similarities ended. The moderates emphasised the politics of federalism in opposition to Lumumba's centralism. Their criticisms of the Belgium presence were mere denunciations, preferring instead to accept Belgian assistance. The removal of Lumumba and the creation of *de facto* rule by his supporters meant that two leaders were controlling the Congo: Kasavubu and his supporters were mainly based in Leopoldville, while Lumumba's supporters were in Stanleyville.

*Intervention and the Radical States' Appeal for Unity and Exclusivity over the Congolese civil war*

What was significant about the differences among the conflicting parties to the crisis in the Congo was that they were the same as the differences among the independent states of Africa, although the divisions among African states were not visible until the Lumumba-Kasavubu split and the dissolution of the central government. African states then began to take sides with the various parties to the conflict. Before the split, African states had been

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10 The fact that Katanga was an area rich in mineral resources could also explain Tshombé motives for wanting to secede.
working together at the level of the UN to ensure that it properly dealt with the civil war.\textsuperscript{11} For example, in a debate concerning the civil war at the UN General Assembly, many African states had voted together to remove the presence of all Belgian and other foreign military and paramilitary personnel and political advisers not under United Nations Command.\textsuperscript{12} In fact, during the early stages of the conflict African leaders were anxious to uphold the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states. Yet as Vincent Thompson argues, some were also aware...that the factional fighting in the Congo was not conducive to [African] unity.\textsuperscript{13} An apparent contradiction existed between both goals of non-intervention and political unity; if Congo were to secede, it would undermine the progress of political unity that radical states sought in Africa. The aim was to prevent the breakup of the Congo, but would this not undermine the principle of non-intervention?

The desire to build a unified Africa with no disintegration of former colonial states made the objective of non-intervention not only impossible, but incompatible with such a goal. In other words, radical states could not support the principle of non-intervention while seeking the political unification of African states. Radicals defined African states who did not see political unification as the only way forward for the continent as un-African, and raised doubts about their independence and legitimacy.\textsuperscript{14} Where there existed groups or African leaders that supported these radical Pan-Africanist ideals (e.g. like Lumumba’s nationalist movement), the aim was to give them support, although the support given was never properly defined.

For the radicals, Lumumba’s call for a strong centralised government in the Congo conformed with the goals for African unity. When Lumumba died, the radical states of Africa did not recognise Kasavubu as Head of State, but instead gave support to the Vice Premier

\textsuperscript{11} C. Legum, (1965), p. 49.


\textsuperscript{13} V. Thompson, (1969), pp.142-143.

and Lumumba loyalist, Antoine Gizenga. Tshombé gained support from the Francophone conservative states, while Kasavubu, Mobutu and Adoula had support from states within the moderate African bloc. As we discuss below, it is the position taken by these various African groupings that provides a framework for discussion about intervention in African affairs.

Of the three groups, the radical group is immediately relevant to our task of understanding how the practice of intervention evolved on the continent. It has been suggested that the support given to the nationalist-Lumumba cause by the radicals could be characterised as promoting interventionist policies, at least of a political nature. While our stated objective is to see how far the radicals used the idea of unity and exclusivity to justify intervention, Francis Singleton argues that neocolonialism serves as a useful starting point in understanding the actions of the radical states. Certainly, as suggested in Chapter Two, it served as a convenient slogan, not only to support the radical states’ appeal for a formal political union among African states, but also for justifying their direct action in particular conflicts.

The radicals were critical of the fact that some African states seemed pseudo independent in nature because these states were still reliant on their former colonial masters. From the radical perspective, such reliance meant that these states could not be ‘truly’ sovereign or independent. Furthermore, this reliance fostered neocolonialism. The threat of neocolonialism was enough justification for supporting Lumumba’s fight against Belgium who Lumumba argued wanted to undermine the Congo’s progress towards independence. The key word for the radicals and the Congo nationalists was ‘balkanization’ or the threat of it. That is, the carving up of African states into smaller and inevitably, from the radical perspective, dependent states. According to the radicals, African states (or leaders) that encouraged neocolonialism were ‘stooges’ of the West and they were mainly the conservative


\[18\] F. Singleton, (1968), pp. 27-29 and 35.
Francophone states or secessionist leaders like Tshombé.\(^{19}\) In a speech to the National Assembly in Accra, Ghana on 8 August 1960, Nkrumah warned about the dangers of balkanization in Africa stating that he ‘had in mind Katanga’s claim to independence when I said, “The new colonialism creates client states, independent in name but in point of fact pawns of the colonial power that is supposed to have given them independence.”’\(^{20}\)

While neocolonialism may serve as a useful starting point in understanding the position adopted by the radical states over the Congo, this study argues that alongside this ideological justification, the Pan-Africanist ideas on unity and exclusivity are also powerful tools. In many ways, all three bear remarkable similarities. If, as the radical states argued, the greatest threat to African independence was outside interference from the neocolonialist in the West, then the only way of ensuring Africa’s independence was by creating a Union of African states that would be strong enough to maintain Africa’s autonomy over its own affairs. If we accept this view, why then did leaders like Nkrumah request the presence of the UN in the Congo, when its involvement meant that the politics of the Cold War and the neocolonialists in the West could exacerbate the conflict? Surely the presence of the UN meant the involvement of non-African states in African affairs? Was this not a direct challenge to the notion of African exclusivity and the desire to achieve “African solutions for African problems”?

Not all the radicals supported the involvement of the UN, seeing the organisation as an accomplice of the neo-colonialists. Some radicals voiced their criticisms against the UN when they met for the Casablanca Conference in January 1961. As Margaret Roberts states:

> By the end of 1960 every one of the [radical] States represented which had troops in the Congo had threatened to withdraw them, and Guinea had already started to do so. They had taken this step in protest against the failure of the [UN operation], as they saw it, to fulfill the Mandate under which it

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\(^{19}\) R. Good, (1962), p. 50. Radicals also referred to these states as the ‘enemy within...the unwitting puppet, the victim of a colonially corrupted mind, unable to distinguish between national and colonial interests.’ See V. Thompson, (1969), p. 158 who also lists the various names attached to the conservatives as a consequence of their policy. For example, the conservatives (and to a certain extent, the moderates) were seen as ‘sluggards’, ‘traditionalists’ and ‘agents of imperialism’ while radicals were seen as ‘progressives’ and ‘militants’.

\(^{20}\) K. Nkrumah, *The Challenge of the Congo*, p. 29. Also see ‘An Address to the National Assembly’, Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, August 8 1960, pp. 8-9. It is worth noting that in all his works, Nkrumah never explained why splitting up states into smaller states encouraged colonialism.
had been established.\textsuperscript{21}

Guinea, Mali and the UAR pressed the radicals (which began calling itself the Casablanca Group after the conference) to withdraw from the UN. In a communiqué detailing the conference measures, the states present asserted that they ‘reserve[d] the right “to take appropriate action”’ if the nature of the UN operation did not accord with its original mandate. Guinea, Mali and the UAR later withdrew their troops from Opération des Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC).\textsuperscript{22} In so doing, President Sékou Touré of Guinea wondered why Lumumba had allowed the UN to enter the Congo. President Touré argued that the UN operation had produced negative action because, as he saw it, the organization had encouraged the secessionist movement and the ‘chaos sought by the Belgian aggressors.’\textsuperscript{23} In a speech delivered on 1 July 1961 Touré remarked that,

\begin{quote}
Today, one may wonder why President Lumumba appealed to the [UN], that organization which, in the Congolese issue, has disclosed itself as a tool of colonialism, specialized in diversion, corruption, and treason.... Confidence in the [UN], respect for colonial legality, have been too expensive for the Congo and Africa.\textsuperscript{24}
\end{quote}

However, despite Touré’s criticism of the UN, Ghana had supported the idea of a strong UN force in the Congo from the start. In this way, Nkrumah was able to contribute Ghanian troops to ONUC rather than the unilateral provision of military aid.\textsuperscript{25} Nkrumah had convinced Lumumba of the need to invite the UN to provide peacekeeping troops. According to Jitendra Mohan, two reasons existed. First, Ghana saw the UN as the best means of removing Belgian troops from the Congo. The second reason is however more fundamental

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{21} M. Roberts, ‘Summitry at Casablanca’ \textit{Africa South in Exile}, Vol. 5, No. 3, April-June 1961, p. 68. For a analysis of the debate on the Congo and the UN at Casablanca see pp. 68-71. See also K. Nkrumah, (1967), Chapter 9.

\textsuperscript{22} M. Roberts, (1961), p. 70.


\textsuperscript{24} S. Touré, (n.d.), p. 160 and 161.

\end{quote}
and is in keeping with the desire of ensuring African exclusivity over its own affairs. As Mohan states,

by its prompt and effective intervention the U.N. should bar the way to all unilateral 'foreign intervention'. Ghana's main concern was to 'localise' or, rather, Africanise the crisis, by forestalling all non-African, and in particular imperialist and neo-colonial, intervention. This the Ghana Government sought to ensure not only by claiming for the U.N. a virtual monopoly of all outside intervention in the Congo, but even more by its demand that O.N.U.C should predominantly be an African affair composed mainly of African troops and by its related emphasis that the independent states, which bore a 'special responsibility' for developments in Africa, should maintain 'a positive solidarity' and a complete unity of outlook and policy over the Congo.²⁶

Thus, Nkrumah wanted to use the UN to propel the nationalist cause within the Congo. We should therefore see the UN as instrumental in Nkrumah's idea of wanting to ensure that the Pan-African idea of unity was reinforced in the Congo. Thus, ONUC was to be the 'arm' of the radical-nationalist policy and a means of guaranteeing that the 'African revolution' became a reality.²⁷ Seen this way, we should characterise Ghana's intervention in the Congo crisis as political in nature, preferring to mediate within the framework of the UN operation.

However, there were suggestions, though not fully substantiated, that Ghana conducted subversive activities while displaying support for Lumumba at the early stages of the conflict. Apart from the presence of military advisers and the supply of technical aid, the only evidence of Ghana's support for Lumumba was contained within statements, press releases and speeches delivered at the National Assembly in Ghana or at the UN General Assembly. These statements and pronouncements may allow us to suggest that the support and argument provided by the radicals were tantamount to an interventionist policy or at least gave credence to the idea that if the UN operation failed to secure peace in the Congo, then 'action must be taken outside the world organization.'²⁸ So for example, in a news

²⁶ J. Mohan, (1969), p. 375. (Emphasis in original). Francis Singleton also raises the same point when he states that the role of the UN was to provide 'support for whatever policy Africans wished to carry out — the "African solution,"' (1968), p. 24.


conference on 6 August 1960, Nkrumah stated that:

if no United Nations solution is forthcoming, Ghana would lend such armed assistance as the Republic of the Congo might request. Ghana would provide this assistance even though it meant Ghana and Congo had to fight alone against Belgian troops and other forces maintained and supplied from Belgium.  

In another speech to the National Assembly on 8 August in which he requested a mandate for the complete mobilisation of all Ghanaian armed force if no UN solution was forthcoming, Nkrumah argued that:

The struggle of the Congo is therefore our struggle. It is incumbent on us to take our stand by our brothers in the Congo in the full knowledge that only Africa can fight for its destiny. In this struggle we shall not reject the assistance and support of our friends, but we will yield to no enemy, however strong.

Despite accusations of intervention by Ghana, Singleton argues that the methods employed by Nkrumah were ‘diplomacy and persuasion’ and not ‘bribery, military aid, or conspiracy’ as had been suggested by Nkrumah’s opponents. Nkrumah rejected criticisms that his policy over the Congo amounted to intervention. In an address to the UN General Assembly in which he outlined Ghana’s support for Lumumba before his assassination, Nkrumah justified his actions in terms of Pan-African unity and called for an African High Command to take charge of the conflict:

It is because of this viewpoint that I am being charged with officious intervention, and meddling with affairs, in the Congo. How can Ghana pursue an isolationist policy in African affairs, when she is committed to a policy of African unity....

29 Cited in C. Hoskyns, The Congo: A Chronology of Events: January, 1960-December 21, 1961 (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 10. Earlier in the conflict, Lumumba asked for military assistance from Ghana, Guinea and other members of the radical-Casablanca group as a consequence of what he saw as UN failure to remove the threat posed by Tshombé over the secession of Katanga Province. Elsewhere Hoskyns argues that Nkrumah’s threat towards the UN and also that of states like Guinea was aimed at bringing ‘pressure’ upon the UN. In fact, despite the pressure applied towards the UN, Nkrumah had expressed confidence in its operation and encouraged Lumumba to cooperate with the UN. See Hoskyns, (1965), pp. 36-38.


In the event of the United Nations failure to comply with these proposals in conformity with the provisions of the United Nations Charter, it will be my bounden duty to secure, with the assistance of the other African States, the establishment of an African High Command to take immediate action to restore law and order so that the legal Government, headed by Premier Lumumba, can operate.\textsuperscript{32}

In another speech at the opening of the Africa Unity House in London in March 1961, Nkrumah replied his critics by stating:

When I am accused by stooges of interfering in the internal affairs of other African countries, my answer is that every true African nationalist has a duty to concern himself with the present-day problems facing Africa.\textsuperscript{33}

Such action could not be defined as intervention from the radical perspective. Rather, Ghana’s actions towards the Congo fitted into the wider strategy of ridding Africa of colonialism and the culture of dependency from former masters. Until all traces of neocolonialism were removed, ‘tactics that less radical minds might condemn as intervention or subversion remain perfectly fair game.’\textsuperscript{34} Providing assistance to the nationalist cause was a logical step and did not, in Nkrumah’s eyes, constitute interference or subversion. Rather, Nkrumah defined it as one African country coming to the aid of another in distress. More important, solving a crisis like the Congo was imperative for those who held onto the belief

\textsuperscript{32} Note verbale dated 16 December 1960 from the representative of Ghana to the President of the General Assembly, transmitting the text of an address by the President of the Republic of Ghana, \textit{UN Document A/4661}, 16 December 1960 in \textit{GAOR, Fifteenth Session, Agenda item 85: The Situation in the Republic of the Congo}. Nkrumah advocated an African High Command to prevent external forces from participating in that conflict. Since the creation of the OAU, its member states have studied the idea at the level of Council of Ministers and Heads of State Summit meetings with no consensus on whether to develop such a mechanism on the continent. For analysis of the initial discussions surrounding the idea of an OAU defence mechanism, see D. Meyers, ‘An Analysis of OAU’s Effectiveness at Regional Collective Defense’ in Y. El-Ayouty, (ed.), (1975), pp. 118-132 and J. Woronoff, ‘The Case for an African Defense Organization’, \textit{Africa Report}, Vol. 16, No. 6, June 1971, pp. 23-25. It was stated that if an African force was to be established, it would not be used for intervention in the internal affairs of state. Instead its actions would be directed towards two objectives: ‘to protect the OAU Members against aggression [South Africa and Portugal being regarded as potential aggressors], and to support liberation movements engaged in armed struggle.’ See Z. Červenka, (1977), pp. 38-44, esp. p. 38. We will discussed the idea of an African High Command in Chapter Six.


of creating a Union of African states. A strong central and unified system of government as opposed to the creation of smaller, weaker states, was a necessary condition for African unity and fed into radical states’ perception of the new order that needed to prevail on the continent. As Patricia Wild observes, ‘for these states, ideological considerations overshadowed the principle of respect for the territorial integrity of states’ and inevitably the rule of non-intervention. More important, these states saw their position as justifiable within their interpretation of Pan-African unity. Indeed, as we argued in Chapter Two, it was not surprising that radical leaders like Nkrumah saw their position as justifiable. If, as the radical states saw it, Africa was a single country with no boundaries separating brothers from each other, then the question of intervention did not arise. Intervention was only an issue when it came from ‘the neocolonialists and imperialists outside the continent.’

The Francophone conservative states and the moderates, however, rejected this view. They held the radicals, especially ‘Ghana responsible for some of the most flagrant interference that the Congo [had] experienced.’ For the conservative and moderate states, the Congo was a territorial entity, and therefore, its national sovereignty was to be respected. Their criticism of the radical states’ policy over the Congo was largely reflected within the report of the UN Conciliation Committee written mainly by moderate states. In examining the causes of the continuation of the crisis, they cited the problem of interference, not just by the Belgians, but by other states:

Foreign interference by certain States in the internal affairs of the Republic of the Congo compounded the complexity and the gravity of the crisis. This interference largely counteracted the efforts of the United Nations to assist the Congolese to resolve their difficulties.

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38 Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for the Congo, A/4711 and Add. 1 and 2, 20 March 1961, para. 112(a), GAOR, Fifteenth Session, Agenda Item 85: The Situation in the Republic of the Congo. See also R. Good, (1962), p. 58 and 240. The Commission consisted of representatives from Ethiopia, The Federation of Malaya, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Liberia, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal, Sudan, Tunisia and the UAR. Guinea, Indonesia, Mali, and the UAR pulled out early in 1961 after the death of Lumumba and what they saw as UN failure to halt the conflict. It should also be noted that the representative of Ghana, Alex Quaison-Sackey, did not sign the Conciliation Commission most notably because, ‘[t]he Authorities in the Congo dealt with the Commission in bad faith, especially in the formation
Although radical states, and in particular Ghana, were accused of interventionist actions, there is some suggestion that some conservative states were also open to the charge of intervention. Certainly the assistance given by some to aid Tshombé's secessionist movement in Katanga and to support Kasavubu over Lumumba could be characterised as intervention. Their rejection of Lumumba as the legitimate leader of Congo was tantamount to interference in the political makeup of another country. For the Francophone conservatives, Lumumba represented that slow movement to the creation of a militant and revolutionary African continent which they rejected. Consequently, they directed their support at helping Tshombé and Kasavubu in deposing Lumumba.

To accommodate the extreme views of the radical and conservative group, the moderate states, mainly led by Nigeria and Liberia, attempted to strike a balance over the policy to be taken over the Congo. The moderates called a meeting in Monrovia, Liberia which was meant to bring all sides together to resolve the conflict. In the end, only the conservative states attended the meeting in 1961 at Monrovia to formulate a policy that would counter any form of intervention. The aim of Monrovia was to create "a pan-African structure that would build very firmly on the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states." More importantly, it was a place 'where all participants would accept the principle of noninterference' and the 'unqualified condemnation of outside subversive action by neighbouring States.' In fact, the resolution from the conference was explicit on the question of subversion. It affirmed that all African and Malagasy States shall refrain from encouraging, directly or indirectly, dissident groups or individuals of other States in subversive activities by permitting their own States to be used as bases from which such

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37 See Singleton (1968) who suggests throughout his research that some of the conservative Francophone states were open to the charge of intervention. Their support for Tshombé raised questions about the aid given to a secessionist movement.


dissidents may operate or by financing dissidents in other countries or otherwise.\textsuperscript{42}

The Monrovia conference, which was set up to remove the divisions between African states, exacerbated the divisions among African states. We can see the extent of these divisions in the speech made in January 1962 at the Lagos Conference, by the Nigerian Governor-General, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe:

There is one basic difference of an ideological nature between the two groups, which should attract the serious attention of all who sincerely advocate African unity. It is the conspicuous absence of specific declarations on the part of the Casablanca states of their inflexible belief in the fundamental principles enunciated at Monrovia regarding the inalienable right of African states, as presently constituted, to legal equality, irrespective of their area or population; the right of African states to self-determination; the right of African states to safety from interference in their internal affairs through subversive activities engineered by supposed friendly states; the right of African states to be secure in the inviolability of their territories from external aggression.

Whilst the Charter of the United Nations provides for these safeguards, in general terms, it is very material to the subject of African unity that it votaries should declare publicly and recapitulate their faith and firm belief by adhering specifically to the principles made famous at the Monrovia Conference. Otherwise, it can be a matter for speculation whether these principles are capable of becoming speeches to haunt the conscience of those who would rather pay lip service to the Charter of the United Nations, whilst secretly they nurse expansionist ambitions against their smaller and perhaps weaker neighbours.\textsuperscript{43}

The resolutions adopted by the moderate and conservatives at Monrovia and Lagos were crucial. Two years later, the OAU Charter reasserted the same basic thesis when it was established in May 1963. The principle of non-intervention ranked higher than the radical appeal for political unity. Although Article 2(1a) of the OAU Charter stated that one purpose of the organisation was to ‘promote unity and solidarity of African states,’ the term was


\textsuperscript{43} Cited in C. Phillips, Jr., \textit{The Development of Nigerian Foreign Policy} (?: Northwestern University Press, 1964), p. 93; also partly quoted in I. W. Zartman, (1968), p.195. The Lagos Conference was a continuation of the Monrovia Conference which was held a year earlier.
never properly defined. However, as we argue below, a series of events between 1962 and 1963 made the creation of the OAU possible, and ensured that the Monrovia thesis on non-intervention gained primacy in the organisation.

*The Congo and the creation of the OAU: unity and exclusivity versus non-intervention*

The charters signed at the Monrovia and Lagos conferences 'became in essence the model of a new Charter signed at the Africa summit conference in Addis Ababa on May 25, 1963.' Several events, however, between 1962 and 1963 led to the creation of the OAU. Notable during this period was the election of one of the parties to the Congolese civil war, the 'moderate' figure, Cyrille Adoula, as the new Prime Minister of the Congo. The nationalist figure and supporter of Lumumba, Antoine Gizenga was re-elected to his former position of Vice Premier. This not only reunited the Congolese parliament in August 1961, but ended the dual leadership control of Joseph Kasavubu (in Leopoldville) and Gizenga (in Stanleyville). This brought the first stage of the civil war to an end. Adoula and Gizenga’s election had created a space for better cooperation among the radical and the moderate-conservative states of Africa. More important, it led to the break up of the radical-Casablanca group on the eve of the all-African summit at Addis Ababa in 1963 thus allowing the Monrovia-Lagos thesis of the moderate-conservatives to dominate the OAU and the gradual dissolution of ideological alliances.

In his reflections on intra-continental politics during this period, James Mayall notes that 1963 was a 'year of reconciliation' for African states. 'While the causes of friction had not been removed by 1963, the Summit of African leaders in Addis Ababa may at least succeed in healing the breach between the rival blocs.' By the time of the Addis Ababa meeting in May 1963, 'a number of ground rules for keeping intra-African disputes on a manageable level' had been agreed to, most notably a declaration denouncing subversive

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activities, political assassination and interference in the affairs of other states.\textsuperscript{46} States that were previously accused of undermining the legitimacy of other states and of harbouring and supporting the activities of political refugees from neighbouring states (e.g. Ghana and Guinea), were now giving assurances that they opposed intervention in the internal affairs of other states.\textsuperscript{47} As Mark Zacher observes, ‘the Casablanca [radical] states had come to feel somewhat isolated from the prevailing trends of African politics, and hence they were willing to compromise their radical positions to some extent - particularly regarding the issue of Africans’ intervening in the affairs of another African state to promote “progressive” regimes.’\textsuperscript{48} In return for the support they gave to the moderate-conservative thesis, the radicals were given assurance of the new organisation’s commitment towards assisting the liberation movements in Southern Africa and establishing a policy of non-alignment over the Cold War.\textsuperscript{49} For the radical states, non-alignment meant that African states would aim their foreign policies at influencing the major powers of the West without taking sides in the politics of the Cold War. More important, it meant keeping the continent free from outside interference and allowing the continent to solve its problems without being caught in the East-West confrontation. In a sense, the policy of non-alignment was an expression of African exclusivity.

The creation of the OAU can be seen as a symbol of African unity, at least from the perspective of those radical states who believed that it was the first step towards establishing a ‘supranational’ entity.\textsuperscript{50} However, as Mayall observes, creating the OAU was partly due to the realisation of African leaders that they could only deal with many problems of post-

\textsuperscript{46} I. W. Zartman, (1987), p. 34.


\textsuperscript{50} Christopher Clapham however argues that ‘[t]hough often described as a compromise between ‘radical’ and moderate’ states, the [OAU] Charter actually represented the most clear cut...victory for the principle of [state] sovereignty, over any pretensions to supranational continental union.’ See Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 110.
colonial Africa 'within the framework of an exclusively African diplomatic system.' Despite this realisation, there were several contradictions within the Charter. These contradictions could be found in the core principles: respect for sovereignty, condemnation of subversion and non-interference in internal affairs on the one hand, and the demand for non-alignment and promoting unity on the other hand. In addition, there were some lingering differences on intra-continental politics, most notably on the Congo, that were papered over in the early years of the OAU. These lingering differences re-awakened the divisions between the moderate-conservative states and those states with radical commitments on how to conduct African affairs.

What re-awakened this division was the re-emergence of the former secessionist leader of Katanga, Moise Tshombé in the Congo in June 1964. Unresolved political and social tension in the Congo, plus the re-entry of Tshombé in the Congo largely sparked off the second phase of the civil war in 1964. Tshombé's presence, combined with the division among African states on how to conduct intra-African affairs, rekindled questions about intervention and non-intervention. The question of how to deal with Tshombé's arrival in the Congo worsened the division between African leaders as they clashed over the notion of the right to intervene for the sake of African and Congolese unity and the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of another state.

Phase two of the Civil War, 1964-1965: The 'right to intervene' for the sake of African unity versus the principle of non-intervention

On his arrival back in the Congo Tshombé was invited by the 'moderate' figure in the Congolese civil war, Joseph Kasavubu, to form a caretaker government after Adoula's

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52 There were reports that Tshombé had re-entered the Congo with mercenary forces from Angola and former Katangan gendarmes in June 1964. Since 1962, Tshombé had been in exile in Europe where he had been regrouping his forces for a planned return to power. At the time that Tshombé re-entered the Congo, Adoula's government had also been challenged by a military revolt in the Kwilu province in June 1964 by members of the Conseil National de Libération (CNL) and Pierre Mulele, a former minister in Gizenga's government in Stanleyville back in 1961. (The CNL was made up of former Lumumbist and Gizenga supporters who were mainly nationalists.) For discussion of Tshombé's return to the Congo, see 'The Build-up of Tshombe's Forces' Extract from Courrier Africain (Brussels), 4 December 1964 in C. Hoskyns, (ed.), (1969), pp. 10-11. See also Keesing's Contemporary Archives, August 8-15, 1964, p. 20217.
resignation and completion of his first term in office. Tshombé was later sworn into the office of Prime Minister on 10 July 1964. The decision by Kasavubu to install Tshombé as Prime Minister of the Congo once again divided African states into various groupings and counter-groupings. As Zartman remarks,

"[t]he issue at stake...was a clash between two basic ideological concepts. One claimed the right to interfere in the internal affairs of another state in the name of a higher value, "Africanity", and saw in Congo an overt colonial threat against the entire continent; the other rejected subversion and interference in the affairs of a sovereign state and viewed the African system as a concert of state designed to defend the new independence from any threat."

African leaders on all sides expressed their objection to Tshombé’s presence at the OAU Council of Ministers meeting at Cairo in 1964, but the criticism came from mainly radical states. Two statements sum up the position adopted by African leaders over the re-emergence of Tshombé in the Congo. The first, coming from the radical states, objects to Tshombé’s use of mercenaries from Southern Africa. In his speech to the third extraordinary session of the OAU Council of Ministers in September 1964, the delegate from Mali, Mr. Boucoumto stated that,

One of the guiding principles of Mali’s foreign policy is the non-interference in the domestic affairs of other countries. As a function of this principle, if the Congo problem...were limited to a simple conflict, or even a factional struggle among the various political leaders of the country, the Government of the Mali Republic would have refrained from initiations related to the regime or what is happening in this country. But as soon as powerful, extra-military forces intervene in a conflict among Africans, and moreover mercenaries, coming from a country which has been condemned by our organization because of its policy of apartheid towards Africans, have been recruited to slaughter patriots and to burn African villages, we believe that it is our duty not to be a passive bystander to such events. If we were to remain silent towards such a grievous situation which is not only a blow to the interests of Africa, but also to our African dignity, we would be guilty before future generations and our guilt would not be pardoned. What is more, such an attitude would also be contrary to the pledges we made when in May 1963


54 On Tshombé’s use of white mercenaries from Southern Africa, see Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, November 21-28, 1964, p. 20424.
In response to the problem of using mercenaries and the related question of the legality of Tshombé’s presence at the OAU, the second speech from the moderates drew an anti-interventionist line when the Nigerian delegate, Mr Bamali stated at the same meeting that:

President Kasabuvu appointed Mr. Tshombe to head the Provisional Government and elections were scheduled to take place within six to nine months after the promulgation of the constitution. Although we shall all be happy to see an elected government in the Congo, yet we cannot but admit the fact that under the present situation it will be impossible for the Congolese to elect their own government. The present Central Government is the legal government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and this is a fact that we must all accept. I am sure that no African government will wish to treat with any other Organization outside the legally constituted authority in the Congo. In those circumstances it would therefore be wrong and contrary to the Charter of the Organization to go beyond the sovereign authority of that country. To treat with any Organization other than the proper government of a country is to interfere in the internal affairs of that country. Distinguished delegates, we all have our own internal problems and we all would not like external interference. My delegation considers it the primary duty of this Council to assist the Congolese in bringing about the conditions under which a freely elected government can emerge. This condition is the restoration of law and order. In a previous situation this Council, in recognition of the sovereignty of a member state, accepted the principle that such a government being responsible for the security of its country, is free to call for military assistance from any African state that it so desires. My delegation will wish to see that these principles should apply to the Congo problem.

The hostility (especially from the radical states) towards Tshombé led the Congolese government to withdraw from the OAU meeting. According to Herbert Weiss, the objection shown by some African states towards Tshombé raised ‘a thorny question’ which had

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56 Organization of African Unity Third Extraordinary Session of Council of Ministers, Addis Ababa, 5-10 September, 1964, Extracts from Speeches, in C. Hoskyns, (ed.), (1969), pp. 16-17. President Tsiranana of the Malagasy Republic also protested against interference in the internal affairs of another member state of the OAU when he argued that ‘We all deplored the death of Patrice Lumumba, but that doesn’t give us the right to interfere in Congolese affairs. While we are about it, search your hearts. Have we not all signed an execution warrant against one of our compatriots? We are not all angels and if Mr. Tshombé goes to hell, there shall be others among us who shall go with him.’ Quoted in I. Wallerstein, (1967), p. 84.
consequences for the principle of non-intervention: 'On what basis could certain statesmen refuse to deal with official representatives of another state?' Tshombé's presence also raised another question on the legitimate standing of the Congolese state on the international stage. As Ali Mazrui also points out,

Many African states...seem to postulate a kind of 'diplomatic republic of Africa' - for admission into which a regime like that of Tshombé in the first ten months of his Premiership in the Congo did not have adequate credentials.58

Yet, there were implications for Tshombé other than those raised about his legitimacy as leader within Congo. Again as Mazrui states, the problem was not how Tshombé achieved power, but 'how he maintained himself in power.' This was directly linked to the 'external help he got' in suppressing his opponents.59 Pan-Africanism dictated that any form of collaboration with imperialist forces from outside the continent or from the white redoubtist government of South Africa was illegal and contrary to the OAU Charter and the principle of autonomy that Africans sought.

Here then was the key to understanding the debate surrounding non-intervention and intervention within the continent. The OAU Charter, or as Mazrui defines it, 'Pan-African Law' had however proved an inadequate guide in providing an answer to the use of mercenaries or foreign assistance. When was it permissible to seek outside assistance? Could a state ask for an outside force to protect itself against internal unrest?60 We shall discuss the


60 On the question of a state's right to ask for assistance from other African states or persons, according to William Foltz 'the principle is a conservative one, which very much reflects the fact that the indisputable point in common among those who attend OAU summits is that they, too, control capital cities....Ideally, a central government should deal with its internal problems itself, but if it cannot, it has the sovereign right to bring in outside help. This help can be ranked in gradations of acceptability.' The preferred aim is to seek help from within the continent, while the less preferred option is seeking help from non-African states. However, on the question of the use of white mercenaries from South Africa, which Tshombé is accused of, 'it is' as Foltz states,'obvious now...that the use of South African forces and Western mercenaries is not only illegitimate but discredits any cause that employs them in the eyes of most OAU members.' See W. Foltz, (1991), pp. 359-360.
issues of outside assistance in more detail in Chapter Four. In the end as Wallerstein notes, 'it]he exclusion of Tshombé was...an important event, arguing as it did against the concept of unity as alliance (the conservative-moderate stance) and in favour of unity as movement (the radical position). For it amounted to...OAU members’ making a judgement on the moral worth of a fellow member.' The decision adopted by those African states who rejected Tshombé’s presence was significant, for as Vincent Thompson also recognised, such action ‘emphasised that some African leaders were not prepared to sit idly back and not intervene in matters which affected them because of the sacred cow of non-interference in the domestic affairs of member states.’ However, victory for the radicals was short-lived. The OAU seemed unable to affect the Congo situation.

Consequently, the conflict left members split again between the radical states who supported the rebels and the moderate-conservatives who retained their support for Tshombé, but more important, what they saw as the legal government of the Congo. The display of inaction by the OAU may, as V. Thompson suggests, have ‘been because of the formality implicit in the principle of ‘non-interference.’” However, ‘it] would appear that formal attitudes of this kind were likely to make for the connivance by certain African states in situations unhealthy to the development of African unity.’ In other words, the inability of the OAU to clarify the fundamental issues surrounding when intervention was permissible posed a problem for those wanting to create a firm foundation for African unity.

Despite the ability of the radical states to prevent Tshombé’s attendance at the OAU, the resolution of the Congo crisis did not prove satisfactory for these states, especially Ghana. Instead it intensified Nkrumah’s strategy of African unity and the removal of neo-colonialism and its ‘stooges’, and this strategy exposed ‘Ghana to further charges of ‘interference’ and ‘subversion.’ We can see Ghana’s determination when it, along with the leaders of Algeria, Congo-Brazzaville, Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Tanzania and the UAR set out

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61 I. Wallerstein, (1967), p. 84. This was not the first time a country had been excluded from the OAU. Following the assassination of President Slyvanus Olympio, Togo was excluded not only from the preparations leading up to the Addis Ababa Summit of May 1963, but to the OAU itself once it was established.


to provide bilateral assistance to rebels opposed to Tshombé.

In a secret conference after the OAU Council of Minister’s meeting in September 1964 and the Conference of Non-aligned States at Cairo in October 1964, leaders from these countries noted that Tshombé’s ‘survival...constituted a threat to revolutionary African regimes, since a Congo led by [him] would become a base for counter-revolutionary plots directed against their governments.’ Partly in response to the Belgo-American intervention in Stanleyville on 24 November 1964, these countries launched their own intervention in December in support of the rebel leader and President of the CNL, Christopher Gbenye. ‘Egyptian, Algerian, Malian, Guinean, Ghanaian and Sudanese officers’ were sent to the Congo with ‘large shipments of arms’ to assist rebel guerilla forces. At the same time, Congo-Brazzaville, Uganda, Tanzania and the Sudan had used their countries as a base from which military planning could take place to aid the rebels. For these radical states, there existed a right to assist militarily or financially other African brothers who were fighting against neocolonialism. The decision to provide aid to the rebels was in response to the support Tshombé received from the US and Belgians. As Mazrui states, ‘the reasoning’ logically fits into the belief that some felt they had a right to interfere in support of other Africans: ‘If Tshombé was getting aid from non-Africans, Tshombe’s opponents were entitled to some help from fellow Africans.’ But more than some notion of supporting a ‘fellow African’ or a brother, the action taken by some Africans, in particular Ghana, was linked to the wider goal of making Africa free from outside interference and ensuring unity on the continent.


66 P. Wild, (1971), p. 42. Also see F. Singleton, (1968), p. 67 and ARB which covers the allegations of political interference by African states, notably Algeria, Sudan and the UAR: December 1-13, 1964, pp. 201c-202b, p. 207bc and 211c. A full analysis of the secret conference and the military planning can be seen in Jeune Afrique, 13 December 1964 in C. Hoskyns, (ed.), (1969), pp. 45-47. Hoskyns however provides a warning about the information surrounding the secret conference stating that, ‘[t]he information contained in this document should be treated with some caution since it is now known, for example, that neither President Kenyatta [Kenya] nor President Nyerere [Tanzania] was in Cairo at [the] time.’ However she goes on to suggest that ‘it [was] certainly true that some such meeting did take place and that from [that] point on the countries named did begin to give more active help to the rebel groups’ (p. 47).

Conclusion

In sum, two grounds existed for intervention, at least from the perspective of radical states. In phase one of the Congo crisis (1960-1962), the reason behind their intervention was to prevent external intervention by those perceived to be perpetuating imperialist and neocolonialist standards. They directed their actions at supporting the UN operation, and actively promoted the policy of limiting troop participation to the UN force to Africans only. This was to ensure that the politics of the Cold War was kept out of the Congo crisis, thus providing testimony to the principle of exclusiveness and African jurisdiction over its own affairs. Dictating the actions of the UN in the Congo and determining the outcome of the conflict was a means to maintaining the goal of "African solutions for African problems." As Mazrui states,

Africa's ambition to be its own policeman is seeking a different safeguard. It is seeking a capacity to avert external interference even in the event of internal conflict. It would like Africa to have military capability great enough to enforce a domestic continental jurisdiction over Africa's own quarrels.\(^6\)

In this sense, radical states employed the UN to give it that military capability. The UN force never came under African control as Nkrumah would have liked. It was when the UN operation was deemed a failure that the strategy of the radical states changed from one of indirect to direct intervention.

In the second phase of the conflict (1964-1965), radicals attached their justification for intervening to the illegality of Tshombe's presence within the Congo, but more important, to his use of white mercenaries, particularly from Southern Africa, to put down internal opposition. Article 3(6) of the OAU Charter on 'absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the African territories which are still dependent' provided a legitimate haven for radicals to justify their actions. For them, the people of the Congo where not experiencing 'total emancipation', and the presence of neocolonialism and the use of external forces was a threat to African unity and the exclusiveness Africans sought in dealing with their own problems. But did the Congo crisis open the door for legitimising intervention by African states as

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opposed to when non-African states practised it? It certainly raised the question of whether African forces were preferable to the use of other non-African forces. As Howard Weisberg points out, from the start of the conflict the Ghanian representative at the UN had advocated 'an active role, including the presence of African forces on Congolese soil, for African states in the Congo crisis.' This, suggests Weisberg, 'leads to the inference that Ghana would reject...intervention when undertaken by former colonial powers, but would accept it when the interveners were of the same region or perhaps, race.'

It is possible to argue that the position adopted by the radicals intensified the desire by other African states to firmly establish the principle of non-intervention. Thus, in an attempt not to lose sight of the sanctity of non-intervention as a principle for ordering relations amongst themselves, African states created the 'Declaration on the problem of Subversion' in October 1965 with a reaffirmation of the principle of non-intervention. However, the Congo crisis did raise several questions about the future of unity in Africa, especially within the context of intra-African conflicts. While the principle of non-intervention was engraved in the OAU Charter, according to Vincent Thompson, its founders failed to contemplate 'the point at which an issue might cease to be a domestic issue and become one for Pan-Africanist intervention.' As W. Scott Thompson and I. Zartman also note,

...behind the problems of interpreting and applying the norm lay the deeper question of African unity. Were all African governments to be considered equally legitimate (as the conservative states argued) or was there a higher standard of "Africanness" with which the sovereignty of brother African states could be questioned (as President Nkrumah implicitly argued)? Where did the rights of asylum to brother Africans and the duties of support to brother African states stop?

These questions were left unanswered during the Congolese civil war, but the Nigerian civil war and the problem of apartheid in South Africa allowed for another opportunity to discuss

69 The question of capability was not dealt with, except with the understanding that a UN force was to be made up exclusively of African nations.


them. A major question which was left unanswered was the problem of secession which caused division among the radicals and moderate-conservative states. Could African states intervene to support a secessionist movement? Attempts were made during the Nigerian civil war from 1967-1970 to clarify some of the fundamental questions on the rules governing intra-African affairs. The ‘rules of the game’ as set out in the OAU Charter were fundamental in trying to understand how the practice of intervention evolved alongside the principle of non-intervention.

II. The Nigerian Civil War: Secession and the principle of non-intervention

Nigeria’s civil war began when Biafra, a region in south-east region of the country indicated its intention to secede from the federal republic. Viewed from the perspective of OAU action, an institutional consensus held that the Nigerian civil war was a matter of internal affairs for the Federal Government of Nigeria. The OAU Charter attaches great importance to the ‘inalienable right to independent existence’ of African states as noted in Article 3(3). The Biafrans based their desire to secede on this Charter principle. However, this ‘right’ by the OAU Charter is only applicable to colonial territories and not to those territories wanting to secede from existing independent African states.

During the fourth ordinary meeting of OAU Heads of State on 11 September 1967 in Kinshasa, the OAU held that the territorial integrity of Nigeria was not to be undermined. The Organisation set up a Consultative Committee consisting of six heads of state which in the end supported the Federal Government of Major-General Yakubu Gowon. More important however, the OAU found itself unable to intervene, because to do so would have


76 The six states in this committee were Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Niger, and Zaire (formerly the Congo).
been contrary to its Charter, Article 2(2) on ‘non-interference in the internal affairs of States.’ At the Kinshasa summit, Nigeria effectively dictated that the Committee was only to hold consultation if it supported Gowon’s own initiatives on how the crisis was to be resolved. Nigeria was able to prevent any intervention to which it did not consent. The principle of non-intervention reinforced another principle of intra-African affairs, that of the principle of self-determination which protected state sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The Nigerian civil war was to be the first case in which the doctrine of self-determination, along with traditional rules of international law relating to intervention, ‘produced a presumption in favour of the established government’ in post-independence situations. More important was the policy of ‘non-recognition’ which the OAU adhered to over Biafra. According to Zdenek Červenka, this policy ‘implies a refusal to admit the validity of any change.’ ‘The significance of the policy of non-recognition of Biafra’ which was endorsed by the OAU Summit at Algiers in September 1968, called upon ‘all Member States of the United Nations and the OAU to refrain from any action detrimental to the peace, unity and territorial integrity of Nigeria.’ This set a precedent against future support for secessionist movements within the continent. In the end, the OAU argued that those basic principles of sovereignty and non-intervention become ‘relevant’ once the struggle of peoples within colonial territories was over.

There were however variations among African states on the line adopted by the OAU. While the Charter was seen as a restraining order on the Organisation, it did not stop individual states from commenting. As Obi Okongwu points out,

It seems that in such a situation the duty of non-intervention is a matter tacitly

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left to the discretion of the individual member States. Individual members, it
seems, could take measures contrary to that taken by the Organization
without forfeiting their membership of the Organization.\textsuperscript{82}

To this end, four African states (Gabon, Côte d'Ivoire, Tanzania, and Zambia) recognised
Biafra as an independent state. This was a strange mixture: Gabon and Côte d'Ivoire were
conservative states, while Tanzania and Zambia were radical. President Nyerere of Tanzania
provided an explicit statement of why his country supported the Biafran secession. In
adopting a moral attitude, he concluded that,

\begin{quote}
The O.A.U was established by Heads of African States. But it is intended to
serve the peoples of Africa. The O.A.U is not a trade union of African Heads
of States... We must not just concern ourselves with our own survival as
Heads of State; we must be even more concerned about peace and justice in
Africa than we are about the sanctity of the boundaries we inherited....

We must not be like the French monarch (who) said ‘L’état c’est Moi’
- ‘I am the State.’ The O.A.U must sometimes raise a voice against those
regimes in Africa, including independent Africa, who oppress the people of
Africa.\textsuperscript{83}
\end{quote}

Such a statement not only contradicted the OAU Charter, but also the view of early radicals
like Nkrumah on the dangers of ‘balkanization.’\textsuperscript{84} Interestingly enough, Nyerere and later the
Tanzanian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. C. Y. Mgonja, used African unity to
justify Tanzania’s decision to recognise Biafra. This again was quite different from Nkrumah
who rejected Katanga’s secession from the Congo because it would undermine the movement
towards African unity.\textsuperscript{85} Tanzania’s attempts to recognise Biafra were to prove ineffective.

\textsuperscript{82} O. Okongwu, ‘The O.A.U Charter and the Principle of Domestic Jurisdiction in Intra-African Affairs’,

\textsuperscript{83} President Julius Nyerere, ‘Tanzania’s Memorandum on Biafra’s Case’ in A.H.M Kirk-Greene, (ed.),
(1971), p. 438. This document was circulated privately to the OAU Summit Meeting held at Addis Ababa,
4 September 1969. For Nigeria’s response, see the Statement made by Chief Enahoro at a press conference
held in Addis Ababa, September 1969, ‘Nigerian Refutes Tanzania’s Charges before the O.A.U’ in the same

(Hereafter \textit{ACR}).

\textsuperscript{85} For the full text of the speech see, Julius Nyerere, ‘Why we recognised Biafra’, \textit{ACR}, 1968-1969, pp. 651-652
and Mr. C. Y. Mgonja, “Tanzania Recognises Biafra”, \textit{Tanzania’s Foreign Affairs Bulletin: An Official
Record of Foreign Policy at the United Republic of Tanzania} (Dar es Salaam: No. 1, Vol. IV, May 1969),
pp. 41-45.
We should note that the usual discernible ideological position in Pan-African politics did not dictate Africa’s response to the Nigerian civil war. So while some sections of the radical group supported Biafra (i.e. Tanzania and Zambia), others did not (i.e. Algeria, Guinea and Mali). This was due in part to various domestic factors. A majority of the radical states were Muslim who, out of solidarity, supported the large Muslim leadership and population in northern Nigeria. These states supported the vote of conservative states like Malagasy, Cameroon and Ethiopia to maintain the strategy of ‘keep Nigeria ONE.’ Yet while these conservatives held to this view, others from their group - Gabon and Côte d’Ivoire - supported Biafra’s plea for secession.

What was significant about the Nigerian civil war was that it was an African crisis from the beginning to the end. As Mayall states, ‘[i]t was clear that this question would be settled by Africans themselves, albeit with powerful outside support.’ The aim of the OAU was to avert the possibility of non-African interference so as to display Africa’s ability and jurisdiction to solve its own problem. Africa’s official position to the international community, via the OAU, was that the war was an ‘African affair’ thus confirming the principle of ensuring that the continent had autonomy over its affairs. However, in essence, it indicated the opposite: under intra-OAU relations, it was Nigeria’s ‘internal war’ and Africans were also prohibited from intervening.

Conclusion

The Nigerian civil war illustrated that the principle of non-intervention was paramount

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88 J. Mayall, (1991), p. 26. In reference to the Congo, Mayall states that what ‘had been at stake was the role that the outside world would play in reshaping the political map’ of that country, p. 26. However, Andemicael states that ‘the Congo had such an ideologically divisive character that it induced serious interference by certain African states and non-Africans and other foreign interests,’ (1976), p. 84. The main outside support for the Biafrans came from France who provided military aid via Côte d’Ivoire and Gabon. The Federal Government of Nigeria also received military assistance from the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union although it is worth adding that overall the international community did not intervene in the civil war. See J. Stremlau, (1977), who discusses the external support received by both sides throughout his book, esp. pp. 79-80, 148, 224-237, 263-268 and 297-308.

in cases of internal conflicts. In addition, it also indicated that the ‘rules of the game’ governing intra-continental politics held that no policy should aim at undermining state boundaries inherited from the colonial era. The general pattern of thought found within African diplomatic behaviour was geared towards ensuring that the colonial boundaries and the leadership instituted within these boundaries were not to be challenged. As a result, the principle of self-determination was effectively subordinated to the quest for territorial integrity, thus preserving ‘the territorial status quo.’

However, in the final part of this Chapter, we show how African leaders applied a different set of rules to the problem of apartheid in Southern Africa. The actions taken by African leaders over Southern African was another indication of how the idea and practice of intervention evolved alongside the principle of non-intervention. African leaders argued that the rules applicable in post-independent situations differed from those during the struggle for liberation.

III: Intervention to remove colonialism: An exception to the rule of non-intervention?

As far as the ideology underpinning African unity was concerned, the view of African leaders was that their freedom and security were incomplete while colonialism was present in Southern Africa. All necessary means, although never properly defined, were to be enlisted to end the colonial and racial struggle. The action of African leaders towards South Africa showed how they loosely interpreted the principle of non-intervention in dealing with the cause of freeing peoples from illegitimate racist regimes. African leaders sought to attach the right of intervention to human rights and the principle of self-determination of peoples.

While there was no direct military intervention in South Africa, the speeches and resolutions passed, along with the position adopted by African leaders, in particular those from the radical bloc, represented a view indicating that intervention was preferred not only

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91 The aim here is not to consider the success or failure of African states or the OAU in ensuring the liberation of Southern Africa. The aim instead is to use the early struggles against South Africa as a means from which to discuss the evolution of intervention as a policy advocated by African states. For a full analysis of the OAU and the liberation struggle see, Z. Červenka, (1977), Chapter Four.

to achieve freedom, but also to promote the rights of an oppressed group. In the pursuit of ending colonialism and apartheid, African leaders established what James Mayall defined as a ‘two-track policy’:

The first was diplomatic. African governments would continue to press for an accelerated pace of decolonisation and for the isolation and/or withdrawal of South Africa from multilateral organisations....

The second track consisted of both diplomatic and financial support for the liberation movements. Continental support for the legitimacy of armed struggle, in those cases where the colonial power refused to go quietly, raised the anti-colonial struggle to new levels of militancy....[T]he African Liberation Committee [ALC] was set up to coordinate African assistance to the liberation movements.

Thus, at the diplomatic level, the aim was to apply moral pressure upon the South African government through the UN.

African states, along with other developing countries, sought an ‘exception to the rule - a higher imperative’ to the principle of non-intervention and domestic jurisdiction. They affirmed a right of intervention for ‘the case of peoples struggling for their independence against the persistence of the old order.’ African states derived their claim from several sources such as the Non-Aligned Summits in Belgrade (1961), Cairo (1964) and Lusaka (1970) which dealt with the issues of apartheid, racialism, human rights, self-determination and colonialism. However, the most important source was the UN Charter which African states argued gave the UN ‘right...as representative of international society, to overrule the plea of domestic jurisdiction if standards of conduct within states fell below standards asserted to have been agreed between them.' By taking their cue from the principles in Article 55 and 56 of UN Charter on human rights, African leaders demanded active UN

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93 It should be noted that in accordance with Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, ‘no armed forces of OAU Members [were] being used “against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State.”’ As we shall discuss later in section, ‘it [was] the national liberation movements that [were] using force in their own Territories with moral and material assistance from OAU Members and other States.’ B. Andemicael, (1985), p. 105.


intervention on behalf of the black population of South Africa.\textsuperscript{97} The moral argument introduced by African states led to a confrontation between the white regime of South Africa who asserted the right of state sovereignty, and Africans who linked their argument to human rights and the associated questions of self-determination and racial equality. Whether it legitimated human rights intervention for the future is doubtful. It is possible to suggest that African states limited this policy to the white redoubtist regimes of Southern Africa. We shall come back to this point towards the end of this part of the Chapter.

At the level of 'diplomatic and financial support for the liberation movements', the newly independent states of Africa, notably the Congo (Kinshasa - formerly Leopoldville), Guinea, Senegal, Tanzania, and Zambia provided training and assistance to the freedom fighters in Southern Africa, although their actions stopped short of direct military intervention.\textsuperscript{98} African states saw the provision of aid as legitimate, corresponding as it did to UN General Assembly Resolution 2131 (XX) of 1965 which noted that 'all States shall contribute to the complete elimination of racial discrimination and colonialism in all forms and manifestations.' However, the resolution never delineated the nature of this contribution, and some states interpreted it as they saw fit. Although this declaration, along with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples was not binding, they nonetheless, as Richard Falk states, 'disclose[d] an altered normative environment which became established in the late 1950s...In effect, support for anti-colonial, anti-racist...action was legitimated as an exception to the rule on non-intervention.'\textsuperscript{99}

African leaders argued that the situation in Southern Africa constituted a 'threat to international peace and security.' Representatives of Guinea, Somalia and Sudan argued, that

\textsuperscript{97} Article 55(c) authorised the UN to promote 'universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion', and Article 56 states that, 'All Members shall pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55.'

\textsuperscript{98} Y. El-Ayouty, The United Nations and Decolonization: The Role of Afro-Asia (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), p. 235 and M. Shaw, (1985), p. 347. Emphasis was placed on giving aid and assistance to the liberation movements as opposed to direct military intervention for mainly one reason. African armies were too weak militarily to take on the regimes of Southern Africa. More important, the independent states of black Africa 'lacked the institutional and economic base to contemplate any support in military confrontation with either the colonial powers or the regimes of the white redoubt.' A. Sesay, O. Ojo, and O. Fasehun, (1984), p. 15.

this being the case, the UN Security Council should take measures under Chapter Seven of the UN Charter to end apartheid. These states aimed at three possible outcomes. First, to convince the UN that it should resort to actions ranging from economic sanctions to military intervention. Second ‘to push South Africa into isolation from the international community.’ Finally, to work for South Africa’s ‘expulsion from the United Nations and all other international organizations.’ Despite the efforts of African leaders to define the problem of apartheid as one of a threat to peace and security, ‘the Security Council never went beyond mere description of the situation in South Africa as ‘seriously disturbing international peace in southern Africa.” Nevertheless, African states appeared to have widened the intervention debate:

The African states contend that the perpetuation of colonialism and the continuation of apartheid constitute a threat to international peace and security. The major powers had resisted such a conclusion (with the notable exception in regard to Southern Rhodesia) though, through their silence, they seem to have implicitly recognized the right of African states to intervene directly in the affairs of southern Africa.

African representatives, including Asian and Middle Eastern representatives at the UN, further based their call for intervention on ‘a moral duty above the law’ by stating that ‘in the context of apartheid, the principle of nonintervention had become a totally

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100 Yearbook of the United Nations (1972), p. 70. Article 39 of Chapter Seven determines whether a situation is a threat or a breach of international peace and security. Articles 41 to 43 consider what measure are to be taken to ‘maintain or restore international peace and security.’ Also see R. J. Vincent, (1974), p. 267.


103 R. Matthews, ‘Interstate Conflicts in Africa: A Review’, International Organization, Vol. XXIV, No. 2, Spring, 1970, p. 337. The link between apartheid and the clause on maintaining peace and security was brought about by a series of events within the African continent: the Sharpeville Massacre in South Africa (March 1960), where many Africans lost their lives to white police forces; the outbreak of various wars of liberation, beginning with Angola in 1961; the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the white minority Ian Smith regime in Rhodesia in November 1965 and; the declaration of a ‘Republic’ of Southern Rhodesia (March 1970). See Y. El-Ayouty, (1971), pp. 234-235. As early as April 1960, the UN Security Council met at the request of the Afro-Asian group at the UN and adopted resolution 134 (1960) which declared that in light of Sharpeville, the situation in South Africa, was ‘one that has led to international friction and if continued might endanger international peace and security.’
discredited doctrine.'\textsuperscript{104} It is important to note that the call for intervention against South Africa was justified because the governmental system advocated institutionalised racism. As Mazrui states, 'it is not simply the governmental institutions of South Africa that African States object to; it is more the government personnel and its racial arrogance.'\textsuperscript{105} Witness the declaration made in the Lusaka Manifesto, which fourteen east and central African states signed in April 1969, that effectively called for intervention over the racist regime of South Africa:

\begin{quote}
The Republic of South Africa is itself an independent Sovereign state and a member of the United Nations. It is more highly developed and richer than any other nation in Africa. On every legal basis its internal affairs are a matter exclusively for the people of South Africa. Yet the purpose of law is people and we assert that the actions of the South African government are such that the rest of the world has a responsibility to take some action in defense of humanity, self-determination and non-racialism.\textsuperscript{106}
\end{quote}

African states recognised the legal entity of South Africa, but not its leadership or governmental system. The purpose of action was to change the structure and make-up of the governmental system, which they deemed illegitimate under Pan-Africanism and unacceptable to the international community. African states sought justification for their actions through the OAU Charter.\textsuperscript{107}

The position adopted over South Africa was also reflected in the overall policy taken towards the states that made up the Southern African region (i.e. Angola, Mozambique and Rhodesia). Again the Lusaka Manifesto, which the Assembly of Heads of States and Government of the OAU and the UN General Assembly later adopted, openly stated the position of many African states. It noted that African states were to use all means at their


disposal to cause change, including the provision of aid to the liberation movements in Southern Africa:

On the objective of the liberation..., we can neither surrender nor compromise. We have always preferred and we still prefer, to achieve it without physical violence. We prefer to negotiate rather than destroy, to talk rather than kill. We do not advocate violence; we advocate an end to violence against human dignity which is now being perpetrated by the oppressors of Africa. If peaceful progress to emancipation were possible, or if changed circumstances were to make it possible in the future, we would urge our brothers in the resistance movements to use peaceful methods of struggle even at the cost of some compromise on the timing of change. But while peaceful progress is blocked by actions of those at present in power in the States of Southern Africa, we have no choice but to give to the peoples of those territories all the support of which we are capable in their struggle against their oppressors. This is why the signatory states participate in the movement for the liberation of Africa, under the aegis of the Organisation of African Unity.108

The Lusaka Manifesto was essentially a ‘dual strategy of “talk and fight.”'109 As an indication of the necessary means at their disposal, during 1960-1970, African states, with the support of other developing countries, called for UN sanctions against the colonial and apartheid regimes of Southern Africa. Among the resolutions passed were the sanctions against Southern Rhodesia in resolution 217 (1965) resolution 232 (1965) and resolution 277 (1970). The UN also passed an arms embargo against South Africa in Resolution 181 and 182 (1963), 282 (1970), and 311 (1972). This latter resolution was the more effective of the four as it gained support from the UK and the US (France abstained) and recognition of ‘the legitimacy of the struggle of the oppressed people of South Africa in the pursuance of their human and political rights, as set forth in the [UN] Charter and the Declaration of Human Rights.’110


110 Security Council Resolution 311, 4 February 1972 The full text can be seen in Yearbook of the United Nations, (1972), p. 88. Also see B. Andemicael, (1976), p. 138. S. Neil MacFarlane points out that while African leaders castigated the regime of South Africa over its apartheid policy, ‘many black African states...maintain[ed] wide-ranging and lucrative economic ties with South Africa,’ (1983/4), p.55. For example, the President of Malawi, Dr. Kamuzu Banda, established diplomatic relations between his country and South Africa. Trading links were also established with South Africa by the following countries: Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Rhodesia, Swaziland, Zambia, Central Africa Republic, Gabon, Ivory Coast.
Conclusion

Did the actions against South Africa fit into the wider question of African unity? Yes, insofar as the ideology underpinning Pan-Africanism maintains that the states of Africa will not be completely free and independent until all regions had been liberated from colonialism. African leaders saw colonialism as an illegitimate system, and where it was present, intervention was permissible to end its reign. African leaders asserted a right to intervene in South Africa, an independent African state, since its political system and its racial constitution were detrimental to African unity. The lack of racial representation in South Africa and the problem of what to do not only raised interesting questions, but had several policy implications for those who called for intervention. If African states granted themselves the right to interfere on such grounds, what of a situation where members of the same race were suppressed? What did Africa's leadership say about this, especially when colonialism was not at the heart of the debate? Was there an 'exception to the rule', 'a higher imperative' that outlawed the principle of non-intervention when blacks were oppressing blacks? Certainly, Nyerere's statement in support of Biafra's secession from Nigeria did partially confront the question of the principle of non-intervention when atrocities were being committed by fellow Africans. However, as we shall see in the following Chapter, it was Nyerere's intervention in Uganda that explicitly raised this question and added another dimension to the debate on intervention and non-intervention in intra-African affairs.111

Conclusion

The purpose of this Chapter has been to explore how the idea and practice of intervention evolved alongside the principle of non-intervention in intra-African affairs. More specifically, the aim has been to consider whether the two central themes of Pan-African unity and exclusivity - are useful in understanding how the practice of intervention evolved on the continent. The three cases studied in this Chapter tell us how the practice of intervention evolved alongside the principle of non-intervention in post-colonial Africa.

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111 A. Mazrui also considers this point, (1967), pp. 43-44.

and Zaire. Also see C. Hoskyns, (1967), pp. 170-171.
The Congo was the first intra-state conflict on the continent where African leaders were confronted with the question of intervention and non-intervention. The main question was whether African intervention in the internal affairs of another state was permissible? In addition, could African states intervene to aid a secessionist or an opposition movement? African leaders were unable to answer these questions effectively in the context of the Congo crisis, instead, diverging views emerged.

Although the moderate-conservatives criticised what they perceived as intervention in the internal affairs of the Congo, radicals used the underlying principle of Pan-Africanism and the OAU’s call for ‘emancipation of the African territories that are still dependent’ (Article 3(6)), to legitimise and fulfill a dual strategy: unity and autonomy. In fact, both were persistent and recurrent themes in statements issued to defend their actions in the Congo. The radicals argued that although the Congo had gained its independence, it was only nominal; the Congo was not completely free from colonial domination. For Pan-African unity to be a reality, all states had to be free from colonial domination, but more important, once freed, all states must relinquish links with their former colonial masters. Not to do this would undermine the progress towards the political unification of African states. In addition, failure to achieve political unification undermined the possibility of Africa’s exclusive right to deal with its affairs. For the radical states, the Congolese nationalist leader, Patrice Lumumba directed his policy at freeing the Congo from its former colonial master, hence why they supported his struggle.

When radical states were accused of supporting the nationalist Lumumba cause, they defended their actions by claiming that they wanted to preserve the Congolese state from disintegration. Nkrumah argued that the breakup of the Congolese would undermine the possibility of African unity and autonomy. Factional fighting between fellow brothers was not conducive to the goal of unity. More important, as Nkrumah argued, factional fighting or disputes encouraged extra-African influences if African states could not resolve their problems. Nkrumah advocated the idea of a Pan-African High Command not only to replace the UN in the Congo, but to fulfill his strategy of continental exclusiveness. In the end, African intervention in the Congo became synonymous with the liberation struggle and the radical goal of unity and autonomy in African affairs.

However, not all states supported the radical cause. The conservatives supported Tshombé attempts to secede, but there was no agreement among African states on the
controversial question of foreign assistance, especially the use of mercenaries to put down internal unrest. The difference of opinion among African leaders over the Congolese civil war and the failure of Africa states to strictly define when intervention was permissible largely explained why the anti-interventionist norm gained primacy within the OAU. Combined with the accusations of Ghana’s subversive activities in the West African region that we discussed in Chapter Two, the principle of non-intervention was gradually becoming the rule by which African states conducted their affairs. More important, when Kwame Nkrumah was deposed in a coup in 1966, the notion of unity which he promoted and along with it, the contentious policy of intervention to ensure political union among African states seem to come to an end.

The extent to which the non-interventionist thesis was fast becoming the dominant thesis of African affairs could be seen in the Nigerian civil war. A commitment to the principle of non-intervention dictated the OAU’s position over the Nigerian civil war. As with the Congo, African states defended the principle of non-intervention to secure African unity as opposed to the break up of Nigeria. With the exception of Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Tanzania and Zambia’s support to the Biafrans, the involvement of African states was limited to supporting the cause of the Federal Government of Nigeria. The OAU claimed that Africa had autonomy over the crisis to avoid widespread non-African intervention on a scale as that witnessed over the Congo. But that autonomy was not Africa’s, it was Nigeria’s and Africans were also prohibited from intervening.

The Congolese and Nigerian civil war showed how African states were slowly developing rules to govern intra-African affairs especially in situations of civil wars. When it came to the question of apartheid in Southern African, African leaders sought to redefine intervention and the principle of non-intervention. For African leaders, intervention was permissible to free those regions that were still under colonial rule. What African states were arguing was that the principle of non-intervention did not extend to the white redoubtist regimes of Southern Africa until they had changed the nature of their political system.

In sum, African leaders claimed a right to intervene to liberate regions of Southern Africa that were still under colonial rule. In situations of civil wars, as the Congo civil war illustrated, the lack of solidarity among Africa’s leaders made it impossible to obtain a clear decision on the right of intervention despite the fact that non-intervention became the guiding principle of intra-African affairs in the OAU. An unresolved question in the Congolese civil war was on the issue of mercenaries and foreign assistance. Could an African leader, as
Tshombé did, use mercenaries or seek outside assistance to resolve an internal crisis? Did this not contradict the notion of African exclusivity? Similarly in the Nigerian civil war, although most states observed the principle of non-intervention, President Julius Nyerere statement in support of Biafra’s secession opened the door on the problem of what to do when blacks were being oppressing by blacks. Was there a right to intervene when atrocities were committed by black African states? As we shall discuss in Chapter Four, these unresolved questions not only challenged the non-interventionist movement that had built up in the OAU, but also shed further light on how the practice of intervention evolved in Sub-Saharan Africa.
CHAPTER FOUR


Introduction

By the start of Africa’s second decade of independence, several events occurred on the continent that shed light on how the practice of intervention evolved alongside the principle of non-intervention. These included the Shaba (formerly Katanga) I and II crises in Zaire (1976 and 1977-1978); the Angolan civil war which started in 1976; the Chadian civil war which was paramount throughout the 1970s and 80s, and the Tanzanian intervention in Uganda (1978-1979). With the exception of the Tanzanian intervention in Uganda, what tied all these cases together was the issue of mercenaries and foreign assistance or put another way, the use of extra-continental forces (i.e. non-African forces) to solve African problems. The purpose of this Chapter is to argue that the action of African states in these events challenged the principle of non-intervention as set out in the OAU Charter.

In this Chapter, we focus primarily on the Pan-Africanist theme of ‘exclusivity.’ We stated in Chapter Two that one way of understanding the notion of African exclusivity was to explore how it was used by some African leaders outside of the OAU framework to justify interventions in the internal affairs of other African states. Can we understand the actions of African states through the Pan-Africanist theme of ‘exclusivity’? Does it serve as a useful source for understanding intervention by African states during the 1970s and 1980s? Another aim of this Chapter is suggest that other factors ranked higher than notions of exclusivity in understanding how the practice of intervention evolved in Sub-Saharan Africa. These factors included arguments to protect national security and to ensure self-defence and territorial integrity.

This Chapter is divided into three parts. In Part One, we argue that the issue of mercenaries and extra-continental forces shed a spotlight on understanding when intervention was justified alongside the principle of non-intervention. The Angolan civil war and the Shaba I and II crises are useful cases in addressing the issues of foreign assistance, intervention and non-intervention. More important, we note how the notion of African exclusivity was extending from its original meaning of developing a mechanism that would keep the continent free from outside influences and pressure.
In Part Two, we focus again on the issue of foreign assistance and the presence of non-African forces. We argue that some states, notably Nigeria, saw intervention by African states as a legitimate way of preventing or limiting the presence of non-African forces in African conflicts. To argue this point, we focus on the involvement of Nigeria and the OAU in the Chadian civil war between 1975 and 1981. However, we also ask what other norms and principles guided Nigeria’s actions in the Chad. Can they be understood in terms of Pan-Africanism or were there other considerations such as national security and the threat to regional peace and security that directed Nigeria’s actions in Chad?

In Part Three of this Chapter, we consider Tanzania’s intervention in Uganda. Of all the cases discussed in this Chapter, Tanzania’s action not only challenged Article 3(2) of the OAU Charter, but more important, it directly questioned the political authority of an African leader. An unresolved question in the Nigerian civil war was openly discussed when President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania intervened against the regime of General Idi Amin in Uganda: What did the rules governing intra-African affairs have to say about atrocities committed by black African states? Was intervention justified to end widespread abuse by an independent black African state?

I. The principle of non-intervention and the issue on foreign assistance in Africa.

If there was a period in which the politics of the Cold War came to have a lasting impact on the African continent, then the 1970s was surely it. This period saw the gradual intensification of East-West rivalry and outside interests taking their toll on the continent. The main problem facing the continent was the unprecedented number of non-African interventions that were taking place in African affairs since the end of colonial rule. From Angola to Chad, non-African intervention had become a permanent feature on the continent. The politics of the Cold War, the ‘continuing historical obligations and economic considerations’ combined to heighten the presence of extra-African forces. As Colin Legum

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stated when assessing the year 1977:

Looking back to the Berlin Treaty of 1884 and the carving out of separate spheres of influence by the colonial powers, Africans began to speak uneasily about 'a new scramble' for the continent. Although the historical analogy is false, the colonial memory persists, reinforcing the association of foreign power rivalries in Africa with subjugation of the continent.\(^3\)

Legum goes on to suggest that a 'new phenomenon' for this period 'was the externalization of inter-African conflicts, brought about by militarily and economically weaker forces engaging the support of foreign powers.'\(^4\) The presence of foreign powers was significantly felt in inter-African conflicts such as that between Morocco and Mauritania against Algeria over the Western Sahara in 1977. Here France was said to have been 'invited by African leaders themselves to play a greater military role in the dispute.'\(^5\) However, most notably for our immediate concern, foreign interventions by Cuba, France and the Soviet Union were a prominent feature in several civil wars on the continent, for example, the Shaba I and II crises and the Angolan civil war. Yet this was hardly a new phenomenon; the Congolese civil war had shown how an African conflict could become internationalized. The main problem was not only that outside powers were participants in some African conflicts, but that some African states were, as Legum observes, seen to be encouraging their presence.

The presence of non-African intervention was contrary to that aspect of African diplomacy which agreed at the Addis Ababa conference of May 1963 that extra-continental forces would be kept out of African affairs. If strictly interpreted to mean that no outside intervention in African affairs was acceptable, then 'invitations' to foreign forces went against the intention of the founding fathers of the OAU who sought to establish Africa's autonomy over its affairs. The participation of non-African forces in African conflicts since the end of

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colonial rule was a direct challenge to the notion of exclusivity - a principle objective of Pan-Africanism - that Africans felt they had over their affairs. However, as was the case in the Congo, the principle of African exclusivity was left open to the various interpretations of some African leaders in the 1970s. A major problem facing the continent in post-independent Africa and which challenged the assumption of African exclusivity over its affairs, was the continuing attachment some states had towards their former colonial masters. Many states embraced the idea of what Sam Nolutshungu defined as 'sovereignty under surveillance' where former colonialists like France appeared to provide 'protection for otherwise insecure regimes.'

There was one area in which African leaders gave tacit approval to the presence of non-African forces. This was in averting the spectre of secession. We discussed the extent of the OAU’s opposition to secession in Chapter Three when we noted the OAU’s rejection of Biafra’s attempt to secede from Nigeria in 1967. Again in the 1970s, the Organisation’s stand against secession was being challenged, this time by the Eritreans in Ethiopia. It was the threat posed by various secessionist movements that led some OAU member-states to suggest that if they enlisted foreign help to prevent the breakup of the state system, such action was not to be 'regarded as interference,...but rather as brotherly help.' So, when the Soviet Union stepped in during the latter part of the 1970s to help Ethiopia prevent 'the greatest of all evils,' secession, Ethiopia’s President, Mengistu Haile Mariam, did not see this as foreign intervention, but as supporting and preserving the African state system.

Both constitutionally and practically, the OAU could not give unconditional support to the use of foreign intervention. To this end, it passed a resolution during the Assembly of Heads of State and Government Summit meeting in Libreville, Gabon in July 1977 that was critical of foreign military assistance. However, the OAU never condemned the Cuban and Soviet presence on the continent. The resolution urgently called

on all African states so that, without prejudice to their right to conclude

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defence agreements of their choice intended especially to forestall outside aggression, they refrain from having recourse to foreign intervention in the settlement of conflicts between African states.9

In an appeal to the Soviet and Cuban presence on the continent, but also the French, the resolution called ‘on all extra-African powers, particularly the big ones, to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of African states.’ Both the Soviet Union and Cuba had pursued an active role on the African continent, most notably in the Angolan civil war (from 1975) and the liberation movements in Southern Africa.10

Angola and foreign military intervention: a threat to African exclusivity?

Angola gained independence from its Portuguese colonial master on 11 November 1975. Even before then, fighting had begun among the three nationalist movements and the civil war continued to plague the continent. Although fighting continued into the nineties, our immediate concern is with the initial years of the conflict and the support the nationalist movements received from extra-continental forces. Furthermore, we want to illustrate how the attitudes of African leaders to the use of extra-continental forces sheds light on how the practice of intervention evolved on the continent.

Briefly, there were three main nationalist movements who were ideologically divided and contending for power in Angola: 1) the Movimento Popular de Libertaçâo de Angola (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, MPLA) led by the strong Marxist leadership of Dr. Agostinho Neto had been mainly based in the far east region of Angola. The MPLA’s strong socialist credentials under Neto attracted support from the Soviet Union and Cuba. 2) The Frente Nacional de Libertaçâo de Angola (National Front for the Liberation of Angola, FNLA) led by President Dr. Holden Roberto. The FNLA had bases in northern Angola, but its main base was in southern Zaire were it had been receiving support from


President Mobutu, but also had ‘connections’ with the US, China and North Korea. The União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (National Union for Total Independence of Angola, UNITA) led by Dr. Jonas Malheiro Savimbi. Of all the three movements, UNITA was the smallest with its base in central and south-east Angola. UNITA was created after a split between Roberto and the former Foreign Affairs spokesman and Secretary-General of the FNLA, Jonas Savimbi, who had accused Roberto of tribal-based politics. UNITA had not fully established a network of external allies as the MPLA or FNLA had, although its early allies seemed to include the US and China. It also controversially sought support from South Africa.

Some member-states of the OAU had been critical of the use of extra-continental forces in the Angolan civil war. As an example of the extra-African Powers, we consider the role of the Soviet Union and Cuba primarily in helping Dr. Agostinho Neto and the MPLA gain power. The position of both countries is significant, for as Legum states, ‘[f]or the first time since the onset of Africa’s modern independence, an African Government was actually helped to establish its power through open foreign intervention.’ The Soviets and Cubans claimed that their position in Angola was directly related to their links with liberation movements in Southern Africa. In justifying its presence in Angola, the Soviet Union outlined its policy objective in Pravda as one of ‘assisting “Angola’s legitimate government based on the internationalist principle of supporting the nations’ struggle for freedom and independence.” It later claimed, along with the Cubans, that the South African intervention

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11 It is possible that Mobutu’s support for Holden was tied to the fact that the both men were related by marriage. See K. Somerville, (1990), p. 86.


13 For an analysis of the civil war in Angola, see ‘Decolonialization’, (1976), pp. 27-38.

14 For an analysis for the role of extra-Africa Powers in the Angolan civil war, see K. Somerville, (1990), pp. 94-101.


16 Pravda, 3 January 1976. Cited in C. Legum, (1975-1976b), p. A12. There were other foreign policy objectives beyond providing assistance for the struggle for liberation that explain the presence of both countries on the African continent. Certainly, if one looks at the Soviet Union, its objectives ranged from wanting to extend the Soviet sphere of influence in the continent to one of undermining Western interest in the region. For an analysis of the Soviet Union’s role beyond that of assisting the liberation struggle, see, D. Albright, ‘Overview of Communist Arms Transfer to Sub-Saharan Africa’ in B. Arlinghaus, (ed.) Arms for...
in 1975 and US military aid primarily fuelled its decision to enter Angola on the side of MPLA. What is of main interest to us here is not the exact role or real intentions of the Russians and Cubans, but the reaction of various African states towards their participation in Angola's civil war.

Much of Africa's response to the Russian and Cuban intervention, and also to the South African intervention, was aired at the OAU Assembly of Heads of State Summit meeting at Kampala, Uganda between 28 July-1 August 1975. There was, as Legum suggests, a broad 'consensus' within the OAU that all three main movements in Angola be treated equally and that no support was to be given to external intervention. However, this 'consensus' broke down when South Africa intervened in support of UNITA. What was however significant about this breakdown was that it shed light on the inconsistencies that surrounded a major principle of African diplomacy - the prohibition of external intervention in the internal affairs of African states. Member-states had agreed on condemning South Africa who was not yet regarded as an independent black African state because of its white redoubtist regime. However, there was division between those who rejected outside intervention and those who supported the Soviets and Cubans. This latter group (i.e. the pro-MPLA group) supported Cuban and Soviet intervention because they believed that both countries were protecting the legitimate MPLA government and the rest of Angola from South Africa's intervention, but more important supporting the liberation struggles in Southern Africa. This group mainly included left-wing radical states, Algeria, Congo, Guinea, Somalia, and the former colonies of Portugal, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and

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18 This section on the reaction of African states to the Angolan civil war is derived from Colin Legum's analysis of the debate that took place at the OAU Kampala Summit in C. Legum, (1975-1976b), pp. A22-A26.
São Tomé and Príncipe.19

Nigeria also staunchly defended the position of the pro-MPLA group. Nigeria had initially rejected the MPLA's claim to be the legitimate government of Angola, when she agreed with the OAU that a national government be composed of the three nationalist movements. More important, Nigeria's new leadership under General Murtala Muhammed had followed the policy of his predecessor Yakubu Gowon in condemning the support MPLA was receiving from the Soviet Union, because it undermined the potential for reconciliation among the nationalist movements. A shift in policy however occurred under General Muhammed when Nigeria discovered that South Africa had been helping UNITA. In a statement to the OAU Summit meeting in Kampala in 1975, General Muhammed criticised the neo-colonialist actions of Western governments, particularly the US, for not condemning and preventing the South African intervention. In relation to the Soviet Union's support for the MPLA, Muhammed not only praised this action, but the Soviet Union's overall policy of helping the liberation movements in Southern Africa:

We are all aware of the heroic role which the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries have played in the struggle of the African peoples for liberation. The Soviet Union and other Socialist countries have been our traditional suppliers of arms to resist oppression, and to fight for national liberation and human dignity. On the other hand the US, which now sheds crocodile tears on Angola, has not only completely ignored the freedom fighters whom successive US administrations branded as terrorists, it even openly supported morally and materially the fascist Portuguese Government. And we have no cause to doubt that the same successive American Administrations continue to support the apartheid regime of SA whom they see as defender of Western interest on the African continent.20

In response to Nigeria's approval of Soviet presence in Angola, President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia remarked that support given by the Soviet Union for liberation should 'not be an excuse for establishing hegemony in Africa.'21

19 Those who were critical of MPLA and as consequence, the participation of Russian and Cuban forces in the civil war, included Uganda and Zaire.


We can also see the extent of the division among African leaders over the question of allowing non-African intervention in two draft resolutions that were put forward at an emergency summit held in Addis Ababa on 16 January 1976 to deal specifically with the Angolan civil war. Two groups emerged within the summit because of this division. The first group included mainly moderate and conservative Francophone states: Botswana, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt, Gambia, Gabon, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mauritania, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Upper Volta, Zaire and Zambia. This group rejected foreign assistance claiming that it had jeopardized and internationalised the conflict. In its resolution, it called for the 'immediate withdrawal of all African and non-African States and cessation of the arms supply.' The second group was a mixture of radical, moderate states and former Portuguese colonies: Algeria, Benin (Dahomey), Burundi, Cape Verde, Chad, the Comoros Island, Congo, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, São Tomé and Príncipe, Sudan and Tanzania. This group supported a resolution which laid the blame for the civil war squarely at the door of the South Africans and 'its active collaborators,' but refrained from condemning Russia and Cuba. Rather, its resolution allowed for 'Material and military assistance to the People's Republic of Angola both through bilateral arrangements and collectively by the OAU.' Where a consensus existed, it was limited to both groups' condemnation of South Africa's role in the civil war.  

In his speech to the OAU Summit in Khartoum, Sudan in July 1978, the new Nigerian head of state, Lieutenant-General Olusegun Obasanjo, held the Soviet and Cuban position as legitimate, but added: 'having been invited to Africa in order to assist in the liberation struggle and the consolidation of national independence, they should not overstay their welcome.' While we suggested earlier that a policy of outward support for foreign

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intervention showed a degree of inconsistency with the policy of African exclusivity, the position of some African states over Angola showed that there was nothing entirely inconsistent about this policy. We need to be quite clear about what foreign intervention meant to African states.

African states were in two minds about the use of external military assistance on the continent. Those who expected the OAU to condemn the Soviet and Cuban presence in Angola failed to understand how ‘foreign intervention’ was interpreted by the OAU. Outside intervention was deemed legitimate when aimed at supporting the struggle against the white regimes of Southern Africa, and to this end, some African leaders invited outside forces to support this struggle, although there was no established policy on what type of intervention was preferable to remove the white regimes. Some leaders recognised the need to seek outside help for the liberation struggle, not only because they lacked indigenous capacity to fight the white regimes in Southern Africa, but also to ensure an international dimension to their struggle. At the same time, these leaders were aware of the dangers of allowing the continent to become dependent on foreign assistance, especially during a period of heightened superpower rivalry. It was largely because many perceived the Soviets and Cubans to be supporters of the liberation struggle that the OAU Liberation committee apparently ‘legitimised’ (if only by default) the supply of arms given to MPLA by these countries.

Yet, this was not just a struggle for liberation; Angola had already gained independence from its Portuguese colonial master. The struggle now was over who would control the country’s political landscape, therefore Angola’s conflict was internal and no outside interference according to Article 3(2) of the OAU should have occurred. Furthermore, African exclusivity dictated that problems arising on the continent should be dealt with, in the first instance, by Africans. The idea behind African exclusivity was to keep the continent free from outside influence and pressure, and if defined this way, then the support given to the Soviet and Cuban intervention contradicted this policy. However, the radical left-wing states that supported President Agostinho Neto and the MPLA, interpreted this struggle for power in Angola as a continuation of the fight for independence and saw

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intervention as a necessary means to fulfill the struggle. In one sense, the radical states and the MPLA could define the struggle in Angola as a fight for “second independence”, this time against those forces in the country whom they believed to be ‘un-African’ because of their pro-Western outlook and influence. They saw these forces as breeding neo-colonialism within the continent, for they allowed Western interest to get in the way of the liberation struggle and the creation of a ‘true’ African identity. Such a view was similar to that promulgated by Nkrumah during the Congo civil war who favoured Lumumba’s radical-nationalist credentials to the apparently Western influenced views of Tshombé and Kasavubu. Seeking outside assistance to achieve this goal of “second independence” was not contrary to the principle of African exclusivity, because African states were deciding for themselves how to solve a problem even if they had to call outside powers (e.g. the Soviets or Cubans) to fulfill their policy. As Nigeria’s Head of State, Lieutenant-General Obasanjo stated:

In the struggle for independence and freedom, the only source of effective support was the Eastern Bloc countries. The Soviets were therefore invited into Africa for a purpose, and that purpose was to liberate the countries to which they were invited....[W]e should not be over-concerned by the presence of those we invited to fight for specific causes....We have no right to condemn the Cubans nor the countries which felt they needed Cuban

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26 According to George Nzowgola-Ntalaya, the term “second independence” was coined by the people in the Kwilu region of Western Zaire. For these people, the first independence from their Belgian colonial masters had failed. ‘Independence was meaningless without a better standard of living.’ The promise of a better life had been squandered by those African ‘politicians who inherited state power,...lived in much greater luxury than most of their European predecessors and used violence and arbitrary force against the people.’ Consequently, people attempted to fight for another independence, this time against their own leaders. See Revolution and Counter-revolution in Africa, (London: Zed Books, 1987), p. 92.

27 The same ideological split that developed between the Casablanca and Monrovia group during the Congolese civil war re-emerged over Angola in 1976, with the radicals supporting the MPLA and the moderate-conservatives backing UNITA and the FNLA. The membership and character of the various ideological groupings had rapidly changed in the 1970s. Significant among the groupings was the radical bloc. Two kinds of radicals emerged: those who held on firmly to Marxist-Leninist thinking (“Marxist-Radicals”) and the radical or “militant nationalist” of which Nigeria was one. However, this latter group was different from the days of Nkrumah in that it never strove for a United States of Africa. For a full analysis of the various groupings, see Z. Červenka and C. Legum, ‘The Organization of African Unity in 1978: The Challenge of Foreign Intervention’, ACR, Vol. XI, 1978-1979, pp. A27-A28. On the differences and similarities between the radicals of the 1960s and the 1970s (the “new wave”) see M. Radu, (1984a), pp. 15-40, esp. 16-21 and 31.
assistance to consolidate their sovereignty or territorial integrity.²⁸

Here lies the second meaning of the notion of African exclusivity. It became synonymous with outside intervention in the struggle for independence and not just as mechanism to keep the continent free from outside interference. Indeed, it did not undermine the notion of Africa exclusivity; states who supported the MPLA recognised the use of non-African forces, but only as a last resort, to remove the foreign meddling of Western states in African states.

The support given to Neto and the MPLA was not surprising. More than seeing it as a continuation for the struggle of national liberation, some of the states supported Neto because he shared the same Marxist-socialist ideology that they believed in. While the struggle for liberation was widely used to justify outside intervention, there was another form of justification that some African leaders frequently cited. As we have pointed out in this study, support for states who share the same radical or revolutionary view of another country was often a reason why some states intervened in certain conflicts. During the 1970s radical African states held a seemingly congruous record when it came to interventions aimed at supporting a regime that shared the same ideology or overthrowing a regime that held opposing views.²⁹ A pattern was emerging within the continent by which radical states extended support to other states who fell within the Marxist-Leninist mould or who were ideologically friendly regimes, and the support given to Neto and the MPLA was an example.³⁰


³⁰ The radical or left-leaning states during the 1970s were Eduardo dos Santos (Angola), Mathieu Kerekou (Benin), Samora Machel (Mozambique), Mengistu Haile Mariam (Ethiopia), Agostinho Neto (Angola), Didier Ratsiraka (Madagascar), Jerry Rawlings (Ghana) and Albert Rene (Seychelles). See M. Radu, ‘Africa in the 1980s: The End of Innocence’ in R. Bissell and M. Radu, (eds.), (1984b), p. 233. Angola and Guinea-Bissau were active participants in averting the coup d’état in São Tomé and Príncipe in 1977, while Guinea extended military support to Benin in the same year to help President Kerekou’s Government in diverting the mercenary invasion. Many of these interventions took place by virtue of bilateral or defence agreements that individual states had with one another. Such agreements allowed a state (e.g. Guinea) to lend support to another state (e.g. Benin) when it faced internal unrest. As an example of bilateral defence agreements, see that signed by Guinea and Sierra Leone in March 1971 in ARB, Vol. 8, No. 3, March 1-31, 1971, p. 2045a. Other defence agreements were that signed between Nigeria and Benin, (29 April 1979) and Senegal and The Gambia (July 1981). Also see M. Radu, (1984a), pp. 35-36.
However, in supporting states with the same ideological persuasion, several radical states became reliant on external military assistance. Did this not contradict the Pan-Africanist notion of exclusivity that they identified themselves with? The answer was no; these radical states wanted to support those who shared similar political views, but they lacked indigenous military capacity available to help neighbouring or ‘friendly’ states. As Radu states, ‘unlike the more naive or unrealistic Pan-Africanists or African socialists [e.g. Nkrumah and Touré],’ the leaders of the radical states in the 1970s ‘realize[d] that their goals [could] not be reached with indigenous resources,’ hence they had ‘no objections to the introduction of non-African forces on the continent.’

The notion of African exclusivity was again extended in the Shaba I and II crises by African leaders this time to either support or reject foreign intervention. Again, we notice how African leaders, but more significantly the OAU, claimed that the notion of exclusivity had not been undermined, rather supplemented or reinforced.

**The Shaba I and II Crises**

The conflict that provoked intense debate on the question of foreign military assistance was the Shaba crises of 1976 and 1977-1978 in Zaire. Briefly, the crises that engulfed Zaire in the latter half of the 1970s was a spillover of the unresolved political problems from its civil war when it was called the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Members from the Congolese National Liberation Front (FNLC) had apparently launched their attack from their military base in Angola with the aim of overthrowing President Joseph Mobutu and creating a government of national unity. The FNLC were partly made up of Katanga gendarmes loyal to the former secessionist leader Moise Tshombé. These gendarmes had been in exile in northern Angola after two failed attempts in 1966 and 1967 to restore Tshombé’s leadership which he had lost to President Joseph Mobutu. The FNLC had been led by a former police commissioner who was appointed by Tshombé, General Nathanael Mbumba. President Neto allowed the FNLC to use Angola as a base to launch its attack largely because the FNLC had fought alongside Neto’s MPLA during Angola’s civil war against the FNLA who were receiving support from President Mobutu. The FNLC were also

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helped by Soviet Union and Cuba.\textsuperscript{32}

In response to the FNLC invasion, President Mobutu sought the help of Western allies. The US and France responded, the former providing limited support through $15 million of non-military aid.\textsuperscript{33} In keeping with its policy of maintaining and expanding its sphere of influence in Africa, France sent in a small number of military advisers and military equipment to the province of Shaba.\textsuperscript{34} Some Francophone ‘conservative’ African states such as the Central African Empire, Côte d’Ivoire, Morocco and Senegal had ‘played an active behind-the-scenes role by encouraging French intervention’ while King Hassan II of Morocco dispatched 1,500 troops in a French military aircraft.\textsuperscript{35} King Hassan’s support for the Zairean leader was not surprising. According to Keith Somerville, Hassan was repaying Mobutu back for supporting his claim for Western Sahara and the removal of ‘socialist-inclined movements like the Polisario.’\textsuperscript{36}

What provoked criticism from some African leaders was a Western-sponsored initiative to create a Pan-African Intervention Force to help Mobutu put down the rebel incursion. During the Shaba conflicts, France, with the support of the UK, Belgium and the US, had recommended the establishment of a Pan-African Intervention Force to replace non-African forces. Troops from the Central African Empire, Gabon, Côte d’Ivoire, Morocco, Senegal, and Togo took part in the African force with the support of US and French military assistance in mid-1978 to protect Mobutu. President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania was notable among the critics of this intervention force. He accused France of ‘neo-colonialism for economic purposes’ and America of wanting to use the African continent as a pawn in the East-West conflict.\textsuperscript{37} In a statement on 8 June 1978, Nyerere gave support to the idea of a


\textsuperscript{36} Keith Somerville, \textit{(1990)}, p. 170.

\textsuperscript{37} \textit{Keesing’s Contemporary Archives}, August 11, 1978, p. 29130. It should be noted that King Hassan of Morocco did not support the French initiative of an African force, ‘on the grounds that it would split Africa into moderate and progressive factions.’ (p. 29130).
Pan-African security force, but was critical of outside intervention:

It might be a good thing if the OAU was sufficiently united to establish an African High Command and a Pan-African Security Force. If, having done so, the OAU then decided to ask for external support for this force, no-one could legitimately object.

Yet until Africa at the OAU has made such a decision, there can be no Pan-African Security Force which will uphold the freedom of Africa. It is the height of arrogance for anyone else to talk of establishing a Pan-African Force to defend Africa. It is quite obvious, moreover, that those who have put forward this idea and those who seek to initiate such a force are not interested in the freedom of Africa. They are interested in the domination of Africa.38

For its part, the OAU never openly criticised Mobutu's decision to seek extra-African support. This was not because it supported such a policy; rather, the OAU recognised that it was unable to dictate outright how members were to conduct their foreign policies. In the end, as Červenka and Legum note, '[t]he essence of the consensus reached at the OAU...was an appeal to member-states to avoid resorting to foreign military assistance as far as possible and to refrain from using force against one another.' This was however a point familiar to OAU members as the civil war in Angola had shown. The OAU 'had always claimed that an invitation to foreign troops was made only as a last resort and adopted only with reluctance by the urgent necessity [of states] to defend their territorial integrity.' The Organisation was also simply acknowledging that the demands of its Charter could not prevent members from pursuing their own course of action.39

The OAU's position introduced an interesting aspect to the continent's understanding of the principle of non-intervention, but it was also an indication of the fallacy that lay behind

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39 Z. Červenka and C. Legum, (1978-1979), p. A37. (Emphasis in original). Two resolutions were passed at the 31st session of the OAU Council of Ministers meeting held in Khartoum from 7-18 July, 1978 prior to the Heads of State Summit of 18-22 July which were critical of the use of outside military intervention, but nevertheless, did not condemn the decision of states to seek outside assistance. See, 'On an Inter-African Military Force of Intervention', *CM/Res. 635 (XXXI)* and 'On Military Interventions in Africa and on Measures to be taken against Neo-Colonialist Maneouvres and Interventions in Africa', *CM/Res. 64 (XXXI)*. The full text of both resolutions can be seen in *ACR*, 1978-1979, p. C16 and C19, respectively.
the principle. As stated above, external intervention seemed justifiable, on the one hand, to prevent secession and maintain internal order and movements of national liberation. On the other hand, external intervention was also justified if it is aimed at supporting the existing status quo and the integrity of the state system. As S. Neil MacFarlane states, 'there is little basis for a sweeping condemnation of intervention when the purpose of such action was to preserve sovereignty and ensure political stability.'

Research has shown that those African leaders seeking to maintain their position in power often sought external aid, and such a policy largely went unchecked among African states who argued that the African state system needed to be preserved. Asking outside powers to prop up the African state was necessary, especially as many states did not have indigenous military capacity to either maintain internal order or ensure their survival in power. More important, many African leaders feared that the overthrow of a regime by rebel forces in one state could have wider implications for the continent. It is therefore possible to suggest that underlying African diplomacy was the idea of intervention to preserve the African state-system. Most, if not all African states were weak and it became an interest for other African states to ensure the survival of 'brother' states or at least support outside co-operation that was aimed at maintaining the African state along with the incumbent regime.

**Conclusion**

To summarise Part One of our discussion, so far we have argued how the principle of African exclusivity was used to justify the intervention of individual African states in some internal disputes, or to justify the support given by some to intervention performed by extra-continental forces. While Western observers might therefore conclude that there appeared to be some contradiction in the meaning some African states attach to the principle of non-intervention, this was not so. African leaders not only attached a special meaning to the principle of non-intervention, but they approached the principle in a pragmatic fashion, giving it a wide ranging meaning within the context of African affairs.

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41 In their study of military involvement of African states with each other, Hughes and May state that intervention to support the regimes of particular African states was a common feature on the continent. See 'Armies on Loan', pp. 180-184. Also see C. Clapham, (1996), pp. 80-85.
In Chapter Two and Three we pointed out that involvement in the internal disputes of another state was defined, at least by radical states, as intervention when conducted by non-African forces. However, when conducted by an African state, particularly when the aim was to ensure the ‘right’ kind of regime was in power, radical states did not define this as intervention, but as either lending support to a ‘brother’, maintaining and preserving African ‘solidarity’ against neo-colonial forces or supporting the cause of ‘national liberation’. However, what of when African states supported or as Obasanjo stated ‘invited’ non-African forces to resolve intra-African conflicts? Again, radical states were able to extend the meaning of exclusivity by stating, as they did in Angola, that they wanted to prevent foreign meddling by the neo-colonialist powers of the West, although an underlying motive was to seek outside help for those African regimes that they supported.

For conservative or moderate states, or states that maintained strong links with Western powers, intervention by non-African forces, when called upon, was justified as support for the status quo or for the African state system as in the case of Mobutu’s request for help in the Shaba conflicts. For these states the main concern was stability and the survival of the state and assistance from allies whether African or non-African was welcome. Furthermore, seeking helping from mainly Western powers was also a way of countering the influence of Soviet and Cuban presence on the continent who supported radical and revolutionary states on the continent.

Despite Article 3(2) of its Charter, the OAU also attached various meaning to the principle of non-intervention. While it deplored the use of foreign forces on the continent, the OAU recognised the right of any country to invite any state, African or extra-continental, to help that country with its internal or external affairs. Yet at the same time, such a position allowed for increased reliance on external military assistance.

However, there are several reasons which account for the increased reliance on external military assistance in the 1970s: 1) The OAU displayed an inability to resolve Africa’s disputes. The OAU was supposed to serve as a body of ‘first instance’, yet it was impotent in effectively dealing with the continent’s internal conflicts. 2) A lack of unity among its member-states over how to respond to conflicts on the continent had allowed or encouraged outside intervention by major extra-continental powers. Put another way, the

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42 Also see ARB, Vol. 13, No. 5, 1-31 May, 1976, p. 4015c.
failure to harmonise their policies or develop concrete policies on how to tackle conflicts on
the continent meant greater outside involvement in African affairs. 3) An inability by African
leaders to maintain law and order in their countries forced them to seek outside assistance.
Many states were economically weak and politically bankrupt and consequently signed
defence agreements with Western or Socialist allies to protect their regime from internal and
external aggression. Instead of concerning themselves with keeping the continent free from
the politics of the Cold War as the notion of African exclusivity dictated, these states argued
that exclusivity gave them an ‘inalienable right’ to direct their own foreign policy. 4) Another
factor, though not discussed in this study, was the ability of the major powers of the North
to on the one hand, exploit weak African states that could not shield themselves from foreign
machinations and on the other hand, take advantage of the divisions among African states in
resolving their conflicts. In the end, these factors contributed to the increased presence of
foreign intervention and as Nigeria’s Head of State, Lieutenant Obasanjo argued, it is the
actions of African leaders ‘which provide [outside powers] with the excuse to interfere with
[Africa’s] affairs.’

To a certain degree, in the next part of this Chapter, we should see Nigeria’s decision
to involve itself in the Chadian civil war in the context of some African states wanting to limit
external military involvement on the continent. The belief among Nigeria’s diplomatic circle
was that enhancing Africa’s indigenous capacity through the OAU would replace individual
state reliance on external military assistance. To this end, the next part of this Chapter
examines another aspect of how the debate on intervention evolved alongside that of non-
intervention in the continent. We can understand how the practice of intervention evolved in
the second half of the 1970s in the following statement: ‘Getting the Organisation of African
Unity strengthened by actually being involved in solving African problems like Chad, is one
way of ensuring that superpowers do not unduly penetrate the continent.’ However, there
are other reasons that lay behind Nigeria’s intervention in Chad.

II. Regional Intervention in the name of non-intervention: The civil war in Chad

See K. Somerville, (1990), who argues that there are ‘long-term structural factors and shorter term political,
social and economic factors’ which account for foreign military intervention in African states, (pp. 183-188).

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In the introduction to this Chapter, we suggested that some African states saw intervention by African states as a legitimate way of preventing or limiting the presence of non-African forces in African conflicts. To argue this point, we focus on the involvement of Nigeria and the OAU in the Chadian civil war between 1975 and 1981 to further illustrate how the practice of intervention evolved on the continent.

The civil war in Chad had gone almost unbroken since the republic’s independence in 1960, and engulfed the country right into the 1980s. We are not questioning whether the various African attempts at mediation in Chad did much good to resolve the conflict. This is another question altogether and for another study. Rather, we are concerned with why there were attempts by Africans to intervene at all in what was essentially an intra-state conflict, an area which the OAU traditionally refrains from involving itself. The civil war challenged the system of intra-African affairs on three levels. First was over the question of to whom to grant recognition at the level of the OAU. Put another way, which leader had legitimate control in Chad? Second was the territorial dispute between Chad and Libya over the Aouzou Strip, thus challenging the principle of *uti possidetis*, a concept that asserts that all member states were committed to respecting the frontiers existing at the time of their independence. The third level, and one which is of immediate concern here, is the problem of dealing with an internal affair while holding on to the principle of non-intervention in member-states. The presence of non-African forces, but also of other powerful African states (i.e. Libya) in the Chadian civil war, helped some African states side-step the issue of non-intervention. There were two main African actors that intervened in the Chadian civil war. First Nigeria in 1979, then the OAU in 1981. Let us begin with the former.

*Nigeria’s intervention in Chad*

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Of the African states to participate in the civil war, the position of Nigeria’s federal military government is worthy of analysis. Nigeria played the role of mediator when it first involved itself in the Chadian conflict. In brief, Nigeria held four conferences to resolve the difficulties surrounding the conflict: Kano I, 12-16 March 1979; Kano II, 3-11 April 1979; Lagos I, 26-27 May 1979, and Lagos II, 18 August 1979. Nigeria sent in peacekeeping troops on 10 March 1979 in the hope of fostering a peaceful outcome to the civil war. Nigeria abandoned the operation in June 1979, partly in response to the difficulties of maintaining a viable cease-fire, but also in response to its opposition to the constitution of the Transitional Government of National Unity (Gouvernement d'Union Nationale Transitoire or GUNT) which was established in April 1979. GUNT was to be inclusive of all parties to the Chadian conflict, but was instead seen by Nigeria as undermining negotiations at Kano I and II which sought to broaden the power-sharing base within Chad.

Despite its rejection of GUNT, Nigeria however maintained a key role in the crisis through OAU initiatives. In response to the failure of all-inclusiveness within GUNT, Nigeria resorted to coercive measures such as the placing of an oil embargo on Chad. Nigeria further insisted that the composition and constitution of the new government of Chad be acceptable and 'subject to “legitimation”' by other African states. Nolutshungu argues that although such a policy was contrary to the OAU’s principle of non-intervention, the Chadian state was however 'in eclipse' and on the verge of collapse.

Nigeria went on to support the formation of a new transitional government which was established after the second Lagos peace conference.

There are several factors which we can use to explain why Nigeria intervened in the Chadian conflict. For the purpose of this section, we discuss them under three headings: 1)

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46 The other states who were involved in the Chadian civil war were Cameroun, Central Africa Republic, Libya, Niger, and Sudan.


48 It was also reported that Chad ordered Nigeria to withdraw its troops on 1 June 1979, because the peacekeeping troop was viewed as an 'army of occupation.' See *ARB*, Vol. 16, No. 6, June 1-30, 1979, p. 5305A.

49 See *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, February 1, 1980, p. 30066.

Nigeria's internal politics, 2) Nigeria's regional security, and 3) African diplomacy.

1) Nigeria's internal politics

On the question of internal politics, Chad and Nigeria were neighbours. More important was that like Nigeria, religious and economic divisions affected Chad. As *West Africa* states, '[g]iven the internal make-up of Nigeria and its proximity to Chad, it ha[d] more than a passing interest in the settlement of the conflict.' For Nigeria, a stable Chad meant one that allowed a cross-section of society to participate in the economic, administrative and political life of the country, all of which Nigeria was concerned with because of its own civil war. Nigeria's concern was also due in part to the economic linkages and the 'common body of water' that both countries shared along with Cameroon and Niger.

Of the issues to affect Nigeria's internal politics, the presence of refugees posed a problem for the country's security. Notable among these were members of the Kanuri tribe. At the time of the partitioning of Africa after the Berlin Conference of 1884, the Kanuri tribe had found itself divided and governed by two different colonial entities - Britain in Nigeria and France in Chad. When independence came nothing had been done to merge both groups; rather they remained within two separate independent states. As Ade Adefuye states, 'the Kanuri are one of several African cultural groups who ha[d] been separated from their Kith and Kin' because of colonial partitioning. Consequently, such a policy, as Adefuye notes, 'affected internal politics and dictated the pattern' of Nigeria and Chad's inter-state relations, and other countries who found themselves in similar situations. Nigeria's intervention was

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51 'Massacre of Muslims in Chad', *West Africa*, No. 3217, 12 March 1979, p. 420.

52 I. James, 'Nigeria in OAU Peace-keeping in Chad: Historical and Political Analysis' in M. Vogt and A. Ekoko, (eds.) *Nigeria in International Peace-keeping 1960-1992* (Lagos: Malthouse Press Ltd, 1993), p. 137. As a consequence of this 'common body of water', the Lake Chad Basin Commission was established in 1964 as a system of economic and regional cooperation among the surrounding states. The conflict in Chad was seen as having a direct effect on the development of the basin. Also see A. Adeyeye, 'The Kanuri Factor in Nigeria - Chad Relations', *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria*, Vol XII, Nos. 3 & 4, Dec. 1984-June 1985, p. 129.


in part an attempt to stem the flow of refugees in its borders. Adefuye states that this ‘ethnic factor’ influenced the nature of Nigeria’s intervention.

Nigeria was said to have intervened to support Aboubakar Abdelrahmane, ‘a Kanuri with a view to making him occupy an important position in Chad so that he could be used to affect the course of events in the country.’ Abdelrahmane had been part of Goukoni Oueddei’s Frolinat (Front de Libération Nationale Tchadien (du Tchad)), until May 1977 when he broke away to form the Frolinat Third Army. Although there is no concrete evidence, Nigeria was reported to have given his army financial and training assistance because Abdelrahmane supposedly shared Nigeria’s opposition to Libya’s involvement in Chad. As Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff state, ‘General Obasanjo forthwith became his “protector” providing “the Third Liberation Army with funds and a training ground for its recruits.” One could however suggest that Nigeria’s motives were directed at achieving a peaceful settlement and ensuring that a stable government could be established in order to end the conflict in Chad as opposed to supporting one faction.

2) Nigeria’s regional security

In relation to Nigeria’s regional security, her involvement in Chad stemmed from her concern that the presence of foreign military troops not only undermined the independence of the African state, but also had implications for Nigeria’s own security. The main foreign troops in Chad were French and Libyan. Nigeria’s involvement could be presented as an alternative to the Libyan, but in particular, the French intervention which it saw as neo-colonial.

With regard to France, Nigeria saw French involvement in Chad as a way of maintaining a traditional sphere of influence in a region where French economic interest was at stake. However, French presence in Chad went beyond economic interest. France had a

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56 V. Thompson and R. Adloff, (1981), pp. 112-113

defence agreement at the time of Chad’s independence in 1960 which entitled her to station troops in the country. French military presence had been in the country since 1968 to support both the regimes of President Ngarta Tombalbaye and General Felix Malloun and was withdrawn in May 1980.\(^5\) Chad had strategic relevance for French policy in Africa. As David Yost notes, ‘Chad is a buffer state, partly shielding other French-protected states (most immediately Cameroon, Niger, and the Central African Republic) from invasion or subversion from territories beyond French influence.’\(^6\) Nigeria’s involvement in Chad could therefore be seen as an attempt to avert any challenge to its own security. As Margaret Vogt suggests:

Nigeria’s interest in Chad stems from a reluctance to allow complete freedom of action to foreign military powers in a country that is so strategically located at her border for fear that the conflict may spill over to adversely affect Nigerian security. Nigeria [was] suspicious of the intentions of countries that maintain[ed] military establishments in Chad for fear that this may be turned into a launching pad for subversive activities against her.\(^6\)

Although Nigeria’s intervention in Chad has often been described as an attempt to counter French presence, France herself was said to have sought Nigeria’s participation in resolving the Chadian civil war. In an attempt to prevent itself from becoming further ‘embroiled’ in the conflict, France promoted the idea of regional participation in the hope of shifting the financial and political responsibility away from herself.\(^6\) France was facing domestic criticism over its ‘apparently endless commitments’ in Chad and consequently, France not only ‘encouraged’ Nigeria’s involvement, but regarded it as timely.\(^6\)

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\(^5\) Under the Kano (I) Conference, French troops were to withdraw from Chad. On 20 March 1979, the French Government announced that its troops would be leaving Chad, although it would still offer technical assistance and other forms of co-operation. France began its withdrawal at the beginning of September 1979. See Keesing's Contemporary Archives, February 1, 1980, p. 30065 and 30067.


To a lesser extent, Nigeria saw Libya’s intervention in Chad as a threat to its attempts at becoming the dominant player within the region. Libya’s involvement in Chad goes back to the 1960s when Colonel Muammar Qadhafi gave political support to the Frolinat, whose exiled leader, Dr. Abba Siddick had his headquarters in the Libyan capital, Tripoli. Relations with Chad began to deteriorate after Libya’s occupation of the Aouzou Strip on the Libya-Chad border in 1973 and its intervention in the Chadian conflict in 1980. Nigeria saw Libya’s presence in Chad as not only undermining, but tilting the balance of power in the region towards Libya, a factor which Nigeria used to justify its involvement in Chad. Part of Nigeria’s dilemma was that it was unsure of the intentions of Libya’s Head of State, Colonel Qadhafi. However, as opposed to seeing Libya as a major threat, Nigeria took comfort from the fact that her presence served to counterbalance French influence in Chad and the region as a whole. As Vogt states,

Nigeria’s concern over the events in Chad... is further aggravated by the absence of a clear perception of Libya’s real intentions. As long as the Libyan military presence in Chad has resulted in the withdrawal of French forces and in the creation of a peaceful environment necessary for the conduct of elections, then their presence may be rationalised as a response to the appeals made by the Organisation of African Unity to member states to help find a peaceful solution to the crisis.

Nigeria and Libya both had an interest in reducing French and Western presence in the region. Thus, they worked together to ‘dislodge’ what they saw as ‘the imperialist penetration of Africa.’ It was on this basis that Nigeria decided that it was not ready to start a diplomatic war with Libya.

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63 The Aouzou Strip was said to be rich in manganese and uranium, but it was also said that Qadhafi was claiming the area by virtue of a Franco-Italian treaty signed in 1935 by King Idris of Libya. For an analysis of Libya’s involvement in Chad, see C. Legum, ‘The Crisis in Chad: Colonel Gaddafi’s Sahelian Dream’, ACR, Vol. XIII, 1980-1981, pp. A35-A46 and R. Lemarchand, ‘The Case of Chad’ in R. Lemarchand, (ed.) The Green and the Black: Qadhafi’s Policies in Africa (Bloomington and Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1988), pp. 106-124.


67 It is also interesting to note that the northern part of Nigeria which shares a border with Chad is heavily populated with Muslims. Some sections of the Muslims population were said to ‘show some affection’
We can therefore define the history of Nigeria’s search for peace in Chad as two-dimensional. On the one hand, it aimed at preventing the complete collapse of the country, while on the other, it sought to reduce French and Libyan presence which it argued posed a threat to Nigeria’s security. While one cannot dismiss Nigeria’s internal security fears of a civil war being conducted in a neighbouring country, we have paid attention to the second reason - Nigeria’s concern over her own security within the region. There is a third area, that of African diplomacy, which is not only relevant to this study, but also provides an interesting element to our understanding of how the practice of intervention evolved alongside the principle of non-intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa.


Although it is likely that Nigeria’s actions in Chad were aimed at protecting its own security by countering French interests in Chad, we could further define Nigeria’s actions as promoting a regional initiative or to recite the popular euphemism, “African solutions for African problems.” Put another way, Nigeria’s intervention can be described as a case of ‘African diplomacy’ negotiating peace in an African conflict at the expense of France. Nigeria saw itself as playing an important role both in international and African politics. As Pauline Baker notes, “[o]ver the years, ... Nigeria has come to see itself as a regional power with the duty and obligation to intercede in African issues, particularly those involving...extra continental intervention.”

Nigeria’s participation in the Chadian civil war was reminiscent of the radical foreign policy pursued by Nkrumah in the 1960s. As stated in Chapters Two and Three, Nkrumah’s aim was to prevent the participation of extra-continental powers in the affairs of African states to ensure African autonomy over its own affairs and the formation of a United States of Africa, hence his interventionist policy over the Congo. Minus the goal of an African

towards Qadhafi’s brand of militant Islam. There was a suggestion at the time that this explained Nigeria’s initial reluctance to criticise Libya’s actions over Chad. See ‘Nigeria and Gaddafi’s African Ambition’, *West Africa*, No. 3312, 19 January 1981, p. 99.


government, Nigeria’s policy in Chad was also partly aimed at stopping what it perceived were neo-colonial aspirations of major powers like France. Such objectives led Sam Nolutshungu to remark that the ‘radical concerns of the earlier period’ (as laid down by Nkrumah) were not abandoned altogether.70

In an article that analyses the history of peacekeeping in Africa, Pelcovits states that Nigeria developed a ‘novel exegesis on the doctrine of nonintervention’ to justify its call for intervention in Chad in 1979.71 This policy could be defined as regional intervention in the name of non-intervention. What added weight to Nigeria’s justification was that its involvement in Chad came at a time when there was increased external intervention in African conflicts. For example, outside Chad, there was also the French intervention in the Central African Empire in 1979 to remove Emperor Jean-Bedel Bokassa and reports of Spanish involvement in the removal of President Marcias Nguema in Equatorial Guinea, also in 1979. In response to these activities, the President of Nigeria, Lieutenant-General Olusegun Obasanjo, ‘called for engaging African regional peacekeepers in internal conflicts so as to deter the weaker, vulnerable states from being driven “into the laps of extra-African powers for defense and security.”’72 Nigeria hoped that the policy of regional intervention would provide an additional degree of legitimacy to African states who sought to restrict the number of outside interventions within the continent and ensure African autonomy over its own affairs. As Nolutshungu states, ‘African mediation claimed...a function of legitimation, and a control and limitation of external armed intervention.’73 In other words, Nigeria felt that there was more credence to be found in an African state intervening in another African state’s internal dispute than there would be if the intervening state came from outside the continent. This argument leads one to wonder whether Nigeria was also extending this policy to Libya. Was Libya not part of the African continent, and therefore had a family ‘right’ to involve itself in African affairs?

In one sense, the claim of regional intervention in the name of non-intervention may

70 S. Nolutshungu, (1996), p. 120.

71 N. Pelcovits, (1983), p. 264. Pelcovits adds that ‘regional intervention by African peacekeepers is justified as a countervailing force to foreign intervention (and not necessarily because of the consent of the parties).’


seem to suggest the compatibility of both regionalism and non-intervention in containing a particular conflict and preventing outside intervention. Certainly if one looked at the OAU's own position on Chad before it sent in an Inter-African peacekeeping force in 1981, it had been unable to respond to the conflict in Chad partly because of its own principle on non-intervention, but nevertheless it used the strategy of "African solutions" for limiting, if not preventing outside interference. As Nolutshugu states, '[i]n Chad, regionalism was pushed to the point of significantly qualifying the principle of non-interference, a requirement of state sovereignty in which the OAU placed much store.' However, and again Nolutshugu proves instructive, this claim of regionalism was more than a plea for the recognition of non-intervention. It set up a form of 'right' that Africans felt they had concerning the future of the state in Chad. This is similar to Ali Mazrui's argument that we raised in Chapter Two. African states claimed a 'family right' to interfere in conflicts within the continent, not because they could somehow resolve the conflict, but because their presence could act as a barrier or a means of preventing unwanted outside intervention. It fitted into the notion of exclusivity or what Mazrui labelled 'continental jurisdiction' or as Nolutshugu suggests, that aspect of African nationalism which inferred that the African continent had some 'right of oversight' in dealing with its own conflicts.

Yet, it would appear that this 'right of oversight' seemed limited to Nigeria. Certainly, no other African state except Libya played an active role in the Chadian conflict. Neither was there any clear understanding of what was inferred by regionalism among African states, save that it was directed and used for preventing or deciding the nature of outside intervention. The principle of regionalism and "Africa solutions" appeared vague as it never specified the degree of responsibility, expectation or obligation on the parts of African states in situations of internal conflicts. In addition, it never properly defined when it was acceptable to call on non-African states to intervene in the internal affairs of African states. However, more important than this, those states who did concern themselves with the conflict in Chad lacked

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74 The OAU first addressed the crisis in Chad in 1977 at the Libreville Summit meeting when it approved an ad hoc committee of six (Algeria, Cameroon, Gabon, Mozambique, Nigeria and Senegal) to negotiate in the dispute between the regime of General Felix Malloun and Libya over its support for Frolinat.


the military or economic means to take any decisive actions and consequently turned to their Western allies for assistance. In the end, the notion of "African solutions" served to legitimise the presence of non-African intervention in African affairs because African states were exercising 'their supposed African responsibility' in dealing with a conflict on the continent. Yet, it is because of this dependence on outside military assistance that Nigeria advocated a stronger OAU presence in resolving the conflict in Chad.

At the heart of Nigeria's policy of wanting to involve the OAU in the Chadian civil war was the hope that its presence would halt the supply of arms by non-African powers to the various warring parties. In a shift from its position in the Congo civil war where it supported the role of the UN instead of the OAU, Nigeria now wanted to see the OAU take an active role in African conflicts. During the Congo crisis, Nigeria had characterised the Organisation's role as an 'infringing of the [Congo's] sovereignty and thus contrary to the organisation's charter.' Now Nigeria wanted to see 'some major problems...resolved by the OAU to prevent foreign exploitation of such issues.' It was a strategy to keep African affairs and resolutions over the Chadian conflict in 'black hands.' Nigeria did not aim this policy at guaranteeing a successful outcome to the conflict, rather success was measured by how far the continent could maintain authority over its own affairs. As Thompson and Adloff states, '[i]t is far they have successfully opposed bringing the Chad impasse before the UN, even after their own efforts as neighbors and as members of the OAU had proven unavailing.' The OAU did however appeal later to the UN when it decided to send in a peacekeeping force in 1981.

The OAU came in primarily to reduce Libya's own involvement in the Chadian conflict, but also in response to 'the increasing conflict of interests by external powers in Chad.' An OAU inter-African force comprising Nigeria, Senegal, Zaire and the other African states was suggested to replace Libyan forces. The OAU's peacekeeping force has been criticised for its handling of the Chadian conflict, largely because of its failure to define

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its mission or mandate, but also because it lacked the capacity to launch a peacekeeping operation. While this study is not concerned with the issues surrounding the OAU’s perceived failures, Červenka and Legum suggest an interesting point on the Organisation’s lack of success which is relevant to our present study. They argue that despite the plea to limit the presence of the major powers in the conflict, the OAU asked for peacekeeping troops and logistical and financial assistance from the UK, France and the US. The decision to invite these countries was not only contrary to the idea of exclusivity, a central pillar of Pan-Africanism, but it also ‘tarnished’ the OAU’s principle of “African solutions for African problems.” Although ‘the original decision was to seek this support through the UN’ (which was consistent with the role of regional organisations under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter), ‘in practice the request for logistical support was made only to France, the US and Britain.’

Yet, as we have stated occasionally throughout this Chapter, the OAU’s request for outside assistance was an illustration of the vagueness surrounding the idea “African solutions.” There was no consensus among African leaders on whether non-African states could be called upon to intervene in internal conflicts. Despite this, Nolutshungu raises an interesting point about non-African intervention in the Chadian civil war which is relevant to our understanding of how the thinking on intervention evolved on the continent:

...the OAU, or some states through it, effectively claimed a right of veto in the internal politics of Chad (though the distinction between internal and international was hard to sustain in Chad) and tried to open or shut doors to external influences as it judged proper....In this way, OAU members were no

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82 Z. Červenka and C. Legum, (1981-1982), p. A86. The decision to seek financial assistance from the UN was made at the 35th OAU Council of Ministers Meeting in Freetown, Sierra Leone, held on June 23-29, 1980 and passed at the 17th annual Assembly of Heads of State and Government also held in Freetown, between 1-4 July. The text of the Council of Ministers stated that they, ‘resolved that member states in a position to do so should contribute towards a required budget of $60,000,000 to finance an African peacekeeping force, and that an appeal would be made to the United Nations Security Council if sufficient funds had not been raised within two months.’ Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, November 7, 1980, p. 30557. It should be noted that the intervention in Chad was appropriately dealt with by the UN Security Council and was therefore legitimate.
longer merely assuming the right to “legitimate” governments in Chad, as they had seemed to do in 1979; they were now also being assigned a power to “legitimate” foreign armed intervention in Chad, which they had not the means themselves to undertake or to control effectively when done by others.  

In other words, because the Organisation and its member states lacked indigenous capacity to resolve the conflict, the OAU invited non-African states to act on its behalf while still dictating how the conflict ought to be conducted. Put this way, such a policy did not go against the principle of exclusivity; rather, it meant that the conflict (in theory at least) was to be handled within the framework of African diplomacy. In reality however, the fund-raiser of a peacekeeping force for the OAU would inevitably have a large influence on the objectives of the operation and the outcome of the conflict, and to this end, states like France and America influenced the nature and pattern of the Chadian civil war, and also the policies taken by some African states.

Conclusion

In sum, Nigeria’s intervention and later the OAU’s involvement can be understood within the context of the Pan-African desire to maintain jurisdiction over African affairs or at least where outside intervention is involved, to decide the nature of this intervention, thus preserving the idea of African autonomy. We could however suggest that Nigeria brought in the OAU and appealed to the Pan-Africanist notion of African exclusivity to legitimise its real intentions for intervening. Nigeria’s ‘real’ motives in Chad were to preserve its national security, maintain regional peace and security and protect its regional hegemony against its rival states, France and Libya than any appeal to Pan-Africanism. However, one cannot discount the presence of non-African forces intervening in conflicts on the continent, especially in the later half of the 1970s, consequently, Nigeria was able to appeal to a higher order - the Pan-Africanism desire for “African solutions” - to justify its involvement in Chad.  


84 See C. Clapham, (1996), Chapter Six in which he notes the increasing presence of non-African intervention on the African continent in the latter half of the 1970s.
In the next part of this Chapter we focus on another example of how the practice of intervention evolved on the continent. The type of intervention being discussed is not justified in terms of seeking “African solutions” to prevent extra-continental intervention, nor is it justified within the context of African unity. In fact, Tanzania’s intervention in Uganda not only challenged the political authority of an African state, but accused the regime of General Idi Amin of human rights atrocities: What did the rules governing intra-African affairs have to say about atrocities committed by black African states? Was intervention justified to end widespread abuse by an independent black African state? Did the rules sanctioning intervention against the white redoubtist regimes of Southern Africa apply to black independent African states who commit atrocities?

III. The principle of self-defence: Tanzania’s intervention in Uganda

Of all the cases studied so far, the Tanzanian intervention in Uganda in 1978 is particularly significant. Tanzania’s action raises several questions especially in trying to understand how the practice of intervention evolved alongside the principle of non-intervention on the continent. Significantly, this was a case that generated a different level of justification from the cases we discussed so far in this study. Tanzania’s decision to intervene was not spurred on by a desire to prevent major extra-continental forces from entering the conflict involving it and Uganda, nor was it to do with the question of African unity or the struggle for liberation and independence. How then was the Tanzanian intervention justified? What criteria existed from which Tanzania could base its actions? If the ‘rules of the game’ did not apply yet to what radical states like Tanzania suggested were not free and independent states in their own right, what then of President Julius Nyerere’s decision to intervene in Uganda - an independent black African state?

The conflict between Tanzania and Uganda goes back to 1971 when Idi Amin deposed President Milton Obote in a military coup. Obote was a personal friend of President Julius Nyerere and a ‘seeming socialist like the Tanzanian Head of State,’ so Nyerere offered Obote and his troops asylum. The conflict between Tanzania and Uganda goes back to 1971 when Idi Amin deposed President Milton Obote in a military coup. Obote was a personal friend of President Julius Nyerere and a ‘seeming socialist like the Tanzanian Head of State,’ so Nyerere offered Obote and his troops asylum. The former President along with his supporters launched an

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attack from the Tanzanian territory against Uganda which failed. The dispute between Tanzania and Uganda continued throughout the 1970s with both sides issuing threats or counter threats and accusing one another of planned or attempted invasions. In 1975 the Tanzanian government used Amin’s human rights atrocities as grounds for boycotting the OAU Heads of State Summit at Kampala because of its location in the Ugandan capital. Tanzania saw the decision to hold the Summit meeting in Kampala as the OAU giving tacit approval to the regime of Amin. In an official statement issued on 25 July 1975 by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ndugu John Malecela, the Tanzanian government openly criticised Amin and began the first of many comparisons between Uganda and South Africa. The criticisms were also directed at the OAU for not condemning Amin’s human rights atrocities:

The reason given by African leaders for their silence about [the atrocities committed] is the non-interference clause in the OAU Charter. This agreement not to interfere in the internal affairs of another State is necessary for the existence of the OAU. A similar condition is accepted by members of the United Nations. But why is it good for States to condemn apartheid and bad for them to condemn massacres which are committed by independent African Governments? Why is it legitimate to call for the isolation of South Africa because of its oppression, but illegitimate to refuse co-operation with a country like Uganda where the government survives because of the ruthlessness with which it kills suspected critics?

Malecela raises some fundamental questions about when intervention is permissible, and we shall come back to address them when we focus on the question of intervention for...

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humanitarian reasons in this part of the Chapter.

It was the 1 November 1978 annexation of the Kagera Salient - a Tanzanian territory which was north of the River Kagera - that finally provoked Nyerere's decision 'to contribute directly to [Amin's] overthrow.' Before this, Nyerere had not advocated intervention or military action against Amin, but openly criticised Amin's leadership in Uganda. Two reasons lay behind Nyerere's condemnation of Amin throughout the 1970s. First was Nyerere's 'self-interest' in wanting to weaken 'the cause of a troublesome and threatening neighbour state', and second, was 'a humanitarian impulse which found the brutality of the Amin regime repugnant.' However, with Amin's attack on the Kagera Salient and his direct challenge on the OAU Charter principle of 'territorial integrity,' Nyerere was able to turn his open criticism into a 'three-point strategy' or a plan of action to ensure Amin's downfall. The strategy set out:

(1) to get the OAU to condemn Amin's aggression, to obtain compensation for the damage done as well as a renunciation of all claims to Tanzanian territory; (2) to drive Amin's forces out of Tanzania and to punish the two battalions involved in the Kagera operation; and (3) to ensure that there would be no repetition of attacks against Tanzania.

President Amin was overthrown with the fall of the capital city, Kampala on 10-11 April 1979. While these plans reflected Nyerere's intentions, *Africa Contemporary Record* (ACR) states that it was not part of his 'original plan that Tanzanians should overthrow Amin.' According to ACR, Nyerere had stated in several speeches that this was a task 'entrusted to Ugandans themselves.' Nevertheless, ACR goes on to state that 'Nyerere did commit himself to helping the Ugandans.' This not only provided evidence of interventionist intention, but challenged Article 3(5) of the OAU Charter which sought to prevent subversion, the overthrow of a leader, political assassination or support of these activities by

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an outside force. We can see this in the following remark Nyerere made to justify the overthrow of regimes:

> Despite my dislike for Amin - and I really do not like him - the government of Tanzania has no right to enter Uganda in order to topple Amin...No other government in Africa or anywhere else in the world has the right to overthrow Amin's regime...But Amin's regime is a brutal one, and the people of Uganda have that right. All people all over the world have the right to topple regimes they detest....Recently Iran did likewise...and I congratulate them for this....

The question that needed to be asked was whether other states could help the people in the overthrow of a regime that they opposed? Nyerere claimed that his military action against Amin should be understood separately from that being conducted by the people of Uganda who wanted to overthrow him. To this end, Nyerere claimed that there were ‘two wars’ being fought in Uganda and his was a fight to ‘maintain national security’ against Amin’s aggression. However, as Caroline Thomas states, such an analysis was an oversimplification of Tanzania’s action: ‘Tanzanian forces...were helping to topple Amin. They made the job of Amin’s opponents far easier than it would otherwise have been.’

During the conflict with Uganda, Nyerere had been critical of the OAU’s position and its refusal to condemn Amin’s regime, especially as Amin had in Nyerere’s mind challenged the Charter principle on the ‘inviolability of borders.’ In a speech to mark Tanzania’s 17th Independence anniversary, President Nyerere again drew comparisons with South Africa and Ian Smith’s Rhodesia:

> Amin is a killer. Since he took over the leadership of Uganda....he has killed many more people than [Ian] Smith has done. He has killed many more people than [John] Vorster has done in [South Africa]. But there is a strange habit in Africa: an African leader, so long as he is an African, can kill Africans just as he pleases, and you cannot say anything. If Amin was white, we would have passed many resolutions against him. But he is black, and blackness is a licence to kill Africans. And therefore there is complete silence; no one

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speaks about what he does.\textsuperscript{96}

In another speech, Nyerere demanded that the OAU Charter, which only defended the rights of those living under colonial and racially dominated regimes, be reviewed. Once these states were liberated and had achieved statehood, Nyerere claimed that the Charter sought only to protect Africa’s Heads of State. In this way, the OAU was nothing short of a trade union. As Nyerere stated, ‘It did not matter what a Head of State did; he could kill as many people as he liked in his country and he would still be protected by the Charter.’\textsuperscript{97}

The Tanzanian intervention enables us to consider whether, in a similar line with how the debate has evolved in the West, there may exist a special case for intervening on humanitarian grounds. Tanzania could have justified its action on humanitarian grounds if it chose to.\textsuperscript{98} In the section that dealt with South Africa in the previous Chapter, we raised the following question: if the right to interfere was to be granted on the grounds that the regimes of Southern Africa were colonial and racially oppressive, what of a situation where members of the same race were suppressed? What did Africa’s leadership say about this, especially when colonialism or the struggle for liberation was not at the heart of the debate?

In defending its actions, Tanzania refrained from providing a humanitarian rationale. Instead, official documents from Tanzania said that self-defence was the basis for intervention. Certainly, the actions of Idi Amin on the Tanzania-Uganda border were a threat to Tanzania’s own security, territorial integrity and sovereignty. As stated earlier, since 1971, Amin’s troops had been attacking Tanzania, culminating with the 1978 invasion in which troops occupied parts of the Kagera Salient. But why did the documents not mention Amin’s


\textsuperscript{97} Cited in 'United Republic of Tanzania,' (1978-1979), pp. B394-B395. Also see 'Nyerere on need to review OAU Charter', \textit{Africa Currents}, No. 14, Spring 1979, p. 4.

atrocities? Caroline Thomas gives us an answer:

[i]nterestingly, in the many cases of intra-Third World intervention, justifications are never couched primarily in humanitarian terms, but always within the logic of the state system, that is, in terms of self defence. It is easy to understand why. State interest takes precedence over human concerns. States outlaw intervention as an insurance policy for their own futures. ⁹⁹

Other reasons exist to show that humanitarianism was not the prime concern for the Tanzanian intervention. As noted earlier, part of Nyerere’s aim was to re-install his friend Milton Obote back as leader in Uganda. Nyerere had refused to recognise Amin as the legitimate leader in Uganda. It is worth noting that Nyerere did back the new government of Mr. Godfrey Lukongwa Binaisa which followed the overthrow of the Amin regime.

It is difficult to state whether member-states of the OAU supported Tanzania’s action. Although Tanzania defended its right to intervene, there was general criticism levelled against her for undermining the main principles of the organisation. Rather than provide institutional condemnation for the atrocities committed by Amin, some member-states accused Tanzania of trespassing the rule of non-intervention. Morocco, Sudan and Nigeria condemned Tanzania, the latter partly because Nyerere had supported Biafra’s plea for secession in the Nigerian civil war. Before this, Nigeria had supported Nyerere when Uganda had violated the territorial borders of Tanzania on several occasions since Idi Amin’s accession to power. ¹⁰⁰

The OAU seemed reluctant to establish a precedent which gave human rights primacy over the principle of state sovereignty. More important, as Thomas states, ‘the OAU had never condemned a black African, nor an Arab state, whatever the atrocities that had been committed, and [in relation to cases like Uganda] it was not prepared to set a precedent.’ ¹⁰¹

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⁹⁹ C. Thomas, ‘The Pragmatic Case Against Intervention’ in I. Forbes and M. Hoffman, (eds.), (1993), p. 95. It is worth noting that eight years before, in 1971, India also defined its intervention in East Pakistan (Bangladesh) as self-defence, while in 1978, Vietnam also adopted the same reasoning to defend its actions in Kampuchea (Cambodia). Yet, as with Tanzania, both also raised the question of humanitarianism to justify intervention.

¹⁰⁰ We should also note that Nigeria had also rejected Vietnam’s claim of intervening in Kampuchea (Cambodia) to end the brutal regime of Pol Pot, also in 1978. After international criticism of the Federal Government’s treatment of the Ibo tribe who mainly supported the Biafran secession, Nigeria was sensitive to outside criticism of human rights atrocities. Nigeria argued that human rights abuse did not warrant outside military intervention.

Instead, during the 16th OAU Heads of State Summit Meeting in Monrovia, Liberia from 17 to 21 July 1979, President Numeiry of Sudan, the Chairman of the OAU at the time of the Tanzanian intervention in Uganda, criticised Nyerere for violating OAU principles, while Nigeria’s Head of State, Lt. General Obasanjo stated that Tanzania’s intervention was ‘ill-advised’ and had set ‘a dangerous precedent of unimaginable consequences.” Obasanjo went on to state that, ‘[s]ecurity may be endangered by this act, for the weaker and smaller nations of Africa will have to look over their shoulders at their powerful neighbours whenever they have to act.’

Despite these criticisms, there was no consensus about how to respond to Tanzania’s intervention, which clearly fell outside the framework of the OAU Charter. Rather, as Thomas notes, ‘most African states remained silent’ at the OAU Summit in July 1979, thereby indicating a tacit approval of Tanzanian action. Similarly, William Zartman notes that rather than outwardly condemning Nyerere’s actions,

the African community [i.e. the OAU] was generally content to register criticism in principle alone, since Nyerere saved the continent from an egregious aberration that the system of collectivity could not handle, bound as it was by its own negative norms against any interference in internal affairs.

More important, in a joint statement in Luanda, Angola, the frontline states of Mozambique, Zambia, and Angola denounced Amin’s past incursions in Tanzanian territory as well as his human rights abuses at home. The support of the frontline states was largely due to

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105 O. Aluko, (1981), p. 172. On 3 March 1979, the Times of Zambia stated that: ‘Either the OAU puts Africa first now, or it will degenerate into self-seeking power groupings, each intent on its own narrow national ambitions.’ It went on to state that ‘Amin’s Uganda is the aggressor nation. It is in breach of the OAU Charter [on territorial integrity]. Amin’s regime should be roundly condemned by the OAU.’ Cited in Z.
Tanzania’s policy of championing the cause of these states in their struggle for liberation and independence and their shared belief in the same radical Marxist-Leninist philosophy. Such justification, although not explicitly stated, corresponds to those interventions Northedge and Donelan and later Hughes and May defined as ideologically-driven motivations.

Conclusion

Despite these factors or justifications for intervening, Tanzania’s intervention proved significant in terms of understanding the debate on intervention and non-intervention among African leaders. While official documents from Tanzania cite the motive of intervention as self-defence rather than humanitarianism, the statements made by Nyerere did not stop short of indicating the number of atrocities that the Amin regime was said to have committed and, in one sense, it is possible to note an implicit humanitarian motive behind Tanzania’s action. On this point, Červenka and Legum state that the Tanzanian intervention did at least set ‘one positive impact’ in that it ‘compelled’ the OAU to focus on the problem of human rights abuses within the continent.\textsuperscript{106} For example, one could suggest that the Tanzanian intervention ‘enabled’ other African leaders to condemn human rights violation and in several instances, some leaders were assassinated because of their domestic behaviour. For example, Emperor Jean-Bedel Bokassa of the Central African Empire and President Marcias Nguema in Equatorial Guinea in 1979 and President William Tolbert in Liberia in 1980. More important, an ‘African Charter on Human Rights and Peoples’ Rights’ was adopted by African Heads of State at the OAU Summit held in Nairobi, Kenya in June 1981 which sought to apply pressure on African leaders to improve their human rights record. Did the introduction of the Charter sanction intervention if African leaders violated humans rights with impunity?

Certainly, or at least in theory, the African Charter on Human Rights held that African

states could question the legitimacy and internal conduct of other African states. More important, as Christopher Clapham notes, Tanzania’s intervention and the African Charter on Human Rights did remove the pretence that African states could operate as fiefdoms, safe from external scrutiny. As Clapham notes, the Charter on Human Rights did ‘formally [establish] the principle that the domestic conduct of African leaders was subject to generally accepted criteria of international morality’ more so when African leaders were prepared to criticise the behaviour of the South African regime for what they defined as crimes against humanity. Indeed, when African states challenged the apartheid system in South Africa they drew attention to their own human rights record because they were commenting upon how a state should treat its people. Nevertheless, the Charter did not prevent subsequent human rights atrocities by African leaders; nor did it shift the OAU from its traditional orthodox position of non-intervention. Again as Clapham notes,

[t]he Charter was not legally binding, and provisions in the original draft placing states under an obligation to ‘guarantee’ rights and ‘ensure’ respect for them were taken in order to gain acceptance from member states.

In the end, African leaders rejected intervention aimed at overthrowing a regime, even if its conduct was contrary to the standards of international society, and African leaders found any resolution that promoted intervention of this nature dangerous and detrimental to the survival of the African state. President Nyerere too agreed with this despite his condemnation of Amin’s atrocities, hence the official statements from Tanzania justifying its intervention in terms of norms recognisable to African states and the wider international community: territorial integrity and self-defence.

Conclusion

We began this Chapter by suggesting that the 1970s represented a period when there was significant willingness by some states to seek military assistance from external actors, in

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particular, assistance from the two main superpowers, and Cuba and France. Such a policy showed how intervention was deemed acceptable at one level, because its intended use was to support the integrity of the state system and the existing status quo (i.e. the Shaba I and II crises). It is in this context that we can argue that intervention to support and uphold the sovereign state is a source from which to understand how intervention evolved alongside that of non-intervention within the African continent thus conforming with Hughes and May's analysis that most interventions were either 'regime' or 'state' supportive. While the OAU reaffirmed the principle of non-intervention, member-states widely acknowledged that African leaders could call upon outside intervention if its purpose were to protect the incumbent regime and the survival of the African state system. At another level, intervention was supported if its intended aim were to promote the struggle for liberation and rid the country from the neocolonialists from the West (i.e. the Angolan civil war).

The decision of Nigeria to intervene in Chad did not undermine such a policy, although it is possible to argue that Nigeria's, and later the OAU's intervention, was also motivated by the presence of non-African states in this conflict. The intervention in Chad was however an example of attempts taken by some leaders to 'Africanise' a particular conflict on the continent, although it did not limit or remove the presence of non-African states intervening in African conflicts. Rather, African states 'welcomed' their participation in terms of logistical and financial support partly because they lacked the necessary means to solve the Chadian civil war. This policy was in line with what Julius Nyerere defined as a policy of 'Yes to military assistance; no to any foreign intervention.' Such a policy supported the 'occasional necessity' of seeking military assistance from non-African states, but rejected direct military intervention from outside the continent.\(^\text{109}\)

We could sum up the policy of African leaders and the OAU during the 1970s as follows: Africans may call for assistance, but at the end, they must take the lead in resolving a particular crisis. It is within this context that we can understand the Pan-Africanist notion of exclusivity. The involvement of Nigeria and the OAU in Chad was less a matter of resolving the conflict, than one of hoping to reduce the dependence of the continent on non-African powers, and where possible, to define the limits of, and direct, the use of outside

\(^\text{109}\) See 'Tanzania Stands: Yes to military assistance; no to any foreign intervention', Extract from a statement by the President of Tanzania, Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere, 8 June 1978, America Currents, No. 12/13, Autumn/Winter, 1978/79, pp. 21-23.
forces. Such a policy explains how the practice of intervention evolved alongside the principle of non-intervention on the continent. However, we should also note that Nigeria’s actions were primarily to ensure its own security against countries like Libya and France. It used the idea of “African solutions for African problems” to ensure that outsiders did not undermine its security in the region.

Tanzania’s intervention does not fit into the framework of continental exclusiveness. What then does Tanzania’s action tell us about the evolution of the principle of intervention on the continent? We can understand the intervention on two levels: a) as a response to Amin’s annexation of the Kagera Salient in 1978 and, b) as a response to human rights abuses. Both are directly related and cannot be dealt with separately. Nyerere sought to justify his actions on the grounds of self-defence. We can therefore interpret Tanzania’s actions as belonging to the traditional behaviour of states who find that other states are challenging their security and sovereignty. It was the principle of self-defence, one which was far more conventional and acceptable to African states and the wider international community than any assertion of humanitarian intent, that explains Tanzania’s action.

Yet, while making attempts to avoid setting a precedent for intervention on grounds of humanitarianism, Nyerere’s attacks on the brutality of Amin’s regime opened the door for such considerations. However, as Caroline Thomas observed, the OAU or African states never advocated humanitarianism as a first principle for supporting intervention in the affairs of another state. The attitude of the OAU was however significant to the debate on intervention on the continent. While the OAU was critical of Nyerere, it did not pronounce any devastating remark on his actions, even though he transgressed Article 3(5) of the Charter. Rather, its position showed two seemingly contradictory aspects about the Organisation. First, it highlighted that the OAU wanted to show that it did not sanction intervention by one African state in another, thus preserving the sanctity of the principle on non-intervention. Yet, at the same time, the Organisation silently credited Tanzania and Nyerere for saving it from having to continually deal with an embarrassing and brutal figurehead like Idi Amin because of the principles enshrined in Article 3 of the Charter.

In sum, the cases studied in this Chapter can tell us a good deal. They indicate that African leaders developed a pragmatic approach on the question of intervention alongside the clause of non-intervention as set out in the OAU Charter. If intervention was directed at the survival of a regime or the African state, then it was justified, although its legitimacy was not
institutionalised within the OAU Charter. If outside assistance was sought to protect the state or an incumbent regime, this also received tacit approval despite the occasional criticism from some African states.

Seeking outside assistance did not undermine the Pan-Africanist desire of ensuring African autonomy over its affairs, for African leaders were taking the responsibility for these conflicts and dictated whether or not outside intervention was permissible and in turn, legitimate. Tanzania’s case however was different, no appeal was made to notions of exclusivity. However, although history shows otherwise, Tanzania’s actions and the OAU’s silent approval partly answers a question we raised in Chapter Three about what is to be done about African leaders who oppress their people. Although the OAU did not sanction intervention to remove leaders who committed atrocities against their citizens, by the latter half of the 1970s and with attention focussing on the African continent, African leaders were forced to question the behaviour of other African leaders towards their citizens. More important, their routine condemnation of the apartheid system in South African required that African leaders depart from the diplomatic habit of closing their eyes to atrocities committed by a fellow African leader.
CHAPTER FIVE

POST-COLD WAR INTRA-AFRICAN AFFAIRS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERVENTION

Introduction

We said at the outset of this study that while the impact of the Cold War is relevant for understanding the development of African international relations, this study would attempt to isolate its impact on the continent to examine the practice of intervention by African states. However, we have reached a stage in this study where some International Relations theorists say that the setting of international politics no longer resembles that of the thirty years period we covered in Chapters Two to Four. For the African continent, instability, humanitarian crises, and widespread civil wars were still endemic features, but they were occurring within a ‘new’ international environment in the nineties. Any significant discussion on how the practice of intervention evolved on the African continent in the nineties would need to start with the end of the Cold War and the implications it had for the continent in dealing with internal conflicts.

However, as we noted in Chapter One, although relations between states were being conducted in a less ideological international environment in the nineties, the language and definitions on intervention and non-intervention as set in the UN (and OAU) Charter did not change. Certainly as we said, the collapse of the East-West confrontation advanced new opportunities and ideas for tackling major issues of international relations, but the concerns of member-states mainly from the developing world on rules governing the relations of states did not change. More important, as we stated in the introduction, our main contention in this study is that the intervention by ECOWAS in Liberia and the creation of mechanisms within the OAU since the end of the Cold War is not ‘new’, but belong to a tradition of interventions as practised by African states that can be traced back to the early post-colonial era.

The aim of this Chapter is to use the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia in 1990 to argue that the practice of intervention by African states on the continent is a continuation
of intra-African affairs developed in the Cold War context. How relevant are the Pan-
Africanist notions of "solidarity" "autonomy" (i.e. "African solutions for African problems") 
for understanding the intervention by the ECOWAS Community? Where these themes still 
invoked by African leaders to justify their intervention? The aim in this Chapter is to 
illustrate how other factors such as the fear of regional and economic instability, widespread 
humanitarian abuse and complex regional dynamics took precedence over these Pan-
Africanist ideals.

In the lead up to the intervention, member states of ECOWAS offered a variety of 
justifications for their actions in Liberia. We can categorise these justifications under five 
headings: i) the apparent 'right to intervene' given to ECOWAS through the Protocol on 
Non-Aggression of 22 April 1978 and the Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defence of 29 
May 1981; ii) the role of the OAU, African diplomacy and the UN; iii) the fear of regional 
instability; iv) the humanitarian tragedy in Liberia, and v) the personal motives of heads of 
states and the regional sensitivities and political divisions between the main Francophone 
countries, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire and the dominant Anglophone state in the region, 
Nigeria, and those who supported the idea of intervention, Guinea and Sierra Leone. This 
Chapter is divided into six parts with parts two to six examining the above categories of 
justification. As we shall show, the justifications illustrate the way in which ECOWAS 
Heads of State interpreted the principle of non-intervention throughout the West African 
region. In Part One, we offer a brief outline of the Liberian civil war and the debate among 
member states of ECOWAS in the lead up to its intervention on 25 August 1990.

The use of force by ECOWAS was inconsistent with the rules set out in the UN 
Charter, the Charter of the OAU and its own treaty. Was this a break with the principle of 
non-intervention as set out in these institutions? How did the ECOWAS intervention exist 
alongside other important principles such as sovereignty and territorial integrity? Should we 
label this intervention 'new' or 'innovative' and a break with the past, or should we see it 
as a continuation of attempts by African leaders to help other countries affected by internal 
disputes? What principles, norms or criteria were being invoked by West African leaders to 
support their intervention in Liberia? Although the Liberian civil war ended in 1997 with 
the election of the main rebel leader, Charles Taylor on 19 July, this study concentrates on 
the first three years, when significant justifications abound about West African intervention.

Liberia's civil war began on 24 December 1989 when the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) led by its rebel leader, Charles Taylor, invaded the country from neighbouring Côte d'Ivoire. The purpose, according to Taylor, was to end the brutal regime of Liberia's Head of State, Master-Sergeant (Staff Sergeant) Samuel Doe. The armed incursion soon degenerated into carnage and the massacre of civilians as fighting broke out between the NPFL and the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) who were mainly made up of Doe's ethnic group, the Krahs. The NPFL soon controlled most of the Liberian territory and by May 1990, President Doe was constrained to call upon 'all patriotic citizens' to join forces with the government and fight the rebels with 'cutlasses and single-barrelled guns.'

Doe's appeal did not delay Taylor's advance significantly, although he suffered a setback when one of his commanders, 'Prince' Yormie Johnson, spilt from the main NPFL and began fighting both the forces of Taylor and Doe's AFL as the Independent National Patriotic Front (INPFL).

The events taking place in Liberia came under the scrutiny of the 13th summit of the Heads of States of ECOWAS countries held in Banjul, Gambia on 30 May 1990, under the chairmanship of Sir Dawda Jawara of Gambia. Working through the Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) of ECOWAS, some member states (Gambia, Guinea, Ghana, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone) began the initial task of trying to achieve a peace settlement to the

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Liberian civil war. On 6 July 1990 at a summit meeting in Banjul, Gambia, the five members of the SMC took an unprecedented step in the region in deciding to send a multinational peacekeeping force - the Economic Community (of West African States') Monitoring Force (ECOMOG) - to the Liberian capital, Monrovia. The mandate for the peacekeeping force stated that they were 'to conduct military operations for the purpose of monitoring the cease-fire,' and to restore 'law and order to create the necessary conditions for free and fair elections to be held in Liberia.' On 25 August 1990, 3,000 troops from ECOMOG landed in Monrovia with the hope of halting a civil war. The ECOWAS intervention of 1990 can be seen as the first significant collective action taken by African states since the attempt by the OAU Inter-African Force in 1981 in Chad.

This regional peacekeeping merits particular analysis when considering the evolution of intervention on the African continent. As with the Tanzanian intervention in 1978, it is
not easy to place the central motive or justification within the context of “African solutions for African problems,” nor it is possible to understand it through the Pan-African notion of unity. The traditional justification in the 1970s - that intervention was pursued to counter the presence of extra-continental forces - could not be used to explain the actions of the West African states. Having said this, in Part Six we shall consider Nigeria’s initial claim that it intervened to counter French and Libyan interference in the Liberian civil war and the West African region to ensure regionally derived solutions to the conflict. Our main concern is to consider what criteria existed from which the ECOWAS states based their decision to intervene. Parts Two to Six of this Chapter consider five areas used by African leaders to justify their intervention.

II. The ‘right to intervene’ and the ECOWAS Protocols on regional defence and security

Several commentators have raised questions about whether there was a sufficient legal basis for the intervention by ECOWAS. In establishing a peace-keeping force, some member states of ECOWAS tried to address questions of legality under the Protocol on Non-Aggression (1978) and the Protocol relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence (1981). The SMC argued that both Protocols gave ECOWAS a ‘right to intervene’ in Liberia’s civil war because of the provisions on the peaceful resolutions of intra-regional disputes and mechanisms to prevent foreign military interventions. In this way, member states declared that they were able to overcome the principle of non-intervention as laid down in the ECOWAS Treaty and the UN and OAU Charter.

The decision taken by ECOWAS to intervene can be seen as a novel move. ECOWAS was designed in 1975 by a joint initiative of Nigeria and Togo to promote economic and social cooperation within the West African region. Why should a

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7 The ECOWAS member-states are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.
multinational economic organisation with no history of collective military operations embark on a peacekeeping mission in a civil war? The aims of the ECOWAS Community made no provisions for a collective security or peacekeeping role, although as Osita C. Eze notes, there was an assumption that maintaining economic stability as stated in Article 2(1) of the ECOWAS Treaty might infer that member-states were also concerned with ensuring regional peace and security. More important, the West African region was vulnerable to coups, civil strife and insurgencies, thus ECOWAS leaders could only guarantee the quest of economic integration if there was a viable security framework to tackle these issues. As the introduction of the 1978 ECOWAS Protocol on Non-Aggression states, the objectives on economic development among the West African states cannot be met ‘save in an atmosphere of peace and harmonious understanding among the Member states of the Community [i.e. ECOWAS].’

When it came to justifying the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia, this aspect of the 1978 Protocol guided the ECOWAS Executive Secretary, Abass Bundu, when he stated that ‘the Liberian crisis has demonstrated more than anything else,...that it is futile to talk about economic integration unless the environment in which you pursue such integration is peaceful and secure.’ Bundu further stated that ‘this is what I believe was the underlying factor that motivated the standing mediation committee to take the decision it did to establish ECOMOG in August 1990.’ Similarly, the Nigerian Permanent Representative to the UN, Ibrahim Gambari, also used the desire to ensure a continuation in the economic development of the region to explain the motive behind the ECOWAS intervention: ‘member states...acted collectively in the interests of both regional and subregional political and economic development.’

While the Protocol noted that the objectives of economic cooperation needed to be

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conducted ‘in an atmosphere of peace,’ member states also agreed not to transgress Article 2(4) of the UN Charter that prohibited the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of a sovereign and independent state. The 1978 Protocol adds that ‘[e]ach member state shall refrain from committing, encouraging or condoning acts of subversion, hostility or aggression against the territorial integrity or political independence of the other member state’, (Article 2). To this end, member states were ‘to prevent non-resident foreigners from using [their] territory as a base for committing [these] acts’, (Article 4). The Protocol also outlines the Community’s commitment to settling disputes peacefully among themselves, (Article 5(1)). While the 1978 Protocol upholds the principle of non-intervention, it neither rules out the right of individual or collective self-defence, nor the possibility of enforcement under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. However, while it was a valuable document, the Protocol was limited to only addressing aggression between member states. It did not refer to aggression coming from outside the Community or the problem of internal conflicts like the Liberian civil war. The Protocol was later supplemented by another Protocol on 29 May 1981 relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence.\textsuperscript{12}

The 1981 Protocol was drawn up in response to the number of foreign interventions in several West African countries, although it did not come into full effect until 1986. For example, it sought to prevent situations like the Portuguese invasion of Guinea-Bissau and the mercenary attack on Benin in 1977. ECOWAS members also signed this Protocol at a time when there were fears, namely from Nigeria, over the activities of Libya’s Head of State, Colonel Qadhafi, especially in Chad. In 1981, member states were also concerned with the number of foreign military interventions in the region and the African continent and thus signalled a determination to ‘resolve regional conflicts by regional means.’\textsuperscript{13} However, like the 1978 Protocol, the 1981 Protocol did not envisage responding to civil wars like that in Liberia.

There are two parts to the 1981 Protocol. Part one refers to situations of armed conflict between two or more member states. In the preamble to the Protocol, member states declared that they would ‘firmly resolve to safeguard and consolidate the independence and


sovereignty of member states against foreign intervention.' Members also declared that any 'armed threat or aggression directed against any Member State shall constitute a threat or aggression against the entire Community', (Article 2). To this end, 'Member States resolve to give mutual aid and assistance for defence against any armed threat or aggression', (Article 3).

The second part which is of immediate concern to us, refers to internal armed conflict within any member state of ECOWAS directed from a foreign base. Where 'internal armed conflict within any member state engineered and supported from the outside' is 'likely to endanger the peace and security' of the region, 'the Authority [i.e. the Heads of State] shall appreciate and decide on this situation in full collaboration with the Authority of the Member State or States involved', (Article 4(b)). Where armed intervention (Article 9) is to occur, the Protocol empowers the Authority to 'decide on the expediency of military action,' (Article 6(3)). If necessary, the Authority shall interpose the Allied Armed Force of the Community (AAFC) 'between the troops engaged in the conflict', (Article 17). Article 13 (1 & 2) allows for the creation of a Community army made up of troops earmarked from national units. Finally, Article 18(1) of the 1981 Protocol stipulated that 'in the case where an internal conflict in a Member State of the Community is actively maintained and sustained from outside', then the Community can decide on the use of force as stated in Article 6.

When it came to deciding how to respond to the conflict in Liberia, the SMC referred to the 1981 Protocol to justify its intervention.14 Similarly, the ECOWAS chairman when member states decided to intervene in August 1990, Sir Dawda Jawara, placed the ECOWAS intervention within the context of the 1981 Protocol, suggesting that it was extended to deal with civil wars like Liberia. The Protocols, he acknowledged, specified that member-states were to come to the aid of each other in the face of unrest especially if it was generated from outside.15 Similarly, some states of ECOWAS cited the provisions contained

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in the 1981 Protocol. As we argue in Part Four, Nigeria and Sierra Leone argued that Charles Taylor’s war campaign had been maintained and sustained by France, and in particular Libya via Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire, and therefore intervention to preserve the Liberian state against outside aggression was justified. More important, as we argue again in Part Four, Nigeria claimed that it intervened to ensure regionally derived solutions to the Liberian civil war.\(^{16}\)

Although member states referred to the 1978 and 1981 Protocols in various mandates and communiqués, we argue in the next part of this Chapter that it is likely that the position of the OAU, African diplomacy and the UN explains in more detail where the ‘right to intervene’ derived.

III. The role of the OAU and African diplomacy the UN

Outside the ECOWAS structure, there were other avenues available to member states from which to justify their actions. In this regard, it is worth noting the position of the OAU, African diplomacy and the UN whose actions not only gave open approval to the ECOWAS intervention, but provided ECOWAS with the legal basis to justify its intervention.

*The OAU, African diplomacy and the Liberian Civil War*

Throughout this study, we have noted that while member states may act contrary to the Charter principle of non-intervention, the OAU strictly observed this principle. To this end, the Organisation never explicitly extended support to intervention carried out by any African state. So to many observers of the OAU, there was some surprise over its position in 1990-1991 towards the ECOWAS intervention.

It appeared that the OAU had openly contradicted its own principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of member states. It is however important to note the wider context of what appeared to be an open endorsement of the ECOWAS intervention

by the OAU. An open endorsement by the OAU would have been unthinkable several years earlier, however, this was a sign of significant change by Africa’s principle international political organisation. As we will discuss further in Chapter Six, the OAU, at least at the level of the Secretariat and the Office of the Secretary-General, had been seeking ways at the start of the post-Cold War period not only to assume more responsibility for Africa’s conflicts, but also to develop a flexible approach to the principle on non-intervention. To this end, the Secretary-General, Salim Ahmed Salim, stated that ‘non-interference should not be taken to mean indifference.’ Rather than question the legality of the ECOWAS-ECOMOG initiative in Liberia, Salim argued that,

> [b]efore ECOWAS undertook its initiative, many, including the African media were condemning the indifference demonstrated by Africans. The most desirable thing would have been to have [had] an agreement of all parties to the conflict and the convergence of views of all the member of ECOWAS. But to argue that there was no legal base for any intervention in Liberia is surprising. Should the countries in West Africa, should Africa just leave the Liberians to fight each other? Will that be more legitimate? Will that be more understandable? In my frank opinion the decision of the ECOWAS countries to despatch a peacekeeping force or a monitoring group was a timely and very bold decision.\(^17\)

The extent of the OAU’s open endorsement of the ECOWAS initiative could be seen when its Council of Ministers hailed ‘the laudable efforts deployed by ECOWAS’ and expressed ‘its total support for its initiatives.’\(^18\) In 1992, the OAU sent an ‘eminent person,’ former President of Zimbabwe, Reverend Canaan Banana, to act as its special envoy to the ECOWAS headquarters in Liberia, thus confirming its support for the peacekeeping operation.

Similarly, the Ugandan President and OAU Chairman in 1991, Yoweri Museveni, argued for a reinterpretation of the OAU principle on non-intervention when he stated that in regard to Liberia,


...there was no state anymore. Sometimes the situation is so bad that there is no state. Liberia was no longer there. It was chaos, it was anarchy, so some of us were of the view that some supranational force must be available to save the population....

I encouraged...ECOWAS very much to do something in Liberia...So I think there is need to interpret this principle of non-interference: But to clarify the issue, does it mean non-intervention in all circumstances even when it turns to anarchy or what? That is why I call it interpreting.19

Museveni further legitimised ECOWAS’s action when he argued that the anarchic conditions in Liberia rendered a Liberian claim to sovereignty inadmissible. However, at first glance, Museveni’s position was surprising to those who had observed his elevation to power in Uganda. Museveni’s path to power was no different from Charles Taylor’s since he achieved power through a similar armed struggle against Tito Okello’s government in Uganda in January 1986. To this end, Museveni’s remarks added significance to the ECOWAS intervention.20 Here was a man who gained power via the overthrow of a regime in Uganda, thus challenging Article 3(5) of the OAU Charter, but four years later condemning a similar action by Taylor who also wanted to overthrow a brutal regime.

The Zimbabwean Head of State, President Robert Mugabe, gave similar support to the ECOWAS intervention. In a press conference during a visit to Ghana, Mugabe suggested that the OAU enshrine a clause in the Charter sanctioning the right of intervention:

In view of this successful effort and demonstration of togetherness to save a critical internal situation in the country [Liberia], it is necessary that the OAU should examine itself in terms of its efficacy and capabilities to help to sustain the sovereignty of states which have been threatened by so much internal strife that it is no longer within a particular people’s capability to control the strife or to bring it to an end. It is a difficult proposition (to put the right of intervention in the OAU Charter), but nevertheless, it’s a proposition we should examine.21

As with Museveni, Mugabe argued that the right to intervene was justified on the ground

that there was no effective authority to govern Liberia:

The ‘domestic affairs’ of a country must mean affairs within a peaceful environment, but where that peaceful environment is completely gone and the people are no longer in a position to exercise their own sovereign authority, when there is no government in being and there is just chaos in the country, surely the time would have to come for intervention to occur.\(^{22}\)

It is important to explain the background of these various African personalities to understand why they extended support to the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia. In post-Cold War Africa, figures such as President Museveni of Uganda and the OAU Secretary-General Salim Ahmed Salim of Tanzania, were seen as representing a ‘new’ group of leaders advocating that the continent should be more self-reliant in resolving its internal conflicts, and display readiness to shoulder responsibility for peacekeeping and peacemaking. Leaders like Museveni evolved their approach during the long liberation struggles of the 1960s and 1970s. They point to the failure of African post-colonial leaders who not only undermined the progress of the African state, but had in place inadequate economic structures and unaccountable systems of governance. Their struggle, essentially for “second independence” as discussed in Chapter Four, was aimed at reversing the trend towards dependence on outside forces to sustain the African state. In the nineties, these ‘new’ leaders, which also included President Isiaias Afwerki in Eritrea and Prime Minister Meles Zenawi in Ethiopia, advocated “African solutions” to provide basic necessities, equality of opportunity and transparency within African governments and institutions. Although it is difficult to make a general statement about their foreign policy, it is possible to suggest that they thought that intervening to resolve domestic conflicts like that in Liberian was permissible. Their policy certainly put a dent in the established OAU consensus on non-intervention in the internal affairs of member states. We shall say more on these ‘new’ leaders in Chapter Six.

*The UN and the Liberian Civil War*

Outside Africa’s diplomatic circle, the ‘right to intervene’ or at least ‘to do

something' was also granted by the UN, although initially it was not as direct as the OAU’s open endorsement. The support given by the UN and its member states needs to be understood within the context of other events that were taking place, most notably on the Iraq-Kuwait border and in East Europe where significant international attention was directed. These reasons are often cited to explain why West African states responded to the conflict in Liberia.\(^{23}\) There was an expectation that one permanent member of the UN Security Council - the US - would intervene in what was described as its unofficial colony. However, the US initially showed little concern for what it considered would be a brief disruption. The administration under President George Bush stated that ‘the resolution of this civil war is a Liberian responsibility...a solution to Liberia’s current difficulties will be viable if it is worked [out] by Liberians themselves and has broad internal support.'\(^{24}\) Senior Liberians and interest groups called for the US marines to stop the fighting or at least to create a safe haven for civilians, but US troop presence was limited to 200 marines sent to evacuate at least 300 US nationals on 5 August 1990.\(^{25}\)

When there was no significant response from the UN and its member states, leaders from ECOWAS decided to ‘do something’ to stop the conflict in Liberia. However, questions were raised at the start of the ECOWAS intervention about whether its actions were consistent with the procedures set out under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, specifically, the decision to undertake enforcement action to address threats to international peace and security. Chapter VIII does allow for enforcement action if the Security Council authorizes it. As we noted in Chapter Two, Article 52 under Chapter VIII expressly recognises the right of regional arrangements or agencies to deal with conflicts in their region before ‘referring them to the Security Council.’ However, Article 54 further states that ‘[t]he Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the


maintenance of international peace and security.’ The principle difficulty for ECOWAS lies in the fact that it never informed the Security Council of its intention to intervene, nor did the Security Council give it formal authorisation to use force in the internal affairs of another state to maintain international peace and security. In addition, the Security Council never dealt with the role of ECOWAS until 1992, two years after West African leaders had deployed the ECOMOG force in Liberia.

Despite this, Nigeria’s Head of State, President Ibrahim Babangida, used Chapter VIII of the UN Charter to counter those who raised questions about the legality of ECOWAS. More important, there was later support through the UN Security Council for several peace initiatives undertaken by ECOWAS, thus giving concrete meaning to Chapter VIII of the Charter, which encourages cooperation with regional bodies in the peaceful settlement of disputes. This support was a logical extension of the UN’s attempt to encourage an even division of labour between regional arrangements and itself in resolving conflicts. The idea of sharing the burden of maintaining international peace and security was paramount in the UN report, An Agenda for Peace, that the former UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali wrote. Although he wrote this report two years after the start of the Liberian conflict, it nonetheless reflected the belief among the member states of the Security Council that ‘where appropriate’ support should be extended to ‘regional efforts as undertaken by regional organizations within their respective areas of competence.’ More important, as we noted above, it was an indication that member-states of the UN, in particular the five permanent members of the Security Council, were reluctant to intervene in the Liberian civil war. As we shall discuss in Chapter Seven, the major powers of the UN were streamlining their international peacekeeping activities to only respond to conflicts they considered an immediate national interest.

Both the ECOWAS Protocols of 1978 and 1981 and the support of the OAU and the UN were used by ECOWAS leaders to justify their intervention. This was illustrated in the

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27 Provisional Verbatim Record of the Three Thousand Five Hundred and Seventeenth Meeting of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/PV.3517, 13 April 1995, p. 3.

official statements and speeches made by ECOWAS leaders in the lead up to, and after it launched its peacekeeping initiative in Liberia. These sources enabled ECOWAS to overcome the principle of non-intervention and questions about its legal competence to intervene in what was essentially a domestic affair. However, there are other useful sources within the West African region that provide a clearer indication of how the practice of intervention evolved alongside the ECOWAS Treaty ruling on non-intervention.

IV. Intervention to prevent regional instability

A major reason for the intervention in Liberia was the perceived threat to sub-regional peace and stability. As noted in Chapter One, there are vivid examples of how an internal crisis in one country can affect another country or an entire region and spark off regional insecurities. Elements of Charles Taylor's NPFL were said to have joined the Sierra Leone rebel group, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), in the overthrow of President Joseph Momoh of Sierra Leone in March 1991. As a result, President Momoh wanted to send the ECOMOG force to the border between Sierra Leone and Liberia in a defensive capacity. The Heads of State of Nigeria and Benin, Presidents Babangida and Nicéphore Soglo, expressed concern over the implications the crisis in Liberia had for the rest of the West African region: 'Today it is Liberia, tomorrow it could be any one of the countries represented here. Indeed the canker we are fighting against is already showing itself in Sierra Leone and in other parts of the sub-region.'

The immediate threat to regional stability was the overflow and displacement of refugees in neighbouring countries, and some ECOWAS leaders cited this fact as one motive for intervening. While refugees are a humanitarian problem, they often pose a security threat to the host government. Apart from straining the economic or health services of local communities who are ill-equipped to cope with an extra population, 'refugee camps are

potential pools for rebel recruitment,' as the conflict in Rwanda illustrated in 1994.\(^{31}\) To this end, General Emmanuel Erskine of ECOMOG could use the spread of refugee overflows partly to justify the ECOWAS intervention: ‘with the crisis in Liberia creating unbearable refugee problems for Sierra Leone, Ghana, the Gambia, Guinea, Nigeria and the Ivory Coast, it is obvious that the situation in Liberia has gone beyond the boundaries of the country and ceases to be an exclusive Liberian question.’\(^{32}\) Certainly the figures from the UN illustrated the unprecedented outflow of refugees into Liberia’s contiguous neighbours. Between 1989 and 1993, the UN estimated that between 600,000 and 700,00 refugees were mainly in Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea and Sierra Leone.\(^{33}\)

Apart from the problem of refugees, ECOWAS leaders saw the civil war as having potential damage on economic development within the region. Certainly as we have discussed in Part Two, the 1978 ECOWAS Protocol on Non-Aggression noted the necessity of peace and stability to ensure economic development in the West African region.

It is therefore possible to suggest that the fear of regional instability and the possibility that the conflict would spread and engulf other states in the region partly ensured that some ECOWAS leaders would overlook the principle of non-intervention on this occasion. Certainly, those West African leaders who initially sent troops to Liberia (i.e. Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Guinea) did argue that intervention was permissible since Liberia’s war would have spiralling effects on peace and security in the region. In addition, member states argued that large scale human suffering among the Liberians constituted a major factor in the ECOWAS intervention.

V. Intervention for humanitarian purposes

In the past, African leaders have avoided appealing to humanitarianism to justify their actions for fear that their own domestic policies may come under scrutiny. More

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important, as we noted in Chapter Four, President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania preferred to justify his actions in Uganda as self-defence, which he saw as more reconcilable with the norm of non-intervention, sovereignty and territorial integrity than any appeal to humanitarianism. However, in the early nineties, the alleviation of widespread human suffering has often been cited as a reason for military intervention in certain conflicts. What was significant in the early years of the post-Cold War era was that large-scale denial of human rights and widespread human suffering came to be judged a threat to international peace and security. From the protection extended to the Kurds in Northern Iraq, to intervention aimed at establishing a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia, UN Security Council resolutions made appeals to humanitarianism to sanction action by states under the authority of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Resolution 688, which demanded *inter alia* that the Iraqi regime cease the repression of its Kurdish population, represented a significant precedent in the action to be taken against a government that violated the right's of its people.\(^{34}\)

In Liberia, West African leaders used the displacement of peoples and widespread human suffering to justify their intervention. In one Communiqué, ECOWAS gave a strong humanitarian rationale for its decision, adding that, ‘presently, there is a government in Liberia which cannot govern and contending factions which are holding the entire population as hostage, depriving them of food, health facilities and other basic necessities of life.’\(^{35}\) A subsequent ECOWAS statement in August 1990 was more explicit in stating the humanitarian objective as ‘stopping the senseless killing of innocent civilians, nationals and foreigners, and to help the Liberian people to restore their democratic institutions.’\(^{36}\)

Individual leaders in the region also repeated this humanitarian justification.

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\(^{34}\) See UN Security Council Resolution 688, *UN Doc. S/Res/688*, 5 April, 1991. As we noted in Chapter One, the link between human suffering and international peace and security was explicitly noted in UN Security Council Resolution, *UN Doc. S/Res/794*, 3 December, 1992 which dealt with Somalia. In that resolution, the Security Council ‘(a)cting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, authorizes the Secretary-General and Member States cooperating...to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia’, (para. 10). (Emphasis in the original). On the question of whether these resolutions set a precedent, see C. Ero and S. Long, (1995), pp. 148-151.


President Jawara of Gambia advanced the appeal to humanitarianism when he claimed that 'ECOWAS is not sending in an invading force; I think we have made this absolutely clear. One aspect of our mission is strictly humanitarian.' Later, at a press briefing at Dodon Barracks in Lagos on 31 October, President Babangida of Nigeria emphasised that his country was intervening,

because events in [Liberia] have "led to the massive destruction of property, the massacre by all parties of thousands of innocent children some of whom had sought sanctuary in the churches, mosques, diplomatic missions, hospitals and under the protection of the Red Cross, contrary to all recognized standards of civilised behaviour" and international ethics and decorum. [In Liberia...], we are all, first and foremost reflecting the love we have for our respective countries, our sub-region, Africa, the black world and mankind.

Nigeria's intervention was also partly motivated by the attacks on foreigners, especially Nigerians in Liberia. Nigerians in Liberia were seen as vulnerable to attacks from the NPFL, largely because of Charles Taylor's hostility towards Babangida's decision to intervene. Finally, the Ghanian Foreign Minister, Obed Asamoah, also sought to provide a humanitarian motive for the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia when he stated that, 'the basis of ECOMOG is humanitarian, in the sense that it was felt that the slaughter had gone on for far too long and had to be stopped.'

It is worth noting that in line with the rhetoric of the post-Cold War era, various West African leaders claimed that they were acting on behalf of fellow Africans who were facing severe disasters. Yet this desire to extend help to fellow African brothers was hardly new. As we have shown in this study, African leaders often justified intervention on the

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grounds of a perceived sense of ‘brotherhood’ or extended solidarity with other African states.

It is hard to escape the conclusion that ECOWAS strengthened its overall case by increasing the humanitarian justification *post facto*. Furthermore, the resolution establishing ECOMOG did not explicitly refer to a humanitarian rationale, although the communiqué of the SMC was ‘gravely concerned’ with ‘the wanton destruction of human life and property and the displacement of persons’; and ‘the massive damage in various forms being caused by the armed conflict to the stability and survival of the entire Liberian nation.’ However, there is also no reason to question the moral ground adopted by various ECOWAS leaders regarding their decision to intervene. Certainly the reports of large-scale massacres, allegations of widespread loss of life, human rights abuse, mass starvation and the deterioration of social services by Human Rights Watch/Africa Watch and the US Committee on Refugees in the early stages of the conflict indicate the humanitarian tragedy that was facing Liberia. The massacre of 600 people at St. Peter’s Church on 30 July 1990 by remnants of Samuel Doe’s AFL, was also an indication of the atrocities encountered by Liberians before the ECOWAS intervention.42

Taken together, the fears of regional instability and the widespread humanitarian tragedy caused by the Liberian civil war were grounds to justify intervention, and as we have shown, member states cited these reasons to explain their actions. However, in the final part of this Chapter we focus of what are usually defined as ‘real’ motives of states to understand why member states of an economic community, with no history of collective intervention, would mandate a force to intervene in a complex civil war. The aim is to use the diverging views among ECOWAS member-states to understand the intervention. We said in the introduction that we would consider how relevant the Pan-Africanist notions of “solidarity,” “autonomy” are for understanding the intervention by the ECOWAS Community? Where these themes still invoked by African leaders to justify their


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intervention? We show on one hand how complex political divisions, the personal motives of Heads of States and regional sensitivities ranked higher than Pan-African ideals, but also how Nigeria used Pan-African ideals partly to justify its actions in Liberia.

VI. Regional sensitivities and political divisions: why some states intervened

While some ECOWAS leaders predominantly cited fears of widespread regional instability and humanitarian tragedy as justifications for intervening, there are ample political and historical justifications to explain why individual member states intervened to either assist the various warring parties to the conflict or to end the conflict in the region.

The Francophone States: Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire

The two main Francophone countries, Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire, were accused, along with Libya, of providing support to the main Liberian rebel leader, Charles Taylor. These accusations were heightened when it was discovered that Charles Taylor’s NPFL launched its invasion from Côte d’Ivoire. At the beginning of the conflict, supporters of the Liberian President, Samuel Doe, alleged that Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso (and Libya) had trained NPFL soldiers and that the NPFL had entered the country from Côte d’Ivoire, a claim that the states concerned denied. The Ivorian Minister of Communications, St. Auguste Miremont, rejected the allegations, stating instead that his country’s involvement on the Liberian border had been humanitarian, offering help to those fleeing the combat areas.

There are largely historical reasons as to why these Francophone countries extended support to Charles Taylor. For example, relations had deteriorated between the late President


of Côte d’Ivoire, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, and Samuel Doe after the latter’s killing of the former Liberian leader, President Tolbert on 22 April 1980 and the arrest and death of his eldest son, Adolphus Tolbert, the son-in-law of Houphouët-Boigny in the same year. It is partly because of both these events that analysts have so far suggested that the Ivorian leader encouraged another son-in-law, Blaise Compaoré, to support Charles Taylor’s attempt at overthrowing Doe.

The relationship between Burkina Faso’s Head of State, Lieutenant Blaise Compaoré, and Charles Taylor was complex. Compaoré was accused of giving the NPFL a strategic planning ground at Po military base south of the capital, Ouagadougou, and a supply of arms at the start of the conflict. The allegations seem plausible since Compaoré, along with the Ivorian leader, was largely critical of Nigeria’s desire for an ECOWAS intervention force, especially since Compaoré believed that the country was supporting the Liberian President, Samuel Doe. Radio Burkina reported that Compaoré had sent a message to the ECOWAS Chairman, Dawda Jawara, declaring his country’s ‘total disagreement’ with the operation, adding that ECOMOG had ‘no competence to interfere in member states’ internal conflicts, but only in conflicts breaking out between member countries’ as stated in the 1978 and 1981 Protocols on regional defence. Mr. Sanon, the Permanent Representative of Burkina Faso, clarified his country’s position during a debate on Liberia at the UN Security Council: ‘Our conviction is that the situation in Liberia is first and foremost a Liberian matter; that we should not throw oil on the fire; and that no military solution could...be contemplated.’

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Provisional Verbatim Record of the Three Thousand One Hundred and Thirty-Eighth Meeting, Security Council, UN Docs. S/PV.3138, 19 November 1992, p. 33. At the time this speech was made, Burkina Faso took the decision to participate in the ECOMOG intervention largely because of the reaffirmation by the ECOWAS First Summit Meeting Committee of Nine in Abuja, Nigeria on 7 November that the role of
Reports, from diplomats and journalists expelled from Liberia suggest that because of Burkina Faso’s criticism of the ECOWAS intervention, Compaore had sanctioned the supply of arms and troops to help the NPFL.\(^{49}\) Campaore did not deny the allegations made against him; instead he argued that his decision to supply 400 soldiers to fight against Doe ‘was a moral duty to save Liberians from the wrath of a ruthless dictator.’\(^{50}\)

Another factor that may explain Burkina Faso’s support for Taylor is the latter’s own support for Compaore when he overthrew the former Burkinabe head of state, Thomas Sankara on 17 October 1987. As Byron Tarr states, ‘[s]ome people think that the Liberians training in Libya were employed to kill Sankara.’\(^{51}\) Once he became leader, it is believed that Compaore introduced Charles Taylor to the Libyans and also provided him with an estimated 700 Burkinabés who fought alongside the NPFL in Liberia.\(^{52}\) What is more difficult to assess is the suggestion that Compaore could secure the support of Colonel Qadhafi of Libya to help Charles Taylor.

The relationship between Compaore and Qadhafi dates from when the former came to power in 1987. However, Qadhafi’s history in sub-Saharan Africa dates from the 1960s when he extended support to those states that he perceived as radical revolutionists and anti-Western, in particular, anti-US foreign policy, in African affairs. As for Charles Taylor, Tarr suggests that it was the ‘feeling of betrayal by Doe’ who initially shared the same political outlook as the Libyan leader, that drew Qadhafi towards supporting the rebel movement.\(^{53}\) What is more probable is that Qadhafi suspected Doe after 1986 when the latter had allowed Liberia to be used as one of the twelve communication and staging posts for the US’ bombing of Libya. To this end, one suspects that the Libyans wanted a situation in which they could undermine Doe. Supporting Charles Taylor’s attempts to overthrow Doe was

ECOMOG would be that of a neutral disengagement force.

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therefore seen as a logical foreign policy option for Qadhafi. Although Charles Taylor had repeatedly denied reports of Qadhafi’s involvement in the civil war, Nigeria and the US nevertheless maintained that support in the form of arm supplies and trained men from Libya was a major factor in explaining Taylor’s immediate advances in the initial stages of the civil war. Certainly, Qadhafi might have considered that there were new opportunities for Libya to extend influence over the sub-region and develop new alliances, especially with the end of the Cold War and the retreat of the superpowers from the African continent. The withdrawal of the superpowers certainly left a political vacuum that Libya felt it could fill.

To a large extent, Taylor received support from the French-speaking countries of West Africa. Much of this support was due to the belief among Francophone states that the ECOWAS-ECOMOG venture marked the beginning of ‘Pax Nigeriana.’ Francophone countries long suspected Nigeria’s desire for hegemonic power in the region and saw the dispatch of a Nigerian-controlled ECOMOG force as a vehicle to promote its power in the region. In fact, the decision to deploy ECOMOG brought into focus the sharp rivalries and political sensitivities between the Francophone countries and Nigeria, the dominant Anglophone country in the West African region. Although Côte d’Ivoire was party to the decision to set up the SMC, it did not become a member of the committee at the time of the ECOMOG intervention. Rather, it supported Taylor, to halt Nigeria’s attempt at regional domination. However, Taylor was not the only one receiving external support.

Nigeria’s intervention in Liberia

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57 Relations between Nigeria and the Francophone states in West Africa had tended to be fraught, partly because Nigeria objected to French influence in the region, although there were attempts to fuel cooperation through the creation of ECOWAS. The first sign of a strain in relations between Nigeria and Francophone countries was seen during the Nigerian civil war in 1967 when Côte d’Ivoire called for the recognition of Biafra.
Liberia’s Head of State, Samuel Doe, visited countries within the sub-region of West Africa, namely Sierra Leone and Nigeria.\(^\text{58}\) Some saw the Nigerian leader, President Ibrahim Babangida, as Doe’s sub-regional god-father. The extent of the Doe-Babangida friendship could be seen when the Liberian leader named a Graduate School of International Relations and a major road after the Nigerian leader. Much has been said about President Babangida wanting to intervene to protect his friend, Samuel Doe, and to prevent a precedent being set over a civilian being able to oust a military leader in a similar style to Charles Taylor. However, one other area provides another insight into the various motives and justifications that lay behind Nigeria’s intervention in Liberia. It is interesting to look at the claim that Nigeria’s initial motive for intervening was also to counter the support Charles Taylor and the NPFL was receiving from France and Libya via Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso.

While there is doubt about whether Nigeria intervened solely because of the support Taylor was receiving, research has shown this to be a possible dimension in explaining Nigeria’s decision to intervene. In their work on the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia, W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe and Ademola Adeleke noted that Nigeria’s initial motive for intervening in the civil war partly stemmed from the perceived support from France via Côte d’Ivoire for Charles Taylor.\(^\text{59}\) If the suggestions are true, Nigeria’s motive closely resembles those given during its intervention in the Chadian civil war, discussed in Chapter Four.

Nigeria’s role in Liberia needs to be understood within the overall context of its policy towards the region and the whole of Africa. The conflict in Liberia gave Nigeria an opportunity to establish itself as the most influential mediator in the sub-region. As suggested above, its role in the conflict and the perception that it has used Liberia for exacting her dominance in the sub-region has been a source of contention among member states, in particular, Francophone states. Successive governments in Nigeria have aspired to the role of regional hegemonic power primarily because the oil-producing wealth of the country imbued a sense of power, status and confidence that other countries in the region


lacked. However, as we argue below, Nigeria’s leaders did not interpret their intervention in Liberia as an attempt at regional domination. As with his predecessors, President Babangida believed that Nigeria had an obligation to first ensure that the region was a strategically secure environment for its own foreign policy objectives and second, prevent outside interference in the region. A brief history of the principles guiding Nigeria’s foreign policy can explain President Babangida’s actions in relation to Liberia.

Since gaining its independence in 1960, Nigeria’s Heads of State have always maintained that Africa should strive to solve its problems thus conforming to the Pan-Africanist desire of keeping the continent free from external intervention and ensuring exclusivity over Africa’s affairs. It was against this background that in the 1970s, Presidents Murtala Muhammed and Obasanjo of Nigeria introduced a policy of regional intervention aimed at countering extensive extra-continental intervention in African conflicts, especially in the Chadian civil war. The policy advanced by Presidents Muhammed and Obasanjo has remained the cornerstone of Nigeria’s foreign policy ever since. From the perspective of Nigeria’s foreign policy making, intervention by other African states was seen as a legitimate way of preventing or limiting the presence of extra-continental forces in African conflicts. Certainly, Nigeria’s leader since the 1970s have held onto the view that a regional defence mechanism should be established to avert any extra-continental interference, and to this end was prominent in setting up the OAU Inter-African force in Chad. Finding ways to prevent outside intervention also led to Nigeria’s determination to create an organisation like ECOWAS.60

Just as it had sought to explain its intervention in Chad on the grounds of regionalism or ensuring that the conflict did not become internationalised, Nigeria suggested that its intervention in Liberia was aimed at countering the threat posed by extra-continental forces, in particular France and Libya. In line with its foreign policy, Nigeria was not ready to assign tutelage responsibilities for former African colonies to the former colonizers like France.

Historically, the presence of French involvement in the West African region had always posed a problem for Nigeria. The fact that nearly all Francophone countries in the

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region had defence and economic agreements with France under the framework of Accord de Non Aggression et d'Assistance en Matiere de Defence (ANAND) and Communauté Economique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEAO), partly explains why Nigeria has always been suspicious of France. In relation to Liberia, Nigeria had suspected that France had been Charles Taylor's main supplier of arms through Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso. While no substantial evidence has been forthcoming, Nigeria's fears were well placed. Like Nigeria's economic interest, French interest extended to the iron ore sites in the Nimba mountains of Guinea, but more important, to the port of Buchanan in Liberia which served as a transportation site for any material.

As for Libya, Nigeria perceived that Taylor served as a vehicle for developing a revolutionary wave in the West African region. The fact that Libya's Colonel Qadhafi had a history of supporting radical and revolutionary movements on the continent led Nigeria's leadership to conclude that Qadhafi extended support to Charles Taylor. The fear that France and Libya were somehow involved in Liberia accounts for Nigeria's determination to prevent outside interference, but more important, to ensure that they did not undermine its own security and economic interest. As Adeleke points out: 'it can hardly be denied that establishing [ECOMOG] conformed with Nigeria's security and economic interests in the subregion. As the core state in ECOWAS and the dominant economic and military power in West Africa, Nigeria could not remain impassive to a crisis, like the one in Liberia, within its strategic and geo-political orbit.'

Yet despite the fears of French and Libyan presence in the Liberian civil war, it is also interesting to note Nigeria's 'big brother' mentality in the West African region handed down from previous administrations. Certainly President Babangida saw Nigeria as its 'brother's keeper' in responding to emergencies like Liberia. In outlining the imperative features of Nigeria's foreign policy, to paraphrase the title of Babangida's speech, Nigeria felt 'duty-bound to react and respond...to ensure peace, tranquillity and harmony' in the

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62 W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, (1994), p. 273. Buchanan Port is the second busiest in Liberia as it the hub of the economy for Liberians and those wanting to export material from the region.

region. On 31 October 1990, Babangida stated that,

Nigeria has evolved to the point of acceptance of the fact that the conduct of our international relations and foreign policy may at times involve certain contractual military and other obligations beyond our borders. This is moreso, on issues and areas that can stabilize political, economic, security and social facets of our national life, and enhance peace and stability in our sub-region, Africa and the world.64

The Vice President of Nigeria in 1990, Admiral Augustus Aikhomu, repeated the view that Nigeria was acting on behave of peace and stability and a sense of finding an “African solution” to the problem in Liberia as opposed to seeking solutions from the international community:

Nigeria cannot relent in its traditional vanguard role in the defence of fundamental human rights, freedom and dignity of the black man and the black race, and in its commitment to, and the promotion of peace and unity within, and among...sister African states. This position informed Nigeria’s concern over the terrible and self-destructive war in Liberia, and in its participation in the formation...of ECOMOG.

The formation of ECOMOG was inspired by the philosophy that the Liberian crisis was an African problem which demanded an African solution. The time has certainly passed for countries to await intervention of extra-African forces, no matter how benevolent such forces may appear, to solve our conflicts and misunderstandings for us.65

The policy set by Babangida was carried forward by the late President of Nigeria, General Sanni Abacha after Babangida’s departure from office in 1993.66 This sense of ‘brotherhood’ and extending help to fellow Africans was not limited to the leadership, but was reinforced within the military framework when Sergeant Leader Riku Morgan stated that,


65 Vice President Admiral Augustus Aikhomu, ‘Why we are committed to peace in Liberia’, The Guardian (Nigeria), 1 November, 1990, pp. 15-16, esp. 15.


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The concept of an all African force within the sub-region [ECOMOG] in itself, has a cultural under-tone. Culturally, it is un-African to see a neighbour go hungry and do nothing about it, or a neighbour without shelter. The extended family system which is a historical factor is what we are witnessing in...ECOMOG.67

To a certain extent, we could state that Nigeria held what Ali Mazrui defined as a 'family right' (as we discussed in Chapter Two) developed through a sense of solidarity to help fellow brothers. It perceived that it had a 'right' to tackle the region's problems and sought to justify its act as maintaining solidarity and harmonious relations with its neighbouring states.

Sierra Leone and Guinea's involvement in Liberia's civil war

Of the countries to have intervened in Liberia, the position of Sierra Leone and Guinea is more difficult to assess. The only plausible explanation for Sierra Leone's participation in the civil war was that President Joseph Momoh of Sierra Leone and Ibrahim Babangida had a close relationship that was first established while they were both attending the Nigerian Defence Academy at Kaduna. Sierra Leone also received economic assistance from Babangida in the 1980s and Momoh's support for Babangida's policy in Liberia was seen as a repayment of this assistance.68 The only other explanation for Momoh's involvement in Liberia was that like Babangida, Momoh felt that military men should not be ousted from office by a 'bloody civilian.'69 As Max Ahmadu Sesay states, '[t]he tendency of such regimes is...to resist the forces of change which, in subregional terms, appeared to be represented by Charles Taylor's movement.' Sesay further suggests that the 'ECOMOG deployment can be seen as a move by corrupt, repressive, undemocratic and self-

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perpetuating regimes to save the military dictatorship of Doe from collapse.'

Another view likely to be shared by Momoh and other leaders was that Taylor had used dissident groups from neighbouring countries to mount an attack in Liberia. This led to increased concern among regional powers that if Taylor were to become President, he would allow Liberia to be used as a base for dissidents to launch attacks against other states.

Guinea's participation was partly explained because it shared common borders with Liberia. It was the only Francophone state that initially contributed to the ECOMOG military contingent, thus maintaining the dissident stance towards *la Francophonie* that it acquired since the days of President Sékou Touré in the 1960s. However, it is likely that the possible spill-over of the conflict because of the overflow of refugees gave Guinea added justification to intervene to contain the civil war in Liberia.

**Conclusion**

The ECOWAS intervention is unprecedented, not only in the history of the sub-region, but also on the African sub-continent. Not since the OAU Inter-African Force of 1981 had a peacekeeping force been established for responding to a civil war. More important, not since the Tanzanian intervention in Uganda in 1978 had Africa witnessed an explicit challenge to the principle of non-intervention. The attempt at collective intervention offers an opportunity to examine how the practice of intervention evolved alongside the

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71 M. Huband, 'Rebels splits threaten to engulf neighbours in Liberia's war: West African leaders are determined to crush Charles Taylor before the region is set ablaze', *The Guardian*, (London), 13 November 1990, p. 12. At the start of the conflict, Taylor's forces were reported to include Ghanian and Gambian dissidents and soldiers from Burkina Faso.

72 It is important to note that attempts had been taken to correct the rift that had developed between Francophone and Anglophone countries. This was due in part to the fact that Nigeria took a back seat in the peace conferences, such as the Yamoussoukro conferences held in Houphouët-Boigny's country retreat on three occasions in 1991. The Yamoussoukro conferences were led by a Francophone dominated Committee of Five (Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, Togo and Ghana, the only Anglophone). This Committee replaced the Anglophone dominated Standing Mediation Committee. See W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, (1994), p. 276 and J. Adisa, 'Nigeria in ECOMOG: Political Undercurrents and the Burden of Community Spirit', *Small Arms and Insurgencies*, vol. 5, no. 1, Spring 1994, p. 99. For the full text of the various ECOWAS Final Communiqué of the Committee of Five, see Document 138, p. 154, Document 141, pp. 169-172, Document 147, pp. 175-179 in M. Weller, (ed.) (1994).
principle of non-intervention on the African continent. The justifications given by ECOWAS leaders of a humanitarian tragedy and the possibility of regional destabilisation point to how they temporarily overrode the notion of sovereignty and non-intervention. Added to this was the absence of any serious global concern with the crisis in Liberia, but important the support given by the OAU and UN to the ECOMOG peacekeeping force. This not only gave the intervening countries credibility, but it led to the belief among the leaders of West Africa that something had to be done to halt the conflict. By all accounts, as we argued in Part Three, the support and declarations by the OAU Secretary-General, Salim Ahmed Salim and the Ugandan President and Chairman of OAU in 1991, Yoweri Museveni, that ECOWAS had the ‘right to intervene’, were a fundamental and substantive change to the OAU’s principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of member states.

The actions by ECOWAS in Liberia have certainly established a precedent for the Community in responding to similar situations. Events since ECOWAS intervened in Liberia showed a gradual movement towards establishing structures for regional peacekeeping. A one day summit meeting held in Lome, Togo, on 17 December 1997, agreed in principle to set up a mechanism for conflict prevention and resolution in the sub-region. In Sierra Leone, for example, the late Nigerian President, General Sanni Abacha, tried to endorse the use of force to drive out the Armed Forces Council/Peoples Army and reinstate the ousted leader, President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah during 1997 and 1998. While there was no consensus among the ECOWAS leaders on sanctioning a military intervention, General Abacha had been the most committed and visible proponent of the use of force to restore the democratically-elected government in Sierra Leone. This was seen as an unusual position for Abacha who had also come to power via a coup in 1993. Before his death on 8 June 1998, Abacha had outlined three areas that served to justify Nigeria’s action in Sierra Leone. First, he relied on the ECOWAS Treaty and Protocols that prevent cross-border insurgencies and subversive activities. More important, Abacha used the revised Treaty of ECOWAS in 1993 which made explicit provisions for maintaining ‘regional peace, stability

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74 The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council is a military faction backed by the Revolutionary United Front who are loyal to Foday Sankoh, a former protégé of Charles Taylor.
and security. Second, the Nigerian leader relied on the apparent support from the international community of the removal of the military junta and the restoration of the Kabbah government. Finally, Nigeria used the bilateral agreement it signed on 7 March 1997 to support its intervention. This agreement provided Presidential protection and strategic support for the Kabbah government from Nigerian forces and the training of Sierra Leone’s military force.

The ECOWAS intervention was the first post-Cold War intervention by African states, but as we argued in the introduction, it should not be be seen as ‘new’ or representing a break with other interventions by African states during the Cold War period. Rather it was a continuation of a policy by African leaders to either help a regime affected by internal disorder (i.e. Nigeria’s support for Doe) or to help a movement in the overthrow of a regime that had lost favour (i.e. Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso’s support for Charles Taylor and the NPFL). Indeed, many of the justifications used by African leaders to explain why they intervened are not directly specific to the post-Cold war period, save for the strong humanitarian appeal that had become a frequent justification in several post-Cold War conflicts, for example in Somalia and Iraq. However, despite accusations of French (and Libyan) involvement in the Liberian civil war, what was new and specific to the post-Cold War era was that this was the first civil war that did not involve large scale foreign military intervention as was evident during African conflicts in the Cold War era.

What of our assertion that Pan-Africanism and its central tenets can serve as useful sources to examine the evolution of the practice of intervention alongside the principle of non-intervention. How relevant are they in understanding the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia? Nigeria was the only country to make appeals to the Pan-Africanist notion of “exclusivity” or the right to be his ‘brother’s keeper.’ It is likely that the interplay of political sensitivities, personal motives and regional dynamics were far stronger factors that African leaders did not need to appeal to Pan-Africanist sentiments to justify their actions. The fear that the conflict could spread and have effects on an already vulnerable region was a significant justification for several states. Added to this was the political and economic instability that this conflict would cause to other vulnerable states. More important was that

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Charles Taylor’s invasion against the military regime of Samuel Doe could have had implications for other military regimes in West Africa who feared that his actions could ignite other opposition movements to overthrow their regimes.

In sum, the aim of this Chapter has been to consider how the ECOWAS intervention shed further light on how the practice of intervention evolved alongside the principle of non-intervention among African states. We have argued that despite the occasional references to Pan-Africanism by Nigeria’s former Head of State, President Babangida, other factors such as regional and political sensitivities and economic instability ranked higher in understanding when African states intervened in this conflict. However, we have also argued that this intervention by African states is not ‘new’ or specific to the post-Cold War period, but a continuation of that aspect of African diplomacy that either intervenes to help other regimes affected by internal disputes or opposition groups in the overthrow of a regime.

Does this mean that Pan-Africanism was specific to a period where African leaders were trying to consolidate their power against the forces of neocolonialism as Kwame Nkrumah asserted back in the 1960s? Was it because there was no large scale foreign military intervention present that African states, with the exception of Nigeria, did not make appeals to “African solutions for African problems” to justify their interventions? The evidence of justifications used by ECOWAS member states suggest that Pan-Africanism and its central tenets do not provide an immediate understanding of this intervention by African states. However, the support and declarations by the OAU Secretary-General, Salim Ahmed Salim and other African leaders tended to appeal to the Pan-African notion of exclusivity. Certainly as we argued in Part Three, figures such as President Museveni of Uganda argued that the continent should be more self-reliant in resolving its internal conflicts and to this end advocated “African solutions” to maintain stability and order in African states. In our next Chapter, we shall examine the role of the OAU in the post-Cold War period and argue that was reasserting the Pan-Africanist appeal of “African solutions for African problems” as a way of encouraging African states to take charge of the continent’s conflicts. Its support to the ECOWAS member states was the first indication and in a sense, the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia partly paved the way for the OAU to reassert this old Pan-Africanist theme.
The main focus in this Chapter is on the OAU and the resolution of internal conflicts in the post-Cold War era. In Chapter Two of this study, we argued that the Pan-African notion of exclusivity (i.e. “African solutions for African problems”) was tied to the creation of the OAU because, the Organisation was supposed to represent a system of self-help and self-regulation. When it was established in May 1963, African leaders expected the OAU to solve local problems locally, and keep foreign powers from meddling in Africa affairs. However, we argued that although the notion of African exclusivity was expressed in the OAU, the Organisation was inhibited by its strict adherence to the principle of non-intervention to solve the continent’s conflicts. Therefore, we said that we would focus on how African states, working outside the OAU, used the Pan-Africanist notion of exclusivity to justify or support interventions in the internal affairs of other states. On the occasions that we have mentioned the OAU, we have suggested that it did not necessarily condemn state intervention, like Tanzania in Uganda, nor did it abandon the principle of non-intervention.

With the end of the Cold War, the OAU begun discussing ways of overcoming the principle of non-intervention to deal with the perennial problem of internal conflicts on the continent. In so doing, it reasserted the notion of “African solutions for African problems” and tabled several options and initiatives that it argued would ensure this objective. These options were i) an OAU Early Warning Capacity; ii) a Continental Peacekeeping Force; iii) Sub-regional capacity for conflict management, and iv) a Blueprint on Unconstitutional Change. These initiatives were generally seen as ‘new’ or innovative, signalling a kind of proactiveness by the Organisation to respond to, and take charge of internal conflicts that arise on the continent. The idea that these were new was linked to the belief that as the foreign powers of the West began withdrawing their military presence from Africa in the 1990s, the continent would be increasingly marginalised from the international community and forced to find ways of solving its problems.
The aim of this Chapter is to argue that the OAU has longed concerned itself with developing mechanisms to resolve internal conflicts on the continent. The options and initiatives that emerged in the OAU in the post-Cold War era were a continuation of policies established by African leaders to develop “African solutions for African problems” and in a sense, it sheds further light on how the thinking on intervention evolved into the post-Cold War era. It is true to say that the collapse of the Cold War and the disengagement of foreign troops on the continent did influence the thinking within the OAU on how to resolve the continent’s internal conflicts. For so long, African leaders were reliant upon extra-continental forces to resolve many internal conflicts and sometimes, were prepared to justify the use of outside force as “African solutions for African problems.” Consequently, the OAU was unable to fulfill its objectives of seeking African solutions to resolve conflicts primarily because African leaders did not agree on developing structures for responding to conflicts, but instead sought outside assistance. However, the OAU was also aware of the disastrous effects that outside intervention had on the continent during the Cold War, thus in the 1990s, it argued that rather than leaving it to others to tackle the continent’s problems, African themselves would have to address Africa’s problems effectively. Consequently, the OAU reasserted the original meaning of “African solutions for African problems” to ensure that the Organisation and the continent took initial control of its conflicts, but more important, develop a flexible approach to the principle of non-intervention.

A new breed of African leaders were said to have emerged in the 1990s to influence the thinking within the OAU in developing structures to resolve conflicts. This group also reasserted the Pan-African ideal of “African solutions for African problems” and self-reliance in dealing with conflicts on the continent. Significantly, their policies reflected how the thinking of intervention has evolved on the continent.

This Chapter is divided into four parts. The aim is not to provide a critical exposition of the initiatives proposed by the OAU, rather, the purpose here is to illustrate the continuation in the thinking on intervention and the principle of non-intervention among African leaders from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era. In Chapter Seven we will consider whether the notion of “African solutions for African problems” is a realistic goal for African leaders in their attempt to address internal conflicts in the post-Cold War. Part One of this Chapter begins with a discussion on the changes to have occurred in the
international political arena in the 1990s, and the immediate consequences this change had for Africa and its international relations. In Part Two, we consider the role of the ‘new’ breed of African leaders who were said to have reasserted the Pan-Africanist notion of “African solutions for African problems, while in Part Three, we focus on the role of the OAU in the post-Cold War era, in particular arguments put by its Secretariat for addressing the continent’s conflicts. In Part Four, we explore in detail the four initiatives mentioned above for ensuring “African solutions” and suggest that not all of Africa’s leadership were prepared to institutionalise the notion of “African solutions for African problems”; rather, they preferred to engage in ad hoc measures in responding to internal conflicts. Such an approach is however not new; in the past African leaders developed a piecemeal approach to settling disputes rather than undermine the principle of non-intervention. The aim throughout this Chapter is to illustrate how the various proposals suggested by the OAU in the 1990s were aimed at developing a system of self-help and ensuring that the continent took control of its conflicts, thus suggesting that the thinking of earlier African leaders of ensuring African exclusivity were still paramount in the post-Cold War era. More important, as this Chapter indicates, the Pan-Africanist ideal still served as a meaningful principle in understanding how the thinking on intervention has evolved alongside the principle of non-intervention.

I. Africa and the end of the Cold War

During the Cold War, the superpowers and Cuba, Britain and France supplied weapons and training and military assistance to those African states that they favoured. For example, while the US lent support to UNITA in Angola, the Soviets and Cubans provided assistance to Ethiopia and the MPLA in Angola. Simultaneously, Britain and France extended support to their former colonies. The end of the Cold War brought a reversal of policy by these outside powers regarding the African continent.

Before its breakup in 1991, the Soviet Union began to withdraw from the continent, thus ending three decades of political commitment and military assistance to support or resolve regional conflicts on the African continent. Along with the US, the Soviet Union appeared less eager to fight proxy battles in developing countries. The Soviet Union retreat
from Africa began before the end of the Cold War in 1989. We could see signs of a retreat under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev and his policy of *perestroika* in 1985.\(^1\) *Perestroika* was essentially an 'economic reform programme' which, according to Margot Light, was 'aimed at making the Soviet economy more efficient both through domestic restructuring and through attracting Western credits and investments.'\(^2\) The new leadership in Moscow targeted the budget allocation for foreign policy activities as the main area of economic reform. The Soviet policy of supporting socialist-orientated states, such as Ethiopia and Angola, and its involvement in Afghanistan, imposed a profound strain on the Soviet economy, consequently, *perestroika* formed the basis of the 'new thinking' on Soviet foreign policy.\(^3\) The aim was to assess the cost-effectiveness of pursuing not only an Africa policy, but large-scale foreign agendas with other developing countries. The new Soviet leadership under Gorbachev began to question the cost of supporting states that did not serve an immediate strategic or security interest.

The change towards Africa was further intensified after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of independent states with no policy objective towards the African continent. In any case, with the end of ideological confrontation with the US by 1990, the principle reason for maintaining political and strategic interest on the continent had diminished. There seemed, from the policy-maker's perspective, no real reason, save for economic factors, to carry on with an Africa policy. Since 1991, Russia appeared to be promoting trade and investment links with various African states, rather than developing military structures on the continent.

With the end of the Cold War, the other major powers - Britain, France and the US - were also withdrawing from Africa, but their departure was not as immediate as the Soviet

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\(^1\) Margot Light provides several other reasons to explain Soviet disengagement from the continent. She argues that the first signs can be seen as early as 1966 when doubts were raised over the future of socialism on the Africa continent following the coup of Nkumah, one of the founding fathers of African Socialism. Soviet leaders felt that Nkumah's departure signalled the end of socialism on the continent. See 'Moscow's Retreat from Africa', in A. Hughes, (ed.) *Marxism's Retreat from Africa* (London: Frank Cass, 1992), p. 21-22.


Union. European powers, such as France, who traditionally maintained a sizeable military presence in Africa, often to shore up regimes in former colonies, signalled a retreat from the continent. Officials who had been extremely active in carving out a French policy in the Elysée Palace began to advocate disengagement both on a political and military level. France appeared reluctant to carry on with its traditional role as 'gendarme of Africa;' rather, from the mid-1990s its Africa policy was aimed at economic reform, democracy and 'good governance.'

The US also started to reassess its policy over Sub-Saharan Africa when the perceived threat posed by the Soviet Union and its Communist allies diminished. Events such as Namibia's independence, the breakdown of the apartheid system in South Africa and Cuba's withdrawal from Southern Africa, all added to the shift in American policy in the continent. However, it was America's experience in the violent civil war in Somalia, where is was unable to curb the powerful warlord, Mohammed Farrah Aideed, that led to a gradual policy reversal on how the US responded to conflicts on the continent. The 'new world order' which President George Bush proclaimed after the Gulf War in 1991 was shattered on the African continent (and in the Baltic region). Images of dead US soldiers dragged through the streets of the Somali capital by militiamen forced Washington to rethink its strategy on the continent.

The failure of American peacekeeping to restore peace and stability in Somalia was seen as a turning point in US foreign policy activities on the continent. President Bill Clinton announced the withdrawal of US peacekeepers in the UN operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) after the deaths of eighteen American troops in October 1993. The first sign of retreat came with the *Presidential Decision Directive* (PDD 25) of May 1994 that the Clinton administration issued. Not only was there to be a change over the future of international peacekeeping, but PDD 25 also illustrated the marginalisation of Africa in US foreign policy. This directive imposed strict guidelines on UN peacekeeping operations and effectively meant streamlining or, occasionally, non-participation of US troops in international peacekeeping where there was no immediate US interest. This new policy orientation towards Africa was felt in the Great Lakes region of East Africa, most notably

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in Rwanda where political and ethnic conflict resulted in genocide in April 1994.\(^5\)

The political, security and humanitarian crisis in this region between 1994 and 1996 was further evidence of the disinterest shown towards the continent. Members of the UN Security Council voted to reduce the troop and staff presence in the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) from 2500 to 270 at the time of the genocide in that country.\(^6\) The five permanent members of the Security Council soon reflected the uncertainty surrounding international policy towards the countries in the Great Lakes region of East Africa: Burundi, Rwanda and Zaire. The inability of the main players within the Security Council to maintain a clear position over these unfolding crises made apparent the great sense of ‘Afro-exhaustion’ that was emerging within the foreign ministries of the major Western powers. Rwanda prompted Western policy-makers to question not only the future direction of international peacekeeping, but also the role of the African continent in resolving its own conflicts. To this end, the major powers of the West encouraged “African solutions to African problems.” The major powers not only advocated this policy over the last few years, but some within Africa’s diplomatic circle also reasserted this Pan-Africanist principle in response to Western and Soviet retreat from the continent’s conflicts. We shall come back to discussing what the major powers mean by this policy of “African solutions to African problems” in Chapter Seven.

For now, we consider its usage by African leaders and the OAU in the post-Cold War context and what it means in relation to the debate on intervention. How relevant is the theme “African solutions for African problems” in understanding how the thinking of intervention has evolved since the end of the Cold War on the African continent? Does the expression “African solutions for African problems” mark a shift or a continuation of policy justification that some African states employed when intervening in internal conflicts on the continent over the last thirty years?

II. The ‘new’ breed of African leaders: seeking “African solutions” for Africa’s


internal conflicts in the post-Cold War Era

The problems raised by the internal conflicts and widespread instability in African states in the 1990s propelled the African continent into reconsidering the sacrosanct idea of non-intervention and state sovereignty. The urgency and need to do something was partly fuelled by a ‘new’ breed of African leaders who were said to be concerned with the problem of domestic conflicts and the effects they have on the survival of the African state. This new leadership stretched from Ethiopia and Eritrea in the Horn of Africa through Uganda and Rwanda in Central Africa. We referred briefly in Chapter Five to this new group that included President Isiaias Afwerki in Eritrea, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi in Ethiopia, Vice-President and Defence Minister (‘and de facto head of government’) Paul Kagamé in Rwanda, and President Yoweri Museveni in Uganda. This group also included the former Tanzanian Foreign Minister and OAU Secretary-General, Salim Ahmed Salim, who began many of the initiatives in the OAU when he was first elected in 1989. We will discuss Salim’s role in the context of the debates that were taking place at the OAU in Part Three. Western and African commentators earmarked this group as representing a ‘new breed’ of African leaders who were transforming the political landscape of the continent. Glynne Evans describes this group as forming the ‘inner sanctum’ who began to take more responsibility for the political future of Africa in the mid-1990s.

Briefly, this group formed itself into a powerful axis in Eastern and Central Africa, but also in the wider regions of Southern Africa since the late 1980s. As noted in Chapter Five, these leaders evolved their approach during the long anti-apartheid and liberation struggles of the 1960s and 1970s. Their political philosophy stemmed from that aspect of Pan-Africanism that preached the politics of ‘solidarity’ and ‘unity’ among fellow African states. More important, their ‘common intellectual and personal heritage’ can be traced back the 1970s when many of them met under the auspices of the left-wing radical Pan-Africanist

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8 G. Evans, Responding to Crises in the African Great Lakes, Adelphi Paper 311, International Institute for Strategic Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 33. The view that there was a new breed of African leaders was also expressed in several interviews that I conducted at the OAU in February 1997.
leader and former President of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere.\(^9\)

These leaders all shared a similar route to power: insurgency, subversion and guerilla warfare against regimes that they argued were ineffective, corrupt or brutal regimes. The aim of these leaders when they came to power was the reconstruction of the style of African regimes in power from being militaristic to one that practised an open and accountable system of governance. Government, according to this ‘new’ group of leaders, needed to be based on an inclusive, representative, participatory and democratic system of governance, all of which these leaders saw as necessary for ensuring a peaceful environment. Furthermore, this new group of leaders emphasised the need to create economic recovery, integration and cooperation through the revitalisation of bodies like the East African Community (EAC) and the Inter-Governmental Agency on Development (IGAD) in the hope of improving Africa’s potential for economic regeneration. We shall say more on IGAD below.

While this Chapter is not concerned with how the individual leaders have run their countries, Christopher Clapham and Marina Ottaway argue that these states have not fully accomplished the progress to democratisation. For example, Museveni dropped his left-wing ideological commitments to Marxism and Pan-Africanism, preferring to be guided by the politics of free market economy. While their various statements and speeches reiterate the appeal for democracy, these leaders have ‘put the requirements of order before participation’ and, have been concerned with ‘stability and economic growth than with democracy and human rights.’\(^10\)

The concern for stability and order brought this group of leaders together to pursue foreign policy objectives that aimed at tackling widespread instability within their region and the African continent. For these leaders, intervening to ensure regional stability and order was necessary on the African continent especially because of the adverse effects

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internal conflicts in one state can have another state. According to these leaders, finding "African solutions for African problems" in the post-Cold War era was essential for two reasons. First, because of the increasing number of conflicts and the spread of collapsing or failing states. Consequently, they intervened in regional conflicts such as that in Burundi and Zaire to restore stability and order. The extent of this powerful axis could be seen when Museveni lent 'support' and the Rwandese government made soldiers available in 1997 to the rebel leader Laurent-Désiré Kabila and his umbrella organisation of militias, the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Kinshasa (AFDL) in the overthrow of President Mobutu in Zaire. However, pace Hughes and May, the support given to Kabila by Rwanda and Uganda can also be understood as 'regime opposing' where leaders send forces into adjacent countries and help topple leaders they oppose. Both countries were helping Kabila in his attempt to overthrow the brutal and autocratic regime of President Mobutu, but more important, because they believed Kabila's leadership would provide regional security and the political and economic reform necessary for Central and East Africa.

The second reason for advocating "African solutions for African problems" is that it appeared that the international community would not respond to the conflicts in the African Great Lakes or in Liberia. The lack of a clear direction from outside the continent furthered their desire and the determination to take control and participate in various peace processes. In the Great Lakes region, sub-regional leaders believed the fate of the region and even the continent was in their hands, especially after the Kabila's overthrow Mobutu. Consequently, these leaders created ad hoc Great Lake meetings, such as the Arusha Summit, to address the crises in the sub-region.11 Furthermore, these leaders developed "home-grown" or indigenous initiatives aimed at confronting Africa's political and security problems in contrast to peace initiatives from outside the continent. It was clear to these leaders that the continent could not rely on external assistance, but more important, that African leaders needed to dictate the nature of order that should prevail on the continent. The rest of the Chapter focuses on the OAU where many of these "home-grown" initiatives

had been appearing since the end of the Cold War. These initiatives shed light on how the thinking on intervention had evolved in the post-Cold War era.

The influence of this new leadership was visible in the OAU. These leaders took active participation in the attempts to reinstitute “African solutions for African problems” at the heart of the OAU in the hope that the Organisation would be an active participant in mediating conflicts on the continent. The role of the OAU Secretary-General, who also shared an intellectual root with these ‘new’ African leaders, ensured that the movement towards reasserting “African solutions” would be fulfilled at a continental level.

III. The OAU and Africa’s internal conflicts: defining the principle of “African solutions for African problems”

The former Tanzanian Foreign Minister and OAU Secretary-General, Salim Ahmed Salim, began many of the initiatives in the OAU when he was first elected in 1989. According to Colin Legum, Salim’s election ‘breathed new life into the...OAU’ as he ‘provided the kind of leadership at the top which the OAU lacked since its first Secretary-General, Diallo Telli.’

Prior to Salim’s leadership, most attempts by the OAU at creating collective security mechanisms to ensure “African solutions for African problems” were aimed at preventing intervention by outside powers and mediating border disputes during the Cold War period. In 1964, the OAU created the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration to settle disputes among member states, but it did not function well. Usually, the OAU resorted to ad hoc arrangements including the use of good offices of the OAU Secretary-General, and mediation committees to address disputes among states. When it came to responding to internal disputes, the OAU held onto the principle norms of international relations while turning a blind eye to some potentially damaging conflicts. The fear within the OAU was that to undermine the African state system would have disastrous effects on the political and economic development of the continent. However, in the 1990s, the destructive effects of internal conflicts compelled the OAU to re-examine its mechanisms to limit their spread and

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to redress the edict on the sanctity of sovereignty and non-intervention.

The urgency and need to respond to the conflicts on the continent was made by Salim when he encouraged Africa's leaders to consider the changing nature of international politics in 1990. The Secretary-General set the tone in the Declaration on Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and Fundamental Changes taking place in the World which was signed by Africa’s Heads of State on 11 July 1990. In it, the OAU Heads of State and Government renewed their 'determination to work together towards the peaceful and speedy resolution of all conflicts on [the] continent.' The Declaration did not just point to the fact that the nature of the international system was changing and with it, the policy direction of the major international players. It also noted that African leaders needed to consider that the conflicts on the continent took place largely within and not between states. The ending of the Cold War system brought to the fore previously suppressed ethnic and political tensions, and a process of disintegration of some African countries, to the extent that the continent was witnessing what can be defined as failing or collapsed states. In the face of mounting conflicts, the management of internal conflicts was a key issue contained in the 1990 Declaration. The Senior Political Adviser to the Conflict Division of the OAU, Sam Ibok, states that the 1990 Declaration marked a decisive turning point for...Africa because for the first time in its history, the OAU recognized the changing nature of conflicts from inter-State, for which serious if ad-hoc efforts had been deployed in the past to resolve, to intra-state which called for a more dynamic approach, given the African pre-occupation with concepts such as sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of Member States, as enshrined in the OAU Charter.

Largely due to the growing problem of internal conflicts and because of the continent’s perceived marginalisation from the international community, several fundamental implications emerged as officials at the OAU Secretariat considered how to

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respond to these internal conflicts. These were:

1. That there is a need for the OAU to redevelop existing capacities, institutions and mechanisms that ensure that it can intervene when necessary to settle conflicts within member-states.

2. That the OAU and the continent cannot depend on the international community or the UN in any substantial measure for resources to resolve the conflicts within the continent. The signal being sent to the countries of Africa is that they must shoulder an increased burden in the conduct of peace operations on the continent and outsiders might only complement Africa’s effort.15

In seeking ways to respond to internal conflicts, the OAU Secretariat reasserted the popular euphemism of “African solutions for African problems”. In line with its original meaning advocated by Pan-Africanist leaders like Kwame Nkrumah in the 1960s, the OAU was trying to generate a sense of African ownership or a sense of taking charge of matters that could undermine the future of peace and stability on the continent. At the height of the superpower involvement on the African continent in the mid-1970s, the notion of “African solutions for African problems” was extended to mean individual states could seek and obtain support from extra-continental forces to fight their conflicts or to mediate. The OAU never condemned this practice. In the post-Cold War era, according to the OAU, the main objective of “African solutions for African problems” was to break Africa’s dependence on outside involvement and mediation in conflicts on the continent. The OAU argued higher priority should be given to conflict prevention, management and resolution, and the potential of the Organisation to help build Africa’s capacity in this area. The Deputy Permanent Observer of the OAU mission to the UN, Solomon Gomes explains what “African solutions for African problems” means in the post-Cold War era:

Put in the context of today, the notion of African solutions for African problems is basically that the OAU should become pro-active in the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in the continent. It should engage in preventive diplomacy including the preventive deployments of troops in situations that warrant military fact-finding or

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15 These points were raised during interviews with Dr. Chris Bakwesegha, Head of the OAU Conflict Management Division and William Nhara, Coordinator of Conflict Prevention Research at the OAU Conflict Management Division.
military/civilian Observer mission(s). This it should do, in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.\textsuperscript{16}

The first real attempt taken by the OAU to ensure "African solutions for African problems" can be found in the proposal for an \textit{OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution} that the Secretary-General initiated. Salim may have gained inspiration for this Mechanism from the ECOWAS-ECOMOG initiative in Liberia.\textsuperscript{17} Furthermore, the 1992 UN report on \textit{Agenda for Peace} may also have propelled Salim's proposal. This report emphasised the need to devolve the burden of addressing conflicts to institutions and regional bodies other than the UN.

In his proposals to the 56\textsuperscript{th} meeting of the OAU Council of Ministers in Dakar, Senegal from 22-27 June 1992, Salim suggested that the Organisation should take the lead in going beyond the established view of sovereignty and non-intervention in the internal affairs of states when internal conflicts cause widespread humanitarian tragedy and political instability. Salim argued that African leaders should work to develop African 'solidarity' and the idea that 'every African is his brother's keeper.'\textsuperscript{18} Salim's policy was no different to those outlined by the radical Pan-Africanist leaders in the 1960s. Nor was it different from the statement made by Nigeria's Head of State, Ibrahim Babangida at the time of the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia. The difference between what was said in the 1960s and what was said in the 1990s, was that in the 1960s, radical leaders focussed on developing structures to liberate African territories still under colonial rule and to remove neocolonialism on the continent. In the post-Cold War era, while the aim was still to remove foreign meddling, the main concern was with responding to instability and internecine warfare that is not only destroying the lives of thousands of people, but undermining the legitimacy of the African state system. To this end, the Secretary-General has argued that since 'our borders are at best artificial, ...we in Africa need to use our own cultural and


\textsuperscript{17} See the OAU Secretary-General's comments during a newspaper interview: 'OAU defence force inevitable, says Salim Salim', \textit{The Guardian} (Nigeria), 23 August 1990, p. 5.

\textsuperscript{18} 56\textsuperscript{th} Meeting of the OAU Council of Ministers, \textit{Report of the Secretary-General on Conflicts in Africa: Proposals for an OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention and Resolution}, CM/1710 (LV1), Dakar, Senegal, 22-27 June, 1992, p. 12.

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social relationships to interpret the principle of non-interference in such a way that we are [able] to apply it to our own advantage in conflict prevention and resolution.¹⁹

African Heads of State appeared to give weight to Salim’s proposal when they endorsed the idea of a Mechanism at their 28th Ordinary Session in Dakar from 27 June -1 July 1992. They went on to establish the Mechanism at the 29th Ordinary Session from 28-30 June 1993, in Cairo, Egypt.²⁰ This document combined the methods of the UN and the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE since 1994) and the traditional African approach of including elders and chiefs for mediation. Picking up on the theme from the 1990 Declaration to establish an OAU capacity for resolving conflicts, the Mechanism was authorized to concern itself with internal conflicts by anticipating and preventing their emergence.²¹ The document emphasised ‘peace-making and peace-building functions in order to facilitate the resolution’ of conflicts that occurred on the continent. However, the primary objective of the Mechanism was prevention, preferring to forestall a potential civil war, rather than deal with the consequences of launching a large-scale peacekeeping operation.²² The motivation for this was arguably financial, based on what was the most cost-effective approach for an Organisation whose member states were experiencing severe economic difficulties. The OAU also noted the complexities of launching a large peacekeeping exercise where there were limited logistical resources, as reasons for preferring preventive action.²³ In cases where a conflict deteriorates to the extent that international intervention becomes necessary, the OAU states that ‘the assistance or where


²³ OAU’s Position Towards the Various Initiatives on Conflict Management: Enhancing OAU’s Capacity in Preventive Diplomacy, Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping, Central Organ/MEC/MIN/3 (IV), para. 27, p. 9. (No date given).
appropriate the services of the [UN] will be sought under the general terms of its Charter' in full recognition that the UN is tasked with the primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security.\(^{24}\)

At the centre of this Mechanism is the Central Organ - a policy-making body of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government. The Central Organ is a committee of fifteen states charged with finding solutions to conflicts on the continent. The committee of fifteen, which is elected annually, consists of countries selected from the Bureau of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the state of the outgoing Chairman and, where known, that of the incoming Chairman, with the Secretary-General and the Secretariat acting as its operational arm. The Central Organ meets every month at the level of Ambassadors, twice a year at a Ministerial level and once a year at the level of Heads of State and Government to discuss issues relating to conflict situations. In deciding its recommendations, the principle of consensus guides the Organ. The Central Organ has been compared with the UN Security Council, but the fundamental difference is that unlike the UN Security Council, it lacks both a permanent membership or the use of a veto.\(^{25}\) Within its first year (1993-1994), the Central Organ dealt with several of Africa's internal crises: Angola, Burundi, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda and Somalia.\(^{26}\)

As part of the Mechanism, the OAU created a Conflict Management Centre (CMC) in 1996. Can the CMC enable the OAU to develop "African solutions for African problems" in responding to internal conflicts? Although the OAU Secretariat was committed to ensuring that African states were equipped to respond to crises as they emerge on the continent, doubts were raised about the potential of the CMC to intervene in internal conflicts. The OAU lacked two desirable elements for resolving most internal conflicts within the continent: an adequate staff fully trained for managing internal conflicts, and the financial resources necessary for mounting peacekeeping operations. We shall discuss these problems in Chapter Seven. For now, we consider the policy options that were placed before

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\(^{26}\) See the Draft Report of the Third Session at the level of the OAU Council of Ministers of the Central Organ, Central Organ/MEC/MIN/Comm.1(III), Rev.1, Tunis, Tunisia, 3-4 August 1994.
the OAU Conflict Management Centre between 1996-1997.

IV. OAU options for ensuring "African solutions for African problems"

In theoretical terms, the decision to establish the CMC 'represented an important breakthrough' for the OAU principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of member states. However, it is worth noting that the 1993 declaration is still firmly based on the principle of non-intervention. Again, in theoretical terms, while the decision to establish the CMC empowered the 'Secretary-General to become an activist wherever and whenever he [saw] conflicts emerging,' in reality however, member states remained hesitant about allowing the Secretary-General and his Good Offices to enter their country to mediate in internal conflicts.

Despite this, officials argued that the CMC would give the OAU a capacity to intervene, but also ensures "African solutions for African problems". To make "African solutions for African problems" a functioning reality, officials put forward several options that they stated would allow for the continent to take ownership of conflicts that emerge. The various options can be summarized under the following headings:

i) An OAU Early Warning Capacity;

ii) A Continental Peacekeeping Force;

iii) Sub-regional capacity for Conflict Management; and

iv) A Blueprint on Unconstitutional Change.

The remainder of this Chapter looks at these four options aimed at ensuring "African


29 Interview with Ambassador Daniel António, OAU Assistant Secretary-General (for Political Affairs). The Ambassador cites Sudan and Nigeria as examples of member states who have traditionally rejected the presence of the Secretary-General and his Good Offices in their countries.
solutions for African problems.”

An OAU Early Warning Capacity

Although we have argued that most of the initiatives to come out of the OAU are not ‘new’ or specific to the post-Cold War context, the idea of early warning needs to be understood within the context of the post-Cold War period. In this sense, it is certainly an innovative measure by the OAU in its attempts at responding to internal conflicts on the continent.30

After the creation of the CMC, the OAU Secretariat took steps to set up an Early Warning System for collating information on impending violent conflicts and suggesting strategies to forestall the outbreak of conflict. The idea of identifying indicators of nascent conflicts is crucial for the OAU. Officials at the OAU argued that an early warning system should enhance the Organisation’s knowledge and understanding of the underlying patterns, causes and consequences of instability in Africa.31 However, the idea of early warning came under attack in the 1990s by those examining mechanisms for maintaining international peace and security for sounding ‘Pollyannaish and vacuous.’ Yet, as Thomas Weiss asks ‘what are the alternatives’, especially for a continent that lacks real financial capacity to embark on a cost-intensive policy of peacekeeping or peace enforcement?32

The OAU first discussed the idea of establishing an Early Warning System in its review of the OAU Mechanism at the 31st Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State in July 1995. It was generally felt that the lack of such a capacity seriously undermined the ‘efficacy’ of the Mechanism and its potential to perform the tasks proscribed to it,
namely to ‘predict and prevent conflict situations in the Continent.’ In order to establish an effective system, the OAU emphasised the need to create a network with national bodies, sub-regional organisations, the UN and its specialized agencies, academic institutions, the media and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The aim was to generate a ‘multi-layered solution’ to preventing conflicts, by which ‘different actors, intervening at appropriate intervals and using relevant tools can be used to construct a cohesive network for prevention action and conflict resolution throughout the multi-layered paradigm. The attempt to develop a multi-layered approach with the NGO community was a new effort for the OAU as it sought to establish “African solutions for African problems.” Historically, the OAU never worked with NGOs, whether indigenous or external, seeing them as an essential threat to the state system and the principle of non-intervention. However, Salim Ahmed Salim was reported to have been influenced by the NGO community, suggesting that the ‘twenty-first century [would] be defined as the era of the NGO.’ Some within the CMC also felt that NGOs have an intimate knowledge of local conflict situations and an ability to identify the actors in a conflict. However officials were also reluctant to seek the assistance of Western-based NGOs as some African leaders perceive them as having their agendas set by their financial donors, also from the West, thus undermining any neutrality that NGOs seem to have.

The OAU Secretariat set up a 24-hour watch centre, a Database Unit and an officer charged with providing indicators of impending conflicts and strategic advice for preventive

33 ‘The Concept’ in S. Ibok and W. Nhara, (eds.), (1996), p. 10. The desire to institute an Early Warning System within Africa led to a four day seminar at the OAU January 1996. The rest of this section is a summary of the key elements that were raised during this seminar. The full text of the seminar can be seen in the edited book mentioned above. Also see Early Warning in Conflict Prevention: OAU Perception and Possibility, (Addis Ababa: OAU, 4 October 1996).


36 Interview with W. Nhara and Medhane Tadesse, Research Coordinator of Environmental Conflict Management, (Ethiopian NGO).

37 Interview with Medhane Tadesse.

38 Interview with Medhane Tadesse.
diplomacy with the hope that this mechanism would help it prevent conflicts. However, the OAU Secretariat found itself constrained at three levels in trying to develop an Early Warning System. First, the OAU found it difficult to establish ‘the necessary framework for assessing a wide-variety of information from diverse and sometimes even competing or distorted sources.’ Second, was the problem of obtaining information from member states of the OAU. Many states that face impending conflicts are run by regimes that tend to be hostile towards press freedom; consequently, information received is largely limited, judged suspect and inadequate. Third, and more significant, was what to do with the information once the OAU has received it. Put another way, what use is an early warning capacity if member states have not matched it by early political action or some form of diplomatic initiative to head off a full-fledged conflict? The crisis in Rwanda eloquently demonstrated that the problem was not the failure of obtaining information on the conflict situation, but in taking the necessary political action to respond to it.

Early warning systems are only part of the solution in preventing a conflict and ensuring the efficiency of the OAU’s response to conflict resolution. However, for such a system to be credible, political leaders need to assess the security implications (e.g. the flow of refugees and arms) for acting or not in a region if a potential conflict turns into a full-scale civil war and threatens regional peace and security.

A Continental Peacekeeping Force

The idea of a continental peacekeeping force is not new, and was first suggested by

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39 The officer’s principle job is to: develop, test, implement and maintain methods to detect as early as possible impending situations of conflict, and formulate strategies and prepare documents for consideration within the OAU. This forms part of the ‘Job Description’ of the Senior Political Officer on Preventive Diplomacy, Research and Early Warning System.


41 The idea of early warning was undermined when it was alleged that the UN Secretariat failed to pass on relevant information to the Security Council which could have, it was suggested, prevented the massacre of Tutsis by Hutu extremists in Rwanda in spring of 1994. See Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience - Study 2: Early Warning and Conflict Management (Copenhagen: Steering Committee, 1996), p. 37.
Kwame Nkrumah during the Congolese civil war (1960-1966) to prevent external forces from participating in the conflict, but more important to ‘Africanise’ the solutions to the conflict. Since the creation of the OAU, member states have studied the idea of a peacekeeping force (or to use its original name, an African High Command) with no consensus on whether to develop such a mechanism on the continent. The Shaba I and II crises in Zaire (Congo) in 1976 and 1977-1978 also prompted discussions on the potential for creating a continental peacekeeping force. Twenty years later, the political upheaval and humanitarian tragedy in the same country, again calling itself Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and the surrounding countries of the Great Lakes (i.e. Rwanda and Burundi), reignited an old debate. The idea of a continental peacekeeping force also corresponded with the desire by the international community to devolve responsibility for peace operations to continental bodies, such as the OAU, or NATO (in Bosnia).

As with previous debates, African leaders appeared reluctant in the 1990s to boost the OAU and the continent’s autonomy in handling peacekeeping operations on the continent. Instead leaders appeared to share the view that the creation of a standing peacekeeping force on the continent was neither desirable nor practically feasible. They opted, on the one hand, to set up peacekeeping missions with the limited role of observing and monitoring conflicts, and on the other, to engage in ad hoc peace operations as the need arises. The restriction of peacekeeping to observer status was an indication that African Heads of State had not realised the need for an OAU peacekeeping force as expeditiously as officials in the Secretariat would have wish. More important was the fact that political considerations, such as respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, were clearly at stake once peacekeeping was sanctioned.

However, while member states appeared reluctant to set up a peacekeeping force, the recurring problem of internal conflict on the continent and the decline in outside intervention showed that member states could not always avoid undertaking activities of a peacekeeping

nature. This was exemplified in Rwanda and Burundi where OAU missions found themselves engaged in some activities related to peacekeeping in 1993 and 1994. The massacre of Tutsis by Hutu extremists in Rwanda in April 1994 and Mayor Pierre Buyoya's coup against the government of President Sylvestre Nibantuganya in Burundi in July 1996, further convinced many at the OAU Secretariat of the need to explore how Africa could build a capacity for peacekeeping operations that could be placed at the disposal of the UN, and in exceptional circumstances, the OAU.

Member states discussed the issue of peacekeeping during the 62nd Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers from 21-23 June 1995. At the meeting, the Council felt that the OAU should develop and enhance its capacity in the field of peacekeeping. While recognising that they should give priority to preventive diplomacy, the Council recommended that member states ‘set aside or earmark ready contingents to be given specialized training in peace-keeping operations.’ This policy marked a major step, in theory at least, towards enhancing the capacity of the Organisation to act quickly. However, on the political level, there are reasons to remain cautious about the OAU’s capacity. These reasons were brought to the fore when the OAU deployed an Inter-African Force in Chad in 1981, and again when the West African region set up the ECOMOG force to address the civil war in Liberia; they include: inadequate planning, confusion over the mandates, absence of OAU command and control, perceived partiality of some troop contributing countries, inadequate allocations of financial and logistical resources and, above all, lack of political will, not just of the parties to the conflict, but also of third party mediators in the surrounding region. We will come back to these problems again in Chapter Seven.

As a direct outcome of the 1995 meeting of the Council of Ministers and later the Heads of State and Government Summit, the OAU convened the first meeting of Chiefs of

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43 Statement by H.E. Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim, Secretary-General of the OAU to the Meeting of Chiefs of Staff of State Members of the OAU Central Organ, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 3-5 June 1996.
Staffs within the continent in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in June 1996. Although the 1995 Summit limited the possibility of establishing an African peacekeeping force, the Chiefs of Staff meeting encouraged the need for the creation of an African rapid reaction force. The Chiefs of Staff argued that the modest achievements and shortcomings of the OAU missions in Rwanda and Burundi implied that the time had come for the OAU to develop a common understanding that would guide operations that the Organisation may be called upon to launch in any given conflict area within the continent. The clearest indication of the need to create a peacekeeping force can be found in two proposals that were put forward during the Chiefs of Staff meeting. The first proposal consisted of the establishment of two bodies at the OAU General Secretariat: a body for the prevention and management of conflicts and, another body to act as an Intervention Force. Such a Force would rely on the establishment within each state of a military contingent under the responsibility of the OAU, which, while remaining part of its national army, would be ready to carry out missions for the OAU. The second proposal was the establishment of an integrated African doctrine for peacekeeping, comprising political, military, paramilitary and civilian stand-by arrangements in all the member States, ready for deployment at any time. In relation to the second proposal, decisions about the necessary organs and their institutionalisation at the continental level would have to address some important questions:

i) Should the Organisation have the capacity to use force in an internal conflict?

ii) Should the OAU independently recruit and train a peacekeeping force, or should it be drawn from the armed force units of member states?

iii) Whom should the primary responsibility for deciding to intervene rest with, i.e. at the level of the OAU, a subregional organisation, or the UN?

iv) How will training, maintenance, and deployment of troops be funded?

47 Interview with Commodore Mesfine Binega, Military Consultant to the OAU Conflict Management Centre. Also see 'Working Document,' Meeting of the Chiefs of Staff of the Member States of the Central Organ of the OAU, 3-5 June 1996, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, p. 8.

These questions are relevant for a continent that has limited experience in launching military expeditions for resolving internal conflicts. At the time of writing, the most crucial and contentious question was number three, concerning responsibility for decision-making.

Although Africa leaders argued that they needed to develop operational procedures for intervening, the idea that the OAU could have the capacity to tackle internal disputes and mandate peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations was received with some caution. Some member states, for example Kenya and Zimbabwe, not only questioned the legitimacy of a force if not sanctioned by the UN, but more important, argued that they would only pursue peace enforcement operations under the framework of a clear UN mandate and decisive leadership, and not under the auspices of any particular country. Furthermore, while they argued that they were not denigrating the efforts of the OAU to manage a peacekeeping or peace enforcement operation, they nonetheless raised concerns about the ability of any regional peacekeeping initiative to maintain the essential principle of impartiality. South Africa set out several conditions in its White Paper on National Defence that need to be met if it is to become involved in peace support operations. These are that:

1. The operation should have a clear mandate, mission and objectives.
2. There should be realistic criteria for terminating the operation.
3. The operation should be authorized by the United Nations Security Council.

In addition to the uneasiness shown in South Africa’s White Paper, there is also a certain degree of reluctance and suspicion among Africa’s leadership about establishing a proactive OAU for intervening in Africa’s conflict. As Edmond Keller points out, although African leaders tend to agree that they need an African peacekeeping force, ‘it is unclear what most of them would do if the...OAU were to intervene in their own countries.’ The Declaration

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that established the OAU *Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution* in 1993 emphasised that the OAU’s activities will be ‘in keeping with the provisions of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter on the role of regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security,’ thus providing a clear indication that the OAU would not conduct an operation without seeking the authority, but more important, financial and military resources from the UN.\(^{52}\)

The idea of a body with a mandate to intervene is no less controversial because it is a ‘homemade’ initiative. Indeed, Africans are increasingly wary of the potential for intrusiveness that a continental force will have. Certainly in Burundi between 1993 and 1994, there was great doubt over the possibilities of an exclusive African army interfering in the domestic affairs of the state. More important, as Burundi again illustrated, there was suspicion over the nature of the African force. The Burundi army, which was largely Tutsi, rejected the idea of foreign troops, even if they were African, because it perceived that outside intervention would change the balance of power in the country. The countries in the region - Uganda, Zaire and Tanzania - had all been accused of taking sides in the conflict in Burundi. As a result of a history of partisanship, few countries, if any, in the subregion, could play the role of a neutral mediator or provide troops for an impartial peacekeeping force. As Glynne Evans points out, the perception within the army was that ‘an external force’ would not only have ‘changed the local dynamic’, but also it ‘would have heightened Tutsi insecurity’ rather than ‘promote security.’\(^{53}\) In the end, the OAU only sent an observer mission that posed no threat to the balance of power in the region. Similarly, as we discussed in Chapter Five, in Liberia there were various protests against the ECOMOG force from ECOWAS member states and Charles Taylor who saw the force as an extension of Nigeria’s attempts at regional hegemony.\(^{54}\)

Africa does possess some peacekeeping experience inside and outside the continent. It also has several states such as Botswana, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal and Tanzania who have significant experience in UN peace-keeping operations. Africa’s first experience in the field


\(^{54}\) Also see J. Herbst, (1996), pp. 18-19.
of peacekeeping came with its participation in the Congo in the 1960s. This was followed by an attempt by the OAU in 1981 to dispatch a peacekeeping force (i.e. Inter-African Force) in Chad to resolve the civil war. In the 1990s, the oftquoted example of African peacekeeping is ECOMOG in Liberia and Sierra Leone. African leaders need to look at the ECOMOG experience with care, for not only does it illustrate the potential of subregional organisations in promoting conflict management alongside the OAU system, but it also highlights their shortcomings as they attempt to participate in peacekeeping operations. We will come back to the ECOMOG operation in the next section when we focus on the role of sub-regional capacity for conflict management. Alongside this recent attempt by ECOMOG is the use of African troops from Burkina Faso, Chad, Gabon and Mali in the Mission InterAfricaine de Surveillance des Accords (Inter-African Monitoring Mission, MISAB) which was at the forefront of managing the crisis in the Central African Republic in January 1997.33

Since the end of the Cold War, several programmes and training initiatives have taken place on the continent to enhance Africa's capacity in participating in peace support operations. For example, Zimbabwe held a major Regional Peacekeeping Field Training Exercise (Blue Hungwe or 'Blue Eagle') between April and May 1997. The initiative involved officers from Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, and the Zambia. It also involved participants from outside the continent (e.g. Britain), including the UN and international observers. The aim of Exercise Blue Hungwe, as it became known, was on the one hand to develop a coordinated approach to learning military and technical skills for peacekeeping operations, while on the other hand, it was intended to enhance inter-operability for multinational operations. Since the major powers of the West want to avoid repeating the mistakes of Somalia, they trained a force of African soldiers to respond to widespread internal conflicts and humanitarian tragedies.34 The use of Western resources to train African soldiers is consistent with the idea

33 MISAB was a French initiative to monitor and implement the Bangui agreement signed by the government of the Central African Republic and the rebel soldiers. In April 1998, the UN Security Council established a UN peacekeeping operation (UN Mission in the Central African Republic - MINURCA) to replace the French-sponsored initiative. See S/Res/1159, 27 March 1998.

34 In December 1992, the US led a peacekeeping mission - Operation Restore Hope - in response to the civil war in Somalia. This mission compromised the concept of neutrality in peacekeeping operations when US
of "African solutions for African problems" because the OAU maintains it is not only ensuring that African armies are well equipped to respond to African conflicts, but that Africans can police themselves and be a partner in creating stability.57

Sub-regional Capacity for Conflict Management

The idea that sub-regional organisations should have the capacity to intervene is an innovative step in the history of attempts by the African continent to device mechanisms to resolve internal conflicts. As with the idea of creating an Early Warming Capacity on the continent, it should be understood in the context of the post-Cold War, although the idea that regions should manage their conflicts is clearly noted in Article 52 of the UN Charter. What makes the use of African sub-regional organisations an innovative idea in maintaining peace and security, is that these organisations were originally devised to pursue political and economic integration. No sub-regional organisation in Africa had any significant military structure from which it could devise plans for intervening in internal conflicts. It was not until the intervention by ECOWAS in Liberia that we witnessed an attempt by a sub-regional organisation to resolve an internal conflict. Furthermore, the growing reluctance of the major powers to engage in conflicts that were not an immediate national interest, coupled with an UN body that found itself overstretched in addressing conflicts, led to calls

57 Also see ‘Peacekeeping force could free West from African conflicts’, Agence France Presse International, 4 April 1997 and S. Njanji, ‘African multinational force in conflict resolution exercise’, Agence France Presse International, 15 April 1997. In the another training initiative, African and foreign troops took part in Exercise Guidimakha 98, a ten-day course held by Senegal from 20 February 1998. The event was again aimed at enhancing joint field training of various national armies in peacekeeping techniques so that they will be ready to come together when an emergency arises. As with Exercise Blue Hungwe, Britain, France and the US supported the event.

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for regional institutions to play an active role in maintaining peace and security in the post-
Cold War era.

The intervention by ECOWAS in Liberia widened the options available to the
African continent and the OAU on how to enhance its ability to promote conflict
management. It also raised the expectations of those who saw this style of peacekeeping as
'giving new expression to the cooperation envisaged in Chapter VIII of the United Nations
Charter between regional organisations and the UN in the maintenance of international
peace and security.'\textsuperscript{58} While the ECOWAS intervention highlighted the opportunities to be
had at sub-regional peacekeeping and the capacity of "African solutions for African
problems", it also raised several complex issues concerning the 'competence and
effectiveness of regional and subregional organisations with no history of collective military
action for pursuing peacekeeping operations.'\textsuperscript{59} ECOMOG encountered many problems in
Liberia, not least over its legitimacy and neutrality. On an operational level, it lacked
adequate staff, logistics, transport and an overarching structure to command and control the
operation in Liberia. Despite the criticisms levelled against ECOWAS, one cannot deny that
its intervention force - ECOMOG - will serve as a possible prototype for future Africa
peacekeeping force. The ECOMOG intervention preceded many of the changes and
initiatives that were taking place at the OAU. ECOMOG is likely to continue to serve as a
peacekeeping force for the West African region, although at the time of writing, West
Africa's Heads of State had not defined the nature and scope of future peacekeeping
operations on which ECOMOG will embark.

Certainly the experience of ECOWAS had opened possibilities in the subregions of
Africa in the field of conflict management. To this end, Presidents Afwerki, (Eritrea),
Zenawi (Ethiopia) and Museveni (Uganda) used IGAD in East Africa as a mediation force
in Sudan in September 1993 with a mandate of resolving the conflict between the Sudanese
government and the northern (Umma Party and Democratic Unionist Party) and southern

\textsuperscript{58} C. Ero, 'Subregional Peacekeeping and Conflict Management: The ECOWAS Intervention in Liberia.'
Paper presented at the Second Pan-European Conference in International Relations, Paris, 13-16 September,

\textsuperscript{59} D. Wippman,(1993), p. 191.
Sudanese opposition movements (the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army, SPLA). When the mediation process failed, Eritrea and Uganda extended support to John Garang and the SPLA/M.

In Southern Africa, the South African Development Community (SADC) was seen as an institution for capacity-building after its efforts in Lesotho in 1994. The peacemaking of SADC in Lesotho received attention largely because of the prominent role played by the South African and Zimbabwean Presidents, Nelson Mandela and Robert Mugabe. Regional Heads of State from South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe averted the possibility of hostility and a royal coup by Lesotho’s King Letsie III against the Prime Minister, Ntsu Mokhehle and the elected Parliament. However, while some may cite SADC’s intervention as an example of the role of sub-regional organisations in conflict management, Jeffrey Herbst sounds a note of caution over future operations:

“Everyone’s favourite example of African intervention...should not be read as an easily transferable example of how Africans stop state failure in its tracks. That effort was successful because Lesotho is a landlocked country unusually vulnerable to outside powers. Indeed Mandela was simply continuing an old South African practice of dictating to Lesotho what could and could not be done.”

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60 IGAD is comprised of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and Uganda. IGAD was previously known as the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) which was created in 1986. In 1994 it expanded its mandate to deal with conflict mediation. For an analysis of IGAD’s mediation in Sudan, see F. Deng and K. Medani, ‘Civil War and Identity in Sudan’s Foreign Policy’ in E. Keller and D. Rothchild, (eds.), (1996), pp. 116-117, and *Sudan: Ending the War, Moving Talks Forward*, A Report of United States Institute of Peace Seminar, 12 April, 1994. (Located at http://www.usip.org/oc/st/sudan.html).

61 The SPLA split in 1991 after internal divisions. There are now two groups: the SPLA/Mainstream faction, led by John Garang, and the SPLA/United faction (known as the Torit faction), led by Riek Machar. Eritrea and Uganda decided to help the SPLA because of the support the Islamic Sudanese government was giving to Islamic movements in their countries, especially the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda. See M. Ottaway, (1998), p. 213.


The ECOWAS intervention and the prominent role of IGAD and SADC have highlighted the potential roles of subregional organisations. There are several reasons for focussing on the role of sub-regions in conflict resolution instead of the continent-wide approach favoured by the OAU. Not all states are willing to participate in conflicts that are far removed from their borders as they are not an immediate security threat, a fact not specific to African states. While such a model would ensure continental solidarity, thus keeping in line with the ideals of Pan-Africanism, one cannot dismiss the reluctance of states to send troops to distant areas. Sub-regional approaches to peacekeeping might therefore ensure the participation of states because they have more at stake for the peace and security of their own countries and the sub-region. It would therefore follow that along with a continental mechanism, there is, from the OAU’s perspective, a need for sub-regional mechanisms that can effectively act in helping the OAU to resolve conflicts on the continent. Such an approach would complement the OAU’s continental structure, and, in a sense, remove the burden of resolving all the continent’s conflicts from the OAU. However, work still needs to be done to enhance the capacity of the sub-regions in the field of conflict management as they are not all geared or fully equipped to participate in peacekeeping operations.64

It is worth noting here that South Africa is reluctant to play the role of sub-regional peacekeeper if the OAU were to concentrate on developing the capacity of institutions like SADC to take active participation in peace operations. In the immediate years of its post-apartheid era, South Africa came under increasing pressure to participate in settling conflicts in the continent.65 Since re-entering the international community, South Africa’s role in African affairs raised new and interesting possibilities for the management of conflict. With a new democracy, and with one of the continent’s strongest economies, Western countries were asking South Africa to take an ‘aggressive’ role in rebuilding, and in solving African

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65 See S. Pons, ‘South Africa under pressure to intervene in conflicts’, Agence France Presse International, 5 November 1996.
problems. According to Herbst, some countries within the international community saw
South Africa 'as a kind of “Mr. Fix-It,”’ able, and because of the sacrifices made by many
countries during the liberation struggle, obliged to address Africa’s problems. However,
the Government of National Unity appeared reluctant to involve South Africa's army in
extensive peacekeeping operations for two reasons. First, the South African National
Defence Force (SANDF), had to undergo the process of transforming itself into a credible
defence force after its activities under the apartheid regime tainted it. The military had to
treading carefully for historical reasons, especially after its overt and covert actions against
most neighbouring states that opposed the country when it was under white minority rule.
Second, the political and military dynamics of peace support operations were new to South
Africa and SANDF. South Africa did not complete its programme of integrating non-
statutory forces (e.g. former African National Congress (ANC) soldiers and Inkatha
Freedom Party (IFP) fighters) into a single national defence until 1997. The government has
argued the SANDF’s first task is to serve the new South African democracy before
embarking on peacekeeping or peace enforcement activities in internal conflicts.

While South Africa is perceived as having the necessary power and resources to take
the lead in resolving conflicts on the continent, government ministers have often stated that
the country’s initiatives needs to 'be formulated against a background of what South Africa
can realistically hope to achieve.' South Africa showed its reluctance to take the lead role
on the crisis in Burundi (July 1996), and later in Zaire (February 1997). While President
Nelson Mandela took part in negotiations to end both conflicts, the view from Pretoria was
that South Africa did not have the capacity or the intention to act unilaterally in addressing
African conflicts. To this end, the South African government emphasised that peace
support operations in the Southern African region ‘should be sanctioned by SADC and
should be undertaken with the SADC states rather than conducted on a unilateral basis.

69 See ‘South Africa will not act alone over Burundi: Mandela', Agence France Presse International, 30 July
1996.
Similarly, operations in Africa should be sanctioned by the Organisation of African Unity.\(^7^0\)

**Blueprint on Unconstitutional Change**

Of all the four options that were proposed by the OAU, the idea of a ‘Blueprint on Unconstitutional Change’ was by far the most ambitious, controversial and extensive. Some officials at the Secretariat argued that reforms in the Organisation were meaningless if nothing was done about failing states and the abuse of the doctrine of sovereignty and non-intervention. The need to stop the prevalence of failed states and coups in African states led to the ‘Blueprint on Unconstitutional Change’. Early in 1996, the Central Organ asked the OAU Legal Division to help it set up a Subcommittee to formulate a blueprint on unconstitutional change of government in Africa, so that it might empower the Organisation to condemn the illegal removal of a government in power.\(^7^1\) The Central Organ defined unconstitutional action to mean,

Military coups against democratically elected governments; refusal by incumbent governments to relinquish power to the winning party after free and fair elections; refusal by governments to call general elections at the end of their term; Governments by Decree; and Mercenary intervention.\(^7^2\)

Not surprisingly, when the Central Organ presented the proposal, Nigeria and Algeria rejected it. According to the Subcommittee, the purpose of this blueprint was to ensure that the OAU ‘assist Member States involved to restore constitutional order and prevent escalation of violence’ and to stand by ‘the side of legitimacy and the popular will of the people.’ In this respect, the Sub-Committee stated that the

OAU should in the future be able to consistently condemn any unconstitutional change of government...and be able to apply sanctions such


\(^7^1\) Interview with Ben Kioko, Legal Officer, OAU. See also the Draft Report of the Second Meeting of the OAU Central Sub-Committee on the Preparation of a Blue Print for dealing with Unconstitutional Changes in Africa, (OAU Doc: Sub-Cttee/Central Organ/RPT., April 1996).

as temporary suspension of Member States or withhold recognition of any government or would-be government that violates its principles.\textsuperscript{73}

While member states had not endorsed this proposal, the OAU Legal Officer, Ben Kioko, states that the proposal will not be watered down to the extent that it becomes meaningless. Rather, he suggests that it should be seen as a ‘milestone’ in thinking by the OAU Secretariat.\textsuperscript{74}

Certainly the initial actions taken over Burundi at the time of the July 1996 coup confirmed the possible function of this blueprint. Before the coup, the Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism issued a communiqué on the impending situation in Burundi. It warned against the overthrow of what it defined as the ‘legitimate’ government of President Sylvestre Ntibantuganya: ‘Any attempt to take over power through illegal means will not be accepted by Africa and will be strongly condemned and opposed by the Organisation of African Unity.’\textsuperscript{75} To this effect,

the Central Organ called upon Member States and the international community...to prepare themselves to isolate...any such regime which could take over leadership through the use of force or any other pretext.\textsuperscript{76}

The Heads of State of the OAU supported the recommendation for sanctions proposed by the former President of Tanzania and leader of the peace negotiations, Julius Nyerere, and the regional body known as the Arusha Summit.\textsuperscript{77} The decision to press for sanctions marked a progress in the thinking of OAU; this stance was unusually tough and unprecedented from an Organisation that had often turned a blind eye to coups on the continent. Evans noted the significance of this decision taken by some African leaders when she stated that

\textsuperscript{73} Draft Report of the Second Meeting of the OAU Central Sub-Committee on the Preparation of a Blue Print for dealing with Unconstitutional Changes in Africa, (1996), p. 3 and p. 4.

\textsuperscript{74} Interview with author.


\textsuperscript{76} Statement of the Central Organ of the OAU on the Grave Situation in Burundi, (25 July 1996).

\textsuperscript{77} Members of the Arusha Summit included Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire and Zambia.

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This was the first time a group of African countries, with the political cover of the OAU-CRM [Conflict Resolution Mechanism], had taken coercive action against one of their own number, on their own initiative, on a matter that had traditionally been regarded as the ‘internal affairs’ of another state.78

The OAU (through its Council of Ministers or Summit of Heads of State), had never condemned any member state except apartheid South Africa, but according to Kioko, since the end of the Cold War, a new trend had developed.79 Before the creation of the blueprint, the OAU had condemned the coup d’etat in the Comoros led by French mercenaries on 28 September 1995. However, to date, the OAU has only concerned itself with condemning coup leaders who rule over small or weak states, but it may run into difficulty in condemning the coup leaders from powerful states like Nigeria. However, despite the likely challenges to the proposal, the OAU Secretariat maintained that it would work ‘slowly and pragmatically’ to modify certain aspects of thinking on this area without laying itself open to criticism of interfering in the political structure of a member state.80

Of all the initiatives taken by the OAU, the attempt to develop a principle that challenges leaders who come to power via ‘illegal means’ (e.g. coup d’etat or insurgency) goes to the core of the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention. At the time of writing, the blueprint was however still at its draft stage and any significant action is dependent upon the signatures of OAU member states. Yet, although did not received full approval, Kioko argued that it did prove worthy of examination, if only because it highlighted the new thinking that existed among some members of the Secretariat. The idea of challenging leaders who come to power via ‘illegal means’ is not entirely new. When the OAU was established in 1963, Togo was excluded from attending the first OAU meeting after the assassination of President Slyvanus Olympio. The then-Foreign Minister of Nigeria, Jaja Wachuku, questioned the legality of the new Togolese leader, President Grunitzky. However, the OAU has not been consistent in condemning leaders who came to power via


79 Interview with Ben Kioko. As with Western commentators on post-Cold War African affairs, Kioko cites Yoweri Museveni, Zenawi Meles and also Gerry Rawlings of Ghana as leaders who instigated this new trend within the OAU.

80 Interview with Ben Kioko.
illegal means,' preferring not to involve itself 'in disputes which could otherwise have divided African states between the supporters of rival domestic regimes.'\textsuperscript{81} The document on the blueprint for unconstitutional change therefore signals a renewed attempt by the OAU in the 1990s to deter the continuation of coups as a means of gaining power.

Conclusion

The aim of this Chapter has been to focus on the 'new' breed of African leaders, mainly in East Africa, and the various options proposed by the OAU for responding to internal conflicts to illustrate how the thinking on intervention has evolved alongside non-intervention. The response of the 'new' breed of African leaders to the crises in the Great Lakes region provided several ways of understanding how the notion of "African solutions for African problems" was still relevant in considering how the thinking on intervention has evolved alongside the principle of non-intervention in the post-Cold War era. Rather than define their actions as intervention, leaders like President Museveni and Vice-President Kagamé argued that they needed to find regionally based solutions to ensure regional stability and order. Finding "African solutions for African problems" was necessary, they argued, because of the increasing number of conflicts and the spread of collapsing or failing states. However, leaders in this region also justified the use of force by arguing that the lack of a solution or concrete policy from the UN and its member states furthered their decision to search for "African solutions." The willingness of Museveni and Kagamé to use force in support of Kabila in Zaire was defined as "African solutions for African problems" where international efforts and peace negotiations failed. It was clear to these leaders that the continent could not wait for the international community to respond to growing regional insecurity, but more important, that African leaders needed to determine the outcome of the conflicts in the region without recourse to outside intervention.

The 'new' breed of leaders in East Africa partly encouraged the thinking within the OAU that Africans should take a lead role in mediating the continent's conflicts. Since 1989, the OAU had been run Salim Ahmed Salim who shared the same desire as these leaders for continentally-derived solutions. In the 1990s, the OAU picked up the objective of "African

\textsuperscript{81} C. Clapham, (1996), p. 112.
solutions for African problems” - an objective that it was unable to fulfill in the Cold War period. In the spirit of Pan-Africanism, the OAU Secretariat sought to find “African solutions for African problems” to save the continent from self-destruction. The OAU argued that the principle of non-intervention needed to be watered down, not only to respond to conflicts that emerge on the continent, but to ensure Africa’s own self-reliance in addressing its crises. In essence, the notion of “African solutions for African problems” is aimed at putting the “African house in order.” Yet, more than this, we have argued that the idea of “African solutions for African problems” is a continuation of a policy started by Kwame Nkrumah to dispense with Western intervention to resolve its periodic crises. In the 1990s, “African solutions for African problems” held the same expression as it did 30 years ago: to establish an African High Command or a continental peacekeeping force to deal with Africa’s internal conflicts.

The OAU justified its call for a more pro-active response to internal conflicts as seeking “African solutions” thus avoiding the controversial debate of intervention versus non-intervention that hindered its effectiveness in the Cold War period. It further argued that the options it put forward were “home-made” indigenous initiative aimed at preserving the African state-system and not undermining the principle of non-intervention. Furthermore, as we argued, while the CMC reaffirmed the doctrine of non-intervention in strong terms, officials suggested that they will continue to act pragmatically outside the framework of the OAU Charter to ensure that regional peace and security is not put at risk. When asked, for example, if the OAU would intervene if there was another crisis like Somalia where there was a complete collapse of state and society, some officials were prepared to answer ‘yes’ to some form of military intervention. They argued that the OAU would be dealing with a failed or collapsed state, where intervention would be less of a diplomatic or a legal problem.

In sum, the aim of this Chapter has been to consider how the various initiatives developed by the OAU, and the response of the ‘new’ breed of African leaders shed light on how the thinking and practice of intervention evolved alongside the principle of non-

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82 Interview with Ben Kioko and Sam Ibok.

83 Interview with Ben Kioko, William Nhara and Sam Ibok.
intervention in post-Cold War Africa. The attempt by Africa's leaders through the OAU to appeal to the Pan-Africanist notion of "African solutions for African problems" to justify intervention in internal conflicts is further evidence that Pan-Africanism provides a useful source in understanding the thinking and practice of intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, in the concluding Chapter of this study (Seven), we will consider how realistic and practical the notion of "African solution for African problems" is for the continent in responding to internal conflicts.
CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF AFRICAN INTERVENTIONS IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS

Introduction

This concluding Chapter is divided into two parts. In Part One we argue that the cases discussed in this study have been useful in exploring how the thinking and practice on intervention evolved on the African continent. In Part Two, we point to future research when we consider the question of outside assistance in post-Cold War Africa. While this study has not suggested that African interventions in internal conflicts are more likely to succeed than Western interventions, this study ends by arguing that attempts to prevent widespread internal conflicts are also dependent on help coming from the international community.

I. Justifying Intervention African style?

In the introduction to this study we asked the following questions: How has intervention evolved alongside the principle of non-intervention since the end of colonial rule in Africa? Is it possible to find sources from which to understand the practice of intervention in Africa by African states? In this study, we have argued that one way to understand how the practice of intervention has evolved is to focus on Pan-Africanism and two themes contained within it: African exclusivity (often defined as “African solutions for African problems”) and African unity (often called “solidarity”).

Pan-Africanism set out to provide a set of political and philosophical ideas on independence, the building of political unity on the continent and rules governing intra-African affairs. Furthermore, we argued that it served as a useful starting point in understanding how norms and principles of African international relations evolved because, the philosophy of Pan-Africanism littered the foreign policy statements of African leaders, especially those states labelled ‘radical’ states when they were accused of intervening or supporting another state’s intervention. The notion of African exclusivity and unity emerged from the Pan-African conferences and meetings of the 1960s and served as powerful
expressions in understanding rules governing intra-African affairs, especially the principle of non-intervention.

When African states met at various Pan-African meetings and conferences in the early stages of decolonisation, there was general agreement that unity and exclusivity would be the principles guiding them in their struggle to liberate the continent from colonialism and racial discrimination. African leaders argued that unity was important to guard their independence against future outside intrusion. In addition, they argued that they needed to create a diplomatic body that would regulate the affairs of the continent to prevent outsiders from interfering in their affairs. That diplomatic body was the OAU. The idea of unity and exclusivity became a rallying point for the first leaders of independence: Azikiwe, Houphouët-Boigny, Keita, Kenyatta, Nkrumah, Senghor and Touré. These leaders held that only black African states of the continent should determine African affairs, and to this end, the notions of unity and exclusivity emerged as guiding principles in African diplomacy towards the outside world.

Thus, the focus of African foreign policy towards the outside world was clear: the struggle for independence against future outside interference. When it came to deciding the rules and principles that would guide intra-African affairs, African leaders were divided. There was no clear or concrete definition on what unity or exclusivity meant beyond the desire to prevent future incursions on the African continent. The notion of unity and exclusivity became divisive themes in understanding the ‘rules of the game’ in intra-African affairs, most notably on the issue of intervention in the internal affairs of states.

African unity: a source in which to understand how the thinking and practice of intervention evolved among African states?

What does the notion of African unity tell us about how the thinking and practice of intervention evolved in Sub-Saharan Africa? The Congolese civil war was the first indication of how useful the notion of unity would be in understanding the thinking and practice of intervention among African states. In the Congo, the notion of unity became a useful slogan for radical leaders like Nkrumah and Touré when they justified why they helped the Congolese nationalist leaders, Patrice Lumumba and Christopher Gbenye.
Generally, radical states provided assistance because they supported a particular leader or movement that shared their own political outlook. In the early 1960s, the political outlook for radical Pan-African leaders was ‘African unity’, meaning the political integration of African states into a single federation or union of African states. Externally, African unity became a significant vehicle in the struggle for continental liberation from the neocolonialists in the West. Internally, it became synonymous with the struggle for national liberation from those African leaders, like the Congolese secessionist leader, Moïse Tshombé, who were seen as ‘stooges’ or ‘puppets’ of the West. The call for unity was to create a supranational organisation that would not be dependent on outside assistance. African leaders, whether in government or in opposition that represented the kind of leadership that radical leaders like Nkrumah and Touré wanted in Africa (i.e. commitment to unity), received their help. The help, though never properly defined, was at times subversive or involved sending in propaganda materials to destabilise a regime. Nkrumah and Touré rejected accusations that their activities amounted to interference in the affairs of another state. In the end, subversion was seen as necessary and served as a useful political strategy in the struggle for national liberation and African unity.

The belief in African unity lasted as long as Nkrumah was in power. When Nkrumah was overthrown in a coup d’etat in 1966, the policy of intervention for the sake of Pan-African unity ended. Leaders who appeared to transgress the principle of non-intervention did not appeal to Pan-African unity to justify their intervention again. Although the notion of unity was significant in understanding why states like Ghana and Guinea intervened in the Congo, it was not the only theme at play to justify state intervention. The notion of Pan-African exclusivity became a significant tool to justify state intervention.

African exclusivity: a source in which to understand how the thinking and practice of intervention evolved among African states?

Again the Congolese civil war provided the first indication of how useful the notion of exclusivity was in understanding the practice of intervention on the continent. Radical states referred to the notion of exclusivity to justify their intervention in the Congo. Radical states provided two meanings on the notion of exclusivity to further justify their intervention
in the Congo. Where exclusivity meant creating a system of self-help to prevent extra-continental intervention (i.e. non-African intervention), radical states claimed that it also meant that black independent African states had a ‘right’ which they derived from belonging to the family of African states, to intervene to help other African ‘brothers’ that were facing internal unrest. These ‘brothers’ were not necessarily other African leaders, but were sometimes opposition movements or dissident groups. Nonetheless, exclusivity became synonymous with the idea that since “We are all Africans” then there could be no sense of intrusion as support was aimed at helping a fellow African brother.

However, and more than just helping a fellow African, intervention was justified as wanting to prevent extra-continental intervention or keeping outsiders from intervening in Africa’s internal conflicts. Radical states originally sought the assistance of the UN to maintain African’s autonomy over the Congolese civil war. But rather than regard this as contradicting the notion of African exclusivity, radical states hoped that the UN would serve a dual purpose. First, that the UN would liberate the Congo from Moise Tshombé who supported secession and Kasavubu who wanted to maintain links with the neocolonialists in the West. Second, radicals argued that if ONUC was composed of mainly African troops this would not only prevent foreign interference, but ensure that the Congo was an African affair, thus giving testimony to the notion of exclusivity. When the UN appeared unable to fulfill this dual strategy, Nkrumah advocated the idea of a Pan-African High Command (i.e. a continental force) to fulfill his strategy of unity, but also continental exclusiveness.

When Nkrumah was overthrown in a coup d’etat, the notion of exclusivity that he appealed to lived on and became a useful slogan for African leaders of all political persuasions. Exclusivity became a ‘persistent and recurrent’ theme in justifying why states intervened or supported intervention in the affairs of states. The civil war in Angola clearly illustrated how the notion of African exclusivity was useful in understanding how the practice of intervention evolved on the continent. We also saw a widening of the term of exclusivity in this civil war as states sought to use it to defend why they supported extra-continental intervention.

From the Superpower proxy struggles that destroyed Angola and tore at the heart of the Horn of Africa, to the near breakdown of Zaire during the Shaba I and II crises, foreign powers usually played a prominent role, backing one side or another by intervening directly
or by supplying arms, advisers or military technicians. On these occasions, African leaders justified their intervention as either preventing or supporting foreign involvement. In the Angolan civil war, some radical states (e.g. Nigeria, previously a moderate state) supported Soviet and Cuban assistance because it was aimed at preventing the emergence of a pro-Western 'puppet' government. Similar to the Congo, seeking outside assistance was to fulfill a wider political strategy, liberation. The Soviet and Cubans were seen by radical states as allies in the struggle for liberation in Southern African and using them served the purpose of removing the neocolonial threat on the continent. Here we can notice a close and interconnecting factor between these two cases of intervention by African states. Like the radicals had argued in the Congolese civil war in the 1960s for the UN to fulfill the strategy of liberation, the radical states in the 1970s were also seeking outside assistance to ensure liberation. This policy as we argued did not undermine the notion of exclusivity, rather, African states argued that were deciding for themselves how to solve a problem even if they had to call on outside powers (e.g. the Soviets or Cubans) to fulfill their policy.

The Shaba I and II conflicts in Zaire (formerly the Congo) further raised interesting points on how the notion of exclusivity shed light on the practice of intervention on the continent. In Zaire, other radical states (e.g. Tanzania), were critical of the support from mainly Francophone conservative states to Western intervention to protect the regime of President Mobutu. President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania argued that this challenged the OAU principle of non-intervention and the idea that Africans had an exclusive right to solve their problems. But the OAU never condemned the use of outside assistance; instead, it accepted the principle that a government, being responsible for its own security, was entitled to seek assistance from any state, whether it was African or not. This was defined as an African solution to an African problem and not a diminution of the principle on non-intervention. Furthermore, those states that did support Mobutu claimed that they sought outside assistance to preserve the African state system. In the end, African states failed to respond to the fundamental question of when foreign assistance did or did not constitute intervention. Put another way, leaders were unable distinguish between intervention and the right of any state (defined as “African solutions”) to appeal for external assistance in order to preserve its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

There was further confusion over the meaning attached to intervention when Nigeria
intervened in the Chadian civil in the later 1970s. Nigeria appealed to the Pan-African
notion of exclusivity when it stated that it intervened to end outside intervention from
France and Libya. Nigeria felt that there was more credence to be found in an African state
intervening in another African state’s internal dispute than there would be if the intervening
state came from outside the continent, hence its decision to intervene itself, and also to
involve the OAU in the civil war. The belief among Nigeria’s diplomatic circle was that
enhancing Africa’s indigenous capacity through the OAU would replace individual state
reliance on unilateral external military assistance.

The appeal to “African solutions for African problems” was again used by Nigeria
to justify why it intervened in the Liberian civil war. Liberia was the first post-Cold War
civil war that involved African intervention, thus signifying a continuation in the thinking
and practice of intervention among African states. However, the appeal to this Pan-
Africanist theme in the post-Cold War era was forcefully asserted in Zaire in 1997. We
argued that in the 1990s we could witness the emergence of a so-called ‘new’ breed of
African leaders who had sought to give the continent ‘home-made’ initiatives for resolving
conflicts. These ‘new’ leaders were not however shifting the thinking of the continent on the
principle of non-intervention. Instead, they were reasserting the Pan-Africanist themes that
could be traced back to leaders like Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere. The ‘new’ leaders
in Uganda and Rwanda appealed to the notion of “African solutions for African problems”
to justify their military support for Laurent-Désiré Kabila’s overthrow of President Mobutu.
Their appeal for developing ‘home-made’ initiatives was reflected in the OAU when the
Organisation embarked on creating mechanisms to respond to internal conflicts on the
continent in the post-Cold War era.

One reason why the OAU reasserted the Pan-Africanist notion of “African solutions
for African problems”, was either to prevent or control outside intervention. In the post-Cold
War era, the Organisation used it to explain African involvement in conflicts because
disinterest from the international community meant that the future of the continent was
largely in the hands of Africa’s leaders. Additionally, in the latter part of the nineties,
outsiders also emphasised “African solutions for African problems” because propping up
corrupt regimes or resolving African conflicts was too costly.

Taken together, the cases of African involvement in internal conflicts show a
continuation in the thinking of intervention among African leaders. These cases illustrate the view that the notions of unity and exclusivity were common themes when African states justified intervening in internal conflicts. However, did the notion of unity and exclusivity work at every level in understanding why African states intervened in internal conflicts? This study has not suggested that these are the only themes that were dominant when states sought to justify their actions. On the contrary, Nigeria’s intervention in the Chadian civil war, Tanzania’s intervention in Uganda and the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia, showed that other factors ranked higher than the Pan-African notion of unity and exclusivity.

*Other sources to understand the practice and thinking on intervention among African states*

When we looked at why Nigeria intervened in Chad, we found that in addition to wanting to develop “African solutions for African problems,” Nigeria also had a mixture of security, territorial and domestic concerns that affected its interpretation of the OAU principle on non-intervention. Furthermore, Tanzania’s intervention in Uganda did not seem to support our primary claim that interventions carried out by other African states can be understood within the framework of Pan-African unity or exclusivity. However, what Tanzania’s intervention demonstrated, far more explicitly than Nigeria’s intervention in Chad, was that considerations other than African unity and exclusivity account for why states intervene. Tanzania’s official statements noted the intervention was in response to Idi Amin’s territorial aggression along the Tanzanian-Uganda border.

Similarly, the ECOWAS intervention in post-Cold War era showed how other factors ranked higher than the notion of unity and exclusivity. Despite Nigeria’s attempts to appeal to Pan-Africanism, there were wider regional and political sensitivities, coupled with the fear of regional and economic instability that provoked intervention by African states in the Liberian civil war.

*Conclusion*

What then can we say about how the thinking and practice of intervention evolved in Sub-Saharan Africa? African states intervened in internal conflicts on the continent for
several reasons: to support those who shared a similar ideological commitment or political persuasion, to preserve a regime, to ensure the survival of the African state-system, to ensure regional and political stability, or to prevent outside intervention. In analysing the apparent contradiction between the non-interventionist principle and the interventionist practice, the two can be reconciled in the justifications African leaders provided to explain their activities. These justifications were based on an appeal to a sense of Africanness as stated in Pan-Africanism: that African states had an *inalienable right* to determine their destiny and that the continent was responsible for deciding its affairs. These justifications appeared to work at every stage, especially when questions were raised over the legitimacy of intervention (as when Nkrumah intervened in the Congo or when Nigeria supported Soviet or Cuban intervention in Angola).

One area where intervention was justified was in addressing the plight of blacks in South Africa. Intervention, as we noted in Chapter Three, was justifiable because the aim was to liberate Southern Africa from the aegis of colonial rule. However, when it came to responding to the oppression of black people by African leaders (e.g. Idi Amin’s human rights abuse in Uganda), there was no clear line on the question of intervention. While some African states condemned the decision of Nyerere to assist in the overthrow of Amin, others applauded Tanzania’s decision. The OAU never outwardly condemned Tanzania’s actions, thus leaving no indication about whether or not this was a tacit approval on its part and whether it held that intervention for humanitarian reasons was legitimate.

What is significant during the period between 1960-1989 is that while African leaders pursued intervention in practice, there was no attempt to institutionalise it within the OAU Charter. Throughout this period, the OAU was a fervent advocate of the principle of non-intervention, although it did not condemn states who overrode the principle. An example of its strict interpretation of this principle was in its response to the Nigerian civil war in 1967. The Organisation told the outside world that this civil war was an African affair thus confirming the notion of exclusivity. However, among African states, exclusivity was defined as Nigerian exclusivity, and no African state could intervene.

The aim of this thesis has been to sketch out a history about the co-evolution of non-interventionist norms and interventionist practice among African states in the post-colonial era. Although it is difficult to suggest that there is a coherent tradition or a pattern that is
easily identifiable, we can make two statements about this co-evolution. First, the evidence offered demonstrates that in large parts of Africa the practice of intervention exists, that there is nothing new about intervention by African states, but more important, that there are various ways for states to justify intervention. However, it is important to note that in the areas where we have studied state intervention, we need not assume that these actions represent an endorsement of intervention in general. All we can say is that African leaders have advocated or opposed intervention less upon clearly formulated principles or law, and more upon circumstances, including political interest, but also normative considerations and conviction.

Second and directly related, we can state that there was a degree of pragmatism at play in how African leaders applied the principle of non-intervention. Put another way, African leaders developed a 'step-by-step approach' on the question of intervention in the internal affairs of states which did not lead to the collapse of the non-interventionist norm. In fact, this pragmatic approach showed the elasticity of the non-interventionist norm. African leaders and the OAU were able to stretch the meaning of this norm to its maximum without overhauling its core features. This had been done despite the incredible pressures and forces ranging from superpower politics, internal tensions and conflicts caused by state-building, socio-political cleavages, economic underdevelopment, political struggle, weak social and political institutions and complex regional and political realities and sensitivities, all of which undermined the transition from being a colonial entity to an independent state. What we could say is that individual states and the OAU have managed - at least as well as their sometimes-intervening colleagues elsewhere in the world - to maintain the non-interventionist norm, even though it took a few dents.

However, although the OAU and its member-states have managed not to undermine the non-interventionist norm, the main challenge for the continent is how to respond to internal conflicts which are going to remain a constant feature as the continent enters the twenty-first century. The OAU wants to resolve conflicts on the continent, without undermining the non-interventionist norm, but it does not have the capacity to achieve this goal. The OAU may however need to seek outside assistance to achieve its goal of resolving internal conflicts on the continent. However, the question of foreign assistance poses a problem for a continent that seeks "African solutions" to prevent outside intervention. The
idea of "African solutions for African problems" may seem like a desirable policy for a continent that seeks to maintain the most sacrosanct principles of Pan-Africanism: solidarity, autonomy and sovereignty. It may also be a sensible policy for the major powers of the West who want to shift responsibility for resolving conflicts to bodies like the OAU, ECOWAS and SADC. However, in the final part of this concluding Chapter, we point to future research when we argue that "African solutions for African problems" needs foreign assistance if this policy is to become a functioning reality. Several crises on the continent in the post-Cold War - Liberia, Rwanda and Burundi - have exposed the notion of "African solutions for African problems" as unrealistic and impractical, thus leaving doubts about the future of African attempts to resolve internal conflicts. Therefore, we argue that a degree of foreign assistance is necessary to ensure "African solutions" in resolving internal conflicts.

The OAU has emphasised that for Africa to fulfill its potential in resolving conflicts, a multi-layered solution or a 'multi-institutional' approach is necessary. It is worth remembering that the notion of "African solutions for African problems" does allow for foreign assistance. What makes it an "African solution" is that African leaders argue that they should decide upon the level and nature of foreign assistance.

II. The future of African Intervention in internal conflicts

"African solutions for African problems": a realistic goal?

Despite the optimism within the OAU Secretariat about the continent's potential to develop "African solutions for African problems," there are some serious concerns about the OAU's ability, and that of the continent as a whole, to create an effective mechanism and ensure that sufficient action is taken. Unfortunately, many accomplishments of the OAU since the end of the Cold War remain in the stage of projects, sometimes highly advanced, but rarely matured. Consequently, there are major problems that are going to prove difficult for the Organisation.

The OAU created several structures for African peacekeeping on paper, but this is


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not enough. Bringing them to life is also necessary, and this requires the political will of its members. However, member states are unlikely to empower the CMC with the means to intervene in future internal conflicts. As with the UN Secretariat, the CMC is dependent on the political will of its member states. It is therefore hard to escape the conclusion that for "African solutions for African problems" to have some degree of success, African Heads of State will need to redefine when and how the Organisation will become involved in settling internal conflicts. This however might prove difficult, for while Africa’s leaders make declaratory statements on the need to develop mechanisms for coping with the continent’s flashpoints, there are still fundamental reservations about the feasibility of establishing a peacekeeping force with the mandate to intervene in the internal affairs of states. Furthermore, there are fundamental questions about the continent’s operational and financial capacity to ensure that solutions to Africa’s conflicts are ‘home-made’ initiatives.

Despite all the initiatives pursued at the level of the OAU and throughout the continent in the nineties, the inability of the OAU to respond effectively to crises like Rwanda and Zaire highlighted the glaring disjuncture between expectations and institutional capacity with respect to resolving internal conflicts. The OAU Secretary-General was said to have described Rwanda as the ‘baby’ of the OAU Conflict Division, suggesting that it would take the lead, and initially it did so. However, the OAU found itself unable to carry out many of the initiatives it proposed in the Arusha Accord of August 1993. Rwanda exposed the OAU’s lack of resources and capability to launch a peace process successfully. While individual African states may have troops available to mount an operation even for a cease-fire, lack of financial resources prevents any meaningful outcome. However, despite the scarcity of resources, Rwanda provided the most graphic example of the lack of political will, not only in the international community, but also in the OAU at the level of Heads of State.

Ever since Kwame Nkrumah advocated an African High Command to carry out conflict resolution, the OAU has wrestling with how it could solve the continent’s conflicts and ensure that Africans bring a solution to their own problems. The CMC was an advancement of Nkrumah’s limited idea of only responding to the liberation of African

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2 Interview with Carla Mucavi, Diplomat of Mozambique and Sam Ibok, Senior Political Adviser, Conflict Management Centre.

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states from neo-colonial powers. In the 1990s, the CMC was more ambitious, seeking to respond to internal conflicts, an area that the OAU has traditionally shied away. However, as the Senior Political Adviser at the Conflict Division, the Deon Van Schoor argues, the CMC is likely to underachieve because member-states are reluctant to give it the freedom to intervene in internal conflicts. As Van Schoor argues, the organisational arm of the OAU needs to be empowered by states to be more proactive rather than being driven by the traditional mechanisms of high-level diplomacy. This however requires political commitment and effective institutions to mobilise the continent’s own resources, a problem Van Schoor recognises.

If we take all the problems that confront the OAU in enhancing the continent’s role together, it is hard to escape the conclusion that the goal of “African solutions for African problems” may prove difficult for the OAU and its member states to achieve. It is because of these fundamental reservations that we argue that “African solutions for African problems” need the support of foreign assistance to make it a functional reality. However, we also argue that foreign assistance needs ensure effective planning and coordination to meet the needs of the continent.

Foreign Assistance and “African solutions for African problems”

Since the African continent is not ready or fully equipped to manage internal conflicts, there is no doubt that it needs outside assistance. During the nineties, several Western governments produced proposals to help Africa develop mechanisms for responding to conflicts on the continent. This section summarizes the proposals produced by those powers who actively engaged in African affairs during the Cold War era - the UK, France and the US - and considers ways of ensuring effective political response in providing assistance to African states in their attempts to resolve internal conflicts on the continent.

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3 Author interview.

4 Author interview.

5 Other countries developed proposals for enhancing Africa’s capacity to resolve conflicts. These included the Dutch and Canadian initiatives. Some institutions and research organisations have participated in developing mechanisms for resolving Africa’s internal conflicts. For example, Global Coalition, African Leadership
In 1994, Britain and France launched initiatives for strengthening Africa’s capabilities in the field of peacekeeping and conflict management. According to the then-British Foreign Secretary, Malcolm Rifkind, the aim was ‘to help give Africa’s regional organisations military and humanitarian capacity in responding to internal conflicts.’ Between 1994 and 1996, the British Government convened seminars in Camberley, Accra, Cairo and Harare with the view of creating ‘regional centres of excellence for UN peacekeeping training.’

At the 18th Franco-African Summit in Biarritz on 9-10 November 1994, the French proposed an African Intervention Force. The French proposal was largely fuelled by the crisis in Rwanda. The basis of the French initiative was similar to that proposed by the British Government, but the emphasis was directed at ‘collective self-reliance’ through subregional intervention during crises situations. The British and French proposals were aimed at creating an early warning system; preventive diplomacy; training and pre-stocking of material; and the emergency deployment of peacekeeping forces.

Of the three external initiatives, the US proposal received critical response from the OAU Secretariat. As with the French initiative, the US proposal was a reaction to the genocide in Rwanda, coupled with the deterioration of security in Burundi and the potential for other crises on the continent. In September 1996, the then-US Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, proposed to set up an African Crisis Response Force (ACRF) with the task of facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid and securing a healthy environment for the Forum, ACCORD, The Carter Centre and the UN African Regional Centre for Disarmament.

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7 Interview with Commodore Mesfine Binega, Military Consultant to the OAU Conflict Management Centre. Also see OAU’s Position towards the Various Initiatives on Conflict Management: Enhancing OAU’s Capacity in Preventive Diplomacy, Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping, (n.d.), para. 51, p. 17.

internally displaced.\(^9\) The ACRF was based on the idea of "marrying" resources, whereby concrete steps would be taken towards uniting the contribution of African military forces with those from other nations. The main aim was however to establish a force capacity on the continent to respond to major crises like Rwanda or Burundi. However, it was not envisaged that it would assume a Security Council mandate to carry out UN Chapter VII peace enforcement activities. Neither would troops merge into a continental standing army, but would instead remain in their countries. The US proposal recommended that the ACRF be placed under the authority of the UN Security Council and cooperate in joint operations with the OAU and appropriate sub-regions.

The US initiatives received critical response from the OAU and several African countries. The main criticism came from South Africa who raised suspicion about US motives. South Africa's position was summed up by Jakkie Potgieter, a senior researcher at the Institute of Security Studies in a newspaper interview:

He [Warren Christopher] was dangling a carrot in front of everybody's nose. He had a 20 million dollar aid package and a lot of American training to get African countries to start to take responsibility for peacekeeping. It pretty much looked like a buy off - sorry guys we're not interested in getting involved in your problems but here's some money, see what you can do about them. So it created a lot of negative responses.\(^10\)

The main challenge from South Africa and the OAU was that the US proposal only targeted a select group of countries that, the US argued, had the capacity to establish such a force. Ironically, South Africa was part of the US strategy. The OAU Secretariat argued that initiatives with only 'favoured' states or former colonies endangered the possibility of creating a Pan-African Force if some countries were left out of the consultative process.\(^11\)

The OAU further argued against unilateral initiative, preferring that Western proposals acted


in collaboration with the OAU and its member states. The OAU Secretariat wanted to see the response of the international community as part of the ‘multi-layered solution’ whereby partnerships are built in resolving conflicts within Africa. Another concern for the OAU Secretariat was the question of ownership of this Force. The OAU feared that African soldiers may be used as policemen by the West who preferred not to send in their own troops. Furthermore, the OAU consistently stressed the need for all formal procedures concerning the deployment of troops and operational matters to be decided within its headquarters.

In response to the criticisms from Africa, the Clinton Administration revised its initiative, renamed it the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) and began discussing its plans with the OAU, while maintaining those links it had already established. What distinguishes the ACRI from the ACRF is that it is not aimed at creating a Force, but ‘interoperable capacity.’ The word ‘Force’ was dropped to avoid contentious questions on ‘who controls the force’ or ‘where does the political authority come to mandate a particular operation?’ This new initiative held that there was already an international organisation - the UN Security Council - who authorised peacekeeping. The US envisaged a ‘two-track approach’: bilateral training and international coordination. This latter point was emphasised in response to earlier criticism that Western governments were duplicating their programmes of peacekeeping initiatives on the continent. There was to be a broader multinational initiative with Britain, France, and joint coordination between the UN and OAU. The essence of this redesigned programme was to have US Special Forces, with soldiers from Britain and France, teach peacekeeping skills to military units from participating African nations. The US envisaged that these units could be quickly combined into a Pan-African

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12 This view was expressed in an interview with Chris Bakwesegha and William Nhara.


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peacekeeping force of 10-12 battalions to prevent outbreaks of violence. However, the ACRI still conforms with Western political interest in ensuring that African countries take care of their own problems.

Despite the reworking of proposals from the major powers, it appeared from discussion with various officials at the OAU-CMC, that the Organisation believed that Western governments were operating within two policies. First, Western countries seem less inclined than ever to commit resources and to risk casualties in military operations. Second, because of the human and financial cost behind peace operations, officials at the OAU seemed to conclude that Western capitals would only support or promote initiatives and increase partnership between Africa and the international community if the result meant a diminished demand for Western forces and no more ‘body-bags’ being carried back home to face the media and public opinion. Certainly such thinking became apparent after the failure of the US military intervention in Somalia.

While the OAU Secretariat criticised Western initiatives, officials also recognised the necessity of Western initiatives, at least in financial and logistical terms, if they are to achieve any lasting success in the field of peacekeeping and conflict management. Western initiatives are directed at helping the OAU and individual states develop mechanisms for responding to internal conflicts - a process far removed from placing Western troops at the centre of African conflicts. In developing initiatives to meet the objective of strengthening African mechanisms for peacekeeping and conflict resolution, the West will need to redirect its future strategy at least to limit the suspicions raised by the OAU and some African states.

First, while the West seems likely to continue to direct initiatives at favoured states, the main emphasis might also be directed at developing a ‘continental strategy’, thus targeting the existing mechanism set up within the CMC. The OAU jealously guards its position as the regional political and collective security organ on the African continent. For this reason, there should be more sensitivity to African political realities by the West as

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15 Since it started the ACRI, a sixty-man team from the 3rd Special Forces Group from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, US has conducted separate, two-month exercises starting in July 1997 with various African battalions: Uganda and Senegal (July-September 1997), Malawi (September-November 1997), Mali (February-April 1998) and, Ghana (March-May 1998).

16 This is the impression of the author after speaking to various officials at the OAU Conflict Management Centre. This view was also expressed by J. Herbst (1996).
resources and skills are transferred to the OAU and subregional bodies. In addition to this, foreign assistance needs to be based on a more collaborative and well-structured approach as opposed to a policy perceived as ad hoc and un-coordinated.17

Some African states, notably Kenya and South Africa argued that the OAU or subregions are unlikely to receive the necessary assistance from the West in responding to Africa’s internal crises because of the growing sense of “Afro-exhaustion.”18 Consequently, they argued that a multi-institutional approach, directed by the UN, may remove some of their misgivings and improve Africa’s efforts at responding to internal conflicts.

Some African leaders, notably President Nelson Mandela and also the OAU argued that the UN was a more credible institution for channelling and promoting international assistance to Africa than individual Western states. On 16 April 1998, the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan produced a document -The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa - which aimed at improving the OAU’s capacity to respond to conflicts and ensuring a coordinated international response.19 This document stated that the objective of the UN was to ‘complement rather than supplant African efforts to resolve Africa’s problems.’ For example, in the area of peacekeeping, the UN targeted areas relating to training assistance, joint peacekeeping exercises and greater African participation in UN Standby Arrangements as areas to ensure effective contribution from Africa.20

The argument for turning to the UN was not limited to the fact that the UN was the only credible institution for ensuring that resources were effectively channelled to the appropriate areas on the African continent. More important than its ability to coordinate resources was the recognition that the OAU or subregional organisations were not ready or prepared to succeed in this task. In response to many OAU criticisms, the UK, France and the US developed a joint initiative in October 1997 known as the ‘P3’ initiative. The initiative is based on long-term peacekeeping training and education programmes to ensure that African states have the capacity to conduct peace operations. Under this programme is the US initiative, ACRI, the UK initiative, African Peacekeeping Initiative, and the French initiative, Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix (RECAMP).

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17 In response to many OAU criticisms, the UK, France and the US developed a joint initiative in October 1997 known as the ‘P3’ initiative. The initiative is based on long-term peacekeeping training and education programmes to ensure that African states have the capacity to conduct peace operations. Under this programme is the US initiative, ACRI, the UK initiative, African Peacekeeping Initiative, and the French initiative, Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix (RECAMP).

18 Interview with Deon Van Schoor.


20 Report of the UN Secretary-General, ‘The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa,’ (1998), paras. 41 and 45.
fully equipped to launch peacekeeping operations without the assistance of the UN. Furthermore, the OAU argued that the UN was primarily responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, and in this respect, Africa should not be left alone to solve its own problems. However, the relationship of the UN towards the OAU needs to be based on mutual assistance in responding to conflicts aimed at reducing human suffering in war-torn societies.

Thus, while the UN may be able to help the OAU in its attempts to strengthen its capacity, it is still difficult to suggest that OAU member states will redefine when and how the OAU will become involved in the settlement of severe internal conflicts. The objective of “African solutions for African problems” will therefore be difficult for the OAU to achieve as it enters the twenty-first century. The OAU, at least at the level of the Secretariat, will continue to encourage member states to abide by the provisions set out in the Cairo Declaration: to ‘anticipate’ and ‘prevent’ conflicts and to undertake ‘peace-making and peace-building functions in order to facilitate the resolution.’ In the area of peacekeeping, it is likely that it will continue to rely on the assistance of the UN while making African troops available to contribute to international forces. In situations where the UN and its member states appear reluctant or unwilling to intervene, the OAU and African states argue that will attempt to take matters into their own hands as they did in Liberia and the Great Lakes region. This approach to resolving conflicts is at the heart of the continent’s Pan-African philosophy of “African solutions for African problems.”

Conclusion

We began this study with the Congolese civil war in 1960 because it was the first major internal conflict from which we could examine the co-evolution of non-interventionist norms and interventionist practice among African states. We ended with the crisis in Zaire, renamed the Congo in 1997, to demonstrate again how events in this country serve as an excellent prism through which to understand this co-evolution. We cannot end this thesis without acknowledging how events in the same country were again defining the ‘rules of the game’ on the continent in the latter half of 1998. A year since it was renamed the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the internal crisis in that country has again become
the focal point for speculating about the future of non-interventionist norms on the continent.

Between August and October 1998, Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe militarily intervened at the request of President Laurent-Désiré Kabila not only to counter the internal rebellion against Kabila, but also the alleged support the rebellion was receiving from Rwanda and Uganda. There was a willingness among those that supported Kabila to openly suggest that their intervention was a legitimate “African solution” to counter what was in an international law or OAU sense, illegitimate action by Rwanda and Uganda to topple Kabila. More important, was the claim that their intervention was aimed at upholding the twin pillars of international relations - sovereignty and non-intervention. In fact, one can suggest that this was a classic case of counter-intervention at the request of a leader whose regime was being undermined not only by an internal rebellion, but also by the support that rebellion was receiving from outside. Those states that claimed to defend Kabila were in a sense strengthening the non-interventionist norm. However, the intervention of various African states on either side of the conflict may have complicated regional politics in an already volatile part of Africa. Furthermore, the actions of these states could, in fact, lead to the erosion of the non-interventionist norm.

As a consequence of the various intervening force, the DRC found itself encircled by two divided and hostile regions - southern and central Africa - that may decide the future of the non-interventionist norm for the whole continent. In October 1998, these subregional blocs were largely characterised by deep cleavages between friends who had turned enemies and by a reconfiguration of military defined power. Dissatisfied with his failure to ensure security in the east region of the DRC, Kabila’s former friends, Rwanda and Uganda were accused of sponsoring armed conflict to remove him from power despite having supported Kabila in overthrowing Joseph Mobutu a year earlier. In addition, a rift developed between the pro-Kabila camp (Angola-Zimbabwe-Namibia) and South Africa who rejected a military solution to the crisis in the DRC. The fissure between the Angola-Zimbabwe-Namibia axis and South Africa could become serious. There is real potential that, in the months and years to come, fraternal squabbles between South Africa, Zimbabwe, (both vying for regional power status in the south), Uganda, Rwanda and the DRC will lead to an open and devastating confrontation in central and southern Africa. More important, we may see a return to classic style geopolitics were the interests of the powerful may lead to antagonism.

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and heavy military exchange. Such an outcome may surely undermine the non-interventionist norm in intra-African affairs. More important, if central and southern Africa and in particular the Great Lakes region explodes (again) - or even as we have suggested spreads further - any hope of African unity on any scale will be lost for more than a generation; the door will be open wide for non-African intervention, so African exclusivity will also be lost and Africans will be left with the possibility of some form of neocolonialism - more likely in the form of a trusteeship. However, another possibility is that Africans could, because Western governments are unwilling to directly intervene in African conflicts, be effectively abandoned to their fate.

The African continent is again on the move as it enters the twenty-first century and the above speculations are just that - speculations. What this thesis suggests to students of International Relations is that there has been a slow build-up of interventionist practice among African states. Yet, bearing in mind the events in the DRC in 1998, this thesis has also demonstrated the extend to which some African states (e.g. pro-Kabila states) will employ interventionist tactics in the pursuit of a non-interventionist strategy. The response of the pro-Kabila states to the conflict in the DRC demonstrated that nothing is clear cut for those who seek to understand the central dynamics of the non-interventionist norm on the African continent. This is quite in keeping with the history that has been outlined in this study.
## APPENDIX I

### TABLE OF INTERVENTIONS BY AFRICAN STATES IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Internal Conflict</th>
<th>Intervening State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960-1966</td>
<td>Congo-Leopoldville</td>
<td>The following states were part of ONUC: Egypt, Ghana, Nigeria, Liberia, Ethiopia, Guinea, Senegal and Mali. In 1964 the following states supported the rebel group, CNL: Algeria, Congo-Brazzaville, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Tanganyika</td>
<td>OAU force (Nigeria)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967-1970</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Reports are not clear, although it is suggested that Egyptian pilots were used by the Nigerian Air Force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>Various African states were said to have supported President Touré against the mercenary invasion, no clear records of who they were.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-1973</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Zaire (Tanzania initially provided military assistance to the government)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Conflicts in bold-face type are discussed in this study.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975-78</td>
<td>The Comoros Island</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-79</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977-78</td>
<td>Zaire/Shaba I and II</td>
<td>Angola. The following took part in the Pan-African Intervention Force: Central African Empire, Gabon, Côte d'Ivoire, Morocco, Senegal and Togo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977-78?</td>
<td>São Tomé Príncipe</td>
<td>Angola and Guinea-Bissau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977-79?</td>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978-81</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Tanzania (Libya in support of the Idi Amin government)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Libya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Central African Empire</td>
<td>Zaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979-80</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Libya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>OAU Neutral Force: Congo-Brazzavile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-81</td>
<td>The Gambia</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981-82</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>The following states took part in the OAU Inter-African Force: Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal and Zaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Zaire and Sudan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1985 Mozambique Zimbabwe


1993 Sudan The Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (Reports later suggested that Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda openly supported the Sudanese opposition groups in the north and south)


1994 Lesotho Under the authority of SADC: Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe

1994 Burundi OAU Observer Mission (OMIB)

1997 and 1998 Sierra Leone West African Peacekeeping Force, ECOMOG (Led by Nigeria)

1997 Central African Republic The following states went under the Inter-African Monitoring Mission (MISAB): Burkina Faso, Chad, Gabon and Mali (later incorporated under the UN Mission in the Central African Republic -
MINURCA, April 1998 and also included Egypt, Senegal and Togo).

1997

Zaire

Uganda and Rwanda sent troops to assist rebel leader, Laurent-Désiré Kabila

1998-

Democratic Republic of Congo

Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe sent troops to assist President Laurent-Désiré Kabila.
(Reports that Chad and Sudan also sent troops to assist Kabila). Rwanda and Uganda sent troops to assist the rebel movement.
## APPENDIX II
Various African Groupings in the 1960s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CASABLANCA GROUP*</th>
<th>BRAZZAVILLE GROUP**</th>
<th>MONROVIA GROUP***</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria (joined in 1962)</td>
<td>Cameroun</td>
<td>Cameroun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt (UAR)</td>
<td>Central Africa Republic</td>
<td>Central Africa Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Chad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>Congo (Brazzaville)</td>
<td>Congo (Brazzaville)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td>Congo (Leopoldville)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Dahomey</td>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>Dahomey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Malagasy Republic</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>Gabon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>Malagasy Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>Niger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Upper Volta</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Senegal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Somali Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Togo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Upper Volta</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Also known as the ‘radical’ or ‘revolutionary’ group. These states were signatories to the African Charter at Casablanca on 7 June 1961.

** Later known as the Union of African and Malagasy States or ‘conservative’ group. These states were signatories to the Brazzaville Declaration on 19 December 1960.

*** Derived its name from the Conference held in Monrovia in 1961. These states went on to sign the Lagos Charter on 20 December 1962. These states were also known as the ‘moderates’ or the Inter-African and Malagasy States Organisation.
APPENDIX III

Declaration
of the Assembly of Heads of State
and Government
on the establishment, within the OAU
of a Mechanism for Conflict prevention,
Management and Resolution
Adopted at the OAU 29th Ordinary Session, 28-30 June, Cairo, Egypt
Decision AHG/Dec.I (XXVIII)

We, the Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, meeting in our Twenty-ninth Ordinary Session in Cairo, Egypt, from 28 to 30 June 1993, having considered the situations of conflict on our Continent and recalling the Declaration we adopted on 11 July 1990, on the political and socio-economic situation in Africa and the Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World, declare as follows:

1. In May 1963, when the Founding Fathers met in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to found the Organization of African Unity, they were guided by their collective conviction that freedom, equality, justice and dignity are legitimate aspirations of the African peoples, and by their desire to harness the natural and human resources for the advancement of the Continent in all spheres of human endeavour. The Founding Fathers were inspired by an equally common determination to promote understanding between the African peoples and cooperation among the African States, and to rekindle the aspirations of the African people for brotherhood and solidarity in a larger unity transcending linguistic, ideological, ethnic and national differences.

2. The Founding Fathers were fully convinced that to achieve these lofty objectives, conditions for peace and security must be established and maintained.

3. It was with this overriding conviction, and also by the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration of Human Rights, that our countries began on the arduous task of meeting the triple challenge of decolonization, economic development and maintenance of peace and security.

4. Today, thirty years later, we can look back with pride at the achievements which the Organization of African Unity has been able to make against heavy odds and many obstacles it has had to surmount.

5. The ranks of independent countries have been strengthened and the membership of the OAU has increased from thirty-two at its founding to fifty-two today. The frontiers in Africa have been pushed to the doors of Apartheid South Africa. And even there, significant progress has been made; and we have reasonable cause for optimism that we shall soon see the total eradication of the remaining vestiges of colonialism, racism, racial discrimination and apartheid.

6. We, however, continue to be faced by the daunting dual challenge of economic
development and democratic transformation. Our countries have made tremendous efforts both individually and collectively to arrest and reverse the decline in our economies. Notwithstanding the many serious difficulties they have encountered, and the magnitude of what remains to be done, appreciable progress has been made in the social and economic fields.

7. The socio-economic situation on our Continent remains nonetheless in a precarious state. Factors including poverty, deterioration of the terms of trade, plummeting prices of commodities we produce, the excruciating external indebtedness and the resultant reverse flow of resources have combined to undermine the ability of our countries to provide for the basic needs of our people. In some cases, this situation has been further compounded by external political factors.

8. We do recognize, however, that there have also been certain internal human factors and policies which have negatively contributed to the present state of affairs on the Continent.

9. No single internal factor has contributed more to the present socio-economic problems on the Continent than the scourge of conflicts within and between our countries. They have brought about death and human suffering, engendered hate and divided nations and families. Conflicts have force millions of our people into a drifting life as refugees and internally displaced persons, deprived of their means of livelihood, human dignity and hope. Conflicts have gobbled-up resources, and undermined the ability of our countries to address the many compelling needs of our people.

10. While reaffirming our commitment to the Declaration on the Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and the Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World which we adopted during the Twenty-sixth Session of our Assembly, in Addis Ababa, in July 1990, we renew our determination to work in concert in the search for speedy and peaceful resolution to all the conflicts in Africa.

11. In June last year at the Twenty-eight meeting of our Assembly in Dakar - Senegal, we decided in principle to establish within the OAU, and in keeping with the principles and objectives of the Charter of the Organization, a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. We took that decision against the background of the history of many prolonged and destructive conflicts on our continent and of our limited success at finding lasting solutions to them, notwithstanding the many efforts we and our predecessors had expended. In so doing, we were also guided by our determination to ensure that Africa through the Organization of African Unity plays a central role in bringing about peace and security on the Continent.

12. We saw in the establishment of such a Mechanism the opportunity to bring to the processed of dealing with conflicts on our continent a new institutional dynamism, enabling speedy action to prevent or manage and ultimately resolve conflicts when and where they occur.
13. Now, having considered the report on the Mechanism prepared by the Secretary-General pursuant to our decision on the principle of its creation, we hereby establish, within the OAU, a Mechanism for preventing, managing and resolving conflicts in Africa.

14. The Mechanism will be guided by the objectives and principles of the OAU Charter; in particular, sovereign equality of Member States, non-interference in the internal affairs of States, the respect of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Member States, their inalienable right to independent existence, the peaceful settlement of disputes as well as the inviolability of borders inherited from colonialism. It will also function on the basis of the consent and the cooperation of the parties to a conflict.

15. The Mechanism will have as its primary objective, the anticipation and prevention of conflicts. In circumstances when conflicts have occurred, it will be its responsibility to undertake peace-making and peace-building functions in order to facilitate the resolution of these conflicts. In this respect, civilian and military missions of observation and monitoring of limited scope and duration may be mounted and deployed. In setting these objectives, we are fully convinced that prompt and decisive action in these spheres will, in the first instance, prevent the emergence of conflicts, and where they do inevitably occur, stop them from degenerating into intense or generalized conflicts. Emphasis on anticipatory and preventive measures, and concerted action in peace-making and peace-building will obviate the need to resort to the complex and resource-demanding peace-keeping operations, which our countries will find difficult to finance.

16. However, in the event that conflicts degenerate to the extent of requiring collective international intervention and policing, the assistance or where appropriate the services of the United Nations will be sought under the general terms of its Charter. In this instance, our respective countries will examine ways and modalities through which they can make practical contribution to such a United Nations undertaking and participate effectively in the peace-keeping operations in Africa.

17. The Mechanism will be built around a Central Organ with the Secretary-General and the Secretariat as its operational arm.

18. The Central Organ of the Mechanism shall be composed of the State members of the Bureau of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government elected annually, bearing in mind the principles of equitable regional representation and rotation. In order to ensure continuity, the States of the outgoing Chairman and (where Known) the incoming Chairman shall also be members of the Central Organ. In between Ordinary Sessions of the Assembly, it will assume overall direction and coordinate the activities of the Mechanism.

19. The Central Organ shall function at the level of Heads of State as well as that of Ministers and Ambassadors accredited to the OAU or duly authorized representatives. It may also seek, from within the Continent, such military, legal and other forms of expertise as it may require in the performance of its functions.
20. The proceedings of the Central Organ shall be governed by the pertinent Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. The Central Organ shall be convened by the Chairman or at the request of the Secretary-General or any Member State. It will meet at least once a year at the level Heads of State and Government; twice a year at the Ministerial level; and once a month at Ambassadorial and duly authorized representatives level. The quorum of the Central Organ shall be two thirds of its members. In deciding on its recommendations and without prejudice to the decision-making methods provided for in the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, it shall generally be guided by the principle of consensus. The Central Organ shall report on its activities to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government.

21. The venue of its meeting shall ordinarily be at the Headquarters of the Organization. Meetings may also be held elsewhere if so decided through consultations among its members. The provisional agenda of the Central Organ shall be prepared by the Secretary-General in consultation with the Chairman.

22. The Secretary-General shall, under the authority of the Central Organ and in consultation with the parties involved in the conflict, deploy efforts and take all appropriate initiatives to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts. To this end, the Secretary-General shall rely upon the human and material resources available at the General Secretariat. Accordingly, we direct the Council of Ministers, in consultations with the Secretary-General, to examine ways and means in which the capacity within the General Secretariat can be built and brought to a level commensurate with the magnitude of the tasks at hand and the responsibilities expected of the Organization. In his efforts, the Secretary-General may also resort to eminent African personalities in consultation with the Authorities of their countries of origin. Where necessary, he may make use of other relevant expertise, send special envoys or special representatives as well as despatch fact-finding missions to conflict areas.

23. A special fund governed by the relevant OAU Financial Rules and Regulations shall be established for the purpose of providing financial resources to support exclusively the OAU operational activities relating to conflict management and resolution. It will be made up of financial appropriations from the regular budget of the OAU, voluntary contributions from Member State as well as from other sources within Africa. The Secretary-General may, with the consent of the Central Organ, and in conformity with the principles and objectives of the OAU Charter, also accept voluntary contributions from sources outside Africa. Disbursement from the Special Fund shall be subject to the approval of the Central Organ.

24. Within the context of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, the OAU shall closely coordinate its activities with the African regional and sub-regional organizations and shall cooperate as appropriate with the neighbouring countries with respect to conflicts which may arise in the different sub-regions of the Continent.
25. The OAU should also cooperate and work closely with the United Nations not only with regard to issues relating to peace-making but, and especially, also those relating to peace-keeping. Where necessary, recourse will be had to the United Nations to provide the necessary financial, logistical and military support for the OAU's activities in Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in Africa in keeping with the provisions of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter on the role of regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security. In like manner, the Secretary-General of the OAU shall maintain close cooperation with other international organizations.
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**INTERVIEWS**

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* Ambassador Daniel António (OAU Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs)  
* Dr. Chris Bakwesegha (Head of the Conflict Management Division)  
* Commodore Mesfine Binega (Military Consultant, Conflict Management Division)  
* Ben Kioko (OAU Legal Officer)  
* Sam Ibok (Senior Political Adviser, Conflict Management Division)  
* William Nhara (Coordinator of Conflict Prevention Research, Conflict Management Division)  
* Deon van Schoor (Senior Political Adviser, Conflict Management Division)  
* Letter from Solomon Gomes, Deputy Permanent Observer of the OAU mission to the UN, 16 March 1997.

* Medhane Tadesse (Research Coordinator on Environmental Conflict Management - Ethiopian NGO)  
* Carla Mucavi (Diplomat of Mozambique)