Spatialities of Social Justice: Reflections on South African Cities

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Abstract

The geographical engagement with social justice has neglected to adequately focus on the spatiality of the concept and its implications for geographical investigation. As a first response to this omission, this thesis illuminates the spatiality of social justice by suggesting that the concept is a historically and geographically located understanding of the manner in which society's benefits and burdens can be distributed.

This thesis develops a route of geographical enquiry into the concept of social justice that moves beyond the tripartite of structuralist, post-structuralist and egalitarian approaches currently supported in this discipline. Drawing on relatively neglected liberal debates, the spatiality of social justice is investigated in relation to both theoretical and empirical accounts of this concept. It is subsequently suggested that Hayek's liberal challenge to the notion of unitary understandings of social justice, presents a productive alternative to current geographical investigations focused on this concept. Following Hayek's challenge, social justice is presented as a concept that is located, differentiated, bound to particular spatial arrangements and reflected through various imaginations of inclusion and exclusion. In this light a spatially sensitive account of social justice draws attention to the particularity of geography and history in shaping understandings of social justice.

These themes are investigated within the concrete historical context of South African urban development. Here, the spatiality of social justice is explored with reference to the construction and demise of apartheid. This specific theme is then developed through a case study of the post-apartheid city of Tygerberg, the second largest local authority in the Cape Metropolitan Area. The investigation of Tygerberg illustrates that understandings of social justice are multiple, contested and located in particular understandings of the urban world at various stages of imagining the apartheid city. These differentiated understandings of social justice persist in the post-apartheid urban era, with notions of social justice shaped by the history and the geography of the apartheid realities from which it has arisen.
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<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>BAAB</td>
<td>Bantu Affairs Administration Boards</td>
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<td>BF</td>
<td>Bridging Finance</td>
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<tr>
<td>BLA</td>
<td>Black Local Authorities</td>
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<tr>
<td>BNSC</td>
<td>Bellville Non-Statutory Caucus</td>
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<td>CMA</td>
<td>Cape Metropolitan Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMC</td>
<td>Cape Metropolitan Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMNF</td>
<td>Cape Metropolitan Negotiating Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>CP</td>
<td>Conservative Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTCC</td>
<td>Cape Town City Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNU</td>
<td>Government of National Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>GAA</td>
<td>Group Areas Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Integrated Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAC</td>
<td>Local Affairs Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGNF</td>
<td>Local Government Negotiating Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>LGTA</td>
<td>Local Government Transition Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MC</td>
<td>Metropolitan Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEC</td>
<td>Member of the (Provincial) Executive Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSDF</td>
<td>Metropolitan Spatial Development Framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSS</td>
<td>Metropolitan Substructure</td>
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<td>NP</td>
<td>National Party</td>
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<td>PLA</td>
<td>Primary Local Authority</td>
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<td>RDP</td>
<td>Reconstruction and Development Programme</td>
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<td>RSC</td>
<td>Regional Services Council</td>
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<td>SANCO</td>
<td>South African National Civic Association</td>
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<td>Transitional Metropolitan Council</td>
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<td>TMS</td>
<td>Transitional Metropolitan Substructure</td>
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<td>Tygerberg Spatial Development Framework</td>
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<td>WCRSC</td>
<td>Western Cape Regional Services Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>WCDB</td>
<td>Western Cape Demarcation Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>WLA</td>
<td>White Local Authority</td>
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This thesis is dedicated to my parents and sisters Anzelle and Brigitte.
Chapter One

Introduction

1.1 Introduction and thesis objective

Geographical analysis has illustrated that the spatiality of the city is grounded in a plethora of diverse experiences and interpretations, concentrated in the close confines of city-space (Hagerstrand, 1984; Lefebvre, 1991; Soja, 1985). As a result, the answer to what the city is or should be is not found in singular definitions but in a process of definition - evolving, changing and constantly redefined (Massey, 1999). It is at the intersection of what the city is interpreted to be and what it could be, that this thesis considers how multiple readings of the city frame and contribute to the construction of what social justice is understood to mean.

The distribution of society’s material and non-material benefits and burdens is uneven within cities (Amin, 1976; Massey, 1984; N. Smith, 1990). The meanings and interpretations accorded to the significance of such uneven distributions in urban space are however, contested and have become the foundation of a broad range of so-called social justice debates (Harvey, 1973; D.M. Smith, 1994a; Young, 1990a). It is the contention of this thesis that the meanings and interpretations accorded to these uneven distributions of society’s benefits and burdens are mediated by how people interpret the city as it is and how they think about what it could be. Thus, it is argued that how people interpret urban space holds implications for how people respond to the city and for how they understand social justice. This thesis intends to suggest that it is necessary to consider that understanding(s) of social justice are shaped, developed and reworked in the full glare of changing and unstable interpretations of urban reality. While being in and living in the city have been shown to matter to the spatiality of the city, it is suggested that the more general, yet more fundamental basic principles of social justice are framed and shaped by the multiple interpretations of those who reside in the close confines of city-space.

It is in this context that the spatiality of social justice as reflected through the spatiality of the city is investigated. At the root of this investigation is the belief that the spatiality of the city shapes and re-creates how we think about social justice. It is argued that experience of the multiple spatialities of the city, simultaneously
fragments and connects our understandings of social justice. As interpretations of the city are embedded in its spatialities, so too are interpretations of social justice shaped by these spaces and the historical processes underlying their formation. Thus our understandings of social justice are not suspended above, detached or innocent of the spatiality of the city, but grounded, moulded and recast, in and with reference to it.

It is the contention of this thesis that geographical debates focused on social justice do not adequately consider the spatiality of this concept. Moreover, they have neglected to illustrate how interpretations of what the city means to different people, in different parts of the city, impacts upon the meaning accorded to the social justice concept. More specifically, this thesis suggests that geographers focusing on social justice have failed to indicate that space constitutes a central and fundamental element in generating and refining normative theorisation of this concept. This crucial oversight has resulted in a failure to indicate how space – geography’s principle intellectual construct – contributes to the construction of understandings of social justice. In addition, this omission has left geographers powerless to shape the theoretical development of social justice debates raging in the social sciences. A truly unique geographical contribution has so far been absent from current social justice theorisation. It is the intention of this thesis to indicate that the spatiality of social justice, reflected through the differentiated, located and bounded ranges of meanings associated with the concept, constitutes not a universal truth but a variable, geographically and historically situated understanding of how a particular society’s benefits and burdens can be distributed.

1.2 Positioning the thesis

This thesis develops David Smith’s (1995a; 1995b) consideration of social justice in post-apartheid South Africa. In deference to the difficulty in stating what kind of post-apartheid society might most persuasively be defined on the grounds of social justice, Smith considered a number of theoretical deliberations focused on what might be seen as a more socially just society. He concluded that a form of egalitarianism provided an appropriate universal framework to guide thinking about social justice in South Africa, but admitted that its application would require attention to the particular inheritance of apartheid (Lemon, 1995). Smith’s work on South Africa, moreover, bears the hallmark of a more general geographical engagement with social justice. In terms
of social justice, geographical debates have been guided by an "objective" and "impartial" theoretical social justice framework, which is then "applied" to particular geographies. While proponents supporting this approach acknowledge that there are "yawning gaps" between what is implied by theoretical considerations of social justice and what is most likely to happen, it becomes apparent from these debates that existing geographies are interpreted as constraining the implementation of a particular theoretical understanding of social justice. Although this approach recognises the importance geographical and historical context has for implementing a particular understanding of social justice, it fails to indicate the role which geography and history takes in shaping theories of social justice in the first place. It also fails to offer reasons why there are seemingly always "gaps" between theoretical positions and geographical realities. Consequently, these investigations of social justice consistently suggest that the possibility of attaining social justice is, as David Smith (1995a,p.61), and others conclude, "profoundly depressing". However, perhaps it would be helpful to consider why what is theoretically desirable might hold little attraction to a societal reality whose moral sensibilities and understandings of socially just distributions are framed by particular interpretations of history and geography.

In the South African context, David Smith's work was pitched at the national government level and in terms of the implications his particular understanding of social justice would hold for general distributive objectives in post-apartheid South Africa. Yet, far greater clarity and elaboration in terms of which institutions should implement a particular understanding of social justice is required to meaningfully discuss social justice in this country. Social justice theory as a set of guiding principles linked to institutions of control over the distribution of a given society's benefits and burdens have to consider what level of intervention and by which institutions, are appropriate and responsible for implementing theoretical understandings of social justice. It is here that the central importance of the particular place and the interface between theory, geography, history and society come to problematise the indiscriminate "application" of universal theories of social justice to a given geographical reality.

In South Africa, the historical development of centralised notions of what is deemed desirable and undesirable, have been met by a longstanding tradition of resistance (Sparks, 1996). In this country's recent history, apartheid ideology provoked a politics
of resistance, demanding inclusive decision-making institutions and a negotiated notion of what constitutes the societal good. In terms of governance and the development of policies to construct a socially just post-apartheid South Africa, this particular country entered a historical phase in which prescriptive policy measures are no longer considered reasonable. The "implementation" of social justice as a general guideline for government action, orchestrated from a central point, with reference to social justice theories, and without negotiation of the particularity of the place and institution in which it is "applied", does not fit well with these new political sentiments.

The politics of this transforming society are underpinned by a paradigmatic shift from prescription to participation. This country's history, that in the past had at its core the prescription of a particular set of social relations and social justice, has as a result of apartheid's profound negative impacts, developed a deep-seated insistence upon the recognition of multiple interpretations of social relations, which include understandings of social justice. In a societal context influenced by multiple needs for development and transformation, normative value-claims have themselves to be subject to political negotiation and contestation. Thus, debates on social justice in South Africa or more specifically South African cities, are shaped by the context in which these discussions are deployed and by the particular geographies and histories of those contexts.

This thesis deals with local government at a particular moment in South African urban history. In the main, it focuses on the constitutionally defined transitional phase (1994 to 1999) of local government development. The study focuses on a time when old notions of what constituted and was seen as a desirable urban society, were critically and intensively scrutinised and reworked. It is suggested that this transitional phase represents a time when a particular society radically and intensively reconsidered its social structures, social relations and societal aspirations. In the post-apartheid era, democratic local governments are now central to the functioning of the South African urban system, the primary site of its citizens' life-worlds.

Local governments plan land-use, urban development priorities, release land, plan and build roads, lay on basic service infrastructure, often supply the water and electricity and remove refuse. As such, the realisation of many provincial and central
government redistributive interventions across the country are highly dependent upon the local state. South African local government is not only politically and administratively independent in many ways but financially independent too. Issues concerning the distribution of society’s benefits and burdens and how they ought to be distributed are increasingly dependent upon what local governments and their constituents perceive to be a desirable distribution of urban society’s benefits and burdens. Thus, in engaging with social justice in South Africa, it is important to scrutinise how local governments, and particularly their decision-makers, interpret these urban complexes. Moreover, how in the light of these interpretations do they develop an understanding of how to distribute urban society’s benefits and burdens? In this context, urban local government, national and regional government, individuals and communities, as well as private and public institutions must all negotiate the implementation of their respective contributions to the development of a more socially just urban society.

Accepting these observations, this thesis contends that local government in South Africa represents the primary site or arena in which understandings of social justice in the process of transforming post-apartheid South Africa are evolving. These institutions have to take stock of past, present and future imaginings of the urban world they manage. Thus what the city is and what it can be, should not be read-off from a central blueprint, but developed from the realities and desires of the urban citizens it aims to serve. It is local governments that have to align the multiple views of the citizen-base they represent, with those resources they have at their disposal. So where issues of how society’s benefits and burdens ought to be distributed are concerned, the focus on local government appears to be critical to a discussion of social justice in South Africa generally.

1.3 The study area

The reconstruction of the apartheid city and its transformation into a post-apartheid urban complex has developed in different ways in different localities across South Africa. Every city and town, province and district, has experienced different processes in the slow and often confusing reworking of apartheid’s imprint upon South Africa’s local government geography. While this restructuring process has been a reality for all local authorities - be they cities, towns or small rural hamlets - it has been in the cities
and the metropolitan complexes in particular, that the restructuring of South African society appears to be most visible and complex. The processes leading to urban reconstruction were intensely debated in all urban areas but it was in the metropolitan areas of Cape Town, Durban and Johannesburg that debates were most fierce (Cameron, 1996a). The first political demarcation of post-apartheid cities is of interest for this study as these processes involved highly contested and widely reported debates about what the South African city represented, how it was interpreted by different communities and what it should aspire to achieve. This public intersection of understandings about what the South African city is and what it could become provides a prime site to investigate multiple understandings of social justice and its links to a geographically and historically located South African urban spatiality.

This thesis investigates the spatiality of social justice in one of its largest metropolitan areas – Cape Town (Figure 1.1). The choice of the Cape Metropolitan Area (CMA) for this investigation is founded in the fact that it was the most severely contested demarcation decision the Western Cape Demarcation Board had to make in the Western Cape Province and indeed, the country (Cameron 1996a; 1996b; Cloete, 1998). There were multiple reasons for this controversy and they form the subject of the empirical discussions in this thesis (Chapters Six and Seven). The crucial point is that the demarcation of the CMA's transitional metropolitan substructures led to particularly heated public debates. Within these debates, the demarcation of the City of Tygerberg became the single most significant controversy. In fact, in many ways the internal demarcation debates of the CMA were centred on the actual creation of the City of Tygerberg (Cameron, 1996a). Consequently, the study focus falls on the Cape Metropolitan Area and the Metropolitan substructure of the City of Tygerberg in particular. This study is not representative of the whole transitional post-apartheid urban experience. It is made plain from the outset that the analysis of the CMA and the City of Tygerberg in the empirical Chapters Six, Seven and Eight, cannot be considered wholly representative of local government in South Africa, that is to say, replicating or producing the same dynamics as elsewhere in the country. This is discussed further in Appendix A. The examination of the CMA and Tygerberg in particular, nevertheless provides a set of insights into the basic theoretical claim of the thesis - that social justice can best be conceptualised as a historically and geographically located understanding of the manner in which a society's benefits and burdens ought to be distributed.
1.4 Thesis structure

Having sketched the general contours of this thesis in Chapter One, those that follow provide a systematic exposition of the spatiality of social justice as reflected in South African cities. Chapter Two sets out the contribution of geographical enquiry to the development of the social justice concept to date. It suggests that in their engagements with the social justice concept geographers have focused on exploring three approaches: structuralist and egalitarian liberal debates, (both universalist understandings of social justice) and post-structuralist debates (particularist understandings of social justice). On the whole the social justice debate, in terms of geography, has shown a propensity to apply particular theoretical understandings of social justice to chosen places and has failed to interrogate the spatiality of this concept to challenge and contribute to the theoretical development of the social justice concept.
Chapter Three initiates the development of an alternative social justice approach by which theoretical accounts can be informed by empirical investigation. Drawing on liberal social justice debates (Rawls, Nozick and Hayek) this chapter builds on David Smith's (1994a) suggestion that geographers should return to the local case study and sharpen the theoretical claims of social justice debates in the specifics of the situation, its temporal spatiality. However, whereas Smith's project ultimately aims to interpret the empirical world through theoretical truth claims about social justice, this approach pursues the reverse. It aims to interrogate theoretical accounts of social justice through empirical investigations informed by a geographical imagination. Building from Hayek's critique of Rawls' and Nozick's theorisation of social justice, it is suggested that Hayek's awareness of how located interpretations of how society's benefits and burdens ought to be distributed complicates this concepts theorisation, can be deployed as a starting point for exploring empirical approaches to social justice.

Chapter Four illustrates how Hayek's challenge to normative social justice theorisation is based upon his scepticism of unitary interpretation of social justice as empirically possible. Drawing on the intellectual space Hayek's critique creates for rethinking social justice theorisation, the exploration of empirical approaches to social justice developed by Miller and Swift et al are investigated. The chapter proceeds by seeking out the relationship between social justice theory and the actual beliefs of ordinary subjects' views of social justice. It is argued that a re-thinking of normative social justice debates in the light of spatio-historic interpretations of contemporary and past social realities provide the "empirical foundations" upon which theorists may build appropriate normative work. Revisiting some empirical accounts that explain how social justice is understood by different societies in different ways, aspects of the spatiality of social justice emerges. This chapter recasts these theoretical concerns into an exploratory geographical project that can investigate the spatiality of social justice and illuminate how understandings of this concept are historically and geographically located. The empirical chapters that follow systematically illustrate this argument.

Chapter Five develops a detailed account of the spatiality of social justice with reference to the twentieth century history of South African cities. This chapter illuminates the assertion that understandings of social justice are located, differentiated, bound to particular spatial arrangements, and reflected through various imaginations of inclusion and exclusion. This discussion sketches the broad outline of
how social justice at the local government level was understood following the construction of the South African Union in 1910 until the late apartheid era of the 1980s. Whilst South African urban history has not previously been drawn upon to demonstrate understandings of social justice (as opposed to social injustice), this chapter indicates that South African urban history is replete with differentiated and contested understandings of social justice. More specifically, this chapter will argue that social justice was produced differently, at different times, with reference to different types of social relations and was fraught with contradiction. By focusing on the construction and demise of urban apartheid, this discussion illuminates the outlines of various understandings of social justice, illustrating the central argument that social justice constitutes a geographically and historically located understanding of how society's benefits and burdens can be distributed. This chapter also sets the background for the empirical study of contemporary South African local government.

Chapter Six develops these observations by considering the construction of post-apartheid local government following the 1994 elections in South Africa. This chapter develops a detailed account of the differentiated understandings of social justice which emerged in the transitional period in South African cities, and broadens the interpretation of social justice set out in Chapter Four and illustrated in Chapter Five. Drawing on a case study of the City of Tygerberg, this chapter illustrates the spatiality of social justice with reference to the demarcation debates that led to the construction of the first post-apartheid cities in this region. This chapter will illustrate how the re-imagination of the more socially just post-apartheid urban future was contested and displayed competing understandings of social justice – interpretations bound to different experiences of South African urban space and history.

The methodology employed in generating the empirical evidence-base from which Chapter Six, as well as Chapters Seven and Eight build are detailed in Appendix A. Attention is drawn to the general fieldwork methodology, which sources of information were considered, how informants were identified and which institutions acted as starting points to this investigation. The different governance institutions from which information were obtained; the types of material collected; why the material was collected and its relevance to illustrating the spatiality of social justice, are set out. Appendix A also conveys some findings drawn from the research experience in the transitional context of South African cities and ties these experiences
into a growing body of research about researcher positionality and political-temporal contingency in the research process.

Chapter Seven considers a broad range of social justice interpretations reflected in the debates that followed the demarcation of the substructures in the CMA but with the particular focus on the creation of the City of Tygerberg. Furthermore, this chapter offers detailed accounts of how social justice was understood at that time. Specifically, the role of different urban spaces (both real and imagined) as the foundations of these understandings of social justice are highlighted. The demarcation debate is also broadened to include various individuals and decision-makers beyond those directly involved in the development of demarcation proposals for Tygerberg. Taken as a whole, these chapters (Six and Seven) develop the theoretical claim that understandings of social justice are located and differentiated, shaped by the multiple and changing interpretations of urban spaces in the study region.

Chapter Eight provides a contemporary interpretation of how social justice is understood in the context of the City of Tygerberg. This chapter investigates how negotiated urban visions have come to function as a mechanism by which shared understandings of social justice in the post-apartheid city are enabled. The narrative indicates how urban space and the spatial imagination has come to function as a starting point to facilitate the emergence of shared understandings of social justice in this transitional post-apartheid city. It is suggested that the development of a general urban vision of the desirable spatial form of the city presented a way of thinking about the manner in which a particular city can distribute its benefits and burdens. Drawing on this negotiated urban vision facilitated by an inclusive (if not uncontested) system of public participation, a general understanding was developed of social justice, and how local government resources can (justly) be distributed. It is also indicated that these urban visions are changing and contested, illuminating the variability of understandings of social justice in response to different historical and spatial developments within urban space. Thus, whilst a particular urban vision, which encourages a particular distribution of local government resources at a particular moment has been negotiated, this distribution is not seen as static but as part of an evolving process – pointing to (possibly) new (and changing) understandings of social justice in South African cities in future.
Chapter Nine concludes this investigation into the spatiality of social justice and aims to draw together the central themes from this study. As such this chapter draws on the evidence presented in the preceding chapters to illustrate that social justice, as reflected through the prism of South African cities, can be regarded as contested understandings of how society's benefits and burdens can be distributed, which are geographically and historically located in, and shaped by, the particularities of urban space. The chapter concludes with some implications of this thesis for future geographical research on social justice.
Chapter Two
Geography and Social Justice

“We are accustomed, in geography, to look for some kind of theory as a guide to practice. By theory we mean an intellectual construct that enables us to make sense of the world or part of it: the way it is, or ought to be. By practice we mean doing things, undertaking projects with particular aims in view, including the possibility of understanding the world (or part of it), judging it, and changing it for the better...The notion that theory might provide a guide to our moral purpose and practice may be no less obvious. Faced with questions of social justice, of inequality in distribution and the process responsible, the inclination is to look to some ethical or moral theory...However, matters are by no means so straightforward when we enter the realms of ethics and morality.”

(David Smith, 1994a, pp.21-22)

2.1 Introduction

Geographers have become accustomed to look towards theory to guide their practice. This practice, as David Smith (1994a) suggests is however, by no means a simple matter and has been reflected in the many different ways geographers have come to approach the issue of social justice. In geography three approaches to this area of investigation have predominated, with much of the debate focused on the defence of one theoretical position over another. Whilst this discipline has productively drawn from political philosophical social justice theory, these debates have remained peripheral to the wider geographical discourse. In addition, the geographical social justice debate has simultaneously failed to focus its investigations on the development of the social justice concept. Rather, the handful of geographers involved in the social justice debate has come to apply social justice to various geographies, without considering the impact of geography on the meaning of this concept.

In order to investigate this claim, the contours of the geographical social justice debates of the past three decades are sketched in this chapter. Building from Fainstein’s (1996) investigations into geographical social justice debates, it is suggested that despite geographers' prolonged interest in this field of enquiry, they have mainly utilised three approaches in their engagements with the social justice concept.¹ The first approach relates to Marxist approaches, the second to post-structuralist debates

¹ I should immediately add that such typologies do injustice to the refinements of individual thinkers and ignores the degree to which they synthesize arguments across the intellectual boundaries established in Fainstein’s (1996) work.
and the third to liberal egalitarianism. With regards to the first approach - Marxism - it is suggested that although this school of thought either deflected the question of social justice or else branded debates around justice as bourgeois flirtations, some geographers have become involved in this project. Geographers such as David Harvey (1973) deployed Marxism to investigate critically, how ideas of social justice and moral philosophy could be related to geographical inquiry.

The meaning of justice is, however, complex and the formulation of a universal model of justice that is mindful of exploitation, domination and oppression became the focus of increasing investigation. To this end Iris Marion Young, in her *Justice and the politics of difference* (1990a) illustrated that universalist tendencies in theories of justice have presupposed a decidedly unsatisfactory homogenous public. This crucial text came to frame the outlines of a second approach to social justice, suggesting a post-structuralist engagement with social justice. These two tendencies, whilst both critical of capitalist domination, incorporated understandings of spatial relations and the built environment that differ in their visions of a socially just city and in their proposed strategies for achieving social transformation. However, although these approaches are built on a vision of social justice they are vague about their normative frameworks, taking a critical stance without specifying clearly the standards by which they are evaluating the objects of their analyses (Fainstein, 1996).

Geographers have, however, not all worked within the structuralist/post-structuralist matrix. Questions relating to the content and meaning of social justice have also been an integral part of egalitarian liberal debates and it is not surprising that one would find geographers approaching issues of social justice from this theoretical position. Consequently, it is suggested that a third approach - egalitarian liberal accounts of social justice and in particular those derived from John Rawls' (1971) explorations and understanding of this concept is best represented in the work of David Smith (1994a). Smith's work essentially falls outside the two-sided approach to the city and social justice as investigated by the first two approaches. Whilst in many ways these approaches focus on the identification of ways in which to understand and discover the injustices of the capitalist Western urban society, Smith has developed and extended geographers understanding of the social justice concept with persistent and in-depth normative engagements with political philosophy at a more general level. Of all the figures participating in the geographical social justice debate, Smith's œuvre
stands alone, as this discipline's most fully developed set of statements about the distribution of society's benefits and burdens - social justice - firmly grounded in critical normative debate.

Finally, the focus turns to a consideration of the universalist - particularist debate between structuralists and egalitarians, on the one hand, and the post-structuralists on the other. Whilst both groupings, it is suggested, present part of the answer to what social justice might mean, neither draws upon the geographies of the human world to provide content to their discussions of social justice. Thus, neither approach draws upon geography as a central core element that frames the construction of the meaning of social justice. In reviewing the outline of these geographical engagements with social justice, it is suggested that geographers have taken theories about how the world ought to be and set out to create a human geography in accordance with these theoretical objectives. Geographical social justice debates have consistently held on to deductively derived theory to inform the world of how it ought to be, with a secondary concern, if any, for what that world understands as representing a just geography. Neither the remedies to the perceived injustices pervading society, nor the socially just geographies proposed, are set against what the intended beneficiaries imagine to be just. By engaging in this prescriptive debate about what social justice is, geographers have failed to indicate that an empirical reality holds implications for the meaning(s) of this concept itself.

The chapter development mimics the three-sided nature of the social justice debate. Consequently, attention is first drawn to the development of the social justice debate in the structuralist mould. The post-structuralist response to this engagement with social justice is then considered and finally the egalitarian liberal views of Smith, as response to both are investigated. The chapter closes with a reconsideration of the particularist critique of universalist theories and a recent return of geography's search for universal understandings of social justice.

2.2 "Placing" the social justice debate

The ideal of social justice is the bedrock of any democratic society within which citizens can actively participate in a free, tolerant and inclusive political community. Speculations as to what constitutes the just society have been the stuff of political
philosophers from the ancient Greeks onwards (Merrifield and Swyngedouw, 1996,p.1). In the twentieth century we find ourselves living in a world and at a time in which this pursuit for justice has remained, but with a very specific addition, social justice has been framed by what is a seemingly endless demand for equality: social, political and economic. This dream of equality has until fairly recently been understood in terms of equality of opportunity. The idea of material inequality, as such, was generally not challenged. However, since the 1960s, on both sides of the Atlantic this notion of equality of opportunity has been replaced with an increasing emphasis on the equality of condition or outcome, as the preferred notion of equality. The eradication of all significant divisions of wealth and income became in the view of many the central value problem of the post-industrial society (Bell, 1974), whilst for others it is the most powerful moral imperative paralleling the concept of liberty in the 19th century (Brzezinski, 1973). As is currently the case, the early 1970s saw an outpouring of publications on equality, arguing in favour of, or against, these notions (Phillips, 1979,p.84). Then, as now, authors pointed to the enormity of particularly the economic inequalities in the condition of individuals within various societies, most arguing for the elimination of the differences in material well being. Some, like Coser (1974), referring to this as a scandalous state of affairs (that being the great economic and other inequalities between people), whilst others such as Jenks (1972) demanded an income policy which guaranteed a more equitable distribution. Along with these demands for greater economic equality within Western societies, there developed a demand for greater economic equality among the nations of the world.

Phillips (1979,p.86) notes that despite the multitude of claims for greater economic equality, both within and among societies, the legitimacy of equality as an ideal has been seldom argued for or justified. In fact, calling for a more equal distribution, founded on claims of moral responsibility for doing so, was mainly underpinned by a vision of a shared humanity. It is the shared humanity of the world's citizens that is frequently the sole justification for the elimination of economic inequalities. Because the moral base of these demands for greater material equality was seldom intellectually defended – this explaining claims that it lacked a solid philosophical justification – they have been fiercely criticised by some neo-conservatives. Nisbet (1978) for example, argued that the nature of providential ideas like equality was

2 Whilst Phillips argues that equality needs to be justified, writers such as Brian Barry (1989) have consistently argued that it is inequality that requires justification.
supported neither by fact or logic. In the early 1970s authors such as Glazer, Moynihan, Kristol and Bell were among those questioning the demands for economic equality noting in contrast that equality of opportunity was a fundamental principle of classical liberalism. These new debates did not focus on individual satisfaction as the measure of social goods, but rather on redress for the disadvantaged as a priori claim on the societal conscience or on social policies (Bell, 1974). Bell, following Kant and Tocqueville, stressed the opposition and frequent incompatibility between equality and another cherished social value – liberty. Set against this backdrop, those involved in moral philosophy set out to bridge these "oppositions" and "incompatibilities", producing a body of literature loosely grouped together as investigating differing notions of justice or social justice.

It is also within this forum there arose a key work of twentieth century philosophy, John Rawls' (1971), *A theory of justice*, which caused an explosion of liberal political theory. Rawls re-established the capacity of abstract, deductive liberal thought to engage with problems that "matter", including issues of social justice, after a period in which political philosophers had become, as Daniels (1975) noted, obsessed with technique at the expense of substance. As such, this work was and still constitutes the most serious site of debate about the principles and convictions that might help craft desirable political regimes based on liberal foundations. David Harvey's (1973) *Social justice and the city*, drawing on aspects of this general debate, appeared two years after *A theory of justice*, and likewise produced a text that would transform the field of urban studies. Harvey's text mobilised a renewal of urban research by turning it away from the "surface" and relatively trivial questions, to engage the fundamental social and economic processes that structure space (Katznelson, 1996,p.45-48).

As David Smith (1994a,p.4) notes, "The explicit engagement of geography with morality and social justice dates from the latter part of the 1960s". A number of reasons could be put forward as to why debates centred on morality and social justice entered the geographical consciousness at that time. According to Johnston *et al* (1994,p.496) the initial disinterest in normative ideas can be attributed to the mainstream epistemology of geography at the beginning of the 1960s. The four main foci of positivist epistemology of the "new geography" at the time were grounded in

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1 It would be incorrect to say that social justice did not appear on the agenda of geographers earlier but it could be argued that it was not a significant pursuit earlier (Johnston *et al*, 1994).
notions of empiricism, exclusivity, validation and integration of general theorems of
spatial organisation of observed phenomena. Changes in the geographic research
agenda came towards the end of the 1960s and the beginning 1970s, eventually
leading to the introduction of a so-called “radical geography” (Peet, 1978). Radical
geography started off as a mainly American endeavour rooted in concerns over
contemporary political and social upheavals. Radical geography however, came to
represent an increasing volume of geographical writings which were critical of spatial
science, as well as of positivism as the mainstream philosophy dominating research in
human geography (Johnston et al, 1994, p.497). Peet (1978, pp.3-29), suggested that this
“new” and "radical geography" developed mainly in response to the discipline as it
was practiced at the time - that being a discipline largely ignorant of more contentious
social issues such as hunger, poverty, health, crime, and the explanation of these
occurrences. But the 1970s marked the beginning of a new epoch in which discussions
of urban space and the seemingly endless problems associated with the capitalist
urban form were dominant (Fainstein, 1996, p.18). The 1970s, indeed, saw a dramatic
redirection of human geography towards a concern with welfare problems (D.M.
Smith, 1977) and a proliferation of studies on crime (e.g. Newman, 1972), hunger,
health (e.g. Shannon and Dever, 1974), welfare and poverty (e.g. Rutter and Madge,
1976) came to press. This “new interest” was rooted in a broader shift in social
concern, from what Smith (1994b, p.674) referred to as “narrow economic criteria of
development or progress to broader aspects of the quality of life”. A geography of
well-being or welfare geography developed, of which Knox’s Social well-being: a spatial
perspective (1975) and particularly Smith’s The geography of social well-being in the United
States (1977), bear witness, bringing together a wide range of concerns relevant to the
quality of life in a new urban and regional synthesis (D.M. Smith, 1994b, p.676).

2.3 The structuralist genesis of the geographical social justice debate

Despite geographers’ increasing involvement with many aspects related to social
justice, the direct discussion of social justice as concept, and how it relates to
geography, was not reflected in the works published by geographers at the time. It
would appear that the only author at the time to make a book-length enquiry into
social justice as such, was David Harvey. Harvey’s classic text Social justice and the city
(1973), was written (according to him) primarily because he felt it “important and
appropriate to explore how ideas in social and moral philosophy - ideas that are
customarily regarded as distinctive and separate avenues of enquiry from the philosophy of science...could be related to geographical enquiry" (Harvey, 1973,p.9). In Ira Katznelson's (1996,p.45) view, Harvey attempted to engage with two broad themes. The first was to focus on the insufficiency of an orientation to social justice, of which Rawls' theory was seen as emblematic, that does not take issues of capitalist production into account. The second theme sought the re-orientation of the work produced by urban geographers. More generally, Harvey expressed frustration with the limits of liberal formulations that he wished to supplant, and his manifest excitement in discovering the possibilities of socialist (Marxist) conceptions of social justice (Katznelson, 1996,p.46). Importantly, he treated social justice as a concept on which views were either Marxist or liberal. He chose the former, setting the foundation for a structuralist geography and approach to issues of social justice. Harvey's book can be seen as addressing four main concerns. Firstly, he attempted to overcome the artificial separation of social science methodology from philosophy. Secondly, he insisted on the need to rethink space, by focusing on how it is that different human practices create and make use of distinctive conceptualisations of space. Thirdly, he proposed to reject concepts of social justice that defined it as a matter of eternal justice and morality. Finally, he argued for the development of a relational view of urbanism as a vantage point from which to capture some salient features about the social processes operating in society as a whole.

Consequently, Harvey examined the history of urban development in order to demonstrate how the inequalities of the capitalist labour process play themselves out in spatial terms, and then how the ensuing social space itself exacerbates inequality and exploitation. Furthermore, he referred to the capitalist property market, indicating how spatial arrangements were employed to enhance the profitability of property capital at the expense of urban residents. Harvey was (and still appears to be) of the opinion that governmental efforts at urban improvement inevitably recapitulate the miseries of the earlier situation, moving impoverished people out of one depressed area into another (Harvey, 1989). Thus, in his view, it is apparent that in a capitalist economic system, there is no escape from extremes of inequality and that the built environment both contributes to, and embodies the capitalist dynamic, regardless of the programmes of even well intentioned policy makers. As such, Harvey's work bears the hallmark of a Marxist political economist and criticism of his work often emulates that levied at the broader approach itself (e.g. Hayek, 1976; 1988; Sayer,
1995). On the whole, the critique regarding this tradition of political economic thinking is well documented and only briefly considered below. Suffice to say that Harvey sympathises with this approach, and is consequently exposed to its weaknesses. Though Harvey's contribution to geography, in this work, must surely be counted as one of the most important, it is difficult in the end to argue that *Social justice and the city* was written explicitly to introduce the theme of social justice to geography. In fact, it could be argued that Harvey, rather than move the geographical focus to a new theme - social justice - introduced a new approach to geographical thinking. This work reflected his personal movement away from a positivist locational analysis to an understanding of urbanism that was derived from Marxian social theory (Laws, 1994, p.604).

Following Harvey's work some five years later, Manuel Castells' (1977) *The urban question* may be seen to comprise a second foundational work in the political economy tradition of urban analysis and our encounters with social justice. Castells moved away from Harvey's preoccupation with production and circulation. His emphasis was more on collective consumption and the rise of urban social movements that aim at capturing control of the local state and at redistributing the social wage. He rooted urban crisis in the clashes between the accumulation and legitimisation needs of capital and in a prescient prophecy concerning the future of US cities, predicting a new and sinister urban form - the "wild city". Even before Castells' later break with Marxist structuralism, he focuses on battles over distribution, on factors that gave rise to social movements and on the potential for such movements both to encompass coalitions that straddle class divides and to contribute to the achievement of social progress. On the whole, however, political economists were in agreement that economic inequality subsumes all forms of subordination.

This position has been attacked from various positions and a steady flow of geographical research has suggested that people's interests were (and still are) not only defined by their economic position (see for example, Duncan and Ley, 1982; Dear, 1988; Deutsch, 1991; Giddens, 1979; Sayer, 1984). In addition, other status determinants interact with economic interests and causality leads in both directions. Furthermore, networks of influence, based on ethnicity, lineage, gender or which ever other traditional relationship, combine with relations of production to generate structures of domination regardless of the mode of property ownership. In fact, as
Wilson (1991) points out, Marx regarded clientelism and patronage to be remnants of traditional societies that would be eradicated by capitalism and consequently most contemporary political economists simply ignored the question of the non-economic bases of economic power. As Fainstein (1996, pp.22-23) suggests, these forces, as well as ordinary corruption, have endured within both socialist and capitalist societies and seem more dependent on culture and political process, than on the economic system. In fact, their persistence corroborates the correctness of the common view that having access to people in power improves one's chances for material benefits. Wrong (1994) contends that a second problem experienced in the political economy approach is its silence concerning the need to maintain social order under any economic system. It is suggested that even among those political economists that have abandoned Marxist structuralism, little mention is made of problems of social hostility, except as a product of the capitalist economic system, and the socialist penchant for tracing all forms of domination to economic inequality remains.

In this respect the liberal political theorists have sought ways by which people with differing interests or lifestyles can remain dissimilar and yet live peacefully together (e.g. Hayek, 1976; Nozick, 1974). Socialist thought has typically aimed at dissolving differences through economic change and class struggle and thus has not been concerned with the problems of governing antagonistic groups. Liberal thinkers are often vulnerable to the argument that their institutions and procedures function to perpetuate and disguise inequality (Barry, 1996). But a demonstration that the adjudication systems of liberal democracies are biased against the poor and minorities does not mean that greater equity would result from their dissolution (Hayek, 1976). Harvey (1992) has recognised this issue when he declared that a just planning and policy practice must seek out non-exclusionary and non-militarised forms of social control to contain the increasing level of both personal and institutionalised violence without destroying capacities for empowerment and self-expression. As Fainstein (1996), however, comments, Harvey's simple statement of the problem does not suggest a solution.

A third problem with the political economy view, relates to the fact that an economic programme with redistribution as its central goal lacks strong appeal to popular majorities in societies where the majority feels that pursuit of such a policy would cause it to lose many of its advantages or would threaten aggregate economic
prosperity. In this case it can alienate substantial portions of the stable working class, who see their security in home-ownership and in separating themselves from the social strata beneath them. In addition, solidarity based on non-economic communities have more emotional pull and indeed may provide many initially lower-income individuals with greater material gains than structural economic change that dampens class privilege (Sayer, 1993).

Given some of the above limitations with the political economy avenue of inquiry, geographical interest in social justice per se soon evaporated. Harvey’s “hidden mechanisms” as agents causing and maintaining distributional injustice, investigated from an arsenal of Marxist interpretations (see Bodman, 1992) grounded in historical materialism and focused on the nature of capitalism, proved more challenging than the topic of social justice itself. Moreover, “Anglo-American geography appeared to [have] consider[ed] the unjust outcomes of the prevailing capitalist system too obvious to require refined analysis” (D.M. Smith, 1992a, pp.128-129).

From here, urban geographers started to explore social processes far beyond the various spatial patterns they so laboriously described in the past. Indeed, urban morphology was reconceived, “not as the inevitable outcome of the free market, but as the product of the accumulation of capital and the class struggle that accompanied it” (Laws, 1994, p.604). In particular, government was re-conceived as central in the reproduction of capitalist social relations, not seeking greater equality in the capitalist city, but central to the perpetuation of urban systems in which “the exploitation of the many by the few” was inevitable (Harvey, 1973, p.314).

From Harvey’s (and others) work, a productive field of inquiry developed, and the material conditions in urban areas where frequently focused upon. This new approach would, however, come under closer scrutiny and a number of critiques would suggest that the political economy approach was not in itself going to address all of society’s ills.

By the mid 1980s a general interest in the theme of social justice as such had not yet been brought into focus, prompting David Smith (1992a, p.128) to remark that “the discourse of social justice has been muted, if not virtually silent, in the geography of

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4 Having said that, it should be pointed out that when Harvey came to criticize geographers’ reluctance to explore social processes that gave rise to the injustices of society at the time, his ideas were not received enthusiastically by all geographers. Indeed many stuck with geography as the spatial science of the earlier sixties.
recent years.” Indeed, it could be said that geographers were perhaps motivated by a concern with social justice, but did not study it as such.

2.4 A post-structuralist response to the structuralist social justice debate

Aspects of Smith’s concerns, however, seem to have been addressed even as he was writing the above statement, as by the mid 1990s Smith (1994a,p.1), was able to report that “social justice is firmly back on the geographical agenda.” The reason for this renewed interest is probably to be found in the so-called cultural turn in the geography since the late 1980s which saw the emergence of a “new geography” which investigated culture and the traits it ascribed to people (like women and the elderly, etc.) (Cloke, Philo and Sadler, 1991; Jackson, 1989). In addition, Smith reported notable engagements with post-modernism, as well as the development of a post-modern human geography (e.g. Gregory, 1993; Harvey, 1989; Soja, 1989). A crucial theme within post-modern thinking in the social sciences generally and in geography in particular focuses on the questioning of grand meta-theoretical narratives vis-a-vis an increasing emphasis on human diversity and difference (e.g. Derrida, 1976; Foucault, 1980; Lyotard, 1984). This aspect of post-modern thinking holds important implications for the manner in which we approach morality, including social justice, and appears to have led to a second, post-structuralist approach to debates focused on social justice within geography (D.M. Smith, 1994a,p.7).

In the past decade post-structuralism / post-modernism have attracted increasing attention in the more philosophically-inclined literature and has proven to be a very broad approach encompassing a variety of formulations that emphasise contingency over structure in explaining outcomes and therefore eschews reductionist explanations (e.g. Bondi, 1990; Dear, 1989; Gregory 1989; Soja, 1989). The origins of these ideas are diverse, but among the chief concerns that characterise this movement are: a preoccupation with discourse and language; a suspicion of concepts of truth and falsity and of empirical testing; an “incredulity towards meta-narratives” like philosophical systems or Marxism; a distrust of the idea of a progressive development of knowledge having an emancipatory role; and an openness to difference and an advocacy of local knowledge (Sayer, 1993,p.320). Arguably some of the earlier roots of post-structuralism, in urban geography, can be found in the work of the urban populist, Jane Jacobs’s (1961) *The death and life of great American cities* and later in
Richard Sennet's (1970) *Uses of disorder*. Within urban studies the importance of post-structuralism lies in its recognition of diverse bases of social affiliation and multiple roots of oppression and these works appear to adequately suggest this position. This understanding in turn leads to a reverence of diversity over similarity. Whereas political-economic thought both predicts and celebrates the disappearance of racial, religious and ethnic divides, post-structuralism expects and welcomes their persistence (Young, 1990a).

Themes of diversity are consistently found in the post-structuralist critique of capitalist urban development (for example, Whyte, 1988; Young, 1989; Young, 1990a). As a consequence, we find that post-structuralists, when viewing the city, do not stress uneven development as seen with the political economists but rather focus on the exclusivity and sterility embodied in urban development. Authors such as Sennet (1990), Wilson (1991) and Zukin (1996) condemn the contemporary city as the product of a white male capitalist elite imposing order on other groups with potentially unruly lifestyles. These multiple "other" voices are purportedly subordinated, as suggested by Sorkin (1987), through the mechanisms of city planning, which segregate uses through the development of large projects and separated suburban communities (also see Silverstone, 1997). According to Mike Davis' (1990), seminal text *City of quartz*, this has lead, in its most extreme, towards exclusionism expressed in gated, fortress communities. It is in these gated suburban bourgeois utopias of apparent social homogeneity and property interests, that is created:

"... a vicious politics in which middle-class homeowner groups ally themselves with capitalist elites in a battle against progressive taxation and publicly provided social welfare benefits" (Davis, 1990, p. 102).

The cultural, rather than the economic, provides the foundation for political identity in post-structuralist thought. Individuals exist as members of socio-cultural groups from which they draw their identities, derive their sense of well-being, and deploy strategies of resistance and purposeful action. Although post-structuralists posit difference as indissoluble, they regard the particular bases on which it is created and its expressions as socially constructed and therefore subject to changes through time and space. The political aim embedded within this tradition is the empowerment and representation of the least powerful, which may coincide with economic betterment but is not limited to it. Arguably, the strongest statements of the post-structuralist
position on difference within the urban milieu is to be found in the oft quoted ideas of Iris Marion Young (1990a,p.227) who suggests that:

"An alternative to the ideal of community ...[is] an ideal of city life as a vision of social relations affirming group difference. As a normative ideal, city life instantiated social relations of difference without exclusion. Different groups dwell in the city alongside one another, of necessity interacting in city spaces. If city politics is to be democratic and not dominated by the point of view of one group, it must be a politics that takes account of and provides voice for the different groups that dwell together in the city without forming a community."

In Young's view, emancipation lies in the rejection of the assimilationist model and the assertion of a positive sense of group difference, wherein the group defines itself rather than being defined from the outside. The politics of difference, she suggests promote a notion of group solidarity against the individualism of liberal humanism and more broadly advances the post-structuralist aims of eradicating social subordination and creating in its place a civil society that allows the free expression of group difference.

David Harvey's (1996) latest work appears to have incorporated some of these ideas. His aim is to seek an alternative vision of justice grounded in human practice by arguing that:

"... justice and rationality take on different meanings across space and time and person, yet the resistance of everyday meanings to which people do attach importance and which to them appear unproblematic gives the terms a political and mobilising power that can never be neglected" (Harvey, 1996, pp.595-596).

Neil Smith (1996,p.132) interprets Harvey's statement as a recognition of the need to translate this intellectual perspective into political ammunition. Harvey is seen to support Iris Young's proposed democratic cultural pluralism which simultaneously deflates the claims of traditional liberal universalism and yet is cognisant of the need to include unassimilated others in a less than homogenous system of justice. Harvey (1996) develops six principles of so-called just planning and policy practices: minimising exploitation, militating against marginalisation, self empowerment of the oppressed, a sensitivity to cultural imperialism, non-exclusionary and non militarised containment of personal and institutional justice (thus the main facets of oppression
Young argues against), with Harvey adding the creation of socially just ecologies. This then would underpin a programme in which just planning and policy practice would empower rather than deprive the oppressed. However, the political task Harvey appears to suggest in his six principles, is nonetheless to press for the establishment of certain "temporary universals" which will be widely understood and will have the symbolic power to stir people to action. In his view social movements are about the solidification of particular ambitions for justice as temporary social norms. The substantive difference between Harvey's suggestions and those of post-structuralists is less clear than in the past, but the stress in his argument suggests a greater emphasis on universal truths than post-structuralists such as Young (1990a) might propose.

Despite these multiple themes of investigations, the geographical community has not to date produced a book-length study of what might be seen as a direct post-structuralist exposition of social justice comparable to Harvey's *Social justice and the city*. Whilst many authors in recent years have productively drawn on post-structuralist ideals and ideas, in main derived from Young's work, no-one has systemically investigated the role of geography in this concept. In fact, whilst there might be a return to considerations of social justice in geographical work, one will find it difficult to identify any well developed and persistent geographical debate from post-structuralist geographers that aims to develop our understanding of the meaning or multiple meanings of the social justice concept in light of spatial analysis.

Substantial critique of the post-structuralist position generally, although seldom pitched as a critique of a post-structuralist understanding of social justice itself, has developed over the past decade (Callinicos, 1989; Sayer, 1993). Firstly, it appears that post-structuralism clashes with both individualistic liberal humanism and structuralism, as well as with the concept of the class-based mass party that has been the vehicle for the expansion of the welfare state and the rights of labour in many European countries and elsewhere. It has been argued that in an effort to transcend Marxist economic reductionism, the post-structuralists have abandoned economic analysis and a recognition of class interests altogether. Perhaps Fainstein's (1996, p.29) strongest objection to post-structuralist thinking is found in the following passage:

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5 See p.41 in this chapter for an example of Young's own version of temporal universals.
“Virtually by definition a view of society as consisting of multiple dissimilar cultural groupings produces a conception of politics as based on coalitions. This is...a standard perception of liberal pluralism, and within that context...wholly desirable. From a left perspective, however, such an approach is problematic. Where exclusion and oppression are identified as prevailing social characteristics of capitalist democracies and hopes for social emancipation come to rest with a coalition of out-groups that share little but their antagonism to the extant social hierarchy, expectations for a coherent alternative political force are shaky. Even the identification of the components of such an alliance is difficult. In Harvey’s attempt to devise a programme sensitive to post-structuralist arguments, he declares that ‘just planning and policy practices must empower rather than deprive the oppressed’. But who decides who is the oppressed? Without a universalistic discourse, oppression is in the eyes of the beholder. Many members of the American middle class would accept Harvey’s dictum but consider themselves oppressed by welfare cheats and high taxes, while their European counterparts construe immigration as representing a similar imposition. Identification of oppressed groups within a pluralist framework is hardly a simple matter.”

In the view of theorists supporting more universalist theoretical positions, the post-structuralist project has given rise to a weak theoretical expression of the concept of social justice. As seen in the critique of those supporting universalists views, a positive normative theory or political expression of what is to be done, remains wanting. Indeed, the socialist dream of a working class united in its common commitment to justice and equality becomes reduced to demands for tolerance and redistribution with no programme of fundamental economic reconstruction. At worst, post-structuralism leads not to tolerance and reduction of repression prescribed by its more enlightened thinkers, but to essentialism, unproductive conflict, and new forms of oppression. Perhaps most disconcerting, as Moi (1985) suggests, is the tendency of post-structuralist thought in its feminist and ethnic-culturalist manifestations to take a critical stance towards other groups but avoid self-criticism. In this case we have an acceptance of the privileged position of the marginalised and oppressed and the incapacity to deal with oppression carried out by members of other groups that are themselves marginalised and oppressed (Fainstein, 1996,p.29).

Indeed, the attainment of both democracy and recognition of diversity are difficult to combine in the world of politics, where popular sentiment for the latter is often
lacking. As an approach geographers are constantly reminded of what the socially just society and institutions are not, but not what they are and what the substantive aims should be. As such the approach has been productive in isolating injustices in societies relative to those concerns post-structuralist theorists see as important. But geographers and social scientists generally have no clear indication of what normative position is ultimately prioritised in this work and certainly no clear indication of what a geographical post-structuralist position on social justice would entail. Of relevance to geographers, this approach has not illustrated what the geographical project implicit in their debate would amount to and whether space constitutes a key variable to the theorisation of the social justice concept.

2.5 Social justice and liberal egalitarianism

Reflecting on the limited number of published geographical engagements with social justice, it would appear that it has been David Smith who has nearly single-handedly maintained a continuous interest in the concept social justice and its geographical applications (D.M. Smith 1977; 1987; 1992a; 1992b; 1994a; 1994b; 1995a; 1999). Whereas Smith’s contemporary, Harvey, for example, moved from social justice to broadly reorienting the work urban geographers perform (Katznelson, 1996), Smith set out to specifically develop social justice within an egalitarian liberal formulation as a focus within geography. As such Smith stands alone in presenting a clearly defined geographical social justice project.

Themes from Smith’s extensive writings on social justice are drawn together in his book Geography and social justice (1994a). Smith is very aware that the various theories of social justice all display distinctive features, including some which have incompatible basic values. Faced with the fact that these base values differ he remarks that it is indeed very tempting to follow the line encouraged by the contemporary post-modern/ post-structuralist turn and withdraw from the realm of grand theory into a form of evaluative ethical relativism. But for Smith such an approach is unsatisfactory and he suggests another approach, which he concedes “involves faith in at least the possibility of universal principles of social justice” (D.M. Smith, 1994a, p. 117). Smith argues that the aim of such an approach is to seek common ground among alternative perspectives. In his reading of the extensive theories of social justice every theory could be viewed as based on the same ultimate value – equality.
However, to progress beyond this insight, he points out that “we will have to narrow down the conceptions of equality with which we are concerned” (D.M. Smith, 1994a, p.117). Smith rejects out of hand the libertarian conception of equality manifest in equal freedom to benefit from one’s holdings, as well as the claim of equal individual weight in some utilitarian maximising calculus. To him these conceptions permit degrees of inequality, which assail powerful intuitive notions of what is consistent with accepting the equal moral worth of individuals. In addition, Smith argues that we cannot be satisfied with a preoccupation with difference almost to the exclusion of human similarity, which can allow inequalities in through the back door in the guise of responses to differences of dubious moral relevance. Or the otherwise appealing ethic of care needs more egalitarian content than it seems to possess, if it is not to degenerate into a parochial and localised concern for people who happen to be closest to those best able to care.

What Smith has in mind is to narrow down the concern of (in)equality to some good or set of goods which have to do with people “being well in the most general sense”. He side-steps initially the distinction between equality of resources (inputs) and welfare (outputs), which greatly and properly complicates the application of egalitarian policies. Smith (1994a, p.118) summarised his basic theoretical position in the following manner:

“A review of alternative perspectives on social justice almost twenty years ago led me to advocate the axiom of the more equal the better. Two decades on, and informed by a further review of a burgeoning field, I find myself in the same position. Indeed, I believe that this position can now be argued with greater conviction. Very simply, the perspective proposed is this: that social justice is manifest in reductions in inequality in a process of returning to equality.”

Smith qualifies this statement by stating that this notion is firstly, grounded in the here and now, not in the abstract state of nature or clean slate onto which can be etched perfectly just social arrangements. Secondly, that the perspective is dynamic and concerned with change, with the movement from one state of affairs to another, which can be in stages and might never be completed. And finally, that the objective of reducing inequality, of moving towards equality, need not require a commitment to the achievement of perfect equality, soon or ever. Perfect equality is held out only as
an ideal, practically impossible and not necessarily right. These three points represent Smith's basic and main normative position from which he then develops a geographical social justice project.

Smith's most recent views on the interaction between geographical endeavour and social justice theory were presented in his 1999 Progress in Human Geography lecture "Moral progress in Human Geography: transcending the place of good fortune". Under the subheading "Equalisation in context; good geography" Smith sketches the contours of his vision for a geographical agenda in social justice research. Building from his arguments for social justice as equalisation, Smith suggests geographical research, which aids the clarification and promotion of this process would qualify as moral progress in geography. He is of the opinion that the return of social justice to the geographical agenda would clearly contribute to this.

To Smith the tension between the particularism encouraged in the current post-modern epoch and the universalism of the social sciences' Enlightenment heritage, highlights the distinctive contribution which geography might make to the fields of social justice and ethics. Quoting Nussbaum's work, Smith contends that philosophy cannot perform its function unless fact and experience inform it: that is why the philosopher, while neither a fieldworker nor a politician, should try to get close to the reality she described (this issue is discussed in some length in Chapter Four). It is in this pursuit then, that we are assured that geographers can assist. Smith believes that justice, the morality that people actually practice and the theories that ethicists devise, are embedded within specific sets of social and physical relationships manifested in geographical space, reflecting the particularity of places as well as time. As a consequence of this sensitivity to context, geographers then have much to contribute.

Whilst stressing the imperative of getting closer to reality however, Smith reiterates his personal belief, here framed in Nussbaum's words, that it also points to the importance of theory (political philosophical theory): "We won't learn much from what we see if we do not bring to our fieldwork such theories of justice and human good as we have managed to work out until then." A weakness in current geographical work on moral issues is that it tends not to be closely linked to ethical theory (D.M. Smith, 1999.p.9). This then brings Smith to argue that research at this
new disciplinary interface will have to weave between theory and observation. This is, in his view:

"... how to collapse unhelpful dichotomies or dualism – between absolutism and relativism, sameness and difference, universalism and particularism – in the creative process of scholarship. Michael Walzer has referred to the historical and cultural 'thickening' of those grand 'thin' moral ideals like justice, suggesting that 'there are the makings of a thin and universalist morality inside every thick and particularist morality. Thus when we try to understand what social justice might mean in the specific geographical circumstances of post-apartheid South Africa or post-socialist Eastern Europe, for example, we are working with both the particular and the universal."(D.M. Smith, 1999,p.9-10).

Whilst we may agree with this approach to social justice in geographical endeavour, it is unclear how we are in fact supposed to approach the concept of social justice – what is in fact the research sequence proposed in relation to theoretical and empirical issues? This is explored in the following section but suffice to suggest that there appears to be tension in an argument that first elevates equalisation of condition as a the higher moral value, derived from abstract argument and then supports the notion that the specifics or contexts of the human experience matters to theory. In this case Smith appears to err on the side of theory first, observation second, without indicating clearly what the contours of the geographical research project he is proposing are.

2.6 The Universalist – Particularist debate: a new focus

One of the main foci of recent geographical social justice debates has been that of universal vis-a-vis particularist approaches to the social justice debate. In fact, the general tenor of the current social justice debate appears to be heavily weighted towards the task of resolving this particular debate. In my view, this debate has, in fact, come to confuse a clear geographical contribution to the social justice debate. Under the heading “The post-modern death of Justice” Harvey, for example, laments that:

"Universality is a word which conjures up doubt and suspicion, downright hostility even, in the 'post-modern' times, the belief that universal truths are both discoverable and applicable as guidelines for political-economic action is Nowadays often held to be the chief sin of 'the Enlightenment project' and of the
The post-modernist/post-structuralist (particularist) position discourages the search for universals and has in Harvey's words "render[ed] any application of the concepts of social justice problematic" (Harvey, 1996, p.342). There appears however, to have been abundant signs of frustration with the apparent dead end into which post-modernism and post-structuralism has lead the question of social justice (Harvey, 1992; 1993; 1996; Sayer, 1993; D.M. Smith, 1994c; 1995a; Williams, 1985). Nevertheless, the radical intent of the post-structuralist to "do justice" in a world of heterogeneity and a refusal to apply universal principles rigidly across heterogeneous situations are not without considerable merit. Perhaps the most compelling of the misfortunes involved in the application of universalism is that the application of any universal principle of social justice entails injustice to someone, somewhere. However, on the other hand, questioning the super-imposition of singular rules in a situation of infinite heterogeneity, and insisting upon open-endedness about what justice might mean, can leave a void or worse a rather unpleasant world in which the needs of the exploiters or oppressors can be regarded as "just" or on equivalent terms with those of their victims. David Smith (1995b,p.3) illuminated this point when he argued that relativism can indeed hold many pitfalls, perhaps the most obvious being a sustained approval of what is seen from a Western perspective as being totally unacceptable local practices such as physical mutilation, torture, limited citizenship or access to primary necessities. It would thus appear that relativism denies the possibility of comparative evaluation, stunting our ability to judge human progress, "for how is the vulgar relativist to say life is better now than then, here than there"(D.M. Smith, 1995b,p.3)?

Similarly, Harvey (1992,p.596), points out that the post-modern perspective stresses the powerful "differentials which produce different conceptions of justice and embed them in the struggle over ideological hegemony between classes, races, ethnic and political groupings as well as, across the gender divide". Consequently, interest groups of any persuasion can promote their own conception of justice, emphasising their goals and the rights of whatever grouping to realise whatever they wish from their property or personal aptitudes (D.M.Smith, 1994a,p.290). The conception of justice which is put forward will thus reflect the abilities and relative power of the interested parties to influence the processes of competition between alternative distributional outcomes. In the end the grouping that has the most power will enforce
its conception of justice. If there is no set of universals, there is no way of judging the
moral validity of the arrangements put to the fore. As a result, initiatives have
emerged which attempt to reintroduce at least some interest in the more general
principles of social justice while attending to post-structuralist criticisms of
universalising theories which marginalise multiple “others”.

In this respect there are a number of debates currently underway, which aim at
resurrecting the mobilising power of arguments about justice in ways which either
permit appeal to carefully circumscribed, but nevertheless general, principles or which
more ambitiously, try to build a bridge between the supposed universalism of
modernism and the fragmented particularities left behind by post-structuralist
deconstructions (Harvey, 1996,p.346). Harvey (1996,pp.346-358) and Smith
(1994a,p.289-298), identified particular debates that, in Harvey’s words “resurrect
social justice”, and at least in my view, together offer the best exposition of the
possibility of constructing universal notions of social justice. Smith with his
“Possibility of Universals”, for example, provides a particularly poignant plea to push
ahead with our search for values and ideas that humankind does share. However, one
might share a belief in the possibility of universals but one could still argue that Smith
and Harvey are approaching this issue from an unsatisfactory viewpoint. The
alternative is to assume that there are universals, but that these are necessarily found
in the practices and belief of a society, not the development of an argument with near
pure reference to abstract logic. It is the reasoning behind their position, and not the
position itself that is problematic. Smith's argument for "possible universals", or
"temporary universals" as Harvey suggests, could possibly be strengthened by
acknowledging that different people in different places do in fact support particular
central values, as well as supporting them for the same reasons. Or perhaps more
telling, that "abstract theoretical" argument in favour of universals are always and
necessarily socially determined.

Retracing Iris Young’s arguments, Smith, as in fact Harvey does too, suggests that it is
not universality itself which is the problem but the way the concept has been used to
inhibit universal inclusion and participation. In reaction to this Harvey (1996, p.350),
argues:
"But there are chinks in the armour of Young's idealist conception of a just society...The double meaning of universality then becomes plain: 'universality in the sense of the participation and inclusion of everyone in moral and social life does not imply universality in the sense of adopting a general point of view that leaves behind particular affiliation, feeling, commitments and desires. But... universality is no longer rejected out of hand. It is reinstated (perhaps smuggled back in)...in a dialectical relation to particularity, and group difference. But what constitutes this universality; who is to determine how it is to be specified and in what ways is it really so different from what liberal theory and the Enlightenment all along maintained? Young provides no answer to these questions but, plainly, the question of social justice awaits exactly such a clarification."

Following Eagleton, Smith (1999,p.6) points out that a critical omission on the side of the particularist is a form of reductionism which under-values what persons have in common as natural, material creatures and overestimates the significance of cultural difference. Similarly, this time drawing on Rorty, he points out that common traits of human beings are not substantial enough to dispute a notion of total dissimilarity. We are reminded that human beings regardless of where and who they are experience pain and humiliation, all have the capacity for language and poetry, have sexual instincts, a sense of identity, integral beliefs. In addition, all have needs for nourishment and sleep. A capacity for laughter and for play, powers of reasoning and invention that are, by comparison with other terrestrial species, truly formidable (D.M.Smith, 1999.p.6).

To Smith these are not only natural facts but also carry significant moral weight. Drawing on Sack he points out that the encouragement of different and diverse viewpoints should not obscure the fact that human beings have much in common. He observes that we live in a concrete material environment and we share basic biological, social, intellectual and perhaps even spiritual capacities; we also share the capacity to reason. Losing sight of this basic reality comes from too great an emphasis on difference and diversity. In Smith's opinion Sack is also less than impressed about moves which deny the existence of anything essential and foundational that can lead to shared positions. In this respect Harvey (1996,p.360) echoes that "difference can never be characterised...as absolute otherness, a complete absence of relationship or shared attributes." Thus, diverse reasoning has challenged the contemporary preoccupation with difference and seeks a universal perspective without abandoning the insight gained from recognition of the particularity of persons, place and time.
Whilst this position establishes that there might be a case for the return to universal principles Smith advances his pursuit of universals by suggesting an argument that we might consider human needs as encompassing a set of universal variables that are required by all. He starts this argument by stating that particular needs are sometimes referred to as basic, to stress their urgency and thereby give them special moral force. He acknowledges that attempts to define universal needs reveal differences, some more extensive than other. The point is that he identifies context-independent requirements for human welfare, set by universal, historically constant and culturally invariant needs created by human nature. Even using the most restrictive view taken from O'Neil he reiterates that it is not controversial that human beings need adequate food, shelter and clothing appropriate to their climate, clean water and sanitation and some parental and health care. When these basic needs are not met people become ill and often die prematurely. The fundamental point to his argument is that hostility to relativism can be found in the notion that all people do share one obvious need: to avoid serious harm. This goes beyond the failure to survive in a physical sense, to include impaired participation in the prevailing social milieu (D.M. Smith, 1999).

From this then follows two basic needs, based on Doyal and Gough, for physical health to continue living and functioning effectively and for the personal autonomy or ability to make informed choices about what to do and how to do it in a given societal context. The actual need satisfied, in the form of goods and services may be culturally specific, as opposed to the universality of the basic needs themselves. Suffice to say that in these brief passages it is rather obvious that at least in terms of basic needs, no particularist insistence on difference can jettison the basic fact that universally we all need certain things to survive. A social order which denies such needs can be challenged on the grounds that it is denying our basic humanity, which is usually a stronger argument against difference than is the case that it is flouting our contingent cultural conventions. To suggest that these arguments would satisfy all particularists would not be true and we might quarrel about the extent of human needs, but in the end this points to the fact that absolute and undefined relativism and a total retreat into the particular, is plainly wrong if asserting that there is nothing that is universal (D.M. Smith, 1999).
Whereas this debate might in the end be productive in isolating distributive principles which are morally or philosophically superior to any alternative approach, the place of geography in these debates is in many ways a secondary concern. As stated at the outset of this section, this particular debate which has no current resolution, has come to obscure the development of a clear geographical contribution to the development of the social justice concept.

2.7 Beyond the universalist – particularist debates: a new theme

In geographical social justice discourse, the universalist / particularist debate appears to have become the new theoretical divide, with egalitarian liberals and structuralists of multiple inclination on the one side of the debate and particularists of similarly diverse tradition on the other. In this brief and generalised outline of the geographical social justice debates there are a number of issues that arise. In particular the either/or, universalist/ particularist structure of this debate which appears to have diverted attention from the role of geography in developing either theoretically or empirically derived understandings of social justice.

My particular concern is with the persistent universalist attack on particularists. Harvey and Smith's work provides both insights and justifications to the claim that the particularity of the human condition cannot dissolve human similarity in terms of basic needs and shared humanity. Whilst the position is difficult to counter it does limit the types of issues geographers might consider. In addition, these arguments do far more than simply justify the possibility of universals - they promote very particular ideas about social justice. This debate, particularly as developed by Smith, presupposes that an argument built on basic human needs for survival can constitute a set of distributive principles that will hold true for all material and non-material goods society can distribute. To me this position could result in an over-extension of one set of values into other material and non-material realms of desire and need that does not out of necessity relate to the dictum that we share a common humanity and hence an equal right to all distributable goods.

Contrary to universalist claims, geographical interest in these debates have been aligned to the application of social justice theory, not the development of this concept with reference to geographically and historically located empirical realities. As a result
geographers have generally not engaged in empirically developing the social justice concept. As suggested, Smith is one of the few geographers who actively engage in the development of the social justice concept. Yet even so, his development of the concept is always prior, near "external", to the case studies he deploys. Thus, there is much in his work that reflects the philosophical debates, often presenting and developing his argument in typical "philosophical exposition". The socially just "geography" is, consequently set out and developed prior too the case study of social justice in reality. Even then, those geographies under investigation appear to be an obstacle in the way of attaining his particular theoretical formulations of social justice and socially just geographies – never the source of new meaning for the theoretical development of this concept (e.g. D.M. Smith 1994a; 1995a).

This has resulted in a very particular methodological practice, indicative of universalist theorisation generally (for example, Harvey, 1992; 1996; D.M. Smith 1994a; 1999): setting out the theory, identifying the winning theoretical candidate, conducting a case study and pointing to the injustices that are presented relative to that theoretical position. It is, I agree, desirable to go into the field with conceptions of the human good, as it aids our understanding of social justice in practice. However, if this is to be an useful exercise, we have to equip ourselves with as many theories of social justice as possible, not a limited number of perspectives, which in current universalist geographical social justice debates does not extend beyond the structuralist and egalitarian liberal debates.

In addition, if geographers in the universalist social justice discourse are motivated by developing these debates with reference to a geographical reality, they need to be more critical of the theories they draw upon and illustrate how their development of social justice benefits from empirically derived understandings of social justice. The first step has to be an understanding that neither theory, nor theorists hold the truth in hand. Geographers need to accept that social justice theory presents only interpretations of society and how it ought to distribute its benefits and burdens. Theoretical truth claims are located in time and space, illustrating how society might distribute its benefits and burdens relative to a particular theorist's interpretation of society and its core ideals and values. Social justice theory, because of the theorist's positionality in spatio-historic context, is not above or beyond this context, but always located in and theorised with reference to it. Secondly, to "resurrect social justice" as
Harvey (1996) suggests or to discover Smith's (1994a) "possible universals" by pursuing a geographical project in which the dialectical relationship between theory and practice might develop "temporary universals", requires a different geographical approach. Whereas I support Smith and Harvey's belief that universal values might be found, it first requires a serious reconsideration of what social justice is empirically discovered to mean in different spatio-temporal contexts. In addition, as geographers much more appears to be required in demonstrating the role of space, if there is any, in framing both theoretical and empirical understandings of social justice.

These remarks are clearly sympathetic towards particularist formulations of social justice but should not be confused with a purely relativist understanding of this concept. Although these remarks suggest an empirically driven engagement with social justice and a tentative acceptance that this concept is geographically and historically located, it is not to suggest that understandings of social justice are totally "free-floating" interpretations of how society's benefits and burdens ought to be distributed. Whilst understandings of social justice might differ because of different spatio-temporal realities, it is my contention that these different interpretations are located in place and time and are constructed through different interpretations of different geographical and historical contexts. It is within these parameters that I suggest a distinct geographical approach to social justice might be developed. This approach, I shall contend, can demonstrate that our differentiated interpretations of spatio-temporal context shape the meanings ascribed to the social justice concept. In this sense social justice might be shown to have many different meanings, not understood to be "free-floating" and totally relativist, but rather structured around located interpretations of particular spaces and how they come about.

These observations however, need substantial clarification to be useful as a starting point to a different geographical and empirically driven development of the social justice concept. In light of these observations, the following chapter draws on liberal social justice debates to plot the outlines of a different geographical engagement with social justice that advances a spatial understanding of both theoretical and empirical work in the field and draws them into a new relationship with one another.
Chapter Three

Liberal Theories of Social Justice: Histories and Geographies

"One of the main strengths of geographical practice, long revered, is the local case study...the specifics of the situation, its temporal spatiality, in getting to grips with social justice in reality. This is where aspiring universals, such as the principle of justice as equalisation, or need of place, must be refined in the experience of practice. The main message...is the importance of geography returning to social justice, in theory and in practice."

David Smith (1994a,p.297)

3.1 Introduction

Drawing on liberal social justice debates, this chapter initiates the starting point to an empirical development of the social justice concept. The objective of this chapter is to plot the starting point of an approach to social justice that will give credence to David Smith's suggestion that geographers should return to the local case study and sharpen social justice debates' theoretical claims in the specifics of the situation, its temporal spatiality and get to grips with social justice in reality. In order to explore this route of geographical enquiry, however, a number of assumptions prevalent in the geographical literature on social justice theory first need to be addressed.

Chapter Two illustrated that there is little in the current geographical social justice debate, either universalist or particularist, to suggest that liberal theories of social justice are in any way central to geographers' exploration of this concept. Pronouncements "that justice (in its liberal political philosophical manifestation) continues to pivot around some kind of abstract and pristine ideal - invariably devoid of time and place" (Merrifield and Swyngedouw, 1996,p.3) or in Katznelson's (1996,p.48) view is "disembodied and a-historical ... insufficiently attuned to institutions ... credulous about the character and identities of political actors", suggest that this position is not seen to be fertile ground for geographers. This chapter will argue, to the contrary, that liberal approaches to social justice, like all social justice theories, are historically and geographically located statements, the acknowledgement of which can open productive avenues for an empirical engagement with geographical social justice debates.
Seen against the paucity of liberal social justice debates in geographical enquiry, this chapter first argues that liberal theories, as is the case with all theories of social justice, are not "neutral", "objective", "a-historical" or "a-spatial" statements about social justice that transcend time and place but are located and fixed in specific spatio-historic contexts. Liberal philosophers' understandings of social justice are shaped by their surrounding geographical and historical contexts, leading to the first suggestion that social justice theories are spatially and historically located. The importance of this suggestion is not only of relevance to the liberal theorists focused upon in this chapter but suggestive in relations to all theories of social justice. Thus, this first suggestion reminds geographers that no theory of social justice can lay claim to "impartiality", "objectivity" or "universality" but is always located in time and space – those spatio-temporal realities mediating the meaning theorists accord the social justice concept.

The chapter proceeds by sketching the broad contours of three leading liberal theoretical views on social justice, providing a backdrop against which we may place those social justice understandings explored in the empirical chapters that follow. By doing so, however, this section also illustrates that there are in the theoretical realm various interpretations of what can be seen to constitute the socially just society. Thus, despite these particular theories' placement within a liberal philosophical tradition they have conflicting opinions of the meaning of social justice. The theories discussed here are not representative of the whole range of theoretical deliberations in political philosophy but represent the general contours of the social justice debate as developed within liberal political philosophy. Consequently, attention is focused on John Rawls (a contractarian), Robert Nozick (a libertarian) and Frederich Hayek (a classical liberal). All are liberals (in the broadest possible sense), but argue from different positions and follow different methodologies, in order to reach their respective positions on social justice. The chapter concludes by suggesting that liberal theories are historically and geographically located, not representing impartial, objective and universal truth but particular understandings of how a society's benefits and burdens could be distributed. The acceptance of this conclusion, relevant to all social justice theories geographers might draw upon, provides the key to a new geographical approach to the theorisation of this concept.
3.2 “Placing” liberal social justice theory

James Bayley (1981, p.1) wrote that the concept, justice, is essentially meaningless, “it is an empty place-marker whose content is to be supplied by any given individual’s intelligent conviction about what is desirable”. Given the contested nature of justice, it would be conceivable to argue that ultimately we have no more to go on than the intuitive convictions of intelligent people and that of reasoned systematic defense of those convictions. Though the ideal of justice may not have a single fixed function and accepted meaning, it does appear to have a fixed function or use in the universe of discourse within which states and societies are examined and evaluated. This function is to designate, or to serve as, what Bayley (1981, p.2) refers to as “a place-marker” for those consummate and controlling social and political ideals a society upholds. Accordingly, if freedom is given as a particular society’s consummate ideal, then members of that society will judge their social and political order to be just if it provides a notion of freedom. If the concept of justice functions to designate a consummate ideal, then its content is not a matter of intuitive conviction but can be determined by looking for what a society strives for: freedom, equality, material well-being, religious solidarity and the like. In principle, reasoned agreements as to whether a society is just or not could be reached. Implicit in this reasoning however, is the possibility of different conceptions of what social justice means to a given society. What is essential to understand then, is that the theories of social justice are not numerous because each preceding theory is necessarily “wrong”, but can be seen as different interpretations and adjustments to new societal realities as perceived by individual theorists and disciplinary traditions; the development of these ideas attuned to the perceived realities of the day or epoch.

My first suggestion then is that theoretical abstractions of social justice are geographically and historically located. Thus, the way in which we think about how society’s benefits and burdens ought to be distributed is framed by the geographical and historical context in which we find ourselves. Approaching this proposition at the general level we may consider the following statement about social justice, by Roger Scruton (1996) in his *Dictionary of political thought*:

“One source of confusion concerning the topic [of social justice] is the European discussion has tended to introduce, under the idea of social justice, questions of need, welfare and poverty, giving arguments designed to be as responsive as
possible to relations of social interdependence. American discussion, on the other hand, have emphasised the concept of justice and so see the discussion largely in terms of individual rights (ibid., p.513)."

Scruton goes on to suggest that these tensions are partly because the terms “social” and “justice” pull in different directions, the first towards the condition of society, the second towards the self-affirmation of the individual. The point that needs to be stressed, however, is that theories of social justice have developed out of traditions and in contexts that are thoroughly space and time bound. When viewing the main theories of social justice it is not only the realities of the day, as well as the perceived deficiencies, in the societies within which the authors live or lived which are addressed, it is also the context of the broader academic and cultural traditions in which they stand.

Scruton’s comment reminds us that the general outline of social justice debates is influenced by a social dynamic - implicit in his denotations of “American” and “European” discussions. These discussions are based in regional contexts, as is the development of the subsequent debates. This also provides us with a clue to how we might think of the liberal normative theories of social justice. Are these debates about all societies? Are these debates about a specific type of society? If so, which type of society? And where do we find these societies? Scruton’s observation suggests that normative theories are not built or devised in “pristine” intellectual spaces, nor are they necessarily “devoid of time and place”, as Merrifield and Swyngedouw (1996) would suggest of liberal social justice theorisation, for example. This position is not exceptional and many academic commentators (for example, Kukathas and Pettit, 1990; Young, 1990a) have alluded to the spatial and historic locatedness of the information or knowledge on which theories in a more general sense are built. There are two themes, however, that emerge from this point: the first relating to the locatedness of the social justice debate, and second to the locatedness of the authors in that debate.

To those interested in the development of the social justice concept, the political philosophical debates of the 1970s raging in the United States, presented both an era and place that formed the bedrock of a lengthy and ongoing debate about the meaning of the concept social justice. John Rawls represents the chief initiator of this debate, producing a theory of social justice based on issues in and proposing a resolution for
the American society in which he was based. In the context of the liberal justice debates, Norman Daniels (1983, p.xi) suggested that one of the reasons for the success of *A theory of justice* was that Rawls returned to the tradition of substantive moral and political philosophy. This theory has great coherence and power by appealing to contemporary models of scientific method and findings in the social science, views of a period acceptable to all reasonable people. Whilst Rawls' position on social justice is set out later in the chapter it is sufficient, for the moment, to suggest that Rawls aimed to achieve three goals in *A theory of justice*. First he aimed to reveal the principles of justice that underlie the dominant moral and political views of a period in history (more precisely the 1960s-1970s). Second, he aimed to indicate that these principles could be viewed, as the result of a selection procedure, as what all people could agree is fair, hence that justice involved fairness. And finally he wanted to show that these principles describe a workable social arrangement, given available knowledge from the social sciences.

This latter statement, I believe, provides geographers with a first entry point to the liberal social justice debate - Rawls built his theory from information that social science had produced about particular societies. The philosopher might have abstracted the knowledge into normative statements and in terms of typical philosophical language, but the knowledge of a given society was a principle component of the normative statement (also see Chapter Four pp. 73-79). This, however, immediately suggests that this knowledge (the social science information from which Rawls built his theory) also has its own foundations and implicit agendas, which are spatially and temporarily located. This point is illuminated when Daniels (1983, p. xiv) remarks:

"But, the dominant moral and political ideology of our time, reflected in these principles, is, of course, a form of liberalism. Perhaps it is a more egalitarian liberalism than dominated the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but it is

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1 This statement is made with reference to Kukathas and Pettit's (1990, pp.1-16) suggestion that the two main concerns of political theory, the study of the desirable and the study of the feasible, came apart early in the twentieth century, with the demarcation of philosophy on the one side from economics and politics on the other. Having "come apart" they suggest that each project tended to wither in isolation: the study of the desirable gave way to the analysis of concepts, the study of the feasible focused in the capacity of the market to produce utilitarian or at least Pareto-superior results. In this context, *A Theory of justice* had a dramatic impact as it returned to both, in fact to nothing less than a systematic rethinking about the purpose of government — "a testament of political theory reborn" (p.16).
liberalism nonetheless. Rawls' goal, then is to produce a persuasive, coherent framework for this liberalism.”


“For too long now, the main tradition of moral philosophy has been utilitarian in its broad assumptions: people ought to work for the greatest happiness of the greatest number of their fellow men; minorities should submit to the interests of the majority. But the utilitarian attitudes are incompatible with our moral judgement and with the principles on which our Constitution (USA) rests. It is, therefore, a crucial task of moral and political philosophy to make clear the inadequacy of utilitarian concepts and more important, to provide a persuasive alternative to them.”

This statement provides an additional spatial and temporal focus, specifically that the principles of the American Constitution frame common-sense understandings of social justice and prefigures the manner in which this particular society organises itself. The key point is the notion that the normative theory of Rawls is attuned to the realities of the particular public to which it speaks, in this case an American addressing a predominantly American audience.

Rawls' goal of providing such an alternative is of particular interest because *A theory of justice* was published following a period of intense political struggle and questioning, a period in which a serious challenge to liberalism was mounted. To this effect Brain Barry (1973, p.4) in a challenging critique of Rawls, remarked that:

“Both *A Theory of justice* and Sidgwick's *The methods of ethics*, which appeared just two years short of a century before it, are comprehensive and systematic statements of a thorough-going liberal position; and both, it might be added, appear at a time when liberalism is becoming unfashionable, dismissed in smart circles as shallow compared with the deep (not to say unfathomable) truths of Hegel or a Hegelianized Marx.”

In the USA, the Civil Rights and Black Liberation movements, followed by the Anti-Vietnam War movement, brought millions of people into conflict with existing political institutions and policies. These movements raised, in sharp form,
fundamental questions about the justice of basic political and social institutions, questions about the distribution of liberties and other social goods and questions about the just use of political power. That Rawls worked on his book throughout this period, and may have been responding to his social realities (hence his thoughtful discussion of civil disobedience) did not go unnoticed. Again, it was Marshall Cohen (1972, p. 1), who wrote:

“All the great political philosophers of the past - Plato's, Hobbes's, Rousseau's - have responded to the realities of contemporary politics and it is therefore not surprising that Rawls' penetrating account of the principles to which our public life is committed should appear at a time when these principles are persistently being obscured and betrayed.”

Thus, when we read Rawls we must remind ourselves that the cool exposition of normative theory is not only a debate and exchange of logic and reason but also that these statements were indeed bounded, both spatially and temporally to the society within which he experienced life and created and recreated "abstract" social justice views. The locatedness of the Rawlsian theory of justice in time and space is, however, nowhere more explicit than in his later work summarised in *Political liberalism* (1993). In this work, the arguments of *A theory of justice* were taken further; in the context of Rawls' own intellectual development and response to two decades of debate. An essential feature of *A theory of justice*, was that a well-ordered society associated with "justice as fairness" required that all its citizens endorse this conception on the basis of what Rawls now calls a comprehensive philosophical doctrine (Rawls, 1993, p.xvi).

In *Political liberalism*, however, Rawls argues that:

“Now the serious problem is this. A modern democratic society is characterised not simply by a pluralism of comprehensive religious, philosophical and moral doctrines but by a pluralism of incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines. No one of these doctrines is affirmative by citizens generally. Nor

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2 Rawls wrote in the “Preface” to *A Theory of Justice* that he had tried to bring together into one coherent view the ideas expressed in papers written over “the past dozen years” (p.vii). He makes reference to "Justice as fairness" written in 1958, "Constitutional liberty" (1963) and "Civic disobedience" (1966), in (Rawls, 1971, i-x).

3 Rawls wrote on civil disobedience in Chapter Six of *A theory of justice* (pp.363-391), mentioning minority rights with reference to ethnic minorities in the USA, as well as footnoting literature produced by Martin Luther King.
should one expect that in the foreseeable future one of them, or some other reasonable doctrine, will ever be affirmed by all, or nearly all, citizens” (Rawls, 1993, p.xvi).

And finally under the title “Justice as fairness: political not metaphysical”, Rawls (1985, p.223) writes:

“In this discussion I shall make some general remarks about how I now understand the conception of justice that I have called justice as fairness. I do this because it may seem that this conception depends on philosophical claims I should like to avoid, for example, claims to universal truth, or claims about the essential nature and identity of persons. My aim is to explain why it does not.”

These statements suggest that the Rawlsian liberal theory of justice was acutely aware of time and space, making it clear that his theory is neither universal, a-historical nor a-spatial. In addition, the impact of geography and history enter the debate (again). Rawls made this claim in response to (and amidst) numerous political and theoretical developments in the United States, for example, the increasing emphasis on a politics of difference and the post-structuralist turn in social justice theorisation (for example Young, 1990a).

Robert Nozick developed a critique of Rawls’ theory, as well as systemising his belief in the individual rights of people over property in a rights based theory of justice. Nozick’s Anarchy, state and utopia (1974), contrasts with the moderate and conventional ideological stance of Rawls and astounded reviewers both lay and professional (Paul, 1981,p.1). This work, extolling the virtues of eighteenth century individualism and nineteenth century laissez-faire capitalism seemed in stark contrast to the distributivism that had characterised the speculations of most twentieth century political theory.4 As Jeffery Paul (1981, p.2) remarked:

4 This argument (see for example Barry, 1996, p.58) suggests that the current dominance of liberal egalitarianism over classical liberalism is intellectually upheld by a subtle transformation of concepts that are common to both doctrines. Thus, the individualistic force of classical liberal thought, its commitment to law, rights and personal liberty has been retained by egalitarians but only at the cost of giving these terms a pronounced collectivist, or at least redistributive, twist. Examples of this exploitation of an apparently unavoidable permissiveness in political language are legion. It is justice and rights that provide perhaps the best examples of the process. That notion of moral equality which is at the basis of any liberal theory of justice has now been converted into a demand for economic equality so that the original injunction to treat people equally, under common and impartial rules, has been supplemented by the argument that they
"... much objective contemporary social science tacitly assumes some variant, usually utilitarianism, of distributivism in both its scientific analyses of society and its prescriptions for social betterment. In rejecting distributivist notions of social and economic justice, Nozick has, then, defined a radically different normative paradigm - entitlement theory - within which philosophers, jurists and social scientists may work."

However, the locatedness of this theory is perhaps less obvious than Rawls. A theory of justice was written partly to restore the impaired foundations of the existing ideological paradigm - distributivist liberalism - the theoretical foundation of the Western welfare state and mixed economy, whereas Nozick's statement struck at the conceptual underpinnings of both contemporary Western society and its totalitarian adversaries in the East. What is central to this discussion is that Nozick presented a response to Rawls. Thus, in response to Rawls' interpretation of social justice - tailored to the American societal debates - came another American developing an alternative view of social justice, also developed from and for this same public.

The Hayekian contribution flows forth from a located conversation too, although his debate essentially falls beyond those debates that developed between Rawls and Nozick, as well as their respective supporters. As such, the locatedness of the theorist and the need to develop methods that properly accounted for this was the starting point to Hayek's own belief that social justice theory is a thoroughly located set of arguments, problematising unitary and generalisable views of social justice. Hayek as one of the first commentators to introduce this theme from the 1930s onwards, found it necessary to engage in the social justice debates of the 1970s and as a result wrote about the "Mirage of social justice". Hayek thus became involved in the social justice

ought to be treated as equals. This demand can only be met by substantial redistribution; either as justified compensation for the disadvantaged or as the rather bald demand for equality as a good thing itself.

3 The totalitarian adversaries in the East Nozick refers to were those nations of Communist Eastern Europe, the former USSR, as well as Communist China.

6 In fact, Nozick essentially wrote a reply to Rawls' rights based theory - the rights based dialogue itself derived from the culturally located 1970s American political philosophy movement. Nevertheless, whilst Nozick's theory is insightful and as Steiner (1977,p.120) remarked "the best piece of sustained analytical argument in political philosophy in a very long time", the extraordinary divide between moral visions of the good society as held by the general academic community and society at large, and Nozick's paradigmatic break from convention, made this theory one that has not been taken up by society. Notwithstanding, Nozick stands as a twentieth-century successor to the great classical liberals of the seventeenth century, but also with the shadows of twentieth-century libertarianism as developed by Von Mises and Hayek, cast over his work.
debate by challenging its very existence, drawing on his general methodological concerns with developing meaning for this concept.

Hayek formed his views on the possibilities of social justice, informed and shaped by a radically different environment and personal history from both Rawls and Nozick. Hayek started academic life not as a classic liberal but as a socialist Fabian. Jeremy Shearmur (1996,p.28), remarks that like many of his generation, following the First World War, Hayek was profoundly affected by the social and economic realities of the day, and developed a passionate concern to better the lot of the poor, which led him towards what he later described as a form of Fabian socialism and his wish to study economics. In his Inaugural Address at the LSE in 1933, "The Trends of Economic Thinking", Hayek said, referring to himself and his generation in Vienna immediately after the First World War:

"We felt that the civilisation in which we had grown up had collapsed. We were determined to build a better world and it was this desire to reconstruct society that led many of us to the study of economics. Socialism promised to fulfil our hopes for more rational, more just world" (Hayek, 1981,p.xix).

Thus, Hayek - the academic - was not born a classical liberal, he became one. It was the influence of the Austrian School of Economics, in particular his admiration "for Von Mises, and the 'strength' of his arguments", that gradually won him over to different views. The impact of Von Mises was considerable, and it is interesting that Hayek makes plain that his environment was crucial to the development of his later theoretical arguments. To this end, we might consider the following passages. Hayek tells us:

"When [von Mises] Socialism first appeared in 1922, its impact was profound. It gradually, but fundamentally, altered the outlook of many of the young idealists returning to their studies after the First World War. I know I was one of them" (Hayek, 1981 ,p. xix).

Likewise, Hayek's work is dotted with reference to times and places of conversation and debate. Later in the preface to The counter-revolution of science (1952,p.9), one of the fundamental theoretical statements underlying his critique of social justice theory, time and place is critical to him, in fact a justification for writing The road to serfdom.
(1945) and *The Counter-Revolution of Science* (1952). In response to the Second World War, the preface to this book reads:

"The essays assembled in this volume were written as part of a greater work, that if it ever should be finished, pursues the history of the abuse and decline of reason in modern times. I wrote them on a remote subject matter in a state of intensive concentration with which I reacted to my impotence against the continuous disruption of falling bombs."

This was not the only aspect of space and time that was significant in the development of his work, as the influence of the "European" environment in which he found himself held profound implications for his own ideas about society. The Great War and then the rise of Nazi Germany, the totalitarian systems of government imposed upon Europe by Lenin, Hitler and Stalin, the extension of the social democratic state's power and the abuses that came along with that type of power were, all in his view, the result of state planning and the numerous problems that social order presented. Whilst he held a concern for the poor throughout his life, the failure of government to address this issue without the abuse of freedoms led him to consider different solutions to many of his contemporaries.

To conclude: this discussion illustrated the suggestion that theoretical abstractions of social justice are, at least in some ways, geographically and historically located. If not for the geographical and historical placement of these theorists in American societal turmoil, or the horrors of WW1, Nazi Germany or the rise of socialist Eastern Europe, these theories would probably not have been possible. The question then arises as to what constructions of social justice these theorists developed? The following section provides the basic framework of these theorists' understanding of social justice. Whilst recounting their general characteristics, this section simultaneously underlines and illuminates that even in a theoretical realm where theorists share a liberal intellectual foundation, understandings of social justice are differentiated and contested.

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7 Hayek developed his work on spontaneous orders throughout his life but *The road to serfdom* (1945) remains the most accessible example of his response to general shortcomings in the manner state structures the human condition.
3.3 Three liberal interpretations of social justice

I have argued that Rawls, Nozick and Hayek (as with all theorists), constructed theories of social justice with reference to geographically and historically located interpretations of the realities of their life-worlds. These realities produced three highly divergent understandings of social justice. Whilst all three shared a liberal tradition and found themselves in Western industrialised countries, they emphasised different aspects of their reality, prioritising different characteristics central to that society. Whilst none of these three theorists questioned the fundamental principle of a basic right to freedom of association and the rule of law, the shared sympathies ended there. In the following section I shall investigate how Rawls filled Bayley’s “empty place-marker” with a meaning that defended the status quo in the USA, prioritising a distributive system that would work towards an “end-state” in which the society would distribute its benefits and burdens so as to place the worst-off in a better-off position, thus proposing amendments to the original liberal doctrine. Nozick defended another key feature of this society – private property rights, arguing that the process by which transactions led to different distributions had to be agreed upon and distributions rectified where this was not followed. Unlike Rawls, no patterned distribution was deemed more desirable than another. Finally, Hayek in Law, legislation and liberty (1976) set out to defend yet another cherished value – liberty – and in the process challenged the whole notion of social justice on the grounds that it would destroy liberty. The underlying observation, however, is that at the theoretical level social justice is contested and elicits multiple meanings.

3.3.1 Rawls – A theory of Justice

John Rawls’ project culminated in A theory of justice (1971). Rawls argued that justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought. The goal of his work was to develop a moral theory of justice. For him moral thinking was a fully rational, highly systematic activity. Rawls suggested that one might think of a public conception of justice as constituting the fundamental character of a well-ordered association. Thus, the primary subject of justice is the basic structure of society. Rawls assumed that conflicts are inevitable in any society, and that morality is a necessary regulative mechanism for settling such conflicts. He argued (1971, p.4) that:
"Although society is a co-operative venture for mutual advantage, it is typically marked by conflict as well as by an identity of interests. Thus principles are needed for choosing among the various social arrangements which determine [the] division of advantages and for underwriting an agreement on the proper distributive shares. These requirements define the role of justice."

Thus, his conception of justice was that it should provide a standard against which we can assess the distributive aspects of the basic structure of society. It serves as a point of comparison to be used in appraising the ways in which social institutions distribute to individuals the benefits and burdens of their shared social existence (Phillips, 1986,p.54-55). Taken together, he attempted to reconcile a liberal ideal of political obligation with a redistributive conception of social justice. The elements of his approach are, the social contract, the "original position" and "justice as fairness" positions.

The social contract is a contract neither explicit nor tacit, but rather hypothetical. The determination of justice is based on an arrangement involving an enquiry into whether it would be the outcome of a social contract made under certain conditions. The original position is based on the idea of the just arrangement being formed by abstraction from all actual social conditions so as to appeal to rationality alone. By deploying a veil of ignorance - an idea with its roots in Kant’s categorical imperative - which is to be drawn over social reality, we can choose from behind this veil a social arrangement that would then be acceptable to all. The original position is fair, and what is chosen as a result of it is just, since it makes no a priori discrimination among members of society. Hence the resulting theory is one of "justice as fairness".

Rawls argues that two principles emerge from the thought experiment involved in the postulation of an original position. First, an arrangement is just if and only if (a) each person has an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for all; (b) social and economic inequalities should only exist if they can be reasonably expected to better the position of the least advantaged, and are attached to offices and positions open to all. In speaking of basic liberties in the first principle, Rawls is referring to freedom of speech and assembly, freedom to hold property, and freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure (1971,p.61). All citizens in a just society are equally entitled to these liberties. The second principle stresses that position of office in the hierarchy of organisations must be equally open to all, but it does not require
that the distribution of wealth and status or power be equal. Whatever the distribution, however, it must be to everyone’s advantage. These two principles are arranged in serial order, with the principle of equal liberty having absolute priority over the second. In his words (Rawls, 1971, p.61) “the ordering means that a departure from the institutions of equal liberty required by the first principle cannot be justified by, or compensated for, by greater social and economic advantage”.

According to Phillips (1986, p.58), this emphasis on the priority of liberty is of crucial importance to Rawls’ theory, and has frequently been misunderstood by his critics. The precedence of liberty over the second principle of justice means that liberty can be restricted only for the sake of liberty itself. Only when those with lesser liberty require compensation, can there be a restriction of other people’s liberty. Accordingly, Rawls (1971, p.62-63) formulated the priority rule: The principles of justice are to be ranked in lexical order and therefore liberty can be restricted only for the sake of liberty. There are two cases: (i) a less extensive liberty shared by all, and (ii) a less than equal liberty must be acceptable to those citizens with the lesser liberty. Thus, condition (b) is not supposed to apply until (a) is satisfied, and is itself an application of the difference principle. The difference principle is a criterion of his theory according to which situation (a) is to be preferred to situation (b) only if the least advantaged member of society is better off in (a) than the least advantaged individual would be in (b). By virtue of the element of abstraction in the original position, rational choice must concern itself with the position of the worst off, whoever s/he might be. The two principles define the just original position; all other arrangements are just to the extent that they can be traced back, via just transactions, to such a position.

Rawls’ theory, one might concede, is in many ways something of a “status quo” theory. Status quo referring to the fact that the end-state his theory presents is in effect recognisable in current government arrangements in most Western industrialised countries. In fact, his theory seems reminiscent of the ideals of the welfare state. From the Rawlsian perspective human agents are categorised in a socio-economic hierarchy; those who are most well off through to those who are worst-off. A systematic redistribution of material and possibly non-material goods takes place via a “neutral agent”\(^8\), by means of a mechanism such as progressive taxation, so as to channel

\(^8\) The notion of relationships and responsibilities in Rawls’ theory as commonly interpreted in any given domain are at least in part second-guessed by a third party, a governmental official or office.
goods to those less well endowed. The intent is that a society might strive towards a more equal distribution of material and non-material goods, however, equality is not sought *per se*, and his concern is rather that those in the worst-off position have to improve their lot over the longer term. Should that mean that inequality increases, it has to be to the greatest benefit of the worst-off, placing them in a better position than if goods for example were equally distributed.

The relationship between the two polar opposites – rich and poor – is one of indirect economic linkage. The responsibility of the most well off is that of provider, as the unknown and un-intentioned benefactor. Those receiving the benefit from the redistribution are thus related to the benefactor by means of the distributing agency, in an unknown dependence or receivership capacity. The responsibility of the least well-off to the well-off, at least as it is understood from a Rawlsian perspective, is unknown, only that should these receivers somehow improve their position, a similar demand would be made on them to help the least worst-off. Thus relationships and responsibilities of those in a Rawlsian society are not direct but indirect, generally, determined by the distributive agency, commonly the state. Nevertheless, his ideas are presented as universal – using his veil of ignorance – true for human agents throughout time and space. To Rawls' credit, as seen in the previous section, he has recently acknowledged the limits to the applicability of this theory. The foundation upon which this theory is built is, however, the product of his own intellectual grappling with his known society: his thoughts are ultimately embedded in that society too.

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Usually understood as the national government, though regional and local governments could be incorporated.

9 According to Kukathas and Pettit (1990, pp.142-145) the shifts in emphasis in Rawls later work is increasingly a reliance on the feasibility arguments which predominate Part One of his book and correspondingly down-playing considerations of desirability. Rawls thinks that the important question is that of how to maintain an enduring social unity in a pluralist society like America. The task of political philosophy is not to find the answer to the question of what would be the most desirable principles of justice to govern a good society but to develop workable or feasible principles. Consequently, the contractarian device of the original position is now re-interpreted by Rawls as a solution to the problem of finding a suitably feasible conception. It is a device used to model the reasoning of persons in modern society. The constraints on rational choice it imposes are taken to reflect the most important values and commitments to freedom and equality latent in the public political culture of a democratic (not any type) society (1985, p.252). Under the reasonable conditions these constraints express, rational choice produces the principles of justice all can accept. Such principles amount to a conception of justice, which is stable, because they are principles, which would be chosen by that society. These principles are therefore feasible.
3.3.2 Nozick – Anarchy, state and utopia

Whilst Rawls' theory is forward-looking and presents a particular end-state in which inequality is only justifiable in order to generate a surplus which can be redistributed to the least advantaged, Nozick's theory is historical in the sense that it focuses on the process by which property transfers have taken place. Thus, in contrast to Rawls' theory, which is concerned with patterns of distribution (the end-state), Nozick focuses on the processes (procedural justice) through which distributions are established. He is of the opinion that it is the history of distribution, rather than its pattern that determines whether or not a distribution is just. His standpoint is similar to Locke's position on the justice of competition; namely, that it is the way in which competition is carried out, not the result that counts.\(^{10}\) Thus, it is the acts themselves that are of paramount importance so far as justice is concerned. Nozick's *Anarchy, state and utopia* (1974), sets forth a complex restatement of what in many ways might be seen as a Lockean theory of the state, justice and private property. Beginning from the individualistic assumption that there is no true political entity other than the individual, that only individuals have rights (defined in a Kantian sense)\(^{11}\), he presents a defence of private property, of accumulation, and of social and political inequalities, not as things good in themselves, but as things which can be removed only by denying the rights of individuals. Nozick believes that conditions can be laid down for determining when property is justly acquired and justly transferred.

Framing Nozick's book is his notion of *entitlement theory*. He argues that Rawls' theory of justice violates people's rights and therefore, cannot be morally justified. In common with most other theories of justice, Rawls' theory ignores the issue of

\(^{10}\)Nozick builds on the idea that natural rights exist in a state of nature and do not require the absolute protection and control of Hobbs' sovereign for their recognition. They are specific individual rights and cannot be removed or limited except by the consent of those possessing them, a process which probably extends only to freedom of action and property and not to life and limb. All government, since it involves the limitation of the freedom of the subject and his subjection to a higher power, must, therefore, be the result of consent if it is to be legitimate and no government is made legitimate in any other way. Locke brings powerful arguments against the idea of an independent hereditary principle of government and against theories of legitimacy that try to bypass the need for consent on the part of the governed (Scruton, 1996, p.384).

\(^{11}\) The language of rights has the function in moral and legal discourse of laying limits to what can be done: a right is to be respected, and can be disrespected only by doing wrong. Kant took up the idea in his ambitious philosophy of practical reason. Kant argued that all persons must be treated as ends in themselves, that this is the fundamental right and that reason alone compels us to comply with it. Thus rights cannot simply be set aside in the interest of policy, precisely because rights are trumps in the hands of the individual who possesses them.
people's entitlements. It forgets that whatever is to be distributed comes already tied to particular individuals. Theories of distributive justice focus only on the end distribution of holdings and pay little or no attention to the process by which holdings are acquired. Theories of justice are also patterned in that they specify that a distribution is to vary along some natural dimension, weighted sum of natural dimensions, or lexicographic ordering of natural dimensions (Nozick, 1974, p.156). Distribution according to need, merit, work, and so on, are all patterned. Nozick (1974,p.159-160) argues that to:

"... think that the task of a theory of distributive justice is to fill in the blank into 'each according to his _' is to be predisposed to search for a pattern; and the separate treatment of 'from each according to his _'treats production and distribution as two separate and independent issues."

The major weakness of end-state and patterned principles of distributive justice is that they can only be achieved and maintained by continuous interference with people's lives (i.e. violating their rights). Because of such interference, Nozick rejects the patterned and end-state principles. For him, whether a distribution is just or not depends on how it comes about. If the world were wholly just, then according to Nozick (1974,p.151), "the following inductive definition would exhaustively cover the subject of justice in holdings:

1. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in acquisition is entitled to that holding.
2. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in transfer, from someone else entitled to the holding, is entitled to the holding.
3. No one is entitled to a holding except by (repeated) applications of 1 and 2."

Nozick's entitlement theory is concerned with the subject of justice in holdings, consisting of three parts. First, is the question of the original acquisition of holdings. The second topic focuses on the transfer of holdings from one individual to another. These two principles constitute the principle of justice in acquisition and transfer. The third topic concerns the existence of past injustices - that being the violation of the aforementioned two principles - and focuses on the rectification of injustices in holdings. Furthermore, it can be shown that there may be just holdings of large accumulations, or just distributions, which are vastly unequal, and so on. Any theory of distributive justice, which concentrates not on just transfer, but on the end state of
distribution is, according to Nozick, bound to do violence to our far surer and more philosophically defensible ideas of the just transaction, and so should be rejected as a covert justification of injustice. In this way, he argues against many ideas of redistribution and in favour of certain kinds of private property (Scruton, 1996, p.385). The key point, however, that we should take forward in this discussion is that the pattern of distributions are not a reflection of social justice, but that the process by which a distribution is attained is of issue. Furthermore, the additional crucial point to his theory is that should the process turn out illegitimate in terms of transfers, rectification has to restore the distribution of goods to its historically legal owner.

3.3.3 Hayek – The mirage of social justice

In contrast to Rawls and Nozick, who attempted to provide a theory of social justice, Hayek challenged the very notion that social justice constitutes a feasible social project. Hayek’s challenge appears to be unknown to most geographers and his impact on the social justice discourse in geography appears negligible. The only mention of Hayek, for example, in Smith’s Geography and social justice relates to his declaration surrounding the importance of private property and the emphasis placed on the minimisation of tyranny. Other recent book-length collections such as Merrifield and Swyngedouw’s (1996) “The urbanisation of injustice”, which in many respects is highly critical of the neo-liberal resurgence of the past two decades, fail to include a single reference to Hayek. Whilst this might be for good reasons, his controversial challenge to social justice holds key points of consideration, not least because of his belief in the multiple responses a notion of social justice can illicit - responses so fragmented that no general unitary theory could possibly accommodate this diversity. Hayek’s understanding of social justice has, however, to be seen in relation to his broader project (Hayek, 1945; 1961; 1976; 1988). Consequently, I shall briefly sketch his approach to social science prior to indicating his particular understanding of social justice.

One of Hayek’s greatest contributions is to be found in his development of hermeneutic social science, built on his adherence to methodological individualism. Like all theorists who call themselves methodological individualists, Hayek criticises social theory that deduces individual action from autonomous social structures. Hayek was, however, also extremely critical of the atomistic, reductionist social theory, which
is usually labelled methodological individualist. In Burczak’s (1994) view, Hayek’s notion of subjectivism leads – paradoxical as this may sound – to a non-reductionist, non-essentialist methodological individualism.

Hayek intended his understanding of methodological individualism to be a foil against two kinds of reductionism: Cartesian individualism commonly exhibited in neo-classical economics; and holistic social theory characteristic of traditional Marxism. In Hayek’s (1948) essay “Individualism: True and False” he distinguished his vision of methodological individualism from the Cartesian view. He called his view of individualism, true individualism, and he posed this against the “false” individualism of the Cartesians. False individualists, Hayek suggests, attempt to understand social phenomena in terms of isolated, self-contained individuals who are able, using the power of reason, to design optimal institutions. He places such thinkers as social contract theorists (thus theorists such as Rawls), economic planners (such as Socialists) and legal positivists within this tradition.

In opposition to the “false” individualists, Hayek believes it is misleading to view individuals as somehow separate from society. Because Hayek defines “true” individualism as an attempt to understand those forces which determined the social life of humans, he argues that:

“... this fact should by itself be sufficient to refute the silliest of misunderstanding: the belief that individualism postulated (or bases its arguments on the assumption of) the existence of isolated or self-contained individuals, instead of starting from men whose whole nature and character is determined by their existence in society” (1948, p.6).

Hayek acknowledges that there are social influences on individual action, that people are inherently social creatures. Consequently, Hayek insists:

“... that there is no other way towards an understanding of social phenomena but through our understanding of individual actions directed towards other people and guided by their expected behaviour” (1948, p.6).

This is, in Burczak’s (1994) view, because true individualism denies the independent existence of social structures and hence their ability to determine human action. Hayek
employs his notion of "true individualism" not to support the supposed integrity of the autonomous individual but to deny the validity of pre-given social structures that determine human existence. Post-modern liberals like Madison (1990, p.49) have reinforced this view arguing that the “whole point of Hayek’s methodological individualism is not to reduce the whole to the sum of its parts (in the manner of what Hayek refers to as the 'resolution' or 'analytic approach')”. Because the individual is always caught up in a social context, a context that influences understanding and agency, the possibility of reductionism is precluded. Madison believes that the purpose of Hayek’s methodological individualism is to remind us that those irreducible “wholes”, “like society or culture”:

“... are nevertheless not things - ontological entities (such as a group mind) capable of exerting efficient causality on individuals and thus, of ‘explaining’ (in the scientific sense) their actions - but are, rather, as it were, meaning-objects which are not understandable apart from the categories of human understanding and agency, apart that is, from the 'individual’” (Madison, 1990, p. 49-50).

What is apparent in the essay “Individualism: True and False” and more fully developed in *The counter-revolution of science* (1952) is Hayek’s efforts to articulate the notion that there is an irreducible role for interpretation as a guide to human action and, even more significantly, that interpretative ability is determined neither by an all-encompassing reason nor by social structure. Interpretation is a subjective act; it is not a matter of apprehending the objective nature of the world. Moreover, the subjective act of interpretation is always the act of an individual caught within a social context. Hence, Hayek’s ambition to produce a social theory in which the “whole” does not exert “efficient causality” but which also does not eliminate social factors as constituents of individual perception and, therefore, individual action. Burczak believes (1994) that the central role Hayek gives to subjective interpretation and the consequent non-reductionist understanding of human action produced by this subjectivism result in a non-essentialist theory of human agency. Hayek’s subjectivism leads him to a non-essentialist hermeneutical social science.

Within this framework, then, Hayek developed the work he is best known for, the theory of spontaneous orders, in order to justify not only the free market but also the fundamental feature of any rational and self-regulating social order (Hayek, 1945; 1961; 1981; 1988; also see Appendix B for a brief discussion). His late work (1961;
In this work Hayek (1976) suggests that social justice is a mirage – an illusory goal whose pursuit can only lead to disaster. This expression, he thought, described the aspirations which were at the heart of socialism, indeed he argued that “the prevailing belief in social justice is at present probably the gravest threat to most other values of a free civilisation” (Hayek, 1976, pp. 66-67). In fact, “so long as the belief in ‘social justice’ governs political action, this process must progressively approach nearer and nearer to a totalitarian system” (ibid.p.68). Hayek’s argument against social justice is presented in six statements. He was of the opinion that social justice is meaningless, religious, self-contradictory and ideological, that realising any degree of social justice is unfeasible and that aiming to do so must destroy all liberty. His first claim can be seen as semantic. Here the term social justice is seen as “entirely empty and meaningless”. It does not belong to the category of error but to that of nonsense, similar to expressions such as “a moral stone”. Hayek re-formulates this claim in a qualified form, suggesting that social justice is meaningless only in certain conditions, namely in the so-called great society of free men (p.67). Consequently, he argues that "in a society whose members are allowed to use their own knowledge for their own purposes, the term 'social justice' is wholly devoid of meaning or content" (p.96).

Social justice can only be given meaning in a directed or command economy in which the individuals are ordered what to do. Hayek allows that social justice might after all have a certain kind of meaning, even perhaps in a free society, namely a religious or quasi-religious or superstitious one, comparable to the general belief in witches or ghosts. Hayek (1976,p.88) suggests that it is:

“... a sign of the immaturity of our minds that we have not yet outgrown these primitive concepts...moral feelings which express themselves in the demand for 'social justice' derive from an attitude which in more primitive conditions the individual developed towards the members of the small group to which he belonged.”
not deliberately been brought about by men. He argued that injustice couldn’t be attributed to the consequences of an impersonal process that is not intended or foreseen, and that it depends on a multitude of circumstances not known in their totality to anybody. Justice and injustice are thus inapplicable to the results of a spontaneous process – for if injustice is being claimed it must make sense to ask “who is supposed to have been unjust?” More specifically:

“The manner in which the benefits and burdens of society are apportioned by the market mechanism are not unjust nor are they just. The conduct of individuals, in the impersonal process of market allocation, may well be just or unjust but since their wholly just actions will have consequences for others which were neither intended nor foreseen, these effects do not thereby become just or unjust. The contrary supposition - that the results of the spontaneous ordering of the market are capable of being just or unjust - derives from the anthropomorphism or personification by which naive thinking tries to account for all self-ordering processes. Society becomes the new deity to which we complain and clamour for redress if it does not fulfil the expectations it has created.” (Lukes, 1997, p.68).

Hayek contends that in the free society, there is no human agency responsible for differences in human fates, no personal distributing agent whose will or choice determines the relative position of the different persons or groups and thus no individual nor co-operating group of people against which the sufferer would have a just complaint and no conceivable rules of just individual conduct which would at the same time secure a functioning order and prevent such disappointments. In short, since social processes are impersonal, while justice presupposes the deliberate agency of a person or persons, Hayek’s third claim is that the idea of social justice is self-contradictory. In Lukes (1997, p.69) view:

“Hayek as a corollary, maintains that although we have time-honoured political and civil rights - negative rights...protecting individual domains and positive rights to participate in the direction of governmental organisation - there are no positive social and economic human rights or claims to particular benefits to which every human being as such is presumed to be entitled. No one has a claim to justice on society for the provision of particular things which is the duty of that society to provide for us and a claim to such provision can exist only to the extent that we are maintaining an organisation for that purpose.”
Hayek (1976, p.102) continues by arguing that society which produces the means for the satisfaction of most of our needs is not an organisation directed by a conscious will, and could not produce what it does if it were. Thus, in his view, it is meaningless to speak of a right to a condition which nobody has the duty or perhaps even the power, to bring about and it is equally meaningless to speak of a right in the sense of a claim on a spontaneous order, such as society, unless this is meant to imply that somebody has the duty of transforming that cosmos into an organisation and thereby to assume the power of controlling its results. So, since society is a spontaneous order and since nobody has a right to particular state of affairs, unless it is the duty of someone to secure it, Hayek claims that the idea of social and economic rights must be self-contradictory.

Hayek (1976) maintained that appeals to social justice are really just disguised ways of expressing the demands of some particular group. In his view almost every demand for government action on behalf of particular groups is advanced in the name of social justice with the result that opposition to it will rapidly weaken. Governments feel compelled to satisfy the claims of the ever-increasing number of special interests who have learnt to employ the open sesame of social justice. In his view it becomes a humbug - the effectiveness of which the agents of organised interests have learnt successfully to exploit. Hence, far from being an innocent expression of good will towards the least fortunate, it has become a dishonest insinuation that one ought to agree to a demand of some special interest which can give no real reason for it. In short, Hayek’s fourth claim is that the idea of social justice is ideological.

Hayek (1976) implies that it is impossible to preserve a market order while imposing upon it, in the name of social justice, or any other pretext, some pattern of remuneration based on the assessment of an authority possessing the power to enforce it. Hayek is seen to have made two arguments for this assertion. The first is that in a free society agreement can never be secured as to what counts as satisfactory performance, or need, or merit, or desert, or value to society; nor, more seriously can there be agreement as to how to rank these: there is no single hierarchy of ends and the values attached to the different services by different groups of people are incommensurable. Furthermore, Lukes (1997) writes that in Hayek’s view even if such agreement could be secured, no government or planing agency could have access to the knowledge it would need to successfully implement such a pattern. Were such a
conception realisable it would imply that the processes of society should be deliberately directed to particular results by subjects endowed with a conscious mind capable of being guided in its operations by moral principles, yet this is impossible. Thus, Hayek’s fifth claim is that a socially just market order is unworkable.

Hayek is of the opinion that what are all too feasible are pressures upon and misguided attempts by governments to try to achieve some recognisable scheme of distributive justice. However, the more governments try to realise some preconceived patterns of desirable distribution, the more they must subject the position of different individuals and groups to their control. So long as the belief in social justice governs political action, this process must progressively approach nearer and nearer to a totalitarian system. Hayek concedes that the highly interventionist mixed economy existing in most countries today results from governmental measures aiming at what was thought to be required by social justice; his dark prophecy is that aiming further in this direction can only lead to a totalitarian system in which personal freedom would be absent. This then leads him to his sixth claim that striving for social justice is disastrous for liberty.

Hayek’s challenge to social justice has been criticised from multiple angles - many highly technical. To this end recent work by Lukes (1997), Feser (1998) and Johnston (1997; 1998) have provided an outline of some of the most pressing problems with Hayek’s challenge. Of interest to the discussion here is Hayek’s vulnerability to the charge that his methodological individualism obscures other knowledges. It is particularly anti-humanists (for example Foucault) that reveal a weakness in Hayek’s apprehension of the importance language and discourse plays as constituents of perception and guides to action.

As pointed out, Hayek’s methodological individualism is motivated by the belief that a social theory that begins by exploring human action and its epistemic circumstances prevents the holist’s error of positing autonomous social structures that determine human action. Hayek seemingly does not adequately recognise that the way in which society is described influences human action and that a “structural” or “macro-founded” theory like the labour theory of value can be viewed as a particular rhetoric, a call to action, and not an objective and scientific exegesis of the nature of value. Burczak (1994,p.53) indicates for example, that Hayek cautions social scientists against
treating “wholes” or “collectives” as guides to human action. In Hayek’s (1952,p.64) words:

“Is it the ideas which the popular mind has formed about such collectives as society or the economic system, capitalism or imperialism, and other collective entities which the social scientist must regard as no more than provisional theories, popular abstraction and which he (sic) must not mistake for fact? That he completely refrains from treating these pseudo-entities as facts, and that he systematically starts from the concepts which guide individuals in their actions and not from the results of their theorising about their actions, is the characteristic feature of methodological individualism which is closely connected with the subjectivism of the social sciences.”

Burczak goes on to point out that the distinction which Hayek draws between “concepts which guide people in their action” and the “result of their theorising actions” is dubious. Lukes (1997) and Johnson (1997) contributed to this observation arguing that people act in order to serve their “nation”, to achieve “social justice” and to overthrow the rule of “imperialistic” countries. Stating this in more familiar Hayekian frame, people may buy and sell certain commodities and change their saving propensities when they notice reports printed in the newspaper that the aggregate price level or money supply has changed. Clearly, theoretically conceived collectivities impact upon people’s decisions. In light of the importance theory plays as a guide to action, any methodological statement that requires society to be explained solely in terms of individuals and their actions and choices, without any reference to social structures, is problematic. David Ley (1985) reaches a similar conclusion, suggesting that believing collectivities as theoretical entities can have no impact on choice is inconsistent with Hayek’s assumption of limited, imperfect knowledge and not required by methodological individualism. The important point is that theoretically or otherwise conceived collectivities might be part of the context within which individuals, groups or communities function and can provide a call for action under the rubric of greater social justice.

Notwithstanding, the central role Hayek ascribed to recognising the importance of context bound interpretation, seeking an open-minded and critical reflective sensibility in theorising societal action, provides a different approach to the closed nature of grand theory and foundationalism apparent in various meta-theoretical claim about
the meaning of social justice. His open-ended, anti-foundationalist approach to social justice provide geographers a starting point to approach the meaning of social justice afresh, as an "empty place-marker" which can be filled with new interpretations, sensitive to geographically and historically located meanings ascribed to the social justice concept.

3.4 Conclusion

In this chapter it was argued that liberal theorisation of social justice, like all theoretical developments of this concept, involves historically and geographically located statements about how society's benefits and burdens ought to be distributed. Whilst these theorists share a general support for liberalism, the theoretical claims they make regarding social justice are shaped, formulated and reformulated with reference to their differentiated interpretations of different historical and geographical realities, resulting in three very distinctive approaches to social justice. Whilst the two substantive theories of social justice (thus Rawls and Nozick) provide a framework from which to engage with social justice debates, it is my contention that Hayek's dismissal of the social justice concept in fact provides geographers extraordinary scope to explore the spatiality of social justice and develop a distinctively geographical social justice contribution. At the core of his concerns is that no statement about social justice, be it liberal or otherwise, is an objective interpretation of how society's benefits and burdens ought to be distributed. Theories about social justice are always located and interpreted through particular historical and geographical contexts in which both the theorist and the individual, communities or society's find themselves. The possibilities of this argument in relation to geographical research are illustrated in the following chapter.
4.1 Introduction

This chapter suggests that Hayek's challenge to the notion of a *unitary* conception of social justice provide geographers with a theoretical space from which to explore the possible impact spatiality has on the construction of different understandings of social justice. This chapter plots the contours of an engagement with social justice that enable geographical work to illustrate that geography and those histories that underpin its development represent key variables to the construction of the meaning of social justice. This discussion, consequently, proposes a different, empirically driven route by which geographers might return to social justice in theory and practice - insisting on empirical reality as the foundation of any theoretical development of the social justice concept.

The chapter proceeds to seek out the relationship between social justice theory and the actual beliefs of ordinary subjects' views of social justice. Meta-theoretical perspectives on social justice, such as those by Rawls or Nozick are by necessity resistant to change based upon new empirical findings. Nevertheless, there are arguments that can be deployed to enable empirical geographical contributions to the development of this concept's meaning. Following the work of Miller (1992), Swift *et al* (1995) and Marshall *et al* (1997), it is argued that a re-thinking of normative debates, in the light of spatio-historic interpretations of contemporary and past social realities, provide the "empirical foundations", as Elster (1992) would suggest, upon which philosophy may build its normative work. These arguments, in tandem with Hayek's insights, enable new routes of geographical development of the social justice concept with reference to an empirical geographical social justice project.

The chapter explores the suggestion that the spatiality of social justice is central to the meanings it is accorded. Revisiting empirical accounts that illustrate how social justice is understood differently by different societies, aspects of the spatiality of social justice emerge. It is suggested that social justice understandings are, with reference to empirical evidence, geographically and historically differentiated. Thus not only do the spaces and times in which theorists develop their normative statements influence
the theories they construct but so too do different societies in different spatial and
temporal realities have different understandings of social justice. Taking this statement
further, a brief review of empirical accounts of social justice will support a further
suggestion, that social justice understandings are also differentiated within particular
localities and with reference to different scales. This chapter concludes by recasting
these theoretical concerns into an exploratory geographical project that investigates
the spatiality of social justice and illustrates that understandings of this concept are
historically and geographically located.

4.2 Empirical accounts of social justice

The general understanding of the Hayekian challenge to social justice is that he
denies the concept per se (Lukes, 1997; Johnson, 1997; Shearmur, 1996). This is,
however, in my view an incorrect interpretation of Hayek. Hayek's critique of social
justice should, as Shearmur (1996) suggests, be understood as "institutional" in
character, in the sense of being grounded in specific ideas about the institutional
requirements of a liberal market order as a social system. Hayek is arguing that the
realisation of the ideal of social justice is not compatible with a liberal market order, in
which he believes we are currently living. Hayek's challenge to social justice is based
on the belief that there are incompatibilities between the operation of a market-based
social order and the achievement of social justice. What Hayek argues is that within
such a social order, distributional issues are (for the most part) not a matter of
deliberate activity. Rather, they are – in Hayek's argument – the result of rewards that
people happen to receive, as a result of what their goods or services are able to
command in the particular situation in which they are offered, and where these
rewards are the product of disaggregated decision-taking on the part of economic
agents throughout the entire economy. From Hayek's perspective, the complexity of
the processes which lead to distributional consequences means that even if the actors
in some economy wished to bring about some particular distributional pattern it
would be impossible to have access to the kind of information that would be needed to
reward people on the basis of merit.

Hayek's challenge to social justice is based in scepticism about what theories of this
concept prescribe as the necessary action of human behaviour. Thus, the objectives of
a Rawlsian theory of social justice, for example, are built on a presupposition that
human beings will act in a certain manner in the experimental (abstract) conditions behind a veil of ignorance. Yet it is Hayek's belief that human action cannot be reduced to such logical action, because these actions are neither determined by an all-encompassing reason, nor by social structures alone (this belief is, as seen in the development of post-modern geography, an increasingly accepted and plausible argument). As a result of this belief, Hayek argues that the theorist cannot know what people will do or how they will act, with regards to distributional issues, because of an inherent necessity to follow only certain lines of reasoning. Because people have access to countless layers of interpreted information, which are situated and interpreted through lenses such as history, culture, religion and geography, there is little "logical" reason why they should or will behave in such predictable fashion. The crux of Hayek’s arguments revolves around the questioning of the information base from which Rawls, for example, is arguing. What Hayek finds problematic is that subjective observation, of the object of study’s subjective and multiple mediated understandings of the world, becomes a prescription of action to be taken by all human agents.

Thus, Hayek challenges the central notions of social justice theorists in exposing their arguments to various problems associated with the knowledge-base on which they base their extrapolations for societal action, adding an additional constraint of proving how dynamic these theories are in terms of adjusting to different contexts. Whilst the aim of studying how different subjects think about constructs such as social justice may be reasonable, the additional step of providing a framework of how we ought to construct social relationships between people, institutions and places is more problematic. It ignores deeper seated issues of knowing, especially in relation to claims that the respective theories can capture the diversity of agents' actions, beliefs and desires, for example, at different times and in different places.

It is this Hayekian insistence on knowing, in the face of an empirical reality, what social justice means to people, that opens the space for a new geographical project. The use of a Hayekian approach to social justice can be an enabling process by which geographers can attempt to construct truly geographical theories of social justice. As the previous chapter illustrated, even within the theoretical realm history and geography are central in the manner this concept is theorised. Geographers can broaden their investigation to illustrate how geography and history impacts upon the meanings "ordinary people” ascribe to social justice. This exploration presents a large
canvas from which to approach social justice and provides geographers with the
starting point of arguments in which a spatialised theorisation of the social justice
concept is possible.

An empirical approach to social justice does not, however, imply that all social justice
theory needs to be discarded. The insistence upon an empirical development of the
social justice concept based on how individuals understand social justice can be
developed with reference to existing theory too. This would require geographers to
focus on the relationship between the existing body of social justice theory and
ordinary subjects' actual belief about social justice. Following this route of enquiry,
empirical geographical projects can influence the direction in which theoretical work
on the social justice concept develops.

On the face of it, it might be suggested that there is little reason for the political
philosopher to pay attention to the findings of social scientists generally and
geographers in particular. The justification of moral principles by Rawls, for example,
occupies different logical spaces from the description and explanation of the moral
principles to which the people in the "real world" actually subscribe. One could
suggest that more "empirical" research is unlikely to contribute to political-theoretical
debates, mainly because the philosophical task of justification remains largely immune
from whatever one might discover about the justice beliefs current in any particular
society. In addition, as seen from our earlier discussion of Rawls, Nozick and Hayek,
political theorists' motivations for supporting or devising a particular view of justice is
invariably rather complex and generally developed over many years, even decades.
Consequently, it would be rather surprising if "ordinary people" arrived at similarly
measured conclusions. Swift et al (1995,p.17) illustrated this point, quoting an
anonymous referee commenting on the International Social Justice Project's request for
funding:

"Surveys of popular opinion on these topics seem to me to be of little academic
value. The great debate about justice that has been in progress since the time of
Plato has thrown up many difficulties. But we will not be helped in the least in the
resolution of these difficulties by knowledge of the quirks of public opinion.
Justice is, one might also say, a semi-technical notion. It is the topic discussed by
Plato in the Republic, by Aquinas in Summa Theologia, and by Mill in Utilitarianism:
there are obvious continuities between views of these very different thinkers."
Someone who knows nothing of this material is hardly in a position to contribute to the resolution of our problems. It would seem therefore a waste of time to survey the views of people who are not in the position to judge the issues.”

Seen in this light, the conclusion appears to be that normal people are simply wrong in advocating distributive principles that more careful thought, or more refined moral sense, would lead them to reject. These views, however, may be contrasted with Miller’s (1992) arguments suggesting that empirical beliefs can be regarded as “data” against which theories of justice may be “tested”. Or as Elster (1992) suggests, that theories of justice need so-called “empirical foundation” and that these might, in fact, be provided by studies of the manner in which institutions allocate the scarce resources at their disposal.

Obviously, there are some very complex philosophical issues at stake here and it is not my aim to provide definitive treatment of this matter. Nevertheless, it is instructive to consider some of Swift et al’s (1995, p.18-19) suggestions in distinguishing ways in which empirical research into normative beliefs held by social actors might be thought of as important to political philosophy. This potentially opens new research agendas for philosophers and geographers alike. Swift, Marshall, Burgoyne and Routh (1995) first present a rather uncontroversial statement suggesting that knowing others think differently gives the philosopher, or at least one with a sense of humility and fallibility, ground for caution. In fact, they quote Elster (1992) as arguing that “the knowledge that others hold or practice very different conceptions should make him (sic.) [the theorist] scrutinise his own opinions with extra care”(Swift et al, 1995 .p.18). Nevertheless, in this case the philosopher may still end up rejecting popular opinion. Thus, descriptive and explanatory empirical research can be helpful for the normative project, despite this role being merely external. In this case, however, there is still no serious suggestion that what other people think, or why they think it, could do more than give the philosopher reason to reconsider his/ her own argument and intuitions.

Swift et al’s (1995, p.19) second consideration of why empirical research might be of interest to the political theorist is that conceptions of justice that fail sufficiently to correspond to ordinary thinking are doomed to failure, no matter how sound they may be in philosophical terms. Quoting Dunn, they observe that “if historical agents are to be provided with reasons for acting, they must be furnished with reasons which are reasons for them” (ibid., p.19; italics in original). In addition to ensuring that an
argument is presented in such a way that it can actually motivate those to whom it is addressed there is, however, another point. This is that it may be strategically justified to compromise with opponents for the sake of achieving, on balance, better outcomes than would be achieved by insisting on pure truth.

The boundaries of political possibility are to a large extent set by popular opinion, so that judging what can be done politically requires knowledge of that opinion. Swift et al (1995) add to this the claim firstly, that it makes little sense to advocate that which is “impossible” to achieve. Second that the responsible theorist should worry about the sets of feasible outcomes given the status quo. And finally, that a person has a variety of moral reasons for taking lay beliefs into account when constructing normative theory. Nevertheless, one does not need to regard those beliefs as making any difference to the truth about justice, for the conclusion may well be simply that justice is unattainable and will be so while popular opinion remains as it is. However, one will have reason to take them into account when offering prescriptions here and now.

The third argument put forward by Swift et al (1995, p.19) - as to why popular beliefs might bear on political philosophies of justice - is much stronger. The idea presented is that the right answer in politics, in this case the distributive principles that are justified for the society in question may be internally related to lay beliefs themselves. Whereas the second argument regarded those beliefs merely as constraints upon the feasibility of achieving a just society and the justification of principles of justice as occurring quite independently of popular beliefs, the third argument claims that at least part of the answer to the question of how goods should be distributed is to be found by looking at the way that people think that they ought to be distributed. Swift et al presents two versions of the claim that empirical beliefs have a constitutive role to play in the justificatory project. Seen in one way, there is the anti-foundationalist ("anti-philosophical") position, which simply rejects the idea that there is anything else to which one might appeal other than a society’s “shared meanings” and “shared understandings”. On the other hand, however, there is the position that holds that there are good (possibly “foundational”) moral reasons why one should respect the opinions and judgements of our fellow citizens. Following this second view, it is not so much a matter that there is no other manner by which to arrive at normative principles (what Rorty refers to as “historico-sociological description of the way we
live now) as it is rather that people have normative reasons to accord moral weight to
the beliefs of relevant others (Swift, et al, p.20).

The anti-foundationalist version of this claim is in fact not clearly supported by the
influential theorists, although Rorty (1990) counts as one of the most explicit
supporters. According to Rorty, this position can, for example, be attributed to Rawls
in his later work in Political liberalism (1993). Rorty claims that his theory of justice is
political and not metaphysical, indicating how liberal democracy can apparently get
along without philosophical presuppositions, thus requiring only history and
sociology (Rorty, 1990,p.284). Read properly, however, Rawls’ claim that we should
seriously consider certain fundamental ideas seen as implicit in the public political
culture of a democratic society, not only because they represent “the way we live
now” but rather because we have reason to value a society where coercion is not used,
except in ways that are publicly justifiable to its members.

Simplifying the argument, it would appear that what Rawls is suggesting is that it is
valuable to note that people want to live in a society where coercion is not used
(except in a ways that are publicly justifiable). Consequently, the importance of public
justifiability leads the political theorist to see “society’s main institutions and their
accepted forms of interpretation...as a fund of implicitly shared ideas and
principles”(Rawls, 1993,pp.13-14). The idea of society as a fair scheme of co-operation
between free and equal citizens is such an idea, which is articulated by Rawls in terms
of the imaginative construct of the “original position”; and from that device of
representation, then, emerges a substantive theory of distributive justice.

Seen in a different light, Rawls provides a constitutive role to the ideas shared by his
fellow citizens for independently justified moral reasons, not because those shared
ideas are all there are. If it is asked why it matters that society be publicly justified and
hence why political philosophy should take seriously those shared ideas, the answer is
in terms of what Rawls calls the “liberal principle of legitimacy”. In Rawls'
(1993,p.137) words:

“Our exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is exercised in
accordance with a constitution, the essentials of which all citizens as free and
equal may reasonably be expected to endorse, in the light of principles and ideals,
acceptable to their common human reason.”
Rawls is subsequently led to espouse a methodology constraining him to work out ideas latent in our public culture by his distinctively liberal understanding of the proper relation between the individual and the state. On this view, the political philosopher has moral reason to care not about truth as such, but about truth that can be justified publicly.

Taken together it can be argued that there are reasons to suggest theoretical use for empirical accounts of social justice. The suggestions in this section were three-fold. First it was argued that studies focused on the interpretations people give to the meaning of social justice are plausible. Such an approach presents the opportunity for geographers to indicate that theorists have to reckon with these interpretations in the construction of philosophical accounts of social justice. The second suggestion was more general, arguing that a conception of social justice that fails to sufficiently correspond to ordinary thinking about social justice is doomed as a call for political action, irrespective of philosophical soundness. Finally, it was suggested that at least part of the answer to the question of how goods should be distributed in a society is found by looking at the way people think that they ought to be distributed.

The way people think goods need or ought to be distributed is, however, also located in space and time. As the geographical and historical "place" of the social justice theorists was illustrated in Chapter Three to shape the types of theories of social justice they developed, the same argument can be extended to the views "ordinary people" hold of social justice. The following section will illustrate this argument, suggesting that interpretations of social justice, as recovered from empirical analysis, demonstrate that this concept's meaning is geographically and historically located.

4.3 Differentiated understandings of social justice

Drawing on a literature that supports the notion that there is theoretical use for empirical research into what social justice is interpreted to mean in a general public, this section illustrates some aspects of the spatiality of social justice. As such, it considers studies that aim to provide empirical foundations to test and direct existing social justice theorisation and possible future requirements. It also provides a framework from which to develop the geographical engagement with social justice.
reported in the chapters that follow. Drawing on these empirical studies, this section also introduces the claim that understandings of social justice are differentiated over space, that these understandings of social justice are located in particular histories and geographies and that social justice is contested across class and other social cleavages: all themes that will be developed in greater detail in the empirical chapters that follow.

Miller (1992, pp.586-588), in a review of empirical studies focused on social justice beliefs aimed to indicate how these beliefs were nationally differentiated among a number of industrialised capitalist democracies. Although there is not as yet, systematic cross-national studies of beliefs about distributive justice, there are a number of ad hoc comparative studies at both macro and micro levels. Using the United States as the focus of comparison, Miller (1992) reported that differences (in social justice understandings) are quite considerable, especially in those cases of societies whose social structure and culture are radically at variance with that of the USA. Apparently, in the case of advanced capitalist democracies, the contrasts are less marked, but there is a general tendency for the United States to occupy a different position on issues such as general attitudes to equality and inequality.

Miller reports that there were quite considerable differences to be found. For example, it was indicated that there was substantial variance between countries such as the United States and a number of European states in relation to income differences. In European countries such as Italy and West Germany these differences were interpreted as being too large, whilst in the USA this view was substantially less pronounced (see for example, Bell and Robinson, 1978; K. Smith 1989). Miller (1992,p.586) explained this variance, for example, between the United Kingdom and United States in the following terms:

"As one might expect (given underlying cultural similarities), the United Kingdom and the United States are close in their citizens' general beliefs about justice and somewhat less over the more practical question of the government's responsibility to promote social justice, where the American tradition of anti-governmentalism makes itself felt, particularly on the issue of welfare provision."

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1 I have to point out, as Miller did in his recent review, that there are grounds for skepticism on the quality and relevance of the empirical work that has been done in some cases. The point however, is not to make a definitive argument but to illustrate a more general observation that understandings of social justice differ according to specific contexts.
To illuminate this point of "tradition"\textsuperscript{2}, Miller reports that sharper differences emerge from a three-sided comparison between the United States, Germany and Sweden, using experiments where subjects were asked to rank order contribution, need and equality rules as means of allocating a range of resources (see for example, Tornblom and Foa, 1983). In this study it emerged that whereas American businessmen favoured the contribution rule for most resources and American students favoured it for money and status, Swedish students were egalitarian in their preference and consistently opposed to the contribution rule. The German students adopted an intermediate position, favouring the latter rule for status but not for money. In Miller's mind these differences can be explained for the following reason:

"This pattern of responses correspond to the differences in political culture that one would normally attribute to these three societies, with the United State displaying the highest degree of individualism, Sweden the highest degree of social solidarity and Germany occupying an intermediate position representing a blend of capitalist and social democratic ideology" (Miller, 1992, p.587).

We need not probe too deeply in either culture/society to recognise that both history and spatial location are key variables in explaining these differences (see for example, Hobsbawm, 1994). This evidence also prefigures a further point, that though these societies are broadly speaking democratic, industrialised, capitalist countries there is differentiation between these societies too. This begs the question whether there would be differentiated notions of social justice internal to each country? I shall return to this question later, but will first consider whether there are differences between the industrial societies of the West and developing countries in terms of social justice beliefs.

Miller (1992,p.587) reports that very few comparisons have yet been attempted between understandings of social justice in developed and developing countries. Drawing on studies by Murphy-Berman (1984) and Tallman and Ihinger-Tallman (1979), however, he suggests that if we were systematically to compare societies with well-developed capitalist economies with those in which markets relations have not yet come to occupy such a central position, we would find quite significant differences.

\textsuperscript{2} We might re-call Scrutons earlier (see Chapter Three) remark concerning the differentiated exposition of the social justice debates in American work, as opposed to that in Europe, explained with reference to cultural and historical differences between these societies.
in conceptions of social justice. In particular, we are told, the pre-eminence of dessert
criteria, which was a major theme running through many of the Western society
empirical studies he reviewed, may be radically weakened if we look elsewhere. The
point Miller was communicating was that there might be a very real difference to how
people in the developing world view the notion of social justice. Thus, not only is
there a need for social justice theories to be sensitive and respond to differences in the
"North" but that people in the "South" might understand social justice in a radically
different manner (see for example Miller, 1992).

Similarly though I would suggest that we may consider historical time and argue that
understandings of social justice are not stable over time but change, sometimes
dramatically. Here we may consider the different types of economic policies countries
in different places pursued at different times. We may consider, for example, the
United States and ask why certain policies were pursued at certain times. Miller made
reference to the tradition of anti-governmentalism in the United States. However, in
the USA one of the most severe breaks with this country's historical trend of
individualism and anti-governmentalism can be found in the introduction of the "New
Deal", under Roosevelt in the 1930s (see for example, Galbraith, 1949; Hawley, 1969).
The reason for the policy break was found in the effects of the great depression of the
1930s on the US society. Social justice understandings at the time took on the notion
that the state had an obligation to redistribute wealth so as to provide for the worst-off
in the 1930s society. These policies were successful, but also led to a neo-conservative
backlash that came as a response to the perceived limitations of this system,
prefiguring the advent of Reagonomics and the retreat of the welfare state, assuming
its more traditional adherence to individual liberty and anti-governmentalist
sentiments (see for example, Galbraith, 1983). Likewise, in the UK the immense
destruction of WW2 led to the notion that the state had to act as redistributive agent to
guarantee the betterment of those in the worst-off position, leading to the introduction
of the extensive welfare state under Beveridge. The welfare state, however, implied a
distribution of society's benefits and burdens that was perceived by some of the

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3 For example in Murphy- Berman (1984) study American and Indian respondents were asked to
judge how a company should allocate a $200 bonus between two employees in light of
information about each person's work performance and domestic needs. The Americans were
inclined to favour either equality or contribution as the basis for distribution, the Indians, on the
other hand, overwhelmingly favoured distribution according to need. In Tallman and Ihinger-
Tallman’s (1979) study in Mexico it was also need, rather than desert criteria that was deemed
more just as criteria for distribution of employment opportunities.
electorate to limit individual's economic actions and the creation of wealth. The enormous problems of the welfare state in the late 1970s and the "undermining" of wealth generation by overly progressive taxation, for example, arguably lead to economic collapse and the Thatcherite backlash (see for example, Phillips, 1993; Simmons, 1996).

Understandings of social justice are, however, not only spatially differentiated at the national level and changing over time but are also socially, geographically and historically differentiated within particular localities. In this respect we could consider variables, such as gender or class or race categories, internal to a particular country or region. Following the work of Alves and Rossi (1978), Robinson and Bell (1978) and Beedle and Taylor-Gooby (1983), for example, it is suggested that justice beliefs between and in different social economic classes differ. Thus not only are social justice beliefs different in the United States from Britain, but within each society they differ too. Drawing on the work of Hochschild (1981), Kluegel and Smith (1986), Lane (1962), McClosky and Zallar (1984) questions relating to whether the working classes were significantly more egalitarian in its beliefs about social justice than the middle class within the same society, demonstrate some surprising conclusions.

The most interesting example is that working-class subjects (in America) generally endorsed rather than rejected the dominant belief in the fairness of income differentials based on skill, effort and achievement. This was particularly evident in the interview studies of Lane (1962) and Hochschild (1981). Lane, for example, found that working-class men rejected the proposition that incomes should be equal. This, however, did not make class an irrelevancy to beliefs about justice and desert. Most studies, according to Miller (1992, p.583), find some correlation between a low rank on one of the class measures and egalitarianism. The relationships appear easiest to establish when it is defined in terms of income. In its most general sense there was a cross-class consensus on what constitutes a socially just distribution. However, where they exist he aimed to suggest two broad avenues of inquiry. If one appeals to the idea that beliefs about justice are a rationalisation of self-interest, people will tend to endorse the view of justice which, if implemented, would work to their relative advantage. At the individual level, it has often been observed that people tend to regard a small percentage increment on their current income as fair pay for the job they are doing. Transporting this to the social level, Miller (1992) suggests that we
would expect to find people at the low end of the income scale favouring its compression and those near to the top in favour of stretching it out, and this would give a familiar and straightforward explanation for the differences in belief unearthed in empirical studies of social justice. An alternative approach, potentially very useful to geographers, is to relate differences of belief to differences in social context. Here it could be argued that lower-class respondents, for example, tend to have greater exposure to solidaristic relationships and less exposure to competitive relationships than higher-class respondents do. Thus, the linking assumption would be that a person’s immediate social experience colours his or her general view of society so that, for example, someone who experiences a high level of solidarity in his or her everyday relationships will be inclined also to conceive society in solidaristic terms and therefore to use the appropriate criteria in making judgements of social justice. Seen in this light we may finally suggest that social justice understandings are differentiated within localities.

These observations enable a further conclusion, illuminating the differentiated nature of social justice at different scales. Beyond our discussion that geography and history shape understandings of social justice, the implicit point in the above discussion has been that different scales illuminate different understandings of social justice. We have seen how there are broad or general differences in how key characteristics of social justice are differentiated by tradition, for example, in Scruton’s observation of “American” and “European” discussions. We have also observed that social justice is differentiated in terms of the “developed” or “developing” nature of the economy. We have also indicated that differences exist between countries within Europe, for example, between Sweden and Germany. So too have we seen differences between different strata within a society, for example, in the USA. Thus social justice is interpreted differently by rich people as opposed to poor people. The point is that as we draw different boundaries, different understandings of social justice emerge. Whilst residents of the USA hold a different general understandings of social justice to, for example, those in the UK, we find that if we search deeper, drawing boundaries within the UK or in the USA, we find that understandings of social justice might be expected to vary from one place to another within each country as well.
These observations, whilst general and somewhat sketchy, point to a number of concerns central to geographical investigation, some of the possibilities of which are explored in the next section.

4.4 Towards a geographical project

Illuminating the differentiated understandings of social justice in studies that empirically seek to record the meanings ascribed to social justice by people with different locational, cultural and socio-economic characteristics proposes multiple themes of geographical enquiry. A key feature of the discussion was that it could be shown, even if only tentatively, that understandings of social justice are differentiated over space and time. Two important points arise from this observation. The first is that the meaning of social justice is not seen as holding a singular meaning but many. It is suggested in these observations that the social justice concept does not exhibit a unitary set of characteristics or principles to which different people in different places or in different sectors of the social order subscribe. The second point is that different variables were shown to be important to framing or (partially) explaining these differentiated meanings accorded to the social justice concept. Of particular interest to geographers is that place, time and position in the social order were shown to have an impact on the meaning of social justice.

The illustration of differentiated understandings of social justice between people in different places, at different times and with reference to differential positioning in the social order, touch upon central themes in the study of human geography itself – the concern with the spatial and temporal differentiation and organisation of human activity. It is my contention that these studies hold clear potential for geographical investigation. In particular, it illustrates that by accepting the notion that there is an intellectual space for investigating empirical understandings of social justice, far more can potentially be achieved than merely knowing what social justice is understood to mean to particular theorists and what spatial implications those theories hold. For me this acknowledgement suggests at least three new levels of geographical engagement with the social justice debate.

In the first instance - and demonstrated in the previous section - the geographer can aim at uncovering what the social justice concept represents with reference to multiple
variables and institutions, within countless spatio-temporal settings. Such a project mimics aspects of the studies reported above. It would suggest either direct or indirect observation of how social justice is reflected through the statements of people or as recoverable through their actions.

The second geographical project is directly related to the first and would involve a comparison of these empirical descriptions of social justice with the various social justice debates currently found in the social sciences. Here geographers would attempt to indicate which theoretical understandings of social justice are currently supported in multiple geographical and historical contexts. As such these debates would directly aim at testing the validity of various social justice claims and contribute to theoretical debates by isolating those theories that found resonance in an empirical reality and those which are clearly discarded.

The third geographical project would allude to a geographical theorisation of the social justice concept developed with reference to empirical illustrations of the social justice concept's meaning in different spatio-temporal settings. Here geographers would aim to illustrate, for example with reference to Hayek's invitation for the development of the social sciences, that a deeper structure could be excavated from those empirical understandings of social justice at our disposal. Geographers would seek out similarities in those factors that influence the types of meanings people ascribe to the social justice concept. The main task of the geographer would be to illustrate that its principle explanatory construct - space - constitutes one of those core elements theorists have to consider in the theoretical development of social justice. As a result, the conclusion geographers would aim to achieve is to point out that social justice meanings are intimately related to space - thus that space directly shapes the meaning of social justice and underpins the differentiated and located understandings people have of this concept. Thus, the geographical task would not only be to illustrate the historically and spatially differentiated meaning of social justice but also that space shapes the nature of those ideas of social justice, how they are negotiated and change through and with reference to different spatialities.

The material in the chapters that follow contributes to the development of these themes in an empirical, grounded interpretation of understandings of social justice as reflected in the development of South African cities. Each chapter, dealing with a
particular chronological period in the history of South African cities, will address these themes, although each will highlight different aspects of the spatiality of social justice. Chapter Five presents some of the basic contours leading to the construction and demise of urban apartheid. In particular this investigation focuses on urban development as it affected the Black, Coloured and Indian population groups. In particular it is argued that historically and geographically located interpretations of urban space shaped the types of relationships that developed between different racial communities in turn underpinning a racially differentiated acceptance of responsibility towards particular communities. It is then suggested that changes in urban space led to the acknowledgement of the interdependency of urban communities and the need to change the manner in which society’s benefits and burdens were distributed. The importance of these historically located understandings of the spatiality of the South African city and its reflection in the manner urban society's benefits and burdens ought to be distributed would remain central features shaping the re-imagination of these cities in the post-apartheid era, the focus of Chapter Six and Seven.

Chapter Six and Seven investigate how the spatiality of urban apartheid came to bear on the understandings of social justice that came into play in the post-apartheid reconstruction of South African cities. Focusing on the re-demarcation of the Cape Metropolitan Area (CMA), these chapters investigate the local government demarcation debates leading to the creation of the City of Tygerberg. This case study demonstrates divergent imaginations of the post-apartheid urban future and in turn reflects on the multiple interpretations of the relationships that existed between different urban communities and the types of responsibilities these relationships engendered. By illustrating the links between interpretations of urban spatiality and its bearing on the types of relationships and responsibilities that this brought about, this discussion demonstrates that understandings of social justice were shaped by different interpretations of urban space.

More specifically Chapter Six focuses on how these understandings of social justice recoverable from the demarcation debates were based upon and constructed through the geography and history of the apartheid city. This chapter illustrates that social justice was understood differently in different places in the city, demonstrating that understandings of social justice are located, differentiated and contested. Chapter Seven focuses on the finalisation of these debates and the dynamics of the intense
political conflicts that followed in the wake of the re-demarcation of the CMA, particularly in Tygerberg. Drawing on these debates this chapter illustrates that differentiated interpretations of the spatiality of the city underpinned different understandings of social justice.

Chapter Eight places these concerns in a contemporary setting, illustrating the dynamics of Tygerberg's subsequent development and its bearing on the production of a post-apartheid understanding of social justice. It is shown that in the wake of the City of Tygerberg's controversial demarcation the spatiality of the city, again, plays a central role in shaping the understanding of social justice displayed by the local government decision-making body that decides how this urban society's benefits and burdens ought to be distributed.

In many respects, the history of South African urban development, the Cape Metropolitan Area and Tygerberg replays a familiar set of apartheid and transitional post-apartheid events, but with new and different nuances. Most significant in this account, though, is the illustration of the role of space and its underlying historical development in shaping and producing differentiated understandings of social justice. To develop this claim Chapter Five then, seeks out the relationship between spatial organisation and understandings of social justice in the early development of South African cities.
5.1 Introduction

This chapter develops an account of the spatiality of social justice as reflected in the construction and demise of urban apartheid. Whilst South African urban history has not been drawn upon to illustrate understandings of social justice – in fact more often quite the contrary, this chapter will argue that South African urban history is replete with understandings of social justice. Focusing on the general contours of South African urban development as it affected the Black, Coloured and Indian populations groups, this chapter first seeks to demonstrate how particular geographical and historical developments led to (White) racially differentiated interpretations of the spatiality of South African cities. In turn, it is suggested that this racialised urban spatiality underpinned racially differentiated access to South African urban resources. Exploring the link between how different racial communities were excluded and included in White interpretations of South African urban spatiality and their access to the city's benefits and burdens, demonstrates that the meaning of social justice was associated with urban spatiality.

To illustrate this suggestion the chapter provides an outline of South Africa's urban development. Attention is first drawn to the general frameworks within which the urban histories of South Africa have been recounted. Thereafter, the general contours of urban development as it affected the Black, Coloured and Indian populations are mapped. The development of the reform apartheid era is briefly captured in a discussion focused on the evolution of Regional Services Councils, Bridging Finance and the one-city initiatives of the mid 1980s.

5.2 Urban segregation in South Africa

The foundations of the South African local government system were laid on 15 August 1836 with the enforcement of the Municipal Ordinance for the Cape Colony (Cloete, 1992, p.188). Ever since, municipalities have enjoyed considerable autonomy within the limits of the powers accorded to them and subject to the control of provincial authorities and the central state (Kendall, 1991, p.29). The principal motivation for the
establishment of municipal and other local authorities was to give the citizens of an urban area, be they cities, towns or villages, the opportunity to provide for those matters which are of local nature and which directly impact on the lives of the local citizenry in an every day fashion (Cloete, 1992,p.187). Historically these matters were the responsibility of the “White City” local authorities who acted as the “guardians” of South Africa’s urban areas demarcated, along racial lines, for the various population groups (Bekker, 1991,p.109).

Urban scholars have often dismissed South African cities, their urbanisation process, urban form and local government system as an aberration (Christopher, 1990). The apartheid city has been seen as a peculiarity of the South African state, with the casual observer of South African urban development frequently reading these urban geographies as a result of the over-zealous mapping of White political power. Mabin (1992,p. 13), however, suggested that South African cities are far less unique or “exceptional” than so many scholars would like to believe, as these arguments contain considerable dangers, such as placing a too strong emphasise on the role of ideology and state, which glosses over much more basic concerns, such as the economics of daily life, differences in racial identity and the manner in which people ascribe meaning to one another and the spaces they inhabit.

One of the greatest pitfalls in studying the construction and demise of segregation in South African cities is the immense range of processes shaping this history. The events leading to the development and evolution of South African urban areas are multiple, involving a long, highly interwoven set of events, spanning both colonial and post-colonial history. Indeed, the genesis of urban segregation in South Africa is obscured and the causes of the segregated form of the city debated at great length (Robinson, 1992,p.126). Urban segregation did not begin in one particular place, at any one particular moment. The story of South Africa’s urban segregation is, in fact, a collection of many beginnings, as is its decline one of ongoing and somewhat tentative endings.

The urban historiography of South Africa has developed along many different theoretical lines. A central concern of these debates has been the nature of the apartheid state in terms of its interventions in urban areas (O’Meara, 1996,p.423). Maylam (1995) in a recent review of studies explaining the imperatives that brought
about South Africa’s particular urban form, suggests that most explanations tend to fall into one of two categories — either stressing a materialist position or social and psychological factors. Material interests appear to have weighed heavily in the drive to explain urban segregation. During the 1970s a vigorous debate among South African social scientists focused on the relationship between capitalism and apartheid (Meth, 1998, K. Smith, 1989). The key protagonists in this debate were a group of Marxist scholars challenging the liberal thesis on South Africa. The debates waged between liberals’ and revisionists over the role of Black reserves and the supply of cheap labour to the emerging industrial economies of the central Witwatersrand and other large urban centres during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, have drawn much attention (Brown et al, 1991). Understandings of migrant labour (Webster, 1978; Van Onselen, 1982; Crush et al, 1991), the agrarian struggle (Bundy, 1979; Beinart, 1982), Black opposition politics (Beinart and Bundy, 1987) and consciousness and culture (Bozzoli, 1979; 1983; 1987; 1991) have been greatly extended and refined. However, as authors such as Posel (1997, p.19-20) have pointed out “a strong tendency in much of the literature has been to conceptualise the state as first and foremost an instrument of capitalist interests” which has led to an “instrumentalism...legacy of the ‘either/or’ formulation of the debate about Apartheid and capitalism”. Thus, as Robinson (1997,p.368) notes, “while the imperatives of nationally organised merchants, mining and industrial capital contributed at times to the consolidation of specific segregative practices, the overall tale of the relations between economy and segregation is much more complex.”

Both Maylam (1995) and Robinson (1997) point to those accounts of the emerging segregation of South Africa which focus on non economic aspects of social processes that encouraged segregationist legislation and outcomes. The seminal contribution of Swanson’s (1976,1977) “Sanitation Syndrome” investigated the official concerns for public health in response to plagues, epidemics and endemic slum conditions and how this played a large part in shaping the form and timing of segregationist efforts, have been highly instructive. Recent literature on the apartheid state looks at state and politics, focusing on the representation and subjectivity, on ideology and the role of ideological transformation in these conflicts within and between state departments and uncovering the discursive construction of social processes concerning race and class in South Africa (Dubow, 1995, Greenberg, 1987). Similarly, Parnell and Mabin (1995) suggest that the local nature of racist discourses that could be established, and
the direct activities of local political agitation in shaping segregation initiatives needs to be acknowledged. A large silence in many of these accounts of segregation has been the salience of race itself, as secondary explanations for the primary racial form of urban areas have been enthusiastically sought out.

Maylam (1995) indicates that a few scholars writing about apartheid have emphasised processes that fall beyond these categories. In this respect, Robinson (1996) in particular has focused on the significance of the organisation of space as crucial to the exercise of state power. Robinson (1996, 1997) has suggested that a persistent absence in the many accounts of the origins and rise of segregation in South Africa, has been the continuous omission of acknowledging the importance of spatiality in the construction of state power. A central theme to her argument rests on an insistence that the survival of the apartheid state was centrally dependent upon the geographies that it created. Thus, the stability of White minority rule was developed and sustained by a firm control over the spatial development of the urban form.

The emphasis in this chapter is on the impact racialised interpretations of urban spatiality had on considerations of social justice. It is suggested that the particular spatiality of the South African city reflected racially differentiated social relations amongst urban residents, developed from an array of material, social and psychological factors. As such this interpretation of urban apartheid does not prioritise individual "categories" of factors but accepts that they all played a role in the development of segregation and apartheid. Instead, the focus is on how different racial groups (and the areas they lived in) were differentially included and excluded in the White interpretation of the spatiality of the city and how this came to bear on the manner resources were distributed in these cities. It is argued that once established, the racially fragmented spatiality and a particular set of accompanying distributive practices came to represent a more general White understanding of the city and how it ought to function. It is my contention that the subsequent introduction of Afrikaner Nationalist government came to harness the spatiality of the segregated South African city reinforcing the existing racially and fiscally fragmented spatiality of these cities.

The layering of these various historically and geographically located materialist, social and psychological considerations in urban space developed a distinctive spatiality - the apartheid city - and came to underpin a narrow racialised understanding of social
justice. In time, the White population came to see these urban environments as desirable and eventually generated a self-replicating notion of what "proper" forms of urban development would entail. By developing modern, productive, White urban environments, the racially segregated spatiality of South African cities became the basis for the anticipated urban future of the White community and the undermining of its particular spatiality perceived as an injustice. Consequently, the spatiality of the South African city as interpreted by its "White guardians", over time became the focus of what social justice was understood to represent to White urban citizens.

To illustrate this interpretation of urban apartheid and social justice the following section reflects upon the early development of South African city and the differentiated inclusion and exclusion of racial communities in the urban geography and resource distributive patterns of these settlements.

5.3 Urban development in South Africa

South African cities developed in a European manner and did not share the dualism\(^1\) so apparent in the colonial cities in Asia and much of North and West Africa (Christopher, 1984,p.73). Despite South African cities' physical intra-urban segregation, these settlements were since the foundation of Cape Town in the mid-seventeenth century primarily, and until the twentieth century, conceived and maintained as unified entities. Whereas residential segregation was always a fact of South African urban morphology, the deliberate separation of these urban areas into "dual cities" occurred quite recently (Davenport, 1991). Christopher (1984,p.73-74), too, points to the long-standing informal, rather than the legislative segregated nature of the South African urban world, illustrating urban segregation as common in most colonial situations and broadly accepted by officials and settlers as the norm. Two distinct strands in urban segregation, however, developed. The first related to the relationship between Europeans and the indigenous population (i.e. White - Black) and the second to the more complex division between Europeans and other immigrant groups, as well as groupings formed as a result of miscegenation (i.e. "White" - "Indian" and "Coloured") (Christopher, 1984; also see Alden, 1996). Subsequently, the

\(^1\) The White colonial powers in South Africa (the Cape and Natal colonies and the Orange River and South African Boer Republics) developed cities in non-urbanised areas. Consequently the builders of these settlements had "a clean slate" from which to construct urban settlements, without reference to existing urban complexes in this region.
situation confronting Black, Coloured and Indian communities in the urban areas varied as each statutory population group underwent a different historical experience.

In retracing the development of urban areas in South Africa, it emerges that Black South Africans experienced persistent exclusion from the outset of urban development, whilst simultaneously the Indian and Coloured groups experienced varying degrees of inclusion. The differentiated inclusion and exclusion of different racial communities into South African cities was not only of relevance to their experience of the urban world in the early development of these cities. It also came to frame their "place" in these cities and their differentiated inclusion or exclusion from decisions about the distribution of urban society's benefits and burdens. The spatiality of inclusion/ exclusion became a geography of different understandings of social justice, extended and replicated into the apartheid, late apartheid and post-apartheid re-construction of the South African cities.

The exclusion of Black South Africans from the city traces its genesis from the early nineteenth century. The first “African locations” developed with mixed motives and by various institutions in the eastern parts of the Cape Colony. Port Elizabeth was the scene of South Africa’s first “location”, demarcated by the London Missionary Society in 1825 as a settlement promoting “civilisation”2 and “Christianity”3 among the new urban dwellers4. In 1855, the municipality of Port Elizabeth established the first locations for control and segregation, as Blacks were forbidden to live in certain sectors of the town (Lemon, 1987,p.210-211). Other Eastern Cape towns, such as East London, along with a host of other frontier towns - Cradock, Graaff-Reinet and Grahamstown - all established locations for Africans in the mid-nineteenth century and can be seen as

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2 There was a seemingly unstoppable desire in the Empire-consciousness of the United Kingdom to bring civilization to Africa. Almost all commentators of the period make repeated reference to an accepted starting-point that European civilization is undoubtedly superior to any other and that it is a positive duty to spread its superior elements through all those regions where European domination extends (Mair, 1936,p.3).

3 One might consider the role of Christianity beyond that of Christian salvation as it was in Comaroff and Comaroff’s (1997, p.20) view “simultaneously about aesthetics and modes of production, about the inscription in the landscape of the imaginative, tactile geometries and about crops, labour and machines.”

4 It was assumed that all native tribes lived in a condition of chaotic savagery which they themselves found very disagreeable. The introduction of locations could, thus also aid in the creation of greater order of those natives living in urban areas (Mair, 1936,p.3).
the founding arenas of formal South African urban segregation (Fox et al., 1991, p. 58; Maylam, 1995, p. 23).  

Elsewhere in South Africa - perhaps more indicative of the norm - the early (mid to late 19th century) years of urban development did not follow any particular "policy" over the settlement or citizenship of "non-European" people. There was, however, some variation in the status accorded to certain "non-European" groupings vis-a-vis the "Natives" or "Africans" who were differentially included in the colonial system. The British colonial regime, for example was, at least in theory, "partially" colour blind, interpreting the status of Indians, in a markedly different manner to the persistently excluded "Natives" (Pachai, 1971). Nevertheless, despite these official positions, racism within the South African British colonies, as well as the Boer Republics increased

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5 A point that needs to be kept in mind, is the development of a strategy which was connected to the promotion and/or defense of "Christian civilization" in a European mould (as seen in Manzo, 1992), which would continuously resurface and eventually be deployed by the NP too.
markedly in the last decades of the nineteenth century (Christopher, 1984, p.74, also see Davenport, 1998; Mair, 1936; Swanson. 1983).

The formation of the Union of South Africa (1910) entrenched White minority rule and started the process of formalising differentiation between the various racial groups, in particular the blanket exclusion of Black South Africans from the national state apparatus. The cementation of Black exclusion in South African cities can also be linked with this period, in particular the development of the Milner regime’s concern for orderliness in the face of African urbanisation. Milner’s government tightened urban segregation and gave the “Native” location regular status on the South African urban landscape, justifying it in terms of an acceptable racial ideology (Davenport, 1991,p.2; also see Dubow, 1995). Notwithstanding this position, segregationist notions remained a rather uncoordinated affair being mostly a matter of ad hoc measures (Parnell and Mabin, 1995). The Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923 (drawing on the Stallard Commission proposals) would, however, address this matter and provide a framework for a more uniform national system of Native Administration, which used municipalities as agents of the central state (Kendall, 1991,p.29).

The increasing influx of Black rural migrants during the 1920s produced acute and growing political uncertainty around the fate and future of the twin essential “fiction” (to use O’Meara’s words) underlying the system of what was then known as segregation (see O’Meara (1996) and Mamdani (1996) for extensive discussions). O’Meara (1996,p.24) suggested the segregationist policies of successive governments had rested on two core “fictions”. First, that the vast majority of the Black population was described as “tribal natives”; living on the land in the “Native Reserves” set aside in the 1913 Lands Act. The second fiction underlying segregation was that “a la Stallard, the size of the urban African population could be restricted primarily according to the labour demands of the resident white population” (Posel, 1997,p.40-41). The implications of this Act were that segregation, both locally (at the residential level) and regionally (at the national level), would be enforced by the WLAs which were delegated the power and responsibility to construct and manage native locations or townships. This new legal framework provided the foundations from which the South African dual city would emerge. (Abbott, 1995; Lemon, 1987, p.213). Important to this discussion is that Black South African were represented as "non-urban", a denotation in which Blacks were not part of the "White city". 
Whilst the Black population was formally segregated from the White population by the early 1920s, the Indian and Coloured communities were not formally excluded from the urban political process, nor spatially relegated to the outer fringes of the urban areas. Different policies with respect to their urban segregation applied in the different regions of pre-Union South Africa (Christopher, 1988). The former Boer republics, for example, were unambiguous in their dealings with the “race issue”, constitutionally restricting both land ownership and the franchise to the White population. In the two British colonies, however, the race issue was approached differently. In the Western Cape, particularly during the second half of the 19th century, segregation was limited to some churches and government schools but was de facto rather than de jure, with both the Black and Coloured population groups enjoying qualified access to the voters role (Bickford-Smith, 1995; Venter, 1974).

In terms of the Coloured community there appeared to have been a “white bias” in favour of this grouping vis-a-vis any of the other “non-white” groups - a position that would persist well into the twentieth century. As late as the 1920s key Afrikaner Nationalists such as Hertzog and Malan actively campaigned for the clear separation of Blacks and Whites in urban areas whilst simultaneously considering the Coloured community as belonging to their own White Afrikaner community. In fact, they even argued for the extension of suffrage for the Coloured community throughout the country (Venter, 1974, p.70). Thus, racism was not “equally” exclusionary of the “non-White” groups. Not being “White” did not necessarily lead to the dissolving of difference internal to that category of people, as it mattered that you were Coloured rather than Black. The Coloured community was a “civilised ally” in the defence of “White civilisation” and the “White” (in particular the Afrikaner) community, helping to protect the White community’s world from the presumably "uncivilised" Blacks (Venter, 1974, p.69). This “preference” would continue during the apartheid era, though in a severely watered-down guise. Nevertheless, it is important that we consider the immense difference with which these communities were seen vis-a-vis Black South Africans as these differences were to lead to differential experiences of urban apartheid (see Debroey, 1990).

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6 In fact, Norval (1996,p.189) writes “that the Coloured population were regarded as ‘an appendix’ to the white community”.

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For the Indian communities, the development of urban segregation was more complex. Anti-Asiatic agitation increased substantially in the first two decades of the twentieth century. This led to the Union government, in 1920, requesting the Lange commission to enquire into the justice of the complaints that the "Europeans" had made concerning the Indian community in South Africa. Palmer (1957, p.80) recounts some of these complaints, revealing some telling views relating to how the Indian community was perceived. The White public, apparently, spoke of the Indians as a "source of danger to the public health" (the well-known sanitation syndrome), owing to their "unclean habits". They pointed to "inferior buildings" as shop premises; their "religion", "language", "colour", "mode of thought", "manners and customs" as so different from those of the "Europeans" that they could not be assimilated into the White urban world. In fact, their very "presence was a menace to Europeans supremacy, etc." (in Palmer, 1957, pp. 79-80). The commission, however, arrived at the conclusion that these generalisations were un-called for. Their standard of living were "quite equal to those of well-to-do Europeans" (ibid., p.80). In fact, as Palmer reports, the Lange commission argued that "it seems monstrous...to suggest that those men, who have by their industry and commercial ability worked themselves up to such a position, should now be forced to move to locations." Subsequently, the Indian community, along with the Coloured community remained financially, politically and administratively part of the "White city", living, often as business and commercial enclaves, in the WLA jurisdictions and part of White South Africans interpretation of the spatiality of the city (Venter, 1974; Western, 1996; also see Christopher, 1994b).

Whilst the outlines of a racially segregated South African city were well established by the 1940s, the rise of Afrikaner Nationalism and apartheid ideology would solidify this position and build upon this configuration of urban space to develop a highly racialised understanding of social justice in the South African city.

5.4 Establishing Urban Apartheid

Although aspects of what represented apartheid urban policy were prefigured in existing legislation, the establishment of apartheid in 1948 ushered in a dramatic change in the way South African cities would develop. Pre-apartheid policies were already aimed at the upliftment of the country's impoverished White communities but apartheid would significantly extend this project. The "poor white" problem of the
first decades of the South African Union was a mainly Afrikaner problem? (Le May, 1995; O'Meara, 1983). The Afrikaner Nationalists' interpreted this position as both a consequence of the urbanisation of the Afrikaner and as O'Meara (1996, p.75) noted, a feeling among Afrikaners that their relative economic deprivation was a result of "pauperisation and domination by the English".

In addition, the rapid urbanisation of Blacks during the 1930s and 1940s also threatened the poor whites' precarious place in the urban environment (their immediate cultural and social life-worlds) and their specific economic interests in the rural (farming) areas. The reason was that Black urbanisation denied cheap Black labour to the Afrikaner farmers, and increasingly threatened the urban Afrikaner's tenuous hold on relative privilege in the city. In fact, even with the poor whites having greater access to the "White City's" opportunities, literally hundreds of poor white families in Johannesburg, for example, were living in "slums" (Callinicos, 1989; also see Le May, 1995). Despite the broader set of factors underlying the poor whites' position, the core debate for the Afrikaner Nationalist was "that the kernel of the native question has shifted to the cities...and that it would be won or lost as a battle to control African urbanisation" (O'Meara, 1996, p.66).

In response, the Afrikaner Nationalist movements argued that control over the state apparatus would aid the achievement of repositioning White Afrikaners and particularly their poor communities in South African society. This programme was framed by the notion that there should be a rectification of the Afrikaner's position towards far greater levels of equality relative to "English" South Africans. By the 1930s an extraordinary array of Afrikaner organisations were developed to actively work towards this goal, covering the whole spectrum of cultural, religious, political and social dimensions of Afrikaner society (see for example Bloomberg, 1990; Wilkens and Strydom, 1978). Many focused on the worst-off (Afrikaner) Whites and the repositioning of this group to the best possible level relative to any alternative distribution of government resources (O'Meara, 1983; 1996). As such, Afrikaner Nationalism at the time represented a radical reworking of how the South African society's material and non material benefits and burdens were distributed –

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7 This statement is made only with reference to the White politics of the day and does not suggest that other racial groupings were not equally or even more severely effected by poverty.
representing a narrow racialised and nationalist understanding of social justice (see for example, Lazar, 1987. O'Meara, 1983).

With the establishment of the Nationalist government in 1948, the state and its institutions were mobilised to fulfil these objectives (O'Meara, 1983; 1996). The segregated urban geography played a central role in enhancing its capacity to realise these goals (see Robinson, 1996). Further controls over Black urbanisation and employment prospects would form an important part of the strategy to develop many of the (re)distributive ideals the Nationalists held (O'Meara, 1983). The development of the apartheid programme was seen in the Populations Registration Act (1950), Group Areas Act (1950), Native Laws Amendment Bill (1952), Bantu Education Act (1953), Reservation of Separate Amenities Act (1953) (to name a few), which would lay the foundation for more rigid racial segregation and domination (Johnson, 1994; Posel, 1997; Wilkinson, 1998). In terms of urban areas a plethora of legislation derived from these apartheid acts, would be introduced.

Moreover, this period ushered in a time when the notion of Black people as "aliens" or "foreigners" in "White" South Africa generally and "White cities" in particular, was cemented into the White spatial imagination. The project of urban apartheid reinforced the denial of South African citizenship to the Black population, which in turn framed the denial of those (equal) duties, responsibilities, rights and privileges that flow from meaningful membership of a society (Lalloo, 1999). In developing legislation to secure the privileged position of the White constituency, however, it not only established a racialised and limited sense of how society's benefits and burdens ought to distributed to focus on the White (Afrikaner) population. It also generated particular spatial formations, which came to underpin these objectives, building and radically extending the broader significance of the already segregated spatiality of the South African city. As such, South African urban geography and a more general Afrikaner project of rectification of historically located political, social and economic inequalities, became inextricably linked to White interpretations of urban spatiality.

5. 5 Developing urban apartheid

Apartheid did not develop a singular uniform and totalising racial strategy but emerged as a dual policy of "total segregation" and "practical" apartheid. Posel (1997)
observed that this position would represent apartheid's so-called long and short-term priorities, respectively. The main result of this two stage process would be that "industries would continue to draw increasingly on African labour, since the presence of Natives in European areas...as labourers [was] essential...It was accepted that the process of African urbanisation had created large detribalised communities" (Posel, 1997, p.67). This would lead to apartheid differentiating between "two categories of Blacks: those who were 'detribalised' and thus de facto permanent city-dwellers, and those who retained 'tribal' identities and links" (ibid.p.67). Despite this distinction, "detribalised" Black communities were still not seen as urban citizens, who had the city as their only "place of residence". In fact, "steps had to be taken" to diminish the number of Blacks in the cities and to "reinstate their tribal links" (in Norval, 1996, p.119).

The development of this "Bantustan strategy" meant that urban Black administration was progressively linked to this idea (Grest, 1988,p.91). Its general effect was to further limit the resources available for urban Black administration, especially the provision of housing. In addition, official representation of urban Black South Africans was confined to limited access to Advisory Boards and Urban Bantu Councils (1961), neither of which had any real power to influence decision making in either the White municipalities or the Administration Boards which controlled Black townships (Lemon, 1987,p.240). The introduction of Bantu Affairs Administration Boards (BAABs) brought about a further fundamental change in the manner in which Black local government would be perceived. BAABs, introduced in 1971, meant that the Black township areas, hitherto managed by their adjacent White Local Authorities (WLA), were handed over to 22 BAABs, which ensured that grand apartheid would be applied systematically and uniformly throughout all urban areas in South Africa (Kendall, 1991,p.30).

More importantly, the already spatially separated townships were now financially and administratively separated from the WLAs too. The severance of links with the WLAs meant that direct municipal subsidies, as well as their professional expertise, were lost. The BAAB Act made no changes to the sources of finance which the municipalities had open to them, i.e. the beer hall income, service charges, housing rents and increasingly the registration and services levies from employers (Bekker and Humphries, 1985,p.130). In addition, WLAs had no choice but to reduce or end
whatever form of cross-subsidisation (mainly in terms of planning/management expertise and particularly housing developments) that might have occurred (but mostly never did), since WLAs no longer had any jurisdiction over the townships and consequently no incentive to transfer funds from the general rates account to the Administration Boards. This reinforced a further deterioration of Black urban living, conditions at odds with the increasingly wealthy White urban world.

Amidst the flurry of legislation imposed upon Black South Africans, the Indian and Coloured communities experienced a different apartheid during this period. In fact, White attitudes towards other racial groupings at the time can perhaps best be summarised in Steven Debroey's (1990, p.455) statement, “Merciless towards Blacks, but some consideration for Coloureds and Indians”. Emblematic of this "consideration" was that it took the apartheid government more than a decade from taking control over the state to suggest fundamental changes to the position of these communities in the management of South African cities.

Notwithstanding, the changing relationship between WLAs and their Coloured and Indian communities surfaced in the early 1960s. Within the new realities of apartheid ideology, the Niemand Committee of Investigation (1961) dealing with the development of the local government requirements for these communities, was probably of greatest importance. This investigation made provision for a phased development of Coloured and Indian local government. The creation of fully independent local authorities, however, never really materialised. In practice nearly all Management Committees (MCs)/Local Affairs Committees (LACs), created for most Coloured and Indian communities, remained under the tutelage of their respective WLAs (Cameron, 1991,p.50).

In addition, the central state, realising that Coloured and Indian representation at the local level had serious deficiencies and sensing the growing solidarity amongst “non-Whites” in the country, sought to co-opt conservative members of the Coloured and Indian communities by introducing MCs/LACs. These committees comprised individuals elected at racially separate ward-based elections. Initially these committees

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8 The Contributions in Respect of Black Labour Act no.29 (1972), was introduced but the income derived from it was used for different purposes from the Services Levy Act.
9 By 1976, for example, no Coloured local government structures existed, and only two Indian Town Boards had been created.
served as advisory bodies to the WLAs on matters relating to the provision of services. They were therefore subordinate to the local authorities. Later, some municipal authorities delegated powers to the MCs. The Provincial Administration also granted a few MCs - Verulam, Isipingo and Umzinto in Natal and Lenasia in Gauteng - fully fledged independent council status (i.e. municipal status). From the outset, however, the majority of Coloureds and Indians regarded the LACs and MCs as powerless structures lacking any form of real authority. These state-imposed, apartheid-based local state agencies drew little support and were therefore plagued by a lack of political legitimacy. Furthermore, the few MCs that progressed to autonomous municipal status lacked the necessary basis for financial self-sufficiency and were burdened by a fiscal crisis (Grest, 1988; Seethal, 1991). Consequently, whilst the apartheid state brutally enforced financial, political, administrative and spatial separation onto the Black population, the Indian and Coloured communities were still mainly administered, financed, controlled and planned by the WLAs.

The 1976-77 uprisings in the townships were a consequence of numerous frustrations and grievances among Black urban South Africans. These developments, however, came to represent far broader struggle challenging the long-standing and racialised assumptions concerning White South Africans' interpretations of an acceptable distribution of society's benefits and burdens. The hallmark of the late 1970s, illustrated in "reform apartheid", represented the differential inclusion of Black South Africans into the “White” urban world and considerations of local government resources. In this respect, the findings of the Riekert Commission (1979) were of central importance. This commission’s approach differed from the traditional apartheid policies insofar as it recognised, for the first time, the right of a limited group of Blacks to reside permanently in the “White” cities. Furthermore, it drew new distinctions between the Black urban “insiders” and the rural “outsiders” in a process attempting to devise a more effective form of influx control (Norval, 1996, p.231).

The Koornhof Bills followed, within the context of the Riekert Commission findings and the reality of the largely discredited Community Councils, aiming at offering Blacks a form of self-government parallel to that of the self-governing homelands (Abbott, 1994,p.203). The Black Local Authority Act (1982) reconstituted the Community Councils into its two signature structures - Town and Village Councils (BLAs), and transferred the bulk of powers formally allocated to the Administration.
Boards to the new local authorities. The fact that the new BLAs were to be self-financing\textsuperscript{10}, in contrast to the old Administration Boards,\textsuperscript{11} was to be one of the core factors that were to lead to the increasing politicisation of the provision of services.

The administrative, political and financial exclusion of the Black community by means of the BLA and their marginalised economic position in the South African economy generally, also further impacted upon the imagination of the WLA and its residents. Townships, in a historical sense and increasingly in terms of their current realities displayed much of what the White community had come to see as non-urban. The differences of the conditions of the BLAs \textit{vis-a-vis} the WLAs and their historically defined urban partners Coloured and Indians, increasingly underlined the notion that Black South Africans could not be part of the "White city".

This era was not only associated with \textit{inter alia} the establishment of BLAs but also the adoption of the so-called tri-cameral Constitution of 1984 (O'Meara, 1996). Many opinions are held about the significance of this particular decision. In the main, these opinions suggest that major tension arose from the apartheid government implementing increasingly different sets of ideas for the statutory population groups that formed part of their reform apartheid policies. Shubane (1991,p.64), argues that the contradiction which arose from granting a municipal franchise to urban Blacks, while simultaneously tying them to the homelands within which to exercise their national franchise, served to focus anti-apartheid agitation among the already highly frustrated townships residents. Nevertheless, the introduction of the BLAs in 1983 marked an important event in the history of South African urban areas. It was the high-point of apartheid in the urban context, representing the total separation of the Black and White communities. In fact, it was the final implementation of legislation for the "total" severance of broad societal linkages between the urban Blacks and Whites. As such, there was at that stage no meaningful flow of resources from the wealth generating WLAs to the increasingly poor BLA areas. The White city and the Black townships were basically independent from one another, the relationships between these areas tenuous at best and consequently the responsibility of WLAs towards BLAs areas at its most limited.

\textsuperscript{10} The BLAs were to be self-financing and their financial resources were no more extensive than licensing fees, house rental and services charges levied on the sub-economic township.

\textsuperscript{11} These Boards were partially funded by the profits made on the Beer Hall sales and levies they charged employers for their registered workers.
The introduction of the tri-cameral parliament and the formation of the House of Representatives and the House of Delegates, representing Coloured and Indian South Africans, again underlined the differentiated nature of the social relations between these groups and the White South Africans. Historically, these communities though always as "junior partners" have been part of the spatiality of the "White city", this constitutional change came to yet again reinforced the differentiated social relations of Whites vis-a-vis Coloured/Indians and Blacks. Beyond representation at the national level, the tri-cameral parliament also gave MCs/LACs a new lease on life, particularly with regard to their status vis-a-vis the WLAs. The new constitution provided the local structures access to the highest level of national government, although access per se was not sufficient to ensure greater influence.

Nevertheless, Cameron (1991, p.52) contends that the reason for this greater influence came about because interests of the government and the Coloured and Indian political parties converged on the issue of giving these representatives greater say in the running of their own affairs. Indeed, it could be possible to argue that at best the MCs/LACs provided for some form of formalised input, on the side of the Coloured and Indian communities, in the running of their respective areas. Despite the tri-cameral constitution and its emphasis on own affairs, these authorities never really became independent. Central to this development impediment was that although MCs/LACs had decision-making power, they were always financially and legally part and parcel of their mother WLAs. Consequently, decisions of the MCs/LACs, potentially at least, had financial and legal consequences beyond their areas of own affairs jurisdiction.

What is particularly interesting about the MCs/LACs both before the tri-cameral parliament and after its implementation, was their inability to gain independence from the WLAs. The irony is that despite the apartheid government's ability to force independence onto the Black townships (as seen in the BLA Act) and the creation of the Homelands earlier, the apartheid government never used this "well-honed" skill on the Coloured and Indian communities. Whereas the apartheid regime ruthlessly removed both Indian and Coloured communities from the "White" group areas, the same vigour was lacking in enforcing local government independence. What makes this position even more interesting was that the apartheid government took the
recommendations of a number of Commissions\textsuperscript{12} into the creation of independent Indian and Coloured local government seriously and took on board the fact that these communities could not become fiscally independent. Thus whereas BLAs had to financially fend for themselves, the Coloured and Indian communities remained within the fiscal system of the WLAs, retaining access to the resource base of the "White city".\textsuperscript{13}

Consequently, by the early 1980s at a time when the apartheid city was institutionally at its most developed, the South African city remained split between White and Black communities but with Coloured and Indian communities part of the White urban world. Whilst the Black urban dwellers were physically, administratively, financially and politically relentlessly and ever increasingly relegated to the urban fringe, the Coloured and Indian community still lived administratively and financially in the fold of the WLAs. Those that benefited little from these arrangements would not accept this narrow and racially determined understanding of social justice. Whereas the Indian and Coloured communities remained part of the WLAs and to a limited extent were provided with the main services to sustain urban living, Black South Africans, locked into the townships and homelands, where increasingly marginalised.

Important to this discussion is that urban apartheid in its most developed form reflected three racially differentiated understandings of how urban society’s benefits and burdens ought to be distributed - all three interpretations intimately linked to

\textsuperscript{12} The Roussouw Report (1960), as well as the Botha Report (1971), found that in the Greater Cape Town area, none of the Coloured areas were in a position to sever the umbilical cord with the mother WLAs. This report identified financial reasons as the main stumbling block. These areas on the whole lacked financial viability because of small or often non-existing rate-generating commercial and industrial areas. In addition, it was pointed out that these areas were dominated by low-ratable, low-cost housing, a shortage of trained staff, a lack of suitable candidates for elected office and the fact that for town planning reasons local authorities viewed Coloured areas as integral parts of the WLA’s jurisdiction. In a scathing report, Theron (1976) pointed to a number of variables, which made local government in the Coloured areas ineffective. The findings, in addition to the complaints lodged by the Association of Management committees of the Cape, led to the Schlebusch Commission in 1978, which attempted to investigate the functioning of the MC system in the Cape Province, with a view to delegate extra powers to these structures.

\textsuperscript{13} A few related suggestions in this regard may be put forward. First, numerically these populations groups did not pose a similar threat to the White urban population, as did the Black population. Secondly, and related to the first, the National Party’s "Verligte" (reform-minded faction of this party) components had been seeking to accommodate the Coloured community on a more equal footing in the political system (as seen above). They could in fact, also grant a similar opportunity to the Indian population without endangering their political dominance. Third, as repeatedly seen in this discussion, historically these communities were an undisputed part of the urban realm of South Africa. (Venter, 1974; Western, 1996).
White understandings of South African urban spatiality. The historically and geographically located ways in which other racial groupings were positioned in White interpretations of urban space impacted upon how other racial communities were included in the resource base of the "White city". There were different understanding of social justice for the Coloured and Indian community vis-a-vis the Black community. Thus the allocation of urban resources internal to the White community was highly redistributive, with wealthy and poor communities having access to relatively similar services levels heavily cross-subsidised from wealthy CBD rates income (Swilling, 1997; World Bank, 1994). For the Coloured and Indian community a similar, if less extensive system was in operation, whilst Black urban residents had to "fend" for themselves. Thus, the "White guardians" (following Bekker's (1991) denotation) of the city simultaneously implemented different understandings of how South African urban society's benefits and burdens ought to be distributed. What is essential to our discussion, in addition, was that these distributive notions were intimately linked to different racial communities being included or excluded from White interpretations of who belonged to "their" urban world.

Black South Africans increasingly opposed these positions. The narrow and racialised understanding of apartheid social justice enabled by its particular urban geography held no benefit to them and needed to be addressed. These challenges would lead to the introduction of new administrative and fiscal arrangements. The "one-city initiatives", bridging finance and regional services councils would all become emblematic of a shift in thinking about the spatiality of the South African city and manner its benefits and burdens were distributed within it – the outlines of which now come into view.

5.6 Linking Black and White Local Authorities

By the early 1980s, the apartheid city was in a state of crisis (Friedman, 1987; Grest 1988, Seethal, 1991; Swilling 1988). Black opposition to the White minority government became a prolonged and sustained "struggle". The State's response to the crisis included a "reform-repression" strategy. This strategy sought to reform the apartheid structures in an effort to win the support of conservative elements among the Black majority and stabilise the political instability Black opposition politics were causing in the South African city and economy more generally (Grest, 1988). The creation of the
BLAs was, in terms of political strategy and local government financing, a monumental mistake, as the new functions granted (forced onto) to these councils necessitated a massive expansion of the local revenue base and resulted in sharp increases in rents, rates and other township levies. These increases sparked-off massive urban unrest amongst the township residents and led to the collapse of BLAs and the introduction of an alternative set of reforms, of which the Regional Services Councils (RSCs) and Bridging Finance (BF) became central elements of the post-1984 reformist agenda (Seethal, 1991; Lemon, 1992).

RSCs and BF were introduced to address the nonviable BLAs arrangements\(^{14}\), while simultaneously retaining the basic framework of apartheid local governance. The RSCs were introduced as an additional local government structure and BF as a resource transfer mechanism.\(^{15}\) RSCs, were envisaged to have two central functions; firstly, to allocate new sources of income for local authorities\(^{16}\) and; secondly, to preside over the provision of certain services within their regions of jurisdiction. The RSCs also represented an attempt to reconcile official insistence on the maintenance of the apartheid framework in local government, with the need to provide services at regional or metropolitan level (Lemon, 1987, p.290). The RSCs established a two-tier structure of service provision in urban areas consisting of lower-level primary local authorities (PLAs) (e.g. WLAs and BLAs), established on a group area premise, operating the local services, and RSCs which provided services over a whole urban region. Representatives from PLAs, remaining management and local affairs committees managed each RSC. The value of PLAs or related institution purchases of RSC services determined representation on these councils. Obviously, this resulted in the over representation of the WLAs, who consumed the most services. The RSCs had many shortcomings. Kendall (1991, p.35), indicated that one of the most important

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\(^{14}\) One might consider this point with reference to work by Anton Lowenberg (1997) and Lowenberg and Kaempfer; 1998) recounting the financial cost of Apartheid.

\(^{15}\) Bridging finance is yet another South Africanism, referring to loans both provincial administrations and RSCs made to BLAs to cover budgetary shortfalls as rent boycotts have deprived councils of operating funds. According to Mandy (1991, p.129) this system had several unfortunate consequences. In many respects, it postponed the realization that fundamental issues of local government finance needed to be faced, additionally, it channeled funds to those BLAs where boycotts have been prevailing to the disadvantage of those whose residents were meeting their obligations to pay services charges.

\(^{16}\) Considering the already bloated proportions of the apartheid government, central government could not impose more pressure on the central fiscus. Consequently, a new form of local government taxation was introduced. The solution took the form of levying business payrolls and turnover, coupled to a denial of business rights to representation.
problems with RSCs related to their undemocratic, secretive and unaccountable nature. These councils primarily served the policies of central government, instead of meeting the needs of local communities. Nevertheless, these councils did, at least in part, succeed in redistributing wealth, although they are said to have done so in a manner that detracted from the dignity and self-esteem of Blacks, as well as masking the chaotic financial position of particularly the BLAs (Kendall, 1991).

The RSC system led to a host of unintended consequences that further exacerbated the fiscal crises of the BLAs. Because of government policy, RSCs spent the bulk of their funds on the development of capital projects in the townships. Though these developments were generally much needed infrastructure investments, the assumption that the respective BLAs had the operating income and administrative capacity to maintain these new roads, sewage systems and electricity networks, was a serious oversight. Indeed, even if protest action, such as the rent and services boycotts had not taken place, it would have remained highly unlikely that BLAs could have afforded to maintain the new assets adequately. Besides not having the finances to maintain this infrastructure, BLAs did not have the technical or administrative capacity to maintain these new assets, nor could they afford to hire such expertise. In the end, personnel from nearby WLAs and the provincial administrations were seconded for this purpose and RSCs were instructed by the provincial administration to subsidise the operating costs of the BLAs. The inclusion of the BLAs into the RSCs led to a redefinition of the role of the latter, now charged with the task of keeping the financially nonviable BLAs afloat.

An additional strategy for keeping the ailing BLAs afloat was the granting of bridging finance (BF). As has been pointed out, the BLAs showed budget deficits from their inception. The BLAs budget deficits were initially expected as part of the transitional phase towards financial independence. Consequently, government initially stepped in to "balance the books", with so-called bridging finance. Township communities, however, negated this fiscal life-support system through well-organised rent and services boycotts. This frustrated the government's efforts to keep the BLAs financially afloat and eventually forced the acceptance that townships could no longer be regarded as financially self-reliant entities. Nonetheless, government pushed ahead with the result that "non-viable bridging finance" became a permanent entry on the annual provincial budgets. Subsequently, townships, at least financially, became
unofficial appendices of the RSCs and the provincial administration budgets, although these arrangements maintained the basic framework of the urban apartheid structure at the national political and administrative level.

Following Swilling et al (1991, p.177), one might suggest that these institutions had a significant symbolic role. The creation of the RSCs and bridging finance, in fact, represented an acknowledgement that BLAs were financially not viable. It became evident that vastly larger amounts of capital were needed for capital projects in the townships. The significant feature of RSCs was that the revenue from these levies and transfers was not allocated to the existing local authorities, but instead went to regional authorities (RSCs) that could spend the funds in local authority jurisdictions other than those from where they were raised. Consequently, it became a mechanism aimed at providing infrastructure to areas that could not hope to finance such projects from their existing tax base (Norval, 1996, p.245). Symbolically, at least, both RSCs and BF meant that at the local government level, local resources were distributed beyond the WLA boundaries to areas in need, pointing to wealthier local government institutions acknowledging fiscal responsibility for all communities living in an functional urban unit.

The redirection of the role of RSCs to that of redistributing locally derived taxes and particularly the subsidisation of the running costs of townships, also indicated, that in terms of local government finance, local government in South Africa had entered a new era. In fact, the creation of the RSCs ushered in an era in which South African cities were increasingly re-imagined as financially interdependent spaces. Whereas the imagination of the urban areas as a place for all was a long way off, this institution marks the break-down of the fiscal exclusion of the Black townships which started in 1923 and which was taken to its "logical" conclusion with the Black Local Authorities Act in 1982. These funding mechanisms, also implemented to appease urban instability and an undermining of the White wealth base, drove home the realisation that the current distribution of urban society's benefits and burdens did not reflect those held by many other urban residents and was ultimately unsustainable. The pressing question that arose would be how to address this new reality. The tentative answers to this question would be explored in the so-called "one-city" initiatives.
5.7 The one city initiative - new urban visions

The development of RSCs as a redistributive agency would appear to have acknowledged some sort of fiscal interdependency between the various “White” and “Black” managed urban areas (Solomon, 1990). This was not, however, the only indication that the apartheid city was entering an era in which the city, urban citizenship and social justice were being re-considered by a number of “other” urban stakeholders. In this respect the “one-city” initiatives of the mid-1980s, referred to the idea of an unitary city; the reintegration of the fragmented South African urban form and sharing of its collective resources to the benefit of all its inhabitants in a broadly participatory framework. Atkinson’s (1991a,p.271-289) investigation into the politics of the one-city concept developed from the notion that national political issues since 1910 concerned the central structure of the government and the ethnic ownership of the state. Until the mid eighties, city residents were too concerned with identity within nation-wide movements to give their identity as city-dweller much thought. In her view the mid 1980s marks the start of an era in which some sought a new urban order, marking the beginning of negotiated settlements for a collective urban future, only to be concluded in the mid 1990s. 17

The genesis of the move to the reintegration of the apartheid city can, according to Atkinson (1991a,p.272) and Heymans (1991, p.264), be traced back to 1985 when a number of "one-city" initiatives took place in Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, East London, Soweto and Pietermaritzburg (see for example Shubane, 1989; Seethal, 1991; Swilling, 1989). These initiatives encompassed many forms of political action, ranging from boycotts to negotiations. On the whole, these firsts steps to negotiate settlements had broadly similar goals: the redesigning of local government on a non racial basis and redrawing municipal jurisdictions to include all racial groups within a single municipality. These initiatives, which in the end proved fruitless, were remarkable achievements, particularly given the deep racial divisions between the negotiators and

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17 The reason for this change is not always clear. It is argued here that the greater interest in the urban form and system stemmed from the following: White urbanization had stabilized by the 1970s, the politics of establishing White and particularly Afrikaner power completed and White privilege entrenched. Furthermore, urban South Africa was the life-world of the vast majority of Whites. Urban spaces started to define the political agenda. It was the survival of this urban world - urban experience - that became important. The maintenance of this base became central to the White constituent, but it also became clear that these cities were increasingly part of a greater urban whole. The failure of addressing the problems of the township would inevitably lead to the collapse of the urban form upon which most Whites have become wholly dependent.
underlying class divide, the security syndrome prevalent at the time and a deep-rooted historic lack of meaningful city-wide solidarity as seen in the early fragmentation of South African cities. The net result of this policy, and its many additions over the years, was an extremely differentiated urban spatiality with immense inequalities, reinforcing the hazardous task of producing some overarching sense of loyalty and identification (Seekings, 1991). Strengthening this divide was the significant overlap between class and race boundaries. The GAA further entrenched the different race and class boundaries and cemented the idea of exclusively White neighbourhoods. This resulted in the isolation of Whites in modern urban enclaves, functioning in relative independence of the other non-white areas of the city. A further source of fragmentation, the Administration Boards, totally severed any remaining institutional contact. Thus, an institutional Berlin Wall descended on towns and cities, so that Africans’ proximity to the “White City” became dissociated from the White patterns of administration, political participation and urban identity – “Africans were in the city, but not of the city” (Atkinson, 1991a,p.273).

The question does arise as to why local governments started to negotiate around integration, or at least attempted to hear the “other side’s story”. This is far from clear, and local conditions appear to have been of some significance in this respect. Nevertheless, either individually but, more likely in combination, the following factors were of some importance. Firstly, townships towards the mid-1980s were the scenes of diverse and complex political turmoil. Political dissatisfaction of immense magnitude and depth rooted in a number of social, economic, political frustrations abounded. Some townships became the locale of near, if not total ungovernability (Soni, 1992). Ungovernability came in many guises, ranging from BLAs without any councillors to councillors simply not doing their job, protest marches, to unbridled violence and loss of life. Secondly, consumer boycotts particularly in the Eastern Cape were particularly successful in driving home the messages of township dissatisfaction. In addition, it exposed the nature of mutual dependence between township and town. The importance of the “Black market” became evident. Thirdly, the realisation of the extraordinary dimensions of the fiscal crises in townships in general was threatening the stability of at least some provincial government’s finances. In addition, the effects of the fiscal crises became evident for (White) consumer service providers such as ESCOM and the Rand Water Board. Finally, it was apparent that none of the above could be resolved in any manner if some form of legitimate government, or legitimate
organisations were not involved in seeking co-operation in the resolution of the above
problems (Coovadia, 1991). Taken together, it was the "spilling over" of these
problems, particularly material plight, in the townships that alerted some
communities and stakeholders in the "White" cities and towns that they shared a
collective urban destiny, which appears to have prompted action.

The first tentative steps towards negotiations appear to have been a traumatic
experience for the White councillors. The devastation of urban apartheid was
seemingly unexpected and there were no public institutions in existence which could
deal either with the issues raised by the Black civic organisations or with the methods
they used (Coovadia, 1991). Consequently, the various local authorities embarked on a
number of individual efforts to address the mounting crises at hand. In general, and
not surprisingly, the mobilisation of the township communities did not find much
sympathy with the Whites. Years of apartheid segregation had hardly made the
general White population attentive to the needs of people they did not perceive as
belonging in the city, let alone working out an agenda which would ultimately imply
co-operation, of sorts, between themselves and the restless township masses.
Nevertheless, some WLAs started to view the realities of the urban Black communities
in a fundamentally different manner. The unprecedented concern for Black living
conditions, combined with a new calculation of material interests, propelled some
White leaders to make contact with the unknown radical leaders of the townships. The
actors within these initiatives were subject to a range of contradictory pressures. The
township representatives and the White establishment, alike, had to respond to one
another in new and untested ways. Not surprisingly, the central government and its
extensions into the townships, the Development Boards, were unambiguously hostile
to these initiatives and to complicate matters further, the local White and Black
leaderships always had to respond to different dynamics in their respective
constituencies. In addition, institutions and organisations often contained within
themselves different factions who interpreted events and problems differently and
sent confusing signals to allies and opponents alike. Atkinson (1991a, p.275) reports
that the lack of appropriate and shared institutions and procedures to deal with urban
restructuring was prohibitive in the synchronisation of the agendas, priorities and

18 Among the first local authorities to engage in local negotiations, was in Port Alfred in 1985,
followed by East London and Port Elizabeth in 1986. In the other cities, the future of the urban
political order was also put on the agenda. On the whole the form of these initiatives varied
greatly.
perceptions of Black and White leaders within a single city. Despite all these problems a number of urban initiatives were taken.

What is at issue is that the development of the one-city initiatives, together with the RSCs and BF mark, albeit symbolically, the eminent demise of the racially differentiated distribution of the South African city's benefits and burdens as envisaged by its planners in the 1940s. The introduction of the RSCs and particularly their unintended mobilisation to bail the BLAs out of their dismal financial collapse was, though not intended, a move towards the fiscal re-integration of the apartheid city. The "one-city" initiatives, though never successful, in addition, marked the starting point to a re-imagination of the South African city. In this process, long-standing and racialised assumptions concerning socially acceptable distributions of society's benefits and burdens were challenged, and a new, negotiated understanding of social justice in a South African urban context had to be found.

5.9 Conclusion

This discussion represented a starting point to considering links between the spatiality of the city and how social justice is understood. The review of South African urban development illustrated that early segregationist and apartheid policies affected the Black, Coloured and Indian populations in different ways. It was suggested that particular geographical and historical developments led to differentially racialised interpretations of the spatiality of South African cities - a sphere of South African geography over which the White community held out-right control. The argument preceded to suggest that the White "guardians" of the South African city interpreted the spatiality of city as one in which Whites, Coloureds and Indians were (to adapt Atkinson's 1990 wording) of the city, whilst Black South African were in the city but not of it. From the 1920s onwards the inclusion of Coloureds and Indians and the exclusion of Black South Africans, came to bear on the type of access these communities had to the resource base of the "White city". Subsequently, the distribution of urban society's benefits and burdens did not represent a uniform and all encompassing understanding but contradictory and racially differentiated

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19 It must however, be pointed out that transitional local government negotiation in the early 1990s often built on the momentum and ideas of these initiatives. In that respect we might have to reassess interpreting these events as having been totally unsuccessful.
understandings that changed over time. Importantly, the terrain of what could be seen as representing statements of social justice was intimately linked to inclusion or exclusion in White interpretations of urban space.

In the face of political struggle and Black rejection of this "White" understanding of the spatiality of the city, the 1980s saw the beginning of a re-working of how the city's benefits and burdens ought to be distributed. The crucial change only occurred once the White urban residents, so long the "guardians" of the South African city, came to realise and in some ways accept that Blacks were not only in the city but also of the city. The gradual acceptance of this reality would fundamentally change the manner in which White urban South Africans would think about the distribution of its benefits and burdens, the dynamics of which are discussed in the following chapter.
Chapter Six

Imagining the Post-Apartheid City: Different Views of Social Justice

6.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on the local government demarcation debates (1994-1995) which led to the construction of the first post-apartheid cities. As these debates centred on the distributive realities of the apartheid city and how they could or ought to be reimagined, they are read as illustrating competing understandings of social justice. It is suggested that these debates illustrated divergent imaginations of the urban future and reflected multiple understandings of how urban society's benefits and burdens could be distributed. It is the contention of this chapter that these differentiated understandings of social justice were based upon and constructed through differentiated interpretations of the geography and history of the apartheid city, in turn reflecting the located, differentiated and contested spatiality of social justice.

Focusing on the demarcation of the Cape Metropolitan Area, it is suggested that urban communities were afforded an opportunity to re-imagine the manner in which the benefits and burdens of urban society were distributed. In fact, it created a significant opportunity for urban citizens to explore the “horizons of possible urban futures” (Atkinson, 1990). The analysis of the demarcation process in the Cape Metropolitan Area - with particular reference to the demarcation of the City of Tygerberg - illuminates how this city's future organisational and political structure was imagined. This investigation also illustrated what kind of urban spaces were sought by different communities, located in different parts of the city, how local government resources would be distributed within those imagined urban spaces and who would be involved in making decisions about these outcomes. Simultaneously, the demarcation debates illustrated how the impact of past urban geographies, built on apartheid understandings of social justice, framed the types of understandings of social justice reflected in the demarcation proposals.

As the geography of the apartheid city reflected a differentiated inclusion of Coloured, Indian and White urban citizens and exclusion of Blacks in considerations of social justice in the past, the understandings of social justice reflected in the demarcation debates echoed this divide. Consequently, this chapter illustrates that past
understandings of social justice and past spatial arrangements shaped, bounded, and perhaps even limited, “the horizons of possible urban futures” reflected in these debates. Finally, this chapter also illustrates two broad categories or views of social justice in the post-apartheid city, demonstrating differentiated, located and contested understandings of how urban society’s benefits and burdens ought to be distributed.

To facilitate the illustration of these suggestions, the following discussion first sketches the national context within which the demarcation of the post-apartheid city arose. Thereafter, the particular locational context through which the Cape Metopolitan future was imagined is briefly described, after which the demarcation debates themselves are considered.

### 6.2 Local government restructuring in South Africa

Negotiation of a democratic South Africa was built on a situation which cannot be seen as a result of one party having won a battle against another (Mbeki, 1996, p.119). Starting from 1990 and periodically interrupted by deadlocks and brinkmanship, three years of formal negotiations ended in late 1993 with a political settlement that detoured significantly from the position held by both the NP and ANC at the beginning of that process. The task that would be assumed by the new post-apartheid government was to construct and administer a hegemonic project based upon a radical break with the exclusionary paradigms enforced under apartheid. The principles of conciliation and concession replaced conflict and triumph as the key catalysts for societal change. The dominant discourse came to orbit postulated common interests and destinies, rather than difference, contradiction and antagonism (Marias, 1998, p.93). Commonalities were emphasized and amplified in service of a project which sought to organise South African society on the basis of inclusion. The tone of reconciliation and inclusiveness was echoed, not only in the negotiation of a national government but also in broader policy directives for economic restructuring, such as the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) (1993), the South African Interim Constitution and the Local Government Transition Act (1993) (Swilling, 1997, p.220).

Amidst these national negotiations, negotiation of inclusive local government structures was simultaneously underway (Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1989;
Pretorious, 1994; Price, 1991). The early 1990s witnessed an upsurge in attempts to resolve local issues through negotiations between various urban communities. The main parties involved in these negotiations included the respective provincial administrations, RSCs, WLAs, BLAs, Eskom, the Development Bank of Southern Africa and various churches, who also attempted to incorporate these local settlements into national settlements through the Interim Measures for Local Government Act (1991) (Kotze' and Geldenhuys, 1992, pp. 9-10). In some cases considerable progress was made (notably Gauteng and the Eastern Cape) (also see Atkinson, 1991b; Atkinson, Heymans and Humphries, 1987; Bekker and Humphries, 1985; Swilling, Humphries and Shubane, 1991). This Act however, gave provincial administrations authority to recognise, or veto, local settlements, including the power to dissolve existing local authorities and introduce new joint local authorities (Pycroft, 1996, p. 235). As the Act only recognised the legitimacy of established local government institutions (e.g. WLAs, BLAs and MCs), it relegated the highly influential civic organisation to the position of interest group (Reid and Cobbert, 1992, p. 244). Though the negotiations established by this Act were seriously flawed, they did establish a framework for future negotiations that eventually determined the new structures of local government. A major breakthrough came in September 1992 when the government, provincial administrations and organised local government met with representatives from the South African National Civic Organisation (Sanco) to create the Local Government Negotiation Forum (LGNF) (Cloete, 1994, 1995). This forum included all established local government institutions and consequently brought the civic organisations on board (Cloete, 1994).

From 22 March 1993, the forum served as the main negotiating body on local government in South Africa. Across the country this bipartite forum constituted representatives from central, provincial and organised local government spheres in all the provinces (the statutory delegations), on the one hand, and SANCO (the non-statutory delegation) on the other (Cloete, 1994, p. 44). Initially the different stakeholders strongly defended their respective policy positions. Robinson (1998, pp. 536-537), for example, reports that the NP led statutory group's policy platform supported extensive autonomy for local communities. In essence, they suggested that particular racial areas (the NP building on the basis of the apartheid

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1 This was because the balance of power always favoured the NP government and the apartheid based local government structures, at the expense of civic organisations and ANC.
city) should have powers to ensure that the wealthy, mainly White communities, could protect their privileges through setting zoning and planning norms which would preserve the character of their neighbourhoods. In doing so the NP could limit the kinds of changes in urban form envisaged by representatives of the poor Black majority. In addition, government proposals included a second ballot for property owners, ward-based election rather than proportional representation, as well as local options allowing the electorate to deviate from nationally agreed guidelines for the unification of fragmented apartheid local government (Robinson, 1998, p.537).

On the non-statutory side, SANCO and the ANC brought to the negotiating table well-formulated ideas to which a post-apartheid city and urban local government should aspire (Robinson, 1998,p.537). The basic demand was summarised in the well-known slogan of "one-city, one tax-base", which called upon WLAs to share the benefits of high industrial and commercial property taxes with BLA areas. In their view the boundaries of the city were conceptualised on a functional basis, integrating all who lived and worked within an urban area. Robinson (ibid.p.537) suggests that the demands were for a more equitable rendering of basic services to all people living in urban areas on an affordable and if necessary, subsidised basis (see Cameron, 1996a; Pycroft, 1996 and Robinson, 1998 for detailed analysis of the negotiating process). However, for a long period the process seemed to stall as the WLAs generally, and the Conservative Party (CP) controlled authorities in particular, were still bent on retaining separate local authorities and resisting redistribution of "White City" revenues. Conversely, the non-statutory delegation insisted that the effect of pre-interim structures must be to ensure that a single local government structure exercised authority over all resources in a single jurisdiction, based on non-racial boundaries.

Nevertheless, a political desire to neutralise the disruptive and violent threats of conservative local governments, together with the need for these proposals to be accepted at the national multiparty Negotiating Forum (deciding on the constitution for the new national government), encouraged a settlement based on the idea of a government of local unity (Robinson, 1998,p.538). This meant that many of the initial demands of the non-statutory delegation were not met. The consolidation of a consensus position in support of lengthy power-sharing arrangements at the national multiparty negotiations and the various deadlines set by that process strengthened the government's hand at the LGNF. Amidst fears that radical right-wing organisations
could derail the whole negotiating process, the non-statutory delegation agreed to a complex power sharing formula for the local government elections in the interim phase, from 1994 to 1999 (Cloete, 1994, p.1).

Political representation was provided through a combination of directly elected ward-based candidates and proportional representation, with 60% of Transitional Local Councils' (TLC) councillors elected from established wards and 40% from party lists using proportional representation (Pycroft, 1996, p.239). The division between wards and party lists, was an "imaginative" attempt to protect minority groups in the interim phase. Half of the wards were demarcated in areas of the former WLAs and half in the township areas. This demarcation guaranteed that approximately 30% of the membership of the new councils were elected by the White population and 30% by the Black population. Consequently, Black townships would be under-represented in most of the country. This compromise was a pragmatic solution to the fears of the White electorate, but led to anomalies, for example in Cape Town, where Black people, who form the minority of the population were over represented (Pycroft, 1996, p.239). Thus, the ANC alliance had promoted a compromise in the face of NP intransigence which although technically non-racial and arguably more democratic and strategic than entrenching a property vote, generally weighted White votes much higher than Black votes and set in motion a complicated process of political delimitation of urban space (Robinson, 1998a,p.539).

By July 1993 the LGNF published its recommendation for the process of local government transition, incorporated in the Local Government Transition Act No. 209 (1993) and the Interim Constitution, Act No. 200 (1993) (Cloete, 1994,pp. 43-44). The local government transition was, in terms of the LGTA, divided into three phases: the Pre-interim phase, which prescribed the establishment of local forums to negotiate the appointment of temporary councils, which would govern until the first democratic

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2 The whole notion of all people irrespective of race or whether they held property or not, or would receive an equal voting right, was deemed a very progressive step by the White Afrikaans press (e.g. Die Burger, 1993.07.10). Furthermore, this compromise was not initially supported by all Whites, for example those living in the Cape Metropolitan Area, as it would lead to an over-representation of the Black population (Die Burger, 1993.07.15).

3 The general outcome of these negotiations was that a voting system was agreed that gave Whites an effective veto over many areas of local government for at least the interim phase. This laid the grounds for the potential persistence of these agreements into the future as well. There was likely to be substantial room for manoeuvre on the part of the conservative or wealthy White councils wishing to avoid the redistributive consequences of a unified metropolitan (i.e. TMC) or city government (TMS or TLA).
municipal elections; the *Interim phase*, beginning with municipal elections held in 1995/96 and lasting until the following elections in 1999/2000; and the *Final phase*, when a new local government system would be established (RSA, 1998). Beside the time-frame and political representative aspects of the agreement, the LGTA (1993) made provision for the establishment of a Local Government Demarcation Board in each of the nine provinces, which would oversee the political redistricting of the local government jurisdictions (Cameron, 1996a, p.23; Cameron, 1996b, p.28). Among the many local authority categorisations, the LGTA made provision for the creation of metropolitan authorities in the pre-interim and interim phases.

During the LGNF deliberations, two models of metropolitan government became apparent. In order to facilitate dealing with, among other issues, the disparities in service provision, rapid urbanisation and the inefficiencies of the apartheid city structure, the SANCO alliance supported strong metropolitan government (Cameron, 1996a, p.29). This "model" envisaged metropolitan governments controlling the primary sources of urban finance and assumed a central role in the allocation of resources for development and service provision. The NP on the other hand, was concerned that strong ANC dominated metropolitan governments, particularly when furnished with extensive powers and functions, would adopt policies inimical to White substructures, such as extensive taxation and the locating of low-income housing in affluent areas. Hence the NP promoted a metropolitan government vision in which the over-arching metropolitan government would be weak and comprise strong "municipality-like" substructures (Cameron, 1996a, pp.29-30). These two models would later come to frame two competing views of social justice in the post-apartheid city.

Part of the compromise reached at the LGNF was that the Transitional Metropolitan Councils (TMCs) would be created with at least the functions and powers of the former RSCs (Cameron, 1996a, Cloete, 1995). This was however, not mandatory but depended upon the TMC concerned, which had the discretion to negotiate which additional functions it would adopt. Generally TMCs would have the power to enforce

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4 Metropolitan areas were defined as areas: which comprised the areas of jurisdiction of multiple local governments; were densely populated and within which there is an intense movement of people, goods and services; were extensively developed or urbanised, comprised multiple central business districts, industrial areas and concentrations of employment; and were economic and functional units comprising various smaller units interdependent economically and in respect of service delivery (Cloete, 1994, p.60).
levies and tariffs in respect of any of their functions. Provision was made for equitable contributions from its constituent Transitional Metropolitan Substructures (TMSs) based on their gross or rates income. In addition TMCs would receive, allocate and distribute intergovernmental grants. Consequently, the LGNF, did not fully resolve the issue of metropolitan-local government relationships, but set out alternatives, leaving the specific arrangements to the discretion of particular metropolitan negotiating forums (Cameron, 1996a,p.30).

Following the LGTA, the Administrator / Provincial Committee of the Western Cape Province appointed a Local Government Demarcation Board - the Western Cape Demarcation Board (WCDB) - to preside over the creation of new post-apartheid local government jurisdictions in the province. This investigation included the jurisdiction over all negotiating forums and local government bodies. The 16 members of the WCDB were required to be persons with extensive experience in local governmental related disciplines, such as planning, finance, municipal services and administration. The Board had to be - and was in Cameron's (1996a) view - structured in a way that was balanced, representative, non-racial and gender inclusive.

The recommendations made to the Administrator had to take into consideration a number of demarcation criteria as stipulated in the LGTA. These criteria were:

- Topographical and physical characteristics of the area concerned;
- Population distribution;
- Existing demarcation of areas pertaining to local government affairs and services;
- Existing and potential land usage, town and transport planning, including industrial, business, commercial and residential usage and planning;
- Development potential in relation to the availability of sufficient land for a reasonably foreseeable period to meet the spatial needs of the existing and potential residents of the proposed area for their residential, business, recreational and amenity use;
- Economy, functionality, efficiency and financial viability with regard to the administration and rendering of services within the area concerned;
- Community of interest;
- Integrated urban economy.
The Demarcation Boards were given the opportunity to interpret these guidelines within the context of decisions on powers, duties and functions made by the various Negotiating Forums (NF), as well as draw from the boundary proposals made by the public - be they local government authorities, interest groups or private individuals. Consequently, the demarcation criteria, in tandem with proposals from the public, came to form the basis upon which the demarcation debate would unfold. It is the content of these debates in the demarcation of the CMA, that forms the focus of the remainder of this chapter. Before pursuing this debate however, the following section aims to provide a brief profile of the CMA context within which these debates unfolded.

6.3 The Western Cape Demarcation

Whilst the demarcation debates in South Africa shared central concerns, the demarcation process was mediated by the particularities of each region's geographical and historical development. The CMA is the third largest in South Africa and the only metropolitan area that does not have a Black majority. Due to historical concentration and the Coloured Labour Preference Act (1954), approximately 50 percent of the CMA's population of 3.1 million are classified as Coloured and only around 28 percent as Black. Prior to re-demarcation, the CMA included 16 municipalities, together with two RSCs (Bridgman, Palmer and Thomas; 1992) (Figure 6.1 - 6.4). Thirty percent of the population lived in the central city, the older southern suburbs (such as Rondebosch, Newlands, Claremont and Wynberg) and the newer high-income northern suburbs (such as Milnerton and Durbanville). While most of the residents of these areas were middle to high-income Whites, there were a few areas, such as the southern parts of Wynberg and Retreat and parts of the north east such as Kuilsriver, Brakenfell and Kraaifontein, that have traditionally been occupied by largely middle-class Coloured residents. The vast bulk of low to middle income Coloured and Black residents of Cape Town resided either on the Cape Flats, accommodating 32 percent of the CMA's total population or in the south east sector which contained 38 percent of the population (Saff, 1998) (Figure: 6.1. also see Appendix C.1).

5 Cameron (1996a,p.22) argued that the Coloured areas generally operated as a buffer between the white and black areas. The standard of services in Coloured areas did not approximate to those in white areas. Nevertheless, because many of these areas fell under the control of the WLAs there were basic infrastructure facilities such as electricity, water and underground services. Services in the Coloured areas were however, substantially better than those available in the Black areas, where services had virtually collapsed.
Figure 6.1 Selected Locations in the Cape Metropolitan Area
(Source, WCDB, 1995, p.87)
Figure 6.2. Selected Local Authority Jurisdictions in the Cape Metropolitan Area (1994) (Source: WCDB, 1995, p.91)
Figure 6.3: Schematic illustration of racial development in the CMA  
(Source: MSDF, 1996, p. 18)

Figure 6.4: CMA population size (1990)  
(Source: MSDF, 1996, p. 16)
Despite Cape Town's long history of segregation, it was nevertheless the least segregated of the main urban centres prior to the implementation of the GAA. When it came to the implementation of the GAA, Cape Town strenuously opposed it. By 1985, however, Cape Town was as segregated as any of South Africa's main urban centres.

One of the most controversial outcomes of the GAA was seen in the massive removal of Coloured people from District Six (Zonnebloem) in the City Bowl, to the Cape Flats (Mitchell's Plain), an area of few public amenities and a considerable commute to most sites of employment (Western, 1981). Despite these realities, Cape Town nevertheless represented a more "liberal" environment, with the Coloured community always having been an integral part of this city's political, social and cultural identity (Bickford-Smith, 1995; Venter, 1974; Western, 1980). An illustration of this can be found in large-scale social housing provided by the WLA of Cape Town. As many of the victims of removals in Cape Town could not afford accommodation, the Cape Town City Council (CCTC) and the Divisional Council embarked upon large scale housing projects that offered subsidised rental accommodation. By 1990 there were close to 100 000 council-provided units, many located in Mitchell's Plain. Despite these efforts, an estimated 25 percent of this population group were living in the backyards of these over-crowded housing estates or squatter areas in the vicinity.

Since the early part of the 20th century, a limited amount of segregated housing was built for Blacks, first in Ndabeni, then Langa, Nyanga and Gugulethu. As the Cape was a Coloured labour preference region, virtually no housing was constructed for Blacks during the 1960s and 1970s. This meant that the existing Black townships became increasingly overcrowded, which together with increased "illegal" Black urbanisation, resulted in the establishment of spontaneous squatter settlements, probably the most famous being Cross Roads (Saunders, 1989). By 1983 numerous violent struggles between the state and the squatters in the Cape finally forced the government to recognise the necessity of making more land available for Black settlement. As a result a new township, Khayelitsha, on the south eastern edge of the city was constructed. Although the original plans called for the provision of formal housing, the area increasingly became a giant "site and service scheme" with informal shelters predominating. The Black population continued to grow in the course of the 1980s and 1990s, exacerbating the already acute overcrowding in Black townships. A consequence of this was the mushrooming of informal settlements and backyard shacks within the existing townships. In addition to these housing crises there were
additional complex problems related to the delivery of local government services and functions in these already challenged urban environments. As elsewhere in South Africa, the townships prior to the redemarcation also found themselves in enormous fiscal crises with accumulated rent and service debt totalling R1.8 billion (Cameron, 1996a, p. 22; also see Saff, 1998).

These geographical and historical features represented the context within which the demarcation debate in the CMA developed. The fragmented urban form, in which there was an established differential inclusion and exclusion of racial communities, framed understandings of the spatiality of the city. In the following section the impact of apartheid urban spatiality is demonstrated to have been reflected in the types of post-apartheid urban geographies imagined in the development of the demarcation debate. These in turn reflect different understandings of social justice embedded in these proposals' interpretations of urban space.

6.4 Imagining post-apartheid Cape Town: The opening debate

The development of the Western Cape demarcation debate significantly predated the formal demarcation debates that came to the fore in mid 1994. Central figures on the WCBD (for example, Cameron, 1998; Cloete, 1998; Classen, 1998 and Younge, 1998) suggest that the earliest boundary proposals were developed in the numerous discussions among the non-statutory organisations in early 1993. In particular, the Cape Town branch of the ANC played a central role in shaping these debates. Drawing on the insights of representatives in the Black and Coloured areas of the CMA, the ANC summarised the general dynamics of these debates in a discussion document released in May 1993. These discussions developed in the context of an uncertain metropolitan boundary, as well as the shifting decisions of the Cape Metropolitan Negotiating Forum (CMNF) who were focusing on the division of powers, functions and duties of TMSs and the TMC within the CMA. Given these uncertainties, the initial demarcation proposals developed from discussions framed by the possibility of a metropolitan outerboundary and division of powers, functions and duties between TMSs and TMC. These debates described a particular understanding of the post-apartheid local governance system, its resources, and distributive principles, as well as suggesting its spatial dimensions.
Post-apartheid local government “needed to go further than creating non-racial councils ... but had to create effective, accountable and efficient local councils in the future” (ANC, 1993, p.7). The overall emphasis was on significant improvement upon the urban realities of apartheid, broadly addressing the dismal conditions in the townships. This re-thinking of the post-apartheid city did not signify a radical re-organisation of local government jurisdictions but a radical re-working of the fiscal structure that underpinned the development of urban space. This document made no clear mention of BLAs necessarily having to amalgamate with WLAs. The central assumption underlying their understanding of a future post-apartheid local governance system was that the status of urban citizens would ensure access to the metropolitan council's fiscus, with the TMSs coordinating and supervising efficient and effective delivery of basic services. Implicit in this debate was the notion that all areas in the city had the right to a minimum level of key basic services necessary to sustain urban living. These services were generally regarded as comprising water, electricity, basic sanitation and refuse collection. Whilst there was never any explicit statement about social justice, the deliberations focused intensively on how urban society's benefits and burdens could be re-worked.

The future local government would radically alter the manner in which resources were distributed and envisioned this notion to have specific spatial implications (also see Figure: 6.5):

- “local democracy and accountability was most likely in very small councils such as Pinelands and Constantia, where everyone knows the councillors and staff and civics can play an effective 'watchdog' role;
- services provision would be most efficient in councils where the population is between 150 000 - 250 000 people. This is medium sized and will mean that the council can provide most of its own services. This also improves local accountability;
- the costs and bureaucracy of the new councils could be kept lowest where accountability is strong and services are effectively delivered. Therefore, a small to medium-sized council would be appropriate. Very large councils suffer from too much bureaucracy; and
- if the TMC was to address the needs of people in the Cape Metropolitan Area in a meaningful manner, it had to work effectively. It must not be undermined by very large, rich local councils which do as they please. Consequently, large, rich power blocks should not be created” (ANC, 1993, p.9).
Selected Place Names

1. Athlone
2. Atlantis
3. Atlantis Industria
4. Bellville
5. Bellville South
6. Blue Downs
7. Bonteheuwel
8. Constantia
9. Delft
10. Durbanville
11. Elsies River
12. Fish Hoek
13. Goodwood
14. Hout Bay
15. Kayelitsha
16. Kraaifontein
17. Kuils River
18. Langa
19. Lingelethu West
20. Matroosfontein
21. Melkbosstrand
22. Mfuleni
23. Milnerton
24. Mitchells Plain
25. Parow
26. Pinelands
27. Retreat
28. Ruiterswacht
29. Simonstown
30. Somerset West
31. Strand

Figure 6.5 African National Congress TMS boundary proposal (1993)
(Source: ANC, 1993, p. 8)
These ideas resulted in a particular local government geography. As illustrated in Figure: 6.5, the local government geography produced from this initial discussion, generated multiple, small, racially, culturally and economically homogenous local government jurisdictions. As such, this demarcation proposal replicated many of the fragmented local government jurisdictions of the apartheid city model. The spatiality of the post-apartheid city was expressed through the imagination of a fragmented urban space in which multiple small local authorities would function in highly participatory, yet effective and efficient local government structures. The way in which urban society's benefits and burdens ought to be distributed within these proposed TMSs were located in the community, but the whole of the metropolitan population would contribute towards financing these localised needs. In general terms, these proposals built upon the RCS system, although they did place greater emphasis on the redistribution of resources from the "rich" to the "poor" and radically enhanced public participation in distributive decision-making.

These proposals however, developed in the context of CMNF indecision and uncertainty regarding the CMA's outer boundary. As the context within which these debates were located changed, the spatial dimensions of the post-apartheid local government geography changed too. While the opening debate saw the replication of a socially, culturally, politically and economically fragmented urban world, the configuration of the desirable local government spaces in the CMA changed radically in the face of the new institutional context negotiated in the CMNF.

By the beginning of 1994 the demarcation debates in the region had developed significantly. The national negotiating process was finalised and the general elections were at hand. At the local level the various statutory and non-statutory parties had been meeting in the CMNF and the future local government arrangements for this area were finalised. Unlike TMCs elsewhere in the country, the CMNF negotiated a "weak" metropolitan council, assuming the powers, function and duties of the former RSCs. TMSs would constitute the primary local authorities and would hold the main responsibility for reconstructing the post-apartheid city. The TMSs would be responsible for both the physical development of their jurisdiction, as well as assuming the main fiscal responsibility for the reconstruction, development and operation of local government services. These decisions and agreements would
provide the new context within which the TMS boundary proposals would develop and would in turn be reflected in the spatial dimensions of the socially just post-apartheid TMSs proposed. As a result, the geographies of the future jurisdictions were rethought, not fixed, changing in response to a new negotiated context.

The first signs that the demarcation debates were shifting in line with the CMNF settlement, came from the CMNF non-statutory (referring to representatives from the township areas) delegation's new position concerning the TMS boundaries, arguing that the basic objective of the demarcation process was that:

"Black Local Authorities must be amalgamated with White Local Authorities which are able to provide administrative support and other infrastructure necessary to aid the development of these areas...[this] foundation was non-negotiable" (Non-statutory delegation, Cape Metropolitan Negotiating Forum, 1994, p.2).

This position was interpreted as having a number of consequences:

- "new local government boundaries needed to show a clear break with the apartheid past;
- they needed to comply with the spirit of unification underlying the Act;6
- they needed to give effect to the spirit of breaking with the apartheid past, the removal of racially-based local government bodies and the amalgamation of these bodies to form new, non-racial TMSs, as negotiated at the national level in Kempton Park and given effect to in the Constitution Act, no. 200 of 1994; and
- they should enable RDP funds to be made available to local government in the Cape Metropolitan Area" (ibid.).

With specific regard to the RDP, attention was drawn to the funding criteria, which indicated that funds would only be provided to amalgamated local government bodies. The demarcation of TMSs, in such a way as to jeopardise their eligibility for RDP funding, could in their view have presented extremely serious consequences for the upgrading of services in these areas. In addition, it was argued that it could seriously undermine the long-term stability and image of the CMA as a whole,

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6 It has to be stressed that this "spirit of unification" was not explicitly stated in the LGTA as a criteria for the internal demarcation of the South African metropolitan regions.
bearing in mind the potentials for attracting tourism, industrial development and sporting events (ibid., p.2). This led to the non-statutory delegation representing the BLA areas to re-position themselves relative to other local authorities of the CMA and re-think the spatial dimensions of socially just TMSs in the CMA. However, in Tygerberg this position also set the context within which the WLAs of the CMA and particularly those nearest the BLAs, imagined socially just TMSs.

6.5 Imagining the post-apartheid city: "White" visions of social justice

Whereas the non-statutory groups embarked upon a radical re-working of their understanding of the political geography that would enable the development of a socially just urban future, the WLAs were now also in the midst of intensive debates about their position within this new negotiated local government context. The WLAs set out to propose the development of local government jurisdictions that would draw on the CMNF decisions, for which they had strenuously argued, by proposing TMSs that could "shield" them from any major fiscal responsibility for the township areas. Exemplary of WLAs taking this route were those in the Tygerberg region.

The demarcation proposals of Bellville (1994a; 1994b), Durbanville (1994a; 1994b), Goodwood (1994a; 1994b) and Parow (1994a; 1994b) illustrate to varying degrees how the rethinking of the post-apartheid urban world retained the basic structure of apartheid municipal jurisdictions. Though seeking a democratic and integrated local authority, these councils sought to limit their role in redressing apartheid inequalities across the CMA, to relatively small areas, located adjacent to their existing jurisdictions. This position was differentially applicable to the WLAs, with Bellville and Durbanville arguing for a basic retention of the apartheid local government status quo, while Goodwood and Parow displayed greater flexibility by including less privileged neighbouring areas.7

In general terms, the WLA of Bellville (and echoed by the other WLAs of the Tygerberg) presented a particularly clear outline of what post-apartheid local government institutions might be like. They should be:

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7 Whereas these views were developed over more than a year, this discussion draws primarily on their final proposals to the WCDB.
• "non-racial;
• viable;
• capable of rendering proper services;
• capable of providing for daily services and functions, largely independent from central government;
• had an able personnel corps;
• able to satisfy the reasonable expectations of its citizens to create and develop new and existing infrastructure;
• was effectively and economically administered;
• capable of equitably contributing to the execution of the RDP;
• have potential for spatial expansion and densification with regard to development possibilities; and
• contribute to the development of a community culture, which will enable its citizens to identify with its area" (Bellville, 1994b, p.1).

All the Tygerberg WLAs supported this view of local governance in the post-apartheid era. Generally speaking their expectations of local government were essentially the same as those of their non-statutory neighbours to the south. However, the urban space - the local government geography - within which to achieve this was the focus of their respective demarcation proposals and where divergent opinions arose. For the WLAs of Tygerberg:

"the restructuring of municipalities in South Africa...face[d] two critical decisions...the drawing of boundaries and the development of a financial strategy...the choice of municipal boundaries will directly influence the selection of fiscal strategies" (Parow, 1994a, p.1).

But the drawing of new boundaries represented a far more complex rethinking of the post-apartheid city than this statement suggests. This particular WLAs' demarcation proposals came to represent a complex and nuanced rethinking of the interplay between WLAs' (in a more general sense) notions of desirable local governance; the urban form they sought to maintain and/ or extend; the redistributive systems necessary to maintain this urban form; the urban citizenship base that would make this possible and; other demarcation proposals being formulated at the time.

The choice of a particular boundary or jurisdiction was either directly or indirectly "referenced" to a very particular (White) interpretation of South African urban
spatiality. Such interpretations of the South African city in turn shaped understanding of the socially just distribution of society's benefits and burdens. There was a very literal link between how these future desirable urban spaces were imagined and their current urban realities. All the WLA submissions acknowledged the racially fragmented nature of the city along with the corresponding differentiated characteristics of the urban form. Whilst recognising a collective responsibility for the "upgrading of disadvantaged areas" it was also argued that "the incorporation of large areas in which lower standards apply with areas in which relatively high standards have developed, would lead to the degeneration of those areas in which the higher standards apply" (Bellville, 1994a, p4-5).

Whilst the CMA included many less developed urban areas, the concern was that the inclusion of larger underdeveloped areas into one jurisdiction would endanger those areas (i.e. WLAs) deemed more desirable. Implicit in this statement was a very general notion that "like had to be grouped with like" (Bellville, 1994a, p.5), which at the outset implied a replication of most urban apartheid morphological characteristics and by extension the more general social, cultural and economic spatiality of the Tygerberg region. Certain areas (such as the townships) represented an urban world so unlike WLA environments that in the interim at least, it was felt that the divided nature of the apartheid city should be perpetuated till such time as they had developed adequately, echoing the characteristics of the WLA areas (Bellville, 1994a; Durbanville, 1994a). As a result, the only way in which poor areas (i.e. Khayelitsha) could be "helped" was if large TMSs were considered. This however, would be contrary to their understanding of effective, efficient, viable and accountable local government, as larger urban units in their view would be inefficient and less responsive to the needs of the local citizens. Furthermore, the financial responsibility of such development would rest directly on the shoulders of the WLAs included in such a jurisdiction. In this light Bellville for example, argued that Khayelitsha required too much infrastructure and expertise for one local authority to handle and should be seen as a medium to long term project managed and funded by the Cape Metropolitan Council (Bellville, 1994a, p.4; Bellville, 1994b, p.8-9). Consequently, this position repeated the late apartheid understanding of local government resource allocation.

For the wealthy Durbanville WLA, the socially just local authority was captured in the building of TMSs which led to "internal cohesion, strengthening the image of the
small town, as independent from the communities of the larger metropolitan region” (Durbanville, 1994b, p.5). Arguing only for the extension of its jurisdiction to include those areas that enabled an identity not aligned to general metropolitan living, the Durbanville WLA promoted (and aimed to retain) a view of the metropolitan region as fragmented, a collection of homogenous, closely-knit "town-like" communities. Their interpretation of the post-apartheid city actively mobilised social, cultural, political and economic difference as central motifs and perpetuated the fragmented apartheid urban spatiality.

Not all Tygerberg WLAs imagined that the incorporation of "other areas" who were "too different" or with "lower standards" would "lead to the degeneration of those areas in which higher standards applied" (as was seen in Bellville, 1994a; Durbanville, 1994a). To those WLAs located in close proximity to the poor Coloured areas, such as Parow (1994a) and Goodwood (1994a), the imagination of a new urban form incorporated at least parts of these previously disadvantaged areas. In Parow's case functional integration with its neighbouring Coloured areas in terms of a variety of variables (working patterns, recreation, urban economy, retail and commercial activity and interdependence) was far greater than suggested by the current boundaries of their municipality. They were of the opinion that there should be a consolidation of logical neighbouring local authorities, acknowledging their interdependence and connection between these different racial, social and economic communities. As Parow Council (1993a, p.4) argued:

"at the same time some integrating [with other local authorities] social factors exist such as a large group of people sharing the same language, religious beliefs and shared political views. This will enhance integration and harmony."

This more inclusive view of the possible future TMS was expressed in five alternative amalgamation proposals (see Figure: 6.6, for two of the proposed TMS amalgamation options). The main theme was that the post-apartheid city would include a number of “Coloured areas” (for example Elsies River and Bonteheuwel), however, they were generally exclusive of “Black” areas (with the exception of Langa which featured in two of the scenarios). Nevertheless, in these more inclusive imaginations were still

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8 Parow could in fact hardly have argued differently as it was more centrally located relative to the metropolitan region than most other existing local authorities.
inscribed the continuation of the racially differentiated social relations of the apartheid past. Whilst Parow moved beyond the persistence of racial and socio-economic homogeneity, as was clearly evident in the proposals of Bellville and Durbanville, they nonetheless sought to integrate those areas of Tygerberg that already formed part of their imagination of the city. Their proposal built on a general "acceptance" of the Coloured community as their neighbours, acknowledging their historical proximity to this WLA and their historical inclusion in the imagination of the South African city (particularly in terms of the urban development history of Cape Town), whilst simultaneously perpetuating the exclusion of the BLA areas (the relative "new-comers" to the CMA).

![Figure 6.6 Parow TMS boundary proposal](Source: Parow, 1994a, p. 21)
Figure 6.7 Goodwood TMS boundary proposal
(Source: Goodwood, 1994a, p.6-7)

Even the Goodwood WLA (Goodwood, 1994a), whose proposals were the most "progressive" of the former WLA's, envisioned the urban future in terms of socially and culturally homogeneous jurisdictions. Although Goodwood sought an enlarged and racially more diverse community, significantly transgressing its jurisdiction at the time and professed to be prepared to "negotiate and investigate at local and at metropolitan level the implementation of one of three scenarios", it nevertheless sought to do so in relation to communities that were generally similar and part of the spatiality of "their" urban life-world. (Goodwood, 1994a p.1). Consequently, Goodwood isolated those communities that shared a common language, religious

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9 It was progressive in so far as this council investigated amalgamation options with various former Coloured neighbourhoods and was willing to substantially enlarge their area of jurisdiction.
beliefs and political views, even though this would involve a far larger area and racially more diverse jurisdiction. Therefore their boundary proposals aimed at incorporating the Coloured neighbourhoods of Elsies River and Matroosfonte, to the south. Another added Milnerton, Thornton and Bothasig to Goodwood, while a third incorporated nearly the whole of the Northern Atlantic Seaboard, including poor areas such as Bishops Lavis and Langa (Goodwood, 1994a, p.2) (see for example Figure: 6.7). Nevertheless, though this submission was "progressive" relative to those of other Tygerberg WLAs, it still fell far short of including Khayelitsha or any other large BLA.

The reason for this differentiated inclusion and exclusion of racial communities was not only due to their historic positioning in the WLA spatial imagination of the city, but was also closely related to fiscal concerns. There was apparently little acceptance of any obligation for the historically disadvantaged (i.e. the Black Townships), with no acknowledgement of any responsibility in the "creation" of these challenged urban environments. All the WLAs were merely concerned that after the demarcation process, TMSs should constitute authorities that were fiscally viable (Bellville, 1994a; Durbanville, 1994a; Goodwood, 1994a; Parow, 1994a). Although these councils argued that it was wholly in support of local government transformation, the achievement of local government's new goals was envisaged within tightly drawn jurisdictions adjusted only according to reigning circumstances and emerging needs of citizens residing within or in close proximity to these jurisdictions. On the whole, WLAs did not aim to rework the local government financing arrangements and limited opportunities to redistribute resources away (i.e. BLAs areas) from where (i.e. WLAs areas) they were generated.

Fundamentally, these authorities did not want to take on any fiscal responsibilities that would require their constituents to make any real contribution to the reworking of resource distribution in the city. To "sweeten" their reluctance to accept responsibility for funding redistribution, they argued that the demarcation process of the post-apartheid city had to be seen as a multi-phased process, subject to future revision. This argument was put forward "to guard against the creation of a financially impractical entity" which "could impede" the delivery of what local government is reasonably expected to achieve (Bellville, 1994b,p.1). In the event of "creating [financially] impractical entities" local authorities would fail to achieve their objectives. The creation of a fiscally unsound jurisdiction would lead to "delay" in extending and
improving service delivery and would have “drastic negative consequences for the region” (Bellville, 1994b, p.1-2). These drastic effects were however, focused on their own privileged positions, dependent upon retaining the resource base they had and extended only to areas that would not require major resource imput.

More sinister was the blatant refusal to change the distribution of local government resources, whilst simultaneously acknowledging that their resource base was important to the CMA’s financial state (Cameron, 1998; Cloete, 1998; Younge, 1998). For example, Durbanville (1994a) argued that dramatic boundary changes would “[lead] to the destruction of the proverbial goose that lays the golden eggs”10 (Durbanville, 1994cp.2). Thus not only was the resistance to local government amalgamation inspired by their notions of local government’s role in the preservation of local identity and sense of community as expressed in a particular urban form, it was also motivated by a plain refusal to take on any responsibility for “others” throughout the CMA, despite knowledgeing that it held a strong fiscal base.

In this re-imagination of a more socially just local government, it was suggested that communities could not lay claim to resources that did not hold direct benefit to the communities from which these resources originated. Thus those that contributed to the resource base were seen to have a right to extract from it a share proportional to their contribution. In their view socially just urban governance only included minimal redistribution across metropolitan space. Consequently, post-apartheid local government reform:

“should preferably be phased in and that the first phase comprising a period of between five and ten years should provide for logical rounding off11 to existing local authority areas, for example, Durbanville together with its hinterland as a new substructure” (Durbanville, 1994c, p.2).

Durbanville council’s concluding remarks, interestingly under the heading “Upliftment: the Solution” noted that:

10 This expression referred to the White rates base of Durbanville.
11 This statement was made with reference to the consolidation of the commercial and residential activities in the peri-urban areas of Durbanville. The reference basically agitated for the integration of the various activities and communities in Durbanville, prior to amalgamation with communities outside the Durbanville/ hinterland community.
“the council wishes to reiterate ... that it is prepared to accept its responsibility in future for its hinterland and even if possible make further contributions to the upliftment of disadvantaged areas but that it would prefer not to become involved in further amalgamation as it is convinced that very large substructures/amalgamations may have serious financial and other consequences for the whole of the Cape Metropolitan area.” (Durbanville, 1994c, p.6).

In this imagination, the post-apartheid city merely represented a continuation of the late apartheid city, without any fundamental reconstruction envisaged. Responsibility for those areas where services were not available or in short supply were to be undertaken with the assistance of regional (metropolitan-wide) levies during a phased period, perpetuating the apartheid system. To stress the point it was argued that,

“it can under no circumstances be expected that the upliftment of disadvantaged areas can only be done by means of amalgamations of existing local authorities or by means of regional levies” (ibid., p.2).

On the whole this WLA aimed to shield itself from all responsibility for the poor regions of the CMA.

As a consequence, all WLAs resisted the incorporation of underprivileged areas, consistently excluding those areas that were most in need of additional resources. Each WLA’s proposal made a conscious decision to exclude large, desperately poor areas such as Khayelitsha. It was felt that these areas could not be the sole responsibility of a single local authority, but collectively of the metropolitan region, thus replicating the then existing local government fiscal system. The terrible irony was that those very same WLAs negotiated in the CMNF a metropolitan governance system which would do the opposite, vesting the main redistributive powers in the hands of the TMSs (Younge, 1998).

Finally, the insistence on the fiscal independence of the local government sphere from the provincial and central government held a further message. It underscored the importance the WLAs accorded to independent actions to maintain the desirable urban form as they understood it (Cameron, 1998; Cloete, 1998; Younge, 1998). The only route by which to maintain control over the development of the urban form would be by being financially independent from central and provincial government,
which would invariably have conditions attached. Secondly, they wished to devise jurisdictions that would group “like minded” people together (i.e. by keeping jurisdiction relatively homogenous in terms of their social, economic, cultural and political variables). This intention became clear when Durbanville concluded that:

“it is necessary that whilst re-demarcating the aim shall be to only amalgamate areas that naturally belong with each other” (ibid., p. 8 emphasis added).

In the context of their broader statement this appeared to mean that those areas which had similar “types” of citizens, living in broadly similar physical spaces and seeking apparently similar urban environments, in addition to having historically formed part of their life-worlds, should live in homogenous local authorities that could maintain and develop these collectively held aspirations of urban space.

To attain this objective, membership of the new TMSs had to be limited to those "naturally" belonging together. This argument at best extended to the amalgamation of White or Coloured communities. The distant "other" - BLA areas that were historically and geographically excluded in the interpretation of the spatiality of the "White city", consequently drifted from their horizons of a possible urban future. This was strikingly demonstrated by the WLA proposals in which the largest urban area in the CMA in most need of improvement - Khayelitsha - was consistently excluded from incorporation into the neighbouring WLAs of Tygerberg. These areas with "special needs" had to be managed by the TMC (to which WLAs were not going to make any significant resource contributions) until they were self-sufficient and viable entities.

In conclusion, the WLAs' imagination of the socially just post-apartheid city indicated numerous continuities with the late apartheid era. Their proposals reiterated the essence of the status quo. Thus, whilst the city was now (unlike the past) seen to be a place for all, the need to preserve the existing character of those parts of the city that formed an essential part of the WLAs was their central focus. This position re-enforced the need to limit the membership of local government jurisdiction, while making gestures at limited redistribution. Whereas the "White city" was the locale of defence for White South Africa in the past, and the smaller neighbourhoods and municipalities within the broader metropolitan areas formed the primary category of concern during late apartheid, the post-apartheid imagination of the just city merely extended this
position to democratising these fragmented sub-units of the metropolitan complex. The maintenance of the WLA and ultimately the spatiality of the late apartheid city essentially represented the spatiality of the socially just post-apartheid city. The sustainability of the familiar urban form was at the expense of any real contribution to the reworking of the apartheid city. Perhaps the weakest point of the WLAs' proposals was to be found in their total disregard for how the apartheid city was created in the first place - why their own urban realities were favourable, why the Coloured areas were "more alike" and why the townships were so underdeveloped and "different". Indeed, Robinson (1998a,p.537) was absolutely correct when she observed that "the history behind the dreadful conditions in townships was conveniently forgotten...the present reality was evoked, innocent of its past."

These proposals, located in the WLA areas, illustrated a particular understanding of social justice. In this view of social justice, the desirable urban form was defined as a consolidation and extension of the urban development frameworks typical of the late apartheid era. These proposals generally retained small jurisdictions that were characterised by similar social, cultural, economic and political attributes. At the most general level the urban world was imagined as comprising largely homogenous racial and socio-economic areas, similar to those of the late apartheid city. Second, these proposals represented an understanding of social justice that saw the redistribution of urban society's benefits and burdens to apply only to those communities that geographically and historically conformed to WLAs existing imagination of the South African urban world. Building from that context, these proposals differentially included and excluded different racial communities. Those communities (Coloured in this case) historically and geographically included in the White imagination of the city, would be entitled to resources redistributed internal to TMSs from the wealthy White areas to the poor Coloured areas, this aiding the rectification of urban inequalities that came about under urban apartheid policies. Simultaneously, this imagination of post-apartheid social justice excluded BLA areas who geographically and historically fell beyond the WLAs' understanding of the urban world. As they fell outside the WLAs interpretation of the desirable city they did not qualify in any real sense for resources generated in WLA areas.

The third aspect of these proposals might be seen against the divided nature of urban citizenship. Citizenship status provided the foundation upon which participation in
decision making about local government resource allocation and urban form was to take place. The primary citizenship category focused upon small, relatively homogenous areas which were seen as more important than a secondary metropolitan citizenship. Primary citizenship was awarded according to the manner in which different racial communities formed part of the imagined urban world, both past and present, and determined the level of responsibility groups internal to that community took on in the distribution of urban society's benefits and burdens.

Communities located elsewhere in the Tygerberg however, experienced the late apartheid city differently and sought social justice in a fundamental re-working of the CMA's political geography. "White" views of social justice, reflected through their particular racialised interpretation of the spatiality of the South African city, were not accepted, for example, by some Coloured communities in the Tygerberg, most of whom were destined to gain substantially from the WLAs arguments (Cameron, 1998; Cloete, 1998; Younge, 1998).

6.6 Competing understandings of social justice: Township views

This section presents some aspects of competing understandings of social justice and demonstrates how racial and socio-economic communities located elsewhere in the Tygerberg region interpreted the spatiality of the post-apartheid city and the political geography that would enable its realisation. For these communities social justice was located in a political geography that would bring the wealthy and poor communities of the CMA into a new relationship, one that required an acknowledgement of the interdependence of communities in the city.

First we may consider a grouping of Coloured communities in Bellville, mobilised under the banner of the Bellville Non-Statutory Caucus (BNSC) and their demarcation proposal that illustrates a competing understanding of which reconfiguration of local government space would enable social justice in the post-apartheid city (BNSC, 1994,p.2). The BNSC placed explicit emphasis on the need to gain access to the fiscal base of the WLAs to rework the realities of the apartheid urban space. The focus was on the ability of the demarcation process to create local government jurisdictions that had the fiscal capacity to redistribute resources and address the developmental concerns of those areas not located within WLA areas.
The BNSC proposal challenged the Tygerberg WLAs' claims that the process of amalgamation should take place in a piecemeal fashion. They agreed that the criteria of economic viability, growth potential and infrastructure were important, but felt that these arguments could not be used as an excuse for a protracted piecemeal approach or as reason for excluding disadvantaged areas. In their view a gradualist approach to defining boundaries would delay the transformation of the CMA and further neglect communities in an already marginalised position. With reference to the debate focused on the maintenance of community standards (e.g. proposals submitted by the WLA of Bellville), this group argued that the question of maintaining standards was a culturally loaded issue. Indeed, they specifically remarked that:

"the matter of standards should not be used as a new means of apartheid, for if that is so perceived, it will put back the whole project of reconstruction and reconciliation in our country" (BNSC, 1994, p.1).

They argued that the setting of such standards should be done in a representative manner. Their proposal stated that the post-apartheid city had to be fundamentally re-imagined:

"our new boundaries must be drawn in a manner which will help to create [a] new loyalty and identity for [a] particular substructure... hence including certain areas in the jurisdiction of a place like Bellville merely means that those areas are in fact added to Bellville" (BNSC, 1994, p.2).

The realities of the apartheid geography apparently instilled in this group a desire to guard against differentiated inclusion and exclusion, cultivating an inclusive beginning for all urban communities. To them the WLAs' fragmented view of the CMA was merely a form of gerrymandering and racism. While acknowledging that change would be "painful" they "all should have the courage to work towards this ideal rather than cling to old ways camouflaged in new-sounding words" (BNSC, 1994, p.2). Consequently, the "wait-till-they-are-ready" proposals on the inclusion of BLA areas like Khayelitsha were challenged and rejected. Ultimately, "the development of these disadvantaged areas should be the responsibility of all and not of the TMC on its own" (ibid., p2). Consequently, for this community, the local

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12 As was illustrated earlier, some Tygerberg WLAs argued for a ten year conditional timeframe.
that would enable this understanding of social justice was mapped as seen in Figure 6.8.

Their main reason for this was based on their observations that inter alia: the R300 route served as a natural road to and from Bellville and Kuilsriver, etc., helping to ferry a number of workers to the Bellville Industrial Areas and surroundings; a large number of those employed in Tygerberg reside in Khayelitsha; shoppers from the BLA area, in particular from Khayelitsha, spend their money in WLA areas of Tygerberg.
This position was not only held by the BNSC but formed the central focus for how various organisations located in the BLA areas imagined a socially just urban future. Their understanding of social justice, located in the poor and desperate spaces the WLAs aimed to exclude, took on fundamentally different dynamics. While the WLAs deployed the CMNF arrangements to insulate themselves from fiscal responsibilities towards the BLA areas, the BLA administrations, as the BNSC recognised, pursued amalgamation with WLAs in order to aid the development of BLA areas. Thus, in order to re-work the spatiality of late apartheid social justice, a new post-apartheid jurisdictional geography had to be sought to underpin the beginning of a different understanding of social justice.

The BLA of Mfuleni (1994a; 1994b), for example, supported much of what was argued by the BNSC. This BLA proposed the amalgamation of Mfuleni with more viable adjacent or nearby WLAs. They pointed out that this township had substantial servicing needs, subsequently favouring amalgamation with local authorities that could provide services on a subsidised or sub-economic basis. This council was of the opinion that the amalgamation of Mfuleni with Khayelitsha alone, would be a perpetuation and conglomeration of former BLAs, retaining their apartheid era status and administrative and fiscal abilities. These areas would have inadequate income and infrastructure, be largely uni-racial and would not aid optimum development under a non-racial constitution. Consequently, the Mfuleni BLA argued for its incorporation into a larger Bellville municipality. The reasoning behind this decision was based on a "recognition of their (Mfuleni's) economic and empowerment dependence" upon a stronger local authority (Mfuleni, 1994b, p.1). Moreover, the backlog in required infrastructure and a substantial unemployment rate necessitated financial assistance over the medium to long term in terms of both capital and operational accounts. Mfuleni had to be incorporated in a municipal area (i.e. a TMS) which could support

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14It is very important to remember that by the beginning of 1994, BLAs in the Cape region had no legitimacy and had been functioning without elected councillors since April 1993, when they were forced by the township residents to resign. Consequently, these views are not really representative of the Mfuleni community but do, nevertheless, high-light a point of view, that according to Younge (1998) rather ironically, echoed the views this community held.

15 This of course needs to be read against the fact that by then it was clear that the Metropolitan Council would have far fewer redistributory powers and service functions.

16 Cloete (1998) remarked that "The argument followed here was consistent with the ANC's national view. The black communities did not possess the financial resources to develop "itself", and as a consequense of the white community's exploitation over the years now had the money and the advantaged of the apartheid past, so they had to help with the financing the development (of the townships)".

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its development needs and perceived Bellville as an area of opportunity and a possible route by which it could "empower" itself by means of association.

These views were echoed by the township administration of Lingelethu-West (this council managed Khayelitsha at the time). They (Lingelethu-West, 1994) argued that the proposed scenario of 15-20 substructures (this was with reference to the ANC's initial discussion document mentioned above), which at the outset of the demarcation debate was seen as the best solution in terms of effective local government and service rendering, would not be economically feasible. This was particularly the case since the CMNF negotiated that the TMSs would mainly be responsible for the redistribution of local government resources. Moreover, this scenario would, in their view, result in the isolation of Khayelitsha, which would be a perpetuation of the apartheid model. Consequently, they suggested that:

"the only solution left is to demarcate the Metropole in 5-6 substructures that should operate the same way as intended with the Transitional Metropolitan Council for the Metropole" (Lingelethu-West, 1994, p.6).

This would result in a TMS within which the WLAs of Tygerberg and Khayelitsha would be amalgamated. This view was supported by other township communities too. Perhaps a major irony of this BLA's proposals was that the non-statutory demarcation proposals - made by the collective representatives of Khayelitsha - echoed the proposal of an institution they saw as totally unacceptable.

The ANC aligned SANCO Khayelitsha proposal was radically different from that made more than a year earlier in the ANC discussion document (as seen in section 6.4) and again demonstrated that the spatiality of social justice is unstable and moulded by the changing contexts in which its conceptualisation is located. The Khayelitsha (SANCO Khayelitsha, 1994) proposal came from a broad alliance of community organisation in the contested areas of Khayelitsha. This short proposal was however, important because of the immense scope of community interests represented therein. The submission was made by SANCO on behalf of the Khayelitsha community, through its organisations, ranging from churches to political and civic structures, in total representing the views of the ANC, SACP, COSATU, AZAPO, PAC, KHABA and the Ministers Fraterna. In their view the achievement of better local government rested on the establishment of a sound fiscal and administrative base to address the
inequality and legacies of the apartheid system, reconciliation, maintenance to peace and prosperity within the larger South African society, and most importantly ensure the creation of strong non-racial local government system (SANCO, 1995,p.1). In their view this:

"local government system is extremely important. This local government's responsibility, amongst others would be an enormous task of restoring services and implement the RDP. Black Local Authority[ies] have dismally failed in this regard ... if we have to succeed in achieving the above reflected sentiments, radical boundary changes is the only framework. To put it more concise, the community of Khayelitsha demands all existing BLAs to be integrated to adjacent WLAs, Khayelitsha to the Bellville council ... Only that would illustrate transparent attempts to eradicating the apartheid system and the resumption to address its legacies as well" (SANCO, 1994,p.1).

This proposal was stripped of those ideals propagated at the outset of the demarcation process. The focus was re-shifted from a strong emphasis on urban citizens' involvement in the local government functioning, the insurance of accountability, effectiveness and efficiency, to a primary goal of increasing the local government resource pool so as to address the services and functions backlogs left in the wake of urban apartheid. Thus as the context - the negotiated settlement of the CMNF - which shifted the role of the different tiers of local government in the CMA changed, the dimension of the socially just jurisdiction was re-imagined to enable the development of a local government resource base that could deliver their understanding of social justice to the townships.

To conclude: the demarcation proposals of those communities located in the "non-WLA" areas represented an alternative understanding of social justice vis-a-vis the WLAs. Unlike the WLA proposals, these illustrated the imagination of the socially just city as inclusive of all urban communities in the CMA. The post-apartheid city was interpreted as diverse and heterogeneous, interdependent and interacting spaces displaying diverse social, economic, cultural and political characteristics. The focus in this re-imagination of urban space was on the creation of a metropolitan entity and constituent substructures that would re-work the apartheid urban reality, leading to the development of a single functional unit.
The attainment of this vision necessitated a re-conceptualisation of the distribution of urban society's benefits and burdens, with all sharing in the rights and associated responsibilities that flow from urban citizenship. The focus was on the application of the resources generated from the entire metropolitan area to the benefit of the whole urban community, but focusing on the basic service needs of the poor in particular. At the outset of these re-formulations of the apartheid city we find that the prioritisation of greater equality in the distribution of resources across the whole metropolitan space was deemed fundamental.

Though the areas that required priority were those in the worst-off position, i.e. former BLA areas, the mechanisms for redistributing the resources of the metropolitan region were not to be restricted by intra-metropolitan boundaries. Whilst political citizenship of a certain sub-unit of the metropole would determine how local government resources were distributed in particular areas of the metropole, the resource base from which they could draw would not be limited to that particular political jurisdiction. The CMNF however, changed the context within which resources could be redistributed across metropolitan space. In response, the interpretation of the boundaries within which social justice could be enabled in the CMA were re-worked, to secure local government jurisdictions that were interpreted to have the resources necessary to improve the position of those worse off in the CMA.

6.7 Conclusion

In recounting the development of the Western Cape Demarcation debate, this chapter illustrated a number of aspects of the spatiality of social justice. It demonstrated how social justice in the post-apartheid city was differentially imagined in the demarcation proposals of various communities in this region. In the main, two competing understandings of social justice were prevalent, those seen in the proposals of the WLAs and those in the proposals from communities living mainly in the townships. While the chapter demonstrated that the demarcation proposals represented two broad and competing understandings of social justice, this discussion crystallised aspects of the spatiality of social justice.

First, the discussion illustrated that understandings of social justice were differentiated. They were shown to be located in and bounded by the racially and
economically differentiated spaces from which different communities viewed the urban world. Thus, understandings of social justice were shown to be located in different parts of the Cape Metropolitan urban space and were mediated by differentiated interpretations of the spatiality of the city. Secondly, these differentiated views of social justice were also linked (as seen in the WLAs demarcation proposals) to differential inclusion and exclusion of different racial and socio-economic communities in the White imagination of the post-apartheid city. These imagined inclusions and exclusions had, as seen in Chapter Five, historical and geographical roots and illustrated the impact of the spatio-historic context of South African urban development upon the spatiality of an imagined socially just urban future. Third, these understandings of social justice were also located in the context of national and locally negotiated settlements. In this chapter, the impact of the locally negotiated settlements reached in the CMNF in particular, was shown to have come to bear on what the socially just post-apartheid urban future would constitute. As a result, in these changing contexts, social justice meant different things, to differently located communities, at different times in the development of the demarcation debate. So too did the competing views of differently located urban communities influence one another over time, these different views re-shaping the understandings of social justice reflected in the development of the demarcation debates.

These themes are extended in the following chapter. The discussion will focus on the WCDB’s interpretation of social justice relative to those that have been set out in this chapter. In particular the chapter provides a new interpretation of the fierce debates that followed in the wake of the WCDB’s demarcation decision. The chapter will argue that the ensuing conflicts that developed between the various participants were not, as current interpretations of this process suggest, focused solely on issues of polical control over the CMA but founded in different interpretations of the spatiality of social justice.
Chapter Seven
The Spatiality of the City and Social Justice

7.1 Introduction

This chapter builds on the previous chapter's exploration of the demarcation proposals presented to the Western Cape Demarcation Board (WCDB). In particular this discussion focuses on the finalisation of the CMA's re-demarcation and the debates that followed in the wake of the publication of the WCDB's proposals. In contrast to current readings of the demarcation debates, this chapter re-interprets these debates and demonstrates how different interpretations of the city underpinned different understandings of social justice and stood at the centre of the "political" debates that have hitherto characterised commentators' understanding of the CMA demarcation process.

To illustrate this argument, this discussions builds from the notion that the LGTA also provided the WCDB\(^1\) with the opportunity to reinvent the CMA and enable the "production" of the post-apartheid urban dispensation. The explicit achievement of social justice was not an objective of the WCDB. The central focus and purpose of the demarcation process and the WCDB was, however, to re-work the spatial framework for the distribution of the CMA's benefits and burdens, enabled by the re-demarcation of the local government geography of this region. This points to the implicit social justice focus of their activities. Working within the context and parameters of opportunity afforded by the apartheid geography of the CMA, the decisions of the CMNF and the submitted demarcation proposals, the WCDB aimed to create a new urban jurisdictional geography that would enable the construction of a more socially just post-apartheid Cape Town.

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\(^1\)In keeping with Part seven of the Local Government Transition Act (LGTA) provision was made for the establishment of Local Government Demarcation Boards in each province (Cameron, 1996a). The members of these Boards were required to be people with extensive experience in local government and related disciplines such as planning, finance, municipal services and administration. The members of these Boards were appointed by the Administrator or Provincial Committees concerned and in the case of the Western Cape Demarcation Board amounted to a 16 member team under the chairmanship of Prof. Fanie Cloete. Upon the request of the Administrator, the objective of these boards was to investigate the demarcation of local government boundaries in the each province.
The WCDB’s demarcation proposals clashed primarily with the views of Tygerberg’s WLAs. This chapter offers some insights into the dynamics of how these debates developed. The views of various individuals and locally organised communities located in the Tygerberg are first presented. It will be shown that the spatiality of the city as interpreted by the WLA residents vis-a-vis the WCDB, presented the key point of conflict. The fact that the WCBD focused on the CMA as a whole while the White public of the Tygerberg and, by extension, the WLAs focused only on their immediate urban world, was at the core of the debate. In a bid to assist and politically capitalise on the outcome of the Tygerberg demarcation, political parties, particularly the NP, became intimately involved in the demarcation debate, resulting in a complex party political struggle over control of the CMA.

Commentators on the demarcation debate have placed much emphasis on the political control the NP sought to retain and extend in the CMA. At the surface the development of the demarcation debate was seen as focusing upon the search for political power and spatial configurations of political space that would achieve this goal. But these debates were not only about retaining or extending political control over the CMA. The reason for gaining political power was founded in the need to control the distribution of TMS resources, thus seeking the political power to implement Tygerberg’s (mainly “White”) understanding of social justice. Only by taking seriously the WLAs residents understanding of social justice, located in their interpretation of the spatiality of the CMA, could the NP retain political relevance.

To demonstrate these arguments the chapter first reviews the decisions of the WCDB, thereafter the White public response to the Boards demarcation proposals, followed by the political party responses to these events.

7.2 The demarcation board and the post-apartheid city

Although confined by having to operate within the LGTA, submitted demarcation proposals and the rulings of the CMNF, the WCDB had significant discretion in the demarcation of TMS jurisdictions. In fact, the WCDB had both the opportunity and ability to construct the starting point of post-apartheid Cape Town, demarcating the broad spatial framework within which a more socially just urban society would develop. The basic reference point of the demarcation process was the LGTA. In the
demarcation of the metropolitan inner boundaries or substructure boundaries, Schedule 11(6)(b) of the LGTA stated that the Demarcation Board (prior to making its recommendations to the Administrator) should take on board specified criteria (as seen in Chapter Six, p.123). The detailed interpretation of this “formal”, if sketchy frame of reference was however, something the demarcation boards had to decide upon within the context of the region in which they were working and the transitional context of South Africa at large. Consequently, the Government of National Unity (GNU) did not prescribe a definitive understanding of the post-apartheid city. The intention was that the demarcation boards would draw upon the insight of the various local communities to construct a political geography that would enable the reconstruction of South African cities. As such there appears to have been a clear acceptance that the manner in which urban society’s benefits and burdens ought to be re-worked would be differentially understood in the different urban contexts of South Africa.

Despite the undefined nature of what the precise outcome of the demarcation process would be - a notion that no unitary understanding of the post-apartheid city would reflect the diverse interpretations of the desirable urban future - there was a general consensus on a set of departure points for the demarcation process. For the WCDB the main objective was summarised as establishing larger, non-racial local government areas in order to achieve more financially viable local authorities (WCDB, 1995). The WCDB aimed to ensure that the outcome of the demarcation process would enable the dismantling of racism and racial boundaries, as well as acknowledge the organic unity between the communities of the city and the metropolitan area at large. The WCDB thus had a particular interpretation of the spatiality of the post-apartheid CMA and sought to reorganise the distribution of local government resources to attain this urban vision (Cameron, 1998; Classen, 1998; Cloete, 1998; Younge, 1998).

Elaborating on this overall objective, Cameron (1998) pointed out that the decision-making mechanism of the demarcation process was guided by a number of principles, which acted as a so-called baseline against which all submissions were adjudicated. These “principles” were however, not only a mechanism by which to judge demarcation proposals. It also illustrated an understanding of social justice that sought the rectification of the apartheid urban geography, facilitated by a fundamental
shift in the manner in which the CMA’s local government resources were distributed in urban space.

The major concern facing the demarcation board related to the number and size of the TMSs in the CMA (Cameron, 1998; Cloete, 1998; Younge, 1998). This issue was framed by the decision as to whether or not all disadvantaged areas in the CMA should be amalgamated with existing WLAs in order to overcome the institutional and spatial fragmentation caused by apartheid urban policies (WCDB, 1995,p.22). The WCDB's consensus position was that the intention of the LGTA was to integrate disadvantaged areas with larger WLAs. Consequently, amalgamation seemed to be the way forward (Cloete, 1998). Furthermore, the Board was of the opinion that the creation of a relatively large number of stand-alone and separate Black or Coloured local authorities could not aid the integration of the CMA and contradicted the aim of insuring the dismantling of racial boundaries and the development of the organic unity of the city. To overcome this, relatively large TMSs, incorporating local authorities representing various racial and socio-economic communities, would have to be considered.

The most significant implication of this decision was that in the context of the TMS demarcation of the CMA, Khayelitsha would have to be amalgamated with a WLA, or grouping of WLAs. Spatially the incorporation of disadvantaged areas in the south with WLAs to the north and west would ultimately mean that there would be a small number of larger substructures, rather than a large number of small substructures. Seen against the need to maximise TMS capacity, especially once a relatively weak metro council had been decided upon (i.e. the CMNF's negotiated position) and in order to ensure the upgrading of poorer areas, amalgamation with existing, large WLAs was not only inevitable but also seen as desirable. Thus, the starting point of the WCDB was framed by a desire to address and rectify the stark inequalities apartheid urban development had imposed on the CMA.

Cloete (1998) recalls that underlying this idea, was a second important demarcation principle: the WCDB took the notion of the redistribution of resources to aid local government capacity and attainment of greater equality at the TMS level very seriously. Cloete (1998) argued that the:
"approach to the demarcation was to take vertical lines (i.e. rich – poor) and not horizontal lines (rich – rich or poor – poor). We wanted a change to the apartheid morphology. We wanted something more balanced within the substructures. We argued that the richer areas should seek to help the poor areas in socio-economic development. There was a need for the rich areas to develop at least some understanding of a social consciousness. So the logically rich areas were identified and logically poor areas were grouped together and then connected to the richer groupings...in that way to attain the redistribution effect."

The Board was, however, “caught between two contradictory imperatives in this regard” (Western Cape Demarcation Board, 1995,p.22). Cloete (1998) and Classen (1998) illustrated this point by recalling that the incorporation of poor areas meant a smaller number of large substructures, although it was felt that smaller local authorities were more efficient and accountable. The decision to integrate all disadvantaged areas with existing local authorities precluded this outcome (Western Cape Demarcation Board, 1995,p.22). As Cloete (1998) on further reflection stated, "the Board members felt that the incorporation of disadvantaged areas remained the overriding concern and had to receive priority". Thus, the Board’s understanding of the post-apartheid city reflected by this "concern" was a desire for the rectification of the material imbalances in the apartheid city by amalgamating the resources bases of poor and wealthy communities.

Having taken this position, a third demarcation principle could be identified: that the incorporation of disadvantaged areas should be done on a fair and equitable basis. In taking this decision their interpretation of the spatiality of the post-apartheid city was mediated by the negotiated decisions of the CMNF. In fact, the Board reportedly gave serious consideration to the CMNF’s agreements and felt that these ideas would be included as a matter of priority, ignored only if aspects of the agreement contravened the LGTA (WCDB, 1995,p.23). The CMNF agreement sanctioned the creation of a relatively weak TMC and strong TMSs. A weak TMC and strong TMSs meant that the metropolitan government would be mainly involved in metropolitan wide planning and bulk service delivery. In fact, its powers, functions and duties would resemble the rather limited functions of the former WCRSC. On the other hand, the TMSs would be the primary local authorities, meaning that they would perform the functions and

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2 This was a point the WLAs repeatedly made and which the ANC in the BLA areas initially supported too.
duties similar to those of the former WLAs. The main addition to the TMSs services and responsibilities would therefore be the requirement of greatly extending the developmental functions of local government into previously disadvantaged areas.

A further aspect of the CMNF agreement, that the WCDB interpreted as a commitment to redressing imbalances in the CMA, meant that not only would all levels of government share responsibility for redressing imbalances, but also that the various local authorities should share commensurate responsibility in this regard. Thus, no community in the CMA would escape the financial implications of restructuring and developing the CMA as a whole (WCDB, 1995, p.24). Underlying this principle was concern for a more equal distribution of urban society’s benefits and burdens across the whole CMA, hinting that the TMSs were part of a metropolitan system and would all have responsibility to contribute to the re-development of poor areas. The task of aiding the development of poor and disadvantaged areas thus the concern of all CMA residents, a responsibility that could not be delegated to any one single urban community.

The final clause of the CMNF agreement “directly taken into account” was that all substructures would have an equitable share in the commercial and industrial base of the CMA (WCDB, 1995, p.25). Cameron (1996, p.25) reported that given the concentration of wealth in the White business areas in the north and the north-west of the region and the concentration of poorer areas in the south-east, the Board found it impossible to demarcate TMSs with similar financial capacities. However, as alluded to, the financial viability of the TMSs needed to be considered. As a consequence this would entail demarcating TMS boundaries which would include richer and poorer areas. Once again this indicated that the demarcation process was heavily weighted towards local government resource concerns. Yet, in addition, it indicated that the starting point of post-apartheid cities was bounded by the current distribution of resources in the Metropolitan space-economy, thus ensuring that the inherited apartheid city directly and fundamentally determined the demarcation options the WCDB had at its disposal. Consequently, whichever distribution of the CMA’s benefits and burdens the WCDB decided upon, it would be bounded by the geography of the CMA.
The decision of the Board was that richer TMSs with strong tax bases should assume greater financial responsibility for incorporating densely populated poorer areas. Cameron (1996, p.25) reports that this led the WCDB to decide on two relatively large TMSs with sufficient capacity and resources to take on the major responsibility for upgrading disadvantaged areas. The “acceptance of this principle entailed the rejection of ‘cherry-picking’ whereby some local authorities (in particular the Tygerberg WLAs) proposed options which selectively targeted Coloured areas whilst ignoring abutting Black areas” (Cameron, 1996, p.27). Thus, the Board restated its position that all former WLAs would share the responsibility of rectifying the injustices of apartheid urban development. In addition, this statement underlined the notion that those in the better-off position (those holding the resources) were expected to aid those former BLAs which were least well-off. Implicitly however, the Board also drew up a hierarchy of concerns. The focus in the restructuring process was on the least well off and not those who were relatively well off. Consequently, by framing the need for redistribution of WLA resources in this manner, the Board actively precluded the entrenchment of local government jurisdictions based on socio-economic and cultural similarity.

7.3 Demarcating the Cape Metropolitan Area

These "principles" were mediated by the demarcation proposals submitted for the Board's consideration. As the WCDB followed a "holistic" metropolitan perspective, this proved to be rather problematic because there were very few metropolitan-level proposals. Most of the proposals did not contain metropolitan-wide options and as far as the WLAs of Tygerberg were concerned none, bar the BNSC (WCDB, 1995). In their view (and reiterated by Cameron, 1998; Classen, 1998; Cloete, 1998 and Younge, 1998) this lack of proposals might have been out of concern that it would be presumptuous of one local authority to prescribe to areas other than their own and additionally some proposals were locally negotiated. On the other hand, many submissions did not contain a metropolitan perspective, simply because that would have exposed their own particular option as “cherry picking” - “where a grab had been made at metropolitan resources without commensurate responsibility for the upgrading of poor areas” (WCDB, 1995,p.24). Classen (1998) suggested that the paucity of such demarcation proposals was telling in itself, insofar as it reiterated the notion that the Tygerberg WLAs perceived the urban world as a fragmented urban space. The CMA
was interpreted as an array of separate, disconnected and independent social, cultural, economic and political spaces. The interdependency of the metropolitan reality and a sense of relationship between these various spaces, as seen in the previous chapter, were absent from the White interpretation of the spatiality of the CMA.

Given these limitations, Cameron (1996a) and Cloete (1998) report that only a handful of competing approaches, mindful of the metropolitan area as a whole could be considered. One was a so-called “bi-polar model”, which was proposed by the Cape Town City Council (CTCC). A second proposal suggesting (not explicitly though) a similar “model” was submitted by the BNSC (as discussed in Chapter Six), while a third proposal came from a WCRSC official, Dr van Tonder. The CTCC and BNSC proposals were relatively similar in terms of reasoning, although the exact shape and size of the proposed TMSs differed. The proposals basically entailed addressing:

- “the existence of local government boundaries drawn according to racial criteria;
- the fact that local government in the CMA is the most highly fragmented of South Africa’s metropolitan areas;
- the breakdown in the delivery of local government services in the BLAs; and
- the lack of a significant rates base in BLA areas for a programme of reconstruction and development” (Cape Town City Council, 1994, p.1).

Within this context they proposed:

- “the need to twin local government administrations with high operational capacities (i.e. local authorities with high level of administrative skills and know-how, administrative infrastructure, etc.) and local authorities with low operational capacities in order to create smooth functioning and desirable local government across the area of jurisdiction of the TMC;
- areas with no significant rates base (viz. BLA areas which do not have industrial and commercial areas that provide a higher property tax income) needed to merge with WLAs possessing a large rates base in order to ensure that the new local authorities are not overly reliant on financial transfers from the TMC and Province;
- the integration of BLAs with WLAs in order to create ethnically mixed TMSs;
- in order to embark on the restoration and extension of services and capital programmes consonant with the RDP it is essential that TMSs with a high operational capacity be kept intact. Given the general agreement within the
CMNF that the TMC should perform a very limited service delivery role, it is not desirable to create a fragmented system of local government which may make the delivery of services problematic” (Cape Town City Council, 1994, p.1).

These two proposals set out to create TMSs that would facilitate the reconstruction of the CMA by redistributing local government resources from those areas with a strong resource base to those with a weaker base. An active involvement in the improvement of the least well off’s position in the respective TMSs was consequently envisaged. The spatiality of this understanding of social justice for the CTCC, meant that it could incorporate Ikapa and Crossroads into its own jurisdiction and that Khayelitsha could be aligned with another large functional authority with a significant resource base. It was therefore suggested that the Tygerberg municipalities could amalgamate with Khayelitsha to form a single TMS.

Finally, Dr. Van Tonder’s (in WCBD, 1994) metropolitan model was presented purely in his personal capacity. He placed the former BLAs of Khayelitsha, Ikapa and Crossroads, together with Cape Town in the same TMS and the remaining disadvantaged areas, as well as the Tygerberg municipalities, in another. This meant that the CTCC would be responsible for the needs of the two largest disadvantaged areas – Mitchell’s Plain and Khayelitsha. The significance of the personal proposal as Cloete (1998) recalls, was that Van Tonder’s proposal was emblematic of the political concerns behind many of the proposals:

“The NP wanted the status quo way (meaning that nothing would change from the apartheid system), which was in principle wrong in the view of the demarcation board. The views that came out in this proposal was not his, nor of the municipalities. It was the NP speaking via the municipalities. Nearly all the old Tygerberg wards and municipalities were NP and it was via the caucuses that the NP spoke. The Coloured areas, included in Parow (with reference to the Parow proposals that included the Coloured areas) for example, were purely political in motivation. Minister Marais gave up the southern areas, but the northern areas would be ‘his’. Coincidentally - it was Afrikaans Whites and Coloureds versus the south’s Black and English communities.”

Whilst the re-demarcation of the CMA held major political implications, the impact of this demarcation in terms of party political power balances was not the concern of the
WCDB. Van Tonder's proposal was seen merely as an alternative proposal and its utility in achieving the objective the WCDB had set itself. Considering the lack of such a possibility in Van Tonder's proposals, the Board decided to use the bi-polar models as a starting-point in tandem with the demarcation objectives identified earlier and aspects of proposals presented (and discussed in the previous chapter) of the local communities views.

Against this back-drop the WCDB "spatialised" their understanding of social justice and set out to demarcate a political geography that could realise this position. An important influence on the Board's decision in spatialising their interpretation of a more socially just post-apartheid CMA, relative to their choice of the bi-polar model was the impossibility of subdividing Khayelitsha into two or more separate units. In addition, the WCDB also tried, in the context of the bi-polar model, to reconcile the important objectives of effective electoral accountability and financial viability, especially against the background of the constraints already summarised above. The policy implications of these considerations were that any substructure which had the responsibility of upgrading large disadvantaged areas could not be too small, otherwise it would not be financially viable. On the other hand, they argued that, units that are too big would complicate the policy responsiveness of the local authority towards its residents and make electoral control of local government more difficult. The result was that the Board could not recommend substructures of roughly similar size, either in terms of population numbers or financial capacity. It did however, try to reduce the gap between the smallest and the largest substructures as far as was practically possible. In the end the Board decided to recommend the demarcation of substructures which would have "fair and equitable" access to the resources available to local government, given their differing population sizes and development needs (WCDB, 1995, pp.64-69).

In light of these considerations, the WCDB considered various options and their permutations to demarcate the CMA into as few as five and as many as twelve or even more substructures. The Board came to the conclusion that it was not feasible to have

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1 This argument was mainly drawn from the recommendation made by the administrators of Lingelethu-West Town Council and SANCO Khayelitsha, who clearly stated that this area should not be fragmented. In addition, from a technical point of view, Khayelitsha was developed as a single physical unit and the management of that infrastructure could not be subdivided (Younge, 1998; WCDB, 1995, p.118-119).
either very few TMSs or significantly more than six substructures. Consequently, they recommended six substructures that were, in their view, the optimum balance that could be achieved among all the different interests, as well as statutory and other considerations the Board had to take into account. This decision led to the creation of the Northern (Blaauberg), Helderberg, Southern (Peninsula), Central (Cape Town), Eastern (Oostenberg) and Tygerberg substructures (Figure: 7.1). Table 7.1 provides a brief summary of which BLA and WLA areas were amalgamated and what their respective municipal incomes were, both in real terms and per capita.

Table 7.1 The CMA and its constituent TMSs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TMS</th>
<th>Population (approximate)</th>
<th>Financial Resources</th>
<th>Selected Constituent Neighbourhoods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cape Town TMS</td>
<td>1 411 000</td>
<td>(i) R 1, 748 million</td>
<td>Athlone (Coloured) City Bowl (White) Pinelands (White) Langa (Black)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(ii) R 1, 240</td>
<td>Gugulethu (Black) Nyanga (Black) Cross Roads (Black) Mitchel’s Plain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Coloured)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern TMS</td>
<td>346 700</td>
<td>(i) R 165,9 million</td>
<td>Bloekombos (Coloured) Blue Downs (Coloured) Brakenfell (White) Kuits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(ii) R 672</td>
<td>River (White) Wallecedene (Coloured)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helderberg TMS</td>
<td>110 600</td>
<td>(i) R 139 million</td>
<td>Faure (Coloured) Firgrove (Coloured) Helderberg Basin (mainly White)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(ii) R 1, 253</td>
<td>Lwandle (Black) Macassar (Coloured) Nomzamo (Black) Somerset West (White)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern TMS</td>
<td>167 900</td>
<td>(i) R234, 8 million</td>
<td>Atlantis (Coloured) Bloubergstrand (White) Melkbostrand (White)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(ii) R 1, 397</td>
<td>Milnerton (White)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern TMS</td>
<td>340 000</td>
<td>(i) R 346,9 million</td>
<td>Constantia (White) Fish Hoek (White) Grass Park (Coloured) Hout Bay (White) Weton (Coloured) Wynberg (White)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(ii) R 1, 020</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tygerberg TMS</td>
<td>802 700</td>
<td>(i) R 802, 8 million</td>
<td>Bellville (White) Boteheuwel (Coloured) Durbanville (White) Elsies River (Coloured) Goodwood (White) Khayelitsha (Black) Lingelthu West (Black) Mfuleni (Black) Parow (White)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(ii) R 1, 022</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: WCDB, 1995, pp.31)
Figure 7.1 Final Western Cape Demarcation Board boundary proposal for the CMA
(Source: WCDB, 1995, p. 102)
7.4 Contesting the demarcation of the City of Tygerberg

The Demarcation Board submitted its report to the Provincial Minister of Local Government, Peter Marais, in February 1995 and it was subsequently made available for public comment. On the whole the report drew enormous criticism. In particular, it was the proposals to amalgamate Tygerberg's WLAs with the former BLA area, including Khayelitsha, that elicited the lion's share of public criticism. This section provides the outlines of these responses by first considering the general public's response to the demarcation proposal, the WLAs views building upon the public response then comes into view, with the following section focusing on the formal party political response, in turn developed as a response to these communities' views.

7.4.1 The general (White) public's response

A number of revealing responses can be taken from letters of complaint addressed to the Premier's Office. These letters illustrated how (White) people living in the WLA areas of Tygerberg perceived the CMA and particularly Khayelitsha and its people. In addition, a more general impression of the White public's interpretation of the spatiality of the CMA can be drawn from these responses. It becomes clear that these (White) responses illustrate that interpretations of the spatiality of the city meditated their understandings of which urban communities could be included in considerations of social justice.

The key conflict between the White public and the WCDB's proposals resulted from the very different interpretations the public held of the spatiality of the city and its post-apartheid future. Whereas the WCDB focused on the CMA as a whole, the White public of Tygerberg understood the CMA in a far more fragmented and disconnected manner. For the White public of Tygerberg, the Black townships were seen as distant, different and unfamiliar places with no "connection" to their own urban world. The township is a far off place, not part of the White urban world but separate and threatening, representing the antithesis of "their city".

We find that Khayelitsha was seen as a place filled with "rural people ... [who] have been allowed to move into the city" or "non-urban people will move to our area". Comments such as "the disadvantaged (of Khayelitsha) can explain their position
mainly because of tradition...a tradition of having more than one wife and having 20-30 children for which there is inadequate funds to educate to a proper level” indicate an antagonism (or the persistence of apartheid myths) towards Black people generally. A misguided and in fact racist statement such as this also indicated just how little many White people knew about urban Blacks or Khayelitsha residents itself. In these views Khayelitsha was portrayed as an area not akin to a real urban settlement or as a place inhabited by people who do not belong in the city. Moreover, other respondents suggested that the “majority of the people (Khayelitsha’s) are squatters” or expressed a fear that “Tygerberg will become one big squatter area”. The fear of their own neighbourhoods becoming like “one big squatter area” - highlighting the notion that at the crudest level BLA areas represented squatters. These positions also illuminate how the exclusion of the Black community, an apartheid reality, was replicated in their re-imagination of the post-apartheid city.

Other statements such as “there are over a million of them” or “they would lower our quality of living” reinforce the notion that the residents of the Townships were an “alien other”, not welcome in the White urban environment. In fact, reading through such submissions illustrates the significance of apartheid government myths / visions of the “swart gevaar” (very literally here the "Black Threat") which was so often employed in the development of apartheid and this ideology's defence in later years. These views of difference in some cases bordered on fear as seems to be suggested in Mr Brits’s letter, “There is a very wide perception amongst the people of Tygerberg that they would be annexed by Khayelitsha and I personally share that concern.”

Others remarked that “Khayelitsha is on the other side of the Peninsula, this it is not our financial responsibility” or Tygerberg’s “linkages are East – West not North – South”, indicated how those in the WLA areas of Tygerberg saw both their own and Khayelitsha’s placement in the CMA. There was, in their view of the urban reality, no discernible link / relationship with this BLA area whatsoever. As there was no

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4 Kotze (1995)
5 Greyling (1995)
6 Postma (1995)
7 Knoetze (1995)
8 Anon (1995)
9 Brits (1995)
10 Anon (1995)
11 Munro (1995)
12 De Beer (1995)
relationship between these communities there was no discernible responsibility towards the township. These feelings were clearly reflected in relation to fiscal concerns.

Here the central theme was the level of financial responsibility the wealthier citizens of "White" Tygerberg would have towards the residents of Khayelitsha with whom there was no relationship of shared belonging to the city or a notion of a collective, shared urban destiny. These views ranged from "surely it is not Tygerberg's baby" or "Khayelitsha is not only the Tygerberg responsibility" to "Khayelitsha is the responsibility of the whole country". In this respect Mr. Postma from Bellville wrote that his first concern with the Board's decision was that the Tygerberg WLAs did not have the financial ability to "look after Khayelitsha, Bonteheuwel and Mfuleni on its own". He continued by stating that "the area was too large and could not be managed and administered effectively", a view repeatedly presented by the WLA councils. In fact, he suggested that:

"Should the internal boundaries of the CMC remain as proposed, the financial responsibility placed on the citizens of the Tygerberg's wealthier neighbourhoods would become unbearable in relation to the other five TMSs. Furthermore, should the culture of non-payment of rent and services in Khayelitsha and other areas remain, the people that normally pay their municipal bills would start to refrain from doing so."

He argued that Khayelitsha should be demarcated as a single TMS with financial and service support from the CMC, thus the whole of the CMA should be responsible for the area. "A disgruntled and concerned citizen" from Durbanville shared this point of view, in fact in this person's view "the whole metropole should take on the responsibility for areas like Khayelitsha". In addition, Mssrs. Clausen and Harry's argued that:

"The criteria set out in the interim constitution have not been followed, thus creating a substructure which is not economically viable. Surely one cannot expect a few thousand residents of the so-called 'affluent' northern suburbs to carry the

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13 Greyling (1995)
15 Downing (1995); Riamond (1995)
16 Postma (1995)
17 Ontevrede en bekomerde inwoner (1995)
encroaching 1 000 000 inhabitants of Khayelitsha. This burden must be carried by
the whole Cape Metropole equally.\footnote{18}

The basic message that came across in these responses was that these citizens did not
see Khayelitsha as part of their urban reality and were certainly unwilling to resume
any real fiscal responsibility for the maintenance or development thereof. Khayelitsha
represented a far-off, unknown place and one that they felt they had no "connection"
with.

These statements demonstrate the spatiality of the CMA as interpreted by these
residents. Whereas there is nothing in these statements directly related to social
justice, it provides a window on the basic framework within which their undefined
understandings of social justice operated. Issues of distribution related directly to
whether or not different communities in different parts of the CMA formed part of
these respondents interpretation of the city. The prerequisite for participation in the
distribution of local government's benefits and burdens was dependent upon
communities being seen as part of the same urban world and its future development.

Clearly Khayelitsha was not part of this "vision" of the city and consequently not
included as a community that could lay claim to "their" local government resources.
Perhaps more revealing was the absence of any statement concerning the poor
Coloured communities included in the WCDB's proposals. In fact, not a single
response took issue with the fact that the Coloured areas were subsumed into
Tygerberg. On the contrary, one respondent argued that "we already have our own
[i.e. coloured] poor community we have to look after."\footnote{19} While the particular
understanding of social justice in these responses is unclear, who would / could be
included and excluded in the distribution of "their" local government resources were
clearly linked to the spatiality of "their" (White) urban world. Thus whichever
understanding of social justice would be pursued was dependent upon that
community's inclusion in these respondents' interpretation of the desirable city. The
spatiality of the city can thus be said to have had a direct impact upon who would be
included in an understanding of social justice.

\footnote{18} Clausen and Harry (1995)
\footnote{19} Anon (1995)
These responses were also reflected in more organised community responses such as the Taxpayers Associations of Goodwood (1995) and Parow (1995a). Both tax-payers associations argued, that while the WCDB was charged with creating boundaries for the creation of economically viable TMS, with development potential, they had failed to do so. In their view the Board failed to create a TMS that had the necessary financial ability to cope with the development demands of the underprivileged. Furthermore it was pointed out that the LGTA did not specify that BLA areas had to be amalgamated with WLA areas. Once more no mention was made of the poor Coloured communities, the critique being focused on Khayelitsha. This again illustrated the notion that if fiscal responsibility had to be taken for poor communities then they should be communities that stood in some sort of discernible and positive relationship with the WLAs' urban experience.

As was the case with the individual public responses, they continued by suggesting that if Khayelitsha was such an important and unique community, worthy of special attention, the logical step would have been to demarcate it separately and make the whole CMA responsible for it. Ironically this position was precluded by their very own elected WLA representatives' negotiations in the CMNF (i.e. these communities argued for a position in which the TMSs would have responsibility for the redistribution of local government resources). It appeared that these communities really thought that the re-demarcation of the CMA could be orchestrated in such a manner as to avoid any responsibility for the re-working and funding of post-apartheid urban reconstruction and in particular the re-construction of the townships. Consequently, the spatiality of the CMA again mediated the context within which understandings of social justice were considered.

But interpretations of the spatiality of the city were differentiated and contrasting views came from the Tygerberg Chamber of Commerce and Industry (1995). In a letter written by the president of the Chamber, it was argued that the Board should have demarcated larger TMSs. In the view expressed here, it was argued that one TMS could basically encompass the traditional jurisdiction of Cape Town while a second would include the remainder of the CMA, which would include both the WLAs of Tygerberg and BLAs of Khayelitsha and Mfuleni. It was argued that in this manner it would be possible for the two TMSs to have the necessary mix of economic viability and structural basis for future growth. Their emphasis on economic sustainability of
the future TMS and belief in economies of scale underpinned the presentation of a proposal that hinted at a different understanding of space within which the distribution of urban society's benefits and burdens could operate. Consequently, although the publicly organised groupings might generally have disapproved of the demarcation result because it created too large a TMS, at least some thought it was too small to be able to cope with the development needs of the former BLA areas.

These views (with the exception of the latter) were significant as they provided an outline for the WLA council debates that further articulated these positions. More important was the impact of these views to the political parties represented in the WLA chambers, notably the NP. The inability of the White public to identify with Khayelitsha as part of "their city" and as a consequence the denial of any form of fiscal responsibility towards the development of the Black townships, held clear directives for the NP. The debate therefore spilt over into a more political concern founded on the White public's interpretation of the spatiality of the CMA and understandings of social justice it enabled. These opinions and views were incorporated in the response made by the Tygerberg's WLAs.

7.4.2 The WLAs response

Drawing on their residents' negative reception of the TMS proposals, the WLAs of Bellville (1995), Durbanville (1995), Goodwood (1995) and Parow (1995a) rejected the findings of the WCDB. They argued that the proposed Tygerberg TMS was not financially viable and that it was too large to be effective or efficient in service delivery. They were of the opinion that the size and development needs of Khayelitsha were wholly under-estimated. In addition, issues of democracy in such a large local government unit, self-determination and local autonomy were also cited. Their criticism aimed at reiterating their positions reflected in their initial demarcation proposals. As illustrated in Chapter Six, the WLAs of Tygerberg submitted demarcation proposals as individual entities, with apparently very little in their submissions suggesting an over-all strategic or collective effort to restructure the CMA (Van Rooyen, 1998). Both Cloete (1998) and Cameron (1998) suggest that the NP dominated councils had an agenda to keep the BLA areas from amalgamating with

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20 On the other hand, the report was supported by the non-statutory delegation of the CMC and the ANC.
WLAs and that there had been collaboration amongst these WLAs. Whilst this may have been the case following the WCDB’s boundary proposals, this argument does not fit neatly into the boundary proposals discussed previously. Nevertheless, this lack of co-ordination would soon be addressed. Following the publication of the demarcation report, an informal meeting of the main WLAs of Tygerberg, Bellville, Durbanville, Goodwood and Parow, led to a subsequent alignment of the Tygerberg’s WLAs' response to the demarcation decision.

The starting point of these responses focused on the immense attention placed on the needs of the people of Khayelitsha. In the view of these councils, the WCDB took as its starting point the decision not to subdivide Khayelitsha and elevated the well-being of Khayelitsha to a position where it was the only criterion that was seen as important. It was argued that the six proposed TMSs would result in underprivileged Coloured areas such as Elsie River and Bishops Lavis being deprived of up-liftment due to the large Black areas which would demand available funds to be utilised in their particular areas (Goodwood, 1995; Durbanville, 1995; Parow, 1995a). For example, it was suggested that:

"Too much attention is focused on the Khayelitsha areas and in the view of the council, the needs of the disadvantaged in other communities of the Metropole, particularly in the Tygerberg area is to a great extent ignored" (Durbanville, 1995, p.1).

As an alternative they suggested that the impoverished Black areas were:

"...a problem which should be addressed nationally and collectively by the Metropole and to be administered by the City of Cape Town with its large infrastructure, on behalf of the Metropolitan Council" (Durbaville, 1995, p.2).

Thus, the WLA were apparently willing to re-work budgetary priorities to accommodate Coloured community needs but not those of the Black communities.

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21 Thus the restructuring of the local government jurisdiction in such a manner that it would be to the greatest potential benefit for those in the city’s poorest areas.

22 Provincial government MEC, Peter Marais, supported this notion, remarking “that it was disturbing that the debates on demarcation in the Cape Town Metropolitan Area only focused on Khayelitsha. No-one asks about areas such as Lavender Hill, which is one of the poorest communities” (Die Burger, 1995,04,19,2).
Black communities' needs were too extensive and as they were not part of "their" urban world, the WLAs felt little responsibility towards the Black township residents. Furthermore, the report was, in their view, fraught with inconsistencies and mistaken assumptions.

The WLAs argued that their submission was based on the creation of non-racial TMSs but also the notions that these TMSs had to be financially viable, administratively manageable and that service delivery should not be impeded or disrupted (Bellville, 1995; Durbanville, 1995; Goodwood, 1995; Parow, 1995b). All four Tygerberg WLAs drew attention to the perceived inability of the proposed TMS's to enable representative governance. In this regard, detailed attention was given to the number of political representatives for the TMS population and the number of inhabitants per ward, arguing that if accepted norms were implemented (that being 10 000 voters per ward) there would be too many political representatives, which would be both costly and obstructive to accountable representation. The WLAs went on to argue that this meant that the TMS would not be able to address the development needs of Khayelitsha, together with other areas with great development needs. An additional point related to financial matters, in particular the costs of local government rationalisation, while the final one related to the increasing levels of urban migration to Khayelitsha and its impact on the ability of a future local authority to cope with this influx. Finally, extensive attention was focused upon the predicted inability of a local authority to manage such a physically large and clumsy substructure, threatening service delivery, as well as effective administration and public accountability.

At the core of these concerns was the fact that the NP's WLAs' had to reflect the opinions of their electorates. The WLAs were of the view that the inclusion of the Black townships held major fiscal implications, which the WLA residents of Tygerberg wanted to avoid. Whereas the Coloured community was seen as an part of the White Afrikaans community and their interpretation of the spatiality of "their city", as well as increasingly political ally in the evolving post-apartheid politics, Khayelitsha certainly was not (Cameron, 1996a). As "White Tygerberg" did not identify this community as part of their urban world (thus a positive sense of relationship), they did not want to include this community in the sharing (thus taking on responsibilities) of their local government resources.
7.5 Political responses and social justice

The "orthodox" interpretation of debates that developed in the wake of the demarcation debate, sketched by commentators such as Cameron (1996a) and Cloete (1995) regard them as founded in a battle for political control over the Tyerberg TMS and the TMC generally. This section re-thinks these "political debates", arguing that whereas this literature colours them in "political power" terms, debates concerning social justice were also at play. It is demonstrated that a central point that has to be kept in mind when interpreting these debates is that political control over particular jurisdictions was founded in the resources distributive implication that political control over a local government jurisdiction offered. This review argues that the political parties sought to secure control over TMSs to implement particular redistributive practices that echoed those views held by Tygerberg's (White) electorate. It was essential for the NP (who controlled the WLAs) in particular, to retain control over the decision-making structures that allocate local government resources among its mainly White and less secure Coloured political base. Should it not have control over TMS councils there could be radical changes in the distribution of the TMSs' benefits and burdens, with the WLA areas having to take on the fiscal responsibility of such action with potentially negative impacts upon the NP's political future. This outcome could cost them political support both in the short and long term. Thus it is suggested that it is essential to grasp that political control per se was not the sole motivation in these debates. Rather, it was a concern for the re-working of the distributive system of the post-apartheid city that echoed Tygerberg's White residents' understanding of who would qualify to benefit from "their" resource base.

The first of the political parties to formally respond to the demarcation proposals was the NP who immediately referred the dispute to management consultants Deliotte & Touche for comment. Their analysis supported the WCDB's proposal for six substructures. The consultants' report, however, merely took the demarcation proposals information and reworked all calculations to see whether in fact the financial implications of this projected demarcation proposal were correct. This did not deter the NP's MEC, Peter Marais from announcing on 23 May 1995, new TMS boundaries for the CMA that differed substantially from the Board's proposals. These proposals, the first of a number of NP alternatives suggested over the following eight months, had four substructures instead of the six TMSs suggested by the Board. The
Eastern and Tygerberg TMSs, as well as the Central and Southern TMSs were to be combined (see Figure: 7.2). What was of critical importance was that Khayelitsha was included in the Central TMS (the former CTCC) and not the Tygerberg substructure. The reasons given for this included:

- The Tygerberg / eastern TMS would have been financially overburdened with the inclusion of Khayelitsha. The Central TMS would still have a per capita income advantage of R1 140 as against Tygerberg’s R922;

- There was a need to give Khayelitsha to the largest municipality with the greatest administrative and financial base (Cape Town) so as to begin an up-liftment and development plan immediately;

- Tygerberg would lack urgent capacity through the merging of several autonomous municipalities, which would take 18 months to complete before Khayelitsha could benefit (Cape Times, 02.06.1995).

Controversially Mr Marais also altered the composition of the Provincial Committee that had to approve the boundary demarcation. Two members of the committee were replaced by NP-aligned appointees which ensured that the NP’s boundary proposals were accepted by this body (Cameron, 1996a,p.29). Cameron (1998) recalls that the NP’s proposals were motivated by a number of "political" concerns. First, the NP was of the opinion that the inclusion of a significant number of Blacks in the Tygerberg area could cause it to lose its stronghold to the ANC in the elections.23 In addition, there was also a major concern about the number of actual voters in Khayelitsha, as well as future settlements in the area that could alter the balance of political power in the TMS. Furthermore, the constitutional clause giving half the wards to former BLA areas would over-represent Khayelitsha in the then forthcoming local elections if it were to be included in the Tygerberg TMS and it was feared that this would give the ANC an edge it otherwise would not have had. By including Khayelitsha, and the Ikapa area into the Central TMS along with the predominantly White and Coloured Southern TMS, this could offset any of the political advantages to the ANC in the CMA.

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23 The demarcation board was not blind to the political implications of the demarcation debate and was well aware that certain amalgamation options could potentially give either the NP or the ANC a built-in electoral advantage. Cloete (1998) recalls that as far as he was concerned, the board tried to avoid being influenced by such considerations and to focus on the integration of the metropolitan area and the development of local government that could address the needs of the former BLA areas.
The decision was followed by a major outcry in the CMA region. *The Argus* (11.05.1995) reported that the ANC rejected the proposal not to include Khayelitsha in
the Tygerberg and branded it racist. The decision was described by the DP as ethnic cleansing because there were now hardly any Blacks in the Tygerberg TMS. The *Cape Times* (22.05.1995) reported that representatives of the ANC, PAC, DP, ACDP and the ratepayer's federation, criticised the NP's blatant gerrymandering and called for a consolidated front against the NP and MEC, Pieter Marais. According to the *Sunday Times* (07.05.1995) this led to the formation of the "Unity of the City Campaign" which was a front supporting the Board's proposals and opposing those of the NP. Interesting though, was that despite the NP's "gerrymandering" of the boundaries, an NP dominated TLC such as Kuilsriver, came out in defence of the WCDB proposals. Its NP mayor, Danny de la Cruz and executive council leader Ebrahim Sawant, made it clear that they disagreed with Minister Marais' proposals. In their view the six TMS proposals were on balance the best option, despite the proposed boundaries placing this council (Kuilsriver) in the financially weakest TMS (*Die Burger*, 14.05.1995).

Whereas it was the expressed intention that the different political parties would negotiate their differences, this conflict resulted in central government intervention. The parliamentary Standing Committee on Constitutional Affairs passed an amendment that gave the Minister of Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development, in consultation with the Minister of Justice, and after consultation with the provincial premier, the power to appoint and dismiss Provincial Committee appointees. Deputy Minister of Constitutional Affairs, Valli Moosa said that this was necessary for the central government to "step in" where it saw flagrant violations of the central government process that made local government transition impossible. The President subsequently proclaimed this amendment. This invalidated all decisions taken by the Committee between April 30 and June 7, including the controversial CMA boundary decision. This decision also meant that Minister Peter Marais had to submit his boundary proposals to a newly reconstituted Provincial Committee. This amendment was however, held back in order to see if the ANC and NP could broker a compromise. Notwithstanding, although a deal was nearly struck, stalemate was reached and the amendment was promulgated (Cameron, 1996a; 1996b).

The NP regarded this decision as flagrant interference in provincial affairs. The *Sunday Times* (11.06.1995) reported that the Premier was of the opinion that the proclamation had the effect of stripping provinces of powers devolved to them by the Interim Constitution. The NP-led Western Cape government subsequently, initiated action in
the Cape Supreme Court and Constitutional Court to declare null and void the central government's dismissal of its demarcation plans. The issue was taken to the Supreme Court on the grounds that the proclamation was in breach of administrative justice, while it was referred to the Constitutional Court on the substantive issue of provincial autonomy.

The NP lost its challenge against the central government in the Supreme Court. The judges ruled that an Amendment to the LGTA, giving the President powers to pass proclamations, cancelled Parliament's legislative competence by allowing the President to make laws in its place (Sunday Times, 13.08.1995). The NP however, won the Constitutional Court case, albeit on procedural grounds. Cameron (1998) recalls that the Court ruled that proclamations made by the President regarding the LGTA, were in conflict with the Constitution and accordingly invalid. The Court, however, pointed out that such intervention was permissible if it was made via parliamentary legislation and gave Parliament a month to do so. As a consequence Parliament was specially reconvened to pass this legislation. It subsequently did so and a new provincial committee was appointed replacing that of Minister Marais.

The Minister then submitted his proposals to the new Provincial Committee for consideration. However, he included a new proposal, again changing the political geography that could secure White (NP) control and hence implement its particular understanding of social justice. It was still a four-substructure proposal. Khayelitsha (and the South) remained part of Cape Town, but a large portion of Ikapa, namely Gugulethu, Nyanga and Crossroads was now part of the proposed Tygerberg Eastern TMS. This proposal (with the exception of the exclusion of the Southern TMS) was the compromise model, which was almost agreed to by the NP and ANC in June. This had however, floundered when ANC negotiators could not convince their constituency (Weekend Argus, 03.06.1995). The Provincial Committee could not reach a decision with the statutory component supporting Mr Marais' proposal and the non-statutory component supporting the Demarcation Board report. Having exhausted all alternatives, the matter was then sent to the Special Electoral Court established under the Independent Electoral Commission Act of 1993 for a final decision.
The Electoral Court held its hearings on 4 December 1995. In the documentation submitted by the Minister's advocates, it was stated that he had accepted important Board principles such as:

- integrated management and control of important natural features;
- the establishment of racially heterogeneous TMSs;
- the creation of a few non-racial, viable units comprising advantaged and disadvantaged areas; and
- the need to ensure that TMSs were not too large.

However, his proposal differed from the Board's report on a number of important aspects. General criticism was expressed about the Board's neglect of poorer Coloured areas and the Minister reiterated the view expressed in his earlier submission that Cape Town was the only TMS with the capacity to upgrade Khayelitsha. Cape Town with its greater financial base was also in a better position to handle the potential population development of Khayelitsha. Conversely, Ikapa was already overpopulated with little scope for future development, hence the decision to allocate it to Tygerberg (Cameron, 1996,p.32). The underlying point here might be seen as both politically and financially strategic in the sense that these areas had little room for further development and could not therefore grow as either a political constituency or a fiscal burden because of very literal space constraints. Thus from the NP and Tygerberg WLAs' perspective, in the long term it might have been a good option.

The advocates, who represented the Minister at the Electoral Court however, laid much greater emphasis on promulgating the Eastern and Southern TMS as part of Tygerberg and Cape Town respectively. The Khayelitsha issue only received cursory attention. The explanation for this was that the WCDB had recently examined Minister Marais' amended proposals and had pointed out that there was very little difference in population and number of registered voters between Khayelitsha and Gugelethu/Nyanga/Crossroads (the Ikapa BLAs). For example, 302 000 population and 178 000 voters versus 276 999 population and 184 000 voters respectively. The net cash flow deficit of the portion of the proposed Ikapa portion of Tygerberg was however, R42 million, compared to Khayelitsha's R13, 5 million cash flow deficit (Cameron, 1996a, p.32).
It was indicated that at least in the short term Ikapa would be more of a financial burden than Khayelitsha and this report apparently caused some disquiet within the NP (Cameron, 1998; Cloete, 1998). This refocused the debate on the fiscal implications of the amalgamation options – the more immediate concern of the Tygerberg’s WLAs. The NP decided that it would be better off with Khayelitsha than Ikapa and while it would not withdraw its proposals, it would not push this option too strongly at the Electoral Court. Because of this belated recognition that the NP dominated WLAs of Tygerberg would be worse-off with Ikapa than with Khayelitsha, the NP did not file any representations to the Court (Cameron, 1998; Younge, 1998). In this act the NP, after an extraordinary eight months of protracted debate, court hearings and appeals, moved away from its objections to having Tygerberg WLAs amalgamated with Khayelitsha.

All other major groupings that submitted evidence to the Court supported the Demarcation Board’s proposals and argumentation. This included the Southern TMS, the ANC, the Cape Town TMS, the CMC, the Kuilsriver TMS and the Kraaifontein TMS. There was a general consensus amongst these (non-NP) parties that the Board offered a fair and equitable solution to demarcation and that the Minister had not brought any new evidence to refute the Board’s recommendations. The Electoral Court concurred with these views and recommended that the Demarcation Board’s report be accepted in its entirety. It found that the Minister’s criticisms of the Board’s report were successfully countered in argument and shown to be without any real substance. It also found that the Minister did not advance any positive explanation for why his proposals should be accepted. They lacked substance and supporting evidence. Conversely, the Court found that the WCDB’s proposals were far more detailed, cogent, well-reasoned and enjoyed more support than the Minister’s (Sunday Times, 04.06.1995). In the end the Minister accepted the WCDB’s proposals.

Cameron (1996a) suggested that the Minister consistently argued that economic and not political reasons were the major reason for his demarcation decision. However, it is clear that during much of the boundary dispute the NP position was motivated by two political objectives that sometimes contradicted one another. The first position was to avoid having Khayelitsha being incorporated into Tygerberg in order to prevent the ANC from winning this traditional NP stronghold. The second objective was to avoid demarcating Cape Town in a way that could lead to a city-wide ANC
election victory. Indeed, the prospect of the ANC capturing the wealthiest and most powerful local authority in the region and using it as its power-base against the NP-controlled provincial government caused great alarm in the NP provincial caucus.

Furthermore, this debate underlined the fact that the NP’s concern at the local government level (in contrast to the provincial level) was the minimisation of responsibility for the reworking of the townships into functional urban environments. The fact that the demarcation decision was eventually accepted reiterated the importance of fiscal (not the political) concerns for their own followers, regardless of the more general impact on the broader urban environment in which they functioned. Although rational, the emphasis on having the “cheapest” option for their constituents also illuminated this political party’s interpretation of its mainly White supporters in Tygerberg’s understanding of social justice in the future urban context. Like the responses of WLAs and their residents, the focus had been on stemming the possibility of redistribution to aid the reconstruction and rectification of the massive imbalances left in the wake of urban apartheid. In the end, political power per se had to make way for the real concerns of the WLAs – the redistributive implications of re-demarcation and the reality of standing in a relationship with the CMA as a whole, one that would require taking responsibility for "other" communities and a sharing of "its" local government resources.

7.6 Conclusion

This chapter investigated the finalisation of the CMA’s demarcation debates. In contrast to current interpretations of these debates, the chapter demonstrated that different interpretations of the spatiality of the city underpinned different understandings of social justice that in turn formed the foundation of intense political debate. Thus, a significant finding of the chapter is that the debates that followed in the wake of the WCDB’s decisions were not only focused upon political power and control over the CMA but also different interpretations of the spatiality of social justice.

To illustrate this argument the chapter investigated how the WCDB understood the demarcation process, what it aimed to achieve and how this could be realised by a reorganisation of the CMA local government geography. The central focus of the
WCDB's work was upon enabling a re-working of the distribution of the CMA's benefits and burdens. Their key social justice statement was that the local government resource distribution of the apartheid city had to be rectified in such a manner as to ensure a more equitable distribution of these resources. A central process by which to enable this was by means of redistribution, brought about by the amalgamation of rich and poor local government jurisdictions. The demarcation decision-making process, led by these normative concerns, were "spatialised" with reference to the CMA as of whole, resulting in six TMSs.

It was demonstrated that the debates developing in the wake of these proposals were centred on differences between the WCDB's interpretation of the spatiality of the city and that of the White public in the WLAs of Tygerberg. The WCDB focused on the CMA as a whole, while the White public focused on their immediate life-world. Consequently, the arena in which social justice would come into play became the crucible of the ensuing demarcation conflicts. Whereas the differences between their particular understanding of social justice did not clearly come to the fore, the spatial arenas that were relevant to redistributive practices implicit to the re-demarcation of the CMA, were framed by different communities across the CMA, differentially forming part of the spatiality of the city. The differentiated spatiality of the CMA as interpreted by the WCDB and the White public (and by extension the WLA and finally the NP) underpinned differently perceived relationships between the diverse urban communities of the CMA and the types of responsibilities they were willing to take upon themselves in the (re)distribution of the CMAs benefits and burdens. By illustrating this argument, this chapter demonstrated that understandings of social justice are impacted upon by differentiated interpretations of the spatiality of the city.

The final empirical chapter focuses on how the City of Tygerberg developed following this contested process of demarcation. Whilst Chapter Five, Six and Seven have illustrated that understandings of social justice are differentiated, located, bounded to the particularities of specific places, in particular moments in time, and mediated by differentiated interpretations of the spatiality of the city, Chapter Eight demonstrates the impact of imagined space on the construction of a set of distributive principles that are perceived to be more socially just. Whereas the preceding chapters have illustrated that space and its underpinning development paths framed the meaning of social justice understandings, this chapter extends this suggestion, showing that not only is
the interpretation of current urban spaces central to the meaning of social justice but that imagined, future spaces, spaces that still need or can be created, impact upon understandings of social justice.
Chapter Eight

Spatialities of Social Justice in Post-Apartheid Cities

8.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on the City of Tygerberg which came into being following the re-demarcation of the CMA investigated in the previous chapters. It illustrates some of the dynamics of this city's subsequent development and its bearing on the development of a post-apartheid understanding of social justice. In particular it is suggested that following this city's controversial and highly disputed demarcation, developments within this local government have led to the emergence of a shared understanding of social justice across former political divisions. This narrative illustrates that despite the differentiated, located and bounded understandings of the spatiality of social justice shown in the previous chapters, a shared understanding of social justice can develop. The chapter demonstrates the impact of a negotiated urban vision on facilitating a consensus position on how this city can justly distribute its benefits and burdens. This outcome it is argued, was facilitated by the emergence of a negotiated urban vision enabled by a planning system referred to as Integrated Development Planning (IDP). By demonstrating the impact of a negotiated urban vision and its links to the distribution of local government resources, the chapter shows how space shapes understandings of social justice.

While developing such a suggestion, this chapter indicates that this urban vision and the distributive consequences presented by it, are understood to be changing and contested, illuminating the variability of meaning of social justice in response to possibly new interpretations of the city in future. Thus, while a particular urban vision, which necessitates a particular distribution of local government resources is interpreted as facilitating the achievement of social justice, this distribution is not seen as static but part of an ongoing process of transformation in the city. It is accepted that this urban vision might enable changes in the spatiality of the city and in turn generate new understandings of how urban society's benefits and burdens ought to be distributed.

In order to achieve this objective, the chapter first sketches some of the political dynamics pertaining to the City of Tygerberg in the wake of the demarcation process.
It then investigates the Integrated Development Planning concept and its particular development in the Tygerberg. Thereafter the IDP's role in stimulating the development of a new understanding of social justice is investigated and its impact upon the distribution of local government resources assessed. The chapter concludes by considering what understanding of social justice this post-apartheid city has arrived at.

8.2 The City of Tygerberg: a contested beginning

The demarcation process resulted in the formation of the City of Tygerberg in 1996 through the amalgamation of numerous White and Black municipalities, as well as a number of RSC service areas, stretching from Durbanville in the north, Khayelitsha in the south, Bellville in the east and Goodwood in the west. Other former municipal jurisdictions incorporated into Tygerberg include Mfuleni, Parow, Belhar, Elsies River, Bishop Lavis, Bonteheuwel and numerous other management areas (Figure: 8.1). The creation of the city brought together distinctly diverse communities, consisting of the poorest of the CMA's poor communities, in Khayelitsha, to the more stable middle and higher middle income communities in Bellville and Durbanville.

Following the first local government elections in May 1996, the NP narrowly won control over Tygerberg. Unlike most local councils in South Africa, Tygerberg has a near equal political party division between the NP (35 seats, 49%) and the ANC (34 seats, 47%) (the balance is made up by the DP, with one seat or 2% and ACDP, with one seat or 2%).1 While leading by a narrow margin, the council is officially an NP controlled TMS. Considering this particular political weighting a broad-based consensus decision-making process is essential for effective local governance. Reflecting on the heated debates preceding the demarcation of Tygerberg, consensus proved elusive after its proclamation too. This was particularly apparent in the decision-making processes leading to the formation of development plans and budgets.

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1 We also have to bare in mind that this particular outcome was influenced by the weighting of ward votes, which in this case of the CMA, resulted in the over representation of the Black township vote. Also see p.120 in Chapter Six.
Figure: 8.1 The City of Tygerberg
(Source: Tygerberg, 1998b, no page numbers)
Decisions about how the council could develop Tygerberg to alter the distribution of benefits and burdens were totally absent, practically paralysing the functioning of the city (Knoetze, 1998). This problem was further compounded by the fact that a two-thirds majority is required to approve council budgets, leading to further tension in the governance processes. An example of these tensions can be found in an article in *The Cape Argus* (1997.07.01) reporting, under the title "ANC hits out as Tygerberg backs R1.4 bn budget" that:

"The African National Congress [is] calling for a formal review [of the budget]...the budget meeting yesterday got off to a stormy start with about 30 placard-waving National Party supporters. The meeting was adjourned when it was disrupted by protesters...ANC caucus leader Vuyani Ngcuka criticised it as a maintenance budget...'it is to maintain the present infrastructure, not catering for new infrastructure in disadvantaged areas'."

Two ANC representatives, Ngcuka (1998) and Van Zyl (1998) too, recall that tremendous conflict and suspicion marked the starting point from which this council set out to address the challenges of Tygerberg. Ngcuka noted that the general understanding of the NP aligned councillors was that:

"...the ANC wanted to take it all...not share these things [local government resources]...the rather strong language and pointless arguments at the beginning of the council's term in office, wondering whether anything could possibly be resolved in the coming years."

On the other side of the party political divide, the NP councillor Frikkie Knoetze (1998) recalls that:

"We were highly suspicious about the manner in which the demarcation process took place...It is as if there were hidden intentions...we didn’t know what the ANC wanted. The initial shock behind the massive task that was awaiting was a daunting prospect."

Perhaps the judgement of the single DP councillor in the Tygerberg chamber, Remo Ciolli (1998), best described the dynamics of this city's decision-making body when recalling that:
"There was little co-operation between the various parties in the conceptualisation of the development schemes in the Tygerberg area. When the ANC came up with something the NP rejected it out of hand purely because it was an ANC plan, not because it might have been a worthwhile project."

A situation in which there was constant conflict over fundamental points of departure was dysfunctional to the management of Tygerberg. As Ngcuka (1998) observed, it was "a year on and nothing was achieved". The lack of co-operation meant that the city council could not deliver the services and functions it was constitutionally required to deliver, nor could they agree upon a sustainable financing strategy to do so (Younge, 1998). It was not only a public embarrassment that the council could not deliver basic services but also a threat to the council's existence, as the provincial government was constitutionally sanctioned to take control of local authorities that could not provide the "basics of normal local government" (Burger, 1998; Peterson, 1998). It was the development of the Tygerberg IDP however, that stands out as having been central to facilitating a sea change in this city's decision-making process.

In Ngcuka's (1998) opinion, the introduction of the Integrated Development Planning policy framework in 1998 led to:

"A change of mentality...people started to seek a common goal. There was an alignment of ideas to reach consensus...they (the ANC) had to look at things in a realistic way, i.e. what is viable? What makes economic sense?"

Lukas Olivier (NP) interpreted the introduction of the IDP as facilitating:

"A golden middle way...we must try to find the golden middle way. My personal opinion is that the necessity for upliftment of the disadvantaged areas, as well as the provision of services, cannot be financed from rates alone. It will kill the goose that lays the golden eggs (in Van der Walt, 1998b, p.1).

Ngcuka's (1998) echoed this view recalling,

"We had to seek something half way. Yes, we need to do projects that both stabilises the economy but also bring relief to those in need. On the other hand, the levels of poverty and unemployment need to be addressed. Thus you have to come up with a programme that brings both and alleviates the problems."
Van Zyl (1998) was of the opinion that "the IDP process was central to the emergence of a new consensus on the development of Tygerberg." There were a number of basic building blocks that needed to be considered in the development of the city and a budget that underpinned its realisation. For example,

"First expense priorities need to be taken into consideration...on the one hand it is fair to say that the poor people need to be helped.... and everyone buys it...in which way precisely is where the problems arise. The other thing is that the people who pay are in the position to expect something in return for it, i.e. better levels of service delivery" (Van Zyl, 1998).

In Van Zyl's (1998) view "the fights are in the degree to which these understandings are applied." Balance between the needs of the poor and rich communities has to be the goal. In his view and this is crucial to our discussion, "this is where the IDP itself and the IDP process proved central in focusing the council's attention" on what and where the city's needs are, and how the satisfaction of those needs can be maximised to serve more people:

"The IDP did to some degree manage to initiate a start...how to apply the money. Thus money must be spent so that the return will lead to something better tomorrow - that something better would have developed" (Van Zyl, 1998).

Those that monitor, evaluate and regulate the actions of local authorities in the Western Cape Province also noted the impact of the IDP in Tygerberg. The provincial government officials perceived the councillors and city management of Tygerberg's current approach as having changed radically since the introduction of IDP. For example, Rob Peterson (1998), the Provincial Director for Local Government Finance argued that:

"The IDP has already brought about much change. It has brought about harmony in the council chambers, as there is a greater understanding of what the main priorities of the municipality are...things are going better than the first round of budgets. The councillors know far more about the various needs in the community...but importantly they now realise that there are some things that are more important than others. There are far more demands on the budget than the
Rudi Ellis (1998), Director of Social Planning in the provincial government supports this view remarking that:

"Tygerberg's IDP has shown things that no one would have thought possible two years ago. I think that if you look at the budget in a few years time you will see a 180 degree turn in terms of spending priorities."

Reflecting on these statements, the IDP appears to have had a significant impact upon the management of this previously divided local government. To investigate this suggestion the following section outlines what Integrated Development Planning involves, after which the IDP's impact upon the development of a more inclusive spatial imagination or urban vision in Tygerberg and its implication for social justice are investigated.

8.3 South African local government and Integrated Development Planning

The South African constitution explicitly provides for local government. Governance in this country is organised on the principle of co-operation between three "spheres", national, provincial and local. The word "sphere" is, according to Corrigan (1998, p.5), deliberate and intended to convey the view that there is no hierarchical relationship between the various levels of government. The constitution states that these spheres are distinctive, interdependent and interrelated, enjoying a measure of autonomy while co-operating with and respecting the functions and operations of others. Constitutionally, local government is enjoined to carry out two main tasks, that of ensuring the delivery of services to the communities within their jurisdiction and to promote economic development (Brewis, 1998; De Jongh, 1998).

The Local Government Transitional Act and the new White Paper on Local Government (RSA, 1998) ushered in a number of significant changes to the legislative framework controlling the management of South African cities. Within these documents, objectives such as cost containment by means of a reduction in the number of local authorities, as well as the increasing professionalisation of political offices are set out. In addition, principles of financial accountability are introduced and
fund raising abilities of local authorities are enhanced (Parnell and Pieterse, 1998). The most important policy directive is focused on the expanded function of local government to include poverty eradication and local economic development. Fundamental, to our discussion here, is the institutionalised mechanism for local government authorities to achieve these responsibilities - Integrated Development Planning (IDP) or the creation of an IDP. The particular focus of the IDP is found in its subtext that alludes to various aspects of the spatiality of cities discussed in the preceding chapters. First though, we should consider the broad outline of Integrated Development Planning.

The development of Integrated Development Planning as an institutional mechanism was initially hinted at in the South African Constitution. In particular, Section 153 dealing with the developmental duties of municipalities provided that:

"A municipality must structure and manage its administration, budgeting and planning processes to give priority to the basic needs of the community and to promote the social and economic development of the community; and participate in national and provincial development programmes."

The Local Government Transitional Act, Second Amendment Act (1996) attempted to give effect to this by requiring that all municipalities prepare IDPs conforming with Provincial Land Development Objectives (Swelling, 1997). An IDP is defined in this Act as a plan aimed at the integrated development and management of the area of jurisdiction of the municipality concerned in terms of its powers and duties. The Act requires that every municipality shall:

"... prepare a financial plan in accordance with the integrated development plan in respect of all its powers, duties and objectives; regularly monitor and assess its performance against its integrated development plan; and annually report to and receive comments from its community regarding the objectives set in its integrated development plan".

The intention is that by means of the IDP mechanism, the post-apartheid objectives of restitution, (re)development and growth will be achieved at the local level. Integrated development planning embodies the core purpose of local government and guides all aspects of revenue raising and service delivery activities, interaction with the citizenry
and institutional organisation. It is also the primary tool by which to ensure the integration of local government activities with other tiers of development planning at provincial, national and international levels. In this sense it serves as the basis for communication and interaction among the different tiers of governance. The IDP is thus the gearing mechanism through which national constitutional obligations are matched with the autonomous prioritisation of locally generated development agendas (Parnell and Pieterse, 1998).

The White Paper (1996, p.47) sees the process of Integrated Development Planning as one through which a municipality can establish a development plan for the short, medium and long term. The IDP is envisaged to enable a municipality to assess the current realities in its area of jurisdiction, including economic, social and environmental trends, available resources, skills and capacities. The IDP should enable the assessment of the varied needs of the community and different interest groups; prioritise these needs in order of urgency, importance and constitutional and legislative imperatives. This programme should establish frameworks and set goals to meet these needs; devise strategies to achieve the goals within specific time frames; develop and implement projects and programmes to achieve key objectives; establish targets and monitoring tools/instruments to measure impact and performance; budget effectively with limited resources and meet strategic objectives; and regularly monitor and adapt the development programme based on the underlying development framework and development indicators.

For Parnell and Pieterse (1998,p.17)

"Local government as enshrined in the White Paper therefore extends way beyond the scope of the Urban Development Strategies and spells out a vision for transforming South African cities that relies on both the latest technical procedures of environmental, economic and physical planning and democratic political process at the local scale".

Parnell and Pieterse (ibid., p.18-19) point to the subtext of this institutional mechanism, recognising the complex inter-relationships between various aspects of development, for example, political, social, economic, environmental, ethical, infrastructure and spatial inter-relations. These commentators go on to remind us that given the complex inter-relationship of these various aspects, it is impossible to
address only one dimension and expect to make an impact on inequality or poverty. In fact, they are of the opinion that IDPs recognise that any sustainable and successful strategy must address all of these elements in a co-ordinated way, based on an analysis of the underlying structural factors that sustain economic growth, poverty and inequality.

The IDP makes it an essential requirement for a local community to identify development needs and simultaneously execute agreed anti-poverty strategies, as well as growth strategies that emanate from a common vision that spells out how local needs will be satisfied. The IDP thus has as its core the consultation of all urban stakeholders in the development of a local governance strategy that will support local citizens' understandings of how the urban world ought to develop. This position represents a major break from earlier urban development policies in South Africa in the sense that this development framework is set on addressing the general needs of all those who live in urban settlements (Ellis, 1998; Weideman, 1998).

Unlike apartheid urban governance systems which focused on the recognition and addressing of a particular urban community's understanding of social justice (e.g. White South Africans), the IDP has facilitated negotiation and consensus building about what the transforming post-apartheid city should achieve for all its citizens. It is however, the way in which this process was guided by a spatial imaginary and codified in the IDP, that makes it of particular interest to the geographer. Constructing an urban vision of the city - a negotiated spatiality - indicating what could be developed, where in the city, to who's benefit and based on agreed reasoning, has been fundamental to the resolution of much of the conflict in the Tygerberg decision-making structures discussed earlier.

The following section aims to provide some indication of how the IDP process developed in Tygerberg and sketch the contours of a negotiated urban vision, fundamentally impacted upon by the IDP process.

8.4 Creating an IDP: "Re-Spacing" the Tygerberg

Tygerberg published South Africa's first IDP (Van Zyl, 1998). This IDP represents a broad-based development initiative, hitherto never attempted. It required participants,
both within in the communities and the city council bureaucracy to compile an urban image of post-apartheid Tygerberg as an integrated whole. As Rudi Ellis (1998), the Provincial Director of Social Planning suggested, "...IDP is [a] methodology, and should be able to develop an integrated city in which the 'desires' of the people are married with good planning practice". The Tygerberg IDP however, makes no secret about its position at the bottom of the "learning curve" in aiming to achieve this goal. The document urges the reader to consider that:

"This report must be seen as the first in a process repeated annually...the possibility is accepted that the process may have been flawed but it also accepted that a concerted effort was made to be as inclusive and participative as possible" (Tygerberg, 1998a, no page numbers).

The IDP co-ordinator, Dr Martin van der Merwe, reports that nearly 1400 community organisations were invited to participate in fifteen working groups responsible for the compilation of this development plan. How many actually participated was never made clear, although it would appear to have included a very significant community input (Van Houwelingen, 1998a, p.12). The important point is that the city managers set out to develop a post-apartheid urban vision that aimed at accommodating as many civic and community based organisations' views as possible (Dyantyi and Frater, 1998). As such the IDP "...faces the things of the past... work[ing] towards a common goal - how do we [the community] want the city to look in ten or fifteen years time" (Ellis, 1998).

In conjunction with the working groups, civic movements, as well as political and administrative representatives of Tygerberg, the general statutory objectives of the IDP were reworked into a "Vision for the City of Tygerberg" which describes this city as:

"A city of opportunity, at the hub of economic activity in the Cape Metropolitan area, in a safe and secure environment where all its residents have a quality of life in a sharing and participatory atmosphere" (Tygerberg, 1998a, no page numbers)

The urban vision is to be enabled by specific strategic goals in which:
"The City of Tygerberg [is] to become the hub of economic activity in the Cape Metropolitan Area, to maintain an economic growth rate of 6% of GDP per annum and to act as generator of economic wealth; improve the quality of life of all people in the City of Tygerberg. It should also advance access and availability of land and promote the environment and general living conditions in this city. The IDP has to aid the development of the City of Tygerberg in order to achieve world class service delivery and customer satisfaction; the achievement of a safe and secure city in order to build social harmony and civic responsibility; and ensuring the long-term sustainability of the City of Tygerberg" (ibid., no page numbers).

By means of Tygerberg's consultation workshops, Krynauw (in Tygerberg, 1998a) indicated that Tygerberg Council reworked this vision into a number of spatial development objectives negotiated with various community representatives. "A city of opportunity" is seen as a city in which people will have access to adequate facilities where they can reach their personal, emotional, physical potential, as well as their ideals and dreams. The "hub of economic activity" is seen in the context of the CMA specifically, signifying a north/south development corridor from Khayelitsha in the south and Durbanville in the north crossing the east/west development corridor of Voortrekker Road and ending with Industrial Parks near Delft and Khayelitsha which should create enough jobs to meet all the employment requirements of Tygerberg (see Figure: 8.1, above page 182). "Quality of life" according to this document means that a community must be sought in which every person has a "decent place to live" and "enough food to eat", "has access to clean water", in suburbs where all people have access to parks, pools and sport facilities. "Share and participate" implies unity through diversity of ethnic, cultural and religious units where people can interact, participate in decisions affecting their fate and will have empathy for each other's group identity. It should be evident from these "interpretations" that the visual and spatial metaphor figures strongly. Abstract goals are redefined into concrete things. Consequently, "economic activity" becomes a development corridor, it denotes "industrial parks" in very specific places, for example, Delft. "Quality of life" becomes "decent house", it becomes "food", "water", "swimming pools", etc. (ibid., no page numbers). These objectives have become detailed images of the more desirable urban form.

Delving deeper into this document it becomes apparent that there are multiple spatial references, and specific urban images or visions attached to this statement and the
strategic goals listed above. This should, however, not be surprising as the IDP itself has its foundations in a document which is profoundly spatial - the Tygerberg Spatial Development Framework (TSDF) (City of Tygerberg, 1998b). Although there is no apparent legislative requirement that the IDP has to be based or framed by a spatial development framework Krynauw (in Tygerberg, 1998b) wrote that:

"The Tygerberg Spatial Development Framework and Tygerberg Urbanisation Strategy are two major projects that will directly influence the IDP...Both studies will directly influence the 1999/2000 budget with primary projects to integrate the various areas of the City of Tygerberg into one functional unit".

The TSDF makes for an interesting understanding of the challenges facing Tygerberg. Although Tygerberg developed this document, it is very specifically placed within the context of the larger Cape Town metropolitan region. Unlike the fragmented urban visions of the apartheid era, Tygerberg is envisioned as part of a metropolitan whole. Now, unlike the past, the location of this city in a metropolitan context is seen as essential to thinking about its development (contrast this position with the WLAs demarcation proposals in Chapter Six). It is no longer the antagonistic "us" and "them", with the urban reality of one local authority seen as unaffected by its larger geographical and historical setting. Rather, "care has to be taken to ensure that it slots into the Metropolitan Spatial Development Framework (MSDF)" (Van der Merwe, in Van Houwelingen, 1998a,p.12). The planning vision proposed to overcome these challenges is:

"...to integrate the city at both the physical and socio-economic levels in order to create a unique urban image and to facilitate the socio-economic development of its people".

"Effective integration" and development of the city is to be achieved through the creation of "high intensity nodes", linked by infrastructure ensuring "high levels of mobility", and encompassed by an enabling framework for socio-economic development within a sustainable metropolitan environment (Van der Merwe, in Van Houwelingen, 1998a,p.12). To achieve this planning vision, in an effort to optimise investment, a number of development nodes (or areas of opportunity) have been identified, closely aligned to the ideals of the MSDF. These nodes capitalise on existing infrastructure and natural attributes and have been selected for their perceived growth
potential over the planning period (Tygerberg, 1998a). In their line of reasoning the selected nodes cannot however, function properly in isolation and should be "inter-linked" in order to provide an integrated system in which the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. The existing east-west Voortrekker Road Corridor is to be supplemented by a north-south Tygerberg Corridor, serving as a framework for attracting most of the investment in the city, thus concentrating resources where they would have the greatest benefit. They (Tygerberg 1998a) go on to suggest that by intensifying development at these nodes and by creating continuous "movement corridors", a new dynamic can be created which would not only facilitate the provision of public transport, but would also provide the necessary accessibility and exposure in previously disconnected areas, which could lead to the creation of new job opportunities. In addition, higher density housing should be concentrated along these corridors, so that the bulk of the population can be accommodated close to all the opportunities that the city may offer (Van der Walt, 1998a,p.6).

It is envisaged that over time each of these nodes will develop its own character and that a nodal hierarchy will emerge over the planning period. Being located at the intersection of two metropolitan corridors (the north-south stretching Tygerberg development corridor and the current well developed corridor spanning east-west along Voortrekker Road), Bellville should emerge as the largest of the nodes serving as a focus for the City of Tygerberg and functioning as a metropolitan node, as envisaged by the MSDF. This structure should also, it is hoped, result in a strong identity and sense of place within Tygerberg as a city, integrating the previously disparate local authorities (Tygerberg, 1998b). A main conclusion was that the "changing" of a number of urban spaces - how these urban spaces are developed and how they might be linked to other types of spaces - could lead to a broader societal and political transformation. In fact, there is a firm hope that changes in spatial arrangement will lead to changes in society. As alluded to above, these are acknowledgements that Tygerberg is not only in need of changes to its internal spatial arrangement but how it is linked into the larger Metropolitan context. Thus, Tygerberg is not only seen as an isolated urban space but as part of a metropolitan hierarchy, i.e. a metropolitan node, with its activity streets part of metropolitan development corridors. Consequently, there is a sense and understanding of Tygerberg's connectivity to a larger urban reality - the Cape Metropolitan Area.
Like the Metropolitan Spatial Development Framework (MSDF) for the CMA, the Tygerberg IDP represents (and borrowing from Robinson, 1998) a codification of ways in which the apartheid city form could be restructured for the post-apartheid era. This post-apartheid city is positioned as a central part of the MSDF and closely related to most, if not all the ideals promoted in the MSDF. The IDP shares the MSDF (1996) vision of an "integrated, equitable, sustainable" city, which is contrasted with the existing inequalities in service functions, physical disconnectivity, isolation and the ultimately unsustainable nature of the current urban form (see Appendix C.2). Like the MSDF, the integrative features of the new City of Tygerberg are linked to "activity corridors", "nodes" and "sustainable development". These features are now to be deployed to aid the transition from the dysfunctional and problem-ridden apartheid city to create a better, more socially just post-apartheid Tygerberg.

The TSDF and IDP represent a practical response to the problems these councillors and city managers have identified. Unlike the MSDF, the TSDF and the IDP are relatively evasive on judging the current distribution of economic, social, etc. activities in Tygerberg. The view of the apartheid past is rather technical and apartheid ills mainly expressed in terms of the functional problems this situation presents to "good urban management and development". Unlike Robinson's reading that the diagnosis of the MSDF, on which the IDP is based, developed both in the context of an anti-apartheid political practice and in the framework of the analytical concerns of urban planning, it would appear that the latter point is of greater relevance to the Tygerberg. The salient political motivation of the IDP is to contribute to undoing apartheid legacies by rectifying an urban geography which is seen to hamper "good" urban planning. An important aspect of apartheid policies' impact on urban living is "fragmentation", leading to inequality and a lack of development in many parts of the city - a key characteristic of the present urban form. In the process of integrating the city, the IDP has also led to significant change in the meanings ascribed to various areas in the Tygerberg. "Old" apartheid spaces have been ascribed "new" meaning. As such the IDP holds implications for the re-interpretation of the spatiality of this city.

The IDP's drive to integrate the Tygerberg, aimed as it was at rectifying the distributional legacies of the apartheid geography has led to political and local government decision makers ascribing new meanings to localities in Tygerberg which formerly were seen by many (particularly WLAs) in a very negative light (we can
recall, for example, the White public response to the WCDB demarcation proposals). These "old" apartheid spaces which held little or no potential value are now interpreted differently, not representing zones of decay but places of opportunity. Shahid Solomons, Director of Urban Planning and Economic Development of Tygerberg argues (in Van Houwelingen, 1998b, p.2) that the “physical development” of the city has to be beneficial to a broader base of citizens and seen to hold potential in many different spheres. Considering high levels of unemployment, poverty and the lack of resources, the IDP has understandably focused much of its energy on economic development projects - hence a focus on industrial development, new nodes of economic activity, activity corridors and the improvement and development of transport links between the "north" and the "south". Southern Tygerberg, only three years previously denoted as a major expense (to the WLAs) with no opportunity is now seen to hold great economic potential.

For some there is a reworking of the economic spatiality of the Tygerberg. As, for example, Frikkie Knoetze (1998), a former mayor of Parow and initially opposed to the integration of Khayelitsha with Parow and the Tygerberg laments:

“People are starting to reconcile themselves with the new spatial unit... One day I can see that interaction, particularly in the CBD will be North-South rather than East-West. People see the commercial interaction in a far more positive light. The idea that Bellville-Parow-Goodwood development corridor will be over run and ruined didn’t materialise. People are rather more interested at the prospect of improving business interests. In fact, I see that sometime in future it will not only be them [sic] coming to shop here but even better, I can see a day when we will be shopping further South.”

Thus, new meanings are ascribed to the zones of economic decay and hardship, which are now seen as holding potential for economic development. While in the past, zones of economic activity supporting local government fiscal stability were confined to the east-west corridors connecting Bellville with Cape Town, potential zones of development are now also seen in the embryonic Khayelitsha CBD via Cape Town International Airport to the Bellville CBD (Tygerberg 1998f; see also Van Houwelingen, 1998c. p.6; Van Houwelingen, 1998d, p.34).
Yet, the IDP is not only filled with "economic" re-imaginations of Tygerberg’ spatiality. We can consider other aspects of this re-imagination to denote a more general recodification of this city. In this regard, for example, we find that the urban edge in the Coastal area (Khayelitsha), is now seen as "midway between Muizenberg and the Strand, Momwabisi on the False Bay coastline provides an ideal opportunity to establish a sustainable interface between city and nature" (Tygerberg, 1998b, no page numbers). Or the badly neglected open spaces on the city's boundary with Kuilsriver "is seen as one of the greatest development opportunities within the City of Tygerberg...[which could] serve the 1 500 000 people in the surrounding areas" (Tygerberg, 1998b, no page numbers). Michelle Robertson (1998), a consultant regional planner for Tygerberg reports that there is a serious attempt, backed-up with money, to integrate the green belts and recreational areas along the river drainage systems, linking Durbanville to the townships in Khayelitsha. In her view, this council wants to link the north and the south of the city with a continuous recreational green-space to help integrate the two parts of the city, not only economically but as an ecological and recreational system too, extending beyond merely an economic re-spatialisation of the city. As Michelle Robertson (1998) remarks:

"Who knows, if my project is implemented totally, you will be able to walk along a recreational space from the new Tygerberg Waterfront in the north [adjacent to the large-scale Tygerberg Valley developments in Durbanville], to Momwabisi to go for a swim in the sea [the Khayelitsha beach resort on the False Bay coast]."

These comments in part demonstrate that the IDP has invoked a re-thinking of the spatiality of this city. The re-imagining of Tygerberg's urban space encompasses multiple layers of societal activity, thus moving beyond a mere rethinking of economic possibility in this city but also incorporating the recodification of the meaning of different parts of the city in other respects too. The impact of the re-imagination of this particular urban space has also shaped and enabled a new understanding of how urban society's benefits and burdens ought to be distributed to achieve this "re-imagined" urban vision.

8.5 Social Justice thinking in Tygerberg

The recodification of Tygerberg's urban space and the apparent willingness of decision-makers to seek this vision's realisation has had a profound impact upon their
understanding of how this city's resources ought to be distributed (see section pp. 186-189). This section aims to sketch the general outline of the distributive objectives these decision-makers aim to achieve and simultaneously starts to tie these views to particular theoretical understandings of social justice. In addition, the link between the re-imagination of the Tygerberg's spatiality and the understanding of social justice it underpins is established.

At the provincial level it was suggested that the impact of the IDP in Tygerberg is seen in greater levels of consensus about how this city's resources should be distributed. As such, there is a feeling that a new understanding of social justice has emerged. Peterson (1998) argues that the consensus position reached by means of the IDP urban vision appears to have transcended the spatially and economically differentiated understanding of social justice seen in the past. Besides his believe that this negotiated urban vision has facilitated agreement upon a particular re-imagination of how Tygerberg's benefits and burdens ought to be distributed, his statement is also telling in terms of how he understands the manner in which social justice is interpreted in this city. Peterson (1998) notes that:

"The perception of what social justice is will differ between the ethnic groups: Black-Coloured-White. An example of the differences in what is socially just can be seen between the Blacks and Coloureds...There are differences in how the population feels about history. Past events have influenced their current position. Blacks feel that they were more disadvantaged than the Coloured communities and hence need more in the line of upliftment."

This statement reiterates observations made in the previous chapters, that understandings of social justice are located in terms of the racially (and because of apartheid generally spatially and economically) differentiated experiences of the history and geography of apartheid. This view is also relativist, even Hayekian in terms of the contested and differentiated desirable distributive outcomes he suggests these communities might have due to their particular and located interpretations of both the geography and history of urban apartheid.

Although Tygerberg's distributive goals - and thus social justice - are interpreted by Peterson (1998) as a contested understanding of how post-apartheid benefits and burdens ought to be distributed, he believes that emphasis is also placed on "the
upliftment of the underprivileged areas as an important issue" (Peterson, 1998). This view was framed by a notion that social justice could be achieved by means of redistribution of urban society's benefits and burdens. For example:

"I think that they would like to talk about redistribution as a way to get to something more socially just..." (Peterson, 1998).

A Nozickian concern for the rectification of past injustice also arose, in so far as local government has a major role to fulfil in "redressing past wrongs" (ibid.). Yet, he goes on to argue that:

"... I think they are trying to give access to new services and functions which are difficult to obtain...however, social justice is not there when you do things that are not sustainable."

This statement echoes Rawls' concern that social justice could only be found in and be subject to a "just saving principle". Thus, in seeking greater equality in distributive outcomes at the local government level, he interprets Tygerberg's IDP as arguing that it is essential that such a distribution of benefits and burdens had to be sustainable over an extended period of time. Going on to indicate how these (Rawlsian and Nozickain) social justice statements are relevant to his primary concerns for local government financing, Peterson (ibid.) elaborates that:

"From a [local government] financial point of view the only manner to get something more socially just is redistribution by means of the budget process, the contents, the priorities, have to be fundamentally revised. To facilitate this process, provincial government has an important role to fulfil. We see the IDP as the process by which this drastic change can be done."

These interpretations of Tygerberg's current situation, interpreted as having been brought about by the development of the IDP process, are echoed at "the coal-face", that is in terms of Tygerberg's immediate local governance realities.

John Marshall (1998), the Chairman of the Executive Committee managing Tygerberg's political decision-making body argued that social justice was "something" that was expressed in terms of "what local government does". The abstraction of social justice was "made real", gaining its meaning from its various services and
development programmes enabled by the IDP. In his view, a socially just local government was expressed as one that could:

"First, provide every household with a minimum service so that they can enjoy a healthy and reasonably comfortable way of life. This does not, however, mean that the person who cannot pay must expect the highest achievable standards of service." Second, "That a common fiscus must pay for such services" and third, "That income of the fiscus must largely be from the more affluent persons but everybody must make a contribution no matter how small."

Two themes can be identified in this statement. The first relates to a minimum service level. This statement hints at the idea that regardless of the wealth of a specific community or area, some form of baseline – or lifeline services have to be available to all. Implicit, in the second point, is that forms of cross-subsidisation will have to occur to facilitate the delivery of this level of services. This means that contributions made to the central city fiscus are not directly linked to resources allocated from that fiscus. In language reminiscent of Rawls, those in the better-off position, i.e. the wealthy, are those who should contribute most to the common fiscus, thus suggesting at its crudest interpretation, an assumption concerning a direct flow of resources from the wealthier components of the society to the least well-off.

The NP's Frikkie Knoetze (1998), who spent much of his time in the Parow Council devising ways by which to exclude Khayelitsha from Tygerberg in the 1994-1995 amalgamation debates, gave a practical example of what Marshall was aiming to communicate. Knoetze argued that:

"Khayelitsha does not need to finance itself ... it is a matter of whether people have money or not. As far as I am concerned the council should not collect payment from the squatter areas at all...because they have to share one or two taps between so many people. And the fact is these people do not have an income...how will you collect money from someone who has no job?"

Having to actually engage with the problems of the new Tygerberg area and resolve them seems to have changed his approach. His central claim is that those worst-off in Tygerberg should be provided with a baseline set of services free of charge, not only because these services are not provided at a desirable level, but because the poor communities have no source of regular income. Thus, we have not only a clearer view
of how this NP representative understands social justice but also a view that is very far removed from those held by NP councillors at the time of the demarcation of Tygerberg in 1994-95.

Two prominent ANC councillors, a member of the Executive Committee, Radi Van Zyl and the Deputy Mayor, Vuyani Ngcuka, echoed these views, demonstrating some convergence in their understanding of social justice with their NP political opponents. Van Zyl’s understanding of social justice is sober and relativist, echoing Hayek’s notion of the multiplicity of social justice interpretations in the face of different historical and geographical contexts. Van Zyl (1998) suggests that:

"Attaining social justice means that you cannot get satisfaction for all...it will always be and become a higher goal...social justice will not be pegged down. Social justice is dependent upon the realities of the moment, you can bring it down to the local level and similarly things would differ from time to time and context to context. The golden thread to me is that, importantly, it would involve equal opportunity and to correct things."

Thus in this statement there is a direct appreciation of the central argument of this thesis: that understandings of social justice are multiple and bounded by changing geographical and historical contexts. Simultaneously it also reflects key liberal understandings of social justice. For example, the Hayekian awareness of context, for example "social justice is dependent upon the realities of the moment" and "will differ from time to time and context to context". So too is the reflection of a Nozickian notion of rectification seen, for example in his statement concerning local government’s role in "correct[ing] things".

What is central to our discussion is that Van Zyl goes on to link this interpretation of social justice to the "re-imagination" of the Tygerberg in the IDP:

"There are two important things about the council and the drive for social justice - that is money and energy. In my view it is the energy that is important, not the finance itself...the IDP manage[d] to initiate a start...(Van Zyl, 1998)."

For Ngcuka (1998) the link between the re-imagination of the spatiality of the city reflected in the IDP is central to changing interpretations of social justice:
Mental changes are needed...the management structure seeking a common goal...an alignment of ideas to reach consensus on what the city must provide to the constituent and the IDP proved to be very helpful in this regard...in the past they [the white community] wanted to change the running of the city and its economy so that the White communities got the best for the White communities instead of doing any development in the disadvantaged areas. This is changing."

Thus, the understanding of social justice, is led by "a change of mind", in turn found in the impact of the IDP and the urban vision it has enabled. As such the IDP facilitated a convergence in thinking about the city and the types of distributive decisions that could aid the realisation of that "urban vision". Thus, we may (for the moment) conclude that the IDP represents a process that has led to “a change of mind” in thinking about the spatiality of the city and that there is some evidence to suggest that understandings of social justice, particularly with reference to resource allocation, are converging too.

This convergence is not however, only seen in these statements by councillors, but is also beginning to be reflected in the manner in which the City of Tygerberg is applying its finances. Consequently, the following section briefly investigates how some of the ideals reflected in the IDP are evident in the first “post - IDP” budget, in turn aiding the realisation of a "spatially led" understanding of social justice.

8.6 The capital budget and the IDP

The manner in which local government resources are allocated is not only evident in how this council conceptually develops its notion of a more just distribution of urban activities, but the manner in which the local government fiscal system distributes its resources. The notion that local government financing has changed significantly since the advent of post-apartheid urban transformation has been contested in academic debate. Zziwa (1997) for example, has analysed the municipal budgets of Tygerberg’s neighbouring TMS - Cape Town, and argued that there was little evidence of a shift in the fiscal management arrangements from the pre-democracy form. Whereas various commentators (Bond, 1998; Dyantyi and Frater, 1998; Gotz, 1995; Heymans, 1995; Lemon, 1997; Lohnert, et al 1998; Oldfield, 1998; Swilling and Boya, 1995; Wooldridge and Cranko, 1995, Zziwa, 1998) have substantiated claims that local government
change has been slow and often inappropriate, care needs to be taken in asserting the near absence of positive change and development in these urban arenas. In addition, an "economistic" reading (such Zziwa's) of Tygerberg's budget would fail to capture the positive moments of this budget in the history and geography of Tygerberg and its impact on the continued search for a more just post-apartheid city. The aim here, is to provide a brief analysis of the Tygerberg budget and then to place this budget in the context of its reception by the city council and its links to the IDP. Thus, this analysis elevates the significance of the budget beyond spending figures and aims to communicate and broaden an understanding of the political meaning of this "moment" in which Tygerberg's political representatives aimed to bring the previously separate entities of this particular urban society together in its first consolidated budget - a budget that represents the first efforts to implement its IDP.

A city budget has two main components, the operating budget and the capital budget. Both reflect understandings of social justice. Due to the complexity and length (1234 pages) (see Tygerberg 1998b) of the operating budget, the focus falls upon the capital budget. The capital budget is that part of the municipal budget that addresses all capital and development programmes and projects of a local authority and in Tygerberg represents the fiscal expression of IDP goals. As such, this is the budget set aside for various programmes and/or projects which generally include civic amenities, electricity transmission systems, construction of community health service centres, housing schemes and street works. Thus, it is that portion of the budget that directly affects the socio-economic development of the local authority's many communities and best reflects what a council "really does" about social justice at the local government level.

In addition to funds raised internally, the local authority's income for capital expenditure primarily comprises the following sources (Table: 8.1):

- Consolidated Capital Development and Loans Funds (CCDLD);
- Cape Metropolitan Council transfers;
- National Government transfers;
- National Housing Fund Loans; and
- External agencies.
Table 8.1: Primary Capital Budget Aid 1999 (in Rands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ex CCDLF</td>
<td>114,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ex Grants</td>
<td>136,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ex Reserves</td>
<td>24,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ex other internal funds</td>
<td>15,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>289,000,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Tygerberg, 1998b, p.15)

Table 8.2: Capital Budget 1998/99 (in Rands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Budget 97/98</th>
<th>Budget 98/99</th>
<th>Variance(R)</th>
<th>Percentage Inc/(Decr)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rate &amp; General Services</td>
<td>250,844,680</td>
<td>167,822,130</td>
<td>(83,022,550)</td>
<td>-33.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Services</td>
<td>89,004,170</td>
<td>42,808,535</td>
<td>(46,195,635)</td>
<td>-51.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporate Services</td>
<td>4,388,480</td>
<td>6,388,060</td>
<td>1,999,580</td>
<td>45.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Engineering</td>
<td>86,604,200</td>
<td>86,066,550</td>
<td>(537,650)</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Planning &amp; Economic Development</td>
<td>67,805,780</td>
<td>26,029,805</td>
<td>(41,775,975)</td>
<td>-61.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical Engineering</td>
<td>2,357,000</td>
<td>5,900,415</td>
<td>3,543,415</td>
<td>150.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Executive Officer</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>65,320</td>
<td>65,320</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>685,050</td>
<td>563,440</td>
<td>(121,610)</td>
<td>-17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>47,741,680</td>
<td>51,286,325</td>
<td>3,544,640</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trading &amp; Economic Services</td>
<td>45,216,800</td>
<td>42,663,140</td>
<td>(3,053,660)</td>
<td>-6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water</td>
<td>6,424,000</td>
<td>6,606,000</td>
<td>182,000</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity</td>
<td>18,414,300</td>
<td>21,551,240</td>
<td>3,136,940</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refuse</td>
<td>5,412,000</td>
<td>7,310,000</td>
<td>1,898,000</td>
<td>35.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sewerage</td>
<td>14,966,500</td>
<td>6,695,900</td>
<td>(8,270,600)</td>
<td>-55.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Funds</td>
<td>725,000</td>
<td>750,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingencies</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,027,740</td>
<td>1,027,740</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td>344,528,160</td>
<td>262,021,595</td>
<td>(82,506,565)</td>
<td>-23.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Tygerberg, 1998b, p.32)

The capital budget (Table: 8.2) for Tygerberg amounted to R262,021,595 for the year 1998/99 and represented a R82,506,565 or 23.9% decrease in the capital budget from the previous year (Tygerberg, 1998a). Nevertheless, this budget represented the first

2 This decrease has occurred because the CMC has severely cut its contribution paid directly to this TMS, as with other CMA, TMSs. Certain central government funds, connected to the previous WLAs have been withdrawn after the amalgamation of the WLAs and BLAs. A new funding formula is however, to be introduced by the central government in the 2000/2001-budget year which should positively alter this position.
consolidated account of the capital budget for Tygerberg and cannot really be used in a comparative manner. Despite the fact that direct comparisons with past budgets are not possible, the point is that there are some interesting resource allocations which are different in form (the projects) and location (service areas), to what might be expected from a local authority that did not have the developmental needs of poor communities in mind (as suggested by Zziwa, 1997).

Analysing the breakdown of the total capital budget per area (Table 8.3) derived from all sources of income, it becomes evident that the council has indeed (in terms of budgeted figures at least) focused on the needs of those areas worst-off. From the capital budget it is evident that the vast majority of dedicated funding for projects in the six service areas of the council are focused in the City’s most needy areas i.e. Khayelitsha (Coastal Service Areas), Mfuleni (Southern Service Area), Belhar and Delft (Eastern Service Area).

For example, the service area focused on Khayelitsha (Coastal Area) received R50 513 265 (37,2%), of the funds (R135 503 670, in total) dedicated to the six service areas in the capital budget, while the wealthiest areas (Central and Northern Service Areas), received just under R24 million (about R12 million, or 10% respectively). To support this statement further, should the capital budget be analysed in relation to per capita allocation, the following general conclusion may be made. There are approximately 740 000 people living in the Coastal, Eastern and Southern Service areas. A total (excluding the amounts allocated to housing) of R91 198 685 was assigned to these areas, or 67,3% of the total budget went to 59% of Tygerberg’s population. The remaining service regions received R44 304 985 or 32,6% of the budget. This meant that in the (Black) former service areas (Coastal, Eastern and Southern) R123 per person was spent, and R87 per person in the latter (i.e. the Central, Western and Northern service areas).

The largest spending item was housing, with R51 286 325 dedicated for this purpose. It is currently estimated that between 80 000 and a 100 000 social housing units are required. Considering this shortage of housing however, spending appears grossly inadequate, as the most basic housing units will cost in the region of R15 000 each, which leaves the council with enough capital to build only 3400 houses (Tygerberg, 1998a). Furthermore, housing is funded from National Housing Funds and Loans and
is not really an indication of how a particular local authority has changed its spending priorities. Rather it points to the ability of the council to mobilise and support those eligible for the housing subsidies (Oldfield, 1998). The second largest spending item (more reflective of the reorientation of the councils own spending priorities) is that of civil engineering. With a budgeted total of R86 066 550 for the city as a whole, the Coastal service area (Khayelitsha) was awarded R38 606 265 or 48.5% of this total.

Table 8.3: Total Capital Budget per Service Area 1998-1999 (in Rands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Directorate</th>
<th>Head Office</th>
<th>Central Region</th>
<th>Coastal Region</th>
<th>East Region</th>
<th>North Region</th>
<th>South Region</th>
<th>West Region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electrical</td>
<td>10 320 105</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11 320 750</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>574 000</td>
<td>5 236 800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Planning</td>
<td>7 394 805</td>
<td>705 000</td>
<td>7 955 000</td>
<td>6 490 000</td>
<td>510 000</td>
<td>1 510 000</td>
<td>1 465 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Engineering</td>
<td>18 996 305</td>
<td>8 493 480</td>
<td>38 606 265</td>
<td>10 398 900</td>
<td>12 094 000</td>
<td>5 492 500</td>
<td>12 597 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Services</td>
<td>84 723 910</td>
<td>1 404 250</td>
<td>3 877 000</td>
<td>166 000</td>
<td>204 300</td>
<td>4 324 500</td>
<td>144 900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>563 440</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporate Services</td>
<td>4 454 040</td>
<td>1 124 255</td>
<td>75 000</td>
<td>408 770</td>
<td>326 000</td>
<td>See Coastal</td>
<td>See Central</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Executive Officer</td>
<td>65 320</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals Per Area</td>
<td>126 517 925</td>
<td>11 726 985</td>
<td>50 513 265</td>
<td>28 784 420</td>
<td>13 134 300</td>
<td>11 901 000</td>
<td>19 443 700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Tygerberg, 1998a, no page numbers)

Delving deeper, it becomes evident that the bulk of these funds are dedicated to ten projects, among them: eight crèches, seven customer services centres; new administration offices; upgrading of the Spine (the north-south link) and Landsdowne Road intersection; rehabilitation of roads and upgrading of streets and storm water drainage; bulk water supply points (in the Coastal Service Area, i.e. Khayelitsha). These projects are integrated with other large capital projects in the adjacent South (with the Helderberg TMS) and Central service areas (CCTC) that include Delft, Mfuleni and Airport Industria respectively (see Figure: 8.1). In these areas funding is committed to water network extension and the upgrading and extension of the sewerage pump stations and networks. On the whole these projects are seen by the council as the appropriate manner in which to extend basic service delivery in order to provide at least a minimum level of basic goods to sustain urban living for the most needy in Tygerberg. In addition, a number of traffic related projects linked to
signalling, lane extension and construction, are underway. In this case the intention is
to better physically integrate the city, as well as to increase and enable greater north-
south flows of traffic and people within the TMS and with neighbouring TMSs
(Tygerberg, 1998b). These projects are also directly related to the stimulation of a
development corridor linking the CBD of Bellville and Durbanville to the embryonic
CBD of Khayelitsha.

A further point relates to a substantial amount of funding set aside for the
development of detailed development programmes (indicated in the Head Office
spending of close on R19 million) in the various service areas, many of which relate to
the construction of transport, sewerage, water and storm water networks in those
areas most in need of better infrastructure. Likewise, the city’s Department of
Environment, which primarily aims at developing and maintaining open spaces, as
well as providing landscaping development services to create a better quality living
environment, is investing heavily in the poorer parts of Tygerberg. Although
Khayelitsha and Delft have not had the benefit of cumulative investment in their
urban environments in the past years, these areas were the main focus of this
department’s budget (see Robertson’s remarks in section 8.5). No less than 88% (R2
888 620) of the capital budget dedicated for this purpose was spent on projects in Delft
(R1 209 000) and Khayelitsha alone (R1 336 840), with less than 2% (R50 300) going to
neighbourhoods in the wealthy north and north western reaches of Tygerberg.
Depending on precisely how “the poor” is defined, which is not mentioned in the
budget, about 70% of the 1998/99 budget is reported to have been spent in the poorer
communities through service rendering, provision of facilities and general upgrading
of infrastructure (Tygerberg, 1998c; Tygerberg 1998f).

The main point to be made is that in general, the capital budget has in its first attempt,
managed to give credence to IDP initiatives. More importantly to those living in the
disadvantaged areas, this budget does in fact focus attention on the needs of the less
developed areas of the city and appears to be searching for ways in which to
“physically” integrate these areas into the more developed areas of Tygerberg and the
CMA. As to whether these projects are necessarily the best way in which to allocate
these resources, only time will tell.
The above discussion however, provides only a brief technical summary of the city's first consolidated capital budget. As such these spending figures say little of what may really be changing in Tygerberg. In fact, Zziwa's somewhat pessimistic statements can so easily flow from such analysis, when the progress, change and rethinking of the budget are seen in mere fiscal terms. Yet, it is in the meaning of this budget itself and how it was developed, negotiated and re-worked, that the impact of the IDP is inscribed, casting a different interpretation on this budget.

The most striking aspect of the formal passing of this budget was the mood in which this first consolidated budget was presented. There was visible excitement during the presentation of the document and the "Budget Speech" and a real sense of achievement on the occasion of the budget debate and its approval by the full council (Tygerberg, 1998f). In these deliberations, more of what has changed in thinking about the post-apartheid city and social justice was visible than dry resource allocations could ever convey. The NP's Gerald Smith (Chairman of the Finance Committee) presented "his" budget and the opposition ANC had the first opportunity to remark upon it.

"A good job was done" and "Congratulations" prefaced the responses of nearly every ANC representative that took the stand. Prior to any claims by these speakers, it was a sense of achievement at the development of a budget that included the opinions of all that was for them of great importance. The budget was a "first step" towards the realisation of the IDP. It was "not perfect" but it was "better than the previous year" said ANC Councillor Jada (Tygerberg, 1998f). The "budget reflect[ed] a development minded government policy", specifically "economic development which is very important", whilst "we must deal with the problem of poverty but not at risk of fiscal balance...as a good credit rating has to be sought" reminded another (Tygerberg, 1998f).

The IDP was never far from the surface and the ANC and NP councillors repeatedly drew attention to the urban vision the IDP had set out. The focus on the budget was not led by its ability to "allocate" funds to the poor communities per se but these followed when the IDP objectives were addressed. Consequently, the focus was on whether there were resources for the development corridors, the airport project and its industrial parks, which had to create jobs close to the poor of Khayelitsha who needed
the employment. Thus, these remarks were primarily focused on the budget's ability to facilitate the creation of Tygerberg's negotiated urban vision set out in the IDP. This was not to say that this budget and its connection with the IDP were not unproblematic and some communities' representatives felt that their particular areas' needs were ignored. Perhaps one of the most interesting observations was that it was the poor communities that were competing against one another for resources. What was particularly distressing was the "competition" to be the poorest. The "poorer you are the better the chance to get help", was shouted across the floor at one stage (Tygerberg, 1998f).

But more formal presentations were forthcoming in which a community organisation from a former Coloured neighbourhood - Elsies River SANCO, a civic organisation - documented their frustration with the budget (Elsies River SANCO, 1998). This organisation argued that too much emphasis was placed on poor Black communities and not on poor Coloured ones. In addition, it was suggested that too much money was spent on the rich wealth generating areas, whilst Elsies River was neglected. However, even in this critique, "the IDP - budget link" was apparent.

"The IDP is effected through the application of the budget. By itself it is merely visionary. It is only when the budget meets this vision that aspirations are realised" (Elsies River SANCO, 1998, p.3).

Yet, as Ngcuka (1998) argued, roads connecting Khayelitsha in the south and Bellville and Durbanville in the north are more important than only upgrading various different clinics, sporting facilities including a number of swimming pools, streetlights, additional traffic lights and speed bumps in Elsies River (Tygerberg, 1998f). In the view of many commentators the budget did move towards the meeting of the IDP in the application of local government resources, focusing on the whole Tygerberg and not single communities. The IDP is shaped around the needs of the general Tygerberg community, suggesting that the most must be made of existing facilities, integrating and increasing the flow of people across this urban space to "share", in Ngcuka's words, rather than to have their "own". The budget prioritised, as Van Zyl (Tygerberg, 1998f) suggested, the need of roads to connect the townships with the work place, a more urgent than the upgrading of a swimming pool in Elsies River. And these were the issues that repeatedly arose in this meeting. The focus always returned to the
larger urban context, not focusing on the isolated needs of only one or two communities.

In addressing an issue that has received extensive media attention - non-payment of local government services - the focus of the budget debate shifted to the notion of who contributed to the development of the city's fiscus and who is benefiting disproportionately from it. In this respect there were numerous contributions and statements presented that ran to the core of social justice at the local government level. The redistribution of local government resources is perhaps most apparent in who in fact funds the operating and capital budgets of the city. At the time this budget was formulated there was no direct central government contribution to the local government fiscus in terms of operating finances (this has subsequently been formulated in the central government's Local Government Equitable Share programme). Thus the operating budget was wholly dependent upon the TMS receiving payment for services and the generation of profits to feed into the capital budget to augment resources received elsewhere (Tygerberg, 1998f).

In Elsies River SANCO's contribution, references were made to the reluctance of the wealthy to contribute to the upliftment of the Tygerberg poor. The Director of Finance, Mr Hein Herbst, in an effort to bring some "statistical objectivity" to the debate, summarised average monthly accounts ranging from the more affluent to the areas of indigent population (see Table: 8.4). The main point of this summary was that nearly 100% of the wealthy paid their rates and services charged and that large parts of the townships did not. Whilst this was not a debate that the councillors, particularly Hein Herbst, seemingly wanted to engage in, the issues of "the rich not carrying their weight" as an ANC councillor shouted out, prompted this discussion (Tygerberg, 1998f). In response, Claudette Lee (NP) (Tygerberg, 1998f), drawing on Herbst's statistics, illustrated that the upper middle-class was in fact carrying a very substantial burden of local government operations not reflected in the budget. The services payment regime, which is in fact a mystery to most (Knoetze, 1998), aims to generate income from the high use consumers, such as the wealthy, so as to subsidise services consumption in poorer areas. This in her view demonstrated that "the rich are carrying their weight". This is also an important point because it represented the first clear signs that the residents of Tygerberg's former WLAs were in fact contributing to the
collective fiscus of the integrated post-apartheid city, a responsibility they so strongly opposed only three years ago.

In an effort to defuse the debate this dead-end presentation of "facts" was pushed aside in favour of focusing on the historical reasons why this was the case. Interesting was that the "re-focusing" of the debate was forthcoming from the "wealthy area" representatives in the NP seats. It was the NP's Gerald Smith that reminded the mainly ANC commentators that there was an historical legacy "to this culture of non-payment, etc." (Tygerberg, 1998f). What was interesting though, was that the discussion's resolution was tied back to the IDP and to where the focus of the council debates should be. The point for him was that the resources the council allocated would contribute towards the integration of the city's fragmented geography and the creation of the development corridors and nodes, so as to stimulate economic growth - a key feature of the IDP. This, in his view, would start a forward motion in which people would have the money to pay for the services. Again, these discussions alluded to more than the budget itself including the realisation of desirable urban space negotiated and incorporated in the IDP.

### Table 8.4: TMS Services Payment Rates 1998-1999 (by income category in Rands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Upper-Middle Income</th>
<th>Middle Income</th>
<th>Lower-Middle Income</th>
<th>Poor/ Lowest Income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rates</td>
<td>405.33</td>
<td>150.02</td>
<td>102.45</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity</td>
<td>313.56</td>
<td>194.31</td>
<td>153.20</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water/Refuse/Sewerage</td>
<td>97.21</td>
<td>57.56</td>
<td>38.56</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>816.10</td>
<td>401.87</td>
<td>293.21</td>
<td>29.00 Flat rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payment Rate</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Tygerberg, 1998f)

Thus the link between the budget and the IDP was re-established and the budget was finally, in contrast with the previous two years, immediately approved. It was, however, the general consensus that the capital budget aided the development of the IDP that enabled its approval (Ngcuka, 1998). This budget was seen to provide for this council's new, negotiated understanding of how this urban society's benefits and burdens should be distributed.
8.7 Social justice in post-apartheid Tygerberg

This chapter illustrated how a collectively constructed urban vision – an imagined urban space - has come to function as a device by which a shared understanding of social justice in the post-apartheid city of Tygerberg was enabled. These negotiated and imagined urban spaces have made greater consensus possible on how the post-apartheid urban form ought to be constituted and how local government benefits and burdens can be distributed to achieve this objective. It was suggested that the negotiation and incorporation of multiple communities' views of the desirable urban future into a collective urban vision facilitated a shared, if temporary, understanding of how local government benefits and burdens should be distributed. Important is that the socially just distribution of urban society's benefits and burdens are interpreted as negotiable and relative to the needs, desires and possibilities of contemporary Tygerberg, mediated by a shared spatial imagination of the future city, both of which are interpreted as changeable over time and contested in urban space. By developing shared visions of this city, in which all urban citizens are seen to benefit in some way, urban citizens' representatives were willing to negotiate an allocation of resources that they had previously been unable to identify or agree upon. It was suggested that the spatial imagination, enabled and developed through Integrated Development Planning, has generated a negotiated, if temporary, collective understanding of urban social justice in Tygerberg.

This narrative has, however, also illuminated a contemporary understanding of social justice in post-apartheid urban context. What is clear from this exploration is the repeated echoes of liberal social justice understandings found in both the policy frameworks and decision-makers interpretation thereof. More significantly for this thesis, there is an acceptance of the notion that there are multiple potential understandings of social justice in the city. It is never presupposed that there is only one correct distribution of urban society's benefits and burdens, but that there are many different types of socially just distributions. The notion that there are no unitary understanding of social justice but multiple and located understandings of such a concept, is a clear reflection of Hayek's project that aimed to destabilise the notion that only one type of distribution will be interpreted as socially just. However, unlike Hayek, the contributors to the IDP aim to bring to fruition a negotiated position on social justice. Thus, the classical liberal notion that no single distribution frames the
delivery of social justice to diverse communities appears to be recognised. Nevertheless, the negotiation of a collective project of redistributing this urban society's benefits and burdens is simultaneously sought. This means that a shared understanding of social justice is seen as possible, however, with the expressed proviso that a particular rendition thereof is only temporary, located in the realities of the present and potentially variable in future.

These notions are, however, also framed by a judgement of present distributive realities. There is an underlying agreement that the apartheid city form and its possibilities are not socially just and not capable of delivering these negotiated understandings of a more desirable urban space. There is an active acknowledgement that the current distribution of this urban society's benefits and burdens arose out of an unjust (apartheid) system of resource allocation. This has led to support for a programme aimed at the rectification of these distributive realities. This central theme of rectification, in the light of historical processes leading to the current distribution, reflects a key aspect of Nozick's understanding of social justice. Whereas the resultant action does not in any sense echo those resolutions proposed by Nozick, it is the judgement of a current distribution relative to a historical distributive process, which is interpreted as unjust and requires action to rectify, that stands central to both Nozick's theory and Tygerberg's post-IDP development actions. The end-state the IDP supports is, however, also linked to a key aspect of Rawlsian interpretations of social justice. The crux of this theory argues for a distribution of society's benefits and burdens that place the worst-off in the best-off position relative to all other distributive actions and in keeping with a just savings principle. Again the realities of Tygerberg have demonstrated support for this theoretical position, both in the re-imagination of urban space and the manner in which it dispenses of its resources.

To conclude: the "grounded", empirical understanding of social justice reported here suggests a very different understanding of this concept to those prevalent in contemporary geographical social justice discourse. This discussion demonstrates the impact of the spatial imagination upon the manner in which this particular urban community negotiated the (re)distribution of its benefits and burdens. This case study illustrated that social justice encompasses multiple, diverse and even theoretically (the liberal theories of Rawls, Nozick and Hayek) incompatible distributive principles. Despite these incompatibilities, imagined urban space, in this narrative enabled by the
IDP planning process, has given expression to a temporary understanding of social justice intimately linked to a particular negotiated urban spatiality, the distributive principles of which encompass divergent liberal understandings of this concept. Finally, not only are understandings of social justice located, differentiated, contested and bounded by historically and geographically located interpretations of the city, they are also shaped by both present and imagined, future urban spaces.

The following conclusion to this thesis reflects upon some of the main implications of this study as a whole, and will also consider some questions which remain unanswered and which could most profitably be addressed in the future.
Chapter Nine

The Spatiality of Social Justice: Towards a New Geographical Project

This chapter addresses the remaining task of this thesis: to rework the observations of the previous chapters into a geographical statement about the relationship between interpretations of urban space and understandings of social justice. The task is to demonstrate how space shapes understandings of social justice. In order to do so, attention is first focused upon the main theoretical argument of the thesis. Second, the substantial question of how space shapes understandings of social justice comes into view, and finally an outline of the implications this argument presents to the future theorisation of social justice follows.

A review of the geographical social justice discourse in Chapter Two, suggested that recent geographical debates have focused on universalist vis-a-vis particularist approaches to social justice. It was suggested that this hitherto unresolved debate has undermined the development of a clear geographical contribution to social justice theorisation. It was argued that geographical social justice debates have neglected to adequately illustrate how space - the discipline's principle intellectual construct - impacts upon the meaning of the social justice concept. The thesis subsequently suggested that a spatially informed empirical engagement with social justice could address this omission. This approach it was argued, could not only demonstrate that social justice is a geographically and historically located understanding of how a society's benefits and burdens ought to be distributed, but also that spatiality stands central to what social justice is understood to mean.

Chapter Three aimed to develop the outlines of this alternative geographical social justice project. This chapter drew upon Bayley's (1981) argument that we might view social justice as an empty "place-marker", and Hayek's (1976) notion that social justice was essentially a meaningless concept relative to his concerns about the subjective knowledge bases upon which theorists develop normative claims. It was argued that the central role Hayek ascribed to the located nature of social justice theorising underpinned his dismissal of unitary theoretical understandings of this concept. Building from Hayek's challenge, social justice was denoted to represent no more than
a construct that refers to how a society's benefits and burdens ought to be distributed. The thesis then set out to fill this "empty place-maker" with meaning, by reflecting upon the policies and actions of urban decision-makers; what these views mean in terms of the distribution of urban society's benefits and burdens; and demonstrating the role of differentially located interpretations of urban space in moulding these distributive decisions.

Chapter Four expanded upon this approach to social justice, drawing on Swift et al's (1995) work regarding the relationship between empirical understandings of social justice and normative social justice theorisation. Following their argument, it was suggested that knowing that "ordinary citizens" (geographers' object of study) might, or do, think differently about social justice to the theorist(s), gives ground for caution on the part of the theorist. Thus, descriptive and explanatory empirical research was argued to be helpful for the normative project, giving the theorist reason to reconsider his/ her own arguments. Second, it was suggested that conceptions of justice that did not correspond to ordinary thinking about this concept were doomed to failure, no matter how sound or robust they were in philosophical terms. It was argued that in order for agents to respond to issues of social justice they had to be provided with reasons for acting, furnished with reasons which were reasons for them. Thus, judging what could be done politically (or geographically) about social justice requires knowledge of that opinion. The third argument suggested that the right answer in politics or geography, in this case the distributive principles that are justified for a society in question, may be internally related to lay beliefs themselves. This argument claimed that at least part of the answer to the question of how goods should be distributed is to be found by looking at the way in which people think that they ought to be distributed. In this view there are good (possibly "foundational") moral reasons why one should respect the opinions and judgements of fellow citizens. This view was suggested, not because there is no other manner by which to arrive at normative principles but rather that people have normative reasons to accord moral weight to the beliefs of relevant others (Swift et al, 1995).

Taken together the theoretical part of the thesis provided two sets of arguments for an empirically driven theorisation of social justice in geography. The Hayekian argument underlined the notion that understandings of social justice are located in infinitely
many interpretations of spatio-temporal contexts, complicating the theorisation of concepts such as social justice. It was argued that by drawing on his critique of social justice as an "empty place-marker", empirical investigation might aim to fill it with meanings which differently located individuals, groups or communities accord this concept. The arguments of Swift et al provided a further opportunity, not only to investigate the empirical understandings of social justice, but also to demonstrate that there could be a relationship between empirically grounded understandings of social justice and existing normative social justice theorisation.

Working from this position, a review of empirical studies demonstrated that people with different locational, cultural and socio-economic characteristics understood social justice differently. A key feature of the discussion was that it could be shown from existing empirical social justice studies (if only tentatively so) that understandings of social justice are differentiated between and differentially located in, particular spatio-temporal contexts. Two important points arose from this observation. The first was that social justice is not interpreted as holding a singular meaning but many meanings. It was demonstrated that the social justice concept did not (as Hayek argued) exhibit a unitary set of characteristics or principles to which different people in different places or in different sectors of the social order ascribe. It was suggested that the differentiated spatio-temporal contexts in which social groups were located could be part of explaining these variations in understandings of social justice. This then led to the second suggestion that different variables were shown to be important in framing or (partially) explaining these differentiated social justice meanings. Of particular interest to geographers is that place, time and position in the social order were shown to have an impact on the meaning of social justice. Thus, it was suggested that these views might be structured around differentiated interpretations of spatio-temporal contexts. Working from this position, the contours of an alternative geographical social justice debate were developed.

In the first instance it was argued that geographers could aim to uncover what the social justice concept represents with reference to multiple variables and institutions, within countless spatio-temporal settings. It would suggest either direct or indirect observation of how social justice is reflected through the statements of people or as recoverable through their actions. The second geographical project is directly related to
the first, and involved a comparison of these empirical descriptions of social justice with the various social justice debates currently found in the social sciences. Here it was suggested geographers could attempt to indicate which theoretical understandings of social justice are currently supported in multiple geographical and historical contexts. The third geographical project suggested a geographical theorisation of the social justice concept developed with reference to empirical illustrations of the social justice concept's meaning in different spatio-temporal settings. Here it was argued that geographers would aim to illustrate that a "deeper structure" (for example spatiality) could be excavated from those empirical understandings of social justice at their disposal.

The main theoretical task of the geographer would be to demonstrate that understandings of social justice are intimately related to interpretations of space underpinning the differentiated and located understandings that people have of this concept. Geographical research would not only illustrate the historically and spatially differentiated meaning of social justice, but also that space shapes or "structures" the nature of those ideas about social justice, how they are negotiated and change through, and with reference to, different spatialities. These foci represented the main lines of enquiry in the thesis. The findings of this investigation were that there are a number of ways in which interpretations of the spatiality of the city influence the meanings accorded to the concept of social justice:

First, urban space does not only reflect social relationships but also generate new relationships. Racial communities (and by extension in this case study generally cultural and economically differentiated communities) and their relationship towards one another in urban space represented the primary focus of the thesis. Chapter Five demonstrated that different historically and geographically located factors moulded the manner in which different racial communities in South African cities related to one another. These social relations were in turn reflected in urban space. The focus in the thesis was not however, to explain how the initial social relations developed, but what their impact upon understandings of social justice was, once established in urban space. What was important was that over time the spatiality of these racialised social relations became normalised in the minds of the White "guardians" of South African
cities, creating a strong visual image of what city spaces should look like and what
distribution of benefits and burdens were associated with it.

Whereas there are many reasons to explain how this White interpretation of the
spatiality of the city came about, the cumulative outcome was that these racial
communities were seen as part of the "White city", replicated over time and (urban)
space, and as a result included in its resource distributive system. Crucial to the thesis
and demonstrated in Chapter Five, was that the Coloured and Indian communities
formed "part" of the White communities' interpretation of the South African city,
generating a particular social relationship between them. Black South Africans by
contrast, found themselves historically and spatially excluded from this White
interpretation of the city, replicated and re-enforced over time and across South
African urban space leading to the development of a different relationship between
Whites and Blacks. The important implication was that by the late twentieth century a
racialised spatiality of the city and particularly the notion that Whites, Coloureds and
Indians were part of the city and Blacks were not, was established.

This formed the foundation of the relationships between South Africa's urban
communities, as well as its decision-makers, and remained central (as seen in Chapter
Six and Seven) in the negotiation of the post-apartheid city. Chapters Six and Seven
demonstrated the link between these historical interpretations of the spatiality of the
city and a sense of relationship between White and Black urban communities. These
chapters demonstrated that the development of a relationship between Black and
White communities was contingent upon White interpretations of the spatiality of the
city (the CMA in the case study). As such, these chapters showed the link between
Whites' historically located interpretations of urban spatiality and the development of
relationships with Black communities through which the distribution of local
government resources may take place.

Taken together, it is my claim that the thesis demonstrated that urban space not only
reflects social relations but also generates them. Focussing on urban space draws
attention to the notion that different urban communities stand in different
relationships towards one another. The importance of this realisation (of relationship
between urban communities) is that it forms the foundation from which responsibility
between urban communities develop. If there is no recognition of a relationship between urban communities, as seen in the development of apartheid and also reflected in the demarcation process, a sense of responsibility towards “other” communities in urban space cannot develop. This then points to a second way in which interpretations of space shape understandings of social justice.

Chapter Five demonstrated that the interpretation of the spatiality of the city and its links to either “belonging” in the city or not, engendered the refusal or acceptance of responsibility towards these various included and excluded communities. The recognition of White responsibility (or not) to "other" communities was the outcome of many different historical and geographical processes. The important point was however, that interpretations of urban space framed White citizens’ and urban managers’ inclination to take on responsibilities, or not, for other racial communities under apartheid. In the case of White urban residents, the distribution of benefits and burdens were arranged in such a manner as to redistribute resources mainly from the wealthy to the poor internal to the White community. These distributions were aimed at achieving greater equality in terms of the access that different White communities had to urban resources. For the other "included communities" (thus the Coloured and Indian communities) the extent of sharing resources was less extensive but nevertheless more than for Black urban residents (Cameron, 1996a).

The crucial point was however, that these "included communities" shared the central urban fiscus and retained clear links with the wealthy White Local Authorities who assumed, even if in a limited way, the responsibilities associated with the funding and management of the poorer Coloured and Indian communities. For Black South Africans, whose residential areas were meant to be self-financing, this was not the case (Bekker and Humphries, 1985). Not "being part" of the city, or as Atkinson (1990) so poignantly stated "being of the city", led to their systematic exclusion from the urban resource base until there was hardly any resource flow between Whites and those Blacks that did reside in the city.

The impact of exclusion and inclusion in the manner in which apartheid city space was interpreted by White communities, remained central in re-demarcating the post-apartheid city. In Chapter Six, the Tygerberg's White communities' initial proposals
demonstrated that they were willing to acknowledge their responsibility towards the Coloured community on the basis that they interpreted this community as historically part of "their" urban space. By contrast, the historically excluded Black community not standing in a similar relationship of "belonging" in the "White city", underpinned White's resistance to taking any responsibility for these communities. Chapter Seven demonstrated that the debates that developed in the wake of the demarcation proposals centred on the replication of longstanding racial differences in the interpretations of the spatiality of the CMA. The spatiality of the CMA (differentially interpreted by the WCBD, the White public, WLAs and the NP) underpinned differently perceived relationships between CMA's communities and the types of responsibilities they were willing to take upon themselves in the (re)distribution of the CMA's benefits and burdens. The central claim is thus that responsibility towards "others" in considering how society's benefits and burdens ought to be distributed, is contingent upon the nature of the relationship between urban communities in recognising, or not, "other" communities as part of their interpretation of the spatiality of their urban life-world.

A further impact of urban space in shaping understandings of social justice can be identified. Urban space exposes its residents to the interdependence that exists between people that live in the city. In the case of South African urban development, the responsibilities that the White communities were willing to take for others were directly related to these urban communities, being part of White interpretations of urban space. Whereas there was certainly an economic interdependence among the racial communities under apartheid it was not articulated, nor directly acknowledged, in a sharing of White urban resources with the Black urban communities. The demise of urban apartheid (Chapter Five) illuminated the interdependence of communities living in the city and prompted White action in terms of taking on responsibility for "other" (i.e. Black) communities. Only then did the "White city" start to take some responsibility for the townships, by way of a limited redirection of "White city" resources via BF and the RSCs. The realisation that Blacks were part of the South African urban reality increasingly pointed towards the realisation of the relationship between urban communities - that responsibilities in urban living had to be shared because of the interdependency between communities in urban space.
In terms of the post-apartheid transition, and as demonstrated in Chapter Six, Seven and Eight, a realisation of the interdependence associated with urban living only gradually came to the fore. The demarcation proposals discussed in Chapters Six and Seven, repeatedly demonstrated that diverse communities were very aware that the re-demarcation of urban space would generate different and new types of interdependency amongst different urban communities. Whereas Black communities recognised the interdependence of urban living and developed their demarcation proposals around that understanding, the Whites seemingly did not. In fact, the White communities of the Tygerberg actively developed demarcation proposals that indicated the opposite - a denial of the interdependence between urban communities. This it was argued, was due to a historically located interpretation of the spatiality of the South African city.

Chapter Eight demonstrated that the initial problems experienced with the planning strategies and fiscal management of Tygerberg were closely associated with the inability of different community representatives, particularly the White decision-makers, to wholly recognise the interdependence of racially and economically diverse communities in urban space. The interdependence in the minds of local government decision-makers was only seen after it became apparent that Tygerberg could be heading for total fiscal collapse. This necessitated a search for a common goal, crucially defined in spatial images which acknowledge that urban communities have a collective destiny, requiring new types of responsibilities because of the interdependent nature of urban living. Again, the role of urban space was central to the types of distributive principles that these communities chose, because different racial, social, economic and cultural communities' futures were interpreted to be irrevocably interdependent in urban space.

Finally, this thesis has presented changing views of social justice spanning the construction and current dismantling of urban apartheid. This study demonstrated that social justice is not interpreted in the same manner by all urban residents. Rather, social justice was interpreted differently in different spatio-temporal settings. Whilst what these "ordinary people" might think about social justice could simply be wrong from a number of philosophical and geographical theoretical perspectives, it gives social scientists generally, and geographers in particular, "data" against which
theoretical social justice debates may be re-evaluated (see for example Elster, 1992). For geographical social justice debates, the findings of this thesis hold a number of implications:

First, Chapters Five to Eight demonstrated that understandings of social justice are differentiated, located, bounded to the particularities of specific places, in particular moments in times, and mediated by differentiated interpretations of the spatiality of the city. Yet, although these observations fit comfortably within the frameworks of particularist thinking, this empirical study nevertheless gives cause for a reconsideration of particularists’ theoretical concerns with understandings of social justice. Differences in terms of a range of socio-economic, cultural or political communities’ interpretations of what is desirable are not “cast in stone” and necessarily, as often argued in particularist approaches to social justice, “un-negotiable” (see Young, 1990a). The case study suggests that a central reason for this "negotiation" of difference is that urban citizens' interpretations of desirable urban spaces are not static and only bounded by various social, etc. characteristics. Interpretations of the desirable distribution of a society’s benefits and burdens change in light of ever-changing interpretations of spatio-temporal contexts and the relationships, responsibilities and interdependencies these encompass. The fact that urban geographies do change, and that urban citizens interpret changing urban space differently, does not prevent the sharing of particular ideals, even if they are not wholly in accordance with any given group or individual’s particular interpretation of a desirable outcome. This alludes to the need for a more nuanced presentation of the significance of “difference” to the study of social justice. Therefore, it is important for particularists to recognise that specific yet shared understandings of social justice can, in the face of multiple "differences" and if only temporarily, be achieved.

Second, drawing on liberal theories of social justice, Chapter Three demonstrated that these theoretical understandings of social justice, like all social justice theories, are spatially and historically located interpretations of how society’s benefits and burdens ought to be distributed. This suggestion is important to universalists and particularists alike. On the one hand, it undermines the universalists notion that theoretical claims about social justice can act as “neutral” and “objective” guides to how society’s benefits and burdens ought to be distributed. For particularist on the other hand, universalist
social justice theory can be shown to be neither a-historical nor a-spatial, but rather interpreted as spatially and temporally located understandings of how a particular society's benefits and burdens could be distributed.

Third, for those who advocate the development or use of universalist theories or approaches to social justice, this thesis holds a number of implications. To geographers like Harvey and Smith this study suggests that "temporary universals" might in fact be achievable, despite the many differences found between urban communities. This position would, I suspect, be welcomed by universalist sympathisers. These temporary universals are however, necessarily unstable (temporally) and geographically more circumscribed than these geographers might find desirable.

From the evidence presented here it would appear that geographers, who have mostly supported universalist theories of social justice, have drawn from a relatively narrow theoretical base in terms of those ideals they hold out for society. Empirical understandings of social justice are far more fluid and multi-dimensional than universalist theorists currently demonstrate. Thus social justice in practice reflects aspects of many different theoretical perspectives simultaneously. If theories of social justice are, as Smith (1994a) contends, to be guides to practice, social justice theorists will need to reflect more closely on what society understands this concept to mean. As seen in this thesis, social justice is closely associated with political institutions and their ability and willingness to intervene in the distribution of society's benefits and burdens. For "ordinary people" to accept and follow a particular understanding of social justice they have to be provided with reasons for acting in support of particular political programmes. They must, as Swift et al (1995) argued, be furnished with reasons which are reasons for them. Should geographers choose not "to come to grips" with what social justice means empirically, or to reflect a more general understanding of this concept, the geographical social justice project is doomed to failure no matter how sound or desirable it might be on philosophical grounds.

This point is important to geographers, particularist or otherwise, who draw upon the prevailing social justice perspectives in the spatial sciences. This observation implies that geographers need to search beyond the narrowly focused structuralist, post-structuralist and broadly defined egalitarian theories of social justice and engage, for
example, with liberal understandings of this concept too (Katznelson, 1996). In the face of what "ordinary people" think about the socially just society in South Africa, Chapter Eight demonstrated that liberal formulations thereof are interpreted as desirable. Thus, even if geographers aim to suggest universalist understandings of social justice, they should at the very least also consider those of Rawls, Hayek and Nozick in a more direct manner. Notwithstanding a geographical tradition in which there is a central concern with growing inequality, exclusion and a feeling that liberal theories of social justice neglect these concerns (Merrifield and Swyngedouw, 1996), it might be strategically justified to seriously consider views generally not popular in geographical discourse, for the sake of achieving, on balance, better societal outcomes (also see Swift et al, 1995). The boundaries of political possibility, and this is equally true for the impact of geographical knowledge upon society, are to a large extent set by popular opinion. So judging what can be done politically (and also geographically) requires that geographers equip themselves with the knowledge of those popular opinions about social justice in particular spatio-temporal settings.

Finally, in demonstrating the relevance of liberal formulations of social justice, geographers will thus have to contend with the notion that different, and even theoretically incompatible distributive ideals, operate simultaneously in urban space. For geographers (and social scientists generally), the simultaneous support of Hayekian, Nozickian and Rawlsian interpretations of social justice in one context presents a supreme challenge. None of these theorists ever considered their interpretations of social justice to be compatible or capable of being subsumed in one coherent statement about social justice. On the contrary, the very fact that three liberal theorists have proposed alternative social justice theories, illustrates that each felt that a key aspect of liberalism was undermined in the others' theoretical statements. In this respect, geographers (and philosophers) are presented with a formidable challenge. Whereas philosophy has to date been unable to reconcile the diverse interpretations of social justice reflected in competing liberal understandings of this concept - this study has demonstrated that they do, nevertheless, simultaneously operate in particular historical and geographical circumstances. In particular spatio-temporal contexts the incompatibility of Hayek, Nozick and Rawls' distributive principles are apparently transcended. In this attention to spatio-temporal specificity and to spatiality geographers are presented with an extraordinary opportunity to contribute to social
justice theorisation beyond its disciplinary concerns. In demonstrating the profound impact of interpretations of space on theorising social justice, and on how "ordinary people" understand social justice, geographers are presented with a unique opportunity to contribute to the development of new, spatially informed social justice theories.
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Appendix A

Thesis Methodology

1. Introduction

Feminist (England, 1994; Haraway, 1991; Hartsock, 1987; Rose, 1997), social and cultural (McDowell, 1992a), political (Ward and Jones; 1999) and increasingly economic geographers (Herod, 1999; Mullings, 1999) are re-examining the way in which geographers conduct research, how the research process unfolds and the various subjectivities that are inscribed in their work. Following an increased awareness and emphasis on transparency, this appendix details the thesis research process, methods of data collection and interpretative devices. The appendix also conveys some findings drawn from my research experiences in the transitional context of South African cities and ties them into a growing body of research about researcher positionality and political-temporal contingency in the research process. To this end, this appendix supports and gives further voice to these debates. The first part illustrates the importance of political-temporal contingency in the research process, suggested by Ward and Jones (1999) to be crucial to the level of access the researcher can gain to certain types of information. The second draws attention to the more established debates about researcher positionality (McDowell, 1992a), illustrating the dynamic way in which identities and attendant power relations are created and transformed during interviews with elites in multi-cultural settings (Mullings, 1999).

First, attention is drawn to the general fieldwork methodology, which sources of information were considered, how informants were identified and which institutions acted as starting points to this investigation. The focus then turns to the different governance institutions from which information were obtained; the types of material collected (demarcation proposals and current local government policy documents), why this material was collected and its relevance to illustrating the spatiality of social justice. Attention is then drawn to the impact of political-temporal contingency and researcher positionality in this research process. Interview characteristics and analysis are then taken into view, concluding with how these observations might present limitations to the project findings.
2. The fieldwork methodology

An extensive literature review preceded the fieldwork programme. This drew on academic papers written on local government transition in South Africa but yielded a disappointingly small information base, particularly in terms of the demarcation process and recent local government development. This did not come as a surprise as many of the current developments are still being recorded and reworked by researchers and will take some time to filter through the academic publication system. To augment this literature, South African newspapers and news magazines focusing on both Cape Town and the country generally, were consulted in order to build the basic outlines of the demarcation process and current local government developments. From this investigation emerged the contours of the demarcation debates and a general impression of the manner in which the boundaries and forms of representation in post-apartheid cities were developing. In addition, these searches illuminated some of the key role-players in the demarcation debates over this period; led to the identification of the Tygerberg as case study area; and also pointed to the key role-players in the larger metropolitan context. This was developed further by contacting various academics at South African universities to establish whom they saw as key informants to the demarcation debates in the Western Cape Province.

A further part of the fieldwork preparation related to the development of a network of informants and key contacts, facilitating access to information and informants. To develop this network, an existing group of academics at the School for Public and Development Management at the University of Stellenbosch were drawn upon. The choice of this particular grouping was founded in their willingness to assist and prior acquaintance. This entry point was perceived, at the time, as an ideal starting point to the use of a snowball technique giving access to the local government of Tygerberg and the provincial government of the Western Cape Province. Whilst the thesis focuses on local government decision-makers, it was deemed necessary to consider the provincial government as a potential source of information. The particular interest in the provincial government was because this tier of government, among other duties, monitors the implementation and development of current local government policy frameworks, and is therefore a good source of general information about post-apartheid local government. Furthermore, this tier would have information regarding Tygerberg, which falls under its jurisdiction. Consequently, it was envisaged that this
tier of government would have access to details of the historical process of local
government and post-apartheid urban restructuring in the CMA generally and
Tygerberg in particular. In terms of the local government of Tygerberg it was intended
to first interview those informants at the local government level accessible via the
Stellenbosch network and then to work from there by means of referral, providing
access to wider local government political and administrative structures.

3. Documents at the Provincial Government level

The provincial government was a good starting point for developing a general
understanding of local government practice. On arrival in the field the first objective
was to develop detailed familiarity with the present local government context from a
policy and regulatory position (national and provincial government policy documents)
and with the recent demarcation debates. The search for insights beyond those gained
from the limited academic literature and the extensive press coverage already
acquainted with was however, frustrating and did not render the hoped for results. It
became apparent that there was little information about the demarcation process
beyond that uncovered by the literature review. Consequently, reading of the original
demarcation materials generated during the demarcation process was essential.
Unfortunately the demarcation material was not held in public access archives or
libraries, nor did anyone at these institutions know where to locate them. A chance
discussion however, resolved the issue as an acquaintance in the provincial
government previously involved with the initial filing of the demarcation proposals
knew where to search. This provided access to material that has not been, and
apparently is unlikely to be, freely available to the public. The inaccessibility of the
material explained why no detailed analyses of the demarcation debates in the Western
Cape were forthcoming. It also explained why only the Chairperson (Prof. Fanie
Cloete) and one member of the Western Cape Demarcation Board (Prof. Rob Cameron)
have published work on these particular demarcation debates. Nevertheless, a chance
contact (Mr Mike Brewis) provided access to the demarcation reports.

Thus, a significant outcome of this investigation was the discovery of the demarcation
proposals from various local governments and community representatives in the
former Cape Metropolitan Region submitted to the Western Cape Demarcation Board
The demarcation proposals, discussed in Chapters Six and Seven, included all material concerning the demarcation of the first post-apartheid local governments in the CMA, over the period of roughly mid-1994 to mid-1995. The importance of these documents is the fact that they provide valuable insights into how different interest groups and communities viewed the apartheid past and the post-apartheid future. These documents record how political parties, local government institutions, civic organisations, etc. thought of the South African urban form at a particular moment, which communities constituted a political, social and cultural community of interests; which communities would lead the decision-making system presiding over and maintaining these various communities; and which communities would take political and financial responsibility for the construction of the post-apartheid city, etc.

This documentation was not initially accorded the important position in the research that it currently holds. The initial intention was to produce a text about the spatiality of social justice mainly generated from interview material. However, the detail and scope of the views expressed in the documentary sources held significant potential for broadening and strengthening the thesis, beyond what could reasonably have been expected from interview material. In the transitional flux of South African society, the astonishing speed at which political debates evolved, presented the potential danger of confusing these past events with their subsequent development. The demarcation process was drawn out over more than a year, it was highly detailed and sometimes contradictory in terms of the development of the debates and the positions held by the central role-players. Having viewed the demarcation documents it was realised that interview material alone would have been a very limited source for understanding this complicated set of events. Subsequently, in the fieldwork period, for example, in reflecting on the central moments in South African history and comparing these reflections with the respective interviewees, it became apparent that much of the detail contained in the initial demarcation proposals was glossed over. The development of the demarcation debate had to be probed, thus interviewees had to be reminded of the starting position of the White Local Authorities (WLAs') proposals, which for example, were often neglected in favour of the later positions these institutions adopted. The fragmented understandings of the WLAs socially just post-apartheid city were presented as uniform proposals, whilst the actual proposals presented more complex and detailed positions regarding the demarcation process.
These texts also formed the foundation of the Demarcation Board's decisions in demarcating the post-apartheid metropolitan substructures in the Western Cape. Like demarcation boards across the country, the WCDB had substantial freedom in interpreting the demarcation process but were intended to draw their insights primarily from proposals generated within the local communities in those areas where demarcation of local governments was taking place. Proposals were submitted by political parties, various local governments, civic and other community-based organisations, and sometimes by individuals.

Second, these texts represent a primary source of information and clearly formulated representation of how various actors at this important juncture in South African urban history thought of their past and the new era they were about to enter. The proposals captured the emergence, formulation and reformation of urban social justice understanding of the post-apartheid city. Rather than only presenting summarised final positions, as might have been the case with a reliance on interview material only, the documents captured a process of rethinking, re-defining and reformulating social justice. Despite the technical and at times cryptic nature of the demarcation proposals, the texts present a clear statement of different communities, interest groups and individuals' views of the apartheid past and post-apartheid future. The "moment" of the proposals is fixed in these texts and shielded from subsequent events, if not in their interpretation, at least in their substance. In addition most, if not all press coverage and public opinion on the matter of local government demarcation drew on these texts.

The various demarcation proposals submitted to the WCDB were produced in different ways and we might briefly consider the general outlines of two "categories" of proposal. The first were highly technical reports, with relatively low levels of discernible public input as was seen in the case of the WLA and BLA proposals. The second category included proposals from the non-statutory organisations, which were less technical and compiled from conclusions drawn from highly participatory discussion forums. The larger number and most comprehensive technical reports came from the WLAs of Tygerberg. Reports varied in length but were nonetheless extensive and in some cases over a hundred pages each. Most were couched in the form of direct applications of the LGTA demarcation criteria. This was, as discovered during subsequent interviews, often deliberate. The "clear", "technical" and "scientific" approach to the demarcation criteria by the WLAs were often a technique by which to
present demarcation proposals as "non-political", presenting only "facts" as the foundation of a preferred demarcation proposal (Cameron, 1996a; Van der Merwe, 1998). While this was the intention, the WCDB members often remarked upon this "technicality" as a thinly veiled method by which to hide far larger political statements. In most cases, as it emerged from interviews (Cloete, 1998; Van der Merwe, 1998; Younge, 1998), these reports were compiled by the Engineering Departments of the respective WLAs, debated by the WLA councils, and refined and communicated in ward meetings to test (White) public opinion. In some cases, such as Durbanville, which represents a clear exception, surveys soliciting opinions on amalgamation were administered (Van der Merwe, 1998).

The demarcation proposals from the townships' non-statutory groupings were produced differently and were not presented in the technical manner of the WLAs. The hallmark of the township proposals as the Chairperson (Cloete, 1998) and WCDB members (Cameron, 1998; Classen, 1998; Younge, 1998) recalled in interview, was the extraordinary community participation in the construction of amalgamation options and the general urban visions people in the township areas were aiming to establish. And again, for the purposes of this thesis, it is the detailed expression of how the post-apartheid city was imagined at this time that is of importance. As seen in the discussion of these proposals in Chapter Six and Seven, a complex and evolving debate, rarely developed in the general public debates on the demarcation, is found. While little has survived (no documentary records have survived) in terms of the discussions held in those forums (for example the townships), the contours of these discussions about the urban past and re-imaginings of the South African city's future, are preserved in these demarcation proposals. These documents "froze" a moment in time when local government decision-makers and the public alike were invited to think about the South African city, what was wrong with it, what it should aim to be and how to arrive at such goals. Thus, these documents capture these emerging thoughts and their development, facilitating illumination of what urban social justice in the post-apartheid city could mean.

Consequently, in the field it was decided that this project, in terms of the information needed for Chapters Six and Seven, covering the 1994 and 1995 period, would shift its emphasis to a detailed analysis of these rich textual sources. Moreover, these would be
supplemented by interviews as a way of substantiating and augmenting their interpretation.

4. Demarcation proposals, local government context and potential interviewees

Working in the provincial government buildings, searching and copying the demarcation reports, enabled access to key informants knowledgeable of the current state of local government in the Cape Metropolitan Area. During my time there, interviews were held with the Provincial Directors of Constitutional Affairs, Local Government and Social Planning, as well as advisors to the Department of Constitutional Affairs. A snowballing technique in the Provincial Government context worked well in securing access to those informants closely involved in the demarcation debates and current local government system. In addition, interviews with the Chairperson of the Demarcation Board for the Western Cape Province, Prof. Fanie Cloete and three further members of the 16 member WCDB, Amanda Younge, Prof. Rob Cameron and Dr. Piet Classen were secured in quick succession. In terms of the composition of this grouping of informants, obvious issues of their representative validity might be posed. The importance of this grouping of people is that these four members of the Board were mainly responsible for the final writing of the Demarcation Report that would be implemented in the CMA (as discussed in Chapter Six and Seven). In addition, as far as the composition of the political representation of this grouping of interviewees are concerned, it might be added that two of these members were nominated by the NP and two by the ANC. While this division does not suggest representation of all political, let alone community interests, they did represent the two major categories in the demarcation debates. In addition, it should be pointed out that those academics contacted at the outset of fieldwork planning, in addition to contact with the provincial government informants, all indicated that interviews with these four Board members were essential to understanding the demarcation events. The outcome was that in terms of the broader context of the development of the first post-apartheid local government structures and the current local government context, progress was quick and generally successful.
The snowball technique was dependent upon gaining access to a network of potential informants by means of referral (Sheskin, 1985). In this respect the existing network of informants at the regional level and the WCDB did not provide contacts in either the City of Tygerberg's political or administrative structure. As a starting point to the development of a network of informants, all main role players within the local government of Tygerberg were identified, based on a listing of political representatives and administrative managers obtained from this City's information centre. Drawing on Ira Sheskin's (1985) techniques for securing interviews with interviewees one is not familiar with, letters were written to all the political representatives and directors of the different service clusters in the City Council, stating the intent to contact them for interview. The letters included personal background information, purpose of the study, what general points were intended for discussion and the proposed length of the interview. It was stated that they would be contacted within a two-week period to seek their assistance personally and to set up an interview.

The reason for the focus on the council representatives was two-fold. The first was that these were the formal democratically elected representatives of the community of Tygerberg. As these informants are formal representatives it was possible to immediately ascertain who they were, who they represented and where to contact them. The second reason for focusing on the council representatives is located in the particular moment in local government transition in post-apartheid South Africa which is the focus of this study. Democratically elected local government came to the City of Tygerberg only in 1996. Up to that point, political authority in non-WLA jurisdictions was divided into the illegitimate city councils of the BLAs on the one hand, and the legitimate community leaders of the non-statutory representative base on the other. However, with democratically elected government, the community or civic leaders became part of the formal political representative decision-making structure of local government. Thus, while the demarcation period represented a clear need to consider the legitimate community leaders (assembled under the banner of the non-statutory representatives), the first elected local governments consisted of those very same community leaders, who had been voted into the formal local government structures. Thus the first transitional local government structures of the CMA represented a particular moment when the split between state and community became
extraordinarily blurred. At this moment in Tygerberg's history, the "real" community representatives were also the decision-makers of the formal local state. The views developed by these representatives therefore presents a brief and unique moment when the legitimacy of these local government leaders were at a maximum, and local government representatives perhaps most representative of community aspirations, desired and needs. This position was however, starting to change towards the end of the study period as new communities of interest began to emerge (for example, see Chapter Eight).

6. Political-temporal contingency in the research process

The development of a network of informants at the local government level was hampered by three important factors: the timing of the fieldwork, the topic, and positionality relative to the potential and actual informants. Kevin Ward and Martin Jones (1999) have recently suggested that the geographical methodology literature is not sufficiently sensitive to political-temporal contingency of the research process. This omission, they suggest, refers to a political approach to the relations of research production, by problematising "research situatedness" vis-a-vis the timing of research enquiry. Such timing, they argue, plays a key role in the "critical positioning" (following McDowell, 1992a) of the researcher in relation to structures of local power, which is process-based and fluid. This means that certain processes and programmes developing and conducted at certain levels and within particular organisations or institutions at particular times, set obstacles to gaining access to information, in addition to those limits imposed by positionality and power in the research process. Thus conducting research on a topic that is sensitive at a particular time and with reference to particular tiers of government, for example, presents divergent problems (or opportunities as I shall suggest below) in terms of access to certain types of information and the range of informants. The experiences I had in the Tygerberg were perhaps indicative of their observation and consequently I consider "political-temporal contingency" in the fieldwork process to be an issue of considerable importance in terms of the research reported in this thesis. Thus, supporting Ward and Jones (1999), it is suggested that not only was interviewer positionality (McDowell, 1992b; Schoenberger, 1991; 1992) central to issues such as research access but so too (simplifying Ward and Jones argument) was the intersection of politics and time in relation to the research project focus.
The research reported in this thesis was influenced by the general timing of the fieldwork relative to the local government calendar of Tygerberg. Timing was crucial in terms of access to information. In many respects the constraints of the academic calendar, the stage of the research project itself, and financial constraints determined the timing of the fieldwork. Given these constraints, the best time was between April 1998 and August 1998. In retrospect this was a rather unfortunate decision and debilitating in terms of gaining interviews at the local government level. First arrival in South Africa during the Easter Holiday season. This meant that local government officials were unavailable, effectively rendering weeks of the field trip useless in terms of gaining access to the City of Tygerberg. A second problem arose, once contact began with councillors and bureaucrats in the study area. The City of Tygerberg was in the midst of an enormous project, the creation of their first Integrated Development Plan (IDP). This meant that both the political and the bureaucratic management structure of the city were locked into meeting after meeting. Thirdly, they were working on the final draft of the first consolidated budget for the city. This effectively meant that all those councillors and bureaucrats with whom I sought to engage, simply did not have time for interviews. In addition, they were not prepared to speak to the public (or researchers) on issues that were not only highly contested but also not finalised. Thus interview (potential and actual) questions about the basic structures and content of the city's budget; the level of redistribution taking place; how needs of different communities played-off against one another; the dimensions of assistance needed; the intention of the IDP; who would benefit most from these arrangements; etc. could not be answered. This effectively meant that interview dates could only be suggested following the public presentation of the budget and the formulation of the IDP (July 1998 onwards), as well as having to contend with informants who were unwilling to participate in this study.

By contrast, at the provincial level, besides the pre-existing network connecting me with this tier of government, questions about the budget of local government, the IDP and general reflections on local government in the CMA were far less sensitive and informants appeared willing to share the information they held. As Ward and Jones (1999) suggest, these interviewees had nothing to fear in passing on information, opinions or general insights, as they are not, for example in this context, elected officials and are not directly involved in the development of local government projects.
Further, echoing Emmanuelle Sabot's (1999) recent observations, the position of the provincial government relative to other tiers might have influenced these informants' willingness to assist researchers. Provincial governments in South Africa were perceived to be conceding political power to both the local and central tiers. Perhaps, as was the case in Sabot's experience, they perceived the interviews and enquiries as an opportunity to assert their knowledge and accessibility to a public that does not hold these institutions in high regard.

For the local government of Tygerberg, these dynamics are different and for these decision-makers, the stakes are stacked differently. This tier of government is wholly responsible for the IDP and the always-controversial city budget. They have to negotiate the potential minefield of sharing opinions that might be passed on to other politicians, bureaucrats or the public. In the end their views on various issues matter for their re-election, legitimacy, etc. and they have to be cautious what and with whom they share their views. Thus, the timing of this research was not only problematic in terms of the general cycle of local government functions but also very sensitive in terms of some pressing decisions, for example, which of the poor communities will benefit most in the short term, as a result of the IDP or city budget proposals and actions.

Nevertheless, the timing presented opportunities too. Being in Tygerberg when the final draft of the IDP was being developed and the first consolidated budget for the City of Tygerberg was being created, meant that there were a number of workshops and public meetings that could be attended. These gave insights into the manner in which the City of Tygerberg was developing, changing and thinking about its future, that would not otherwise have been possible. In this respect, access was gained to four workshops and two public meetings focusing on the IDP and the 1998-1999 budget respectively. The IDP and subsequent Budget debates that gave fiscal support to this programme produced some of the most interesting material in the case study. The important aspect of the IDP and the debates its development produced is that it was developed for the first time and from a "clean slate". As the production of this document was without reference to any similar existing document (as all subsequent IDPs will be), a historically specific expression of how the urban past, present and future of Tygerberg was constructed, is presented therein.
7. Positionality in the collection of data in Tygerberg

Researchers also have to be aware of one of the more commonly discussed factors that can influence access to informants and information – the positionality of the researcher (Herod, 1993; 1999; Cochrane, 1998; McDowell, 1998). The focus here is on researcher positionality in an elite interview context – a concern often neglected by many geographers writing on researcher positionality. In fact, methods for elite research (beyond political science) have until recently received relatively little attention from social scientists. Yet, as Cormode and Hughes (1999, p.299) have recently remarked, 'researching the powerful presents very different methodological and ethical challenges from studying 'down'. The characteristics of those studied, the power relations between them and the researchers and the politics of the research process differ considerably between elite and non-elite research.' This neglect reflects, according to Hertz and Imber (1995), at least to some extent, on the perceived difficulties of gaining access to elite networks and the political commitment of many social scientists to studying the less privileged. This thesis, focusing on the local government decision makers' interpretations of social justice was dependent upon access to elite networks. Moreover, it had difficulty gaining access to a particular elite which frustrated access to both informants and information.

Mullings (1999) and Herod (1999) suggest that there are currently many debates focusing on how researchers gain access to privileged viewpoints (Rose, 1997; Hill-Collins, 1990). Mullings (1999) and Herod (1999) problematise the particular argument, such as that put forward by Abu-Lughod (1988) and Hill-Collins (1990), that as "insiders", researchers who study a group to whom they belong, have an advantage because they are able to use their knowledge of the group under study, and more likely to be perceived as neutral and therefore be given information that would not be given to an "outsider". On the other hand, they also challenge the counter argument that would suggest that "outsiders" who do not belong to a group have a greater degree of objectivity and ability to observe behaviours without distorting their meanings (Mullings, 1999, p.340; also see Sabot, 1999) aiding these researchers in gaining access to different levels of information. The general binaries implied in the "insider – outsider" debates, in their view, are less than real because it seeks to freeze positionalities in place and assumes that being an "insider" or "outsider" is a fixed attribute. As Mullings (ibid.) argues, the "insider – outsider" binary in reality is a
boundary that is not only highly unstable but also one that is subject to the dynamism of positionalities in time and through space (also see Ward and Jones, 1999).

In the case of the research conducted in Tygerberg, Mulling's suggestion appears to be accurate. To illustrate this point, the following examples, of my positionality vis-a-vis four categories of informants are briefly recounted, leading to the suggestion that at a particular time, at a particular place, this researcher was an "outsider" from multiple points of view, which frustrated access to certain types of information and informants. As a White, Afrikaans-speaking and educated male, conducting research in a local government environment where many of the political and administrative decision-makers (my potential informants) share similar attributes, this researcher could (and I think reasonably) been have positioned as a privileged insider. However, those very informants who share the same attributes considered me an "outsider". To illustrate this point, examples of two categories of informants expected to assist in my research but were reluctant to do so, can be identified.

First the "conservative"(i.e. N.P-right) White Afrikaans male. The former apartheid town councillors, generally middle-aged and politically aligned to former apartheid implementers and champions - the National Party, can be placed in this category. It appeared that in the mind of this group, questions arose as to why I (as a South African, Stellenbosch educated, Afrikaner male) would be affiliated with a foreign (British) university when the theme of investigation was located in South Africa and could have been undertaken locally. For example, one interviewee bluntly asked "So wat maak jy tussen al daai souties" (so what are you doing among all those Limies). Furthermore, it appeared that this group was particularly suspicious of the underlying reasons for interest in the topic of local government and overly cautious about the fact that social justice was part of the project title. It appears that there was a fear that the intention of the project was criticism of the work they were doing. Furthermore, the notion of explaining their understandings and reasoning behind certain issues was relatively foreign to councillors who in the past had little obligation to explain or defend the reasoning behind many of their actions.

Second, the "liberal" (NP left or ANC) Afrikaans male view posed similar problems but with a slightly different dynamic. The same question of foreign university affiliation came to the fore but with an added twist. There was a perception of being positioned
"as one of those pseudo liberals" who sold-out and emigrated abroad when democracy was finally brought about. Frequently for example, questions such as "so are you going to stay in the UK" or "Why are you studying in the UK" were asked and statements such as "there are so many South Africans abroad nowadays" made. An additional problem was centred on the fear that I might perceive the actions taken at local government level and theirs in particular, as not having been radical and far-reaching enough in transforming South African local government. They feared that it might be perceived that too little has changed over the past few years and that the post-apartheid government was not delivering on its promises, etc. In addition, it sometimes came across that interviewees were trying to appear as politically correct as possible and explaining what they thought should be heard (this was beyond the fact that this is in any case a standard problem when conducting interviews). This was evident when one was constantly reminded that "the transition was only at its beginning stages"; that it would take time to implement new strategies and ideas; that the new emphasis on community participation that is crucial to the legitimacy of the council slowed down implementation but was essential in a post-apartheid environment; and that there were political factions (the NP) that did not want to move as quickly as necessary, etc.

Then there were two categories of informants, to whom I represented an "outsider" in a more "predictable" sense as little in my background should have "endeared" me to these informants. In this respect the Black ANC councillors and the former White anti-apartheid activists are a case in point. However, whilst my "outsider" positionality did prove problematic, some of the most informative discussions came from people in these particular two categories.

The Black (ANC) councillors represented a very diverse grouping of informants and care needs to be taken in categorisation. For one there were Black councillors who were from specific historical positions in township politics closely aligned to civic organisation in the late 1980s. On the other hand, there were those who had only recently (in the 1990s) entered into local politics. As far as I could ascertain none of the Black councillors interviewed were former BLA councillors. In addition, it should be added that it was not possible to position, for example, potential Black ANC interviewees in terms of their entrance into the ANC party structure, be that entrance from ANC alliance members, such as the SACP, trade unions or via the civic
movements. This point is important in the sense that the ANC alliance represents a very diverse set of political positions, meaning those views on the IDP, or the city budget or local government transition could, despite the formal party position, be very diverse.

As was the case with some of their White counterparts, uncertainty as to what the objectives of the project implied for them created a range of problems. Frequently, councillors were on the defensive and perceived the project as a possible critique of how local government was performing in the post-apartheid era. This defensiveness, however, needs to be read against the moment. As the representative of the townships, the Black councillors had to realistically balance the enormous needs of the communities they represented in context of a limited local government resource base. This meant making choices, many of which could not satisfy the multiple needs of their supporters. In this case, the possibility of an informative interview was nearly impossible. An added problem with respect to this group related to my home language and possible background, which was immediately evident by name. By the time they realised that much of my education was completed at the former intellectual powerhouse of the apartheid government – Stellenbosch – suspicion was at its most obvious. This appears to have had at least some negative impacts on these individuals' willingness to agree to an interview or reveal new or significant insights. In addition, basic communication problems arose, as I cannot speak Xhosa and the councillors were not always fluent in English, whilst Afrikaans (as the former "Apartheid" language) was not seen as desirable. Yet, despite these limitations, some of the most informative interviews came from this particular "group" of informants.

Former White anti-apartheid activists proved to be a particularly difficult group to deal with. Aged 27, this researcher was too young to have been involved in activist politics in the 1980s and too old to claim not to have benefited disproportionately from the apartheid system. I felt that my age and background "cohort" fitted uneasily in this group's mind. Their networks in the new government and bureaucratic structures, often due to their involvement in the liberation struggle, were extensive but simultaneously exclusionary to "outsiders" (like myself). Here exclusionary is used in the sense that there might – and I cannot assert this position without remarking upon the "feeling" – that in terms of background I did not represent the "type" of researcher "deserving" of any particular assistance in the gathering of information. This is
unfortunate as this grouping has understandings of past events I have only read about, yet appeared to doubt the honesty and intention of my interest in obtaining further insights into their experiences. Ironically, however, not having been closely involved in the resistance movements of the past can lead to different understandings of the past, which in turn can be misunderstood by this grouping of informants. Ultimately, however, these informants were personally involved in the liberation politics and struggles of the 1980s, whilst I was still sitting on my exclusively white Afrikaner school bench. What seems to be lacking in their understanding of “me” is that I was, in fact, privy to understandings of those who supported apartheid and at least some of the reasons why change was needed, which perhaps they were not. "I" and many people like me straddled the uneasy divide of growing-up in the years of reform apartheid, one foot in the apartheid mindset and the other in reform transitions. "I" cannot categorise groupings into camps of “good” and “evil” in the same manner they did (and it appears they still sometimes do). The multiple contradictions of both apartheid thinking and the thinking of those who maintained it are alive and real to me, be it because of my parents, family, grand parents, etc. There is, unfortunately, no way “I” could “prove” my post-apartheid "worth" to them. This was a great pity, as I needed to understand their experiences of much of the current transition to a post-apartheid society. Yet, as was the case with the Black ANC councillors, despite these limitations some of these interviews were highly productive.

And then the matter of age. A variable that transcends the basic political affiliation, background, education, etc. of the interviewees and other informants relates to age. The Afrikaans, English and Xhosa community, as is the case in many of South Africa's communities, ascribes significant importance to age. A young male, quite simply does not command the same type of respect and seriousness as someone, for example, in his or her middle-age, would be able to command (also see Sabot, 1999). Most South Africans are not really familiar with the idea that relatively young students engage in PhD research and on topics that relate in some way to the exposure of their moral judgements. In fact, one can broaden this statement by suggesting that many South Africans are unfamiliar with independent research. It might have helped if this project was part of a larger study conducted by a well-known South African research council. Whereas I might have been able to cope with some of the other issues regarding the manner in which I was perceived - being younger or being too young for what I needed and wanted to know, could not be transcended.
Due to problems of access to interviews and other opportunities which emerged, the focus of the fieldwork in the City of Tygerberg, illustrating current understandings of the spatiality of social justice at the local government level, and the focus of chapter Eight in this thesis, was broadened to obtain as much information, in other formats, as possible. In this respect the monthly council meetings, preliminary budget meetings, the council budget speech, the draft IDP discussions and the IDP presentation for comment, that were open to the public were attended with the purpose of securing interviews, obtaining insights into the council decision-making process and potential pieces of documentation. It was via these meetings that documents such as the IDP, the city's budget and the council meeting agendas were obtained. This information, while in many cases technical and not focused on my direct interests, provided clear and well-formulated analyses of the current realities of Tygerberg and the manner in which decision-makers were dealing with them. As was the case with the demarcation debates, the focus thus shifted to documentation generated in council debates and decisions, as well as plans developed to address the transitional post-apartheid realities of the Tygerberg. Moreover, council meetings presented different insights into how local governance in post-apartheid South Africa functions. These meetings illuminated the differentiated located understandings of how scarce resources should or could be distributed; what types of urban vision they aimed to generate and how to attain them. However, following the complex issues of negotiating internal party political differences, seeking out common themes according to which common support could be built, exploring and debating commonalities between different communities that are radically different, illuminated, in some respect, more than singular interviews could communicate. It was in the dynamics of these animated and often long meetings that the search for negotiated and shared understandings of social justice were often most visible, if not always in succinctly expressed statements but in the collective effort to resolve and explore complex challenges facing this city.

8. Interview characteristics and analysis

While securing interviews was demanding, 20 elite interviews were conducted. These covered both the demarcation period and the current transitional realities of Tygerberg. The interviewees represented the main political structure of the City of Tygerberg, thus political representatives from the townships and the White suburbs, WCDB members, Directors of Provincial Directorates directly involved with local
government, as well as academics were included. It is important to acknowledge
though, that the interview base is, due to some of the issues discussed above, uneven in
its representation of current South African demography with less formal input from
individuals representing and/or coming from township areas, than former WLA
areas. Due to these limitations, the interview base was primarily used to augment
understanding of the documented material, both with reference to the demarcation
debates and current local government realities. Documents such as the Integrated
Development Programme, the Tygerberg Budget, the Tygerberg Spatial Development
Framework and various Council meeting notes for example, were illuminated with
reference to interview material where the technical texts and arguments did not always
clearly express its intent, meaning or propose.

The interviews were semi-structured, recorded and between one and two hours in
duration. Semi-structured interviews presented several advantages given the objectives
of this particular study. This technique provided a setting in which to pose specific
questions relating to both theoretical points of interest and various issues raised in the
broader primary sources examined. In addition, semi-structured interviews also share
many of the strengths of unstructured interviewing. For example, they allow the
researcher to explore the respondents perspective of the subject under investigation;
they give flexibility in terms of suggesting ideas that could not have been foreseen in
the background research; and finally they can provide considerable depth of
understanding of the situation being studied (Chadwick, Bahar and Albrecht, 1984;
Foddy, 1993; Bell, 1993; Fontana and Frey 1994). An additional advantage of semi­
structured interviewing, particularly in an exploratory study such as this, is that this
technique is generally recommended for sensitive topics (e.g. Nichols, 1991), which is
the case with many of the socio-political issues concerning local government in
transitional post-apartheid cities.

The analysis of the interview material and the documentary evidence was a process
that took place both in the field and in the write-up stages. The first step was to "re­
listen" the interviews, making notes of those aspects of the interviews that appeared
relevant to the respective chapter foci. These notes were compared with notes taken
during the interviews, thus seeing whether on review of these interviews I still agreed
with those initial impressions documented. The recorded interviews were then
transcribed. The analysis of the "texts" these interviews generated could be divided
into two categories, those focusing on the demarcation debates (reported in Chapter Six and Seven) and those concerned with the current local government transition (reported in Chapter Eight). In reading these texts and writing about them, a number of methods, recommended by Babbie (1986) and Huberman and Miles (1994) were used, such as comparison, contrast, the noting of patterns, themes and the validation of preliminary conclusions. Those interviews focusing on the demarcation debates were all conducted after I had studied the demarcation proposals. Thus these interviews were generally focused on the "filling" of "gaps" in terms of information and recording the interviewees interpretation of these debates. The interviews focusing on the current local government situation were less structured and more concerned with the gathering of information and interpretation of documented material I collected over the fieldwork period. Consequently, some of these interviews produced a general narrative on local government and in particular Tygerberg's transition, while others were similar to those conducted in relation to the demarcation period, being focused on clarifying and understanding particular issues raised by a reading of the documents.

These interview texts were subsequently rearranged into categories of related statements, and then integrated into a text representing a narrative. The initial stages of the analysis were focused on the construction of a narrative that could, for example, weave together the various demarcation proposals and the debates they generated. Similarly, Chapter Eight drew on the interviews to direct the analysis of the Integrated Development Programme, Tygerberg Spatial Development Framework, to develop greater insight into the Tygerberg budget and establish a general sense of the current local government debates related to space and social justice. On the whole, the integration of the interview texts and the document material involved was, as Bechofer (1974) and Bryman and Burgess (1994) suggests a permanent interaction between the observation and the theoretical concepts reviewed in this thesis.

9. Limitations to this study

The methodological limitations of this work are similar to the ones that have often been mentioned in relation to text and semi-structured interviews regarding generalisation, reliability and validity (Babbie, 1986; Chadwick, Bahar, Albrecht, 1984; Bell, 1993). In order to overcome issues concerning validity, reliability and generalisation, the range
of interviews conducted acted both as sounding-boards to the interpretation I have given to the collected texts and as mechanism to illuminate interpretations my own understanding of these texts might have over-looked. I believe that this method guarded against a too personal interpretation of the demarcation or IDP text, for example, but simultaneously shielded against building an overly simplistic or one-sided view that might or could have developed because of the composition of the interview base.

This alludes to a possible limitation of the interpretations given to material included in this thesis. It could be argued that the format of the demarcation debates and the IDP, etc. might have excluded communities who generally and for whatever reason, did not engage in the formal presentation of their views. In terms of the history of the demarcation process, the demarcation reports were, while representing multiple interpretations of the spatiality of social justice in the apartheid past and post-apartheid future, ultimately only representative of the main institutionally based political, cultural and civic role-players in the CMA. Consequently, it is possible to argue that many “other” voices were and are potentially excluded from this study. Not being included in the demarcation debate texts (demarcation proposals); the interviews could have over-looked some debates that could have led to a more nuanced discussion of the spatiality of social justice. In addition, questions could be asked regarding the interviewees political intent in the manner in which they reported and reflected on the demarcation debate, weighting my views perhaps in the direction of their priorities and interpretations.

Equally, the production of reports, be they for the demarcation proposals or the IDP, etc. - also inevitably smooth over internal group and community contestations and difference, presenting too tidy a view of a fragmented societal reality. In terms of the interview material analysed and employed to unlock hidden meanings and interpretations of the documentary evidence presented here, this study could have gained from a greater range of views. In particular the absence of more community or “township” political representative and the subsequent reliance on “White” informants (though some with strong sympathies and alliances with township organisations), limits the diversity of views on this complicated historical event. Furthermore, many of the processes and politics at play in the construction of the IDP or the City's Budget, were hidden from public view, excluded from the documented text and only accessible
by means of interviews with informants that have been closely involved in their development.

Concerning the analysis of the CMA and the City of Tygerberg, it should be remembered that this particular case study cannot be considered wholly representative of all local governments in South Africa, replicating or producing the same dynamics as elsewhere in the country. The examination of the CMA and Tygerberg in particular nevertheless provides an insight into the basic theoretical claim that social justice is a historically and geographically located understanding of the manner in which a society's benefits and burdens ought to be distributed. Undoubtedly, the texts from which the empirical chapters draw and the interview material that support and illuminate some of the issues these documents raise could have gained from a broader set of interviewees. Again, the representation of the "townships" or "suburbs" beyond those views presented by the documented material and the formal representatives of the decision-making structures could have presented a greater diversity of views citizens of Tygerberg held in terms of social justice. Different and perhaps highly critical views of the local government realities could have been uncovered and inadequacies in the IDP for example, mapped out.

Nevertheless, while the range of views and the depth of the information reported here might have gained from broader and more racially representative groupings of informants, the central point that the spatiality of the social justice concept, reflected through its historical and geographical locatedness, its differentiated meanings bound to particular spatial arrangements and reflected through various imaginations of inclusion and exclusion, I believe, would only have been strengthened and would not have undermined this central premise.
Appendix B

The Market as Discovery Process

Hayek has suggested that all social action requires information about the wants and needs of indefinitely many people; it also requires spontaneous solutions to conflicts. In a free market the price of every good is determined by the totality of human demand for it, and there can be no better indication of the sacrifice which others are prepared to make in order to obtain the good. The information contained in a price is therefore social, dynamic and practical: it is information concerning what to do in order to satisfy the distant wants of strangers. The information could not exit in a single head, since it is available only in the process of free interaction, in a society where people are free to buy and sell. Any interference with the market mechanism therefore destroys the information-base upon which rational economic decisions depend. Planning, which attempts to reconstruct the information as a static set of data, is invariably irrational, since the information in question cannot be captured in that way (Scruton, 1996, 228-229).

The free market is an example of a spontaneous order, which arises by an invisible hand from free association and which generates of its own accord the solutions to economic problems. In like manner, the common law generates a spontaneous legal order, which because it grows from particular solutions to particular conflicts, inherently tends to restore society to a state of equilibrium - unlike statute law, which tries to anticipate conflict and thereby creates it. Hayek saw the economic structure of capitalism however modified by historical contingencies, as an essential part not only of economic prosperity but also of freedom of action to which all social beings aspire. Nevertheless, freedom is only possible when guaranteed by a constitution and it is no easy matter to develop a constitution that permits liberty, while forbidding licence and anarchy.
Appendix C

Selected characteristics of the Cape Metropolitan Area

Figure C.1: Existing pattern of spatial development in the CMA
(Source: MSDF, 1996, p. 17)
The following are the activity spines of the corridors shown:

1. Voortrekker Road
2. Main Road
3. Wetton/Lansdowne Road
4. Kipfontein Road
5. Koeberg Road
6. Old Paarl Road
7. Durban Road
8. AZ Berman
9. North-South Link
10. Bonga Drive
11. Van Riebeeck Road
12. Blue Downs
13. Kraaifontein

Activity Spine
(100m Zone approximately 100 units per Ha)

Freeways

Railway Lines

Figure C.2: Metropolitan Spatial Development Framework (MSDF)
(Source: MSDF, 1996, p. xix)