
by

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ABSTRACT

This thesis is a study of decentralisation in the Sudan both as a mechanism for the management of ethnic diversity and for development administration. The study focuses on a particular period (1969-1983) during the Nimeiri regime when extensive administrative reforms were carried out which gave the Sudan one of the most decentralised governmental systems in Africa. Although decentralisation was applied in the Sudan to achieve these twin objectives, its effectiveness fluctuated depending on the political situation at central government level. A case study was conducted to investigate the impact of decentralisation policy in one district council, Wau. The research was particularly focused on education, one of the services for which the local authorities were responsible. The field research involved the collection of data through a structured questionnaire to investigate such variables as: educational administration, school management, school environment and community participation. An analysis of the data reveals that all was not well with decentralisation in the Sudan. In light of these findings, the last part of the thesis reassesses the conditions for effective decentralisation policies generally and the Sudan in particular. Finally, areas for further research are suggested based on the findings of the study.

This thesis confirms the following hypotheses:

- The success of state-ethnoregional cohesion is largely dependent on the state's ability to initiate integrative policies.

- A decentralised system of government requires effective and active central participation to control and guide its implementation.

- Entrusting incommensurate powers to local authorities in areas at a rudimentary stage of development adversely affects their role as participants in development.
AFFIRMATION

Except where I have made reference to readings which I have fully acknowledged, no part of this thesis is the work of anyone else but me.

Published works on Related Subjects and a Paper Pending Publication:


To:

Liz, my wife, Hanna and Bemnet, our children
Who have had to put up with my long solitary confinement.
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The case study part of this thesis is based on data collected during a consultancy engagement with UNICEF in the Sudan. In 1980 the Government of the Sudan requested UNICEF to initiate a primary school development project in Bahr El Ghazal province, as a pilot project to provide a model for eventual replication throughout the country (Ref. MO/G.H.1; 1 Dec 1980). It was in response to that that I was employed by UNICEF, Sudan country office, in October 1982 to investigate, report and design a project including costing and a plan of action. The investigative study revealed a serious problem with the educational system in the Sudan which triggered my interest in the policies of decentralisation that the government of the time was so earnestly pursuing.

I was enrolled as a full time student for a PhD degree at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) in October 1985. I am grateful for my academic supervisors Drs Michael Hebbert and Brendan O'Leary from the departments of Geography and Government respectively for their understanding of my commitment to the "Eritrean Struggle", which distracted me for some time, and for their guidance throughout.

My time with UNICEF in the Sudan was a very happy and fruitful one. I admired the efficiency of its operation and the help and the collaboration its regular staff rendered to external consultants. My consultancy was completed successfully, the report I produced having been instrumental in raising funds for educational development in Bahr El Ghazal. Sadly, the second civil war broke out in south Sudan soon after the completion of the report and the planned educational project had to be postponed. My thanks go to all the UNICEF staff who were at the Khartoum, Juba and Wau offices at the time.

The above consultancy involved many people. Mr John Dut Bol, assistant director of education, Bahr El Ghazal province was
my counterpart. John is an old friend from previous work we both were part of and I could not have been more lucky to work with him. Eleven education officials from the same province were also seconded to the consultant and did a marvellous job under difficult conditions. Many education officials at local, regional and central level have helped me a great deal. All the chiefs, sub-chiefs, community elders, head teachers, teachers and students interviewed helped me to understand the educational system in Bahr El Ghazal, something that would not have come out through formal interviews alone.

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Finally, this thesis is very much a remembrance to my late parents, Woldemichael G. Rufael and Haregu G. Selassie, and my late cousin, Bemnet G. Amlak, who is affectionately remembered. Bemnet was a multi-talented man and he has been an inspiration in my educational pursuit.
INTRODUCTION

General

The north-south divide of the Sudan, which is culturally, historically and geographically determined, has plagued the country with chronic civil strife and political instability since it became independent in 1956. During the Nimeiri regime, 1969 - 1985, some progress was made towards accommodating diversity resulting in the north-south peace agreement of 1972, by which the south Sudan became an autonomous self-governing region. Unfortunately, the self-governing status was unilaterally withdrawn in 1983 by President Nimeiri, eventually sparking off the restart of the on-going civil war.

The aims of decentralisation in the Sudan, both as a means of national integration and development administration, have been severely constrained by the ruling elite's inability to manage state-ethnic relations. For example, the northern ruling elite's insistence on homogenisation by following policies of cultural assimilation have caused the continuation of the conflict. This study also demonstrates that socioeconomic development in the Sudan has very much depended on the central government's ability to initiate both acceptable and workable policies. The knock-on effect of the political situation on decentralisation is demonstrated by the fluctuating fortunes of the delivery of primary education during the Nimeiri regime, as the analysis of the case study in chapter seven will show. The period between 1969-1983 of the Nimeiri regime
has therefore been given special attention in this thesis to demonstrate the "make or break" role the central government played in the management of state-ethnic relations.

Some clarification is in order of the many administrative reforms that have taken place in the Sudan since independence and the way regionalisation and decentralisation have acquired different meanings. Although the term decentralisation in its general usage refers to any transfer of responsibility from the centre to lower authorities of a government structure, as will be discussed in detail in chapter one, it is useful to appreciate the distinction between regionalisation and decentralisation in the context of the Sudan. Regionalisation in the Sudan refers to the transfer of political authority by devolution either in its autonomous form, as was the case when the south was a self-governing region between 1972 and 1983, or, the semi-autonomous type, when the centre retains some supervisory powers. Since the unilateral abrogation of the 1972 north-south peace accord in 1983, the whole of the Sudan has been divided into eight semi-autonomous regions with Khartoum province, in which Khartoum town, the capital city, lies, attaining a special provincial status (see figure 1.1).

The regions in the Sudan were formed by combining two or three provinces together. For example, the Darfur region in western Sudan (see figure 1.1) is a combination of north and south Darfur provinces. But, the separation of Darfur into north and south provinces only occurred in 1976; before that it
constituted a single province whose existence went back to colonial times. In some cases, therefore, the present regions have some historical base in pre-colonial formations like the Kingdom of Darfur.

Decentralisation in the Sudan, on the other hand, specifically refers to the transfer of power to local governments. Local authorities are corporate budgetary units with powers to levy taxes and to expend them as they see fit on the services for which they are responsible. The "localness" of local governments in the Sudan, distinguished in the way the corporate power is legally allocated, has shifted between the province and the district. For example, the corporate base of local authorities between 1969 and 1981, during the Nimeiri regime, was at the provincial level. In 1981, however, following the motto of "power to the people", the provinces were divided into a number of districts which became the base for corporate local authority.

Structure and Synopsis of the Thesis

The thesis is divided into four major parts and each part in turn is divided into chapters. In general terms, part one deals with the conceptual framework of decentralisation both as a mechanism of national integration and as development administration. Part two is a background description of the root causes of the north-south divide and of the evolution of local government in the Sudan. Part three contains the case study which is based on an analysis of the decentralisation
policies of the Sudan as applied in the Southern Region during
the Nimeiri regime. Finally, part four provides a concluding
discussion on the policy implications of the south Sudan
study for the Sudan as a whole and reassesses decentralisation
in its application to the management of ethnicity and
development administration in general. The following is a
chapter by chapter synopsis:

Chapter one: Seeks to define what the term decentralisation
means both in its conceptual and contextual dimensions.
Conceptually, the different meanings and the patterns that are
ascribed to decentralisation are analysed in detail.
Contextually, the focus is on the actual environment under
which decentralisation operates. The issues of
decentralisation and centralisation are also discussed not in
abstract terms but in connection with real country situations.

Chapter two: The twin objectives of decentralisation, as a
mechanism for national integration and for development
administration, are discussed in detail. The chapter is thus
divided into two sections. In the first section, issues
concerning ethnic-state relations and the continuing search for
political and administrative systems in post-independence
Africa are explored. In the second section, a comparative
analysis of four countries is made to measure the performance
of decentralisation as development administration.

Chapter three: Offers background information on the Sudan
and on the root causes of the north-south divide. Since the Sudan was forged into a single entity by the Turko-Egyptian rule which started in 1820, the north-south relationship has always had an element of inequality and injustice against the south. With the policies of assimilation successive governments followed in the post-independence period, the north-south divide widened unabated until the coming to power in 1969 of President Nimeiri, who initially embraced the motto of unity with diversity. Although the north-south peace agreement which followed was short-lived (1972-1983), it nevertheless offers a model upon which future north-south relations could be based. Hence this chapter is a detailed analysis of the historical developments of north-south relations.

Chapter four: The evolution of local administration in the Sudan, as opposed to the political dimensions covered in chapter three, are the issues of concern here. In the first section of the chapter, the historical development of local administration is discussed and, in the second section, which focusses on the period of the Nimeiri regime, the decentralisation and regionalisation policies which were the hallmark of the regime are discussed in detail.

Chapter five: The social and economic situations that the decentralised system was expected to improve are the issues of concern here. In the first section, aspects of regional inequalities are compared and in the second section, an
assessment is made of the level of poverty in south Sudan.

Chapter six: Contains three sections; the first describes the 1972 regional government Act by which the south became a self-governing region. In the second section an analysis is made of the vigorous regional politics which developed and, in the last section, how the region as a whole was managing its affairs under conditions of extreme poverty is discussed in detail.

Chapter seven: Is a case study of one Area (District) Council; Wau, in South Sudan. It is based on a field research study of the management of primary education, for which the local councils were responsible. The research findings show that Wau council, faced with all sorts of shortages - financial as well as manpower resources - had serious problems managing primary education. In the concluding discussion, the wisdom of decentralising substantial power to areas at a rudimentary stage of development is questioned.

Chapter eight: In light of the issues raised in the previous chapters and the research findings of the Wau case study, the policy implications and the choices for the Sudan are discussed. The Nimeiri regime period is again taken to illustrate both successes and failures of decentralisation as a means of national integration and development administration.
Chapter nine: Based on the arguments developed in the previous chapters, a re-assessment is made of decentralisation policies in situations where multi-ethnicity and underdevelopment are dominant features. The need for a central authority that can promote appropriate policies in such cases is addressed. Using examples of relatively successful decentralisation experiences, the kind of state-ethnic relationships that must exist to avoid destructive conflicts are suggested. Only with political stability can the development objectives of decentralisation be realised.

Finally, suggestions are made on future research needs and how they may enhance the study of decentralisation in situations where multi-ethnicity and poverty are dominant features.
PART I

DECENTRALISATION:
CONCEPTS AND CONTEXTS
FIGURE 1.1: POLITICAL MAP
THE SUDAN, 1982

WHAT IS DECENTRALISATION?

Introduction

Decentralisation is the latest fashion in development administration. It has universal appeal as a subject of research and also as a practical tool that can help to alleviate many of the general problems, for example, the delivery of services. The numerous works published in the last decade are indicative of a growing interest (Conyers, 1984). A widely-held view attributes the shift in interest towards decentralisation to the disappointing results of centrally managed development plans. In general, the new decentralisation advocates allocation to sub-national units of the necessary powers for decision-making to enable them to tackle the many problems of development from the bottom-up. But the allocation of power, being a political decision, has varying patterns and degrees of central-subnational relationships. Inevitably, there are many, and often conflicting, theoretical explanations of and prescriptions for the determination of central and subnational relationships.

This chapter aims to analytically review some of the concepts, theoretical assumptions and policy proposals of decentralisation particularly as they relate to the situation in Africa. There are three main sections and each in turn is divided into a number of subsections. The first section deals
with the many meanings and definitions that have been accorded to decentralisation. In the second section a detailed analysis is made of the complex patterns of decentralisation and the third looks at issues concerned with central and local administrative relationships and responsibilities.

This review draws on the literature on decentralisation mainly concerned with governmental systems. Decentralisation has also been applied in business and other forms of organisations and these are outside the scope of this chapter. The main interest here is the political environment that determines the extent of decentralisation.

THE MEANING OF DECENTRALISATION

Use of the term decentralisation is fraught with confusion in the literature of social sciences because "it can be used in a number of different ways and in significantly different contexts" (Conyers, 1984:1987). A major cause for this confusion is the convergence of a number of social science disciplines upon decentralisation; public administration, political science, administrative theory and, now, development studies. As a result there has been a considerable borrowing of concepts and empirical evidence of decentralisation (Hart, 1972:605). The general meaning of the term, derived from its Latin roots, is 'away from the centre' (Macmahon, 1961:15). This deceptively simple interpretation relates decentralisation to the transfer or shifting away of decision making or responsibility, for example, in governmental
systems, "by a central ruling group [to] other groups, each having authority within a specific area of the state" (Mawhood, 1983:4). But the transfer of decision making can be organized in different ways and in varying degrees with the delegation of responsibility, even in government systems, not restricted to the domain of the central ruling authority. Smith perceives the concept of delegation of decision making, as indication that "decentralisation is an administrative technique employed within unitary states; or within the states [or regions] of a federal union" (Smith, 1967;1). Smith was clear at the time that decentralisation "does not encompass the division of government powers within federal or confederal constitutions" (Smith 1967:1; see also Mawhood 1983;4-5). Smith has however shifted from this position and lately attributed to decentralisation a much wider application:

Decentralisation entails the subdivision of the state's territory into smaller areas and the creation of political and administrative institutions in those areas: the countries and districts of England and Wales, or the departments and communes of France, for example. Another is federalism, which presents evidence of two of the major constitutional forms which decentralisation can take. Each of the constituent parts of a federation, such as the fifty states of the USA or the nineteen states of Nigeria, may be regarded as unitary states each with its own internal system of local government. Local governments themselves may employ various kinds of administrative decentralisation within the internal organizations of their administrative departments (Smith, 1985:1-2).

The definition of decentralisation given in a United Nations publication limits its use to two forms of government
organization: "Decentralisation: this term refers to the transfer of authority on a geographic basis, whether by deconcentration (i.e. delegation) of authority to field units of the same department of level of government, or by devolution of authority to local government units of special statutory bodies" (UN publication No. St/TAO/M/62/Add.2. p.92; see also UN, 1961). Rybicki (1971), quoting the UN publication also, expresses agreement that "decentralisation is not federalism". Perhaps the most far reaching definition of decentralisation is that given by Friedman who referred to it as including "deconcentration, delegation, devolution, or the assignment of functions to nongovernmental bodies" (Friedman, 1983:35-36). A definition not far from Friedman's in the final analysis but expressed with added clarity is that provided by Rondinelli:

Decentralisation is ... the transfer or delegation of legal and political authority to plan, make decisions and manage public functions from the central government and its agencies to field organizations of those agencies, subordinate units of government, semi-autonomous public corporations, areawide or regional development authorities; functional authorities, autonomous local governments or nongovernmental organizations (Rondinelli, 1981:137).

Mawhood and others (see Mawhood, ed., 1983) regard the generalization of the concept of decentralisation into a blanket term as unnecessarily confusing (Hamid, 1986:123) principally because they consider decentralisation and deconcentration as two quite different principles of government organization: 
Within the centrally directed hierarchy of public administration ... it is normal practice to shift outwards geographically the power to make certain types of decision. Every day of his life a field official uses his delegated authority to settle a range of individual cases, and to regulate the work of his own office. It is a useful arrangement, every country has it, and there is a universally agreed word to describe it: deconcentration ... Far different from this, in the structures of government, is the creation of bodies separated by law from the national centre, in which local representatives are given formal power to decide on a range of public matters .... Their area of authority is limited, but within that area their right to make decisions is entrenched by the law and can only be altered by new legislation ... This is the meaning of decentralisation (Mawhood, 1983:1-2).

The definitions Mawhood applies follow the continental European usage. In France, for example "decentralisation is a term reserved for the transfer of powers from the central government to an areally or functionally specialised authority of distinct legal personality (Fesler, 1968:370). Deconcentration on the other hand, is regarded as a technique of organization by which powers of decision making are delegated to officials within the same administrative hierarchy. Mawhood seems to suggest, however, that such a distinction is only useful when applied to a political system. In his words, "if we were simply making a study in public or private management, decentralisation might reasonably by taken to cover any shift of decision making outwards from the centre - to be identical, in fact, with deconcentration. But when a political element is brought in, as it must be in a study of government, the sharp difference between the two categories comes out" (Mawhood, 1983:2).
Whatever merit there would have been to stick to the "old" usage, Fesler (1968:370) is right to assert that efforts to obtain general acceptance of the neat French distinction have been unsuccessful (Maddick, 1963:23; Macmahon, 1961:15-16; Conyers, 1984:187; Bray, 1984:5). In many African countries it is certainly the case that the term decentralisation is used loosely to refer to "any transfer of authority from the national level to any organization or agency at the sub-national level" (Conyers, 1983:101).

Given the diversity in the use of the term decentralisation, Macmahon is perhaps right to emphasise the impossibility of trying to standardize "by seeking to give it meaning that would be acceptable universally" (Macmahon, 1961:15). Some writers choose to overcome this problem by considering decentralisation as the inclusive term, with its various manifestations specified as types (Macmahon, 1961:15-16; Furniss, 1974:973; Friedman, 1983:35-36). In other words, to lessen misunderstanding when comparing government decentralisation systems, the general meaning of the term must be supplemented by qualifying definitions for the particular use in which it is to be employed (Lundqvist, 1972:13; Conyers, 1986:696; Macmahon, 1961:15). In this study also decentralisation is employed in its broad sense encompassing the terms deconcentration, devolution, delegation, federation and the assignment of functions to nongovernmental bodies.
PATTERNS OF DECENTRALISATION

In political systems, the way in which decentralisation takes place, or rather, the way in which authority is delegated from higher to lower levels, inevitably differs not only from country to country but also within a single country. The notion of "away from the centre" inherent in the meaning of decentralisation is, however, a common denominator in all of its different uses. Six patterns of decentralisation are discussed in the following subsections. The distinction between them is basically determined by their legal status. As mentioned above, the extent of responsibility that is delegated can vary greatly from country to country. For example, the same term is used to describe the federal systems
in Nigeria and the United States but the extent of powers delegated are quite different. Similarly, forms of local governments differ from country to country as their responsibilities are dependent on the discretion of the central government (1.1).

**Devolution**

Devolution occurs when specified powers are delegated to sub-national territorial units "to make certain decisions in some spheres of public policy" (Smith, 1967:1). The essence of devolution is "autonomy or system separateness involving the legal conferring of powers to discharge specified or residual functions upon formally constituted local authority" (see in Hamid, 1986:122). Following a similar line, Mullen (1985) understood devolution to mean "the transfer of functions or decision making authority from central government to legally incorporated and autonomous local government such as states, regions etc". The implication in this, according to Mullen, is "an independence from central government in discharging the function and existence of parallel systems of authority in a non-hierarchial order (and) often takes place when a function e.g. education, is designated as a provincial or local government function rather than a central government function" (Mullen, 1985:29).

For purposes of clarity, it is useful to discern devolution as having two forms: autonomous and semi-autonomous. The autonomous form, what Rondinelli and Cheema (1983) regarded as
the 'purest form of devolution', has one certain identifiable characteristic which is that the local units of government are accorded powers which lie "outside that command of the structure of central government ... therefore, implies separateness, or diversity of structures within the political system" (Hyden, 1983:85; see also Rondinelli and Cheema, 1983:22). According to the report of the Royal Commission on the Constitution of Scotland, produced in 1973 under the chairmanship of Lord Kilbrandon, "the more advanced forms of devolution involved the exercise of power by persons or bodies who, although acting on authority delegated by Parliament, are not directly responsible to it or the central government for their actions" (quoted by Hamid, 1986:122, Hamid's emphasis). In Britain, the autonomous form of devolution is usually debated within party politics in reference to the ethnically differentiated regions of Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. How devolution is perceived in the British context was highlighted in the 1987 general election party political publications. The Labour party manifesto makes the following pledge:

We shall legislate in the first Parliamentary session to establish a democratically elected Scottish Assembly in Edinburgh. This will have a wide range of powers over health, education and housing and over significant aspects of industrial and economic policy. It will take responsibility for changes in the structure of Scottish local government" (Labour manifesto, 1987:11).

The Social Democratic party and the Liberal party Alliance Programme for Government also pledged, using carefully
selected terms, to recognize the government structure.

We will devolve power to nations and regions of Britain. We aim to establish an elected Scottish Parliament, Welsh Sennet and elected regional assemblies throughout England" (The SDP/Liberal Alliance Programme for Government, 1987, emphasis added).

Among the developing countries, the cases of Papua New Guinea, where a substantial degree of political decentralisation at the province level is given (Axline, 1984:306; Conyers, 1981:111; Bray, 1984:32), and the autonomous regional self-rule agreement that operated in South Sudan from 1972 - 1983, are examples of the autonomous form of devolution. In both cases, an elected parliamentary system having legislative and executive organs was instituted with its source of powers embodied in each country's constitution. Because of the significant degree of power devolved in such cases some writers have used the term quasi-federal to describe it (Axline, 1984:306; Conyers 1981:111).

The semi-autonomous form of devolution is more restrictive, in that the central government maintains responsibility for the framework of legislation and for major policy issues. Typical of the semi-autonomous form is the British local government system where the constituent units enjoy powers, within the limits delegated to them, of administration, implementation and the passing of ordinances having a local application, (Madick, 1963:23, Seeley, 1978:36). The semi-autonomous form of devolution is also a common feature of government
organization in the developing countries where "local government units are given responsibility for some functions over which the central government often retains some supervisory powers and in which it may play an important financial role" (Rondinelli and Cheema, 1983:23). Financial control is in fact one of the instruments that all central governments use to secure a general conformity to their policies among individual local authorities. In Britain, the justification for such central control over local government finances was spelt out by Lord Bellwin, the government spokesman in the House of Lords:

Surely it is right for the Government to spotlight those authorities who are not willing to conform to national policy objectives. I am sure that the country at large thinks right and proper that those authorities who refuse to co-operate should bear the cost. The Government are entitled to expect the co-operation of local authorities whose individual local interests must be subordinate to the national interest (quoted by Duncan and Goodwin, 1985:20).

Deconcentration

Deconcentration refers to the transfer of administrative functions within a government's organizational hierarchy, from a higher level to a lower level. A typical example is the distribution of administrative responsibilities from ministries at the central level to their representatives at lower levels. Such an arrangement is administrative in nature as the final decision making will remain with the delegating authority. Deconcentrating responsibilities can however vary widely from a mere shifting of workload at one end of the
spectrum to the transfer of certain discretionary powers to field staff "to make routine decisions and adjust the implementation of central directives to local conditions", at the other end (Rondinelli 1981:137; saw also Mullen, 1985:29).

Following Rondinelli's classification, deconcentration can usefully be divided into two forms, namely "field administration" (some writers prefer to call it functional deconcentration) and "local administration". Field administration is a form of administrative organization found in many countries whereby areas of government function such as electricity, water supply, telecommunication and postal services, may be territorially divided according to individual administrative convenience and not necessarily follow the constituent area divisions (Smith, 1967:12; Howell, 1974:2). Local administration on the other hand, "is a form of deconcentration in which all the subordinate levels of government within a country are agents of the central government... Local functions are performed under the technical supervision and control of central ministries, and the heads of the local administration serve at the pleasure of the nation's chief executive" (Rondinelli, 1981:137). Local administration may be integrated or unintegrated. When the various central ministry field representatives are required to function, by the provision of statutory law, in a coordinated way under the supervision of a chief executive administrator, usually the representative of the ministry of internal affairs or local government, this is called integrated local...
administration. Organizationally, the field staff remain responsible to their respective central ministries, that is, they may be hired and paid by the centre. Administratively, however, they are accountable for the efficient performance of their duties to the chief executive who also has the power to confirm and render reports on them. The French prefectorial system of government is usually considered to be the "classic" case of the integrated form.

In a prefectorial system, such as that established by Napoleon, the national government divides the country into areas [departments] and places a Prefect in charge of each. The Prefect represents the whole government, and all specialised field agents in the area are under his supervision. The several ministries either directly or through a central agency issue instructions to the Prefect, who then instructs his specialised subordinates, after adapting his instructions to the conditions of his area. Similarly, communications upward to the ministries flow through the prefect. [The prefectorial system] has been widely adopted in recent times and has been the dominant pattern in colonial administration (Fesler, 1968:374).

In the unintegrated system, the various field staff representing central ministries are operationally independent of each other. Coordination between the various representatives, if it exists, is dependent on the competence of the chief local administrator. Although the chief local administrator in such a case has no legal backing to directly control other functional departments, nevertheless his strong political position will make him a natural coordinator of the field representatives. But the question remains as to what actually is, in the unintegrated system, the responsibility of
the chief executive? "Why should", as Smith (1967) asks, for example "the central government appoint a general administrator to a province when most central administration is carried out by individual departments and ministries"? According to Smith, the answer is partly administrative and partly political:

It is still politically expedient for some countries to maintain an office with general responsibility for peace, order and stability in the province. The long established traditions of his office and the fact that for most people that office is almost indistinguishable from the ordinary person's concept of "the Government" means that the Prefect (known as governor or commissioner in other countries) may enjoy great authority, and a corresponding power in his area, despite the absence of legal supremacy. This may be extremely useful for a national executive wishing to "dampen down" local provincial loyalties (Smith, 1967:90).

Tanzania is a country which has experienced various types of decentralized government administration and provides a good example of why a certain form prevailed at a particular period of its history. Tanzania was under British rule during the colonial period and by far the most dominant model of British colonial administration in Africa was the prefectoral system. The basic features of the British colonial administration in Africa "were borrowed from India where a system of rule, very much inspired by Napoleon's (and thus French) ideas of government had been established in the nineteenth century" (Hyden, 1983:87; see also Friedman, 1983:36). British colonial administration in Africa, however, followed the unintegrated form which was known as indirect rule or indirect
administration. Indirect rule "prescribes government by the co-operation of indigenous political elements" (Smith, 1967:85) or, according to Lugard, its principal promoter, the idea was to leave the local population to "manage their own affairs, through their own rulers, proportionately to their degree of advancement, under the guidance of British staff and subject to the laws and policy of the administration" (quoted in Smith, 1967:85). Usually, an amalgamation of a number of Native Authorities (1.2) would form a district which became the focus of British colonial administration. The District Commissioner, as the chief government representative at this level, was responsible for example, for the supervision of Native Authority functions, the collection of taxes, magisterial duties such as hearing of appeals and, above all, ensuring political stability:

The idea (of establishing native councils) was to contain budding territorial African nationalism. One way to do this was to formalize and localize the arena of political agitation, but at the same time to do so in a manner that ensured the effective control of such institutions by the regime (Oyugi, 1983:112).

The District Commissioner was a generalist administrator and as such had no direct responsibility over the technical departments, who were directly answerable to their ministries at the centre. Nevertheless, being in a strong political position he usually acted as the coordinator of their operations (Kasfir, 1983:124-125). As a whole, the unintegrated form of deconcentrated administration in the
British colonies, as Niculescu observed, offered "both the cheapest and the most efficient system .... at least as long as what was wanted was peace, order and, generally speaking, a holding of the fort" (Niculescu, 1958:38).

Towards the end of colonial rule in Africa, the British colonial administration changed its policy, favouring the advancement of democratization of local government (Ola, 1984:39; Hyden, 1983:88). The shift in policy was the result of the coming to power of a Labour Government in Britain whose ideas were influenced by the Fabians, a philosophical group within the governing Labour Party. "The real point, for the Fabians, whether in Britain or in the colonies, was that good or very efficient government was not to be preferred to self-government" (Ola, 1984:39). According to Ola, "this view of the Fabian Society was to become the Labour Party's official position" (p39). In an important British Local Government Dispatch of 1947, the new Colonial Secretary elaborated his government's policy as follows:

Territories should be administered by colonial powers as a trust for the Native inhabitants .... a primary object of the administration should always be to train the native inhabitants in every possible way, so that they may be able in the shortest possible time to govern themselves. (quoted in Ola, 1984:38).

The new policy directives were drastic in nature as they implied the end of the Native Authority system and "indeed in due course the institutions of indirect rule in many countries
were replaced by more modern local government structures, in many countries based on the English model" (Smith, 1967:113). The post of the District Commissioner was in many cases abolished along with the Native Authorities and in others, for example Tanzania and Nigeria, it was retained although in a somewhat different capacity. In Tanzania, the District Commissioner was given an ex officio seat in the council and as the elected councillors were "business or professional men, the District Commissioner's brief was to represent the interest of the less-educated masses" (Mawhood, 1983:79). As in many other British colonial governments during this period, local authorities in Tanzania were given a wide range of responsibilities including powers to directly employ department heads and the necessary work force to run their own affairs. Thus the last years of the British colonial period saw an attempt to establish semi-autonomous local governments at sub-national levels and a parliamentary political system at the centre that would form the basis for political independence (Post 1970:31). The local governments established by the British colonial governments in Africa were not to survive long after independence. "The speed with which decentralized local governments were dismantled after independence is surprising ... Their removal was so decisive and universal that when Wraith produced the second edition of his Local Government in West Africa, he pointedly retitled it Local Administration ... He could no longer find any local governments with control over their budgets nor any with autonomous policy-making powers" (Kasfir, 1983:32). District
councils in Tanzania too had their powers curtailed soon after independence and were headed by political appointees replacing the generalist District Commissioners. This arrangement itself was only a temporary measure and by 1967 the councils were abolished altogether (Mawhood, 1983:87).

The change of the administrative structure in Tanzania was hastened in 1967 following the Arusha Declaration wherein the ruling party leadership set out their political and developmental orientations and in the case of the latter gave emphasis to a strategy of self-reliance (Nyerere, 1972:1). "The primary objective of the new strategy was to permit a less uncertain, a more domestic needs-oriented and a more socially responsive utilization of investible resources" (Bienefeld, 1982:300. In order to achieve the objective a development oriented government structure was devised: "At the regional level powers [were] vested in the regional development committees, which [were] composed of a combination of civil servants, party officials and representatives of local organizations. At the district level a new body, known as the District Development Council, [was] formed, supported by a district development and planning committee. The new District Councils, which have replaced the former local government council, include locally elected representatives, civil servants, party officials and members of parliament" (Conyers, 1981:109). At the regional level, Regional Commissioners were appointed whose position was given ministerial status (Mawhood, 1983:98). As the chief
representatives of the government the Regional Commissioners also acted as chairmen of the Regional Development and Planning Committees and, at the district level, similar functions were performed by Area Commissioners. Former President Julius Nyerere, in a policy proposal document, was clear as to why the new integrated form of deconcentrated administration would best suit his country:

At present, each functional officer is responsible only to his own Ministry in Dar es Salam (the capital), so that it is extremely difficult to work out a Regional or District development or problem solving scheme which calls for co-ordinated action. Thus, for example, if all the different functional officers based in a District get together to work out the solution to a particular village problem, each of them has then to apply to his own Ministry for any little money which may be necessary, or even sometimes for permission to devote his or her own energies to that project. Then if one Ministry refuses permission, the whole scheme can fall to the ground (Nyerere, 1972:1).

Under Nyerere's policy directive, the Commissioners were expected to "devote a great deal of their time to political education for socialist development" and were required "to think in terms of development, and not in terms of administration on the traditional civil service lines" (Nyerere, 1972:4-5). Nyerere had also, at least on paper, tackled matters of finance and the need to strengthen the centre to "co-ordinate Regional activities... [and] to provide clear policy direction and planning for the Regional and District Authorities" (p.9).

Despite what seemed to be a well thought out development
oriented government structure adopted by Tanzania in the 1970s, the outcome is usually associated with failure rather than with success (Bienefeld, 1982; Hyden, 1983; Raikes, 1983). "Economically, Tanzania did no better than her neighbours, and in many ways worse, during the 1970s .... Management in the rural sector was quite clearly not giving the nation what it needed ... [and] by the end of the decade, President Nyerere was speaking of an intention to revive the elected district councils ..." (Mawhood, 1983:99).

Accordingly, a new legislation was passed in 1982 by which all existing laws on local government were replaced and so the pendulum has swung once again towards the semi-autonomous type of devolved government.

**Federalism**

Before discussing considerations of federalism as a form of decentralisation it would first be helpful to describe the general characteristics of a federal system of government and how it differs from other systems.

In a federal system sovereignty is divided between two levels of government. The federal government is sovereign in some matters and the [provincial] (1.3) governments are sovereign in others. Each within its own sphere exercises its power without control from the other, and neither is subordinate to the other. It is this feature which distinguishes a federal from a unitary constitution. In the latter all sovereignty rests with the central government; if provincial governments exist they are subordinate authorities, deriving their power from the central legislature, which may overrule them at any time by the ordinary legislative process\(^5\) (The report of the Royal Commission on the constitution to Scotland. 1973:152).
"The essential institutions of federalism are in which both kinds of governments rule over the same territory and people and each kind has the authority to make some decisions independently of the other" (Riker, 1964:5). Watts, following Wheare's 'classical' definition, described federalism "as a political system characterized by two sub-systems ... in which the component governments are co-ordinate, in the sense that neither is politically subordinate to the other, but which interact with each other at many points both co-operatively and competitively" (Watts, 1970:8; see also Duchacek, 1970:192-193).

Saha and Srivastava (1980:37) have raised opposition to the "traditionalist definition", as they called it, arguing that the definition merely reflects the constitutional arrangement instituted in the old European "settler" colonies of America, Canada and Australia. They are particularly critical of the traditionalist definition which takes the American constitution as a "classical" case and considers all departures from it as dilutions of the federal principle, to be labelled as quasi-federal; see also Watts, 1970:5). Their main argument hinges on the fact that any constitutional arrangement reflects certain national particulars which do not make it any more or less 'pure' when compared with others. They give two major reasons, for example, for the difference between federalism in India and federal systems in Western countries. The first fundamental difference, they argue, stems from history. In the settler federations like the USA,
Australia or Canada, they contend that the main objective of the federal system was to consolidate and legitimize the occupation of new continents by a mainly homogeneous European population and to harmonize the conflicting interests of different groups within the settler population in the process of sharing out the real estate. In India, on the other hand, the different sub-national groups with their distinctive linguistic and cultural identities have several thousand years of continuous historical association and in wanting to maintain this unity with diversity, used federalism as a tool for weaving into one body politic the different groups.

The second major difference, according to Saha and Srivastava, stems from the two entirely different political and economic environments in which the American, the Canadian and the Australian constitutions on the one hand and the Indian constitution on the other, were written. "The three Western constitutions were written within the broad framework of a dominant political philosophy of free enterprise and of minimal state involvement in economic affairs". In contrast "the Indian constitution was drafted at a time when the issue of greatest contemporary relevance was that of the rising expectations of the previously colonised people of reaching levels of living comparable to those prevailing in metropolitan countries" (1980:38). Furthermore, they implied that, in India, central planning requiring extensive state control of the economy, and not free enterprise, was the dominant political philosophy of the time (p.38). According
to Mawhood (1984:524), such a political philosophy "emphasised the unitary bias that was given to the new constitution" in India.

It is perhaps misleading the way the term federalism has very often been unreservedly related with the process of uniting or the coming together of different independent territorial units (see, for example Wheare, 1963). In fact, the majority of federal governments today were not created through the amalgamation of independent units, but from a national state that already existed and whose central authorities then used federalism as a mechanism of sharing power with the constituent units. In the United States itself, the original signatories of the Union were only thirteen states as most of the remaining states were created later from what was a federal territory.

Whatever the background in their creation, real differences exist between different federal arrangements. In some federal government systems, the United States of America, Canada and Australia, for example, the division of power between the federal government and the provincial governments is enshrined in the constitution which cannot be subjected to amendment at the sole discretion of either party. Any amendment can only be achieved by special procedures designed in such a way that the proposed change must have widespread support. To Friedrich, it is the "effective separate representation in the amending of the constitutional charter itself (that) provide
reasonably precise criteria for a federal as contrasted with a merely decentralized order of government" (1968:6). In some other federal government systems, however, for example India and Nigeria, the parliaments of the union have such powers that they can "increase or diminish the area of any state and [they] may alter the boundaries or name of any state" and, under certain emergency situations, the parliaments of the union may even "convert the union into a unitary state" (Wheare, 1963:27-29).

The name apart, the similarity between the federal systems in India and Nigeria and that of some decentralized unitary nations is striking. In Italy and Papua New Guinea, for example, the way power is delegated to the territorial subunits is such that, as with federal systems, it has mechanisms of constitutional protection. Thus, Smith makes the point that "distinction between federal and unitary states (is) much less clear than it is sometimes believed to be ..." (Smith, 1985:13). For Ehrlich too, "there is no difference in substance" between what he termed as "federal decentralisation" and other forms of "high level territorial decentralisation" (Ehrlich, 1984:360-361). Riker has even gone as far as saying that "so difficult is it to distinguish federations from other systems of government that it is a myth" (see in Smith, 1985:15).

When considering the functioning of federations rather than the process of their formation, the range of problems they
experience in intergovernmental relations are, in fact, not
dissimilar to those found in the unitary states. "To speed up
economic progress, to eliminate territorially uneven social
and economic development, and to ensure national security, it
seems imperative to provide for centralization of economic and
political powers on which nationally unified policy and action
may be based. Such centralizing tendencies in federal systems
have complicated our task of differentiating with any degree
of precision a federal from a unitary system (Duchacek,
1970:348). The federal government of Nigeria, for example,
like many other unitary governments in Africa, has been forced
to respond to ethnic and regional differences and has
accordingly reorganized its administrative structure. At
independence in 1960, Nigeria constituted three states.
By 1963, a fourth region was added, and in 1967 Nigeria was
divided into 12 states. Since 1976, 19 states constitute the
federation of Nigeria (Ikporukpo, 1986:130). In the United
States too, whatever the original intention of the federal
declaration was, it is generally agreed that modern pressures
have caused power to gravitate more towards the centre (Smith,
1985:13; Royal Commission of the Constitution to Scotland,
1973). Vile even suggested that in the United States the
concentration of power at the centre has become so great that
the country may be moving out of a system of federalism into
one of decentralized unitary government (Vile, 1973). The
point is that in the United States there is now greater
federal involvement not only in the supervision of standards
and the distribution of funds to state governments, but also,
in the operation of a number of programmes. As a result, there is a continuing debate on the need to "sort out" intergovernmental sharing of responsibilities (Posner and Fastrup, 1987), subject matters which are commonly discussed in decentralized unitary states. Thus, given the similarity in the actual operation of governments, it would seem unjustified to exclude federalism from the general concept of decentralisation. As Smith rightly suggests, "the range of levels of decentralisation which federalism itself is capable of producing makes it necessary to include federations in [the] investigations into decentralized government" (1985:17).

Delegation

Delegation occurs when decision-making and management responsibility are conferred upon semi-independent organizations such as public corporations, regional planning and area development authorities (Rondinelli, 1981:138). Organizationally, parastatals (state-owned enterprises) do not normally come under the direct control of central government ministries, nevertheless, they are ultimately responsible to the central government (Mullen, 1985:29;). State-owned enterprises, as, in transport and communication, national airways, railway services, telecommunication services, in public utilities, electricity, gas and water and large scale state-owned enterprises such as mining, manufacturing and finance, are organizations which normally receive their powers through the mechanism of decentralisation by delegation. In this sense,
"delegation implies the transfer of creation of broad authority to plan and implement decisions concerning specific activities ... to an organization that is technically and administratively capable of carrying them out without direct supervision by a higher administrative unit" (Rondinelli and Cheema, 1983:21). A distinguishing characteristic of state-owned enterprises from other public organizations under direct government control is that they derive their revenue from the sale of goods and services because they are self-accounting and have a separate legal identity (World Bank Report, 1983:75).

Management of state-owned enterprises by delegation has, in theory, "a distinct advantage over regular government agencies in that they could make decisions more expeditiously, free from the red tape and political manoeuvring found in bureaucracies ..., and could operate outside the constraints raised by procurement regulations and civil service requirements" (Rondinelli and Cheema, 1983:21-22). In practice, however, state-owned enterprises are "given other objectives and exposed to pressures from politically powerful sectional interests" (World Bank Report, 1983:50). "The challenge is", the World Bank Report of 1983 suggests, "to design a system that holds management accountable for results while giving it the power to achieve them" (p78).

However parastatal organizations are viewed, their number has been on the rise in most countries. "Kenya, for instance, had
approximately twenty such bodies at independence ... by 1979 that figure had trebled ... Nigeria witnessed an even more rapid expansion. By 1973 it had some 250 publicly owned enterprises ... in the late 1970s, Tanzania had over 350 parastatals covering sizeable operations in all sectors of the economy” (Hyden, 1983:97). A wide variety of reasons are given for creating semi-independent state-owned enterprises by governments:

Whereas some have an ideological preference for public control, others have travelled the same route for more pragmatic reasons. They may have wanted to wrest control of key enterprises from foreign owners (Egypt in 1956 and Madagascar in 1974) or from minority ethnic groups (Uganda in the 1970s); in other instances, enterprises were inherited by the state after independence (Bangladesh in 1972) or a revolution (Portugal in 1974), or as a result of private sector bankruptcies. Governments have used nationalization to capture the rents from exploitation of minerals and, where national security is involved (as in arms manufacture), to exercise direct military control. In other instances, governments have decided to take the lead in starting a major new industry in the absence of private investors ...” (World Bank Report, 1983:50).

Severe limitations of public administration is another reason why governments in the Third World, with the support of most international lending institutions, have been delegating more functions to public corporations and special authorities (Rondinelli, 1981:138). The quantitative increase has also meant that state-owned enterprises play a major role in the economies of most countries. “Information available suggests that in the early 1960s the share of the public sector in capital formation in Ghana was approximately half of the
nation's total ... in Tanzania it was responsible for 80% in 1978" (Hyden, 1983:99; World Bank Report, 1983). This being the case, it is surprising that parastatals receive negligible attention (Morrison, 1986) and particularly so in the field of study that comes under the umbrella of decentralisation. Understanding the important issues in the institutional links between government and parastatals would seem necessary particularly when decentralisation is seen not in terms of administration alone but also as a tool for achieving development (Conyers, 1986:598).

**Assignment of Functions to Nongovernmental Bodies**

There cannot be a country in the world where nongovernmental organizations, of one form or the other, do not exist. Leaving aside the question as to why they exist in the first place, it is generally acknowledged that nongovernmental organizations perform important social and "developmental" functions. In Britain, voluntary organizations like Save the Children Fund, Oxfam, Help the Aged, the British Refugee Council, The Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals etc., are all organizations which play important roles both at home and abroad. In the developing countries, religious organizations, co-operative movements, self-help organizations and farmers associations have been playing vital roles in facilitating services and resources. The self-help schemes in Kenya, for example, have been involved not only in supplementing government efforts in the construction of schools and health centres but also directly participating in
economic development projects with impressive results in terms of projects completed (Wallis, 1982:12-13).

Governments have recognised, in many cases, the contribution that nongovernmental organisations can make as being complementary to their function. Governmental recognition may also result in the nongovernmental organizations receiving financial, material or expert assistance from central authorities. In some cases, formal linkages between governments and nongovernment organizations may be created without the latter being subjected to much central government intervention or control. When governments decide to pass part of their functions to nongovernmental bodies, decentralisation by assignment of function is what takes place. Governments may also "decentralize by shifting responsibility for producing goods or supplying services to private organizations; a process often called privatization" (Rondinelli, 1983:24).

Several writers have argued, as Rondinelli does, that "for development purposes, the capacity of local governments to carry out programmes and projects effectively and through reciprocal relationships with other organizations may be more significant than their legal status as independent units" (Rondinelli, 1983:24; see also Baviskar, 1985). Uphoff and Esman have also pointed out that "what makes the most difference are systems or networks of organization that make local development more than an enclave phenomenon" (quoted by
Rondinelli, 1985:24). Hyden even goes further by arguing for the need to invest more resources in nongovernmental organizations; giving as the reason the failure of the public sector to cope with development tasks in many African countries. He argued, "even if governments could become more efficient and effective in performing their duties, they cannot serve as universal dispensers of services and resources. Other institutions are needed to complement government" (Hyden, 1983:120; Cheema, 1985:226 also makes a similar argument).

CENTRALIZATION VERSUS DECENTRALISATION

Problems of Measurement

It is important to recognize that "both centralization and decentralisation are processes of changes rather than fixed states" (Conyers, 1986:30) and in practice neither full centralization nor full decentralisation could exist. As Fesler remarked in this connection, "total decentralisation would require the withering away of the state, whereas total centralization would imperil the state's capacity to perform its functions" (Fesler, 1968:371). Whether a government system is characterized as "centralist" or "decentralist" is dependent on some relevant elements that prevail with respect to intergovernmental distribution of administrative and political powers (Wright, 1984:100). A governmental system that seeks to distribute decision making powers from higher to lower levels of government with the objective of increasing the participatory role of the latter would be considered a
decentralist system. A centralist system on the other hand, would concentrate most of the decision making function in the hands of the central authorities (Lyons, 1985:86; Cornford, 1975:11).

The indicators commonly used to determine relative degrees of decentralisation or centralization (despite serious problems with this measure as will be discussed below) can be conveniently summarized under three headings — intergovernmental distribution of functions; intergovernmental financial relations and central government control mechanisms (see, for example, Bulpitt, 1983:20). Firstly, the degree of decentralisation will tend to be less when local governments lack the latitude to carry out important functions. The execution of these important functions may instead be carried out by agents of the central government. Secondly, where the source of revenue allocated to local governments is such that their existence is dependent to a large extent on central grant-in-aid, it may be indicative of power relations which inhibit local independence. Finally, decentralisation may be undermined "when the central authorities possess a large number of controls over the operations of local governments. These controls can be of financial, judicial, administrative or legislative character and, if used, result in considerable restrictions on the autonomy of local authorities as regard the election or nomination of its personnel, its decision making process and the nature of its policy output" Bulpitt, 1983:21).
Power sharing is, however, a complex phenomenon which admits of numerous possible arrangements and a great deal of variation in degree. "It is this that makes available measures only a faut de mieux approach to comparing degrees of decentralisation among countries or among different time periods in a single country" (Fesler, 1965:537). Riker (1964:5) has suggested, however, that it would be possible to compare federal constitutions by rank-ordering them along a minimum-maximum continuum according to the degree of independence one kind of the pair of governments has from the other kind. At the minimum end "the ruler(s) of the federation can make decisions in only one narrowly restricted category of action without obtaining the approval of the rulers of the constituent units (the minimum is one category of action, not zero, because if the ruler(s) of the federation rule nothing, neither a federation nor even a government can be said to exist)", and, at the maximum end of the continuum, "the ruler(s) of the federation can make decisions without consulting the rules of the member governments in all but one narrowly restricted category of action" (Riker, 1964:5-6). Most contentiously, Riker mentions the Soviet Union as an example of a federation at the maximum end, and, implicitly the United States federation at the minimum end. Fesler (1968:371), perhaps adopting Riker's minimum-maximum continuum, has also suggested that "centralization and decentralisation are best regarded as opposite tendencies on a single continuum whose poles are beyond the range of any real political system". Accordingly, "it should be possible
to compare individual political and administrative systems by noting their relative position on the continuum. Fesler adds that "it should also be possible to characterize any single political or administrative system, over a given time period, as moving toward one or the other pole" (1968:371).

Cross-national assessment of centralization and decentralisation, as said above, is extremely hazardous because of the inherent methodological problems, particularly with qualitative methods of measurement (Wright, 1984:99). Garrish makes this point clear in his study of centralization and decentralisation in England and France where he emphasises the danger of comparing two structures without taking into account the differences in geography, history and cultural and institutional heritage (Garrish, 1986:145). For example, he dismisses the contrast often drawn between "a decentralist England with more or less self-governing local authorities and a centralist France where there was no conception of local government ... even before French decentralisation [the 1981 reform] began", as misleading. He argues that "England has always been a highly unitary state" where local authorities, "by comparison with other Western countries as well as France, exist to the will of Government which is able to change the local government map and change the financial support system by legislation more easily than would be possible elsewhere". Garrish emphasises the point that "everything local governments can do they can do only because Parliament has given them the power... [but] what parliament has given it can also take
away" (p.148). By comparison, according to Garrish, "France is more of a corporate state than a centralized one":

[In] France, before or after decentralisation, the division of functions between central and local government is relatively clear-cut. There are still a fair number of control systems within particular services but there are very few functions shared between central and local government. There is therefore less need for a strong State presence on the ground and less personal mediation or negotiation, particularly with the gradual dismantling of specific grant system and the technical controls which went with them". (Garrish, 1986:148).

The roles of the Prefects and the Maires in the French system is another area which leads to the system being perceived as centralist (de Forges 1975; Irving, 1975; Machin, 1979; Booth, 1985). Unlike the prefectorial systems adopted in many other countries, particularly in the developing countries where the Prefect is usually a political representative whose brief is to safeguard the interests of the central government, in France, "the Prefect [is] as much the advocate of his Department as its controller [and] because of the almost universal 'Cumul des Madas', [even] powerful local Maires who [are] at the same time Deputies, Senators or Ministers could, even while in opposition, exercise great personal influence in favour of their towns". In this way, "not only [is] the State strong in the provinces but the provinces [are] strong in Paris" (Garrish, 1986:149; see also, Booth, 1985). The very fact that France has by far the smallest units (36,000 communes and about 80% of them with fewer than 1,000 inhabitants) of administration in Europe must mean that the
individual is also a lot closer to the power of the state (Booth, 1985:6). In other words, the system enables more people to participate more effectively, which is one of the main reasons why pluralists advocate decentralisation (see Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987:57-70). Taking these points into consideration, it would indeed be difficult to outrightly claim that the British system is more decentralized than the French system. An equally misleading stereotype, as that of Riker mentioned above, has been the frequent portrayal of the United States' federal arrangement as the "purest" and hence the most decentralized federal system and the Soviet Union's as the most centralized (see also Wheare, 1963; Watts, 1970). Leaving aside ideologies and value judgements it would be extremely difficult to compare the two systems with any certainty as the constitutions of their federal systems have started from separate traditions based on historical and cultural differences. On the face of it, the constitution of the Soviet Union did, in fact, offer a greater degree of political decentralisation given the fact that it contains provisions recognizing the right of the individual republics to territorial self determination including secession from the union. In contrast, the American constitution neither allows secession by any state nor expulsion of any state by the federal government (Duchacek, 1970:218). If the reality of decentralisation in both countries were to be measured accurately in terms of the amount of independence enjoyed by the sub-national units, it may well turn out to be that the United States federal system is relatively more decentralized.
than the Soviet Union's federal system, but, the gap may not be so much that they would be placed on the opposing poles of Riker's minimum-maximum continuum.

The Role of Centralization in Decentralisation

Critical treatment of decentralisation in terms of its shortcomings is very scant in the literature of the social sciences. A good deal of what is covered about decentralisation is usually concerned with what are regarded as obstacles to decentralisation and problems of overcentralization, implicitly taking for granted that decentralisation is "good" and centralization is "bad". Decentralisation has noble ideals, there is general consensus on that, but what seems to be wrong is when decentralisation is considered as negating centralization, which would lead to anarchy. Decentralisation tends to generate enormous passion to the extent of ignoring the fact that, for it to work, there must be a centralized organizational set-up in existence (Hart, 1972:605). The choice of any one form of decentralisation is, after all, a political policy outcome (Wright, 1984:100; Smith, 1985 preface).

In this connection, Fesler is right to raise some linguistic problems and how scientific discussion is handicapped as a result. As he said, "we appear to have neither a term that embraces the full [centralization-decentralisation] continuum ... nor a term that specifies the middle range where centralizing and decentralizing tendencies are substantially
in balance" (Fesler, 1965:537; 1968:371). Susan Hadden (1980) has avoided this problem by using the expression "controlled decentralisation" to explain a successful rural electrification programme in the Indian state of Rajasthan. The rural electrification programme was initiated by a central authority but planned and implemented by a local government agency. Hadden attributes the achievement of the programme to "efficiency", which, in turn, was achieved because higher level authorities established enforceable criteria for the programme whilst at the same time ensuring that it was feasible with the necessary powers delegated to lower level governmental bodies - hence, controlled decentralisation (Hadden, 1980:172). Hadden further explains the advantages of controlled decentralisation as follows:

Controlled decentralisation may retain the best features of centralization and decentralisation. It employs the long-range perspective of higher level bodies that set the technical criteria, while incorporating the short-range perspective of local officials who set additional political criteria ... The best use of controlled decentralisation depends on effective use of technical advice by high-level officials in the setting of the criteria designed to operationalize the economic goals of the programme ... Controlled decentralisation may lower the cost to higher levels of government of control over lower levels by making the granting of funds routinely contingent upon the fulfilment of certain conditions (Hadden, 1980:188-189).

The essence of controlled decentralisation is quite straightforward, that is, for decentralisation to be effective there must exist an effective "centre" as well. In its absence, what results can be discerned from Uma Lele's
observation in Tanzania; "one of the lessons learnt from Tanzania is that decentralisation creates a demand for a strong centre capable of both professional advice and coordination of field activities. The Prime Minister's office was unable to perform the latter function because of serious staff shortage ..." (quoted by Hyden, 1983:93).

In governmental systems, the subject of decentralisation must therefore be one that deals with the relationship between the central and territorial units of government in terms of whether one or another form of decentralisation is possible, feasible or even desirable in any given situation. Annmarie Hauck Walsh (1969), having made a comparative study of thirteen urban governments in different parts of the world, took this issue quite seriously and is worth quoting at length:

Several fallacies are common in the treatment of decentralisation by reformers and analysts. First, decentralisation is viewed as a singular process rather than a multidimensional set of relationships. Second, decentralisation and centralization are treated as opposites in a zero-sum relation, although practical experience suggests that an increase in local roles does not necessarily entail a decrease in central power, and vice versa. And, third, futile attempts are made to formulate optimum arrangements for all programmes and all times, without regard for variation in values, technologies and geography. The advantage to be gained from any shift in central-local relations depends upon its conformance to feasible division of power and practical division of work - practical in terms of both the nature of public programmes and the resources of existing institutions" (Walsh, 1969:179).
The Advantages of Decentralisation

Of all the arguments in favour of a well conceived form of decentralisation, the commonest is that decisions made within a decentralized framework "can improve the relevance and accuracy of planning, and provide greater sensitivity to local variations" (Bray, 1984:9; Blunt, 1984:406). Inherent in this argument is that local knowledge, and hence participatory planning, is essential to meet varying circumstances. Diana Conyers (1982:103) provides three main reasons why local participation in planning and implementation is considered to be so important. "First, it is a means of obtaining information about local conditions, needs and attitudes, without which development programmes and projects are likely to fail ... Second, people are likely to be committed to a development project or programme if they are involved in the planning and preparation, because they are more likely to identify with it and see it as their project ... The third reason for encouraging popular participation is that in most countries it is considered to be a basic democratic "right" that people should be involved in their own development".

Former President Nyerere of Tanzania has been a leading advocate in Africa of the idea of local planning for local needs. He wrote:

The planning and control of development in this country must be exercised at local level to a much greater extent than at present. Our nation is too large for the people at the centre in Dar es Salaam always to understand local problems or to respond with enthusiasm to a call for development work which
may be to their benefit, but which has been decided upon and planned by an authority hundreds of miles away" (1972:1).

The idea of local planning for local needs has also been a subject of much debate in the industrialized countries. David Owen, leader of the Social Democratic Party in Britain, in discussing matters of policy, contended that "the task for Social Democrats is to try to develop and build a fresh decentralized philosophy and put forward a detailed programme of legislative and administrative reforms to diffuse power in Britain" (Owen 1981:12). He clarified this by saying that "this calls for a radical reorientation towards a more decentralized society where the immense task ahead is that of passing beyond the welfare state, in which people get given things, to the kind of society in which they find satisfaction in doing things for themselves and for one another" (Owen 1981:12). At the heart of all this is the idea that "local people know best how to utilize the special advantages of their locality for their own collective benefit" (Studenski and Mort 1941:2; see also, Hart, 1972:606).

A second point of view is that which regards decentralisation as a promoter of national unity and political stability. The division of Nigeria from four federal states at independence into 12 in 1967 and further division into 19 states in 1976; and the division of Papua New Guinea into 19 autonomous provinces within a unitary framework of government were carried out to permit greater diversity and preserve national
unity and promote political stability.

Another important advantage of decentralisation is that by delegating responsibility, the central government may be relieved of some of its burdens. The time so saved may then allow central officials to deal with the major issues of policy and supervision of implementation. In other words decentralisation may in this case enhance efficiency in central government operations.

A further point that has often been made in favour of decentralisation is that "it can increase the flexibility of central agencies, field staff and local leaders to deal with unique problems in an area or region, to experiment with programmes without having to justify them for the whole country, to test administrative innovations within a region, and to encourage the initiative of local officials and political leaders" (Rondindelli, 1983:14-15). In other words, mistakes can be less costly for a country when experimentation is carried out in only one local area. Duncan and Goodwin (1985) give an interesting case of a British experience with such experimentation:

Scotland with its separate legislative procedures, has often been used by central government for political and administrative experiment. This is because Scotland is relatively remote for the English and London based establishment and media. Even parliament interest is low. If the experiment goes right it can be extended to the whole country, if it goes wrong almost no one who is seen to matter will know (pp. 4-5).
These are only some of the relevant examples from the familiar long catalogue of what governments could potentially achieve through a well-conceived policy of decentralisation. Since most of "the assertions and hypotheses underlying the alleged advantages have not all been empirically verified" (Rondinelli, 1981:136), it will serve no particular purpose here to list the full catalogue.

The disadvantages of decentralisation

For each of the arguments for decentralisation there is a counter argument against it. In most cases, however, these counter arguments are not in opposition to decentralisation in general but a matter of preference of one form from another.

One of the commonly cited is that the far-reaching forms of territorial decentralisation, by devolution or federation, permit and even encourage ethnic and regional diversity which may threaten national cohesion (Bray, 1984:11). For example, regional officials may interpret further decentralisation as a deliberate move to the centre to weaken their power and a resultant disagreement may lead to civil war. Excessive decentralisation may also lead to an increase in local identity thus weakening national loyalty. Where this local identity is based on ethnicity, it may also lead to conflicts between areas. Studenski and Mort, in recalling American history, wrote that "the vesting of excessively wide powers in state governments and totally inadequate powers in the central government after the war of independence, produced disunity
and a breakdown of government. As soon as a strong central government was provided under the new constitution, the disintegrating tendencies came to an end" (1941:25).

The form of decentralisation that advocates the dispersal of powers to local communities to increase their participation in planning and implementation, is another form to which there is strong opposition. The argument is that decentralisation can be counterproductive if programmes focusing on local communities are not planned at a pace and in a manner consistent with local realities and capabilities. "The officials of the small local areas generally have an exceedingly narrow outlook, and are inclined to be satisfied with existing conditions and to resist innovation. They especially resist ... any projects requiring concerted effort on their part" (Studenski and Mort, 1941:30); see also Mawhood, 1983:3). David Korton, having studied several community organizations and rural development programmes in many developing countries, came to the conclusion that what is needed is "to provide assistance in ways that respond to local needs while building local social and technical capacity" (1980:484). What Korton is pointing to is the fact that community related programmes in the developing countries tend to work in quite the opposite way to their stated aims. The stated aims usually expound on how government authorities will encourage community participation to help them to help themselves, but, instead, they usually end up being the mechanism for "untapping" resources from them. This situation
may produce conflict between local communities and government officials. Referring to participation (perhaps to the political type rather than the developmental) in Britain, C.A.R. Crosland is quoted by Owen as having "questioned the reality of the all embracing participatory society" when he wrote, "if what he meant by participation is an active and continuous process of participation in decision making, then all experience shows that only a small minority of the population will wish to participate ... the fact is that the majority will continue to lead a full family life and cultivate their gardens" (in Owen, 1981:21).

Finally, excessive decentralisation may result in inefficient management of local affairs and uneconomic expenditure of public funds (see in Hart, 1972:605). Extensive decentralisation by its very nature requires an increase in public employment and capital investment and all the financial requirements that go with it. In poorer countries such an increase can cause great financial strain leading to problems in budget allocation. In countries where skilled labour is not in abundance, further decentralisation may also create a situation where less qualified and trained employees are elevated to take important positions which may lead to inefficient management. Furthermore, in excessively decentralized systems, "coordination becomes a major exercise, and the result of spreading decision making can be that it takes a much longer time to reach a conclusion" (Bray, 1984:12).
Conclusion

The main purpose of this chapter has been to bring out the complexities of decentralisation in both its concept and context. The first issue looked at was that concerning the confusion that exists over the meaning of the term decentralisation which has greatly concerned some writers. The point is, however, that governmental systems differ from situation to situation and if decentralisation is used in a different way in relation to a different situation this must, in fact, be welcome. It will be futile to attempt to find an all embracing expression for all situations of decentralisation. The second aspect looked at was the dichotomization of governmental systems between centralization and decentralisation. The tendency to regard decentralisation not as a policy mechanism of achieving policy objectives or "end-values" but as an end value in its own right (Fesler, 1965) has transformed it into something "mythical". In many African countries the myth attached to decentralisation is such that some do believe that its very adoption will somehow trigger development. A Sudanese government official attending a seminar on decentralisation, for example, argued that "now that the Councils (local governments) are accorded with sufficient powers (referring to the 1981 Act), it is up to them to get on with the job of development" (Woldemichael, 1983:14). The consequences of "the do nothing" attitude by higher authorities in such cases are only too clear - "uncontrolled decentralisation" or chaos.
Introduction

Two issues pertaining to the persistent problems of nation building that are prevalent in most post-colonial states are addressed in this chapter. The first is the nature of ethnic diversity and the problems that have bedevilled most post-colonial states in managing ethnic claims. It goes without saying that the degree of national political integration, and hence the extent of the political stability, in a country is a determining factor for socio-economic development. In the absence of cohesive and stable national political unity the ability of a nation-state to compete in the international power game can be seriously undermined. In the second part, a comparative assessment of the socio-economic development of four states with different political and ideological perspectives is made. The purpose is to highlight the link between the decentralised power-sharing mechanism devised in each of the four states and the impact of this on social and economic progress.

ETHNIC-STATE DISCOURSE AND NATION-BUILDING

The Post Colonial State

Most postcolonial states are multi-ethnic in character, composed of diverse groups whose ethnic identities are based
on racial, cultural or regional differences. The territorial boundaries of these states were derived from colonial partition. The results bore little or no resemblance to the territorial frameworks of traditional societies. "They are arbitrary political units in geographical shape and size, population membership, political identity, and socio-economic reality" (Jackson and Rosberg, 1984:178). The political viability of many of these states, after independence, was therefore problematic and ethnicity emerged as a crucial political and developmental variable.

In Africa, the attempted secession of Katanga became the first focal point for a world crisis (Young, 1983:203). Katanga, as a centre of mining in Zaire, was a highly prized region and, when it declared itself a sovereign and independent state on July 11, 1960, African independent states were outraged at what they considered to be a foreign inspired conspiracy with the intention of not only destroying Zairean independence but also of underminening radical African nationalist independence movements: which were struggling for independence from colonial rule at the time.

The concern expressed by the African independent states over the Katanga issue was not without foundation at least on one count. When Mourice Tshombe, the secessionist Katangan leader, appealed to the world for recognition and for immediate technical, financial and military aid, Belgium, the colonial power which had ruled over Zaire, although it
declined to accord Katanga an outright recognition, nevertheless was swift to provide effective material and moral assistance. On July 21, 1960, King Baudouin of Belgium declared that when "entire ethnic groups headed by men of honesty and worth ... ask us to help them construct their independence... It is our duty to respond favourably" (see in Young, 1983:202). Belgian's material support to Katanga came in military personnel and hardware which was vital for its survival in the initial stages. However, as the international community became uneasy at the precedent the Katangan rebellion could set, a direct military intervention was mounted by the United Nations which forced Tshombe to concede defeat. In January 1963, he announced that Katanga's aspiration for secession was over.

Fearful of the Katanga type of rebellion repeating itself in other parts, the governments of the independent African states were quick to conceive and establish, in 1963, an organisation, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), to protect their territorial status quo. Thus the declared OAU charter, "fully acknowledged and legitimated the colonial frontiers and the principle of state sovereignty within them" (Jackson and Rosberg, 1986:277). An important aspect of the OAU charter was also the declaration of the principle of non-interference in the affairs of a sovereign state: "that frontiers are sacred and what goes on inside them are internal affairs" (Worsley, 1984:289). As Jackson and Rosberg (1984:184) elaborated:
Every multi-ethnic state in Africa without exception enjoys international legitimacy by virtue of its political independence, recognition by other states, membership in international bodies, and the general protection of international law. No independent African Government is in any danger of losing international legitimacy as long as it remains a good citizen of the world community. Citizenship demands little except respect for the independence of other states and forbearance from interfering in their internal affairs. Severely abusive regimes, such as Idi Amin in Uganda..., were never deprived of international legitimacy. Indeed, the invasion of Uganda by Tanzania's army in 1978-79, which resulted in the overthrow of Amin's tyranny, was censured and not applauded by most other African governments and the OAU. According to existing international practice, the only conceivable type of African regime that probably would be denied international legitimacy is either one that attempted to alter existing ex-colonial boundaries without the consent of the other countries involved, or one that was composed of non-African aliens.

International legitimacy has thus benefited the central hegemonical authorities of African countries to consolidate their power by undermining ethnic politics. After gaining independence, African governments took no time to dismantle the inherited colonial political and administrative systems that provided for widespread political participation involving "integration of autonomous sections living side by side in order to consolidate territory and identity groups" (Chazan et al., 1988:103). For example, a major provision of the independence constitution of Kenya was the establishment of a decentralised government in which power was shared almost equally between the centre and the seven newly established regions (Oyugi, 1983:117). Immediately after independence, however, the central government started repudiating the constitution, bypassing the regional authority, and dealing
directly with the lower tiers of provincial authorities. The aim in doing so was to frustrate the implementation of regionalisation in accordance with the constitution. Only a year after independence, Kenya, abandoning the multi-party system it inherited, became a republic with a strong executive President. With a one party system in place, regionalism, as a state-ethnic power sharing mechanism, was discarded as an unwanted and divisive colonial implant.

President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe later articulated the typical post-independence belief in the one party system for the maintenance of national unity in which all factional interests could be absorbed and hence dissolved: "ZANU (The Zimbabwe African National Union) believes that the principle of the paramountcy of the People demands that the national concept and the sense of national belonging be made a dogma that should submerge and destroy tribal, regionalistic and racial animosities" (Mugabe, 1982:3). In a Parliamentary debate of 22 February 1984, Robert Mugabe, responding to a question regarding a one party system, stated that: "a multi-party system is what we have inherited, and we do not view that system as conducive to maximum democracy and unity under that democratic state....ZANU will fight the next elections on a platform which will include the One Party State proposition and that if the party won those elections, then the party will not allow the will of the people to be foiled by the rigidity of our constitution" (see Murphree, 1986:162). As in Kenya, Zimbabwe became a one party state not long after independence.
with Mugabe's ZANU party assuming power. As in Kenya too, the 
Mugabe government has ever since been, as Mazrui (1983a:210) 
wrote, "searching for a Utopia that knows no tribes".

Thus, the obsession of the post-colonial African state with 
monopolising all legitimate politics at the centre is intended 
"to facilitate the control not only of opposition but also of 
ethnicity: if all rival political organisations are abolished, 
then ethnic cleavages are less likely to be politicised and 
stability will be easier to achieve and maintain" (Jackson and 
Rosberg, 1984:188). What President Siaka Stevens said, 
speaking in Sierra Leone's parliament after the referendum in 
1978, sums up the fear that every multi-ethnic African state 
has had regarding the multi-party political system (see in 
West Africa, April 1982:1115):

> After some two score years of politics, it is my 
considered view that the multi-party system with 
government and opposition, contributes an open 
invitation to anarchy and disunity.... We have 
banned a system which institutionalized tribal and 
ethnic quinquennial warfare euphemistically known as 
elections...We have done away with an unnecessary 
system.

As the discussion in the following chapter will show, 
President Nimeiri of the Sudan applied the same reasoning as 
the above quotation to abolish the sectarian multi-party 
system that existed in the country.

**Patterns of State Control**

It is not the formation of a single party system and the loss 
of competitive politics alone which has been the cause for
much of the rising ethnic conflict in the post-colonial African State. The brutal means governments employ to neutralise ethnic diversity, in the name of national unity, may be a major causal factor for the escalation of state-ethnic conflict. A case in point is the way successive Ethiopian regimes have followed deliberate policies of cultural assimilation, villagization, resettlement schemes and administrative reforms as instruments of control and subordination. With regards to culture as an instrument of control in Ethiopia, Paul Baxter’s study (1983:136-137) on the Oromo nationality, the largest ethnic group in the country numbering between ten and fifteen million, shows how their language was denied any official status during the Haile Selassie regime:

It was not permissible to publish, preach, teach or broadcast in any Oromo dialect. In court or before an official an Orom had to speak Amharic (the official language of government) or use an interpreter. Even a case between two Oromos before an Oromo-speaking magistrate had to be heard in Amharic.

In Ethiopia, language has always been an important distinguishing factor of “Ethiopianess”. As Baxter (1983:136) observed, "fluent Amharic and an Amhara way of life have always been, and still are, a pre-requisite for entry to government employment; and government was, and is, almost the only employer of schooled labour....an Oromo doctor who had been educated overseas and did not write Amharic was refused employment because of that" (see also in Knutsson, 1969:96). Baxter’s further remark that for most officials in Ethiopia
"to civilise" was to "Amharise" is a simple but effective explanation of the process of ethnic subordination. It is common knowledge in Ethiopia that the late Emperor Haile Selassie was by "blood" as much Oromo as Amhara but he never portrayed himself as having anything to do with the former. Similarly, Chairman Mengistu Haile Mariam was an Amhara, only by culture being from a minority ethnic group by descent, but, the Amharisation drive during his time was no less intense than those of previous regimes.

The logic of the policy of assimilation the Ethiopian regimes followed compares with that of the French, who, as described by Mazrui (1983b:36), regard cultural criteria as distinguishing factors of "Frenchness". As Mazrui wrote "...if a black person became adequately French linguistically and culturally, those were grounds for becoming a French citizen... Black people could become French --- the key was the French language and culture". Similarly, in Ethiopia, Amharic, as the language of political power and a symbol of national identity was a prerequisite for "Ethiopianess". For example, no other language except Amharic was allowed in schools in Ethiopia. The process of national integration was therefore tantamount to assimilation into the Amhara culture, the state culture (Markakis, 1987:73; Buxton, 1983:137).

Another instrument of ethnic control used by the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia was what Niggli (1989:5) called the "real nationality policy aiming at creating the 'new Ethiopian'
without 'tribal' ties'. Niggli is referring to the rural policy of collectivization and villagisation programmes which were the hallmark of the Mengistu regime. According to Niggli (1985:5), collectivisation was a policy instrument designed to integrate the subsistence economic base of the peasantry into the state controlled market economy. Villagisation was the most clear expression of the collectivisation scheme by which the rural population were congregated in planned settlements. This social engineering exercise thus enabled the state to exercise more effective control.

The resettlement programme was a further social engineering policy carried out under the pretext of moving people to less drought prone areas. The programme involved the movement of two million people from the Tigray province in the north to the western provinces of Wollega and Illubabor. Like the collectivisation programme, the resettlement programme was designed for ethnic control. Tigray province was the power base of the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), a nationalist movement which had become a real threat to the government. On the other hand, the provinces of Wollega and Illubabor, largely inhabited by the Oromo people, were fast becoming politicised with the entry onto the scene of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) in 1974. The aim of the resettlement programme was thus both to deprive the TPLF of its power base in Tigray province and, as the new settlements were strategically located in Wollega and Illubabor, "to cut the OLF and any other conceivable opposition force from its
Another ethnic control instrument of Mengistu Haile Mariam's government was the use of administrative reforms. In 1987, regions with long-standing historical bases were partitioned and rearranged along ethnic and religious lines into several "autonomous regions". This policy was most fervently followed in Eritrea, which was engaged in a bitter struggle for independence from Ethiopian occupation (2.1). In 1987, the Ethiopian government passed a decree by which Eritrea was divided into two separate autonomous regions - Eritrea and Asseb. The latter region incorporated Eritrea's coastal province of Dankalia with adjoining areas in Ethiopia to correspond with the territory inhabited by the Afar speaking ethnic group. In so doing, the government's aim was to erode Eritrea's established territorial identity and to lessen its potential threat to Ethiopia's occupation by dividing its people. However, that policy probably had the opposite effect, as events proved later, in fueling the extraordinary determination of the Eritrean people to liberate their territory, which was achieved by military force in May 1991.

Thus, Ethiopia's politically motivated centralising thrusts, as elsewhere in Africa, have not been particularly effective for processes of national integration and nor have they created the necessary condition of stability for social and economic development. Ethiopia remains one of the bottom three poorest countries in the world.
As in Ethiopia, successive governments in the Sudan had also followed policies that aimed for cultural assimilation of the southern Sudanese. Again as in Ethiopia, the effects of assimilation has had disastrous effect both politically and economically, as will be fully discussed in the following chapters.

The African "Soft State"

"If the African state sometimes appears overactive and imperious" wrote Rothchild and Olorunsola (1983:56), "it can, paradoxically, also display an evident 'softness' and ineffectiveness. With respect to the latter aspect, the hegemonial option was less a manifestation of the strength of the state institutions or of the preferences of the dominant political class than a reflection of the frailty of the post-colonial state in the face of burgeoning pressures. Hegemonial institutions and practices tended to obscure the reality of limited governmental effectiveness, both in managing central affairs and penetrating and regulating activities in the hinterland". Former President Nyrere of Tanzania was well aware of the existence of such problems in his government. In recommending decentralisation as a mechanism of development administration for Tanzania, he emphasised that "if this decentralisation is to be effective at the same time as the nation continues to go forward in unity, the Central Government organisation also has to be changed in many respects" (Nyrere, 1972:8). A theme that Nyrere consistently followed was that "development cannot be
done for the people; it can only be done by them" (see in Jackson and RosberD, 1986:209). Frustrated by the bureaucratic red-tape and inefficiencies in Tanzania's governmental institutions, Nyrere (1972:12) sought to change the prevailing work attitudes of government officials, party leaders and members: "For the really vital element in decentralisation is that we have to drop our present apparent urge to control everything from the centre. At the centre we can prod, urge and help, but not control".

The problem that Nyrere was grappling with in Tanzania, the inability of the state to govern by delegating sufficient powers to its citizenry, is similar to the situation that Gunnar Myrdal describes as the "soft State" in his study of South Asia. "When we characterize these countries as 'soft states'", he writes, "we mean that, throughout the region, national governments require extraordinarily little of their citizens. There are few obligations either to do things in the interest of the community or to avoid actions opposed to that interest. Even those obligations that do exist are enforced inadequately if at all". The general characteristics of a soft state are reflected in the way public businesses are conducted: in the absence of work discipline, disrespect for the rule of law by officials, corrupt practices, evasion of responsibility and the like (see in Hyden, 1983:73).

Most, if not all, African states have these characteristics of softness. The African soft state is particularly centralist
and because its institutions are weak, it lacks the ability to promote rapid development. In Bangladesh, Blair (1985:1232) points out, "The imperative for stability brings with it a strong urge for central administration and control to ensure that stability". The failures of decentralisation in many African countries (see, for example, Wunsch, 1991) can be associated with this strong urge to control from the centre. Although local authorities in most African countries have been accorded substantial powers for decision making and management functions, paradoxically, the political elites that gave them the powers have also been denying them the necessary resources to carry out those powers. The reason is, according to Werlin (1992:224) political elites "feel threatened by decentralisation because of the danger of intensifying ethnic and kinship loyalties". In any case, the central institutions of the African soft state are also too weak to facilitate support for decentralisation plans. The effect of central inefficiency on the functioning of decentralisation was graphically described by Nyrere (1972:1): "most frequent complaint in the districts and regions is that they cannot get answers to their letters at all. They write and write, sometimes five times, and hear nothing, yet it is impossible for them to visit Dar es Salaam from a place like Sumbawana, or even Morogoro, without permission - which they cannot get!". As will be discussed in the second part of this chapter, central government's ineffectiveness in managing its decentralisation policies have quite serious socio-economic developmental consequences.
The African soft state, as stated earlier, is marked by fragile institutes and hence lacks the ability to govern. One of the manifestations of this inability to govern is the way "dominant political elites... have reacted most forcefully to perceived threats from ethnoregional groups" (Rothchild and Olorunsola, 1983:7). A case in point is the programme of "Red Terror" that was unleashed over the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP), an urban-based organisation of radical intellectuals, by the Mengistu regime of Ethiopia in 1977. Condemned as anti-revolutionaries, members of the party and their sympathisers were hunted and "gunned down in broad daylight or dragged out of their homes at night and killed" (Giorgis, 1989:32). According to Giorgis, thousands were executed and thousands more forced to flee for their lives by the Red Terror offensive. Such measures of reprisals, carried out by agents of governments to head off real or imagined ethnoregional challenges, are common occurrences in Africa. Thus, a soft state's inability to govern can exacerbate ethnic discord and in many cases its own clumsy actions can cause the eruption of conflict. To return to the Ethiopian scene as an example, the armed rebellion of the Oromo ethnic group was triggered as a reaction against the arbitrary force used to suppress Oromo associations (see in Baxter, 1983).

The Claims of Ethnic Groups and State Responses

The nature of ethnic group claims may be differentiated between the distributive claims (claims for equity) and the
claims for regional self-determination and secession. The distributive claims are made within the existing framework of the state and, depending on the situation, there can be tacit or explicit support for the dominant political power. Ethnic group demands of the distributive kind may also differ, ranging from claims for equitable distribution of services to more substantial claims for decentralised power sharing. With regard to the second category, what Rothchild and Olorunsola (1983:10) called the high intensity demand, the ethnoregional demand is for self-determination and independence. To date, no negotiated settlement has ever been achieved over demands for self-determination in Africa and conflicts in this category have been particularly destructive.

Claims that seek distributive ends can also be sources of destructive conflict if they are not properly managed. Political tensions and conflicts can occur either from unreasonable demands on the part of ethnic groups or when the state is perceived to be acting unfairly in the distribution of those powers and resources among the competing ethnic groups. In the case of Africa, Rothchild and Olorunsola (1983:10) explain that conflicts associated with the distributive concerns are less than might have been expected given the prevailing scarcities. The reason they give, although they admit that this is put forward most tentatively, is that "peoples in the relatively disadvantaged areas...make fewer demands upon scarce public resources than their counterparts in the relatively more advantaged parts of a
country". The significance of the "disadvantaged making fewer demands" for state-ethnic relations is further explained as follows (1983:10):

If the relatively disadvantaged lack political clout and make only limited demands upon the state, the government finds itself, by default, in a position to put minimising (or "satisfying") policies into effect. The soft state can, for the time being at least, endure and display a degree of coherency precisely because the modest demands of the relatively disadvantaged permit somewhat inequitable practice in the distribution of scarce resources.

But this is not a new revelation as such and it is precisely the neglect and the overly oppressive methods that the dominant political groups employ over the disadvantaged ones that have been the causes of many ethnic-state conflicts in Africa (Jackson and Rosberg, 1984:194). Arbitrary and abusive treatments may quieten ethnic discontent temporarily but never permanently. The trail of discontent they leave behind is likely to resurface with added force at an opportune moment in the future. The case of the Oromo ethnic group of Ethiopia is again a good example. The Oromos, in spite of their numerical superiority in Ethiopia, have been downtrodden for generations by successive Amhara regimes (Baxter, 1983). The collapse of Haile Selassie's regime in 1974, and the uncertainty that followed until the military coup leaders consolidated their power, gave the Oromos an opportune moment to organise a national liberation movement. As Baxter (1983:145) commented in this connection: "...among the Oromos, many of what were local, sullen resentments have been
converted into national aspirations ... [and] the grip the Amhara have held over the government of Ethiopia for some ninety years is being profoundly challenged". This prediction proved to be right as a combined Ethiopian opposition force led by the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF), in which an Oromo faction also played a part, were able to take over power in Ethiopia in 1991. However, the biggest Oromo organisation, the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), is demanding the right of self-determination for Oromia, a new name the Oromos have accorded to the region inhabited by the Oromo people. Thus, the people of Oromia have managed to transform their struggle into a nationalist movement of such force that no power in Ethiopia will ever dictate terms to them.

The high intensity demand by ethnoregional groups, that of the right to self-determination, presents a real threat to the very existence of the African post-colonial state. However, although a number of bitter battles were fought "between central governments and some formidable ethno-regional opponents" (Jackson and Rosberg, 1984:196) - notably in Zaire, Nigeria, Angola, Sudan and Chad - no state has suffered a break up as a result (2.2). In spite of the arbitrariness of state demarcation during the process of colonisation, as discussed above, self-determination in Africa "is not perceived to mean the right of every distinct ethnic community to secede from an established polity" (Keller, 1983:252). The colonial boundaries were legitimised and accepted as permanent and inviolable by virtue of the Organisation of
Africa Unity Charter, which the world community as a whole also recognises. Herein lies the problem though. The legitimacy of the post-colonial state seems to contradict the basic principle of self-determination, which is, that all peoples have the right to freely determine their political status (Wiberg, 1983:43). What constitutes "a people" has been a matter of endless debate and the current anomaly is of the existence of miniscule nations like Nauru with a population of eight thousand that are internationally recognised and, on the other hand, nations like Oromia with ten to fifteen million population and a territory twice as big as Great Britain that are denied the status of "a people". The bitterness and intensity of the ethnoregional based conflicts in Africa could therefore be a manifestation of the denial of self-determination. That is, ethnic groups are being driven to recognise the use of force as the only means of gaining total control of their territory (Healy, 1983:94). There is a strong possibility in Africa, therefore, that a situation may develop whereby the strong break from states leaving the weaker ones with little option but to adapt to the existing multi-ethnic state as best they can (Rothchild and Olorunsola, 1983:12). Keller's (1983:255) description of the crucial role of state leaders in minimising ethnic conflict in Africa is of much relevance here:

The potential for ethnic turmoil which exists in most African states demands that state leaders conscientiously devise policies to avoid or even solve such problems. Brute force alone is not the answer; measured, skilful leadership is often a better tactic. The latter approach invariably
includes a contextually relevant mix of positive and negative sanctions and a blend of materials and symbolic resources. In the end the success or failure of the state's policy choices relating to the potential for ethnic conflict determines the degree to which such potential conflicts might threaten state coherence.

In promoting such proposals, however, the soft state condition of many countries in Africa must be taken into account. In this connection, Rothchild and Olorunsola (1983:20) are right to point to the "western-based policy analysis [which] assumes an enormously enormous capacity on the part of the state agencies to put policies and programmes into effect. The African reality allows no such comfortable assumption".

POLITICS AND DECENTRALISATION POLICIES: COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCES

The Setting
In many of the developing countries, the search for an appropriate administrative, economic and ideological model is a continuing exercise. Many government changes in Africa, for example, have been accompanied by the introduction of a new set of policies. The incoming leaders, almost always professing a different ideological perspective from the one before them, take no time to promise a better life for the people. The inherited system is likely to be blamed as being the cause for the poverty and squalor. In many cases a new set of administrative mechanisms is introduced accompanied by such slogans as "power to the people". In some unfortunate countries, the Sudan, Uganda and Chad, for example, this
situation has been repeated many times over. The result has been that these countries are left bare of any ideological, developmental or organisational culture upon which they can build.

Does political ideology matter for development anyway? Ample evidence is now available for some judgement to be made on the role of ideology on development. Tanzania and Kenya have the same historical background of British colonial administration. They both achieved independence in the 1960s; were both sparsely populated and both had comparable labour and other factor endowments. Although Kenya had a stronger economic and administrative base at independence, mainly because its favourable climate had attracted many European settlers who brought investible capital with them, nevertheless, the two states were comparable in many ways and have both since been objects of interest for research and hence their progress has been closely monitored.

India and China are neighbours who also started from a similar background. "In 1950 both India and China had per capita incomes of about $50... The two countries initiated their development operations at about the same time and from the same type of economic structure. In both, at least 80 per cent of the working force was in agriculture and small-scale enterprise" (MaIenbaum and Stolper, 1971:123). They both have large land areas and populations and so again this pair of countries were comparable in many ways.
Although each of the above four countries has its own ideological pattern, they all have declared decentralisation as their major tool for development administration. At this point, some questions may be posed: How do the two pairs of countries compare now in terms of their social and economic progress? To achieve progress, must there be a choice of an ideologically distinct route? Finally, could any of these countries offer a blue print that might be emulated by other countries?

Policies of Decentralisation in Tanzania and Kenya
Tanzania during the leadership of President Nyrere had a clear vision of what it intended to achieve by introducing a policy of decentralisation. The primary objective of decentralisation was, as president Nyrere said, "to make a reality of our policies of socialism and self-reliance, the planning and control of development of this country..." (Nyrere, 1972:1). It was these twin political and developmental objectives of decentralisation which prompted Rondinelli (1983:83), on writing about decentralisation of development administration in East Africa, to say that "attempts to decentralise planning and administration in Tanzania cannot be fully understood without an appreciation of their political and ideological background".

After independence Tanzania introduced an ingenious one party system of government which permitted electoral competition (2.3). The Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), the
party that took power, was eventually constituted as the sole party in the country. Although political analysts like Crawford Young (1982) and William Tordoff (1984) justifiably make substantial ideological distinctions between Tanzania's type of "populist socialism" and the "scientific socialism" of Leninist-Marxism, nevertheless, TANU had vowed to follow the principles of comprehensive central planning which is the hallmark of communist countries. Tanzania's development objective made "special emphasis on self-reliance and rural development, as well as the expressed need to democratise the Tanzanian society" (Mwansasu, 1974:8).

On assuming power, TANU took no time to create a hierarchial party structure down to village level, the chief party representative at every level becoming the chairman of the relevant local body (Nyrere, 1972). According to Nyrere's policy directive of 1972, regions and districts were to plan and implement local development activities as well as administer local affairs with the very minimum of interference from the centre. But the need for strong central control to oversee that local bodies functioned within their allowed limits was not to be overlooked. As Nyrere put it:

To ensure that national objectives and priorities are adhered to, and that the policy of gradual equalization of well-being between different Regions can be implemented, broad general policy guidelines will be issued within the framework of which the local bodies must make their decisions. The central government, in addition to setting the framework and giving technical assistance where required, will also be responsible for inspecting the performance achieved. But otherwise, in the matters for which they are responsible, the Region and District will be free to make their own decisions about priorities.
and methods of work. (Nyrere, 1972:2-3)

Tanzania's distinct system of local administration was designed to serve as a vehicle towards revitalising and developing the traditional African egalitarian social system (2.4). Concerning the development of education, for example, which was now geared towards the objective of self-reliance, the emphasis was on preparing for rural life and cooperative endeavour. The aim was to do away with the educational system inherited from colonial times which was thought to have fostered elitism, inequality and the destabilisation of students' rural background (Young, 1982:108). The local government system in Tanzania was thus a vital part of the political process which aimed for political stability and economic and social development.

Unlike Tanzania, Kenya is a "developing capitalist" state having taken the developmental choice consistent with the modified version of free enterprise or what some may prefer to call liberal market economy. Also unlike Tanzania, the Kenyan government did not discard the local administrative system that it had inherited from the colonial government. "While most other African countries tried to scrap them, the Kenyan government streamlined them and encouraged their development" (Akivaga et al, 1985:2).

At the national level Kenya's politics started with a multi-party system of parliamentary democracy. It was not long
before it reverted to the Tanzanian model of a one party system but it still maintained its developmental strategy of a market economy. The single party system does allow competition but candidates are carefully vetted for their proven allegiance to KANU – the Kenya African National Union, the ruling party (2.5).

At the local level, a modified version of the British local government model is still practised. A significant departure from the British model is that in the Kenyan system councils comprise of both elected and nominated members. Furthermore, since the one party system was constituted in 1982 "every intending candidate for councillorship must seek clearance from KANU before he/she may stand for election. Without this vital support from the party it is impossible to stand elections of any kind" (Akivaga et al, 1985:38). Again, the KANU party machinery has the responsibility for granting or refusing permission to compete in elections. Where the British and the Kenyan local authorities have similarities is in the way councillors perform their duties through the council committees and sub-committees.

Rondinelli (1983:82-83) explains the elaborate system of local planning that exists in Kenya and how, in theory, it was meant to link with higher authority plans to form part of the national plan: The problem is, however, as Rondinelli (1983:83) further explains: "rural development planning and administration in Kenya remain centralised, and province and
district development committees continue to play relatively weak roles. The central ministries retain control over sectoral plans and budgets, and recommendations from districts rarely influence national policy.

Without measuring the actual power delegated to local authorities in terms of their achievements, the structures and the control mechanisms of the decentralisation systems in both Tanzania and Kenya are in fact not widely disparate. The central political influence over the local authorities in the two countries are similarly quite strong.

Decentralisation Policies in India and China

The opposing political ideologies that developed in India and China and the administrative mechanisms and organisational systems that have been instituted to manage their economies offer some insight in terms of how the two systems compare in their objectives for the elevation of the well being of their societies. The historical situations which shaped the emergence of their particular ideologies, fascinating though they are, will not feature here. The main concern here is with the administrative structures that were devised with the intention of implementing policy objectives.

India is a federalist state. Federalism was already introduced in India during the British colonial administration and was thought to offer the best option for the maintenance and continuation of the unity of India both during the
transitional period to independence and beyond. Many nationalist parties were established in the pre-independence period. The Congress Party, led by two of the most prominent personalities in India at the time, Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharl Nehru, was by far the largest. All parties were, however, deeply suspicious of British intentions with federation. To them, any proposal that could trigger the break up of India into parts was not only a "painful one to contemplate", as Nehru said, but also: "it went against all those deeply-felt sentiments and convictions that move people so powerfully [as] the whole nationalist movement of India had been based on India's Unity" (Nehru, 1946:455).

Those sentiments were expressed at a time when the British government proposed a form of federalism and suggested that the "constituent assembly or constitution making body of the states would be a mixture of elected and non-elected elements, the former chosen by separate religious electorates as well as by certain vested interests, the latter nominated by the rulers of the states" (Nehru, 1946:455). Nehru eloquently expressed his fears about this proposal when he said:

The semi-feudal rulers of the states could nominate their own representatives in proportion to the population. These nominees might contain some able ministers but, as a whole, they would inevitably represent, not the peoples of the states, but the feudal and autocratic ruler. They would form nearly one quarter of the members of the constitution-making body, and would powerfully influence its decisions by their numbers, their socially backward attitude, and their threats of subsequent withdrawal" (1946:454-455).
The Working Committee of the Congress Party made its position clear in its resolution on the British proposal, which merits quoting at length:

The Congress has been wedded to Indian freedom and unity and any break in that unity, especially in the modern world, when people's minds inevitably think in terms of ever larger federations, would be injurious to all concerned and exceedingly painful to contemplate. Nevertheless, the Committee cannot think in terms of compelling the people in any territorial unit to remain in an Indian Union against their declared and established will. While recognizing this principle, the Committee feel that every effort should be made to create conditions which would help the different units in developing a common and co-operative national life. The acceptance of the principle inevitably involves that no changes should be made which result in fresh problems being created and compulsion being exercised on other subnational groups within the area. Each territorial unit should have the fullest possible autonomy within the union, consistent with a strong national state. The proposal now made on the part of the British War Cabinet encourages and will lead to attempts at separation at the very inception of a nation and thus create friction just when the utmost co-operation and goodwill are most needed. This proposal has been presumably made to meet a communal demand, but it will have other consequences also and lead politically reactionary and obscurantist groups among different communities to create trouble and divert public attention from the vital issues before the country (see Nehru, 1946:459. Emphasis added).

The Congress Party took over power at independence and has ruled India much longer than any other party since. Three years after independence, the modified constitution of federalist India, which mirrored the Congress Party's position, was passed by parliament. India's federalism has been regarded by some as only "quasi-federal" pointing to its unitary features which even permit the Parliament to change state boundaries, "as it thinks fit", and also entrusts the
centre with such powers that it has made the states in many respects dependent on it (Paylee, 1960:154; Mathur, 1983:70).

The history of central and bottom-up planning in India has its roots in the thoughts of Nehru, who espoused rapid industrialisation and a centralist approach to management, and Gandhi, who favoured cottage industry and community participation (Natraj, 1981). The constitution empowered the central government with wide responsibilities for formulating economic and social development policies through its functional departments whose line of authority is vertically structured. Mathur (1983:70) observed that: "in cases where state government interests were weak, the centre seeks to strengthen them through financial grants, which means that, more often than not, the involvement of the state is determined by the amount of funds they receive. Use of financial grants in this way not only helps control the decentralised agencies but also determines their scope for independent action".

Experiments with decentralisation at the local level in India began soon after independence. "Community development" became the catchphrase of the time and incorporated the ideological underpinnings of the Ghandian philosophy of a village-centred approach in development. As interest in community development waned in the 1960s, however, "a nation-wide system of local councils was established that was geared to the twin principles of direct and indirect elections, and interlocking
three-tiered government set up, although implementation was purposely allowed to vary among the states" (Friedman, 1983:37).

Friedman (1983) and Slater and Watson (1985) have cast doubts on the ability of the decentralised systems in India to carry out their functions on the basis that actions by the centre will continue to limit their effectiveness. As Friedman (1983:37) said, "central government leaders have been unable to resolve the conflict between treating local institutions as an extension of the centre and referring to them as autonomous units".

China has been a communist country since the Mao Zedong led revolution took over power in 1949. The communist party of China has adopted Marxism-Leninism as its guiding ideology. Initially, China's developmental ideology was based on the model of the Soviet Union. From about 1957 onwards, however, China adopted its own brand of socialism believing that it would be better suited to its cultural and economic conditions (Maxwell and McFarlane, 1984). China's broad developmental objectives are to achieve equality between people by changing the character of social relations and to be self-reliant in material needs (Wu and Ip, 1983:163).

China is a unitary, multi-national state according to Article 3 of its constitution (2.6). Also according to the constitution, the organs of local government parallel the
administrative divisions of the functional departments under the central government. Thus there are people's congresses at province, county, district, sub-district, city district and town. Except at the lowest local level, where the congresses are elected directly, the people's congresses are elected by the congress on the next lower level. The local governments conduct their function through a system resembling the British type of council committees called people's revolutionary committees. Counties are divided into communes, "typically involving from 10,000 to 50,000 people" and covering "up to 100 natural villages" (Stavis, 1974:34). The Communes are subdivided into production Brigades comprising of about 250 households each. The Brigades are further divided into Teams of about 40 households, which often correspond to villages (Howe, 1978:31).

Mention must be made at this stage of the ubiquitous party apparatus whose structure goes parallel with that of the government at every level. Thus, as Waller wrote, "a government department on one level would be responsible not only to the corresponding department on the next higher level but also to the party committee on the same level" (Waller, 1981:103).

Lardy (1978) explained the combination of top-down and bottom-up planning methods that operate in China.

Economic planning in China is a complex process that proceeds simultaneously in two partially overlapping hierarchical systems. The national economic plan is essentially an aggregation of two fundamentally
different types of economic plans - those that are compiled according to vertical, sectoral lines of administration and those that are compiled on horizontal, territorial lines of administration. The sectoral plans are nationwide and cover all enterprises under the management of a single ministerial system, regardless of location. Horizontal plans, on the other hand, are compiled on a provincial basis and thus are multisectoral. However, they include only enterprises and institutions that are managed by local governments (Lardy, 1978:16).

Although the horizontal or provincial plans are centrally directed and controlled, decisions about production methods, what to produce as well as distribution is made locally (Wu and Ip, 1983:156). Within the limits set by the plan, the management of the Team’s resources is, for example, largely an internal matter.

Measures of Performances

Four different developmental models (ideological choices) were discussed above: Tanzania’s "popular socialism"; Kenya’s "modified capitalism"; India’s liberal economy and, China’s Marxist-Leninism. Comparing consequences of the developmental choices in these countries is not an easy undertaking particularly with some factors that require qualitative assessment, for example, human dignity. However, a combination of several hard facts can assist in qualitative assessment. Young (1983) used six sets of criteria to guide his judgement on "ideology, the post-colonial state and development in Africa", which are: growth, equality, autonomy, human dignity, participation and capacity. Following a combination of Young’s (1983), Malenbaun and Stolper’s (1978)
and Uphoff and Esman's (1974) methodologies, therefore, the four developmental models will be comparatively reviewed below for the two pairs of countries under consideration. For simplification, Young's set of six criteria are narrowed into three: Economic growth and distribution, quality of life, and, decentralisation and participation.

1. Economic Growth and Distribution: Tanzania and Kenya have probably received more attention in the international development debate than any other countries in Africa. Being neighbours and both having had the same colonial historical experiences and then taking different developmental modalities after independence have obviously induced the interest in them. At the heart of this interest has been the question of whether the experiences of these countries would provide answers to the debate about alternative strategies in the rest of Africa (2.7).

### Table 2.1. Basic economic indicators

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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to the World Bank (1991) definition, countries with GNP per capita below 500 dollars are low income economies. By this economic yardstick, Tanzania, Kenya, India and China are all among the least developed countries of the world. Although growth as measured by GNP per capita alone cannot serve as an indicator for performance, nevertheless, there is a strong correlation between the extent of poverty in a country and its GNP per capita and so it cannot be dismissed either (World Bank Staff, 1983:82; Young, 1982:298). In 1989, a quarter of a century after Tanzania and Kenya gained their independence, the state of their economies (table 2.1) remained, in real terms, more or less static in the former and with only modest progress achieved by the latter. From table 2.2, the deterioration of Tanzania's industrial and manufacturing output can be seen. By 1989, the contribution of gross domestic product from the sectors identified was only one half of what it was in 1965. The major shift in emphasis in Tanzania's economy towards agriculture is clear. Kenya's production structure, on the other hand, remained largely unchanged during the period although the comparatively higher increase in the Gross Nation Product is an indication of the expansion that took place in all the sectors (see table 2.2).
Table 2.2: Structure of Production

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1965 GDP (millions of $)</th>
<th>1989 GDP (millions of $)</th>
<th>Agriculture 65</th>
<th>Industry 89</th>
<th>Manufacturing 65</th>
<th>Services 89</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>790</td>
<td>2,540</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>920</td>
<td>7,130</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>50,530</td>
<td>235,220</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>67,200</td>
<td>417,830</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The suggestion that socialist systems are more egalitarian does certainly hold true when the income distribution patterns of the two East African countries are compared (table 2.3). Whilst in Tanzania the lowest 40% of the population's share of household income in 1969 was 16%, the comparative figure in Kenya in 1974 was only 8.9%. This does not of course mean that households in Tanzania are better off than households in Kenya because of the overall weakness of the economy in the former.

Tanzania's watchers, left and right, are now admitting, pointing to its insurmountable current problems, that its self-reliance strategy has been a failure (Jackson and Rosberg, 1986; Hyden, 1983). After a spurt of high economic achievement in the first decade following independence, Kenya's performance has also run out of steam. Ironically, some policy prescriptions being suggested by students of the
two countries have been for complete reversal of their political strategies. For example, Hyden (1983) argues that the only way out for Tanzania is a return to a market economy whilst for Kenya an adaptation of "state socialism" was suggested by Leys (1980).

Compared with India, China has achieved remarkable social and economic progress, its economy increasing at a rate of 5% between 1960 and 1989 (table 2.1). The difference in performance could be associated with the proportionately greater investment China made in both industry and manufacture as the contribution of these sectors to the GDP indicate (table 2.2). In India, however, "no great priority has been given to machine tools since the mid 1960s ..whose poor performance constitutes strong evidence for structural retrogression in the industrial sector" (see Byres, 1982:152).

India's average annual growth rate between 1965 and 1989 was a mere 1.8% but its inflation was running at a rate of 7.5% during the same period (table 2.1). The impact of this situation on the standard of living would inevitably have been graver compared to China which experienced no inflationary pressure about that period. Malenbaum and Stolper (1978), in their comparative performance study of India and China, which covered the period between 1950-59, made a valid observation on the difference in approach concerning the management of the two countries' economies.
The Chinese put more effort into expanding physical output as against services [see table 2.2]...the degree of utilization of resources, and especially labour, was increased significantly. Over the whole period, government played a much larger role in economic life in China than in India. ..By and large, China's economic progress has been steady. In India, government adheres to models of growth which are permissive; comparatively few restraints are imposed on individuals whose usual way of life did not in the past generate economic expansion. ..The total performance has been less even; the degree of plan fulfilment has not increased steadily, for example (Malenbaum and Stolper, 1978:124).

Table 2.3: Income Distribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Lowest 20%</th>
<th>Second quintile</th>
<th>Third quintile</th>
<th>Fourth quintile</th>
<th>Highest 20%</th>
<th>Highest 10%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>35.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>60.4</td>
<td>45.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1975-76</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>33.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Lowest 40%

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Urban 25</th>
<th>Rural 20</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Except for China (see note), other figures are extracted from World Bank Report 1983. The World Bank.


Concerning the distribution of income in India and China, the available data (table 2.3) does not provide a clear picture for direct comparison. However, it does help to indicate in a general way that income is more evenly distributed in China than in India. By Third World countries' standards, it is
remarkable that the richest 10% of all households in China earned less than 30% of the total household income in 1970. In Kenya, the highest 10% earned as much as 46% of all household income in 1974, in socialist Tanzania more than 35% in 1969 and in India, over 33% in 1975-76.

2. Quality of Life: Abizadeh and Basilevsky (1986), applying what they called "a maximum likelihood factor analysis technique", made a socioeconomic classification of 64 countries using data for 21 variables from the "World Development Report 1983" of the World Bank. The variables were selected to reflect three major theoretical criteria or dimensions: industrial development-underdevelopment, high-low income, and quality of life. Abizadeh and Basilevsky's factor analysis on the "quality of life dimension" provides an ordered linear ranking, from the lowest to the highest, of the sixty four countries. Their findings clearly show that Kenya did better than Tanzania on all three counts. A quick glance at tables 2.4 and 2.5 will confirm this finding. It can be seen that Kenya has a better health service than Tanzania, as reflected by the number of physicians available and by the lower mortality rate (table 2.4). From table 2.5, the indication is also that Kenyans are better fed than Tanzanians as a higher ratio of their daily calorie requirement per capita was met in 1977. A reflection of the overall health situation is also that life expectancy at birth was higher in Kenya in 1980 than in Tanzania (table 2.5). In education, again Kenya did better than Tanzania judging by the higher
enrolment ratio in primary education in 1965 and in 1988 (table 2.4). It was thus the scaling of all these factors which gave Kenya a higher rating than Tanzania in the Abezadeh and Basilevsky study.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>21,700</td>
<td>24,980</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>5,490</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>2,063</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>13,280</td>
<td>10,050</td>
<td>1,930</td>
<td>n.a</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>2,032</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>4,880</td>
<td>2,520</td>
<td>6,500</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>2,021</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>n.a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>1,010</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>1,610</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2,441</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>n.a</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: (*) should read 'as percentage of requirement'.

India, but not China, was also one of the 64 countries in the Abezadeh Basilevsky study. In terms of quality of life, India is at a lower scale than both Tanzania and Kenya according to the study finding. From tables 2.4 and 2.5, it can also be observed that China does better than India in all aspects. It is, therefore, safe to conclude that had China been included in the study, the result would have shown a higher quality of life scaling in its favour not only over India but also over
Table 2.5: Social indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Life expectancy at birth (years)</th>
<th>% of cohort persisting to grade 4</th>
<th>Females per 100 males</th>
<th>Percentage of population with access to safe water</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>n.a</td>
<td>n.a</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


A word of caution needs to be expressed at this stage. Demographic and economic variables alone may not be sufficient measures of quality of life. Human dignity must also feature as an important criterion in the performance assessment of states. Repressive and authoritarian measures, lack of freedom of expression and all the variables that come under the umbrella of human rights could be as important variables as the demographic and economic variables in the measurement of quality of life. For example, Young (1982:313) has suggested that indirect indicators such as the flight of refugees from their country of origin should be considered as...
direct evidence of repression. Adding these human dignity measures may not have significantly changed the outcome of the scaling of the country cases under consideration here but their inclusion could make significant difference in other cases.

3. Decentralisation and Participation: As discussed above, the four case countries have embraced decentralisation as a mechanism for development administration. Accordingly, all have assigned responsibilities for primary education and primary health care services to their local authorities. A measure of the performance of these services has therefore a direct bearing on the degree of decentralisation and participation, whatever ideology might exist. The evidence (tables 2.4 and 2.5) is that decentralisation performed better in Kenya than in Tanzania. This can be contrasted with the niceties in the Tanzanian law which empowered the minister responsible for local government to promote "meaningful involvement of and participation by the people in the making of decisions affecting or connected with their livelihood and well-being at all local levels" Mawhood (1983:103). However, Mawhood (1983:99), in his study on "the search for participation in Tanzania", concluded that "economically, Tanzania did no better than her neighbours, and in many ways worse, during the 1970s... Management in the rural sector was quite clearly not giving the nation what it needed". The decentralisation measures introduced in Tanzania, it is widely believed now, "have had precisely the opposite effect from the
publicly stated [policy]; they have increased central control and reduced opportunities for citizen participation" (Tordoff, 1984:282; Fortmann, 1980:60; Lundqvist, 1981:338).

There was an inherent contradiction in Tanzania's decentralisation policy because it became clear as it was being implemented that the scope for such local participation was small (Lundqvist, 1981:338). As Hyden (1983:93) explained: "people were often consulted by government and party officials, but the decisions about priorities and the design of programmes remained the prerogative of the officials. Thus it is difficult to conclude that the rural people of Tanzania benefited in terms of being able to make decisions affecting their own future welfare".

Kenya's relative economic superiority over Tanzania's should not conceal the fact that it is still among the least developed countries in the world. In 1970, the country introduced a major decentralisation reform and, as in Tanzania, its main objective was to improve participation by local authorities in the identification and execution of development projects. To implement this objective, planning development committees were established initially at the province level but later at the district level. But, again as in Tanzania, "the planning development committees had no influence on national decisions; ministers in Nairobi largely ignored their recommendations" (Rondinelli, 1983:81). The poor results in tables 2.4 and 2.5 are measures of
inefficiency, whatever the reason might be, of Kenya's local government.

Turning to China, it can be seen from tables 2.4 and 2.5 that it has done a lot better than India in the delivery of its social services. This again is a measure of China's more effective decentralisation mechanism as compared to India's. An elaborate comparative case study made on some selected Asian countries, including India and China, by Uphoff and Esman in 1974 confirms this conclusion. The study was designed to find out the impact of "local organisation" on "rural development". Uphoff and Esman came to the conclusion that "in the Asian context and probably elsewhere, rural development measured in terms of agricultural productivity, income distribution, and composite welfare criteria is hard to achieve without active and effective local institutions" (Uphoff and Esman, 1974:97). The study findings show China to be among the more organised countries and, compared with India, it performed better in almost every aspect of rural welfare put under test, including: security of rural people (the three dimensions considered were, protection from natural disaster, protection against violence and access to justice, population and employment, and, political-administrative participation (see table 2.6)).
Table 2.6: Indicators\(^1\) of Rural Political-Administrative Participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Electoral Control of Rural Development Resources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total parti- bureaucracy policy influences allocations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>10 1 4 2 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>9 3 2 2 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Uphoff and Eswaran, 1974:56.
Note: 1. The comparative estimates for the four dimensions were scored on scales of 0 to 5.

From table 2.6, (note that data are nearly twenty years old) India's comparatively high score could be misleading. The score was a reflection of India's democratic political heritage but, as Mathur (1983) explained, power is a monopoly of a few powerful people at a local level who manipulate it. Concerning decentralisation policies, for example, Mathur (1983:74) observed that it created a new power base for "local vested interests" whose strength "determined the extent to which administration could be decentralised" to lower tiers.

A measure of China's comparative superiority of administrative effectiveness is the high score registered under the "control of bureaucracy" criterion as shown in table 2.6.

China's acclaimed achievement, many observers believe (see Stavis, 1974; World Bank, 1980:78; Kitching, 1982:103), has largely been due to the capability of its leadership in building on important lessons and on its capacity to adjust accordingly (Selden, 1984:2). China is ruled by the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP). The CCP mobilises society to achieve party-determined goals through its cadres whose role is to guide and translate party policies. The Party is organised on the principle of "democratic centralism": the democratic aspect of this concept refers to the election of party committees by the party congress at each level in the hierarchy (Waller, 1981:48). The party committees at each level are responsible for ensuring the implementation of plans and that government organs and peoples' organisations on their levels obey party directives.

From the preceding discussions, it would be hard to claim that the decentralisation system of government in India is more democratic than that of China. What is the purpose of decentralisation after all if it is not made to function as intended to? In other words, the higher score India registered on the "electoral" variable in table 6 may not be justifiable. One of the differences in local government management between China and India is that whilst in the former administrative control is a mechanism quite openly, officially and strictly exercised, in the latter this task is to a considerable extent manipulated by "interest groups" and so hardly democratic. In the final analysis, therefore, it may well be the case that more people participate in local government functions in China than in India.
Conclusion: Underlying Factors

A common trend that emerges from the main themes of nation-building, the management of ethnic diversity and development administration, discussed above, is that national integration and economic development are not determined by mere adherence to an ideology nor by the acquisition of one or other economic model. Political stability and economic development are determined by the availability of a "strong" and interventionist state, even more so in situations where multi-ethnicity and underdevelopment are dominant features. If a weak state is one that lacks competence, a strong state is one with the capacity to draw up workable policies and one which is able to respond to arising problems proficiently.

The recent experience of the East European countries provides some insight into the kind of problems that may befall many African countries. Without imaginative measures to avert the impending ethnic problems, "Balkanisation" along ethnoregional lines is more a certainty than a likelihood in many African countries. The recent Ethiopian experience, where a combination of ethnoregional forces managed to smash the existing hegemonial power may, however, offer some hope for an alternative scenario to Balkanisation. The qualification is that the forces that took over power in Ethiopia are still grappling with establishing a new political order.

From the comparative analysis above, it can be said that no simple ideologic-administrative-developmental relationship
exists. Ideology is, as Plamnatz (1970:15) usefully defined it, "a set of closely related beliefs or ideas, or even attitudes, characteristic of a group or community". In politics, therefore, ideology is a set of ideas, a vision of a preferred, ideal society, that governments may recognise as a goal to aim for. Throughout the discussion in this chapter, the main interest has been in how the competency of governments determines the achievement of a certain ideology — a goal. It cannot be the other way round; competence and achievement are not determined by ideology.

Jackson and Rosberg (1986) are critical of Tanzania's socialist experiment which, they say, "was flawed in its conception and that Nyrere's government was the author of some of the misfortunes". Some commentators attribute Tanzania's troubles to inept implementation (Hyden, 1983; Lundqvist, 1981) but, to Jackson and Rosberg, the root of the problem was, "more than most other African political economies...the result of an ambitious rationalist design" (Jackson and Rosberg, 1986:217). However, an ambitious design cannot be regarded as a rationalist design. Tanzania's strategy was rather based on an ambitious and irrational design (see Lundqvist, 1981:341-342). This irrationality is evident from the apparent gap between the developmental design and state competency to implement it (Fortmann 1980). To Lundqvist (1981:339), blame for this incompetence lay with the state bureaucracy which became a hindrance in much the same way as in Tuma's (1988) explanation of "Institutional Obstacles to
Unlike in Tanzania, China's comparative success story can be attributed to the capacity of the government leadership to produce implementable rational designs and to their ability to translate them into reality. As mentioned earlier, China's state competency to learn from its mistakes and "to proceed from China's reality" (Shaozhi, 1982:17) has been a main factor in its progress. (China is at present undertaking a programme of economic liberalisation but, as the Tienman Square incident showed, it has not been accompanied by political liberalisation. Whether political liberalisation would bring stability in China is, however, questionable). Malenbaum and Stolper's (1978) cogent assessment of these issues is worth quoting.

China's ties to a Russian model of rapid, large-scale industrialization did not impede early recognition of the emptiness of industrialization without agricultural advancement in a nation where most people will long remain rural; of the complementarities, rather than the competitiveness, of large industry and many types of small enterprises suitable to a heavy endowment of labour. Important deviations from Communist economic lore were soon made in the allocation of large percentages of investment resources to agriculture and small scale sector. A form of communal organization was created with continuous and strong guidance and controls to assure the change that the economy on its own could not generate.

The government of India's models of growth are largely derived from the patterns and relationships found in Western capitalist societies; neither the concepts, nor the values, of the multipliers relevant to a market-economy in the throes of expansion are directly applicable in an institutionalised and static society. The major task of rural improvement and growth was placed upon a national community development and extension scheme. While this action recognised the need,
especially in the initial years, of injecting into rural India a new force for change, government did not provide the programmes with sustained, strong leadership. (emphasis added)

The imperative of strong leadership needs to be re-emphasised. As will be discussed in the case of the Sudan in the following chapters, the acute problem with leadership has had dire consequences for the processes of nation-building.
PART II

BACKGROUND ON THE SUDAN
FIGURE 3.1: POLITICAL MAP
THE SUDAN AT INDEPENDENCE, 1956

CHAPTER 3

STATE FORMATION AND THE NORTH-SOUTH DIVIDE

Introduction

Like all African countries, the geographic entity which is now known as the Sudan is a colonial creation. This chapter deals with the process by which the Sudan was forged into a nation state and the nationalist political movements that emerged and eventually took over power. The chapter will also deal with the analysis of how the creation of the Sudan brought different ethnic groups together and with the conflict that developed along the north-south divide.

In 1972, the north south conflict was resolved when the warring factions concluded a peace accord in Addis Ababa. An understanding of how the peace process was managed and then peace achieved is of great importance in any study of the Sudan and hence the last section focusses on the political commitment which made it possible.

PRE-INDEPENDENCE AND THE ROOTS OF THE NORTH-SOUTH DIVIDE

The Making of the Sudan

Bilad al Sudan, "The Land of the Blacks", is an Arabic expression which was used to describe the lands lying south of the Sahara in Africa. It was a reference to the fact that the first Arab traders came into contact here with the black peoples of Africa (see Boateng, 1978:50-51). In modern
geography, also, the term 'Sudan' is used to describe the belt which stretches across Africa approximately between latitudes 10 degrees and 20 degrees north of the equator, except for the part normally known as the Horn of Africa comprising Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea and Djibouti (see Herskovits, 1965:19). The present Republic of the Sudan occupies part of this great Sudan belt and "consists of the territory administered under the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium regime from 1898 to 1955. It is a recent administrative creation, whose origin does not go far beyond the early part of the nineteenth century" (Beshir, 1968:1). Beshir ascribes the origin of modern Sudan to the Turko-Egyptian rule (3.1), 1820-1885, under which the country was administratively united for the first time (see also Salih, 1974:13).

Sudanese history before the Turko-Egyptian rule was one "of kingdoms and tribes, bonded in the North by the influence of Islam" (Norris, 1983:51; Salih, 1974:16). On the other hand, little was known of the South Sudan until a successful penetration of the Sudd, a swamp covering a large area in the South, was made in 1839 by an expedition organized by the Turko-Egyptian regime in an effort to discover the source of the White Nile. In contrast to North Sudan, Arab and Islamic influences were never important factors in the South. "Self-contained tribal units with a structure and organization based on traditional African heritage and beliefs are still dominant" (Norwegian Church Relief Sudan Programme, Progress Report No.7, 1977:13). The Sudan is normally thought of,
according to Beshir, "as a country of two peoples and made out of two different halves - the North Sudan and the Southern Sudan". "This conception arose", Beshir wrote, "not only as a result of the existence of two physical types of people or two different administrative policies followed during the condominium administration, but as a result of the different physical and climate features obtaining in South and North" (Beshir, 1968:1).

The Sudan, however, is a much more complex country in terms of its geography, ethnicity, and cultural composition and the generalisation of a north-south divide is highly inaccurate. This diversity has caused some writers to describe the Sudan as a microcosm of Africa (Al-Rahim, 1985:228; Voll and Voll, 1985:6). This is not without justification because "the Sudan contains within its borders representatives of all the major defined groupings of languages in Africa, except the Khoisan languages of Southern Africa (Stevenson, 1985:11). Fadlalla (1979:32) demonstrated the extent of Sudan's linguistic and ethnic diversity thus:

[In the Sudan]. . .there are about 115 languages, 26 major ones, 56 ethnic groups subdivided into 597 subgroups, 43 non-Arabic tribes, more than ten Islamic religious sects [and] numerous non-Islamic religious sects...

In the area now known as north Sudan, the ancient inhabitants were of Hamitic origin who became culturally arabacised by muslim Arabs entering the country from Arabia and Egypt (Ross, 1969:4). North Sudan was also influenced by negroid people
from the south who made their way through tribal conquests (El-Mahdi, 1965). The Shilluk, now occupying a relatively small area on the western side of the White Nile in the Upper Nile Province of south Sudan, had ruled a vast area of the north of Sudan. "As late as the mid-nineteenth century their northern limit was the island of Aba, thirty years later to be the cradle of the Mahdia" (Holt and Daly, 1988:3). North Sudan is today occupied by an admixture of peoples of various descent - Hamites, Negroids and Arabs. In the census of 1956 only 39 per cent of the population of the Sudan claimed Arab descent, 28 per cent of the population were non-Arab northerners, 30 per cent were southerners and there were 3 per cent others. Also, "despite common language, religion and self-identification, Arabs do not constitute a cohesive group" (Kaplan, 1982:89). Those who claim Arab descent are overwhelmingly dominant in the province of Khartoum, and in the Central (some times referred to as Middle) and Northern regions and less so but still a majority in Kordofan and Darfur regions (see figure 1). The other significant ethnic groups in northern Sudan are the Nubians whose homeland is the river valley in the far northern Sudan, the Beja speaking peoples of the Red Sea and Kassala provinces of the Eastern region and the Fur of Darfur province in west Sudan.

As figure 3.1 on the following page shows, the southern Sudan contains "a bewildering variety of ethnic groups and languages" (Holt and Daly, 1988:3). In the 1955-56 census the
Table 3.1: Classification of Principal Languages in the Sudan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AFRO-ASIATIC</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Semitic</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cushitic</td>
<td>Beja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIGER-KORDIFANIAN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Niger-Congo:</td>
<td>Bodo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bantu</td>
<td>Huma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bangala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Adamawa-Eastern:</td>
<td>Golo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>Zande, Pambia etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sere-Mundu group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kordofanian</td>
<td>Koalib-Moro group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Teqali-Tagoli group</td>
<td>Masakin group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Masalin group</td>
<td>Kadugli-Krongo group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Katla, Tim</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NILO-SAHARAN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saharan</td>
<td>Zaghawa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Berti</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maban</td>
<td>Masalit</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fur</td>
<td>Fur</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shari-Nile:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Sudanic</td>
<td>Nubian Group</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Didinga-Murle group</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tabi (or Ingassana)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nyimang, Afitti</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Temein</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tama, Mararit, Sungor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Daju group</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berti</td>
<td>Berta</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Sudanic</td>
<td>Bongo, Baka, etc</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kreish</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Binga, Yulu, Kara</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Muru-Madi group</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coman</td>
<td>Komam Gumuz, Uduk</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ganza, Gwama, Gule</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Highlighted are the main linguistic groups in south Sudan. Source, R.C. Stevenson, 1985:10
Nilotes constituted more than three fifths of the peoples of south Sudan (Kaplan, 1982:96). The Nilotes are dominated by the Dinka ethnic group who constitute two thirds of the category. In south Sudan as a whole, the Dinka make up 40 per cent of the population and nearly 11 per cent in the Sudan as a whole, according to the 1955-56 census. But the Dinka people are not a culturally homogeneous society and, according to Deng (1973), consist of about twenty five independent tribal groups. The next largest ethnic groups are the Nuer followed by the Shilluk who again are of the Nilotic division. The Nilotic group between them dominate four of the six provinces of south Sudan, namely, Bahr El Ghazal, Lakes, Jonglei and Upper Nile. Other major ethnic groups in south Sudan are the Bari and the Azande who inhabit the Western Equatoria province and the Latuko and Toposa who inhabit Eastern Equatoria province.

In what is now the northern Sudan, the coming of the Arabs in the seventeenth century and their assimilation into the indigenous population made it possible for larger areas to acquire a common language and culture and, in turn, to form larger social organisations. The kingdoms of Funj and Fur, for example, were to control most of what is now northern Sudan between them from the early sixteenth century onwards. The Funj kingdom had a government structure which in modern times would have been called a decentralised system. The kingdom was divided into two administrative regions and each region in turn was divided into "petty kingdoms" or
sheikhdoms. The Fur Sultanate was also divided into regions with each region in turn divided into districts and each district into sheikhdoms. But, unlike the Funj Kingdom, the Fur Sultanate had a highly centralised system of government where authority was hierarchically structured. Leadership at each level of the hierarchy was by direct appointment from the centre. Thus, the northern Sudan already had relatively highly developed and sophisticated forms of government administration when it was invaded by the Turko-Egyptian army in 1820. In the case of south Sudan, which was isolated by a series of formidable geographical barriers, its distance from centres of civilization in the north contributed to the relative cultural, material and political underdevelopment of its population (Gray, 1961:9).

The Turko-Egyptian Rule

The Turko-Egyptian invasion of the Sudan was carried out in stages. The first of the existing kingdoms to fall was the Funj Kingdom. It was not until some fifty years had elapsed that the Fur Kingdom was finally defeated and its territory added to the Turko-Egyptian rule (El-Mahdi, 1965:77-78). The invasion of the Sudan by the Turko-Egyptian (3.2) regime was for the personal expediency of Muhamed Ali, Viceroy of Egypt. Muhamed Ali Pasha, who ruled Egypt from 1805-1849, was at the height of his fame when he invaded the Sudan in 1820. His power was such that the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire recognized his rule over the Sudan for the duration of his lifetime. That is, "the administration of the Sudan was
independent of the Porte (3.3) and was closely controlled by Muhamed Ali himself" (Gray, 1961:3). The main motive for Muhamed Ali's invasion of the Sudan, as Barbour says, "appears to have been to establish an empire for the sake of the revenues that he could draw from it, whether in gold or in slaves to serve in his army" (Gray, 1961:3).

Whether or not Muhamed Ali Pasha's initial intentions were to reap the riches of the Sudan, the Turko-Egyptian regime played an important role in the development of the Sudan, almost exclusively though in the northern part. During this regime, different varieties of crops, fruits and vegetables hitherto unknown in the Sudan were introduced; ox-drawn ploughs were encouraged; boat-building and navigation were developed along the Nile (Barbour, 1961:266). In later years a number of factories were in operation and large plantations were worked by slaves (Hill, 1959:70). As Hill also notes, in appreciation of the plan Khedive Ismail of Egypt had for the Sudan:

Ismail's Schemes for the development of the Sudan embraced every phase of economic planning known to his day. The Sudan company was formed with his encouragement in 1863 to build railways and launch river steamers as well as to foster the export trade... (Hill, 1954:122).

In contrast, the Egyptian role in the development of southern Sudan was disappointing:

They established a government monopoly in the ivory trade and actively pursued, at least at first, the trade in slaves, whom they transmitted to the markets of Egypt and Arabia. Later, a perfunctory effort was made in 1854 by Said, Viceroy of Egypt, to suppress the trade but nothing very much was achieved in this direction until 1874 when Gordon...
was appointed to be the Governor of Equatoria. His work was certainly aided by the fleet of Nile steamers which had been brought to Khartoum after 1864" (Barbour, 1961:266).

The Turko-Egyptian regime was by no means a popular regime in the Sudan. The regime's ruthlessnes in the exaction of taxes was strongly resented, particularly by the Northern Sudanese who were subjected to heavy taxation on their properties, whether on their agricultural produce, their animals or their domestic slaves. Another source of conflict between the North Sudanese and the Turko-Egyptian regime was the latter's attempt to suppress slavery following international pressure. "To the Northerners it was illogical that taxation, which they considered unjustified, should be imposed on them while their main source of income (slavery) was outlawed" (Deng, 1973:19; see also El Mahdi, 1965:79; Hill, 1959:146).

For the southern Sudanese the discontent with the Turko-Egyptian rule lay with the regime's record on slavery. During the regime's period slave trading in South Sudan reached such an extent that it was responsible for causing "far-reaching devastating effects on the social fabric of Southern Sudan (Wai, 1981:29). Samuel Baker's observation on his second trip to the South (3.4) is a clear account of the effects of slave trading in the South. He wrote:

"It is impossible to describe the change that has taken place since I last visited this country. It was then a perfect garden, thickly populated and producing all that man would desire. The villages were numerous, groves of plants fringed the steep
cliff on the river bank, and the natives were neatly
dressed in the bark cloth of the country. The scene
has changed. All is wilderness. The population has
fled. Not a village is to be seen. This is the
certain result of the settlement of Khartoum
traders. They kidnap the women and children for
slaves and plunder and destroy wherever they set

The discontent with the Turko-Egyptian regime, although
founded on opposing grounds in North and South Sudan, was such
that when Muhamed Ahmed declared himself the Mahdi (3.5) in
March 1881 and "called upon the people to rally with him
against the Turks" (Abdel-Rahim, 1978:11) his call received
widespread support. The Mahdi's support was, as expected,
stronger in the north but "in some places the southerners
joined forces with the Mahdists against the Turko-Egyptian
forces" (Wai, 1981:30; Deng, 1973:20). Under the leadership
of the Mahdi, "the apparently minor rebellion was rapidly
transformed into a Jihad (a holy war) and a nation wide
revolution. After four years of guerilla warfare during which
the Mahdists won a succession of victories against government
forces, Khartoum fell to the Mahdi on 26th January 1885 and
with it the Turko-Egyptian rule in the Sudan was over. Thus,
the Mahdist rule was the first independent government of
modern Sudan.

The Mahdist Regime
The Mahdist regime was to last for thirteen years (1885-1898).
The Madhi himself did not live long; he died suddenly six
months after the fall of Khartoum. He was succeeded, on his
own recommendation, by his Khalifa, his principal deputy (see
"The Mahdist regime was essentially Islamic and nationalistic .... Islamic law was applied in its literal sense and the spread of the divinely-inspired mission was vigorously undertaken" (Deng, 1973:20; see also El Mahdi, 1965:98). The two guiding principles of the Mahdiya government were that, firstly, Islam and the teachings of the Qur'an be accepted by all the Mahdi's followers and secondly, that the Islamic constitution and its laws be adopted (see in El Mahdi, 1965:97).

Under the Mahdiya government, the Khalifa was the supreme head of state. "He was not only the ultimate authority in the administrative system but its prime mover...No political decision of any importance could be taken without reference to him; indeed throughout his reign the initiative seems to have lain with him alone" (Holt, 1970:250-251).

The centre of administration of the Mahdiya state was Omdurman, one of the three towns that make up Greater Khartoum. The frontiers of the Mahdist state were never demarcated. War with neighbouring countries and internal rebellion led to gains and losses on every side (Holt: 1970:244). However, the country was divided into twelve provinces and each province was ruled by a governor (Amir) who was directly responsible to the Khalifa. The Amir was, all at the same time, "a political officer, civil administrator and military administrator" (Salih, 1974:15). "Under each Amir came a number of Umal (singular Amil) who collected the taxes"
The Mahdist state was never able to establish complete authority or effective administration in the South (Beshir, 1968:15-16). This ineffectiveness of the Mahdists in the South was to open the way to the renewal of slave trading and anarchy.

The Mahdist regime was no less ruthless than the Turko-Egyptian regime it succeeded. The Mahdists dealt with any internal uprisings, and there were several of them, "with great cruelty and finality" (El Mahdi, 1965:105). The Mahdists' rule in south Sudan, for example, left scars of bitterness the memories of which were to persist from generation to generation. Wai (1981:31) explains:

Scars of brutality inflicted on the Southern Sudanese still remain. The Mahdist invasion upset the traditional pattern of tribal life and left nothing but anarchy and fear - strong enough to defeat the Negroids but never sufficiently strong to establish their hegemony over them, the Mahdists were compelled to raid again and again not only to maintain their position but also to secure even the most essential supplies. And the only lasting result of these continual raids was the Southerners' hatred and fear of the Northern Sudanese".

The events which led to both the success and the downfall of the Mahdist era were dictated by events occurring in Egypt itself. Firstly, the construction of the Suez Canal just before the Mahdist uprising in the Sudan had driven the country to near bankruptcy. The Khedive of the time was unable to meet Egypt's financial obligations to its creditors and recommendations made by a committee of inquiry to improve
the financial situation were rejected by the Khedive as they included measures that would have curtailed his power. As a result of the protestations of the creditors, the Khedive was deposed by decree of the Sultan of Turkey and replaced by a "more pliant Khedive" (Fieldhouse, 1966:183). But merely replacing the Khedive did not solve the financial problem in Egypt and in the ensuing disorder a nationalist uprising was to emerge led by Colonel Arabi who, by 1882, had gained control of most of Egypt.

It was thus at a time when Egypt was in a state of civil war that the Mahdist uprising started in the Sudan. Egypt had, at that time, no effective government at home let alone one capable of defending its interests in the Sudan. It was at the time of the nationalist movement in Egypt also that Britain intervened militarily on the pretext of helping the Egyptian government against Arabi. In August 1882 Arabi was defeated and the Khedive was reinstated. However, as it turned out, Britain was to remain in Egypt for the next thirty years (1882-1913), effectively controlling it. Feis (1964:390-391) explains the dual British and Egyptian Government arrangement that functioned during this period as follows:

"The British Consul-General was given authority over all the English advisers that were placed in the Egyptian ministries. From 1883 to 1907 Lord Cromer held this place and, under the Egyptian constitution of 1883, was the real governing power of Egypt. The Khedive was dependent upon him. The Egyptian representative bodies could advise and criticize the executive branch of the government but could not
directly oppose it. The most important of the other English advisers was the financial adviser who had a seat in the Council of Ministers. Though he possessed no vote, the British Government enforced the rule that "no financial decision should be taken without his consent, which gave him an extensive power over all government operations".

The British presence in Egypt was thus to mark the beginning of what was to be called the "scramble for Africa". As Fieldhouse (1966:184) explains, "Egypt, therefore, became a key factor in the diplomacy of colonial partition after 1882; for Britain, hitherto the arch-exponent of a 'hands-off' policy, had broken the ring and had taken one of the plums before others had staked their claims. Egypt did not cause the partition of Africa but its occupation by Britain significantly influenced the latter course of events".

Following the loss of the Sudan by the Turko-Egyptian regime with the fall of Khartoum, the British Government adopted a policy of non-interference despite the Egyptian Government's displeasure. The idea that whoever controls the Upper Nile controls Egypt had always been an Egyptian belief. Samuel Baker had written that "a hostile power could readily dam the Upper Nile, starve Egypt of water and so destroy the country" (see in Robinson and Gallagher, 1981 (ed), p.283). The reversal of the British policy of non-interference in the Sudan came with the Italian occupation of Eritrea. The long-held British view that "the savage tribes who ... rule in the Sudan do not possess the resources or the engineering skill to do any real harm to Egypt" (see Robinson & Gallagher, 1981:285) had now become redundant with the possibility of a
foreign power occupying the Sudan. From November 1889 onwards, Britain adopted, as a general principle, the view that all parts of the Nile Valley were essential to the safety of Egypt.

Thus the safety of the Nile had by now become a supreme consideration, and the policy was quickly put into effect. On 7 March 1820 (Britain) warned the Italians off the Nile .... The new strategy also forced (Britain) to consider the defensive policy of the past six years in the Sudan. ...... Three reasons (were given) for doing so; in the first place, Egypt's finances had now turned the corner; secondly, the dervish movement has been going rapidly downhill; and thirdly, diplomacy could not be relied on for ever to ward off other Powers. In the end, occupation alone could make certain of the Upper Nile. The Prime Minister agreed that sooner or later the Sudan would have to be conquered" (see in Robinson & Gallagher, 1981:286).

By 1894, the threat of a foreign power occupying the Nile Valley had become real. Italy had gained territory by defeating the Mahdists in the east. Threats of Belgian and French intrusion from the south were also becoming a reality (3.6). The British and the Egyptians had no option but to act and soon. The Anglo-Egyptian offensive against the Mahdists began in 1896 and was completed by 1898 after the fall of Omdurman, the Mahdists' capital. Thus started the period of Anglo-Egyptian rule in the Sudan, generally known as the Condominium, which was to last for over fifty years. On January 19, 1899, the Anglo-Egyptian agreement was signed by which Britain was given the trusteeship of the country based on the right of conquest.
The Condominium Period

Beshir (1974:20) contended that the Anglo-Egyptian agreement was without precedence in international law. In answer to the question of why and how the agreement was arrived at, Beshir (1974:20) explains, quoting Lord Cromer, the British Consul-General of Egypt at the time:

England not Egypt had in reality conquered the country. It is true that the Egyptian Treasury had borne the greater burden of the cost and that Egyptian troops, officered, however, by Englishmen, had taken a very honourable part in the campaign. But, alike during the period of the preparation and of the execution of the policy, the guiding hand had been that of England. It is absurd to suppose that without the British assistance in the form of men, money, and general guidance, the Egyptian Government could have reconquered the Sudan. "From this point of view, therefore, the annexation of the reconquered territories by England would have been partially justifiable".

Thus, although the Anglo-Egyptian agreement gave the British more than a mere partner's role, nevertheless this did not make the Sudan a British colony. As Beshir (1974:21) says, "for all practical considerations the Sudan was an 'autonomous' independent state governed by British administrators assisted by junior Egyptian officials". Internationally, British presence in the Sudan was defended in the name of Egypt. It was also in the name of Egypt that the French were forced to leave Fashoda (3.7) or else risk the possibility of a real war. The anomaly was, however, that when, in later years, Egyptian claims over the Sudan were gaining momentum, the British removed all Egyptian junior officers working in the Sudan to undermine Egypt's influence
there (see, for example, in Beshir, 1974).

The coming to power of a revolutionary government in Egypt in 1952 was to be the beginning of a new era in the relationship between the condominium partners on the one hand and between Egypt and the Sudan on the other. The new revolutionary government of Egypt was willing to accept Sudanese nationalist demands for immediate self-government leading to self-determination in due course. An Anglo-Egyptian agreement was signed in February 1953 to this effect. "The transitional period of self-government preceding self-determination was limited in the agreement to a maximum of three years from the 'appointed day'" (El Mahdi, 1965:147).

Parliamentary elections were held in November and December 1953 and, at its first sitting on 7 January 1954, a Prime Minister was elected to lead the transitional government. By 19 December 1955 the House of Representatives had passed a resolution declaring the independence of the Sudan. Three days later the Senate concurred. These parliamentary decisions were recognized by the condominium partners and on 1 January 1956 independence was officially declared and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan became the Republic of the Sudan (see, for example, Beshir, 1974:182; El Mahdi, 1965:150-151).

Santi and Hill (1980:1) have provided a good summary of what the new Sudan inherited from the condominium regime:

The condominium rebuilt the framework of government destroyed by the Mahdists, retaining certain Turko-
Egyptian institutions and adding the political, legal, economic, technical and cultural apparatus of a British dependent territory. The effective direction of policy lay with the British and, for a great part of its existence, the condominium was autocratic modified by the introduction of consultative, and an approach to representative, institutions towards the end of the regime."

In the field of economic development, the condominium regime's achievements were, however, less than impressive. As Barbour (1961:265) commented: "If the factors that really brought about economic expansion be studied, it may prove truer to say that parts of Sudan were already beginning to be affected by world trade when the Egyptians ruled the country before the Mahdi's revolution, while other areas were scarcely touched by fifty years of British rule". But perhaps more than the developmental inequality, it was the political imbalance between the north and the south which was to become most damaging. Already, a year before independence was declared a mutiny of southern soldiers from the Equatoria Corps, an all-southern section of the army created forty years earlier and stationed at Torit, a military garrison town in eastern equatoria province, south Sudan, took place, an event which is accredited as being the starting point of the seventeen year civil strife that followed.

National Political Developments

During the interwar period, nationalist feeling was taking ground in many African colonial countries. As a result, "the fear of the possible implications of self-government for the colonies began to be felt in earnest in the metropolis."
...Before the end of the second world war, there is evidence of the first recognition of the distant but eventual possibility of successful independence demands in Africa" (Mayo, 1975:30). Following the Second World War, this became a reality and colonial governments were racing against time to develop a political system of their choosing in the colonies. The central purpose of the British colonial policy, for example, became "...to guide colonial territories to responsible self-government in conditions that ensure to the people an orderly social system, the highest possible standard of living and freedom from oppression from any quarter" (Minister of State for Colonial Affairs, quoted in Snyder, 1962:129). Politically, the British wanted the colonies "...to remain stable and friendly to the western world" (Snyder, 1962:129). Accordingly, local political institutions were allowed and encouraged to develop in line with the political, economic and social standards of the "mother country".

A reflection of the new position in the Sudan immediately after the the Second World War was the mushrooming of political parties in the north. However, the Sudan became independent, earlier than most other colonial countries in Africa, more because of the mistrust between its joint rulers - Egypt and Britain - than the pressure of nationalist demands (Hamid, 1986:127; Woldemichael, 1987:10). Nothing akin to the nationalist movements which preceded independence in most colonial African countries existed in the Sudan. The nationalist movements that emerged before independence in the
Sudan were all north-centred and dominated by the two traditionalist Islamic religious sects, the Ansar and the Khatmiya, whose loyalty to the emerging Sudanese political nation-state was marginal (Khalid, 1987:115-116; Woodward, 1979:44). Nationalist consciousness in the southern Sudan was at an even lower ebb than in the north and "one could hardly say that the south had given its full consent and support to the birth of the Sudanese nation-state" (Russell and McCall, 1973:39). Paradoxically, therefore, during the time of decolonisation, nationalism, the most basic ideology for national integration (Mazrui, 1969:18), played no role as a uniting factor in the development of national consciousness and national loyalty in the Sudan. Instead, "consensus developed on two regional levels, north and south" (Wai, 1983:316). Hence the clash that occurred when independence brought the two together.

The two major parties to emerge in the pre-independence period in the north were the Umma Party, and the Unionists. Each of these parties were under the patronage of one of the two main religious establishments in north Sudan. The Ansar religious sect or the Mahdiya as it is interchangeably called, was the patron of the Umma party and the Khatmiya of the Unionists. Because of the influence the two major religious sects have on the north Sudanese societies, smaller parties that emerged eventually gravitated towards one or the other for patronage and joined their respective parties (Woodward, 1979).

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The political positions of the two major religious sects on the future of the Sudan in the pre-independence period were diametrically opposed. The Khatmiya favoured union with Egypt, while the Ansar sect, "agreed to participate in the constitutional developments proposed by the British administration" (Beshir, 1974:168). The British administration proposal was the establishment of a transitional government which would be empowered to exercise the right of self-determination through democratic means (Beshir, 1974).

The other important parties that emerged in the north were the Sudanese Movement for National Liberation (SMNL), later to become the Sudanese Communist Party, and the Moslem Brotherhood Organisation. Both these parties were extensions of parties with similar names in Egypt and initially both drew their support from the University of Khartoum students. In later years, support for the Communist Party grew among trade union movements.

Whilst these political developments were taking place in the north, no political movement of any description appeared, before independence, in south Sudan. At the approach of independence, "southern apprehensions was manifested in the formation of informal associations among the nascent intelligentsia, dubbed "political committees" (Markakis, 1987:149). Some of them went as far as giving political names to their groups: such as the "Southern United Party" and the
"Southern Sudan Federal Party", but these groups lacked "coherent political organisations through which Southern interests could be articulated and defended" (Niblock, 1987:212). Even when the country was conducting important talks with the co-dominii governments on the eve of independence, there was no southern political party claiming to speak in the name of the South (Beshir, 1968:71). Niblock (1987:215) outlines the north-south political imbalances, thus:

...the south's political interests could be, and were, subjected to the overriding concerns of the northern political elite. No southerner had been invited to take part in the discussions which the northern political parties had held with the Egyptian government prior to the 1953 Anglo-Egyptian agreement. Southerners remained peripheral to the debate over independence arrangements during 1955, except when their votes were needed in parliament..

Table 3.2: Seats Gained in the 1953 Elections for the House of Representatives, by Province (Territorial Constituencies only).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>UNP</th>
<th>UMMA</th>
<th>Socialist republicans</th>
<th>Southern Party</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blue Nile</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darfur</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kordofan</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahr El Ghazal</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equatoria</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kassala</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Nile</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khartoum</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>46</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Elections for Sudan's first parliament took place in November and December 1953, with the National Unionist Party scoring a
decisive majority win (see table 3.1). The elected members from the South, most of them claiming to represent the "Southern Party", were politically and numerically too insignificant for their views to have any impact in the national assembly. The Southern members did make some progress towards creating a new party which they called the "Liberal Party" but, lacking in organisation and leadership, the Liberal Party, "never became very much more than a parliamentary number...almost continually divided by disputes over policy and leadership" (Howell, 1978:122). However, the call that the Liberal Party made for federation at its first meeting in Juba in September 1954 was to become "a rallying cry of the South and a fixed item on the political agenda of the Sudan ever since" (Markakis, 1987:150).

Roots of the North-South Conflict

Several factors contribute to the north-south conflict. The main ones are cultural, historical and colonial-policy factors.

The portrayal of the Sudan in terms of Arab north and African south has been a source of misguided Sudanese identification and, hence, of conflict. Gray (1963:12), for example, states that "the decisive, distinguishing factor between north and south seems to be a sense of belonging which has its roots in history and is confined by birth... the southerner feels himself to be an African, while the northerner is proud of his Arabic connection". However, the term "Arab" in reference to
racial character cannot be used in the case of the Sudan. Arabism in the Sudan, as already discussed above, is an acquisition of culture rather than racial heredity (Ahmed, 1984:28). The term "African" too, in the racial sense it is used, has been misleading. "Africa is essentially a geographic term; it has almost no distinctive linguistic, political, traditional, institutional, or other cultural references" (Jackson and Roseberg, 1984:179). The African people are composed of several races - Semitic, Hamitic, Nilotic and so on - and hence there is no such thing as "African" race. It is obvious from the various shades of skin and color of the Sudanese people that extensive intermixing has occurred (Beshir, 1984:9). It appears, therefore, that cultural differences were the basis for the social stratification used in the Sudan. The point is, however, that what may have started as stratification by culture has lead the northerners and the southerners to "treat one another as if they belonged to racially distinct groups" (Russell and McCall, 1973:107). Russell and McCall could not have been more accurate when they wrote in this connection that "subjective racism, however much it may rest on a mistaken conception of real racial differences, can be as potent a source of discord and inequality as objective differences of race".

A second source of conflict between the north and the south has its roots in the historical past. The southerners regard the northerners as their traditional enemies because the latter
had always invaded the south for slaves. The slave trading period remains a historical fact of significance in terms of north-south perceptions and attitudes. However, it is not only memories of past misdeeds which have been affecting inter-regional perceptions but also the persistence of northern attitudes of superiority over the south. Southerners continue to suffer real social discrimination in the Sudan (Woldemikael, 1985; see also Sudanow, June 1986).

The third source of conflict could be regarded as the colonial policy factor. During the Sudan's long colonial history (1820-1955), the two regions were administered differently, developed differently and treated differently, and because of this differential treatment over a long period, social, economic and political developments also took different routes which all added up to the development of a distinct line of division between the north and the south. The most far reaching action the British authorities took, for example, as far as the north-south relations were concerned, was the adoption of the law by which the movement of people was controlled. The promulgation of the Passports and Permits Ordinance, empowered the Governor General to declare any part of the Sudan a "Closed District". By this order, northern Sudanese were forbidden to trade in south Sudan, preventing normal social and cultural intercourse from taking place (Beshir, 1968:42). In a 1930 memorandum dispatched from the Civil Secretary in Khartoum to the Governors of the three provinces in the south, which came to be known as the southern
policy, the government of the day's intention to isolate the south from the north was made clear:

Whereas at present Arabic is considered by many natives of the south as the official and, as it were, fashionable language, the object of all should be to counteract this idea by every practical means (see in Beshir, 1968:118)

One practical means used to counteract the spread of Arabic was to allow education develop differently in the north and in the south as a result of the different policies the regime introduced. In the north, a western-style three level system of general education was introduced with Arabic as the medium of instruction for the first two levels. The education policy in the south during the earlier period of the Condominium regime was based on the recommendations that emerged from the conference held at Rajaf (in the south) in 1926. Following the Rajaf conference recommendations, six vernacular languages were used in the first four years of primary education in the respective areas and English became the lingua franca of the south (Thomas, 1978:13-14). "Arabic, and even the use of common Arabic terms, were to be discouraged" (Holt and Daly, 1986:139). In the south, the colonial authority's direct involvement with education was comparatively minimal and instead, it gave freedom to the various Christian missionary societies to found and administer schools with religious education receiving much emphasis (UNICEF, 1980:1). The effect of the various government policies on north-south relations was clearly explained by Holt and Daly (1986:139):
The combination of the closed district system, indirect rule and education policy encouraged and increased the differentiation of north south which had already existed. The southern policy entailed both the progressive separation of the south and the fostering of particularism within it.

There were various reasons for adopting different policies in the northern and southern Sudan. Firstly, the British authorities were undecided on the future of the south until 1946. A policy dispatch of 1945, for example, states that: "It is only through economic and educational development that these people can be equipped to stand up for themselves in the future, whether their lot be eventually cast with the northern Sudan or with East Africa - or partly with each - (see appendix 2 in Beshir, 1968:119). Secondly, the policy of encouraging missionary activity in the south was partly to control the influence of Islam from spreading southward into the British colonies of East Africa. In the end all these came to nothing as the government was to completely reverse its policy in 1946:

The policy of the Sudan Government regarding the southern Sudan is to act upon the facts that the peoples of the southern Sudan are distinctively African and Negroid, but that geography and economics combine to render them inextricably bound for future development to the middle-eastern and arabacised northern Sudan: and therefore to ensure that they shall, by education and economic development, be equipped to stand up for themselves in the future as socially and economically the equals of their partners of the northern Sudan in the future (see in Beshir, 1968:120-121).

The reversal of the Southern Policy, Wai states "was the beginning of a new chapter in Afro-Arab relations in the
Sudan" and, he argues: "it is difficult to comprehend how southern interests were to be served when intense hostility existed, having been deep rooted in north-south relations since pre-colonial times" (Wai, 1980:384). British administrators serving in the south were also aghast at the new policy, particularly Richard Owen, who accused the Civil Secretary of "sacrificing his conscience" and warned that the northerners will "dominate the southerners and treat them as their fathers did and that the sins of the fathers shall be visited upon their children unto the third and fourth generation" (see in Wai, 1980:384). Despite strong opposition, the policy was adopted and in 1947 the government convened a conference in Juba to discuss the south's representation in the proposed national assembly. The southern Sudanese who participated were handicapped for this purpose, most of them being illiterate local chiefs and some junior clerks serving in the Administration. Present at the conference were also the Civil Secretary and his assistant, the governors of the southern provinces, the director of establishments and six delegates from the north representing various political parties. The imbalance in the level of sophistication in political negotiations between the northern delegates and those from the south, in favour of the former, is clear from the minutes of the conference. However, the southerners, illiterate though they might have been, and with no experience in negotiations, showed a remarkable sense of responsibility. It is recorded that one of the chiefs "regretted that he was not ready for these discussions as he
had not been able to consult his people before coming to Juba". It is further recorded that the same chief said:

...a girl who has been asked to marry a young man usually wants time to hear reports of that young man from other people before consenting; likewise before coming to any fixed decision about relations with northerners. The ancestors of the northern Sudanese were not peace loving... the younger generation claim that they mean no harm, but time would show what they would in fact do. He agreed unification with the north but insisted on the southerners' need for protection and for further time to consider the matter... An immediate decision could not be taken now (the minutes of the Juba conference, 1947; see in Beshir, 1968).

The southern participants at the conference repeatedly stressed that they were being pushed too hurriedly. As one of them said: "the north wanted immediate southern representation in an assembly which would legislate for the whole Sudan. Southerners were afraid of this because they felt that, through lack of understanding [language barrier, for example], their representatives might agree to laws which would prove harmful". To a suggestion put forward by one of the southern delegates that a southern "Advisory Council" be established, the Chairman [the Civil Secretary], ironically "deplored the tendency to regard any suggestion that southern problems should be treated in a different manner from those in the north as a conspiracy to divide north from the south" (minutes of the Juba conference, 1947).

Sudan became independent in January 1956 without heeding the south's fear of domination by the north thus putting in jeopardy any chance of lasting unity from the very start.
During the Sudan's self-rule period between 1952 and 1955, the south, having previously failed to "dissuade the British authorities from uniting the two regions under a single unitary government was persistently arguing for a constitutional safeguard in the form of federation" (Wai, 1983:307; Malwal, 87:11). In the end the southern demand for federalism as a compromise was also rejected after cursory examination and the minimal safeguards which they requested were not incorporated into the Sudan's constitution" (Wai, 1983:308).

At the eve of independence, educated southern Sudanese "were too few to form a significant elite, or to give southerners a fair share of the jobs which were becoming available as a result of Sudanisation" (Thomas, 1978:25). During the transitional period between 1953 and 1956, for example, not a single southern Sudanese occupied a senior administrative position in the south itself (Sanderson and Sanderson, 1981:345). As the positions were occupied by northern Sudanese, Sanderson and Sanderson (1981:345) believe that the resentments created as a result of northern domination were the root cause of the disturbances that erupted in 1955 (see chapter 4).
Escalation of Conflict
Since independence the Sudan has experienced frequent changes of government, the pattern varying between parliamentary democracy and military rule. In the first two years (1956-1958), democratic party politics continued to prevail through the parliament system. The National Unionist Party, which was victorious in the first election for the transitional government, continued in power for two years after independence until it was defeated when some of its members crossed the floor and joined the opposition (Beshir, 1974:207). A coalition of parties led by the Umma party then took over power for two years under difficult conditions with members changing allegiances. In November 1958, the military, led by General Ibrahim Aboud, took over power in a bloodless coup. The military rule in turn was swept aside by general civil unrest in October 1964 and, after a short period of transitional government, the parliamentary system was restored once again (1965-1969). However, no single party had a majority sufficient to form a government on its own and an unstable coalition of parties became the norm. The political rivalry within and amongst the parties was such that between May 1965 and May 1969 there were four changes of government. By this time the country was in a state of chaos both politically and economically. Pledging to restore order in the country, the military, led by Gaafar Nimeiri, took power in May 1969.
Before the Nimeiri regime, north-south relations continued to deteriorate culminating in open hostility with the emergence of an organised armed movement in the south, the Anya-Nya, which, literally translated, means "the snake venom" in one of the local languages, Madi (see Wakason, 1984:125). Mohamed Omer Beshir (1976:20) provides a good resume of the causes of the escalation in the north-south conflict after independence:

...successive governments failed to address themselves enough to the issues involved. The policies adopted regarded the diversities as if they did not exist. In addition to this, the general attitude was that the promotion of the culture of the majority would ultimately lead to integration and the establishment of national integration. Assimilation, rather than the recognition of diversity and equality of cultures was seen as the way to national unity. The result of these policies and attitudes was the [start of the] war...and the emergence of groups and organisations with regionalist and separatist tendencies.

In post-independence Sudan, northern politicians and scholars have been so preoccupied with the exposition of what they regard as the "mischiefs" of the British during the colonial rule that it has prevented any search for an alternative approach to the north-south conflict. The philosophy and the policies that emerged from the anti-British-rule fixation, as far as north-south relations were concerned, was that since all that the British did in the south was wrong, the opposite would be right. Accordingly, Arabic and Islam were vigorously promoted and contact between the north and south intensified (Deng, 1987:60). Examples include "the decision by the north to close down vernacular schools in the south and replace them with Arabic schools; the closing down of Christian
missionary churches and setting up in the same village of Muslim Qoranic centres" (Malwal, 1981:2). Most provocative of all was the imposition in the south of Friday as the weekly holiday instead of Sunday. The final blow came in March 1964, when the military government of the time passed a decree by which all missionary activities in the south were stopped and all foreign missionaries expelled within seven days (see in Malwal, 1981:66). There was a belief in the north during this time, as expressed by Sadiq El Mahdi, leader of the Umma Party and Prime Minister following the overthrow of the military government in 1964, that "the failure of Islam in southern Sudan would be the failure of the Sudanese Muslims to the international Islamic cause. Islam has a holy mission in Africa, and southern Sudan is the beginning of that mission" (see in Malwal, 1981:4). A leader of the Islamic Charter Front, Dr Hassan El Turabi, went even further by arguing that "the south had no culture, so this vacuum would necessarily be filled by Arab culture under an Islamic revival" (Alier, 1973:24; Heraclides, 1987:218). As Lesch (1985:419) also wrote: "Those groups and political figures who have called for an Islamic state and Arabisation of all the people believe that the only proper course is to assimilate the non-Arab and non-Muslim peoples into the Muslim Arab face of the Sudan. They view the south as a fertile field for conversion and press for Arabic as the sole language for administration and instructions throughout the country". However, the "aggressive programme of Islamization and Arabisation" as Hamid (1986:128) called it, "was to further alienate
southerners [from northerners].

The impact of the oppressive rule in the south was quite dramatic. The more the north pushed the implementation of its expressed policy of cultural assimilation the more opposition it met. As Wai (1983:309) wrote, "somehow, the brutality of northern reprisals seemed to inspire rather than discourage resistance". As the Anya-Nya's activities intensified the reprisals of the army led thousands of southerners to flee to neighbouring countries as refugees and, under the shield of safety, they soon began to organise themselves into political groups. In Uganda, a group of southern refugees comprising Father Saturnino Lohure, Joseph Oduho, Aggrey Jaden, Alexi Mbali and Pancrasio Ocheng founded The Sudan Christian Association in 1961 (Wakason, 1984:184). In Zaire, The Sudan African Closed District National Union was formed under the leadership of Joseph Oduho in 1962. This party changed its name in 1963 to the Sudan African National Union (SANU) under the leadership of William Deng. SANU became the most enduring of the three parties and was instrumental in petitioning major international organisations like the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity and in promoting the activities of the Anya-Nya (Beshir, 1974:220). Another noted activity by SANU was that in 1964 it organised a conference in Kampala, Uganda, seeking to restructure itself in order to make it more effective. Aggrey Jaden became the new president and for the first time SANU sent emissaries to eight countries. SANU also started propaganda publications in French and in English.
Impressed with SANU's activities, a group of educated southerners living in Khartoum attempted to establish a party, the Southern Sudan Front (SSFP) and declared their allegiance to SANU. The intention was that SSFP would function as a mouthpiece for SANU inside the country although it never worked quite that way.

However, although SANU was acting as a political wing of the Anya-Nya, this was not on any formal basis. Disagreements among its leadership and between it and the Anya-Nya became a serious handicap for effective functioning of the organisation. Joseph Oduho broke away from SANU and founded his own party in early 1966 which he called Azania Liberation Front. The external political movements were in tatters by this time and in an effort to bring them and the Anya-Nya closer, a convention was held at Angundri in August, 1967. At this convention, a provisional south Sudan government (SSPG) was declared. The headquarters of the provisional government was decided to be inside the south Sudan.

Internal rivalry among the SSPG leadership became rife and necessitated holding the 1969 convention at Palgo-Bindi, near the Sudan-Zaire border. The two main resolutions that were passed at this convention were to change the name of the SSPG to the Nile Provisional Government (NPG) and to stress its basic policy to be the separation of the south from the north.

After the formation of the NPG a proper reorganisation of the whole movement was instituted. Provincial commissioners were appointed for all southern provinces, helped by junior administrators.
Every region had its own commanding officer directly responsible to the commander-in-chief of the region who worked in close coordination with the Secretary of Defence of the whole movement. At the regional level there was close coordination of the activities of the fighting forces and the civil administration (Wakoson, 1984:199).

It was all very well that the NPG had a proper governmental structure but in reality it never functioned as envisioned because of internal functional rivalries based on, according to Wakoson, "tribalism" and "regionalism". The whole movement was at the stage of disintegration, when in July 1970, Colonel Joseph Lago, who was then an area commander and an arms procurement officer of the Anya-Nya, declared the formation of the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement. By this declaration the Anya-Nya became the sole authority in the south and all other existing political organisations both within and outside the country were asked to join. The Nile Provisional Government stepped down and declared its allegiance to the leadership of Joseph Lago. Others followed suit and either joined in or dissolved themselves. "Those who showed some signs of opposition to Lago's government were dismissed from active participation in the movement" (Wakoson, 1984:202).

The Search for Peace and Unity

For nearly a decade after the Sudan became independent, no government that came to power sought a political solution to the South Sudan question. By the time the first military government was overthrown by popular revolt in October 1964, having been in power for six years, the conflict in the South
had gone deeper than at independence. The October revolution brought to power a transitional civilian government with a mandate to prepare the country for parliamentary elections. The transitional government was in power for only eight months but nevertheless this was a period of great significance in the relations between the North and South Sudan. For the first time since independence, the Prime Minister of the transitional government declared his intention to resolve Sudan's intractable problem in the South by political means. As Beshir wrote in this connection, "the government was convinced that violence and armed measures would not solve the problem" (1968:89). As a sign of good-will the new government appointed Clement M'boro, Ezbon Mundiri and Hilary Paul Logali, all prominent southerners residing in Khartoum at the time, to the cabinet. Clement M'boro was given one of the most important portfolios as Minister of the Interior. The new government also made contact with the southern parties in exile and declared a general amnesty to all Sudanese who had fled the country including "those who were tried in absentia or wanted for trial on any political charge" (Beshir, 1968:89).

These moves by the transitional government were welcomed by the various Southern political parties that had emerged both inside and outside the country since independence. A proposal put forward by SANU to hold a conference and discuss North-South relations was agreed following negotiation concerning the venue and conditions. On March 16, 1965, the Khartoum
Round Table Conference was convened with all the main parties of both regions represented. Six African countries, Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, Tanzania and Uganda sent delegates to the conference as observers.

From the addresses delivered by the representatives of the Northern political parties, it was clear that the northerners regarded the mistrust by the South to be the result of the role the British and the missionaries played in the past (Beshir, 1968). All the speakers from the North renounced the use of force and spoke for a peaceful political solution by negotiation. However, "all of them were emphatic that any agreement reached on the constitutional relations between the North and the South should be within a united Sudan, and should in no way generate separatist forces" (Beshir, 1968:93). This main theme was made clear in the joint proposals tabled by the Northern parties for the settlement of the Southern question. Concerning the constitutional relationship between the two regions, the North's proposal provided for the South a semi-autonomous regional government with limited executive and legislative powers. According to this proposal, the regional government so established would have constitutional guarantees including freedom of religion, freedom of missionary activity for Sudanese nationals, freedom of movement, equal opportunity in employment and no discrimination for reasons of religion, language or race (see Beshir, 1968: appendix 16).
There was no consensus of opinion among the southern political parties on the political solution of the conflict. Three different proposals were presented at the conference. Agrey Jaden, a representative of the most militant wing of the southern exiles, is said to have pointed out that "the north and the south had never been one. Any unity that there had been between the two was always imposed by outsiders and maintained through the use of force .... the only viable proposition to discuss at the conference was the separation of the south from the north and how the north would hand over power smoothly to an independent south ... otherwise the struggle for independence by the south would continue" (Malwal, 1981:106). The second proposal called for a plebiscite in the south under international supervision, thus allowing the southerners to vote freely between federation, unity with the north, or independence and separation (Salih, 1984:68; Beshir, 1968:94; Malwal, 1981:107). The third proposal was for a straight federation between the north and south. This last proposal being the position of the weakest southern party, Sudan Unity Party led by Santino Deng and Philimon Majok, was not one for any serious consideration at the time.

Intense negotiations continued for some days after these positional proposals were put on the conference table but, neither side showing any sign of compromising their stated position, a deadlock was reached. The Southern point of view was that the north did not show a sincere desire to resolve
the conflict. The stance the north took, that the south should first declare its commitment to the unity of Sudan for serious discussions to proceed, was seen by the south as a non-negotiating position. As Malwal says "after all, the south was fighting the already existing 'oneness' of the Sudan in which it had no say in the running of the affairs of the country" (1981:106). To the northerners, on the other hand, the southerners' unpreparedness "to produce proposals which would exclude separation or independence and meet the [their] proposals half way" (Beshir, 1968:95) made the discussion simply not worthwhile. In the end it was realised that it was impossible to resolve the differences at the time and instead an agreement was reached to continue the dialogue in the future. A committee representing all the parties was set up to review the proposals and to set an agenda for a second conference in three months time. But events soon changed and no second conference was ever convened.

Northern and southern writers give credit to Sir El Khatim El Khalifa, the Prime Minister of the transitional government, for creating the conditions for the conference to take place. All sides also agree that the Prime Minister was sincere in his desire to end the conflict by political means. In his introductory address to the conference he expressed his "sincere belief in democratic means, the open acknowledgement of previous mistakes and full recognition of the racial and cultural differences between the North and the South." (Albino, 1986:116-117). Although a Northerner, he knew the
South well as he had served there as an educational officer for a number of years. But he was only selected to the job of Premier by the northern parties for the duration of the transitional period, that is until national elections should take place. Despite the Prime Minister's sincerity, it was perhaps over ambitious and even ill founded to presume that a political solution could be reached whilst a "care-taker government" was in power. No northern political party, it appeared, could commit itself to any radical policy from the conference that might hamper its prospects in the election which was to be held two months later. After all, a tough stance against the South was still regarded as a vote-catcher in the North (Malwal, 1981).

In April 1965, a general election was held and brought back parliamentary rule with the traditional northern parties in dominance. Beshir described the governments that ruled after the 1965 election as follows:

The parliamentary regimes of 1965 to 1969 were thus characterized by chaos, intrigue and lack of purpose. The successive governments representing the traditional parties and groups failed to carry out what they set out to do. Crisis followed crisis and their impotence became obvious (Beshir, 1974:226).

With such regimes in power, as Malwal (1981:110) stated, "no-one thought again of convening the Round Table Conference". But, the 1965 Round Table Conference was not a total failure. The fact that it took place was in itself a demonstration that
both sides had the desire to resolve their differences by negotiation. The conference also enabled both regions to know where the other party stood in the conflict. Beshir (1968:94-96), for example, writes how the conference enabled the Northern political parties to realise that "the Southerners looked upon them as nothing more than descendants of Arab slave traders and colonisers" and that the northerners "were shocked to find how history and facts were being distorted and that they were blamed, more than British colonial policy, for the backwardness of the southern provinces".

However, whatever impact the conference might have made on individual participants this did not translate into any meaningful action to correct the situation. With no party able to secure an overall majority, shifting coalitions and changes of governments became a feature of governing the country. Given such a situation, the parties became greatly preoccupied with the art of staying in power, leaving the north-south conflict to further deteriorate (Salih, 1984:69).

It was against the background of the Sudan in such political chaos that a group of young officers, led by Major General Gafaar El Nimeiri, took power on May 25, 1969. It became immediately clear that the new government's policies and attitudes departed in quite a major way from those of any of the previous governments. In two statements simultaneously broadcast to the nation on the day of the power takeover, President Nimeiri spoke of the dominant traditional political
parties "functioning on wrong conceptions". He was scornful of these parties for "having had no ambition other than that of power [and for failing] to find a solution to the Southern Problem". Nimeiri promised "to save the nation from the destructive elements" and to achieve that end he warned that "the revolution will crush any attempt by any person who tries to stand in the face of the tide..." (Nimeiri, May 25, 1969). Two weeks later, the new government announced a 'policy statement on the Southern question'. It emphasised the following points (see in Beshir, 1975:155):

- A recognition of the October 1964 revolution which brought down a repressive military government and of the transitional government that followed which accepted for the first time that a southern problem existed and the steps that it took to resolve it.

- An acceptance of the historical and cultural differences between the North and the South and the right of the Southern people to develop their respective cultures and traditions within a united Sudan.

- A call to all Southerners at home and abroad to see that peace and stability prevailed in the South so as to enable the new government to carry out its policy.
A promise to create a special economic planning board for the South and prepare a special budget for the South, to aim at the development of the Southern provinces in the shortest possible time. To attain this end, the Government would create a Ministry for Southern affairs to coordinate efforts and training of personnel would commence in preparation for autonomy.

There were two crucial points in the statement that created the impetus for the eventual negotiations to take place. The first was the government's "public recognition of diversity and that it [was] not incompatible with national unity" (Beshir, 1984:16). The second was the commitment the Revolutionary Government had made in emphasising that, unlike previous governments, it would deliver what it promised. This was boldly made clear in the policy statement that "the revolutionary Government is confident and competent enough to face existing realities".

It was three years, though, before the new policy of regionalisation could be realised. The revolutionary government had first to deal with internal political opposition. The traditional northern parties were not only opposed to the special status the government was granting the south (Khalid, 1985:42) but also to the new government's declared socialist orientation. The Government dealt with all the oppositions and uprisings in a decisive way (Hamid,
1986:130). It was only when the opposing forces were put down that the dialogue with the south commenced in earnest. That done, southern leaders in exile were approached and with the governments' improved relations with neighbouring countries, and the diplomatic efforts it was waging to promote the peace proposal, the pressure was on the Southern leadership to enter into negotiation (Salih, 1984:73).

In the South itself, the government was proving its sincerity in the implementation of its programmes. As promised, the Ministry of Southern Affairs was established and, following the 1971 Act, by which powers were decentralised to local councils, President Nimeiri appointed three southerners, for the first time ever, as Commissioners of the three Southern provinces. The President also appointed, as one of the three vice-presidents in the country, Abel Alier, a southerner, who was also the Minister in charge of Southern Affairs. Attitudes were changing as even "the Army began to take a positive interest in the areas of construction by contributing towards the construction of roads and the setting up of co-operative societies" (Beshir, 1975:82). All these measures and activities made a positive impact on the Southerners and soon the "great bulk of Southern public opinion was in favour of the new government policy of regional autonomy" (Salih, 1984:73).

On 16th February, 1972, negotiations started in Addis Ababa between the Sudan Government and the Southern Sudan Liberation
Movement, the political wing of the Anya-Nya. Both sides would have been aware of the price of failure from the 1965 attempt at reconciliation. This was evident from the flexible attitude each side adopted in the preliminary negotiations. For example, the north dropped its earlier condition that the venue for the negotiations be inside the Sudan and the south did not insist on the cessation of hostilities. As Salih said in this connection: "both sides realised that an unyielding attitude could preclude cooperation with possible disastrous results" (1984:74). But the positions of the two parties were quite different from those at the time of the 1965 attempt. The Anya-Nya was by this time the undisputed voice of the South and, equally, with the crushing of the communists and the outlawing of all political organizations in the country, the new government's power was at that moment unchallengeable (Albino, 1987:120). It was thus this aspect of the situation which made it possible for both sides to abandon "their hardline positions and agree to a regional autonomy scheme for the Southern Region" (Wai, 1983:317; see also Khalid, 1985:43; Hamid, 1986:130). The agreement was signed in Addis Ababa on February 27, 1972, and on March 3, 1972, the text of the agreement was, by Presidential decree, made part of the Permanent Constitution of the Sudan. In return for acquiring internal autonomy as well as proportional representation in the National Assembly, the South relinquished its demand for secession. Thus ended the seventeen year civil conflict and for the first time in their history, the two regions were set to operate in harmony under the framework of a unified Sudan.
Several factors contributed to bringing the conflicting parties to the negotiating table and to the successful conclusion in Addis Ababa. The war had already cost the Sudan enormously. Some estimates put the number of dead up to one and a half million (Manifesto, Sudan People's Liberation Movement, 1983:9). The war was also causing much damage to the economy as "funds which might have been allotted to development projects were used to finance military operations in the South" (Salih, 1984:72). For the Anya-Nya, external factors were also working against them. Libya was putting pressure on Idi Amin of Uganda to sever diplomatic relations with Israel and expel all Israeli military advisors from Uganda which he eventually did in early March, 1972. The Sudanese and Ugandan governments had also reached agreement on the expulsion of "elements hostile to the other state" from their territories. This was the time also when Emperor Haile Sellassie of Ethiopia was playing an active role as peacemaker in Africa and in order not to jeopardize his image he was withholding support to the Anya-Anya (see Woldemichael, 1987). Given these situations, the countervailing pressure proved more significant (Niblock, 1987:277). As Niblock says "unable to use Uganda either as a safe base for organization, or as a channel through which Israeli military aid could reach the Anya-Nya, the South Sudan Liberation Movement would have encountered difficulty in maintaining a strong military campaign". There was thus an earnest desire by both sides to see an end to the fighting. President Nimeiri had participated in the civil war having served in the South from
November 1966 to December 1967 as an army commander, an experience which might have helped him to realise that the country could not survive much longer simply by resorting to force.

An important factor during the time was also "the availability of a mediating body which enjoyed the confidence of both sides of the conflict" (Niblock, 1987:275). The rapprochement was facilitated by the World Council of Churches and the All African Council of Churches who worked hard for a number of years to bring the two sides together to negotiate. The two mediators (instead of chairman) at the Addis Ababa conference were representatives of these bodies and the fact that "both were Africans (from Ghana and Liberia) contributed to their success in their role" (Beshir, 1975:275). Beshir explained: "Notwithstanding the fact that they both represented church organizations, they were accepted by the Northern representatives. Their "African-ness" was more influential than their Church connections - hence their acceptability" (1975:128).

The important thing was that a peaceful settlement was reached. Unlike other ethnic conflicts in Africa, Biafra and Kinshassa for example, where the conflicts were resolved on the battlefields, the southern Sudan question was resolved at the negotiating table (Salih, 1984:81). International response to the agreement was unanimously favourable. The Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity, for
example, described the agreement "not only as a resounding victory for the Sudan, its people, Government and President but also, and above all, as the beginning of a new era in the peaceful settlement of African conflicts" (quoted by Beshir, 1975:108). The New York Times of March 30th, 1972 went even further by claiming that "if successful, Sudan's new experiment in unity with diversity might even offer a useful guide to many other underdeveloped nations similarly afflicted with racial, religious and other domestic division".

National Politics, 1969-1983
Between 1969 and 1983, two significant phases can be identified. The first phase was between 1969 and 1977. During this phase distinctly radical policies were followed with the declared intention to save the country from political stagnation and to bring to an end the north-south conflict. During this period, too, the political ideology of the regime was defined, modelled on the Arab Socialist Union, Nassir's single-party organisation in Egypt (Markakis, 1987:203; Tartter, 1982:225).

The Nimeiri regime's inherent socialist outlook was accentuated "by the fact that the communist party and its supporters then enjoyed a uniquely dominant position in governmental and policy-making processes" (Abdel-Rahim, 1978:24). "Scientific socialism" was declared as the guiding principle of the regime because, it was claimed, "capitalist methods had led the economy to a dead end" (Markakis,
Accordingly, a series of nationalisation decrees were passed and several foreign owned companies and local financial and banking institutions were affected. However, the alliance with the Communist party was not to last long. President Nimeiri's intention to create a single political movement, which was to effectively exclude all existing parties, including the communist party, was not one many members of the communist party and its sympathisers within the military junta itself were willing to accept. "These differences, and others, lay behind the coup of July 1971...in which the communist party was swiftly implicated, and after which the Soviet Union quickly recognised the regime" (Woodward, 1986:68). The coup had alarmed Egypt, Libya, with whom negotiations were under way to form a union, and the Western nations over the Soviet Union's involvement. Therefore, troops loyalist to Nimeiri launched a successful counter attack and managed to release the imprisoned president unharmed. Severe reprisals followed swiftly; several of the coup leaders were executed and many others were imprisoned.

Following the 1971 coup attempt, President Nimeiri's preoccupation became the consolidation of the power base of his regime. In August 1971, barely a month after the Communist Party lead coup was foiled, an interim constitution was proclaimed by which the Sudan became a "democratic republic" and a "socialist state". A presidential form of government was constituted effectively replacing the collegiate type of leadership that existed under the
Revolutionary Command Council with Nimeiri now occupying the office of the presidency.

Events were moving fast and by January 1972, a National Charter was drawn up at the Founding Congress of the Sudan Socialist Union - the SSU (Woodward, 1986:68). The Charter spelled out the basic principles of the SSU which was to become the guiding force of the government. Much like the system in China, discussed in chapter two, the SSU's party structure was to run parallel with that of the government down to village level to exercise control over state organs, to encourage popular participation, and, to guide the implementation of programmes.

In May 1973, the permanent constitution of the Sudan was declared which completed the process of institutionalisation. The power bestowed upon the president, "custom-made for Gaafar Nimeiri" (Markakis, 1987:207), was much enhanced. Not only was the state president empowered to proclaim a state of emergency "as he saw it necessary" but he could single-handedly veto any legislation passed by an elected People's assembly. An important aspect of the "permanent" constitution was that it included the Addis Ababa peace agreement, a measure of the seriousness the Nimeiri regime attached to it.

Throughout this first phase, the Nimeiri regime had "shown a consistent determination to exclude the leaders of the traditional parties and their generally right-wing supporters
from the political arena" (Abdel-Rahim, 1978:28). Decisive action was taken against any threat to national stability even against establishments revered for their religious status. In March 1970, the island of Aba, base of the heir to the El Mahdi and a spiritual leader of the Ansar, his son Imam al Hadi al Mahdi, was bombarded from the air following a violent demonstration against Nimeiri during a visit to the Ansar bases in the White Nile (Khalid, 1985:19). Another version has it that the bombardment followed an attempted assassination of the President during the visit (Malwal, 1981:128). The Imam managed to escape from Aba Island but he was pursued by the army who caught up with and subsequently killed him near the Ethiopian border.

After the incident with the Ansars and the systematic elimination of the communist threat, Nimeiri's political control over the country became absolute. However, Nimeiri had many enemies outside the country. His political adversaries had taken refuge in neighbouring countries from where they organised acts of destabilisation and, at least on one occasion, July 2, 1976, an attempt was made to oust the regime by force. A group of Ansar followers of Sadiq El Mahdi and the National Front led by Sherif Hussein El Hindi and Sadiq al Mahdi himself, attacked Khartoum and fought a pitched battle for twelve hours before they were defeated. The attackers were believed to have received their training in Libya, by now at loggerheads with the Nimeiri regime for siding with Nasser's successor, Anwar Sadat of Egypt.
In spite of the sporadic attacks and challenges to the regime during the first phase, however, "the road seemed clear for an earnest start to economic and social development" (Malwal, 1981:154). The nationalised companies were either returned to their previous owners or compensation paid. As will be fully discussed in subsequent chapters, the indications are that the Sudan achieved impressive progress in development during the first phase more than at any other time in its history.

In 1977, Nimeiri took a political gamble and decided "to introduce open political engagement to public life by persuading his adversaries - even those who plotted against his life in the 1976 coup attempt - to return to the domestic political arena" (Tartter, 1983:222-223). 1977, therefore, signifies the start of the second phase of President Nimeiri's rule. Under a plan Nimeiri termed "National Reconciliation" his political adversaries were permitted to contest elections to the national legislature although competition was only allowed under the ticket of the SSU. In the elections held in February 1978, the opposition groups together won nearly half the seats. Nimeiri kept his promise of National Reconciliation and went as far as appointing Sadiq El Mahdi, leader of the Umma party and head of the Ansar religious sect (3.2), to the political bureau of the SSU (Malwal, 1981:164; Tartter, 1983:229). Nimeiri also made a surprise move in appointing Dr. Hassan El Turrabi, leader of the Moslem brotherhood, as attorney general, and another leading member of one of the former traditionalist parties as Controller of
the People's National Assembly — a position which was "the nearest thing to an institutionalised opposition in the one party state" (Africa Contemporary Record, vol XII, 1979-80: B104-B105).

Whatever the reasons were for the declaration of National Reconciliation, however, it was to mark the beginning of the erosion of all that President Nimeiri had previously stood for (see in Khalid, 1985:226-227). As Malwal also explained:

National reconciliation...rather than becoming healer of old wounds, which President Nimeiri obviously intended [it] to be, it seemed to have had the opposite effect. Such issues as multipartisanship, sectarianism and the official religion of the state, with Islam being regarded by some as an inseparable part of national policies, have re-emerged. Many had thought and hoped that the country had left behind it all these old and traditional slogans. They have now become matters of heated public debate (1981:155).

Regionalisation was another preoccupation of the Nimeiri regime during the second phase (see chapter 4). Unlike the first phase when regionalisation was successfully applied as a means of national integration, during the second phase, Nimeiri "looked upon regionalisation from the point of view of continuing in power rather than on rational and objective grounds" (Beshire, 1984:25). In 1983, the south was divided into three regions by presidential decree in contravention of all the existing legal frameworks agreed upon in Addis Ababa. The 1983 declaration brought the south to parity with the other regions of the north and thus reversed the motto of
"unity with diversity" which was the hallmark of the regionalisation policy in the first phase.

The re-division of the South was carried out in the name of "further decentralisation" but this time it became the cause for sparking off the civil war and for turning the clock back to the times of bitter animosity between the two halves of the country.

Conclusion
The Sudan has been suffering from destructive, long, civil strife because northern political leaders at the centre, who have styled themselves as Arabs, although this is more imagined than real, want to impose their cultural hegemony by force over the peoples of the south. President Nimeiri attempted to put the illusion of Arabism in the north under check for the first few years of his reign. The slogan of "unity with diversity" was earnestly promoted thus paving the way for negotiations to take place between north and south which culminated in the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement.

The Addis Ababa Agreement could not have come to fruition had the central government of President Nimeiri not taken decisive action in dismantling the archaic political system that it inherited. By doing so Nimeiri achieved what all government's before him failed to achieve. The prospects for lasting peace and unity in the Sudan did indeed look promising.
President Nimeiri's reversal of his political convictions in the second phase was a terrible blow to the healing process of the North-South divide. Only history will show the eventual effect but the Sudan's very existence will balance on a knife edge should the political organisations in the North fail to accommodate the diverse requirements of the Sudanese people. The Sudan need look no further for solutions as it has all the lessons to be learnt from its own history.
CHAPTER 4

THE EVOLUTION OF LOCAL ADMINISTRATION

Introduction

Local administration has passed through many changes in the history of the Sudan, particularly so during the Nimeiri regime when decentralisation was the guiding principle. During the 1970's, the responsibility for local administration was bestowed upon the provincial authorities. In the 1980s, the district became the corporate unit of administration going back, to the system the Sudan inherited from the Condominium Regime at independence. Regionalization also became part of the decentralisation equation as a means of securing national cohesion.

This chapter has two main sections. The first section describes the colonial heritage of government administration both from the time known as the Turkiya and that of the condominium regimes. The Sudan offers a fascinating case for the study of decentralisation as different regimes restructured local administration, not only to suit their ideological stances, but also to resolve the challenge of extending government influence over a vast and diversified country.

The second part of the chapter is, to a large extent, a description of the decentralisation reforms that the Nimeiri regime introduced. During this time the Sudan became a
country with one of the most decentralised systems of government in the world. The implications of these reforms will be analysed in the case study of south Sudan in Part II and an appreciation of the decentralisation policies and what they were intended to achieve is important at this stage.

THE COLONIAL HERITAGE OF LOCAL ADMINISTRATION

Local Administration Under the Turko-Egyptian Rule

The present geographical entity of the Sudan, as previously discussed, is a recent creation. Before the advent of colonisation the different "tribal" areas had their own indigenous forms of rule although, as mentioned in chapter three, they differed in sophistication from area to area. It is important to realise at this stage that whilst the successive colonial governments were able to make use of the existing well developed social organisations in the north, in the south new institutions had to be created and with every change of government different new institutions were introduced.

The Turko-Egyptian government system at the time of the invasion of the Sudan was modelled on the French system. Egypt had inherited this system following Napoleon Bonaparte's occupation of the country in July 1798. The French heritage seemed to suit the ruler who took over from the French, Muhamed Ali Pasha, a man renowned for his appetite for power.
When Muhamed Ali invaded the Sudan, he divided the lands he conquered into provinces and each province was headed by a governor, directly answerable to Cairo. In due course, however, "the Viceroy, realizing the weakness of decentralisation, of provincial governors, isolated from one another, taking their orders from Cairo, appointed . . . . . (a) Governor General with his capital at Khartoum" (Hill, 1959:37). The system of government that developed in the Sudan under the Egyptian rule was described by Holt (1970:13) in the following way:

During sixty years of Egyptian rule an elaborate bureaucracy developed in the Sudan. At the head of the administration was normally a single governor-general, although as in 1882 the Sudan might be broken up and the administrative system decentralised. These attempts of decentralisation were made to prevent the excessive accumulation of power and influence in the hands of a governor-general: the remoteness of Khartoum from Cairo offered temptations to the ambitious which the viceroys of Egypt were quick to suspect. For the same reason few were allowed to remain long in office. Between 1825 and 1885 there were twenty five governors or governors-general in Khartoum, only three of whom held office for more than five years. Thus Egypt administration in the Sudan was unstable and relied upon an opportunist and vacillating concept of polity.

Hill (1959:37) mentions "an interesting feature of the Egyptian administration in the Sudan" which was "the use it made of agents in Egypt". Hill explains this further by saying that "not only the Governor General but each provincial governor had his personal agent in Cairo". And the agents' duties were to translate "all manner of routine business for their principals in the Sudan but (they) kept their hands off
At the provincial level, the governors had a dual responsibility as administrators and as heads of the military wings in each province. The provinces were divided into districts and headed by a district-shiekh (Omda). Below the districts were paramount sheikhdoms and below them town or village sheikhdoms. Thus the system was well suited to accommodate the traditional patterns of the north which the government was quick to exploit for purposes of tax collection and other functions.

As the Turko-Egyptian rule expanded to the south, however, its administrative mechanisms were to prove unworkable for the situation there. "Here in the primitive south, a close, formal administration would have been impossible. All was expediency, improvisation" (Hill, 1959:139). Hill explains "the peculiar difficulties", as he called it, of adapting the Turko-Egyptian forms of government to the Southern condition: "the very terminology was different in the south where the chief administrative division of the province was not the Qism (District) as in the north, but the Idara (area) " (Hill, 1959:139).

Thus, although the Turko-Egyptian regime was determined to establish regular administration in the South, it never managed to do so. The viceroy was, for example, at one time forced to take drastic action by appointing a prominent slave
trader as governor of Bahr El Ghazal. This followed the defeat of a government contingent sent to crush the slave trader, who had a claim over Bahr El Ghazal as his area of influence. The appointments of Europeans (4.2) at different times as governors in the south also illustrates the difficulty the Turko-Egyptian regime had in establishing its authority in the South.

One novelty of the Turko-Egyptian rule in the Sudan was the introduction of money. The Funj and Fur Sultanates struck no coins and most of the internal trade was by barter. "The coming of the Egyptians brought a great increase in external trade, and with it, a vastly extended use of money (Hill, 1959, p.37).

The Turko-Egyptian government's accounting system in the Sudan followed the established practice in Egypt. At first "central and provincial accounts were rendered to Cairo monthly and annually but were balanced only annually" (Hill, 1959, pp 35-39). Hill quotes an interesting example of how authority was exercised, when the Viceroy stormed at one unfortunate governor; "Hasten to remit to the treasury the accounts of your province .... You will be assuredly punished if a like delay recurs, for it is due entirely to your carelessness and neglect" (see in Hill, 1959, pp 38-39). About 1836, however, with the establishment of the Governor-General's office, a centralised Sudan accounts service was introduced in Khartoum which was only answerable to the Viceroy.
The Turkiya government can be characterized as a highly centralised system with supreme power resting in the hands of the Viceroy and his successors in Cairo. Their method of control was not only by the kind of threat mentioned above but also by their way of dealing with officials who were "frequently replaced to keep them under check" (Deng, 1973:18). This method of control was extended right down to the village sheikhdoms. Although the Turkiya maintained the tribal system, the chiefs were now puppets under central control and never enjoyed the autonomy they had had during the Funj and the Fur periods. This loss of tribal independence might indeed have contributed to the deep resentment the Sudanese had against the Turkiya government:

Egyptian rule was unpopular, not merely its faults but by its very nature, since it was alien, unremitting, and exacting. The explosion of the Mahdiya is partly to be explained by this deep-seated frustration although the form which the revolution took proved in the end more hostile to tribalism than either the Egyptian rule which preceded it or the condominium which followed (Holt, 1970:17).

Condominium and the Development of Local Government

When the condominium regime took over from the Mahdiya, the country was in "a state of complete collapse and bankruptcy" (Hinden, 1980:197). The prime objective of the new administration was, therefore, to secure peace and stability and in order to achieve this a workable administrative machine had to be established quickly.

During its long history in the Sudan, the condominium regime's
administrative structure passed through three major phases. The first phase took the form of direct rule, the second, indirect rule and the last, self-government rule. Each of these phases reflected the particular historical events of the period.

The first phase was the period of consolidation, internally to restore law and order and externally to engage in treaties defining boundaries. "At the outset, therefore, conditions necessitated a semi-military administration carried on by a small number of British provincial governors and inspectors and a subordinate clan of Egyptian administrative officials" (Hinden, 1950, p.197). This was, in many ways, a re-introduction of the administrative system of direct rule which the Turko-Egyptian government had applied in the country before. The provincial administrative divisions of the country under Turkiya rule were also retained. Sub-divisions of provinces took account of the maintenance of ethnic territorial units.

A memorandum by the first Governor-General (Kitchener) to his subordinates gives some insight into the purpose and method of his administration. In it he stated:

"... the task before us all is to acquire the confidence of the people, to develop their resources and to raise them to a higher level. This can only be effected by the District Officers being thoroughly in touch with the better class of native, through whom we may hope gradually to influence the whole population. ... it is to the individual action of British officers, working independently,"
but with a common purpose, on the individual natives whose confidence they have gained, that we must look for the moral and industrial regeneration of the Sudan . . . . . . .

"All insubordination must be promptly and severely repressed. At the same time, a paternal spirit of correction for offences should be your aim in your relations with the people . . . ." (see in Beshir, 1974:23).

What is important to remember here is that, by the Anglo-Egyptian agreement of 1899, the Sudan government was constituted an autonomous government absolutely separate and distinct from the Egyptian government (see, for example, Beshir, 1974:21). Unlike the Turko-Egyptian period when the Sudan was a province of Egypt with its rulers having limited power, the condominium regime was granted wide ranging powers by the agreement. Internally, authority for decision-making descended in a hierarchical line from the capital to the smallest and remotest administrative unit in the country. Tribal chiefs played no part in the government system during this phase. According to Salih, "the new Government did not want to give power to any native who might create a new fanatic national leadership to wage another Mahdist war against it" (in Howell, 1974:22; see also Norris, 1983a:51). However, such fears did not prevail for too long and by 1914 local sheikhs had already been given responsibilities in the judicial sphere to deal with minor criminal offences. This concession was "Motivated less by the desire to strengthen these authorities than by the need to lessen the burden to the administrative officials" (Hinden, 1950:197; see also Bakheit, 1974:26-27).
The real shift from the first phase (direct rule) to the second phase (indirect rule) came following the Milner Commission's report immediately after the first World War. The 'keynote', as Marshall (1949:15) called it, of the Milner report was that "a centralised bureaucracy is wholly unsuitable for the Sudan". More elaborately, Milner wrote: "Having regard to (the) vast extent (of the Sudan) and varied character of its inhabitants, the administration of its different parts should be left, as far as possible, in the hands of the native authorities wherever they exist under British supervision" (see Salih, 1974:22). The Milner report was thus to form the basis for the Indirect Rule policy of the Sudan which was implemented by enacting a series of laws. "This policy was accelerated by two important events: the expulsion of the Egyptian civil servants in the Sudan in 1924 and the world depression of 1929-33. The former necessitated involvement of more Sudanese in the administration to fill the gap left by the Egyptians, and the latter called for economy in administration" (Salih, 1974:23).

Under the Indirect Rule policy, which was to last for two decades in the Sudan, Native Authorities were fostered in earnest; their judicial powers were extended, simple administrative work was devolved to them, they were also allowed to participate in the administration of local services. In contrast to the initial government reservation about tribal organisation, the policy now was "not only to restore but to increase the prestige of tribalism ......"
(Marshall, 1949:6). In this the government was no doubt influenced by the theory of indirect rule, administration through the instruments of indigenous institutions, expounded by Lord Lugard, which at that time provided the guiding principles for many of the British colonies.

Native administration was found to be unaccommodating to the reform and change required for development. Salih (1974:23) has explained this in clear terms thus:

"- native administration proved to be, in the late 1930's, a rigid system of administration favouring only the unchanging conditions of medieval tribal life. As life developed in the larger villages and towns, and in parts of the country where economic progress began to create more individual freedom, and as external and internal migrations began to disintegrate many tribes, old tribal influences began to decay. In some areas where they could survive, they became an anachronism hampering evolution and advancement of the people. The tribal administration, for example, had neither the desire nor the capability to provide urgently needed public services such as education, sanitation and public works."

"In response to these shortcomings and to the increasing frustration of the nationalist elite ..., the British began to adapt 'native administration' into 'local government' - an administration no longer according to the tribe a man belonged to, but according to the place he lived in".

In 1937, the third phase in the history of the development of local government began. Three local government ordinances were passed in that year dealing with municipalities, townships and rural areas and, together with their subsequent amendments, they were to be the legal basis for administration in the country until 1951 (see in Hinden, 1950:200; Marshall,
1949:7). It was significant that by the terms of these laws, 'Local Government Authority' was exercised either by a single person or a body of persons which made it possible to grant "local government powers not only to the former native or local administration heads, but also to Local Government Councils" (Hinden, 1950:200). What is significant about this is that the laws were designed to accommodate the different local circumstances.

With the intensification of demands for self-government in the 1940s, it became necessary to introduce a new uniform system. For this, Dr. A.H. Marshall, an expert in local government, was invited to advise the government. His brief was "to enquire into and report on the policy and practices of Sudan Government in respect of Local Government and to make recommendations". Dr. Marshall's report was completed in 1949 and "his recommendations were implemented almost in total in one comprehensive Local Government Ordinance, 1951, which repealed and superceded the former laws" (Salih, 1974:24).

In 1950, the political climate in the Sudan was such that it was predictable that sooner or later the country would be self-governing. A clear intention in the passing of the 1951 Local Government Ordinance was therefore to lay the foundation of government in a future self-governing Sudan. Indeed, the foundation was laid as the 1951 Ordinance was to remain the legal force of the local government system in the Sudan until it was replaced by the military government of General Aboud in
1960, four years after independence.

The 1951 Local-Government Ordinance

The 1949 Marshall report, which formed the basis of the Local-Government Ordinance of 1951, was a remarkable piece of work by all considerations. Since independence in 1956, the local government system in the Sudan has undergone several changes and the influence of the Marshall report has been considerable. As Salih (1974:33) rightly said "any understanding of local government in the Sudan today must start with an examination of the system which evolved from the 1951 Ordinance".

Marshall was the city treasurer of Coventry City, England, when he was invited to carry out the job. That he was strongly influenced by his personal experience in England is clear from his references throughout the report but he seemed to be too much of a realist not to be aware of the special situation he was dealing with in the Sudan. The following, from his report, tells of his thinking:

"..... England's local government, though admittedly one of the best in the world, has features which are not so praiseworthy such as dependence on the single tax, the craze for uniformity and the legal obstacles which deter local authorities from undertaking any tasks other than the conventional ones. Then there are aspects of English local government which, in their setting are admirable but would not 'bear transplantation, for example the peculiar position of the town clerk who is able in England to carry out sufficient co-ordination though not possessing formal powers of supervision over other departments" (1949:75-76).
Local authorities were already well established on the British model when Marshall did his study and the thrust of his report was not for a major change but for improving the system taking account of Sudan's peculiarities. For example, Marshall recommended that a network of autonomous local government units be established which would be "primarily devoted to the provision of services to the public and divorced from the major stresses of national politics" (Norris, 1983a:53). However, his mere approval of the existing model was not given without considering other models. For example, he rejected "pyramidism, that is, making the central government the apex of a pile of authorities beginning with village councils and passing upwards through local districts and province councils, each layer being subject to the layer above" (pp. 13-14) on the grounds of economy. His reasoning became clear when he compared two-tier with single-tier systems of local government. Marshall (pp 26-28) gave three reasons why a two-tier system of local government should not be adopted for the Sudan:

1. "... those functions normally performed by an upper tier authority in other countries, such as main roads, either do not exist in the Sudan or are services such as hospitals and secondary schools which are likely to be local functions for many years to come".

2. "The system would saddle the country with a double battery of executive staff. In any case it would be some years before sufficient staff was available. If the two tiers shared staff then all the evils of divided loyalty and part-time employment arise".

3. "In so far as the system multiplies the number of authorities, it confuses the inhabitants. The upper tier authority could hardly collect its own taxes. ......It is one of those
Taking his basic assumption that there should be "autonomous local authorities not tangled up with central government", Marshall recommended the following principles upon which the local government structure in the Sudan should be built (p116):

1. "Local authorities should be corporate bodies answerable to a local electorate.

2. "The system of local government must be sufficiently flexible to allow for the widely divergent conditions in the Sudan.

3. "New powers should be granted piecemeal to local authorities as they show themselves capable of assuming additional responsibility.

4. "Local authorities should be allowed as much freedom as possible.

5. "Local authorities must have independent tax revenues.

6. "There must be adequate central supervision with power to suspend the recalcitrant or inert authority.

7. "A system of grants-in-aid should be instituted.

8. "Units of local government should be financially stable, and able to attract the best personnel as members and officers.

9. "A halt should be called in development of local authorities' duties until they have been provided with adequate executives".

With regard to the method in which the state should discharge its continuing duty concerning its relations with local governments, Marshall raised some important points:

"Upon the central government must rest the ultimate
responsibility for the government of the country and for the quality of work of local authorities. The central government will wish to ensure minimum standards of performance in such services as education and health, and will wish to be assured that local authorities are conducting their affairs in accordance with their constitution and in a business-like manner free from abuses and corruption. The central government must therefore not only supervise local government but must lay down the framework in which local authorities shall work. It must retain power not only to stimulate the reluctant local authority but to supersede any local authorities whose behaviour is detrimental to the public interest. Local authorities should look to the centre for advice and guidance, and the central departments should continuously place at the disposal of the local authorities expert knowledge and the experience of other local authorities. Further, the central government must always be ready to step in financially to assist the weaker authorities. In the south, for example, unless the state is prepared to take a very generous view towards local government, there will be many areas unable to support local government for a long period ahead.

"The task of the central government in a country which varies so much in conditions is particularly difficult, demanding a flexibility of control and catholicity of outlook. Any attempt at uniformity of local government in the interests of convenience at the centre, would be fatal to the idea of local self-government. Nor can the attitude of the central departments to local authorities be standardised; the smaller authority with its limited resources and relatively inexpert staff will need more help than its larger neighbour" (pp.16-17).

To emphasise the importance of the points Marshall stated that "the responsibility does not cease when local government is established". He made detailed recommendations on central-local relationships and suggested the line of authority. He favoured the establishment of "a ministry of local government which would exercise field supervision through its own inspectorate" (Norris, 1983a:55).
As to the place of native authorities in local government, Marshall described it to be "the most fascinating, the most intricate, the most elusive and the one liable to be misunderstood" (p.40). As described in previous sections, native authorities played an important role throughout the history of the Sudan. How to settle the proper relationship of tribalism to the new local governments was therefore a matter to which Marshall gave great consideration. After a careful study of the advantages and disadvantages, he came to a compromise solution by recommending "a policy of gradual differentiation", as Norris (1983a:55) called it, which was "confining the tribal leaders to native court work, tax collection and certain ceremonial functions".

On the powers and duties of local authorities, he urged the "undesirability of the state confining local authorities to the traditional duties of local government in Europe". He explained this by saying that "in Europe the state is nearer (geographically) to the people and often there exists an army of associations - voluntary and otherwise - concerned with the welfare of the inhabitants". Due to the different situation prevalent in the Sudan, "the Local Authority alone must fill in the gaps in the public services" (p.51). Marshall then laid down what he called "the principles which should determine the allocation of duties to local authorities" as follows:-

"Having created local authorities with proper administrative machinery the central government must adopt a bold policy and not merely grudgingly hand over to local authorities part of the services
previously undertaken by central departments. Upon local authorities should be placed the responsibility for all local services, except those which are so highly technical that the state must administer them direct, or those such as the post office which must clearly be under one management throughout the country. Whenever a central department suggests the setting up of local departmental machinery, the onus should be upon it to prove why the duty cannot be carried out by the local authority. The argument in favour of allowing local authorities to administer as many services as possible, is particularly strong in so large a country and one where, because of the differences in districts, so many adaptations of services are needed. Finally, from the financial point of view alone, the state cannot afford to create an elaborate administrative machine and then neglect to utilize it to the full" (pp.50-51).

Following these principles, Marshall recommended that local authorities in the northern provinces should be responsible for provision of primary education. Marshall did not find a local authority strong enough to handle this in the south, but, he said, "whatever principles are applied in the northern provinces should eventually be applied to the south", that is, "when fully fledged local authorities come into existence". Other functions that he recommended should be local government responsibilities were water supplies, agriculture and forestry services, community health (clinics etc., but not hospitals), welfare work, maintenance of local roads, and town planning and building works. Marshall also maintained that "whilst the primary object should be the rendering of services and not the making of profit, power to use surpluses in aid of the general expenditure should not be denied the local authorities (p.58).

He gave, as examples, electricity, water supplies and the running of ferry services. Concerning the "economic
activities. Marshall's view was that "local government administration is not ideally suited for trading operations, and local authorities should participate in ordinary business activities only when other agencies are failing to meet the needs of the community". The example he gave was that in areas like the South where shopping facilities were inadequate, local authorities might set up in business as retailers. Obviously, it was not possible for Marshall to give precise details of all that local governments should do as their functions vary from area to area according to the different needs of local communities.

Local government finance was the area on which Marshall most extensively reported. In an introductory passage on this subject, he said:

"Since it has been usually the financial aspect of the problem which has remained undetermined, a dangerous but natural belief has arisen that, as soon as local government finance is reorganized, an idealistic equilibrium between local authorities and central government will be reached. Now it happens that the one aspect of local government which never reaches finality is the financial relation of local and central government; the centre thinks the local authorities expect too much, whilst the local authorities believe themselves to be robbed of their deserts. ... (thus) a universal acceptable financial relationship is impossible of attainment" (p.81).

And, on the importance of local governments being self-supporting:

"The corollary of placing duties on autonomous local authorities is to put taxes at their disposal. If local authorities are merely fed by government subventions, whoever determines the amount of the available funds is in fact ruler of the area; self-government does not exist" (p.81).
Marshall (1948:82) brought his own experience to this analysis when he said, "the golden rule in dividing taxes between the central and local government is not to leave the local authorities with only a single tax, or with taxes which are on so constricted a basis that no expansion of activities is possible without help from the central government". As an example, he said, "this is why English local authorities, confined to a single tax, have always looked with envy on the range of taxes available to German and American cities".

With regard to the revenue source of local authorities in the Sudan, Marshall urged that the "taxes directly collected at the local level should be assigned to the local authorities, including Ushur (tax on rain-fed land), irrigated land tax, date tax, poll tax and property rating tax in urban areas" (Norris, 1983a:55). Although he acknowledged that many local governments in the Sudan would be largely dependent on central assistance, nevertheless he urged that the aim of financial policy should be to keep cases needing equalisation grants to a minimum (p.87).

During the transitional period to independence (1951-1955), the 1951 Local Government Ordinance was followed in earnest. Local governments were created in stages strictly reflecting local needs, that is, avoiding uniformity, as Marshall prescribed. "For the least developed or civically conscious areas", as Salih and Howell called them, "the Ministry of Local Government issued an order appointing a local government
inspector as the statutory local government authority" (in Howell, 1974:34). The inspector had no independent budget initially but in the second stage he acted with a budget. At the third stage the local government inspector delegated his powers to a council and his role was then supervisory; at the fourth stage a council was created by warrant but the chairman was appointed by central government. Finally, the last stage was reached by amending the warrant of the fourth stage empowering the council to elect its own chairman. The chairman of the council was elected annually (see Salih, 1974:34-35; Norris, 1983a:55). But, of course, the creation of the councils and their eligibility for onward promotion was very much dependent on the merit of the individual councils, that is, "local government councils could have been promoted from the first stage to the fourth or fifth without undergoing other stages" (Salih, 1974:35).

Salih and Howell provide a clear picture of the nature and composition of the councils:

"The composition of councils varied in detail and members but not in principle. The number of councillors usually ranged from ten to forty in number. Some of them were elected and the remainder nominated - the latter never exceeding one third of the total number of councillors as a rule. Each council area was divided into a number of single-member electoral wards in which elections might either be direct or indirect. Appointed members were nominated by the governor of the province, and they were normally chosen to represent tribal, economic or other special interests which did not come by elections to that specific council" (in Howell, 1974:35).

The fact that all these stages existed, elections of
councillors, appointments of chairman etc., illustrates that the central government machine was functioning fully. The story of local government in the post-independence period is quite different. The ineffectiveness of the central machine, as discussed before, crippled the function of the existing structure. Gaafar Mohammed Ali Bakheit described the decline of local government activity in the post-independence period as follows:

"... after independence, the tendency of the Government to soften was coupled by internal conflicts among the organs of the State as to their relative powers and fields of jurisdiction. Administrative vacuums occurred as a result of structural changes and often apathy and inaction became the prominent symptoms of administration. The outcome of this deterioration in field administration was that supervision played a very minor role in the relationship between officers of the central government, including those responsible for supervising native courts, and their agents, the native authorities. In the few cases where supervision was maintained it was no more than an appearance; a show intended for its own sake and not to serve any real purpose.

"Co-ordination also suffered from the instability of central government organs, and native administrations found that they were dealing with not one administration but with half a score of sovereign departments each jealous of the other. In particular, the Police, Judiciary, and the Ministry of Local Government were at loggerheads.

"Owing to the lack of authority, supervision and coordination, the indirect influence that in the past had sustained orderly administration, became less effective. Insurrections, tribal flights, refusal to pay taxes, and general lack of civic discipline became frequent. The Government authority depended more and more on coercion, and where that could not be effectively used, government authority became only nominal" (in Howell, 1974:46-47).
So, what went wrong? In an attempt to understand the problem and rectify it, the military government that took power in 1958 appointed the Abu Rannat Commission with a brief to investigate decentralised government and identify "the best system from all points of view". After all, the military regime's proclaimed policy was "to end anarchy and corruption in all the state's organs" (el-Beshir, in Howell, 1974, p. 81). Based on the Abu Rannat Commission's report, the Provincial Administration Act of 1960 was declared.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Centre/Region</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Lower</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>- Minister of local gov. with supervisory powers</td>
<td>- Governor</td>
<td>- Distric commissioner</td>
<td>- Native administration (chiefs and sheiks etc)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Field Agencies</td>
<td>- Urban and rural councils: corporate bodies with powers to levy taxes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Native administration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>- Ministries with supervisory powers over provincial authorities</td>
<td>- Province council chaired by central gov. representative, elected and nominated councillors</td>
<td>- District commissioner coordinates work of field representatives</td>
<td>N.A. with limited powers of running local courts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>- Same as above (After 1972 Southern Regional Gov. responsible for provincial council)</td>
<td>- Commissioner appointed by president, People's executive council with elected members, Corporate bodies</td>
<td>- Local council powers delegated by province</td>
<td>Councils at village and market levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>- Central and regional Ministries (regions created in north 1980)</td>
<td>- Commissioner with limited supervisory powers</td>
<td>- Local councils with corporate powers and budgetary units</td>
<td>The same</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Shadowed area signifies the location of the local authorities with corporate powers.
The Provincial Administration Act, 1960

The Abu Rannat Commission was not overly critical of the 1951 Act; on the contrary, it reported finding the system "sound in terms of structure and organizations". However, the commission was very critical of many elected council members "who degraded the standard of membership itself". A second point the Abu Rannat Commission criticized was the problem of coordination between the functional departments and the local authorities. According to the commission's report, "the present organization which incorporated side-by-side two systems under two different ministries, the one being a centralised administration system represented by the Governor and the District Commissioner, and the other a local system functioning on the basis of councils, resulted in a duplication of work, undefined responsibility, delays in execution, overlapping of duties and extra expenses in the cost of general administration" (Norris, 1983a:59).

The finding of this lack of coordination appears to have been the triggering point for the military government to pass the Provincial Administration Act, 1960. "The aim was to create a structure through which the different departments of central government and local institutions operating in the provinces could be co-ordinated" (Norris, 1983b:211). The main feature of the Act was the creation of a middle tier authority at the provincial level with its function divided into two - policy-making and executive. The policy-making body, called the province council, was chaired by an appointed government
representative and members of the council included the heads of the different department representatives in the province, members elected by the local government councils from amongst their members and experienced and qualified members appointed from amongst the inhabitants of the province. "Province Councils were granted their own source of revenue and a supplementary block grant" (Norris, 1983b:211). The Executive Council, constituted by a warrant of establishment granted by the Council of Ministers, had amongst its members the heads of all government units and the chairman was the representative of the Ministry of Local Government who also acted as secretary of the Province Council. Apart from its executive function, the Executive Council prepared the proposals for the budget which it submitted to the Province Council for approval.

It will be remembered that Marshall, in his 1949 report, had considered a two-tier system of government but had rejected it because all the services which he recommended should be local responsibilities could be handled by an "all purpose authority". Whether the Aboud regime felt that the local authorities were over-burdened by duties they could not adequately perform and hence needed a second tier to share the responsibilities, was not clear from its declaration. El-Beshir (1974:81-82) thought though that it was more for political ends than anything else:

"The adoption of the Provincial Administration Act of 1960 was, in fact, not so much a step towards more democratization of the government process, than a deliberate policy on the part of the military dictatorship to achieve a greater degree
of political control over the activities and attitudes of the
civil servants at the local level .... each province council
was essentially a political body entrusted with the
responsibility for explaining and promoting the policies and
objectives of the regime. Its members were appointed, in a
large part, on the strength of their support and enthusiasm
for the regime".

The structure of the 1960 Act remained in force for the life
span of the Military regime. "With the fall of Aboud in
October 1964, however, the Act was, to all intents and
purposes, assigned to the scrap-heap" (Salih, 1974:43). Not
entirely so, however, as, although the civilian government
that took power amended the Act, nevertheless, the province
was by then established as a higher tier of the local
government system. The amendment which was made was that the
Provincial Authority now became the Executive Council,
representing departmental heads under the chairmanship of the
Provincial Commissioner who was the representative of the
Ministry of Local Government.

Despite the creation of a higher tier of administrative
function at the provincial level by the Aboud Government in
1960, later amended by the civilian government that succeeded
it, the position of the local authorities remained more or
less unchanged until 1971. By this time a military government
led by President Nimeiri was in power.
THE NIMEIRI REGIME AND THE ACCELERATION OF DECENTRALISATION REFORMS

The 1971 People's Local Government Act

During President Nimeiri's period in office the structure of local government was subjected to several changes. It started with the declaration of the 1971 People's Local Government Act. The aim of the 1971 Act was, according to a report on decentralisation prepared by a committee chaired by Nimeiri, the "uprooting of social and economic backwardness, supporting of national unity and modernising of administrative patterns in a manner that would enable authorities concerned to have a clear conception of the needs of the citizens, and strive for their satisfaction" (Nimeiri, 1979, p.18). The same report provides four points which it called "the basic features of the People's Local Government Act, 1971" - in summary, it:

1. Removes the understanding prevailing under the Local Government Ordinance, 1951, and under the Provincial Administration Act, 1960, that there were two governments - a local government and a central government.

2. Widens the base of popular democracy.

3. Ensures the right of women to membership of the People's Local Government organs.

4. Removes the duality in providing services between the local council and the province council on the one hand and the local government and the central government on the other" (p.18).

Thus the Act was not solely about provincial administration. The Regional Government of South Sudan, for example, gave its own interpretation of the Act as follows: "This structure (of
the Act) aims to spread the democratic rule from the base to the top by allowing citizens to participate in development and to solve problems in local ways in accordance with the local traditions and customs" (The Six Year Plan of Economic and Social Development, 1977/78-1982/83, Directorate of Planning, Southern Region, 1977, p.330).

The structure outlined in the Act took the form of a pyramid with the Provincial Council at the apex followed by District Councils and, below them, Town and Rural Councils and finally, at the base, Village and Neighbourhood Councils.

The 1971 People's Local Government Act, however, might best be explained as creating two parallel hierarchies, political and administrative, linked at the provincial level under the leadership of the Commissioner who was also the Chairman of the Council. The Commissioner was appointed by the President and was responsible to him through the Minister of Local Government (Articles 6, No (1) & (2)). (After February 1979, the Commissioner was directly responsible to the President following the abolition of the Ministry of Local Government). The Commissioner, as chief representative of the Government in the province, was empowered by the Act "to be responsible for the execution of the general policy of the Government and for fostering and consolidating the revolutionary and socialist regime of the May Revolution and for the functional organizations and shall see that these organizations are responsive to the general policy of the Government" (Article
The Province People's Executive Council, of which the Commissioner was the chairman and treasurer by virtue of his office, was a corporate body established by a warrant by the Council of Ministers (Article 7(1)). The Council was composed of representatives of the functional organizations (village and town development committees), which should constitute the majority, as well as representatives of the heads of departments in the province (Article 9(1) & (2)). The Province Council was empowered to administer virtually all the services in the province including agriculture, health, education up to senior secondary level, roads, housing, town planning and general security. By the Act, the province council was authorised to establish, control and supervise the functions of the local councils in districts, towns and rural areas within its jurisdiction (Article 15(2)). In addition, the Province Council was entrusted with the overall administrative responsibility for resources - financial and manpower - not only for the budgets and manpower needs of local councils but also for all government agencies coming under its authority. The provision of this wider function to the province was intended to decentralise power from Khartoum and, to a lesser extent, from Juba, the regional capital of South Sudan, to the provincial capitals.

The Province People's Executive Council was authorised to delegate some of its powers and functions to the local
councils (District, Town and Rural) which functioned under its supervision. These local councils were not corporate bodies, that is, they did not have an independent budget and a general seal. The members of the local councils were chosen by election from amongst the bodies representing the functional organizations. Persons serving in the government at this level were also chosen as members in the manner prescribed by the Province Executive Council. The Chairman of the local council was appointed by the Minister of Local Government or by the appropriate Minister at the regional level in the case of the South. The local councils, with the consent of the Province Executive Council, were allowed to impose fees or rates of a local nature upon members of the public in their area for the finance and administration of local self-help schemes.

Unlike the two previous major local government acts (1951 and 1960), whose formulation was preceded by the production of reports, the 1971 had no such precedent. It is therefore difficult to identify precisely what prompted the government in its choice of this particular pattern. Howell's comments along this line, however, are of interest, thus:

"It would be both wrong and unfair to be too sceptical towards the intentions of the Sudan Government ...... Certainly, the reform of local government is part of the Government's strategy of broadening its base of political support ...... there is a genuine, and well-based, fear that completely open local government elections would provide the old political parties with a fifth column which could surely hinder the Government's work at provincial and local levels. And there is a
genuine, populist desire to break what is considered to be the conservative stronghold of traditionally powerful families" (Howell; 1974:73).

There may well be some truth in Howell's assessment, at least for the initial period of Nimeiri's regime. Whatever the reasons were, Nimeiri was all set for decentralisation, and further decentralisation. That he was committed to this was mentioned in his 1979 report: "it is a step that will be followed, God willing, by other steps in support of the decentralisation of government and administration". These other steps appeared in the form of the Regional Government Act, 1980, which will be discussed in the last sub-section of the chapter, and, the the Local Government Act, 1981.

The 1981 Local Government Act

The passing of the 1981 Act was yet another occasion during the Nimeiri regime when the country suddenly found itself confronted with a major structural reorganization. By the 1981 Act, the Province People's Councils were abolished. Instead, as mentioned above, the Act gave the power to the Regional Executive Authority to establish a number of Area (District) Councils (Article 5(1)). The Area Councils in turn were empowered by the Act to "establish People's Local Councils for towns, rural areas, quarters, villages, camps, industrial areas and markets; and shall delegate to them such powers and limited financial resources as it deems necessary for performance of services" (Article 7).
Figure 4.1 The Structure of the Decentralised Government in the Sudan - 1981.
The Area Councils assumed many of the functions of the previous Province Councils including primary and intermediate education, public health, roads, drainage and water supplies, agriculture and veterinary extension work; culture and sports; social affairs and self-help schemes; labour and the regulation of employment; licensing, price and commodity control; and the maintenance of public order.

The Act specified that the functional organizations were to be represented and it authorised the Area Executive Authority to prescribe a reasonable number of seats for women. With the recommendation of the Commissioner, the Area Executive Council could also appoint to the Council experienced members of the public who had an interest in the public work provided that the appointed members did not exceed ten per cent of the total membership (Article 11(3)). The Act also stipulated that the Council should elect a chairman from amongst its members at its first sitting, "provided that such sitting be chaired by a person to be chosen by the Commissioner for the said purpose (Article 11(5)). "The large councils established on this basis, such as Omdurman, have a membership of fifty, thirty-five being elected members, ten from the Alliance of the People's Working Forces (functional organization), and five nominees" (Norris, 1983, p.217). The councils in the South consisted of thirty members only but with similar proportions.

The Councils had a policy-making and an executive organ. The executive organs were chaired by the most senior
administrative officer who was also, by virtue of his office, the Council's secretary, treasurer and supervisor of employees in the Council (Article 12(3)). The Council had been allowed by the Act to make a job structure for its executive organ with the assent of the Commissioner and appointment was by secondment from the Regional Executive Authority or from the National Government through the Regional Executive Authority (Article 12(1)).

The role of the Provincial Commissioner was radically redefined. He was no longer directly responsible to the President but to the Regional Executive Authority. The powers of the Commissioner were specified by the Act, and briefly, he was responsible: 1., for the security of the province; 2., for the supervision of the police, the prisons and the fire brigade; 3., administratively, for the heads of the executive organs in the Area Councils and the procedures of secondment of all employees in the public service organs of the Area Councils.

The method of control by both the Regional Authority and the Commissioner over the Councils was specified by the Act. Any Regional Minister could inspect the work of the Council and the Commissioner too could "revise the work of the Council and of the People's Local Council" (Article 34(3)).

The Commissioner had also a supervisory role over the Councils as he was authorised to "present to the Regional Executive
Authority periodical reports on performance of the Councils" (Article 34(4)).

The Regionalisation Drive

President Nimeiri made a distinction between political and administrative decentralisation. Political decentralisation was equated with the transfer or devolution of power to the regions and its main objective was "to lay a solid basis for building a Sudanese nation wherein all tribal and racial groups, whatever their origin of beliefs, shall be fused in one united national personality" (Nimeiri, 1979:23). Regionalisation was thus a form of decentralisation which aimed to preserve national unity.

Table 4.2: Evolution of regionalisation in the Sudan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Northern Region</td>
<td>4 Khartoum Province</td>
<td>7 Darfur Region</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Eastern Region</td>
<td>5 Central Region</td>
<td>8 Equatoria Region</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Kordofan Region</td>
<td>6 Upper Nile Region</td>
<td>9 Bahr el Ghazal Region</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The notion of regionalisation for national integration is reflected in the writings of Sudanese academics and experts on governmental issues. Mohamed Omer Beshir (1980) entitled an article he wrote in Sudan Notes and Records "Ethnicity, Regionalism and National Cohesion". Beshir described the implications of regionalisation for national integration as follows:

The concept of regionalism — though understood differently by different groups — was for the first time accepted and endorsed by the political leadership in the north and the south as the only means that would satisfy the legitimate aspirations of the south, remove southern grievances and at the same time dispel the fears of the north that the south would secede at some time in the future. It was the beginning of conferring legitimacy on ethnicity.

Mohammed Beshir Hamid (1986), following a similar line of analysis, wrote, in an article entitled "Regionalisation, devolution and National Integration in the Southern Sudan", about the distinction between regional government and local government and the former as involving "more complex set of relationships that necessarily entails a measure of autonomous rule through the creation of executive and legislative organs" (Hamid, 1986:124).

Rafia Hassan Ahmed (1984:7) defined regionalism as "a cultural and political movement seeking to protect and foster indigenous culture and to promote autonomous political institutions in a particular region". President Nimeiri's understanding of regionalism was along similar lines. About the experience gained from regional self-governent in the
south, Nimeiri wrote (1979:22):

There is no doubt that the system of regional self-government has achieved tremendous success and has attained positive results from the political point of view. Perhaps the most important are that it created national unity, ended the civil war, attained peace, and that it satisfied the aspirations of the citizens of the southern region, gathered them together and fused them in the forefront of national work for development, progress and prosperity of the region.

It was clear that President Nimeiri regarded the successful implementation of regionalisation as a political necessity for maintaining national unity and decentralisation to local governments as a mechanism for development administration.

Taking the south Sudan experience into account, President Nimeiri, in February 1979, announced a series of Presidential Orders which were, according to Alassam (1983:113) "to reshape government powers and structure through the devolution of authority to provincial councils" (see also Africa Contemporary Record, '1979-80:B105). Seven central ministries (4.3) were abolished and their powers transferred to the province authorities. In their place two new ministries (4.4) were created to execute functions not transferred to the provinces" (Alassam, 1983:112). Four other ministries (4.5) had their powers curtailed. At the same time, President Nimeiri was made the "Patron of Local Government" and an office for local government affairs was created inside the presidential office. According to the new arrangement the provincial commissioners became directly answerable to the president.

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Whilst these changes were being introduced, two committees (one national and the other technical) were set up to make specific recommendations for the creation of regional governments in north Sudan. The technical committee toured the various parts of the country, except the south which was outside its term of reference (Beshir, 1984:24), in order to sound local opinion (Alassam, 1983:112). In its final report, the technical committee endorsed the general principle of regionalism as a suitable system of government for the Sudan but there was disagreement among its members "on the issue of the numbers of regions to be established, the pattern of implementation and the detailed structure" (Beshir, 1984:25).

Some members of the technical committee, for example, argued against immediate implementation having taken into consideration the lack of human and financial resources at the time and the unfavourable economic conditions. However, "these views were not accepted since President Nimeiri was determined to have immediate regionalism irrespective of any possible disadvantage " (Beshir, 1984:25).

In July 1980 the constitution of the Sudan was amended to incorporate the new Regional Government Act in replacement of the previous provincial local government Acts. The regional system devised for the north Sudan was the semi-autonomous type. Unlike in the south, the national President retained the authority to appoint the governors, deputy governors and the regional ministers. The Governor, his deputy and the ministers were responsible for the executive function of the
regions. The legislative functions were vested in the People's Regional Assembly. The regional assemblies were designed to have between fifty and seventy members, the majority of which were to be selected by geographic constituencies and others nominated by women's, youth, village development, and other functional organizations. The president was also empowered to appoint 10 per cent of the members. The Bill gave the President a power of veto over regional legislation.

Section six of the Regional Government Act 1980 forbids the regional governments from encroaching upon the following central government functions:

a) National defence and security
b) Foreign affairs and international diplomatic representation
c) Nationality, immigration, passports and aliens affairs
d) Public audit
e) Judiciary, public prosecution and advocacy
f) Transit means of communication and transport
g) Inter-regional water supply resources and the electricity network
h) Currency and coinage
i) Export and import trade
j) Weights and measures
k) Natural resources and mining
l) National and regional elections
m) Educational planning
n) Any other matters regulated by national legislation

The regional governments were made responsible for the general good of their respective regions and for the maintenance of law and order. Section eight of the Act spells out the functions and powers belonging to the regional governments, which include:

a) The development and utilisation of regional financial
resources
b) The fostering, development and supervision of local government councils
c) Supervision and control of police and fire services
d) Fostering of social and regional religious institutions
e) Regulation of commerce, supply, co-operation and regional industry
f) Utilisation of water resources
g) Development of regional communications and transportation
h) Supervision of public services personnel in the region
i) Development and control of land use and town planning

The People’s Regional Assembly was empowered to approve its own budget, levy taxes and impose fees and charges but it was not to levy or collect any of the following:-

a) National taxes on import and export
b) Excise duties
c) Capital profit tax
d) Public service benefits (pension)

With the creation of intermediate government at the regional level, the position of the provinces became unclear, barely a year after their powers had been increased with the abolition of some central ministries. To remove the anomalies which existed between the Regional Government Bill 1980 and the People’s Local Government Act 1971, the 1981 Local Government Act, discussed above, was passed.

Conclusion
Local administration in the Sudan passed through unprecedented upheaval during the Nimeiri regime. Considering the vast extent of the country and the diversity of its population, decentralisation policies in the Sudan were hailed as revolutionary in Africa (Moharir, 1986). However, judgement
on the merits of the extensive decentralisation may be dangerous without consideration of its impact both as a means of national integration and development administration. The case study of Part II will thus assess the implications of decentralisation policies in south Sudan between 1972-1983, that is, during the life of the Addis Ababa peace agreement.
CHAPTER 5

DIMENSIONS OF SCARCITY AND POVERTY

Introduction

One of the declared aims of decentralisation in the Sudan was "to accelerate economic development at the local level by enabling the citizens of the different regions to determine what is best suited to their regions, and how best to utilize it for their own good" (Nimeiri, 1979:27). Since decentralisation was, therefore, planned to serve as an instrument of economic development, it is imperative that in the first instance, the socio-economic condition it was expected to improve, and the means available for so doing, are clearly understood.

Thus, this chapter reviews the nature of Sudan's economy in general terms, analyses the prevalent inter-regional disparities, and, in order to expose the extent of the problem, an in depth analysis is made of the poverty situation in South Sudan.

MEASURES OF DISPARITY

Some Cross-National Comparisons

"The Sudan ranks twelfth among the so called least developed countries with a per capita income in the area of $300" (ILO, 1984:5). But, it is generally agreed that GNP per capita provides a poor guide for measuring and comparing social
progress both within and between countries (Chennery et al., 1974:xv; Todaro, 1987:137-138). Given the socio-economic concentration within the Sudan in the Khartoum - Kosti - Kassal triangle (central eastern), the inadequacy of GNP per capita as a representative measure of development is only too clear. Better indicators do exist, however, for assessing development performances of countries. The physical quality of life index (PQLI), a composite of life expectancy, infant mortality, and literacy is one such (Sharif, 1986:567). Another indicator, the infant mortality rate - the number of deaths before the age of one for every 1,000 live births - is one particularly favoured by UNICEF as "the most sensitive of all indicators ... because it reflects such progress as education, water supply, health care, and nutrition for both the mother and the child" (Grant, 1983:7). Grant believes that "when taken together with per capita GNP, the use of social indicators - either the infant mortality rate alone or the composite PQLI index itself - reveals a much more three dimensional picture of development in a given country than either economic or social indicators standing alone".

In 1981, UNICEF, quoting the United Nations statistical office, estimated that the infant mortality rate in the Sudan was 125 per 1,000 (UNICEF, 1981:4). UNICEF acknowledged, however, the wide variation between the north and south of the country: "by the most recent population model developed, the infant mortality in the south is 170 per 1,000 compared to 100 per 1,000 in the north" (UNICEF, 1981:4). Another UNICEF
report on the southern region of the Sudan estimated that, in 1981, the annual per capita income was $75 and child mortality rate under five years of age was as high as 400 per 1,000 (Sclafani, 1981:11).

Abizadeh & Basilevsky (1986), applying a 'maximum likelihood factor analysis technique', show the socioeconomic classification of 64 countries. On the list for 'quality of life factor' beginning from the lowest value, the Sudan stood 7th (p140) and on the 'industry-agriculture split scaling', ranked from the lowest to the highest, the Sudan again stood at 7th position (p.106). According to Abizadeh and Basilevsky's classification the first 21 countries in the industry-agriculture scaling represent the highly "underdeveloped" countries (p.103).

Table 5.1 on the next page shows the comparatively underdeveloped structure of Sudan's economy with the manufacturing sector's contribution to GDP showing less than 10%, that is, lower than the average share of manufacturing in GDP of the low-income countries. Since non-industrialised countries, according to Ali (1985:7), are those whose economies have a value-added share of the manufacturing sector of less than 20 percent, the Sudan is both a non-industrialised and an underdeveloped country.
Table 5.1: Sudan's Economic Structure, 1982

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Group</th>
<th>Percent share of GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Sudan</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Low-income countries</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Middle income countries</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Upper-middle income countries</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Industrial market economies</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: [World Bank, 1984].
1. Note that manufacturing is a sub-sector of industry.

The discussion below will show the existence of disproportionate distribution of the economy in the Sudan and the south has come off worse by most of the indicators. But, if the Sudan as a whole is ranked the 12th least developed country in the world on the basis of its $300 GDP per capita and about the 7th on the basis of both quality of life and level of industrialisation, the south with only $75 per capital and an infant mortality rate of 170 per 1,000 etc may well compete for ranking as the least developed region in the world. The implications of the state of the economy for the policy of decentralisation in the Sudan is quite significant, a point which will be raised later.

Inter-regional Inequalities
The North-South diversity in the Sudan is reflected not only in geographic and ethnic differences but also in social and economic development. In the history of the Sudan as a nation, there has always been a North-South differential in development in favour of the northern part. Tosh (1981:275)
argues that "the major obstacles to the South's economic development lay in the intractability of its environment and human geography: the shortage of good arable land, the scattered population, and above all the extended and costly communications with the outside world". Tosh is far from being right in his assertion of a shortage of land and a scattered population in the South but the lack of communication, as discussed before, has been an acknowledged development obstacle. Whatever the reasons, however, successive governments have failed to make any headway in tackling the development problems of the South. During the Turko-Egyptian regime, whilst the North was regarded as one of the provinces of Egypt and thus development efforts were made accordingly, the South was only regarded as an area of influence reserved for its riches - ivory and slaves (Barbour, 1961:266; Hill, 1959:70). The condominium government too was not interested in balanced economic growth and concentrated its development efforts on irrigated agriculture and the railroad system in the north (Whitaker, 1983:142). By all the usual yardsticks of development, therefore, the South Sudan had little to show when the country gained its independence (Tosh, 1981:275; Ross, 1969:40). Joseph Garang's explanation of the situation is clear enough; he said:

The consequence of 58 years of British rule was that the South entered independence having only five university graduates, one secondary school, a handful of secondary school leavers, five junior administrative officers - and no doctors, engineers, agriculturalists or other experts; and no industries, trade, or any economic projects. On the other hand, there were thousands of northern
educated men, hundreds of rich merchants, thousands of workers. There were railways, cities and a developed agriculture and some industry (see in Horn of Africa, Vol.3, No.1, 1985).

The North-South developmental imbalance continues to be a serious problem in post-independence Sudan too. In spite of the limited data (an acknowledged problem in the Sudan), some general picture of the disparity may be provided. Generally speaking, there is a North-South decline in infrastructure measured in terms of educational and health services, road and railway, electric supply, bank and post and telecommunication facilities. In 1976, the South, making up about 30 per cent both of population and surface area, had "little more than 10 per cent of existing dispensaries and dressing stations, a similarly small percentage of post and telegraph offices and only 5 per cent of bank branches" (ILO, 1976:199). As table 5.2 below shows, the general pattern of the South being more underdeveloped than the North is evident.

Despite these identifiable disparities, and the political and social problems such inequalities are capable of creating, it was only recently, since 1970 to be exact, that the central government became interested in formulating definite regional policies. The main interest in planning before then was at the sectoral level. For instance, the first Ten Year Plan (1961/62-1970/71) had no regional component in it (see Mirghani, 1983:74). The amended Five Year Plan (1970/71-1976/77) marked the beginning, at least in theory, by referring to the role of the local Councils in preparing
economic development plans and how these plans were to form part of the national plan. In fact, local governments were empowered by the 1971 Act to conduct studies and research in order to identify and prioritise development needs, thus, "ascertaining the role of the local and regional institutions in self resource development and positive contribution towards national development plans" (Ministry of Planning, 1977, Vol.1, p153).

Table 5.2: Some socio-economic and health indicators by province, 1977.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Percent distribution of manufacture</th>
<th>Per Capita income (£s)</th>
<th>Percent Urban</th>
<th>Percent Female literate above 10 years</th>
<th>Percent of children 7-9 yrs never attended school</th>
<th>Population per doctor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khartoum</td>
<td>73.2</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>68.2</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>3,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue Nile</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>56.1</td>
<td>20,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kordofan</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>68.9</td>
<td>45,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darfur</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td>43,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>20,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kassala</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>18,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red Sea</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>16,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.E. Ghazal</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>93.2</td>
<td>74,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Nile</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>83.4</td>
<td>63,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equatoria</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>72.5</td>
<td>62,200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: 1. Urban defined in terms of towns with population of over 10,000.

However, the ministry of planning admitted that "the Five Year Plan (1970-75) had limited effects on regional economic structure and on the standard of living". The ministry identified the problems which hampered progress as being "the meagre financial resources and limited number of trained
planning personnel and the absence of information and sufficient data required for proper regional planning" (Ministry of planning, 1977, Vol.1, pp145-146). In spite of these shortcomings, however, much emphasis was made on the importance of regional development in the Six Year Plan (1977/78-1982/83). Accordingly, the development strategy of the Six Year Plan aimed to achieve the following goals in regards to regional development (Ministry of Planning, 1977, Vol. 1, pp145-146):

- Realisation of equality among all groups of people, and of balanced growth between the various regions and provinces.
- Widening the base of income distribution so as to achieve social justice specially between the low income and poor groups, in distributing the fruits of development.
- Raising the general standard of living of all people in the provinces and minimising the income differentials between the various regions.
- Assurance of proper distribution of the services among the various geographic regions - particularly the rural and desert areas - and in a just manner.

But these were statements of intent which merely reflected the aspirations or wishes of those who drew up the plan rather than strategies for implementable development action (Woldemichael, 1983:8). A study of employment and the income distribution aspect of rural development in the Sudan in 1978 points to the "apparent lack of income growth in the traditional sector and the likelihood that regression is more probable than improvement" (Keddeman, 1978:3). As will be discussed below, this was proved to be true in connection with
the situation in South Sudan. A clear indicator of the widening imbalance in inter-regional development has been the continuing concentration of industrial investment in the Central-Eastern Sudan. In 1983, "about 60 per cent of large-scale and 30 per cent of small-scale firms were located in Khartoum province alone, with about two thirds of industrial employment and about half of the investment of the industrial sector" (UNIDO, 1985:21). Abu Affan's study (1981:84) on the development of the public industrial sector shows that of the ten firms established between 1977 and 1981, five were located in the Central region (already the second richest), and one each in the remaining regions of Northern, Eastern, Darfur, Kordofan and Southern.

The extent of the North-South inequality was explained in House and Cohen's study (1986:7) on the Socio-economic and Demographic Profile of the population of urban Juba, the capital of the Southern region: they wrote:

[The] mean monthly per capita income [in Juba was found] to be £s64 and the median per capita income to be £s32. The poorest 20% of households receive less that £s16 per capita whilst the richest 20% receive more than £s70 per capita per month. In 1981 GNP per capita per month for the whole of Sudan is estimated to have been £s40.5, an income level which is exceeded in 1983 by only 40% of the households in urban Juba. Given that cash incomes, as well as real incomes, are much greater in Juba than the rural areas, these data are indicative of the extent of relative and absolute deprivation in Southern Sudán compared with the rest of Sudan.
Inequalities in Skilled Manpower

A survey made to determine the 'total stock of high-level personnel' in the Sudan, in 1973 showed the disproportionate regional distribution that existed (table 5.3). Taking into account the size of population in each region, it can be seen from table 5.3 that the South fared badly in the distribution.

Table 5.3: Percentage regional distribution of high level personnel, 1973.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Khartoum</td>
<td>44.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kordofan</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darfur</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The unavailability of qualified personnel in South Sudan had been such that in, 1977, one third of all the established posts within the regional public sector were unfilled (Mills, 1977:121). Of the 11,450 unfilled posts "8,500 required people with primary education and above. At least 5,000 required people with junior secondary schooling and above, 4,300 with senior secondary and above, and 622 with graduate and post graduate training" (Mills, 1977:130-131). In spite of the critical shortage in manpower, Mills observed that many projects in the Southern Region Six Year Development Plan (1977/78-1982/83) were prepared "on purely financial grounds and without consideration of the supply of manpower to undertake such projects" (Mills, 1977:121/131). The same
argument could be made of the 1981 decentralisation policy (by which the districts were made the units of local government, replacing the 1971 Act under which the provinces formed the units) which did not seem to have taken account of considerations of the multiplying manpower needs and the financial implications (see table 5.4 below).

Table 5.4: Vacant posts in the Southern Region public sector of major occupational groups in 1976

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation Group</th>
<th>Vacant Posts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary school teachers</td>
<td>1,747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unclassified manual labourers</td>
<td>1,514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police and detectives and related</td>
<td>881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General office clerks</td>
<td>604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical assistants</td>
<td>559</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional nurses</td>
<td>544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government executive officials</td>
<td>302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prison guards, watchmen and related</td>
<td>289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Book-keepers and related</td>
<td>265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,718</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Mills (1977:133) had calculated the total skilled manpower required in South Sudan during the duration of the Six Year Plan (1977/78-182/83) based on the growth rate anticipated at the time and came up with the following figures:

- Graduates 2,400
- Diploma/certificate holders 12,000
- Senior secondary school leavers 5,000
- Junior secondary school and training 3,000
- Junior secondary school leavers 8,000
The Southern Regional Government had, however, neither the means nor the capacity to produce the required manpower, particularly those above the senior secondary level. Hence, the lack of high-level educated manpower in South Sudan continued to be a major impediment to the expansion of classified posts in the public sector (South Sudan Monthly Review Bulletin, 1980:10-11, Regional Ministry of Information and Culture, 1977:83). The irony was, however, that the supply of university graduates in north Sudan had been outstripping demand resulting from the absorptive weakness of the economy (Gelaleldin, 1985:26). But the Southern Region had a separate personnel system with its own procedures for appointment and dismissal and transfers of personnel between North and South had never been a common practice.

THE EXTENT OF POVERTY IN SOUTH SUDAN

The Subsistence Economy of South Sudan

The economy of the southern region, as already explained, is predominantly agrarian "with most of its production subsistence-oriented" (Southern Regional Ministry of Health, 1976:15). As was indicated above too, more than 90% of the population live in rural areas in poor social and economic conditions. In other words, the level of productivity of subsistence agriculture is so low that it only enables survival and very little else. A good summary of the economic structure of the south is provided in a book prepared by the Southern Regional Ministry of Health (1976:16).
As in any subsistence agrarian economy, there are few employment opportunities outside agriculture. Two-thirds of the rural population own some cattle in addition to their cropland. There is no shortage of land although the more fertile areas have a concentration of population. Large landowners do not exist, nearly all land being held by customary tenure based on past use.

Crop yields are extremely low, reflecting the lack of modern agricultural techniques. Shifting cultivation is almost universal. The soil is prepared almost extensively by hand tools. There has been virtually no government agricultural service to farmers during the war years [1956-1972] and technical executive staff have been limited.

In their work on income distribution in Kenya, Collier and Lal (1984) identify the sources of growth in smallholder farming as improved resource allocation, capital formation and innovation. In the case of southern Sudan, House (1985b) explained the constraints that exist in all these areas and hence the "almost stagnating economy" (p.48). Generally speaking, therefore, "Southern Sudanese economy has remained not merely relatively underdeveloped but has been left largely undeveloped and the contribution of the region's people to the economy of the Sudan as a whole has been marginal" (Daly, 1985:77).

Dimensions of Rural Poverty

One way of determining the level of poverty in any given situation is by assessing the standard of living that allows for the satisfaction of the minimum basic needs of life. Basic needs are defined in terms of food, shelter, clothing, health, education, water, sanitation, and opportunities for mental, psychological, and social development. No systematic
study has been carried out to determine the absolute level of subsistence in rural south Sudan but a number of scattered studies from different parts of the region are available and provide indications of the poverty situation.

The 'length-for-weight' or the 'age-for-weight' index of measuring the nutrition and health aspects of children are useful methods for assessing poverty levels. The first method is specially helpful in societies where parents do not easily recall the ages of their children. Those who are found to be under 80% of the standard are usually considered to be at risk of malnutrition (House, 1985b:50). Using the weight-for-age standard, a survey that was carried out in Yei River District found that between 30 and 40 per cent of children between 1 and 5 years were at risk of being malnourished (Eaton-Evans, 1980). A similar problem was also found to exist in Mundri district (Eaton-Evans, 1982). "In 1981 the villages of Logire and Oluro in Eastern Equatoria were surveyed and 30% of the children were found to be malnourished. In Juba rural district almost 50% of children under 5 years were found to be less than 80% of standard weight for age" (House, 1985b:57).

Other studies have tried to determine absolute household incomes both to expose poverty levels and for comparisons with other areas. A household survey from Gogrial district of Bahr El Ghazal province in 1977, for example, found that the per capita income was only £s 29.8, less than one-third of the national figure for the same year (Southern Regional Ministry
of Agriculture, 1978:10). Perhaps the most comprehensive rural study ever undertaken in South Sudan was that by House and Phillips-Howard (1985) in the Acholi area of Eastern Equatoria province. According to House and Phillips-Howard (1985:150) the Acholi area is "a fairly typical cross-based subsistence economy in Southern Sudan". In their concluding remarks they pointed out that "at the most aggregate level, the great majority of households are in absolute poverty in the sense that the barest minimum of basic needs - in having inadequate access to clean water, education, food, security, health and nutrition - are largely unfulfilled". House and Phillips-Howard's Acholi area study is even more revealing when seen in a national context. As they said (p.150):

> Our estimates of cash income in the area which, under a generous assumption that each income reflects only 10% of real income suggests that only 10% of Acholi households attain the mean per capita income for the whole of Sudan. If our estimates of cash income in fact represent more than 10% of real income, then a greater proportion of the local population is much more deprived.

**Dimensions of Urban Poverty**

In 1973 there were only three towns (Juba, Malakal and Wau) that qualified as urban in south Sudan, taking the standard United Nations definition of a population of more than 20,000. The 1983 census suggested that another three towns (Aweil, Yei and Yambio) had grown to urban status by the same definition (House, 1985a:7). The population influx to urban settlements since the 1972 north-south peace accord has been astronomical; to take Juba's (the capital of the southern region) case, its
population has been increasing at an average rate of "8% per annum with two-thirds of the population having been born outside the town (House, 1985b:43, see also Woldemichael, 1981:32).

Categorising the Juba labour market into formal and informal sectors, House (1985a:135) pointed out that nearly one-half of all the males and one-quarter of all females were employees in the former. A major constraint on the expansion of the informal economy has been access to capital. "Neither formal access to banks nor informal capital market ... appear to exist in Juba" (House, 1985b:47). As House (1985a) also found, a reflection of the overall underdeveloped state of the Juba economy was the narrowness of the distribution of occupations: "Only 4% of the employed labour force are professionals and only 10% are skilled and semi-skilled manual workers" (House, 1985a:136).

House and Cohen's (1986) comprehensive study on the socio-economic profile of the population of urban Juba provides information on the extent of poverty. Using the weight-for-age and the length-for-age standard methods of assessing children's welfare, they found that, overall, 27% and 16% of the children respectively fell below the 80% acceptable standard. What is surprising about these results is that they were comparable to the poverty incidence found in the rural areas discussed above.
Research by a medical team from Juba University in the Atlabara area of Juba, where a sample of 127 new born babies was monitored during the first 12 months of life, showed that the babies' weight gain during the first three months of life was satisfactory. But their growth rate then slowed and deviated from the mean for healthy babies so that by 12 months the mean for the survivors equalled the third centile for healthy girls, twenty eight per cent of the sample were below 80% of standard weight for age and were considered moderately malnourished while 5% were less than 60% of the standard and their condition was severe (Woodruff et al., 1984).

Health problems with children in Juba must be seen against the general sanitation conditions "where 79% of households are without access to any form of toilet. This proportion rises to around 90% for the poorest 30% of households, but even some of those in the richest decile have no toilets" (House and Cohen, 1986:54; see also Nichols, 1982).

House and Cohen could well be the first to have attempted to determine how poor, in some absolute sense, households with low cash incomes in Juba were. For this they reverted to a method of measurement developed by Crawford and Thorbecke (1978). Basically, the method assumes a poverty level diet that each household adult equivalent (children under 15 counted as one-half of an adult) requires, taken to be a daily intake of 2250 calories. Based on this assumption, House and Cohen (1986;66) found from their survey study of Juba, that a
household (found to consist of five adult equivalents) needed to spend £8.58 per month per equivalent adult on food to satisfy the minimum daily calorie intake. "Accordingly, between 10% and 20% of households, and between 12% and 25% of persons, in Juba fall below [this] absolute poverty line. And 6% of households do not receive enough income to meet the minimum food requirements contained in [the] absolute poverty line" (House and Cohen, 1986:67) A survey conducted in 1979/80 in fact showed the situation to be worse even than House and Cohen found. About 30% of children under 5 years showed signs of chronic malnutrition (Kurup, 1984).

A reflection of the poor health, nutrition and sanitation conditions in Juba is that almost one-half (45.6%) of all women under the age of 35 years in House and Cohen's sample survey (1986:54) have lost at least one child and at least two-thirds of women under the age of 35 years with five and more children have lost at least one child.

It is to be expected that if the situation was so bad in Juba, the capital town of the southern region of the Sudan, the situation in other towns was unlikely to be better.

Conclusion
This chapter began by explaining the nature of the economy in the Sudan and of the obstacles hampering its progress. In the second part of the chapter, we saw the glaring inter-regional economic disparities and this despite government policies to
the contrary. In the third and last part of the chapter, an attempt was made to show the extent of poverty in South Sudan. The aim was to emphasise the importance of a broader horizon of understanding when dealing with issues of decentralisation.

House and Phillips-Howard (1985:50) have raised a significant point in relating unfulfillment of basic needs not only to the low labour productivity but also "to a social organization which cannot provide its citizens with access to the full cultural, social and economic possibilities that are available" (emphasis added). Given the depressing socio-economic situation in South Sudan, decentralisation policies have neither been successful in narrowing inter-regional inequalities nor have they served as instruments for dealing with poverty. Rothenberg (1980:146) was right to ask, therefore, "whether decentralisation is desirable or even feasible in all organizational settings...". Accordingly, the justification for the widely acclaimed policy of decentralisation in a poverty stricken Sudan should be questioned.
PART III

CASE STUDY:
IMPLICATIONS OF
DECENTRALISATION POLICIES
IN SOUTH SUDAN, 1972-1983
FIGURE 6.1: SOUTHERN REGION, LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREA COUNCILS, 1982

Legend

- Urban Area Council HQ
- Rural Area Council HQ
- Peoples Rural Council HQ
- International Boundary
- Regional Boundary
- Provincial Boundary
- Area Council Boundary
- Peoples Rural Council

Source: A.K. Pickering and C.J. Davis, 1985
CHAPTER 6

THE SOUTHERN REGION: PROVISIONS, POLITICS AND CHALLENGES

Introduction

Regionalisation, in the form of devolution, in South Sudan, as previously established, was a political settlement prompted by geographical, historical and cultural factors. Under the "Southern Provinces Regional Government Act, 1972", the south became a self-governing region with a substantial degree of legislative and executive power. As a way of giving permanence to the regionalisation peace agreement, Article 2 of the 1972 Act stated that the law could not be amended except by a three-quarters majority of the People's National Assembly and confirmed by a two-thirds majority in a referendum held in the three Southern provinces. The creation of a powerful intermediate tier between the central government and the provincial authorities thus took decentralisation of authority in the Sudan a stage further (Howel, 1974:74).

This chapter analyses the nature of the power delegated to South Sudan and of the central-regional relationships envisaged by the 1972 act. Three major sections make up the chapter. The main aspects of the regional government structure are outlined in the first section. In the second section, an analysis is made of the source and application of regional and local finances. Finally, the third section looks at the practice of development planning in the southern region of the Sudan.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS

The Regional Legislature

The law, the 1972 Act (see appendix III), provided the Southern Region with a legislative organ, the People's Regional Assembly (Article 5), which, at its inception, consisted of sixty members (later enlarged to 110) elected by Sudanese citizens residing in the Southern Region (Article 8) by direct secret ballot (Article 9). The elected members in turn elected one of their colleagues as Speaker. Under the Act, the Regional Assembly was empowered to legislate in a wide range of areas such as public order, internal security, efficient administration and in socio-economic development of regional application (Article 1). Particular areas of regional authority established by the Act included the organization of regional and local administration; powers to legislate on traditional law and custom; promotion of trade and the establishment of local industries and markets; establishment, maintenance and administration of public schools at all levels in accordance with national plans; establishment, maintenance and administration of public hospitals and environmental health services; town and country planning; land use in accordance with national laws and plans; promotion of self-help programmes; and other matters delegated by the President or the People's National Assembly.

In addition to its legislative powers, the Regional Assembly could, by a two-thirds majority, request the President to
postpone the coming into force of any law which, in the view of the members, would adversely affect the welfare and interests of the Southern Region (Article 14). The Regional Assembly could also, by a majority of its members, request the President to withdraw any bill presented to the National Assembly which in their view would affect the interests of the Region (Article 15(i)). However, the same Act empowered the President to veto any bill passed by the Regional Assembly which he deemed contrary to the provisions of the national constitution (Article 28). The Act was vague in some areas; for example, it implied that the national president had limitless power when it said that only "if he thinks fit" could he accede to a Regional Assembly request to postpone from coming into force laws which may affect the interest of the Region (Article 14).

The central and regional relationships were regulated in such a way that neither the Regional Assembly nor the High Executive Council were allowed to intrude on what the law specified as matters of national nature which were national defence, external affairs, currency and coinage, air and inter-regional transport, communications and telecommunications, customs and foreign trade, nationality and immigration, planning for economic and social development, educational planning and public audit (Article 7).
Figure 6.2: The government structure in the Southern Region, 1972-1981

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Authority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Centre</td>
<td>President of the republic and President of SSD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National Vice President and President of the Regional High Executive Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regional Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Regional Ministries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ministry of Regional Admin. &amp; Legal Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Province</td>
<td>Provincial Commissioner (PC), Deputy PC, and representatives of functional organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>People's Province Executive Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>District Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Town Cs, Rural Cs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>Village Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Village Councils</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neighbourhood Cs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Direct elections on limited franchises, controlled nominations to village councils, indirect elections &amp; nominations from gov. employees at other levels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Directly elected on limited franchises</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The hallmark of the regionalisation agreement being to preserve the nation against disintegration, the Act called on the Regional Assembly to "strive to consolidate the unity of the Sudan and respect the spirit of the National constitution" (Article 31).

The Executive System

The executive organ of the Southern Regional Government comprised the Regional President and Ministers which collectively formed a body known as the High Executive Council. The President of the High Executive Council was appointed and relieved of office by the National President on the recommendation of the Regional Assembly (Article 28). Likewise, members of the High Executive Council were appointed and relieved of office by the National President on the recommendation of the President of the High Executive Council. However, the Regional Assembly had the power, by a three-quarters majority, to request the National President to relieve the President or any member of the High Executive Council from office, to which the National President had to accede (Article 13).

The term of office of the High Executive Council as well as the Regional Assembly was four years. The High Executive Council, which, according to the Act, would "act on behalf of the National President (Article 17)", was empowered to specify, supervise and direct the duties of the various departments in the Southern Region (Article 3(v) and 18). On
matters relating to Central Government agencies in the Region, however, the President of the High Executive Council or its members could only act with the approval of the National President (Article 18). The High Executive Council was responsible to the national President and the regional assembly for efficient administration in the Southern Region (Article 21).

The nature of the relationship between the High Executive Council and the central ministries was left to the discretion of the National President. As stated in Article 23 "the President shall from time to time regulate the relationship between the High Executive Council and the central ministries".

**Administrative Organization**

The machinery of the Regional Government administration was organised under a number of executive ministries, whose names indicated the services they rendered. By and large, the composition of regional ministries was based on the central pattern and in 1977 their number had reached thirteen. Some of the most important regional ministries were, the Ministry of Decentralisation Affairs (formerly Ministry of Administration, Police and Prisons); the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Resources, Forestry, Fisheries and Irrigation; the Ministry of Education; the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare; the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning; the Ministry of Co-operatives, Community Development
Regional Ministers were political appointees and professionally the ministries were headed by Directors or Director Generals. The big Ministries were divided into a number of Directorates each headed by a Director. In such cases, the Directors were responsible to a Director General who, in turn, was responsible to the respective Regional Minister.

The organizational structure of the Regional Ministries was pyramidal in form, with authority and responsibility increasing gradually towards the apex. The Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, for example, was divided into two directorates, namely the Directorate of Finance and the Directorate of planning. The Directorate of Finance on its own consisted of the following departments and sub-sections (Regional Ministry of Information and Culture, 1977:80):

1. Departments of Auditing, Finance, Accounts, Taxation and the Regional Institute of Accountancy. Each of these departments was headed by an assistant director.
2. Subsection Departments of: Estate, Auditing, Revenue, Budgeting, Accounts, Taxation, Purchases. Each of these subsections was headed by a senior inspector.
3. Each of the subsections indicated above was subdivided into smaller units which were headed by an inspector or assistant inspector.

The laws with regard to the administrative relationship between the regional and local governments in the Southern Region were vague in many areas (Southern Regional Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, 1977:331). The 1972 peace
accord was enacted in such haste that its ramifications on existing laws were not properly realised. In other words, the 1972 Regionalisation Act was imposed over an existing structure, the 1971 Local Government Act, without clearly defining the relationship between them. A case in point was the position of the Provincial Commissioner under the 1972 Act, who had ministerial status and was directly answerable to the national President under the 1971 Act (Badal, 1980:13).

Table 6.1 : Changing Administrative Divisions by region and province since 1972, south Sudan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Province</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972 - 1976</td>
<td>Southern Region</td>
<td>Bahr el Ghazal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Equatoría</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Upper Nile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976 - 1983</td>
<td>Southern Region</td>
<td>Bahr el Ghazal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lakes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Western Equatoria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Eastern Equatoria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Upper Nile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Jonglei</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983+</td>
<td>Bahr el Ghazal</td>
<td>Eastern Bahr el Ghazal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Western Bahr el Ghazal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lakes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Equatoría</td>
<td>Western Equatoria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Eastern Equatoria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Upper Nile</td>
<td>Upper Nile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Jonglei</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- 241 -
The legal status of the provincial commissioners remained unclear until the introduction of the 1981 local government Act (6.1) by which they were made accountable to the President of the High Executive Council (Article 10a). However, the 1981 Act still had some gaps in connection to the position of the provincial commissioner. Although Commissioners were made responsible to the President of the High Executive Council, their position with regards to the Ministry of Decentralisation Affairs, the authority responsible for local governments, was not defined by the Act. Again the practice was that the commissioners acted as subservients to the Minister of Decentralisation Affairs (see in Khamis, 1982:28).

Representatives of the different functional ministries at provincial and Area (District) levels were administratively responsible to the Commissioner and the Chief Executive officer respectively under the 1981 Act. The technical supervision, however, remained with their respective ministries. Taking the Ministry of Education as an example, the province Inspector of Education, as representative of his ministry in the province, was technically responsible to it but administratively responsible to the commissioner. His duties were to supervise the functions of the Area Education Inspectors whose responsibilities in turn were to supervise the functions of the Rural/Town Council Education Inspectors. The following diagram gives the general picture of the line of authority:
Figure 6.3: Line of administrative responsibilities of the Executive branch in the southern Region, 1972-1983

REGIONAL POLITICS

Articles (6) and (7) of the Permanent Constitution of the Sudan spelled out that the decentralised administration system was to be guided by the principles of the Sudan Socialist Union - the SSU. One of the SSU principles referred to was the requirement that election to the national or regional assemblies and to people's councils at local level was only possible for members of the SSU. However, the SSU mechanism...
was not strongly entrenched in the South and strict vetting of candidates for election to Regional Assembly was not employed.

During the life of the autonomous southern Regional government, two dominant political factions developed around two personalities. One faction was lead by Abel Alier and the other by Joseph Lagu. Abel Alier and Joseph Lagu were the chief negotiators at the Addis Ababa agreement, the former heading the government negotiating team and the latter, as leader of the Anya-nya movement, representing the south. Abel Alier had remained in the country during the civil war and once served as secretary-general of the Southern Front Political Party which operated from Khartoum and had a following of southerners living there, especially civil servants and students. The party "advocated the south's right to determine whether it would be part of Sudan or an independent State" (Kaplan, 1982:220). When Nimeiri was elected to the office of the presidency by popular vote in 1971, Abel Alier was appointed as a second vice-president in the national government.

After the Addis Ababa agreement, Nimeiri appointed Alier as head of the southern High Executive Council for the duration of the transitional period until the first assembly elections in November 1973. However, Alier was nominated in advance by Nimeiri as the sole SSU candidate to the office of the president of the High Executive Council and at its first
meeting, the regional assembly duly elected him unopposed (Malwal, 1981:237).

The Regional Government had a daunting task to tackle. As discussed in chapter 5, the socio-economic situation in the south as it emerged from the seventeen years of conflict, was at "the most rudimentary stage of development" (Sclafani, 1981). During the transitional period, the government had more pressing tasks to perform before it could even begin to think about long term developmental issues. The first task was to set up the basic administrative structure through which the implementation of the responsibilities delegated to the region could begin. The second task was the integration of 6000 former Anya-Nya fighters into the people's armed forces and the rehabilitation of the remainder. The third task was the repatriation and rehabilitation of returnees from neighbouring countries and of internally displaced ones. This task involved the movement of about a million people, one third of which were outside the country (Malwal, 1981:210). A considerable number of the returnees who had previously been employed in the public sector were reinstated. The fourth task during this period was to construct schools for the returnees' children. In carrying out these tasks, the government was helped by the UN system and many aid organisations.

The Regional government's efforts to speed up socio-economic development were, moreover, handicapped by many factors. The
following were cited as the major obstacles to its development effort (Government of Sudan, Southern Regional Ministry of information, 1977:85):

1. Lack of basic statistical data for purposes of planning
2. Uncertainties about financial resources both in terms of quantity and timing of flow.
3. Continuing shortages in trained manpower, and the problems of mobility and communication.

There were many other problems as well but the working relationship between the regional and National governments was at its best and genuine efforts were made to resolve any arising questions (see in Malwal, 1981:213).

Alier remained as president of the High Executive Council until the 1978 election when his supporters were defeated by the opposition who contested under the Joseph Lagu ticket. During the election, six ministers and leading members of Alier's government were defeated. According to Malwal (1981:236), a long serving cabinet minister in Nimeiri's government, "the whole Central Government, and the north in general were all alarmed at the news from the south" and, "to spare the south any further divisions, the President sent his First Vice-president to the south with a message to Abel Alier, asking him to step down from the contest and to give his support to Joseph Lagu". The President's intervention would also avoid the risk of Abel Alier, who was the national vice-president as well, losing to Joseph Lagu in an open contest in the parliament hall (Malwal, 1981:236).
A remarkable feature of the 1978 elections was that no factionalism along ethnic lines occurred. Alier is a Dinka, who constitute about half the population in the South, and Lagu is a Madi, numerically an insignificant ethnic group. The divisions that became apparent during the elections were more along party lines, most of Lagu's support coming from old members of the Sudan African National Union (SANU), and, Alier's from the Southern Front Political Party. The defeat of Alier by Lagu, therefore, showed the potential of ethnic diversity in politics. Also, "the fact that a former commander of the Anya-Nya could become president of the High Executive Council with the support of the central government represented a major transformation of the southern problem" (Voll and Voll, 1985:87).

The government of Joseph Lagu was beset with problems from the very start. His vice-president, Samuel Aru Bol, confessed to misappropriation of funds and allegations of corruption surrounded Lagu himself. Accusations and counteraccusations became rife between supporters and opponents of Lagu in the parliament. He also became "embroiled in a struggle with his own former supporters, among them the speaker of the regional assembly, Clement Mboro, whom he forced out of office in July 1979. Lagu personally took over as speaker in a step of questionable constitutionality" (Kaplan, 1982:221). As Lagu was not an elected member of parliament, his action in fact had no constitutional support. With the complaints against
him mounting, Nimeiri intervened and dissolved the Regional Assembly and with it Lagu's government in February 1980.

The elections that followed in March 1980 brought Alier back into power as president of the High Executive Council. During the election, Lagu's faction was represented by Aru Bol who received only thirty-five assembly members' votes as against sixty-seven votes that went to Alier.

Regional politics following the 1980 elections were dominated by issues relating to north-south relations. A major political crisis arose in the southern regional assembly when a draft bill of the national government suggested boundary changes so as to incorporate the "oil rich lands" (6.1) of the South with the regions newly created in the north (Badal, 1986:144). A committee of enquiry was set up by the national government to assess the situation and, following its recommendation, the offending section of the bill was withdrawn by Nimeiri (Malwal, 1985:32). Another controversial issue which generated just as much heat in the south was a proposal to construct an oil refinery at Kosti, in the north, instead of at the site of the oil wells, in the south. Nimeiri was supportive of the Kosti site arguing the infrastructure advantage Kosti has, being located on a major railway line and on the river Nile (Lesch, 1986:415). However, it was precisely because of the south's relatively underdeveloped structure that the regional government wanted the refinery site located in the south. In the end, the

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central government abandoned the idea of the Kosti site and decided instead to export the crude oil directly from the production site to the Red Sea port through a 1400 kilometre pipeline (see in Lesch, 1986:415).

To many northern politicians, the south's protective posture over its resources was seen as a first step towards separation and southern autonomy as an anomaly in the central-regional relationships (Malwal, 1985:30). The first hint of Nimeiri's intention to undo the southern autonomy came in late February 1981 when, in an opening address to the meeting of the central committee of the SSU, he said:

The south has led the Sudan successfully on the path to regionalisation. Now that the devolution of powers has become a reality in the north, which now has five regions, is it not time that we consider the possibility of developing administration in the south itself? It would, for example, bring administration nearer to the people and make government more efficient given the vastness of the region. This would be in keeping with the revolution's resolve to hand power to the people. A division of the south into more regions might be a good way of avoiding domination of the southern region's administration by a single ethnic group. However, I do not intend to let this issue become a source of contention (Sudanow, April 1981).

Ethnicity did become a major source of contention and the south was soon aflame, with its people divided into two camps - the divisionists and the unionists. Heading the divisionist camp was, of all people, Joseph Lagu who complained of Dinka dominance in the regional government (Lagu, 1981). The reason for his advocacy of division was made clear in an interview he gave to Sudanow when he said: "Regionalism has now been
understood and hence the North divided into five regions. There is thus now no need to keep the south as a block" (Sudanow, April 1981:16). Thus, with central government support behind him, Lagu managed to amass support for division in Equatoria, his home province.

However, the central government sponsored divisionist idea had provoked outrage among its many opponents. Southerners in the national assembly produced a booklet entitled "The Redivision of the Southern Region: Why it must be rejected" in which they refuted Lagu's arguments point by point. Firstly, they argued that redivision was simply against the terms of the southern regional agreement. The second argument, concerning the accusation of Dinka dominance, was that division would condemn smaller tribes to perpetual dominance. Lagu's achievements, first the leadership of the Anya-Nya and then the presidency of the southern regional government, were cited as proof of the advantages of remaining united. The third, and last, major point was the economic unfeasibility of maintaining additional regional bureaucracies, when the south was finding it difficult to make ends meet as it was.

The debate was gathering momentum and proponents of division were urging Nimeiri to "overlook the legal restrictions on his powers and to order the creation of more southern regions on grounds of public interest" (Wai, 1983:323). On October 5, 1981, he suspended the government of the South led by Abel Alier and, in its stead, installed a caretaker government lead
by a military governor, General Gismalla Abdalla Rassas. He was appointed to head a new selected High Executive Council for a period of six months during which time a referendum was to be held to decide on the division issue. However, the referendum idea was abandoned and Nimeiri suddenly decided to hold fresh elections to the regional assembly. Elections were held in April 1982 and resulted in members who were divided into three major groupings:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>vote</th>
<th>remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-Divisionists</td>
<td>34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Unionists</td>
<td>49</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Change two</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>-politically closely related to the unionists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Others</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-nominated members of the army, police and prisons. They abstained from voting during the election.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>115</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The election for the office of the presidency of the High Executive Council was delayed for one month, according to Malwal (1985:33.34), to give time for lobbying the unionist groups to support the divisionist candidate. On 23 June 1983, amidst allegations of bribery and coercion of the unionist MPs, Joseph James Tambura was elected President of the High Executive Council by 62 votes against the 49 votes that went to Clement Mboro, the unionist's candidate (Arou, 1988:179). The distribution of the MP votes by ethnic allegiance, table
6.2 below, shows that support for the divisionists came from all the main ethnic groups in the south whilst for the unionists, the power base was clearly among the Dinkas.

Table 6.2: Election of regional president: distribution of MP votes between divisionists and unionists, June 1983

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>for Divisionists</th>
<th>for Unionists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dinka</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bari Speaking Groups</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zande</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuer</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shilluk</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Sudanese</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moru</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acholi</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latuko</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Didinga</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banda</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murle</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topossa</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jur</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>62</strong></td>
<td><strong>49</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Arou, 1988:180-181

The election results provided the central government with what it wanted. "The propaganda machine then thundered into action, endeavouring to give the country and the world the impression that the whole south had opted for division, that the majority of its freely elected members had voluntarily chosen the candidate who favoured division, and that the south had supported Nimeiri wholeheartedly" (Malwal, 1985:34). In June 1983, the south was declared divided into three regions. Those who supported redivision were rewarded with political appointments in the newly created regions and Joseph Lagu was made national vice-president.
In September 1983, only two months after the division of the south, Nimeiri passed a decree effectively making the Sharia (Islamic law), the penal code of the whole Sudan. As Heraclides (1987:227) said: "the sharia decision drove at the very heart of the tenet of unity with diversity which had inspired the Addis Ababa understanding". The impact of the cumulative central government actions was thus the restart of the north-south conflict in 1983.

REGIONAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCES

Financial Inequality

One of the greatest failures of local governments in the Sudan has been the lack of finance and this is even more acute in the South. Many analysts have been voicing concern about the state of affairs of local government finances in the Sudan; that the reforms of decentralised administration have been accompanied by no commensurate financial decentralisation (Badel, 1979; Malik, 1981; Fadlalla, 1984). As Malik (1981:16) said, "the legal sources assigning revenues to the councils have not substantially changed since the local Government Act 1951, and the tax base has remained constant with little or no change". In South Sudan, this problem has been compounded by the nature of its relatively underdeveloped economy which has no appreciable tax base as discussed in chapter five (see also in Malik, 1981:16; Yongo-Bure, 1987:45). But one of the reasons for the emphasis on decentralisation in the Sudan during the Nimeiri regime was
"in order to cut down on the economic and social disparities existing between areas" (Ministry of Planning 1977:145). The statement seemed to imply that the government was committing itself to a policy mechanism of 'redistribution with growth'. The underlying implication being that equity would be secured by granting more aid to the relatively backward areas.

The reality of decentralisation was, however, one of disappointment to many observers (Sudanow, March 1979:12). Firstly, the central government was accused of delegating responsibilities to the regions/local authorities without giving them the necessary financial power to carry out their responsibilities. Secondly, despite the rhetoric on considerations of equity, the government had no workable formula to enforce the distribution of revenues equitably among the various local government authorities (Fadlalla, 1984:213). The Sudan had been using a deficit financing system which traditionally encouraged local councils to send in inflated budget estimates, in the knowledge that they would be cut down. A typical example was provided by Sudanow (March 1979:12): "In 1975-76, Darfur Province Council estimated its needs at £s7 million; it received £s5.5 million. The following year, it raised its estimates - presumably to secure more than the previous year - to £s11 million; it still received only £s5.5 million". 
Table 6.3: Local Government Revenues and Central Grants, 1979/80 Fiscal Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Local Revenue x1000 £s</th>
<th>Central Grant x1000 £s</th>
<th>Total x1000 £s</th>
<th>% of Grant to total</th>
<th>Population x1000</th>
<th>Per Capita of total £s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>3,655</td>
<td>23,906</td>
<td>27,561</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>1,008</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>8,532</td>
<td>17,284</td>
<td>25,816</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>1,426</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>16,676</td>
<td>29,837</td>
<td>46,512</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>4,859</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kordofan</td>
<td>8,492</td>
<td>21,069</td>
<td>29,561</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>2,419</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darfur</td>
<td>5,229</td>
<td>18,593</td>
<td>23,822</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>2,632</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khartoum</td>
<td>12,293</td>
<td>17,346</td>
<td>29,639</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>1,626</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>54,880</td>
<td>128,036</td>
<td>182,916</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>14,473</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>7,143</td>
<td>19,800</td>
<td>26,943</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>3,359</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: adapted from Moharir, 1984:251 and Malik, 1982:42. Population figures are from 'Sudan Statistical Abstract, 1983'.

1. The regions in the north were created in 1980 and the data refers to the provincial and local authorities that are now within their boundaries.

The dependence of local authorities on central grant is clear from table 6.3 above. In fact the level of dependence continued to increase in later years. In the case of the local governments in South Sudan, it had gone up to 85% by 1981/82FY (Malik, 1982:42). Table 6.3 also shows the unequal distribution of the central government grant to the various areas; the South and Darfur, the two poorest regions getting less of it than the rest. Table 6.3 also permits a comparison of the distribution of grants to local authorities on a North-South basis; for every pound transferred to the South the North received £s 1.6.
Sources of Revenue

The legal basis of the Southern Region sources of revenue was as specified in the 1972 Addis Ababa north-south peace accord and in the 'revenue of taxes and duties for Southern region of the Sudan Act, 1972' or, the "Presidential Order No. 39", as it is generally known. The revenue sources of the Southern Region consisted of three main categories:

1. Transfers from the central government
2. Tax and non-tax revenues (local resources)
3. External assistance

1. Transfers from central government were by far the most important source of revenue to the Southern Region. As specified in the Addis Ababa peace accord (article 25 (iv)) the central government was made responsible for meeting the costs of established services in the south. This responsibility included financial support to local authorities which was channelled via the Southern Regional Government. In the absence of a workable formula, however, the amount of the financial transfer was subject to negotiation between the central and regional governments on one hand and between the
Figure 6.4: Sources of Finance of Southern Regional Government
regional and local governments on the other. Table 6.4 below shows the proportions of the annual central government transfers to the two levels of governments between 1973/74 and 1981/82 fiscal years. Significantly, the substantial increase in central government transfers to local governments beginning in the 1979-80 fiscal year was a result of President Nimeiri's decree in that year by which seven Central Ministries were abolished and their functions decentralised to lower levels of governments.

Table 6.4 : Financial Transfers from central to the Southern Region (in millions £s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>to the regional government</th>
<th>to the local government</th>
<th>total</th>
<th>per cent of local to total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1973-74</td>
<td>5.50</td>
<td>n.a</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-75</td>
<td>6.39</td>
<td>n.a</td>
<td>6.39</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-76</td>
<td>8.30</td>
<td>6.70</td>
<td>15.00</td>
<td>44.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-77</td>
<td>10.73</td>
<td>7.07</td>
<td>17.80</td>
<td>39.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977-78</td>
<td>12.72</td>
<td>8.08</td>
<td>20.80</td>
<td>38.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979-80</td>
<td>16.20</td>
<td>19.80</td>
<td>36.00</td>
<td>55.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-81</td>
<td>19.29</td>
<td>20.71</td>
<td>40.00</td>
<td>52.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981-82</td>
<td>21.96</td>
<td>26.04</td>
<td>48.00</td>
<td>54.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: adapted from Sodhi, 1981:48-49

Another form of resource for the South emanating from the centre was funding for projects that were centrally planned and implemented. Planning for economic and social development was one of the items, according to the Addis Ababa agreement, over which the Southern Regional Government was not allowed to exercise any power as it was regarded as a matter of national
nature (Article 7 (vii)). Consequently, the central government development budget covered development expenditure for the whole of the Sudan, including the south. One of the reasons that the central government assumed responsibility for planning economic and social development was that it would allow it to maintain inter-regional equality. As already discussed in chapter 5, however, the South had lagged behind in the allocation of central government resource distribution creating a serious economic grievance against the central government (Mawson, 1984:521). In addition, the central government sponsored projects in the south had an even more serious implementation problem than the general national trend discussed in chapter five.

However, the Southern Regional Government was empowered by the Accord "to prepare a supplementary special development budget for the region", which was to be financed from three sources: direct transfers from central government; regional savings from recurrent expenditure, and, external assistance. According to the Regional Ministry of Finances and Economic Planning, "the level of implementation of the projects which were financed by the special development budget always fell below expectation", and, "the major single cause, for the shortfall [was] lack of financial resources" (Regional Ministry of Finance and Planning, 1977:227). The Southern Regional Government was finding it difficult to keep pace with the increase in public expenditure (mainly the personnel budget) and thus could not make savings towards the special
development budget as expected. Consequently, almost the whole of the Special Development Budget provision every year had to come from central government (Regional Ministry of Finances and Economic Planning, 1977:227). But again the Regional Government had difficulties in receiving the Central Government subventions consistent with the budgeted amounts (see table 6.5 below).

Table 6.5 : Central Grants for special Development Budget (in millions Sudanese pounds)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>amount budgeted</th>
<th>actual amount released</th>
<th>per cent released to budgeted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1973-74</td>
<td>7,330</td>
<td>0,676</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-75</td>
<td>7,136</td>
<td>1,696</td>
<td>23.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-76</td>
<td>7,164</td>
<td>1,624</td>
<td>22.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-77</td>
<td>15,332</td>
<td>4,226</td>
<td>27.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977-78</td>
<td>32,490</td>
<td>6,125</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978-79</td>
<td>22,500</td>
<td>7,822</td>
<td>34.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979-80</td>
<td>20,500</td>
<td>10,305</td>
<td>50.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-81</td>
<td>20,500</td>
<td>12,804</td>
<td>62.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: adapted from Sodhi, 1981:49

2. The second of the southern region's sources of resource was the tax and non-tax revenue originating in the South itself. As specified by Presidential Order No. 39, the tax revenues consisted of:
   a. taxes imposed by central government but collected by the regional government and retained for its own use;
   b. taxes imposed and collected by the central government but shared with the regional government;
   c. taxes imposed and collected by the Southern Regional Government.
The taxes which were imposed by the central government, but collected by the regional government and retained for its own use mainly consisted of the following three items:

- Personal Income Tax
- Land Rental Tax
- Business Profit Tax

Although the collection procedures of these taxes were governed by national laws, the Southern Region was empowered by Presidential Order No. 39 to levy tax from individuals and firms working or operating in the south. The administrative machinery of the Southern Regional Government was, however, not sufficiently developed to organize tax collection systems. As an illustration, the yield from personal income tax amounted to only £s 500,000 in 1976/77 (Sodhi, 1981:44).

Another major problem was that the fiscal relationship between the regional government and local authorities was not clearly defined by law in many areas leading to the use of the same tax base by both levels of governments. Sodhi (1984:44-45) explained the practice of collecting Business Profit Tax in the southern Region; tax from traders with an annual income of more than £s 1000 was collected by the regional government and from those with an income less than £s 1000 by the local authorities. According to Sodhi, this "practice of having both a 'Regional list' as well as a 'Provincial list' [of traders] ... led to large scale evasion of tax". Following a
Taxation Enquiry Committee in 1974, the Regional Government decided that the entire Business Profit Tax would be collected by the Regional Government and that it would transfer 60 per cent of the yield to local government authorities. In early 1981, however, this decision was reversed and the responsibility for collecting Business Income Tax was passed on to the provincial local authorities in its entirety. But, with the reform of local government structure in May 1981, by which the focus of local government was shifted from the provincial to the district level, the collection of Business Profit Tax was once again in a confused state.

The second group of tax revenues, taxes imposed and collected by the central government but shared with the regional government, was composed of the following:

- Excise duties
- Consumption duties
- Export duties
- Corporation Tax on new projects, and
- Profit on sugar.

This group of taxes was classified as indirect taxation by the central government tax system. The revenue the southern region was able to derive from this group of taxes were very low even after the regional government was empowered, by the Excise, Duties and Consumption Act, 1977, to levy and collect taxes on goods produced and consumed in the region and assumed responsibility for maintaining all the communication services (mainly postal and telegram) in the south. During
the 1977/78 fiscal year, yields from indirect taxes represented about 34% of the total locally raised financial income of £s 6.2 million of the Southern Regional Government (see Sodhi, 1981:58). This was unlike the situation with the central government, where, as mentioned in chapter 5, up to 60 per cent of its current revenue had been coming from indirect taxation. Table 6.6 below shows the static nature of indirect taxes as a source of income in South Sudan.

Table 6.6: Yields from indirect taxes of the Southern Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Excise Duties</th>
<th>Consumption Duties</th>
<th>Export Duties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1974-75</td>
<td>190,000</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-76</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-77</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977-78</td>
<td>1,700,000</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978/79</td>
<td>1,100,000</td>
<td>580,000</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979/80</td>
<td>1,100,000</td>
<td>580,000</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980/81</td>
<td>1,100,000</td>
<td>580,000</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981/82</td>
<td>1,700,000</td>
<td>580,000</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sodhi, 1981:45

The Southern Regional Government had great expectations of increasing its yield from excise duties during the period of the Six Year Development Plan (1977/78 - 1982/83). The expectation was based on the assumption that Wau Beer Factory would start producing 20,000,000 bottles per annum, thus generating, on average, £s 4.05 million per year in revenue to the Regional Government. According to the Six Year Development Plan, the total yield of the excise duties alone in the 1981-82 fiscal year would have been £s 5.5 million (Regional Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, 1977:80).
Of the three tax groups, those imposed by the regional government and also collected by it were relatively the most profitable, accounting for over 50% of the total tax revenue (Doornbos, 1986:281). These taxes were collected from a variety of sources and the largest part of it came from development tax. The regional government was empowered by the Addis Ababa agreement to impose development tax on residents in the south for the acceleration of economic and social development (Article 26 (iv)). Making a "liberal use of this privilege" (Sodhi, 1981:46), the Southern Regional Government promulgated a law (Finance Act, 1974) by which development levies were imposed on a number of goods and services. Since then yields from development taxes had steadily increased—from a mere £s 860,000 in the 1975-76 fiscal year to over £s 5 million in 1980-81.

Non-Tax Revenues: The non-tax revenues were raised by different Ministries and Departments of the Southern Regional Government from goods sold and services rendered by them. The major part of these revenues were collected by the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the Ministry of Communication, Roads and Transport and the Ministry of Wildlife, Conservation and Tourism (see Sodhi, 1981:48). The yields from non-tax revenues were small in comparison to the yields from tax revenues. In the 1979-80 fiscal year, for example, the proportion of actual non-tax revenues to tax revenues was 1:3.5 (see figures in Sodhi, 1981:58).
3. The third category of revenue source comprised of external assistance and loans that the South negotiated but which had to be channelled via the central government. "External assistance plays a crucial role in development planning and financing in the Region in so far as it helps in bridging the gap between demand and supply of critical inputs for development projects" (Regional Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, 1977:44). External assistance to the Southern Region came from three sources: Multinational organizations, bilateral assistance and voluntary organizations. By its own admission, the regional government had no satisfactory machinery to record the flow of external assistance and so its exact contribution was not known. When the Six Year Development Plan (1977/78-1982/83) was drawn up, however, committed external assistance alone accounted for £s 21.1 million representing 7.3 per cent of the total planned outlay (Regional Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, 1977:52). But, since firm agreements with donors were concluded on a yearly basis, the actual contribution was expected to have been much higher (Southern Sudan Monthly Review, 1978:11).

Regional Patterns of Expenditure

Budgetary outlays of the Sudanese financial systems are divided into three major sections which are known as 'Chapters'. All personnel expenditures (salaries and wages) are classified in Chapter I, all service expenditures (allowances, transportation costs, fuel, stationery etc) are
classified in Chapter II and expenditures on development in Chapter III. Of the three, budgetary outlays on Chapter I were the biggest in the Southern Region. The rate of growth of Chapter I (see table 6.7 below) during the time of the north-south peace accord in the South was such that the regional government was unable to generate surpluses towards development expenditure.

Table 6.7: Rate of growth of Chapter I between 1972/73 and 1977/78 Fiscal Years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percentage Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972-73</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-74</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-75</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-76</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-77</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977-78</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The dominance of Chapter I in the Southern Regional recurrent expenditure is shown in the following table. Up to 83 per cent (6.4/7.7x100) of the total actual expenditure of the Regional Government in the 1975/76 fiscal year was spent on Chapter 1 alone. The amount spent on development projects (Chapter III) by the Regional Government was almost negligible in the 1975/76 fiscal year and this pattern did not alter significantly in subsequent years (see Badal, 1979:46-49).
Table 6.8: Budgeted and actual expenditure of the Southern Regional Government in the 1975/76 financial year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Approved Budget</th>
<th>Actual Expenditure</th>
<th>Per cent actual to budgeted Expenditure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chapter I</td>
<td>7,953,087</td>
<td>6,429,259</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter II</td>
<td>5,462,975</td>
<td>1,240,219</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter III</td>
<td>124,626</td>
<td>25,497</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-total</td>
<td>13,540,688</td>
<td>7,694,975</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grants-in-Aid to Local Authorities</td>
<td>7,217,460</td>
<td>4,480,125</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>20,758,148</td>
<td>12,175,100</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Badal, 1979:48

The approved budget in the above table did not signify that that amount was available to the regional government for expenditure. As mentioned previously, the Regional Government's annual budgets tended to be inflated with the expectation of attracting a higher rate of transfers from central government. In effect, therefore, the actual expenditure represented the Region's total resources for the particular fiscal year.

Moharir (1986) raises the problem of auditing of accounts in the Sudan generally, which has been more acute at regional and local levels. For example, "in January 1983 accounts in Eastern Region had not been audited since 1973" (Moharir, 1986:257). The Southern Region had suffered from the same problem (see Malik, 1982:102) and because of it, information on the actual distribution of expenditure on a department by department basis is hard to find. However, the approved ordinary budgets do provide, if not accurately, at least an
indication of the pattern of distribution among the different Regional Ministries and Departments as shown in table 6.9 below.

Table 6.9: Approved Ordinary Budget for 1975/76 Ministry-wise for the Southern Region of Sudan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Ministry/Department</th>
<th>Budget</th>
<th>As % of Total Approved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Regional Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation</td>
<td>734,182</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Animal Production and Forestry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Regional Ministry of Communications, Transport</td>
<td>947,222</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and Roads</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Regional Ministry of Cooperative and Rural Development</td>
<td>371,564</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Regional Ministry of Education</td>
<td>1,003,233</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Regional Ministry of Information,</td>
<td>401,945</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Culture, Youth and Sports</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Regional Department of Wildlife Conservation and Tourism</td>
<td>343,670</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Regional Ministry of Housing and Public Utilities</td>
<td>620,847</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Regional Ministry of Health and Social welfare</td>
<td>2,754,659</td>
<td>13.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Regional Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning</td>
<td>288,404</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Regional Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Supply</td>
<td>110,873</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Regional Ministry of Administration, Police and Prisons</td>
<td>4,426,346</td>
<td>21.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>People's Regional Assembly</td>
<td>256,754</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Central Regional Services</td>
<td>760,701</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Regional Ministry of Public Services and Administrative Reform</td>
<td>395,622</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Grant-in-Aid to People's Local Government</td>
<td>7,217,460</td>
<td>35.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>20,633,482</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Democratic Republic of The Sudan, Primary Health Care Programme Southern Region Sudan, 1976:2
The Regional Ministry of Administration, Police and Prisons (later the Ministry of Decentralisation Affairs) was the biggest employer in the Southern Region. Almost 60% of the public sector posts in the Region were accounted for by this Ministry alone (Mills, 1977:117). The Ministry of Decentralisation Affairs was not only the biggest employer but was also the biggest spender of the Southern Regional Government departments (table 6.9). The reason for this was that local government expenditure, which included salaries of the technical departments' staff such as primary school teachers, agricultural and health workers, were budgeted for by that ministry. According to Mills (1977:119) the dominance of the Ministry of Decentralisation in employment was a reflection of "the vast size of the Region, the state of economic development and the relatively undeveloped nature and range of public sector employment within the Region".

If the actual expenditure had followed the percentage pattern of the approved budget allocations as shown in table 6.9, the share of the Ministry of Decentralisation Affairs would have been £s 2.6 million. Following the same assumption, however, the expenditures of some of the Ministries and departments in the South would have been so small that they would not have been in a position to engage themselves in any developmental activities. Taking the Regional Ministry of Industry and Supply as an example, its actual expenditure in the 1975/76 fiscal year would have only amounted to £s 61,000.
Some Aspects of Local Government Finance

Sources of Local Revenue: Local governments in the Sudan derive their revenue from three main sources. Firstly, and most importantly, is grants-in-aid from the central government; secondly, there are locally imposed taxes; and thirdly there are miscellaneous receipts derived from fees and charges. A main feature of local government finance during the Nimeiri regime was the continued financial dependence on central grants. The table below shows the growth of grants-in-aid to local authorities in South Sudan for the years 1977/78 to 1981/82. It can be seen that in the 1981/82 fiscal year, 85% of the local authority finance came from outside their local revenue.

Table 6.10: Local Government Revenue Resources in South Sudan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Budgeted Revenue (£s 000)</th>
<th>Local Revenue (£s 000)</th>
<th>Percent of Local to Total Revenue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1977/78</td>
<td>15,671</td>
<td>7,307</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978/79</td>
<td>17,241</td>
<td>7,418</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979/80</td>
<td>29,990</td>
<td>7,143</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980/81</td>
<td>37,853</td>
<td>7,362</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981/82</td>
<td>55,443</td>
<td>17,396</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Malik, 1982:42

Another feature of local government finance in the Sudan since independence has been that, in spite of the many changes that took place in administrative structure, the base of local revenues has remained virtually unchanged. In the main, the law by which local governments are assigned their tax revenue sources has been the Local Government Appropriation of Taxes
Ordinance which was passed in 1954, that is, from the pre-independence period. The following are some of the sources of finances for local governments under the provision of the 1954 Tax Ordinance:

1. **Poll Tax.** This is sometimes known as Social Services Tax and is collected from every male adult resident in a local authority. Poll Tax is a crude form of taxation as it bears no relation to the individual's ability to pay. According to Ali (1974:109): "the original reason for such a tax was to entice people to work for money, and hence, eventually transform the traditional (subsistence) sector in undeveloped countries into the change (money) economy". It "being generally regarded as inhuman to tax a person for his sheer existence ... most underdeveloped countries have begun abolishing [poll tax]" (Ali, 1974:109-110). In the Sudan, Poll Tax is still one of the important sources of revenue for the lower tiers of local councils that is, Town and Rural Councils.

In South Sudan, the collection of Poll Tax has always been beset with problems. The method of collection has been through the traditional chiefs who are allowed to retain a certain percentage (up to 20 per cent) of the amount they collect. However, as Badal wrote, quoting an anonymous source: "among chiefs misuse of taxes is frequent: they come back to tax payers asking them to pay again and call the next payment as arrears" (Badal, 1979:63). Failure of payment is
normally dealt with by confiscating property or imprisonment of the defaulter. But, as discussed in chapter 5, the plain truth is that the South is so poor and unproductive that little money can be squeezed out of the people by taxes or otherwise.

2. **Property Rates:** These are taxes levied on land, building and ground properties owned by individuals or business enterprises. The amount to be collected depends on the location of the property and of its value. In South Sudan, this type of rating is only applicable in the urban areas. The land rating in urban Juba is, for example, divided into five classes but the local authority there uses a flat rate, based on the lowest value, to avoid administrative complexity. Even at that rate a survey team in 1977 found that non-payment of property taxes in Juba was very high (Mumtaz et al., 1977:22).

3. **Ushur:** Ushur is a tax levied from commercially-marketed crops. It is collected from farmers when crops are sold at grain markets. Since volume of revenue from Ushur is a function of the volume of commercial agricultural production in an area, income from this tax in South Sudan is very small.

4. **Gibbana:** Gibbana is a tax on agricultural produce and is charged to producers at markets for weighing, use of market place by producers and other services. Gibbana has proved to be a valuable source of revenue to local governments in South
Sudan (Mumtaz et al., 1977:22). In Yei Area Council, for example, it was reported that 50% of its income has been derived from Gibbana (Pickering and Davies, 1985:30).

5. Fees and Charges: Local authorities have certain powers to impose fees and charges for services or facilities provided by them. They also have some powers to charge fees for licences and permits issued by them. Although the revenue from these sources varies in magnitude from one local authority to another yet they form a source of revenue to all of them. There are four main categories of fees and charges:

a) Trading and occupational licences: This includes licences issued to traders and licences issued to regulate the small professions and small works like dress-making, carpentry, local liquor production etc.

b) Health Licences: Licences and inspection charges to regulate occupations like butchering, restaurants and any similar occupations linked with public health.

c) Vehicle and Driving Licences: These licences are designed to regulate the different uses of vehicles and the profession of driving (Iman, 1976:87).

d) Charge on Services or Facilities Provided: These are items such as court fines, stamp duties, use of market
place, slaughtering and charges on water and electricity services etc..

As an illustration, the following table shows the sources of income of one Area (District) Council, Yei Area Council, in the Eastern Equatoria province of South Sudan. Yei Area Council is made up of two rural councils (Yei Rural and Kajo-Kaji Rural) whose sources of income are delegated to them by the Area Council. Thus the revenue generated by these local councils is not included in the table below.

Table 6.11: Estimated and actual revenue sources of Yei Area Council in 1982/83.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Estimated</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Administration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Business Profits Tax</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>10,932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Gibbana</td>
<td>86,265</td>
<td>55,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Licences:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Firearms</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Liquor</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Motor Vehicles &amp; Drivers’</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Others</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Fees and Charges</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Other receipts</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>9,365</strong></td>
<td><strong>67,254</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Receipts from Agriculture</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Forestry</td>
<td>79,250</td>
<td>59,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>178,615</strong></td>
<td><strong>126,504</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Pickering and Davis, 1985:28

The above figures are indicators of the poor contribution made by the technical departments in realising revenue resources in Yei Area Council. During the same financial year (1982/83),
the overall budgeted revenue estimate of the Area Council was based on the assumption that the two local councils under it would generate most of the finances as follows (Pickering and Davis, 1985:27):

Budgeted Area Council Revenues = £s 178,615
Budgeted Yei Rural Council Revenues = £s 395,000
Budgeted Kajo-Kaji Rural Council Revenues = £s 101,701
Total: = £s 675,316

Unfortunately, Pickering and Davis do not give information on the source of the revenues of Yei and Kajo-Kaji Rural Councils for the 1982/83 fiscal year. This would have been useful to complete the financial picture of the Area Council as a whole for that year. Nevertheless, the two authors have compiled information of the actual revenue raised by one of the Rural Councils (Yei Rural) in the 1983/84 financial year which provides insight into its revenue base.

Table 6.12: Actual Revenue Sources of Yei Rural Council 1983/84

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Actual Revenue</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social Services Tax (Poll Tax)</td>
<td>31,444</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Produce Tax</td>
<td>85,643</td>
<td>28.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Licences</td>
<td>35,300</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fees and Charges, including market fees</td>
<td>114,905</td>
<td>57.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various receipts</td>
<td>38,395</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charges for public health services</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>305,903</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: adapted from Pickering and Davis, 1985:29
The inadequacy of the source of revenue in Yei Rural Council becomes apparent when looked at in the context of its population. In the 1983 population census, Yei Rural Council's population was registered as 267,082. Accordingly, the annual local resources of Yei Rural Council were equivalent to only £s 1.2 per head which does not appear to be compatible with the decentralized responsibilities entrusted to it.

**Local Government Expenditure** In theory, Local Governments in the Sudan, as previously explained, are corporate bodies with wide powers over local taxation including powers to approve their own budgets. Badal (1979:50), however, argued that the reality was quite different from the theory. According to him, Local Governments in South Sudan have had "little autonomy in budgetary and financial matters". Badal further explained:

The budgets of the People's Executive Councils [local governments] are subject to ratification by the Regional Government and the procedure can be quite lengthy. The Councils submit their budget proposals to the Regional Ministry of Administration in the first place. The Ministry forecasts the revenues of the different Councils including subventions from Central Government. These budget proposals are next discussed by the High Executive Council which in turn presents them to the Regional Assembly for full debate. The Assembly then considers each budget proposal item by item, sometimes making drastic cuts.

Block grants made by Central Government to [local] administrations ... through the Regional Government ... are earmarked for specific functions such as established services: education, health, housing, agriculture and administration. As such [local governments] have no rights to vary these sums.
Legally speaking, the Councils have discretions only over the use of 12% of the total revenue estimate in any one year... (Badal, 1979:50-51).

With little real power coming their way, Local Government initiatives in south Sudan have been suffocated (Malik, 1982:101). The following table shows the precarious financial situation of Yei Area Council.

Table 6.13: Summaries of Budgeted and actual Revenues and Expenditures in Yei Area Council, 1982/83.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Budget</th>
<th>Revenue £s</th>
<th>Expenditure £s</th>
<th>Deficits £s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chapter I + Chapter II</td>
<td>(exp.-Rev.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated</td>
<td>178,615</td>
<td>1,381,420</td>
<td>1,202,805</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual</td>
<td>126,504</td>
<td>795,208</td>
<td>668,704</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


From table 6.13 it can be observed that the budget deficit of Yei Area Council for 1982/83 was 87%. This financial situation of Yei Area Council was not in any way atypical. Pickering and Davis (1985:26) mention, for example, that a similar study undertaken in Eastern Area Council (Kapoeta Area) in 1983 indicated the budgeted deficit to have been 96%. But, as with the differences in the budget and actual revenues discussed previously, wide disparities also existed between the budgeted and actual expenditures. In the case of Yei Area Council, the actual expenditure was 58% of the budgeted expenditure and only 16% of this expenditure was covered by revenue raised from its own resources.
The pattern of expenditure of Local Governments in South Sudan closely resembled that of the Regional Government except that not even a small amount of funds were available to them for Chapter III (Development Expenditure). From table 6.12 above it can be seen that most (80%) of Yei Area Council's expenditure went to Chapter I (Personnel) and the remaining to Chapter II (Services). A feature of Local Government expenditure in the Southern Region was also that more than half of their budgets were consumed by educational services and almost all of this was spent on teachers' salaries. In the 1978/79 fiscal year, for example, the total expenditure for education was £s 7,308,254 out of a total Local Government's approved budget of £s 13,190,883 (Badal, 1979:51).

DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION AND PLANNING

The National Context
The importance the Nimeiri regime attached to planning was expressed by the establishment of a fully fledged Ministry for the first time in the history of the Sudan. In theory, the ministry of planning was responsible for the allocation and utilisation of the country's resources in a coordinated manner (Idris, 1979:189). The method of planning adopted was declared as "scientific" which was that the policy making and implementation were not to be the responsibility of the national government alone but local authorities were to be
given opportunities to participate in key decisions related to the future pattern of development (Idris, 1979:190).

In practice, however, neither decentralised planning nor the central planning mechanism worked in the way it was intended to (Moharir, 1986:258-259). This was admitted in the Six Year Plan (1977/78 - 1982/83) where the experience of planning was raised not in terms of malfunction but in terms of "the absence of regional planning in the Sudan" (p.145). In addition, the Six Year Plan admitted that the absence of local planning led to the "disorderly growth of urban centres and the concentration of these centres in certain areas". In an attempt to rectify the situation, the Six Year Plan set out a strategy of regional development which again was based on "scientific studies and on sound understanding of the various regions and localities" (p.146). One of the Six Year Plan's main objectives was "the introduction of regional planning as basis for comprehensive national planning, giving more emphasis to decentralisation in implementing those developments which have a regional or local nature" (p.150). To achieve the proposed strategy, the Plan suggested "the establishment of a regional planning body in all the provincial headquarters". Ironically though, this planning body was to be "accountable to the central Minister of National Planning" (p.152) and not to the regional governments.
Case studies on regionalisation in northern Sudan by Fadlalla (1986) and Moharir (1986) explain the attempt that was made by regional governments there to establish planning units. Both studies show the confusion that arose as the units were accountable to two authorities at the same time - the central Ministry and the Regional Government. As Fadlalla (1986:219) said in the case of the Eastern Region: "The assistant Director of Planning is very much tied to the central Ministry of Planning from where he was seconded, and the terms of reference for his relationship with the regional government are vague and imprecise. This fact, plus the fact that to date there are no departmental or regional bodies with which he can coordinate his activities, made his job altogether a rather precarious one". According to Moharir (1986:258) also, "although regionalisation of economic and social planning is the crux of decentralisation for development, little importance has been given so far to this function at the regional level". Moharir (1986:258) thought this was because the central Ministry was not willing to decentralise responsibility doubting "the ability of most regional governments to undertake the regional planning exercise on their own")).

As a result of all this, Moharir (1986:259) asserted in his study on the eastern region, "the planning function at the regional level was interpreted mostly as management of the limited development budget granted to the region, and liaison with central government ministries for the release of funds".

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Studies from other regions in north Sudan (Fadlalla, 1986) also portray similar problems and the centralising tendency of the planning process appeared evident in all of them.

Development Planning in South Sudan: At the Regional Level

The Southern Regional Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning was one of the first portfolios created following the formation of the autonomous region in south Sudan in 1972. The Ministry was made up of two directorates: Finance and Planning. These were further organised into departments, the planning division consisting of:

a) General economic planning
b) Sectoral planning
c) Manpower planning
d) External assistance

According to the first Six-Year plan of Economic and social development of the Southern Region, which was drawn up concurrently with the national six-year plan, "the organization for development planning [was] built on the assumption that the most competent body to propose development shall be those who ultimately implement the projects". As a step towards realising this philosophy, the Regional Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning passed directives to the various ministries and parastatal bodies in 1974 to organise Planning committees and Planning Units (Six-Year Plan, 1977-42). A year later, Presidential Decree No. 210/1975 -
Regional Plan for Development and the Structure and Competence of the Regional Planning Organization was enacted. The decree formally established a Regional Planning Council, Planning Committees and planning Units at the High Executive and Ministry levels, government corporations and institutions (Six-Year Plan, 1977:42).

The objective of the Directorate of Planning, as the central planning authority in the Region, was to appraise the existing and potential resources, give guidance to the various governmental bodies and coordinate development programmes (The Ministry of Regional Administration Police and Prisons, Annual review 1981-1982: annex xi-ii). In practice, however, as the Six-Year Plan readily admits (p43), "the planning Committees and Planning Units have either not been organised or, where organised, have not seriously applied themselves to the tasks specified for them". A progress report by the President of the High Executive Council in 1977 identified four main obstacles which impeded the "efforts of the Regional Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning to speed up the tempo of economic development in the region". These were:

1) Lack of transport, especially vehicles, spare parts and fuel.
2) Lack of machinery, equipment and building materials.
3) Lack of skilled manpower.
4) Lack of liquidity.
As a result, the planning function at the regional level in south Sudan was relegated, as was the case in the North, to the preparation and appropriation of the limited annual budget. Reference was made earlier to the problem of flow of liquid funds from Central Government to meet the planned development budgets in the regions, a particularly severe problem in the south; chasing funds from the centre was a major preoccupation of the regional government (Deng, 1978:12).

**Development Planning at Local Government Level**

During the Nimeiri regime, development arguments formed part of the reasoning for entrusting local government organs with powers to carry out the functions provided for in their warrants of establishment. Decentralisation was emphasised as the mechanism for transferring decision making to local authorities and was intended to open avenues for their participation in the development process. In practice, however, the decision making authority of the local bodies was limited and, in the field of development, their activities were confined to the maintenance of some services and the implementation of a few small scale projects, mostly in the agriculture sector.

Although the Regional Government of South Sudan had from its inception adopted planning as a means of tackling development problems, no effective organizational framework for planning was established below the regional level. Following the
presidential decree 210/1975, the regional government attempted to establish planning units at province level and went as far as appointing Assistant Commissioners of planning in each of the six provincial capitals in 1976. However, as a United Nations advisor to the Directorate of Planning observed:

The A/Commissioners of Planning - appointed or acting - [were] hampered in their work by frequent changes in duty-stations and lack of support staff ... A/Commissioners of Planning are senior administrators - besides being development planners - and therefore [had] authority over the other A/Commissioners [heads of functional departments]. On the other hand however, this seniority had led to the fact that the administrative workload took virtually all their time because of the shortages of experienced administrators (Wessels, 1981:62).

Going by the various governmental declarations, the provision of the wider function to local authorities was intended to decentralise power from Khartoum and, to a lesser extent, from Juba with an aim to "spread the democratic rule from the base to the top by allowing citizens to participate in development..." (Regional Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Directorate of Planning, 1977:330). Taylor (1979:15) was perhaps the first one to clearly express doubt on the effectiveness of decentralisation in the Sudan having assessed its actual working in South Sudan. He said:

The theory and even the law relating to public administration in the Southern Region indicate the existence of a sophisticated local government system, a decentralized structure of regional administration and tiers of development planning committees reaching right down to the basic units of
Community life. Recent high level statements ... point to popular participation in government and development planning at many levels, with sophisticated horizontal and vertical integration. But these are statements of intent rather than definitions of reality. What is actually seen on the ground reveals a high degree of departmentalism and the predominance of the project approach to government operation ... No evidence of effective participatory planning or consultation with the people at large was discernible ... (emphasis added).

Conclusion
The decentralisation system in the Sudan is fraught with contradictions. On the one hand is the existence of a sophisticated and impressive organizational structure constituted by law and rigorously promoted by the central government. On the other hand, the very authority that created the decentralised system appears to deny it the necessary resources to work. From the analysis of the financial situation of South Sudan it was established that the region was in no position to carry the burden of the additional expenditure brought about by the policies of decentralisation.
CHAPTER 7

THE WORKING OF DECENTRALISATION:
THE DELIVERY OF PRIMARY EDUCATION
IN SOUTH SUDAN

Introduction
This chapter deals with the implications of the decentralisation policies during the Nimeiri regime for the delivery of primary education. "The ultimate goal governing the process of decentralisation in the Sudan", wrote President Nimeiri, "is the handing of power over to the people so as to enable them to govern themselves by themselves" (Nimeiri, 1979:iv). But how effective was the policy of decentralisation as development administration and what benefit did this "handing over of power" bring to the people? Based on field research findings, how decentralisation worked in Wau district council of south Sudan will be analysed in the second part of the chapter. The first part will describe the development of the educational system during the Nimeiri period. The divergent development of education in the north and the south during the colonial era was noted in chapter three.

BACKGROUND TO EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Educational Development During the Nimeiri Years
The dominant perspective of many countries on acquiring independence was that heavy investment in education was regarded as the primary instrument for modernisation (Lulat,
The Sudan experienced rapid expansion of education after independence, not only because of the need to promote rapid economic growth but also to satisfy the growing public desire for increased opportunities for education (Sudan Government, Education Sector Review, 1977:9). However, the expansion of schools, teachers and enrolment in the Sudan has disproportionately been in favour of the urban centres (Bechtold, 1976:14; Kaplan, 1983:129). Whilst 79% of the total population of the Sudan is said to live in rural areas (7.1) the ratio of their share in primary education distribution is less than 30% (Sudan Government, Education Sector Review, 1977:31). The rural and urban differentiation is even more pronounced in the south which has only three settlements that fall in the latter category and has therefore a relatively small and very scattered educational distribution. In addition, the civil war that erupted in the south on the eve of independence and the expulsion of foreign missionaries in the mid-1960s all contributed to further widening the gap in educational distribution between north and south (Sudan Government, Regional Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Southern Region, the six-year plan 1977/78-1982/83, 1977:204; Southern Regional Government, Peace and Progress 1974-1975:21).

When the Nimeiri-led government took power in 1969, it carried out an extensive review of the educational system that it inherited with an intention "to further improve the level of education, both in quality and in the number of schools and
students, so as to meet the basic needs of development" (Sudan Government, the Six-Year Plan, vol. II, 1977:129). Under the specifications of the Five-Year Plan of Economic and Social Development, 1970/71-1974/75, an extensive reorganisation of the educational system was proposed (Betchtold, 1976:147). Administratively, provincial councils were given the powers, by the 1971 Act, to resume responsibility for primary, intermediate and secondary education. An Assistant Commissioner of Education, supported by a small staff of professionals and administrators, was made responsible for the general management and implementation of educational policies of a province. Beneath the provincial authority were the district councils which, as corporate bodies and budgetary units following the 1981 Act, became responsible for primary and intermediate levels of education. "Provincial authorities still retained direct control over secondary schools as they were limited in numbers" (UNICEF, 1980:5). The main educational responsibilities of the provincial authorities were in school supervision, inspection, staff allocations, school location planning, provision for school buildings, furniture and equipment, and the school calendar.

Educational data during the amended Five Year Plan (7.2), 1969/70-1976/77, show the great expansion that took place at all general education levels, and especially in primary education, in this period of the Nimeiri regime as shown in the table below.
Table 7.1: Development of Primary Education During the Amended 5 Year Plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>School</th>
<th>Classes</th>
<th>Enrolment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969/1970</td>
<td>1,716</td>
<td>10,663</td>
<td>578,865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976/1977</td>
<td>4,685</td>
<td>26,916</td>
<td>1,254,497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- number</td>
<td>2,969</td>
<td>16,253</td>
<td>657,632</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- %</td>
<td>173%</td>
<td>152%</td>
<td>116%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- % Annual Av.</td>
<td>24.7%</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The achievement in primary education during the amended Five Year Plan was by no means a small one. In a matter of seven years, the enrolment in primary education had more than doubled. The Nimeiri regime had no doubts that these achievements were attributable to the "application of decentralisation in educational services" (Sudan Government, The Six Year Plan, 1977/78-1982/83, vol. II, 1977:129).

During the amended Five Year Plan, primary education consumed the largest portion of the educational budget in the Sudan. In 1975/76, expenditure on primary education was over 45% of the total education budget, as table 7.2 below shows.

Table 7.2: Education expenditure by level in 1975/76

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Expenditure (x 000 £s)</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Primary</td>
<td>35,074</td>
<td>45.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Junior Sec.</td>
<td>14,932</td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Senior Sec.</td>
<td>10,993</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Administration</td>
<td>5,432</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Higher Edu.</td>
<td>11,036</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>77,472</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Education Sector Review, 1977:177
The share of central government in the total expenditure, table above, was just over 14%, of the local governments nearly 82%, of self-help 1% and of all external sources 3.2% (Education Sector Review, 1977:177).

In 1975, an Educational Sector Review Commission was set up by the Government of the Sudan whose responsibility was "to survey the state of education in the country and its relevance to development goals, and to formulate guidelines for educational development (Hajjar, 1983). The Commission's Educational Sector Review was produced in report form in 1977 and the recommendations contained in it were, by ministerial decree (GSM/1/A/5/4/, dated 5/6/1977), adopted as the official educational policy of the country. In effect, also, the recommendations of the report were to form the basis for the education sector plan of the National Six Year Plan of Economic and Social Development, 1977/78-1982/83.

The 1977 Educational Sector Review was an attempt, according to the commission, "to study the future of education in the Sudan during the coming twenty five years" (page ix). Some of the main features of the education sector review's policy recommendations concerned with primary education were the following:-

- universalisation of primary education, that is, the attainment of full school enrolment of all 7 year old children, by 1991.

- promotion of administrative performance in schools, regional offices and central units, and coordination of their efforts.
definition of administrative responsibilities and appointment of suitable persons to appropriate positions...

- promotion of financial decentralisation to go hand in hand with administrative decentralisation...

Following these policy guidelines, the National Six Year Plan set out specific targets to achieve for the development of education. Concerning primary education, the Six Year Development Plan's ambitious target was to raise the ratio of those registered in primary schools from 35.5% in 1976/77 to 60% in 1982/83 and reaching this target was to require the opening of 5466 new schools during the plan period.

The Six Year Development Plan placed much emphasis on community participation for achieving the educational target. Compared to the previous National Plan, primary education had an increased share of the total educational budget. The plan anticipated, however, that out of the total primary education development budget, which was planned to take 55% of the total educational budget, 34% was to be met by self-help programmes (vol. II, p.155).

The plan to achieve universal primary education through decentralisation by 1991 was an over ambitious programme (Hajjar, 1983). Unlike the real accomplishments registered during the Amended Five Year Development Plan period of 1970/71-1977/78, the Six Year Development Plan period actually witnessed a slow down in the annual growth rate of primary enrolment as shown in diagram 7.1 below. The actual ratio of
enrolment in primary education by the end of the Plan period (1982/83) was only 46% and the ratio of the primary one intake was just over 48% against the planned intake ratio of 87% (Ministry of Education, Education Statistics, 1982/83:13).

Figure 7.1 Progress in Primary Education in the Sudan in the period 1970/71-1982/83.

![Graph showing progress in primary education enrollment in Sudan from 1971 to 1983.](source)


The South Sudan Experience

The responsibility of the Southern Regional Authority concerning education, as spelt out in the 1972 Addis Ababa agreement for Regional Self Government, was the "establishment, maintenance and administration of public schools at all levels in accordance with National Plans for education and economic and social development" [Chapter V,
Article II/v]. Following the 1981 Act, the Area (District) authorities were required by law to comply with the general policy, plans and programmes made by the regional executive authorities [1981 Act, chapt.III, 8/1]. The regional authorities in turn were responsible to the central authority. Thus, a well defined line of responsibility and legalised relations among the different levels of the government hierarchy was set in place (Sudan Government, Education Sector Review, 1977:83).

Education was one of the most urgent problems that the Regional Government decided to tackle after acquiring self-rule (Sudan Government, Regional Ministry of Culture and Information, Peace and Development in the Southern Region, 1973-74:16). After a year in office, the daunting task that the High Executive Council had in managing education was frankly explained in its progress report:

This first year has presented the new Regional Ministry of Education with many problems and difficulties. It has been difficult even to get full information about those schools in existence when the Regional Ministry took over. The need to absorb Anyanya schools into the educational system, the influx of returnee students seeking school places, the difficulties of obtaining educational supplies, many damaged schools needing repair or rebuilding - all these have put a heavy demand on the limited staff and resources of the Ministry (Sudan Government, Peace and Progress, 1972-73, Report of the High Executive Council of the Southern Region).

Despite the various impediments facing it, the Regional government was willing to tackle the problem "as quickly and as systematically as the resources, the experience and the
time at [its] disposal, would allow" (Sudan Government, Peace and Progress, Report of the High Executive Council of the Southern Region, 1973-74:18). To resolve the shortage of teaching staff, the regional government even went as far as enlisting volunteers, like clerks, accountants and university graduates including "some senior officials and the minister of education" to teach during the day and in the evenings (Report of the High Executive Council, 1973-74:17).

The South Sudan having come out of seventeen years of civil strife in 1972, it could be argued that any input was likely to result in an improvement in the educational system. But the pace of progress following the peace accord was such that it would be difficult to deny credit to the regional government. In the 1971/72 school year, the total primary school enrolment was 49,248 and during the following four years of self-rule, two hundred and fifteen new schools were constructed with enrolment rising to 109,552 pupils which was an increase of 122.4% (see Southern Regional Government, Peace and Progress, 1972-1976/77, 1977:23). The regional government's explanation was that these achievements were due to "the exemplary spirit of cooperation between the voluntary organisations, the parents and the government" (Southern Regional Government, Peace and Progress, 1972-1976/77, 1977:22;).

Concurrent with the national Six Year Plan, the Southern Regional Government had also produced its own plan of economic
and social development. Concerning primary education, the regional government's target was to achieve between 41% and 45% of the primary school age population enrolled in schools. In order to achieve "this basic development policy", as the plan called it, 557 new schools were to be constructed and equipped (Southern Region, the Six Year Plan of Economic and Social Development, 1977:214). Unlike the National Plan, however, where the implementation of primary education targets was to rely to a greater extent on decentralisation, the Regional Plan was to rely on central government financial support (p.215).

However, educational development in south Sudan followed the national trend. As the figure below shows, primary education in the South experienced steady growth up to the 1976/77 academic year, but for the next six years between 1977/78-1982/83, that is, during the entire duration of the six Year Plan, only minimal progress was made. Whilst primary enrolment between 1972/73-1976/77 grew at a staggering annual average rate of more than 23%, the annual average growth rate during the Six Year Plan was only about 5% (See Regional Ministry of Education, annual statistics review, 1976/77 and 1982/83).
CASE STUDY: THE MANAGEMENT OF PRIMARY EDUCATION IN WAU AREA COUNCIL

The Research Methods

Explanatory Note: The field work for this case study was conducted in two stages. The first stage, which was part of a consultancy undertaken by the author for the United Nations Childrens' Fund (UNICEF) (7.3), was conducted between November 1982 and August 1983. In early 1982, UNICEF was formally invited by the Government of the Sudan to assist in the promotion of primary education in those provinces where the enrolment of primary school age children fell short of the national average. It was in response to this call that UNICEF
appointed a consultant to investigate the overall situation of primary education in Bahr El Ghazal province. The investigation involved the collection of data through a structured questionnaire (appendix 1) in the whole province. Wau Area Council, one of four local authorities before the 1983 reorganisation, is subjected to close examination for the purpose of this study.

An important aspect of the first stage of the study was that thirteen high ranking officials from the provincial education authorities of Bahr El Ghazal were seconded to the research programme. The officials were not only the source of much invaluable information through interviews but also participated as enumerators in the data collection. The research work schedule followed was as shown in figure 7.3 on the next page.

The second stage of the field work was conducted in February/March 1986 and was made possible by a grant received from the University of London, Central Research Fund. This second stage was intended to augment the data already collected in the first part. In the main, it consisted of gathering information from primary official documentary sources and various aid agencies who operate in the country. Much of the literature referred to throughout this study was collected during this time. In addition, the second stage also permitted informal interviews of government officials and other 'experts' in the field and provided useful illumination
of some of the issues that had arisen from the preliminary analysis of the data collected in the first stage.

Figure 7.3 Research Work Schedule.
Questionnaire Design: The questionnaire designed for the Bahr El Ghazal study was a comprehensive and structured one intended to investigate many aspects of the educational system: administrative; school management; quantitative and qualitative aspects of education; community participation; availability of teaching aids and physical conditions of the schools, furniture and equipment (See Woldemichael, 1983). The relevant variables of the questionnaire extracted for the purpose of this study are as shown in the table below.

Table 7.3: Variable Analysis: The Impact of Decentralisation on Primary Educational Development in Wau Area Council.

A. Policy Making and Implementation
   1. Statutory framework for decision making
   2. Relationships, control and responsibilities
   3. Financial and material resources

B. Impact on School Environment
   1. Effects on management
      - Working climate
      - Teacher participation
      - Leadership qualities
   2. Teaching and Non-teaching Staff
      i) Status variables
         - Level of qualification
         - Professionalism
      ii) Process variables
         - Motivation
         - Attitude
   3. Effects on Students
      - Enrolment
      - Achievement/Motivation

C. Impact on Community Participation
   - Measures of community participation
   - Attitudes towards school
   - Rural/Urban differentials

Testing of Questionnaire: The draft questionnaire was tested in five schools for practical applicability in the field.
This exercise was found to be very useful in refining the final version. The draft questionnaire was very long and the wording of some items was either not easily understood or rendered the question difficult to answer. Shortening and simplification of ambiguous questions had therefore to be carried out.

It was during the testing of the questionnaire too that the need for interviewing chiefs and village communities became apparent. As a result the questionnaire form was redesigned to accommodate any relevant information that could be gathered by conducting such interviews.

The testing of the questionnaire also helped in the selection of the enumerators. Some were found to have difficulties conducting interviews or to be generally incapable of completing the questionnaire and therefore replacements had to be found.

Training of Enumerators: Twelve enumerators, who were all civil servants holding responsible jobs as council education officers and senior teachers, from the provincial education authority of Bahr El Ghazal (7.4) were selected for the task. The enumerators were given two weeks of intensive training on the application of the questionnaire and the testing of the questionnaire served as part of the training schedule.
Data/Information Collection and Processing: The enumerators were assigned to predetermined strategic centres from which they carried out the survey of the schools in their allocated areas on bicycles. In this way, all the one hundred and twenty three primary schools of Bahr El Ghazal province (later divided into East and West Bahr El Ghazal as shown below) were surveyed. An assistant Director of education from the same provincial headquarters was assigned by the provincial authority to work as a counterpart to the researcher (UNICEF consultant) and assisted in the supervision of the data collection.

Most of the data processing was done by hand using a desk top calculator including the extraction of information from the questionnaires which was done by means of a coded card system as no computer facilities were available in the field at the time. This method was a lengthy and tedious process and it imposed a number of limitations on the kind of information that could be extracted from the questionnaires. It was not found to be necessary, however, to reprocess all the data so calculated for the purpose of this study as they provide sufficient information. Nevertheless, computer aid was sought where graphical and tabular presentations would explain certain situations better.

Mention must be made of the importance of the formal and informal interviews conducted with government officials, teachers, chiefs and village elders which provided a wealth of
invaluable information. For example, senior education officers in the south (at the regional level) gave the impression before the survey that assigning teachers to the locality from where they originally came was a good thing. The reason given was that a teacher was better suited to serve in the environment he/she was accustomed to and hence would be more effective. This was found to be not necessarily so as many teachers interviewed expressed a preference to serve outside their locality because of them being regarded as only one of the sons or daughters by their kinfolks and so found it difficult to maintain respect from and authority over their students. This in turn had implications for enforcing discipline in the schools. The parents' preference likewise tended to be for an outsider because, as one village elder said, "they find it difficult to point a finger of any wrong doing if the teacher happened to be from the local area".

The involvement of the 13 government education officers in the research survey had many advantages. The officials were very instrumental in clarifying several questions that arose during the field survey and two week-end workshops. The first workshop was held immediately after the completion of the field survey and the second one after the completion of the primary analysis of the data.

The Study Area: Wau Area Council (the study area) was one of the seven Area Councils (Districts) which made up the Bahr El Ghazal region following the 1983 administrative reorganisation.
Wau town, which is the second largest town in south Sudan, is the regional as well as the Wau area capital town being the seat of both administrative authorities.

The selection of Wau Area Council for close examination was for two reasons. Firstly, although as indicated above the investigative study in the first stage covered the whole of Bahr El Ghazal province, a comparative sample data analyzed from each of the four Area Councils revealed no significant difference in the type of the problems they face and hence the decision to concentrate on only one of them. Secondly, Wau Area Council includes Wau town and therefore it is possible to investigate some urban/rural differentials in the educational system.

ANALYSIS OF MAJOR FINDINGS
Statutory Framework for Decision Making
The responsibility for laying down the guidelines of educational policy during the Nimeiri regime rested with the central ministry of education, a practice common in many countries not only because education is believed to promote "fusing together of local groups" (Sudan Government, Education Sector Review, 1977:23) but also, at least in theory, in order to correlate the overall national economic and social development with financial capacity and manpower resources and requirements. The importance of central control on major educational policies was, for example, unambiguously expressed in the 1972 north-south peace agreement, in that neither the
Peoples Regional Assembly nor the Southern Regional High Executive Council could legislate or exercise any powers on matters of educational planning (Article 7.1). The role of the regional directorate of education was thus limited to the execution of nationally determined plans (Sudan Government, report of the Sudan education sector review, 1977:84).

The practice was, however, found to be quite different from this. For example, in what could, strictly speaking, amount to a breach of the peace agreement, the regional government in 1976 passed a resolution for the introduction of local languages as the medium of instruction for the first four years of primary education. The organisation of language teaching for the primary schools in the south as determined by the regional government was as follows (Southern Regional Ministry of Information and Culture, Peace and Progress, 1972-1976/77, 1977:26):

   a) Rural Primary Schools
   P1-P4: Local language as medium of instruction. English and Arabic as foreign language.
   P5-P6: Arabic as medium of instruction and English as second language.

   b) Urban Primary Schools
   P1-P6: Arabic as medium of instruction. English as second language. Instruction of children in their respective local languages in the afternoons.

The introduction of local languages in the southern schools was in contravention to the central government's policy which aimed to spread Arabic and to remove the obstacles which
faced the use of Arabic as the language of education in areas where Arabic was not the mother tongue (see Sudan Government, education sector review, 1977:132). These conflicting policies had dire consequences on the development of education in South Sudan as will be discussed in detail below. The problem was that neither the central or regional policies were based on realistic assessments in terms of the available capacity for their implementation. Barbara Ward's (1963) observation on the over-emphasis of plan formulation in India is strikingly applicable to the situation in the Sudan:

"It is not unfair to say that from the beginning, Indian planning has been stronger on formulation than implementation - or less pompously put, on thinking things out rather than getting things done".

In the Sudan also, in spite of the central government's policy of adopting Arabic as the medium of communication in all schools, no effort had been made to blend the Arabic language into the specific local environment so as to make it acceptable to its users as an alternative language. A report by a provincial government official of the department of education itself makes this point clear:

In the past, local languages were the basic languages of instructions in primary schools...After independence Arabic was introduced....To a child in the rural area, Arabic is not only strange but very difficult language to understand. This obliges many pupils in rural schools to give up learning as the young untrained Arabic teachers who use classical Arabic in the class-rooms seem of no help to them (J.D. Bol, 1983).
On the other hand, the regional government's pronouncement on the use of vernacular languages was not only "illegal" but also unrealistic in terms of the possibility for its achievement. No school in Wau Area, for example, was found to be teaching in any vernacular language. There was no teacher training for it and there were no teaching aids available. In the heartland of the Dinka speaking people of Gogrial District, Bahr El Ghazal province, only two schools were found to be teaching the local language as a subject. These schools happened to have one teacher each who served during the condominium period and who happened to have kept their old note books.

The value of promoting vernaculars in the Sudan was doubted as long ago as 1954 when an International Education Commission, which was invited to make recommendations on the system of education reported that:

> It would be a waste of time and energy to try to teach the children of the South in their own vernacular in which they will not be able to pursue any reading after they leave school. Such vernaculars have no literature and cannot be used as culture media" (see in Beshir, 1968:74).

The impact of the conflicting central and regional policies was that the schools in the South were left to decide by themselves what medium of instruction to use. Table 7.4 below shows the confused situation with the language of instruction in primary education in South Sudan. The multiplicity of languages in primary schools, seen against the background of
the general lack of resources, was a major factor in the lack of progress in education.

Table 7.4: Primary Schools (gov. & nongov.) by Medium of Instruction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Arabic</th>
<th>Eng</th>
<th>Arab/Eng</th>
<th>Verna.</th>
<th>Eng/ver</th>
<th>Eng/Ver</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B.E.G</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Equat.</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jonglei</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lakes</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Nile</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Equat.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Constructed from Regional Ministry of Education, Statistical Unit, 1982/83.
Note: Eng. = English; Ara= Arabic; Ver= Vernacular; B.E.G.= Bahr El Ghazal; E. Equat= Eastern Equatoria, and, W. Equat= Western Equatoria.

The strong feeling that was found to exist against the use of Arabic as a language of instruction was partly explained because officials saw the policy as imposition from above. According to one provincial official, "the southern delegates who signed the agreement with the central government in Addis Ababa, should have consulted the southern Sudanese people before agreeing the terms for peace... and had that been done, no southerner would have agreed that educational policy be decided from the centre".

The provinces bordering north Sudan (B.E.G and Upper Nile) have most of their schools teaching in Arabic. However, Wau, the study area, is a district of Bahr El Ghazal and no
evidence was found to suggest that the reason for many of the schools there teaching in Arabic was because of any active central government involvement. The reason was more because that the influence of Arabic in those areas was greater than in the other provinces. It is interesting to note from table 4, for example, that the number of Arabic schools decreases according to the distance from the border area (123, 87 and 25 for Upper Nile, Jonglei and Eastern Equatoria respectively, and; 92, 16, and 7 for B.E.G, Lakes and Western Equatoria respectively). The availability of more English schools in the southern-most provinces could also be because during the long conflict before the Addis Ababa agreement much of the population from those areas took refuge in the neighbouring East African countries (Kenya and Uganda) where English was the medium of instruction in schools.

Whatever the differences were between the provinces, there were convincing arguments in favour of Arabic as a language of instruction in primary schools for the whole country had the central ministry of education actively promoted its use. The first was that, if students from non-Arabic speaking areas were to effectively compete at higher levels of education, it was to their advantage to take the challenge of learning Arabic at an earlier stage. The issue of language was a serious problem in the development of education in the South, the setting and marking of school examinations being the responsibility of the Central Ministry of Education (see Johnson, 1986). The second point, and an even stronger
argument for the use of Arabic considering the poor economic situation, was that the Sudan could not afford to promote vernaculars on account of the sheer extent of ethnic diversity.

The problem with the implementation of central policies can further be explained. Of the thirteen education officials interviewed at the provincial level, it was found that none had ever seen or even heard of the central government's Education Sector Review, 1977. This is the document which sets out both the government's educational philosophy and the guidelines for achieving it. The 1977 Education Sector Review was based on thorough studies by pedagogic experts and when, in the process of this research the provincial authorities were shown a copy, they confided that it would not have been of much use to them anyway even if they had acquired a copy. The reason for this was that few officials had the opportunity to develop their reading and comprehension skills and they therefore would have found it difficult to extract the main information from a lengthy and "expertly-written" document. Their expressed preference was for an easily readable and understandable document.

At the central and regional levels of the education administrative hierarchy, no mechanism was found to exist for effective problem diagnosis and monitoring. The planning capacity at each level was very weak, uncoordinated and functionally preoccupied with the production of annual
quantitative statistical data which, by themselves, were not able to explain existing problems. There was no system for gathering qualitative information from schools in the Sudan as a whole and hence knowledge remained fragmented and very localised.

Relationships, Control and Responsibilities

Norris (1984) makes a useful observation with regards to the eagerness that existed in South Sudan following the 1981 Local Government Act.

Lack of realism arises in the immediate expectations of the structure, the haste for decentralisation of services, and assumptions concerning implementation that seem to ignore the hard facts with which local government has come to terms...The widespread assumption that Area Councils are fully prepared by strength of the legislation alone, are ready made to bear the burdens passed on by Regional Governments, even perceived to be capable of taking on the role of some external agencies in the relatively near future, gives cause for serious concern. Some Councils seem innocent of their own limitations, accepting without question responsibilities with serious implications.

Some councils might have been innocently accepting responsibility without questioning but there were several who warned of the impending problems. In a council chairmen seminar organised by the regional ministry of decentralisation, it is recorded that several of them asked "if it would be possible for the Area Councils to sustain the burden of education, especially in view of the poor state of so many schools" (Regional Ministry of Decentralisation Affairs, 1982:41). At the same seminar, the Council Chairmen also raised concerns about their capacity "to maintain the
Health Care Centres, and get drugs for dressing stations, especially in view of the need for foreign exchange to buy drugs". These concerns were not heeded by the Regional Ministry of Decentralisation, and the Area Councils were still expected to implement the full provisions of the 1981 Act, as can be seen throughout the discussion of this case study.

The division of the provinces into three or four Area Councils by the 1981 Act had an impact on the distribution of resources (7.5). The newly created Area education offices, for example, had to share the personnel of the former provincial Education authority between them. The provinces themselves did not have an adequate number of personnel and the shortage problem of the newly created Area Councils had, therefore, to be resolved by promoting unqualified staff to new positions.

Of the five people occupying "senior" positions in the Wau Area education administration, for example, only the Area Education Officer had some experience in management by virtue of his long service at the provincial education office as assistant commissioner. The remaining were teachers elevated to fill the newly created posts. The following table shows the number of personnel planned for the Wau Area education office and the actual number of staff in employment in the 1982/83 fiscal year.

Table 7.5 below gives some indication of the problem the management of education at the Area level was faced with. Of the sixteen posts planned, only seven posts were occupied and
five of those had no previous training or experience in a similar job. But this alone does not tell the whole story. Nearly a year and a half after the declaration of the 1981 Act, the Area Education Officer had no office space at the Wau Area Council headquarters and, on his own admission, he had not been able to undertake his responsibilities. The remaining Area education administrative staff were all sharing one office under cramped conditions.

Table 7.5: Education Administrative personnel of the Wau Area Council in 1982/83 FY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planned positions</th>
<th>Occupied</th>
<th>Unoccupied</th>
<th>experience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area Education officer</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Ed Officer</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wau Town Council Ed. officer</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant to above</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wau Rural Council Ed Officer</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant to above</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area Adult Ed Officers</td>
<td>x(2)</td>
<td>x(2)</td>
<td>x(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistants to above</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head Staff Clerk</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Clerk</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerk</td>
<td>x(2)</td>
<td>x(1)</td>
<td>x(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strore Keeper</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Book Keeper</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: numbers in parenthesis show the number of employees under that category.

The Area education administration had no budget of its own to manage and, because of the general lack of resources, no inspections of schools were being done (Wau Town council state of education report, 1982/83). The Wau rural and Wau urban education officers confirmed that, because of lack of transportation, they had not been able to conduct inspections.
of schools. The Wau urban education officer, for example, asked that provision be made in the budget for a bicycle for inspection purposes, the schools under his responsibility being in close proximity; he did not get it.

By the time the research survey upon which this study is based was conducted, two years after the declaration of the 1981 Act, the Area council authorities had not set up an education sub-committee to oversee the management of education. The employment, assignment and transfer of teachers, was still being handled by the provincial director of education. The Area Authorities' sole educational responsibility was the payment of teacher's salaries, the money for which came to them from the region at irregular intervals.

A UNESCO discussion paper on community participation in education makes a useful observation concerning the need for support to local leadership:

> Decentralisation to local leadership is an essential prerequisite for effective community participation. ...[but] the administration must actively support this and, if it does not do so, little will be accomplished (UNESCO, N.S. 102, 1982).

The lack of support from higher authorities for the policy of decentralisation in Wau Area Council was such that the Area education officer complained of the "power without substance" that was accorded to him. The Wau Area education officer was so worried about the state of decentralised education that he asked "how anybody could not have thought through that there
was no money to run the system"? This sentiment was clearly expressed by the executive officer of Wau Area council in a paper he presented at a seminar on decentralisation held in Wau town:

In any system no official can be made accountable to any higher authority, by mere delegation of responsibility and assignment of task, without handing over the required resources to enable the person in question to achieve that particular target. This is the case with us who have been seconded to these newly created Area Councils without or with limited resources (Kuckon, 1985:45).

During a discussion period at the same seminar, the Director General of Services (7.6) was quoted as saying that "the consequences of the 1981 Act had been detrimental to the provision of services, and that the Act was incompatible with the social values and political structure in the Southern Regions". He was particularly critical of considerable numbers of absentee Councillors. The extent of power that the 1981 Act accorded to the local governments was felt by the majority of the Wau Area education officials to be unrealistic given the lack of trained personnel and the overall level of poverty prevalent in the Area. An assessment made by the director of administration and local government of the ministry of regional affairs and administration, Bahr El Ghazal Region, concerning the mechanism of administration following the 1981 Act was of great interest in this case:

...the majority of the councillors are illiterate and cannot cope with the demands of modernisation and change. Consequently they tend to bog the administration down with petty problems that they may not have relationship with their roles as Councillors. (Dot, 1985:22).
Wau Area Council's administrative problems were not only with its councillors but also with its technical officers. An account by the Executive Officer of Wau Area in the above mentioned seminar paper described the lack of responsibility by the technical officers to the council authorities. In it, he said:

...some technical officers care less of the contents of the 1981 Act. The technical officers identify themselves with their ministries and, more often than not, they tend to ignore that the Office of the Chief Executive Officer is responsible for them financially and administratively" (Kuckon, 1985:47).

As far as many of the Education officers interviewed were concerned, their position was that they should not be expected "to feel obliged", as one of them put it, as long as they do not get their salaries regularly,. The assistant director of education who participated during the research period of this study as a counterpart representing the department of education, put it more succinctly when he said: "It is not whether the technical officers identify themselves with this or with that body which is the issue, it is in fact whether any body has any moral duty left in him to continue working under the current situation"

Financial and Material Resources

Wau Area Council was largely dependent on grants-in-aid from the regional government for its budgeted expenditure. According to the Area Executive officer, grants-in-aid amounted to 85% of the total revenue in 1981/82 fiscal year. Threequarters of the total resource of the Area Council was
spent on Chapter I (salaries and wages) in the 1981/82 FY, the remaining one quarter being spent on services (fuel, transport costs etc). No funds were available for Chapter III, which was development expenditure.

In a joint paper presented at a Juba conference on decentralisation, two local government inspectors from Wau Area Council were clear about the problems facing education:

After more than one year of exercising powers transferred to them by the Local Government Act, 1981, the reports coming from all the Area Councils are that there has never been any development plan executed because of lack of funds...In addition to that, most of the Area Councils have not received their grants-in-aid for many months, because of cash shortages from the Regional Ministry of Finances. This has greatly affected Primary and Intermediate schools. Since the salaries are not paid to the teachers, education is also being imparted irregularly to the pupils. If this situation continues for long then education under the Area Councils will be in great danger (Nyuol and Bol: 1984:53).

However, Nyuol and Bol might not have realised that education had already reached a critical stage by then as the following analysis will further illustrate.

The scarcity of primary school teaching materials in Wau Area Council was found to be a serious problem. Except for some materials that were supplied by an aid agency (UNICEF), there had been no other source for many years. As one Council Education Officer recalled, the last time schools in Wau Area council had received a provision of textbooks was in 1974.
It was not surprising, therefore, that many teachers attributed the decline in the standard of education to the lack of teaching materials. As one teacher expressed: "It is alright to teach under a mango tree but only when you have the materials to teach your students with". One of the enumerators who participated in the field survey of this study also remarked about his observation in a report:

All the schools in the province have serious shortage of teaching materials. Wherever I went, teachers cried for help. The attitude of many teachers is that there is nothing they can do to improve the standard of education without text books...without the presence of these basic tools, teachers are not able to do their job effectively (Bol, 1983).

No school in Wau Area council was found to be keeping a daily attendance record of students because they lacked the attendance ledger book. There was a general lack, non-existence was perhaps more correct, of all items and teaching aids in all the schools. It was not unexpected, therefore, that in answer to the question of what main problems face schools, the following were given in descending order of priority:

1. Lack of teaching materials
2. Lack of school facilities
3. Problem with feeding programmes for students (7.7).

**Impact on School Environment**

**School Management:** The most detrimental factor in the decline of the educational system in Wau Area Council was perhaps the
management of the schools. The headteachers had no training in administration whatsoever and promotion to the post of headmaster was normally on the basis of long service alone rather than ability. The average length of service in teaching of all headmasters in Wau Area was just over 20 years and that of teachers 7 years. By level of education, only 20% of all headmasters in Wau Area had completed senior secondary education, 50% had only Junior Secondary School qualification and the remaining 20% had only completed primary level education.

A measure of the ineffectiveness observed in the school management system was that the headmasters did not exercise authority over their teachers. Reprimanding for wrong doing or, for that matter, reporting for good work, was not the norm. In Wau Town Council, out of the 147 teachers in employment in the 1982/83 academic year, only 111 teachers were physically present during the field survey. That is, nearly a quarter of the teachers were not on duty. The situation was even more alarming in Wau Rural Council where only 50% of the teachers were on duty, 91 out of 180. The two main reasons that were given for this absenteeism were sick leave and attending the funerals of relations. A typical example observed by one of the enumerators in the field survey can be mentioned:

It is really a pity to get a school with the headmaster and his assistant sick-listed for a number of months. This encouraged the other masters to absent themselves too - as I got only two masters
in the school" (Anthony Arop, about Mayo school).

The ratio of absenteeism per teacher in Wau Area council for the academic year 1982/83 is shown in table 7.6 below. A marked difference was found in teacher absenteeism between those in Wau town council and those in Wau rural council, 0.27 and a staggeringly high ratio of 0.59 respectively. In other words, on average, a teacher in Wau Town Council only worked for 73% of the working days in the 1982/83 academic year and a teacher in Wau Rural Rural Council for only 41%.

Table 7.6: Teacher absenteeism in Wau Area Council

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local Council</th>
<th>Total No. of teachers</th>
<th>Working days in academic year</th>
<th>Total teacher working day</th>
<th>Total working days absent</th>
<th>Ratio of absenteeis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>(c)=(a)x(b)</td>
<td>(d)</td>
<td>(d) - (c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V.T.</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>29,400</td>
<td>7,917</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V.R.</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>36,000</td>
<td>21,215</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V.A.</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>65,400</td>
<td>29,132</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: C = Council; V.T. = Wau Town; V.R. = Wau Rural; V.A. = Wau Area.

Examples of administrative ineffectiveness and managerial malpractice were something of which there was no shortage in Wau Area council. Officially, El Genina school in Wau town council had three separate schools, boys, girls and evening schools with the full allocation of teaching staff for each.
However, there was only one school functioning, co-education and in a single shift. The teachers for the evening and girls schools were found not to be working for "lack of teaching space" in the El-Genina school. But El Genina school is in Wau town, the administrative centre, which illustrates how the administrative machine was not coping with "the complexity of the educational enterprise" (see World Bank, 1980:53).

Thus, the educational problems of Wau Area Council may not be attributed solely to lack of finances as was widely believed. The mismanagement of the existing resources was also contributing to the problem. The wasteful use of scarce resources in Wau Rural Council can be illustrated by the way the schools were run. As shown in table 7.7 below, the teacher/class and student/teacher ratios in the schools both show unacceptable levels by any standard.

Table 7.7: Teacher/Class and Student/Teacher Ratios in Wau Area Council Primary Schools in 1982/83

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Council</th>
<th>Teacher/Class Ratio</th>
<th>Student/Teacher Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wau Rural</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wau Town</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>37.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wau Area</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>24.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

But with such generous teacher/class and student/teacher ratios, particularly in Wau Rural Council, a high educational standard would have been expected which was not found to be
the case as will be discussed below.

Finally, a sign of the mismanagement crisis was the lack of discipline observed among teachers during the survey. On a number of occasions, the writer came across teachers behaving in a manner not compatible with their responsibility, especially relating to alcohol abuse during working hours. When one head teacher was asked if he was to take action against an offending teacher, his answer was "how can I discipline a hungry man", a reference to the delay in salary payment.

**Teaching and non-teaching staff:** The survey analysis of primary schools in Wau Area Council provides some significant insight into their profile (see table 7.8 below). Nearly 40% of the teachers in Wau Rural Council and 24.5% in Wau Town were untrained. The urban bias in the number of trained teachers was therefore very clear. Many of those in the untrained category were newly recruited teachers with no experience. But the idea of providing statistics concerning teachers on a trained and untrained basis had no relevance whatsoever. A UNICEF consultancy study on training teachers in south Sudan gives a grim picture of the standards of the existing teaching institutes (Mwajombe abd Kinunda, 1981). Beset by the kind of problems general education was faced with, the students who come out from the teaching institute themselves were not better equipped than those who qualified.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Wau Area</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Wau Town</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age Range</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in years</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 - 20</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 - 30</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 - 40</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 - 50</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 - 60</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61+</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>180</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Service</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in years</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 - 10</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>72.8</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>71.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>11 - 20</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>21 - 30</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>14.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>31 - 40</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40+</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>180</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sex</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>91.87</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8.13</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>51.0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>180</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Marital Status</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>180</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Training</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trained</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>60.6</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>75.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Untrained</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>180</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Qualification</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.S.L.C.</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J.S.L.C.</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.S.L.C.</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>180</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Teacher’s residence</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-local</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>61.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>180</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* P.S.L.C. = Primary school leaving certificate
  J.S.L.C. = Junior school leaving certificate
  S.S.L.C. = Senior school leaving certificate
from academic schools. In any case, with no books to teach with, no libraries to refer to etc. the indications were that the teachers in primary schools, whatever their background, were lapsing into semi-literacy.

In Wau Rural Council, 27% of the teachers had been employed since the formation of the Area Council. As mentioned earlier, the Area Council had not taken responsibility with regards to employment and distribution of teachers. As this function continued to be in the hands of the provincial education authorities, the Council Authorities had to adjust their budget constantly to accommodate payment of salaries.

It was interesting to find that about 30% of the teachers in Wau Rural Council were teaching in the locality they originally come from although, as mentioned earlier, this was found to have no advantage to the school system.

Only 15 of 180 teachers (8.3%) in Wau Rural Council were female. The picture is different in Wau town where just over half (nearly 51%) were female.

The investigative survey also included qualitative questions to find out what the teachers regarded as the main problems facing them. The following answers emerged in order of their importance:
1. Delay of salary payment
2. Lack of means of transportation
3. Accommodation
4. Lack of market at work place

As already discussed, there was a problem meeting regular salary payments in schools which became a pretext for many to abandon their work places. However, even when salaries eventually came, many teachers were still reluctant to go to their centres, giving various reasons. One of the enumerators' observations in Liethnom school was typical of the situation with staff absenteeism in schools:

This school only has two classes but has 5 teachers and 7 labourers allocated to it. Most of the teachers never reported and likewise the labourers are not there. Frankly, these 12 employees are redundantly paid which is complete waste of national resources (Bol, commenting about Liethnom school).

Every school in Wau Area had a number of non-teaching staff (average number being 7) employed for a variety of reasons - as watchmen, messengers, labourers, cooks etc. The rate of absenteeism among the non-teaching staff was even worse than that of the teachers. Out of the 163 non-teaching staff in employment in Wau rural schools, only 23 of them (14%) were physically present at their places of duty during the survey. Given the economic situation of the Area Council and the unavailability of sufficient administrative staff, as mentioned earlier, the maintenance of the large number of teachers could be questioned.
Lack of means of transportation was the second main reason for teacher's absenteeism. It was true that this was a problem but the main cause was the endless transfers of teachers. When teachers were "officially" transferred or when new ones were employed, the general expectation was that means of transportation should be made available to them. However long it took until that was done, it was one of those unwritten laws that they would continue receiving their salaries.

Lack of accommodation was considered by teachers as one of the main problems for two reasons. The complaints of the urban teachers were mainly because of the house rent payments they had to meet. On average, a teacher was paying about one fourth of his/her salary per month in Wau town and, building ones own house was becoming out of a teacher's reach.

To understand the complaints of accommodation in rural schools, the nature of the traditional hut, mostly provided by the community, needs to be appreciated. More than other types of buildings, the traditional hut is susceptible to rapid deterioration if it is not continuously inhabited (Woldemichael, 1980). As many of the teachers were absent from their work place for long periods, they would find the huts needing immediate maintenance or totally uninhabitable.

The fourth point, lack of a market at work place, seemed to be a legitimate grievance. Indeed, some of the schools were far from any market centres. However, this was a reflection of
the overall development situation of the region and not one for which there was any solution in prospect.

No inspection, no proper school management and all the grievances the teachers had add up to a depressing impression of the school system in South Sudan. Some of the older teachers spoke of the old days with nostalgia when, as one teacher said, "the school used to be a centre of learning". As it was, there was nothing left in the school environment which would motivate teachers' effectiveness. A measure of this ineffectiveness was the state of the students, as will be shown below.

Effect on Students: The effect of all the problems with the educational system in Wau Area Council expressed itself with such indicators as the ratio of repeaters (those who fail end of year school tests and are allowed to repeat the year again) in classes, dropouts and examination results. Table 7.9 below shows the enrolment and repeaters by grade in Wau Rural primary schools. The average percentage rate of repeaters was 18.1% which indicates the poor quality of education given the fact that students' performance is related to the quality of education they receive. Girl students seemed to do better in schools than boys judged from the ratio of repeaters, that is, whilst the male/female ratio in enrolment was 2.8 (1811/643), the ratio in male female repeaters was 3.2 (337/107). The female student enrolment in Wau town schools was found to be much higher, at 42%, than in Wau rural schools.
but the rate of repeaters showed the same trend (Woldemichael, 1983).

Table 7.9: Enrolment and Repeaters by Grade in 24 Primary Schools in Wau Rural Council in 1982/83

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% of Repeaters by Grade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P1</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>625</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>21.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P2</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>527</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P3</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P4</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P5</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P6</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,811</td>
<td>643</td>
<td>2,454</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A further indicator of the wastage rate of the educational system in Wau Area Council was that of the 1833 students at primary grade one level in 1977/78 scholastic year only 658 of them completed grade 6 education in 1982/83, that is 65 percent of those who started dropped out. The student input/output ratio of 2.9 (1883/658) in Wau Area Council must rank among the highest in the world as a World Bank Study on 17 low income developing countries in 1975 showed the median of their student input/output ratio to be 1.98 (World Bank, 1980:30).

Table 7.10 below is constructed from examination results from two academic years, 1980/81 and 1982/83. As can be seen from the table, education in Wau Area Council worsened both in
quality and quantity in 1982/83. Quantitatively, the number of students who completed primary education in Wau Area Council dropped from 877 in 1980/81 to 658 in 1982/83 and qualitatively, the percentage drop from 45 to 37 of the students who passed the primary school leaving examination must be an indication of the decline in standard.

Table 7.10: Primary School Examination Results of 1980/81 and 1982/83

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Council</th>
<th>1980/81 Academic Year</th>
<th>1982/83 Academic Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sat</td>
<td>Passed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wau Rural</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wau Town</td>
<td>616</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wau Area</td>
<td>877</td>
<td>399</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The worsening situation in student enrolment since the 1981 decentralisation reforms can further be examined. The figures in table 7.11 below are self explanatory and show that student enrolment had been on the decline for several years and that the 1981 reform rather than improving it, in fact, exacerbated it.
Table 7.11: Total Student Enrolment by Year in Wau Area Councils.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Wau Rural</th>
<th>Wau Town</th>
<th>Wau Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1977/78</td>
<td>n.a</td>
<td>n.a</td>
<td>7,947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978/79</td>
<td>n.a</td>
<td>n.a</td>
<td>8,422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979/80</td>
<td>5,678</td>
<td>2,781</td>
<td>8,459</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980/81</td>
<td>5,907</td>
<td>2,990</td>
<td>8,897</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981/82</td>
<td>5,814</td>
<td>2,592</td>
<td>8,406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982/83</td>
<td>5,565</td>
<td>2,257</td>
<td>7,904</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Regional Ministry of Education and Guidance, from 1977/78 to 1980/81; the rest, from the school survey results.

According to the results of the third population census of 1983, the population of Bahr El Ghazal was increasing at a rate of 3.1% and, therefore, student enrolment as a percentage of school age population must have been declining at an alarming rate.

**Impact on Community Participation**

In south Sudan, performing village duties communally is a daily way of life and therefore a tradition. The heavy work of tilling the land, hunting expeditions, constructing houses, seasonal movements among the pastoralists, are all carried out communally. This tradition in communal work has in recent years extended to participation in the provision of educational facilities, schools and accommodation for teachers.

All the schools surveyed in Wau Area Council had parents' associations. The active involvement and awareness of the community in education was evident from the number of schools that were built (table 7.12 below) on a self-help basis in...
Wau Area Council.

Table 7.12: Responsibility for Building Schools in Wau Area Council.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School built by</th>
<th>Council Wau Rural</th>
<th></th>
<th>Council Wau Town</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>55.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid Agency</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>24</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>18</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From interviewing chiefs, community leaders and teachers, however, the impression received was that the communities' involvement and interest was losing its momentum. Two facts came to the forefront as the main causes:

1. The endless disruption in the function of schools had left both parents and students disenchanted, leading to loss of confidence in the public administration. One of the enumerators noted the following about a school he visited: "Teachers have kept away from the school and yet they receive their salaries... the community is eager to work but is discouraged by the teacher's bad performance and the role of the administrative staff" (Bol, commenting about Yiil-Ador School, Gogrial). About another school in a similar situation, the same enumerator wrote that: "the existence of a school of such nature causes serious damage to the communities' morale as well as the children to learn" (Bol, on Liethnom
2. The schools built by the communities on a self-help basis were built from locally available materials and because of lack of technical knowledge (7.2), fire accidents, termite attacks, etc., the communities had to construct the school buildings frequently. With the local materials getting scarcer every year the communities were getting weary of this endless exercise.

The decline in community participation was clear from the year of establishment of schools in Wau Area Council. No new school had been established for three years when the survey was conducted (table 7.13).

Table 7.13: Year of Establishment of Primary schools in Wau Area Council

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1910-1940</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941-1950</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951-1969</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-1970</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>26.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-1980</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>23.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-1983</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the two years following the declaration of the policy of further decentralisation in 1981, not only were no new schools established but maintenance work was not being done on the existing ones. As one sub-chief said on this issue "people have lost confidence of the school system for many years and
it will require some convincing action before the community could participate in school activities again" (sub-chief on Gettan school).

The finding of the year of establishment of schools in Wau Area Council was puzzling on one score. The South Sudan having been in a state of civil war for most of the period between 1951 and 1970, it was surprising that so many schools (38%) were built during this time. With only 10 schools established between 1971 and 1980, the expansion rate was much lower than expected especially considering that the target of the Regional Six Year Plan (1977/78-1982/83) was to establish 557 new schools in south Sudan. Roughly speaking, if the 557 schools were divided equally among the 25 Area Councils in the South, something like 20 new schools should have been established during the Plan period in Wau Area Council.

Conclusion and Discussion

It would be an understatement to say that primary education in Wau Area Council was in a poor state. It was, in fact, on the brink of collapse. The school as a teaching centre was failing to interest and inspire students and parents were losing faith in the school system as they were not getting any economic reward by keeping their children there; the high dropout and repeater rates were factual evidence of that.

The question this chapter has addressed was the role of the policy of decentralisation in the problems exposed by the
research findings. In the first part of the chapter, the historical development of education was analysed. The impressive progress of education for the first few years of the Nimeiri Regime was noted. The progress that was achieved during this period, far from being coincidental can be related to three main features that created an environment conducive to progress. Firstly, this was the period when the Nimeiri regime declared its commitment to unity with diversity and, to achieve this, Nimeri's government took the decisive action, as discussed in chapter three, of dismantling the sectarian political parties which were, through their policies of assimilation, the cause of the continuation of the north-south conflict. The removal of the divisive political systems had the effect of creating a relative political stability in the Sudan. Secondly, the unit of local government during this period of achievement was the province. Given the nature of Sudan's social and economic underdevelopment, there was a realisation at the time that the country simply did not have the resources to cater for numerous district councils. Thirdly, and more crucially, much like the Chinese case discussed in chapter two, the central government was committed and effective enough to see through the implementation of its policies.

The case study also shows that from 1977/78 onwards, the reversal of principles on the part of the central government concerning decentralisation had a direct and negative effect on educational development. Ironically, 1977/78 was the start
of the Six Year Development Plan and the year when President Nimeiri declared his commitment to further decentralisation, producing a report entitled: "Study on consolidation of decentralisation". In effect, the 1981 Act was therefore a formalisation of the policy of decentralisation which was enshrined in the Six Year Development Plan. But why did the development of education and all the other economic indicators during this period show a decline in progress? Again, this is related to the political developments at the centre. Firstly, the declaration of national reconciliation in 1977, by which the sectarian parties were invited to participate in the political life of the country, diverted the government's attention from concentration on nation building to the game of political manoeuvring for survival. Secondly, with the sectarian parties well entrenched in the political system of the country, Nimeiri's commitment to unity with diversity was on the decline. Thirdly, decentralisation policies during this period were, as already described, for political ends rather than for developmental realities. For example, in south Sudan, six local authorities during the period of relative achievement were divided into twenty five new local authorities following the 1981 Act. It will be recalled from the discussion in chapter four that the Marshall report had warned of the impending problems with whole-sale decentralisation policies that do not match local capability. Clearly, Wau had neither the resources nor the capability to cope with the powers imposed on it. The case study is therefore an illustration that decentralisation policies must
be commensurate with the capacity and the general availability of resources both nationally and locally, in fact in line with what Marshall had recommended for the Sudan before independence in 1949.

The important point that became clear from the case study is that the central government must be every bit as involved in a decentralised system of administration. In other words, decentralisation should not mean the negation of responsibility by the centre. At all times, decentralisation policies will only succeed with commitment from the centre. Conversely, lack of central commitment can only lead to the kind of spectacular collapse the school system experienced in Wau Area Council.
PART IV

BY WAY OF CONCLUSION:
TOWARDS AN UNDERSTANDING
OF DECENTRALISATION FOR
NATIONAL INTEGRATION AND
DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION
CHAPTER 8

APPROACHES TOWARDS REALISM IN THE SUDAN

Introduction
The problems of political instability in the Sudan, as discussed in chapter three, have been portrayed as reflections of the ethnic differences between the Arabised and Muslim North and the African and Christian South. More often than not, government policies have magnified these differences as diversity was considered incompatible with national integration. Assimilation and cultural homogenisation were thus looked upon as desirable and actions taken to that effect. However, what such policies have achieved has been the intensification of the conflict and to drive the Sudan into the depths of ungovernability. An exception to this trend was the brief period during the Nimeiri regime when unity through diversity was taken as a guiding principle, and decentralisation as a mechanism for achieving it.

The experience of the Sudan offers an interesting insight into the creation of two opposite environments, resulting, on the one hand, in the intensification of ethnic conflict and, on the other, its resolution. This chapter will thus appraise, using the information developed in the preceding chapters, the implications of ethnic management policies in the Sudan and draw lessons of experience from them.
In the first place, it is imperative that the obstacles that have obstructed the search for peace and stability in the Sudan are clearly recognised. The inability of the Sudanese state to manage ethnic conflicts, it will be argued, has been the main cause for the political instability that has plagued the country since independence. It will further be argued that national integration cannot be achieved in the Sudan without a fundamental shake up of the system of governance in which all ethnoregional groups have a part to play.

CAUSAL FACTORS OF STATE-ETHNIC CONFLICT

State Weakness

The Sudanese state has shown all, and to a large degree, the characteristics of softness that most African states portray (as discussed in chapter two, pp. 77-80). Since the Sudan became independent in January 1956, power has been in the hands of the economically and politically dominant elites who come from the central part of the country, mainly from the provinces of Khartoum, Kordofan, White Nile and Gezira. Although Arabism in the Sudan is a myth rather than a reality, the Arabic language and the Islamic religion have become the hallmarks of ethnic identification of the political elites. Apart from the brief period during the Nimeiri regime mentioned above, Arabic and Islam have been the only accepted state language and religion.

The softness of the Sudan state is particularly apparent in
its inability to realise the internal and external repercussions of its policies. Internally, its inability to advance the collective interests of all has had the effect of generating resentment and discontent among the impacted ethnic groups. The state sponsored discriminatory policies of Islamisation, for example, had the effect of widening the gap of misunderstanding in the north-south relationship. Externally, policies like Islamisation and the application of the Sharia penal code on non-muslim groups have tarnished the image of the State. On both counts it is the state that has been suffering the consequences; internally, from the resultant escalation of the conflict and, externally, from diplomatic isolation by the international community. The insensitivity of the Sudan to the principles of equal justice and protection has also had the effect of generating sympathy for the cause of the south.

A major problem in Sudan's ethnic relations is the way the affairs of the state have been dictated by the ruling elites. The perceived cultural superiority of the ruling elites is not only protected by state laws but also enforced on others and used as a means of subordination or neutralisation of cultural diversity. In pursuit of their assimilation policies, the ruling elites have mostly taken an uncompromising "come hell or high water" position even when the effects seemed to threaten state coherence. It was the reaction to assimilation policies which lead to the birth of the Anya-Nya movement in the south (see chapter three, pp. 1438-150).
How the north-south conflict might eventually be concluded is difficult to predict but, as some groups in the south have already started claiming, the issue of self-determination is more likely to feature on the agenda when the next round of negotiations for peace start (a splinter group of the SPLA/APLM is now demanding separation of southern Sudan). That is, whilst regional autonomy was an accepted formula for peace in 1972, it is probable that the cost of peace for the state next time round will be even greater concession to the demands of the south.

**Southern Weakness**

The reason the principle of self-determination has not featured more prominently as a claim by the south is related to the ethnic fragmentation that exists within the south itself. In spite of the shared historical experiences among the various ethnic groups in south Sudan, no clear and unified national identity could be said to have ever developed. The seventeen years of civil war before the Addis Ababa peace accord did bring the Southerners closer to fight a common enemy, but still, the Anya-Nya movement was more of a military organisation and did not have a developed political expression which could unite the various ethnic groups in the region. The lack of political cohesion in the south (as discussed in chapter three, pp. 137-139; and, in chapter six, pp. 243-253) has thus enabled the central ruling elites to wedge discord between the various conflicting groups and to apply divide and rule tactics. The south's political weakness has therefore
been an obstacle to national integration as a more politicised, united and assertive south would have defended its claims better and thus shortened the life of the conflict.

The South's weakness is of course related to its level of underdevelopment (discussed in chapter five, pp. 224-225). Given the social and economic deprivation of the south, it is to be expected that the struggle for survival has affected the development of a unified and strong regional-nationalist movement. The fact that the south has not given itself an appropriate name that could label it as a distinct identity is a measure of its weakness. This is not insignificant because people from that area still prefer to identify themselves by their tribal affinity. For example, one will say he/she is a Dinka or a Nuer but not the cumbersome name of "Southern Sudanese".

However, in spite of its political, social and economic underdevelopment, the south's resistance against the north has not only endured brutal repression but is increasing in strength. It is not impossible to imagine that in time the South's resistance will convert itself into a national aspiration and that a politicised and unified "pan-south Sudan" nationalist movement will emerge. As discussed in the case of the Oromo of Ethiopia in Chapter two, "power" speaks more than anything else in ethnic discourse and if the South manages to build its strength, the voice of its people is not going to be ignored.

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The Problems of Leadership

Many Sudanese writers (see Wakoson (1987); An-Naim, 1987; Khalid, 1987) have presented the north-south conflict in terms of differences of identities between Arab north and African south. The cultural assimilation drive by the north is viewed as having a religious objective for Islamising the south. Such a notion misses an important point by interpreting the conflict solely as a religious issue. As discussed in chapter two with regard to Amharisation in Ethiopia, which was a mechanism of consolidating and protecting the power base and wealth of the ruling class, acculturation in the Sudan has had the same purpose. To relate the north-south conflict just to cultural differences, therefore, underestimates the salience of competing interests and the defensive hostility by the ruling elites to protect their positions of privilege.

Take for instance the oil find within the borders of south Sudan discussed in chapter six (p. 248). The attempt made by the Nimeiri regime to incorporate the "oil lands" into the north in 1980 indicates the policies primacy of interests. The border issue and the question of how future oil wealth was to be shared thus became a major source of conflict between the Nimeiri regime and the Southern regional government. One explanation why Nimeiri made a complete reversal of the regionalisation policy as concluded by the peace agreement in Addis Ababa and his subsequent declaration of Islam as the state religion in 1983 was to revert to the old ways of preserving the hegemonic right of the ruling elite.
To reiterate, acculturation was believed to promote unity and hence offer a better chance for the hegemonic continuity of the ruling elites. The bottom line of the north-south conflict has therefore more to do with competition over the allocation of power and the control of resources than that of cultural differences. In the Sudan and elsewhere, it may not be the ethnic cultural differences that determine the viability of a nation but how the competing groups within it can agree to share power and resources equitably.

Power-sharing as an integrative factor in ethnic relations has not been a favoured formula in Sudanese politics. The position of the National Islamic Front (NIF), a conservative Islamic fundamentalist party whose power base has considerably increased since Nimeiri entered into some sort of a pact with it in 1980, can be mentioned as an example. In its 1987 Charter, a manifesto entitled "Sudan Charter: National Unity and diversity", an article on "the sharing of power" states that regionalisation is to be based "on the principle of assigning to regional authorities the right of legislative initiative and executive autonomy with respect to certain matters, without restraining the central authority from legislating on the same matters with absolute authority that overrides regional law" (emphasis added). The NIF's policy by dictation rather than accommodation aims to deny regions the right of power sharing in the national political structure. As far as the south is concerned, it has already rejected
President Nimeiri's similar policies in 1983, and a Charter which advocates the maintenance of hegemonic power at the centre cannot be expected to be an acceptable proposition.

It is useful to ask here why it is that the northern political elites continue to advocate disintegrative rather than integrative policies; and how it is that a state that claims to have legitimate control over an area and the people that live in it can hope to maintain its hold by following policies so abhorrent to those to whom they are applied. Does the theory of the lust for the preservation of hegemonic interest, through the idea that unity is achievable by acculturation, explain the situation when its effect seems to be bitter resistance and even the possibility of disintegration, that is, the opposite of what is intended. In the Sudan, the explanation for the obsession with acculturation may lie in the inability of the political elites to separate political loyalties from cultural loyalties given the intertwining of these two as discussed in chapter three. Even so, to have had any chance of success, then the policy of acculturation should have been based on the logic of winning the "hearts and minds" of those targeted. In the case of the southern Sudan, as the discussion in the previous chapters has shown, brutal repression and social and economic deprivation have not made being an integrated part of the Sudan apparent at all attractive.

If the ideal of unity and diversity, that is, political unity
and cultural diversity cannot find a place in the Sudan, it is clear that national integration will not be possible to achieve without such drastic and repugnant action as the wholesale eradication of the southern population. As this cannot be a viable proposition in the modern world, the Sudan's only hope for unity is a respect for diversity. Here, there is no better example than the Sudan's own experience both with integrative and the disintegrative processes of decentralisation during the Nimeiri period.

LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE: THE NIMEIRI YEARS

THE YEARS OF HOPE

An exception to the turbulent history of north-south relations was the brief period that followed the Addis Ababa peace Accord when the country as a whole enjoyed relative political stability and created favourable conditions for the enhancement of national unity. The determining factor was the availability at the time of a political leadership that came to realise the futility of the past policies. The Addis Ababa agreement was a negation of the assumption that unity depended on assimilation. As discussed in detail in the preceding chapters, President Nimeiri not only preached the ideals of unity and diversity but he also had the will to deliver.

Nimeiri consistently argued during this period that his government's actions were influenced by two overriding
concerns: "a scientific approach to problems and the sense of national responsibility" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sudan, 1973:125). Nimeiri needed both of these essentials, firstly, to contain the northern politicians and their supporters who were working to frustrate the ongoing regionalisation process and, secondly, to convince the south of his sincerity about peace. In the case of his northern opponents, as mentioned earlier, Nimeiri had no other option but to deal with them in a ruthless manner. As a northerner himself and an army colonel who served in the south, convincing the southerners was not that easy. However, true to his convictions, Nimeiri undertook an extensive public relations campaign to "sell" the Addis Ababa agreement and such symbolic gestures as attending mass in Juba cathedral were important exercises. President Nimeiri's gesture, however symbolic, must have left, as Khalid (1985:45) rightly commented, "an indelible mark on the minds of the worshippers". In defiance of his critics, Nimeiri even went as far as declaring the date the Addis Ababa agreement was signed to be a national holiday.

However, agreements by themselves are only statements of intent and what brought the two halves together was the political commitment to make them work. If the Sudan before Nimeiri was a soft state, the same Sudan during the first phase (1969-1977) of the Nimeiri Regime may be called anything but soft. The strength of the state can be shown not only in the way it reformed local administration in the whole country but, perhaps even more impressively, in the ability it showed
in guiding implementation. For the first time since independence, Nimeiri came to appreciate that the size of the country, ethnic diversity and the social and economic inequality between regions could only be tackled by decentralising commensurate powers. At the same time, he was aware of the need for central control if those differences were not to lead to the break up of the country.

The administrative revolution that was declared in 1971 (the 1971 Act) was envisaged to fulfil two major objectives. The first was to lay the basis for effective local government. In the philosophy of the Nimeiri regime, politics and administration were regarded as inseparable elements for the process of development and nation-building. The second objective of the Act was to break the power base of the traditionalist political parties by allowing only members of the Sudan Socialist Union or individuals who held certificates of "non-objection" candidature for council elections. Whether intentionally or coincidentally, the local government structure devised by the 1971 Act was similar to that of China discussed in chapter two. As in China, the 1971 Act was not solely about local government administration but also about the development of popular participation which was intended to serve as an instrument for the execution of revolutionary programmes. Again as in China, the Sudan Socialist Union (SSU) was not only a party for political mobilisation but was also a mechanism for supervising the achievement of targets. In addition, the SSU had a programme for augmenting local
efforts in organising self-help groups through which the potential of the rural population could be exploited to improve living standards. All in all, the Nimeiri regime during this time was a government of action.

The Nimeiri regime's achievements during the years of hope were quite remarkable. To start with, the country had never in its independent history enjoyed the kind of peace and tranquillity that existed during the years of hope, not only in the south but in the north as well. With peace reigning in the Sudan, the Nimeiri regime was able to turn its attention to long term national development programmes. A measure of the Nimeiri regime's "non-softness" was that progress indicators of the time show that impressive achievements were registered by every department. For example, the Sudan became one of the very few African States to produce food in excess of its own needs. Another impressive achievement of the period, as discussed in detail in the preceding chapter, was the great expansion that took place in primary education.

Perhaps the best available information on the probable reason for the progress the country made during the years of hope is the current expenditure. Remarkably, defence and security expenditure fell from 48 Million Sudanese Pounds in the 1970/71 FY to 42 million pounds in the 1974/75 FY (Government of Sudan, The Six Year Plan, 1977/78-1982/83, Vol. 1, 1977:12). In contrast, and, it cannot be doubted, as a result
of the peace dividend, there were substantial increases in social and economic services and in transfers to local authorities. As mentioned in chapter one, finance is one of the areas where central governments exercise control over local authorities and the substantial increase in the central government contributions over the same period (from 17 Million in 1970/71 FY to 47 Million in 1974/75 FY, in real prices) may be explained in terms of the transformation that had taken place in central and local government relations.

The Years of Gloom

During "the years of hope" in the Sudan, the south became self-governing and local governments were accorded substantial power by the 1971 Act but central power was by no means diminished. On the contrary, as the President had all the authority to make or break the powers of lower authorities, Nimeiri's actual power was much enhanced. So why did Nimeiri take the road of "national reconciliation" in 1977 that led to the undoing of his own achievements and eventually his downfall? One theory has it that national reconciliation was a ploy or a political trap which Nimeiri instigated to lure opposition politicians back to the country, to engage them in his own system of politics and by so doing eventually to diminish their importance. Another theory points to Nimeiri's long standing state of ill-health suggesting that it might have reduced his capacity to maintain the momentum he set himself. And yet another relates it to the oil find in the south and his desire to consolidate his power base in the
north as the Southern Regional government had become too assertive. Whatever the reasons were, the declaration of National Reconciliation, which was made without any consultation with the Southern Regional Government, was the beginning of the erosion of Nimeiri's political commitment to decentralisation.

In the post National Reconciliation period, Nimeiri appeared to become increasingly autocratic. His old ways of reaching decisions based on "scientific approaches" and his proclaimed overriding principle of putting "national interest first" took a different turn. His unconstitutional meddling in the internal affairs of the Southern Regional Government, the harbouring of the Muslim Brotherhood in his government, the decision to close down a number of the functional departments at the centre in the name of decentralisation, his attempt to tamper with the north-south borders and, finally, his division of the south and his declaration of Islam as a state religion were some of the decisions Nimeiri made that neither scientific rationality nor national interest had any influence over. Thus, if the first phase represented the "years of hope", the second phase represented just the opposite - "the years of gloom".

The unfortunate aspect of the years of gloom was the erosion of the confidence building that had gone on in north-south relations during the years of hope. The southerners long standing fear that "a northerner will always remain a
northerner" was confirmed again. Nimeiri's return to Islam was the final blow to their relations and a reversal of the healing process that preceded it. North-South relations thus returned back to where they were before he came to power with acculturation very much in the fore as a government policy for the maintenance of unity.

During the years of gloom, all the characteristics of state softness emerged and were in place in no time. The government lost the political will to govern and decentralisation became merely a way of enhancing the presidential system. The knock-on effect of the situation on the fortunes of the state was as dramatic a down-turn as was the up turn during the years of hope. As the case study in the previous chapter has shown, the clearest indication of the failure of decentralisation in the second phase of Nimeiri's rule was the decline in the provision of the services for which the local governments were responsible. The impressive development in the first phase is in sharp contrast with the downward dive of educational development in the second phase. The trend was the same in all sectors and, unlike during the years of hope, the economy during the years of gloom registered a negative growth rate, turning the high hopes of earlier years into an economic nightmare.

In all the reorganizations that were made during the years of gloom, it was always declared that the purpose of decentralisation was to give more power to the people and to
achieve participation and democratisation. But, as Mansour Khalid (1985:207) revealed, from his inside knowledge as a former senior Minister, Nimeiri had a hidden agenda: "His concern, apart from widening the domain of patronage, was basically to take the responsibility of the collapse of services off his back. Another concern was to destroy central government's authority, that is, the authority of the Ministers around him. Nimeiri never wasted an opportunity to tell his ministers that the days of empire builders were numbered. There should only be one empire and one emperor". This happened, as mentioned in chapter 3, when Nimeiri abolished central Ministries and declared their responsibilities transferred down to the provinces in 1978. By the same declaration Nimeiri was made patron of Local Government.

When the aim of decentralisation became holding onto power, the effect on the performance of the local councils was quite dramatic. With no effective central control, no additional finances to support the increasing bureaucracies created by further decentralisation reforms, and a declining economy, the result was the sorry state of which the educational development discussed in the previous chapter, was an example.

CONCLUDING REMARKS:
THE CHOICES FOR THE SUDAN

The main issues raised in chapters one and two, that is, the political and developmental policy objectives of decentralisation, may now be assessed in terms of their
practical applicability for the situation in the Sudan. It was argued in chapter two that, in a multi-ethnic situation, a state’s ability to regulate power-relations between the various competing groups is crucial when the ultimate desire is national unity and political stability. As a policy objective for the management of state-ethnic relationship, the applicability of decentralisation in the Sudan was demonstrated by the success, albeit brief, of the autonomous regional government that operated in the south. On the other hand, the subsequent hegemonic choice was a miserable failure as the south’s sustained resistance to subjection demonstrated.

The Sudanese study also suggests that the decentralisation of power should not mean the containment of power such that the regions do not have a say in the central decision making mechanism. Whether in a single or multi-party system it is essential, if unity is the ultimate objective, that the subnational units should be equitably represented at the centre.

The experience of the Sudan with decentralisation as a mechanism for development administration proves two important points. Firstly, that decentralisation is only effective if it matches the local capacity and capability and, secondly, that, in a decentralised system, the centre’s ability to guide and control is an equal determinant in its success. In other words, decentralisation should not be a mechanism for escaping
responsibility or, more directly stated, should not be used as a mechanism passing the blame for policy failures to others.

The two contrasting periods during the time of President Nimeiri offer both a warning and a solution to the Sudan's ethnic conflict and the management of its local administration. Concerning the north-south conflict, it is imperative that the political elites appreciate the choices available to them, which are unity or the eventual breakup of the country. Taking the choice of unity will require no less than accepting the south as an equal partner. There are two aspects to this. The first is equity in power sharing which should be based on an appreciation of the concrete reality of the situation at any given time. For example, the current situation in the Sudan may dictate that any political solution within the framework of unity would have to be not merely a devolution of power to the south, such as that entailed in the Addis Ababa agreement, but the sharing of central power itself. It has been the lack of power sharing at the central level, for example, which has reinforced the Southerners' deep-rooted suspicion of northern politicians. The second aspect of equality is the acceptance of the south for what it is and what it stands for. There is no likelihood that the hegemonic choice of assimilation will ever work in the Sudan and it needs to be publicly discarded as unrealistic. There will obviously be many who would continue to espouse its values and no less than a revolution may be required to revive and build upon what Nimeiri had started in the years of hope.
The horrific civil strife which led to the disintegration of Somalia, the only homogeneous country in Africa – all its people being ethnic Somalis speaking the same language and professing the same religion – must be a lesson to those who espouse the idea of assimilation. In other words, assimilation is no guarantee of political stability.

The Sudan can refer to its own history when local administration next gets a chance for re-examination. At the risk of overemphasis, during the "years of hope", decentralisation policies were genuinely used not only as instruments for national unity but for development administration as well. There existed strong central political commitment to directing and controlling policy objectives set by the revolutionary government. The result was, as discussed earlier, quite spectacular. This period must teach a lesson for Sudan's future local administration. Any redesigning of local administration in the Sudan, however, must be based on a realistic assessment of its human and financial resources and consideration of how to address the inequalities between different areas. Here, how China has used decentralisation as a tool for development administration, as discussed in chapter two, could provide a lesson to many developing countries, not least the Sudan.

Finally, what can be done with the poor state of education in south Sudan? Donald Curtis (1988) has made a suggestion for improving the system. As he wrote in the context of south
Sudan: "...parents would contribute an agreed quantity of farm produce to the school for teachers in payment for schooling...This local contribution would have the effect of releasing council funds for education support". The idea would have merit had the sole problem been financial. But Curtis did not relate his recommendation to the political reality and its overall effect on the educational system. Given the enormity and the multi-faceted nature of the problem, the educational system as it is would not be able to cope with Curtis's idea of community involvement. There are some major policy issues, the resolution of which must precede Curtis's suggestion, even assuming the existence of a strong state with all the implications suggested above. These are:

1. An increase in educational administrative capacity at all levels so as to achieve an acceptable level of competency.

2. Discarding the policy of universal primary education which has been one of the causes for overstretching the meagre resources and, in the process, achieving neither quality nor quantity.

3. Limiting the number of schools in accordance with the available resources.

4. Promoting local participation, not only for exploitation of resources as Curtis suggested, but also for sharing of responsibility in the management of the schools.

These are not new ideas as such and the problem in the Sudan is not shortage of ideas. The Ministry of Education has elaborate policy documents (see Woldemichael:1983:7-8) full of many innovative sounding ideas. It is the eradication of
"state softness" and the availability of a conducive political climate which determines whether ideas can be translated into implementable practice.
CHAPTER 9

DECENTRALISATION: A REASSESSMENT

Introduction
The complexity of decentralisation as an area of enquiry and as a political and administrative practice has been raised in several instances in the previous chapters. The Sudan case has demonstrated both the intensity of the expectation that decentralisation would be a cure-all for many of problems, and how its fortunes fluctuated, to a large extent, depending on the political will of the central government. From the analysis of the Sudan case some general conclusions may now be drawn.

The issues of particular concern are, firstly, should national integration be decided by the ultimate verdict of central government alone? What is the justification for the centre deciding at will either to give to or take away powers from local geographic entities? And, are there alternative mechanisms of managing diversity for the maintenance of political unity? Secondly, in light of the economic, social and political problems in many of the developing countries, can decentralisation, in the manner it has been promoted by governments and supported by aid organisations, continue to be a useful tool for development administration?

These are crucial issues that will continue to dominate the
political and developmental debate in the context of developing countries. As the preceding chapters explained, most African countries are faced with extreme problems and require extreme solutions to bring them to a semblance of normality. The alternative strategies available are very limited and the discussion in this chapter will bring out the kind of steps that will have to be taken if the looming political instability in many of the developing countries, particularly of Africa, is to be averted.

QUESTIONS OF NATIONAL INTEGRATION

The Basis for State-Ethnoregion Coexistence

There are not many countries in the world that are completely homogeneous in their ethnic composition. Some multi-ethnic states have found a successful formula for coexistence, Switzerland being perhaps the best example. In others, there is an ever-present tension, in yet others, open conflict. Some countries, like Ethiopia, the Sudan and Iraq, to mention only a few, have been emphasising rigidity in the management of ethnic nationalism and, in the process, creating an over-centralised system of government. This has proved to be counter-productive because of the huge resources devoted to maintaining the status quo. Recent events in the east European countries are perhaps the best examples of the fallacy of that strategy which may only postpone the problem for it to erupt at a future time. It is imperative,
therefore, that governments continuously seek new formulae that will not encourage the option of open conflict.

Decentralisation by devolution or federation has been advocated as a strategy for resolving ethnic claims and ensuring the survival of the state. Federation was, for example, the system of government the British left in Nigeria and India because it was regarded as the system best suited for the diverse nationalities in those countries. Since then, the federal arrangement in these two countries has been subjected to drastic changes and the fragile unity is being maintained in Nigeria by military force and in India direct rule has been imposed in certain states. In Kenya, the authoritarian regime's method of handling ethnic based politics has been to thwart them by force. Successive Ethiopian regimes also followed a similar approach to their peril. Imperial Ethiopia's annexation of Eritrea and its attempt to absorb it by force ended with the spectacular defeat of its occupying army in April 1991.

Decentralisation, in whatever form, may no longer be a useful concept particularly in the management of the high intensity ethnoregional claims in many countries, unless, yet again, a new definition is added to the existing long list. Genuine peace and stability in many African countries may only be possible by due recognition of the historical accident that brought the different parts together. The basis for power sharing of the different ethnoregional components of many
African countries needs therefore to be redefined. The break-up of the Soviet Union and that of Yugoslavia, and even the growing support for independence in Scotland, should bring home to many African countries the impending problems. The issue that must be faced soon, therefore, should be not whether power should be decentralised by devolution or any other form at the discretion of the centre, but whether there is sufficient consensus for voluntary association between the different units that make up the state.

The process of state legitimisation in Africa, as discussed in chapter two, has not helped the development of consensual politics. Protected by international legitimacy, many African governments have been ignoring calls to devise policies that would generate internal legitimacy. For example, the political attraction of a single party system in a multi-ethnic situation in Africa has been both to maintain hegemonic power and to avoid the risk of political competition. For political elites whose constituency power base comes from a dominant majority, like that of Robert Mugabe and his majority Shona ethnic constituency, the attraction of a single party system is to maintain the hegemonic power. President Mugabe has tried to balance his administration by including members of other minority groups but this is done at his discretion rather than as an exercise of right. On the other hand, political elites whose power base come from a minority ethnic group fear political opposition in an open contest. For example, President Arap
Moi of Kenya, who comes from a minority ethnic group is holding on to power by intimidating opposition with a stronger political power base (Jackson and Rosberg, 1986:238-239). There have been, of course, dictators who grabbed power by military means, like Idi Amin of Uganda and Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia, whose only means of staying in power was by the use of brutal force against any opposition.

The unjustness of authoritarian and dictatorial regimes, based on destructive methods of holding on to power at any cost, are obvious and do not need elaboration. The justification of rule by majority in a multi-ethnic state in Africa, on the other hand, is particularly troublesome and deserves some mention. In many multi-ethnic African states, the reality is that politics is based on ethnic or "tribal" affiliation. The notion of majority rule in Africa, be it in a single or multi-party system, has had the effect of perpetuating the domination of a single ethnic group over all the others. Thus, the smaller ethnic groups are permanently denied a share of power in a system based on majority rule. As explained previously, the monopolisation of power has been a cause for resentment and, hence, the breaking-out of conflict in many countries. Majority rule does not reflect the reality of the existence of separate ethnic identities and so it is not only unjust but undesirable.

It follows that in some multi-ethnic states in Africa, where the conflict has been of the high intensity type as discussed
in chapter two, adherence to the concept of the right of self
determination may prove to be the only viable option left to
avoid complete disintegration. What this means is that a
"deserving" ethnoregional entity decides by itself whether to
join in or opt out of the union. Peter Self (1985:204) is
right to comment, in this connection, that "no one can easily
predict how much autonomy will satisfy a nationalist movement,
or what use the people in question will make of such self-
government or perhaps full independence". For precisely this
reason, therefore, geoethnic claims must be settled by the
claimants themselves deciding their options. Accordingly,
the right of any geographic entity, that is, the high
intensity type, to exercise its right to self determination
must be given the international recognition it deserves.
Historical accidents ought not condemn geoethnic entities for
ever. The break-up of the Soviet Union has disproved the
notion that ethnic differences will wither away with time.
Eritrea's lead in ascertaining its right to self determination
ought also to remind many African countries of their options.

The argument here is not for the promotion of dismemberment
of the multi-ethnic state. On the contrary, the exercise of
the right to self determination will bring the divergent
groups closer rather than dividing them. Arguably, economic
reality will bring home to many of them the constraints on the
viability of going it alone. The argument is that a stable
and lasting unity is only possible when the ethnoregional
components decide by themselves their options, without
coercion. Switzerland offers a good example of such political formulation. In Switzerland, the belief in full-fledged democracy is such that the people are the final arbiters and umpires on basic questions such as constitutional amendments which are settled by holding a referendum. It is interesting to note that "since these instrumentalities were embodied in the constitution in 1874, they have been extensively used and have, generally speaking, acted as a curb rather than a promoter of change" Friedrich, 1968:149). The referendum has thus become a vital and freely functioning part of the Swiss political system. Friedrich (1968:152) further said that the referendum has become an essential integrating mechanism in Switzerland "for developing the federal relationship between the Swiss people at large and the people of each and every canton on a basis of mutuality and compromise".

In the African situation also, a decision to be part of a union should be on the basis of "co-habitation", that is, that the union is made up of willing partners. The attraction of the idea of "co-habitation" is that it would then be possible to institutionalise the apparatus of political authority. Arbitrary and abusive rule such as that created by the current personal authority type in Africa will then have no place since relationships are based on "co-habitation". The system of "co-habitation" will therefore strengthen the institutionalisation process of the apparatus of governance.
How does this notion apply to the case of the north-south issue of the Sudan? Many Sudanese writers are eager to stress that any solution of the north-south conflict must be within the framework of a united Sudan (An-Na'im, 1987). This is an evasion of the lessons to be learnt from the Sudan's own experience discussed in the previous chapter. No constitutional niceties that rely on the will of the centre to give or take as it wishes can, or should, be a framework for unity in the case of the Sudan. Only a recognition of the south as an equal partner to the north may guarantee lasting peace and this has to be decided on the principle of the right of self-determination. What is at stake here is not only the option for opting-out from or into the union but, as earlier stated, the equitable distribution of central power itself, that is, based on the notion of "co-habitation".

Under the terms of "co-habitation", both the north and the south would come to realise that there is more to gain from being in a united Sudan than a divided one. Their economies are interlinked by the might of the Nile and both would suffer equally from an option that involves complete separation. In addition, since the idea of "co-habitation" is based on the respect of distinctiveness of identity, neither would be hindered in developing its own cultural goal and so the issues that have remained divisive and contentious would no longer be there.

It is tempting, as mentioned earlier, to suggest the inclusion
of the notion of the "right of self determination" within a general definition of decentralisation, such as "decentralisation for self determination". However, since the argument is about the development of relationships based on consensual association, a quite different idea from that of dependence on the centre's willingness to decentralise, inclusion of the right of self-determination is perhaps better left to stand on its own rather than to add to the confusion that already exists.

The distributive or low intensity ethnic claims, as referred to in chapter two, can also include many forms of aspirations for power sharing and hence can be potential sources of conflict. Here again cooperation rather than confrontation should be the basis for the management of territorial entities. The Sudan example during "the years of hope" discussed in the previous chapter is one that can serve to illustrate the kind of state effectiveness that would have to exist to manage emerging territorial demands. An appreciation that the current problems in many African countries are associated with the weakness of the state is necessary. As stressed in chapters two and eight, the inability of the African postcolonial state to design and manage appropriate policies has been particularly severe. Frustrated by this inability, some have suggested (for example, Hyden:1983) that local government systems be based on smaller units than a district in order to promote community involvement. This suggestion is valid if it is assumed that no structural change
can occur and that the state will remain hopelessly ineffective and inefficient. However, small scale community development programmes were the main fashion of rural development before the advent of decentralisation and failures abounded then too. Indeed, as mentioned in chapter two, community development was the main principle for development in India in the 1950s and 1960s and it did not work then. Therefore, tinkering with the problem is not going to be a solution in the case of the African situation. The real hope for political stability and progress is, as suggested above, an overhaul of the political system which may have to come through a revolutionary movement such that attempted by President Nimeiri in the first phase of his rule in the Sudan.

**Integrative Policies**

It is the responsibility of a state to ensure that policies promoting the consolidation of national integration are designed and regularly appraised to meet the changing aspirations of the various ethnoregional societies under its domain. The state should be in a position to respond to the growing ethnic political movements whose range of demands could vary from the equitable distribution of services to the sharing of power by devolution or federation or even separation. It is clear that the state needs to develop decision making mechanisms so that the right strategic choices are made, for example, in deciding what to decentralise and when. In the processes of forming its policies, the state should be seen to act on behalf of and for the well-being of
all the people under its jurisdiction. Sincere attempts to balance differences in territorial development, for example, is the kind of integrative policy that would bring about harmony in inter-ethnic relations. The relative social and economic deprivation of the south in the Sudan has been, for example, one of the issues which has reinforced southern fears that the north is only interested in the "land" and not "the people". As pointed out in chapter one, whether in a decentralised or a centralised governmental system, the ability of the state to regulate inter-ethnic relations is paramount for processes of national integration.

One policy area that engages a considerable degree of state attention is the distribution of scarce resources, both human and financial, among the various units of government. In many African countries, where inter-ethnic differentials are common, the setting of priorities in the distribution of the available scarce resources needs to be based on the principles of equity (Smith, 1985:113). For example, the relative educational deprivation in south Sudan (chapter 7) will always remain a source of conflict unless discriminatory policies are introduced to remedy it. There is a particular problem in situations where the lack of an organised local movement, and therefore of any obvious threat of conflict, attracts less government attention. But governments must weigh their choices carefully so that actions taken today do not become sources for bitter conflict in the future.
Regulatory policies, the laws that determine the whole range of social relationships in a state such as regulations for political participation and those that relate to education, religion or language, have important ramifications for inter-ethnic relations. Therefore, regulatory policies should be designed in such a way that, as discussed in relation to the Sudan and Ethiopia, they do not become sources of conflict. In both these countries, deep social divisions were created by the regulatory policies which were based on the promotion of hegemonic identities. Some countries have taken drastic actions to ensure that their regulatory policies become sources of unity rather than conflict. For example, Indonesia resolved the problem of an official language by adopting the language of the smallest ethnic group. Before the liberation of Eritrea, the official rest day of the week in the territory which was under the control of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) was Wednesday. Having Muslim and Christian populations in almost equal numbers in Eritrea, the EPLF thought that taking either Friday or Sunday would be antagonistic to the losing half and, on the other hand, adopting both days as rest days with Saturday in between was simply unaffordable.

The areas where state intervention is needed to maintain unity are many and suffice it to mention here that, as with the Indonesian and Eritrean examples, policies must be aimed at having a positive impact. It was interesting that the choice of Wednesday in Eritrea met no resistance and the reason was
that people saw the element of fairness involved in the choice.

QUESTIONS OF DECENTRALISATION
AS DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION

Problems of Decentralisation

Decentralisation is frequently perceived as a tool for improving the management of development. A related argument has been that decentralisation of authority to regional or local governments to plan and manage development programmes is, as discussed above, a positive integrative policy intended to meet the needs of geoethnic groups. The theme that runs through all the arguments of decentralisation as development administration is the need for increasing participation so that development programmes become more relevant to local needs and conditions.

Decentralisation as a policy option for development management has been actively supported and promoted by international aid organisations. The support for decentralisation, it is usually claimed, was the result of frustration with over-centralisation which causes problems for donors who are principally involved with small scale projects targeted towards the rural poor. Inefficient and ill informed central bureaucracies are mostly blamed as the cause for these problems. A way of improving such developmental problems of over-centralisation, developing countries were advised, was
to exploit the potential of decentralisation. The emphasis was on promoting popular participation and the need for the involvement of communities, not only in decision making but also in implementation of projects. It was argued that decentralisation speeds up bottom-up development and facilitates meeting basic needs, especially for the rural poor.

Convinced by the appeal of decentralisation, or persuaded by the arguments of the bilateral aid organisations, governments became eager to reform. In Africa, in Kenya in 1970, Sudan and Ghana in 1971, Tanzania in 1972, and Zambia in 1972 and again in 1979, radical reforms of local administration were introduced. Socialist Tanzania's reforms were based on the recommendations of the international firm of management consultants from New York, McKinsey and Company, apparently not famed for their socialist bias.

However, the experience with decentralisation in all these countries has been one of disappointment. In Kenya, control over development planning remained a central function despite the existence of the decentralisation structure discussed in chapter two (p. 89). Tanzania's experimentation with decentralisation, referred to in chapter one (pp. 34-40), never proved to be effective in its aim for popular involvement in decision making. President Nyrere himself explained that Tanzania's failures occurred because the central government was unable to impose and ensure popular
participation in planning and project implementation. In Zambia, the decentralisation reforms were never really implemented and decision making for development remained a central government exercise. In all these countries, the gap between the expressed aims and the actual accomplishments were very wide indeed.

At this stage it is pertinent to ask; what went wrong? Putting aside political motives for a moment and seeing decentralisation as a tool for development administration only, some common problems can be identified:

1. One of the main problems has been the tendency to regard decentralisation as having a universal applicability. Decentralisation policies seem to have been based on the assumption that a standard format of local administration exists. The similarities of the decentralisation programmes in the Sudan during "the years of hope" and that of Papua New Guinea were, for example, striking in spite of the marked political differences between the two countries. Again, as discussed in chapter two, capitalist Kenyan and socialist Tanzanian local government systems had more similarities than differences. The irony with decentralisation has been that whilst a great deal of emphasis is made on the need for local participation, what this local participation actually involves in any specific area has not been a subject of consideration when designing decentralisation programmes.
2. In all the countries mentioned, decentralisation reforms were introduced suddenly without any prior experimentation on their suitability or implementability. Not only did the sweeping changes cause much confusion but also, as the Sudan case study has shown, severe constraints on implementing the services for which the local authorities were responsible. In any case, the uneven level of social and economic development should have precluded the application of uniform decentralisation principles. As discussed in chapter four, Marshall's (1949) visionary advice to future governments of the Sudan was to apply varying degrees of decentralisation depending on the economic and social development of a given area.

3. In spite of the complaints with over-centralisation and inefficient bureaucracy that a decentralisation system aims to improve, it is striking that the implications of these very "weaknesses" for the planning and implementation of decentralisation have never been fully appreciated. This is not, of course, to forget the many weaknesses that may well exist at the local level. As the case of India, discussed in chapter two, has shown, manipulations by small, self-interested local groups can, for example, be obstacles to a decentralisation programme. But if central governments themselves were not weak, obstacles to decentralisation reforms could be held in check. Therefore, it is imperative that the planning of decentralisation should also consider the planning of the central government apparatus so as to make it
perform its duties of guiding and controlling. It is pertinent to mention here that no historical precedent exists of central government not playing a highly interventionist role in development. Therefore, the design of decentralisation must be based on a clear understanding of the totality of any given situation, that is, political, social and economic.

**Essentials for Development**

The fluctuation of the performance of educational development in the Sudan, which depended on the behaviour of central government and how it managed regional demands, confirms the essential nature of consensus politics for development. It also demonstrates that, as the comparative analysis in chapter two has shown, performance in decentralisation is a function of central government competency.

The tendency to regard decentralisation as a panacea for development administration must be extinguished. The case of Wau Area Council shows that the mere acquisition of power was not enough. It was interesting to note, for example, that the district councils themselves questioned the wisdom of delegating the responsibility of education to them knowing that they lacked the capacity to manage it. As discussed in chapter seven, the problem the Wau Area council faced was that it lacked both the capacity and the means to translate the substantial power delegated to it. The majority of the councillors were illiterate and had little understanding of
their responsibilities, and given the level of poverty and hence the meagre local revenue, the mismatch of delegated power with the Wau reality is clear. To reiterate, it is not a mere top-down initiative that is the issue but rather how the top can make it possible for bottom-up development to be achieved.

There are convincing similarities in the Chinese system of government discussed in chapter two and that of the Nimeiri regime during the years of hope, in the way the respective party apparatus were equally controlling as well as enabling. In both cases, the party machineries had elaborate forms of control running parallel with the administrative structure and, on the other hand, they were also enabling agencies being responsible for the implementation of plans. A general suggestion that can be made here is that, in a multi-ethnic and underdeveloped situation, interventionist political structures with enabling and controlling capabilities are the ones best suited to facilitating development.

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH NEEDS

The problem with decentralisation programmes has often been that they are based on unrealistic assessments at the design stage. As the discussion above attempted to illustrate, the design of decentralisation requires a multi-dimensional investigation not only in terms of the availability of resources but also of the capacity for successful implementation. The last aspect, capacity, refers to the
capacity at both local and central government levels. As the political, economic and developmental analysis of the Sudan case has shown, decentralisation can cause havoc both as a mechanism for national integration and development administration if an appropriate balance is not struck in its management.

The main objective of this thesis has been to provide an in-depth empirical analysis of the working of decentralisation policies in the Sudan and the consequences of their impact. Unfortunately, not many studies of the kind are available and direct comparisons of specific policies could not be made. It is pertinent therefore to point out the areas where further research will enhance the understanding of decentralisation.

Research Needs

Much of the literature on decentralisation and centralisation is of a case-study type focused on a single country. But, as Fesler (1968:376) observed "none of the empirical experience recorded in the case studies has been synthesized". One result of this lack of merging of experience has been that the conditions under which decentralisation operates are rarely clarified. Furthermore, not many studies have attempted to measure the impact of politics in the processes of formulation and implementation of decentralisation. The bulk of the case studies available are analyses of the policies and do not go deeper into explaining the conditions that affect the processes of decentralisation.
Perhaps the greatest deficiency in the literature is that no empirical study exists, as far as is known to the writer, that compares decentralisation experiences in the developed and the developing countries. Such a study might have highlighted the existing problem with gross generalisations in the use of the term decentralisation. It is not the use of the term as such which is the problem but the policy prescriptions that emanate from it which tend not to take into account, as discussed before, the specific cultural, political and environmental inheritance of individual countries. For example, given the peculiarity of the south Sudan situation, as discussed in chapters 5 and 6, surely some other, more appropriate, form of administrative organisation could have been found instead of the blueprint enforced on it. In many parts of Africa where poverty, social division and illiteracy dominate, decentralisation reforms do not seem to take these realities into account and the elaborate council systems of local administration seem wholly misplaced.

Diana Conyers (1984) wrote what she called an "exploratory" article in which she discussed the similarities between regional planning in the South and North, that is between the developed and the developing countries. In it she wrote of "general trends in development studies, which suggest that there is increasing interest in the similarities - as opposed to differences - between North and South". Then she suggests that "an interchange of ideas between North and South could be mutually beneficial". Conyer's article was critically

...the fact that many countries are revising their strategies and organisations does not necessarily mean that anything is to be gained by exchanging experiences about a particular institutional form, or particular "solution". The South has after all had long experience in suffering the imposition of institutional forms and development strategies devised in quite different contexts than those they were implanted into. Is there any point in integrating debates about regional planning occurring in different countries? At what level, if at all, should we interchange?

...the problem in transnational discussion about, say, decentralisation, is that there are enormous variations in the organisational structure to be decentralised, in what is sought from decentralisation and in the forms which decentralisation may take.

The mistake we have done in the international diffusion of ideas in the past is that we have travelled the world full of concepts and techniques, divorced from culturally and historically specific contexts in which they have evolved. We have been forced to learn from such naivety. If we are now to interchange experience, it must be within the equipment of theoretical and methodological awareness and sensitivity to socio-historical specifics. I would nevertheless expect that such interchange would serve to confirm the substantial differences between North and South in political and economic processes, and consequently in appropriate policies and institutional forms for their implementation.

Bernard (1984) was equally critical and warned that "until regional planning takes greater account of the political realities within which it operates, one must question the achievements of the administrative model of regional plan implementation". He made a penetrating criticism dismissing Conyer's cross-fertilisation argument as being "limited in
scope" and, furthermore, he said:

[The] important question may be how far in reality does the body of theory in regional planning in the Third World reflect indigenous thinking and experience. It may be that the perceptions of visiting experts and consultants and the narrowness of local but desk-bound urbanites has created a situation where most of what is described as the contribution of the South to the discussion is derived and validated in terms of Northern criteria.

These were strong exchanges but they do touch the heart of the problem. Participating in the same debate, Cheema (1984:361), whilst acknowledging the need for interchanging information, suggested the "launching of an international research project on theory and practice of intra-regional planning in the North and South and dissemination of the "findings by publishing volumes and special issues of professional journals..". But as said above, no comparative study seems to have been made.

Research has tended to gloss over the imperatives of politics in the study of decentralisation. As mentioned earlier, research on decentralisation has mainly concentrated on the administrative and organisational structures and as yet no comprehensive information seems to exist on the role of politics in decentralisation. The discussion in chapter two touches on some of the areas of concern and offers some pointers for further research.

Finally, another area where no rigorous research has been conducted is on the local communities' own form of
administration and organisation. There are structures that local communities at village level value and a comprehensive study is required to understand their operation and functions. Therefore, further research on this may produce important information to draw on for a theoretical framework for the design of decentralised administration.
EPILOGUE

THE CONSEQUENCES OF DIVIDING THE SOUTH
AND THE SUDAN SINCE NIMERI

The Re-start of North-South Conflict

Nimeiri had to pass one major hurdle before he could achieve the total dismantling of the Addis Ababa Agreement - the 6000 strong ex Anya-Nya Army still stationed in the south. Whilst the division debate was taking place Nimeiri "decided to send a number of southern army detachments to the north" (Mawson, 1984:523) and as the process of implementing that decision began, several detachments refused to be transferred. The Government then quite foolishly decided to apply force. On June 4th 1983, the Northern army was deployed to quell an army garrison at Bor town that was resisting transfer. Inevitably, fighting broke out and more than one thousand of the Bor garrison mutinied and fled to the bush taking their arms with them. The Bor mutiny "caused widespread desertions in other units of the Southern Command and in Northern Sudan, and an exodus of refugees to bordering countries" (SPLM Manifesto, July 1983:16). Before long the Sudan's People Liberation Army (SPLA) was born and soon after, its political wing, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) was established.

The SPLA grew in strength very rapidly and by the end of 1983 it managed to force the suspension of the two projects most resented by Southerners; the oil works and the excavation of the Jonglei canal (designed to drain the water of the Sudd, a swamp covering a large area in South Sudan) which would have increased the volume of Nile water available for irrigation in northern Sudan and Egypt (Woodward, 1985:966). Resentment of the eventual benefit from these projects going only to the north had helped to fuel the
rapid escalation of the conflict. In November 1983, the SPLM declared the South a war zone and ordered its military wing in the field (the SPLA) to effect the declaration. Despite Nimeiri's assurance that he would be able to contain the SPLA forces, the two international companies involved with the oil and the canal projects were not willing to take the risk (Horn of Africa, vol.8, No.1., 1985:52). In declaring the South a war zone, the SPLM was aware of its international obligations. Under a long standing international agreement, Egypt has a major say in matters concerning the Nile waters and in "its desire to respect the code of conduct of civilised behaviour", the SPLM wrote a letter to the Egyptian Government, through its ambassador in Kenya, explaining the reasons for declaring the South a war zone thus:

You certainly realise that the renewed fighting between South and North has been directly caused by the abrogation of the Addis Ababa Agreement by the Sudan Government because it broke the truce which was the byproduct of that agreement. It was and is clear to anyone that the agreement was sine qua non and raison d'etre for the observance of peace in the Sudan by both sides. Its unilateral abrogation by one party automatically removed any impediment and obligation from the other party towards respecting that agreement. You will therefore agree with us that the war which was suspended when the agreement came into force had naturally to continue .... It is our hope that Egypt will exercise utmost restraint and choose a peaceful way to solve problems that have been created for it by a Government led by a lunatic in Khartoum ... Any attempt to reactivate further excavation will end in disaster (see in Horn of Africa, Vol 8, No.1, 1985:55).
The proclaimed aim of the SPLM is to liberate the "Sudanese masses from the oppression of the corrupt, racist, backward pseudo-Arab bourgeois system in Khartoum" (The SPLM legislation No.1, 1983). The SPLM has been consistent in its objective which has been to "establish a United Socialist Sudan, not a separate Sudan" (SPLM manifesto, 1983:16). The SPLM emphasises in its manifesto that the South is an integral and inseparable part of the Sudan and "although the movement has started by necessity in the South", it aims "eventually to engulf the whole country" (see articles 20 and 21 of the SPLM manifesto). As they are in the minority, there is no realistic hope that this will happen, and the SPLM would know this, but taking such a position would "conveniently save Ethiopia from the open disapproval of Organization of African Unity Leaders who deplore any and all secessionist movements" (Horn of Africa, Vol.8, No.1, 1985:4)

The rapid development in strength of the SPLA owes a lot to the help it has been receiving from Ethiopia and Libya. Ethiopian assistance is to counterbalance Nimeiri's unconcealed encouragement of opposition forces (The Ethiopian Democratic Union, for example) to the military regime there since the overthrow of Haile Selassie (Markakis and Ayele, 1986:161). Relationships between Nimeiri and Libya flourished and declined several times over. The final blow came when Nimeiri declared support for Anwar Sadat of Egypt following the latter's agreement with Israel at Camp David. Libya's support to the SPLM continued until the overthrow of Nimeiri (then switched to the side of the new government almost overnight) by which time the SPLA was "Believed to contain about 20,000". Apart from its success in forcing the suspension of the oil and the canal projects, the SPLA's military strength was also evident in the way they managed to pin down the government forces to their garrisons in the urban centres. The South is
ideally suited to guerrilla warfare which Nimeiri must have known (see chapter 7) and, however strong an army the central Government could have deployed in the South, to achieve a defeat of the rebels by purely military means would be very difficult, even impossible (Mawson, 1984:526). By 1985, the SPLA had become a force to be reckoned with, having been waging an increasingly successful guerrilla war. With his self inflicted problems in the South mounting, Nimeiri attempted to sound conciliatory and began "urging the SPLM to join a dialogue to achieve peace" (the Guardian, January 3, 1985). But Nimeiri had already done enormous damage which would be very hard to reconcile, and the irony is, national unity may not be secured this time without the central government having to pay an even greater concession to the SPLM than it did in the 1972 Agreement.

The Fate of Decentralization After Division in South Sudan

The abolition of Southern autonomy and the creation of semi-autonomous regions in its stead, effectively put the new regions of the South on a par with the regions in the North. The regional governors, the regional deputy governors, the regional ministers and the provincial commissioners were now all to be appointed by the President and hence be directly accountable to him. The legislative function of the Regional Assemblies had been drastically reduced as they were not allowed to consider any bill until after it had been considered by one of its specialised committees (Article 56). By the same article, any Bill presented by a member of the Regional Assembly was not to be considered by the Assembly unless the committee decided that the Bill was suitable and in conformity with public interest. As a double safeguard against an unwanted Bill being passed, Article 57 of the Presidential Order on the division of South Sudan stated that no Bill would become a law until it was passed by the Regional Assembly and signed
by the Governor of the Region. The Presidential power was greatly enhanced by the Order as it allowed him to dissolve any Regional Assembly if he considered that the public interest and the circumstances necessitated new elections (Article 53).

The implementation of the new regionalization programme in the South started almost immediately after the Presidential Order was announced on June 6th, 1983. No thought was given to, or time allowed for, a smooth transition. To effect the new policy as soon as possible, two central government appointed committees were set up. Their tasks were to supervise the division of assets and the deployment of manpower of the former Southern Regional Government. As they set out to do their duty the committees faced many problems "that were not predicted or had not been properly diagnosed" (Sudanow, October 1981:19). The problem the committee faced with the deployment of manpower was how to identify "who belonged to which region". "In the end it was decided that 65 per cent of the manpower belonged to Equatoria Region, 20 per cent to Bahr El Ghazal Region, and 15 per cent to Upper Nile Region" (Sudanow, October 1983:19). This was a somewhat arbitrary decision because the new regions were taking division quite literally to mean that only those employees who originate in any one particular region would get employment in that region. As a result, absolute chaos followed. Related to this was also the problem of how to share the grant in aid for salaries from the central government. Even after division, the central government's grants-in-aid to the South remained the same. Equatoria Region demanded the larger portion of it, claiming that the majority of the manpower was being left behind in Juba, the former Southern capital and now Equatoria's. As the others objected, friction between the regions was developing.
The division of assets also proved to be a very difficult task. As Badal (1985) wrote: "Almost immediately but not entirely unexpected, bitter rows soon ensued particularly over moveable assets (and) the sight was both shameful and disgusting. Scenes of angry and quarrelling officials were common enough, often over lawful ownership of petty and simple merchandise such as an office cooler or fan, a chair or office utensils of insignificance" (p7). As the quarrel over the division of the assets continued, some government officials from the south suggested that the idea be abandoned leaving all the assets to Equatoria Region alone and the national government provide funds to the two other regions. However sensible this suggestion seemed, it was outside the terms of reference of the committee, which was set up to divide the existing assets only. As the wrangling continued, and with no furniture arriving at the other two new regions, the whole work of regional governments was at a stand still for a long period (Nyuol and Bol, 1984:55).

Perhaps the most damaging consequence of the division of the South in terms of inter-regional relationships was "the enormous scale of human sufferings that accompanied mass deportation" (Badal, 1985:8). After the division of the South, an 'unwritten-law' prevailed in that it became illegal for anyone to live outside his/her region. People who originated from one region but who had lived in another all their lives, and even those with spouses from the local population, were deported to their region of origin and in the process lost their immovable property without compensation (Badal, 1985:8, Sudanow, November 1983:15). As Badal (1985:9) concluded, "the overall effect has been the creation of uncertainty and hatred among the Southern peoples which tend to seriously challenge and undermine social integration process that was already well underway" (see also Sudanow,
March 1985:15). But Nimeiri's main objective in dividing the South, as discussed above, was precisely that a divided South would cease to be an effective block against central government dictat.

The practice of deportation was also to cause serious problems to the newly created regions in many areas. The Area Councils in Equatoria region, for example, faced serious administrative problems because "most of the senior and experienced administrators who were managing the affairs of Area Councils under the former Southern Region were from the present two regions of Bahr El Ghazal and Upper Nile. With further decentralization, these officers left for their regions leaving Equatoria with very few senior and experienced officers" (Kharais, 1985:87). Deportations also brought to a halt the work of many of the institutions which should have remained common to all three regions, such as teacher training institutes, agricultural training schools and the multi-purpose training centre at Juba. With the advent of division the common practice was that each region claimed what was available in its region. But "not only does the region involved not have the requisite manpower and financial resources to run these services on its own but it also means that the other regions have been deprived of these common services (Badal, 1985:8). So decentralization, instead of creating a healthy atmosphere of competition between the regions in the South, as some of its supporters were arguing it would, became a source of friction. Badal (1985:7) explains what he discovered during his visit to the South in 1984:

Ethnic and regional animosities are on the upsurge, at one time in 1984 Equatoria Regional authorities would not allow transit of goods and essential commodities destined for Bahr El Ghazal from East Africa. Upper Nile Region authorities allegedly did the same to
consignment of commodities from the North to Juba. Freedom of movement of Southern citizens, particularly in Equatoria, is now severely restricted.

During the debate over southern division, one of the points its supporters were arguing for was that further decentralization would benefit people because the regions would be smaller, easier to administer [and] it would be easier to keep security or maintain law and order (Sudanow, September 1983:14). A decentralized system, it was argued, would enable problems to be identified more accurately and, because decisions could be made locally, there would be speedy implementation of the decisions. To its opponents, leaving the question of legality aside, the practical and obvious problem was where the resources, both human and financial, were going to come from to support the intended decentralization, given the general economic difficulties the country had at the time. Inevitably, it was not long before information started emerging that all was not going well with decentralization in the South; as reported in Sudanow, March 1986;

Soon after the decentralization of the Southern Region into three regions, the infant Equatoria region found itself too poor to meet the financial requirements of its schools. The grant from the central government was too meagre and Equatoria could not generate enough revenue of its own. In an effort to make ends meet, the regional government of Joseph Tambura closed down the boarding schools [in secondary schools] ..... At the intermediate and primary levels, teachers in the rural and urban schools went for months without salaries. Most of these schools closed down as teachers
battled with the government for their rights (p28).

In the post division period, the financial situation in the new regions became so desperate that the Governor of Equatoria admitted that he was travelling to Khartoum almost every month demanding more because the amount he had at his disposal for paying salaries was not enough (Sudanow, August 1984:17). The financial situation in Bahr El Ghazal was also similar as Nyuol and Bol (1984:56) explain:

The funds released on monthly basis do not meet cash requirements of the Region. As a Result Chapter II (Services) have been severely affected. Only a few deserving special cases are catered for pushing the rest aside. Likewise, funds released for the Development Projects are inadequate and the little fund meant for development is diverted to other urgent priorities, leaving development untouched. Even in Chapter 1 (salaries), payments in some regional ministries and departments are not met regularly. This shortage has also affected the Area Councils whose monthly grants-in-aid have been experiencing severe cuts.

But, even with the situation as grim as it was, some politicians from the South were demanding the creation of more regions (see in Sudanow, June-Nov, 1983). The case of the Fertit, a small group of related but diverse ethnic groups in western Bahr El Ghazal Region, is an example. Basically, the Fertit's demand for their own region was to enhance their identity and to enable them to actively participate in their own affairs which they claimed they could not do as a result of the Dinka domination in Bahr El Ghazal Region (Sudanow, November, 1982:13). To the opponents of division,
the claim for more regionalization emanates from the misunderstanding of what the new decentralization entails. They refer to the fact that, whilst the new regional arrangement was a mere administrative decentralization, the Addis Ababa Agreement was based on autonomy in recognition of the cultural and racial differences between the North and the South. The argument for more regionalization was therefore regarded as an attempt to trivialise the Addis Ababa Regionalisation Accord. As one opponent of division chided its supporters "the only surplus manpower in the south is politicians; the only appeal for the division is to create posts for politicians" (Sudanow, April 1981:18; see also Sudanow, December 1984:13).

Towards the end of 1984, Nimeiri, a desperate ruler by this time with problems closing in on him from every direction, gave the impression that he could reverse his decision on division if the southerners could demonstrate that they would cooperate (Sudanow, December 1984:13; Mawson, 1984:525). According to Sudanow, Nimeiri only took the decision to divide the South for a trial period "in order to enable the people of the South to decide whether they really liked it or not". Nimeiri is said to have made it clear that "he would not force a region to merge with another against its wish" (Sudanow, December 1984:13). Made a year earlier, such an offer might have been enough to defuse the escalation of the conflict. But by now events had changed in the South. The balance of power within the South had fast shifted towards the SPLM whose objectives went far beyond simple administrative decentralization. So it was with this new breed of Southerners that Nimeiri had to come to terms. At the beginning of January 1985, Nimeiri was believed to have offered to make John Garang, leader of the SPLM, "vice-president and co-ordinator of economic development in the South" and that he was "interested about concessions for
the South*. Nimeiri was a politically isolated leader by this time and, with no other head of government taking him seriously, economic speculators, the billionaire Saudi Arabian Adnan Khashoggi and Tiny Rowland of the Lonrho group, were used as go-between to negotiate with the SPLM. (Khashoggi’s economic stake in the Sudan was in the oil exploration as he had, together with Nimeiri, set up the Sudan National Oil Company, in which he had half the share: Rowland’s was in the agricultural sector. Khashoggi was also believed to have been acting as a sort of merchant banker for the Sudan, being involved in planning to raise billions of dollars for the Sudan by the forward sale of oil still in the ground). Garang is reported to have rejected the proposed terms as “ridiculous” since the SPLM was a national and not a regional movement and saying that "the war did not start in order to make him vice-president" (see the Guardian, January 1985).

The Fall of Nimeiri

In the last two years of his reign, President Nimeiri was beset by "a gathering sea of crises" (The Guardian, March 29, 1985). On the political front, Nimeiri's objective of winning support in the north by introducing Sharia law was backfiring on him. His old political opponents, sensing his attempt to take the wind out of their sails, were by now publicly protesting "at the way in which Islamic law was implemented in such unequal society where many could not adequately provide for themselves and their families within the framework of the law" (Woodward, 1985:7). Sadiq El Mahdi, great grandson of the Mahdi and leader of the Ansar sect, accused Nimeiri of political exploitation of the Sharia which was doing a disservice to the cause of Islam (see in Khalid, 1985:257). Criticisms of Sharia also came from other lesser known banned parties, the Republican
Brothers, for example, whose leader, Mahmood Mohammed Taha, accused Nimeiri of being pretentious in his application of Sharia whilst heading a corrupt and an oppressive regime. The Republicans, a more progressive group had defended Nimeiri previously for no reason other than the position he had taken against the Islamic fundamentalists (Khalid, 1985:390). Nimeiri, wanting to establish his seriousness on Sharia, found a soft option in Taha, whom he accused of heresy. Taha, an old man of 76, was hanged in front of 2000 people including four of his colleagues who were facing the same fate unless they recanted within three days.

President Nimeiri knew that his political survival depended on his exploitation of Islam which was gaining momentum in the Sudan as well as in the Islamic world as a whole. On June 6th 1984, Nimeiri took his most daring action to date by proposing to amend the constitution which would transform the Sudan from a secular into an Islamic state. The proposed amendment would also make the President an Imam, "the leader of the faithful and the shepherd of the Sudanese nation" (see in Khalid, 1985:273). The proposals were submitted to the National Assembly for discussion and debate and there were expected to arrive at a decision by July 15th but this was later extended so further discussion could occur. As expected, heated debate followed both within the National Assembly and outside of it. To the Southerners this was the final assault on what remained of the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972. Condemnation of the proposed amendment from the South was universal. Even those who supported division of the South were now joining hands in opposing President Nimeiri's move. Jospeh Lago and Abel Alier, political rivals of the former Southern Regional Government came together and addressed a very critical letter to Nimeiri reminding him of the danger of the proposed
constitutional amendment to national unity. Petitions against the proposal were also sent to Nimeiri by the newly formed Regional Assemblies in the South.

Opposition or not it soon became clear that Nimeiri would eventually declare the Sudan an Islamic state. By this time President Nimeiri's only remaining political ally was the Muslim Brotherhood organization. Its leader, who was the Attorney General and presidential advisor on legal affairs, was believed to have been the main architect of the proposed amendment on the constitution (Khalid, 1985:275). In the debate at the National Assembly on the amendment to the constitution, the Attorney General was reported to have made the following statement:

... the 1973 constitution of the Sudan was achieved at the expense of the Muslims. Muslims were not given the full opportunity to carry out their religious rites. There is an evolution in the Sudan towards Islamization and if any attempt is made to stop or suppress it, it will lead to a revolution (Sudanow, August, 1984:20).

The Muslim Brotherhood Party's support for Nimeiri was a well calculated political expediency, the aim of which was to take advantage of the situation and to emerge as the strongest party in the aftermath of Nimeiri's rule (El Bashir, 1987:158-159). But Nimeiri had not completely lost his political instincts and he too was using the Brotherhood to give legitimacy to his drive on Islamization. In March 1985, President Nimeiri accused the Muslim Brotherhood "of plotting to assassinate him and his closest aids in an attempt to undermine the [islamic] revolution" (The Guardian, 12 March 1985). The charges included using religion for
political ends and that the Muslim Brotherhood had sought the backing of a foreign power (a reference to rumours that the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood had made contacts with Iranians whilst on a trip abroad). As a result several senior members of the organisation were sacked from the government and many others including their leader, the Attorney General, were arrested. Whilst Nimeiri and his political rivals were fighting for power, the economy was left unattended to for far too long leaving the country on the verge of bankruptcy. To add to Nimeiri's problems, the Sudan suffered the worst drought ever in 1984 and the once self-sufficient nation was now dependent on foreign aid. The economic mess left Nimeiri with no option but to abide by the strict economic austerity prescription of the International Monetary Fund. As a result of government subsidy withdrawal on basic items of consumption, the price of bread went up by 33 per cent, petrol 50 per cent and the price of sorghum, the country's staple food, rose five times within a year. With the political and economic crises escalating, students and professionals were out in the streets in protest and soon the riots spread across the Sudan. As the crisis deepened, Nimeiri flew to the United States, to ask President Reagan to help him out. Nimeiri was never to return and on April 5th 1985, he was toppled by the Army, led by the chief of staff, General Sawar al Dahab, whom Nimeiri had appointed to the post only two weeks before his departure.

The Sudan Since Nimeiri

The military junta which toppled Nimeiri called itself the Transitional Military Council (TMC). Immediately on coming to power, the TMC declared its role as "transitional" and being to see the country return to a civilian democratic government. A Civilian Council of Ministers was established to manage the affairs of the country.
In April 1986, one year after the TMC took over power, elections were held and brought a coalition government into power under the prime ministership of Sadiq al Mahdi, leader of the Umma party. As the civil war in the south was raging elections were held in some parts only. History was repeating itself, and the arguments within the coalition government and between the different parties was such that the affairs of the country were neglected. Corruption and government inefficiency further crippled the country. In June 1989, the military, led by General Omar al-Beshir ousted the civilian government and took over power. General Beshir's regime has embraced Islam as its guiding principle in government. The civil war in the south goes on unabated. The tragic civil war and the drought of recent years has driven the Sudan into decay.

The north-south divide is back where it was when the country became independent in 1956. The country is indeep trouble all round and what the future holds for it is anybody's guess.
Notes and References

1.1 The indiscriminate use of the term decentralisation for all situations and conditions has been causing major problems. For interesting exchange of ideas see the comments by Patsy Healey and Derek Bernard on Diana Conyer's article, "Bridging Gap Between North and south". Third World Planning Review, vol. 6 No. 4, 1984.

1.2 An expression used to describe indigenous political systems.

1.3 Provincial was used instead of the term "state" to avoid confusion.

2.1 The Eritrean struggle had very often been mistakenly confused with separatism and secession - the Eritrean struggle was for the right of self-determination from a colonial occupation, a process that all former colonies had passed through. The complication in Eritrea was that the colonial power happened to be an African power and a neighbouring country - Ethiopia.

2.2 The liberation of Eritrea, as mentioned above, is not part of this consideration being a colonial issue.

2.3 POTHOLM, C. P. (1979), "The Theory and Practice of African Politics", described that there was a good deal of competition within the single party. For example, in 1970, all but 6 of the 120 elective constituencies had competing candidates. Three cabinet ministers were defeated and fairly large numbers of MPs lost their seats.

2.4 This should be contrasted with Hyden's (1983) theory of "economy of affection". Hyden regards the "traditional African Egaliterianism" as anti-developmental p.13.

2.5 The single party system was copied from Tanzania, a "popular socialist" country, whose party system was based on the principle of democratic centralism of the communist countries.

2.6 I have heavily relied for the description of China's political structure upon Waller's book (1981), chapter 3, "The Government and Politics of the People's Republic of China".


3.1 Most of what is now northern Sudan was under the rule of the Kingdoms of Funji and Fur from the early sixteenth century onwards.

3.2 Generally known as the Turkiya because Egypt was then technically a province of the Ottoman Empire.

3.3 The title given to the head of the Turkish empire.

3.4 Samuel Baker's first visit was during his travels to "discover the source of the Nile" in the early of 1860s. His second visit was as an employee of the Khedive of Egypt with a brief to "annex to Egypt all the territories in the Nile Basin". See in Holt, 1970:76).

3.5 A spiritual title meaning "the Divine Guided Saviour".

3.6 Belgium and France were acquiring more territories in the south, the former through the Belgium Congo and the latter through central Africa.

3.7 A French expedition commanded by Captain Marchand occupied Fashoda 10 July 1898, a place south of present day Malakal town in south Sudan, which alarmed the Condominium's governor general. As word reached him, he set out to Fashoda and told Marchand "the presence of a French force at Fashoda and in the valley of the Nile was
regarded as a direct infringement of the rights of the Egyptian
government and of Great Britain". After a period of great tension
the French gave way.

4.1 This definition only relates to the region now called north Sudan.
4.2 Egypt made use of European experts to take key posts in the Sudan.
The explorers Samuel Baker and Richard Burton, for example, were at
the service of the Viceroy at different times.
4.3 They were: education, interior, religious affairs, youth and sports,
co-operation, social affairs and commerce and supply.
4.4 These were: education and guidance and cooperation, commerce and
supply.
4.5 They were: finance, agriculture, health and construction.

6.1 In practice, the commissioners were responsible to the regional
Executive Authority.
7.1 This definition was applied in the general population census of
7.2 The Plan was initially made for 5 years and later extended by two
years and hence the amended five year plan.
7.3 Consultancy reports like that produced for UNICEF by the author are
the responsibility of the consultants.
7.4 Shortly after the completion of the survey, a new law was passed in
the Sudan by which the old Bahr El Ghazal Province was divided into
two provinces - East and West Bahr El Ghazal.
7.5 The 1981 Act delegated powers to 25 District Councils in South
Sudan. Before that, the legislative units of Local Government were
the former six provinces.
7.6 After the division of the south into three regions in 1983, Wau town
became the regional capital of Bahr El Ghazal Region. One of the
five ministries that were created to operate in each region was the
ministry of services which includes education.
7.7 The government used to provide lunch for students which stopped as
the Area council could no longer afford to support it.
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Interview - Regional Minister of Education, the southern Region, Juba.

Interview - Director, Regional Directorate of Educational Planning, Juba.

Interview - Director, Department of Education, Bahr El Ghazal Province, Wau.

Interview - Area Education Officer, Wau Area Council, Wau.

Interview - Council Education Officer, Wau Rural Council, Wau.

Interview - Council Education Officer, Wau Town.

Interview - Asst. SSU secretary for rural development, Bahr El Ghazal Province, Wau.

Interview - Chiefs, Sub-Chiefs, Education Council Officers, headteachers and teachers in many parts of Bahr El Ghazal Province.

Interview - data collected from forty two primary schools in Wau Area Council through structured questionnaire (Appendix 1).
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX I

QUESTIONNAIRE

UNICEF PRIMARY SCHOOL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
BAHR EL GHAZAL PROVINCE SUDAN

Starting time ................... Date .................

Name of Surveyor .............. Interviewee(s)...........


1.0 General

1.10 NAME OF SCHOOL .......... 1.19 ETHNIC ORIGIN ...........
OF STUDENTS

1.11 AREA COUNCIL(DISTRICT) ...........

1.12 RURAL/TOWN COUNCIL .......... 1.20 ENROLMENT:

1.13 NAME OF CHIEF .............. 1979/80 ..............

1.14 NAME OF CHIEFS AREA ......... 1980/81 ..............

1.15 TOTAL CLASSROOMS .......... 1981/82 ..............

1.16 TOTAL CLASSES .............. 1982/83 ..............

1.17 TOTAL TEACHERS ............ 1.21 APPROX % OF SCHOOL AGE
CHILDREN (7-12 YEARS)

1.18 LANGUAGE OF ............... WHO ATTEND SCHOOL IN
INSTRUCTION YOUR AREA ...........

2.0 HISTORY

2.10 STATUS OF SCHOOL
2.101 GOVERNMENT [ ]
2.102 SELF-HELP SCHOOL [ ]
2.103 GOVERNMENT-AIDED SCHOOL [ ]

2.11 TYPE OF SCHOOL
2.111 DAY SCHOOL [ ]
2.112 BOARDING SCHOOL [ ]
2.113 GIRLS ONLY SCHOOL [ ]
2.114 BOYS ONLY SCHOOL [ ]
2.115 CO-EDUCATIONAL SCHOOL [ ]

INSTRUCTIONS
1. PLEASE READ INSTRUCTIONS VERY CAREFULLY ON EACH PAGE
BEFORE PROCEEDING
2. PLEASE WRITE CLEARLY IN CAPITAL LETTERS
3. PLEASE TICK IN APPROPRIATE BOXES
2.12 WHEN WAS THE SCHOOL ESTABLISHED 19......

2.13 SCHOOL BUILT BY
2.131 GOVERNMENT [ ]
2.132 COMMUNITY [ ]
2.133 CHURCH (NAME ............) [ ]
2.134 AID AGENCY (NAME ............) [ ]
2.135 OTHERS (SPECIFY.................)[ ]

3.0 ACCESSIBILITY

3.10 DISTANCE OF SCHOOL FROM MAIN ROAD ...............MILES

3.11 IS THE SCHOOL ACCESSIBLE BY CAR ALL THE YEAR ROUND ?
YES [ ] NO [ ]

3.12 IF NO FOR HOW LONG IS ROAD CLOSED ......MONTHS

3.13 NAME OF VILLAGES SERVED BY SCHOOL

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INSTRUCTIONS
1. PLEASE WRITE CLEARLY YEAR THE SCHOOL WAS FIRST ESTABLISHED.
2. PUT A TICK IN APPROPRIATE BOXES
3. WRITE DISTANCE FOR 3.10 AND 3.13 IN MILES
4.0 STUDENT CALENDAR

4.10 WHEN DID THE SCHOOL START THIS YEAR ....................

4.11 IF IT DID NOT START IN TIME, WHAT WERE THE REASONS:

1. ........................................................................
2. ........................................................................
3. ........................................................................

5.0 STUDENT ENROLMENT

5.10 STUDENT ENROLMENT AT THE BEGINNING OF LAST YEAR (1981/82)
(WRITE MONTH ...............)

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5.11 STUDENT ENROLMENT AT THE END OF LAST SCHOOL YEAR (1981/82)
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5.12 STUDENT ENROLMENT AT THE BEGINNING OF THIS SCHOOL YEAR (1982/83)
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INSTRUCTIONS 1. PLEASE WRITE CLEARLY
5.13 STUDENTS PRESENT BY CLASS AT TIME OF SURVEY
(WRITE MONTH ....................)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BOYS</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>GIRLS</td>
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5.14 REPEATERS BY CLASS LEVEL (1982/83)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASS</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>VI</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BOYS</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

5.15 WHAT ARE THE MAIN CAUSES FOR DROP-OUTS?

1. ............................................
2. ............................................
3. ............................................
4. ............................................
5. ............................................

INSTRUCTIONS
1. PLEASE WRITE NUMBERS CLEARLY FOR THIS PAGE.
5.16 DO TEACHERS KEEP DAILY STUDENTS ATTENDENCE  YES [ ] NO [ ]

6.0 TEACHERS PROFILE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>Marital Status</td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Qualification</td>
<td>PTTI Training</td>
<td>ISETI Training</td>
<td>Length of Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

HM
TA
TB
TC
TD
TE
TG
TH
TI
TJ
Tl

INSTRUCTIONS FOR 1. OR 5.16 ASK TEACHERS OR VILLAGE ELDERS THIS PAGE

2. H.M = HEADMASTERS; T.A. = TEACHER "A" ETC.,

3. UNDER 6.13 WRITE PLC FOR PRIMARY LEAVERS CERTIFICATE JLC FOR JUNIOR SECONDARY LEAVERS CERTIFICATE; SSC = SENIOR SECONDARY SCHOOL CERTIFICATE

4. PTTI = PRIMARY TEACHER TRAINING INSTITUTE

5. ISETI = IN SERVICE EDUCATION TRAINING INSTITUTE
### 6.17 ABSENCES AMONG TEACHERS THIS YEAR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TEACHER</th>
<th>NO. OF DAYS ABSENT</th>
<th>REASONS FOR ABSENCE</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H.M.</td>
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<tr>
<td>T.A.</td>
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<tr>
<td>T.B.</td>
<td></td>
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<td>T.C.</td>
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<td>T.D.</td>
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<td>T.E.</td>
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<td>T.F.</td>
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<tr>
<td>T.G.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>T.H.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>T.I.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T.J.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 6.18 HOW MANY TEACHERS ARE PRESENT AT TIME OF SURVEY .........

### 6.19 DOES H.M. KEEP DAILY REGISTER OF TEACHERS  
YES [ ] NO [ ]

### 6.20 DO TEACHERS HOLD MEETINGS  
YES [ ] NO [ ]

### 6.21 WHAT WERE THE TOPICS DISCUSSED IN THE LAST MEETING

1. ..............................................
2. ..............................................
3. ..............................................
4. ..............................................
5. ..............................................

### 6.23 WHAT DO TEACHERS THINK ARE THE MAJOR PROBLEMS OF THE SCHOOL

1. ..............................................
2. ..............................................
3. ..............................................

### 6.24 WHAT ARE THE MAJOR PROBLEMS FACING TEACHERS

1. ..............................................
2. ..............................................

### 6.25 DO TEACHERS PARTICIPATE IN COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES OTHER THAN SCHOOL ACTIVITIES

1. ..............................................
2. ..............................................
6.26 TEACHERS ACCOMMODATION

6.261 WHERE ARE TEACHERS HOUSE LOCATED
1. ON THE SCHOOL GROUNDS ........
2. IN A NEARBY VILLAGE ..........
3. OTHERS (SPECIFY) ........

6.262 WHO BUILT THE TEACHERS HOUSES
1. THE GOVERNMENT ........
2. THE COMMUNITY ........
3. THE TEACHERS THEMSELVES ..........
4. OTHERS (SPECIFY) ........

7.0 NON-TEACHING STAFF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OCCUPATION</th>
<th>NO.</th>
<th>OCCUPATION</th>
<th>NO.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. WATCHMAN</td>
<td>6. LABOURERS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. HEAD LABOUR</td>
<td>7. COOKS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. CARPENTERS</td>
<td>8.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4. MESSENGERS</td>
<td>9.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5. BUILDER</td>
<td>10.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8.0 SCHOOL SUPERVISION AND INSPECTOR

8.10 WAS YOUR SCHOOL INSPECTED THIS YEAR YES [ ] NO [ ]
8.11 IF NO, WHEN WAS IT LAST INSPECTED .....................

9.0 SERVICES AVAILABLE

9.10 WATER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOWN SUPPLY</th>
<th>BORE HOLE</th>
<th>WELL</th>
<th>RIVER</th>
<th>NONE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

9.101 SOURCE

9.102 DISTANCE

9.103 CONDITION

9.104 IF NO WATER SOURCE, WHERE IS WATER AVAILABLE ........

9.11 SANITARY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PIT LATRINE</th>
<th>BUCKET LATRINE</th>
<th>NONE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

9.111 TYPE

9.112 CONDITION

INSTRUCTIONS

1. FOR 9.102 WRITE DISTANCE IN MILES
2. FOR 9.103 AND 9.112 WRITE GOOD, FAIR OR BAD.
9.12 NEAREST HEALTH SERVICE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HOSPITAL</th>
<th>RURAL HEALTH CENTRE</th>
<th>DISPENSARY</th>
<th>PHCU</th>
<th>DRESSING STATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

9.121 TYPE

9.122 DISTANCE

9.123 CONDITION OF SERVICE

9.124 IS THERE MEDICAL PERSONNEL AVAILABLE FOR HEALTH CONSULTATION

- YES [ ]
- NO [ ]

9.125 IF YES, SPECIFY QUALIFICATION

1. DOCTOR [ ]
2. MEDICAL ASSISTANT [ ]
3. NURSE [ ]
4. COMMUNITY HEALTH WORKER [ ]
5. DRESSER [ ]
6. NATIVE MEDICAL PRACTITIONER [ ]

9.126 DOES THE MEDICAL PERSON VISIT THE SCHOOL TO PROVIDE HEALTH EDUCATION?

- YES [ ]
- NO [ ]

9.127 IF YES, HOW OFTEN? .........................

9.128 IS THE HEALTH SERVICE AVAILABLE ADEQUATE TO MEET THE HEALTH PROBLEMS OF STUDENTS & TEACHERS IN YOUR SCHOOL

- YES [ ]
- NO [ ]

9.129 IF NO, SUGGEST ALTERNATIVES OF HOW TO IMPROVE HEALTH SITUATION (RECORD VERBATIM)

1. ..............................................
2. ..............................................
3. ..............................................

9.130 WHAT ARE THE COMMON DISEASES IN THE AREA?

1. ..............................................
2. ..............................................
3. ..............................................
4. ..............................................
5. ..............................................

---

INSTRUCTIONS FOR

1. "PHGU = PRIMARY HEALTH CARE UNIT"

2. FOR 9.123, WRITE GOOD, FAIR OR BAD

- 420 -
9.130 ELECTRICITY SUPPLY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9.131 REGULAR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.132 NOT REGULAR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.133 NONE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10.0 TEACHING MATERIALS

10.10 HAVE YOU BEEN PROVIDED UNICEF TEACHING KIT YES [ ] NO [ ]

10.11 IF YES, WHEN DID YOU RECEIVE IT ..........

10.12 HAVE YOU RECEIVED TEACHING MATERIALS FROM OTHER SOURCES YES [ ] NO [ ]

10.13 DOES YOUR SCHOOL HAVE SUFFICIENT TEXT BOOKS YES [ ] NO [ ]

10.14 WHEN WAS THE LAST TIME YOUR SCHOOL RECEIVED TEXTBOOKS ..... 

11.0 COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT

11.10 IS THERE A COMMUNITY WORKER IN YOUR AREA YES [ ] NO [ ]

11.11 IS THERE A PARENT/TEACHER ASSOCIATION YES [ ] NO [ ]

11.12 IF YES, WHAT TOPICS WERE DISCUSSED AT LAST MEETING

1. ..................................................
2. ..................................................
3. ..................................................
4. ..................................................

11.13 HAVE ANY ACTIVITIES BEEN CARRIED OUT BY THE ASSOCIATION YES [ ] NO [ ]

11.14 IF YES, WHAT ACTIVITIES WERE CARRIED OUT?

1. ..................................................
2. ..................................................
3. ..................................................
4. ..................................................

11.15 IF NO, WHAT ARE THE REASONS FOR ITS NOT BEING ACTIVE

1. ..................................................
2. ..................................................
3. ..................................................
4. ..................................................

INSTRUCTIONS FOR 1. PLEASE WRITE CLEARLY IN CAPITAL LETTERS THIS PAGE

- 421 -
12.0 COMMUNITY ATTITUDES TOWARDS EDUCATION
12.10 DO PARENTS WANT TO SEND THEIR CHILDREN TO SCHOOL
   YES [ ]  NO [ ]
12.11 IF NO, STATE REASONS
   1. ................................................
   2. ................................................
   3. ................................................
12.12 WHOM DO PARENTS PREFER TO SEND TO SCHOOL:
   BOYS [ ]  GIRLS [ ]  BOTH [ ]
12.13 IF PARENTS DO NOT PREFER TO SEND GIRLS TO SCHOOL, WHAT
      ARE THE REASONS?
   1. ................................................
   2. ................................................
   3. ................................................
   4. ................................................

13.0 FINANCES
13.10 DO PARENTS CONTRIBUTE MONEY TOWARDS THE SCHOOL
   YES [ ]  NO [ ]
13.11 IF YES, HOW MUCH WAS RAISED Ls ...............
13.12 IF ANSWER IS NO, WHAT ARE THE REASONS:
   1. ................................................
   2. ................................................
   3. ................................................
13.13 STUDENT FEES
   13.131 DO STUDENTS PAY SCHOOL FEES   YES [ ]  NO [ ]
   13.132 IF YES, HOW MUCH? Ls .................
13.15 SCHOOL GARDENING
   13.151 DOES THE SCHOOL HAVE A GARDEN YES [ ]  NO [ ]
      (IF NO, GO TO 13.154 BELOW)
   13.152 LIST MAJOR ITEMS GROWN IN THE GARDEN
      1. ...........................................
      2. ...........................................
      3. ...........................................
   13.153 WHAT DO YOU DO WITH YOUR HARVEST
      1. ...........................................
      2. ...........................................
      3. ...........................................
   13.154 IF THERE IS NO GARDEN, WHAT ARE THE REASONS
      1. ...........................................
      2. ...........................................
14.0 RESOURCES AVAILABLE

14.10 LOCAL MATERIALS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PLACE</th>
<th>DISTANCE</th>
<th>COST PER UNIT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14.101 SAND</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.102 GRAVEL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.103 STONE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.104 TEAK</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.105 GRASS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.106 BAMBOO</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

14.11 SKILLED LABOUR AVAILABLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
<th>DAILY WAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.111 CARPENTER</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.112 MASONS (BUILDERS)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.113 BLACK SMITHS</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>14.114 LABOURERS</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

14.12 DO PEOPLE KNOW HOW TO PRODUCE BURNT BRICKS? YES[ ] NO[ ]

14.13 MAIN SOURCE OF CASH INCOME OF COMMUNITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>YES [ ]</th>
<th>NO [ ]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14.131 PAID JOBS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.132 AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.133 ANIMAL HUSBANDRY</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHERS (SPECIFY)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>..........</td>
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</table>

14.14 ARE THERE OPPORTUNITIES FOR PAID JOBS IN YOUR AREA?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MEN</th>
<th>YES [ ]</th>
<th>NO [ ]</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WOMEN</td>
<td>YES [ ]</td>
<td>NO [ ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tbody>
</table>

14.141 IF YES, INDICATE THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR JOBS

1. ..................................................

2. ..................................................

3. ..................................................

INSTRUCTIONS FOR 1. WRITE HOW MUCH MATERIALS AND LABOUR COST FOR THIS PAGE 14.10 AND 14.11.
14.15 DO MANY PEOPLE LEAVE YOUR AREA FOR PAID JOBS ELSEWHERE?
    YES [ ]  NO [ ]

14.151 IF YES, WHERE DO THESE PEOPLE GO?

    1. ..............................................
    2. ..............................................
    3. ..............................................

14.16 DO MANY PEOPLE LEAVE YOUR AREA FOR OTHER THAN PAID JOBS?
    YES [ ]  NO [ ]

    IF YES, PLEASE FILL IN TABLE BELOW.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PLACE THEY GO</th>
<th>MONTH THEY LEAVE</th>
<th>MONTH THEY LEAVE</th>
<th>REASONS FOR LEAVING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
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<td>2.</td>
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<td>3.</td>
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<td>5.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>CODE</td>
<td>TYPE</td>
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<td>-------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>15.10</td>
<td>STAFF HOUSING</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.11</td>
<td>CLASS ROOMS</td>
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<tr>
<td>15.12</td>
<td>STORES</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>15.13</td>
<td>LABORATORIES</td>
<td></td>
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<td>15.14</td>
<td>LIBRARY</td>
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<td>DORMITORIES</td>
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<td>15.16</td>
<td>DORMITORY CAPACITY</td>
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<td>15.17</td>
<td>OFFICE FOR HEAD/MASTER</td>
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<tr>
<td>15.18</td>
<td>OFFICE FOR TEACHERS</td>
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<td>15.19</td>
<td>WORKSHOPS</td>
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<td>15.20</td>
<td>KITCHEN</td>
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<td>15.21</td>
<td>TOILET FACILITIES</td>
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<td>15.22</td>
<td>WATER</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OTHERS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**DOES THE SCHOOL HAVE SUFFICIENT LAND AREA?**

YES [ ]

NO [ ]
### 6.0 PHYSICAL FACILITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BLOCK OR HOUSE NO.</th>
<th>FUNCTION OF ROOMS</th>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>CONDITION OF BUILDING</th>
<th>CONDITION OF FURNITURE</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>FLOOR</td>
<td>WALLS</td>
<td>ROOF</td>
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426
APPENDIX II

POLICY STATEMENT ON THE SOUTHERN QUESTION
BY PRESIDENT NIMEIRI, 9TH JUNE 1969

Dear Countrymen! Warm congratulations and greetings to you on this historic occasion of your revolution.

No doubt you have heard of the broad aims of the revolution outlined in my speech and in that of the Prime Minister which was broadcast on 25 May. Our revolution is the continuation of the October 21 popular revolution. It works for the regeneration of life in our country, for social progress and the raising of the standard of living of the masses of our people throughout the country. It stands against imperialism, colonialism, and whole-heartedly supports the liberation movements of the African and Arab peoples as well as other peoples throughout the world.

A Historical Background

Dear Countrymen, the Revolutionary Government is fully aware of the magnitude of the Southern problem and is determined to arrive at a lasting solution.

This problem has deep-going historical roots dating back to the last century. It is the result of the policies of British colonialism which left the legacy of uneven development between the Northern and Southern parts of the Country, with the result that on the advent of independence Southerners found themselves in an unequal position with their Northern brethren in every field.

The traditional circles and parties that have held the reins of power in our country since independence have utterly failed to solve the Southern question. They have exploited state power for self-enrichment and for serving narrow partisan interests without caring about the interests of the masses of our people whether in the North or in the South.

It is important to realise also that most of the Southern leaders contributed a great deal to the present deterioration of the state of affairs in that part of our beloved country. Over the years, since 1950 to the present day they have sought alliances with the Northern reactionary circles and with imperialism, whether from inside or outside the borders. Personal gain was the mainspring of their actions.

Dear Countrymen, the enemies of the North are also the enemies of the South. The common enemy is imperialism and neo-colonialism, which is oppressing and exploiting the African and Arab peoples, and standing in the way of their advance. Internally, our common enemies are the reactionary forces of counter-revolution. The 25 May Revolution is not the same as the coup d'état of November 1958. That was a reactionary move stage by the imperialists in alliance with local reaction in and outside the army. It was made to silence the demands of the masses of our people both in the North and South for social change and genuine democracy.

The Revolution of May 25 is the very opposite of the coup d'état of 1958. Our revolution is, we repeat, directed against imperialism, the reactionary circles and corrupt parties that destroyed the October Revolution and were aiming at finally liquidating any progressive movement and installing a reactionary dictatorship.

Dear Countrymen, the revolutionary Government is confident and competent enough to face existing realities. It recognises the historical and cultural differences between the North and South and firmly believes that the unity of our country must be built upon these objective realities. The Southern people have the right to develop their respective cultures and traditions within a united socialist Sudan.

In furtherance of these objectives the Revolutionary Council and the Council of Minister held joint meetings and after a full discussion of the matter resolved to recognise the right of the Southern people to Regional Autonomy within a united Sudan.
Regional Autonomy Programme

You will realise that the building of a broad socialist-oriented democratic movement in the South, forming part of the revolutionary structure in the North and capable of assuming the reins of power in that region and rebuffing imperialist penetration and infiltration from the rear, is an essential prerequisite for the practical and healthy application of Regional Autonomy.

Within this framework and in order to prepare for that day when this right can be exercised, the Revolutionary Government is drawing up the following programme:

1. the continuation and further extension of the Amnesty Law;
2. economic, social and cultural development of the South;
3. the appointment of a Minister for Southern Affairs;
4. the training of personnel.

The Government will create a special economic planning board for the South and will prepare a special budget for the South, which aims at the development of the Southern provinces at the shortest possible time.

Dear Southern Countrymen, in order that we may be able to carry out this programme it is of the utmost importance that peace and security should prevail in the South and that life return to normal. It is primarily the responsibility of you all whether you be in the bush or at home to maintain peace and stability. The way is open for those abroad to return home and co-operate with us in building a prosperous Sudan, united and democratic.
APPENDIX III

THE ADDIS ABABA AGREEMENT ON
THE PROBLEM OF SOUTH SUDAN

Draft Organic Law to organize Regional
Self-Government in the Southern Provinces of
the Democratic Republic of Sudan

In accordance with the provisions of the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan and in realization of the memorable May Revolution Declaration of June 9, 1969, granting the Southern Provinces of the Sudan Regional Self-Government within a united socialist Sudan, and in accordance with the principle of the May Revolution that the Sudanese people participate actively in and supervise the decentralized system of the government of their country, it is hereunder enacted:

Article 1.
This law shall be called the law for Regional Self-Government in the Southern Provinces. It shall come into force on a date within a period not exceeding thirty days from the date of the Addis Ababa Agreement.

Article 2.
This law shall be issued as an organic law which cannot be amended except by a three-quarters majority of the People's National Assembly and confirmed by a two-thirds majority in a referendum held in the three Southern Provinces of the Sudan.

CHAPTER II: DEFINITIONS

Article 3.
(i) 'Constitution' refers to the Republican Order No.5 or any other basic law replacing or amending it.

(ii) 'President' means the President of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan.

(iii) 'Southern Provinces of the Sudan' means the Provinces of Bahr El Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile in accordance with their boundaries as they stood in January 1, 1956, and any other areas that were culturally and geographically a part of the Southern Complex as may be decided by a referendum.

(iv) 'Peoples Regional Assembly' refers to the legislative body for the Southern Region of the Sudan.

(v) 'High Executive Council' refers to the Executive Council appointed by the President on the recommendation of the President of the High Executive Council and such body shall supervise the administration and direct public affairs in the Southern Region of the Sudan.

(vi) 'President of the High Executive Council' refers to the person appointed by the President on the recommendation of the People's Regional Assembly to lead and supervise the executive organs responsible for the administration of the Southern Provinces.

(vii) 'People's National Assembly' refers to the National Legislative Assembly representing the people of the Sudan in accordance with the constitution.

(viii) 'Sudanese' refers to any Sudanese citizen as defined by the Sudanese Nationality Act 1957 and any amendments thereof.
CHAPTER III

Article 4.

The Provinces of Bahr El Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile as defined in Article 3 (iii) shall constitute a self-governing Region within the Democratic Republic of the Sudan and shall be known as the Southern Region.

Article 5.

The Southern Region shall have legislative and executive organs, the functions and powers of which are defined by this law.

Article 6.

Arabic shall be the official language for the Sudan and English the principal language for the Southern Region without prejudice to the use of any other language or languages which may serve a practical necessity for the efficient and expeditious discharge of executive and administrative functions of the region.

CHAPTER IV

Article 7.

Neither the People's Regional Assembly nor the High Executive Council shall legislate or exercise any powers on matters of national nature which are:

(i) National Defence
(ii) External Affairs
(iii) Currency and Coinage
(iv) Air and Inter-Regional River Transport
(v) Communications and Telecommunications
(vi) Customs and Foreign Trade except for border trade and certain commodities which the Regional Government may specify with the approval of the Central Government.
(vii) Nationality and Immigration (Emigration).
(viii) Planning for Economic and Social Development
(ix) Educational Planning
(x) Public-Audit.

CHAPTER V: LEGISLATURE

Article 8.

Regional Legislation in the Southern Region is exercised by a People's Regional Assembly elected by Sudanese Citizens resident in the Southern Region. The constitution and conditions of membership of the Assembly shall be determined by law.

Article 9.

Members of the People's Regional Assembly shall be elected by direct secret ballot.

Article 10.

(i) For the First Assembly the President may appoint additional members to the People's Regional Assembly where conditions for elections are not conducive to such elections as stipulated in Article 9, provided that such appointed members shall not exceed one-quarter of the Assembly.

(ii) The People's Regional Assembly shall regulate the conduct of its business in accordance with rules of procedures to be laid down by the said Assembly during its first sitting.

(iii) The People's Regional Assembly shall elect one of its members as a speaker, provided that the
first sitting shall be presided over by the Interim President of the High Executive Council.

Article 11.
The People's Regional Assembly shall legislate for the preservation of public order, internal security, efficient administration and the development of the Southern Region in cultural, economic and social fields and in particular in the following:-

(i) Promotion and utilization of Regional financial resources for the development and administration of the Southern Region.

(ii) Organization of the machinery for Regional and Local Administration.

(iii) Legislation on traditional law and custom within the framework of National Law.

(iv) Establishment, maintenance and administration of prisons and reformatory institutions.

(v) Establishment, maintenance and administration of Public Schools at all levels in accordance with National Plans for education and economic and social development.

(vi) Promotion of local languages and cultures

(vii) Town and village planning and the construction of roads in accordance with National Plans and programmes.

(viii) Promotion of trade; establishment of local industries and markets; issue of traders' licences and formation of co-operative societies.

(ix) Establishment, maintenance and administration of public hospitals.

(x) Administration of environmental health services; maternity care; child welfare; supervision of markets; combat of epidemic diseases; training of medical assistants and rural midwives; establishment of health centres, dispensaries and dressing stations.

(xi) Promotion of animal health; control of epidemics and improvement of animal production and trade.

(xii) Establishment of zoological gardens, museums, organisations of trade and cultural exhibitions.

(xiv) Mining and quarrying without prejudice to the right of the Central Government in the event of the discovery of natural gas and minerals.

(xv) Recruitment for, organization and administration of Police and Prison services in accordance with the national policy and standards.

(xvi) Land use in accordance with national laws and plans.

(xvii) Control and prevention of pests and plant diseases.

(xviii) Development, utilization and protection of forests, crops and pastures in accordance with national laws.

(xix) Promotion and encouragement of self-help programmes.

(xx) All other matters delegated by the President or the People's National Assembly for legislation.

Article 12.
The People's National Assembly may call for facts and information concerning the conduct of
Article 13.
(i) The People's Regional Assembly may, by a three-quarters majority and for specified reasons relating to public interest, request the President to relieve the President or any member of the High Executive Council from office. The President shall accede to such request.

(ii) In case of vacancy, relief or resignation of the President of the High Executive Council, the entire body shall be considered as having automatically resigned.

Article 14.
The People's Regional Assembly may, by a two-thirds majority, request the President to postpone the coming into force of any law which, in the view of the members, adversely affects the welfare and interests of the citizens of the Southern Region. The President may, if he thinks fit, accede to such request.

Article 15.
(i) The People's Regional Assembly may, by a majority of its members, request the President to withdraw any Bill presented to the People's National Assembly which in their view affects adversely the welfare, rights or interests of the citizens in the Southern Region, pending communication of the views of the People's Regional Assembly.

(ii) If the President accedes to such request, the People's Regional Assembly shall present its views within 15 days from the date of accession to the request.

(iii) The President shall communicate any such views to the People's National Assembly together with his own observations if he deems necessary.

Article 16.
The People's National Assembly shall communicate all Bills and Acts to the People's Regional Assembly for their information. The People's Regional Assembly shall act similarly.

CHAPTER VI: THE EXECUTIVE

Article 17.
The Regional Executive Authority is vested in a High Executive Council which acts on behalf of the President.

Article 18.
The High Executive Council shall specify the duties of the various departments in the Southern Region provided that on matters relating to Central Government Agencies it shall act with the approval of the President.

Article 19.
The President of the High Executive Council shall be appointed and relieved of office by the President on the recommendation of the People's Regional Assembly.

Article 20.
The High Executive Council shall be composed of members appointed and relieved of office by the President on the recommendation of the President of the High Executive Council.

Article 21.
The President of the High Executive Council and its members are responsible to the President and to the People's Regional Assembly for efficient administration in the Southern Region. They shall take an oath of office before the President.
Article 22.
The President and members of the High Executive Council may attend meetings of the People's Regional Assembly and participate in its deliberations without the right to vote, unless they are also members of the People's Regional Assembly.

CHAPTER VII

Article 23.
The President shall from time to time regulate the relationship between the High Executive Council and the central ministries.

Article 24.
The High Executive Council may initiate laws for the creation of a Regional Public Service. These laws shall specify the terms and conditions of service for the Regional Public Service.

CHAPTER VIII: FINANCE

Article 25.
The People's Regional Assembly may levy Regional duties and taxes in addition to National and Local duties and taxes. It may issue legislation and orders to guarantee the collection of all public monies at different levels.

(a) The source of revenue of the Southern Region shall consist of the following:-

(i) Direct and indirect regional taxes.

(ii) Contributions from People's Local Government Councils.

(iii) Revenue from commercial, industrial and agricultural projects in the Region in accordance with the national Plan.

(iv) Funds from the National Treasury for established services.

(v) Funds voted by the People's National Assembly in accordance with the requirements of the Region.

(vi) The Special Development Budget for the South as presented by the People's Regional Assembly for the acceleration of economic and social advancement of the Southern Region as envisaged in the declaration of June 9, 1968.

(vii) See Appendix B.

(viii) Any other sources.

(b) The Regional Executive Council shall prepare a budget to meet the expenditure of regional services, security, administration, and development in accordance with national plans and programmes and shall submit it to the People's Regional Assembly for approval.
CHAPTER IX: OTHER PROVISIONS

Article 27.
(i) Citizens of the Southern Region shall constitute a sizeable proportion of the People's Armed Forces in such reasonable numbers as will correspond to the population of the region.

(ii) The use of the People's Armed Forces within the Region and outside the framework of national defence shall be controlled by the President on the advice of the President of the High Executive Council.

(iii) Temporary arrangements for the composition of units of the People's Armed Forces in the Southern Region are provided for in the Protocol On Interim Arrangements.

Article 28.
The President may veto any Bill which he deems contrary to the Provisions of the National Constitution provided the People's Regional Assembly, after receiving the President's views, may reintroduce the Bill.

Article 29.
The President and members of the High Executive Council may initiate laws in the People's Regional Assembly.

Article 30.
Any member of the People's Regional Assembly may initiate any law provided that financial Bills shall not be presented without sufficient notice to the President of the High Executive Council.

Article 31.
The People's Regional Assembly shall strive to consolidate the unity of the Sudan and respect the spirit of the National Constitution.

Article 32.
All citizens are guaranteed freedom of movement in and out of the Southern Region, provided restriction or prohibition of movement may be imposed on a named citizen or citizens solely on grounds of public health and order.

Article 33.
(i) All citizens resident in the Southern Region are guaranteed equal opportunity of education, employment, commerce and the practice of any profession.

(ii) No law may adversely affect the rights of citizens enumerated in the previous item on the basis of race, tribal origin, religion, place of birth, or sex.

Article 34.
Juba shall be the Capital of the Southern Region and the seat of the Regional Executive and Legislature.

APPENDIX A: FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS

The following should be guaranteed by the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan.

1. A citizen should not be deprived of his citizenship.
2. Equality of citizens.

(i) All citizens, without distinction based on race, national origin, birth, language, sex, economic or social status, should have equal rights and duties before the law.
All persons should be equal before the courts of law and should have the right to institute legal proceedings in order to remove any injustice or declare any right in an open court without delay prejudicing their interests.

3. Personal liberty.

(i) Penal liability should be personal. Any kind of collective punishment should be prohibited.

(ii) The accused should be presumed innocent until proved guilty.

(iii) Retrospective penal legislation and punishment should be prohibited.

(iv) The right of the accused to defend himself personally or through an agent should be guaranteed.

(v) No person should be arrested, detained or imprisoned except in accordance with the due process of law, and no person should remain in custody or detention for more than twenty-four hours without judicial order.

(vi) No accused person should be subjected to inducement, intimidation or torture in order to extract evidence from him whether in his favour or against him or against any other person, and no humiliating punishment should be inflicted on any convicted person.


(i) Every person should enjoy freedom of religious opinion and of conscience and the right to profess them publicly and privately and to establish religious institutions subject to reasonable limitations in favour of morality, health or public order as prescribed by law.

(ii) Parents and guardians should be guaranteed the right to educate their children and those under their care in accordance with the relation of their choice.

5. Protection of labour.

(i) Forced and compulsory labour of any kind should be prohibited except when order for military or civil necessity or pursuant to penal punishment prescribed by law.

(ii) The right to equal pay for equal work should be guaranteed.

6. Freedom of minority to use their languages and develop their culture should be guaranteed.

DRAFT ORDINANCE ON ITEMS OF REVENUE AND GRANTS-IN-AID FOR THE SOUTHERN REGION

1. Profits accruing to the Central Government as a result of exporting products of the Southern Region.

2. Business Profit Tax of the Southern Region that are at present in the central list of the Ministry of Treasury.

3. Excise Duties on alcoholic beverages and spirits consumed in the Southern Region.

4. Profits on sugar consumed in the Southern Region.
5. Royalties on forest products of the Southern Region.

6. Royalties on leaf Tobacco and Cigarettes.

7. Taxation on property other than that provided in the Rates Ordinance.

8. Taxes and Rates on Central and Local Government Projects (5 per cent of net profits of factories, co-operative societies, agricultural enterprises and cinemas).

9. Revenue accruing from Central Government activities in the Southern Region provided the Region shall bear maintenance expenses e.g. Post Office revenue, land sales, sale of forms and documents, stamp duties and any other item to be specified from time to time.

10. Licences other than those provided for in the People's Local Government Act, 1971.

11. Special Development Tax to be paid by Residents in the Southern Region the rate of which should be decided by the People's Regional Assembly.

12. Income Tax collected from officials and employees serving in the Southern Region both in the local and national civil services as well as in the Army, Police and Prisons, Judiciary, and Political Establishment.

13. Corporation Tax on any factory and/or agricultural project established in the Region but not run by the Regional Government (5 per cent of the initial cost).

14. Contributions from the Central Government for the encouragement of construction and development; for every agricultural project, industrial project and trading enterprise (20 per cent of the initial cost as assessed by the Central Government).

15. New Social Service Projects to be established by the Region or any of its Local Government units, and for which funds are allocated, shall received grants from the National Treasury in the following manner:

- Education institutions, 20 per cent of expenses.
- Trunk and through Roads and Bridges, 25 per cent of expenses.
- Relief and Social amenities, 15 per cent of expenses.
- Tourist attraction projects, 25 per cent of expenses.
- Security, 15 per cent of expenses.
- Grants for Post Secondary and University education within the Sudan, 20 per cent of grants, outside the Sudan 30 per cent of grants.
- Contribution for Research, Scientific Advancement, and Cultural Activities, 25 per cent of expenses.

AGREEMENT ON THE CEASE-FIRE IN THE SOUTHERN REGION

Article 1.
This Agreement shall come into force on the date and time specified for the ratification of the Addis Ababa Agreement.

Article 2.
There will be an end to all military operations and to all armed actions in the Southern Region from the time of cease-fire.

Article 3.
All combat forces shall remain in the area under their control at the time of the cease-fire.
Article 4.
- Both parties agree to forbid any individual or collective acts of violence.
- Any underground activities contrary to public order shall cease.

Article 5.
Movements of individual members of both combat forces outside the areas under their control shall be allowed only if these individuals are unarmed and authorised by their respective authorities. The plans for stationing troops from the National Army shall be such as to avoid any contact between them and the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement combat forces.

Article 6.
A Joint Commission is hereby created for the implementation of all question related to the cease-fire including repatriation of refugees. The Joint Commission shall include members from all the countries bordering on the Southern Region as well as representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross, World Council of Churches, All Africa Conference of Churches and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

Article 7.
The Joint Commission shall propose all measures to be undertaken by both parties in dealing with all incidents after a full inquiry on the spot.

Article 8.
Each party shall be represented on the Joint Commission by one senior military officer and a maximum of five other members.

Article 9.
The headquarters of the Joint Commission shall be located in Juba with provincial branches in Juba, Malakal and Wau.

Article 10.
The Joint Commission shall appoint local commissions in various centres of the Southern Region composed of two members from each party.

PROTOCOLS ON INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS

CHAPTER 1: INTERIM ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS
(Political, Local Government and Civil Service)

Article 1.
The President of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan shall, in consultation with the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (S.S.L.M.) and branches of the Sudanese Socialist Union in the Southern Region, appoint the President and members of an Interim High Executive Council.

Article 2.
The Interim High Executive Council shall consist of the President and other members with portfolios in:

a) Finance and Economic Planning.
b) Education.
c) Information, Culture and Tourism.
d) Communication and Transport.
e) Agriculture, Animal Production and Fisheries.
f) Public Health.
g) Regional Administration (Local Government, Legal Affairs, Police and Prisons).
h) Housing, Public Works and Utilities.

i) Natural Resources and Rural Development (Land Use, Rural Water Supply, Forestry and Cooperatives).

j) Public Service and Labour.

k) Minerals and Industry, Trade and Supply.

Article 3.
The Interim High Executive Council shall, in accordance with national laws, establish a Regional Civil Service subject to ratification by the People's Regional Assembly.

Article 4.
The President shall, in consultation with the Interim High Executive Council, determine the date for the election to the People's Regional Assembly, and the Interim High Executive Council shall make arrangements for the setting up of this Assembly.

Article 5.
In order to facilitate the placement in and appointment to both central and regional institutions, the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement shall compile and communicate lists of citizens of the Southern Region outside the Sudan in accordance with details to be supplied by the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform.

Article 6.
The Interim High Executive Council and the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform shall undertake to provide necessary financial allocations with effect from the 1972-73 Budget for such placements and appointments.

Article 7.
The Mandate of the Interim High Executive Council shall not exceed a period of 18 months.

CHAPTER II: TEMPORARY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE COMPOSITION OF UNITS OF THE PEOPLE’S ARMED FORCES IN THE SOUTHERN REGION

Article 1.
These arrangements shall remain in force for a period of five years subject to revision by the President on the request of the President of the High Executive Council acting with the consent of the People's Regional Assembly.

Article 2.
The People's Armed Forces in the Southern Region shall consist of a national force called the Southern Command composed of 12,000 officers and men of whom 6,000 shall be citizens from the Region and the other 6,000 from outside the Region.

Article 3.
The recruitment and integration of citizens from the Southern Region within the aforementioned Forces shall be determined by a Joint Military Commission taking into account the need for initial separate deployment of troops with a view to achieve smooth integration in the national force. The Commission shall ensure that this deployment shall be such that an atmosphere of peace and confidence shall prevail in the Southern Region.
Article 4.
The Joint Military Commission shall be composed of three senior military officers from each side. Decisions of the Joint Military Commission shall be taken unanimously. In case of disagreement such matters shall be referred to the respective authorities.

CHAPTER III: AMNESTY AND JUDICIAL ARRANGEMENTS

Article 1.
No action or other legal proceedings whatsoever, civil or criminal, shall be instituted against any person in any court of law for or on account of any act or matter done inside or outside the Sudan as from the 18th day of August 1955, if such act or matter was done in connection with mutiny, rebellion or sedition in the Southern Region.

Article 2.
If a civil suit in relation to any acts or matters referred to in Article 1 is instituted before or after the date of ratification of the Addis Ababa Agreement such a suit shall be discharged and made null and void.

Article 3.
All persons serving terms of imprisonment or held in detention in respect of offences herein before specified in Article 1 shall be discharged or released within 15 days from the date of ratification of the Addis Ababa Agreement.

Article 4.
The Joint Cease-Fire Commission shall keep a register of all civilian returnees, which register shall serve to certify that the person therein named are considered indemnified within the meaning of this Agreement provided that the Commission may delegate such power to the Diplomatic Missions of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan in the case of citizens from the Southern Region living abroad and to whom the provisions of this Agreement apply.

Article 5.
In the case of armed returnees or those belonging to combat forces the Joint Military Commission shall keep a similar register of those persons who shall be treated in the same manner as provided for in Article 4.

Article 6.
Notwithstanding the provisions of Articles 4 and 5 above a Special Tribunal and ad hoc judicial powers shall be established to examine and decide on those cases which in the estimation of the authorities do not meet the conditions for amnesty specified in Article 1 of this Agreement. The Special Tribunal shall be composed of a President appointed by the President of the Republic and not more than four members named by the Cease-Fire Commission.

Article 7.
Cases referred to in Article 6 shall be brought to the attention of the Special Tribunal by request of the Minister of Justice.

Article 8.
The Amnesty Provisions contained in this Agreement as well as the powers of the Special Tribunal shall remain in force until such time as the President after consultation with the commissions referred to in this Agreement, decide that they have fulfilled their functions.
CHAPTER IV:
REPARTIATION AND RESETTLEMENT COMMISSION

I: Repatriation

Article 1.
There shall be established a Special Commission inside and where required outside the Southern Region charged with the responsibility of taking all administrative and other measures as may be necessary in order to repatriate all citizens from the Southern Region who today are residing in other countries and especially in the neighbouring countries.

The headquarters of the Commission shall be in Juba.

Article 2.
The Commission shall be composed of at least three members including one representative of the Central Government, one representative of the Southern Region and one representative of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. For those commissions operating outside the Sudan, a representative of the host Government shall be included, plus the Central Government representative who shall be the Ambassador of the Sudan or his representative.

Article 3.
The control of repatriation at the borders shall be assumed by the competent border authorities in co-operation with the representatives of the Resettlement Commission.

Article 4.
The repatriation commission shall work very closely with the Commission for Relief and Resettlement to ensure that the operation and timing of the returning of refugees from across the borders is adequately co-ordinated.

II: Resettlement

Article 1.
There shall be established a Special Commission for Relief and Resettlement under the President of the Interim High Executive Council with headquarters in Juba and provincial branches in Juba, Malakal and Wau. The Commission, its branches and whatever units it may deem fit to create in other localities in order to facilitate its functions, shall be responsible for co-ordination and implementation of all relief services and planning related to Resettlement and Rehabilitation of all returnees, that is:

a) Refugees from neighbouring countries;
b) Displaced persons resident in the main centres of the Southern Region and other parts of the Sudan;
c) Displaced persons including residual Anya Nya personnel and supporters in the bush;
d) Handicapped and orphans.

Article 2.
Although resettlement and rehabilitation of refugees and displaced persons is administratively the responsibility of the Regional Government the present conditions in the Southern Region dictate that efforts of the whole nation of the Sudan and International Organisations should be pooled to help and rehabilitate persons affected by the conflict. The Relief and Resettlement Commission shall co-ordinate activities and resources of the Organisations within the country.

Article 3.
The first priority shall be the resettlement of displaced persons within the Sudan in the following order:
a) Persons presently residing in overcrowded centres in the Southern Region, and persons desirous to return to their original areas and homes;
b) Persons returning from the bush including Anya Nya Supporters;
c) Handicapped persons and orphans.

Article 4.
The second priority shall be given to returnees from the neighbouring and other countries according to an agreed plan. This plan shall provide for:

a) Adequate reception centres with facilities for shelter, food supplies, medicine and medicaments;
b) Transportation to permanent resettlement villages or places of origin;
c) Materials and equipment.

Article 5.
The Relief and Resettlement Commission shall:

a) Appeal to international organisations and voluntary agencies to continue assistance for students already under their support particularly for students in secondary schools and higher institutions until appropriate arrangements are made for their repatriation;
b) Compile adequate information on students and persons in need of financial support from the Sudan Government.

Article 6.
The Relief and Resettlement Commission shall arrange for the education of all returnees who were attending primary schools.

This Agreement is hereby concluded on this twenty-seventh day of the month of February in the year one thousand nine hundred and seventy two, A.D., in this City, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, between the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan on the one hand and the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement on the other. It shall come into force on the date and hour fixed for its ratification by the President of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan and the Leader of the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement. It shall be ratified by the said two Leaders in person or through their respective authorised Representatives, in this City, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, at the twelfth hour at noon, on the twelfth day of the month of March in the year one thousand nine hundred and seventy two, A.D.

In witness whereof, we the Representatives of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan and the Representatives of the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement hereby append our signatures in the presence of the Representative of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Ethiopia and the Representatives of the World Council of Churches, the All Africa Conference of Churches, and the Sudan Council of Churches.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE SUDAN

1. Abel Allier-Wal Kuai, Vice-President and Minister of State for Southern Affairs.
2. Dr. Mansour Khalid, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
3. Dr. Gaafar Mohammed Ali Bakheit, Minister for Local Government.
5. Abdel Rahman Abdalla, Minister of Public Service and Administrative Reform.
7. Colon Kamal Abasbar.
FOR THE SOUTHERN SUDAN LIBERATION MOVEMENT

2. Dr. Lawrence Wol Wol, Secretary of the Delegation.
4. Colonel Frederick Brian Maggot, Special Military Representative.
5. Oliver Batali Albino, Member.
6. Angelo Voga Morjan, Member.
7. Rev. Paul Poot, Member.
8. Job Adier de Jok, Member.

WITNESSES

1. Nabiylul Kifle, Representative of His Imperial Majesty, the Emperor of Ethiopia.
2. Leopoldo J. Nillus, Representative of the World Council of Churches.
4. Burgess Carr, General Secretary All Africa Conference of Churches.
5. Samuel Athi Bwogo, Representative of Sudan Council of Churches.

ATTERTATION

I attest that these signatures are genuine and true.

BURGESS CARR, Moderator.