COMPARING THE BASQUE DIASPORA: Ethnonationalism, transnationalism and identity maintenance in Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Peru, the United States of America, and Uruguay

by
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Abstract

Through a comparison of Basque diaspora populations in six countries, this thesis describes and analyzes ethnicity maintenance, transnational consciousness, and ethnonational tendencies of self-defining Basques. I argue that despite geographical and generational differences, the core elements of Basque identity are defined in a constant manner, and ethnic institutions have developed according to similar patterns. I categorize these populations as ‘diaspora’ utilizing Cohen’s definition, and give examples of their (1) traumatic dispersal from an original homeland; (2) expansion from the homeland in pursuit of colonial ambitions, trade, or work; (3) shared myth and collective memory of their homeland; (4) idealization of their homeland; (5) return movement; (6) sustained strong ethnic group consciousness; (7) sense of solidarity with co-ethnic members in other countries; and (8) distinctive and enriched lives in tolerant host countries.

I suggest chain migration and consistent interaction with the homeland have strengthened transnational ties and diasporic consciousness. Contemporary relations between Basque diaspora communities and the Basque Government have fomented and reinvigorated ethnicity maintenance for many from the thirty-eight Basque associations represented. Tajfel’s ‘positive social identity’ theory aids in partially explaining ethnic identity preservation in Uruguay, Argentina and some areas of the United States, though respondents in Australia, Peru, and Belgium tend to employ primordialist vocabulary to interpret their persistent ethnonationalism. While homeland definitions of “Basqueness” have progressed to a more civic and inclusive nationalism, diaspora definitions tend to follow the traditional conservativism of Sabino Arana and ancestry, language, and religion.

A multimethod approach creates original quantitative and qualitative data from 832 written anonymous questionnaires and 348 personal interviews. SPSS empirical data analysis facilitated cross-tabulations and comparisons.
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS

_Aberri Eguna:_ Day of the Fatherland (coincides with Easter Sunday)
_abertzale:_ patriot
_Aitzan Artean:_ "Sisters All"; a Basque women's organization in Boise, Idaho USA
_Araba:_ Alava
_arreba:_ a female sibling of a male
_barrio:_ neighborhood
_baserri:_ farmhouse
_batua:_ a standardized and unified Basque language currently taught
_Behe Nafarroa:_ one of the Basque provinces in France
_berri:_ new
_Bilbo:_ Bilbao, capital city of Bizkaia
_biltzarrak:_ elected popular assemblies
_Bizkaia:_ Vizcaya
.Castilla:_ Castile
_chorizo:_ typical sausage used in Basque cooking
_Donostia:_ San Sebastian, capital city of Gipuzkoa
_Donibane Lohitzun:_ St. Jean-de-Luz
_Emakume Abertzale Batza:_ United Patriotic Women; the women's branch of the PNV
_ertzaintza:_ Basque police
_españolista:_ a person who loves things Spanish; derogatory term for Basques who are not nationalist, or patriots
_etarra:_ member of ETA
_Euskadi:_ Basque Country as the current political entity of Araba, Bizkaia, and Gipuzkoa
_Euskadi eta Askatasuna (ETA):_ Basque Homeland and Liberty
_Euskadiko Ezkerra (EE):_ Basque Left, political party
_Euskal Etxeak:_ literally Basque houses or homes; Basque Centers outside of the Basque Country
_Euskal Etxeak:_ the name of the journal published by the Basque Government for the diaspora Basques
_Euskal Herria:_ Basque Country as an historical entity including all seven provinces
_Euskal Herriarrok:_ literally "those from Euskal Herria"; leftist nationalist political party; new name for Herri Batasuna
_euskaldun:_ a person that speaks the Basque language; _euskaldunak_ is the plural Basque speaking people
_Eusko Alkartasuna (EA):_ Basque Solidarity, political party that split from the PNV
_Eusko Jaurlaritza:_ the government of the Basque Autonomous Community
_esukera:_ the Basque language
_Euskadi:_ Sabino Arana's original term for the Basque Country including all seven provinces
_fueros:_ local charters and laws
_fors:_ French equivalent of _fueros_
_frontón:_ two or three walled court used to play handball (pelota) and paddle ball (pala)
_Fundación:_ Foundation, the foundations established in the diaspora by the Basque Government for economic endeavors regarding the Basque Country and that host country
_Gasteiz:_ Vitoria, capital city of the Basque Autonomous Community
_Gernika:_ Guernica
_Gipuzkoa:_ Guipúzcoa
Guardia Civil: Spanish Civil Guard utilized as military police
haizpa: a female sibling of a female
haizpak: sisters
Hegoalde: South, Southern Basque Country, the four provinces in Spain
Herri Batasuna: People’s Unity; leftist nationalist party; political arm of Euskadi eta Askatasuna; name changed to Euskal Herritarrok (those from Euskal Herria)
ikastola: a school which utilizes the Basque language for instruction
ikurriña: Basque flag
Instituto: Institute; the institutes established in the diaspora by the Basque Government for economic endeavors regarding the Basque Country and that host country
Iparralde: North, Northern Basque Country, the three provinces in France
lauburu: a Basque symbol with four heads similar to 🌹
Lapurdi: one of the Basque provinces in France
Larak Bat: literally “the four are one”, meaning the four Basque provinces; also the name of various diaspora Basque Centers and publications
Lehendakari: President of the Basque Government
mus: card game
Nafarroa: the province of Navarra in Spain, Navarre in English
pala: ball game similar to paddle ball
Partido Nacionalista Vasco: Basque Nationalist Party, PNV
pelota: handball
Pyrénées-Atlantiques: French administrative Department that includes the three Basque provinces of Ziberoa, Lapurdi, and Behe Nafarroa
Reconquista: the Reconquest of Muslim Spain by the Catholics 718-1611
Sociedad de Socorros Mutuos: Society of Mutual Aid
tortilla: egg omelette
txistu: Basque three-holed flute
txistulari: person that plays the txistu
Vizcaya: the Spanish for Bizkaia
Vizcaínos: the Spanish for people from Vizcaya
Zazpirak Bat: literally “the seven are one”, meaning the seven Basque provinces; also the name of various diaspora Basque Centers and organizations
Ziberoa: one of the Basque provinces in France
ONE

Introduction

We left the Basque country for political reasons. One of our daughters is in prison as a convicted ETA sympathizer, and another daughter decided to stay in Donostia, so we go home often. Brussels is close and it is easy to keep up with the events in Euskadi. We will go back some day after she is released. I will not live in a country where my daughter is in a cage (T. Egibar 1995).

I don’t ever remember a time when I didn’t know I was Basque. Although my parents didn’t speak to me in Basque, my mother spoke to her mother in Basque. My grandparents came to the U.S. from Ibarrangeluela and wanted to forget the old country. They couldn’t. I was born in the U.S. and thought I could be like the Americans. I can’t (Garatea Lejardi 1995).

Well you see I was a sugarcane cutter. It is not a prestigious job like my grandfather had in Zornotza where he owned a sawmill. But times were hard in the 60s and I needed to find work. Because I took my wife from her family and our homeland, I have tried to recover that part of Euskal Herria by helping to organize the Basque club of Sydney. We imagine that we are still in Zornotza and recreate the fiestas every year. My children know their history and I hope will teach it to their children (Orúe 1995).

Fifth generation Uruguayan. Can you imagine that I just visited my family’s farmhouse near Donibane Garazi for the first time? I wept. I wept for all that I have missed. For that which my parents and grandparents never knew. All of my ancestors in Uruguay died without knowing, without feeling, without smelling, without completing. Can you imagine that I have just visited my family’s farmhouse (Maytia 1995).

In November of 1995, Gasteiz (Vitoria), the capital city of the Basque Autonomous Community in Spain, hosted the First World Congress of Basque Collectivities. The fourteen different countries sending delegates were as diverse as Canada, with a few thousand Basques and one formal organization in the making, to Argentina, which boasts of three and one-half million Basques, seventy-two separate Basque organizations, and numerous smaller social clubs. Delegates had been elected or appointed by their organizations to travel to the Basque Country, Euskal Herria in the Basque language, to help the Basque Autonomous Government formulate policy regarding Basques in the diaspora.

Curiously these Basques had more in common than not. Comments from interviews, such as those mentioned above, revealed very similar responses whether from fourth generation Uruguayans, fifth generation Argentineans, first generation Australians, or second
generation Belgians; "we are Basques who live outside of the homeland but that does not make us any less Basque." A fourth generation Basque from Peru and a second generation immigrant to Chile agreed with a fifth generation Basque from Uruguay regarding tax policy in the Basque country. Three second generation women, from the United States, Argentina, and Venezuela all carried the same definition of which characteristics are important for the maintenance of Basque identity.

Until this Congress, these people had not met each other, nor had any of these organizations ever interacted institutionally with the exception of Argentina with Uruguay. If generally accepted theories of acculturation and assimilation would be considered, these Basques should have all been very distinct from each other because of the influence of the host society to which their ancestors had emigrated. By the fifth generation there should be exhibited characteristics common of the new society. Why then was there so much homogeneity and consensus in their views toward ethnonationalism and ethnic identity maintenance when their host societies are so different from one another? This thesis aims to answer this puzzling question and to describe diaspora Basques individually and collectively in regards to their persistent connection to Basque ethnic identity and to their transnational diaspora linkages.

The phenomenon of ethnic identity emerges where the subjects of anthropology, sociology, political science and psychology converge. The contemporary escalation of ethnonationalism and ethnicity as determining factors in political conflict demands their urgent scrutiny, investigation and analysis. The definition of ethnic identity as will be demonstrated is not stagnant, and in the case of the Basques is being constructed amongst its population as political, economic, technological, and human geography factors take on new significance. In what ways is the concept of ethnic identity transformed when the definition is created and established outside the homeland of the ethnic group? What effect does a host society have on an immigrant's self-identification with their ancestors, with their myths and history of origin, with the homeland events, and traditional culture? In Chapter Three I will explain that a formerly accepted definition of a Basque was a person born in the Basque country, of Basque ancestry, and who spoke the Basque language. Can a person who has none of these attributes be, or become, Basque? Today, many of the hundreds of thousands of Basques who left the homeland for economic opportunities and for political exile, and their descendants which currently outnumber those living in the Basque country, are answering 'yes'. The diaspora represents the extraterritoriality of Basqueness.
I will investigate what constitutes Basque diaspora identity if it is no longer defined and described by territory, language, or ancestry as in traditional Basque nationalism. For those in the diaspora, it is beneficial to modify who can be included since most of them have only one of three of these attributes, that of ancestry. The ancestry for many is also quite mixed and ‘diluted’, as they are fourth and fifth generation in their host countries and their ancestors have intermarried with other ethnic groups. My investigation was prompted by curiosity about why the Basque identity persists for these people, and what is it about being Basque, and the characteristics and behaviors of Basque people that allow this culture to endure and not only maintain itself, but recently demonstrate an actual growth in its interest- and how this is related to the process of globalization. I also search for evidence of instrumental reasons and benefits derived by creating and maintaining transnational links with the homeland and with other Basque diaspora communities.

These themes can be examined by comparing Basques of different generations in different host societies. This study will examine the self-identifying Basques in Argentina, Uruguay, Peru, the United States, Australia, and Belgium. Each has a different time period and circumstance for emigration out of Euskal Herria, with Peru and Argentina being the earliest and Belgium the most recent. Most emigrants left in search of economic opportunities and for political exile. Over the centuries they departed from each of the seven provinces from both sides of the Spanish-French state border, speaking Spanish, French, and a variety of dialects of Basque. Regardless of their local diversity, they united to form similar Basque institutions with the goals of maintaining their traditions and ethnic identity, fomenting the music, dance, poetry, cuisine, history, sports, language, and religious practices of their ancestors' homeland. These are not reproductions of homeland religious or cultural institutions or networks as seen in other diaspora communities, but immigrant specific organizations and later ethnicity maintenance organizations.

**Rationale for this Study**

Past research of Basques in the diaspora has focused on institutions, descriptions of communal structures and their activities (Cava Mesa 1996; Escobedo Mansilla 1996), histories of immigrants and their participation in and the development of the local economies (Pérez-Agote 1997; Galindez 1984; Douglass and Bilbao 1975), the Basque Government-in-exile during the dictatorship of General Francisco Franco and subsequent political exiles (Amezaga Clark 1991; San Sebastian 1991; Anasagasti 1988; Beltza 1977), and biographies of Basque
personalities who climbed the economic and social ladders in their prospective countries (Azcona Pastor 1992; Pildain 1984; Decroos 1980). There are no published studies (in English, Spanish, or Basque) of contemporary Basque diaspora identity, nor of Basque ethnonationalism in the diaspora, nor any comparisons of Basque diaspora communities and their activities and programs for culture maintenance, structure, goals, and future plans. There is a vacuum in studies of Basque diaspora communities and their relations with homeland institutions, both public and private. There are no publications regarding the current Basque Government's attempts to create business and political ties in the host societies using the prestige and status of the immigrant Basque organizations to open these designated doors. There are no works describing or analyzing the effects of globalization on Basque ethnic identity.

This thesis then is original in its contributions to ethnic studies and is the first comparison of Basque communities in the diaspora. Benefitting from historical analysis of Basques in the Americas from the fifteenth to mid-twentieth centuries (Douglass and Bilbao 1975; Azcona Pastor 1992; Alvarez Gila 1996; Pérez-Agote 1997) and their tendencies to group and form associations, this project builds on their foundations and extends into contemporary research in anthropology, nationalism, and ethnicity and diaspora studies. Although there are academic theses and materials published dealing with the history of Basque emigration to Argentina, Uruguay, Peru, and the United States that are extremely beneficial (Douglass and Bilbao 1975; Azcona Pastor 1992; Bilbao Azkarrreta 1992; Ruiz de Azua 1992; Caviglia and Villar 1994) there are only a few descriptive studies of Basques in Australia (Douglass 1987; Orúe 1993), and nothing for Belgium, excepting an excellent study of war evacuees and orphans cared for during and after the Spanish Civil War (Legarreta 1984). I have created this primary source information from additional research and interviews in both countries.

The fields of immigration research, ethnic identity persistence, and diaspora-homeland relations are underdeveloped yet emerging academic topics. There is ample description referring to certain groups in certain countries, for example the Jewish, Greek and Armenian diasporas, Irish in the United States, Greeks in Australia, Italians in Argentina etc., but theories of explanation and testing of the salience of ethnicity outside of the homeland are lacking. Chapter Two examines the fundamental concepts and theories concerning personal and social identity for immigrants, and creates a map of possible directions from which to choose for understanding and explaining diasporas and transnational ethnic identity.
persistence of Basques in their various host societies.

In the following chapters I will demonstrate support for and advance five hypotheses regarding ethnic identity maintenance in the Basque diaspora, including:

1. Despite geographical and generational differences, the core elements of Basque ethnic identity in these six countries are defined in a constant manner by self-defining Basques in the diaspora, and their ethnic institutions have developed according to similar patterns.

2. Basque collectivities in these six countries do exhibit a diaspora mentality, as defined by Robin Cohen: (1) dispersal from an original homeland, often traumatically; (2) alternatively, the expansion from a homeland in search of work, in pursuit of trade or to further colonial ambitions; (3) a collective memory and myth about the homeland; (4) an idealization of the supposed ancestral homeland; (5) a return movement; (6) a strong ethnic group consciousness sustained over a long time; (7) a troubled relationship with host societies; (8) a sense of solidarity with co-ethnic members in other countries; and (9) the possibility of a distinctive creative, enriching life in tolerant host countries (Cohen 1997:180). They imagine themselves as connected to the homeland and to each other. I suggest chain migration and constant interaction with the homeland through transnational ties have strengthened this diaspora consciousness.

3. A resurgence in ethnic identity salience is related to globalization but is not a partner in a causal relationship, nor a defensive reaction to it. The tools of global communications are being embraced and utilized by the homeland and the diaspora to educate and to inter-communicate. Global technology networks are perceived as positive mediums for Basque diaspora ethnic identity creation of interest, maintenance, and enhancement, but are merely fortifying and simplifying transnationalism- an already existing phenomenon.

4. Gender does not affect Basque ethnic identity maintenance, nor the definition of ‘Basqueness’ itself. However, first generation males and females perceive and understand the act of immigration and the process of acculturation differently.

5. Homeland definitions of nationalism and ‘Basqueness’ have progressed to a more civic and inclusive nationalism, while diaspora definitions lag behind. They tend to follow the traditional conservativism of the 1900’s father of Basque nationalism Sabino Arana y Goiri definitions linked to exclusive race, language, and religion. I propose that as communications and transnational links are intensified and accelerated with the process of globalization, the diaspora definitions of ‘Basqueness’ will more closely mirror those in Euskal Herria.

**Plan of the Thesis**

In order to fortify an understanding of the phenomena in this thesis Chapter Two reviews several of the well-known interpretations given to ethnicity and ethnic identity maintenance and persistence, and to diaspora theories. Unlike many other group
memberships, ethnicity is oriented toward the past, the history and origin of family, group, and nation. Ethnic identity and diasporic imagination combine the past with one’s present and future selves.

To understand the Basque collective past, real and imagined, Chapter Three describes Basque history as written by Basques and non-Basques, and the importance of the old foral laws and collective nobility which are elements of homeland and diaspora identity. I will trace Basque nationalism from the 1700s to Sabino Arana y Goiri’s pronouncements of the 1900s, continuing through the establishment of the Basque Nationalist Party, and Euskadi eta Askatasuna, ETA, Basque Homeland and Liberty, to the contemporary homeland and diaspora definitions and attitudes towards Basque nationalism. The Basques’ own perceptions of their history are essential to understanding their myth of a collective past and diaspora consciousness.

Chapter Four discusses the formation of the Basque economic and political diaspora by focusing on four stages; Basques as an element in Spanish colonization of Latin America, the Carlist Wars and primogeniture inheritance systems, the Spanish Civil War and Franco dictatorship exiles, and current temporary migration of young educated professionals.

Basque diasporans’ political attitudes toward homeland politics are exhibited in Chapter Five. I include participants’ interview results and survey response attitudes toward separatism and independence movements, homeland and host country political partisanship; their political mobilization as communities; and the exclusivity, and more recent inclusivity of their definitions of Basque identity. Survey results will demonstrate the degree to which these Basque diaspora communities are politically or culturally defined, and whether or not there are differences based on variables of generation, geography or gender.

Chapter Six analyzes the maintenance of Basque cultural traditions in the diaspora, Basque language preservation, the effects of globalization and the Internet in ‘downloading identity’, ties to Euskal Herria, and institutional connections between Basques through their ethnic Basque Centers. I also delve into the idea of a Basque sisterhood and search for gender similarities in migration experiences. The daily ethnic socialization process and banal Basque ethnonationalism are explored when I examine home decoration and personal adornment used by Basques in these six countries.

I interpret the development of homeland-diaspora personal and institutional networks in Chapter Seven, and explain the Law of Relations with the Basque Collectivities in the Exterior and its fundamental importance to future relations between and among the Basques.
worldwide. Spanish Constitutional and Basque statutory law and policy making for the diaspora are detailed in regards to Congresses of Basque Diaspora Collectivities, Basque Government grant subsidies, diaspora rights and benefits including voting, and to the extension of Basque media to the diaspora communities.

Concluding observations compare my analysis of the Basque diaspora to that of other diasporas, and present my suggestions for future research of transnational identity, diaspora communities, and the relationships both have with the process and effects of globalization.

Choosing the Right Words

In the complex reality of 'the Basque Country', there are Spanish names for Basque places and Basque names for Spanish places, to say nothing of the north which is bestowed with the equivalent puzzle- in French. How one determines the 'correct' name for an appropriate place depends much on one's own identity and political opinions. In an attempt to not offend, I will utilize Spanish names for Spanish places and people, French names for French places and people, and Basque names for Basque places and people. For example, the Basque town of Gernika will be presented as Gernika, and not in the Spanish spelling of Guernica. How simple this would be if all agreed to what counts as Spanish, French and Basque. For this thesis I utilize the current geo-political boundaries as stipulated in the Spanish Constitution of 1978, the Statutes of Autonomy of Euskadi of 1979, and the Statutes of Autonomy of Nafarroa of 1979, and the French department of Pyrénées-Atlantiques. The "Pyrénées-Atlantiques" encompasses the Basque provinces of Lapurdi, Behe Nafarroa, and Zuberoa; "Euskadi" is the political name for the politically and economically autonomous region that covers the provinces of Araba, Bizkaia, and Gipuzkoa; and "Nafarroa" is the separate autonomous province of Nafarroa. The Glossary of Terms gives the Spanish or French equivalent for Basque towns, but in the thesis body I will use only the Basque language names after the initial explanation.

When communicating Basque language terminology, there are various spellings and entire words that can be different depending on the regional variations. I apply the standardized Basque language, known as batua, one or united, which is the official variation of the Basque Autonomous Government, the Basque public media, and of the Basque Language Academy. Especially important are uses of "the Basque Country", "Euskal Herria" by which I mean all seven provinces described above; "Euskadi", which denotes only the three provinces of Araba, Bizkaia, and Gipuzkoa; and "Nafarroa" which includes only
the lands in today’s Spain which made up the historical Kingdom of Navarre and today is ruled by its own Statutes of Autonomy. “Euskadi” is problematic because in traditional Basque nationalism, “Euzkadi” meant all of the Basque Country. Some interview details utilize “Euzkadi” though when allowed to elaborate, were discussing “Euskal Herria”, all seven provinces. Consequently, I have paraphrased some interview quotations in order to clarify to the reader the object of the subject’s discussion.

Research Methodology

Survey Questionnaire

The empirical data utilized in this thesis is based on the results of 348 personal interviews, and 832 anonymous written questionnaires surveying men and women, over 18, of Basque descent, who are current members of Basque organizations in Argentina, Uruguay, Peru, the United States, Australia, and Belgium. These six states have been chosen as representing the most disparate examples of Basque diaspora host societies. From oldest to most recent migration, largest to smallest diaspora Basque populations, furthest and nearest to the homeland- by comparing attitudes, opinions and values of these immigrants and their descendants in totally different host societies- I am able to compare the aggregate answers in each society and then compare from country to country looking for similarities and differences using cross tabulations.

Of course there are limits to what one Ph.D. student can accomplish. Being a single investigator lacking outside funding made it impossible to find and survey non-identifying Basques living in the same cities where these forty-three Basque organizations investigated herein are located. In the United States and Australia women tend to change their recognizable Basque surnames to that of their husband’s, making it extremely difficult to locate Basque women married with non-Basque men, and in each of these six countries, telephone book listings tend to print only the male head-of-household’s names. Personal interviews do include snowball samples with self-identifying Basques that are, and others who are not currently, members of Basque organizations. The research focuses on those who do identify with their ethnicity and who do participate and have contact with other Basques through their organizations. In order to facilitate the research by utilizing membership mailing lists, and to remove the variable of the organizations themselves and their impact on their members or non-members, only those Basques who associate themselves with a Basque organization are included in the 832 survey data. Searching for those Basques who maintain
ties with their homeland to keep within the diaspora definition also necessarily excludes those who have completely assimilated and/or have no interest in their ethnicity and ancestral homeland, or are not interested in manifesting their ethnic identity collectively or publicly. Therefore, this data is generalizable only to those Basques who tend to identify themselves as Basque, and mostly to those who have joined a Basque organization in the diaspora.

Independent variables include generation; host country; occupation and level of income; level of formal education; gender; marital status and whether or not the person is married to another Basque; if one or both parents are Basque; age, and frequency of travel to the Basque Country. The comparisons will investigate how these variables affect the attitudes, values, opinions, and definitions of Basque identity, homeland ties, and how each and combinations of variables affect the behavioral practice of ethnic traditions.

Measuring for differences between genders, I have taken into account a recent United States study of adolescent children of Jamaican, Nicaraguan, Hmong, Cuban, Filipino, Vietnamese, Laotian, Cambodian, and Mexican immigrants to the United States which showed a significant difference in the choice of forms of self-identification (Rumbaut 1994:775). Males were more likely to identify in unhyphenated terms as 'American', or by national origin, whereas females were more likely to choose an additive binational identity label such as 'Cuban-American' or 'Vietnamese-American.' Another study of second generation black Caribbean immigrants in New York reports that gender shapes the meaning attached to different types of ethnic self-identity. Waters suggests that the boundaries between different types of identity are more fluid for females than for males and that the task of developing an ethnic identity is bound up with issues of gender identity as well (as cited in Rumbaut 1994:778). I examine gender and its effects on diaspora ethnic identity in Chapters Five, Six, and Seven.

Classical ethnicity theory assumes that with improved socioeconomic status, people of immigrant descent assimilate into the mainstream host society culture, leaving behind communal structures to the working class. Ethnicity is seen by many scholars as a working- and lower-class phenomenon (Gans 1982; Esser 1982 as cited in Alba 1990:27). The idea is consistent with the assimilationist interpretations, that ethnicity is strongest among socially disadvantaged groups and is eroded by social mobility. My evidence is to the contrary. Even when controlling for the costs involved in joining one of these Basque clubs (which are minimal except for the $3000 entrance fee of the San Francisco Basque Club and Cultural Center in the United States), extremely wealthy Basques, upper-middle class and lower-middle
class, and pensioners alike are members of these organizations and participate in this perpetuation of ethnicity. I did not expect responses to vary with economic class, although economic class may vary with generation. Each of these variables are separated and analyzed for their impact.

Questionnaire respondents were randomly chosen from organization membership lists and were telephoned or mailed introductory letters followed by the questionnaire. Others were telephoned to introduce the research and then these people came to the Basque Centers, or a chosen restaurant, office, or person's private residence to collect the questionnaire. Respondents either mailed the anonymous questionnaires to the Basque organization address or personally left it at the Basque Center or gave it to the researcher. Items included general ethnic identity variables (di Leonardo 1984; Alba 1990, Waters 1990, Bakalian 1995; Okamura 1998) and specific to Basque ethnicity variables (Douglass 1989; 1993; Pérez-Agote 1984; 1986; Ramirez Goicoechea 1991). Both conceptual and nominal definitions of ethnicity were used in the questionnaires.

Participants could choose to respond to English or Spanish versions of the questionnaire and answered anonymously. Basque editions were not provided to eliminate confusion over which dialect and spellings to send, and the majority of the minority of those in the diaspora that do speak Basque are illiterate in Basque. The leadership of the Basque organizations in Belgium assured me that no French or Flemish versions were necessary for the Belgian Basques as the older Basques all spoke Spanish, and the younger ones spoke English or Spanish. British English was utilized for the Australian version and United States spellings for that of the United States. The Spanish versions were all pre-tested with native speakers from each separate country to allow for colloquialisms and variations in Spanish. The Appendix includes copies of both the English and Spanish versions of the questionnaire.

Detailed Interviews

Qualitative in-depth interviews reinforced the quantitative evidence collected and embellished an understanding of these populations in their respective settings. Analysis of unstructured interview data was the second phase in a multimethod approach to incorporating qualitative and quantitative data. While the survey measured behavioral ethnicity, attitudes

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and opinions, the interview information focused on definitions of ‘Basqueness’ with
discussions centering on values, attitudes, and opinions regarding maintenance and persistence
of Basque ethnic identity for the individuals themselves and for their communities, and in what
manner the interviewees' exhibited the common factors of diaspora groups (Cohen 1997:26).
Persons selected for consultation included Basque priests, language teachers, dance
instructors, athletes, musicians, journalists, cooks, volunteers who organize Basque club
events, and general members, all from the institutional memberships. Because there are no
studies of these immigrants' values, attitudes, and opinions the interview responses are crucial
to understanding and obtaining more than a superficial picture of what is developing in the
communities. Interviews were conducted in Spanish or English and sometimes a combination
of both, and others included Basque (utilizing another combination of this researcher’s
knowledge of *batua* and Bizkaian Basque).

Interviews were conducted with purposive samples and snowball samples from those.
The goal of purposive sampling is to explore the range of possible responses rather than
determine their distribution or frequency (Miles and Huberman 1994; Rowles and Reinhartz
1988; Trost 1986). The questionnaires give the information for the prevalence and distribution
of certain elements. While the questionnaire respondents were selected from random samples
from Basque organizations membership lists, the individuals interviewed are not a
representative sample of Basque population in each host country. They are self-identified
Basques who exhibit interest in their ethnic identity at least by participating in the
organizations and/or in organization activities, and represent the range of intensity of Basque
diaspora identity.

Personal interviews (as well as the questionnaires) were conducted in Argentina,
Australia, Belgium, Peru, the United States of America, Uruguay, and the Basque Country
during 1995-1999. Respondents range from 18 to 101 years in age, span five generations of
immigration, possess low to high formal education and income levels, and live in rural,
suburban and urban areas. Numerous Basque cultural festivals, dinners, dances, funerals,
weddings, choir performances, athletic events, and membership meetings were attended in
these countries. Because the transmission of Basque identity has largely been accomplished
through the Basque Center activities where individuals can manifest their ethnic identity in a
social setting, if a town had a physical building, meeting hall, bar or restaurant etc. for a
Basque Center, I visited it to include interviews of those people managing the facilities.
These questionnaire and interview responses have created the nucleus of this thesis comparing Basque diaspora definitions of Basque ethnonationalism, identity, and diaspora consciousness, and I am indebted to these participants for their willingness to disclose of themselves for academic research. The depth of the interviews with the breadth of the survey questionnaires constitute a comprehensive study. This first ever comparative research of diaspora Basque immigrants' attitudes establishes a foundation for future inquiry and investigation.
Theories of Ethnicity, Ethnic Identity Persistence, and Diaspora

What exactly is meant by 'ethnic identity', and what is 'ethnicity'? Is it the language one speaks and the civic territory in which one lives? Then the person originally from Mozambique that moves to London and speaks English becomes English? The person from Shanghai that moves to Bilbao and learns Basque becomes Basque? I do not expect the physical location of a person to be synonymous with their ethnic identity, nor the languages they speak to be the determining factors, such as these Basques living in Australia and speaking English. Persons outside of an ethnic group cannot define who the 'insiders' are. Acceptance and definition of who is 'in' must come from those who are 'in'. In the case of the Basques, ancestry plays a crucial role in this determination. This thesis asks self-defining Basques these very questions. What does it take to be a Basque? Who is considered a Basque and who is not? What characteristics must one have to be a Basque, regardless of where they live?

Prospecting in the anthropology, psychology, sociology, and social-psychology literature reveals a rich body of theories, approaches, and arguments concerning personal and social identity creation and maintenance. When specifically attempting to understand and explain ethnic identity, Fredrik Barth's writings are especially helpful commencing points. Using Naroll's 1964 anthropological definition Barth designates an ethnic group as a population which:

1. Is largely biologically self-perpetuating
2. Shares fundamental cultural values, realized in overt cultural unity in cultural forms
3. Makes up a field of communication and interaction
4. Has a membership which identifies itself, and is identified by others, as constituting a category distinguishable from other categories of the same order (Barth 1969: 10).

His arguments assert that clear boundaries persist and are maintained despite changing participation and membership in the groups; important social relations are maintained across boundaries; cultural differences can persist despite inter-ethnic contact and interdependence; and ethnic groups are categories of ascription and identification by the persons themselves (Barth 1969). This describes the Basque populations to be sampled in each diaspora host country.
A. Theories of Ethnic Identity and Ethnicity

A.1. Primordialism

The concept regarding natural, affective attachments of identity is that of primordialism, first introduced by Shils (1957) when examining the effect of 'primordial qualities' on social interaction. According to Shils, primordial attachments to kin, territory, and religion are characterized by an 'intense state of comprehensive solidarity'. Race and ethnicity are seen as primary sources of loyalty and the essence of the manner in which people group themselves. The primordial perspective focuses attention on the great emotional strength of ethnic bonds because primordial 'givens' are not seen to change. Subsequently da Silva (1975) argues that the continued vitality of Basque nationalism is a result of this emotional power of the Basques' group identity. Primordialists generally argue that ethnic identity is a function of strong emotional ties which are based upon common descent and the distinctive past of a group.

Greeley (1974), Isaacs (1975) and Connor (1978) broadly presume the importance of primordial loyalties and the human primal need to belong. The current tide of ethnonationalism sweeping the world demonstrates that an 'intuitive bond felt toward an informal and unstructured subdivision of mankind is far more profound and potent than any of the ties that bind them to the formal legalistic state structure in which they find themselves' (Connor 1978:377). This could describe diaspora Basques' loyalty to their Basque culture and identity over time and distance even though they are a part of a 'formal legalistic state structure' elsewhere. One's identity need not emanate from where one is physically situated, but instead from ancestral, historical, and experiential factors and a transnational existence and/or diaspora imagination.

The application of Shils' concept is expanded beyond kinship to larger scale groups based on territory, religion, language and other customs by Clifford Geertz (1963). These attachments are the 'givens' of the human condition, rooted in the non-rational foundations of the personality, and provide a basis for affinity with others from the same background. In a more controversial usage, Pierre van den Berghe (1981; 1995:62) connects primordial ethnic feelings to sociobiology which rests on genetic tendencies, derived from the kinship process, to practice 'in-group amity and out-group enmity'. These attachments forming the core of ethnicity then are biological and genetic in nature, making the argument that ethnicity is based upon descent. Paul Brass (Hutchinson and Smith 1994:85) reduces the primordialist assertions to the core features that ethnic groups are based on distinctive cultures or origin.
myths or patterns of exchange with other groups, and persist through time.

The primordial approach to Basque identity would refute the idea that identity is fluid, or rational, or calculated. It seeks a psychological or biological explanation for the behavioral phenomenon of continued ethnic solidarity and ethnic identity persistence. This perspective focuses on the important emotional strength of ethnic bonds that persist over time in radically different environments and adds an historical dimension by highlighting a group's distinctive past. Research aimed at this area has shown that some ethnic attachments persist for hundreds of years, and in certain cases override loyalties to other significant groups such as religious affiliations or economic ties. Spicer (1971) observes that Basque ethnic populations have demonstrated a remarkable capacity to adapt to new environments which has enabled them to maintain their traditional cultural systems. This could help us understand Basque identity persistence in the diaspora five and six generations after emigration.

However, as one can imagine, scholars have queued to dismantle this hypothesis and a condensed barrage follows. Why is it that some Basques in some communities have these primordial attachments and yet others do not? If they are natural, biological, and genetic, everyone should experience these feelings should they not? Why have some Basques dropped their ethnic identity when emigrating and established themselves as Argentineans, or Belgians, or Australians, or from the United States? Why would some Basques in Euskal Herria itself identify themselves as Spanish or French, and not Basque? Identities are subject to change; people change religious beliefs, learn new languages, leave their homelands and settle elsewhere. If the foundation of the argument is in regards to beliefs and practices shared through time, what about new identities that are constructed or reconstructed, or have undergone transformations and adaptations? Primordial sentiments would be fixed, and static would they not?

The direction of causation is the main criticism of primordialism in explaining ethnic solidarity and persistence. George M. Scott, Jr. (1990:155) quotes Vernon Reynolds' own assessment that according to primordialists:

> genes determine psychology and psychology determines individual relationships, group structures and group relationships. However this whole approach tends to ignore the alternative view which places the causal arrows in the opposite direction. In much of conventional sociology... man is conceived as constructing his realities and constructing his society, and constructing the screen through which he views other people and... himself. Man... is a largely self-constructed agent... the use of language and the categories of his cultures are the decisive elements (Reynolds 1980:313).
The final doubts to be addressed refer to the 'in-group amity and out-group enmity', and the waxing and waning of ethnicity. Would these not depend on the social, political, economic, and military circumstances of the day? Perhaps it would be more beneficial and enlightening to examine ethnic identity in different situations.

A.2. Circumstantialist, Mobilizationist, and Instrumentalist Approaches to Ethnicity

In refining these ideas of choosing identities some sociologists argue that ethnic identity is amenable to fluctuations (Matsuo 1992:507), and that ethnicity involves a great deal of choice as demonstrated in Waters' research of European ethnics in the United States (M. Waters 1990). Scott argues that primordial sentiments have to be elicited by some experience, thus they are tied to circumstances (Scott 1990 as quoted in Eller and Coughlan 1996:48). Circumstantialists suggest that ethnic identities have a social source and are not natural givens from birth.

Lyman and Douglass (1973) argued originally that ethnic group boundaries are not only selected and permeable but that people use ethnicity differently in varying situations. The 'us' and the 'them' change according to the circumstances, and different identities are called upon according to their appropriateness for each situation. What is 'appropriate' may also be that which is instrumental in achieving a goal or specific objective. In the early stages of Basque immigration to Argentina, Uruguay, and the United States, Basques were likely to help other Basques setting up bakeries, working in the tanning operations, buying livestock and land, dairying, etc. which meant that this ethnic group, like others, evolved with certain labor specialties. If members of an ethnic group then tend to be relatively homogeneous with respect to occupation and residence when they settle in a new host society, they are affected in much the same way by government actions and policies. Ethnic groups are therefore likely to become interest groups, and this fact breathes new life into Old World social groups and identities (Glazer and Moynihan 1970, Olzak 1983, Nielsen 1985). In societies lacking sharp class divisions, ethnicity may tend to be underscored for social class positioning and then becomes the 'appropriate' instrument used to obtain resources and benefits, or a positive social status and identity.

Theorists who adopt this viewpoint agree on at least one essential feature: renewed ethnic tensions and conflict are not the result of any primordial need to belong, but are the 'conscious efforts of individuals and groups mobilizing ethnic symbols in order to obtain access to social, political, and material resources' (McKay 1982:399). Glazer and Moynihan
write about the 'strategic efficacy of ethnicity', van den Berghe (1976) claims that the use of ethnic symbols for gaining access to economic and political resources is an 'ethnic game' being played in nearly all multi-ethnic societies, and Bernard (1971) and Henry (1976) argue that ethnic identities and ideologies are maintained and highlighted in order to influence political and social policies, though ethnic identity is situationally variable and involves both revivals and creative constructions (Nagel 1994). However, the public profile and degree of participation in politics that ethnic groups achieve in their host countries is related to the wider questions of assimilation and integration and tied to the "host country's legal, political, administrative and cultural-ideological apparatus . . . " (Tölołyam 1996:20). The rational choice account of ethnic identity persistence focuses on group loyalty and the congruence of self-interest and group identification as well as the costs and benefits of ethnic identity maintenance as opposed to total assimilation (Hardin 1995; Congleton 1995: Hechter 1996). Survey data presented here will investigate positive correlations between self-interest and maintenance of Basque ethnic identity, or of transnational ties with the Basque Country.

Douglass and Lyman (1976:214) and Yinger (1976:208) argue that it is very difficult to lump an ethnic group's interests into one political pile, and that with today's integrated labor forces, diversified economies, and mobile populations, members of ethnic groups are seldom in accord with regard to political, economic and moral issues. The fact that a group has interests does not mean it will mobilize as an interest group. Explanations which deal exclusively with political and economic factors 'underrate' the emotional power of ethnic bonds and 'exaggerate' the influence of materialism on human behavior (Connor 1972; Epstein 1978). Indeed, instrumentalist (strategic) and primordialist (cultural) approaches need not be mutually exclusive (A.D. Smith 1984:285). The fact that some ethnic groups pursue domestic and transnational political and economic interests does not mean that all ethnic groups have identical actions, and the groups that do pursue the resources and certain policy outcomes are not ipso facto political interest groups.

What will we find in each of the six selected countries? Belgium, Australia, and the United States have established societies without sharp class divisions and they also have democratic governments where party competition and interest group activity is allowed and encouraged, yet Basques in these countries do not see their ethnicity as an instrument for gaining political power, resources, and benefits. 2 Only 1.9% of the total respondents have

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2 The United States' relatively weak party system and influential interest group activity makes it easier for groups small in number to gain access to domestic political and economic
received any sort of special government benefit by maintaining their Basque identity, and a mere 6.4% believed that Basques, collectively or because of their ethnic identification, could influence their own host country politics. Comparing these survey answers will begin to focus this picture of ethnicity as primordial, circumstantial, instrumental, or something else.

B. Ethnic Identity Persistence

B.1. Assimilation, Acculturation, and Symbolic Ethnicity

Researchers of culture have generally assumed that direct and continuous contact between groups of different cultures leads to a decrease in the differences among them. The minority culture might add a little to the dominant one, but eventually with time would take on the majority's characteristics and become assimilated, losing their separate identities and becoming another in the majority culture. Sandberg (1974) named this the 'straight-line theory' of acculturation and assimilation, associated with Robert Park's school of sociology and Lloyd Warner's and Leo Srole's "Yankee City" research published in 1945. Each native-born generation acculturates further and further and raises its socio-economic status vis-a-vis the previous one, reflecting upward economic and social mobility of succeeding generations until they are an indistinguishable part of the society. The prediction is of a decrease in adherence to ethnic culture and behavioral forms with increased length of time in the host society. Although it has been valid for various immigrant populations in many different host country settings (Alba 1990; Waters 1990; Jupp and Kabala 1993; Okamura 1998; Gjerde 1997; Nagel 1995), there have been several criticisms of this theory.

Herbert J. Gans (1992:175) believes a more apt term may be the 'bumpy-line theory'. The graph line may not always decline into a final and complete assimilation, and it is possible, and he believes likely, that ethnic groups reach a plateau after several generations in which they continue to categorize themselves as members of an ethnic group but mainly participate in a familial and leisure-time ethnicity. He has termed this 'symbolic ethnicity' (Gans 1979). Others have more precisely categorized ethnic persistence distinguishing 'assimilation', meaning total submersion within the dominant society's culture, from 'integration' denoting the participation in the culture of the dominant host society while still maintaining a separate ethnic self-identity (Berry and Annis 1988:45; Berry 1992). Can economic and political circumstances, and societal changes produce 'bumps' or returns to ethnicity?
In the United States, Gans' own research demonstrates that with descendants of the 1880-1925 immigrants studied, the interruptions in the acculturation and assimilation processes operated quite independently of the economy. In his original article in *Ethnic and Racial Studies* (1979), he argued that symbolic ethnicity and the consumption and use of ethnic symbols were intended mainly for the purpose of feeling or being identified with a particular ethnicity, but without participating in an existing ethnic organization whether it be formal or informal, or its economic activities, or actually practicing an ongoing ethnic culture. Therefore, the assimilation process might continue but the ethnic identity could still be a very prevalent part of the psychological make-up of the person. He argued that "symbolic ethnicity would persist at least through the fifth and sixth generation in America" (Gans 1979:15).

I append my own inquiries to the debate of Gans' ideas to ask what types of factors determine if a person's ethnic identity is 'symbolic'? If 'symbolic' is defined as that which represents something else, what is the something else? Something more 'real'? Who and what determine whether a person's ethnicity is real, or only represents something that is real and is instead 'symbolic'? Gans writes, later still in 1994, that he was trying to make empirical observations and was not suggesting that contemporary ethnicity was "unauthentic, unserious, meaningless", or not real. He considers symbolic ethnicity to be equivalent to leisure-time ethnicity. I continue to raise the same questions about the perceived importance or triviality of 'leisure-time' or 'symbolic' ethnicity. I understand them both as diminutive and as making ethnicity inconsequential for latter generations. Thus the importance of the survey results and interviews in this thesis. How do these Basques, *themselves*, perceive their individual ethnic identity? Better for each respondent to define its importance to themselves than for researchers to categorize it according to the respondents' behaviors and then judge it according to researcher imposed criteria.

I also question Gans' assumptions that erosion continues, on the whole voluntarily, because old traditional cultures and groups no longer seem relevant to people trying to make their way in a new host society. He believes that for young people especially, immersion in their new country's culture is easier and more socially rewarding than 'paying obeisance to an old culture that had little meaning for them, mainly to please their parents and grandparents' (Gans 1994: 579). I present opposing evidence of this regarding diaspora Basques in their selected societies in Chapters Five, Six, and Seven and in the following Table 2.1.
Table 2.1 Basque Diaspora Organizations Created after 1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>(some new, some re-established)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>(all new)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>(all new)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(re-established)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(new currently organizing)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The increasing interest in ethnicity manifestation is not only from the elderly. As shown in the table above each of the countries in this study, exempting Peru, has a demonstrated growth in establishment of institutions- which include all ages of members, with various activities for differing interests, and not merely leisure entertainment.

This is not a result of new emigration out of the Basque country. If the number of organizations is growing, and the memberships are increasing, I would argue that we are experiencing the opposite of the assimilationist effect and that globalization residues are facilitating avenues for reconstructing and maintaining transnational ethnic identity. It should not be forgotten that the popularity and renewed interest in ethnicity in the United States and Australia in the recent decades coincides with their respective increased societal legitimation and the improved socioeconomic status of most white ethnic groups in those countries (Birch 1989; Castles, Cope, Kalantzis, and Morrissey 1996). I will examine how these compare to the situations in the other host societies and whether or not this improved status of 'ethnic identity' in Australia and the United States is also prevalent in the other case studies. For example, although Argentina's economy has been in general decline for the last decade, Table 2.1 shows that concurrently thirty-nine new Basque organizations have been formed.

Related to this reconsideration of ethnicity is Marcus Lee Hansen's (1938) "third-generation return hypothesis", which explained that the first generation to the host society, the emigrants themselves, established ethnic organizations, churches, perhaps schools, etc. for the centers in their new host country lives and promoted some sense of cultural continuity. These institutions would be the repositories of their homeland cultures, symbols, and languages. Their children's generation then revolted against their emigrant parents' lifestyles, and wanting to fit in and be like their peers in the society, would purposefully cast off their parents' beliefs and customs, including ethnic and religious affiliations. The grandson, having no reason to feel inferior and already fitting in to the society, had a need to belong to something (also Connor 1978; Burton 1990) and uniqueness would be especially appealing. This third generation person then would seek his ethnic identity which fulfilled his need to belong and be recognized as a part of a group. Perhaps this would be useful in explaining the
increase in numbers of persons who are recently joining the Basque clubs if they are generally third generation. However, not only are the newcomers representing all generations, but in these Basque organizations there does not seem to have been a decrease of second generation participants. Preliminary interviews conducted at the First World Congress of Basque Collectivities produced reactions from institutional leaders that there was no gap from second generation persons and that membership, in their recollections, seemed to move in linear progression through the generations. Responses in the surveys from questions asking whether or not previous generation family members had participated in Basque activities and data in Table 6.2 confirm this assumption.

In Anny Bakalian's investigation of Armenian immigrants' ethnic identity in the United States (1993), she describes assimilation as a dynamic process which may be reversed. She proposes that the processes of assimilation and maintenance of identity go hand in hand because Armenianness changes in form and function. She utilizes Gans' concept to describe 'symbolic Armenianness as voluntary, rational, and situational, in contrast to the traditional Armenianness of the emigrant generation, which is ascribed, unconscious, and compulsive' (Bakalian 1993:6). Her aim is not to measure how similar to other immigrant groups the Armenians in the United States are, but to measure their departures from traditional Armenian value systems, behavioral forms, and life-styles. I believe this approach creates a more interesting question and focus. Adopting this application, this study then does not converge on sociological nor psychological reasons for assimilation, though they are essential to understanding the overall picture regarding persistence of ethnicity in the diaspora. I will center on how and why these Basques who have not taken on a singularly host country identity continue to define and identify themselves transnationally with both the homeland and their host society, and how they define who, and what, is Basque.

I will examine Gans' suggestions of looking to 'old culture' and traditions as a means of measuring ethnic identity. If a person living in Euskal Herria, Basque Country, drives to work (a computer programmer) in a Japanese Toyota Celica, cooks a frozen Italian lasagne in a microwave for dinner, and relaxes at night watching Hollywood produced movies and listening to an Irish U2 CD, does that mean this person is not Basque? They are not practicing the 'old culture' of their grandparents nor living the way in which they did. Are they 'symbolically' Basque because they do not live the way their grandparents did, but they go to the Basque festivals, and know how to dance one of the Basque folk dances? What would one need to do, think, and feel to be a 'real' Basque?
This line of reasoning also supposes that there is no contemporary homeland culture, that culture is stagnant in the home country of the immigrants, frozen in a certain time period. Of course contemporary Basque culture is not the culture of the grandparents, neither is Argentine culture that of Argentinean grandparents. Perhaps 'symbolic ethnicity' and symbolic culture is practiced in every society and might be better termed historical ethnicity, or historical culture. Ethnic groups have shared memories of ancestors in their own historical context, and the reproduction of those historical traditions, myths, and memories are indeed symbolic of the times they represent. In that vein, yes, recreating a folk dance in traditional costume is symbolic and representative of how their ancestors used to dress and celebrate special occasions, and 'symbolic ethnicity' it would have to be argued, is also practiced in the homeland. 'Symbolic ethnicity' could also be more acceptable to students of diaspora ethnicity if it meant that the diaspora communities reproduce the culture of the homeland in their own ways, and that this symbolizes the homeland culture. Nevertheless, that would be an erroneous interpretation of Gans' concept. Perhaps it would be more accurate to think of ethnic identity as an optional identity that varies widely in intensity from symbolic ethnicity to ethnic fundamentalism (Pieterse 1997:371).

B.2. Social Identity Theory

An alternative sociological conception of ethnic identity comes from Henri Tajfel's 'social identity theory'. His concerns are less with deep personal psychology and more with the perception individuals have of themselves in comparison to others in the society. The social world is composed of social categories and memberships in groups by which an individual defines herself and is defined by others. The categories and groups have evaluative and emotional 'loadings' which determine the self-esteem which is to be derived from a specific identity and expectations or roles (Tajfel 1978, 1981, 1982; Tajfel and Turner 1979; Abrams and Hogg 1988; Stryker 1968). Social identity is self-conception as a group member, and the focus on categorization involves the accentuation of differences between the people or objects in the categories. The comparison becomes increasingly salient as people compare themselves to others looking for positive distinctiveness and more specifically, comparing one's group to other groups looking for the same.

If individuals have an upward directional drive and we compare ourselves to others

3 For additional criticism of Gans' 'symbolic ethnicity' theory in specific ethnic case studies see Okamura 1998; Strobel 1996; Kivisto and Nezger 1993; Cozzen 1992; Woodrum 1981.
who are similar to, or slightly better than, ourselves (Festinger 1954), it follows that a person would maintain their ethnic identity and keep that group affiliation in order to augment their comparative social status. If Basque immigrants compare favorably with the native Flemish and Walloon in Belgium, Basque ethnicity would be used for positive self-identification and group identity. In the other five immigrant societies where only a minority are the indigenous population, one might have a more positive, or higher, social identity if self-identifying as a Basque instead of as a generic Australian or Argentinean.

Although there are studies describing people who purposefully identify with a group considered to be an 'out' group and very low on the social comparison scale, such as black teenagers have in the inner cities in European and United States capitals, and people of West Indian origin in Britain (T.H. Eriksen 1993), my aim is to look at the prestige given to Basque immigrants in Argentina, Uruguay, Peru, Australia, the United States and increasingly in Belgium, and to determine if this is a significant factor in explaining Basque identity maintenance. In their study of Japanese Americans, Asamen and Berry (1987) also argue that one’s self-concept and ethnic identity development is influenced by the perception of other members of the society. Social identity theory provides additional descriptive and explanatory measures for the persistence of identifying with an ethnic group, and as Chapter Six data show from 59% in Belgium to 90% of respondents in the United States perceive Basques to have a positive social status in the host country.

In the studies of immigration, ethnonationalism, and diasporas, various trends have emerged indicating that ethnic identity issues are substantially more complex than 'straight-lines' or 'bumpy-lines' of assimilation, and/or the goals of economic and social acceptance or self-interest. It is certainly true that the process of assimilation will continue to cause many of the minority cultural practices to fade away and be forgotten by their descendants. However, new cultural differences are being introduced and 'discovered', and other heretofore unrecognized groups are affirming themselves and making increasing demands on prevailing governments. Many ethnic groups are constructing and then promoting their cultural identity, imagined and real, even as some of the characteristics of their old identities are weakened or disappear, as language has weakened in the Basque case. Homelands once under ‘foreign’ control are now democratically autonomous or independent and Basque populations have to decide whether or not to return to the birth place of ancestors, or remain in the host country with a multinational and deterritorialized identity.
C. Definitions, Elements, and Theories of Diaspora

In the emerging field of diaspora studies, there exists a need for additional empirical research and theoretical consideration of the specific phenomenon of ethnonational diasporas. The essential questions are when and why individuals and small groups of immigrants decide to stay in their host country, maintain or revive their historic ethnicity, and form diasporic communities that preserve ties with their homelands. This ability to establish and maintain international networks is related to ethnic identity maintenance and diasporic nationalism. They are at the same time local and international forms of social organization. To investigate the Basque diasporic populations it is imperative to understand the daily lives of its political exiles and economic immigrants, analyze the local community institutions specifically organized by the ethnic immigrants, and track the links developed with their host societies and with their homeland. As is discussed, the different Basque diasporic groups preserve their ethnic identities considering and 'imagining' themselves as a part of a global ethnic community.

Contemporary growth in world wide international migration begs the question of whether or not ethnic groups will eventually assimilate completely into their new host state's culture, lifestyle, religion, traditions, etc., or, will continue to safeguard their own ethnic identity and basically lead two lives, one in the privacy of their own home with family ethnic traditions, and another separate public life outside the home which reflects more the common culture of the host country environment, although influenced by their own ethnicity. Different Basque migrants have selected each path. Many have assimilated, and incorporated the host culture or a different aspect of identity, and no longer define themselves as Basque. Others have preserved and/or reconstructed a Basque identity, and continue, even after five or six generations, to define themselves as Basques and maintain ties to the homeland. Results of interviews and questionnaires demonstrate this is not dependent on time or generation as there are various examples of sixth generation Basques in Uruguay and Argentina who continue to identify themselves as Basque, and also there are abundant examples of 'return to ethnicity' from each generation.

C.1. Diaspora? Immigrant Community? Political and Economic Exiles?

How should ethnic populations be defined and categorized, and with what criteria? In arguing that these Basque collectivities outside the homeland constitute diasporas, I shall utilize Robin Cohen's definition of the concept of diaspora which highlights these common
features:

(1) dispersal from an original homeland, often traumatically; (2) alternatively, the expansion from a homeland in search of work, in pursuit of trade or to further colonial ambitions; (3) a collective memory and myth about the homeland; (4) an idealization of the supposed ancestral homeland; (5) a return movement; (6) a strong ethnic group consciousness sustained over a long time; (7) a troubled relationship with host societies; (8) a sense of solidarity with co-ethnic members in other countries; and (9) the possibility of a distinctive creative, enriching life in tolerant host countries (Cohen 1997:180).

Utilizing a similar definition, Sheffer (1996:39) estimates that according to this categorization about four hundred million people are members of the various diasporas. A growing interest in ethnicity in general, and the revival of ethnic identity salience and transnational diasporic consciousness in particular, returns us to a focus of this thesis: Are the Basque populations in Argentina, Uruguay, Peru, Australia, Belgium, and the United States ‘diasporas’ as defined above, and if so, in what ways and why do they maintain their ethnic identity?

Basques in all six countries, whether voluntary economic immigrants or forced political exiles, have established political and social organizations. These minorities permanently reside in their host countries though they individually and institutionally maintain personal and information exchanges with others in the Basque Country. They demonstrate solidarity with fellow Basques through social, political, and economic activities; one example being from the United States where many interviewed Democratic Basque voters stated they cross party lines to vote for Basque Republican candidates. Questionnaires and interview results demonstrate a dual loyalty to both host country and Euskal Herria. Eighty-three percent of the 832 questionnaire respondents define themselves as hybrid Basque-host country or host country-Basque and a few from Belgium added “Basque-European”, leaving only seventeen percent identifying purely as one or the other: either “Basque”, or “Argentine”, “Uruguayan”, “Peruvian”, etc. In the conjuncture Basque-host country, the hyphen marks a non-hierarchic union.

Political scientists disagree about the importance of dual and multiple loyalties of diaspora groups in international relations. “Ethnic identities are becoming more meaningful and appear to be increasing in relevance compared to national identity” (Huntington 1997:40). Individuals may have ties and identity claims that are not limited to one single political space in terms of territory. One’s presence inside a particular territorial boundary does not restrict one from engaging in transnational relations. Benedict Anderson describes diaspora politics as a “radically unaccountable form of politics” and diasporas as participating in “long
distance” and “e-mail nationalism” (Anderson 1994:327). However, diasporas often do not have compatible politics with the ruling homeland elite and they even lobby against their homeland governments as United States Filipinos did against Marcos, and United States Cubans against Castro. While some diasporas wish to be politically effective at gaining attention for their cause, or recognition for their homeland, Chapter Five details Basques’ political attitudes and activities as much more ethnonationalist- focusing on cultural and not political goals. I illustrate how political developments in the Basque Country since the death of Franco have affected diaspora Basque ethnonationalism, their political attitudes and partisan opinions, and the globalized networks of communications, keeping in mind “people’s relationship to the past is continually and doubly influenced by developments in the host country and in the homeland, and especially so where conditions in the homeland have become uncertain” (Hall 1990:222-237; Winland 1995:5). Desires for autonomy inside Spain and France, separatism from both, and independent statehood are canvassed from the survey data of the 832 responses.

In the discipline of diaspora studies there is much gray area in the categorization of when a person is a guest worker, asylum seeker, refugee, international migrant, permanent migrant, and when that person becomes part of a permanent diaspora. Each host country setting varies, as do the persons who migrate and their political, economic, and personal reasons for migrating. In Brussels for example, are the Basque Autonomous Government Delegation employees and European Union professionals part of the Basque diaspora in Belgium? They affirm they are not because they are returning to the Basque Country. However, they do influence the other Basques and participate together in cultural activities and they fill the role of agents in chain migration and transnationalism. They share language, current news, values, and opinions, customs, traditions, etc., which are real and not mythical, fantasized, nor nostalgic memories of their homeland. A few of these Eurocrats have married Belgians, or other Europeans, and are permanently living in Brussels. Now would they be considered a part of the diaspora? There is no satisfactory demarcation for the point at which one is a permanent part of this category. Each person defines for oneself if one is ‘in’ or ‘out’ of the group. Perhaps one should apply individual and collective choice models to this issue in the life of immigrants. This element of choice by individuals and by groups has been neglected in past studies of the Basque identity as have been the varieties of Basque identity and degrees of saliency and participation from ethnic fundamentalists to annual Aberri Eguna, Day of the Homeland, festival attendees, similar to ‘Christmas Catholics’. 

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Although western democracies currently exhibit relatively favorable climates for multiculturalism, each host society has its problems with small groups of xenophobes expressing anti-immigrant ideologies and behaviors. For example, in Australia and the United States, maintaining Basque ethnic identity is generally viewed positively when it does not conflict with Anglo-Saxon Christian values. There are no physically differentiating characteristics of Basques that are identifiable from other white Europeans preventing the 'racial' discrimination so prevalent in European settler societies. The “New Australians” white European ethnic identities are celebrated by the society, though not necessarily those of Aboriginal peoples or those of the many varied Asian communities present. Basques in Sydney, Melbourne, and north Queensland tend to feel as though they have been socially accepted with a semi-positive status because of their excellent work reputations with non-Basque employers.

Recent Basque immigrants to these states no longer perceive a necessity to rapidly adapt and conform to the norms of the host society, albeit learning the host country language for employment is an exception. If from the south of Euskal Herria and emigrating to south America, one already speaks Spanish, and if from the north and emigrating to Belgium, one already speaks French, but either obviously would need to learn a new language if selecting Australia or the United States for their destination. There is very little new Basque immigration to any of the six countries excluding Belgium, and most diaspora Basques are second and third generation or more, who speak the host country language and have been raised and educated in the host country environment. They are not choosing to maintain their ethnicity for economic benefits, nor are they making political demands for special recognition or treatment in any of these countries. The ethnicity maintenance in the Basque diasporic communities follows sociological and psychological arguments of belonging, self-fulfillment, and positive social status in one’s daily life.

C.2. Transnationalism and Globalization

The concept of transnational identity matches well with diaspora consciousness and has been aptly defined as:

The ability to add identities rather than being forced to substitute one for another; multiple identities and “cross-pressures” to enhance rather than inhibit one’s options; to anchor one’s uniqueness in the complex constellation of communities to which one chooses to make a commitment; the opportunity to be different people in different settings- these implications of communities in the unbundled world appear to be mutually reinforcing elements of a broad syndrome which fits our current self-image
as autonomous individuals and stands in marked contrast to older notions of rank, status, and duty within an overarching community which claims all our loyalties . . . each individual is, in effect, a community of the communities individually accepted or chosen (Elkins 1997; 150).

Interviewees' narratives of feeling "just as much Peruvian as Basque and vice versa" also fit the description given by Featherstone; transnationalism:

"is the capacity to shift the frame, and move between varying range of foci, the capacity to handle a range of symbolic material out of which various identities can be formed and reformed in different situations, which is relevant in the contemporary global situation. . . . There has been an extension of cultural repertoires and an enhancement in the resourcefulness of groups to create new symbolic modes of affiliation and belonging" (Featherstone 1995:110).

Diasporas “disrupt the spatial-temporal units of analysis” (Lavie and Swedenburg 1996:14). Basques are physically connected to the host countries where they currently live, and emotionally and psychologically connected to ancestral homelands. This is a transnational identity. The boundaries of diaspora identity are imagined just as the diaspora identity is itself imagined.

Transnationalism broadly refers to multiple ties and interactions linking people or institutions across the borders of states (Vertovec 1999:447). New technologies especially telecommunications foment transnational ties with increasing speed. Despite great distances, and time periods of immigration, transnational ties in the Basque communities have been intensified with the globalization of communications. The frequency of communication and contact among the diaspora communities and between the diaspora and the homeland, I argue, will continue to increase. Transnationalism is also described as “the formation of social, political, and economic relationships among migrants that span several societies” and people whose “networks, activities and patterns of life encompass both their host and home societies (Basch, Glick Schiller, Szanton Blanc 1992:1). They suggest the world is witnessing a slow emergence of interstate societies. I suggest that the Basque diaspora is one such community.

Transnationalism is related to globalization and a real or perceived intensification of planetary interconnectedness. David Held, et al, define globalization as:

“a process (or set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and transactions- assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity and impact- generating transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction and the exercise of power” (Held et al 1999:16).

This is difficult to demonstrate with quantitative evidence because it also entails qualitative
shifts which affect the nature of societies and the outlook of individuals towards themselves, their societies and their world. Interviewees’ statements regarding their feelings of connectedness to, and identification with, Basques around the world give an indication of the growing “extensity” and “impact” of globalization processes in the Basque diaspora.

Contemporary patterns of globalization manifest a distinctive historical form which is a product of a unique conjuncture of social, political, economic and technological forces, and particular forms of globalization may differ between historical eras. In their research of discrete historical epochs of globalization, Held et al argue that contemporary global infrastructures of culture and communication have contributed to “the development and entrenchment of diasporic cultures and communities” (ibid:370). Globalization is *aterриториal* because it involves a complex deterritorialization and reterritorialization of political and economic power (ibid:28), and for the Basques in this study, a shift in their evolving ethnic identity paradigm. The processes of the current form of globalization facilitate transnationalism in the Basque diaspora by aiding the creation and maintenance of communications among Basque collectivities and the homeland. Diaspora identity bridges this gap between local and global identities. However, although globalization and diasporization are separate phenomenon with no necessary *causal* connections” (Cohen 1997:175 my emphasis), Basque ethnic identity maintenance and diaspora “extensity” are facilitated by the processes of globalization.

C.3. *“Our Identity is at Once Plural and Partial”* ⁴

Perhaps diaspora communities also need to invent their own diaspora identity and legitimacy in order to maintain themselves, although it is based upon an already existing homeland identity. Diaspora communities have actually created their own self-consciousness as a collectivity and created a group identity out of their shared experiences of exile, immigration, and life in their new host societies. There is consensus among some scholars that ancestral cultures are not recreated in totality in the new environments (Shibutani and Kwan 1965; Roosens 1989), but neither are homeland cultures stagnant. They also react and evolve, transforming and mutating according to outside influences. Cohen suggests that “diasporas can be constituted by acts of the imagination” (Cohen 1996:516). A diaspora can be held together and recreated through a shared imagination. Ethnogenesis is a process whereby

immigrants practice a transfigured cultural identity creating a sort of hybrid culture, or synthesis, from the ancestral culture and that of the new host environment. This provides a link from the homeland to the new country for recent emigrants, and ties from the new society to the homeland for the latter generations. Culture is practiced differently in each family, let alone village or region. I am not arguing that each Basque emigrant continued their lifestyle as though they were pretending to be in their native villages of Oñati, Gernika, or Baiona. I am arguing that ethnicity and ethnic identity are not merely behavioral, but also incorporate deeper, more profound attitudes, feelings, and psychological outlooks, as well as networks which are preserved similarly in these communities.

Basque migration is not a one time event from place A to place B. Locations are linked by the flows and returns of people, resources and remittances, New World and Old World lifestyles, and by the economic and political relations between the Basque Country and the host countries. Basque immigration is time and circumstance specific, but in each of these cases chain migration theory (MacDonald and MacDonald 1962) advances the understanding of how immigrants continued to follow their cues for ethnic identity from a continuous trickle of new relatives and fellow villagers arriving from the homeland. The chain migration phenomenon resulted from the desire to avoid uncertainty and move from the place known to a person known. By moving to a location with personal contacts, Basques left with a hope of assurances of finding work and economic viability. Chain migration also meant that Basques were likely to settle in a limited number of places in these host countries. If these new arrivals were relatively young, they were role models for the youth of what the Basques in Euskal Herria were currently like. They provided a reason for the diaspora youth to learn and practice the Basque language; an example that Basque culture is not only that of the fishing villages and farmsteads, but one with Basque punk rock music, computer software in Basque, and Basque home pages on the Internet. Though there are very few leaving Euskal Herria today, these new immigrants to the host societies have updated the Basque communities' idealized memories of 1920s to 1960s farms and hamlets in the Pyrenees to the new millennium's contemporary reality. Most significantly, they marry in the Basque community and often speak Basque to their children, creating incentives for others; implanting, permeating, and inspiring again the maintenance of ethnic tradition, and in the perception of some, adding 'authenticity' and 'potency' to Basque Center activities and functions. They also continue the transnational aspect of the Basque community by adding new networks.
Edward Spicer's 'oppositional' approach to explaining ethnic solidarity and persistence is also valuable for the persistence of diaspora populations. He synthesizes the primordialist approach described above, with the 'circumstantial' hypothesis. As long as there is some sort of 'other' or 'opposition', there is reason for unity and an 'us'. The opposition process frequently produces intense collective consciousness and a high degree of internal solidarity. Spicer (1971:795-799) uses the concept of the persistent identity system to refer to ethnic groups that have demonstrated their abilities to survive over long periods in different cultural settings - thus the primordial approach. He cites the Basques, Jews, Irish, Catalans, Maya, and Navajo as examples of groups that share characteristics of primordial attachments that are called into importance and utilized to create a group solidarity. This group solidarity persists as long as the 'opposition' establishes the need for a reaction from the 'us'.

For Basques everywhere the opposing 'other' since the mid nineteenth century and especially after the 1930s has been the Spanish central government and then the Franco dictatorship. The primordial feelings then are called out according to the circumstances of being threatened by the 'opposition'. The Basques in the diaspora have followed the homeland reaction to the 'opposition' which has been the Franco dictatorship and the subsequent central governments in Madrid. Franco died, however, and there is a form of federal democracy in Spain granting autonomy to the three provinces of Alaba, Bizkaia, and Gipuzkoa together as Euskadi, and Nafarroa separately. Who or what is the current 'opposition'? There is still much suspicion in the Basque Country, and in the Basque diaspora, of the Spanish central government, and perhaps justifiably so. Former Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez, his personal advisors and Ministers, and several military personnel have been investigated for initiation and implementation of kidnappings and assassinations of suspected Euskadi eta Askatasuna, Basque Homeland and Liberty, ETA, sympathizers and other Basque nationalists. Many in the diaspora are political exiles and the 'opposition' to them is still the Spanish state until the Basque country is its own state. Several interviewees in Uruguay, the United States, and Belgium, believed that the Spanish government has treaties or executive agreements with their respective host countries to monitor Basque individuals and institutional activities.

Basque political scientist Gurutz Jauregui Bereciartu (1986; interview 1998) argues that the upsurge in ethnonationalism and returns to ethnicity by Basques in Euskal Herria and around the world, are actually protests against the de-personalized, post-modern, technocratic world. It could be that those who fear the future and the social trends they are witnessing, are turning to the past for comfort and identity, recognition and self-actualization.
Manuel Castells points to nationalism and ethnic identity resurgence as the products of the conflicting trends of globalization, the information technology revolution and restructuring of capitalism all creating a network society, versus, expressions of collective identity that challenge modernization in favor of the local and communal identity and cultural distinctiveness (Castells 1997:1). Globalization is an outward expanding model of homogenization, but simultaneously ethnonationalism and traditional identities are promoting heterogeneity and cultural difference. He states that many are choosing to move from the unknown future to the known and understood traditional past. However, this does not quite explain the consistent and persistent maintenance of Basque ethnicity of over five centuries of emigrants prior to this age of globalization and modernization. Basque transnationalism is not new, though the methods of maintaining these networks and identities are influenced by the globalization of communications.

C.4. The Politicization of the Basque Diaspora

Utilizing print media as an example of communications, Gellner (1983) and Anderson (1991) regard print culture as a crucial factor in the construction of nationalism, a print culture that interconnects people over space and time. The possibility of a nation depends on the book and the newspaper and a literate reading public able to read the publications and imagine themselves as a community. I will demonstrate readership of newspapers and magazines concerned with Basque Country topics in Chapter Six and the importance of the Basque Government publication for the diaspora, Euskal Etxeak, Basque Centers, which seems to serve as print culture in the construction of a diaspora and in enhancing the imagination of diaspora Basques as a diaspora Basque community.

This increased frequency and volume of contact between diaspora communities and the Basque Autonomous Government could result in conflict, or, increased commitment. The general idea of the 'triadic relationship' (Sheffer 1986; Safran 1991; A.D. Smith 1995:16) between the diaspora community, their homeland, and their host country is investigated in these Basque communities as increasingly the economic and business Institutos and Fundaciones created by the Basque Autonomous Government multiply and intensify their activities in the host countries. Diasporas may be a foreign policy or economic asset which home governments are eager to exploit (Esman 1984:345). The Basque Autonomous Government is successfully using the diaspora in pursuit of its own external economic goals with the establishment of the Institutes and Foundations described in Chapter Seven.
I will demonstrate that the Basque Autonomous Government has never had reason to interfere in any host country to protect its diaspora population, evading political conflicts between homeland and host countries. While Basques have had the democratic ‘opportunity structure’ (Esman 1984:338) in each of the countries, except Peru, to organize and promote their domestic and international interests, they have not often utilized this opportunity except when mobilizing for the political exiles of the Spanish civil war, and to protest the Franco court’s handling of the Burgos Trials of ETA suspects in 1970. Isolated political activism by individual initiative has infrequently occurred in attempts to directly influence political and economic policy making in the homeland before, during, or after, the Franco dictatorship.

Though some diasporas attempt to determine the political outcomes in their homelands and influence the making of domestic and foreign policy, there is no evidence for this in the contemporary Basque case beyond the few who participate in Euskadi elections. Milton Esman’s conclusions that ethnic solidarities become internationally significant by way of transnational economic and political networks (Esman 1995:114) pertains to the Basque case in that it is “significant” to them, though not necessarily to the international economic system. What is salient in categorizing the Basque phenomenon as a diaspora is the consistent commitment to maintain ties—sentimental, economic, political, religious, and kinship— with the homeland.

The Basque communities may prove to be effective and significant non-state actors, proceeding on behalf of their homeland government, institutions, and businesses. Though the role can be evaluated for its importance, the ‘unofficial ambassador’ status will be influential in the cases analyzed here. However, I will also show that diaspora communities do not operate as monolithic blocs of ethnic or political consciousness and that there are personal conflicts and individual agendas that interfere with the effective administration of grants, and with economic and political ties between and among the diaspora and homeland populations.

D. Conclusions

In Argentina and the United States there are Basque rock music bands, i.e. rock bands whose members are of Basque ancestry, creating songs sung in Basque, and performed for Basques and non-Basques alike. In each of the six case studies, there are Basques writing poetry in Basque about their culture; photographers creating works of art that represent the artists’ impressions of ‘Basqueness’, night school classes for learning the Basque language, cooking, and dance classes. I will argue that participants are not practicing “symbolic”
ethnicity. Their Basque ethnic identity to them is as real as any Basque person who lives in Euskal Herria. Their transnational diaspora identity allows them to practice a multiculturalism that is not necessarily circumstantial or situational. I will indicate that despite generational and geographical differences, the core elements of ethnic identity and the definitions of ‘Basqueness’ are very similar among the diaspora Basques.

This thesis will utilize Cohen’s common features to categorize these six Basque communities as diaspora communities. Benefitting from the theories of ethnicity, ethnic identity maintenance, transnationalism, and diaspora, I will demonstrate that Basques outside of Euskal Herria have exhibited an ethnic identity consciousness that confirms elements of both primordial and instrumental theories. There is ‘integration’ in each host society but simultaneously the preservation of a homeland connection through a developing diaspora consciousness aided by the elements of globalization.
THREE

Basque Country History, Basque Nationalism Development, and Contemporary Homeland Identity

An ethnic group’s own history, both real and romanticized, is an active force in determining its present behavior and attitudes. Therefore, I will examine the chronicle of the Basques and the impression made in the collective memory and myth of Basque ethnonationalism and diaspora identity. This is not an exhaustive history of the Basques, but a collection of the historical elements diaspora Basques have in their collective memory and idealization of their homeland and of their ancestors. The story includes Basque history and anthropology from the last two millennia, their dispersion through five centuries of emigration out of Euskal Herria; the consolidation of Spain as a political entity and the ensuing battles for Basque autonomous status; contemporary Basque ethnonationalism as manifested during the Spanish Civil War and the subsequent Franco dictatorship; bringing us to the situation in the Basque Country today and the actuality of homeland Basque ethnic identity.

A. The Golden Age of the Basques

A.1. The Basques

Basques in the diaspora communities tend to idealize their homeland as a pristine niche. The physical borders of Euskal Herria have helped to shelter it from invasion and infiltration by other cultures and military forces as well as provided a gateway to the rest of the world. Its major physical border is the sea, a factor which has played an important role in the history of Basque emigration and has fostered the relative ease of mobility for the population. Running through the heart of the Basque country are the Pyrenees mountains, whose imposing peaks have until recently also created communications barriers between the Basques themselves as the Pyrenees separate the northern and southern provinces.

The Basque Country is quite small in both territory and population. The total population (which has the lowest per capita birth rate in the European Union) is near three million. When Basques refer to “the north”, Iparralde, they are referring to the three provinces that are in France, “to the north” of what many see as an artificial political border.
“In the south”, *Hegoalde*, usually includes all four provinces that lay in the Spanish state. Because those four are also politically differentiated in the current Spanish Constitution of 1978 and the Statutes of Autonomy passed in 1979 referenda, *Nafarroa* has its own separate autonomous statutes, and together, Bizkaia, Gipuzkoa, and Araba, make up the Basque Autonomous Community of *Euskadi*. Hence a person may describe something in *Hegoalde* and then add that it is the same in *Nafarroa*. (See Map 3.1 and Map 3.2) These divisions are a part of the political reality of today and have caused identity divisions in the Basque population as well. For example, early 1900s Basques even established separate Basque Cultural Centers and today in Argentina there still remain a French-Basque Center and a *Centro Navarro*.

The Basques refer to themselves as "*Euskaldunak*" or "speakers of *euskera*", the Basque language. This primal identifying factor invokes one of the strongest indicators of cultural uniqueness, the language.\(^5\) Despite five centuries of speculation by linguists and philologists concerning the possible relationships between Basque and other languages, no studies have indicated a conclusive relationship between Basque and any other language (MacClancy 1996:208; Tejerina Montana 1996:224; Collins 1986:8-12). This makes *euskera* unique among Western and Central European languages and is pointed out often by diaspora Basques as a sign of difference, and prestige. However, defining ‘Basque people’ as ‘those who speak Basque’ becomes problematic in that so many of those who live in *Euskal Herria* no longer utilize *euskera* regularly. The Basque language was prohibited as a means of communication during the Franco years (1939-1975) and it had been lost decades before that in many areas of the hispanicized urban centers. However, diaspora and homeland Basques continue to utilize the language as one of the unifying factors of "Basqueness" because it was a common element of ancestors.

Claims to physiognomic distinctiveness are not unique to Basques, and certain features of the physiological makeup of the Basques also point to uniqueness and are utilized in nationalist rhetoric. Basques differ from the surrounding populations in their blood types, for example; they manifest the highest rate in any European population of the blood type O, and the lowest occurrence of blood type B. They also have the highest occurrence of any population in the world of the Rh negative factor (Collins 1983:110, Collins 1986: 4-8). This evidence suggests the Basque people have remained, over a long period of time, a small and

Map 3.1 The seven provinces of *Euskal Herria*, the Basque Country

Bizkaia

Gipuzkoa

Araba

Nafarroa Beherea

Ziberoa

Lapurdi

Nafarroa
Map 3.2 The three political divisions of the Basque Country; the Basque Autonomous Community, Euskadi; The Historic Foral Community of Navarre, Nafarroa; and the northern provinces which fall inside the French state, Iparralde.
isolated breeding population (Irujo e Irujo interview 1997; Mar-Molinero 1996:8). These factors are salient because of their perceived importance to Basques themselves. They are elements used to argue that Basques are linguistically and biologically distinct from any other population, and therefore deserving of political recognition and status, which was an opinion held by the majority of the diaspora Basques interviewed for this thesis. Fact or myth, perception becomes reality and these factors are often utilized to rationalize difference and self-categorization by the diaspora Basques.

Basque collective myth includes the possibility of a history that stretches to cave populations and human occupation since the stone age (Caro Baroja 1958; Collins 1986:20). It is not known if the present Basque population developed *in situ* or if they migrated into the area later. Some authorities suggest that the Basques are the direct descendants of cave painters who created the sites at Lascaux and Santimamiñe, as well as other caves throughout the Basque country (Eusko Jaurlaritza 1988). Skeptics place the modern Basques in the Pyrenees from approximately 5,000 to 3,000 B.C. Even with this most conservative interpretation, Basques are placed in the western Pyrenees well before the invasions of the Indo-European speaking tribes into western Europe in the second millennium B.C. In each diaspora community, at least one interviewee believed there was archaeological evidence that proved the Basques are lineal descendants of Cro-Magnon men.

What is certain is that there are no recorded histories or information describing the Basques specifically until the Romans targeted the Iberian peninsula and wrote that the Basque population was organized into small tribal units inhabiting the valleys of the western Pyrenees. They originally did not form a single civic unit and spoke a variety of tribal dialects of *euskera* whose diversity persists to the present day. Most of the Basque region was never directly occupied by the Romans, but neither was it independent from Rome. It seems that the Basque tribes accepted an overarching Roman sovereignty in return for local autonomy in the districts (Collins 1983:110; Livermore 1958:35-50). The Christian religion was introduced into the Basque region during these Roman times, but it scarcely spread beyond the southern fringes of lower Araba and Nafarroa. (See Map 3.3)

The post-Roman Visigothic crown broke down the prior civic structure throughout the peninsula though it never established its own full sovereignty over the Basque territory either. The perseverance of the early Basque resistance through the seventh and eighth centuries indicates some kind of civic unity may have been established among these tribes. This is significant in discussing the ethnic identity which has been argued to be a recent development
Map 3.3 Iberian Peninsula During Roman Domination (Livermore 1958).
and a result of modernization (Heiberg 1989;1996). Anthropologists argue that more than a thousand years ago, Basques were thinking of themselves as linked to each other by language and like interests (Caro Baroja 1958; Douglass and Bilbao 1975; Urla 1993:823) and it had nothing to do with class consciousness, nor threats from industrialization. Language united these Basques as a means of communication, even though there were and still are, many differences. Perhaps Basques were imagining themselves as a community with similar interests through spoken communication long before there was “print-capitalism”.

A.2. The Emergence of Spain

Contemporary Spain arose from an unstable alliance of independent Christian kingdoms defending against Islamic invaders. The initial unifying idea behind Spain was that of Christian opposition to the Muslim threat (Heiburg, 1989:1). Unlike Nafarroa, León, Aragon, and Catalonia, Castilla had no previous political existence, and was basically a product of the Reconquista (718-1611). The historic Spanish kingdoms did not have their roots in Roman or Visigothic origins, but in the defensive reaction against Muslims in the early Middle Ages that led to the process of regaining lands. During the eighth century the independent and Christian populations in the northern sections of the peninsula began to coalesce around regional nuclei. (See Map 3.4) This coalescence was determined by three main factors: geography, ethnic identity- which is shown to have been of major importance only to the Basques, and prevailing politico-military pressures (Payne 1975:2). In the diaspora communities, several interviewees remarked on this phase of history and how the Basques have never been dominated by others, as important to their identity. Though only a few were familiar with detailed historical facts, many perceive this time period as the beginning of the unification of Basques, and they perpetuate this myth in their diaspora collectivities.

Those from Nafarroa can vaguely describe how the Nafarroa region was the only major part of the Iberian north that was not ravaged by the last great Muslim offenses of the late tenth and early eleventh centuries. The western Basque territories, which were roughly the same as today’s Bizkaia, Araba, and Gipuzkoa, were independent but associated with Castilla. In 1029, Sancho III El Mayor, detached the Basque territories and incorporated them into the kingdom of Nafarroa. (See Map 3.5) For the next years all of the Basque inhabited territory south of the Pyrenees recognized a single Basque political sovereignty for the first and last time in its history thus far. Upon Sancho’s death his holdings were divided among his sons into three regions creating the kingdoms of Nafarroa, Castilla, and Aragon.
Map 3.4 Iberian Peninsula During the Reconquest (Livermore 1958).
Map 3.5  Iberian Peninsula in the Twelfth Century (Livermore 1958).
The extent to which the identity of Nafarroa was Basque and regional, and non-absorptive may have contributed to its isolation but Nafarroa held its kingdom until it was incorporated into the Spanish crown in 1512.

While Nafarroa has formed a single political unit since the ninth century, the history of the western Basque territory is more complicated. During the eighth, ninth, and tenth centuries separate districts of the western Basque regions formed their own alliances and associations with neighboring powers Asturias, León, and Castilla. Basques emphasize the three western territories’ association with Castilla was conditional on the crown’s recognition of the local fueros, which were the Basque customs, traditions and local laws and citizen rights, and on the autonomy of each province. The legal and administrative structure of the historic Basque districts were based upon the elaborate series of foral laws which originated in two different ways. One was by recognition of customs as laws, and the other was by specific agreements with the crown that had been demanded to protect civil and economic rights and privileges, local governing rights, and citizen responsibilities. Homeland and diaspora Basques underscore the fact that the Basque provinces retained their fueros, and exemptions from crown regulations longer than any other region- a fact used in today’s arguments for self-governance as well. The fueros played a role in establishing farther reaching regional identities, rather than a more immediate local village or town connection. The Basques set themselves apart from the Castilian population and control because of this separate political structure in addition to their linguistic and ethno-cultural uniqueness.

The Basque region entered advanced development during the eleventh and twelfth centuries with the growth of maritime and commercial activities. The Bizkaian and Gipuzkoan seaports participated in cooperative associations with non-Basque towns, with commercial interests in current Belgium, and with Nordic coastal towns, and whaling in the Atlantic. Later during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, using their independent diplomatic relations, they signed naval pacts with the English crown. The fifteenth century proved to be another time of notable economic development especially for Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa. The Bay of Biscay, and particularly Bizkaian shipping, dominated the peninsula’s main carrying trade with northern ports in Europe (Lynch 1965:76). Merchants and seamen served as the middlemen and as freighters for Castilian wool, while simultaneously developing their own fishing and whaling industries. Their maritime expertise was especially necessary for the New World exploration, while at home further inland, the production of iron expanded and its operations moved into the river valleys for easier transport.
Interviewed Basques often mentioned that "the Basque Country has been the Basque Country longer than Spain has been Spain", defining themselves in opposition to Spain and somehow trying to increase their legitimacy or authenticity vis-a-vis the Spanish kingdom/state. Though the peninsula had been divided between the four Christian Kingdoms of Castilla-León, Portugal, Aragon-Catalonia, and Nafarroa since the Middle Ages, between 1479 and 1512 all but Portugal were united under the Trastamara-Habsburg dynasty, which created the Spanish crown. (See Map 3.6) The Spanish-Habsburg state of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was a pluralistic royal confederation composed of the kingdom of Castilla and the three separate Basque provinces of Bizkaia, Araba, and Gipuzkoa that were associated with it; the kingdoms of Aragon, Nafarroa, and Valencia; and the principalities of Catalonia, and of the Balearic Islands. A unified state system did not emerge until the new Bourbon dynasty of the early eighteenth century. Diaspora Basques who are known in their communities as amateur historians tend to gloss over this 'association' and its definition, instead spotlighting and riding the coattails of legitimacy of Nafarroa's separate kingdom.

Neither the Catholic kings (1469-1516) nor the following Habsburgs (1516-1700) tried to force a unified administration upon the Iberian peninsula. Most attention was turned to the New World and the opportunities and problems presented by its administration. The central authority in Burgos and later in Madrid, filled the requirement of organizing and administering to the colonization efforts. The Basque country was oriented toward the Americas, and in providing maritime expertise in ship building and navigation (Douglass and Bilbao 1975; Livermore 1958:262-263). The Basque Museum and Cultural Center in Idaho, United States, permanently displays homage to Basque whalers and explorers, and other Centers' libraries include materials regarding the many initial explorers to the Americas, and their crews, who were Basque. These diaspora communities are similar to others who distinguish themselves by promotion of favorite sons and daughters.

The sixteenth century brought a continually expanding economy and social change to the Basque provinces. Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa were the two juridically freest and most egalitarian areas in all of Spain (Payne 1975:21; Carr 1982:556-7; Collins 1986:201). Throughout most of Castilla the peasantry was being crushed by taxes and the social and economic predominance of the aristocracy, while conversely in Bizkaia (1526) and Gipuzkoa (1610) the fights had been won for royal recognition of the "noble" status of all their native inhabitants. Every person would enjoy equality before the law and freedom from most common taxes (Kamen 1983:226). In Araba and Nafarroa, different communities were
Map 3.6 The Kingdoms of Spain in the Sixteenth Century (Lovett 1986).
protected by their different *fueros* and some had already established this collective nobility for their residents. Other towns and villages continued this process of emancipation and social mobility through the seventeenth century.

Basques point to an "enlightened" upper-middle class in their history- progressive priests and landowners, in addition to merchants and shippers that emerged with a vivid interest in the study and promotion of modern political economy. The expression of this was manifested in the founding of the Society of Friends of the Country, in Gipuzkoa, 1766. The Basque town of Azkoitia's technical academy was the first genuine private, secular school in modern Spain and historians suggest these populations may have had the highest literacy rates in all of Spain (Payne 1975:26; Enciso Real as quoted in Carr 1982:6).

The eighteenth century produced a new interest in Basque historiography, particularly in Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa. Resistance to pressures from Madrid, together with concern to preserve the Basque identity in a more complex and demanding world, resulted in the expansion of myths about Basque history, and the preservation of Basque ethnic and civic identity. The origins of the Basque people were contemplated and connections to biblical personages were maintained as direct descendants.6 Publications of Basque grammar were also first produced in the 1700s (White interview 1998). Despite these examples of Basque initiative in several aspects of progress, the structure of Basque society was in general little altered by the end of the eighteenth century and beginning of the nineteenth century.

Diaspora collective understanding of their history is that for more than a millennium Basques demonstrated an ability to accept technical improvements and modernization in commerce and maritime activities without altering the foundations of their own culture. Advances had already been made in terms of local freedoms, relative civic liberties, legal equality, and widespread property distribution. However, Basque religious values were more conservative than in separate parts of Spain and France. The paradox of the Basque country was that it was one of the most progressive, and concurrently most conservative, areas in all of western Europe.

**A.3. Iparralde and Hegoalde**

Though the *euskeria* speaking population on both sides of the Pyrenees have never formed a single independent political system, the emerging modern centralized state system

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6 In Basque mythology the first male and female were not "Adam" and "Eve", but "Aitor" and "Amaia".
had the effect of severing the southern and northern regions more so than the effects of
geography. After the final incorporation by the French monarchy in the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries, the northern provinces retained their local privileges and governmental structures
to almost as great a degree as did the southern four. All three had representative assemblies,
elected town mayors, and also had the codified "fueros", or "fueros", of customary laws and
citizen privileges. For Basques from Iparralde, the notion of a common history through self-
government and representative politics is also strong, and diasporan Basques see this as a tie
connecting north and south.

The 1512 Spanish-French border created more than a political division of the Basque
country that has remained until today. The division into Iparralde and Hegoalde created an
indelible mental categorization of the north and the south being split permanently and
irreversibly. It is true that there is still an extensive kinship network that straddles both sides
of this political line, and there was, and is, a tendency for many Basques to see their common
interests as conflicting with those of Madrid and Paris (Letamendia 1997; Jacob 1994).
However, there is no doubt that the Spanish-French division weakened Basque cultural
homogeneity. Each has been exposed to almost five hundred years of state organized official
'state' and "nation-building". Everything from Basque vocabulary loan words from Spanish
or French, to the actual pronunciation, the school systems and political socialization, the
patterns of bureaucracy and governmental administration, and actual forms of democracies
and dictatorships, Spanish colonization of the New World, and wars have affected and
influenced their mentalities and realities differently. In general, the French government
historically paid little attention to the Basque region, deeming it a slight, remote, and
backward area. In total contrast to the prominent role Basques played in Spanish affairs, their
northern kinsmen were inconspicuous in the state affairs of France.

When analyzing the economic development of the Basque country, the north is one of
the most depressed areas in France. Besides a thriving summer tourist season, small
agricultural production continues as the economic mainstay of the population and the three
provinces receive more from French government subsidy than they pay in taxes. The typical
settlement of the inland region was the peasant village whose major economic activity derived
from the mixed farming economy of grain cropping, apple orchards, fodder production, pig
and poultry raising, chestnut gathering, bee keeping, and sheep raising. A vision of
whitewashed stone homesteads with red tiled roofs in lush green mountains and valleys
remains in the mental picture of diaspora Basques who have never traveled to the homeland.
Postcards, picture books, and tourist information propagate this representation for both sides of the Pyrenees.

In contrast, Hegoalde, especially the industrial zones of Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa, constitutes one of the most dynamic sectors in all of Spain. Historically it has been the focus of ship building and maritime commerce, iron mining, steel processing, and manufacturing. After the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), industry began to penetrate the inner countryside, converting the former agricultural towns into secondary manufacturing centers of sewing machines, small armaments, cutlery, clothing, household appliances, cement, tires, and furniture among others. Today, the Donosti and Zamudio (Bilbo) areas also include mini “Silicon Valleys” of high technology research such as Sener aerospace engineering, and computer industries. The Basque provinces enjoyed the highest per capita income of any region of the Iberian peninsula until the 1990s when they were surpassed by Catalonia’s economic development.

A.4. The Fueros: A Powerful Source of Separate Identity

For centuries the Basque provinces maintained exclusively separate legal codes and created their own autonomous political institutions. This arrangement granted formal recognition to their autonomy under the Castilian Crown. Importantly for Basques, the separate regions were regarded as having a contractual rather than a subordinate position to the central, royal authority. Castilian royal rule remained indirect. Unlike Cantabria, Asturias, and Galicia, which formed part of Castilla, and unlike the areas newly conquered from Arabs (Extremadura and Andalucia), the Basques retained sufficient autonomy to give themselves political leverage in dealings with the monarchy. Diaspora interviewees repeated the idea that the Basques were not subjects of Castilla, they were citizens of a land that had accepted the king of Castilla as its sovereign. This is a crucial distinction to today’s Basques because it meant that historically, continued Basque loyalties went first to their own villages and provinces, then second to Castilla, and they were contingent upon the monarch’s respect for local autonomy and tradition as written into the local fueros. Nationalists stress this ‘independence’, as do the diaspora populations, when describing their own history.7

7 One husband and wife were quite certain that the Kings and Queens of Castilla had to kneel in front of the Tree of Gernika and the representatives of the Basque towns to swear their support for the fueros and Basque autonomy. After much discussion they decided they had seen it is a famous painting, therefore it must be true.
These rights were not granted by the king, rather they were based upon centuries old Basque legal traditions dating to the tenth century (Payne 1975: 17-18; Collins 1986:169). Under the *fueros*, the popular assemblies, or “biltzarrak” in Basque, were granted legislative authority, and the kings and lords were subject to its laws. Although both the church leaders and the king were excluded from the legislative debate and deliberations, periodically the political sovereign was required to appear before the assemblies to swear to respect their authority. Some examples of the rights enjoyed by citizens from the 1456 *Fuero Viejo de Vizcaya* (Bizkaia) included:

- the freedom of every Bizkaian to engage in commerce;
- rights of due process in all legal proceedings;
- ownership of land in Bizkaia was reserved for Bizkaians;
- exemption from taxes on any maritime activity; and

Another important aspect of distinction between regions in Spain was the concept of universal nobility, which can be traced to 1053 and the valley of the Roncal in *Nafarroa*. In the Basque provinces, there was a legislated collective nobility— all were considered ‘noble’. Thus, any citizen of the Basque region, regardless of his origins, could aspire to noble privileges and offices, a fact that would later greatly affect relations between Basques and non-Basques in the New World. Of course nobility did not mean that all were able to exercise the power of the wealthy, but collective nobility was often cited by the Basques in support of their claims for independence, or to unique status within the Spanish state. While it affirmed the equality between Basques, it also functioned to exclude outsiders and reinforce the imagination of ‘we Basques’. In the overpopulated rural areas which were dependent on limited and fixed resources, Basque nobility became the foundation of legislation designed to regulate the settlement of non-Basques on valuable land. Those who were not noble could be prohibited from moving into an area and could even be expelled from a province. Universal nobility would create a barrier against the excesses of the Castilian aristocracy, and importantly, this legal status facilitated emigration.

**B. The Development of Basque Nationalism**

The emergence and ideological characteristics of Basque nationalism in the nineteenth and twentieth century Spain are a dramatic expression of the conflict between modernity and tradition. For four centuries Basques occupied a position of importance within both the Old
World and the New World colonial Spanish bureaucracy that was out of proportion to their numbers in the state's population. The Basque provinces also occupied a privileged status within the Spanish state, as guaranteed by the *fueros*. They were economically more developed than the center, Madrid, and were the industrial capital of Spain. The significance of colonization for Spain should be kept in mind because during the period Spain ruled its multicultural empires, the ethnic pluralism within its own metropolitan boundaries was much less visible and less important. With the collapse of the empire in the 1898 'Disaster' of the loss in the Spanish-American War and liberation of overseas territories, now all attention would be concentrated on the population within its own borders. However, Spanish nation building resulted in defensive reactions from the regions (Smith and Mar-Molinero 1996:8; Balfour 1996:109).

B.1. The Foundations of Basque Ethnonationalism

A superficial reading of Basque nationalism would begin with the modern writings of Sabino de Arana y Goiri in the late 1800s, whose picture is prominently displayed in several of the Basque Cultural Centers in the United States, Argentina, and Uruguay. However, because longevity seems to lend authenticity and legitimacy for Basque nationalists, digging further before Arana y Goiri entered the scene, others have been re-discovered to have promoted the ideas of a "Basque nation" and of territorial independence. More than a century before Arana's publications, Larramendi, a Basque political ideologist (1690-1766), had approached the idea of government by the people, and the legitimacy of power deriving from the people and their right to determine their own destiny. He had suggested a Basque state independent of France and Spain.

One can go back to the 1765 Royal Basque Society of the Friends of the Country, which was motivated to instill a love of the Basque country, preserve ethnic ties, and increase political unity between the three provinces. These Basque elite were interested in fostering communication and instilling a knowledge of Basque topics and information regarding Basques outside of *Euskal Herria* as well, exemplifying the imagination of an inclusive group mentality. They also demonstrated one of the first concrete examples of an institutionalized Basque transnationalism and diaspora consciousness. Their publication, *Extractos*, included articles about their Basque brotherhood and special unity with the Royal Congregation of Saint Ignatius in Madrid, as well as news of diaspora membership, one hundred and seventy-one Basque members from Mexico for example, and activities of Basques in the New World.
At home, a new era of Spanish politics began with the death of King Fernando VII in 1833 and the subsequent outbreak of the First Carlist War. The issue at stake was the succession to the Spanish throne, which law mandated would go to the eldest legitimate child whether male or female, and in this case was the three-year-old princess Isabel. Fernando's younger brother, Carlos, argued that the crown should follow a male only lineage, making him the new sovereign. Carlos, a traditional, piously clerical individual, wanted to restore conservativism and especially religion to Spanish institutions and reverse the liberal path of constitutional monarchy, individualism, and capitalism which his brother had allowed. The first official group to announce its support was a group from Bizkaia which favored the religious focus and believed that the foral liberties were much more likely to be preserved by a traditionalist monarchy. Small bands of Carlists formed throughout the Basque territories and although the larger towns favored Isabel and the liberals, the majority of the Basque population was rural and favored the Carlists and a return to religiosity, the distinct _fueros_ system, and Basque traditionalism.

The paradox of this support for Carlism's divine monarchy comes from the fact that church and state were more separated in the Basque areas than anywhere else in Spain. Clerics had never been allowed to hold political office. However, the assault of the liberal anticlerics roused more intense opposition in the Basque country than elsewhere because it was perceived as part of a general attack against the institutions and values of the local society. Historians argue that Basque Carlists were not fighting to uphold the monarchists or aristocratic privileges, but rather their own rights, their values, and their own way of life as Basques (Heiberg 1989:36). It was noted in 1834 by the Regency Council that at the present time, the war had become a national war for the four provinces (Payne 1975:44). A Basque writer from the northern province of Ziberoa, Joseph Augustin Chaho, interpreted the basic motivations in his publications in 1837, positing a common identity among all Basques on both sides of the Pyrenees. He interpreted Basque support for Carlism as based on the defense of Basque liberties, which he deemed the freest and most egalitarian constitutional system in the world. Chaho concluded that the political problem of the Basque region would never be solved unless the Basques were fully allowed to affirm their separate identity (Chaho as cited in Payne 1975:70).

During the 1830s, Spanish governmental policy of the liberals in power recognized the need to negotiate with the Basques regarding the foral system. Yet the sections of the Basque territories under Spanish liberal control were ruled by martial law involving arbitrary arrests,
confiscations, and the execution of prisoners, which obviously created more enemies. Internal divisions between ideologies of Carlists, Carlos’ own indecisive leadership, and general exhaustion took their toll. In 1839 the Bizkaian commander and the liberal general agreed to the Compromise of Bergara, by which the Carlists forces were to lay down their arms in exchange for the retention of Basque fueros.

Following the First Carlist War, the mid-nineteenth century was a time of discovery of regional cultures. The European romantic stress on the cultural volkgeist affected new historiography in the Basque region, and even more in Catalonia and Galicia. Basque society in the 1850s and 1860s was less modernized than Catalonia, economically less dynamic, and politically more conservative. Basque parliamentary representatives were referring to Basques as a separate “nationality” in 1864, drawing heated rebukes from the prime minister that there was only one nationality in Spain. Spanish state-building had proved to be more successful than nation-building. Madrid had been unable and unwilling to spend the effort to endow the identity of ‘Spaniard’ with the advantages and a dignity that would outweigh the identity of ‘Basque’.

A new monarchist regime was introduced in Spain in 1868 and the action of the new wave of anticlericalism, the expansion of liberalism and further measures of centralization produced a reaction - a revival of Carlism. The second major Carlist civil war (1873-1876) resulted in a similar outcome with a defeat; the three western Basque provinces had their autonomous fueros revoked, and Nafarroa retained only some of its administrative and fiscal autonomy. This difference in treatment accentuated what during the next two generations would become a growing difference between Nafarroa, and the more united and interdependent provinces of Araba, Bizkaia, and Gipuzkoa. A century later, this would be repeated by the Spanish central government when it negotiated the Statutes of Autonomy separately for Nafarroa and Euskadi in 1979, creating a third ‘partition’ of Euskal Herria and a reaction in the diaspora to Spain’s ‘divide and conquer’ strategy.

The Basques had fought against a liberal Spanish central government twice, and lost both attempts to secure separate status with autonomy for regional fueros systems. Despite the loss of most foral rights, the method of raising and apportioning taxes was left to each of the four Basque provincial governments’ directly elected assemblies, keeping economic privileges as a local affair. In Araba and Nafarroa there were general economic and social stagnation and emigration in the aftermath of the war, but Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa developed the bases of modern industrial economies. Bizkaia, with its iron ore producing economy and
the port of Bilbo especially, was becoming highly differentiated structurally from the rest of Spain. This process of development had placed a heavy strain on the old culture of Bizkaian society, threatening traditional values and identity. Basque capitalism was oriented toward Spanish markets and the economic distance between groups representing capitalists, and groups representing traditional society was great (Diez Medrano 1994:559). There were few local bourgeoisie and the wealthiest Basque capitalist families were incorporated into the Spanish power elite. At this time the people who tended to emigrate were those from the rural areas looking for work, trade and economic opportunity and they transported their rural lifestyle images and traditions to the host communities in which they settled, at this time mainly Argentina and Uruguay. These are the diaspora collective images that have been inherited by their latter generations, not those of urbanizing Euskal Herria. In the homeland, it was in this environment of a rapidly changing and industrializing Bizkaia, added to the long history of autonomy, wars, and demands for separate status, that the traditional Basque nationalism of Sabino de Arana y Goiri emerged.

B.2. Sabino Arana y Goiri and Traditional Basque Nationalism

I have examined how the Basque country was not lagging behind Spanish economic development, and quite the opposite, Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa were leading it. The Basque territories had never been fully incorporated, nor administered or controlled by a central Spanish political power. The Basque country’s four provinces in the south had fought two unsuccessful civil wars against the central state authority and although most civil liberties and social rights of the fueros had been eliminated, an economic autonomy remained. All of these have become salient elements of a collective memory which strengthens ethnic consciousness in each of the six countries investigated here. The ensuing process of economic and social modernization was a challenge to Basque identity, institutions, and values because for the first time this brought a large scale non-Basque immigration into the area, especially Bizkaia, and an increased atomization of society. Traditionalism coupled with the onset of full-scale industrialization required a drastic adjustment in the society to adapt to the new modern circumstances. A product of both traditionalism and industrialism emerged in Sabino Arana y Goiri, recognized by Basques around the world as founder of modern Basque nationalism.

Sabino’s older brother, Luis, actually deserves recognition for the beginnings of modern Basque nationalism. It was Luis who consolidated the idea that Basques were intrinsically different from Spaniards and it would be necessary to secede from Spain and
France to achieve the kind of traditional society that had been prevalent in Bizkaia for centuries. Luis Arana argued that Carlism should not be the main focus for the political future because realistically, the Basques had nothing in common with the rest of Spain. Spain had usurped the government and rights of Bizkaia while attempting to corrupt its people. Total independence should be the goal for Basques.

An Arana family move to Barcelona for Sabino’s studies coincided with the climax of cultural renaissance in Catalonia. New publications in the Catalan language, including the first daily newspaper in Catalan were produced in the time of the “gold fever” of economic prosperity between 1876 and 1886. Cultural societies were born and there followed an explosion of cultural, linguistic, and literary activities, which also took a political form. The argument was made that Catalanism was based on a distinct regional culture and society whose psychology and values differed from the rest of Spain. These movements served as an indirect stimulus to Arana y Goiri’s doctrine of Bizkaian-Basque nationalism and in 1885 Sabino devoted himself entirely to Basque studies.

He had to learn the Basque language because like so many other upper-middle-class Bizkaian families, the Aranas spoke only Spanish. Without its language, the Basque nation would not be able to recover its political institutions, he wrote. He returned to Bilbo in 1888 and developed an ideology and a movement of Bizkaianism that ultimately became Basque nationalism and the platform of the Basque Nationalist Party, Partido Nacionalista Vasco, PNV. His profound belief in Catholicism affected his founding of this nationalism on the “salvation of Euzkadi”, not on any interests of economic classes. Some of his articles were signed with “We are for Euzkadi and Euzkadi is for God.” He also used “God and the Old Law.” In 1892 he published his first major political statement in “Bizkaia por su Independencia” (original copies of which are still available in the diaspora Center libraries in Argentina and Uruguay), which included four articles about historically questionable battles from medieval Bizkaian history which Arana converted into guideposts for Bizkaian independence from Spain. Although the book had very scant historical merit, its political importance was great. He announced his intention to form a political movement which would work to restore Bizkaia to its original state of independence and liberty. None of the new literature and historiography in the Basque provinces at the time had proposed anything so radical.

In the late 1880s and early 1890s, Bilbo was a city in transformation. The population tripled between 1876 and 1890, and the province of Bizkaia was the most densely populated
in all of Spain. Industrialization demanded an ever-growing cheap labor force greatly in excess of what the Basque region could provide. Hence, there followed a vast inflow of non-Basque immigrants from the impoverished rural regions of Spain. The new industrial society emerged with vigor, and socialism gained followers especially among the working class. However, Arana’s concept of nation was based to a large degree on the romantic roots much in vogue when he had studied in Barcelona. According to the Romantics, nations had existed forever and were a natural phenomenon. Every nation had the right to form a state. Nations were based on ethnicity and ethnic interests would be more salient than class interests. Arana’s solution to the social question of the nineteenth century was a more loving, Christian, paternalistic relationship between the classes, it was imperative that the liberal impulse in Iberian politics be destroyed, and that the Catholic church be given “absolute freedom to realize its divine mission” (Zirakzadek 1991:125).

By 1894 his political ideas were widely known in the homeland and in the diaspora as printed in Basque newspapers in Argentina. He had extended the definition of his Basque nation to include all seven provinces and promoted the idea of an independent confederation of Basque states which would be named “Euzkadi”, the place of the Basque race, Euskadi in today’s standardized Basque. The first PNV Center, which was to serve as a meeting place for the first Bizkaianist political party, was opened the same year and the “ikurriña”, the Basque flag designed by the Arana brothers, raised. Although between 1893 and 1898 the movement to develop an effective strategy for creating this independent confederacy had not realized any success, it had stimulated discussion and debate, which resulted in the formation of additional Basque nationalist groups that followed similar ideologies. Chapter Four will also discuss the transplantation of Aranist PNV ideology in the diaspora communities.

For homeland and diaspora Aranists, Spain was a corrupt entity, and the Basque language, euskera, would serve as a wall, a weapon, to contain the Spanish invasion and contagion. The loss of euskera was in direct proportion to the advance of the Castilian language and the immoral customs of the Spanish invader (Aulestia 1985:12). The concept of Basque nationality, for Arana, was realized by a traditionalist path, whereby Basque was defined as anti-liberal and anti-socialist. Liberalism was equated with atheism, although other nationalists preferred to eliminate Arana’s many references to Rome and the ideas that the goal of Basque nationalism would be to Christianize the people.

According to Arana, race was the principal defining element of a nation, and as is demonstrated in Chapter Five, the diaspora populations tend to accept this political ideology.
Arana promoted the idea of endogamy and the expulsion of the non-Basques from the territories. Race was a God-given condition that could never be achieved by an outsider. Membership was determined by birth and continued inclusion was by moral action of language, character, and following traditional values. Race also brought political loyalty and a natural right to self-government. It demanded cohesion and collective action against outsiders and outside threats. Biological kinship meant that a Basque was always a Basque and a Spaniard always a Spaniard. However, responses from diaspora interviewees demonstrate that currently prevailing attitudes accept that a Catalan descendant might be able to ‘become Basque’ after living in the Basque Country for several generations and learning the Basque language, but that it is a doubtful possibility for someone from Madrid. Diaspora interviewees’ definitions of ‘Basqueness’ tended to be wrapped in ancestral terms, with participants often proud to state the surnames of “all-Basque” relatives. Biological credentials were specifically key for Arana. Proof of Basqueness would come in the surnames of a person and one who did not speak Basque would still be Basque if they had Basque surnames in their line of ascendants. Surnames took on an overwhelming importance especially since so many of the population in the Basque provinces did not speak Basque at that time. The surname would be a marker of ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ to categorize the many immigrants also.

Unlike other European contemporaries, Arana did not regard territoriality as an essential or constant feature of the nation. He wrote ‘The patria is measured by race, history, law, customs, character, and language.... our Euskeria would still be Euskeria if it were moved to an island in the Pacific’ (Arana as cited in Heiberg 1989:52). In the following chapters, we shall see that many respondents in personal interviews determine that a Basque is a Basque no matter where they physically happen to be, because being Basque is a biological, genetic, spiritual identity. One does not have to be born in, or live in, the Basque country to be Basque. One must have Basque ancestry to be Basque.

8 Basques tend to respect and empathize with the Catalans as a result of their simultaneous struggles and shared anti-Franco history.

9 This study was greatly facilitated by what I term “my biological credentials” and the fact that I was accepted as an ‘insider’ with all Basques last names. Both of my parents being from Gernika added symbolic legitimacy to me as a Basque, and as a researcher. My ability to participate in all of their Basque activities (knowing the dances, singing the Basque songs, playing pelota with children, even cooking a Basque meal for the Peruvian Basque Center, made me ‘as Basque as’ they.
The preservation of language also carried similar importance. Arana wanted to use the language to stop the invasion of immigrants who 'contaminated and diluted' the Basque race and purity of language. He was opposed to other philologists who at the time were admitting the language was useless as an educated language and its disappearance in urban areas was generally accepted by the Basque bourgeoisie of the time. Because of this decline, Arana blamed the natives more than the foreigners for the situation of the language. "Euskera is dying. It is true. The foreigner is not killing it. The Basques themselves are killing it" (Arana y Goiri 1965:2, 379). Euskera was seen as a language of the unsophisticated peasantry and of very low status. Spanish was the language of culture and refinement and of the educated urban populations. Many emigrant interviewees divulged that upon reaching their new host societies they had made no efforts to teach their children Basque because of its perceived uselessness at the time of their migration. The ideal Basque country for Arana, was an ancient, romanticized, egalitarian one of the fuero system, not the modern one composed of beggars and rich capitalists.

It was at this time, 1893, that the socialist newspapers and Bizkaian nationalists' newspapers hit the streets. By the beginning of the twentieth century the Basque literary movement was following the renaissance of culture and stimulating the nationalist movement as well. Euskera was purged of its Spanish letters along with entire words that were labeled as alien influences on the Basque culture. Literature praising the traditional rural peasantry as the focus of liberty, moral purity, and true Basque values, was presented by Trueba, Chaho, Yparraguirre, Campion, and Askue. In 1898 others such as Unamuno, Maetzu, and Pio Baroja wrote about the ideal, harmonious, and moral nature of Basque traditional life as opposed to the contaminated misery of industrialized society. Each also wrote about the opposition between the Basque and the Spanish as fundamental. The Spanish were depicted as the threatening corrupters of the pure Basque traditional values and lifestyle. These literatures also made their way through the diaspora and were quoted in the diaspora press (San Sebastián 1991; Amezaga Clark 1991), adding to the idealized perception of the homeland.

For nationalists, the Basque represented tradition, pre-capitalist society, egalitarianism and democracy, peace and social order, Catholicism and spiritual rectitude. The anti-Basque represented modernization, industrial society, hierarchies and authoritarianism, violence and disruption, anti-clericalism and spiritual corruption. The Basque therefore was obligated to defend the nation from such a threat. To do so one had to become an "abertzale", a patriot,
and then would be granted the status of insider. Patriotism was an obligation and those Basques who were not patriots were just as deplorable as the Spanish.

**B.3. Building Nationalist Coalitions**

Post-Arana nationalism was divided into many camps including the religious Aranists, the linguistic Aranists, the political independentists led by brother Luis Arana, as well as those following Elias Gallastegui and Marxist-humanist workers. Women formed a special group of nationalists with their organization inside the PNV, the *Emakume Abertzale Batza*, EAB, Association of Patriotic Women, which also organized in the diaspora and still remains as a group in Rosario, Argentina. The capitalists supporting de la Sota resulted from Basque capitalism emerging as one of the main beneficiaries of Spain's military neutrality in World War I. Now more than ever, the Basque economy was directly linked to Spain’s and by 1917 moderate nationalists had dropped the rhetoric of separatism and had substituted the vocabulary of regionalism.

The PNV continued working to establish an infrastructure of support throughout the Basque Country by creating the party club as the focal point for information and activity organization. Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa had PNV clubs in nearly every important city and town, but in Araba and Nafarroa there was no evidence of general support outside of the capital cities. A youth branch of the PNV was formed in 1901, and in 1908 a mountaineering association, *Mendikotzale Bazkuna* was created to instill a love of geography for the Basque mountainous homeland. It later became quite essential to the Basque corps of troops during the civil war and again later organized the Basque resistance and clandestine flow of Basque exiles across the Pyrenees. A nationalist labor union was formed in 1911 which restricted membership to Basques only, and gave the PNV a type of working class support. The conversion of large numbers of lower clergy to the nationalists also affected the mass support because of the close connections between religion and local life and customs. A group of Basque priests founded an association aimed at giving a religious education in *euskera*. This was the precursor to the *ikastola*, Basque language school, movement which would provide the Basques' their own educational system in the 1960s and 1970s. Emigrants who departed in the first decades of the century transferred this familiarity of the PNV and its politics to their new Basque communities in the diaspora, as seen in diaspora published articles and meetings held in established Basque Centers (San Sebastian 1992; Bilbao Azkarreta 1992).
In 1923 Miguel Primo de Rivera staged a coup in Madrid establishing a military dictatorship for the remainder of the decade. Non-Spanish nationalism in all forms was suppressed and many nationalists were imprisoned or exiled, fleeing to Mexico, Venezuela, Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay. The PNV leadership shelved its demands for independence, and instead struggled to obtain a statute of autonomy similar to that of Catalonia, and during the Second Republic (1931-1936), Basque nationalists demanded and worked almost exclusively for that Statute of Autonomy. By 1936 Basque nationalism had become the most powerful force in Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa by attracting support from the traditionalists and the local bourgeoisie. It was a program of a conservative middle class aimed at establishing a society of small-scale industrial and agricultural producers in which religious principles would inform most aspects of life. Electoral results and outcomes of the referenda for the approval of the drafts of the Statutes of Autonomy demonstrate that there was not great support in Araba, nor in Nafarroa. First presented in 1931, by October of 1936 the Spanish Parliament had approved a fourth draft of the statute which did not include Nafarroa. However, by this time the Spanish Civil War had begun.

There never was a homogeneous Basque nationalism. The differences were various including rural versus urban, pro-traditional society versus pro-modernization, industrial versus agricultural interests, liberal versus Carlist, autonomists versus separatists. However, nothing succeeds in unifying a people quite like fighting a common enemy, and the stronger the enemy, the stronger the reaction.

C. Basque Nationalism and Ethnic Identity in the Franco Years

The greatest number of diaspora Basques who are living emigrants left the Basque Country in the 1930s, immediately before, during, or after the Spanish Civil War. Their perceptions of what they lived through, passed on to their children and grandchildren, have prominently influenced those diaspora communities which received this phase of Basque emigration. Though they may not recall the historical facts correctly, what is pertinent are the emotions, attitudes and opinions manifested that correlate with diaspora rhetoric of ‘traumatic dispersal’, ‘collective memory of ills to the Basque population’, ‘solidarity with co-ethnics in the homeland and in the diaspora’, ‘a return movement- both real and mythical’, ‘an enriched ethnic life in the host society’, and a maintenance of links with the homeland.
C.1. The Spanish Civil War: Burning Memories

The spring of 1936 witnessed increasing street violence and clashes between the Falange and Socialists and in July the Army in Spanish Morocco revolted and occupied two cities. General Francisco Franco flew to Madrid to lead his rebelling military forces and throughout Spain the officers in the garrisons rose against the newly elected Republican government. The revolt of the army was not unexpected as it was known that support for a fascist coup in Spain was solicited as early as 1932, and in March of 1934 Spanish Monarchists visited Mussolini to seek backing from the Italian government. Once the war commenced, the Italians immediately sent men, air power and a billion lira (N. MacDonald 1987:36); additionally, the German Condor Legion were used for air raids and the destruction of Durango, Gernika, Santander, and Bilbo. The United Kingdom, France, and the United States declared neutrality and gave no aid to the elected government of the Republicans, necessitating a reliance on purchasing from the Soviet Union. Diaspora Basques discussed how they remembered sending financial aid to their families, and in the majority of communities in Argentina, Uruguay, and the United States, interviewees could recall at least a few men from their areas that had returned to Euskal Herria to fight with the Republicans.

The top PNV leaders had denounced the military's revolt and interference in an elected constitutional government, and their pronouncements expressed the struggle as one between civil rights and fascism, republic and monarchy. Basque nationalist leadership declared that "its principles led it to come down on the side of civil rights and the Republic in consonance with the democratic and republican regime of our people during its centuries of liberty" (Payne 1975:163). However, this civil war was not a delineated conflict between two political ideas, it was also a civil war between Basques in the four provinces. In Nafarroa, army rebels of General Mola were aided by the former Carlists after he declared that the remaining foral privileges in Nafarroa would be completely upheld. The PNV leadership in Nafarroa issued their own declaration of support saying the PNV of Nafarroa would not endorse or support the Republican government. In Araba there was support for all sides but the military insurgents seized control of the capital, Gasteiz (Vitoria), and sent troops to close the Basque nationalists' offices in the area. PNV leaders were arrested and forced to write declarations urging Basque nationalists to support the military takeover and a few months later General Mola in Nafarroa dissolved the Basque nationalist organizations. On certain issues Basque nationalists had much in common with the Spanish Nationalists of Mola and Franco, sharing strong ties to Catholicism and an emphasis on social order, discipline, and traditional values.
On October 1, 1936 the Spanish Republican Parliament approved the Basque autonomy statute which established an autonomous regional government for the three provinces of Araba, Bizkaia, and Gipuzkoa, although all that remained free at this point was Bizkaia and a section of Gipuzkoa. The President of the new Basque government was elected by municipal councils and the unanimous choice was José Antonio de Aguirre y Lecube. Aguirre appointed a coalition cabinet of representatives from five different parties but there was still much discontent and fragmentation among anti-Falangists. Basque nationalists themselves were divided in support for the statutes and many perceived it as a sell out to the Spanish government because of the lack of total independence. When Aguirre swore his oath of office under the traditional Tree of Gernika, as Basque representatives of fueroist governments had done for centuries before him, many jeered and protested for independence. The same day, Luis Arana y Goiri officially resigned from the PNV in repudiation of its compromising of nationalist principles and objectives (Payne 1975:179).

The war in the north of Spain progressed to Basque nationalists and leftist supporters fighting other Basques, Spanish, Germans, and Italians. On April 26, 1937 the most famous incident of the war occurred with the saturation bombing and partial razing of the historic foral center of Gernika. Worldwide condemnation of the civilian bombing, and consequently, Pablo Picasso’s work of art “Guernica”, demonstrated the horrors suffered in this, and all, wars. Because the entire town of Gernika was destroyed except for the church, the parliament building, and the Tree of Gernika where representatives had met for almost one thousand years, Basques have promulgated as a part of the common history and Basque myth, that the symbolism of Basque nationalism, history, and identity can never be eliminated. Tree of Gernika symbols, posters, paintings, and sculptures decorate diaspora Basque Centers and homes and numerous discussions of Gernika uncovered a diaspora faith that “God saved the Tree of Gernika to show the world that as the Tree of Gernika lives, so shall the Basques” (Anacabe interview 1998).

An estimated thirty thousand children were evacuated from Bizkaia to refugee camps in safer locations in Iparralde and other parts of France, England, Belgium, the Soviet Union, Switzerland, Denmark, Mexico, and Cuba. Many were orphans, or soon to become orphans, and not having families to which return, remained in their host countries. Others, upon returning to the Basque country after the war’s end, found their families to be the targets of persecution from Franco’s government and escaped Euskal Herria as political exiles.
The end of military struggle for the Basque nationalists came with the fall of Bilbo, June 19, 1937 leaving nearly all of Bizkaia now in the hands of the Spanish Nationalists. The final collapse of the Spanish Republic in 1939 recorded an estimated 600,000 deaths, countless of thousands more homeless, about 150,000 exiled, and the majority on both sides were left economically, psychologically, and emotionally devastated. Defeat halted the growing institutionalization of the Basque nationalist movement but failed to eradicate nationalist sentiments, and on the contrary, for many it intensified because of their suffering and losses.

C.2. Spanish Nation-building a la Franco

The collective memory of victimization during the Franco dictatorship is shared by the diaspora with their homeland co-ethnics, and whether they personally experienced it or not, the narratives are extremely similar among respondents in all six host communities. The occupation forces of General Franco descended upon the Basque country determined to erase all signs of a distinctive Basque culture and any remnants of Basque nationalism. The anti-Basque nationalist purge extended from schools and churches to businesses and factories. Properties of Basque nationalists were confiscated, teachers and civil servants were fired and replaced, and Basque priests suffered imprisonment, deportation, and execution. Because Basque nationalism relied so heavily on the linguistic identification of race, culture, and nation, Madrid placed a special emphasis on the destruction of this aspect of non-Spanish behavior. The most damaging to Basque culture was the outlawing of the use of the language as a functioning means of communication. Euskera was prohibited in all public places and jail sentences were imposed for a Basque conversation on the streets. All Basque language newspapers, magazines, and radio programs were banned. However, the grandparents' generation still contained Basque monolinguals and therefore behind closed doors Basque was still spoken or whispered.

The repression of political ideas, outlawing the use of the Basque language and display of the ikurriña Basque flag, and public displays of Basque culture in the form of instrumental and choral music were some of the repercussions of Franco's nation-building policies.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{10}}\] Dorothy Legarreta's, Gernika Generation provides a detailed country by country account of the evacuated children and their chaperones. Many of my interviewees in Brussels had originally gone to Belgium as one of these children, and had returned to their Belgian families as orphans, or returned as adults for education or employment and then stayed permanently. One couple had met in the camps in England, married, and emigrated to Australia.
Basques, as well as Catalanians, Galicians, etc. would have to ‘become’ Spanish. The Basque language was removed from school curriculums and from the streets. Civil registry names of newborns had to be Spanish, not Basque, names, and surname spellings were hispanicized. Names of towns were changed to Spanish words, street and plaza names were changed to those of Spanish Nationalist war heros. Cemetery tombstone names were erased and in some cases re-engraved with the Spanish equivalents. Masses were only allowed in Spanish, and non-Basque clergy were brought in to administer to the now Spanish speaking Catholics. Non-Basque teachers were brought in from the south of Spain to instruct the now Spanish speaking children. Most noticeably, non-Basque Guardia Civil, military Civil Guards, were imposed in the provinces for policing the population. Civil liberties were non-existent.

After the conclusion of the war in 1939, Franco promulgated the infamous “Law on Political Responsibilities” which made it a crime for anyone over the age of fourteen 1.) to have “helped to undermine public order” at any time since October 1, 1934; 2.) “to have impeded the Spanish Nationalist movement” even by being passive at any time after the beginning day of the war; or 3.) to have belonged at any time to any leftist political parties, to any regional nationalist parties, to the Liberal Party, or to a Masonic Lodge (Clark 1979:82). Anyone convicted of any of these crimes could have all properties confiscated, have their nationality deprived, be deported to Africa, or be sentenced to a prison term. Trials were conducted by mixed military-Falangist tribunals, and there was no right to appeal.

In the fifteen years after the end of the Civil war, and the exile and imprisonment of most of the Basque nationalist leaders, a durable Basque resistance emerged in spite of Franco’s efforts to hispanicize the Basque population. The Basque government-in-exile installed in Paris was supported by a sympathetic French government, and by the Basque diaspora. The oppressive measures utilized to make Spaniards out of Basques backfired, instead galvanizing anti-Spanish sentiments in Euskal Herria. Iparralde Basques were especially helpful during the war and were about to become essential to the underground resistance and movement of arms and people. Because of the French government’s unofficial blind eye policy, Iparralde became a safe haven for numerous activists and exiles, whose first stop before embarking for the Americas, the Philippines, or Australia, was usually a Basque family in the north.

Basque resistance emerged in the mid 1940s with the creation of the Basque Consultative Council which represented all of the Basque political parties and delegates from the unions in the Basque provinces. It was responsible for ensuring that the Basque
Government-in-exile in Paris would remain in close contact with the main forces and current events in the Basque country, and for coordinating the strategy for the Basque resistance. There was another Resistance Committee that operated primarily on the Spanish side of the border and the role of the Basque Consultative Council was to ensure that the activities of the resistance coincided with the political strategy of the government-in-exile. Diaspora communities in Mexico and Argentina published newspapers and information bulletins that were then distributed in Euskal Herria and clandestine radio broadcasts were transmitted to the south of the Basque Country from Iparralde, and later from Caracas, Venezuela for thirteen years (Beltza 1977; Amezaga Clark 1991; Galindez 1984).

Never separatist nationalists, the Basque bourgeoisie had continued their association with the Spanish system and the economic elite enjoyed preferential treatment within Franco's established economy. The underground PNV had reinforced its own reputation for being a parliamentarian and Christian Democratic party of the middle class. It continued to define itself within the Spanish state and its goal of independence had decades ago been exchanged for autonomy within the state. It even disassociated itself from nationalist movements in Iparralde (Jacob 1994). Expectedly, the rifts and divisions between nationalists before the war, which had temporarily been fused by the war effort, surfaced again.

C.3. Basque Nationalist Underground Resistance

During the 1950s and 1960s nationalist feelings remained strong among the same groups as previously: farmers, peasants, white collar workers of the lower-middle class, shopkeepers and small entrepreneurs, and a few of the skilled urban workers. During this time the young liberal clergy and the Basque intelligentsia also became the most dissident sectors of the society due in part to the slow but steady growth of secularism in what had been potently Catholic territory. In these decades many political scientists and sociologists assumed that ethnic conflicts and nationalisms were on their way to disappearing in advanced European societies because of the pressures of mass society, political centralization, economic coordination, and modern communications and the media. This was not the case in the Basque Country as growing modernization also planted growing crises of identity and values. All of these factors, added to the repression of Basque culture, language, and traditions, summed to an explosion of frustrations that are still being vented today.

New arrests of suspected resistance participants made union activity especially hazardous as work stoppages were illegal. Blue collar workers complained that they were
bearing the heaviest burden of the nationalist movement as they were the ones always called upon to receive Franco’s punishment. Nevertheless, in 1951 a two day strike of 250,000 workers in Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa spread to another 35,000 workers in Nafarroa and Araba with reckless and violent reactions from the Spanish Civil Guard, Guardia Civil. Thousands were detained, imprisoned, beaten and tortured, and dismissed from their jobs. As the actions taken by Basques accelerated in level of severity, the reactions of the Guardia Civil increased in level of violence, and vice versa. Ted Robert Gurr’s theory of why ethnic groups rebel combines the grievances regarding differential treatment and heightened sense of group cultural identity and cohesion, with a mobilizing potential, and when combined with government repressive control tends to result in sustained violent conflict (Gurr 1993). This was the Basque Country. Spanish nation-building for Franco might be better described as attempted peripheral nation crushing.

Basque underground resistance at this time produced the same cleavages in the nationalist movement that had prevailed before the Civil War and Franco repressions. There were those who saw this struggle as a political and partisan one; for them the focus was the Basque Nationalist Party. Other Basques saw economic questions as those of higher importance and joined the struggle through membership in one of the Basque unions. Several defined the resistance as a fight for cultural identity and preservation of the language, focusing their efforts on a clandestine ikastola, the Basque schools movement, and pressured the Spanish government to allow the use of euskera in public. Later, another group tired of waiting for the Basque Government-in-exile to take decisive action, declared war on Spain, the Spanish language, and capitalism as well.

The more cautious and conservative PNV repelled many youth who called for political violence in response to Franco’s state violence. The PNV was more concerned with long range plans of keeping in contact with all anti-Franco forces and preparing the groundwork for the emergence of democracy in Spain once Franco died. In each of these alliances, the quid pro quo was that the PNV would foreswear any move to claim regional independence during the period of the Franco dictatorship if, in return, the democratic Spanish parties would agree to grant the Basques their autonomy once Franco was gone. Theirs was a defensive strategy, to wait it out and work with Madrid and within a democratic Spanish government. The activities of the PNV reflected its passive form of political struggle. The party’s energy and resources went to organize the diaspora efforts and the Basque Government-in-exile, establishing ties to other underground anti-Franco groups in Spain, and raising money to
support the resistance activities. Diaspora communities received personal information from their family members, but the older communities in Argentina and Uruguay relied more on Basque Government interpretations of desired future goals. Several interviewees in Argentina, Uruguay, and Peru stated their beliefs that the “Basque resistance against Franco was united”, and that all Basques had “stuck together”. The preference for the Basque Nationalist Party, PNV, continues today as shown in Chapter Five.

Homeland dissent was also expressed by those who believed that Basques should act to obtain independence, without reference to what was happening in Madrid. They argued that no Spanish government would ever be willing to release the Basque provinces to form their own state, therefore the sooner the process began, the sooner it would be completed. Voices began to complain that the government-in-exile did not truly represent all Basques and had never been ratified by a popular vote. Many believed that confrontational politics would be more effective than working through established political channels.

C.4. Euskadi 'ta Askatasuna

In the 1950s, clandestine groups of students were meeting to write and publish magazines and newspapers, distributing Basque diaspora publications coming from Argentina, Venezuela, and Mexico, discussing examples of European contemporary political writings, and eventually in Bilbo, they formed a secret organization EKIN, which in Basque means to act. The participants in EKIN were frustrated with the lack of commitment of the PNV to preserve euskera, and its being sidelined in the list of priorities. Student leader, José Luis Alvarez Emparanza, known by the political pseudonym “Txillardegui”, argued that Basque was on the verge of extinction not only because of the massive immigration of Spaniards, but because of laziness on the part of those who knew it and did not use it to communicate. Members of EKIN announced that a true Basque patriot should not be content until an independent state of all seven provinces was realized. Most of the older, established Basque nationalist leaders found such ideas utopian and feared such expectations would alienate potential allies in Spain, France and elsewhere. In 1959, Txillardegui and other youth leaders decided to separate from the PNV, creating the independent group Euskadi 'ta Askatasuna,

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11 When I presented them with information that Basques had fought against each other in the Civil War, or that there were many different strands of Basque nationalism they tended to not believe me, or they rationalized their understanding of the Basque history as being “correct” because their relatives’ letters, and people at the diaspora Basque Centers, had told them so.
ETA, Basque Homeland and Liberty.

Because of the ongoing police repression and inability publicly to organize and spread information, from the beginning ETA lacked a centralized system of authority. Local groups often acted independently of each other and there was a general lack of coordination of activity. Subsequently there was also an uncoordinated effort to educate the diaspora or to utilize their potential for the homeland struggle and the organized diaspora continued to take their cues from the PNV. In the early 1960s, ETA activity consisted mainly of educating new etarras, preparing ETA activists, and studying the works of Arana and Elias Gallastegui, who was connected to the separatist movement for the Irish Free State. The First Assembly of ETA temporarily clarified the purpose, goals, and internal organization of the groups of participants. Representatives agreed that ETA was a “Basque Revolutionary Movement of National Liberation” and not a political party, and would dedicate itself to securing political and cultural liberty for Basques in all seven provinces, and to changing the existing society. It would promote mass propaganda, labor activism, internal publications and paramilitary preparation, grass-roots agitation, and popular demonstrations (Pagoaga Gallastegui interview 1997).

In its “Statement of Principles” ETA proposed the creation of an independent democratically elected political order for the region, not dominated by any one party, but by the people at large. Basques would enjoy internationally recognized human rights such as freedom of speech, press, religion, and assembly, which were not a part of the society Franco allowed. Unions would have constitutionally protected rights, as would ethnic and linguistic minorities. The political framework would be decentralized with as much power as possible reserved for municipalities. Although there was ambivalence about government planning and centralized power in general, regarding the economy, the etarras advocated a modified market economy in which personal wealth and income inequality would be limited. Various sectors and resources would be government owned or managed, and workers’ cooperatives would be encouraged (Zirakzadek 1991:152). Methods of achieving this Basque state were vague at this point as there was much disagreement between following Ghandi’s nonviolent resistance, Julen Madariaga’s preferred calculated use of defensive violence, or perhaps offensive tactics and declarations of war, and all varieties of combinations.

The Basque economy continued to expand and soon the memberships of ETA and labor unions overlapped. Following constant arrests, imprisonments, and exile to France and Belgium, the less experienced labor-oriented activists soon inherited control of the leadership.
offices. Now university educated urbanites, the new directors of ETA, entertained joining forces with immigrant workers and advancing proletarian demands while simultaneously pushing for Basque self-determination in an independent state. The emphasized themes of cultural and ethnic oppression were superseded by complaints of economic exploitation. Publications concerning traditions, values, and language were replaced with those referring to the proletariat, the misery of factory production, class struggle, and destroying the roots of capitalism. Leaders read and studied Europe’s New Left theoreticians who argued for a novel way of thinking about social revolution, deducing that socialism would not come from a dramatic economic collapse nor a coup that the international community would not allow. Through patient labor activity and local policy-making centers, workers would gradually gain control over society. Others read works inspiring anticolonial struggles and wished to adapt the contemporary liberation movement models of Franz Fanon (*Wretched of the Earth* was required reading for the organization), Ernesto “Che” Guevara, and Mao Tse Tung. Action would bring about change, not the hibernation of the PNV.

Frederico Krutwig, the political pseudonym used by Fernando Sarraílh de Ihartza, declared in the publication *Vasconia* that violence could be effectively used to set off widespread popular mobilizations against a government (Krutwig 1962). Proposing the positive correlation between state violence and popular violence, Krutwig saw an accelerating spiral of violence between Basque protestors and the *Guardia Civil* leading to greater popular anger and militancy to the point of revolution. Krutwig’s arguments were refined and detailed into how a guerilla should move against a government, becoming a primer for ETA guerilla warfare. If during the first half of the decade ETA’s energies and resources were devoted primarily to cultural activism, the second half could be exemplified by the following statement published in the ETA newsletter, *Zutik*. Arise: “Violence is necessary- a contagious, destructive violence that supports our struggle, a good struggle, one that the Israelis, Congolese, and Algerians have taught us” (Zirakzadek 1991:162).

Opposition to the focus on labor and to strategies of violence mounted. Txillardegui and other senior ETA members, many of whom were in exile in Belgium, France, and several Latin American countries, packed a Fifth Assembly meeting and overthrew the labor leadership, expelling them from ETA. The original ETA became known as ETA-V, because of the significance of the Fifth Assembly, while the expelled New Left members and followers formed an ETA-berri, literally the New ETA. The fragmentation confused those in *Euskal Herria*, and those in the diaspora, who were being asked to support the Basque Government-
in-exile, ETA, ETA-V, and ETA-berri. The ETA split from the PNV, and subsequent divisions within ETA confounded an already extremely fragmented nationalist movement. In *Euskal Herria*, ETA participants of all the various groups, continued to disagree about objectives, and the methods for achieving such objectives, and formed additional detached groups that promoted different paths to different goals for the Basque Country. The original objectives of Txillardegui's ETA: territorial independence and cultural revitalization, were now hardly recognizable and were greatly misunderstood in the diaspora (San Sebastián interview 1999).

C.5. A Shift to Armed Struggle

When Basque nationalism had slowly resurfaced in the 1960s, its ideology had shifted dramatically. Previously the nationalists had declared socialism and socialists to be anti-Christ and anti-Basque. However, the young nationalists who emerged with *Euskadi 'ta Askatasuna* proclaimed themselves to be socialists as well as nationalists, and many were members of the Catholic clergy. This conversion was inspired in part by the student demonstrations and movements exhibited in Europe, Vatican II proclamations and changes in Church relations with oppressed peoples, and Third World anti-colonial and anti-imperialism struggles. The importance of Basque culture had replaced Basque race, and Basque socialism had replaced Basque Catholicism. Opinion had gradually changed to agreement on the idea of a right to self-determination and therefore an inherent right to sovereignty- only Basques could and should rule Basques.

What had not been altered was the significance of being *abertzale*, or patriotic, to be a 'good' or 'true' Basque. Only a nationalist could be an *abertzale*, and hence only an *abertzale* could be a nationalist. Basque society became polarized into *abertzales* and *españolistas*, one was either Basque or anti-Basque. Anti-Basques included the Spanish Police, Guardia Civil, the Communist and Socialist parties in *Euskadi*, and Basque industrialists, the latter having suffered tremendously at the hands of ETA with kidnappings, extortion payments and assassinations.

In 1968 Melitón Manzanas, a Spanish police commissioner with a reputation of torturer, was assassinated and ETA participants fingered as the main suspects. The Spanish government imposed a state of exception and over two thousand Basque were arrested, with many beaten and tortured for information. Sixteen nationalists (two of whom were priests, and others admitted *etarras* and ETA sympathizers), were charged with the killing, though
all pleaded innocent. Conviction was to result in capital punishment. Burgos, outside of the Basque provinces, was chosen for the military tribunal site. Foreign journalists reported repeated violations of international human rights conventions and principles of due process, and described in detail suspects’ descriptions of police torture. Diaspora communities mobilized in rare collective political action and attempted to influence their host country governments’ foreign policy with Spain. Readers around the world reacted in shock and solidarity for the suspects out of identification with an ethnic group minority and anti-discrimination, or out of class consciousness and support for fellow workers (Zabaleta interview 1999). Within Euskal Herria, the unanticipated outpouring of international attention and support reinforced the commitment of activists within the ETA movement and catapulted others into action for the first time. Though six were found guilty, after an intercession by the Pope, Franco granted stays of execution, reprieves, and lesser prison sentences. Although in the aftermath of the Manzanas killing ETA had been decimated by arrests and flights from the homeland, now hundreds of new recruits were ready to take their places. Worldwide attention to the plight of the Basques as an oppressed people lent credence and justification for ETA actions for the first time and Basque individuals in diaspora communities began to perceive a justification for ETA activity that previously had not been understood. A recurring theme in the interviews in all six countries was that though respondents may not support contemporary ETA operations of today, they had favored Franco era ETA activities as necessary defensive reactions to state terrorism. They used the Burgos Trials as one more example of repeated victimization by Spanish political powers.

Prior to Franco’s death in 1975, and conforming to Krutwig’s spiral theory of violence, ETA unleashed a wave of violent political protest unlike anything ever experienced before in the Basque Country. Armed robberies, bombings of personal, commercial, and military properties, kidnappings, and assassinations, were defended as necessary acts against the region’s symbols of capitalist wealth. A kidnapping of industrialist Lorenzo Zabala in 1972 was perplexing as he was ethnically and linguistically Basque. ETA-V argued that the kidnapping demonstrated how ETA’s armed struggle and the demands of striking workers could be combined for success. A new justification for the violence was put forth: intense differences of opinion among government officials concerning responses to ETA violence would bring down the coalitions of moderate reformers and hard-core Francoists (Zirakzadek 1991:186). Contrary to expectations, there did not seem to be any fissures or doubts about another harsh crack-down by the Guardia Civil when ETA assassinated Franco’s political
successor, Carrero Blanco, by bombing his car sky high in 1973. Another series of arrests, beatings and tortures of suspected ETA sympathizers and labor dissidents, together with a mass exodus into exile in France, Belgium, and Venezuela left organized Basque nationalist groups in the four southern provinces devoid of senior leadership. More in-fighting regarding the lack of communication and approval of acts to be undertaken, doubts about aligning with non-Basque labor groups, and immediate plans for action after Franco’s imminent death further divided the already fragmented Basque nationalists. The labeling of *etarras* now would include “*ETA-poli-militar*” referring to those who favored subordinating violent military action to the political task of mobilizing non-elites, and “*ETA militar*”, or those who believed ETA’s most important goal should be to continue the armed struggle and strategy in accordance with the spiral theory of violence. Military operations were out of control and there was no oversight or communications between field organizers (Landa interview 1996; Pagoaga interview 1997), operations backfired and instead of inspiring popular action many were repelled by Basque use of terror against other Basques. Former ETA members and sympathizers watched from *Euskal Herria* and from exile, as Basque nationalists became each other’s worst enemies.

Franco’s widely celebrated death in November, 1975, changed nothing immediately. State violence and repression triggered more Basque violent reaction and although murders carried out by ETA units had never exceeded seventeen per year between 1968 and 1977, in each of the years 1978, 1979, and 1980, over sixty-five killings were attributed to ETA groups (Clark 1984:133). The spiral theory of violence was accurate for ETA and Spanish state actions, but a popular uprising against the regime never materialized. The very opposite attitude seemed to have affected most in the middle and upper classes, and the lower working class was tiring of bearing the brunt of state repression against them. They believed ETA tactics had been unsuccessful in igniting popular revolution and with a new Prime Minister and King, improvements should be on the way. They had waited forty years, what would five or six more matter?

Prime Minister Suarez had established a representative body, the Basque General Council, to facilitate the expected limited transfer of powers from Madrid to the Basque

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12 Numerous interviewees recounted stories of telephone hotlines spreading the news, impromptu champagne parties and emotional celebrations. Several who were children at the time remembered being allowed to eat all the sweets they could stomach and others celebrated with *turron*, a special- and scarce in the diaspora- sweet typically reserved only for Christmas.
region and all wished to have their opinions voiced. Exhausted by government repression and arrests, frustrated by the failure of the spiral theory of violence and the inability to ignite popular resistance, and subject to the increasingly strong disfavor of the public and other Basque nationalist groups, most of the units of ETA-politico-militar dissolved in the 1980s, leaving only a small sector of ETA-militar still engaged in armed struggle. Former participants decided to utilize non-violent means and new legal opportunities presented in the increasingly democratic institutions of the Autonomous Community. A number of ETA leaders also endorsed the idea of negotiating now while there was still something to negotiate before a new French government policy of cooperation with the Spanish wiped out the safe houses, weapons and money. A new coalition of former and current etarras and their sympathizers developed, calling itself Herri Batasuna, HB, One United People or One United Land. It was a loose coalition that agreed to promote what is known as the KAS Alternative, Koordinadora Abertzale Sozialista, Democratic Alternative for the Basque Country, which included immediate withdrawal of Spanish polices forces from the Basque provinces, release of all Basque political prisoners, and political independence for the four Basque provinces. The Herri Batasuna coalition would not participate in the newly developed political institutions and with the legalization of political parties and unions, limited autonomy and self-governance for the Basque regions, the KAS Alternative demands lost importance to other nationalists who were willing to play by the Spanish rules.

In the summer of 1979, the Suarez government proposed an autonomy statute allowing the provinces of Araba, Bizkaia, and Gipuzkoa to establish a regional parliament with limited fiscal, educational, and a few other policy-making rights, and importantly, to allow the Basque provinces their own police force. Many citizens vividly remember the parades of the initial Ertzaintza, Basque police, to the cheering and emotional crowds throughout the four provinces. Nafarroa was allowed a separate autonomy apart from the other three, which are now politically Euskadi, the Basque Autonomous Community. The PNV and another coalition of leftist Basque parties, Euskadiko Ezkerra, Basque Left, endorsed the proposal and urged Basque citizens to approve it through the referendum process. HB opposed the statute and favored abstention, complaining that the powers granted were too limited; that Nafarroa had been separated on purpose to divide the power of the Basques and it should be included with the other three; and that demands for removing the Spanish military police and granting amnesty for political prisoners had not been addressed. The voter turnout was 57%, and 94.6% of those voted in favor of the proposed statute. The referendum passed.
D. Contemporary Basque Identity in Euskal Herria

Since 1980 the southern four provinces of the Basque country have lived through tremendous political, economic, and social changes. They have established their own autonomous governments and institutions, and parallel to this political consolidation they have experienced a transformation in the economy. The centuries old traditional economy of agriculture, iron, and steel sectors which produced mainly for the internal markets of Spain, have now stepped up to the demands of the European Union and its Common Market. The Basques have reorganized and modernized rapidly in order to respond to the competitive requirements of an increasingly open economic and civil society. Commencing after 1975, the Spanish central government set about writing the new constitution, taking the fifty provinces and creating seventeen autonomous regions with separate and different powers devolved to each. The powers granted to the Basque Autonomous Community, Euskadi, are not the same as those granted to the separate Foral Community of Nafarroa.

The Statute of Autonomy for Euskadi, also known as the Statute of Gernika, ratifies political, social, and economic relations between the Basque Autonomous Community and Spanish state administration. The Basque government has executive and legislative powers, including the essential control over taxation. The greater part of tax resources are gathered by the institutions of the Basque government, not the central Spanish government. The Statute of Autonomy keeps under Basque government control all matters which concern the Basque police force, management and development of education and health care, extensive responsibilities in the fields of infrastructure and public works in general, culture, agriculture, industry, and social welfare.

The legislative branch is formed by seventy-five deputies, twenty-five from each province, and its seat is in Gasteiz (Vitoria), the capital city of Araba chosen to increase incorporation of those Basques. Basque nationalist parties consistently receive about two-thirds of the votes cast as was the case again in the 1998 elections. However there are eight or nine parties and coalition groups that present candidates in each election, consequently no one political party has ever reached the fifty percent for a majority of the electorate. The fragmentation continues in the party system, exemplified by the 1989 breaking away from PNV of Eusko Alkartasuna. Some coalitions last for only one election, and even then may break up while in office.

The support that ETA once enjoyed has decreased and only about ten percent of the
respondents in opinion polls taken in Euskadi express an endorsement of ETA (Shafir 1995:109), though its political arm Euskal Herriarrok, the new name of the Herri Batasuna, won 18% of the vote in 1998. In 1988, all six major Basque regional parties, except Herri Batasuna, signed an antiterrorism pact that was designed to isolate and reduce the influence of ETA. This agreement, El Pacto de Ajuria Enea, named after the Presidential palace in Gasteiz, was also taken to the World Congress of Basque Communities in the Diaspora which met in Bahia Blanca, Argentina, 1989. Delegates from the world’s Basque Centers also signaled their support for it, with abstentions from the United States, Uruguay, and Basque Centers from within Spain that are not in the Basque provinces.

The new constitution states that euskera and Spanish languages will share official language status and all inhabitants have the right to know and use both languages. This establishes a legal framework for the bilingualism of the country, though not an actual bilingual society. Many students utilize euskera in the classroom but once on the streets with friends, or at home with parents who may not speak Basque, are likely to utilize Spanish. Because of the Basque character to be accommodating to all, if there is a group of ten friends and one of them does not know Basque, the others will all speak Spanish for that one person instead of that one person learning and using Basque (Tejerina Montana 1996:221-36). There is also a situation of many Basque dialects spoken while the Basque being learned in the classrooms is the new standardized Basque. Some students learn batua in school and then upon returning home speak the local dialect with family and friends. The hope is that in future generations, all the school children will have studied the same batua Basque and will be able to communicate with each other easily. Basque television, radio, and print media also use batua Basque as a means of communication. Road signs, advertising, and all government documentation, utilize the standardized batua Basque, and for many the most important element is to use Basque to stimulate a patriotic consciousness (Pérez-Agote 1987:26).

Basques in the diaspora learning euskera are also studying the batua Basque even though their parents and others in their Basque communities who are older speak regional varieties. When these new Basque speakers travel to the Basque country, they are often disappointed to hear so much Spanish being spoken in the society. They have become examples to other Basques living in Euskal Herria of what a “true” Basque should speak. The homeland media is quite happy to report examples of diaspora Basques that maintain their language skills, and to demonstrate examples of new Basque speakers with the added editorial of “shouldn’t we be ashamed to live in the Basque country and not utilize our Basque when
there are thousands of Basques in other parts of the world trying to learn and practice it to maintain their identity?" (Aranburu interview 1997).

Language continues to be a very important factor in Basque identity especially for the younger generations who have every opportunity to learn it at school. The civil war generation was prohibited by the Franco government from learning and using euskera outside their homes and hence there is a generation gap in the knowledge and use of Basque. Today’s grandparent and grandchildren generations speak Basque as mother tongue or have learned it at school, however the middle generation of today’s parents, if they know any at all, are likely to understand a bit of Basque if they had heard it at home while growing up, and are typically illiterate. Their refusal to take advantage of the free evening language classes offered in all cities and almost all towns is seen by many as a lack of interest and caring about the Basque culture as well as being categorized as not being a Basque patriot. The term "abertzale" is still reserved for those who are active and vocal about maintenance of Basque culture, history, and traditions. It also means that politically, a person would support Basque, not Spanish, political parties, and for some, abertzale means that a person would favor political separation from Spain and France and total independence for the seven provinces of the Basque country. In public opinion polls taken in the Basque Autonomous Community results demonstrate that a person who was considered an abertzale, was ‘more’ Basque than those who were not abertzale (Ramirez Goicoechea 1991:113). Change has been slow to come to the definitions and marking factors of ‘Basqueness’.

What has changed is the shifting emphasis from a racial to a linguistic and territorial definition of Basque identity. Basque nationalist literature has become more inclusive and is now accepting as Basques those who live and work in the Basque country, learn euskera, and identify themselves with Basque culture, traditions, and values. In Ramirez Goicoechea’s 1991 survey of Basque ethnic identity definitions from youth in a Gipuzkoan area, 70% of the respondents placed as the most important marker to “be Basque”, as “those who follow the Basque customs and are interested in the events of the Basque Country”. Following this, “those who speak Basque” (27.35%), and “those who were born in the Basque country” (21.08%), are the most important indicators of who is “more Basque.” Her research demonstrates that these categories are the most inclusive and that “being Basque” can be a matter of behavior and of choice. Respondents selected the “customs” answer whether they defined themselves as “independentists”, “autonomists” or “centralists” on the political geography of the Basque country.
In an earlier study in another region with a higher immigration population, to be considered “a Basque”, respondents thought one should “live and work in the Basque country”, obviously the immigrant population wants to be considered part of the “us”. Many of these citizens have lived in the Basque provinces for three or four generations, but if their last name is not Basque, they are still categorized as an immigrant. However, attitudes may be changing and it seems a person can become Basque. Sabino Arana y Goiri is turning in his grave, and many diaspora Basques are just as incredulous. In several Uruguayan Basque organizations, to be admitted as a member, the applicant must have at least one Basque surname from one of their four grandparents. “Non-Basques”, defined as such because they do not have a Basque surname in their ascendancy, either cannot join the Centers or are accepted as non-voting associates, or “friends of Basques”.

E. Conclusion

I have summarized the perception of ethnic separation of Basques throughout history in their homeland and have noted that Basque nationalism became more intense with opposition to liberal reforms and Spanish state-building in the 1800s. An “unfinished agenda” explanation for twentieth century Basque nationalism seems to be appropriate. In this view, the assimilation of Galician, Catalan, Basque, etc. ethnic groups and a successful Spanish nation-building agenda is incomplete (Douglass 1985). Because the empire’s government was so concerned with the colonies, autonomous regions were ignored and issues that would have been resolved in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were postponed. This “unfinished agenda” story provides a viable explanation for ethnonationalist movements in Europe’s colonial powers such as Spain and Britain. As Spanish and British colonies one by one declared independence the separation by oceans gave a huge advantage to the colonists. But those lands closer and dearer to home could not be let go, such is the case with Britain and Ireland and Scotland, as it is with Spain and Catalonia and the Basque Country.

Industrialization also served as a catalyst for uniting Basques against the changes to traditional culture and identity. Sabino Arana y Goiri ignited the contemporary nationalist crusade with pointed rhetoric exemplifying primordial identity. As industrialization and modernization diversified the Basque socio-economic picture, so too did the nationalist movement diverge from the Aranist catechism. The review of the schisms in Basque nationalist ideology demonstrates that it has never been, nor is it now, a unified front with shared goals. The maturing of Basque nationalism and ethnic identity maintenance in its
homeland and in the diaspora communities has brought me to my ensuing topic of diaspora formation. The following chapters will describe the specific push and pull circumstances of Basque emigration to each country, the birth of Basque ethnonational activity in their communities, and analyze the results of written questionnaires and personal interviews conducted in each state.

While homeland nationalism has shifted its emphasis from race, language, and religion when defining and categorizing 'Basqueness' to a more inclusive civic nationalism determined by living and working in Euskal Herria and by a person’s desire to work for the Basque culture, subsequent data I will present elaborate on the diaspora’s maintenance of traditional Aranist definitions of who and what is Basque. The Basques’ perception of their history and identity idealizes their ancestors and the ancestral homeland, creating a strong ethnic group consciousness and solidarity among Basques. I now turn to the dispersal and creation of diaspora; the expansion of migration for colonial ambitions, economic opportunity, and economic and political exile.
The political, economic, and social factors of migration are numerous, epoch-specific, and person-specific. New World economic and political opportunities weighed against Old World uncertainties and upheaval provided the general stimulus for emigration to the Americas. In the case of Basque emigration the most salient push factors included Spanish colonization of the Americas, restricted economic opportunity in the homeland, the physical position of *Euskal Herria* between Spain and France and its use as a stage for Napoleonic military campaigns, the First Carlist War (1833-1839), the Second Carlist War (1872-1876), the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) and the subsequent Franco dictatorship. The Spanish liberalization of emigration in 1853 also encouraged thousands of persons annually to depart for Latin America, as did the Basque primogeniture inheritance system.

I will establish that Basques pursued ethnically based trading networks to aid the expansion of their ambitions and this was the foundation for a trade diaspora that was followed by economic, political, and socio-cultural transnationalism. Until the beginning of the last century, trade, military and religious conquests were the reasons for Basque emigration, an emigration that took place both inside Basque trans-kingdom and trans-state networks, and inside the framework of the Spanish empire. Basque emigration to the Americas and the Philippines was the transfer of an elite from an imperial country and its regions to its colonies (Bilbao 1992). This emigration was also often temporary, young male dominated, and it was rare for an entire family to leave the Basque country together.

The Independentist movements of Latin American territories and the fact that Spain lost practically all its colonies simultaneously and finally with the Disaster of the 1898 Spanish American War, drew a line that divides the history of Basque emigration into two phases. The second phase was a part of a European wave of emigration to the former colonies in the new worlds, a transfer of people who were economically and/or politically oppressed. Pulling them across the Atlantic were dreams of economic success, civil rights and political freedoms, and asylum. Some searched for opportunities, while others fled difficulties, and the Basques were no exception. They were also no exception in that they sought out other Basques and used ethnic transnational networks in determining their destinations.
A. The First Diaspora: Collaborators in Spanish Imperialism

Throughout the late middle ages, the Bay of Biscay marine economy and trade required Basques to travel and contact other cultures and societies, and Basque place-names dot the landscapes in coastal regions of Europe, Scandinavia, Iceland, and New Foundland (Azkarate, Hernández, and Núñez 1992; Collins 1986:235, 240-41; Caro Baroja 1971:195-203). The Flemish city of Bruges retains archives from the commercial consulate established there in the fifteenth century of Bizkaian and Gipuzkoan merchants which demonstrate the trade networks between Basques in the Basque Country, the Low Countries, and England. Basque whalers, merchants, and shipbuilders along with professional military were among these first emigrants. However, notable collective numbers of Basques did not begin to leave the Basque Country permanently until the 1500s under the crown of Castilla and later Spain, and as a part of the French colonization of North America and particularly Canada.

In the first phase of emigration at the beginning of the sixteenth century, Spain lacked sufficient population and economic resources to pursue colonialism on all fronts. Hence a militaristic policy of control, rather than a colonial policy of settlement, was applied to its Mediterranean regions and Spain’s genuine colonizing efforts were reserved for the Americas. Both policies were heavily dependent upon two elements that predominated in the Basque region- sea power and iron products. Without military and commercial transportation, Spain could not possibly maintain the Old World holdings nor develop its fledgling New World territories. Efforts to colonize would require reliable supplies of iron implements and military campaigns would consume large amounts of weaponry. For the Basque economy the opening of the New World was an immediate stimulant.

A.1. Ethnic Group Awareness in the New World Context

It would not be an exaggeration to state that no major Spanish expeditionary force and no ecclesiastical or secular administration in the New World did not have Basques. More important for this study is not the numbers of Basques involved in migration and settlement but the nature of the Basque involvement. I am concerned with demonstrating that Basques have acted as a self-aware ethnic group who maintain ties to each other and to their homeland. This has resulted in trade networks, collective action, mutual assistance programs, schools for Basque children, associations and societies for the maintenance of Basque language, culture, and traditions, and a perception that Basques have a common stance toward outsiders and that Basques were set apart from other Iberian and New World born persons of European descent.
One of the first instances of Basque ethnic solidarity in the New World involves the initial voyage of Columbus, which utilized the *Santa Maria*, Basque owned and manned, as well as the *Niña* which was Basque manned (Caro Baroja 1981). When the *Santa Maria* was shipwrecked, Columbus left several men behind to found the first European New World colony at Fuerte Navidad, on the island of Hispaniola. When Columbus returned to find the colony destroyed by natives, the explanation was that the Europeans had split into two camps along ethnic lines, Basque and non-Basque. Divided ethnically and unwilling to work together, the Bizkaians had caused a division and they were all defeated by the indigenous population (Las Casas, and Herrera, as cited in Douglass and Bilbao, 1975:74; Galindez 1984:28-31).

Basques were involved in collective efforts at colonization and in 1501 attempted their own separate Basque colony in Santo Domingo. Although it proved to be unsuccessful, it demonstrates ethnic collective action and solidarity by the Basques in the New World. Other colonial encampments founded later in Mexico, Cuba, Peru, Bolivia, and Venezuela were also organized along ethnic lines though Basques were generally misnamed as all being 'Vizkainos', or Bizkaians. Any 'Basque' and anything 'Bizkaian' seemed to be synonymous for those who were non-Basque.

**A.2. Basque Elite Emigration**

A different type of Basque began to arrive in the colonies once the native populations were conquered militarily; land developers, educated scribes seeking posts with the administration, and many who were sent by the Catholic Church seeking converts. The bishop of New Spain (now Mexico and the southwestern United States) named in 1527 was the Basque, Juan de Zumarraga, who appointed and surrounded himself with other Basques. The pull of proselytizing prospects was strong for many Basque clerics who requested and accepted appointments to the New World colonies. Basque explorers opened the sea routes between New Spain and the orient in Basque constructed vessels, manned by Basques. Other Basques Cristobal de Oñate and his brother, Juan, controlled the populations of Jalisco and founded the city of Guadalajara. Juan de Tolosa, discovered silver at Zacatecas, and initiated what was to become one of the most important mining operations in all of the New World. Francisco Ibarra explored more northerly regions between 1554 and 1564 and founded the province of New Bizkaia, named after his birth place. While Governor, he declared that the Fuero of Bizkaia would be the law of the new territory, all would be regarded as nobility, and
were to be exempted from royal taxation (West 1949:6).

Basques also created their own mutual aid societies and separate religious confraternities. This exclusiveness and economic independence from the Church, caused problems for ethnic Basques. In Mexico, one priest who was turned away from an all-Basque chapel when asking for alms, declared that there would be a trial by the Inquisition and would “exile all Vizcayans who were living in Mexico”. He also prepared a list for the mayor with Basque names to facilitate their deportation. Though this proposal was rejected, Basques decided to seek more protection for their activities (Obregón 1949:15). They proposed to build a major asylum to provide protection and shelter for young girls, widows, and descendants of Basque families. The College of Saint Ignatius (named after the Basque patron Saint from Loyola, Gipuzkoa) would provide shelter and education in a living community with residents performing all the necessary tasks to keep it in order. The site was acquired in 1733 with the specific stipulations from Basques that it would remain free of Church control. This requirement led to many confrontations with Church officials in the following years and the College, known as the College of the Vizcayans, was finally opened in 1767.

While Basques of Mexico were prone to collective action as an ethnic group, after a century of involvement in Spain’s New World ventures some feared that their American successes were undermining their ethnic loyalties. In 1607 Balthasar de Echave published a work in Mexico City regarding loyalty to the Basque language as mother tongue, reminding Basques that their first and foremost loyalty should not be to the “Castillian Foreigner” or its language, Spanish, but should be to their “true and legitimate mother”, that of Basque identity (Echabe 1971:84). Even in the 1600s diaspora, Basques tended to place the Castillians as ‘the opposition’, and demonstrated evidence of an idealization of their own ethnicity and a solidarity with co-ethnics.

Basque commercial and maritime interests were also prominent in Guatemala, as were ethnic tensions, where Basque Juan Martinez de Landecho, was deposed as president of the Audencia de Guatemala because of fear that he would convert the Realm of Guatemala into a New Bizkaia with foral rights.

By the beginning of the seventeenth century, the Basque presence in Chile was quite extensive. Thayer y Ojeda concluded that immigration in Chile was characterized by “the father bringing over his son, the brother sending for the brother, the cousin inducing his cousin to come, the friend inducing the friend.... This Basque immigration, improperly called Vizcaíno, was nothing more than a change of residence of various related families ....” The
transnational networks of chain migration were well established in Chile. Estimates are that during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, fully forty-five percent of all immigrants in Chile were Basque. By the nineteenth century half of all “illustrious” persons in Chilean history and society were of Basque descent (Thayer y Ojeda 1904:32-35). However, anti-Basque sentiments were likewise prevalent in Chile. In Santiago de Chile, the Bishop Francisco de Salcedo, warned the king of Spain that the royal treasury was not receiving all it was due from the area. According to Salcedo, the cause of this was that all of the traders, or at least most of them, were Bizkaian. The harbor authority and the registrar who examined the cargos were both Bizkaian. The chief police authority was Bizkaian. In all of the warehouses, he wrote, "the Bizkaians guarded their goods, which were great in quantity" (Thayer y Ojeda 1904:13-14). Non-Basques were fearful, jealous, and reluctant about Basque domination in political and economic power positions and trade relations.

The end of the fifteen hundreds to the middle sixteen hundreds witnessed much ethnic conflict between Basques and non-Basques in present day Bolivia and Peru. Beginning in 1582, Basque emigrants and emigrants from the Extremadura region of Spain fought each other in the mining districts of Potosi. Fighting over games led to killings and then revenge killings from opposing sides. Dwellings were destroyed and an ensuing forty years of violence was ethnically based. Madariaga cites evidence that jealous tensions and anti-Basque sentiment were in part due to Basque indiscretion in the display and use of their economic and political power. There was constant civil war, with one leader even advising his followers “...let all nations be united with the Creoles. This will quicken the destruction of these Vizcainos” (Madariaga 1950:629).

In Peru, Basques and non-Basques remained antagonistic and between 1661 and 1665 there were bloody incidents in La Paz. In 1665 at the mining camp of Icazota, there was an aborted plot on the part of the non-Basques to annihilate the Basque population. Again in 1666, eight hundred non-Basque men returned to Icazota and set fire to the Basque businesses and houses, killing three hundred and fifty persons (Idoate 1957 as quoted in Douglass and Bilbao 1975:83).

It is clear that envy of Basque economic and political success, as well as the Basque clannishness and exclusiveness were factors in the anti-Basque violence, or, perhaps they were close-knit and ethnically united out of self-protection from the anti-Basque sentiments. Basques were prone to collective action in the New World and they constituted a self-aware ethnic group in colonial societies- an ethnic group that was perceived as such by outsiders.
Upon arriving in the new colonies they continued to define themselves as Basques and tried to recreate their Basque homeland's social, economic, and political structures in many cases, such as the fueros of Bizkaia. There were many examples of individualism and competition between Basques too, but Basque activities were usually interpreted by non-Basques as being collective and bordering on an ethnic group conspiracy. Basques initiated trading, religious, and employment networks based on ethnicity. Certainly individual Basques used ethnicity instrumentally to gain political favors or employment with each other, though not necessarily using Basqueness to secure partiality from non-Basques. Although one misconstrued example could be the Royal Guipuzcoan Company of Caracas.

A.3. Basque Economic Dominance in the Spanish Colonies

From its inception in 1498, the colony of Venezuela was a drain on the Spanish crown, requiring more funds to administer it than it generated through trade and taxes. The Spanish emigrants who were the producers with large cacao estates found it more profitable to trade with the Dutch, French, and English. Because of the financial liabilities and the administrative problems of Venezuelans outright trafficking with the Dutch and other contrabandists, the government of Gipuzkoa presented a plan to the king of Spain. Gipuzkoa would form a trading company to colonize Venezuela and control its commerce—another destination requiring population and pulling interested Basques to its lands.

Under Gipuzkoa’s plan, a regional government solicited a state government for a monopoly on commerce vis-a-vis the private sector. In 1728 the king approved the formation of the Real Compania Guipuzcoana de Carácas and granted the contract for twenty years. Only five years later Basque administrators were declaring a one hundred percent return on investment capital and a twenty percent dividend. This began a fifty year period in which Basque activities converted Venezuela into a profitable colony, and a major destination of Basque emigration. The Gipuzkoan company established cacao farms under Basque ownership, new settlements were built, and new port facilities were constructed by recent Basque immigrants—further evidence of ethnic economic solidarity.

From the point of view of the Basques and the crown, the Company was a huge success. However, the Venezuelans disliked the Basque monopoly on business and the selective Basque immigration that was organized by the Company. In 1748 the charter was renewed for Basque control over the colony and another incident of anti-Basque sentiment ensued. In 1749 the Governor of Venezuela substituted a Basque for a Canary Islander as
"Corporal of War" charged with closing off illegal trade. The Canary Islander, León, refused to accept the authority of the Basque and raised an army of three thousand that marched to Caracas under the slogan, "Long live the King, Death to the Vizcayans!" (Douglass and Bilbao 1975:91).

León contended that Venezuela had become a province of the Company. It was controlled by Basque governors, lieutenants, and commercial interests. He agreed to receive anyone of Spanish or Creole background, anything but Vizcayan. Finally he demanded of the King that in all of Venezuela not one person of the Basque "race" should remain (ibid). Madrid sent Julian de Arriaga, a Basque, as an emissary to investigate the motives of the rebellious group. He found deep resentment against the Basque population that was mainly ethnically motivated, as well as somewhat economic. The challenge by León and the rebellion from 1749 to 1751 was an ethnic conflict that united every other ethnic element in Venezuelan society against the Basques, rich or poor. Old World regional antagonisms and racist rhetoric fueled the ethnic problems, even if the real issue may have been a struggle over control of Venezuelan commerce. It evolved into non-Basques uniting against the Basques whether they were owners of businesses, or salaried workers. The non-Basques believed that every single Basque should be removed from the province because it was in their 'race' to be domineering and controlling.

In the 1750s and 1760s Basque involvement in the Gipuzkoan Company was diluted, Old World activities were expanded, and the head office was transferred from the Gipuzkoan city Donostia (San Sebastián) to Madrid. By the end of the 1770s the Company was in deep financial trouble. The Spanish government had liberalized trading policies and permitted other trading companies to traffic in Venezuela. In 1784 one of the Basque directors proposed a merger with another Basque enterprise, the Havana Company founded in Cuba in 1740, and created the Philippines Company. The consolidation was finished in 1788 and this new company went on to monopolize Spain's Philippines trade for the next quarter century, opening yet another door for emigrants. Basque Captains Urdaneta and Legazpi had sailed to the Philippines in 1564 and brought those islands under crown military rule. Now the Basque commercial interests were preparing to take over the economy utilizing trade diaspora networks.

Several generations of colonial expansion into the Americas were realized with Basque leadership, Basque capital, and Basque manpower (Azcona Pastor 1992; Vázques de Prada Vallejo and Amores Carredano 1991; Gomez Prieto 1991; Douglass 1989). The social
structure and economy of the new colonies included numerous Basque land owners, business
owners, administrators, soldiers, and clerics. The many Basque place names record the efforts
of these colonists and their tendencies to cluster together. Basques were often viewed as
potential subverters of Spain's interests although in their roles as administrators, clerics, and
mercantilists they also served the crown's policies, which may have affected the sentiments
toward them. The ethnic rivalries were certainly prevalent, but in some cases the anti-Basque
activities could have been fundamentally anti-crown yet aimed at the Basques because they
were the controlling representatives of crown interests. Yet in the cases presented here,
usually the non-Basques favored the ruling king. The ample forces of maritime, military, and
religious duties pushed Basques out of Euskal Herria to fulfill their responsibilities, oaths, and
vows, while the enticing economic forces pulled Basques with commercial promises of profits
and economic success in the New World.

Basque, and especially Bizkaian, interests controlled more than shipping, they
“supplied capital, equipment and goods for trade as well as many of its personnel” (Lynch
1964:35) and several of the previously established Basque commercial interests in Spain
opened branch operations with kinsmen in the Indies, especially in Santo Domingo (Bilbao
1958:192-209). Iparralde Basques also participated in the American run, and vessels from
Donibane Lohitzun (St-Jean-de-Luz) were registered with authorities as Bizkaian. Lynch
estimates that almost eighty per cent of the New World traffic between 1520 and 1580 was
Basque controlled, and between 1580 and 1610 Basques interests represented at least fifty
percent of the total. This accounts for nearly one hundred years of Basque domination in
Spanish colonial efforts, pushing Basque maritime specialists toward the New World where
they established trade links back to their homeland.

Many experienced the pull of family ties or other contacts from their villages stemming
from the time of this colonial stage, namely in Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Venezuela,
Colombia, Chile, Peru, Mexico, and Cuba. Spain's and France's conquests provided new
alternatives to Basques for overseas migration. Although France did not impose strict rules
in migration, Spain did. It required each emigrant to apply for a license and to depart through
government-established channels. Violations were numerous, however, and the majority of
emigrants left Spain illegally and did not register into the administration's official count.
Many Basques simply went to the north of Euskal Herria and departed from the French side
benefitting from Basque preferential treatment and aid. A seventeenth century document
states, “In 1640 three-fourths of the population of Vizcaya is composed of women due to the
number of men who leave to never return" (Nadal 1966:79 as quoted in Bilbao 1992). Accurate numbers of emigrants by year or by destination are non-existent because of the lack of exact record-keeping by departure port authorities as well as non-detailed records by receiving authorities in the host territories lumping Basques, Galicians, Catalans and other Spanish all together. More contemporary records are no better. For example Spanish official statistics give 1,042,775 emigrants leaving Spain between 1882-1930, but the receiving states show numerous millions of immigrants from Spain for the same years (Ruiz de Azua 1992:266). Some departed from French ports and others were temporary migrations but the lack of consistency in data deems it unwise to infer total percentages or numbers of people leaving the Basque Country itself.

Those Basques who did depart without definite contacts in the New World to receive them, knew from village folk stories that an established Basque group could be found in almost any of these New World trade regions. They knew about remittances to families in their areas and could see the construction of farmsteads and improvements in agricultural implements as results of those remittances. It was only natural to expect that their fellow ethnics would be helpful and useful in adapting to the new society. Particularly for those from the south of Euskal Herria, the Spanish language, culture, and experience with the customs and governmental workings of Spain proved to be beneficial in understanding and adapting to an already somewhat familiar Spanish societal structure in South America.

B. The Aftermath of War Pushes and Pioneerism Pulls Basque Migration

The Latin American colonies began declaring their individual independence from the Spanish empire in the early 1800s. (See Map 4.1) As the period of Spanish hegemony and colonial domination was closing across the oceans, so was the extravagance of ignoring its own immediate neighbors and peripheral regions. Political upheaval in Europe and its tremors could not be dismissed in Madrid nor in the Basque Country. During and after the French Revolution, the northern Basque provinces were subjected to military occupation and their ancient foral laws were abolished. Basques were deprived of their lands and livestock, and while some Basques were interned in camps by revolutionary officials, there was also a forced deportation of more than three thousand Basques who were accused of treason with Spain (Jacob 1994:33-35). In 1793 in Baiona (Bayonne) alone, more than sixty death penalties were pronounced for “complicity in illegal immigration or correspondence with priests in exile
Map 4.1 Spanish Colonization of the Americas c. 1800.

Spanish America c. 1800

VICEROYALTY OF NEW SPAIN

MÉXICO

VICTORIA OF NEW Quito

GRANADA

CARTAGENA

VICTORIA OF NEW Quito

CARACAS

GENERAL OF VENEZUELA

GUAYAQUIL

LIMA

AYACUCHO

BUENOS AIRES

MONTevideo

VIETRI

MALPU

RIO DE JANEIRO

SANTIAGO

VICTORY OF THE RIO DE LA PLATA

Havana

Matanzas

Santa Clara

Camaguey

ORIENTE

Santiago

Spanish territory

Spanish administrative divisions

0 Miles 1000
Emigration was obviously as risky as staying put. Napoleon’s rise to power and push to conquer the Iberian peninsula meant that several wars were fought in the Basque Country, with Basques themselves being recruited and conscripted by both sides. Many escaped, or deserted as did forty-seven Basque soldiers from Itxassou (Jacob 1985: 86).

By the 1830s there were Basques agents in Iparralde recruiting emigration to the safe haven of Uruguay, and Defontaines estimates the 1842 population of the Basque colony of Montevideo alone at 14,000 (Defontaines 1952:6 as quoted in Douglass and Bilbao 1975:119). The French Revolution of 1848 once again found the Basques fighting on the losing side against revolutionary goals, with memories of repercussions from the earlier rebellions encouraging departures from the area. Between 1852 and 1855 there were 1,311 French Basque military evaders—almost one-half of the French total (Douglass and Bilbao 1975:123). Using the official passenger lists for boats leaving from Baiona, it is noted that between 1832 and 1884, 64,227 persons emigrated from the department of Basse-Pyrénées, and by the late 1880s there were twenty-three travel agencies in Bordeaux alone, working with Uruguayan agents to specifically service Basque emigration to Rio de la Plata (Douglass and Bilbao 1975:122-123). From the French side of the Basque Country, it is estimated that between 1832 and 1907 over one hundred thousand persons emigrated to Argentina, that the provinces of Ziberoa and Behe Nafarroa lost between twenty and twenty-five percent of their total population, and that the entire population growth in Iparralde for the last half of the nineteenth century was canceled by emigration (Jacob 1994:46).

The First of the Carlist Wars, described in Chapter Three, commenced in 1833 with the Catholic and regionalist Basques siding with the challenger to the throne. Financing the war meant heavy taxation in most areas of the Basque Country and conscription by the Carlist forces. The defeat of the Carlists in 1839 left Basques with political and economic war debt and retribution, and six years of war had disrupted the economy and agricultural output. An estimated 8,000 war exiles fled to Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile (Bilbao Azkarreta 1992:231). A corn crop failure and the famine of 1846-1847 aggravated the already dire circumstances and gave impetus for many to abandon their economic, military, and political situations and seek relief in the Americas. The Second Carlist War (1873-76) saw a repeat of defeat and emigration to escape hardship. Maritime archives show hundreds of military

\(^{13}\) Those who chose Uruguay were unfortunately obligated to fight in the Uruguayan Grand War upon their arrival. They fled one conflict only to find themselves forced to fight in the Uruguayan Basque Battalion.
aged men avoided or deserted their obligatory three year military service (Azcona Pastor 1996:47) and others later fled the repercussions of the Liberals.

An exact accounting of Basque emigration in this time period does not exist - as the pertinent agency, the Geographic and Statistical Institute in the Ministry of Agriculture of Spain, was not created until 1882. Though Argentine immigration data for the period between 1857 to 1924 record 1,024,033 Spanish and 106,636 French citizens for a total of 1,130,669 individuals (Pérez-Agote 1997:34), there are no records which contain the pertinent data to enable a separation and calculation of Basques only. Though Douglass and Bilbao conservatively put the number of Basque-only emigrants in the same period at 200,000, because of the illegality of emigration; the repercussions and fines to the families of emigrants; the lack of record keeping and the non-specific records that were kept, estimates of totals vary widely.

What is certain is that the preferred earlier destinations of Mexico, Venezuela, and Peru, had changed to Argentina and Uruguay. Therefore, for today's Basque population in Peru, the Basques in Peruvian history are connected to Spanish conquerors and colonizers and are categorized by the general population as "Spanish", while the Basques in Río de la Plata history are distinguished as immigrant pioneers who fought for independence and built the new countries. "Basque" in Peru is a relatively unknown and misunderstood description from either a far-off history of the colonization of the Americas, or from a very few newer immigrants from the 1900s. However, "Basque" in Argentina and Uruguay carries a positive connotation from more recent history and the creation of their respective societies, promoting a positive social status of creators, while in Peru, the colonizers are seen as destroyers.

Emigration at any of these time periods was by no means an unusual option, nor a last resort to remedy hardship. Like their forefathers, Basques in later centuries knew and heard of fellow Basques escaping poverty, political and economic oppression for employment and opportunity. The key to migration may have been information. The choice of destinations and when to go depended on homeland circumstances, family and village ties, and employment opportunities. Because the economic development of Europe implied an increase in specialization, small proprietors and tradesman were faced with a choice of finding alternative employment, or migration (Baines 1991:14), and chain migration information networks among Basques facilitated the latter.
B.1. Circumstances and Incentives Pulling Basques Toward the Americas

The first expeditions to the Río de la Plata region were led by Basques representing the Spanish Crown and who named the region New Bizkaia. Since Basque Juan de Garay founded Buenos Aires in 1580, thirty-four Governors of the territory and then province have been Basque, and of the province’s founding council in 1810, forty percent were Basque. Argentina’s Declaration of Independence of 1816 was signed by twenty-nine Deputies, ten of whom were Basque, and four of the five priests giving the blessing were Basques. For centuries, commercial regulatory codes were those of the “Ordinance of Bilbo” until 1859 when Argentina created its own Commercial Codes. Sociologist and economist, Juan José Guaresti, has noted that Argentine law is based upon the tenets of the Basque fueros (Anasagasti, 1988:16). The Basque foral laws were an integral part of Basque identity in the New World because of their salience in the homeland, and their protection was the most significant factor in the Carlist Wars of the nineteenth century. Basque emigration included not only the persons but their attitudes, values, and institutional principles.

Pulling already frantic potential immigrants toward South America, now Argentina and Uruguay specifically, were decades replete with success stories of riches and the early 1800s welcoming mentality first stated by Basque essayist Juan Bautista Alberdi (1810-1884) that “In America, to govern is to populate”. European settlers were desired and specifically mentioned in Article 25 of the Argentine Constitution of 1853:

The Federal Government will foment European immigration and will be prohibited from restraining, limiting, and taxing the entrance to the Argentine territory, any foreigners who enter with the intent to till the soil, improve industries, and introduce and teach the sciences and arts (Azcona Pastor 1992:36).

It was an open invitation to all and especially enticing to suffering Basques who could likely procure information and possible assistance for a move. All categories of handicraftsmen, professionals, and laborers were needed for expanding economies and societies. Spain’s Royal Order of September 16th, 1853 coincidentally relaxed emigration restrictions.

The 1870 military action by Argentine President Roca against the native tribes opened vast areas of the pampas for control and increased the demand for European settlers. Updated immigration laws authorized advancing the costs of passage for certain newcomers, and particularly Basques. The Argentine government utilized established Basque ethnic ties and sent recruiters to Euskal Herria to advertise economic opportunities and encourage the emigration of entire families. It subsidized transatlantic passages, land grants, and established

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facilities for free room and board, transportation, and employment for the new immigrants (Dupla 1992). These favorable factors convinced thousands to leave their crowded homesteads for South America. Pérez-Agote notes Argentina's worldwide popularity for migration by showing that between 1857-1915, there were 4,445,760 new immigrants (Pérez-Agote 1997:32).

Uruguayan governments, beginning in 1832, had specifically requested Basque immigrants for its agriculture, and with the European Industrial Revolution there was high demand, and profit, for the sheep industry which was mainly controlled by these Basques (Eusko Jaurlaritza 1993). There were agencies in Iparralde devoted exclusively to recruiting and transporting Basque emigrants to the Rio de la Plata region. In 1852 alone the Argentine consul in Baiona processed 2,800 emigrants—destination Buenos Aires. There is evidence that suggests that although some emigration was necessary as an escape valve to political and economic pressures of the region, it also seemed to create social problems such as lack of youth, laborers, and especially males for marriage. For a time marriage ages rose, unmarried elderly women were common, and birth rates fell. In 1852 the Bishop of Pamplona published a pamphlet entitled "Circular in Which the System of Hoodwinking Persons of Both Sexes in order to Conduct them to the American Continent under the Seductive Promises of Establishing a Fortune and a Happy Future is Demonstrated as being Immoral" (Andriani Escofet 1852 as quoted in Douglass 1979:290). There is no clear evidence of its advice being heeded. The seemingly instant financial rewards encouraged recent arrivals to continue sending for relatives and fellow villagers, and for those in the homeland to accept the challenge.

Upon arrival in Buenos Aires the latest Basque immigrants would most likely remain in the capital city or in a coastal town where the majority of the population of Argentina lived. Others moved on to the Uruguayan capital and its interior. Those from cities and accustomed to administrative, factory, and commercial life stayed in the cities, while those Basques originating from villages and rural homesteads were attracted to the agricultural rural life they knew. By the 1840s, establishment of a sheep industry augmented cattle in the interior pampas regions with Basque immigrants dominating southern cone sheep herding and cattle raising.

Construction laborers, longshoremen, craftsmen, brick makers, loggers, charcoal makers, and especially dairy producers and meat-salting plant operators all provided employment and social connections for Basque settlers who dominated these industries in the latter half of the
nineteenth century. *Euskera* was the working language spoken by laborers and entrepreneurs (Alvarez Gila 1998). Basques owned many of the stores and markets in Buenos Aires and Montevideo and their economic success strengthened their influence in Río de la Plata financial circles. There were Basque ethnic neighborhoods, *barrios*, such as the *Barrio de la Constitución* in Buenos Aires where Basques dominated markets, shops, housing, schooling, churches, and Basque was the language of communication (Olaizola 1997). Certain Catholic Churches were known as Basque Churches and there were sufficient Basque priests to hold masses, weddings, baptisms, and confirmations in *euskera* (Alvarez Gila 1996). All of these point to a sustained ethnic consciousness -300 years after the founding of Buenos Aires- and solidarity with other Basques.

In the interior, a few Basques became land barons and others gained tremendous fortunes in the cattle and sheep industries. Initially new Basque immigrants worked in teams as sheep herders and shearsers, barbed-wire fence stringers for livestock, oxcart drivers, and thousands worked as ranch and farmhands. Successful ranchers needed additional hands and often sent passage for relatives from *Euskal Herria*, especially younger disinherited males from the rural regions. Basques opened hotels, restaurants, and bakeries. Artisans and handicraftsmen sent word to unemployed family and friends in the homeland that their specialties were needed, appreciated, and profitable in the Americas. Hundreds of links, one at a time, immigration from *Euskal Herria* produced a chain of transnationalism and bonds between the cone of South America and the Basque Country.

By the mid-eighteen hundreds a new destination attracting Basque emigrants included the United States, mostly in relation to the discovery of gold in California. There was also secondary migration of Basques from South America moving to California. Before 1860, a few Basques that had found no luck in their search for gold, started raising sheep flocks to feed the gold miners in the American west. In the United States at that time in the local vernacular, “shepherd” was synonymous with “Basque” (San Sebastián 1991). Gold strikes in neighboring Nevada and Idaho compounded the need for foodstuffs and Basques raised cattle and sheep inexpensively and with high profit margins on the public lands. English was not necessary for agribusiness and the mixture with other non-English speaking immigrants encouraged Basques to seek each other’s business and social company. Their physical isolation in the vast western territories with other new immigrants made it easier to maintain language and customs and there was not much contact with a uniform host country culture.

The maintenance of Basque language and ethnicity was as prevalent in the 1800s New
World as it was in the centuries previous. It is not a recent phenomenon nor a reaction to globalization. Early Basque emigrants pushed from their homelands by war, lack of economic opportunity, and political repression could not resist the magnetism of welcoming boisterous economies, political favoritism, and extended ethnic families. Urban life in Bilbo and Buenos Aires were comparable and although the climate and terrain of the interior were not, rural daily life and agriculture in Argentina, Uruguay, and the American west at that time was analogous to that of Euskal Herria.

B.2. Primogeniture Inheritance in Rural Euskal Herria and the Revival of Carlism

According to Julio Caro Baroja, anthropologist, the single most important element in stimulating emigration out of Euskal Herria was the rules of inheritance followed in rural Basque society (Caro Baroja 1958:268; Bilbao 1992). Population density, high fertility and live birth rates, coupled with the scarcity of available agricultural lands and low agricultural output resulted in limited expansion potential. The lack of industrial and urban growth until the late 1800s also limited possible options for employment and migration within Euskal Herria. Each farmstead could support a single family in agriculture. Those who had rental arrangements were less committed to the land and were more likely to emigrate because of their current instability. Those who owned their property and animals kept their holdings in the same family and Basque common law discouraged fragmentation or division through sales or inheritance. Consequently, most Basque farmsteads remained unchanged for many centuries, with each generation having a single heir.

The fueros guaranteed the practice of selecting one of the former owner’s offspring to be the new owner, and other siblings could be disinherited, although in practice they were usually provided with dowries. This meant that in every family there were most likely three or four siblings that were candidates for emigration. Even today in certain villages the traditional rules of male primogeniture are followed, in other areas a female is selected, while in parts of Nafarroa the heir or heiress is chosen according to individual merit without reference to gender or birth order. Until recently, the remaining siblings would have to depend upon the new owner for employment, accommodation, care, etc. and although family members, there usually was not enough work to finance the entire extended family. Unmarried siblings had the right to stay with the family farmstead as long as they stayed single, some married other heads of household, others turned to religious professions or the military. For thousands, a more viable alternative to alleviate hardship was emigration.
By this time, the typical emigrant was a single male between 15-25 years old, sent for by relatives in the New World who needed agricultural laborers, or going in search of relatives hoping they needed laborers. It was a prime age for escaping mandatory military service. By the end of the nineteenth century, scarce women emigrated with their husbands, and very rarely single women would be sent to live and work with their kin in the Americas. More commonly, a husband would travel alone to find work and settle in the new community. After several years of saving money one would either send for his wife and any children, or would return to the homeland with the savings. Emigrant bachelors utilized Basque social networks to find mates and Basque endogamy rates were high in Argentina, Uruguay, and the United States (Azcona Pastor 1992). Various Basque women married their fiancés in absentia in wedding ceremonies where a brother, uncle, or cousin stood in for the groom. This way the woman was already technically married and more acceptable for single travel to join her husband.14

The Industrial Revolution of the nineteenth century disrupted traditional agricultural economic activities and displaced workers from both rural and urban areas. The cheaper manufacture of products left artisans searching for markets, which waited open armed in the Americas. Though it may have provided new jobs for existing urban Basques, it simultaneously displaced many as floods of migrants from the south of Spain made their way to the more industrialized Basque Country seeking employment. Basques had to compete with this cheaper labor in their home territory.

B.3. Diaspora Nationalism, Homeland Hardship, and United States Opportunities

As previously documented in Chapter Three, the Partido Nacionalista Vasco maintained branches disseminating information in nearly every important city and town in Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa, and in the capital cities of Araba and Nafarroa. Though nationalism itself was not a reason or significant push factor for emigration, those who did emigrate, left the Basque Country with importantly different political ideas than those previous, and critically impacted the Basque immigrant communities in their host countries.

Basque immigrants in each host society had organized themselves for economic, religious, social, and cultural reasons throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and

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14 Much later in the 1950s, the Catholic Church in Euskal Herria sponsored emigration programs for single Basque women to Australia where scores of single Basque men had emigrated to cut sugar cane.
one of the first known political organizations was created by Buenos Aires Basques. Outraged by the abolition of the *fueros* after the Second Carlist War, they established the first Basque immigrant association in Argentina, the *Laurac Bat* (Four are One, meaning the united four Basque provinces in Spain) in 1877. Its purpose was to unite Basques in the area, provide aid to new immigrants, and establish improved contacts with the Basque Country. The *Laurac Bat* organized an annual political protest against the Spanish government’s abolition of their ancestral rights in the homeland, keeping in mind their hopeful returns to *Euskal Herria* with amassed fortunes (Velasco interview 1997). The organization created a library, an orchestra and choir, a dancing troupe, and arranged numerous cultural and political events. It also provided assistance to the needy Basques in Argentina and because many did not strike it rich in the Americas, *Laurac Bat* also aided funding for repatriations to the homeland. Mutual aid societies were common in Basque diaspora communities in Argentina, Uruguay, and in Peru and the United States as well. Established in 1908, the *Sociedad de Socorros Mútuos* in Boise, Idaho paid medical expenses for needy Basques, funeral expenses, and repatriations (Bastida interview 1999). Regardless of the economic failures and reverse migration of those who were destroyed in the New World, thousands of Basques continued the trend seeking their fortunes outside of the Pyrenees.

One component of this turn of the century immigration was comprised of ardent nationalists. A group of twenty Basque nationalists moved to Argentina in 1900 and published their own diaspora journal *Irrintzi*, Basque war cry, beginning in 1903, postulating the basic tenets of Basque nationalism and writings by Sabino de Arana y Goiri. The following decades witnessed the development of several pro-nationalist associations. The first Argentine-Basque delegation to the national council of the Basque Nationalist Party, the Nationalist Communion of the Republic of Argentina, was sent to *Euskal Herria* in 1919. The Basque nationalist *Aberri Eguna*, Day of the Homeland, was celebrated annually in Argentina and Uruguay at Easter, coinciding with symbolism of the Resurrection. Curiously, Basque nationalism was more widespread and welcomed by those in Argentina and Uruguay than among those in the homeland at the time (Ezkerro interview 1996).

Political divisions among the members of the *Laurac Bat* resulted over the homeland politics of Arana and the nationalists. Pro and anti nationalist factions vied for control over *Laurak Bat* and eventually in 1895 several Basques split to create the *Centro Navarro* (*Nafarroan* Center) and others broke away to inaugurate the *Centro Vasco Frances* (French Basque Center). Mirroring the Basque Country, politics of the homeland had divided Basques
in the diaspora. Interestingly, there are citations of Basque nationalism pre-Sabino Arana in Argentina (Alvarez Gila 1996:176), and it is important to note that the contemporary Basque nationalism heard in the Basque Centers today often still tends to be that of Sabino de Arana ideology. The Aranist nationalist ideology, popular throughout the Buenos Aires, Rosario, and Montevideo urban areas, eventually spread to the rural Basque communities. The Rosario Basque Center founded in 1912 was named Zazpirak Bat (Seven are One) in true nationalist utopia of unification of the seven provinces.

Concurrently, additional institutions for ethnic cultural maintenance continued to sprout in the Republics. In 1882 a Basque sporting club for handball, Plaza Euskara, was inaugurated. The Basque magazine, La Basconia, began publication in 1893, educating its readers in regards to current political news and cultural issues in the Basque Country, as well as Basque immigrant activities and events, until the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in 1936. The Basques of Bahia Blanca, Argentina, formed the Society of Mutual Aid for Basques in 1899. In 1901, the Asociación Cultural y de Beneficencia Euskal Echea (Cultural and Charitable Association, Home of the Basques) was created as an asylum for indigent elderly persons of Basque descent combined with a boarding school for Basque orphans. According to articles published in La Basconia, and Pierre Lhande who conducted immigration research in this time period, there were approximately 250,000 Basque immigrants in Argentina by 1908 (Soraluza 1990:32). The shock and displacement of international migration was buffered by the numerous fellow Basques and the available political, economic, and cultural involvement. Transnational ties were firmly in place among Basques in each host society and between Basques and their homeland.

Those immigrants not interested in the ideologies of Sabino Arana nor those of the Basque Nationalist Party fought for control of the established Basque Centers, especially in Laurak Bat.15 However, the abertzales, patriots, won elections more often than the espanólisis (a derogatory term for persons of Basque descent who were not nationalists) and the Centers continued their anti-Madrid politics. Linking themselves closely to Irish immigrants, Basques cheered Irish nationalism and as in Euskal Herria, paralleled their demands with those of Ireland. The first public act of the Rosario Basque Nationalist Committee in 1911 was to demonstrate solidarity with the Irish community and desired self-government in the delayed Home Rule Act. Basque nationalists continued to publish and

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15 The Laurac Bat changed the spelling of its name to the Basque “k” from the perceived Castillian Spanish “c”, and has since been Laurak Bat.
disseminate political propaganda such as *Ami Vasco; Inocência de un patriota; Aitor; Egi-Zaile; Pátria* in Buenos Aires and Rosario and slowly spread information to the interior. As recent immigrants joined the Centers they outnumbered the older *españolistas* and they represented the growing Aranist ideology of nationalists in *Euskal Herria*. The ensuing ruptures in the established Centers divided Basque culturalists who envisioned a social gathering place to foment sport, music, and friendship against those Basque political nationalists who gained control with the votes of the ever increasing emigrants escaping political repression. The Spanish Civil War and Franco’s dictatorship provided the watershed of political exiles and a common enemy around whom the Basques unified their opposition, fervently pushing the organizations to pro nationalist stances.

Figures for Uruguay estimate a total Basque emigrant count by 1900 at 18,037 (Azcona Pastor 1996:66). This includes only emigrants and not descendants of Basques, and interestingly for many this was their second or third move of residence outside of the Basque Country. It was not uncommon for Basques in Uruguay to have tried Buenos Aires, Caracas, or Rio de Janeiro first. After establishing themselves in Montevideo, the first Basque Center was formed as the *Laurak-bat* in 1876.

Beginning with the first political exiles leaving France and Spain in the 1820s, the development of a relatively small political diaspora Basque consciousness is exemplified through various cultural expressions of songwriting and literary publications. From California’s two Basque language newspapers, *Euskaldun Gazeta* and *California’ko Euskal Erria*, to Argentina’s *La Baskonia* and *Irrintzi*, by the early 1900s there were over sixty different Basque periodicals consistently published in the Americas that promoted the *fueros* and ethnonationalist ideas. Several shared readerships and distribution through international Basque networks. Though mostly disseminated to, and read by, an educated elite, the imagining of an interconnected Basque diaspora had taken form, and would serve a significant role in aiding the forthcoming Basque Government-in-exile.

**C. Francoism, Political Exiles, and New Destinations**

Displacement from rural society, changing urban society, unemployment, unrest, labor strikes, arrests and imprisonments related to a lack of civil rights, all preceded the cataclysm of the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). None of the previous battles with the central government over the *fueros* could prepare the southern Basque Country for the repercussions.
they would endure in the aftermath of fighting to keep a republican form of government. Nor had the north ever received such a profuse influx of exiles requiring immediate aid. After the Republican forces were defeated, Franco’s victory guaranteed a central policy of Basque nation-destroying. As described and cited earlier, the horrendous indignities suffered, the dismantling of Basque institutions, the outlawing of manifestations of Basque culture, the dictatorial repression and lack of human and civil rights, and multitudes of death warrants, shoved Basques out of their homeland in pursuit of safe havens. Urban and rural dwellers, widowed mothers and children, orphaned teenagers, and republican soldiers—thousands who had the connections and the means to escape the political and military crush—did so. Most evacuated to Iparralde initially, and from there decided their final destinations usually based upon family ties to regions in the New World or information they had obtained from family and village networks.

C.1. Diaspora Aid to the Homeland

In the diaspora communities it was almost impossible for Basques to dam the media flood of misinformation defining Basques as communists and anti-Catholic. The United States Catholic clergy praised Franco from the pulpit as the savior of religion in traditionally Catholic Spain; Argentine, Uruguayan, and Peruvian Basque Catholics heard the same sermon. In Belgium however, Catholic relief organizations helped organize the fostering of thousands of children sent away from the Bilbo area just before its military fall. Diaspora Basques were worried about the red scare and the blackballing of individuals suspected of being communist sympathizers, yet knowing the truth they could not help but defend their families in the four provinces.

Little aid came from the United States Basque communities in the west for the military cause, but humanitarian war relief was provided. For example, in Boise, Idaho the proceeds from an annual Shepherders’ Christmas Ball were used to purchase one thousand blankets for Basque women prisoners in Spain (Douglass and Bilbao 1975:361). As the United States was drawn into the Second World War, Franco’s identification with Hitler and Mussolini prompted United States government support for the exiled Basque government. The Basque government maintained a delegation to the United Nations in New York City, and their presence influenced the local Centro Vasco, its “pro-Euzkadi Committee” and the publication of Basques. Bulletin of the Basque Delegation in the USA (Bilbao Azkarreta 1992:237). Interviews demonstrate a more politically aware membership than the communities in the
western United States. Basque Delegation emissaries were sent to Idaho and Nevada, but found no significant interest in political mobilization.

Right-wing politics in Latin American states made speaking out against the Franco regime extremely dangerous. The Basque communities in Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, Venezuela, Cuba, and Mexico, however, did raise private funds to be sent to the Basque Government-in-exile and later after the war enthusiastically received the Basque Government-in-exile delegations and thousands of political exiles. The final collapse of the Spanish Republic in 1939 recorded an estimated 150,000 exiled Basques. Those political exiles significantly influenced the diaspora communities’ definitions and involvement in Basque identity maintenance by transporting the contemporary homeland nationalism of the day.

During the Spanish Civil War, Argentine-Basque women formed Argentine chapters of the PNV women’s nationalist organization Emakume Abertzale Batza (United Patriotic Women), sent financial and material aid to the Basque Country, and received thousands of Basque political refugees in Argentina. Though the world economic depression had strengthened xenophobic and anti-immigrant legislation, one particular wave of approximately 1400 Basques arrived in 1939 with the formation of the Comité Pro Inmigración, Committee for Basque Immigration, which obtained two decrees from Argentine President Ortiz facilitating the entry of Basque refugees to the Republic (Anasagasti 1988:44). The Basque Government-in-exile sent delegations to Uruguay, Argentina, Venezuela, Mexico, and the United States to help organize relief and promote the Basque cause. However, the political and economic climates changed rapidly. The Peronist governments were pro-Franco, and as the post-World War II Argentine economy declined, so did the number of people choosing Argentina for a destination. Basque immigration to the Rio de la Plata region was reduced to a trickle and was replaced with emigration to the English speaking countries and economies of the United States and Australia. Belgium also served as host for political refugees and permanent immigration. Socialist and Catholic relief organizations received over 5,130 Basque children evacuated during the war years (Artis-Gener, 1976:176), and if children were orphaned many families adopted them. Young adults who returned to Euskal Herria after their formative years and education in Belgium often found they felt a stranger in their

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16The Basque Government-in-exile estimate in 1939 was 150,000 Basque exiles in Iparralde alone (Dupla 1992:130), plus several thousand children spread throughout Europe (Legarreta 1984). There are no Basque government official statistics for Basques that entered other host countries as political refugees.
own land. Several returned to their Belgian families and have remained mainly in the Brussels and Antwerp areas for the last forty to fifty years.

Restrictive immigration policies of the 1920s and 1930s in south American countries and in the United States, meant that many emigrants were unable to obtain entrance visas for their preferred destinations. Australia served as an acceptable second best option. Its own restrictive immigration translated to the "White Australia Policy" legislation of 1901 and desired European labor for sugar cane cutting. In north Queensland, government sponsored projects included free passage for European workers, and cheaply and easily available land contracts. Entry to Australia was quite uncomplicated if the emigrant had a personal sponsor that would claim responsibility. One Basque woman in the Ingham area, Teresa Mendiolea, is documented to have sponsored hundreds of Basque men, advancing them travel costs, help with lodging, medical care, and employment (Mendiolea Larrazabal interview 1997). Similar to the United States in this time period, Basques in this Anglo host society were disadvantaged for socioeconomic mobility by the lack of communications and language skills, and the fact that the type of person migrating for manual cane cutting labor was generally uneducated. These Basques relied on ethnic networks for employment, housing, medical care, and education (Goicoechea interview 1997).

C.2. Franco's Political Repression and the Basque Response

Civil War refugees were received in Iparralde by the Basque government-in-exile agencies, which were allowed and ignored by the French Government (Beltza 1977:12). From the three northern provinces, the waves of Basque refugees spread out to the other European countries, especially the Soviet Union, Belgium, and England. Others tried to unite with relatives who had emigrated earlier to Latin American states and an estimated 35,000 refugees made their way to Mexico, Venezuela, and Argentina. The exiles were received by already established Basque communities and were cared for with medical attention, housing, and employment. Although the overwhelming majority of Basque political exiles thought this would be a temporary situation, more than fifty years later interviews revealed the repeated histories of exiles that could not return to the Basque country for political or economic reasons.

This forced separation from family and homeland caused an intense hatred for all things Spanish and a repugnant abhorrence for the memories of Franco. Two interviewees who were children evacuated to London and who later married and moved to Melbourne, blame Franco
for "robbing us of our loved ones, our homeland and personal possessions, our language and
to emotional communication and connection, and our unqualified spirit, soul, and
identity" (Oribe, and Belón Bilbao interview 1997).

Many nationalist intellectuals, business elite, industrialists, merchants, writers, lawyers,
and other professionals fled to the Basque communities in the Americas, and as a consequence
these communities prospered and became the sources of important financial support for the
Basque government-in-exile. Diaspora communities in Mexico and Argentina published
newspapers and information bulletins about the diaspora resistance that were then distributed
in Euskal Herria. Clandestine radio broadcasts were emitted from Iparralde first and then
from outside Caracas, Venezuela for thirteen years after the end of the war. Local radio
programs in euskera in Boise, and Buffalo Springs, and in combinations of Spanish, French
and English in other Basque communities of the United States ran for decades with homeland
news and information from the Basque diaspora network. In Uruguay and Argentina local
programs did the same in euskera and Spanish (Iguain interview 1997; Vicente interview
1997).

Several Basque Centers in Argentina and Uruguay tried to influence their host
governments by protesting Franco's censorship of speech and press, often resulting in their
own censorship. While official media reports concerning Spain were all host country
governmental releases and typically pro-Franco, the diaspora communities also received
another flow of information from their own and other exiles' families and friends relaying the
reality of life at home. The frequent access to information through personal contacts affected
the Basque identity in each community. Interviews and questionnaires indicate that in Basque
organizations which received political exiles from the Civil War, the contemporary ethnic
identity of the Basque descendants is more political, more nationalist, and more separatist than
communities that did not have exiles join their towns and cities. The effect of only a few
political exiles could out power the national and international media, the host society culture
and attitudes, and time and distance away from the circumstances and events of the Franco
regime. As mentioned previously, the primacy and consequence of diaspora transnational
communications, and new immigration, the "chain migration” theory, cannot be overstated
for the Basques in these case studies, regardless of geography and host country setting.

Escaping, for some, meant "to the opposite end of the Earth" (Bengoa Arrate interview
1997). After the Second World War, Australia experienced an economic boom, a labor
shortage, and was attempting to increase the country's population with more liberal
immigration policies. In 1958 the Sugar Growers' Association of north Queensland sent a representative to Spain to recruit emigrants, and over the subsequent seven years, over five thousand Spanish citizens entered Australia, approximately half of whom were Basque (Douglass 1978:5). Cane cutting was a seasonal occupation and many of the Basque laborers found additional work in Melbourne and Sydney in the off season in building construction, others traveled the migrant farm labor circuit harvesting vegetables and fruit. With mechanization of the sugar harvest in the mid-1960s, most cane cutters were put out of work and forced to look for other permanent employment in various government funded infrastructure projects or in the private sector. Even for those who had learned English, current news and accurate information regarding homeland political developments were extremely difficult but not impossible to obtain. Basques in the rural agricultural areas tended not to be so involved with homeland politics, perhaps as a result of this lack of information. For example, in fifty-four interviews held in the Townsville, Ayr, and Ingham areas, not one person could recall first hand, nor from hearing an older Basque recount, whether there had been any organized collective action from their area in response to the Spanish Civil War and the Franco regime. Those Basques who emigrated to north Queensland tended to be economic emigrants, while the political refugees who fled to Australia were more likely to settle in Melbourne or Sydney, and these members still exhibit stronger interest in the complex homeland politics. Basques from Melbourne and Sydney were, and are, more politically aware and involved, as evidenced in their collective mobilization and political actions in the 1970s and their knowledge and understanding of the various contemporary political factions in the homeland.

Political and economic ideological fragmentation in the homeland nationalist movement confused those in Euskal Herria and most of those in the diaspora who were being asked to support the Basque Government-in-exile, ETA, ETA-V, and ETA-berri. An exasperated "What is going on in our country?" and "Which group believes in what theories?" became the topics of discussion and the cause of many debates and problems in the Basque communities around the world. Lacking information, and often worse, receiving conflicting descriptions and explanations of events, many began to lose interest because they could not keep straight all of the arguments, the factions, and movements inside what they judged should be a unified Basque nationalist movement for independence. Excluding Australia, the PNV had the advantage of a developed network and established communications with diaspora Basque Centers. The majority of Civil War exiles were familiar with the PNV names, strategy, and
goals. The ETA split from the PNV, and subsequent splits within ETA confounded an already extremely complex nationalist movement. The change in rhetoric of the New Left to class struggle and class identity rather than ethnic and cultural struggle and identity was not well received by Basques who had not lived in the provinces perhaps for decades. Of special note, during the 1970s most of the Basque Centers in the diaspora modified their organizational statutes and practices and began describing themselves as apolitical Centers, fearful of experiencing the same divisiveness descending upon their homeland. Politics slowly moved to the arena of home and private conversation, and the cultural activities of maintaining language, music, dance, gastronomy, literature, art, and sport moved to the forefront of diaspora Basque activity. The Basque diaspora’s political layer would be thin and short-lived on top of its trade and colonial substratum.

C.3. Diaspora Reactions to Homeland Violence

If Basques in the diaspora did not favor nationalist talk of workers’ struggle, coalitions with Spanish labor unions, and abandoning an independent Euskal Herria, they rejected outright proposals of armed revolution and arbitrary violence advanced by Krutwig. But because the Basque Government-in-exile had been unsuccessful in manipulating any change or improvement for the southern provinces, its status and that of the PNV also waned and diaspora Basques were willing to listen to the original ETA goals. However, too many mutations, lack of information and communication, and general misunderstanding of the fragmentation in the nationalist movement, caused many exiles to begin questioning whether or not there would ever be the same Basque Country to which they could return, and more upsetting for them, whether or not they would want to return.

Many in the Basque Centers had been exiled now for at least forty years, enough time to have married and start a family in their host countries. Some had taken adolescent children with them into exile, and those had now married with host country residents, and are producing grandchildren, making it yet more distressing for immigrants to leave family for a return to an uncertain Euskal Herria. Before 1975, the censorship of the Spanish press made it increasingly more difficult to obtain credible information regarding day to day activity and events in the Basque country. As would be expected, immediate daily pressures and exigencies in the host society demanded attention and Basques in their diaspora communities began to lose interest in, and understanding of, political events in the homeland. Ties to each other were still strong with much associationism and ethnic social networks that provided
pieces of information—pieces that occasionally conflicted. What is important is that the transnational ties of Basques in their separate host countries continued with individuals and organizations in the Basque homeland.

As is often the case, it took sensational political events with international media attention to demonstrate to the Basques and all others in the outside world that Franco’s Spain was still not democratic and that civil and human rights in the Basque provinces were almost non-existent. After the 1968 assassination of Spanish Police Commissioner, Melitón Manzanas, and the ensuing martial law crack down, Basques in Melbourne organized a dockworkers’ strike in Canberra in protest at the national government. In Sydney and in north Queensland, Basque communities sent hundreds of letters to the National Parliament demanding that the Australian Ambassador to Madrid object to the treatment of the Basque suspects. In Uruguay, Montevideo witnessed street demonstrations, letter writing campaigns to parliamentarians, and public denouncements of Franco by the Basque community and the centenary Basque Center, Euskal Erria. Dozens of Centers in Argentina demanded that their government react to the Spanish government actions, and immediate fund raising activity for the families of those imprisoned in Burgos resurrected latent nationalist sentiments. Surprisingly, in the typically apolitical United States Basque communities, private individuals, not Centers, organized dinners, dances, and donation drives to send money for the Basque cause (M.C. Egurrola interview 1999; San Sebastián 1991). The Governors of Idaho, Nevada, and Oregon sent official letters of protest to Madrid. Student groups in Brussels demonstrated against their governments’ support or neutrality regarding Franco, and after the sixteen guilty sentences were announced, several being orders for execution, even the Vatican entered the arena asking the Spanish government to exercise clemency.

Institutional leaders remember that Basque separatist activity and the use of violence as justifiable became a new topic of conversation in the diaspora communities after the Burgos Trials (Velasco interview 1997; Salazar interview 1997; Sarria interview 1999). Dictatorial regimes in Argentina and Uruguay supplied daily reminders to Basques in those countries of how life in the homeland continued. Worldwide attention to the plight of the Basques as an oppressed people lent credence and justification for ETA actions. However, soon the media coverage focused on the activities themselves, not the rationale or objectives behind them, leading host country populations to equate “Basque” with “violence” and “terrorism”—a burden diaspora Basques everywhere have had to carry.

Diaspora Basques repeatedly stated that they had grown weary of defending themselves
against media reports that portray only ETA acts of violence against property and persons. They believe there was not equal coverage of the state violence and repression suffered by Basques during the Franco regime or the subsequent Socialist Governments of Gonzalez or the Partido Popular government of Aznar. In Argentina and Uruguay where Basques have benefitted from a positive social status, some immigrants and their descendants chose to distance themselves from the political affairs and continued with the Basque organized community only for cultural events. As mentioned above, in the diaspora organizations where transnational communications were maintained and there were emigrants with first person accounts of events, a solidarity for Basque separatism continued even if the methods used were doubted. The majority of diaspora Basques did not, and do not now, have constant access to information from the spectrum of *Euskal Herrian* society. So if there is no new migration, the advantage of the PNV and its established organs of communication have been obvious.

Regardless of PNV conservative nationalism prevalence in the diaspora, in written questionnaires, anonymous responses to the enquiry regarding one’s opinion for the most desirable future of the Basque provinces approximately half chose a total separation from Spain and France declaring an independent state for the seven provinces. Basque nationalism as manifested in a desire for territorial independence remains strong even in the third, fourth, and fifth generation descendants. The struggle of the Tupamaros in Uruguay, questions of 'the disappeared' in Argentina, the civil rights movement of Blacks and especially Native Americans in the United States, the multiculturalism of Belgium, and the current politics of Aboriginal peoples in Australia, have affected Basque communities in those states as Basque and host state populations have been likely to equate the Basque nationalist demands with those suffering discrimination and oppression in their own countries and perhaps be more sympathetic.

Franco’s death in November, 1975 propelled many exiles to plan their returns home with full expectations for the creation of a democracy and autonomy or independence for the Basque country. However, little changed in the first years of Franco’s absence. Violence created defensive violence on both sides, and diaspora Basques had to react to these homeland

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17 There are no official statistics of the numbers of returnees because the details of a person’s reasons for requesting residency and their prior residency are not recorded, and many exiles did not officially register with government officials fearing possible future retribution (J. Egurrola Albizu interview 1999).
activities and separate themselves from them in their own host societies.

D. Conclusions

The transition to a democratic Spain, consisting of seventeen autonomous regions with differing degrees of autonomy, is being chronicled with numerous successes as well as difficulties. Much of the political oppression of Basque culture and politics publicly ceased, creating at least an expectation of democracy and political opportunity in Euskadi and separately in the Foral Community of Nafarroa. The entrance into the European Community and the conversion of the Basque industrial society to a post-industrial information society with a large service sector has created additional jobs, although at the end of the millennium, unemployment rates for those under thirty-five years had climbed to thirty percent (Eusko Jaurlaritza, 1998). The open doors of European Union labor markets have facilitated Basques seeking employment and emigration to European countries rather than crossing the oceans to different continents.

It is clear from interview information and questionnaire data that the second stage of Basque emigration due to economic and political oppression has nearly ended. Many scholars believe that without new immigration to the diaspora communities, the ability to maintain ethnic identity may become more difficult (Pérez-Agote 1998; Alday 1998; Douglass 1998; J. Echeverria 1998). This however assumes the traditional view of emigration being a one way, one time phenomenon; that emigration must be a physical move; that culture is stagnant; and that diaspora ethnicity necessarily must be synonymous with homeland ethnicity. This is not the case with the Basque diaspora as return migration is now becoming more and more common with descendants of Basques returning to Euskal Herria for study abroad programs, and returning to their roots. These long term visits have resulted in various marriages of Old World with New World Basques. Travel is much safer and cheaper than ever before making visits practicable. New technology, such as the Internet, (through which most Basque organizations in the diaspora are inter-connected) facilitates networks between Basques in Euskal Herria and Basques in other communities in the world. The Basque diaspora is going through a critical phase in its existence. Its participation in the new frameworks of societal reality and global change are not those of the colonial settlements, nor of those needing mass migration to sustain it. The new media and changing political realities of Europe and the homeland open new possibilities for the future relations between and among Basques and for their ethnic identity maintenance. The necessity of chain migration and the energy infused into
a community by a new immigrant from Euskal Herria may be replaced by a surfing 'virtual migrant' of Internet communications and idea and information exchange. Diaspora Basques may no longer need new immigrants, nor to physically travel to the homeland. Basque ethnic identity, language, information etc., might be maintained through electronic communications without ever leaving one's home, a ‘downloading’ of identity.

The documented examples and descriptions concerning the formation of the Basque diaspora argue in favor of Hypothesis Three that Basque collective ethnic identity is not a recent reaction to modernization nor to globalization. Basque ethnicity maintenance is visible in the historical record since the 1400s in the New World explorations and colonization processes, and continues to this day with the creation of new institutions. This supports the argument that recent Basque ethnic identity salience is related to globalization, but not necessarily in a causal relationship, nor a reaction to it. The ‘resurgence’ is more specifically defined as a continuing phenomenon of these Basque immigrants and their descendants consistently maintaining avenues for ethnic connection and identity manifestation in their host societies. Rather than nationalism and ethnic identity maintenance being a novel phenomenon, it may be that the academic attention to it is what is recent.

It is also evident that the most significant push factors over time have included economic hardship and, in the twentieth century, political oppression. The magnetism of growing economies and democracies in Argentina and Uruguay first, then the United States, Australia, and Belgium, pulled Basques to those host societies in search of opportunity and political freedom. Chapters Five, Six, and Seven will demonstrate that despite geographical and generational differences, the core elements of Basque ethnic identity are defined in a constant manner by self-defining Basques in the diaspora, and their ethnic institutions, as argued in Hypothesis One and briefly described above, have developed along similar patterns regardless of century and country. The mutual aid funds for health care and aid to elderly Basques, funds for return trips to Euskal Herria, Basque cultural centers with choirs, dance groups, mus and pelota tournaments, cuisine development, schools and religious orders, language preservation programs etc. are manifested in each host society regardless of the dates of initial Basque immigration.

Because the latest substantial waves of migration occurred when Basque homeland nationalism focussed on the ethnic aspects proposed by Sabino Arana y Goiri (ancestry, language, religion), this tends to be the prevailing diaspora ideology. Trickling chain migration has slightly influenced this definition of ‘Basqueness’ with a more modern homeland.
civic definition, which is only very recent in *Euskal Herria*. Diaspora definitions therefore remain exclusive and lag behind the civic changes in the homeland.

It is the 1930s, 1940s, and early 1950s civil war generation of immigrants, and their offspring who have most influenced contemporary Basque communities and their institutions in these six diaspora case studies. They have guided the cultural and political paths taken by the Basque Centers spread throughout and have added political links to previously colonial and trade transnationalism. Their influence over the later generation Basques is evident in interview responses dwelling on Franco and political repression, desires for a united seven province Basque state, and the focus on Basque language and nationalist definitions of *who*, and *what*, is Basque. Peru's official refusal to accept political Basque immigration has impacted Lima's Basque numbers, but not their diaspora development. In a small Basque community it only takes a few exiles to impact the others.

Before the 1970s, expensive, unreliable, and slow communications meant that these separate diaspora communities did not regularly contact each other between the different countries, nor sometimes inside one country. Their political activity tended not to be coordinated across the entire diaspora, nor across one host country. It was most likely instigated by individuals and not the Basque Center institutions, and was town or city specific. As migration tended to be from a homeland micro-unit to a host country micro-unit, aid also tended to be from diaspora regions to their corresponding immigrants' region in the homeland. Interviews demonstrated that the Burgos Trials served as the ignition for a more political consciousness diaspora-wide. The following chapters will provide a picture of how modernization is slowly influencing this Basque identity as travel is cheaper, faster, and safer and increased numbers of diaspora Basques traveling to the homeland or, 'chatting' electronically, are confronted with contrasting ideologies and definitions of who counts as 'one of us'.
Ethnonationalism and Political Attitudes in the Diaspora

The Basque diasporan communities have maintained collective memories that are intrinsic to their ethnic identity. Essential to that ensemble is the suppression and self-defense they perceive themselves to have experienced through the centuries, and the historical memory of self-government which is central to the reproduction of a nationalist project. Today their established diaspora institutions are repeatedly described as non-political, and although it is true that there have been few attempts at influencing their respective host societies' current domestic politics, their past members' activities and interventions with host and home country politics were at times quite influential. In Argentina and Uruguay, relative critical mass of Basques and the recognition of their contributions to each society have made it easier to gain political access and influence. In the United States and Australia, Basques are still a relatively unknown ethnic group and have only rarely collectively attempted to influence policy at national or community levels where they are geographically concentrated. Those in Belgium and Peru are relatively insignificant in number and lack political clout. Since the 1980s the impetus of the diaspora institutions has been cultural, and the political aspects of Basque diaspora nationalism have usually been consigned to individual choice, though this was not always the case.

Nationalism in the Basque diaspora exists separately from the nationalism of the homeland. Neither a copy of it, nor in opposition to it, diaspora nationalism is overwhelmingly ethnonational with a focus on cultural and historical aspects of identity. They are eager to promote Basque ethnicity and cultural aspects of a shared history, language, and ancestry, and encourage the transnational ties for such objectives, but the demands for statehood or territorial control have been, and are, rarely expressed. The ethnonational project is devoid of a specific state to control. There are minorities in each Basque community that do harbor territorial and political goals of separatism and independent statehood for the seven provinces, but as will be demonstrated and argued, while homeland definitions of nationalism and “Basqueness” have progressed to more civic and inclusive nationalism, diaspora definitions have lagged behind. Exactly what does being Basque mean to these respondents?
A. Basque Diaspora Nationalism as Historically both Political and Ethnic

In a 1995 survey conducted by the Basque Autonomous Government which included all seven provinces of Euskal Herria, 64% of the respondents defined themselves as “Basque”, while 24% said they were not, with the remaining a mixture of Basque and French, or Basque and Spanish, or something else. Table 5.1 displays participants’ results from a question asking “what are the most important conditions necessary for a person to be considered a Basque?” In this study, “to have been born in the Basque Country” and “to live and work in the Basque Country” received the highest selection rates. This shows a more civic definition of including more people in the Basque category, and the possibility of ‘becoming Basque’. Euskera has lost its importance for a majority of the population, as have ancestry and the political aspect of promoting Basque goals. This demonstrates a change from traditional Sabino Arana definition of “Basqueness” as being a Basque nationalist (abertzale), having Basque ancestry or counting surnames, and speaking Basque.

| Table 5.1 Basque Country Responses for Conditions Most Important for Categorizing “Basqueness” |
|-----------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|
| % of respondents who marked “most important” |
| Born in the Basque Country                     | 59%                                               |
| Live and work in the Basque Country             | 51%                                               |
| Speak the Basque language                       | 27%                                               |
| Comprehend and defend Basque culture            | 15%                                               |
| Have Basque surnames                            | 10%                                               |
| Be a Basque nationalist (abertzale)             | 7%                                                |

Respondents allowed to mark more than one “condition necessary to be Basque”. Data from Aizpurua 1995:206-207.

Not included in this homeland survey was the respondent’s attitude towards Catholicism and Basqueness, which was significant for early nationalists and is included in this Chapter’s research of the diaspora’s opinions.

South American colonial history is replete with references to Basque revolutionary leaders, industrious Basque settlers and the subsequent positive social status associated with Basque ethnicity. A detailed reality of negative aspects are not in published records but might be inferred by the numbers who did not strike it rich and were not able to return to the homeland as they had originally planned. Argentina and Uruguay both observe statewide
holidays, *Dia de la Raza*, Day of Race, celebrating the ethnic origins of their populations and their respective cultural contributions to the Río de la Plata societies, with Basques in their respective communities commemorating their ancestors’ cultural traditions. However, when diaspora Basques have represented themselves politically rather than culturally, outcomes have varied widely. Argentina’s 1940 Committee for Basque Immigration successfully lobbied Argentine President, Dr. Roberto Ortiz Lizardi (of Basque ancestry), to declare a special circumstance with privileges for thousands of Basque political refugees after the Spanish Civil War. Uruguayan democratic leaders further slighted Franco’s Spain and openly celebrated the arrival of José Antonio de Aguirre y Lecube, President of the Basque Government-in-exile, to the *Euskal Erria* Basque Center. Yet fifty years later in Montevideo, seven Basques were detained and judged for extradition to Spain as suspected ETA sympathizers and activists, the only exercise of this power this century by the Uruguayan government against refugees pleading for political asylum. Uruguay’s economic and political decline since the 1960s has necessitated its alignment with foreign powers such as Spain for aid, and the question of granting political asylum now holds dire financial consequences. Uruguayans’ experience with political violence from the leftist rebel group, Tupamaros, and the re-democratization of Spain most likely influenced this decision. Contrasting foreign policy decisions implemented by different leaders remind diaspora communities that their actions do have the potential to cause conflict between themselves and their host society government and between their host society and homeland governments. Hence the current concentration on cultural manifestations of identity and the argument for Hypotheses One and Four that despite generational, geographical, and gender differences in the diaspora population, the Basque populations and institutions have developed in a similar manner emphasizing cultural identity over political nationalism.

### A.1. Non-Political and Non-Partisan? Not Exactly

Personal interviews with past and present elected officials of the Boards of Directors of the Basque Centers, choral and dance troupe instructors, religious leaders, artists, writers, academics, business and political leaders, recognized athletes, in general Basques who have prestige and influence over other Basques, described a more cultural than political focus to identity maintenance and diaspora Basque Center agendas. Many interviewees stated that the Centers are purposefully “apolitical” in order not to divide themselves. “We are so few that we cannot afford to fight over politics”, was often heard in each separate host country. Many
of the Centers' statutes clarify in writing that the Center and its subdivided sections (such as language classes, choir, musicians, athletes, etc.) are "apolitical" and will not promote or involve themselves in either the political process of the host country or of the homeland. Though many Centers have allowed political candidates and parties to make presentations to their memberships, and in the U.S. have allowed candidates to attend Center functions such as picnics and dances to distribute campaign paraphernalia, there have not been examples of Center promotion or support for particular parties or candidates. Although there has been a rational strategy chosen by Basque institutional elite with goals for strictly cultural maintenance in their Basque communities, there are still numerous examples of political nationalism as well.

By the turn of the century there was an established diaspora nationalist press and information circulation network. In Argentina, the Basque periodicals Revista Laurak Bat (1878), La Basconia (1893), and Irrintzi (1904) were published in Buenos Aires as were books with Basque nationalist themes Ami Vasco, Inocencia de un Patriota, Aitor, Egizale, Patria. In the United States, Euzkotarra originated from New Orleans (1907) and later by the period of the Spanish civil war, there were Eusko Deia, Galeuzka, Euskaltzaleak, and Tierra Vasca in Argentina, Euskal Ordua in Montevideo, and various others in Chile, Venezuela, and Mexico. These nationalist writings circulated throughout the Basque population in Uruguay, Argentina, Venezuela, Mexico, the United States and then clandestinely into Euskal Herria. Their Aranist and later anti-Franco direction played an important psychological and emotional role in maintaining networks, and kept hope for an end to the dictatorial repression (Iguain interview 1996). They also enlightened and updated diaspora Basque readers regarding the Basque Country's political and socioeconomic reality. In Uruguay the distribution of Ekin and other informative bulletins sustained the political interest of those in Montevideo. Although the statutes of the Euskal Erria Basque Center refer to being "apolitical", there were Basque Nationalist Party (Partido Nacionalista Vasco, PNV) activities as well as a party Delegate specifically for Uruguay from the PNV dominated Basque Government-in-exile. As early as 1911, in Rosario, Argentine Basques initiated their own Basque Nationalist Committee and in 1919 they had their own Delegation travel to Euskal Herria for the National Council of the PNV. Basques in Argentina, Uruguay, the United States, and Belgium all received the President of the Basque Government-in-exile in some official and institutional capacity, and the Basque Centers were often utilized as nuclei for mobilizing anti-Franco support, and
lobbying their respective host country governments for foreign policies sympathetic to the Basque cause. The President was not welcomed and did not enter Peru, and there were not sufficient numbers of Basque in Australia for a visit or Basque Delegation. There is one case of anti-Basque collective action in a group that identified themselves as “The Independent Order of Spanish Basque American People”, founded in 1940 in Boise, Idaho, United States. Initiated by William Hart who was married to a Basque, the group pushed an anti-communist campaign and identified the work of Basque Government-in-exile PNV representatives in the Boise area as communist- obviously hindering Basque nationalist progress (San Sebastián 1991:17).

Argentina opened its borders to thousands of Basque political refugees because of the influence of the Comité which designated Buenos Aires and the Laurak Bat Center as the port of entry and host respectively (Anasagasti, 1988). The Emakume Abertzale Batza women commanded an impressive effort to organize all the essential aspects of preparing the new exiles with accommodation, employment information, Catholic masses in Basque, details of daily family life, and fundamental emotional and social support through constant communication and contact with the new arrivals at the Basque Centers Laurak Bat, and the Zazpirak Bat in Rosario. Many interviewed exiles pointed to the efforts and dedication of the Basque women in Argentina as their saving grace. Emigrants felt accepted and welcomed in the atmosphere of recognized nationalist political associations, and a part of an international network of Basques helping Basques (Irujo de Olaizola interview 1997).

The Basque Government-in-exile dispatched Delegates around the world to the largest diaspora communities, sending a handful each to France, Belgium, England, United States, Mexico, Cuba, Columbia, Venezuela, Chile, Uruguay, Argentina, and the Philippines. The PNV was the established Basque nationalist party at the time which enjoyed relatively unified political support in the diaspora and although the Delegates were expected to express administrative undertakings, for most people there was no separation between the PNV and the government-in-exile. The Basque Government was the PNV and vice versa. Hence the lingering diaspora approval for the Partido Nacionalista Vasco, although those endorsing it in interviews could not describe its policies. Diaspora nationalists are loyal to the PNV because they believe it was the party in government that enabled their escape from Spain, and it was the party that received and cared for them in the host societies. Party loyalty has stamped its third generation, as young adults relaying their party preferences mentioned their grandparents being PNV and therefore so were their parents, and so were they. In each of
the six case studies, it remains the most popular party with diaspora Basques who did distinguish between homeland parties\(^8\).

Table 5.2 "Which political party in Euskadi most closely fits your political views?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PNV</th>
<th>HB</th>
<th>I don't know enough about homeland politics to choose a party</th>
<th>I stay out of Basque Country politics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total respondents= 832.

Political nationalism in the United States communities was prevalent during the Franco years when various Center fund-raisers paid for blankets and household items to be sent to Euskal Herria's churches and families. Aid was not granted institution to institution but rather community to community through individual initiative. The decades of the 1940s through the 1960s were the years of the "long boom" in the United States, but stagnation and deprivation in much of Euskal Herria. Emigrant generation interviewees stated they felt the responsibility to take care of those at home, and those involved with aid to ETA in its initial cultural nationalism stages believe they were "defending their heritage."

An official Basque Delegation of the government-in-exile was established in New York in 1938 and the State Department granted a special visa to President Aguirre y Lecube in 1941, where he remained to lecture at Columbia University in New York. However, Basques' anti-Franco rhetoric and republican ties to socialists and communists during the Spanish civil war made them the target of interest to U.S. intelligence. Beginning in 1942, there were FBI investigations of Basque Government-in-exile officials, Basque immigrants in the New York area, and those in the western States of California, Nevada, Oregon, Idaho, Wyoming, and Utah as well as of the Centers and the political activities carried out in each community (Ordaz Romay, 1996:230). Obtaining United States governmental endorsement for the Basque cause was imperative and the priority objective for President Aguirre, and there could be no perceived connections to communism or revolutionaries. Eventually, Basques were hired as FBI agents who helped investigate the possibility of a plan by Government-in-exile Delegates José María Lasarte Arana, Telesforo Monzón Ortiz de Uruea, and Antonio de Irala e Irala that Basques in the South American countries could be organized into counter-espionage units to aid the United States with its World War II effort. In an FBI intercepted

\(^8\) Table 7.3 demonstrates actual diaspora voting results in elections from 1990, 1994, 1998.
letter from Aguirre to another Basque in Havana, the Basque President illustrated his fears about a possible agreement between Franco and the democracies, and he suggested that Basques everywhere must present an image of political unity with other republicans, even at the cost of sacrificing nationalist goals (Hoover, FBI Bureau File 10-14311-3, 1942).

Initial FBI investigations into the Basque Government Delegates focused on the possible services which the Organization of Basque Intelligence, with its ample networks in South America and Europe utilized for Basque exiles, could use to aid United States intelligence gathering. From the United States Legal Attache in Buenos Aires, a communication to Director J. Edgar Hoover depicts the level of entanglement between the FBI and the Organization of Basque Intelligence. It looks as though the FBI was spying on its own spies from the Basque Intelligence. The letter lists the categories of information which could be obtained regarding Argentine Basques' nationalist and/or communist activities, political ideologies as well as religious affiliations (Ordaz Romay 1996:235).

In the United States there are few examples of homeland partisan involvement from the diaspora communities. In 1970 in Boise, Idaho there emerged a group Anaia Danok (Brothers All), which did raise and send money to Euskadi for ETA political prisoners' families. However, they disbanded by the end of the decade and never claimed any political party affiliation. Several families, which were and are known to be knowledgeable about and involved in homeland politics, stated that they had tried to influence United States foreign policy through their Senators, namely Frank Church of Idaho, Robert Laxalt of Nevada, and through the Governors of the States of California, Nevada, Idaho and Oregon where the majority of Basques live in the west. It was a tremendous triumph for United States Basques when Senator Church, Chairman of the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee, visited Euskal Herria before Franco's death in 1975 to meet Basque representatives and see symbolic Gernika and the historic Basque Parliament, but did not visit Madrid or Spanish government officials. The majority of United States Basques, uninterested in homeland politics, most likely were unaware of Senator Church's visit, and interviews in Boise demonstrated that those under forty knew nothing of Anaia Danok unless their parents had been involved.

In 1983, representatives from each of Euskadi's political parties traveled to the United States to visit various Basques Centers and to explain their political party's position on constitutional reform and autonomy issues. They were not well received in the sense that people were apathetic. In Boise for example, from a Basque Center that had over 900 paying
members, approximately 30 people attended. Most other Centers had no reception whatsoever and the tour was a complete failure. In the 1980s and 1990s various homeland politicians made trips to the United States and were not officially received by any Basque Centers. Informally they were invited by individuals to dinners or social gatherings at private residences but the Directorships of the Centers had affirmed not to become involved in partisan politics.

The lack of interest and involvement in the 1970s and 1980s democratic transformations in the homeland by United States Basques created an even wider gap in the political networks between homeland and U.S. diaspora, and also has resulted in a general ignorance of Euskal Herria’s social, political, and economic reality. At the Second World Congress of Basque Collectivities in October, 1999, the Peruvian, Australian, Argentine, Uruguayan, and Belgian delegates (as well as the other countries’ delegates) were all prepared to participate in discussions of the ETA cease-fire and the Lizarra Agreement\footnote{The September 12, 1998 Lizarra-Garazi Agreement was signed by political parties; Partido Nacionalista Vasco, Herri Batasuna, Izquierda Unida, Abertzaleen Batasuna, Euskal Alkartasuna, Batzarre, Zutik, Partido Carlista, Iniciativa Ciudadana Vasca; trade unions and social organizations, with the main purpose of facilitating a peace process and democratic settlement in the Basque Country.} but the United States delegation had only two of six members who had even heard of it.

Preferred non-political status is so intense that four of the thirty-one member Centers of the North American Basque Organizations (NABO) have refused to participate in some Basque Government programs because their leadership perceives these relationships as “getting involved in politics” (P. Etcharren interview 1998, R. Echeverria interview 1999, Ysursa interview 1998). The Basque Government has also requested official statistical registries of memberships detailing the person’s name, place of birth, languages spoken, and citizenships, from each Center, but by late 1999 there were still three Centers refusing to participate or solicit this voluntary information of their members. The perception of embroilment with homeland political activity of any sort is negative for some Center activists.

The current dilemma for Centers in the NABO federation is whether accepting Basque Government grant funding and computers constitutes participating in politics. It does not legally jeopardize their non-profit or charitable status. For the Centers in Bakersfield, Los Banos, and Winnemucca, Basque Government “grants will one day have strings attached” and they have refused the computers and Internet services allocated for their Centers, physically returning them to the International Relations Chairperson of NABO. They have
voted not to accept Basque Government grant funding because they understand this to be entering into political entanglements with the Basque Government and the PNV, and they are opposed to such political activities. They believe that there is no such thing as a free lunch, or computer for that matter. Other individuals have trepidations about receiving any financial aid at all from *Euskadi* based on two separate issues. First, the Basque Government requires Centers to be officially registered with its Secretary of Foreign Action in order to receive any monies. This entails the registering of members of the Centers as mentioned above. Bordering on fanaticism, Americans value personal privacy and almost two-thirds of the members have refused to supply this information. The Basque Parliament has accepted this cultural difference and allowed Centers to register without a full accounting of their members. Although Franco has been dead for more than twenty years, the memories for these political exiles are not. United States responses indicated a lasting fear of repeat politics in Spain. Only 14% agreed or strongly agreed that “admirers of General Franco and his politics are NO LONGER a threat to Basques.” Reacting to the statement, “The Basque Autonomous Government should not trust the Spanish central government”, only 16% disagreed. Conversations exhibit a lack of trust in general of politics in Spain, not a mistrust of the Basque Government itself, but rather what could happen to such records in the hands of the Spanish government.

The second reason some United States Basques refuse Basque Government economic aid is shame and embarrassment at the idea that the underdeveloped economy of *Euskadi*, where unemployment for youth hovered at thirty-five percent at the end of the 1990s, would be aiding the Centers in the United States where members are comparatively wealthier than their homeland counterparts. For decades, immigrants sent remittances to families in order to relieve financial hardship. It is unfathomable to many that taxes collected in *Euskadi*, which they believe “should be invested in creating employment, educational opportunities, and improving health care and infrastructure,” would be spent buying television sets for members at the Basque Centers to view videos sent by the Ministry of Culture (Mendive interview 1998). Knowing that “with a few fund-raisers each Basque community could purchase ten television sets if they chose to,” the majority of the United States Centers have not applied for financial grants from the Basque Government since their inception in 1987 (Mainvil interview 1998; R. Echeverria interview 1998; Berria interview 1998).

Basque immigration to Australia was much more economically than politically induced, although there are several Basques in Sydney, Melbourne, and north Queensland who describe
themselves as political exiles fleeing Franco’s repression. Because of the relatively small enclaves, and the long distances between them, there has been very little communication between the three Basque clusters. These Basques’ political involvement and knowledge of and contacts with other Basques in the diaspora are minimal. Although the South American and the United States Basques have interacted much while also at long distances, except for contacts with homeland Basques, those in Australia have been relatively isolated from each other and from other Basque populations in different countries. Even so, there is still evidence of individual political involvement with the homeland, and a desire to influence Australia’s foreign policies concerning the Basque Country.

Political involvement has included letter writing campaigns to Members of Parliament in order to influence Australian foreign policy toward the Franco government—expanded to demonstrations against the death sentences Spanish judges handed down to convicted ETA sympathizers in the Burgos Trials of 1970. Basques from Sydney mobilized and organized buses to take marchers to Canberra to demand some sort of Australian government reaction to what they described as “undemocratic and unjust judicial and general political practices in Spain.” The same year, a general strike by Melbourne dockworkers (organized by Basques) demonstrated solidarity for Basque protests and general strikes in the homeland (Oribe 1997). Paul Oribe and his wife, Carmen “Mentxu” Belon, themselves exiled orphans of the Spanish civil war, met with local politicians, MP Calwell, and other MPs to educate them about the circumstances of the Franco repression in the four provinces. Oribe conducted radio interviews, lectured to community groups, and penned media accounts of political persecution in the Basque Country.

During the 1960s and early 1970s, Oribe recounts that attempting to influence Australia’s government in regards to Spanish politics was “like talking to a rock.” There was almost no interest in, or sympathy for, the victims of a remote homeland unknown to most Australians and unimportant in Australian foreign policy. Worldwide press coverage of Franco’s depiction of Basques as communists also hurt the cause for diaspora Basques’ attempts to mobilize support for international pressure for change in Spain. Once again, individuals used their personal friendship and kinship networks to send material and financial aid to family and friends in the homeland. Because there were established Basque Centers in Melbourne and Sydney which organized various gatherings, Basques in these areas were more likely to share information and discuss possible collective actions. Those in the north Queensland areas of Ingham, Townsville, and Ayr were fewer in number, more isolated from
communications, and acted individually, if at all. Close to one-third of the interviewees remember their parents or themselves contributing to funds for relief to families in the homeland, and believe it to have been general non-partisan humanitarian aid mostly to relatives.

A more recent example of individual interest in political nationalism involved a controversial Herri Batasuna party campaign video advocating the use of all possible means to achieve a united Basque state. Released in 1996 for upcoming elections, it resulted in the subsequent trials and imprisonment in Spain of the entire National Directorate of the Herri Batasuna political party for up to seven years. A copy of the video obtained through personal connections was making its way between homes in Sydney and being reproduced to expand its audience in Australia. Conversations at the Gure Txoko Basque Center in Sydney indicated outrage that the "supposed democracy" of Spain could imprison the entire directorship of a legal political party for advertising its political ideology. "Nothing has changed since Franco died. State terrorism will create reactionary defensive terrorism," stated one member.

Closer to the homeland, Basques in Belgium have benefitted from the abundant availability of current news and information and the advantage of proximity resulting in cheaper, easier travel and access to Euskal Herria. The majority of the Basque population here are first and second generation political exiles of the civil war and Franco years, and several are representatives of the thousands of orphan children cared for by Belgian families during the civil war. They tend to endorse either the traditional nationalist Partido Nacionalista Vasco or the radical nationalist Herri Batasuna, though HB is losing its popular support recently because of the perception that their targets are no longer symbolic of the Spanish government but rather are Basques themselves. In Belgium, as in the other case studies, political activity is carried out by individual actors. As will be discussed, the existence of the Herri Batasuna "embassy" and the Basque Autonomous Government's Delegation to the European Union make it easy for the institutional rhetoric of the Brussels Txalaparta Center to propose more cultural manifestations of identity. Comparative attitudes and opinions exemplify this Basque population's heightened knowledge and understanding of homeland politics due to the relative ease of communication.

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20 The National Directorate were given early release in July 1999 by the Spanish Supreme Tribunal as a result of its ruling that the seven year sentences constituted an excessive penalty (El Diario Vasco 22-7-1999:1).
A.2. Current Homeland Partisan Representation in the Diaspora

As demonstrated above, neither apolitical nor non-political is an accurate description of these diaspora populations' ethnic identity manifestations. There are currently 31,600 persons in the diaspora that hold citizenship rights and of those 26,396 were qualified to vote in the Basque Autonomous Community. There are another 12,690 Nafarroans abroad, but official numbers are not available for Iparralde (Aguirre 1999). Because they are registered to vote in all elections it would seem natural to assume that the political parties might solicit support from these communities, but they do not.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Host Country</th>
<th>Registered Voters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>3,699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>2,010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>1,022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Not Available</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Numbers provided by the Secretariat for Foreign Action, Basque Autonomous Government.

While the number of qualified diaspora voters per country is available, the number of actual voters per country is not. Totals demonstrate that in the 1998 parliamentary election there were 26,396 eligible diaspora voters, and 6,888 of them actually voted— a 26.1% participation rate. In Euskadi itself, voter turnout for the same election was 73%, and again the PNV was the most popular party creating a coalition government after ‘winning’ with 28% of the electorate’s support.

In Argentina, the Acción Vasca (Basque Action) and Emakume Abertzale Batza (United Nationalist Women), both of which are PNV sub-sectors initiated from the 1930s, function openly as sub-groups within several of the Basque Centers. Though not strongly connected to party politics currently, the Acción Vasca and Emakume Abertzale Batza have served dual political and cultural purposes throughout their histories. Of the six countries, Argentina is the solitary example where the PNV political party groups function, but which in the last two decades have become less involved in the actual homeland PNV party politics and have attracted fewer new members. The Emakume of Rosario, Argentina actually has almost nothing to do with the PNV any longer but retains the original name of the organization. It began as the women’s branch of the Rosario Zazpirak Bat (Seven are One) Basque organization, which allows only men as members. Therefore the men joined Zazpirak Bat and the women joined Emakume Abertzale Batza. The practice continues today and the two sponsor several joint cultural activities a year, but none that are political party events (Arregui interview 1997).
The leftist nationalist party *Herri Batasuna* mails informational pamphlets from the homeland to a few of the Centers but has no formal ongoing institutional communications with either FEVA (Federation of Basque Entities in Argentina) or any Basque Center in Argentina (M. Egibar interview 1998). The Sydney *Gure Txoko* also receives *Herri Batasuna* publications which are made available to members who are interested, as does the Boise *Euzkaldunak* Inc. Basque Center in the United States. There is an unofficial personal censorship of *Herri Batasuna*’s publications occurring in several Centers that are on this party’s mailing list. Often the employee (usually the bartender) or person responsible for opening the mail, discards HB publications, thereby censoring and influencing that entire Basque community’s access to information (Arozarena, 1997). Directors of *Herri Batasuna* affirmed in personal interviews that they know this occurs and that they are fighting and losing a propaganda battle with the PNV, which controls the Basque Government. Karmelo Landa, a National Director of *Herri Batasuna* stated the party had plans for addressing the diaspora population for political support (Landa interview 1996), but as of late 1999 nothing had been launched to the Centers.

Belgium is the only case that has had formal representation of another political party besides the PNV, and also has permanent official political representation of the Basque Government. Partisan representation is exemplified at the *Herri Batasuna*’s *Herri Enbaxada* (Embassy of the Homeland) in Brussels. This “embassy” was established as the official headquarters and residence of the *Herri Batasuna*’s European Union parliamentarians elected as representatives from *Euskadi*. The office and five bedroom residence combination functions full-time for HB administrators and is utilized often by those traveling to Brussels for European Union matters. The office managers are themselves political exiles with charges against them of participating in and collaborating with ETA activities in the Basque country. They have been granted political asylum in Belgium and are residing legally in Brussels. These HB *Enbaxada* employees inform the appropriate EU bodies of alleged human and civil rights abuses by the Spanish government, gain media attention for the Basque nationalist cause, and publish information regarding Basque political prisoners and the current political situation in *Euskal Herria*. In the early 1990s they arranged lectures regarding the situation in the Basque Country for interested persons, as well as cultural exhibitions of Basque art and music which were attended by twenty to thirty Basques and non-Basques per event. Interested participants have included Flemish nationalists (who have actually established a Basque bar and meeting site) that identify with the Basque cause for self-determination. Some Belgian interviewees
responded that they had attended events at the *Enbaxada* but had since decided not to associate themselves because of the connections between HB and ETA. They felt that their attendance at any *Enbaxada* events could be misconstrued as support for the HB and therefore ETA. They wanted to share their Basqueness with other Basques and associate with other Basques, but in a non-political way and did not believe they could accomplish this with *Herri Enbaxada* personnel, nor at HB activities.

Three kilometers away from the *Herri Enbaxada* is the *Euskadiren Ordezkaritza Bruselan*, the Basque Autonomous Community’s official Delegation to the European Union, which functions as the stateless region’s informal embassy. Its civil servants are mostly PNV members though this is not a condition for employment or internship. The other Basque ‘Eurocrats’ employed in Brussels do not necessarily define themselves as Basques, and are there representing their own business interests according to Alex Aguirrezabal, Director General of the Delegation. In a 1997 survey, 90% of the Basque civil servants in EU employment in Belgium stated they planned to return to *Euskadi* and 60% said if they could find a job in *Euskadi* they would return immediately (Aguirrezabal interview 1997). This gives an indication of their short term mentality, maintained networks with the homeland, and lack of desire to try to build any kind of permanent diaspora relationships or investments in a cultural institution or other Basque organization. “They are always thinking of when they will be back in *Euskadi*” (Mendibelzua interview 1997).

It is interesting that of the Belgian respondents participating in this research project, a large percentage of people were familiar with the *Herri Batasuna’s Enbaxada*, but many did not know the Basque Government’s *Ordezkaritza* existed. Their interview on the premises was the first time they had visited and become aware of the Basque government’s representation in Belgium and European Union politics and economics. Neither the government’s *Ordezkaritza* nor the HB *Enbaxada* has instrumentally reached out to the Belgian Basque diaspora population, nor do they believe they have any reason to do so with the exception of the HB’s mobilization of people in Brussels to protest Spanish government policies to the EU. The *Euskadiren Ordezkaritza* operates in more of an economic and business capacity for the Basque government by researching EU mandates, rules, and restrictions etc. for business and international trade and promoting Basque companies. Therefore, although there is an official Delegation of the Basque Country in Belgium, and an Embassy of the *Herri Batasuna*, neither seems to have affected the diaspora population as of yet in any significant way, politically or culturally.
A third factor of influence on the Belgian Basque population is the Basque Center *Txalaparta*. This organization is most similar to the other countries’ Basque Centers with cultural dance and music groups, a choir, sporting events, dinners, and an in-progress clubhouse. With the aid of Basque government grants, the *Txalaparta* has purchased a three story building in a prime area of Brussels real estate with a restaurant and bar, a salon for dance rehearsals, and small indoor *frontón* for *pala* and *pelota* that will be converted for other larger celebrations and activities. The effects of partisan politics have been prevalent in *Txalaparta* history and became the catalyst for membership splits, broken friendships, members abandoning the organization, and even disintegrating the association itself. Loosely organized from the mid-1970s, members often disagreed regarding the extent of political involvement the organization should exhibit. While some members were sheltering Basque political refugees and/or were political refugees themselves initiating political events, discussions, and political action, others desired a social association and were more interested in a Basque bar and restaurant. The diverse political opinions of *Euskal Herria* reached the *Txalaparta*, and as in the homeland divided members and crippled the association at the end of the 1980s. The resurgence of *Txalaparta* beginning in 1995 seemed to be a result of renewed interest from the Belgian Basque population buttressed by promised grants and financial aid from the Basque government to carry out cultural activities. However, again, among the interviewees, many did not know that the *Txalaparta* had ever existed, or that it was again resuming activities and inviting additional members. Interviewees stated that Belgium is so close to the “real thing” that they do not have the necessity to reproduce *Euskal Herria* in Belgium. They travel to the Pyrenees easily and inexpensively, maintaining a transnational identity, a luxury not available to those in the other five countries.

Summarizing Belgium’s political and partisan activities then in comparison to the other diaspora communities, it retains three distinct Basque networks operating simultaneously and separately from each other, each in their own sphere of influence. The Delegation of *Euskadi* focuses on business and trade, the *Herri Batasuna* Embassy concentrates on nationalist politics, and the *Txalaparta* promotes culture. Unlike the other diaspora Basques, these generally do not mix or overlap in membership and participation, and they do not feel the same need to act collectively for protection, brotherhood, or to maintain their identity. They are able to manifest their cultural and political interests by traveling to *Euskadi* directly.

In the United States, Peru, Australia, and Uruguay, there are no formal organizations representing any homeland political parties. Individuals are active privately and establish dual
citizenship for voting purposes but there is no systematic official representation of party politics. During the dictatorships Peru has suffered, political socialization has taught people to stay out of politics and to keep any criticism quiet. One Lima member, Francisco Igartua, had his news magazine, Oiga (Listen) censored and closed by the Fujimori government for exhibiting too potent critiques of Peruvian power politics (Igartua interview 1996). In previous decades, the international press accounts replayed in the Peruvian media associated Basques with leftist radicals. After the Soviet Union aided the republicans in the Spanish civil war, Basques around the world were branded as communists, and any anti-Franco rhetoric was perceived negatively in Peru as well as the other five countries, although in Belgium to a lesser degree. Basques in Peru stated that they knew of no Basque political movements or party representation, nor could any interviewee from the Center remember any kind of political coloring to any Euskal Etxeak of Lima activities. They celebrate Sabino Arana’s established Aberri Eguna as the nationalists’ holiday of the rebirth of Basque nation, but for most it is perceived as more of a cultural and social gathering, not connected to the PNV specifically, or any particular political ideology. Combined questionnaire responses regarding the “importance of celebrating Aberri Eguna as a day of Basque nationalism” showed agreement across the cases with its importance from 100% of those in Peru, Belgium 91%, Argentina 91%, Australia 73%, Uruguay 69%, and 68% in the United States.

These diaspora Basques have not consolidated as a Basque lobby to influence domestic politics, but rather as a group have shown more of an interest in homeland politics. Unlike what is often expected of immigrants (that they unite for instrumental economic purposes of protection and use their ethnicity to obtain special treatment from their governments), the Basques in these countries have not followed this pattern of activity. They have not organized themselves as a group in order to sway domestic politics towards themselves, nor to use their ethnicity for political advantage. In response to a questionnaire item asking respondents if “claiming an ethnic identity can help me get a special government benefit”, not a single respondent from Peru or Uruguay marked yes, and the highest affirmative response was the low 4% from Belgium. Their common political interests have continued to center around affecting the circumstances of the homeland, not those of personal economic gain.21

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21To be investigated in Chapter Seven are the more than 26,000 diaspora Basques who have registered with their diaspora Basque institutions and are eligible for benefits from the homeland government.
The *Euskal Erria* membership in Montevideo differs from their brethren in that it continues to institutionally receive all ideologies and politicians of the Basque Country regardless of party, and the needy Centers from the Uruguayan interior have all applied for Basque Government financial aid dismissing any political conflict of interest. The PNV, HB, *Eusko Alkartasuna*, Basque Solidarity, and *Euskadiko Ezkerra*, Basque Left, as well as Basque Country labor union leaders have been invited to present their projects to the Board of Directors at the *Euskal Erria*. A separate Center in Montevideo, the *Euskaro*, formerly the *Euskaro Español*, is often cast off by members of *Euskal Erria* as not being nationalist because they had the word “Spanish” in their original title, and until recently displayed a Spanish flag next to the Basque *ikurriña* at their Center. These members are indeed less concerned with the politics of the homeland and focus more on culture and sport, unless an extreme circumstance erupts as it did in the 1992-94 crisis of extradition proceedings of seven suspected ETA members living in Uruguay.

In this incident, members of the Basque Centers of Montevideo and thousands more from the general Uruguayan community, participated in demonstrations in support of hunger striking Basque political exiles and suspected ETA sympathizers that had been jailed in Montevideo while waiting deportation to Spain. A few Uruguayan Basques were also erroneously jailed and subsequently released. The manifestations of thousands of Uruguayans took place daily and eventually in front of the hospital to where the hunger strikers had been moved, and at one critical point there were shots fired from the Uruguayan military police, killing one citizen (Iguain 1996, Sarazola 1996, Zuazola 1996). This was a simultaneously consolidating and divisive event. Non-Center Basques protested and showed solidarity in opposition to extradition and in favor of self-determination of peoples, as banners proclaimed. Non-Basque leftists spray painted *Gora Euskadi* (Long Live the Basque Country) next to existing *Gora Che Guevarra* (Long Live Che Guevara) on houses and buildings. Demonstrators experienced at shouting union slogans, pro-Tupamarro and anti-government chants, also joined in the mobilization. Homeland representatives from HB, lawyers from human rights groups, and delegates from Basque peace organizations flew to Montevideo to plea for refugee and exile status for those detained, but were refused. The President of the Autonomous Basque Government, José Antonio Ardanza, personally telephoned President Gurutz Iguain of the *Euskal Erria* Center, asking that the Center publicly denounce ETA and political violence in the homeland. The recently re-elected President Iguain of the *Euskal Erria* Center refused the President of the Basque Government’s request to involve the
institution in an official political statement. Basque Government President Ardanza then stated in an interview in the Uruguayan daily *El Pais* that "a position close to ETA had taken control of the *Euskal Erria* Center" (*El Pais* October 30, 1994). This "erroneous accusation" (Iguain interview 1997) created a defensive reaction and intense negative feelings from some in this Center toward the Basque Government. The Basque Government had rarely meddled in any Center's activities and had never "requested" a Center to make a public political statement. Though a major uproar in Montevideo and in the foreign policy circles of Latin America, and of course Spain, Basques in the interior of Uruguay did not participate in any demonstration of support for the political exiles, nor were they so encouraged. There was no attempt to synthesize the efforts of interior Basques of seven other Centers to make any kind of united formal statement, not that they would have participated as institutions anyway according to their Presidents (Bessonart, 1996; Irigoyen, 1996; Zaldua, 1996). Uruguay granted extradition to Spain and five of the seven detainees were transported and sentenced. The break down of amicable relations between the Basque Autonomous Government and the *Euskal Erria* continued as a problem in 1999.

In November 1996, Karmelo Landa (HB) again traveled to Uruguay to coincide with Spain's King Juan Carlos and Queen Sofia, using the opportunity to meet with Uruguayan Parliamentarians to discuss the possibility of Montevideo playing host to initial peace talks between a consortium of Basques and the Spanish government. He was not granted any appointments or joint media time with the King but made his negotiations offer through the Uruguayan press. There was no response and there has not been any progress as Karmelo Landa and his fellow HB directors were in prison from November 1997 until July 1999 for the political video incident. Today HB-EH\(^{22}\) has many supporters in Montevideo, but because of the chaos caused by the detentions and extraditions, and the homeland judgments for imprisonment of the party leadership, plans for utilizing the diaspora in its political causes have been postponed.

This demonstrates the nature of individual choice in political manifestations of ethnic identity. Institutionally, some of the Centers have kept democratic principles of admitting and receiving various ideologies, nevertheless, promoting or favoring none. They have given their members the opportunity to inform themselves and the individual private choice of whether

\(^{22}\) *Herri Batasuna* changed its name to *Euskal Herritarrok* in the spring of 1999. For events occurring before that date I have used the name *Herri Batasuna*, for anything pertaining after that date I have used both HB-EH.
or not to act. Of course, cultural strategies are in general preferred to political activities as less threatening to host societies for there is no challenge to the sovereignty or power of the host country political actors, or to its territory or military. Diaspora cultural activities are also more acceptable to homeland politicians for they will not be upstaged for authority and legitimacy, nor will there be much criticism of public policy in Euskadi. Host governments also would favor the cultural strategy, goals, and collective action so that diaspora communities would police and control themselves and any radical political tendencies. Still in many countries for economic, political, racist and xenophobic reasons, ethnic minorities are regarded suspiciously enough that the host government does involve itself with members’ activities, as was the case in the United States with the FBI investigations of Basques. In Uruguay, three interviewees suspected their telephone lines are regularly tapped by police looking for information regarding ETA and/or political exiles living in Uruguay, and one also believed his telephone is tapped when he visits Euskadi. In Belgium, one family revealed that police had forced themselves into their home searching for information regarding political exiles in Belgium. Families who were sheltering refugees claimed the Belgian police had watched their homes and personal movements for months.

Involving oneself in political nationalism carries much greater risk than the cultural manifestations of everyday ethnicity, and most diaspora Basques do not solicit that risk. In sum, Basques outside the homeland, whether emigrants themselves or fifth generation, have historically infrequently involved themselves with the political aspects of homeland issues and host country involvement. I now turn to what diaspora Basques individually know about homeland politics and to what degree and in what ways they are involved in the contemporary politics of Euskal Herria.

B. Comparing Respondents' Personal Attitudes Towards Politics

B.1. Political Participation

Hypotheses One and Four posit that despite generational, geographic, and gender differences in the diaspora population, the core elements of Basque identity are similar and I argue that they are overwhelmingly cultural and non-political. Specific comparisons are in order to build this argument. If politics were a salient factor of diaspora Basque identity, it

23 Uruguayan police did follow and identify themselves to this researcher after interviewing legal political exiles and HB's Karmelo Landa.
follows that questionnaire participants would be interested in, or know something, about homeland political parties. This is not the present situation in either gender, between the generations, or in any host country.

When comparing across the six cases, in every country the Partido Nacionalista Vasco, PNV, was the most popular party, and in all but Peru where the Partido Popular, PP, Popular Party, and the Partido Comunista de España, PCE, Communist Part of Spain, tied for the second highest response rate, the Herri Batasuna, HB, was the second most popular party. More telling than the choice of party was the respondents’ willingness to select “I don’t know enough about Basque Country political parties to answer this question.” Excepting 0% in Belgium, where most respondents are themselves recent emigrants and where news concerning the Basque Country is readily published in the media and Basques travel frequently to the homeland, in each of the other countries this “I don’t know . . . “ response received the highest percentage; United States 75%, Uruguay 61%, Australia 46%, Argentina 43%, and Peru 39%. There was a 9% difference between males and females and whether or not they knew enough to choose a political party. The additional 9% of males that did know enough, chose the PNV.

Comparing between generations demonstrated the same pattern with respondents selecting the PNV as the most popular party and HB second, across five generations from emigrants themselves to fourth generation born in the host country. In the emigrant generation there was much higher support for the PNV with 37% compared to the other generations’ 7%-17%, and less of them did not know enough about politics to select an answer. Only 28% of emigrants marked this answer compared to between 55%-72% in the other categories. Age groupings, regardless of generation, repeated the pattern with the PNV as most popular party and HB in second place, but again the response with the highest selection rate was “I don’t know enough about the Basque Country political parties to answer this question.”

The arguments that regardless of geography, generation, and gender, diaspora Basques prefer cultural to political manifestations of ethnicity are strengthened with the following data, while assumptions that males take care of the politics while females guard cultural aspects of ethnicity are erroneous. Responses agreeing with the statement favoring cultural over political involvement prevail in each independent variable. When comparing age cohorts, a similar pattern evolves with a preference for cultural manifestation of Basque identity by between 78% (ages 31-45) to 88% (ages 76-90). Between countries the consistent pattern is least
strong in Belgium although still almost two-thirds of respondents agreed or strongly agreed.

Table 5.4 “I prefer to participate in Basque cultural events and not Basque political events.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly Agree or Agree</th>
<th>No Opinion</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree or Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Female</strong></td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Male</strong></td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Peru</strong></td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>United States</strong></td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Uruguay</strong></td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Argentina</strong></td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Australia</strong></td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Belgium</strong></td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Immigrant</strong></td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1st Generation</strong></td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2nd Generation</strong></td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3rd Generation</strong></td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4th Generation</strong></td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total respondents = 832.

Skeptics could claim Basques are non-political in general and do not demonstrate any political interest in their host societies either. However, questionnaire responses demonstrate that they are associated with their own host country politics. Although in Peru 79% do not partake, personal interviews explained this as an example of a lack of civil society, low political efficacy, and struggling democratic ideals of individual participation. Many recent migrants to Belgium explained that because they do not have Belgian citizenship, they tend to not involve themselves with their host country's political issues. Overall, respondents tended to connect politics to civic rather than ethnic identity. No conflict between being Basque (ethnically) and being Uruguayan or Argentine or American etc., (civically) appeared.

There are differences between Basques in each country and their support for liberal versus conservative parties. An overview of diaspora Basques' self-categorization in host country political parties follows in Table 5.5. The highest political party identification rates are in the United States with 85% of Basques reporting an association with a political party, and the lowest in Peru with 21%. Interviews in Peru uncovered a general lack of trust and legitimacy with Peruvian politics and were likely influenced by the current non-democratic Fujimori regime.
Table 5.5 “Which political party do you usually associate yourself with in (host country)?”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Host Country</th>
<th>Political Party Preference</th>
<th>Other Parties</th>
<th>I do not participate in (host country) politics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Argentina</strong></td>
<td>2% Partido Justicialista</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>36% Unión Civica Radical</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10% FREPASO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Australia</strong></td>
<td>47% Labour</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13% Liberal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10% Country</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Belgium</strong></td>
<td>5% Christelijke Volkspartij</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0 Parti Socialist</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0 Socialistische Partij</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9% Parti Social Chrestien</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Peru</strong></td>
<td>7% Cambio 90/Nueva Mayoria</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14% Unión por el Perú</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0 Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>United States</strong></td>
<td>42% Democratic</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>43% Republican</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1% Reform</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Uruguay</strong></td>
<td>15% Partido Colorado</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>47% Partido Nacional (Blancos)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15% Encuentro Progresista</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total respondents = 832.

Political participation in their host countries in activities that affect other Basques would also indicate an interest and/or willingness to be involved with a political aspect to Basque identity. The data again support Hypothesis One. With the exception of Belgian Basques, who, as discussed, take advantage of the European Union’s institutions to promote information about Euskal Herria’s political and economic situation, the other five countries’ responses are similar, with participants overwhelmingly marking that they have not participated in any activities that affect Basques.

Table 5.6 “While living in (host country) have you ever participated in any political movements (rallies, letter-writing, protests, fund-raisers, etc) specifically because it would affect Basques?”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Argentina</th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>Belgium</th>
<th>Peru</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Uruguay</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No, because there have not been any political movements that would affect Basques.</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, because I do not get involved in politics.</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total percentage 94% 97% 56% 100% 92% 92%

Total respondents = 832.
Although they do participate in their host country politics and manifest their civic identity, they do not necessarily think it necessary to participate in political activities as a factor in their Basque ethnic identity. Though reasons for preserving ethnic identity vary widely, in several other diasporas such as the Irish, Armenian, and Jewish, promoting a political awareness in the host country of one’s homeland situation is often popular. Not so in the Basque populations. Only Belgian Basques showed an interest in this expression of their ethnicity with 50% selecting “I want to promote an awareness of the political situation in the Basque Country to (host country population).” The other countries’ positive responses to this same item ranged from Argentina’s 16% to the United States’ 7% low. No very significant gender differences materialized with only 10% of females and 15% of males wishing to promote political awareness, and support ranged from 10% to 17% between the five generation categories.

Because the diaspora is eligible to vote in homeland elections, their political attitudes and opinions may become more important to homeland parties planning on campaigning and mobilizing qualified participants. Though no party currently campaigns for election votes, they may in the future.

**B.2. Diaspora Hopes for the Homeland’s Future**

What are the diaspora populations’ hopes for the homeland? Remembering that currently three provinces (Lapurdi, Behe Nafarroa, Zuberoa) are a part of France, and Euskadi (Araba, Bizkaia, Gipuzkoa), and Nafarroa are two separate politically autonomous regions in Spain, respondents were asked their opinion for the “... most desirable situation for the future of the seven provinces?” Again an average of 49% across the countries answered “I do not know enough about the situation to answer this question.” Males tended to be more in favor of separatism and more likely to claim knowledge about home country politics. While 57% of the females and 40% of males answered they did “not know enough...”, 32% of females and 46% of males chose declaring independence from Spain and France and forming one separate country for all seven provinces as their most desirable preference for the future of Euskal Herria. Of those respondents who had chosen the Herri Batasuna as their homeland party of choice, 96% favored total independence and statehood for all seven provinces, as opposed to 64% of the PNV supporters.
Maintaining the present political situation was favored only by 2% of females and 4% of the males, 3% of self-identified PNV and not one single HB supporter. When comparing the different generations' preferences, Hypothesis One is supported with no highly significant differences in the data. All generations' responses fell between 1% (second generation born in the host country) and 7% (emigrants born in Euskal Herria) favoring the current political divisions, while 32% (first born in the host country) to 46% (third generation born in the host country) favored total political independence. There were marked differences between the age groups.

Table 5.7 "There are many differing opinions of a possible future for the Basque provinces. In your opinion, which of these is the most desirable situation for the future of the seven provinces?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>18-30</th>
<th>31-45</th>
<th>46-60</th>
<th>61-75</th>
<th>76-90</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iparralde stays with France, Euskadi and Nafarroa remain two separate parts of Spain</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iparralde stays with France, the four unite and remain as one part of Spain</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All seven declare independence together and form a separate state</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I do not know enough to answer this question</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total respondents = 832.

Basques in each of the host settings have had to educate their friends and neighbors in regards to each of these options, separatism, ETA, and ETA’s activities toward independence for the Basque Country. Although initially ETA objectives and activities were cultural, acts of violence soon became the dominant subjects of media reports regarding the Basque Country which have been presented around the world since the 1970s (Zabaleta interview 1998). While there was a collective silence or public silence regarding protest against Franco in the early years, by the 1960s ETA provided a voice. It spoke for the Basque community at home and abroad. Though most would not comment publicly that they favored ETA tactics, many did agree with what they perceived it was, and is fighting for, independence and defense of Basques' human and civil rights. Later in the 1980s and 1990s, diaspora communities began to doubt its tactics but not its goals. Interviewees expressed a certain satiation with explaining or defending political violence whether active or reactive to Spanish state violence. Yet in half of the countries, less than a majority disagreed that these tactics were effective in achieving additional autonomy.
Table 5.8 “Whether or not I agree with its use, I think political violence has been effective for achieving more autonomy in the Basque Country.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Peru</th>
<th>Uruguay</th>
<th>Belgium</th>
<th>Argentina</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Australia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disagree or Strongly disagree</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Opinion</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree or Strongly Agree</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total respondents = 832.

More than twice as many Basques in Peru than in Australia disagreed that political violence had been successful in achieving increased political autonomy and very few in Peru had no opinion on this topic while one third of Australian Basques marked this option. Peru’s experience with the rebel Sendero Luminoso and Uruguay’s with the Tupamarros may have affected these answers though not included in interviews or in the questionnaire as an independent variable. Gender was not an indicator for difference as 42% of females and 44% of males disagreed with the effectiveness of political violence as a factor in increasing autonomy, 19% of females and 29% of males agreed. As expected, of those diaspora Basques who identified themselves with the PNV, 30% agreed (58% disagreed) with the effectiveness of political violence while 76% of Herri Batasuna supporters agreed (only 7% disagreed) that violent tactics were useful in obtaining increased political power.

The declared cease-fire by ETA in September 1998 should have been an important topic of discussion in the Centers and in personal circles if the diaspora Basque population is a political diaspora. Centers were contacted by E-mail three months later to inquire if their organization had included this information in their newsletters or if it had been mentioned or discussed formally at any dinners or meetings, etc. Approximately half responded to the enquiry, and of those- half replied that there had not been any institutional discussion, and the other half did not know anything about the cease-fire. Though it could be the ignorance of the Center’s Internet communicator that is represented, this is not likely because those persons who are the computer communicators tend to be some of the most informed and active people at the Centers.
C. Basqueness" as Defined in the Diaspora

Are these diaspora Basques following traditional Sabino Arana nationalist definitions of Basqueness; race, language, and religion? Or are they synchronized with the homeland changes to a more civic nationalism and inclusive ethnic identity of those who live and work in Euskadi and want to be Basque? Science is answering more of life’s questions, relegating religion as a source of meaning to the back stage. Not immune to secularization, Basques, once fervent Catholics at home and in the diaspora, are turning more to ethnicity for identity and belonging (Pérez-Agote 1998). Pérez-Agote argues that science is in, and religion is out, and the question of meaning, in this circumstance ethnicity, becomes socially constructed. However, for Basques, the Catholic religion has been a salient factor that solidifies the boundaries of ethnic identity. The Aranist conservative construction of Basque identity emphasized Catholicism and Basqueness as inseparable. The focus on ancestry and language are also problematic for the diaspora as intermarriages with host country persons and language communications are addressed.

C.1. Aranist and Traditional Basqueness

A significant aspect of Basque identity to the traditional nationalists was the maintenance of the Catholic religion and this still is prominent to diaspora Basques. Males and females agreed that “continuing Catholic beliefs and traditions in our families is of “great” or “very great” importance. When summing the responses of the two with the next category, “some importance”, 71% of females agreed as did 69% of the males. For each gender, 17% did not think that religion was of any consequence to Basque culture, nor should it be to the Basque people living in the diaspora or the homeland. There were differences between the countries and their population’s attitudes toward religion. Aggregate responses ranged from Belgium’s 57% that do not believe Catholicism is important to continue and maintain, to that of only 8% in the United States. The Belgian Basques being the most recent emigrants exhibit an attitude closer to that of the homeland population. In the United States, where Basques often felt discriminated against for their religion, it is still fundamental to their ethnic definition, while in those countries where Catholicism was a state religion such as Peru, Argentina, and Uruguay, it is not considered to be an essential factor of identity. That opposition and reinforcement of group boundary may have strengthened United States Basques’ resolve. There is steady decline by age category believing in religion’s importance to Basque culture,
overall, 46% of the 18-30 year olds do not believe religion to have any importance at all, and excepting any Catholic religious revival in each country, this pattern tends to point to its decline in future definitions as well. In personal interviews some expressed the opinion that they are religious, but they do not connect it to their ethnicity. Several female emigrants in different host countries, but all from Bizkaia originally, detailed how they were actually anti-Catholic because of the Church’s abandonment and siding with Franco during the Civil War. Therefore, if religion worldwide should gain popularity as a source of identity, as it has with new religious movements in the United States, it does not necessarily mean it is Catholicism or that these Basques equate it to the traditional Aranist meaning of “Basqueness”.

Endogamy between diaspora Basques in this sample was lowest in Uruguay at 13% and highest in Belgium at 35%. Basque emigrants in Belgium had usually married another Basque emigrant from Euskal Herria or married while living in Euskal Herria and then emigrated together, and it was not a case of latter generation Basque marrying another latter generation Basque as in Uruguay. When asked if “Basques should try to marry other Basques”, only between 4% in Belgium and 20% in the United States agreed or strongly agreed. The large percentages of people that had “no opinion” indicates that future attitudes could result in different conclusions. Overall, 28% of respondents had no opinion, and in the United States where answers were the most conservative, 38% answered “no opinion”. Although United States interviews included talk of children who were “only half Basque” or “only a quarter Basque”, and “more Basque than . . .”, there were others who did not distinguish or classify hierarchically according to ancestry or lineage. This moving away from Aranist definitions is least prevalent in the United States and most frequent in Belgium which has been influenced by recent chain migration and specifically younger emigrants employed in the Euskadi Delegation in Brussels.

Diaspora Basques tend to be more exclusive even though this is self-defeating to their communities. It might seem more rational to be more accepting in the diaspora, to include others who also want to share in the maintenance of Basque culture even if that person was not born Basque and is not Basque by ancestry. The more intermarrying there is with host country populations, it would seem Basques would want to include those spouses in their group categories. However, the data show the opposite results.
Table 5.9 “A person must have Basque ancestors to be a Basque.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agree or Strongly Agree</th>
<th>No opinion</th>
<th>Disagree or Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total respondents = 832.

These affirmative numbers fortify Hypothesis Five that diaspora definitions of Basqueness tend toward the Aranist traditional conservative nationalism including race or ancestry. As stated previously, currently in the homeland, only 10% listed as a condition of Basqueness “to have Basque surnames” which translates to ancestry. Belgium has the most frequent communications with the homeland and most recent migration with a more recent civic definition of Basqueness and Basque identity and the lowest segment agreeing. The others have critical masses of persons that emigrated earlier, with an Aranist definition of Basqueness they perpetuated in their Center activities and attitudes, and have fewer, and less frequently used, transnational networks with the homeland. Most of the Centers also have a requirement of at least one grandparent with a Basque surname for membership, therefore the sample reflects this institutional bias as well.

Opinions regarding persons permanently living in Euskal Herria and their acceptance as Basques whether or not they were born there, ranged from only 29% of United States Basques to 51% of Uruguayan Basques agreeing or strongly agreeing with acceptance. This was a serious issue of conflict for traditional nationalists as mentioned earlier and remains so as internal migration in Spain is high to the Basque Country. In the 1995 survey conducted by the Basque Autonomous Government’s Department of Culture regarding resident respondents’ “ethnocultural origins” investigators found that those persons born in one of the seven provinces of Euskal Herria to parents also native to Euskal Herria were 47% in Euskadi, 70% in Nafarroa, and 62% in Iparralde (Aizpuru, 1995:50). In the Basque Country, one of the reasons nationalism has transformed to a more inclusive ideology is because of this high percentage of residents that were not born Basque, but have “become Basque”. People have moved to the provinces and raised their families, learned euskera in many cases, support Basque culture and political and economic autonomy, and some even
support independence.

Inconsistent responses from the diaspora arise when asked about the importance of “accepting as Basques those who feel and identify themselves as Basques” (which to respondents must have denoted more emotional involvement than the previous question of merely living permanently in Euskal Herria), 76% from the United States to 95% of those in Belgium agreed that this was of some, great, or very great importance. Younger diaspora Basques, 94% of the 18-30 years old, thought this acceptance to be consequential. While respondents agreed that “to be Basque one must have Basque ancestors”, they also agree that it is important to accept as Basques those who feel and identify themselves as Basques. As the younger Basques assume positions of leadership and policy making and influence, this points to a probable continued change in diaspora mentality moving closer to the inclusive homeland definitions of Basqueness and further from the exclusive primordialist Arana categories.

Table 5.10 “To be considered a Basque, a person should speak the Basque language.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly Agree or Agree</th>
<th>No Opinion</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree or Disagree</th>
<th>% of Respondents who do speak Basque fluently or with some difficulty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-30 yrs old</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-45 yrs old</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46-60 yrs old</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61-75 yrs old</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75-90 yrs old</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total respondents = 832.

Euskera still has not secured itself as a crucial factor in Basque ethnicity. In the homeland itself, various areas have long since been hispanicized and Basque was outlawed as a means of communication during the Franco dictatorship. Consequently, many emigrants of
the political exile era did not themselves speak the language. Though Basques are extremely proud of their unique language and its complexity, most do not consider it a defining factor in categorizing a person as Basque. Sociolinguistic research in all seven provinces has demonstrated that while Basque speakers almost unanimously define themselves as Basque and believe that the most important condition to be Basque is to actually speak Basque, the bilingual and Spanish monolingual participants selected “to have been born in Euskal Herria” as the most salient factor. Nevertheless, all three language ability groups chose as second most important to Basque identity “to live and work in Euskal Herria” (Aizpurua 1995:95).

Only 8% of Australian respondents know no Basque language at all compared to Uruguay’s 66%, and this has affected their opinions that Basques should speak Basque. Obviously, respondents who do not speak Basque themselves would not want this to be a determining factor as they would eliminate themselves from their own ethnic identity. The extreme similarities between males and females strengthen Hypothesis Four once again, and assumptions that females are more interested in, more likely to use, more likely to favor, etc., ethnic language than males, is false in these cases. Although there are no marked differences between age groups in their opinions regarding language and identity, there are variances in their abilities with Basque. Half as many youth as elderly can converse in Basque which bodes ill for its maintenance. Argentine, Uruguayan, and United States’ scattered Centers offer language courses, however, small minorities show interest. Even in the 1995 homeland survey, 35% of Euskal Herria’s residents stated they had “no interest in the Basque language” referring to learning or using it. (See Map 5.1 depicting Basque language knowledge)

C.2. The Development of Diasporic Consciousness and Specific Diasporic Basque Identity

I suggest there is a specific Basque diaspora identity. Many of these participants retain or have acquired dual citizenship, and globalization of communications networks enables their ties with the homeland to be preserved, strengthened, and even reinvented. The collective (sometimes idealized) memory, maintained ties to the homeland, solidarity with other Basques, and the creation of an enriching life in their host countries (Cohen 1997) points to a genesis of something original: not hybrid identity of mixing old country with new host country that all immigrants share in different ways, but an actual diaspora identity. Because they maintain ties with the homeland, it is different than what would result in a person that has no interest in preserving connections with the homeland and wishes to assimilate fully into the host country culture.
Map 5.1 Linguistic Competence by Province (Basque Government 1995).

- **Monolingual Basque speakers**
- **Bilinguals**
- **Passive bilinguals**
- **Monolingual Spanish speakers**
The term ‘diaspora’ to many still implies the forced dispersion found in Deuteronomy (28:25), and the Old Testament warning that a ‘scattering to other lands’ was the punishment for a people who had forsaken the righteous paths and abandoned the old ways (Cohen 1996:507). It has become associated with the Jewish traditions although the origins are actually Greek. The Greek translation originally meant ‘to sow widely’. For the Greeks the expression was used to describe military expansion, colonization, and migration, usually with a positive connotation. While the opposing notion of a ‘victim diaspora’ may better describe the Jewish, Armenian, African, Irish, and Palestinian dispersions (Cohen 1997:31-54), early Basque diasporas connect with the Greek definition of active colonization while the Franco exiles dispersion relate better with the first.

When reviewing Cohen’s list of ‘common features’ of diasporas, it is evident that the Basque emigration can be categorized as a diaspora. However, all diasporas do not necessarily manifest all features, for example, the Basque diaspora would identify least with the seventh feature as there are not adversarial or ‘troubled’ relationships between Basques and host society populations in any of these six countries. I have described the dispersal of Basques to many lands for trade, colonization, and economic and political reasons and summarized their perceived collective history, real and imagined. These populations do exhibit an idealization of the homeland and show a collective commitment to its maintenance and restoration with their remittances and attempts to influence host country policies toward the Basque Country.

The diasporic idea of “return” to the homeland need not be a physical return but can be a constant turning to the homeland by way of information, communications, home life traditions, food, music, language, etc. and each other as fellow kin. The orientation toward the homeland may be manifest in myriad methods. When comparing generations, the youngest respondents (32%) were most likely to mark that they may return to Euskal Herria some day to live permanently. In comparisons between the countries, Basques in the United States had the highest rating, 72%, for “I have my own life in (host country) and plan to return to Euskal Herria only to visit.” However, only 25% of Basques in Belgium responded that they would stay in Belgium. For most, physical location is not strongly related with ethnicity. One does not stop being Basque because one lives in Peru, and practicing the traditions of host societies does not equate to terminating traditions of the homeland. Both can be exercised simultaneously. There has been a strong ethnic group consciousness, based on distinction, and sustained for centuries outside of the homeland corroborated by historical fact, and
confirmed by the fifth generation participating in the Basque organizations. The transnational networks and ties to the homeland, and the creation of host country Basque associations and Cultural Centers demonstrate this consciousness and interest in ethnic identity maintenance.

Number eight of Cohen’s criteria suggests that diasporas can be constituted in the imagination when feeling a solidarity with other Basques outside the homeland and in a similar situation. The creation of communications among diaspora Basques was initiated with the Basque Government funding for computer and Internet hook-up for Basque organizations. However, diaspora Basques have been aware of other Basque populations, and have had limited contacts through personal relationships for centuries. In the age of globalization and cyber space, a diaspora can be held together or re-created in the mind through cultural maintenance and a shared imagination such as is present in the Basque Centers. An identification with a diaspora serves to bridge the gap between the local and the global identities (Hall 1990). The Basques’ strong identification with the past, and not their inability or lack of desire to assimilate in the present, permits their diasporic consciousness. Reacting to the statement “Basque immigrants should try to assimilate and practice the traditions of their new country”, 32% of Uruguayan Basques had no opinion but another 59% agreed or strongly agreed, and the other five countries’ participants also “agreed” or “strongly agreed” by between 72% and 79%.

The age of globalization points to a shift to de-territorialized social identities. The world is being organized vertically by nation-states and regions, but horizontally by an overlapping, permeable, multiple system of interactions. This new system creates communities of interest and not of place, based on shared opinions, ethnicities, religions, etc. Rather than globalization creating a single homogeneous global culture, perhaps multiple cultures are resulting from mixes of a variety of cultures blending differently in each setting (Hall 1990). While modernity demanded state and nation-state building, loyalty from citizens, conformity, and obedience to a uniform state culture identity, post-modernity, or the age of globalization, allows for multiple affiliations and associations, including diasporic allegiances. There is no longer the need to choose one or another identity- a person can be both Australian and Basque simultaneously. Survey research results demonstrate this self-identification with both categories. With a low of 3% in the United States and 28% in Uruguay defining themselves as only host country (i.e. Uruguayan without a hyphenation), almost three-quarters of these Basques described themselves as a combination either Basque-host country, or host country-Basque.
This question of dual loyalty surfaces often when dealing with immigration topics. However, interviews with Basques in these six countries revealed a strong civic loyalty to their host country and plans to remain living in their host countries. They did not necessarily perceive any conflict between their host country’s values and Basque values but majorities preferred their Basque values (by 92% in Peru) to their host country population’s values. Except for the Peruvian Basques, others interviewed did not perceive significant differences between themselves and the citizens of their adopted host countries. They have emigrated to countries whose populations are largely European and Catholic, or allow freedom of religion. Their loyalties to their host country versus to the Basque Country have never been tested since the Basque Country is not a separate state. Therefore this population can claim true dual loyalties because these people do not foresee the possibility that the two would ever conflict. Others stated that they do not like the concept of dual loyalties because it implies that one is exercised at the expense of the other, which they did not believe to be the case.

Basques also reported their loyalties to their host countries as a civic responsibility, but their loyalty to Basque ethnicity was not described as a civic loyalty by way of residence in a territory or allegiance to a form of government. Rather their loyalty to ‘Basqueness’ was felt and not rationalized; a responsibility to ancestors, to a special and unique history, and more of a primordial description. It is rational that homeland Basques would shift toward a civic nationalism of accepting as Basques those who live in Euskal Herria, but Basques living in the diaspora need someway to separate themselves, to keep the insider status, and that is why ancestry remains so salient to them. Otherwise, anyone could be a Basque, and the uniqueness of the ethnicity would diminish.

Basques maximize the option of negotiating their identities depending on the situation. This situational or circumstantial identity does not mean that they are ‘Basque’ sometimes and ‘Australian’ at other times. Rather, depending on the environment and people with which one is associating, diaspora Basques often emphasize one identity more than another; ethnic identity more than civic identity. “What are you?” or “What is your background?” becomes more salient than “In which country do you live?” or “Which state’s passport do you have?” and vice versa. This identity switching is often mistaken for and misunderstood as instrumental behavior for personal gain, however, as often as not it is a response to clarifying one’s identity to an ‘other’ person. In Australia, describing oneself as “Australian” is not as useful as defining oneself to another Australian (of Greek ancestry) as a Basque- in Australia. If a Basque from Uruguay is communicating with a person from Brazil, they would more than
likely identify themselves as Uruguayan. These are more equivalent comparisons; Brazilian to Uruguayan, and Basque Australian to Greek Australian. Societal contexts and processes influence the self-definition and self-consciousness of diasporan identities in issues of self-representation.

Diaspora Basques have been aware of, and known about, each other for hundreds of years, but only this century have collaborated in joint political, immigration, and cultural projects. International *mus* card game championships, exchanges of musicians, dance groups, students and athletes have occurred regularly. Just as impressionable are their repeated interactions with other diaspora Basques visiting their families in the homeland. Frequent returns to *Euskal Herria* have served to heightened their consciousness because of these exchanges with other Basques similar to themselves. While a Basque from the United States is unlikely to travel to meet Basques in Argentina, Uruguay, Peru, or Australia etc., they will meet Basques from these countries during their visits to *Euskal Herria*. Just as one’s parents emigrated to the United States, the homeland neighbors might have relatives that emigrated to Australia and there are ample social opportunities to meet and converse and compare similar experiences. In the same way that contact between diaspora Basques in different host societies has attributed to a diasporic consciousness, so too have their exchanges while in their common homeland.

D. Conclusion

In other diasporas such as Armenian, Croatian, and Jewish, the politicization of attitudes regarding the homeland have pitted members against themselves and fueled serious divisions inside the ethnic community (Winland 1995:11). This has not been the prevailing case with Basques. With the exceptions of the Centro Vasco Francés and Centro Navarro in Buenos Aires, and the Euskaro Español and Euskal Erria in Montevideo, and the Txalaparta in Brussels, political disagreements have not tended to evolve into institutional divisions.

Elderly interviewees remembered the decades of the Franco dictatorship as years of political cohesion in the Centers. This was rational as unified behavior against the common enemy of the central Spanish government and oppression in the homeland. However, subsequent divisions erupted with the creation of democracy and autonomy in Spain, reinforcing the non-partisan and non-political aspect of the Centers. Again, unlike Armenian, Jewish, or Croatian diaspora populations, the democratization, independence, or autonomy in the homeland did not seriously affect the diaspora populations’ general disinterest in
political aspects of Basque identity as argued with data results.

Heterogeneous or hyphenated Basque does not translate to less than the "pure" homeland Basque, and diaspora populations "need not apologize for their alleged lack of authenticity or for the hybridity of diasporan identity, as if it represented mere decline from some purer homeland form" of identity (Töloýyan 1996:7). Basques have achieved multiple belonging on their own terms utilizing their own very similar definitions. This development of a diaspora consciousness is evident in increased understanding and communications between diaspora Basques without homeland intervention or facilitation.

Although these diaspora communities had not collaborated, their actions and reactions regarding events this century corresponded with collective efforts on behalf of homeland Basques. There were parallel attempts to influence host country governments regarding the Franco regime and ensuing political oppression in Euskal Herria. Individual and collective efforts have followed a pattern with Center or Basque institutional leadership absent, neither hindering nor promoting, but preferring cultural leadership instead. This vacuum of political stewardship has resulted in a widespread lack of interest, understanding, and knowledge on the part of individuals, and has influenced the definition of Basqueness while advocating the status quo which was the PNV. While there may be a self-selecting non-political bias in the remarks from respondents from the Centers, non-member Basques have not established any political action groups in any of these host countries either, nor have the HB or the PNV had relations with Basque groups from outside the Centers in these six countries (Landa interview 1997; M. Egibar E-mail communication 1997; I. Aguirre interview 1999). The data outline Hypothesis Five that homeland definitions of Basqueness have progressed to a more civic nationalism while diaspora definitions tend to preserve the traditional conservative Sabino Arana definition. Belgium's continuing chain migration and more numerous transnational networks have affected its responses to be closer to contemporary homeland ideologies, but the other communities seem to be promulgating an early twentieth century Basque nationalism.

There were no significant differences between male's and female's responses on any questions regarding definitions of "Basqueness", fortifying Hypothesis Four that gender does not affect the definition or attitudes toward factors of Basque identity. Politically, males were more likely to claim knowledge of homeland politics and more likely to favor separatism. Though migrating to dissimilar societies whose attitudes regarding gender roles vary, responses did not vary significantly between males and females by host country, generation,
or age.

The theme of attitudes toward autonomy and stateless political power is especially pertinent here because diasporas can be precisely that - a form of stateless power. However, because of these Basques general preference for ethnonationalism over political nationalism and their proclivity for designating cultural rather than political factors for their identity, the Basque diaspora will not likely shift course to engage in transnational political networks.
Basque Ethnicity Affirmation and Maintenance

Basque diaspora populations have historically demonstrated their preferences for cultural rather than political activities relating to ethnic identity maintenance in their individual actions, Center activities, and now in their direct personal responses. Specifically which traditions are maintained, and how, in these six countries are examined here. The question of why this Basque identity persists is equally intriguing, and statements from interviews will be incorporated with questionnaire results from individuals.

The formation of diaspora communities seems to be quite common in many human migrations. Personal and institutional networks function to communicate the information that passes between home communities and diaspora communities and back again. The degree to which these networks are maintained by members of an ethnic community is critical to the establishment of patterns of migration and to the strong sense of ethnic identity and the creation of a community outside the ethnic homeland. Murphy and Leeper distinguish the ethnic institutions which are of particular importance in establishing these networks:

1) formal and informal family and community institutions;
2) religious institutions;
3) economic associations, which are often closely linked with ethnic political organizations;
4) cultural organizations which promote both internal cohesion of ethnic identity (informal institutions) and interaction with host societies (formal organizations) (Murphy and Leeper 1996).

I will indicate the role played by these types of ethnic networks and institutions in the Basque diaspora specifically. Hypothesis One states that the core elements of Basque diaspora identity are defined in a constant manner, and Basque ethnic institutions fomenting the cultural activities have developed according to similar patterns. Hypothesis Three argues that a resurgence in this cultural ethnic identity salience is related to globalization, though

24 Globalization as defined in the Introduction as the simultaneous process of global economic restructuring, as a configuration of economic, technological, geo-political, cultural and ideological changes. Accelerated integration and interdependence of the world economy made possible by technological advances especially in telecommunications and transportation. The increase in speed and scope of information flows.
not a partner in a causal relationship, nor a defensive reaction to it. I argue the veracity of these statements utilizing past research and diaspora questionnaire and interview results.

When considering the question of identity, Ernest Gellner’s ‘potato principle’ (1991) refers to the strong territorial identity and feeling of ‘rootedness’ which he assumes to be prevalent among peasants where social mobility is limited and people are tied to places and kinship networks. This contrasts with more fluid identities in more modern societies. It may be that these Basques mainly from agricultural environments chose to recreate the ‘rootedness’ of their homeland in their new host societies, but they did so regardless of whether or not their host society was industrialized in that time period when they emigrated. Again this was not a reaction to industrialization or modernization per se, but rather to the migration itself. T.H. Eriksen believes social identity becomes most important when it becomes threatened, which is often related to some kind of change, such as migration (Eriksen 1993: 68). An assured continuity with the past, which can be a weighty source of self-respect and self-authenticity in a different society, is very important to a sense of belonging. I will describe and analyze Basque diaspora ethnicity maintenance by exploring these assumptions and questioning the impact of globalization.

A. Social, Educational, and Cultural Functions of the Basque Institutions

The development of migrant networks and institutions is studied in theories of chain migration, networks, and in defining cultural capital (Boyd 1989; Fawcett 1989; Coleman 1992). Ethnic networks comprise relationships that link former, current, and future migrants. Van Hear (1998) dissects networks and their importance to chain migration and disseminating information about means of travel and entry, finding accommodation, employment, and adaptation to new environments. Even though the disruption in a migrant’s life may be overwhelming, the “organic development of personal, family, kin, friendship, community and ethnic ties mean the networks are the strongest when they embrace links with the established populations of the countries of destination” (Van Hear 1998: 60).

The networks enhance migrants’ capacities to adapt to new circumstances. In these case studies the web of Basque Centers provided the fundamental link toward adaptation. The diaspora associations, and especially those that have a physical office or cultural Basque Center, help fortify inter-Basque networking for friendship, employment, information, and news of the homeland. Newcomers, whether visiting or studying, still tend to go directly to
the community’s Basque Center for instant companionship and information.

The Basque collectivities have progressed over time in very similar manners. Since the 1800s in Argentina and Uruguay, and later in the others, a *soccoros mutuos*, mutual aid, fund society for aiding in the costs of medical care, funerals, and repatriation has been present in every country case study. They have provided local community Basques with familial type networks and financial aid for health care, communications with family in the homeland, and with repatriation costs.

Basques in the Buenos Aires area created the *Euskal Echea*, Basque Home, in 1901, an institution for Basque senior citizens’ retirement, and simultaneously a boarding school facility for Basque children. It remains functioning successfully today as initially planned, a care center and home for the elderly surrounded by the energy of educating children. Throughout Argentina and the United States, the Basque-owned boarding houses, and their employees, served as surrogate homes and families where the Basques could stay short-term while traveling to town for doctor visits, or in the off season of agriculture or livestock raising. In Argentina, the United States and on a smaller scale in Uruguay and Australia, these Basque ‘hotels’ served as information centers for news from *Euskal Herria* and networking for employment (J. Echeverría 1989; Douglass 1996; Mendiolea Larrazabal interview 1997). The significance of the facilities emanates from the chain migration which fomented continued interaction with contemporary information and attitudes directly from the homeland for inter-Basque-community relations (homeland to diaspora) as well as intra-Basque-community relations (Basque to Basque inside one ethnic community in the host society).

Once the employment stabilized and single Basque immigrants were joined by families, permanent housing diminished the need for the boarding houses, and as Basque employment in agriculture decreased so did the numbers of customers. The transformation resulted from the end of chain migration and there no longer being a need for a “home away from home”. Basques had made their own homes whether in the rural pampas, the sugarcane fields, the Sierra Nevadas, or the cosmopolitan cities of Montevideo, Sydney, and New York. Established immigrants no longer needed room and board or an informal employment agency, they needed a place to socialize, to communicate with others in their own language, and a place to practice their own traditions and culture.

*A.1. Cultural Adaptation*

Basque immigrants creating and recreating these Centers have chosen to emphasize
similar elements of Basque identity. Basque diaspora culture has been constructed, reconstructed, blended, rediscovered, and reinterpreted—combining the past, present, and expectations for the future in their self-definition of Basqueness. Just as homeland Basque culture has developed and changed so have the diaspora cultures, and much in the same way.

The Basque diaspora's institutions have transformed and developed as have the demands from their members. Initially, immigrants needed employment and social services, to learn the host country language, to understand the host country social, political and economic institutions; in contrast, the later generations need the reverse, to maintain cultural attachment to their heritage and homeland. Individuals participate in ethnic choral and dance ensembles, language and cooking classes, athletic activities, dinners and dances, and various festivals. The original functions of the Basque networks and organizations, as so with other ethnic organizations in other host societies, were to reduce the strain of the newcomer status and alleviate cultural adaptation. The Basque Centers provided immigrants with economic and social services along with instant acceptance, friendship and belonging. Elder interviewees praised the organizations' volunteers that aided their families' acculturation and several confessed they might not have successfully endured without the haven of a Center to which escape, or looking forward to a monthly dinner or ethnic gathering. The efforts of women volunteers to aid newcomers in day to day integration were lauded by numerous interviewees in each country.

Ethnic identities are created through time and subsequent generations, and through space as immigrants carry culture from one place to another. The progression of these Basque collectivities then include the self-development of the diasporic community while simultaneously reacting to the effects of new immigration. The new immigrants' incorporation into the established diaspora community could pose various problems; the new immigrant disappointed the elders by not carrying the same values of the older immigrants because the homeland's culture had also evolved during this time period, and the new immigrant might also be disappointed to find a diasporic community that was focused on the past and historical myths and nostalgia that were not a part of his generation's homeland reality. Basque communities that experienced frequent contact with the homeland, or continuous chain migration were less likely to experience tense cultural conflict or cultural authenticity conflict, or disparate cultural identities between the established and recent immigrants.

More recent immigrants' interviews revealed that upon arrival in the new host society
they were likely to categorize negatively the established Basques as “out of touch with homeland reality”, “Basque nationalists from the Aranist period even though it was the 1970s”, or as “living in the past”. The earlier immigrants were likely to describe the more recent immigrants as “troublemakers”, “probably ETA sympathizers that don’t know their own history”, “more Marxist than Basque.” The Centers’ apolitical stances helped alleviate any further divisions between generations of Basques and promoted integration by focusing on the cultural aspects of Basque identity which were not as time period or generation specific.

The end of continuous Basque immigration has changed the necessary functions of today’s organizations to that of cultural identity defenders and preservers. Participation in these Centers is voluntary and now for psychological, emotional, and social fulfillment rather than economic need. Communications tend to be less the daily member-to-member interaction, which has been replaced by monthly dinners and social gatherings, annual festival celebrations, and institutional newsletters. The same organizations that taught host country language courses, and found accommodation and employment for recent Basque immigrants, are now disseminating genealogical information for Basques to research their heritage, teaching Basque rather than the host country language, collecting travel brochures of Euskal Herria and helping members organize tours to their own homeland. Basque immigrants initially needed the services the organizations provided; later generations however, are optional consumers.

Basque diaspora organizations’ roles have changed significantly as exemplified with an historical Basque Museum and Cultural Center in the United States, and in Argentina there are various organizations devoted to researching and preserving the history of Basques in Argentina, not in the homeland. While Jewish, Polish, Irish, Armenian, and Italian diasporic ethnic communities have mobilized politically for anti-discrimination and political representation in many host countries (Erdmans 1995; Bakalian 1995; Waters 1990; Alba 1990), the Basque fraternal organizations have stressed cultural more often than political activities, and have infrequently mobilized for homeland politics rather than host society representation.

As the needs met by the Basque diaspora institutions are less daily survival functions for the Basque immigrants and their descendants, it becomes more difficult for the cultural organizations to enroll new members. They are now focusing almost entirely on the survival of Basque culture and no longer serve the function of aiding integration into host country
culture. Recent migrants are more likely to be temporary, and have entered their respective host countries with employment contracts and contacts. Because they have no need to join ethnic organizations in order to remind themselves or "prove" their Basqueness, they have no need for the institutions as they have evolved today. There are multiple specific examples from each case study country where very recent Basque immigrants living in one of the six host societies do not participate in the local Basque association functions (dinners, dances, festivals, choirs, art shows, etc.) because they simply are not interested (Urquizu 1997; Pagoaga 1998; Mendibelzua 1997; Larrinaga 1997). "I know I am Basque and I don't need to go to the Basque Center dinners and sing old songs to prove I am Basque to anyone" (Garbizu interview 1996). The organizations do need the new immigrants, however, for authenticity, language regeneration, and updating personal networks with the homeland.

The economy of the Basque Country has progressed and there are many more opportunities to find employment in Euskal Herria. Continual democratic change in Spain has all but ceased the compulsion for political exile. There no longer are significant numbers of new immigrants to any of these six countries with the exception of Belgium and the administrative functionaries living in Brussels that are employed by the Basque Government Delegation to the European Union. They do not consider themselves immigrants but they do influence the existing permanent Basque population in Belgium with chain migration factors. Because the diaspora population is maturing, there are no longer formal institutional networks or programs to provide for immigrant necessities, and sporadic needs are usually accommodated informally by personal networking with activists from the Basque communities.

Basque ethnics have the best of both worlds because the Basque institutions do not usually make any demands on the members. Manifestation of ethnic identity is completely voluntary for the later generation Basques who speak their host country language perfectly, and are a part of Christian European host societies where white Catholics fit in and have been a part of the dominant state religion in Argentina, Uruguay, and Peru. The host society does not tend to categorize and separate them as Basques. They identify and separate themselves as Basques. It is a ‘community without cost’ (Waters 1990:149). The social and political

\footnote{These countries’ immigration records still tend to be dominated by state citizenship, and do not separate Basques in the “French” or “Spanish” categories. The United States and Australia have an optional ethnic classification used in census taking, but these numbers do not specify new immigration.}
costs and consequences of being Basque are quite different from other non-white and/or non-Christian ethnic groups in all six countries. Though there were those respondents whose Basque ethnicity favored them for employment, in the greater part of these Basques’ daily lives, their ethnicity does not matter (housing, schooling, social integration, etc.). They tend to take for granted that when it does matter, it is largely a matter of personal choice for positive status, or for enjoyment. It may be that for each Basque person ethnic identity maintenance is voluntary, costless, and a matter of personal preference. However, it is made ever so much easier because they live in societies dominated by Christians of European descent. The selective aspects of voluntary ethnicity are what make it so easy and enjoyable for many Basque individuals because they do not experience the racism connected to their ethnicity that Asians, Middle Easterners, or Africans do in these same countries.

However, ethnicity is historically variable and it did have costs for Basques in different locations and time periods. Catholics were not particularly welcomed in the United States and several interviewees in the Idaho and Nevada regions stated they were discriminated against at school and when finding employment because of their Catholic religion. Nevertheless, Catholicism was not different enough a religion to necessitate the establishment of religious institutions for ethnic purposes as is the case for the Jewish, Armenian, or Chinese diasporas. In areas where the Basque population warranted it, the Vatican sent Basque priests to the diaspora and there were regular Catholic masses in the Basque language. Today there are still Basque priests in San Francisco, Sydney, and Buenos Aires assigned to the diaspora populations. Other Basque priests have coincidentally been sent to areas that have large Basque populations (which are not difficult to find in South America) but have not been sent specifically as Basque priests for a Basque population. Many of those priests coincidentally assigned during the 1970-90s did not speak Basque anyway.

In analyzing the comparative adaptation of immigrants to Australia and their emotional and psychological health, Scott and Scott determined that most immigrants tend to regard their new circumstances as an improvement over those which they left, except in the areas of employment and friendships, and that those who settle in rural areas tend to be more satisfied with their jobs and are better assimilated. Men are more likely than women to profess emotional well-being and high self-esteem (Scott and Scott 1989:168-169). Interviews of Basques supported this research with males more likely to talk about their varied employment, meeting new friends at work, learning the host society language and customs etc., while many women discussed the loneliness and difficulties experienced while working at home without
significant adult companionship, without establishing friendships, and lacking communication skills. Those who emigrated from rural areas in Euskal Herria to urban regions in their new settings also experienced this additional rupture in their understanding of their surroundings.

A.2 Ethnomusicology: Composing a Diaspora Identity

For diaspora populations, the study of the combination of ethnicity, identity, and music, known as ethnomusicology, is central to linking homeland and “here-land” with a network of sounds connecting the memories of childhood with the present. Ethnic music is a symbolic mode of affiliation for present day diaspora Basques. Preservation of music, and in particular choral music, is an element of ethnicity maintenance in each of the case studies. Though the choirs of Australia are less formally organized, and that in Belgium is temporarily disbanded while finishing the construction of the new Center, very similar types of music have served as the cornerstones of their repertoires. Many have nationalist lyrics, and the repertoire of Basque choirs are often filled with patriotic love songs to the homeland. Music is highly portable and “is an extraordinary multilayered channel of communication, nesting language itself, that primary agent of identity, within a series of strata of cultural meaning. . . before the microchip, music has been wired into the mobile body, forming earliest memories and later evoking deep-set emotions” (Slobin 1994:244). Ethnomusicologists argue that perhaps only the aroma of familiar foods has the same power to evoke memory, and “music makes specific connections with family members, politics, and significant moments for which melodies are the milestone” (ibid).

The Basque organizations affirm these links through music with formal and informal performances of established Basque choirs, with various genre musicians, by teaching folk songs to children and with background music at events. The seemingly mundane piped-in music of Basque Center bars and restaurants, of religious masses and celebrations, and that of festivals for singing and dancing, all contribute to the shared memories and experiences, and connectedness of the diaspora Basques. Musical performances in each of the six countries were very similar with homages to the Tree of Gernika, national anthems, nationalistic hymns of fallen warriors, and mothers’ lullabies. The love songs are not to people but to Euskal Herria and there are both traditional and contemporary examples.

Youth who travel to the homeland return with the latest CDS of Basque folk rock such as Oskorri, Ruper Ordorika, Xabier Lete, Txomin Artola and Amaia Zubiria, and Benito Lertxundi, who all sing in Basque. Although many diasporic customers do not understand the
language, they do recognize the melodies and such performers have become popular enough to travel to Basque festivals in Uruguay, Argentina, Venezuela, Mexico, and the United States for successful tours to Basque collectivities. Consequently, when first time travelers to *Euskal Herria* participate in the fiestas and social scene, they recognize the music and can sing along with the homeland populations, and when visiting other diaspora communities' Basque festival celebrations, also are "insiders". Music often is the main means of identification of diasporic groups, as well as local and regional subcultures (Gastezi interview 1998). Regardless of age, respondents agreed overwhelmingly (between 89% - 96%) that "singing traditional songs in Basque" is of "some", "great" or "very great importance", and geographical location did not seriously affect attitudes either, with between 84% in Australia and 96% in Uruguay and the United States each, also agreeing to its importance. It is not uncommon for individuals to be able to sing a song in Basque and not understand a single word.

Almost every Basque collectivity has initiated a folkdance group. Numbering anywhere from a few adolescents to troupes of sixty young adults, these groups have served the purpose of ethnic socialization for the youth and entertainment at ethnic functions. The larger groups also perform for non-Basque gatherings and educate the host country public regarding Basque culture. *Txistularis* (players of a unique three-holed Basque flute) and accordionists accompany the dancers and often give their own separate performances. Conversations with spectators at musical performances and festivals revealed that because the *txistu* is a Basque instrument, it was preferred over accordions, guitars, and pianos - not because they enjoyed the sound more as it can be quite shrill, but because they equated Basque functions with Basque music played on Basque instruments.

The dancing groups and choirs have served as powerful factors in ethnic socialization because dancers and musicians share their ethnic identity experiences as a group. The peer encouragement to remain active in association programs is tied to personal friendships and loyalties, strengthening the desire to continue membership and interest. Performers learn the meanings of the dances, and of the lyrics and coincidentally about the history and anthropology of *Euskal Herria*. Elder interviewees in communities with established dance groups or choirs regularly mentioned that they had made most of their Basque friends as youth, in the choir or in the dance group. These musical associations then tie the members to the music and its symbolism and language, to each other, and to their youth.
A.3. Preservation of Traditions and Culture

In every case of this research, if there was a physical Basque Center, there was a kitchen. The association of ethnic identity with ethnic food, as mentioned above, is strong. The Centers typically have monthly membership dinners and several special occasion feasts with Basque style selections ranging from typical peasant home cooking to contemporary Basque nouveau cuisine. As in the homeland, often it is the men who rule these txokos or private kitchens, though home cooking tends to remain the domain of the women. Although 91% of the total respondents believed that it is of “some”, “great” or “very great” importance to “teach and use Basque cuisine and food preparation in our homes”, the reality was that a combined average of 63% actually do prepare Basque style meals in their homes at least “a few times a month”. When combining “everyday” “about once a week” and “a few times a month”, there were no significant differences in gender responses although in personal interviews a few males confessed they did not really know which dishes their wives prepared were Basque style or something else. There were differences in country responses which tend to pattern past and recent migration.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6.1 Responses to “How often do you eat Basque style food at home?”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>At least a few times every month</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total respondents = 832. Response percentages combine “everyday”, “weekly”, and “a few times a month”.

The earlier migration being in Argentina and Uruguay translates to fourth and fifth generation Basques continuing cooking traditions. If the next category of “a few times a year” is included, Argentina would add another 36% and Uruguay another 43%. Cross tabulations of generation and cooking frequencies show a steady decline in Basque style food preparation with latter generations. From those born in Euskal Herria to the fourth generation or more born in their host countries, combining the percentages again for eating Basque style food at home “at least a few times a month” the percentages follow a pattern; born in Euskal Herria 89%, first generation born in host country 73%, second generation born in the host country 51%, third generation born in the host country 31%, and fourth or later generation born in the host country 30%.

Many of the Basque Centers in Uruguay, Argentina, and the United States have restaurants attached that are open to the general public, as will have the new Center in
Brussels. Cooking classes are sporadically organized but few people participate regularly. The Basque Government has sponsored diaspora tours by homeland award winning chefs, and Centers and private restaurants in Mexico, Venezuela, and Chile have hired several to infuse the tradition of ethnic cooking (Garritz interview 1999). Several Centers have annual celebrations of Basque gastronomy and in Necochea, Argentina there is an entire week’s festival of Basque food.

Card playing, whether for the International Mus Tournament Championship of Basque diaspora collectivities in twenty-one countries, or sitting at the Center bar literally playing for beans, produces another avenue for ethnic identity reinforcement and shared experiences. Twenty years ago, Sunday nights would find the majority of the Centers in the six countries filled with mus ands briska players (Totorikaguena de Velasco 1998; Iguain 1997, Oribe 1997; Igartua 1999, Salazar 1999) but today the typical generation gap exists. The grandparent and teenager generations are present, playing cards, football, or pelota (Basque handball), or practicing their dancing. The missing generation is that in the parenting years, between the ages of 25-50.

Each of the Basque diaspora world congresses have singled out as a matter of utmost importance, and every interviewee in a position of Center leadership in all six countries stated that they fear, a collapse of the Centers if this generation does not “come back” to their roots. The Basque associations do not track generational data on their memberships and there is no consistent available information on which generations their memberships represent. This research was conducted on stratified samples to ensure representativeness of each generation therefore it represents them equally. However, respondents were asked on the questionnaire if family members before them, and currently, participated in Basque institutions in the host country or if they were the first in their extended family to participate? Results show there are many first timers. In the responses from fourth generation or more born in the host country, 52% were “the first one involved from my family” which demonstrates a turn to ethnicity by those not previously participating institutionally.

26 The international diasporic congresses and relations with the Basque Government regarding this topic are detailed in Chapter Seven.
Table 6.2 Percentages of Respondents from each Category that are the First to Participate.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Born in Euskal Herria</th>
<th>I am the first in my family to participate in a Basque organization in (host country)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>52%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st generation born in the host country</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd generation born in the host country</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd generation born in the host country</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th generation born in the host country</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Countries are listed from most recent to earliest migration. Although Peru experienced the earliest migration with Spanish colonization, those involved at the Basque Center represent later migration from the 1920s. N=832.

Since 1985 there has been an institutional growth unprecedented in the Basque diaspora; there are thirty-nine additional Argentine Basque diaspora organizations, some new and some re-established, ten in the United States, six in Uruguay, Belgium is re-creating its one Center in Brussels, and in the north Queensland area of Australia activists are making plans for initiating a Basque cultural association. With new societies being formed and the previously established organizations attracting people who have not participated before, perhaps the Centers are healthier than they think. Twenty-six percent of the respondents had “never married and had no children”, but 34% had “children [who] participated as youth and continue to participate”, or “children [who] did not participate as youth, but currently do”. Compare this to 23% of those having “children [who] participated as youth, but no longer do” or “children [who] did not participate as youth, nor do they currently”. Both trends— the later generations joining the organizations as first-timers, and more children continuing on with their parents than there are leaving or not participating— point to maintenance, and possibly growth, in numbers of Basques identifying with their ethnicity through the community Centers and associations. Anthropologists have argued that ethnicity becomes more important late in life (Stoller 1996; Climo 1990; Simic 1985) and also when consolidating a new identity, as teenagers do, or when becoming parents, moving, or retiring. These numbers look to a promising future for the ethnic institutions.
The Basque collectivities also promulgate the continuation of Basque sports and athletic events. The same activities are practiced regardless of country: competitions in wood-chopping, weight carrying and weight lifting, team tug-of-wars, jai alai, pelota (handball), and pala (similar to racquetball). Though the weight carrying and lifting, and wood-chopping are for exhibitions during festivals, there are regular games of pelota, and pala, and if the fronton (court) is large enough jai alai is played. International exchanges and tournaments of pelota and pala players for festivals are common and enthusiastically received by the Basque audiences. Teaching and “practicing the Basque sports such as pelota, jai alai, wood-chopping, weight carrying and lifting” also was singled out for “some” “great” or “very great” importance to the respondents from a low of 70% in Belgium to a high of 93% each in Peru, the United States, and Uruguay, where there are numerous public and privately owned frontons in addition to those at the Basque Centers. However, the numerous frontons are often devoid of players. In each country there is a national players’ association, whose leaderships are extremely wary of the continuance of these Basque sports. There is much encouragement from the organizations and the crowds, but the physical hardship of handball played by Basque rules of no hand protection whatsoever, deters younger players from learning. Previous players’ nerve damage, permanent swelling, and hand surgeries easily convince youngsters to try other athletic entertainment.

At the American Congress of Basque Centers in Buenos Aires, 1997, the groundwork was laid by the diaspora organization delegates to create a network of Basque libraries for inter-library loans and information exchange. Many of the facilities in Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, Venezuela, Mexico, and the United States served as repositories for Basque Government-in-exile documents and there are thousands of publications in the diaspora that are not available in Euskal Herria itself (Ugalde interview 1999, Larumbe and Astigarraga 1997). Volumes of clandestine materials were smuggled out of the Basque Country during the Civil War and Franco dictatorship, and exiles in diaspora communities published their own works from the safety of their host societies. Utilization of the library exchanges will greatly depend on the researchers’ language abilities in Spanish and Basque.

Though the library materials have been available for decades, interviews with the librarians in each country revealed that few members utilize the vast resources. One stated and others agreed, “It takes much time and effort to read all this old and very formal Spanish. Unless the person is doing research or is an historian or anthropologist they are not coming in here to wrack their brains. We are starting to receive children’s books from the Basque
Government, but unless a parent is teaching one’s children Basque, no one is interested in that either” ( Guarotxena Larragán interview 1997). General interest in the history books exists. Over 88% of all respondents believed learning about their history and about other Basques in the diaspora to be of “great” or “very great” importance, but going to the Center, browsing through the sources and actually checking-out and reading a book takes time and energy. In any society, whether immigrant or native, there are those who are motivated enough to do it, and a majority of those who are not.

Basque diaspora associations provide newsletters which facilitate information distribution in host countries and often have short articles in the Basque language, which the majority of the readership cannot understand. These newsletters are more social in nature and record the marriages, births, and deaths of members, remind readers of upcoming ethnic events and fundraisers, and may have special vignettes of Basque culture, history, or anthropology to educate their audiences. Many Basque associations exchange their newsletters between and within countries, expanding the ethnic imagination of their readers. Today ten to fifteen organizations also post their newsletters on the Internet for the diaspora audience.

There is a wide variety of additional ethnic activities carried out through the organizations from art exhibitions and lectures and conferences on literature, to medical research of Basque physiology. Those interested in a given topic are encouraged to establish meetings or seminars and to invite and educate others regarding their interest. The most important aspect of the associations may be the informal socialization that takes place between the Basques themselves. Whether sitting at the bar cheering a football team, enjoying a wedding celebration, or attending a Basque cinema event, the exchange of information and shared experiences tie these people to each other through their Basque connections, reinforcing the associations’ and the individuals’ identities.

B. Language Maintenance

Linguists argue that language makes order possible in the world. It functions as the organ of thought, conscience, and reflection, granting the spirit and the mind autonomy over experience. It also provides a basis of support for one’s identity (Grinberg and Grinberg 1989). The Basque organizations have served as the motor for language maintenance and preservation. During continued migration this century, Basque was spoken at Center events
and celebrations, but second and third generation members usually joined speaking only the host country language. With the end of chain migration, the necessity of learning euskera to communicate with monolingual immigrants diminished, and the Basque speakers already present lost the opportunities to communicate in their native language to native speakers.

Currently there are various combinations of bi- and trilingualism (utilizing two or three languages interchangeably) and diglossia (utilizing one language for specific situations and a different language for other specific situations). In diaspora Basque families it is not uncommon to have situations where parents speak to each other in Basque, but to their children in French or Spanish, or children that speak to their parents in Basque, Spanish or French but to their siblings in the host country language. In the United States and Australia, there are later generations that speak English and Basque, some that speak English and French, those that speak English and Spanish, and those that speak only English. Similar combinations exist in the Spanish speaking Argentina, Uruguay, and Peru, and with the French speaking Belgians.

Changes in social identity are accompanied by changes in language attitudes favoring host country language over the homeland language (Gudykunst 1988), and the necessity of communications skills for education and employment make the host country language fundamental. However, according to ethnic studies in migration and language development, many immigrants feel alienated as though they are “in disguise” when they speak the new language, and that they have lost the language in which they feel “authentic” (Grinberg and Grinberg 1989:112). Children seem to overcome the problems of assimilating new languages more easily than adults, and in these case studies, the child immigrant often became the interpreter for the Basque parents which reversed the roles of authority and respect.

Later generation interviewees often articulated that they wished their parents had forced them to learn and speak Basque. They lamented how they had ridiculed their parents for not speaking in the host country language perfectly, or for their “embarrassing” accents. In the South American countries, participants were especially remorseful that they had not learned Basque because as their parents already spoke Spanish, they only had to learn one other language. Though there are families which are trilingual, interviewees in Australia and the United States explained that they, or their parents, had to decide which language to use at home, Basque, or Spanish or French, and usually Spanish or French was selected. Immigrants believed they needed to give their children an economic advantage with a second language, and most immigrated during the Franco years when Basque was outlawed, had a
very low status as a language of peasants, and was diminishing in utility.

"Why should I teach my daughter Basque when people in the Basque Country don’t even speak it? Everyone there speaks Spanish and she can also travel anywhere in South America or get a job for a Latino company in the U.S." (Zabala interview 1999).

"My parents spoke to us in Basque not out of any political or identity statement but because they spoke to their own parents in Basque and because they spoke to each other in Basque. I think in their village, Nabarniz, they didn’t really speak Spanish so maybe they [the parents] didn’t really know it very well." (Achurra Etxebarria interview 1997).

"Oh God we were so embarrassed to go anywhere with Ama. We thought she was really dumb. Actually I guess we thought other people would think she was dumb. We were so ignorant. She’d talk to us in Spanish in front of our friends. We didn’t understand that she was so much smarter than us for all she had learned and overcome. My mom knows English, Spanish, Basque and some French. Now who’s dumb?" (Lasuen interview 1999).

_Euskera_ as a factor of Basque ethnic identity has lost much of its importance in these diaspora populations. In _Euska Herria_ itself, various areas were totally hispanicized by the mid-1800s and later during the Franco era Basque was outlawed as a means of communication. Consequently, many of these emigrants of the political exile era did not themselves speak Basque. Though Basques are extremely proud of their unique language and its complexity for learning, most do not consider it an important factor in their own ethnicity. As seen in Chapter Five, speaking Basque as a prerequisite for “being Basque” has also lost support in the diaspora populations^{27}.

Though traditional Sabino Arana Basque nationalism stressed the importance of the Basque language, and the last influential wave of migration was of people with this ideology, Basques in these diaspora countries no longer consider this of such importance. Because so many of them do not speak _euskera_ they would not want to eliminate themselves from their own category. There are no significant differences between the males and females. Language loss is evident by the data in Table 6.3 that show how few Basques are actually able to speak and utilize Basque, and how many are illiterate in their ancestral language. Respondents were asked to describe their linguistic abilities and frequency of usage. Overall only 5% use Basque regularly, and another 5% “use Basque everyday, switching back and forth between languages and using Basque equally with other languages”. Australian and United States Basques had the highest frequencies in both categories.

^{27}See Table 5.1 for homeland attitudes toward speaking Basque, and Table 5.10 for diaspora attitudes toward speaking Basque.
Table 6.3 Language Knowledge, Usage, and Literacy by Host Country and by Age Category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>&quot;I know only a few words&quot; or &quot;none&quot;</th>
<th>&quot;I only use Basque for special phrases&quot; or &quot;none&quot;</th>
<th>&quot;I can write a few words in Basque&quot; or &quot;none&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-30</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-45</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46-60</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61-75</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76-90</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total respondents = 832.

It is important to compare the first and second columns. They know a few words but they do not actually use them. For example, in Peru the other 46% of respondents know more than just a few words and selected either "a basic conversation", "fluent with some difficulty", or "fluent". But only 15% are using their Basque for more than just a special greeting or special phrase. The higher numbers in column two point to lack of language usage, which is different than language knowledge. Sociolinguists who study language planning, language shift, and language vitality and death, have demonstrated that if a population does not utilize the language it knows (however little that might be), the decline in status, and usage are followed by people not even learning it (Fishman 1985, 1989, 1997; Ariztondo, Garmendia, Aizpurua, and Bourhis 1999). This reflects the Basque diaspora population situation.

There are Basque language programs at the Basque Centers in Argentina, Uruguay, Australia, and the United States; university language courses in Argentina and the United States, and ikastolas (Basque language schools for preschool through approximately year eight), in Argentina and the United States. While the students and parents do put forth a tremendous effort, sociolinguistics studies demonstrate that without a social or economic reason for learning and using a language, it is not likely to be maintained. Diaspora Basques
can use *euskerera* with each other (if they are both one of the few who know it), but can also utilize their host country language. When traveling or communicating with relatives in *Euskal Herria*, those from Peru, Argentina, and Uruguay can easily use Spanish, and those from Belgium might use French. It is the Australian and United States Basques that must learn a second language to communicate with other Basques in the homeland or in the diaspora, and they tend to take school courses in French and Spanish. Interviewees often mentioned the future economic benefits of learning Spanish or French for future employment, while those in Argentina, Uruguay, and Belgium were learning in English. Ironically, French-speaking Basques from Belgium and Spanish-speaking Basques from Uruguay have utilized English rather than Basque to communicate with each other over the Internet.

C. Homeland Connections

The preservation of contact with the homeland is a defining feature of diaspora, and globalization may make it easier and more efficient and convenient, but each of these many generations of Basques have kept relationships with their respective homeland generations utilizing the means of communication of the corresponding time period—word of mouth, written letters, telephone conversations, faxes, and videos, to e-mail, video conferencing, real-time chat rooms, and frequent physical travels home.

The links to the ancestral homeland based on family ties diminish with the generations removed from the immigrants experience, and the diasporic associations have assumed the responsibility for reconnecting members to their ethnicity. Some were never disconnected and have always felt themselves attached to *Euskal Herria*. Tõlõyan (1996) distinguishes between ethnic community and diasporic community in the latter’s commitment to maintaining ties with the homeland and with other kin groups also outside the homeland. Hypothesis Two states that Basques do exhibit a diaspora mentality and imagine themselves as connected to the homeland and to each other.

C.1 Economic and Personal ties to Euskal Herria

In addition to stock market investments and banking accounts, diaspora Basques also maintain other material and financial links to *Euskal Herria* by means of property and/or business ownership. These include a wide range of interests and are not only remaining family inheritances from decades ago; 46% of those with ties were individuals under 45 years old.
who visit the Basque Country regularly.

Table 6.4 Diasporic Respondents with Financial and Material ties to Euskal Herria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Belgium</th>
<th>Peru</th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Argentina</th>
<th>Uruguay</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>57%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total respondents = 832.

The majority of these Basques do keep themselves informed regarding homeland current events and issues through personal contacts at least once a year, (every participant in Belgium and Peru answered they communicate with friends and family in *Euskal Herria* at least once a year, in Argentina only 8% did not, Australia 10%, United States 12% and Uruguay 15% did not) and by regularly reading newspapers or journals from, or with information about the Basque Country. Though Australia's respondents demonstrated a low level of frequent reading, it is important to note that Australian cable television transmits one hour of Spanish broadcast news daily which includes stories from the Basque provinces. Interviews revealed that rather than trying to find printed information about the Basque Country, one could just turn on the television for daily news, and the majority watch or tape record the program at least once a week. Argentina, Uruguay, and the eastern United States began receiving Basque Television, *Euskaltelebista*, via satellite and cable in 1999.

Table 6.5 Readership of Newspapers or Journals from or about Euskal Herria at Least Monthly

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Peru</th>
<th>Belgium</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Argentina</th>
<th>Uruguay</th>
<th>Australia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>79%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total respondents = 832.

Consistent rather than sporadic communications together with personal connections with family, friends, and institutions foster the diasporic mentality among these collectivities. While there is no longer continued migration of people, the chain linking the populations has become a virtual one in the imagination. Information exchange, informal circulation of personal journals and newspapers, sharing music CDs and videos from the Basque provinces, and the stories from personal travels all maintain the ties to the homeland.

**C.2. Institutional Connections Among Basques**

The availability of homeland media information has greatly increased through the Basque Government publications made available to the diaspora organizations; such as *Euskal Etxeak* which is published quarterly with articles concerning homeland and diaspora news and events.
The Ministry of Culture sends a steady stream of video cassettes to the Centers which were also provided with televisions and VCR equipment. The videos engage a diverse range of topics from Basque cuisine, to sporting championships, to history and anthropology. The hook-ups to the Internet provided through Basque Government grants have also aided those who understand computer technology. As of late 1999, there was Basque television transmission from Euskadi via satellite to cable television in Argentina, Uruguay, Venezuela, Mexico and the eastern United States, enabling Basques in the diaspora to experience the same media communications as Basques in the homeland.

In addition to the media communications there is abundant movement of people as well. Asked if they had a trip to Euskal Herria planned for before 2000 (within two or three years of the sample) more than one-third of the total answered they did. When removing the oldest age group, 76-90, for whom it usually is the most difficult to travel, 41% had plans for study or tourism in at least one of the seven provinces. There were differences between the countries in the percentages of respondents that had never lived in or visited Euskal Herria. The proximity of Belgium and the recent migration resulted in every single participant having lived in or having visited the Basque Country at some time in their life, but in Uruguay, 63% had neither lived in or visited their homeland, ever. In neighboring Argentina with similar historical migration, 34% had not traveled to Euskal Herria, and in the United States, Australia, and Peru, the percentages were, 17%, 10%, and 7% respectively. Income did not seem to be an issue in this decision as there was only a high of 3% difference of who traveled and who did not in each of the six crosstabulated economic categories. Strong familial and territorial links encourage interaction and facilitate movement between the communities. The geographic proximity of Belgium adds to the ease of travel for all. Nevertheless, as is the case with the other five countries' diaspora populations, the diasporans themselves are much more likely to return to visit relatives and not the reverse, emphasizing the importance of a temporary 'return' to the homeland as well.

Travel and interstate exchanges between mus players, athletes, dancers, choirs, and elected Center officials in the diaspora and homeland are increasing in frequency. Various annual encounters strengthen personal and institutional networks, and importantly, the diasporic mentality. Basques are allowed to experience another Basque community's festivals and see how similar they are to those of one's home community. They return to those home communities with photographs and stories of the Basque exchange and similarities and differences between themselves- and diasporic imagination is invigorated and fortified (Bastida
There have also been planning congresses of delegates representing Basque collectivities from all over the world, held sporadically in the 1980s and more regularly thereafter with conferences in 1989 Argentina, 1995 Euskal Herria, 1997 Argentina, and 1999 Euskal Herria. Discussions and projects of the conferences have concentrated on organizational issues of increasing youth membership, maintaining current programs for cultural preservation, and improving relations with the Autonomous Basque Government.

Basques have multiple and constant interconnections across state borders and their identities are shaped according to more than one culture. Is transnationalism a transgenerational process? Many migrants have transnationalized their existence by physically moving between host and home countries, or by establishing social networks that transcend state borders. Basque who can afford it are likely to spend July and August in the homeland with relatives or friends, or leasing an apartment. They describe themselves as "... kind of natives- kind of vacationers. I'll tell you, everyone at the market knows us and all of our neighbors know us, we feel at home there too" (Iguain and Oyarbide 1997). Many Basques have created a transnational identity for themselves that is superimposed upon civic, religious, gender, racial, and ethnic identities.

D. Banal Nationalism and Daily Ethnic Socialization

The idea that home decoration and jewelry usage are reinforcers of ethnonationalism has been heretofore overlooked as female triviality and therefore not worthy of academic research. However, I have found that both of these forms of expression recreate ethnic identity through the use of intimate objects and psychologically reinforce ethnicity and ethnic socialization for the individual and family. In addition, they also demonstrate one's "Basqueness" to home visitors and the public. The resurgence in the use of Basque given names for children is also prevalent and marks an ethnic boundary for that person for the rest of their lives. It is another constant reminder, especially in the Anglo societies, every time it is spelled, explained, and its pronunciation corrected, that one is Basque.

D.1. Home Decoration

House decoration tends to be the domain of the female head of household, and in many of these cases non-Basque women that married a Basque also tended to use ethnic symbolic
objects in home decoration. A home provides the setting for modern intimacy and moral community. Values and expectations are transmitted and intensified by which kinds of objects are selected for display, and many of these Basques utilize their homes and home decoration to create and express their identity. Photographs of family and ancestors, family farmhouses and villages in *Euskal Herria*, punctuate the importance of descent and connection to the Basque Country. Mementos from homeland tourist gift shops are placed in areas of importance and displayed with care.

Carved wooden busts of *Amumas* (grandmothers) and *Aitxitxes* (grandfathers), Tree of Gernika artistic representations, Coats-of-Arms of the seven provinces, pictures of *txistularis*, and *ikurriñas*, flags, everywhere greet visitors to thousands of homes of Basques living in the diaspora. This day-to-day reminding and remembering one’s ancestors and ethnic identity creates an example of what social psychologist Michael Billig calls “banal nationalism” (Billig 1995). The ordinary everyday habits, language, food, and displaying of cultural artefacts are imprinted in these Basques minds and remind them that they are Basque. Interviews in each of the six countries were conducted in Basque homes and the majority utilized ethnic cultural decoration. Though I was specifically looking for it and noticed it quite easily, the Basques welcoming me into their homes affectionately pointed out their objects- not necessarily to ‘prove’ their Basqueness to me, but rather to emphasize the importance it represented to them.

Basque women utilize their flag’s red, green, and white for a myriad of choices from combinations of red, green and white for dressing a table, to painting the house exterior and trim, to colors of flowers to plant for the garden. Several women mentioned (without being prompted) that they will not plant red and yellow blooming flowers together because they are the colors of the Spanish flag. Whether in clothing, jewelry, or house decoration, because they do use quantities of green and red, many stated they seldomly buy anything yellow just to ensure they never mistakenly put the two together. Everything from choices of wedding to funeral flowers, and furniture fabric to stoneware glaze seemed to be at least subconsciously affected by whether or not it might promote a Basque awareness, or neutrality. What is conscious is the deliberate separation of red and yellow, which seem to trigger a negative response especially from emigrant and first generation men and women.

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28 Commonly, diaspora Basques’ funeral wreaths are red, green, and white. Interviewees also stated that funeral masses would likely have Basque music and songs, and many are buried with a Basque flag.
D.2. Personal Adornment

Personal ornaments and jewelry have often been utilized as expressions of group identity with intense symbolic significance. In India, for example, there are rigid laws of caste that restrict the wearing of gold to people of certain groups only (Untracht 1997). In the Basque population, gold religious medals for baptisms or First Holy Communions are customary and although some of the younger interviewees stated they do not wear their medals regularly to host country social functions, they almost always wear them to Basque functions. Lauburu \(^{29}\) emblems, rings, earrings, and necklaces are also popular with males and females as are t-shirts, baseball caps, belt buckles, and car bumper stickers with Basque themes. A few males in Australia and the United States have permanently tattooed lauburus on their arms.

Besides public displays of Basqueness there are also those closer to the heart such as that of Juan Miguel Salaberry, an elderly gentleman from Rosario, Uruguay. For decades Juan Miguel has worn his grandfather’s txapela, beret, every day and in his wallet has carried a small tattered paper ikurriña. He says together they keep him safe; the memories of his ancestors combined with the spiritual and emotional strength of Basque ethnicity. After migrating to Melbourne, Nekane Candino legally changed her given name from a Spanish “Rosarito” (Basque given names were not permitted in the four Spanish provinces during the Franco years) to the Basque “Nekane”. This was self-actualizing for her because as she described herself, “Being Basque is primordial. There are thousands of years of Basqueness in me. I am not Nekane who also happens to be Basque. I am Basque and that shapes how I manifest myself as Nekane.” These insignificant daily demonstrations of Basqueness may be “banal”, “symbolic” or “leisure time ethnicity” to some academics, but for Juan Miguel and Nekane, and thousands more like them in the diaspora, maintaining Basque identity is not only a rational matter, but also one of great instinct, emotion, and spirit.

Ethnic identity is increasingly voluntary in the diaspora communities to which Basques have migrated. Because Basques are not distinguishable by skin color, garments, diet, etc. in these European settler countries, maintaining “Basqueness” is a choice. Basques are marking their own group identity boundaries rather than being marked by other outside

\(^{29}\)A lauburu is a four-headed symbol typical in Basque archaeological finds. It is found on tombstones and is believed to be a symbol for the sun. However to Basques it also represents the four seasons; a Basque Catholic cross; and for some it represents the four Basque provinces in Spain. It is similar to $\Phi$. 

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groups and the importance of names is an example of this phenomenon. Just as Nekane needed a Basque name to fulfill her identity, young parents of all generations are increasingly giving Basque first names to their children. There are numerous Mirens, Amaias, Nekanes, Idoias, and Maîtes, as well as Aitors, Kepas, Josus, Mikels, and Inakis. In Australia and the United States special care must be given to how English speaking people will pronounce (or mispronounce) a name and the psychological impact that a unique name has on a child. As adults, interviewees stated that they are proud of their given and surnames, although as children a few hated them because of endless childhood teasing and the constant spelling and correction of pronunciation. In the Anglo Australian and United States societies where it is customary for a woman to drop her own surname and assume that of her husband, Basque women in the last twenty years have increasingly not followed this practice and kept their maiden surnames when marrying a non-Basque. It is another constant demonstration and reminder of ethnic identity.

E. Haizpak: Sister to Sister

Geographically disconnected from each other and their homeland, Basque women in the diaspora have endeavored to perpetuate ethnic identities for themselves and their families. Curiously, their struggles, and the ensuing results, are similar throughout the disparate settings to which they have emigrated. Women are both maintainers and modifiers of social processes (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1994:313) and the role of women as reproducers of ethnic ideologies is often related to women being perceived as the ‘cultural carriers’ of that ethnic group.

Is there a Basque sisterhood, an haizpak (sister of a female)? Or are women always a brother’s sister, arrebak (sister of a male) and defined in relation to a male? Few other languages distinguish these different relationships with different terminology. Are there established homeland women’s roles that are perpetuated by the diaspora women (and men)? In the 1970s and 1980s Basque anthropologists argued the concept of a Basque matriarchy. Yet, while the study of real women was brushed aside, Basque mythology about feminine identities was pervasive. However, Basque feminist anthropologist researchers found that in Euskal Herria the elaboration of the myth of a Basque matriarchy constituted a “gendered tool” which had been used in the development of the ideology related to radical nationalism, and Basque matriarchy provided a powerful ethnic marker. Even though the arguments
regarding real female power had been dismantled by these analyses, the ideology affected the key issues of Basque identity and therefore continued (del Valle et al. 1985: 44-54, as quoted in del Valle, 1993).

E.1. Migration Experiences

Women have essentially been omitted from early studies of migration. When considered, females are generally perceived as amendments to the men who migrate; non-thinking, non-emotional appendages with no choices, comparable to the valuable things packed in traveling trunks. They have been treated more as migrants’ wives, daughters, and mothers than as migrants themselves, relegating their roles in international migration as secondary although in some instances, such as the United States, female migrants outnumber male migrants (Simon and Brettle 1986:4). Because women are intimately involved with men, changes in women’s status affects the men and vice versa and it is erroneous to perceive women as non-working dependents. Many Basque men did migrate solo, planning to send home saved earnings until they could return to the homeland, but when a husband and wife migrated together it would most likely be permanent.

In family migration married couples tend to move to where the husband has the greatest opportunity for employment leading to great difficulty disentangling men’s and women’s individual motivations and aspirations for migration (Chant 1992). Once in the host country men tend to work outside the home learning the host country language, customs, expectations, etc. and how to “move” in the new society. The Basque woman’s experience has not often been so positive, especially in the English speaking United States and Australia. Many women narrated emotions of tremendous loneliness, isolation, and depression; a lack of both self-esteem and sense of self-worth from the inability to express themselves. They had been “robbed of their youth, of their own dreams, and aspirations.” Hence the salience of the Basque organizations as an outlet for these women to communicate through their ethnicity. Ethnic identity provides empowerment and recognition as it has for these haizpak. It gives one a history, a collective feeling, support from the ‘family’ of other ethnics, and self-worth.

Women interviewees who migrated to Argentina and Uruguay entered host societies where Basques were highly regarded with a positive social status. Those in the United States were usually categorized as Spanish or French, and in Australia Basques were and still are commonly mistaken for Italian or Greek. The shock of migration for many Basques was not only from a change of country to country culture, but from a change of ‘country’ to city
culture. Those migrating to New York, Lima, Montevideo, Buenos Aires, or Rosario entered urban settings of hundreds of thousands, or millions, of residents—quite a shift from agricultural and fishing cultures of small villages and farmsteads. Whether in Melbourne or Mar del Plata, San Francisco or Sydney, the demands of city life compounded by geographical and cultural change could be overwhelming. The transition from traditional to modern was, and is, not a simple or linear one.

Costs of migration are personal and emotional with a shift in quality of family relationships away from ties built by the daily interactions of the homeland, to brief interactions on the telephone, letters, and now e-mails. There is much stress that accompanies surviving in a transnational double world that forces migrants to adapt rapidly and frequently to considerable changes in habits and expectations (Basch, Glick Schiller, Szanton Blanc 1994:242). The lack of belonging and/or acceptance in both their homeland and host country is especially frustrating. In Australia, they are described as “the Basque woman”, in Euskal Herria they are “the Australian woman”. “En el limbo”, neither here nor there, was a phrase repeated often in each country usually by emigrants themselves, but also by first generation born in the host country. These women did not feel singularly connected to one or the other, either their homeland or host country, to a territory or culture, but they do feel solidly connected to each other because of shared experiences.

The physical disconnectedness to Euskal Herria is replaced by an emotional and intellectual interconnectedness with other Basque women. Emigrants understand each other’s horrors of political exile, loss of family and friends, and fears of dealing in their new host countries. First and second generation born in the host countries understand each others’ upbringing and how they are different from host country non-Basque friends. From constantly spelling and explaining their surnames, describing food preparation, through to interpreting ETA activities, women of all ages in each of the six settings declared they believe they have more in common with each other in different countries than they do with other women equivalent to them in their own host countries. Their imagined connection is through their Basque ethnicity and its experiences. The Euskal Etxeak journal was often cited as an example in conversations when women compared themselves to other Basques in different countries. “They celebrate San Ignacio and have dancers and choirs the same way we do. I found a story about a girlfriend from my hometown, and she is just like me except she ended up in the United States and I escaped to Belgium. I imagine she has fried as many chorizos and tortillas as I have” (Urriz Larragan interview 1997).
Do women more than men preserve Basque traditions and what is the woman's role in the reproduction and development of ethnicity in her family? The expected role of women as reproducers of ethnic practices and traditions is often related to women being perceived as the 'cultural carriers' of that ethnic group. Women are thought to be the main socializers of children and the teachers who transfer the cultural traditions to the next generation. In the case of the emigrant generation they are often less assimilated because they work in the home which they make. They are less assimilated linguistically and socially within the wider society.

In addition to these assumptions, the concept of the Basque matriarchy is promulgated in the diaspora and it might be expected that women would play the most significant role in ethnicity maintenance. However, these research data of the Basque diaspora communities show no significant difference between the males and females in their attitudes towards mothers or fathers being more influential in preserving and maintaining Basque ethnic traditions. Asked to react to the statement, "Mothers have been more influential than fathers for teaching Basque culture to their children", a majority disagreed or had no opinion. More than one-third, 36% of males and 40% of females, agreed with this statement. The multisocietal socialization from host country peers, school, physical surroundings, media etc., combine with Basque ethnic socialization from home, from the Basque Centers and cultural events with other Basque families, and in this case from both their mothers and fathers.

There is a difference between the women themselves when regarding the salience of religion with Basque identity. Catholicism was a significant factor of Basque identity in the first half of the twentieth century and it continues to be so in the diaspora populations with 71% of females and 69% males agreeing that "continuing Catholic beliefs and traditions in our Basque families" is of "great" or "very great" importance. However, when comparing the female responses separately, the older the woman the higher the percentage that believed Catholicism was of "great" or "very great" importance.

Table 6.6 Maintaining Catholicism is of "Great" or "Very Great" Importance by Age Category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Category</th>
<th>18-30 yrs</th>
<th>31-45 yrs</th>
<th>46-60 yrs</th>
<th>61-75 yrs</th>
<th>76-90 yrs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18-30 yrs</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-45 yrs</td>
<td></td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46-60 yrs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61-75 yrs</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76-90 yrs</td>
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Combined results of 402 female responses from all six countries.

In the United States where many interviewees mentioned experiencing discrimination against Catholics, 80% of the females responded that it is of "some", "great" or "very great" importance to maintain the beliefs and traditions. Basques females in Belgium were the least likely to agree with the religion factor being important to Basque identity with only 33%
agreeing, 54% of Uruguayans, 66% of Argentines, and 67% of Australians also agreed.

There are numerous personal decisions and motivations involved in international migration. For many, their homeland conditions as a female have much to do with the decision to migrate, especially for single women. Both women and men are escaping political, economic, and social oppression and searching for a better life. Women also migrate to escape the forms of oppression that are unique to them as women. Several female interviewees stated that together with economic hardship in *Euskal Herria*, they had helped convince their husbands, brothers, and fathers to migrate. Because many Basque women did experience economic and social status gain in their new host countries, they were not as motivated as their male counterparts to try a return. For economic and familial reasons, 66% of females responded that they have their own lives now in their host countries and plan to return to *Euskal Herria* only to visit. The pull of family in the Basque Country has been replaced with the pull of her own family she has created—children and grandchildren, and she is now accustomed to a host country lifestyle.

Besides the institutional women’s organizations such as *Emakume Abertzale Batza* in Argentina, or the *Aiztan Artean* in the United States, there is an informal sisterhood between the females, regardless of age and generation in the host country. Female interviewees spoke of a connection to other Basque females who understood one another’s suffering in an ethnic context—the separation from family and village, traditions and customs, language and society.

Thus the importance of the Basque Centers and institutions for first generation immigrant women as an environment to connect with others and manifest their identity through ethnicity. Later generation females, and especially teenaged girls, reinforced this pattern through their lasting friendships with other Basques. Teen interviewees who participate in the dancing groups, choirs, and sporting sets, reaffirmed what their parents hope for—they believe their Basque Center friends to be friends for life.

Basque women have tended to be the transnational communicators between homeland and host country families. They have served as the principal correspondents, sustaining family and friendship relations. Kinship networks, and a broad range of social and economic links have been cultivated by the women. They have befriended new immigrants, and relieved each other’s anxieties. They have introduced each other to social realities of everyday life and informally counseled and consulted each other. Increasingly in the last two decades, women have also been elected to leadership positions in the Basque Centers of five countries but not
Peru where males continue to dominate. Women represent Centers in the federations in Argentina, Uruguay, and the United States, and no longer consider their own contributions inconsequential or trivial. So if enquiring of a female Basque immigrant to any of these six countries what she does in the Basque community, and the answer is “nothing really”, she most likely has served fellow Basques as counselor, teacher, real estate agent, employment officer, household manager, tourist operator, taxi, interpreter, and communicator. She has cooked and sold several hundred tortillas and chorizos, set and moved several thousand chairs for dinners and dances, and year after year taught the young txikis (little ones) several Basque songs.

My findings show that although men and women understand and experience the act of migration and the process of acculturation differently, gender does not tend to affect cultural ethnic identity maintenance, nor the definition of “Basqueness” among diaspora Basques.

F. The Age of Globalization is also the Age of Ethnic Identity Resurgence

Manuel Castells describes today’s world as one with conflicting trends of globalization, the information technology revolution, and restructuring of capitalism all creating a transformed network society, a culture constructed by an interconnected and diversified media system, versus, an increase in powerful expressions of collective identity that challenge modernization and globalization in favor of the local, communal separate identity, and cultural distinctiveness (Castells 1997:1-2). On the one hand then we have globalization and an outward expanding model of identity and subsequent homogenization; simultaneously we have ethnonationalism which converges on the historical, the traditional, a known ethnic identity and ensuing heterogeneity and cultural difference. Multitudes are choosing to revert from the unknown future, to the known and understood traditional past.

F.1. Basque Diasporic Identity

Basque diaspora identity salience is related to globalization but not necessarily as a partner in a causal relationship, nor a defensive reaction to it. The tools of global communications are being manipulated and utilized in the homeland and diaspora populations.

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30 The Lima Euskal Etxeak activities are mainly dominated by a group of approximately thirty en who meet weekly for a Basque dinner at the Center, much like the homeland txoko style male gastronomy club, and the women dominate the choir, dance, and music activities.
to educate and inter-communicate, and these networks are perceived as positive mediums for ethnic identity re-creation, maintenance, and enhancement. The homogenization potential is received in the diaspora organizations as a possible means to unifying the Basques in various diaspora communities, not as a threat of cultural imperialism by the United States, or standardization of all world culture and identity.

Identity in this setting is a person's source of giving understanding and meaning to life experiences and events. The various identities that one person has, are not necessarily in conflict with each other, rather they may tend to be complementary. There is a symbiotic diaspora identity that incorporates and synthesizes the two; Basque and host country identities. Glick Schiller et al (1992) consider this the emergence of what they have named "transnationalism"—the formation of social, political and economic relationships among immigrants that cross several societies. It is a new sort of migrating population whose activities and patterns of life encompass both their host and home societies (Glick Schiller et al 1992: 1). The emergence of interstate societies and diasporas are an example of these deterritorialized cultures. When respondents were asked to describe themselves as "Basque", or "host country" (Peruvian, Uruguayan, American, etc.), or a combination of the two, or "other", 73% used the combination either Basque-host country, or host country-Basque.

These Basques' identities are configured in relationship to their host country and to their home country. As is the case with other ethnic groups, there is a continuum of interest in ethnicity ranging from assimilationism, to integration, to ethnic fundamentalism. Often, the diasporic person has "double and multiple consciousness", an identity that crosses boundaries and resists totalization (Tolólyan 1996:28). The world can no longer, if ever, be understood as international in the sense of being made up of independent, separate nations with solid boundaries. Instead it has become a transnational, inter-dependent system where national borders are increasingly permeable (Sorensen 1995:107). People may live in several different locations and/or take part in networks that transcend boundaries and this influences their daily lives and outlook. In the age of transnationalism, identities are contextualized, transnational, binational, pan-national social relations (Sorensen 1995:108).

For many diasporic populations, including the Basques, experiences and means of orientation are divorced from the physical locations in which they live and work. They are able to simulate environments of homeland at the Centers and with each other. The globalization process has opened up the world for increased contact and these Basque Cultural Centers are benefitting. Some academics argue that the difficulties of accepting these
changes are reasons why ‘localism’ or a return to some sort of ‘home’ be it real or imaginary, become important themes (Featherstone 1995:103). The global and local are bound together and not necessarily mutually exclusive. The regularity and frequency of contacts with a group of significant others are what sustain a common culture, and the creation of powerful emotionally sustaining rituals, ceremonies, and collective memories tie these Basques together in their respective communities and also to each other as they imagine each other practicing and remembering the same rituals and ceremonies.

Basque ethnics are able to strengthen symbolic modes of affiliation and belonging through their diasporic consciousness, and they do utilize their ethnic identity to undermine existing symbolic hierarchies and create their own ethnic space for their own purposes, which tend to be more psychological and emotional than rational. However, this is not a new phenomenon for them. What have progressed are the mechanisms used to maintain the Basque identity.

**F.2. www.identity.org**

The Autonomous Basque Government of *Euskadi* has provided funding for each officially registered Basque organization to obtain a computer with Internet access for their members. These communications possibilities have increased the frequency of intercommunications between Basques in different communities and countries, including the communications between Basques in the homeland with Basques in the diaspora, and between diasporic Basques themselves. While diasporic Basques reported knowing about Basques in other parts of the world, the communications had been restricted to personal contacts between family relatives, or occasionally Basques traveling to another country that also took the time to visit the Basque Center and meet other Basques there. Visits to the homeland could also result in diasporic Basque contact. For example, several Australian Basques reported meeting with, and learning about, Basques from the United States while each were vacationing at home in Bizkaia (Garagarza 1997; Kandino 1997). It is common now for diaspora Basque institutions to create their own websites and receive e-mail communications from other Basques around the world making inquiries regarding family genealogy, Basque Center activities, and Basque language learning materials. They are no longer only serving Basques in their physical locale as now these associations’ roles incorporate a global audience.

“Virtual ethnic communities” utilize telecommunications technology to replace mass media with targeted or “addressable” media with specialized and more homogeneous
audiences (Elkins 1997). These technologies allow ethnic communities to support their diaspora populations and attempt to retain their language and culture. The key is the availability of easy, frequent, and inexpensive interactions without physical proximity. Elkins does not argue, nor would I, that virtual communities will replace existing ethnic communities. However, technologies do allow existing dispersed ethnic groups to find new means of support, persistence, and interest. The telecommunications technologies enable and facilitate communications and information exchange between Basques themselves and between Basques through their institutions, creating additional shared experiences for those persons utilizing this method of individual development.

Technology enables and facilitates but does not determine situations. The availability of Internet exchanges and the hundreds of Basque topic websites do not translate to equally distributed usage in the diaspora. At the Basque Center in Peru, there were only two younger members who understood how to use the e-mail and Internet searches, and neither frequent the Center often. Nevertheless, there is a willingness to utilize modern technologies in each of the Centers and there is the beginning of a cadre of likely recruits for the expanding virtual Basque community.

F.3. Diaspora Basque Ethnicity = Positive Social Identity

Tajfel’s social identity theory argues that the process of social categorization enables the individual to define one’s position in society as a member of the groups to which one belongs. Social identity is defined as that part of a person’s self-concept which derives from one’s knowledge of membership of a social group together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership, and people strive for a positive social identity (Tajfel 1978, 1984; Tajfel and Turner 1979). Socioeconomic status is usually a reliable indicator of social categorization. Though Basques think of themselves positively, they do not tend to do so at the expense of other ethnic groups.

Table 6.7 Percentage of Respondents Agreeing/Disagreeing with Basque Socioeconomic Status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Peru</th>
<th>Belgium</th>
<th>Argentina</th>
<th>Uruguay</th>
<th>Australia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Basques have a higher</td>
<td>Agree 31</td>
<td>Agree 31</td>
<td>Agree 29</td>
<td>Agree 15</td>
<td>Agree 13</td>
<td>Agree 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>socioeconomic status than</td>
<td>Disagree 31</td>
<td>Disagree 50</td>
<td>Disagree 33</td>
<td>Disagree 49</td>
<td>Disagree 63</td>
<td>Disagree 59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other immigrants.”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Results of 832 written questionnaire responses. A= Agree and Strongly agree. D= Disagree and Strongly Disagree

Perhaps being Basque is individually relevant in these countries. If the chosen ethnic identity is determined by the individual’s perception of its meaning to different audiences, its
salience in different social contexts, and its utility in different settings, joining and participating in Basque ethnic activities or joining the Center would have an individual and social impact. Diaspora Basques might also utilize this positive status of their ethnicity for personal gain. They do strive for a positive social identity and tend to believe they are perceived positively in each of their host societies in comparison to other ethnic groups, even if their socioeconomic status may not be higher. In every country a majority of Basques admitted their own maintenance of Basque identity was tied to the positive work ethic reputation.

Table 6.8 Perceived Reputation of Basques and Maintenance of Ethnic Identity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Peru</th>
<th>Belgium</th>
<th>Argentina</th>
<th>Uruguay</th>
<th>Australia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;I preserve my Basque identity because I am proud of the reputation of Basques as honest and hardworking people.&quot;</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total respondents = 832.

The positive association between “Basque” and “honest” and “industrious”, is equivalent to social praise, and Basques reported the pride experienced when telling new acquaintances they are Basque. Some individuals in Argentina, Uruguay, and the United States even admitted that they expect the person’s reaction to be actual words of praise. In Sydney and Melbourne, Australia they count on needing to give an explanation of what Basque ethnicity is and a short geography and history lesson, though people in the north Queensland area are more familiar with Basques. Basques in Belgium reported they usually have to disassociate themselves from ETA and political conversations. The majorities in each case still agreed that Basques do have a positive social status in their host society and although future research could test this by asking the non-Basques themselves what they think of the Basques, the positive perception definitely exists with the Basques themselves.

Basque ethnic festivals and collective activities serve to fulfill a psychological need to belong, and at the same time the individual aspiration of uniqueness. Basques can manifest their unique Basqueness to the outside host society, and simultaneously be a part of a group of fellow ethnics. Given a list of fourteen statements made by other diaspora Basques explaining why they maintain their ethnicity, 58% of the male and 62% of the female participants agreed that one of the main reasons they do preserve their Basque identity is specifically because it does make them feel they “have a special connection to each other” and 53% of both selected that their Basque identity makes them “feel special and unique”.

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Respondents were also asked if they had ever been treated favorably or unfavorably “specifically because you are Basque”. Instrumentalists contend that ethnicity is circumstantial and often utilized for gaining resources or services. In the case of Basques the evidence does not consistently support this argument. Table 6.9 presents the percentages of respondents that believe their ethnicity has affected the outcomes of certain situations “favorably” or “unfavorably”.

Table 6.9 Respondents’ “Favorable” and “Unfavorable” Treatment Because of Basque Ethnicity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Uruguay Fav</th>
<th>Un</th>
<th>Peru Fav</th>
<th>Un</th>
<th>Australia Fav</th>
<th>Un</th>
<th>United States Fav</th>
<th>Un</th>
<th>Argentina Fav</th>
<th>Un</th>
<th>Belgium Fav</th>
<th>Un</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joining a club</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admission to school or university</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selection for award or scholarship</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buying or renting accommodation</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receiving a government benefit</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Getting a job</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total of 832 responses from written anonymous questionnaires. Bold numbers show difference figures.

The results for employment are difficult to interpret because in interviews, some men explained that although they believe Basques tend to have a positive reputation in comparison to many other immigrants in their societies, if their Basque ethnicity had aided them with gaining employment it was because another Basque had hired them, not because a non-Basque had hired them. The only way of ascertaining would be to interview all of the employers and ask if the applicant’s Basque ethnicity favored their candidacy or not. However, what is important in positive social identity theory is the Basques’ perception of themselves and whether or not they believe their ethnicity is a help or hindrance for instrumental gain. The data reveal that a majority perceive it as neither.

Though instrumentalists argue that ethnicity must have a practical function in order to be viable, and depict ethnicity as an instrument for competition over scarce resources, T.H. Eriksen focuses on ethnic identity as being those distinctions which are socially relevant to the individual that maintains them (Eriksen 1993:61). Though not a competition over scarce resources, Basques’ social status can be extremely relevant psychologically and emotionally.
though not used for material gain. Several authors have argued that utility is the most important factor in accounting for the ethnic identity maintenance. This instrumentalist argument regards identity as contingent on political mobilization. However, perceptions of utility itself are cultural creations, and the boundary between that which is useful and that which is meaningful becomes blurred (Eriksen 1993:74). Basques in the diaspora may understand their ethnicity as being meaningful but there is not enough convincing evidence they view it as useful for anything material.

G. Conclusions

Basque emigrants have surmounted numerous life altering experiences of changing languages, cultures and societies, and found strength in each other through the Basque Center activities. Ethnic identity is not restricted to only those people who live inside a certain physical boundary and we see from thousands of Basques in the diaspora that maintaining one’s connection to one’s ethnicity is a personal choice. It is demonstrated in a personal way from wearing lauburu earrings to planting red flowered gardens.

The Basque diaspora institutions utilize modern technology and the Internet, and individual respondents explained that actually modernity makes preserving ethnicity easier because of additional mediums for communication and information. Travel is easier and cheaper and the interconnectedness of diaspora organizations intensifies the “us” feeling to a global sense of “we Basques.” As depicted in the third chapter’s history of Basque emigration and ethnic group awareness, Hypothesis Three regarding ethnic identity not being a result of globalization is again strengthened by the examples of colonial Basque ethnic awareness and self-categorization. Globalization trends and telecommunications technology have increased the availability of information and communications between Basques but there is no evidence that trends have scared them into any reactionary activities. In the United States, Alba (1990) found that ethnic identity rises with educational level. It is quite chic now to be ethnic. This pattern is replicated in these diaspora populations participating in their Basque activities as well, with 65% of questionnaire participants having university training and 13% post-graduate studies.

Citizenship is a legal category but not necessarily a description of political or ethnic loyalty or identity. The enabling technologies of globalization have greatly affected the ability of these diaspora groups to maintain ties with the homeland and with each other. It is important to remember the interconnectedness of these communities. It is not a two way
connection between one Basque Center and the homeland, but one between and among all the participants.

Mary Douglas (1983) categorizes some people as ethnic anomalies, people who are 'neither-nor' or 'both-and', depending on the situation and/or the wider context. Diaspora Basques tend to feel this way, as though they are both Uruguayan and Basque, not one or the other. They congregate with others at the Centers who are in the same position and can share similar circumstances. Though public protests regarding homeland and/or host society politics are often perceived as threatening to host country populations, Basques have tended to prefer cultural manifestations of their ethnicity, preventing any questioning of hierarchies of loyalty.

The progression from serving Basque immigrants with assistance integrating into the host society, to functioning as an ethnic organization and a regenerative source of ethnicity by creating and recreating ties to the homeland, to the extreme tourist agency and vacation guide, have less to do with globalization, geography, or gender than the change in migration patterns, in addition to a change in the category of people traveling, and the purpose of their visits. There has been an historical decline in the need for economic functions and services provided by ethnic social structures such as the Basque Centers- but it does not coincide with a declining importance of Basque ethnic identities.

What is significant about this type of ethnicity is its lack of political salience. These second, third, and fourth generation immigrants have no need to consider their ethnicity in an economic light, and hence do not tend to politicize this aspect of their identities. Their economic well-being and education have not been compromised by their ethnicity the way their parents' experiences were. There is no need to bolster their ethnic identity daily and actively. The latter generations tend to experience their ethnicity by voluntary individual choice but continue to preserve a collective identity.
Basque Government- Diaspora Relations

The Spanish Constitution of 1978 attempts to offer a solution to the demands for self-government of the state’s various regions while retaining centralists elements. Thus Article Two begins with the ‘indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation’ and then later recognizes the ‘right to autonomy of the nationalities and regions of which it is composed’, establishing two levels of ‘national/regional identity’. (See Map 7.1) Araba, Bizkaia, and Gipuzkoa provinces approved their Statutes of Autonomy of the Basque Country, Euskadi, also known as the Statutes of Gernika, in October 1979, and elected their regional parliament in March 1980, with creation of the Basque Government following shortly thereafter. Nafarroa achieved a separate autonomy with the 1982 Act affirming the region’s historic rights. The Government of Nafarroa does not have official ties with all of the diaspora organizations yet, though they are currently being established. In this Chapter I will analyze diaspora relations with the Government of Euskadi, and use “Basque Government” to mean the government of the three provinces of Euskadi unless otherwise stipulated.

In recognition of the financial contribution that supported the Basque Government-in-exile in Paris for forty years, the Basque Autonomous Government of Euskadi has collaborated with the diaspora communities via a policy of subsidies and grants, giving aid for their internal operating costs, and educational and cultural activities. Each Basque organization has been presented with audio visual materials with themes of the homeland such as sport, history, anthropology, tourism, cooking, etc. and audio tapes and printed materials for studying euskera. The Basque Government is interested in utilizing the Centers for promotion, development, and diffusion of the reality of the Basque Country. Particularly today, in an environment of continuous globalization and internationalization of modern societies, Basque communities can play the part of stimulator for social, cultural, economic and political relations (Declaration of Motives, Law 8/1994).

The Basque diaspora-homeland transnational networks, previously personal and occasionally institutional, with swings from latency to frenzied activity began a period of stabilization with the establishment of homeland government. By 1994, the Basque
Map 7.1 1999 Provinces and the Autonomous Communities of Spain (Preston 1996).
Government decided to make a qualitative change in the relations between the institutions of the homeland and those of the Basque communities abroad. The institutional development of Euskadi and its increasing self-government and the judicial and political framework of the Law on Relations with Basque Communities, Ley 8/1994, provided a substantial foundation for a new start.

A. Law of Relations with the Basque Communities in the Exterior: Ley 8/1994

A.1. Reversing Trends

The "Law of Relations with Basque Communities Outside the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country", Ley 8/1994, was passed by the Basque Parliament in May 1994. It signaled a new stage in the history of relations between the Autonomous Basque Government and Basque institutions in the diaspora, and was described as being a means of repaying "our historic debt to Basques overseas and to the countries that welcomed them (Sainz de la Maza 1994:14)." This Law was presented to the diaspora communities as a "commitment that begins with recognition and gratitude towards the Basque Communities for their efforts and labors in the interest of the Basque cause" (President José Antonio Ardanza Garro introduction to Parliamentary debate on Ley 8 as cited in Law of Relations with Basque Communities and Centers Outside the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country, 1994:8). President Ardanza described the law as a starting point which would mark a new direction in relations between the Basque Country and Basques and their Centers around the world (ibid:9). (See Map 7.2)

The Law provides for a Registry of Basque Centers for which each Center needs to collect the names, birthplaces, ancestral homeland town names, languages spoken, and citizenships held from its members. Originally in the 1994 law, this was to be made a matter of public record, but following complaints regarding privacy and security from several countries, but especially the United States, this is now a private databank of the Basque Government. This registry of Basque Centers are officially recognized by the Basque Autonomous Government, and the law also establishes the requirements for members of those Centers to also register and be recognized for possible benefits. It endows those registered members of Basque institutions which are also registered with the Basque Government, with material benefits as well as psychological empowerment. The material benefits include among other things the ability to attend university in the Basque country, to receive senior citizens'
Map 7.2 Officially Registered Basque Centers Around the World 1999.

**Canada**
- Canada: 1

**Mexico**
- Mexico D.F.: 2

**United States**
- California: 13
- Columbia: 1
- Florida: 3
- Idaho: 4
- Nevada: 7
- Nueva York: 2
- Oregon: 2
- Utah: 1
- Wyoming: 2
- Washington: 2

**United Kingdom**
- United Kingdom: 1

**Belgium**
- Belgium: 1

**France**
- Paris: 1
- Burdeos: 1
- Juramón: 1

**Spain**
- Madrid: 3
- Barcelona: 1
- Málaga: 1
- Palma de Mallorca: 1
- Valladolid: 1
- Valencia: 1
- Salou: 1

**Argentina**
- Buenos Aires: 72

**Paraguay**
- Asunción: 1

**Uruguay**
- Montevideo: 3
- Carmelo: 1
- Durazno: 1
- Minas: 1
- Rivera: 1
- Rosario: 1
- Salto: 1

**Australia**
- Melbourne: 1
- Sidney: 1

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**ECONOMIC FOUNDATION OR INSTITUTE**
- Argentina: Fundación Vasco-Argentina de Cooperación y Desarrollo
- Chile: Fundación Vasco-Chilena de Desarrollo
- México: Instituto Vasco-Mexicano de Desarrollo
- Venezuela: Instituto Vasco-Venezolano de Cooperación EGUZKI
pensions, to qualify for public housing in *Euskadi* (only the three provinces) and apply for grants for the diaspora community’s projects. The Law sets the requirements to be eligible for benefits, and distinguishes between benefits for members of Basque Centers and for the institutions themselves and it also distinguishes between benefits for the Basques who remain overseas and for those who return to the Basque Country.

*Ley 8/1994* created an Advisory Council for Relations with Basque Communities which meets bi or triannually for discussion and analysis of diaspora programs and communications between diaspora communities and appropriate institutions in the homeland. It consists of three persons selected by the Basque Government who have lived in and/or have researched the diaspora communities. Though the Law passed in *Euskadi* (Araba, Bizkaia, Gipuzkoa) this Advisory Council also communicates with Basque institutions in the Foral Community of *Nafarroa*, and with the three Basque provinces in *Iparralde*, north of the state border.

Importantly, it also proscribes a Congress of Basque Communities to be held every four years to be a forum for social, cultural, and economic relations between the diaspora communities themselves, and between the diaspora communities and the homeland government. Each country is allowed three delegates which they elect themselves to send for their representation. The First Congress of Basque Communities held in Vitoria-Gasteiz in November of 1995 facilitated the establishment of intercommunications between the diaspora communities. By personalizing the Congress with ample opportunity for social functions and time to meet and discuss informally with each other, delegates established personal networks that are evolving into institutional ties. For example the President of the North American Basque Organization and the President of the Argentine Federation of Basque Entities visited each other’s National Basque Festivals. An exchange of Basque dance groups was also organized between the United States and Argentina, and a possible airline charter of Basques from Argentina and Uruguay are planning to visit the Jai Aldi International Basque Festival of Boise, in the United States in 2000. *Ley 8/1994* institutionalized social, cultural, political and economic relations that were mainly personal networks previously. Not included are diaspora political organizations, academic institutions, private Basque associations, or for-profit Basque institutions such as restaurants or hotels.

Article 1 of the law stipulates a desire to preserve and reinforce links, and to support and intensify relations between the Basque Government and the homeland institutions, with the Basque communities and Centers in the diaspora. It also specifically mentions promoting activities to disseminate, stimulate and develop Basque culture and *Euskadi’s* economy.
(Article 1 section 3). This has lead some diaspora and opposition homeland party members to question the Basque Government’s instrumental motives for using the diaspora for economic gain for the homeland economy, then subsequently exploiting this economic gain to further political party, specifically PNV, election objectives. Government officials deny this and state that any relations that are good for the Basque Country are good for everyone equally, not only certain citizens from the PNV (Aguirre interview 1999; Legarreta interview 1999; San Sebastian interview 1999; Esnal interview 1999).

The Law creates a legal framework for the grants and subsidies already provided to the diaspora since 1987 and establishes the permanence of budgetary requests. It promotes networks between Basques in the diaspora with those in the Basque government and with various academic, cultural, economic, and religious, institutions in the homeland.

A.2. Benefits to Basque Organizations and Centers

For Basque Centers and organizations to take advantage of the benefits they must be “recognized” by proving they comply with the requirements of Ley 8/1994. They must have a valid constitution in accordance with the judicial system of the state in which they reside and must include as fundamental objectives the maintenance of Basque culture and social and economic ties with the Basque Country, its people, history, language and culture. Democratic internal structure and functions are required and they must request recognition and follow the procedure to obtain such. Centers must respect the objectives set down in the Ley 8/1994 and failure of any of these could lead to withdrawal of recognition.

The Basque Government also has recognized federations of Basque Centers in Argentina, Federación de Entidades Vasco Argentinos, FEVA, and in the United States the North American Basque Organizations, NABO. Private interviews with homeland government officials and institutional officials reveal a desire for the Uruguayan Centers to federate as well, thereby facilitating the communications between all parties involved. To communicate with the United States or Argentine Basques, the homeland party need only contact the federation and is sufficiently sure that all participating Centers in that country have received the same information. But in Uruguay, Australia, and other countries with more than one Basque organization, the homeland party has to individually contact each Center or

31NABO chose its name in 1973 with the intention of joining with Mexico and perhaps Canada and though it maintains relations with Centers in both countries, none have actually joined the NABO.
organization. Often, requests for information from the diaspora to the homeland are not coordinated, and are repeated and redundant. The federations also keep the Basque government out of "internal" affairs of the host countries' Basques and prevent antagonism between the diaspora and the homeland, though often creating schisms between the diaspora Basques themselves in one country.

However, because the FEVA and the NABO are federations, they share power with the individual organizations and do not have the authority to stop individual organizations from going directly to the Basque Government or other homeland institutions for aid or information. For example, the NABO had asked its Centers to channel applications for grants and subsidies through the federation so that they would be jointly submitted to the Basque Government. NABO has no authority to prioritize or favor any applications for aid. However, the Boise Euskaldunak Incorporated Basque Center went directly to the Basque Government for subsidies for the 1995 Jai Aldi cultural celebration, and the San Francisco Basque Cultural Center also went directly to the Euskadi Pelota Federation to ask for players for an exhibition and competition of handball in 1996. Both received their requests. When questioned about this, the Director of Relations with the Diaspora Communities stated that it was not the business of the Basque Government to meddle in internal affairs between the diaspora organizations, or to follow any federation directives of which they are not a member. The problem remained one for the NABO to settle between its delegates. Obviously it would be easier for the Basque Government to deal with one actor, a federation, than it is to work with sixty-eight Centers in Argentina, or thirty-four in the United States. The statutory benefits specifically given to Centers include:

A) Access to information of a public nature, with a social, cultural or economic content, prepared by the public administration of the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country. Any Basque Center that requests it will also receive the Official Bulletin of the Basque Country free of charge.

B) The right to participation in different forms of expression of Basque homeland social, cultural and economic life which contribute to the external diaspora projection of such.

C) Identical treatment to that of the associations situated in the territory of the Basque Autonomous Community in regards to access to its cultural heritage, artifacts, and special collections.

D) The right to ask the Basque Autonomous Community to participate in activities organized by a diaspora Center to promote Basque culture.
E) Center participation in programs, missions and delegations organized by Basque homeland institutions in the Centers’ territorial area.

F) The right to request and receive advice on social, economic or labor matters in the Basque Country.

G) The right to a supply of published and audiovisual material designed to facilitate the transmission of knowledge of Basque history, culture, language and social reality, for display and distribution among members of Basque communities.

H) Collaboration in activities to spread the word of the situation of Basque communities through means of communication centered in the Autonomous Community, such as Basque Radio and Television, and Euskal Etxeak journal.

I) The right to be heard via the Advisory Council and to attend the Congress of Basque Communities.

J) The organization of courses to learn the Basque language (Article 8 section 1 of Ley 8/1994).

Basque Centers also qualify to receive financial and other types of assistance that the homeland public administration might establish within the framework of this law for the diaspora. It specifically mentions support to temporarily cover the operating costs of Centers and maintaining and improving the infrastructure of the actual buildings, the promotion of activities and programs related to the homeland, and economic assistance for especially needy members (Article 8 section 3).

A. 3. Individual Rights and Benefits

Basques are now in a post-exilic stage and may go home if they desire and can afford it. There are no longer political barriers though there are financial barriers for many families. The “members of Basque communities” to whom the benefits and rights apply are defined as those resident abroad, and their dependents. Included are those who fall under Article 7 section 2 of the Statute of Autonomy, “who specifically request it shall enjoy the same political rights as those living in the Basque Country, if their last legal residence in Spain was in Euskadi, and provided they retain their Spanish nationality”. However, according to Iñaki Aguirre, Director of Relations with the Diaspora Communities, it is possible to receive benefits even if a person has dropped their Spanish citizenship by exhibiting birth records showing their place of birth in the Basque Country (Aguirre interview 1999). Those evacuated during the Spanish civil war and those exiled after the war are specifically listed for aid.

The principle of territoriality has been raised when determining to whom these rights
belong. Should they belong to those Basques born in any of the seven provinces of *Euskal Herria* or just those born in the three provinces of contemporary political boundaries of *Euskadi*? It is the government of *Euskadi* that is funding the benefits and they have determined that anyone born in one of the seven provinces that returns to one of the three provinces in the jurisdiction of *Euskadi* shall qualify for these services.

Specific rights for members of the diaspora organizations are also enumerated including access to Basque cultural heritage and libraries, archives, museums, and other cultural property and institutions for the dissemination of culture under the same conditions as citizens in the Basque Autonomous Community. Language curricula are provided to Basque Centers complimentary so that members may study *euskera* free of charge, and procedures have been established to obtain certificates of Basque language knowledge awarded by the *Euskadi* public administration to those who qualify. Educational, cultural, and economic exchanges are promoted by the Basque Government, such as with the *Gaztemundu*, World of Youth, program for uniting diaspora youth in the homeland. The University of the Basque Country, with three campuses in Gasteiz-Vitoria, Donostia-San Sebastián, and Leioa-Lejona recognizes those qualifications awarded by other universities which are of a similar nature to the qualifications established by the University of the Basque Country. A Basque with a university degree from Macquarie University in Australia could apply to the University of the Basque Country for graduate work and would automatically be accepted, or a Basque from the Universidad de la República in Montevideo studying international law, could begin courses in Montevideo, and transfer for the last year to the University of the Basque Country in Donostia-San Sebastián and not have to duplicate any course work, or take entrance exams as other foreign students do. This could be extremely beneficial for South American Basque students who are looking to future careers in Europe. With Spanish as native tongue, they would not experience the language difficulties of second language study as would the Belgian, United States, and Australian Basques. Additionally, earning a degree or diploma from a university in Spain may carry more prestige for European employment than a South American university equivalent. After education, any diaspora Basques who are interested in creating a business in the homeland can receive “technical and legal advice in regards to the creation of the business” (Article 10 section 1. G.).

The benefits that are described are to be “carried out through the Basque Centers” (Article 1 section 2) which presents a problem in several of the diaspora organizations. Some needy members would like to apply for economic assistance but are too proud to let others
know about it and certainly do not want the Center members or directors to know or to control any assistance they might receive (Olaizola interview 1998; Velasco interview 1997; Egibar interview 1997). All of the Centers are operated by volunteers who tend not to be appropriations specialists, nor account executives. Many do not want the responsibility of being fiscal officers or of determining if a subsidy is being used for the project for which it was intended. The Basque Government has not told the Centers how to do this job, just that they are the institutions to “carry out the benefits”, leaving the application open to interpretation and confusion.

For those diaspora Basques returning to the homeland, automatic residency is granted, eliminating the mandatory waiting periods of other immigrants. Benefits include access to health and social services, public housing, and those who qualify financially “may have access to means of support able to be used to facilitate their return voyage to the Basque Country with the view of establishing their residence there (Article 11 section 3).”

Several Basques in Argentina have argued that they “have a right” to Basque government benefits whether or not they are registered members of Centers. Anyone born in the Basque country should have full access to all benefits even if they cannot go to the homeland to receive them. For example, if there are old age pensions for returning diaspora Basques that will move residence to the homeland, there should be the same pensions for those who, for whatever reasons, must stay in their host country. Some diaspora Basques are demanding “rights” and benefits from the homeland while they stay in the diaspora.

This is an interesting turn of events. During the civil war and the subsequent Franco regime, diaspora Basques sent material and financial aid to the homeland Basques and supported the government-in-exile from their host countries. For some Basques that stayed in the homeland, those who left were traitors, abandoning the country when they were most needed, escaping the political oppression and “making it big” in the Americas. Now the diaspora Basques in some of these economically depressed countries of Latin America are expressing their opinions that they are “owed” these benefits by their brothers that stayed in Euskadi. A representative analogy would be a baserri, family farm, that cannot support all of the siblings. Several of the siblings leave the family farm to seek opportunities in the cities (perhaps for adventure and change, and/or they feel they have no economic options and have been pushed off the farm). Those venturing out may be resented, and their loyalty questioned, by those siblings that stay to keep the farm going. Neither is at fault, for their choices are a result of economic circumstances, personalities, birth order, gender, etc. A part of wages
earned from the city job is sent back home to the family which relieves the city siblings' feelings of guilt and/or demonstrates love and loyalty to family. The city sibling marries and makes a home in the city and becomes a city person though always worrying about and remembering with nostalgia the family's farm life. The economy shifts and now the city employment has moved elsewhere, and the farm has become prosperous. Now the city sibling needs the help of those on the farm. Should they have to move back to the farm to receive the assistance or should the family support the city dwellers as the city dwellers supported the farmers earlier? The Basque Government answers that one must live on the farm to be supported by the family; the Argentine diaspora Basques say family is family and should be supported no matter where they live.

B. Policy Formulation for the Diaspora

The establishment of an official governmental policy for the diaspora is relatively recent. In the early years of the newly autonomous Basque Government, policy makers included returnees from political exile. In 1982, the Minister of Culture invited delegates from various diaspora communities to participate in a congress regarding the future of the diaspora, but no objectives or proposals were confirmed. In 1984, the Service for Relations with the Basque Centers was established in the Ministry of Culture and its first Director, Jokin Intxausti, traveled Europe, the Americas, and the Philippines investigating the current circumstances of the Basque organizations. His untimely death in 1986 was followed by the appointment of Josu Legarreta who fashioned the goals of his office and expanded communications between the homeland government and the Centers. What had previously existed were chains of transnational personal networks between individuals in diaspora communities, and relatives in their hometowns and acquaintances in other areas, and a very few institutionalized relationships such the University of Reno Basque Studies Consortium, and the Boise State University-Ohate university study programs.

In May of 1989, the first issue of the journal *Euskal Etxeak* was published for the diaspora Basque Centers with the aim of “presenting the contemporary Basque reality” (Ardanza, 1989, p.2) to those Basques not living in the homeland. Basques were invited to submit articles thus establishing the first systematic network of communications for the diaspora populations. It has provided a common forum in which the diaspora collectivities enhance their awareness and knowledge of one another’s activities and is the primary source
of information regarding Basque Government initiatives with respect to the diaspora.

B.1. The Advisory Council for Relations with the Basque Communities

The ‘Advisory Council for Relations with the Basque Communities’ was created by the Ley 8/1994 and appointments were made in June 1995. This is the official consultative body of the public administration of the Basque Autonomous Community for diaspora affairs. Its functions are to propose to the homeland institutions the promulgation or modification of provisions relating to Basque communities. They react to and attempt to implement the Four Year Plan for Institutional Action which coincides with the World Congress of Basque Collectivities with the diaspora goals for the next four year period. This Advisory Council consists of the President of the Basque Government and his appointees to Secretary of Foreign Action, Director of Relations with the Diaspora Communities, representatives from each of the cabinet posts of Culture, Tourism, Labor, Social Security, Education, Housing, Finance, and Industry and Commerce. There are also four delegates representing the Basque Town Halls, two representatives from the Basque Parliament, one from the University of the Basque Country, one from the Basque Language Academy, and three assessors “designated by the Congress of Basque Communities” (Article 12 section 3).

Figure 7.1 Diaspora Policy Creation and Implementation

Because the Ley 8/1994 specifically describes the Assessors as “three representatives from Basque Centers designated by the Congress of Basque Communities”, delegates to the First World Congress in 1995 assumed they would be selecting these three representatives. However, the Basque Government had already appointed three persons living in Euskadi who had resided in, or who had studied the diaspora. A select committee of the Congress with one
representative per country had heated discussions regarding this topic as several believed they should represent themselves and wanted the authority to elect their own representation. It was disputed whether or not these “assessors” comprehend the diaspora situations if they are not living in, or from, the diaspora. The question of ‘trustee’ versus ‘delegate’ representation was debated with Argentina taking the lead for three elected assessors from the diaspora. Basque Government officials from the Office of Diaspora Relations intervened in the debate to attempt to soothe misunderstandings by emphasizing the fact that the assessors would have minimal input in twice yearly meetings of the Advisory Council which was only to give ideas for the facilitation of carrying out the four-year plan with homeland institutions, not to propose projects or establish anything not already in the Four-Year Plan. They can only react to what the Centers request, not initiate their own requests. Some delegates had understood that the assessors would have power over the distribution of grants and subsidies and wanted the prerogative to determine for themselves who would represent the best interests of Basques in their country.

Until this discussion there was no evident conflict between the diaspora and the homeland, or among the diaspora groups themselves at the Congress. However, the prospect of money often does divide as does the question of fair representation. The diaspora versus homeland question raised several points. Seven of the nineteen diaspora countries’ Basque delegates did not want the assessors to be appointed by the President or to come from the homeland. They did not believe a person could adequately represent a group of people of which they are not a part. Others worried that because one of the appointees had lived in Chile for many years, that he would be partial to Chile. They questioned whether or not if elected by all the delegates, the assessors would feel obligated to represent all equally, and if the assessors did not live in the diaspora would they would be able to judge which proposals for support, grants, and aid were the most needed or most appropriate.

The other twelve delegates either did not care about who represented them as long as there was trustee representation, or understood that the three Assessors do not have a vital role to play on the Advisory Council nor in the granting of funds. Typically the smaller countries (those with fewer Basques) assumed assessors from the United States or Argentina or Venezuela with their numerous Centers and their federations would be elected because of their numbers. However, because every country is allotted three delegates regardless of the size of their Basque diaspora population, the voting would not be proportional to population and perhaps lobbying and voting blocks would develop to elect an assessor. The blocks could
result in geographical, linguistic, or specific interests.

Table 7.1 Possible Voting Blocks for Advisory Council Assessor Representation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographical</th>
<th>Assessor 1</th>
<th>Assessor 2</th>
<th>Assessor 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South America</td>
<td>North America/Australia/UK</td>
<td>Europe</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Linguistic</th>
<th>Spanish speaking</th>
<th>English speaking</th>
<th>French speaking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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| Interest | Maintaining infrastructure and membership; needs of financial aid for Centers and members | Strengthening networks with homeland; needs of human aid and cultural exchange | Frequent access to homeland institutions, facilities and benefits |

The need for ethnic missionaries in Australia and the United States demonstrates their economic viability but lack of personnel or expertise for teaching language and dance, or for athletic training. While the South American Centers have many ‘Basque experts’, the economic crises in Argentina, Uruguay, and Peru have affected the organizations’ abilities to maintain themselves and that of their members to pay their dues and participate in social activities. Basque Centers in Belgium and France represent every economic group but their proximity makes it easier and cheaper for all to travel to the Basque provinces. Their frequent visits include desired access to libraries, educational facilities, special collections, museums, galleries, transportation rights of residents, health care and social benefits of residents.

The three Assessors actually chosen, the delegates agreed, were knowledgeable, fair, and would be effective representatives, albeit the point of contention was the manner of selection, not the people themselves. The Basque Government had intended that the Congress would rubber-stamp its appointments, but the delegates had understood they would be actually electing. Subsequent interviews with Basque Government officials preparing for the Second World Congress of Basque Collectivities in October 1999, confirmed that the Assessors’ roles and the selection process will remain unchanged unless the newly elected President of the Basque Government should so desire (I. Aguirre interview 1999; A. Aguirre interview 1999; Legarreta interview 1999). A discussion with one of the Assessors, Koldo San Sebastián, confirmed that he believed he was to continue as Assessor at the President’s discretion (San Sebastián interview 1999). Argentina plans to again raise the question of the definition of “designated” at the 1999 World Congress (I. Aguirre interview 1999, Velasco interview 1997, Bilbao interview 1997, Muguerza interview 1997).

B.2. Legal Framework of Basque Government Foreign Policy

The 1979 Statute of Autonomy of the Basque Country enumerates those powers granted specifically to the Basque Autonomous Community of Euskadi, and those reserved for the
central state government of Spain. Regarding diaspora populations, Article Six, section five states:

"Given that "Euskerd" is the heritage of other Basque territories and communities, the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country may request that the Spanish Government, in addition to whatever ties and correspondence are maintained with academic and cultural institutions, to conclude and, where necessary, to submit to the Spanish State Parliament for authorization, those treaties or agreements that will make it possible to establish cultural relations with the States where such territories lie and communities reside, with a view to safeguarding and promoting "Euskera".

Article 7, section 1, continues on "For the purpose of this Statute, the political status of "Basque" shall be accorded to all those who are officially resident, according to the General Laws of the State, in any of the municipalities belonging to the territory of the Autonomous Community." The following Section 2 continues "Persons residing abroad, and their descendants, who officially request it, shall enjoy the same political rights as those living in the Basque Country, if their last residence in Spain was Euskadi, and provided they retain their Spanish nationality."

Two main principles govern citizenship and naturalization in most political administrations: *ius soli* (birthplace) or *ius sanguinis* (blood ties). For example, under *ius soli*, French-born children of foreigners automatically become citizens, and likewise in the United States. However, in Germany it is virtually impossible to obtain German citizenship unless blood ties can be proven. Article 116 of the German Constitution says that all ethnic Germans who lived in the boundaries of 1937 are considered to be German, and also considers those who have never lived within the boundaries of 1937 if they are ethnic Germans. The proof can be by descent. The law of ancestry is *ius sanguinis* and nationality is transmitted to children through blood. Even second and third generation immigrants born in Germany are denied citizenship. Yet under *ius sanguinis*, anyone of German ancestral origin living in Argentina, can become German, even if the link is centuries old and the person speaks no German (R. King, 1993:2). The Basque Government has tried to combine the two, anyone born in the Basque Country that emigrated has the same rights, and anyone born to people that left no matter the generation, has the same rights. They must become members of a recognized and officially registered Basque organization in the diaspora, or return to the Basque Country and become a permanent resident.

In consideration of international treaties, a 1991 ruling by Spain’s Constitutional Court allowed the *Generalitat* of Catalonia to promote by international treaty its cultural values
outside Spain, so long as it did not compromise national sovereignty nor generate state responsibilities vis-a-vis third parties (Garcia 1995:126). Officials of all seventeen autonomous communities carry out external activities; ten have opened commercial offices in Brussels similar to that of the Basque Delegation to the European Union, and in 1995 there were at least seventy-four different treaties in twenty-five countries, mostly with sub-state actors (Garcia, 1995:127). The Basque Government then has the legal authority, and the political and economic ability to forge ahead with its diaspora successes. Utilizing the local contacts facilitated by the diaspora, they have created transnational political and economic ties with several state and sub-state actors.

By the end of 1991, there was evident a clear policy of using the Basque Centers to facilitate meetings between Basque Government officials and those in the highest levels of host country governments. President Ardanza was received with the same protocol of a head-of-state while in Chile, Mexico, Cuba, Argentina, Uruguay, and met with Vice President Gore and Congressional leaders in the United States, as a result of the influence of host country Basques (Ortuzar interview 1997). These foreign policy meetings have increased the status of the Basque Government abroad and pushed some politicians in Madrid to the edge. However, Basque Government officials need only point to the mentioned precedent setting court ruling and appropriate Articles of the Spanish Constitution (Article 42), and the Statutes of Autonomy (Article 6 section 5, Article 7 section 2, and all of Article 22) that empower the Autonomous Community to conclude agreements and treaties with other governments “for the management and provisions falling under their exclusive jurisdiction” (Article 22, Statutes of Autonomy of the Basque Country).

Article 42 of the Spanish Constitution regards the right of return for refugees, over which the Basque Autonomous Government also exercises powers, for example, by utilizing government funds to financially aid needy returnees and providing resident services. The Basque Government must submit these treaties and international agreements with host countries of Basque communities to the Spanish Parliament for authorization. In the five years since the passage of the Basque Parliament’s Ley 8/1994 detailing the specifics of returnees, only three people have requested aid based on their needy circumstances (Aguirre interview 1999). Many diaspora Basques returned in the 1980s before the Ley 8/1994 was passed and though they could also request aid now, they have not. Several of those returnees interviewed did not know the benefits exist (Goitiandia 1999, Foruria 1999, Arrubarrena 1999, Artetxe 1999) and in agreement with others, said they would not apply anyway.
Parliamentary debate on the *Ley 8/1994* and its effects on *Euskadi’s* foreign policy consisted mostly of positive emotional accounts regarding the influence of the diaspora in maintaining the Government-in-exile, the reception and care for thousands of political refugees, the work accomplished by the Centers and their members in presenting a positive image of the Basque Country, and the important work of maintaining Basque culture, language, and identity. Azua Mendia (PNV) gave a more instrumentalist angle when he spoke of the "... two-way relations which are also going to benefit the Basque Country. In a world that is ever more international, our country needs to open out and look overseas, and Basque communities can play, and are in fact playing, an interesting role in stimulating international awareness of the Basque Country, as a professional "lobby", in brief, a basic permanent reference in those markets we want to tackle" (Azua Mendia 1994). The debate from *Eusko Alkartasuna’s* (EA) voice, Intxaurraga Mendibil, raised the point of the several thousand Basques that had escaped to Russia and then were not allowed out, and EA did not want to discriminate between Basques living overseas and those living in the homeland and that both of the groups of needy Basques deserved equal treatment. Others had personal stories of relatives that had lived in exile and their efforts to maintain ethnic identity and language.

There was no mention of creating rifts with Madrid over foreign policy, or competing with other Autonomous Communities for international resources.

The *Ley 8/1994* institutionalizes relations and networks of Basque transnationalism and formulates mechanisms which facilitate cooperation and communication between the diaspora communities and the homeland institutions and among the diaspora communities themselves. The Advisory Council mobilizes the highest spheres of Basque governmental, educational, and cultural institutions in the effort to enhance foreign policy ties with the diaspora.

**C. First World Congress of Basque Collectivities**

The First World Congress of Basque Collectivities in Gasteiz in November 1995, opened the floodgates for horizontal exchange between the Basques of different countries as well as strengthened vertical ties between diaspora communities and their homeland government. Exchanges have occurred between dance groups, musicians, chefs, Center and federation officials, and athletes. Newsletters are exchanged between diaspora communities, and Internet users check each others’ webpages. The success of the Congress was largely the result of an extremely well-planned conference with goals and expectations for participants.
The First World Congress of Basque Collectivities convened to discuss the draft Four Year Plan of Institutional Action proposed by the Basque Government, and additional topics of allowing non-Basque participation at the Centers, of Basque language maintenance, of attracting new members especially youth, and keeping current members active. The conclusion of the Congress included the pronouncements that the Basque diaspora communities were ready to promote a substantial change in relations between themselves and the institutions of the homeland. The Law of Relations with the Basque Communities and the Centers proved to be a helpful legal and political tool that enabled both to reinforce their joint activities and networks.

C.1. Four Year Plan of Institutional Action

The Delegates to the 1995 First World Congress of Basque Diaspora Collectivities debated and approved the following Four Year Plan of Institutional Action. It began with the general objectives: 1.)To keep the structure and infrastructure of the Basque Centers, 2.)To promote and maintain the Basque identity, culture and language, 3.) To establish effective channels of communication and information with Euskadi, and 4.)To associate the younger generations to the life and activity of the Basque Centers, and through the Centers to Euskadi.

All Centers regardless of size or history would be considered as equal when applying for material support and special attention would be given to telecommunications and computing systems. The Basque Government approached credit and banking institutions regarding preferential financing for the Basque Centers renovating or improving physical infrastructure, and it was approved in 1998. Once a year the Book Service of the Ministry of Culture would distribute publications of the Basque Government to the diaspora Basque Centers, and would also help fund the cost of publishing by the Centers themselves.

An International Day of the Basque Language was chosen to be celebrated by all in the homeland and in the diaspora (December 3), and language learning materials sent to the Centers. Further discussion with individual Centers planned the funding for sending diaspora students to Euskadi for intensive language training, and sending homeland teachers to the diaspora communities to teach euskera. An International Association of Basque Sports was created to promote Basque handball and jai alai and unique to Euskal Herria rural sport competitions. Those Centers with fronton courts might be sent coaches and trainers if possible, but this would need further consideration from the Ministers responsible.

The Basque Government also made a commitment to intensify the stream of information
from Euskadi to the diaspora communities by way of encouraging and using Internet and particularly E-mail telecommunications. Basque Radio and Television, Euskal Irrati Telebista, ETB, would begin broadcasting one television channel and two radio stations via satellite and cable to Europe and the Americas. Improved communications would also affect the commercial and economic missions of Basque Government Institutes and Foundations, and homeland institutions would provide information, posters, and pamphlets etc. on Basque Country tourism to help the Centers promote group tours.

The social assistance described in Article 3, sections 1 and 2, of the Ley 8 would be augmented with paying the costs of travel for those needy planning a permanent return to Euskadi. Public housing would be available on an equal basis with current residents, and all diaspora members registered with their organizations would be guaranteed medical and hospital assistance while traveling in Euskadi.

As of 1999, 95% of the plan has been implemented according to the Director of Diaspora Relations, and the positive affirmations by the 75 delegates to the 1999 Second World Congress. They were not able to complete a plan for social security benefits for returnees because the individual provinces of Euskadi exercise authority over these budgets, not the Basque Autonomous Community’s regional level of government.

C.2. Future Possibilities

Not mentioned in this action plan were the responsibilities or reciprocating aid that the homeland might expect from the diaspora communities. While the diaspora needs tangible materials in the form of books, tapes, videos, and ethnic missionaries- the homeland needs a voice. According to Iñaki Aguirre it wants the Centers’ thousands of members to act as goodwill ambassadors for the Basque Country. It “wants the personal testimonies of diaspora Basques to spread the good news about Euskadi and its reality today” (I. Aguirre interview 1999). Though media research demonstrates the negative image of the Basque Country spread in international communications, the continuous ETA cease-fire of 1998-1999 has not warranted the same attention (I. Zabaleta 1998). The Basque Government would like the word of mouth to counter the international media, which is a difficult task.

For future plans, the Secretary of Foreign Action for the Basque Government would also like to facilitate and participate in the creation of an Internet network of world-wide Basque interests, including medical, business, industrial, educational, and political interests that would promote the idea of future independence for the Basque Country to their respective host
society governments. The idea is to establish a databank and exchange of information and exchange of opportunities for Basques, by Basques, and create win-win relations. Though these are the ideas of individuals and do not reflect any formal policy positions of the government or of a political party, the ideas nonetheless are likely to be acted upon because of the type of people that favor them- politicians and upper level civil servants of the homeland, and industrialists and leaders in the diaspora.

In general, the Basque Government has been more reactive than proactive with the diaspora communities. It responds to Center and individual requests as received. Each host countries’ Basque organizations have different predicaments at different times, rendering it inefficient and ineffective to create one uniform policy for all the diaspora. Thus the importance of the open-ended Four Year Plan and the grant possibilities for customizing relations.


As a result of the positive rapport begun at the Congress in Gasteiz, and Argentina’s desire to continue the discussion and activities planned, the FEVA organized a mid-World Congress of Basque Collectivities for Buenos Aires 1997 and invited all the Basque Centers of the Americas to discuss the Four Year Plan of Institutional Action passed in 1995. The American Congress of Basque Centers of 1997 evaluated their own performance on the goals set in Gasteiz and discussed themes that were tabled due to lack of time in 1995. Seminars included the following themes: the selection of the three Assessors for the Basque Government diaspora Advisory Committee; the fact that there are many Basques in the diaspora that are not members of Centers that will not qualify for any grants aid but that are needy and deserving; creation of a worldwide databank of blood donors (already existing in Uruguay, Argentina, and Chile) for the rare RH negative blood abundant in the Basque population; increased frequency and quality of communications among diaspora Centers; the expansion of this American Congress to include all the Basque Centers of the world; and the creation of an international non-governmental organization that would function at the level of the United Nations, European Union, and similar political and economic alliances.

The people of these Basque Centers are all part-time volunteers, not likely international business moguls or high status politicians. However, they know how to mobilize their memberships and how to contact and network with other Basques who are influential. They assume the Basque ethnic connection to be enough to open the door and be heard, and they have often been correct (Eiguren 1999; Garritz 1997; Muguerza 1998).
Argentina's proposal included raising again the issue of Basques who are not members of registered Centers and who therefore do not qualify for aid, which they argued is unjust. They also proposed an identity card for diaspora Basques to utilize while in Euskadi that would identify them as beneficiaries of residents' rights.

D. The Impact of Media

The Basque diaspora communities have recognized their roles in countering media reports since the beginning of the Spanish Civil War with their efforts to inform their host country audiences regarding the falseness of Franco propaganda and their Catholicism and anti-communist ideology. The Government-in-exile utilized the diaspora to spread the word of homeland circumstances for decades, and the current elected Basque government hopes the diaspora will continue to fulfill this role. Iñaki Zabaleta has researched negative media images of the Basque Country and its effects on public opinion. He found that between 1991-98, 96% of news in the *New York Times* concerning the Basque Country was negative and related to terrorism. Only the inauguration of the Guggenheim Museum in Bilbao broke this streak (Zabaleta 1998). To thwart this one-sided image of *Euskal Herria*, the Autonomous Government intends to utilize the Internet, Basque Radio and Television, and the *Euskal Etxeak* journal to keep Basques and non-Basques informed of the Basque Country's reality. Each are also fundamental to the continuing transnational links and the maintenance of ethnic identity.

D.1. Downloading Identity

Internet links established in 1995 between the majority of the Basque diaspora's Centers have produced an explosion of personal communications among the usually younger Basques who understand how to utilize the electronic mail. Information, invitations, Basque language lessons, and Basque website addresses are shared. Since 1995 when the Basque Government financed the 'wiring' of the diaspora Centers, one can witness the profound developments in intercommunications. Lists, chatrooms, and over 600 websites (Alonso interview 1998) give Basque 'surfers' a myriad of choices in information and entertainment respecting Basque themes. Inquiries that otherwise might be disregarded because of the hassle it might cause are now made and answered simply with several clicks of the mouse. Basques from the United States interested in investing in real estate in Argentina have utilized Basque Center e-mail and connections to get information. Basques from Belgium desiring to practice their English have
made institutional and personal contacts through the Centers in the United States and Australia. Researchers and journalists are provided with opportunities to make connections and arrange fieldwork while benefitting from the institutional networks. While the previously established communications between Centers has tended to be institutional and instrumental for the institution, Internet communications have the capability to encourage personal and personally instrumental interactions.

Internet access will likely provide the most significant catalyst for exponential increases in intradiasporic communications. The Internet allows the construction and manipulation of a virtual identity that breaks free from traditional paradigms of territoriality, ancestry, and language and enables a construct of identity based on the actor’s own definition. The exploitation of telecommunications introduces expanded dimensions for the creation and recreation of ethnicity, and carries the potential to unite virtually what is impossible to unite physically. Diaspora populations are accustomed to psychological and emotional ties without the benefits of physical contact. However, the Internet does not give a public or social identity and is therefore not perceived as a threat to the Basque Centers or cultural organizations. Because technology is relatively only available to those with knowledge and financial ability, it is currently utilized at the Basque Centers by those few skilled members, and at home by those who can afford the computer and Internet access. Television is much more accessible and effective for information transfer and entertainment.

Basque public television and radio, *Euskal Irrati Telebista*, has made inroads to the south American market and is transmitting to Basque communities through cable television in Mexico, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Venezuela and the United States in 1998, but there are no sure plans for Peru, Australia, or Belgium (Aranburu interview, 1999). It is hoped that the consistent homeland transmission from *Euskal Irrati Telebista* will show a different perspective on current events in the Basque Country, and will educate and update those who watch. It has been a very popular idea among the Basques in these diaspora countries to be able to receive twenty-four hour current news broadcasts, films, game shows, sporting events, cultural entertainment etc. in Basque and in Spanish. ETB also broadcasts to the homeland audience documentaries and reports regarding the diaspora population. This promotes a more realistic and less symbolic or nostalgic knowledge of each other. The influence of the media and the globalization of telecommunications is being utilized to achieve positive results for Basque ethnic identity as Basques are becoming more and more interconnected with each other around the globe. The imagined community is expanding into a virtual reality.
D.2. Euskal Etxeak: An Intra-diaspora Journal

The *Euskal Etxeak* journal is published for the diaspora communities three or four times a year by the Basque Government with news and information regarding *Euskal Herria* and Basques from all over the world. It arrives to the Basque Centers and to most members’ home addresses, financed by the Basque Government. This extremely popular periodical is written in Basque, Spanish, and English editions and publishes current reports from the homeland regarding sport, politics, economics, history, language, etc. as well as editorials and activities from the diaspora members. Numerous interview respondents pointed to it as an example of prestige and legitimacy, mentioning, “we even have our own magazine you know?” Being an organized and mobilized diaspora community is socially and psychologically significantly different from being just one more descendant of another immigrant in their host society. Conversations with Basques in each host country included the influence of the journal and the ability to compare themselves with other Basque around the world. This publication has been the most effective to date in creating a united diaspora mentality that demonstrates to all Basques who encounter it the similarities between the diaspora populations. Readers compare the celebrations, programs, histories, and problems of Basques in other areas of the world and have concluded that there are more similarities than differences.

One phenomenon resulting from this initial unification sees diaspora Basques trying to find lost kin relations in other *diaspora* communities. A first step for many Basques in their return to ethnicity may have been looking for homeland family, investigating histories of immigrant ancestors, and an emotional visit to the ancestral home in *Euskal Herria*. Now those Basques and others who are a part of a continual line of ethnic maintenance, are branching out and looking for relatives like themselves who emigrated to other parts of the world. Internet websites proclaim abilities to research family genealogy but detailed records on Basques are often scarce and occasionally unreliable. Historical research, such as looking for great-aunts and great-uncles and further removed family entails looking through poorly kept emigration and immigration records, and more specific Basque Center membership lists. Finding information regarding a Basque that was not a Center member is extremely difficult. On the contrary, discovering a live relative that participates in any Basque institution anywhere, is relatively simple when knowing a complete name and place of birth. Subscribers to *Euskal Etxeak* have discovered pictures and names of relatives when reading about other countries, and individual E-mail requests for information to Basque Centers is becoming
customary (Miller interview 1999; Curutchet interview 1999; Arozarena interview 1999; Camino interview 1999).

Abundant homeland information will undoubtedly bring about diaspora opinions and questions regarding public policy. The Basque Government may find that rather than blindly following homeland policy and 'obeying' and being 'loyal' to established governmental policy, the diaspora may raise criticisms. By empowering and encouraging diaspora populations to involve themselves with each other and the homeland, they may have opened a Pandora's box. The growing self-assertiveness of the Basques in the diaspora and the fact that they have survived without the Basque government's aid until now means that the transmission of criticism from the diaspora toward the homeland could go without serious repercussions. If the homeland's leadership perceives that its diaspora should maintain constant contact, express loyalty, and provide the homeland with services in the host country (for example by utilizing the Centers as free "embassies"), there could be considerable tension. Perhaps the Bakersfield and Los Banos groups are justified in their "strings attached" worries regarding the free computers from the Basque Government. Clearly stated objectives and expectations in communications between the Basque Government and the diaspora communities would improve and perhaps eliminate any strained relations.

E. *Euskadi*'s Commitment to the Diaspora

E.1. Basque Government Financial Support for the Diaspora

The various Basque diasporic communities maintain vertical relations with the homeland and horizontal relations with each other in the different host societies. Each of the sample diaspora populations presented here, with the one exception of north Queensland, has institutional relations with the *Eusko Jaurlaritza*, the Autonomous Basque Government of *Euskadi*. Public Law 8/1994 recognizes the Basque Centers as Cultural Delegations of *Euskadi*- representations of embassies for a stateless people. Josu Legarreta, Director of Diaspora Relations with the Basque Communities during the 1980s, asked that the Centers "continue as until now, as Ambassadors of the Basque Country, being a collective acknowledgment of what our country is and has been among the nations of the world" (Legarreta 1989:10). The Basque Government has supported its rhetoric with *pesetas* to help subsidize these cultural embassies.
Table 7.2 Basque Autonomous Government Appropriations to Diaspora Communities

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>$367,741</td>
<td>$625,000</td>
<td>$674,000</td>
<td>$445,476</td>
<td>$478,451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>$32,258</td>
<td>$196,269</td>
<td>$121,428</td>
<td>$81,219</td>
<td>$95,547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>$31,661</td>
<td>$106,015</td>
<td>$88,182</td>
<td>$97,757</td>
<td>$70,738</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>$2,016</td>
<td>$42,857</td>
<td>$35,714</td>
<td>$43,242</td>
<td>$18,465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>$2,420</td>
<td>$15,873</td>
<td>$15,800</td>
<td>$16,921</td>
<td>$11,587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>$6,451</td>
<td>$12,700</td>
<td>$15,690</td>
<td>$12,221</td>
<td>$10,330</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figures in United States dollars figured from Spanish pesetas for each year’s average exchange rate.

Grants were funded even before the formal Public Law 8 passed in 1994, with initial appropriations for the entire combined diaspora communities in nineteen countries applying for aid in 1987 totaling five million pesetas (40,650 $U.S.). This figure increased to 209,356,000 pesetas (1,661,555 $US) in 1997, equal to approximately 0.03% of the entire Basque Government expenditures (Aguirre interview, 1999). The grants support functions such as Basque Center building maintenance, cultural celebrations and promotion, language courses, expenses for choirs and dance troupes, athletes, conferences and academic research on Basque themes.

The effects of the subsidies on the Basque organizations is debatable. As shown in Table 2.1, the creation of fifty-seven new organizations since 1985 in just these six case studies does coincide with the granting of subsidies by the Basque Government. But it also coincides with the autonomy of the Basque provinces which boosted Basque morale in the diaspora. This change in political status can have profound effects on a homeland’s diaspora as witnessed in Polish Catholic communities that have revived their trans-state activities motivated by the emergence of Solidarity and the democratization of Poland (Sheffer 1986:4). Croatians abroad have also revived and created organizations after the break-up of Yugoslavia and have intensified their activities as Croatian ethnics (Winland 1995).

In Argentina, the resurgence also coincides with the consequences of the embarrassment of the Malvinas/Falkland Islands War with Great Britain and shame of Argentine identity (T. Zabaleta interview 1997). One could argue that the increase in Basque awareness follows a trend of general ethnic identity resurgence around the globe. Grants are also only for special one-time projects and are not intended for, nor are they sufficient to compensate for, the construction or permanent maintenance of buildings. However, Arnold Strickon argues, with reference to his analysis of Norwegian immigrants and national
independence, "Once a target population does respond to the overture of the home country, the ideological and material inputs into the emigrant population can themselves become a motivation, resource, and reinforcement of ethnic identification and activity" (Strickon 1984 as quoted in Winland 1995:6). The Basque Government representatives for diaspora relations do not believe there is a positive causal relationship between grants funded and increases in numbers of Basque organizations (Ortuzar interview 1999; Oregui interview 1999).

To obtain these grant funds, Representatives of the Office of Relations with the Diaspora Communities make requests for appropriations to the European Union and to the Basque Autonomous Government Parliament. The Presidentially appointed Director of this office is the main actor in determining which proposals for subsidies are awarded funding. Favored grants for a higher percentage of the total amount requested are those that will affect the most people and which have "staying power". For example, a video tape transformer from the European PAL to the North American NTBS transmission system and vice versa is open for use for all members of all NABO clubs and those in Canada as well. Members mail in their child's First Communion video tape to the NABO representative responsible, he converts the tape and mails it back, and it is ready to send on to their family to be viewed in the Basque Country. Videos sent from the homeland are converted just as easily for diaspora viewing at a cost of just five U.S. Dollars. Because it is available for all members, and can be utilized continuously, the grant was fully funded. Proposals for festival production costs might include requests for everything from bringing homeland dancing groups and athletes to Australia to paying for special gifts for dignitaries in Argentina. Those requests might receive only partial funding.

One section of the grant petition requests the solicitor to give ideas about how this proposal could be otherwise funded in the future- intending to encourage the Centers and individuals to think and move on to self-support. In 1999 only five of the ninety-nine applicants answered. There is a creeping worry among a few policy makers in the homeland administration that diaspora communities in the countries hard hit with economic decline will continue to make grant requests without consideration to the necessity versus desire for a certain project. Festivals can be successful and effective at promoting and enhancing Basque culture and identity, and simultaneously efficiently administered without superfluous accessories. However, Basque Government officials working in Diaspora Relations are adamant about not interfering in internal decision making of diaspora organizations. Therefore, Argentina continues to make requests for festival budgets- including airfares and
gifts for Basque Government officials to participate; the Director of Diaspora Relations determines certain things (such as the gifts) are not totally necessary and decides what percentage of the total request to grant; Argentina receives the grant and buys the gifts for the homeland officials participating and cuts something else they deem as unnecessary. In 1995, there were sixty-one applications for financial aid and by 1999 this number was ninety-nine. During the same years the budget for the Diaspora Relations office decreased.

In 1999, ninety-seven of the ninety-nine separate proposals for grant consideration received partial aid. Rather than fully fund a few projects, each proposal is examined for its breath and depth, and, of course, cost. Each grant application has to be approved by the officially registered Basque organization of which the solicitor is a member. The Basque Government does not meddle in these internal affairs either and each Center can make their own rules regarding how their own members make proposals. The Centers can relay on to their federations every single grant application from its members, or send them all directly to the Basque Government, or screen the applications and deem some unworthy or unworkable. Of course it is to the Centers' benefit to send in all applications and compel the Director of Relations with Diaspora Communities to act as hatchet man. This action avoids personal conflict and internal problems in the Centers, and lays the blame for not being selected on an unknown homeland appointed official and his civil servants.

In addition to grants, the Basque Government has negotiated with the Basque Banco Bilbao Vizcaya to allow special lower interest rates for loans to diaspora Centers, with the Basque Government acting as guarantor. The 4.75% interest rate is extremely advantageous for Centers in countries with floating rates and where borrowers pay more than triple that rate. Sixteen Centers in Argentina, Uruguay, and Mexico have taken loans to carry out investment in infrastructure and to improve their facilities. Each of the Centers so far has received the total amount for which they applied and the total loans equal approximately 1.6 million US Dollars (*Euskal Etxeak* No.41, 1999:10).

The Autonomous Government of Nafarroa opened communications with Basque Centers in the 1990s, mostly as a response to diaspora queries. They have not established a specific office to deal with external relations with Basque communities, but try to accommodate requests for information, especially tourism, through the Basque Centers. They do not have the equivalent of the Director of Relations with the Basque Collectivities, an *Euskal Etxeak*, or an ETB. Euskadi's nationalist governments have been happy to include the neighboring province in research and information spread to the diaspora, but has no
authority over any activities in the autonomous territory of Nafarroa.

The three provinces in the north, Iparralde, have no formal local government-diaspora relations. However, non-governmental organizations, cultural associations, and privately funded activities foster networks. There is relatively recent emigration from Ziberoa, Behe Nafarroa, and Lapurdi, to the United States and to Belgium. Therefore, regardless of the lack of institutional relations, personal chains and networks are recent and strong as demonstrated in Chapter Five by the frequency of visits to the Basque Country. Basque dance troupes, choirs, athletes, and musicians from Iparralde have toured the diaspora communities through personal invitations of Center leaders and through personal and Center funding. The Basque Autonomous Government of Euskadi does incorporate various institutions and artists from Nafarroa and Iparralde into its diaspora projects and continues to promote the nationalists' concept that the seven provinces, although divided politically, are united through ethnicity, history, language and culture.

The Office of Relations with Basque Collectivities changed from the Ministry of Culture to the Office of the Presidency under the Secretariat of Foreign Action in 1992. The Office of Relations with the Basque Communities shares foreign policy responsibilities with two others, whose names and 1998 budgets are depicted in Figure 7.2.

Figure 7.2 Basque Autonomous Government Foreign Policy Responsibilities

Presidency of the Basque Autonomous Government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Development Cooperation</th>
<th>European Affairs</th>
<th>Relations with Basque Communities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30 million (US$)</td>
<td>3 million (US$)</td>
<td>1.5 million (US$)</td>
</tr>
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</table>

The Office of Economic Development Cooperation represents the Basque Government's commitment to aid the underdeveloped world in compliance with the United Nations' standard that each developed country should dedicate .7 of one percent of its GNP to international humanitarian purposes (Douglass UNR conference paper 1998). The Office of European Affairs directs Basque interests in the European Union and researches economic possibilities for Basque industry and business in other areas of the European Union, and also
encourages European industry and business to locate in the Basque Country. It has an official Delegation in Brussels which affects the established Basque collectivity in much the same manner as the Institutos and Fundaciones do in the Americas.

E.2. Fundaciones, Institutos, and Confusion

The Basque Government has established political and economic policies to promote international business networks utilizing the positive reputation and status of the Basque populations in their host communities. Benefitting from the positive social status of Basques, top Basque business leaders, engineers, and lawyers from the host society have been combined with expert economists and specialists from Euskal Herria to create the business and economic Institutos, Institutes, and Fundaciones, Foundations, charged with producing and designing international trade between homeland and diaspora.

In 1992, the Basque Government created the Basque Foundations and Basque Institutes of Chile, Mexico, Argentina, Venezuela, and later those of the United States and Uruguay. An economic network concept established in the diaspora, the idea was to create industrial and business relationships between homeland and host country enterprises where Basques had high social status and economic clout. The homeland businesses would use the diaspora Basques’ contacts and personal networks to make inroads into the Mercosur trading block with investment, production, and distribution for the reconversion of industrial societies. In the United States, the American Basque Foundation had a lobby office in Washington D.C. which helped get Basque Government public debt bonds introduced in United States markets, aided political relations with Vice President Gore and several Congressional leaders and Committee Chairpersons, and facilitated negotiations with the Guggenheim Foundation of New York for the Guggenheim Museum of Bilbao. Though the Foundation in the United States has since dissolved, the others continue to expand. These Institutes and Foundations mediated the investment of thirty-five Basque firms in the Latin American countries during 1997 and 1998 alone (Legarreta interview 1999). It is highly unlikely that the Belgian Basques can influence European Union (EU) policy, or add to the Basque Government’s weight in EU regional committees’ political or economic decisions (Ortuzar interview 1997), therefore, there are no plans for an Institute or Foundation, and the established Delegation of Euskadi in Brussels already performs these economic functions. In Australia, the Basque diaspora population does not meet the critical mass necessary for political or economic influence, and the Secretary of Foreign Action stated that though it would be the natural
opening to the Asian markets, there are no plans yet for expanding to Australia.

The creation of these Foundations and Institutes caused many misunderstandings between their employees (mostly professional economists, marketing and business specialists), the Centers and their memberships, and the Basque Government. The Centers had been told in speech after speech by the Basque President and in numerous communiqués from Diaspora Relations officials, that they were the “embassies of the Basque Country”, that all communications and relations between the homeland and the diaspora would be achieved through Center-Basque Autonomous Government channels. Now there were “Institutes” and “Foundations” created separately by the Basque Government that were receiving business and government representatives from homeland and host country.

One former President of a Basque Center in Argentina described his embarrassment and disappointment when at a business lunch an associate asked why he, after all as President of the local Basque Center, had not attended a reception for the delegation from the Basque Country interested in building a machine plant in their city? He knew nothing about it because in fact, the Institute had not notified him or anyone at the Center. The interviewees at the Institute replied, “Why would we? Why should we? These are business meetings not Basque dance or art exhibitions. We have work to do and just because there is a Basque cultural organization here does not mean we are going to ask permission or clear our business presentations with someone who does not know anything about the topic” (Urquizu interview 1997).

When posed the question regarding money to be made and missing out on it, or personal rivalries or jealousies involved between the two groups, members of the Centers overwhelmingly replied no, they just wanted the information and recognition that they had been told they were granted. They only wanted to be informed, not consulted for permission; only aware of additional ties and links being established in order to be knowledgeable and up to date regarding homeland-diaspora relations of all kinds. A few of the Foundation and Institute personnel believed the Center leaders were worried about losing or having to share their status in the communities as spokespersons for their respective Basque communities, but not necessarily interested in personal material gain as that is practically impossible to obtain through the Foundations or Institutes.

The Centers are not professional structures and do not have continuous leadership by the same individuals. Volunteers make up the Boards of Directors and these people cannot possibly do the work of the Foundations and Institutes. The Basque Government needs
expert professionals to foment these business and industrial communications and they will remain separate from the Centers (Irazusta interview 1997). The Diaspora Relations Director asked to have the FEVA and NABO federation Presidents on the boards of their Institute and Foundation respectively, and in Uruguay, Chile, Mexico, and Venezuela those involved with the Institutes are the same people as are usually on the Boards of Directors anyway, so they did not have the problems of the United States or Argentina. In Argentina the FEVA President is not yet on the Board of the Institute and most people in the Centers could not explain to this researcher what the Institute is, or what are its functions. Homeland policy makers and civil servants admit that the personality conflicts inside diaspora organizations, and between them, are indeed issues of discussion and slight concern. However, they uphold a “no entanglement” policy.

This continuous aspect of homeland-diaspora relations involves the entwining of economic and financial resources, as did the colonial enterprises, migration chains, and activities during the civil war and the following Franco years. Grants appropriated by the Basque Government for the established diaspora Basque Centers, the private ownership of land or businesses in Euskadi by diaspora Basques, and the resources connected to joint ventures, all strengthen the contemporary transnational bonds between the two, although qualitatively changed now with the element of a recognized government as an actor for the first time. The evolving relationship may prove to be problematic. Gabriel Sheffer notes that when examining the behavior of homeland governments toward their established diaspora, governments want to promote their own interests and if there arises a conflict between homeland and diaspora needs—homeland economic and political interests come first (Sheffer 1996: 44).

Future relations between the Basque Government and the Basque Centers will most assuredly continue to be culturally dominated while focusing on expansion and preservation of ethnic identity. Although the PNV has not directly introduced partisan politics into the relationship, when campaigning at home they benefit from the international status they have created by using the position of the Basques in the host societies and from the Institutes and Foundations. Infant networks of Basque Centers, Federations, Basque Institutes, and individuals will soon further impact the ‘imagining’ of a global Basque diaspora. The daily manifestations of ethnic identity preservation therefore, are more likely to evolve into a diasporic-Basque identity rather than host country-Basque identity.
E.3. Gaztemundu: Preparing Diaspora Youth for Future Leadership

A special program encouraging youth to visit the Basque homeland of today, not the idealized and romanticized myth perpetuated by generations of Basques, was initiated in 1990. The other goal of Gaztemundu, World of Youth, is to educate and prepare the future leaders of the Basque organizations. The program is not a two-week tourist trip through the provinces. Diaspora Basques who are members of an officially registered Center and between the ages of twenty and thirty years old are invited to apply to be one of sixty chosen to participate in the Gaztemundu program each autumn. The Basque Centers must carry out their own pre-selection and can forward no more than three proposals per organization. Countries that have only one Basque Center are allowed to send up to ten delegates. Applicants are required to create an individual project regarding one of three themes; 1.) promotion of cultural activities in their Center and in their host country, 2.) economic and industrial relations between their host country and Euskadi, or 3.) attracting and keeping youth active in the diaspora organizations. The participants present their research papers -conference style- and then discuss in their topic group their solutions and proposals for improvement. Each selected person pays up to 700 US$ and the Basque Government subsidizes the remaining costs. This program is perceived as an effective investment in the future for diaspora-homeland relations. The Basque Government is molding the self-selected future leaders of the institutions and preparing them to work inside the current prepared framework of relations. The Gaztemundu initiative has been successful in achieving its stated goals as well as meeting peripheral objectives of strengthening ties among diaspora communities through these youth conferences. Gaztemundu participants interviewed from one month to three years after attending their conference, each stated that they do remain in constant contact with at least one person from a different country, and exchange ideas for each other's Centers.

The ageing of the emigrant collectivities relates to the Basque Government's conscious attempt to recreate a modern Basque diaspora. It has an interest in promoting the reality of today's Basque Country to its own diaspora so that they can also go forth and spread the word about economic development and political autonomy. Occasionally, rhetoric from Basque government officials traveling to the diaspora communities is almost pedagogical in that it seeks to educate diaspora Basques about "Basqueness". It is trying to promote a non-traditional and non-Aranist profile of "is Basque in this way, or is Basque in that way" (Garmendia 1997) rather than the stale definitions of older generations regarding Catholicism,
ancestry, and *euskera*. It is creating institutionalized bonds between hyphenated Basques and the Basque Country "to secure the allegiances of the former for the latter's economic and political agendas, both Old and New World" (Douglass conference paper 1998).

In each election of the Basque Autonomous Community, the PNV has been able to retain the Presidency, which controls the Secretariat of Foreign Action and the Directorate of Relations with Basque Communities, and the Ministry of Culture. Both are fundamental to the diaspora network and to the homeland nationalists’ agenda. Because the diaspora communities were already organized, the Basque Government, and the PNV, have benefitted from the structures of the Centers and were able to utilize and fortify already existing networks.

F. Diaspora Political Commitment to *Euskadi*

F.1. Voting

It is not uncommon for homeland politicians to campaign to their diaspora populations. Israeli parties organize inexpensive airline charters to allow diaspora Jews to travel and vote in homeland elections. Haitian and Filipino leaders actively solicit their United States diaspora populations for support (Basch, Glick Schiller, Szanton Blanc, 1994). In the Spanish Autonomous Community of Galicia, the diaspora vote makes an electoral difference as it did recently by giving the necessary percentage to elect Fraga Ibarne, who traveled to diaspora communities, with approximately 500,000 votes from outside the Galician homeland (Aguirre interview 1999). In *Euskadi* and in *Nafarroa* no political parties campaign for the Parliament or for the Presidencies outside their respective autonomous communities because the diaspora vote does not make an electoral difference. The total number of qualified diaspora voters for the 1998 election in *Euskadi* was 26,396- of whom only 6,888 actually voted and 712 of those were nullified for various reasons. This represents only .5% percent of the total 1,248,203 votes cast in that election.

Table 7.3 demonstrates the differences in political party preferences between the homeland and diaspora populations. There is stronger diaspora support for the PNV, and the PSOE, and less support for the EH/HB, confirming the questionnaire data in Table 5.2. After going to the trouble to become eligible to vote, a very low percentage actually do so.33

33 In *Euskadi* there is an abstention rate in elections that hovers between 30-35%.
Table 7.3 Diaspora Voting 1990, 1994 and Diaspora and Euskadi Voting 1998 Elections

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Registered Voters</td>
<td>7,005</td>
<td>14,373</td>
<td>26,396</td>
<td>1,700,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual Voters</td>
<td>2,152 (30.7%)</td>
<td>3,119 (21.7%)</td>
<td>6,888 (26.1%)</td>
<td>1,241,315 (73%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PARTIES</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNV</td>
<td>647 (30.1%)</td>
<td>978 (31.4%)</td>
<td>2,011 (32.6%)</td>
<td>28.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSOE</td>
<td>523 (24.3%)</td>
<td>858 (27.5%)</td>
<td>1,500 (24.3%)</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PP</td>
<td>205 (9.5%)</td>
<td>431 (13.8%)</td>
<td>1,343 (21.7%)</td>
<td>20.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HB/EH</td>
<td>204 (9.5%)</td>
<td>312 (10%)</td>
<td>522 (8.5%)</td>
<td>18.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IU</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>31 (1%)</td>
<td>256 (4.2%)</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EA</td>
<td>105 (4.9%)</td>
<td>251 (8.1%)</td>
<td>378 (6.1%)</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>468 (21.8%)</td>
<td>258 (8.3%)</td>
<td>166 (2.7%)</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nullified votes</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>712</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>2,152 (100%)</td>
<td>3,119 (100%)</td>
<td>6,176 (100%)</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Election data compiled from Basque Government published results. *Euskal Etxeak*. No. 40, 1998 PNV=Partido Nacionalista Vasco; PSOE=Partido Socialista Obrero Español; PP=Partido Popular; HB/EH=Herri Batasuna/Euskal Herritarrok. The political movement favored by ETA previously known as Herri Batasuna has changed it name to Euskal Herritarrok. IU=Izquierda Unida; EA=Eusko Alkartasuna.

Although the *Euskal Etxeak* magazine explained to its readers the registration and voting procedures, Basques in Sydney erroneously thought they had to go to the Spanish Embassy (they could go to any Consular Office), in Peru, Uruguay, and the United States, some received their ballots by post- after the election. It is clear that many are interested in the homeland elections, it can be assumed at least the over 26,000 from *Euskadi* and another almost 13,000 from *Nafarroa* that are registered. Many, many more are not aware that they qualify and have this right, and as shown in Chapter Five, the majority do not know enough about politics to distinguish between the political parties.

Of note is the lack of information in the diaspora communities regarding the ETA cease fire, except for in Belgium. When leaders of the communities that had participated in the questionnaires and interviews in 1996 and 1997 were contacted again in 1998 and 1999 regarding the imprisonment of the National Directorate of *Herri Batasuna* in the fall of 1997 for the production of a campaign video, and the ETA cease-fire that began in September of 1998, they reported the communities were quite ignorant of both events. Individuals with access to Basque media via the Internet “may be interested”, but none of those communities contacted had held any kind of informative meetings for their members. None had discussed either of the topics formally at members’ dinners or other gatherings. Center bartenders also reported very little discussion of either event. This is consistent with questionnaire data that almost two-thirds of the diaspora populations researched do not know about or purposefully
stay out of Basque Country politics.

G. Conclusions

The Euskal Etxeak, Euskal Irrati Telebista, Internet, and Basque Government communications continue to enhance the imagining and creation of an interconnected diaspora. If a time series analysis could be performed, likely future results would exhibit a change in diaspora definitions of "Basqueness" to coincide more with the homeland changes to a civic and more inclusive definition of what is means to be Basque. The core elements of Basque identity are likely to remain similar with a cultural emphasis, but gaps between homeland and diaspora definitions and attitudes are likely to narrow. The Basque collectivities do exhibit a transnational diaspora mentality though they are not likely to use the "diaspora" terminology. Institutional leaders and individual members define themselves as connected to their homeland and becoming increasingly interconnected with other Basque diaspora communities. The transnational identity of being both-Basque and host country-is prevalent in the questionnaire results presented in Chapters Five and Six. The hyphenated identity denotes equality and eliminates hierarchy.

The bridge between the homeland and the diaspora has facilitated raising international consciousness regarding the Basque cause, primarily through the quasi-state visits of President Ardanza, and education of the diaspora populations themselves in regards to the contemporary overall situation of the homeland. Each new advancement in transportation, telecommunications, and the Internet reduces the physical and conceptual distance between San Sebastián, San Francisco, and Santa Fé.

The Basque communities are proving to be effective and significant non-state actors, preceding on behalf of their homeland government, institutions, and businesses. Though the role can be evaluated for its importance, the 'unofficial ambassador' status has been influential in the cases analyzed here. However, I have also shown that diaspora communities do not operate as monolithic blocs of ethnic or political consciousness and that there are personal conflicts and individual agendas that interfere with effective administration of grants, and economic and political ties between and among the diaspora and homeland populations.

Though some diaspors attempt to determine the political outcomes in their homelands and influence the making of domestic and foreign policy, there is no evidence for this in the Basque case beyond the few who participate in Euskadi elections. Milton Esman's
conclusions that ethnic solidarities become internationally significant by way of transnational economic and political networks (Esman 1995:114) pertains to the Basque case in that it is "significant" to them, though not necessarily to the international economic system. Sheffer also concludes that ethnic diaspora networks are becoming more important in the international arena (Sheffer 1986:1). What is salient in categorizing the Basque phenomenon as a diaspora is the consistent commitment to maintain ties—sentimental, economic, political, religious, kinship—with the homeland.

Home governments may attempt to use their diasporas in pursuit of their own goals as the Eusko Jaurlaritza has with the Institutos and Fundaciones and to benefit for political advantage from personal connections of diaspora members. When the Basque diaspora has attempted to influence their respective host country governments on behalf of the interests of the homeland, they have been unsuccessful with the exception of the Comité de Inmigración de 1940 in Argentina. Individual political actors listened as described in Chapter Four, but host country policies toward Spain or later toward the Autonomous Basque Government have not been changed due to the lobbying of diaspora populations. Nor have either of these six host country governments attempted to use the Basque diaspora for its own political or economic gain in or with any of the seven provinces of the Basque Country, or the governments of Euskadi or Nafarroa, or Spain.

The Basque Autonomous Government has never had reason to interfere in any host country to protect its diaspora population, evading political conflicts between homeland and host countries. While Basques have had the ‘opportunity structure’ (Esman 1984:338) in each of the countries except Peru, to organize and promote their domestic and international interests, they have not often utilized this opportunity except when mobilizing for the political exiles of the Spanish civil war, and to protest the Franco court’s handling of the Burgos Trial of ETA suspects in 1970. Isolated political activity by individual initiative has seldom occurred in attempts to directly influence political and economic activities in the homeland during, or after, the Franco dictatorship.

The leaderless diaspora is no more. There is a marked difference between the passive policy of the 1980s and the active one of the 1990s. The Basque Government has only begun to harness the potential of the diaspora communities. It has been nudged into the spotlight by a diaspora waiting since the days of the government-in-exile. It has not yet made the mistake of attempting to control its diaspora populations, nor has it alienated them by telling them they are not a part of the homeland or no longer understand it. The honeymoon period
is just now ending, and the euphoria of having an autonomous government, enjoying economic prosperity with gifts of grants and subsidies for the Centers and their members, with a "no questions asked" attitude of acceptance by the diaspora for government policy may not last forever. Control of the Basque government by nationalist coalitions may not last either, and the non-partisan non-political and heretofore almost non-politicized and non-mobilized diaspora may flirt with a change of status.

A change in Basque Government ruling parties could change the relations with the diaspora perhaps as less favorable, with less appropriations and less economic development. Regardless of which parties lead, future Basque Governments could utilize the effects of globalization and transnationalism to the advantage of all, with diaspora business and economic development, cultural enhancement, language revitalization, spiritual and psychological augmentation and intensification in regards to ethnic identity. Or, to the detriment of all Basques, it could underestimate the power of ethnic identity and patronize with condescension, or ignore the new model of deterritorialized loyalties- and awaiting opportunities.
Amaia \textsuperscript{34}: An Interconnected Disconnectedness

The history of Basque transnationalism challenges the sociospatial assumptions of community, for these active ethnics have linked themselves simultaneously to networks of relationships and meaning from both host and home country since times of marine trade to Spanish colonialism, through the Basque government-in-exile period to contemporary Basque Centers. “Communities are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined” (Anderson 1991:6). These dispersed Basque diaspora communities are similarly imagined as ethnic diaspora communities promoting cultural preservation and sustained ethnic identity over centuries in some cases; as groups maintaining homeland trade, labor, immigration, and cultural ties; as exhibiting solidarity with co-ethnics; and as a community with shared collective history and myths of its idealized homeland.

I have traced the history of Basque migration and shown by example that Basque ethnic group awareness existed in their European and later in New World trading networks and in the imperial diaspora inside the Spanish colonial framework. Economic conditions, the aftermath of wars, primogeniture inheritance systems and chain migration from village to New World region facilitated a Basque labor diaspora. During the 1930s through 1970s a political diaspora of exiles escaping oppression, prison, and death sentences of the Franco dictatorship provided the last wave of Basque emigration. It is this most recent cohort of Basques who have affected the diaspora communities and their contemporary ethnic identity manifestations. As a means of concluding the results of this project, I aim to summarize the comparisons of Basque diaspora communities in Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Peru, the United States, and Uruguay; to compare the Basque diaspora to various different ethnic diasporas; and to propose its place in present and future Basque studies.

A. “Belonging Here and There”: Expressions from the Basque Diaspora

I have demonstrated support for the argument in Hypothesis One that despite geographical and generational differences, the core elements of Basque ethnic identity are

\textsuperscript{34} Basque literary conclusions and theatrical final acts are designated with the name and title \textit{Amaia}. It is the beginning and the end, the answer to a mystery, puzzle, or question.
defined in a constant manner focusing on ancestry, music, dance, sport, cuisine, religion, and decreasingly on language, in each of the six case studies. The various ethnic institutions and Basque Centers developed in much the same way as ethnic societies for mutual financial aid and as host country adaptation facilitators with a focus on preserving a Basque cultural identity, and not as political organizations promoting a political or partisan ideology. The Centers have also followed a similar transition pattern to institutions that are now facilitating host country Basques' 'return' to ethnicity in general, and often to the home country specifically. The research responses demonstrated that though many maintain a psychological and emotional commitment to the Basque Country, the majority had no intentions of permanent physical return.

A diasporic identity, however, is not merely an extension of the homeland. Boundaries of dual loyalties do shift and can be different from one diaspora location to another. The subjective nature of diaspora identity and the sense of belonging it entails is important because it provides a sense of unity which transplants the sense of belonging from a specific homeland to a transnational consciousness. The subjective identity may also entail a responsibility to survive as a conscious collective (Bakalian 1992: 2-3), a concept which only a few interviewees expressed.

While separate research has concluded that women are more likely than men to implement ethnic food consumption, holiday celebrations, and childhood socialization patterns (Stoller 1996:146), responses to Hypothesis Four questions did not find this a statistical reality with the Basque population. Though there were differences between males and females in their reported knowledge of homeland politics and in their migration experiences, gender was not a significant factor in defining "Basqueness" and the majority of both genders disagreed that mothers had been more influential than fathers in preserving Basque ethnicity maintenance. This adds another dimension to the Basque feminist anthropologists' research that a Basque matriarchy does not exist in reality. Though the myth of a Basque matriarchy continues in Basque populations in Euskal Herria and abroad, questionnaire responses fortified del Valle research (del Valle et al 1984) that mothers are not necessarily more influential than fathers in perpetuating Basque traditions and identity.

I have supported Hypothesis Five that the diaspora definitions of "Basqueness" tend to cling to the traditional exclusive Sabino Arana identifiers utilizing ancestry, religion, and language, although the homeland's understanding (following Catalonia) has been modified to a more inclusive category of those who live and work in Euskal Herria and those who want
to be Basque and work for the maintenance of the Basque culture. There were large percentages of respondents that did not know or had no opinion on these questions, which opens the possibility of an occurring shift in diaspora mentality. However, regardless of geography, gender, and generation, there are prevailing core elements of cultural ethnonationalist tendencies, and ethnic institutions which have developed according to similar patterns. Though Basques in the diaspora consider themselves abertzales, or patriots, they understand it more as an ethnic commitment to fight for the preservation of Basque culture and language and autonomy, though not necessarily territorial sovereignty and statehood.

The most recent Basque immigrant population in Belgium demonstrated opinions closer to those of the homeland and interviewees there stated that their relatively easy access to Euskal Herria facilitated their personal and informational networks. Because distance is less and less a barrier to interaction Hypothesis Five proposes that as the communication and transnational networks intensify in substance and frequency, these Basques, especially those in the “I do not know” and “No opinion” categories, are likely to be influenced by the images and information received from the homeland which will influence their attitudes towards inclusivity of Basqueness.

B. Categorizing the Basque Communities as a Diaspora

Benefitting from Cohen’s common features of diaspora, I have been able to support Hypothesis Two and distinguish these Basque communities as indeed diaspora. Their dispersal to many lands over time has been traumatic and forced, as it was for Carlist War veterans and Franco era political exiles, or also by choice, as exemplified with the Basque mariners, and military, cleric, and commercial migrants inside the Spanish imperial diaspora. Basques have departed their homeland in pursuit of commerce and because of established trading networks that provided information and improved possibilities of success. They created bilateral trade on their own with foreign political entities, and also as a part of the Spanish domination of the Americas. Long left dormant, the Basque Autonomous Government is renewing and creating commercial networks by utilizing Basque diaspora communities to further homeland business through the Institutos and Fundaciones.

The shared understanding of a particular nationalist Basque history creates a perception of victimization and continuous attempted domination by Castillian Spain. For Basques, their ‘golden age’ includes defense from invaders including the Romans and Moors; autonomy from Castilla; superiority of seamanship; the democratic and collective society ruled
by the fueros; and a rural lifestyle where Basque culture and language are maintained. These collective memories were a part of each Basque community regardless of recent or old migrations, large or small community, or host country. This is not surprising because it is the same nationalist history promulgated in the homeland until the 1980s. Regardless of its 'veracity' or 'genuineness' to different historians, what is important is that it is accepted and believed as the truth by the diaspora Basque themselves. This foments ethnicity maintenance and diaspora consciousness. Basques feel they have a responsibility to their ancestors and to “maintenance, restoration, safety and prosperity” (Cohen 1997:26) of Euskal Herria, even if they rarely act politically upon these feelings.

However, the idealization of the Basque Country and the diaspora’s historical perceptions of the Basques as victims of incessant Castillian Spanish domination may change as the diaspora witnesses Basque democracy and administration at work. In other communities the creation of the Israeli state, Croatia, democracy in Poland, and the Ukraine, removed diaspora populations' ideas of themselves as a superior ethnic group- above political corruption and inefficiency. There will be problems in the autonomous communities of the four provinces in Spain, as there are in any administration, and Basques will be confronted with this cognitive dissonance.

Many migrants left the Basque Country believing they would return after making their riches but these were individualized plans and there was no collective ‘return movement’ for Basques to their homeland until the Civil War wave of exiles. Previous emigrants had chosen to leave, albeit pushed by economic hardship and war reparations, and had moved as individuals or families. The Civil War exiles were thousands that moved at once-traumatically and involuntarily. Their return depended upon the elimination of Franco and also became a myth as the decades wore on. There is no evidence of a contemporary collective permanent return movement. The majority of exiles that returned did so from after Franco’s death in 1975 to the mid-1990s. Nevertheless, though it may not come to a physical fruition, many continue to speak of the day when they will go back to Euskal Herria, though for the majority is not feasible to return for family or economic reasons. For most there is no desire as they live successful and enriched lives in their host countries. The ‘return’ need not be permanent, and the research demonstrated that a large number have visited and/or regularly visit their homeland.

Basques have exhibited their salient ethnic group consciousness by preferring each other in trade, labor, and chain migration networks since the 1500s. This time proven
cohesiveness separates diasporas from recent immigrant communities and though the Basque communities in Belgium and Australia are relatively recent compared to those in South America, Basques in Peru, Uruguay, and Argentina continue to maintain their ethnic identity after more than six generations. They do not perpetuate the idea of a 'common fate' for all Basques, and when this was discussed in interviews many tended to associate the idea with the Jewish diaspora and a negative punishment and banishment which they said had nothing to do with their own situations. They were more individualistic and likely to say they could do whatever they chose to separately from other Basques. Neither had they collectively experienced problems as Basques in their host societies. For other diaspora communities this defense of their ethnic group increases ethnic solidarity and identifying with ethnicity. For the Basque communities, the reported isolated problems came from being Catholics in the western United States, and from being mistaken as Italians in Australia. However, there were no reports of collective discrimination in any of the six countries.

The shared history and experiences as immigrants contribute to diaspora Basques' sense of empathy and solidarity with other Basques, especially for the women, and more intensely for the women that migrated to English speaking host countries. This fellowship is transcending the single Basque community-homeland bilateral relationship, and is recently incorporating diaspora to diaspora communities and diaspora X-diaspora Y-homeland multilocal relationships. Basques in Australia feel a similar connection to Basques in Belgium, in Argentina, or in the homeland.

Having utilized Cohen's nine common features of diasporas here, the one that did not apply to the Basques was the 'troubled relationship with the host societies' (Cohen 1997:26). The remaining eight, as summarized again above, did pertain to these communities abroad in varying degrees though some were more salient than others at different times in the development of the Basque diaspora formation.

C. Globalization: Shrinking World-Expanding Diaspora

The factors of globalized technology have aided the Basque diaspora with the development of easy and inexpensive communications and travel. This era "creates communities not of place, but of interest" making it more likely that people loosen their affiliation and allegiances to nation-states (Cohen 1996:517). Stanley Brunn (1996:259-272) stresses the impact of modern technological progress as a major factor in the proliferation of diasporas. Though the resurgence in ethnic identity and newly established Centers and
globalization are correlated, there is not strong evidence to argue that globalization causes the creation or growth of diasporas themselves nor of diaspora consciousness.

A swelling in interest in Basque identity maintenance is not a defensive reaction to globalization but an unplanned embrace of the tools and results of globalization. Basque diasporans manifest the transnational networks and identity that globalization facilitates as proposed in Hypothesis Three. A renewed interest in some Basque communities resulted in their re-establishing diaspora organizations, while in others, first time associations were created, but there is no reason to suggest a direct causal effect. Many of these new organizations in Uruguay and Argentina were founded pre-Internet in their countries, and in towns that would not be considered transnational cosmopolitan globalized communities. The functioning of their associations continued on much the same as those of the 1930s through 1980s until the Basque Government began to implement its consolidation of diaspora communications. The scope and speed of information flows have influenced their cultural patterns. At the same time there have been political and ideological transformations with the spread of liberal democracy, economic liberalism, growth of private enterprise (Van Hear 1998:252), and an acceptance and almost expectation of multiculturalism in democratic societies. However, these elements do not predate the resurgence.

Globalization facilitates transnationalism in the Basque diaspora by aiding the creation and maintenance of communications among Basque collectivities abroad, and with the homeland. The technology age implies that physical location is no longer required for the practice of community. Globalization eases the “interlacing of social events and social relations ‘at distance’ with local contextualities” (Giddens 1991:21). However, Basques will not likely be practicing or celebrating their culture via electronic screens soon. The places where they live, the Centers, and the people with whom they socialize are an integral part of their ethnic identity.

The United Nations Research Institute for Social Development summarizes globalization as a configuration of economic, technological, geo-political, cultural and ideological changes. An accelerated integration and interdependence of the world economy and the mobility of capital, and the liberalization of world trade in goods and services. These developments have been made possible by rapid technological advances, particularly in electronics, communications (especially telecommunications), and transportation, which aids temporary returns to the homeland. These communications also give added value to global media and the Internet (Van Hear 1998:251). The Basque Government funding of computers

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and Internet hook-up for each Center found some organizations unprepared and unacquainted with the technology, but since 1996 the Centers have ‘caught the wave’ and are inter-communicating via the Internet. The media transmissions by Euskaltelebista are also likely to impact those communities receiving it with constant and consistent positive images of the Basque Country. The more positive the images, the more likely currently uninvolved Basques may ‘return to their roots’ and connect in to the positive social identity, and communal belonging of the Basque Centers.

There are also counter tendencies to globalization, such as the increase in nationalist movements, religious fundamentalism, and racism. No interviews revealed any attitudes regarding the promotion of ‘Basqueness’, or the Basque Centers, at the expense of other ethnic groups in their host societies, though this is hardly a ‘politically correct’ topic of conversation with an academic researcher and would not likely be volunteered in one interview. Though one can experience a religious conversion at any time in life, the data showed the opposite regarding religious identification and Basqueness. The younger the person was, the less likely they were to agree that Catholicism was important to their identity.

Along with globalization, transnationalism broadly refers to multiple ties and interactions linking people or institutions across the borders of states (Vertovec 1999:447). New technologies foment transnational ties with increasing speed. Despite great distances, and time periods of immigration, transnational ties in the Basque communities have been strengthened with the globalization of communications. The frequency of communication and contact among the diaspora communities and between the diaspora and the homeland will likely continue to increase. Cautious of predicting, Manuel Castells (1996) argues that though new technologies are at the heart of today’s transnational networks, the technologies themselves do not create, but instead reinforce new social patterns. Basques are utilizing these new telecommunications networks to increase the frequency and intensity of their relations with each other and with the Basque Autonomous Government.

Transnationalism is also defined by Glick Schiller as “the formation of social, political and economic relationships among migrants that span several societies” and people whose “networks, activities and patterns of life encompass both their host and home societies (Glick Schiller 1992:1). This seems to fit the Basque diaspora case. Many exhibited an unconscious multidimensional identity- not only a hybrid two-way identity. They embodied Basque identity, host country identity, and a diaspora identity. They are transnational actors as they go back and forth between two societies, and the societies which they traverse are also
becoming more transnational from the effects of globalization. Perhaps the diaspora populations are better prepared for the future trends of globalization and transnational consciousness. They do not need to react to it because they are already living in it. "Transnational bonds no longer have to be cemented by migration or by exclusive territorial claims. In the age of cyberspace, a diaspora can, to some degree, be held together or re-created through the mind, through cultural artefacts and through a shared imagination (Cohen 1996:516).

Diaspora identity bridges the gap between local and global identities. Globalization has enhanced the abilities of diasporas to continue growing in numbers and to intensify their ethnic identity. By improving faster, cheaper, and easier communications and travel, globalization also promotes a deterritorialization of identity. While a homogenized global culture is emerging, simultaneously, the proliferation and resurgence in local identities mixed with the overarching global culture produces different combinations. "Globalization and diasporization are separate phenomenon with no necessary causal connections" (Cohen 1997:175), but Basque ethnic identity maintenance and diaspora strength is increased by the effects of globalization. The previously negative connotation to not fitting here or there is now likely to be perceived differently as belonging here and there.

D. Choosing the Basque Option

Ethnicity can be utilized as an optional identity and diaspora Basque ethnicity varies widely in depth and in salience for each person. It is more accurate to describe it as a continuum from low-intensity to ethnic fundamentalism, "from an optional identity to a total identity" (Pieterse 1997:371). Scholars see ethnicity as circumstantial and situational, as voluntary (Lyman and Douglass 1973) and/or constructed (Nagel 1994). There is now less emphasis on ancestry and more on subjective orientations of identity. I have shown that Basque-host country identity is not hierarchical but multilocal with sentimental ties to villages, regions, nations, and states. They are not one or the other, they are both and several, simultaneously.

Ethnicity is increasingly a personal choice of whether to be ethnic at all. An ethnic identity is one that does not really affect much in these Basques' daily lives. Optional ethnicity comes from the paradox of a quest for community and a desire for individuality, and from the circumstances of creating a costless community (M. Waters 1990:147). However, if one's own ethnicity is a voluntaristic personal matter, it is difficult to understand that race or
ethnicity for others is influenced by societal and political components. Basque ethnicity is historically variable. In the past in the United States it had social costs associated with it—particularly the element of Catholicism, yet also had positive status in many South American regions. Basques are free to “exercise an ethnic option” because they are European and Christian in European and Christian dominated host countries. If invoking an ethnic background is increasingly a voluntary, individual decision, and it is done for personal enjoyment related to that ethnicity, then ethnicity itself takes on individual and positive connotations. Optional ethnicity persists because it fills the need for belonging to a community and also of individualism without individual costs (M. Waters 1990:164).

For the first generation, ethnicity is “concrete, unreflective, lived experience, while for subsequent generations it becomes more abstract, idealized, reflective and ultimately optional” (Kivisto 1989:67). Basques vary in their level of intensity of publicly demonstrating their “Basqueness”. Some people do not perceive ethnicity as something for public consumption. They understand it as a more emotional, sentimental feeling about ancestors, homeland, language, culture, and private personal identity.

The transmission of Basque identity has largely been accomplished through the Basque Center activities where individuals can manifest their ethnic identity in a social setting. Alba (1990) notes the decline in ethnic social structures but the continuation of ethnic identities. Some Basque organizations have declined such as the Socorros Mutuos and boarding houses, and the Centers have declined in membership and ability to attract younger Basques, but as illustrated, there are many new Centers recently established, and new members joining old Centers.

Different identities produce different demands for the Centers. Emigrants need one thing, fourth generation members need something else, and the Centers are attempting to cater to all their customers and fill all their ethnic needs. Each wave of migration has introduced a version of Basque culture shaped by the political and economic evolutions of the homeland. Compared to the Polish diaspora communities where divisions between new and established immigrants have caused ruptures in the ethnic associations (Erdmans 1995:18) the Basque organizations seem to have provided similarly politically sterile environments that have incorporated all generations and ideologies. Further research could pursue Basques that have left the organizations and inquire the reasons to ascertain if these were political or instrumental motives, or merely a lack of interest. There are many Basques in various stages of leaving the ethnic communities, but my questionnaire results also showed others who are
in various stages of entering the organizations for the first time.

The Basque diaspora once relied on kinship and personal networks, but now identity maintenance and ethnic solidarity are manifested through modern bureaucratic organizations—the Basque Centers, the Basque Autonomous Government, the Institutions and Foundations, and so forth. Cultural associations have been fundamental to the Basque diaspora, and though their objectives and roles are in the process of changing, there is no evidence that suggests their near future demise. There is a shift in the services they provide—services that orient their 'customers' or members firmly planted in the host country, to the homeland, and no longer helping those from the homeland orient themselves to the host country. Volunteers and leaders at the Centers need different skills now. Whereas before they needed to speak home country and host country languages to help the emigrant in the host community, now they still need both languages but to aid later generation Basques planning trips, research, study, etc in the homeland. Previously, a knowledge of the host country was essential, now a knowledge of *Euskal Herria* is necessary.

Interviews and questionnaire responses gave no indication of the straight-line assimilationist assumptions of the disappearance of Basque ethnic identity in the diaspora communities. Without political or economic reasons for maintaining ethnic solidarity, the importance of ethnic identity and allegiance supposedly declines. However, these diaspora communities maintain their identities, and various communities are forming new organizations. There was no evidence that Basque identity survives as a response to instrumental goals of collective political interests in either of the six countries. None of the respondents utilized ideas that could be interpreted as from rational choice theory of personal profit, risk, or utility maximizing and the revitalization surge predates the Basque Government grants scheme. The dimensions of ethnic identity that did emerge from interviews were closest to Tajfel's positive social identity theory (Tajfel 1981, 1982; Tajfel and Turner 1979), chain migration and migration flow theory (Baines 1991) and those theories of diaspora and transnationalism detailed herein (Cohen 1997; Shain 1994; Sheffer 1984, 1996; Basch et al 1994).

Social identity theory aided in explaining why interviewees constantly refer to the high status of Basques, particularly in Argentina and Uruguay, and in communities of critical mass populations in the United States. Their pride in being Basque is connected to their perceptions of social identity and the status assessed to that Basque ethnic identity. There is a social function to being Basque in these ethnic communities abroad. Basques themselves perceive there to be a positive social status even though they do not believe Basques to have
an actual higher socioeconomic status than other immigrant groups. Yet there was no strong evidence of Basque identity being used instrumentally in the pursuit of social interests except for the approximate quarter that had gained employment because of their Basque ethnicity. Basqueness provides a sense of communal belonging and simultaneously an individual sense of uniqueness that can be chosen. If manifesting a Basque identity is increasingly voluntary, and there are no negative costs to it, then Basqueness itself takes on a positive connotation for these diaspora communities as they choose to maintain it.

The means used to maintain Basque identity were very similar in each setting, emphasizing the role of music, dance, sport, cuisine, and less so maintenance of language. Though they remained Catholics they did not actually make this an integral part of their institutions. Until recently, Catholicism tended to be a given so there was no need to highlight or reinforce it, unlike Greeks and Orthodox religious practice (Prévelakis 1996:442-443). The Gaztemundu programs for youth are similar to Irish programs for their diaspora youth to experience the Gaeltacht Gaelic speaking western counties, and the Israeli summer kibbutz work programs, where contact with the homeland is expected to spark interest in ethnicity preservation.

E. If it Aint Broke, Don’t Fix It: Maintaining a Non-Politicized Diaspora

The political significance of diasporas often depends on their origins, development, and their relations with their host and home countries, as well as their own ideological dimensions. Basque diaspora populations have not acted in any way to create hostilities inside their host societies, and there is no evidence that they are perceived as a threat in any of the six countries nor has their civic loyalty been seriously questioned. None of these communities has been perceived as a threat to the homeland government either, as they have not involved themselves with domestic politics of Euskal Herria. There have been no formal or institutional criticisms yet by any of these six diaspora communities of homeland political groups, ideologies, or policymaking. Traditionally the Basque diaspora has not been political, as information transfer was slow and it was difficult to participate in the political life of the homeland at such distances and with delays, and lately with dictatorship. Now easily accessible information, the Internet, and Basque TV could change that disinterest or lack of political efficacy. There is no independent inter-diaspora press, only the Basque Government produced Euskal Etxeak which publishes government regulated information. As information access increases through the Euskaltelebista and Internet availability, Basques may find that
the more they know about the homeland the more there is to critique. However, I believe this unlikely due to the general disinterest in homeland politics exhibited by the diaspora populations in this research.

The Basque Government’s relations with each institution are similar. Therefore, as proposed in Hypothesis Five, expected gradual shifts from traditional Sabino Arana definitions of Basqueness to a more civic and inclusive definition are likely to reach the Centers almost simultaneously, and affect the institutions in a like manner. Though this increased frequency and intensified contact may highlight differences, misunderstandings, and conflict at first (Forbes 1997), because the Basque diaspora is not a politicized community, conflict is likely to be kept at a minimum and not cause the political divisions it has with the Armenian (Pattie 1998), Jewish (Liebman 1991; Hertzberg 1996; Jakobovitz 1991), Polish (Erdmans 1995), and Filipino (Okamura 1998) diaspora groups. Increased contact could result in conflict, or commitment. The general idea of the ‘triadic relationship’ (Sheffer 1986; Safran 1991; A.D. Smith 1995:16) between the diaspora community, their homeland, and their host country, is being exhibited in these communities incrementally as the Basque Autonomous Government and the economic Institutos and Fundaciones intensify their activities.

In other ethnic communities, expanded activities and links between homeland and diaspora populations are creating ‘deterritorialized’ nations as shown in studies of political parties establishing offices abroad, homeland groups lobbying diaspora communities, and diaspora communities lobbying host country governments in regards to homeland politics (Basch, Glick Schiller, Szanton Blanc 1994; Panossian 1998; Subtelny 1991). However, the Basque diaspora populations in this study have been shown to be non-politicized communities whose individuals exhibit little interest in, and knowledge of, homeland political issues, parties, and future goals. The majority were willing to admit they did not know enough about homeland politics to answer the political items in the questionnaire. Basques do not tend to have the diaspora-homeland divides that some other diasporas do because the Basque populations have stayed out of the homeland political arena and promoted a cultural ethnonationalistic identity. They have not attempted to systematically or institutionally influence homeland parties, policy making, or social or economic issues.

They are now involving themselves with policies that affect the diaspora through the Ley 8/1994, and especially its provisions for the World Congresses held every four years to create the Four Year Institutional Plan for Action. None of these diaspora communities had institutions or individuals who claimed interest in affecting domestic politics in the homeland,
though this does not preclude its future possibility, and thousands of them do vote in homeland elections. Different from Filipino and Caribbean diaspora populations in the United States for whom voting procedures in homeland elections and dual citizenship are made difficult by their home governments (Basch et al. 1994:277), the Basque Autonomous Government has facilitated registration and voting procedures and encouraged it. It does so in spite of the fact, or perhaps because of the fact, that the totality of the diaspora vote has not been influential, in comparison to the Galician diaspora that tips the regional election in Galicia, Spain.

A specific role for the diaspora in the internal affairs of Euskal Herria is absent for now. There are no foreign based Basque political parties and no foreign campaigning for diaspora election support. This contrasts with Armenian diaspora communities that have established diaspora parties such as the Armenian Revolutionary Federation and the Armenian Democratic Liberals which lobby for preferential host country foreign policy towards Armenia, and campaign for the diaspora’s and the even the homeland’s vote for homeland elections. There are Armenian diaspora based parties that actually win homeland elections. Though representatives of Basque homeland political parties have visited diaspora communities in an official capacity, the visits have been more educational and social in nature. Neither have the Basque homeland parties utilized the diaspora as an election campaign issue in Euskadi or Nafarroa.

Diasporas may be a foreign policy or economic asset which home governments are eager to exploit (Esman 1984:345). The Basque Autonomous Government has attempted and is successfully using the diaspora in pursuit of its own external economic goals with the establishment of the Institutes and Foundations. Though the homeland government is capitalizing on the Basque status and reputations for an economic advantage, there is no evidence to demonstrate a political or partisan motive for mobilizing the Basques abroad. While the Basque government-in-exile encouraged diaspora communities to utilize their host country status and act politically in their support, there is only unofficial talk of this for the contemporary Basque Autonomous Government’s political future. There is no policy nor have there been any official communications from the homeland government asking the Centers to involve themselves with their host country’s international foreign policy toward Spain, France, Nafarroa, or the Basque Autonomous Community.

A recent phenomenon in the Basque diaspora finds the roles of “donor” and “recipient” have been reversed. The homeland population has historically been the recipient
of migrants’ aid with emigrants sending remittances home. Now the homeland, via its institutions and established autonomous government, is sending financial and human resources aid to the diaspora. This contrasts with Filipino, Croatian, Ukranian, Haitian, or Puerto Rican diasporas (Okamura 1998; Winland 1995; Subtelny 1991; Basch et al 1994). Similar to other diasporas\(^3\) the Basque homeland government has recently established a specific administrative unit to deal with “Basques in the exterior”. The Office of Relations with the Basque Collectivities is the starting and finishing point for individuals and diaspora organizations wishing to establish or fortify already existing transnational networks with homeland institutions.

I have shown that the Basque communities in these six case studies have not attempted to influence host country domestic politics toward themselves either, and have not formed ethnic interest lobbies for internal policy. Nor is there any evidence that they have attempted to utilize transnational links to influence Basque Country domestic policy making. They are becoming more interested in homeland policy making regarding the diaspora as demonstrated in the 1995 First World Congress of Basque Collectivities debates and discussions, the 1997 American Congress of Basque Centers, and in proposals of the Argentine delegation for the 1999 Second World Congress of Basque Collectivities.

It is argued that transnational communities “involve various rather puzzling new forms of linkage between diasporic nationalisms, delocalized political communications and revitalized political commitments at both ends of the diasporic process” (Appadurai 1995:220). However, as demonstrated here, there is no evidence to suggest the Basque diaspora communities are politicized, nor that they will soon utilize collective transnational networks to mobilize. There is no conclusive evidence to describe the Basque diaspora as a pluralistic one either. For example Jakobovitz (1991:45-51) describes British Jews and American Jews as markedly different. Though I chose the most disparate host countries by oldest and most recent dates of emigration, farthest and closest in physical proximity, European versus New World settler societies, host countries with same versus different languages, democracies and dictatorial political systems, communities with critical mass hundreds of thousands versus hundreds, and those with chain migration versus Peru and Uruguay without, there still was a lack of decisive differences manifested between these diaspora Basques’ reasons for, and manners of, preserving their ethnicity. Nor can I declare

\(^3\)In 1997 the President of Armenia signed a decree creating the State Council for Relations with the Diaspora (Panossian interview 1999).
a universal diaspora Basqueness. Belgian Basques'- closest in proximity enabling personal communications and most recent immigration with recent homeland values and opinions-tended to follow homeland definitions a little more closely on issues of religion and who should be included as a Basque. Responses from those in Peru in regards to political questions differed most- likely as a result of their experience with political violence and non-democratic regimes.

F. Future Study: The Trajectory of Basque Diaspora Studies

My attempt to answer a few questions regarding Basque diaspora identity has actually flourished into the research of an enigmatic dynamic. Apart from supporting the arguments I made, I have discovered a plethora of untouched academic themes. The “area” in area studies must be extended to non-physical territories of interest and diaspora. Basque studies has exceptional potential for expansion in the areas of homeland government-diaspora relations, the effects of diaspora networks on the homeland population and institutions, the effects of the Law of Relations with the Basque Communities, Ley 8/1994, and the progress of the recently established Basque organizations. Comparisons of the Basque to Catalán, Gallego, and other Spanish region’s diasporas and Spain’s reactions to these regional governmental functions would benefit diaspora studies as well as Spanish studies.

The trajectory of the Basque diaspora will likely include continued intensification of relations with the Basque Government- relations which are significant for research. If the PNV loses control of the Basque Government in a future election, it will be interesting to see how a different party perceives the importance of the diaspora to homeland politics, and whether or not appropriation for diaspora grants and investments continue. Of course this is also assuming that the Basque economy continues with enough money to consider maintaining a budget for diaspora projects.

Basques have perceived the Castillian Spanish as their opposing “other” for centuries, and now that there is an autonomous government, it is difficult to blame economic, social, and political problems on Madrid. The idealization of a democratic homeland and the desirability of Basques ruling Basques may be disappointing when the reality of the complexities of political administration and bureaucracy deprive diaspora Basques of their utopian myth of Euskal Herria. As with other newly independent or newly democratic homelands such as Israel, Croatia, Poland, and the Ukraine, diasporas may see that several of the problems that were attributed to their “others” still exist.
Different diaspora generations have experienced the same historical events, such as the Spanish Civil War, Burgos Trials, ETA media reports, the death of Franco, and political autonomy, at different stages in their lives. The interviews and questionnaires demonstrate people's ideas at one point in their lives and further longitudinal research could track changes over time.

While ethnic identity maintenance is easy to identify—through personal and collective activity, organizations, and institutional linkages—, assimilation is not. It is difficult to judge whether or not Basques who do not participate in the organization itself or its activities have the same ethnic feelings, thoughts etc. Just because other Basques do not manifest their ethnicity publically or socially does not mean it does not exist. They simply make a more challenging situation for researchers. ‘Assimilated’ is also quite a subjective term (Nagel 1986; Alba 1990; M. Waters 1990; Glazer and Moynihan 1975; Spicer 1971) and tends to describe overt behavior but not psychology or sentiment.

Regarding diaspora studies in general, Khachig Tololyan points to the fact that the terms immigrant, expatriate, refugees, guest workers, exile communities, overseas communities, and ethnic communities and the vocabulary of transnationalism are being incorporated in an inclusive diaspora definition (Tololyan 1991:4-5) but that diaspora should be a ‘collectivity’ not merely “a scattering of individuals” (Tololyan 1996:8). Safran prefers to limit the category to those who meet the following criteria; dispersal from an original center to two or more peripheral regions; retention of a collective memory of the homeland; partial alienation from the host society; a myth of return to the homeland, commitment to the preservation of the homeland; a collective consciousness and solidarity from a relationship with the homeland (Safran 1991:81). Cohen (1996:515; 1997:26) argues that no one diaspora will manifest all features of his list common to diasporas, but adds to and modifies Safran’s list with the “possibility of a distinctive yet creative and enriching life in host countries with a tolerance for pluralism”, and he eliminates the necessary catastrophic or traumatic dispersal from a homeland. The simplest categorization is that of Milton Esman “a minority ethnic group of migrant origin which maintains sentimental or material links with its land of origin (Esman 1986:333).

In comparing transnational communities Van Hear utilizes three minimum criteria for a diaspora including a population dispersed to two or more other territories; the presence abroad is enduring, although exile is not necessarily permanent and populations may move between homeland and new host; and third there is some kind of exchange - social, economic,
political or cultural - between and among the separated populations comprising the diaspora (Van Hear 1998:6). Researchers must be careful about categorizing a group as a diaspora merely because there are diasporic elements to their behavior. Distance has ceased to be a barrier to interaction and communication and many various groups and individuals will make decisions about movement on the basis of networks and communication and information. The political significance of diasporas will continue to grow because of the factors of globalization of economy and international relations (Claval 1996:444). They influence their homelands and host countries, and contribute increasingly to the transnational networks of the world that have yet to be studied.

This thesis is original in its attempt to explain why the Basque diaspora populations maintain their ethnic identity by utilizing theories of positive social identity, opposition, primordial, instrumentalist, and chain migration and diaspora approaches. The maintenance of ethnicity and the creation of networks are mutually reinforcing. They create networks because they maintain their ethnicity, and they maintain their ethnicity because they are involved in these networks. A combination of primordial, circumstantial, instrumentalist and diaspora theories clears the Basque diaspora picture though none of these explanations by itself answers these questions. Facilitated by factors of globalization and the growing realization in host countries that ethnic pluralism is a given, diaspora populations no longer confront a necessity of assimilating and changing or exchanging their ethnic identities.

Other select research on the Basque diaspora has described historical accounts of Basques, none of which included, as did this, Basque Government-diaspora relations, institutional networks, or material and financial links between homeland and diaspora. This work has created original data for Basque diaspora populations in six different countries and compared for the first time, the Basque diaspora to other ethnic diasporas. It is the first attempt to document contemporary Basque diaspora populations and analyze their ethnic identity maintenance and transnational networks. It is also the first endeavor comparing Basque diaspora communities to each other and the first time diaspora Basques have been asked to describe themselves and explain their ethnic identity maintenance - establishing a foundation for future research.
Appendix

A. Sample written anonymous questionnaires: English and Spanish versions ............250
B. Sample personal interview questions ........................................................................266
C. Diskette of SPSS Data
Dear Fellow Basque,

You have been chosen to participate in the first ever comparative survey of Basques outside of the Basque Country, Euskal Herria. This is an opportunity to give your opinions and attitudes in order to fill the gap in knowledge and understanding of Basque ethnic identity and cultural preservation. Your household was randomly chosen and it is important that we receive your completed questionnaire to truly represent people of Basque heritage in Australia. Similar Basque households have been selected in Argentina, Belgium, Peru, the United States, and Uruguay, and their responses are now being received.

In order for these results to truly represent the thinking of Basques in Australia, it is also important that we have about the same number of men and women participating in this study. Thus, we would like for this questionnaire to be completed by an adult male (18 years or older) of Basque descent. If none is present then, it should be completed by an adult female of Basque descent, and returned as soon as possible to the address at the bottom of this page.

The results of this survey will be available from my completed doctoral thesis at The London School of Economics and Political Science in London, England. Summaries of results will also be sent to your Basque organisation. I would be happy to answer any questions you might have and can be contacted at:

Gloria Pilar Totoricagüena
8006 West Silkwood Court
Boise, Idaho 83704
United States of America

Please help us create a true picture of Basques in Australia for future studies and research by promptly completing and returning this survey. Thank you for your participation and valuable opinions.

Sincerely,

Gloria Pilar Totoricagüena
PhD Researcher

RETURN THIS SURVEY TO:

Gure Txoko Basque Club Inc.
344 Liverpool Street
2010 SYDNEY New South Wales
AUSTRALIA
PLEASE CIRCLE THE NUMBER OF YOUR ANSWER

Q-1 Which of the following best describes how you think of yourself? (Circle one answer please)
1  Basque
2  Basque-Australian
3  Australian-Basque
4  Australian
5  Other (Specify) ___________________________________________

Q-2 Do you know how to speak Basque?
1  Fluently
2  With some difficulty
3  I can understand a basic conversation
4  I know a few words
5  None at all

Q-3 Can you read and write in Basque?
1  Fluently
2  With some difficulty
3  Very simple sentences
4  A few words
5  None at all

Q-4 How often do you speak Basque at home?
1  Every day, in almost every conversation, using more Basque than another language
2  Every day we switch back and forth between languages, using Basque equally with others
3  We speak Basque for certain topics, or with certain persons, using it less than other language
4  For certain greetings, celebrations, special phrases like 'Happy Birthday'
5  Never

Q-5 Have your parents and family members participated in a Basque organisation in Australia, or are you the first in your family to get involved? Please circle all those who have participated before you.
1  Parents
2  Brothers and Sisters
3  Grandparents
4  Other Relatives such as Aunts, Uncles, cousins
5  I am the first one involved from my family.

Q-6 If you are married or living with a partner, does he/she and any children you have participate in the Basque organisation? Circle all those who participate. (Please answer for a former spouse if you are widowed or divorced, and for a current partner or spouse if re-married)
1  My spouse/partner participates.
2  My children participated as youth and continue to participate.
3  My children did participate when young, but no longer do.
4  My children did not participate as youth, but currently do.
5  My children did not participate as youth, nor do they currently participate.
6  I have never married, and have no children.
Q-7  How often do you read newspapers or journals with information about Euskal Herria?
1  Almost everyday
2  About once a week
3  About once a month
4  About once a year
5  Never

Q-8  How often do you eat Basque style food at home?
1  Almost everyday
2  About once a week
3  A few times a month
4  A few times a year
5  Never

Q-9  Have you ever lived in, or visited the Basque country? Please circle the numbers representing the dates of your time spent in Euskal Herria.
1  I have never lived in, nor visited Euskal Herria.
2  I lived in, or visited, Euskal Herria before 1975.
3  I lived in, or visited, Euskal Herria between 1975-1985.
4  I lived in, or visited, Euskal Herria between 1986-1996.
5  I plan to visit Euskal Herria before the year 2000.

Q-10 Which political party do you usually associate yourself with in Australia?
1  Labour party
2  Liberal party
3  Country party
4  other____________________________________________________
5  I do not participate in Australian politics.

Q-11 Have you patronised a business or professional solely because Basque people own it or work there?
1  Never
2  Rarely, maybe once in five years
3  Some of the time, maybe once a year
4  Most of the time, usually once a month
5  Always, I make a special effort to give my business to other Basques.

Q-12 In Australia, have you ever been treated favourably or unfavourably because of your Basque heritage? Circle 1 for UNFAVOURABLY and 2 for FAVOURABLY for any of the following situations, or leave blank if being Basque has not made a difference.

UNFAVOURABLY  FAVOURABLY
1  2  Getting a job
1  2  Receiving a government benefit
1  2  Joining a club
1  2  Admission to school or university
1  2  Being chosen for a scholarship or award
1  2  Buying or renting a house or apartment
1  2  Other (please specify) __________________________
Q-13 Which political party most closely fits your views (whether you are eligible to vote or not) in the Basque Autonomous Community (Alaba, Bizkaia, Guipuzkoa)? Please circle only one answer.

1. UCD Union de Centro Democratico
2. PP Partido Popular
3. PSOE Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol
4. PCE Partido Comunista de Espana
5. PNV Partido Nacionalista Vasco
6. EA Eusko Alkartasuna
7. EE Euskadiko Ezkerra
8. HB Herria Batasuna
9. Other (please name the party) _______________________
10. I do not know enough about Basque country political parties to answer this question.
11. I purposefully stay out of Basque country politics.

Q-14 Why do YOU preserve your Basque identity? Listed below are some of the reasons people of Basque heritage give for maintaining their Basque identity and culture in their new countries. Please circle all of those which are also reasons for you.

1. It is my responsibility to my ancestors to carry on the traditions they taught me.
2. I can make friends at the Basque club.
3. I want my children to meet other Basques for a possible future spouse.
4. Being Basque makes me feel special and unique.
5. I feel like I have an extended family in our Basque community.
6. Claiming an ethnic identity can help me get a special government benefit.
7. I feel Basques have a special connection to each other.
8. I want to promote an awareness of the political situation in the Basque country to Australians.
9. People of Basque heritage living in Australia, can influence Australian politics.
10. I am interested in my history and culture.
11. It is important to keep old traditions in this modern world where people do not seem to care about each other anymore.
12. Basque families in Australia are closer to each other, and do not have as many of the problems of other families in today's society.
13. I want to make my parents happy.

Please take a moment to add your own reasons for preserving your Basque identity in Australia and why it is important to you.
Q-15 Next we would like your opinions regarding the following statements made by other diaspora Basques like yourself. Please respond by writing the number from 1 to 5 in the line next to each statement. The numbers range from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree), as indicated on the following scale:

1  2 3 4 5
STRONGLY AGREE AGREE NO OPINION DISAGREE STRONGLY DISAGREE

1. _____ To be considered a Basque, a person should speak the Basque language.
2. _____ To be Basque, one must have Basque ancestors.
3. _____ The Basque culture can be maintained without the language.
4. _____ I feel more comfortable with Basque friends in Australia than I do with other Australian friends.
5. _____ Basque immigrants should try to assimilate and practice the traditions of their new country.
6. _____ Being Basque has helped me get a job, promotion, scholarship, or award.
7. _____ Basques should try to marry other Basques.
8. _____ I prefer to participate in Basque cultural events and not Basque political events.
9. _____ Australian values are more important to me than Basque values.
10. _____ Persons of Basque heritage have a higher socioeconomic status than other immigrants in Australia.
11. _____ It is important to me to correspond with family and friends in Euskal Herria at least once a year.
12. _____ Politicians in Euskal Herria should worry about culture before civil rights and economics.
13. _____ Admirers of General Franco, and his politics, are no longer a threat to the Basques.
14. _____ The Basque Autonomous Government should not trust the Spanish central government.
15. _____ Whether or not I agree with its use, I think political violence has been effective for achieving more autonomy in the Basque country.
16. _____ Persons permanently living in Euskal Herria should be accepted as Basques, whether or not they were born there.
17. _____ I would be willing to help the Basque Government establish international trade links with Australian businesses.
18. _____ It is not important to maintain the Basque language, because so few people know it.
19. _____ Mothers have been more influential than fathers for teaching Basque culture to their children.
20. _____ I have my own life in Australia and plan to return to Euskal Herria only to visit.

Q-16 There are many differing opinions of a possible future for the Basque provinces. In your opinion, which of these is the most desirable situation for the future of the seven provinces?

1. Lapurdi, Nafarroa Behera, and Zuberoa stay a part of France; Araba, Bizkaia, and Gipuzkoa keep their autonomous government inside Spain; Nafarroa keeps its separate autonomous government inside Spain.
2. Lapurdi, Nafarroa Behera and Zuberoa stay a part of France; Araba, Bizkaia, Gipuzkoa, unite with Nafarroa to keep one autonomous government inside of Spain.
3. Lapurdi, Nafarroa Behera, Zuberoa, Araba, Bizkaia, Gipuzkoa, and Nafarroa declare independence from both France and Spain, and together form one separate country.
4. I do not know enough about the situation to answer this question.
Q-17 Please answer the following questions thinking about yourself as a Basque in Australia, and then separately for the Basques in Euskal Herria. How important are these examples of Basque topics and culture to you? How important do you think they should be to Basques living in the Basque country? Please write the number that represents your opinion in each space for Australia first, and then in the second space for Euskal Herria.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Importance</th>
<th>AUSTRALIA</th>
<th>EUSKAL HERRIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very Great</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Learning and using the Basque language to speak, read, and write.
Teaching and using Basque cuisine and food preparation in our homes.
Teaching folk dances to our children.
Organising exhibitions of Basque artwork.
Singing traditional songs in Basque.
Practicing the Basque sports such as pelota, jai alai, wood-chopping, weight carrying and lifting, etc.
Teaching the political, economic, and cultural history of Euskal Herria.
Learning about the history and current events of Basques outside of Euskal Herria.
Celebrating Aberri Eguna as a day of Basque nationalism.
Supporting separatist actions to make Euskal Herria its own independent country.
Supporting the movements for peace and anti-terrorism.
Identifying ourselves as BASQUE, not Australian, and not Spanish or French in Euskal Herria.
Accepting as Basques those who feel and identify themselves as Basques.
Continuing Catholic beliefs and traditions in our family.

Q-18 Many immigrants keep material and financial links to their home countries after they leave. Do you have any ties to the Basque country such as a business or land ownership, an apartment, or baserri, etc.?
1 Yes
2 No

Q-19 While living in Australia, have you ever participated in any political movements (rallies, letter-writing, protests, fund-raisers, etc.) specifically because it would affect Basques?
1 Yes, between 1 - 10 times.
2 Yes, more than 10 times.
3 No, because there have not been any political movements that would affect Basques.
4 No, because I do not get involved in politics.
In order to classify this information, please answer the final factual questions by circling the answers that best describe you.

Q-20 Please circle one:
1  Female
2  Male

Q-21 What is your level of school education?
1  0 to 8 years
2  9 to 12 years
3  Some university but did not graduate
4  University graduate
5  Post-graduate

Q-22 What generation are you in Australia?
1  I was born in Euskal Herria. (emigrant)
2  I am 1st generation of my family born in Australia. (Parent emigrated)
3  I am 2nd generation of my family born in Australia. (Grandparent emigrated)
4  I am 3rd generation born in Australia. (Great-grandparent emigrated)
5  I am 4th generation or more born in Australia. (Great great-grandparent emigrated)

Q-23 Please circle all of your relatives who are/were Basque.
1  My mother’s mother
2  My mother’s father
3  My father’s mother
4  My father’s father
5  My mother is/was not Basque. She is ____________________.
6  My father is/was not Basque. He is ____________________.

Q-24 Marital status:
1  Single
2  Living with a partner
3  Married
4  Separated
5  Divorced
6  Widowed

Q-25 If married, is your spouse Basque? (If widowed or divorced, please answer for your former spouse, if re-married please answer for your current spouse.
1  Yes my spouse is Basque.
2  No. Please specify his/her ethnic background __________________________
3  I have never been married.

Q-26 Your age in years:
1  18-30
2  31-45
3  46-60
4  61-75
5  76-90
6  91 or more

Q-27 What is your occupation/job? (If retired or unemployed, what was your occupation when you were working?) __________________________

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Q-28  Into which category would your total before taxes annual income fall? (Spouse and yourself only)
1  0 - 15,000 Australian dollars annually
2  15,001 - 30,000 Australian dollars annually
3  30,001 - 60,000 Australian dollars annually
4  60,001 - 90,000 Australian dollars annually
5  90,001 - 150,000 Australian dollars annually
6  150,000 or more Australian dollars annually

Q-29  Thank you for your participation and valuable opinions. Please take a moment to use the space below to make any comments you would like regarding this questionnaire. You may clarify any answers, or add any additional feelings you have regarding Basque identity and culture in Australia or Euskal Herria. Eskerrik asko!

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

PLEASE RETURN THIS SURVEY TO:
PRESERVACION CULTURAL VASCA EN LA DIASPORA:
Estudio comparativo de opiniones y actitudes vascas con referencia al nacionalismo y a la sobrevivencia cultural.

Querido compañero vaso,

Usted ha sido elegido para participar en la primera encuesta comparativa de los vascos fuera del País Vasco, Euskal Herria. Esta es una oportunidad para presentar sus opiniones y actitudes que ayudarán a completar el vacío en el conocimiento y entendimiento de la identidad étnica vasca y la preservación cultural.

Su casa fue elegida al azar entre la lista de miembros de su organización vasca. Es muy importante para nosotros el recibir el cuestionario completo para verdaderamente representar a la gente de raíces vascas en Argentina. De la misma manera, se han seleccionado familias vascas en Uruguay, Bélgica, Perú, Estados Unidos y Australia y estamos ahora recibiendo sus respuestas.

Para que estos resultados verdaderamente representen la forma de pensar de los vascos en Argentina, también es importante el tener el mismo número de hombres y mujeres participando en el estudio. Por lo tanto, quisiéramos que este cuestionario fuera hecho por una persona adulta (18 años o mayor) de sexo femenino, de descendencia vasca. Si no la hay, entonces puede ser completado por un adulto de sexo masculino de descendencia vasca, y enviado lo antes posible a la dirección que se encuentra al pie de esta carta.

Los resultados de esta encuesta estarán disponibles en mi tesis del doctorado en "The London School of Economics and Political Science" en Londres, Inglaterra. Los resultados también serán enviados a su organización vasca. Con mucho gusto contestaré cualquier pregunta que usted pueda tener. Me puede contactar de la siguiente manera:

GLORIA PILAR TOTORICAGUENA
8006 West Silkwood Court
Boise, Idaho 83704
United States of America

Por favor ayúdenos a crear una verdadera imagen de los vascos en Argentina para estudios e investigaciones futuras, complete y devuelva esta encuesta lo antes posible. Muchas gracias por su participación y sus opiniones tan valiosas.

Sinceramente,

Gloria Pilar Totoricaguena
PhD Researcher
The London School of Economics and Political Science

POR FAVOR REMITE A ESTA DIRECCION:
F. E. V.A.
Avenida Belgrano 1150
Buenos Aires , C.F. 1092
ARGENTINA
POR FAVOR MARQUE EL NUMERO DE SU RESPUESTA

Q-1 ¿Usted cómo se considera (elija una respuesta por favor)?
1 Vasco
2 Vasco-Argentino
3 Argentino-Vasco
4 Argentino
5 Otro (especifique) __________________________________

Q-2 ¿Usted habla el idioma vasco "euskera"?
1 Fluidamente
2 Con un poco de dificultad
3 Puedo entender una conversación simple
4 Unas pocas palabras
5 Nada

Q-3 ¿Usted puede leer y escribir en vasco?
1 Fluentemente
2 Con un poco de dificultad
3 Oraciones muy simples
4 Unas pocas palabras
5 Nada

Q-4 ¿Con que frecuencia usted habla vasco en su casa?
1 Todos los días, en casi todas las conversaciones, usando más vasco que español.
2 Todos los días, intercambiando las dos lenguas, usando menos vasco que español.
3 Hablamos vasco solo en determinados temas, o con ciertas personas.
4 Para determinados saludos, frases como "Feliz Cumpleaños" o "Feliz Año Nuevo" etc.
5 Nunca

Q-5 ¿Alguien en su familia ha participado en alguna organización vasca en Argentina, o es usted el primero de su familia en asociarse? Por favor marque todos aquellos que hayan participado antes que usted.
1 Padres
2 Hermanos o Hermanas
3 Abuelos
4 Otros parientes
5 Soy el primero de mi familia en asociarse.

Q-6 ¿Si usted es casado o convive con alguien, participa su pareja y/o hijos en las actividades vascas? Marque todas las personas que participan.
1 Mi pareja participa.
2 Los hijos participaron cuando eran jóvenes, y continuan participando.
3 Los hijos participaron cuando eran jóvenes, pero ahora no participan.
4 Los hijos de joven no participaron, pero ahora sí.
5 Los hijos de joven no participaron y ahora tampoco.
6 No tengo pareja y no tengo hijos.
Q-7 ¿Con qué frecuencia lee usted periódicos o revistas informativas publicadas en Euskal Herria?
1  Casi todos los días
2  Una vez a la semana
3  Una vez al mes
4  Una vez al año
5  Nunca

Q-8 ¿Con qué frecuencia come usted comida vasca en su casa?
1  Casi todos los días
2  Una vez a la semana
3  Algunas veces al mes
4  Algunas veces al año
5  Nunca

Q-9 Usted ha vivido en o viajado al país vasco? Marque todas las respuestas que representan las fechas de su conocimiento de Euskal Herria.
1  Nunca he visitado, ni vivido en Euskal Herria.
2  Visité o viví en Euskal Herria antes de 1975.
3  1975-1985
4  1986-1996
5  Seguramente viajare antes del año 2000.

Q-10 En la Argentina, hacia qué partido político tiene usted inclinación?
1  PJ Partido Justicialista
2  UCR Unión Cívico Radical
3  FREPASO
4  Otro. Por favor especifique. ____________________________
5  No me envuelvo en política.

Q-11 Ha sido usted cliente de un profesional o negocio por ser de patrón o empleados vascos?
1  Nunca he elegido un negocio o profesional solo por ser de vascos.
2  Raramente, quizás una vez en cinco años
3  A veces, quizás una vez al año
4  La mayoría de las veces, más o menos una vez al mes
5  Trato siempre de utilizar negocios o profesionales vascos.

Q-12 En la Argentina, ha sido usted tratado positivamente o negativamente solo por ser de identidad vasca? Si le ha sucedido en las siguientes situaciones marque 1 para NEGATIVAMENTE, o 2 para POSITIVAMENTE. Deje sin marcar las situaciones que no le correspondan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NEGATIVO</th>
<th>POSITIVO</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 2</td>
<td>Al buscar trabajo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 2</td>
<td>Al recibir algún beneficio del gobierno</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 2</td>
<td>Al hacerme socio de un club.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 2</td>
<td>En la escuela primaria, secundaria, o en la universidad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 2</td>
<td>Al ser considerado para una beca o cualquier tipo de premio.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 2</td>
<td>Al alquilar o comprar una casa o apartamento.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 2</td>
<td>Otro (especifique) ____________________________</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
¿En la Comunidad Autónoma Vasca (Araba, Bizkaia, Guipuzkoa), hacia qué ideología política tiene usted inclinación? Por favor marque solo una respuesta.

1. UCD Unión de Centro Democrático
2. PP Partido Popular
3. PSOE Partido Socialista Obrero Español
4. PCE Partido Comunista de España
5. PNV Partido Nacionalista Vasco
6. EA Eusko Alkartasuna
7. EE Euskadiko Ezkerra
8. HB Herri Batasuna
9. Otro (indique el partido)
10. No conozco suficiente la política en la C.A.V. para contestar esta pregunta.
11. Prefiero no involucrarme en la política de la Comunidad Autónoma Vasca.

Usted por qué conserva su identidad vasca? Estas son algunas de las razones mencionadas por las que los vascos de la diáspora mantienen su identidad y cultura vasca. Por favor marque todas las que le correspondan a usted personalmente.

1. Es mi responsabilidad a mis antepasados el continuar con las tradiciones que me han enseñado.
2. Puedo hacer nuevas amistades en el club vasco.
3. Quiero que mis hijos conozcan a otros vascos para un posible matrimonio con otro vasco.
4. Ser vasco me hace sentir único y especial.
5. Me siento en familia en la comunidad vasca.
6. El tener una identidad étnica me puede ayudar a conseguir un trabajo o beneficios especiales.
7. Siento que los vascos compartimos una conexión especial.
8. Quiero promover un conocimiento de la situación política en el país vasco entre Argentinos.
9. Los vascos en la Argentina pueden tener influencia en la política doméstica argentina.
10. Estoy interesado en mi historia y cultura.
11. Es importante mantener las tradiciones en este mundo moderno donde la gente ya no parece preocuparse por los demás.
12. Las familias vascas son más unidas y no tienen muchos de los problemas que otras familias tienen en la sociedad de hoy en día.
13. Quiero poner contentos a mis padres.
14. Estoy orgulloso de la fama de los vascos de ser gente honesta y muy trabajadora.

Por favor agregue sus propias razones por las que conserva su identidad vasca y por qué esto es importante para usted?
**Q-15** Ahora quisieramos tener su opinión sobre las siguientes ideas de otros vascos de la diáspora. Para contestar las siguientes preguntas escriba un número de 1 a 5 al principio de cada oración. Los números del 1 (Totalmente de acuerdo) al 5 (Totalmente en desacuerdo) representan lo siguiente:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Totalmente de acuerdo</td>
<td>De acuerdo</td>
<td>Sin opinión</td>
<td>En desacuerdo</td>
<td>Totalmente en desacuerdo</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

1. **______** Para ser considerado vasco, una persona debe hablar el idioma vasco.
2. **______** Para ser vasco se debe de tener antepasados vascos.
3. **______** La cultura vasca se puede mantener sin el idioma vasco.
4. **______** Me siento más cómodo con amigos vascos en Argentina, que con otros amigos Argentinos.
5. **______** Los vascos en la diáspora deben ser parte y asimilar las tradiciones se su nuevo país.
6. **______** El ser vasco me ha ayudado a conseguir trabajo, ascenso, beca o premio.
7. **______** Los vascos deben tratar de casarse con otros vascos.
8. **______** Prefiero participar en eventos culturales vascos que en eventos políticos vascos.
9. **______** Los valores argentinos son más importante para mí que los valores vascos.
10. **______** Las personas de descendencia vasca tienen un status socio-económico más alto que otros inmigrantes en Argentina.
11. **______** Para mí es importante comunicarme con familiares y amigos en Euskal Herria por lo menos una vez al año.
12. **______** Los políticos en Euskal Herria deberían preocuparse más por la cultura que por los derechos civiles y económicos.
13. **______** Admiradores del General Franco, y su política, ya no son una amenaza para los vascos.
14. **______** El Gobierno Autónomo Vasco no debería confiar del gobierno central español.
15. **______** Dejando del lado mi posición personal sobre la violencia en la política, creo que la táctica de usar violencia ha sido efectiva en conseguir mas autonomía en el país vasco.
16. **______** Las personas que viven en Euskal Herria deberían ser aceptadas como vascas hayan nacido o no en las siete provincias.
17. **______** Yo estaría dispuesto a ayudar al Gobierno Vasco a establecer vínculos internacionales de intercambio con negocios argentinos.
18. **______** No es importante mantener el idioma vasco porque hay muy pocos que lo saben.
19. **______** En Argentina, las madres han tenido más influencia que los padres en enseñar y mantener la cultura vasca con sus hijos.
20. **______** Ya tengo mi vida hecha en Argentina y solo tengo planes de volver a Euskal Herria de visita.

**Q-16** Hay opiniones diferentes sobre el posible futuro de las provincias vascas. En su opinión, ¿cuál de las siguientes situaciones sería la más deseable para el futuro de las siete provincias? Marque solo una.

1. Lapurdi, Nafarroa Beherea, y Zuberoa queden como parte de Francia; Araba, Bizkaia, y Guipuzkoa mantengan su gobierno autónomo dentro de España; Nafarroa mantenga su propio gobierno autónomo.
2. Lapurdi, Nafarroa Beherea, y Zuberoa queden como parte de Francia; Araba, Bizkaia, y Guipuzkoa se unan con Nafarroa y mantengan un gobierno autónomo dentro de España.
3. Lapurdi, Nafarroa Beherea, Zuberoa, Araba, Bizkaia, Guipuzkoa, y Nafarroa declaren su independencia de Francia y España, y juntos formen su propio país.
4. No se suficiente sobre esta situación para contestar esta pregunta.
Por favor conteste las siguientes preguntas teniendo en mente que usted es un vasco en la Argentina, separadamente de los vascos en Euskal Herria. ¿Qué importancia tienen estos ejemplos de ideas y cultura vasca para usted? ¿Qué importancia piensa usted estos deberían tener para los vascos que viven en el país vasco? Escriba el número que representa su opinión en cada espacio. Primero para Argentina, y en segundo lugar para Euskal Herria.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>De muchísima importancia</th>
<th>De importancia</th>
<th>Algo importante</th>
<th>Sin importancia</th>
<th>Sin opinión</th>
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**ARGENTINA/ EUSKAL HERRIA**

- _____Aprender el idioma vasco para hablar, leer, y escribir.
- _____Enseñar y utilizar la cocina vasca en nuestro hogar.
- _____Enseñar bailes típicos vascos a nuestros hijos.
- _____Organizar exhibiciones de arte vasco.
- _____Cantar canciones tradicionales vascas.
- _____Practicar deportes vascos como pelota, jai alai, corte de madera, levantar pesas, etc.
- _____Enseñar la historia política, económica, y cultural de Euskal Herria.
- _____Aprender acerca de la historia y eventos de la actualidad de los vascos de la diáspora.
- _____Celebrar Aberri Eguna como el día del nacionalismo vasco.
- _____Apoyar las acciones separatistas para hacer de Euskal Herria un país independiente.
- _____Apoyar los movimientos por la paz y antiterrorismo.
- _____En Argentina, identificarse como vasco y no argentino. En Euskal Herria identificarse como vasco y no español o francés.
- _____Que aceptemos como vascos, a los que se sienten y se identifican como vascos.
- _____Continuar las creencias y tradiciones católicas en nuestras familias.

**Q-18** Muchos inmigrantes todavía tienen bienes (intereses) en su país de origen (como negocios, tierra, vivienda, baserri). Se encuentra usted en esta situación?

1  Sí
2  No

**Q-19** En argentina ha usted participado en movimientos políticos específicamente porque afectaría a los vascos?

1  Sí, entre 1-10 veces.
2  Sí, más de 10 veces.
3  No, porque no han habido movimientos que afecten a los vascos.
4  No, porque no me involucro en política.

5  263
Para poder clasificar esta información por favor conteste las siguientes preguntas. Marque las respuestas que mejor describan a su persona.

Q-20  Por favor marque uno:
1  Mujer
2  Hombre

Q-21  ¿Cuál es su nivel de educación escolar?
1  0 a 8 años
2  9 a 12 años
3  Algo de universidad pero no me gradué
4  Graduado de universidad
5  Post-grado

Q-22  ¿De qué generación es usted en Argentina?
1  Yo nací en Euskal Herria (emigrante)
2  Primera generación nacida en Argentina (padres inmigrantes)
3  Segunda generación nacida en Argentina (abuelos inmigrantes)
4  Tercera generación nacida en Argentina (bisabuelos inmigrantes)
5  Cuarta generación o más de mi familia nacida en Argentina

Q-23  Por favor marque todos los familiares que son o fueron vascos:
1  La madre de mi madre
2  El padre de mi madre
3  La madre de mi padre
4  El padre de mi padre
5  Mi madre no es/era vasca. Ella es/era ____________________.
6  Mi padre no es/era vasco. El es/era______________________.

Q-24  Estado civil:
1  Soltero
2  Viviendo en pareja
3  Casado
4  Separado
5  Divorciado
6  Viudo

Q-25  Si usted es o ha sido casado, su cónyuge es o era vasco/a?
1  Sí, es o era vasco/a
2  No. (Por favor indique su grupo étnico)____________________
3  Nunca he estado casado.

Q-26  Su edad es:
1  18-30
2  31-45
3  46-60
4  61-75
5  76-90
6  91 o más

Q-27  Cual es su ocupación? Si es jubilado o desempleado, cual era su ocupación cuando trabajaba?
Q-28  ¿En qué categoría económica está el sueldo combinado de usted y su pareja por mes?
1  0 - 750 nuevos pesos mensual
2  751 - 1500 nuevos pesos mensual
3  1501 - 2250 nuevos pesos mensual
4  2251 - 3000 nuevos pesos mensual
5  3001 - 3750 nuevos pesos mensual
6  3751 o más nuevos pesos mensual

Q-29  Muchas gracias por su participación y sus opiniones tan valiosas. Por favor dedique un momento para utilizar el siguiente espacio para hacer comentarios sobre este cuestionario, clarificar respuestas, o cualquier otra idea que usted tenga con respecto a la identidad y cultura vascas en la Argentina o en Euskal Herria. Eskerrik asko!

POR FAVOR REMITA A ESTA DIRECCION:
Personal Interview Question Categories

Interviews were conducted in Spanish, Basque, English and combinations of the three. I tried to get information for each of these questions from each respondent, but not in the same order. Interviews were conducted as an informal conversation rather than a question-answer session, and generally lasted from one to three hours. Several “interviews” have continued on to years of correspondence. Following are the topics covered:

Personal facts: Name; place of birth; parents’ place of birth; generation in host country; married to a Basque?; both parents Basque?; occupation; level of formal education.

Can you tell me who in the family emigrated first, and why? Were they a political exile or economic exile/emigrant? Do you know why they chose to migrate here, or how did they end up here and not in another country? For emigrants: What were your first years here like?

Can you think of anything you do, or a way you act or think, that is different from your host country friends specifically because you are Basque?

Do you think you are more like your Basque friends, or host country friends? Why?

Do you feel proud or embarrassed to tell people you are Basque? Why?

Can you think of any examples from your own, or a family member’s experience, of discrimination in the host country because of Basque ethnicity? Can you think of any examples where being Basque helped specifically?

When you tell people you are Basque, what is the usual reaction? (If they mention ETA- what do you respond?)

When you describe or explain the Basques and Basque Country to people what do you tell them?

Can you give me any examples of how the males and females are different in their opinions regarding maintaining Basque identity in your community? Are there differences between your sons/daughters or brothers/sisters and their participation in Basque activities? Whether they participate or not, do you think their feelings are different or similar? In what way?

Why is being Basque important to you? Why do you maintain that ethnic identity even though living in another country?

Do you maintain any kind of consistent communication with anyone in the Basque Country? Please describe it.

Which are your favorite Basque cultural and political events that are a part of your Basque identity here in host country? What would you like your Basque organization to offer you that they are not now offering?

In your opinion, what is the most desirable outcome for the seven provinces? What do you think is the most likely?
Have you ever had the chance to learn about Basque Country politics? Does the topic interest you? Would you like to know more— for example if the political parties sent information to the Basque Center would you actually read it? Do you have double citizenship? Do you vote in Basque Country elections?

What are your feelings towards Spanish people? The central government in Madrid?

Can you think of any examples from the past when you or a family member participated in trying to influence your host country’s governmental policy toward Spain, France, or the Basque Country? Do you remember the extent of the involvement or exactly what people did?

Do you have any information regarding Basques in other places outside of Euskal Herria like yourself? Do you have any consistent contacts with any other diaspora Basques? Where? For what reasons?

Do you feel any connection or responsibility to other Basques in host country? In Euskal Herria? In other Basque diaspora communities?

Why do you think other Basques do not participate in the Center activities?

In your opinion what characteristics make a person Basque? Can a person become Basque if their parents are not Basque?

Have technology or telecommunications changes in the world affected you personally, or your family, in any way in regards to the Basque activities, communications with the homeland, getting information etc.?

What do you think your Basque Center/organization/community will be like 50 years from now?

Have you had the opportunity to travel to, or live in, Euskal Herria? When? What was it like? Were you accepted as a Basque or considered an outsider?

Do you think of yourself as a Basque or as a (host country), or something else? Do you feel like you are totally integrated into this society?

In your opinion what factors do you think have caused the upsurge in interest in Basque identity and the creation of the new Basque Centers?

Is there any chance you might return to the Basque Country to stay? Do you have any desire to do so? Do you know anyone that does?
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