MANAGEMENT REFORM IN A CENTRALISED ENVIRONMENT: PRIMARY EDUCATION ADMINISTRATION IN BALOCHISTAN, PAKISTAN 1992-97

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.)

Randy L. Hatfield

London School of Economics and Political Science, University of London

June 2001
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Abstract

This study reviews the attempt to decentralise the administration of primary education in Balochistan, Pakistan in the period from 1992 to 1997. It critically examines the institutions that managed public, primary education at provincial and district levels and analyses their functions to determine where the locus of control existed for categories of public service delivery. Government officers placed in twenty-six administrative units (districts) were entrusted with the responsibility for government schools and were expected to foster partnerships with NGOs and communities to develop community schools. The thesis assesses the extent to which the process was, in fact, carried through. It investigates the constraints that the Province faced in adopting donor led objectives.

The study design involved interviews at the regional level, textual analyses of government and NGO documents, and two detailed case studies in very different rural districts. The data suggest that no clear education policy framework existed in Balochistan prior to 1997. The lack of policy direction for primary education was found to be a contributing factor to the Province's weak institutional capacity for providing it. Concurrently, decentralisation plans were found to be incongruent with central and district power and political structures. Delegated authority and budgetary control needed for local management did not exist at the district level. Rare local initiatives taken by district managers showed promising signs of decentralised management but they could not be sustained without appropriate local administrative capacity.

The thesis ends by discussing, in light of local experience, the elusive nature of decentralisation and its shortcomings in guiding practical policy. Why do major donors favour decentralisation in primary education administration when capacity is so weak? This contrast provides an important rationale for revisiting the centralisation-decentralisation debate and analysing whether the concept of decentralisation should be considered as the definitive model for primary education management reform in centralist developing countries.
For Mom and Dad

&

Sobia
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Acknowledgements

The benefit of undertaking research that involves fieldwork is that it adds faces, voices and general depth to the final product. There are many faces and voices that I have encountered in the course of this research who have supported, motivated, and challenged me. Foremost, I am grateful to my respondents--the women and men in Balochistan who so willingly shared their time and resources to help me understand education administration in their context. In the Primary Education Directorate (PED), I am grateful for the assistance of Faiz Mohammad Jaffar who played a significant role in my access to the Jaffarabad and Barkhan Districts. Administrative support provided through PED was extremely helpful and I am indebted to the staff for the voluntary assistance given to me as an outsider to the organisation. I am also appreciative of Aamir Mirza's help in carrying out the field interviews. I am thankful for the support provided by the external consultants living in Quetta at the time of the fieldwork, particularly Dr. Brian Spicer and Dr. Kent Noel. Both were instrumental in providing me with data and general advice on Ph.D. research. I am particularly indebted to Dr. Noel for providing my accommodation in Quetta. My thanks also go to Ahmed Ali and Naeem for their daily support at the PED Guesthouse. They were a constant source of education to me as they revealed their own stories from Afghanistan.

Dr. Anthony Hall provided supervisory support for which I am grateful. Professor Carol Weiss of the Graduate School of Education at Harvard University and Dr. Emma Hooper in London were kind enough to comment on various portions of the thesis which proved to be very useful to me. I also owe a special note of gratitude to Professor Howard Glennerster. I am deeply indebted to his conceptual and academic advice throughout that have not only immeasurably benefited my research, but have also shaped my perspective of the social sciences and will continue to guide me in future professional pursuits. I am grateful to the Department for the research studentship and other bursaries that have made this study possible. In this regard am deeply grateful
to the Trustees of the Titmuss Fund for awards that, in a significant way, made my study possible.

On a personal note, I am obliged to The Academy for Educational Development. The idea, the means and access of this study would have not been possible without the institutional ‘capital’, that I gained through my eight years of employment prior to the study. Also, to special friends I owe a large debt of gratitude. Nobile Bhatti was a constant motivator and coach; Romel Ahmed, Griselda Cano, Anupma Jain, Mikael Sami and Rana Sarkar provided personal advice and support throughout; and Masroor Nawaz and his parents were generous with their encouragement and hospitality. To my fellow research colleagues Mafalda Cardim, Carine Clert, Sarah Cottingham, Nick Kirby, Soon-woo Park and Amani Siyam I am grateful for their insights and help. Finally, I would like to thank my friends in ‘Flat #17’ who have provided the levity that I needed while facing the finish line of this study.
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<tr>
<td>AED</td>
<td>Academy for Educational Development, Inc.</td>
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<td>ADB</td>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASDEO</td>
<td>Assistant Sub-divisional Education Officer</td>
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<td>BEMIS</td>
<td>Balochistan Education Management Information System</td>
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<tr>
<td>BIMDTC</td>
<td>Balochistan Instructional Materials Development Training Cell</td>
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<tr>
<td>BOCE</td>
<td>Bureau of Curriculum and Extension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPEP</td>
<td>Balochistan Primary Education Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOE</td>
<td>Department of Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEO</td>
<td>District Education Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>GCET</td>
<td>Government Colleges of Elementary Teaching</td>
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<td>GOB</td>
<td>Government of Balochistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>GOP</td>
<td>Government of Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>LC</td>
<td>Learning Co-ordinator</td>
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<tr>
<td>LAFAM</td>
<td>Light of Awareness for the Fair Advancement of Mankind</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNA</td>
<td>Members of National Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPA</td>
<td>Members of Provincial Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOE</td>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEP</td>
<td>National Education Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>NWFP</td>
<td>Northwest Frontier Province</td>
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<td>PED</td>
<td>Primary Education Directorate</td>
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<tr>
<td>PTSMC</td>
<td>Parent/Teacher/ School/ Management Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>Social Action Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAARC</td>
<td>South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCOPE</td>
<td>Society for Community Organisation for Primary Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDEO</td>
<td>Sub-divisional Education Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Society</td>
<td>Society for Community Support for Primary Education in Balochistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations International Children's Education Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>VEC</td>
<td>Village Education Committee</td>
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<td>WVEC</td>
<td>Women's Village Education Committee</td>
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<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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<td><strong>Baloch</strong></td>
<td>Literally means a nomad or wanderer</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Birathri</strong></td>
<td>Brotherhood within a tribe. Tribal affiliation</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Baluchmayar</strong></td>
<td>Baloch tribal code of honour</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Barani</strong></td>
<td>non-irrigated farmland</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>chai khanna</strong></td>
<td>Literally ‘tea/food’. Refers to a roadside tea shop</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>haal</strong></td>
<td>Concept of information or news being carried from one tribe to another</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>jirga</strong></td>
<td>A 600 year old system of justice carried out by a council of elders of a tribe</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>karez</strong></td>
<td>Ancient underground irrigation canals which transport water from mountain springs to arid valley fields.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>peon</strong></td>
<td>Servant</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Purdah</strong></td>
<td>Islamic practice of shielding women from contact with people outside her immediate family through restrictions on dress, movement, and association.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rawaj</strong></td>
<td>‘Tradition’. A code of practice accepted as law in <em>jirga</em></td>
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<td><strong>Sardar</strong></td>
<td>Traditional leader who exercises influence over large areas equivalent to one or more districts in modern Balochistan. Usually the chief of a tribe.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wadera</strong></td>
<td>Head of a clan or section within a tribe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>zar, zan, zameen</strong></td>
<td>‘Wealth, woman, land’. Basic elements in the protection of the Baloch code of honour.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Zamindari</strong></td>
<td>Landowners of large areas</td>
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The voice that comes from the heart has strength

This voice does not have wings but it has the ability to fly.

-Allama Mohammad Iqbal
Chapter 1

Decentralisation: Selection of a Theoretical Framework

We have made great progress in seizing power from the hands of capitalists and traditionalists, but we must face the fact that, to the mass of the people, power is still something wielded by others—even if on their behalf.

Julius K. Nyerere, *Decentralisation* 1972

Criticisms of post-colonial governments in the 1940s to 1970s were that much of the disappointment that followed independence and the poor economic performance of developing countries lay in the reliance in over-centralisation of administration and authority. The legacy left by colonial powers included a narrow cadre of educated ruling elites; weak local government structures plus the lack of skilled people to run them; and single party rule that encouraged centralisation through Marxist models, which bred national planning. The further effects of independence manifested themselves in administration through corruption, slowness of decision-making and to broader economic inefficiencies including the incapacity of developing countries to make significant reforms (Leaf 1998).
The reaction to this legacy is where this study begins. Rondinelli, a classic theorist on decentralisation, wrote on what he considered to be disillusionment with the 'basic premises of development theory' in the 1970s. It was at this time he asserts, that 'planners and policymakers began to recognise that development requires a basic transformation in social, economic, and political structures that enables poor people to help themselves to increase their productivity and incomes' (Rondinelli 1983:12). The trickle-down policies developed by central governments were not showing favourable results in terms of alleviating absolute poverty, expanding economies and modernisation. Furthermore, Rondinelli points out that human resource potential could not be maximised given that policy development had been separated from policy implementation. He also claimed that social development was unwieldy and prone to frequent change making it difficult for central authorities to prescribe policy for communities who were assumed to be more informed or in better touch with their own reality.

Nearly two decades later, theorists have reflected on the effects of development decentralisation strategies. It has been suggested that many of the outcomes have not measured up to the intent of the strategies (Riddell 1997; Crook and Manor 1998). Centralising forces have continued to plague policy formulation and implementation, as is pointed out in the theory in the following section.

1.1 Decentralisation and Development: A Theoretical Remedy?

The theoretical debate on decentralisation in public administration generally falls into two camps—proponents of the reform and the critics. However, the following discussion highlights this debate according to theme.

Shaffer's View on Centralising Tendencies

Decentralisation has been viewed as just one among many strategies for making administrative improvements. Likewise, its effectiveness has been
questioned. Serious reservations have been expressed as to whether the reform as an ideology supports local autonomy or, conversely, strengthens central control. The discussion concerning centralisation or rather centralising tendencies is compelling in terms of social effects or results of decentralisation and is the focus of discussion in this section.

In abstract terms, centralisation has been identified as an inevitable function of states governing territories. In a posthumous exposition of Schaeffer's work, Smith (1986) contends that state institutions are responsible for public policies that give to space a 'significant perception of specific comparative location'. Recipients of government services and allocations are divided into spatial categories where rules manifested in public policy create spatial distinctions of access and eligibility (p.456).

Underdevelopment increases the significance of rationing and procurement by the state, and formal definitions of spatial concepts come to be used as criteria of inclusion and exclusion: arid zones, depressed areas, hill farming, community development, regional planning, district development and so on. The significance of such classification, defining people as members of eligible or ineligible groups, is not just that it has a spatial dimension. It is a centrally created dimension, and so contributes to the process of centralisation that is so ubiquitous, especially in the political systems of the Third World (Ibid:456).

Other ingredients to centralisation, in Schaeffer's opinion, are expressed in terms of bureaucratic and organisational functions that lead to centralisation. Bureaucratic, allocating processes, institutional ideologies, procedures, and language produce centralising outcomes. Administrative language expresses professional and international standards enshrined in centralised rules. Organisational processes tend inevitably to strengthen the governmental centre. Contractors, clients, claimants, beneficiaries and so on with whom organisations deal must use official, institutional language to bear any meaning for those at the centre. Organisations are inherently centrist given their 'co-ordination' role. By definition, they exist because work is too difficult and diffuse for any one individual to control. Centralisation is evidenced in the way that institutions develop structures of pay, careers, training and promotion: a distribution of power between age groups and generations which inevitably tends to allocate
resources and status towards the centre located in the urban capital. 'This emphasises the political significance of centrality. Headquarters and branches are the visible statement of the centralising process which organisation of itself inevitably tends to mean' (Schaffer 1984:47-48).

These notions broadly reflect Max Weber's classical concept of bureaucracy. Weber distinguishes bureaucracy from other organisational forms in his presentation of hierarchy, division of labour, and rules and regulations. Hierarchy entails a clear hierarchical chain of responsibility. The division of labour denotes the specialisation of tasks performed by different members of the organisation, and rules and regulations specify the rights and responsibilities, which are assigned to different positions in the organisation and how the task of each position is to be carried out (Lauglo and McLean 1985:20). The authors here argue the implications for centralisation.

These key aspects of bureaucracy all imply a concentration of control at the top of the hierarchy. That control is exerted in order to co-ordinate the activities of the organization so that they serve the organization's purpose with maximum efficiency (Ibid:20).

In terms of local administration, the state intervenes in many ways, and therefore has a direct role in perpetuating centralisation. On one hand, for instance, it sponsors local decentralisation through the formation of 'local councils' that are in theory 'autonomous local authorities'. On the other hand, poorly qualified staff and the lack of available resources in many of these councils require 'a strengthening of central assistance that brings centralisation back into the picture' (Schaffer 1982:3). The lack of resources is purported not to be the sole instigating factor in strengthening centralisation, but that it is coupled with a lack of commitment.

Centralisation in developing countries is not just a function of scarcity. It is in part a function of commitment. Those who recommend administrative reorganisation and have to implement it, the central government politicians and civil servants, have the most to lose if access, participation and responsiveness are strengthened by decentralisation. There is thus a generally disappointing record as far as the implementation of decentralisation schemes is concerned (Smith 1986:460).
In sum, administration sets up dimensions of space that are divided. Dichotomies of 'top-bottom'; 'centre-periphery'; 'powerful-powerless' are typical fallout in organisations. Centralisation is the weightier reality of these space divisions and is thus characterised in a negative light given the exclusion that often accompanies it. Decentralisation, on the other hand, should not necessarily be idealised as the elixir for all matters of exclusion, but should rather be viewed as a means of balancing power or authority struggles that generally arise in organisations.

The following section analyses the concept of decentralisation through commonly used definitions that are included in policies currently being established in the developing world. Decentralisation is often ambiguously defined and yet, in a spatial context raises important questions about the centralising tendencies of its strategies, i.e. 'Does the existence of area organisations imply development according to unique local criteria identified by local decision-makers? Or does it represent an area dimension within national development planning, with national planners determining area priorities according to the needs of national goals' (Ibid:461).

Ambiguities with Terms

The discourse concerning the nature of decentralisation would perhaps be richer if we had stronger empirical evidence by which to grade/measure its results. Manor (1999) suggests that while experimentation with development and decentralisation has occurred over a wide range of countries, the evidence is 'imperfect and incomplete'. He also warns that in terms of country experiences, 'the findings may need to be revised after these experiments have more time to develop and make an impact' (Manor 1999:2). As a term, decentralisation has come to mean many things and therefore, as a concept, is ambiguous with borders not well defined (Prud'homme 1994). To gain a better understanding of the proposition that the nature of decentralisation is elusive, this section will attempt to piece together a variety of definitions and arguments that call in to question its theoretical validity.
It is interesting to note that most contemporary sources dealing with the subject of decentralisation and development generally recycle the same definitions. This noticeable pattern raises suspicion as to whether any new thinking is taking place in which practical experience informs theory. The definitions relayed below are examples of these frequently cited sources. They are included here to establish, as many others have before, a baseline by which to critique and measure decentralisation that will be observed later in this study.

The classical definition of decentralisation is 'the transfer of planning, decision-making or management functions from the central government and its agencies to field organisations, subordinate units of government, semi-autonomous public corporations, area-wide or regional development organisations, specialised functional authorities or non-government organisations' (Rondinelli, 1986:2). Decentralisation is further distinguished or classified into four sub-categories along political, spatial, market, and administrative parameters as shown in Figure 1.1. There exist at least four 'institutional arrangements' under the umbrella of Administrative decentralisation (circled in Figure 1.1) including categories of deconcentration, delegation, devolution and the transfer of functions to local governments. These subdivisions or sub-classifications are repeated by a number of theorists, Rondinelli's being the most widely used. However, they also add to the confusion over what decentralisation is supposed to be.
Figure 1.1 Classification of Decentralisation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Administrative</th>
<th>Political</th>
<th>Spatial</th>
<th>Market</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seeks to redistribute authority, responsibility and financial resources for providing public services among different levels of government... and is defined as the transfer of responsibility for planning, management, and the raising and allocation of resources from the central government and its agencies to field units of government agencies, subordinate units or levels of government or semi-autonomous public authorities or corporations, area-wide regional or functional authorities. (SR1-5)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Political decentralisation refers to giving more political power in decision-making to citizens or to their elected representatives. Political decentralisation is usually associated with representative government, citizen participation, and democratisation. (SR2-2)</td>
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<td>A process of encouraging the diffusion of population and services among villages, towns and cities of different sizes to prevent or reverse high levels of concentration in one or two large metropolitan areas. (SR1-3) The objective of spatial decentralisation in education policies is to distribute investments in educational services and facilities more widely among cities and towns, and to strengthen local administrative capacity to raise revenues to maintain them. (SR1-4)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Allows services to be provided by businesses, community groups, co-operatives, private voluntary associations, individuals, and non-governmental organisations. Market decentralisation is a process of creating conditions in which public goods and services are provided primarily through the revealed preferences of individuals by market mechanisms. Some economists contend that under conditions of reasonably free choice, the provision of some public goods such as education is more economically efficient when a large number of local institutions are involved than when only the central government or the public sector is the provider. Market-oriented options include: • private sector provision of services • public-private partnerships • performance contracting with the private sector • market surrogates (SR1-11:16)</td>
<td></td>
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Centralising Tendencies?

Source: Rondinelli 1995
Bray (1994) claims that 'when trying to disentangle the many alternative meanings of decentralisation, one important initial distinction is between territorial and functional decentralisation'. He further suggests that Rondinelli's work has been concerned with territorial decentralisation, i.e. 'with the distribution of powers between different tiers of government' (p.819). His variations of territorial decentralisation, though, are the same as Rondinelli's derivatives of administrative decentralisation and include devolution, delegation and deconcentration (See Figure 1.2). Alternatively, functional decentralisation could mean a 'dispersal of control over particular activities, and is often a 'vertical' form of decentralisation' (Ibid:819).

Figure 1.2: Forms of Administrative Decentralisation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Devolution ✓</th>
<th>Delegation ✓</th>
<th>Deconcentration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The most extreme form of decentralisation. Powers are formally held by local bodies which do not need to seek approval for their actions. They may choose to inform the centre of their decisions, but the role of the centre is merely one of collection and exchange of information. (Bray 1994:819)</td>
<td>Central governments transfer responsibility for decision-making and administration of public functions such as education to semi-autonomous organisations not wholly controlled by the central government, but ultimately accountable to it. a)Public Corporations or Enterprises b)Special Authorities and Districts (Rondinelli 1995:SR1-7)</td>
<td>Often considered the weakest form of decentralisation. It is defined as the redistribution of decision-making authority and financial and management responsibilities for providing services and facilities among different levels of the central government a)Field Administration b)Local Administration (Rondinelli 1995:SR1-5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bray 1994 and Rondinelli 1995

The literature suggests that deconcentration is a more common practice and that it differs from decentralisation on the basis of a political variation. Whereas decentralisation connotes entities 'separated by law from the national centre in which local representatives are given formal power to decide on a range of public matters,' deconcentration constitutes delegated authority within the centrally directed hierarchy of public administration (Mawhood 1993:1). Another dimension to deconcentration is that it occurs when a central authority creates field units or rather 'introduces extra tiers of government without handing over
significant decision-making powers' (Bray 1984:5-6). It is suggested, however, that this is not such a negative state if it can lead to greater local sensitivity and influence.

Decentralisation has also been defined as 'any change in the organisation of government which involves the transfer of powers or functions from the national level to any sub-national level(s), or from one sub-national level to another, lower one' (Conyers 1984). In the wave of idealism in the early 1980s, decentralisation was losing its charm. Besides being tagged as a 'fad' or a 'panacea,' the notion was also being questioned in much the same way that is illustrated in Figure 1.3. Here, Conyers points out a series of antithetical statements about the nature of decentralisation. Her third point is particularly compelling. According to a popular corpus of theory espousing the merits of decentralisation, such a movement would result in the improvement of management or increased participation. Conyers suggests, however, that these 'objectives' are not usually achieved by decentralisation. Of course this a broad claim that implicates her willingness to define decentralisation noted above.

**Figure 1.3: Antitheses to Decentralisation**

1. Decentralisation can be seen as a means of achieving a wide range of objectives, but should not be seen as a solution and a panacea to all problems;
2. The extent to which decentralisation will achieve any objective depends on its degree and form;
3. Most objectives which decentralisation is intended to achieve, such as improvements in the management of rural development programs and increased popular participation, cannot be achieved by decentralisation;
4. Decentralisation can itself create new problems, the nature and extent of which depend on its degree and form and on factors specific to the country in question; and
5. Any attempt to unravel the complexities of the issue is further complicated by the difficulty of distinguishing between changes resulting (or not resulting) from decentralisation and those attributable to other factors.

Source: Conyers 1982

Theoretically, decentralisation is easy to rationalise. This study finds that Rondinelli and a multitude of other specialists on the subject have elaborated the merits of decentralisation many times over. Figure 1.4 below highlights
fourteen archetypes, representative of the literature, that help (theoretically) to rationalise such a reform.

**Figure 1.4: Desirable Effects of Decentralisation**

1. Delegates greater authority for development planning and management to officials in the field and closer to the problems;
2. De-bureaucratises administration;
3. Opens the flow of communication in both directions allowing for better co-ordinated planning;
4. Promotes implementation of national policies to areas where central government plans are often unknown or ignored by rural people or are undermined by local elites;
5. Allows for greater representation of stockholders at the local level;
6. Induces capability-building among local governments and private institutions;
7. Unburdens central managers of tasks that could be conducted by local managers;
8. Creates a condition whereby activities could be better co-ordinated among central planners by and between local institutions;
9. Institutionalises participation of citizens in development planning and management;
10. Offsets the control of elites over development activities;
11. Allows for more experimentation and testing of innovations--allows for more creativity and flexibility;
12. Allows local leaders to locate services more effectively in communities and allows for better monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of development projects;
13. Increases political stability of countries by giving local groups more of a stake in development decision making;
14. Increases the number of public goods and services and the efficiency with which they are delivered by decreasing diseconomies of scale.

Source: Rondinelli 1983:14-16

It is not clear, though, 'how' these goals might be achieved or operationalised thus adding further to the ambiguity of the concept of decentralisation. Rondinelli does offer, however, the suggestion that by improving personnel management capabilities through preparation of job descriptions, effective operating procedures, salary and wage guidelines, transfer and promotion policies, and performance evaluations, local governments can fulfil their potential as decentralised units of governance and as efficient providers of local public services (Rondinelli 1995).

One difficulty with the term 'decentralisation' as illustrated in Figure 1.4 is that it has been over-used and applied repeatedly in the literature to mean many different things.
Decentralisation is a word that has been used by different people to mean good many different things. Most of us—and most governments—like the idea of decentralisation. It suggests the hope of cracking open the blockages of an inert central bureaucracy, curing managerial constipation, giving more direct access for the people to the government and the government to the people, stimulating the whole nation to participate in national development plans (Mawhood 1993:1).

Not only have definitions of decentralisation been over-generalised, but the term has also been substituted and used interchangeably with any number of sub-tier categories already displayed. A pointed distinction between these notions is that while decentralisation is a broad term, it should not be used to cover all categories. 'Mixing of phrases and inter-changing terms has brought some confusion into thinking on the subject and, in particular, has allowed centralising policies in government to be depicted as something different than what they really are' (Ibid:2).

The vagueness that lies in definitions for decentralisation can also be illustrated in another way. In theory, administrative reform is often portrayed in polarised conditions of centralisation and decentralisation. Usually a shift is recommended from a centralised condition to a decentralised condition. This theoretical shift focuses on an 'all or nothing' approach that misses the possibility and potential of the middle ground (Bray 1984:18). It is argued that decentralisation and centralisation cannot be strictly identified at the opposite ends of a continuum, but rather that all forms of government contain a mix (p.5). Policy development and implementation of administrative reforms that would lead a country in the direction of decentralisation require more than simplified definitions of 'either/or' proportions, however.

The concepts of centralization and decentralization\(^1\) are complex and slippery. It is rarely possible without argument to place specific administrative systems on a continuum with centralized at one end and decentralized at the other, and attempts to

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\(^1\) The British English spelling of 'decentralisation' and other words are assumed throughout the writing of this thesis. The trans-positioning of the letter 's' and 'z' varies according to the expression of the authors quoted in the text.
measure the degree of decentralization in particular systems have exposed more difficulties than solutions (Bray, 1994:820).

Other confusion over the definitions of decentralisation exists. One example is that while most of the literature states that it should be the result of a need expressed from 'below,' it generally emanates through a mandate from the 'top' (Rondinelli 1983:182). Another example is that the process of decentralisation typically requires the reorientation and strengthening of some organisations at the centre. Thus, the centre cannot be forgotten in policy formulation. The tendency, however, is that the central agencies which usually allocate the resources are typically more powerful to leverage reforms than the institutions on the periphery. The problem is that they often have little understanding of their own roles, much less an understanding of the roles of decentralised units to which they are devolving responsibility (Schmidt 1989:139). This point is emphasised in a discussion on the implementation of decentralisation by Jain.

The process of decentralisation-centralisation is oftentimes very confusing as different organisation and groups have different interpretations of what they are supposed to do. It is particularly confusing for groups at the centre such as the Ministry of Education who may think that decentralisation means that they can abdicate their responsibilities (Jain 1995:25).

Despite the arguments made concerning the vagueness of the term 'decentralisation', as a management reform ideology it continues to inspire the hope of policy makers and is still a favoured strategy found in international policy in administrative development. As a political phenomenon, decentralisation is widespread. Out of the seventy-five developing and transitional countries with populations greater than five million, sixty-three claim to be undertaking some form of transfer of political power to local units of government (Dillinger 1994:1).

Decentralisation as a reform strategy, however, is often perceived incorrectly as a solution to a wide range of administrative, political, economic and social problems which vary from country to country, but which in most countries appear to place an enormous developmental burden on decentralisation (Smith 1986:461). The question of whether decentralisation is an end or a means to an end adds to the difficulty of defining decentralisation. Schaffer sees
decentralisation becoming an end in itself with the desired outcome being a more democratic and participatory society. In the author's opinion, one of the most pervasive grey areas concerning decentralisation aside from centralising tendencies is whether community participation is a cause or an effect. The next section raises questions about the net impact of decentralisation upon the intended beneficiaries.

Decentralisation and Communities: Access and Exclusion

The consideration of community participation as a function of decentralisation extends the challenge of first finding a suitable definition of the reform and secondly whether the reform is ideal for development (see Michener 1998 for an overview of types of participation). Participatory development has been viewed as a mechanism for handing development over to the people but as a practice has been questioned with regard to achieving this goal. Rahman (1995) suggests that community participation is a long way from being practiced to an extent that would lead to significant structural reforms that would 'transfer resources away from those vested interests that control dominant social and political structures towards underprivileged people' (p.26).

Before we can analyse participation, a working definition of 'community' should be established. Worsley (1987:100) introduces three classical definitions in sociology literature. The first he describes as 'community as locality'. Here the interpretation of the term comes closest to its geographical meaning of a 'human settlement within a fixed and bounded local territory'. Secondly, he suggests that 'community' has been used to denote, a 'network of interrelationships'. In this usage, community relationships can be characterised by conflict as well as by mutuality and reciprocity. In the third usage, community can be seen to refer to a particular type of social relationship; one that possesses certain qualities. It infers the existence of a 'community spirit' or 'community feeling'. The first definition is the one that is used in this thesis.

There are many ways of conceptualising community participation. Moser (1983) finds that first, participation is a 'means to an end', and secondly it is an 'end in itself'. The first approach leads to what is also called 'efficiency-oriented'
or 'weak' participation where development objectives are achieved by consultation with, and contributions of, communities, but not by involving them in the decision making process, or in control of resources. The second approach leads to 'strong' or 'empowering' participation: a process with no quantitative outcome, but designed to increase control by marginal groups of both resources and the decisions made by more powerful actors.

The first approach assumes that it is possible to improve the quality of life of the poor without political conflict, and the second assumes that social transformation is a process whereby changes in political relationships will be the result of participation. However, Moser (1986:4) also states that 'authentic participation can only occur when there is a redistribution of power', and that this implies the existence of a third category of 'strong' or 'red' participation with structural change as its objective. Related to this approach is 'spontaneous' participation that leads to social movements that, in turn, challenge dominant power structures (Midgley, Hall et al. 1986) and organised socialist revolution.

In addition, there is the possibility that communities may become so marginalised that their autonomous actions do not constitute a political challenge to the government or ruling elites, and fall outside the remit of development agencies. This leads to a fourth category of participation where communities initiate action out of need, but without the design, mobilisation or animation of external agents. This has been called the 'incremental mode' (Midgely 1986), the 'self reliance of the poor' (Stiefel and Wolfe 1994), 'authentic' participation (Hall 1986:100), 'self mobilisation' (Estrella and Gaventa 1998) and 'substitution' of the community for a dysfunctional state (Sinha 2000).

The notion of 'rethink' (Oakley 1984) is another term used to denote the fourth category of participation. This notion was cultivated through a backlash to colonisation, industrialisation and resulting dependencies induced on developing nations. Emphasis is placed on an empowering process, which through organisation gives people the strength to create a space for themselves, and to build up material assets to support their own self reliant development (pp. 7-10).
Does decentralisation lead to empowerment and participation? Hurst (1985) argues that it does not. His position goes against the advocates for decentralised reform who claim that shifts of control away from the centre 'must mean an increase in democratic participation, sounder decisions, and more commitment to implementation' (p.79). Hurst's reasoning suggests that the shift of power from one level of authority to another does not mean that the new body of authority will be 'more representative' of the community and 'responsive' than the previous body of control.

Notions of participation and community development often cloud the discourse on decentralisation. Contemporary development efforts are notorious for prescribing some form of participation or community support among their general objectives often characterising them as decentralising efforts. For instance, Malen (1990) has conceptualised school-based management as a 'formal alteration of governance structures, a form of decentralisation that identifies the individual school as the primary unit of improvement and relies on the redistribution of decision-making authority as the means through which improvements might be stimulated or sustained' (Ibid:1). The question remains, however, whether community mobilisation and local participation in development are prerequisites for decentralisation, outcomes or neither.

Decentralisation is a complex subject with many dimensions. As a variable factor in the design of governmental and administrative machinery, it needs to be measured. As such it should be treated as a matter of formal organisational relationships, separable from the concept of local or community autonomy (Smith 1979:222).

In terms of the 'formal relationships' alluded to in the above quote and the linkages between the 'centre' and the 'periphery', some field specialists would argue that participatory strategies designated by the State are not purely motivated whether included as a part of a decentralisation package or otherwise administered.

State-directed participation is a contradiction in terms. This is because the nature of popular involvement becomes so limited as to virtually defy use of the term 'participation'. In effect the concept becomes purely instrumental, useful to government for making the pursuit of pre-established goals more efficient (Midgley 1986:99).
In this respect, the possibility of access to local authorities through decentralisation means including local mobilisation of NGOs, parent groups, etc. would seem to be negligible. Access was a central theme for Schaffer who stated: 'It is certainly the case that decentralisation seems inescapably to be required in some sense or other as a means to improving access' (Schaffer 1982:32). Specific organisational responses, according to Schaffer, must be made according to two key factors related to service provision.

1. eligibility to participate in schemes and services;
2. the services to be assigned to decentralised organisations (p.3)

These factors were suggested as necessary if decentralisation was to improve access and participation.

*Eligibility*

Radical theorists working on the topic of social transition such as Freire (1970) have dealt with power and individual rights to participation in 'transforming their own realities'. These theories, it is argued have merit but are not realisable unless theories or policies advocating macro-scale social transformations are developed which would facilitate 'popular grassroots mobilisations' (Rahman 1995:25). If decentralisation is required to stimulate social transformation on a macro-scale, it has a long way to go as a reform to achieve what has usually been considered a lofty purpose.

Schemes for decentralisation have tended to assume that the establishment of democratic process will automatically endow political power; and that this power will be utilized to redress inequality and injustices. In reality, the acquisition of power may have to precede establishment of political institutions if these are to serve the interests of the most in need (Smith 1986:465).

One interesting conclusion drawn from the discussion of various initiatives promoting community empowerment and even eligibility is that they have contradictory results. The structural adjustment packages mandated by the World Bank and supported through other agencies have resulted largely in 'non-
participatory' outcomes. As Rahman claims, they in fact have turned out to be 'poverty augmenting' by nature. Additionally, he claims that small-scale participatory development efforts are generally observed to be providing a 'safety net' effect and 'do not promise fundamental movement toward people's liberation' (Rahman 1995:32).

In terms of semantics, eligibility is sometimes confused with participation. For instance, it has been recommended that the authorities should not perceive people as a 'target group, membership of which is determined by institutional fiat' (Smith 1986:463). Rather they should be considered as participants. Mistakenly considering people as target groups or beneficiaries ostensibly sets up power structures where eligibility to services is controlled. Rahman suggests a further danger to labelling. He questions community organisations and/or NGOs use of labels such as 'the poor' and 'poverty' cautioning that these classifications define service provision in terms of 'meeting a social liability' rather than 'nourishing a social asset'. 'It looks at people as objects of sympathy and invites some sacrifice from the rest of the society to mitigate their suffering rather than invoking the cooperation of that society towards releasing people's creativity for development' (Rahman 1995:30).

Assigning Services to Organisations

Formal manifestations of decentralised administration ideally would take the arrangement of offices and agencies whose output would include delivery of public goods and services to dependent client groups. In theory, these institutions are a part of the policy process that allocates scarce resources to those deemed to be in need. Generally, however, people who have a greater interest in centralisation than decentralisation staff these agencies. As Schaffer points out, 'It is an element of the paradox to expect decentralising reforms from the beneficiaries of present centralisations' (Schaffer 1982b). Issues of central control, financial dependence and administrative weakness will continue to debilitate 'schemes' of administrative reform if not duly addressed in local organisations to which responsibilities and powers are to be decentralised (p.462). These and many other problems can be identified with service agents at the local level.
However, structural features of administration for service delivery at the local level should not be considered in isolation of behavioural, attitudinal nor cultural factors. Rondinelli (1983) in a comparative study of decentralisation in Asia pointed out that these dynamics featured prominently in his assessment. He claimed that some of the most important factors 'were the commitment of local officials to decentralizing development, the quality of local leadership, the attitudes of rural people toward government, and the degree to which traditional customs and behaviour were compatible with decentralized administrative arrangements' (p.200).

Services to be assigned to decentralised organisations, then, would depend largely on the context of the country undergoing a management reform. Rondinelli (1990) describes what is called a 'contingency approach' to administration in the context social sector reform—the education sector being emphasised. He describes this approach as a management strategy with 'a particular pattern of management processes and organizational structures that enables an organization to accomplish specific tasks in a given environment' (p.33-35).

Below are four 'elements' that should be considered in defining a management strategy:

1. environment (least controlled)
2. tasks
3. management processes
4. organisational structures

The contingency approach to project design is comprised of four phases that include 1) Management Requirement Analysis; 2) Management Capacity Analysis; 3) Feasibility Analysis; and 4) Implementation Planning. Perhaps this contingency method or approach to design is one way that might enable a better analysis of service delivery at the local level which in turn could provide some better definitions for organisational decentralisation.
In sum, the composite units of society represented in theory as 'locals', communities, beneficiaries etc. are often secondary factors in the decentralisation equation. Questions of access and exclusion complicate often oversimplified, idealistic notions of participatory and community development. Schaffer questions decentralisation and whether it assists or restricts access for the most vulnerable areas and people of underdeveloped societies. He further judges that 'decentralisation in rural areas needs to be judged by the degree which works with people's own organisations and provides help to [those] who would otherwise have been excluded. In the end, that is the meaning and test for rural decentralisation' (Smith 1986:463).

1.2 Decentralisation in the Education Sector

The scope of discussion regarding decentralisation thus far has been on public administration at a national level. Theorists are abundant in their policy analysis and prescription of fiscal, political, and administrative changes at a macro or State level. Rondinelli has been cited as a seminal author of decentralisation literature in regard to public administration and hierarchical relationships between national and local governments. He later turned to decentralisation in the education sector in 1990. Bray (1994) cautions that theory for public administration should not be automatically construed as education sector theory. Because of this tendency as he pointed out in his critique of Cummings and Riddell's (1994) article on 'Educational Research', great care must be given not to confuse conditions of administrative change that may occur at different levels and to misrepresent theory regarding public administration as having general applicability in the education sector (Bray 1994:819).

This study, however, has found some validity in the application of general public administration and organisational literature to the education sector as a resource for making some general observations about government policy and implementation. In their discussion of patterns of influence and control of education, Lauglo and McLean (1985) make general use of Weber's classical concept of bureaucracy, as referenced above. They do this to make general characterisations to organisational theory in the education sector.
The following section takes a sectoral approach to the topic of decentralisation. The education sector, about which this study has been framed and designed, has been the target of donor strategies and government policies that call for transfers of power and authorities for education administration to local levels. In yet another analysis of educational decentralisation literature composed by donors, it is claimed that 'while a tremendous body of literature has been written about decentralisation in general terms, very little has been written about decentralisation in education sector reform' (Jain 1995:5). This is an arguable claim, given the discussion by Lauglo and Martin (Lauglo and McLean 1985: 1985:12) who introduce carvers of ideology such as Pestalozzi, Froebel, Grundtvig, Henry Morris, Gandhi, Mao and Nyerere in terms of their general support of educational decentralisation. However if the characterisation of the paucity of literature is on substantive work on education sector reforms through donor driven development projects, his claim may be more accurate.

Decentralisation as an institutional reform mechanism in education is analysed in this section. International development agencies such as the World Bank have invested billions of dollars in education reform in developing countries 'but the impacts of these investments are often undermined by developing countries’ weak capacity to manage and implement changes' (Rondinelli, 1990:4). Interestingly, the World Bank, it is claimed, has no official position on decentralisation in education (Winkler 1989; Prud'homme 1994) only that it favours such a policy shift. In addition, its policies continue to stress or strongly recommend such reforms, with varying degrees of success. Whether decentralisation could or is expected to be the definitive reform model is not as pertinent to this discussion. Rather this section analyses to what extent decentralisation strategies have and can be rationalised as an integral part of policy decisions and thus, to what extent is it the best option in education administrative reform.

The States’ Role and Responsibility for Education

In the early 1980s a broad disillusionment with centrally planned economic systems and with the all-invasive administrative ‘State’ emerged and
began to sweep the globe. Accompanying this was a widespread disappointment with overall progress of the education sector. While primary school enrolments in developing countries grew dramatically in the 1960s and 1970s, issues of quality, equity, efficiency, participation, sustainability, and innovation fell by the wayside. As a result, many of the benefits that were typically associated with the investment in education failed to materialise in developing countries. Much of the blame for these failures has been attributed to the inefficient and bureaucratic nature, the lack of commitment, or the low institutional capacity of governments throughout developing countries. Consequently, throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, efforts that have been undertaken in trying to reform the education sector have focused on addressing weaknesses in implementing organisations and institutions through mechanisms such as decentralisation (Jain 1995).

Advocates of decentralisation claim that central government officials around the world found that they could provide many types of services, including education, more efficiently, effectively and responsively by decentralising appropriate responsibilities to subordinate units of administration, local governments or non-governmental and private organisations. However, even when national governments were willing to decentralise, it is acknowledged that they retained an important function in providing the 'enabling conditions' that allowed local units of administration, school districts or the private sector to play a larger role in service provision (Rondinelli, 1995:1). It has been suggested that when national governments did encourage the decentralisation of education and other services, one of the strongest roles that they could perform over the long run was to strengthen the financial and administrative capacity of local administrative units, a goal that has not always easily been accomplished (Ibid:2). For example, in terms of the provision of education, it is argued that there is no guarantee that local governments will be more 'well-meaning' than central governments. Burgess (1997) argues that unless there is a mechanism for local households to thwart politicians acting in their own interests such as local voting rights, decentralisation will not work.
Local government is more sensitive to local needs, but it is the local needs as they are perceived by the political system, and in the absence of democratic institutions, these may be the needs of a powerful minority (Ibid:337).

Burgess further claims that the success of decentralisation depends on local reaction to the powerful minority through local organisation, but admits that this can occur if the local government is democratic.

At the same time, advocates of decentralisation also acknowledged that some types of services could only be provided effectively by the central government or by an agent of a central ministry at the provincial level. In some countries, educational and other services had to be provided by the central government by default. They were unprofitable for the private sector, or the private sector was not organised to provide them, or local governments did not have the required resources or management capacity (Rondinelli 1995:1).

Problems of Implementing Decentralised Education Reforms

The evidence that exists regarding decentralisation of education paints a bleak picture in terms of the state’s role and responsibility for this. Commonly used education indicators make this point loud and clear where the ‘Centre’ has played an influential role in education development. In developing countries, basic education services are often inefficiently managed by central governments and often, to the embarrassment of development donors and agencies, done so with external advice. For example, the average adult literacy rate in SAARC countries in 1970 was thirty two per cent increasing to only forty eight per cent for 1993. In comparison, the average for other developing countries increased from forty three per cent in 1970 to sixty nine per cent in 1993 (ul-Haq 1997:144).

After studying UN sponsored projects, Havelock and Huberman (1977) identified five problems with the implementation of education reforms in developing countries:

1. Problems in managing the innovation process
2. Problems arising from the personalities and behaviour of those involved in project implementation
3. Inadequate resources and organisational capacities
4. Financial problems
5. Opposition from key groups in society to the proposed reforms.

(Havelock and Huber 1977:11)

The problematic issues in implementation are classic in donor-supported work. As donors addressed development 'panic' in many sectors, they did so with a margin of error in reading and understanding the complicated nature of host countries. In his study of World Bank education projects, Rondinelli (1990) identified some of the causes of ineffective implementation that corroborates this notion.

- **Complexity of reform proposals:** Burgeoning demands of complex projects placed enormous 'strains' on the management capacity of education institutions in developing countries. Donors continued to develop 'more complex and more innovative education reform projects during the 1970s and 1980s' (Rondinelli, 1990:11).

- **Unpredictability of Education Reforms:** One cannot assume that interventions tested in Western countries will have the same effects in less developed countries, where environments are less certain and management capacity is weak (Fuller 1986:17). 'Findings from research on achievement and economic effects of school investments within industrial nations should not be generalised to developing countries, nor even applied to all historical periods within any country' (Rondinelli, 1990:12).

Additionally, in a review of seventeen education projects funded by the World Bank, it was found that a high degree of innovation and uncertainty in government education policies increased the complexity of projects and their management requirements. Projects in the 1970s and early 1980s prescribed by international organisations attempted to increase the number of teachers, improve their qualifications and skills, and raise their pay. They also sought to induce community groups to construct schools, and encouraging private sector participation in education. They tried to improve curricula, increase the effectiveness of teachers, upgrade instructional materials, and use mass media and distance learning (Rondinelli, et al. 1990:8).

In an effort to contextualise the decentralisation process in general, Rondinelli has identified four factors affecting the success or failure of decentralisation policies:
Central political leaders and bureaucracies commitment and support
- Behaviour, attitudes, and culture which are conducive to decentralisation
- Good and appropriate design and organisation of decentralisation programs
- Allocation of adequate finances, human and physical resources

(Rondinelli, Nellis et al. 1984:46-7)

One of the greatest problems with education decentralisation occurs, however, in
determining which level of government controls each component within the
education rubric. The next section explores this dilemma.

Locus of Control

The discussion on centralisation-decentralisation in education commonly
centres on the dichotomy between central governments represented in most
countries by a Ministry of Education vis-à-vis the regional or provincial authority.
Many scholars seem to focus on the implementation of decentralisation programs
from this macro-vantage point. Less consideration is given to the dynamics
between a provincial, central authority and the local authorities commonly
termed as district, community or village level. The analysis, however, of where
the lines of control lie for all of the components concerned with basic primary
education services is one that must be carefully conducted. As was mentioned
earlier, some literature emphasises the fact that decentralisation is not an
either/or dynamic, but should be a mixed propagation whereby the centre is
responsible for some aspects and local authorities are responsible for other
aspects.

Winkler (1989) has developed an 'eclectic model' of decentralisation that
draws a continuum from the centre (national level) to the periphery (provincial
level) along public services included in the education sector. This model, which
is called the 'Centralisation-Decentralisation Typology for Public Education' (See
Box 1.1), begins to map the possibilities that could exist in terms of shared
control in developing education systems from a macro standpoint. Despite the
fact that this model depicts a macro dynamic, it is a useful tool of analysis with
possible adaptation to more local levels of analysis. Essentially, the model
provides a matrix of three strains or degrees of government control across six
general categories of education functions (Winkler 1989:8-9).
Winkler has attempted to outline an optimal level of responsibilities for the Ministry of Education and the local government against each category of provision and finance. However, for this he is accused of attempting to prescribe a 'right answer' for what governments should be administering for education provision and finance (Jain 1995:9). Winkler demonstrates, however, that it is possible for countries to be classified under different categories of degrees of decentralisation. He cites Kenya and Indonesia as being examples of mixed situations where primary education was nationalised and the provision of secondary education was decentralised (Winkler 1989:5).

Other criticisms of the model have been made; for example, that the decentralisation process is in reality more fluid and less prescribed or discreet.
Also, it is alleged that that a 'holistic' approach to the development of an education system is one that embodies a range of 'nuances specific to the education sector and for contextualizing educational decisions that are made within a broader political, economic, cultural, and historical climate' (Jain 1995:5).

The most challenging criticism, however, was made by Bray (Bray 1996b) that no models for discerning the proper locus of control can be recommended. With universal applicability and even in specific places, demands are likely to change over time (p. 44). For this study, however, it is necessary to analyse the relationships between the local-level and the centre. This is important given the common practice of policies that are centrally planned with the expectation that they can be locally implemented. Winkler's model serves as a tool for beginning to map such relationships.

Analysing Governance in Education

Another helpful tool for considering the validity of decentralisation in education administrative reform has been illustrated in James Williams' (1993) article entitled 'Reform in Educational Decision-making.' It is thought provoking in terms of deciding whether decentralisation is an appropriate theoretical framework for such a reform. As illustrated in Figure 1.5, Williams has developed five areas through which to consider change through management reform. This model appears to be inclusive and challenges theorists who rigidly classify systems that are absent of practical application. Tailor-made policy prescriptions, for example, are recommended under his 'Beyond Formulas' idea. Here he compares educational governance to architectural design where certain laws do not have to be redefined but where context plays a more significant role.

Another significant notion that Williams raises is whether abstract theories and strategies can be applied to education. He argues that education systems are loosely structured and that change may be more difficult to bring about than for more easily managed organisations although he does not give any examples of 'easily managed organisations'. Williams asserts that it could be more useful to question the theoretical relevance of decentralisation to education
Figure 1.5: Less and More Useful Ways of Viewing Governance in Education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LESS USEFUL</th>
<th>MORE USEFUL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1 Beyond Either/Or</strong></td>
<td><strong>Where is responsibility for a particular administrative function best located, to achieve particular objectives and given the goals, capacities and needs of a system at a particular time?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Either decentralisation or centralisation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>2 Beyond Formulas</strong></th>
<th><strong>Principles; options; information about options</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One-best, context-free solutions; Nothing can be generalized</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>3 Beyond the Abstracted Technical</strong></th>
<th><strong>Incorporating all insights; Explicit values; Establishing legitimate processes for considering the interests of all groups and for making contestable choices</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Removing issues of politics, organisation, implementation from technical analysis</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>4 Beyond the Purely Theoretical</strong></th>
<th><strong>Too little is known about education to assume that insights from theory and/or other sectors will apply to education; Look for actual effects</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(De)centralisation works in theory, so it should work in practice; (De)centralisation works in other sectors, so it should work in education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>5 Beyond Good-Bad Government</strong></th>
<th><strong>Ways that the organisation of government structures relations among actors (isolating teachers, promoting bureaucratic rigidity); Ways organisations can be changed</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'Bad' government (hierarchy, regulations, bureaucracy, centralisation); 'Good' government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Williams 1993:5

than to accept the theories 'as is'. He says that not very much evidence is available 'about the extent to which theories developed in other sectors work in education' (Williams 1993:7). The example he provides is one in which high-quality soft drinks of uniform characteristic are produced effectively by relatively free markets. He alleges that 'we do not really know how effectively and under what conditions markets might consistently produce education of high quality' (Ibid:7).

He borrows from Hannaway's (1995) discussion on improvement of classroom instruction in the U.S. to support his hypothesis. According to Hannaway, the positive effects of decentralisation on classroom instruction may
not be directly correlated to the efficiencies of the reform as is commonly assumed. In other words, she relates that in the U.S. school systems are highly autonomous with teachers working in separate classrooms, schools operating independently of school districts, and school districts functioning fairly independently of federal and state governments in terms of day-to-day instruction. This situation implies that quality instruction in the classroom, could be viewed as the result of more localised inputs rather than the decentralisation effort itself. So general decentralisation efforts, Williams points out, should be tested in the education sector but not assumed to have dramatic classroom effects (Hannaway 1995).

This argument is contrasted with decentralisation experiments elsewhere. Chubb and Moe (1992) relay the experience of Britain after the passing of the 1988 Education Act. They argue that by being allowed the opportunity to ‘opt out’, schools were allowed to make their own decisions which have effected positive changes. The Act basically allowed schools to leave their Local Education Authorities (LEA) to be maintained through grants. It is claimed that autonomy to make local decisions was as important as assuming financial controls.

But money cannot be separated from autonomy. By giving the GM [grant maintained] schools their share of administrative expenses, the government empowers them to make their own decisions—autonomous decisions about a whole range of issues that were previously decided by the LEAs...Now, the GM schools decide how the money will be spent, while the rest of the schools have these decisions made for them by the LEAs. It’s an autonomy issue (Ibid:30)

Examples of local autonomy were introduced ranging from the ability to maintain school buildings to the purchasing of badly needed materials. So in Great Britain’s experience, according to this account, school effectiveness has been correlated to decentralisation.

An analysis of decentralisation and its effect at the ground level, as alluded to by the previous discussion, is another way of determining whether it is such a positive model for education development. Mai-Brith Schartau concludes in her study of local school management in Sweden and Britain that decentralised
'school management' has not been working. She argues that head teachers have received so many new or extended tasks of an organisational, economic, and administrative nature that they are not able to fulfil pedagogical management in a desirable way (Schartau 1993:238). The framework for decentralisation in her study is reduced from the macro dichotomy between a national government and its state or provincial institutions to the micro level of authority that a school has. It is based on the belief that many important decisions must inevitably be made at the school level because she explains that it is at this level that professionals close to pupils can decide what to do and how to implement goals set at a higher level (p. 229).

This contrasts, in part, with what Glennerster, Hills and Travers (2000) have found. They indicate that early opposition to decentralisation in Britain has given way to increased support. They contend that no one wants to go back to the 'old' system of over-bureaucracy and centralised control. Their discussion, however, resonates with Schartau on one central point, i.e. it is at the school level that one must test for outcomes².

Schartau further argues that at all levels, good management is an important tool to reach the goals of efficiency and productivity. She states that management is a vital function of the organisation and lists five variables for analysing it:

1. Task
2. Structure
3. Procedure
4. Personnel
5. Culture

Yet organisational obstacles continue to challenge strategies for local managers. This, she urges, is worth researching in terms of private sector approaches to solving school management problems (Schartau 1993:217;239).

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² See also Ball, Bowe and Gewirtz 1995 for a broader discussion of local educational markets.
1.3 Conclusion

No one has demonstrated conclusively that decentralisation solves...problems...or that it is necessarily more cost-effective than centralization...Decentralisation is not a “quick-fix” for the management problems of developing countries. The factors that make it such an attractive policy are usually the same ones that make it difficult to implement (Rondinelli, Nellis et al. 1984:4).

Rondinelli's statement characterise the analyses that are made of countries experiencing administrative reform, namely the attempt by central governments to initiate policies of decentralisation. Central government's initiation of these policy shifts implies a top-down approach by which most countries are usually governed anyway. So what really has been accomplished when central governments assume an interest and role in phasing administrative functions away from the centre? It is interesting to note that Rondinelli's pointed remark above is a common concern for attributing tangible results and benefits of decentralisation to the local level. Does the 'record' of past attempts at decentralisation illustrate that the voice of the people has been heard and their needs addressed? This becomes a critical question for policy makers today.

According to Philip Mawhood, no deductive theory exists explaining the intricacies of political decentralisation. In other words, a cookbook with prescribed recipes for such administrative reform efforts does not exist (Mawhood 1993:9). He offers, however, the following question as a means for determining a framework for decentralisation: “What kinds of autonomy are necessary, and how is the boundary to be maintained?” This question implies that local institutions as well as central governing bodies are both necessary entities for determining the right mix of controls for developing and implementing administrative reform policy. At the same time, this question reinforces the fact that a prescription for appropriate decentralisation is absent.

Although Mawhood recognizes the ambiguity of the term decentralisation, he indicates that by observation of different country experiences, a “cluster of characteristics” can be identified. He further proposes that if one or more of the cluster of characteristics defining decentralisation are not identifiable in any
given situation, then a serious argument could be raised as to whether the locus of control has shifted from a central authority to a local institution thus jeopardizing the assertion of a decentralisation effort. Below is a set of characteristics of decentralisation that have been identified through a review of policy developments intended to facilitate decentralisation. These characteristics are presented in the form of an incomplete decentralisation construct (see Figure 1.6).

**Figure 1.6: Decentralisation Construct**

1. True Decentralisation only occurs when local decision-making bodies have control over financial resources. (Midgley 1986:33) A local body has its own budget (Mawhood 1983:9).

2. A decentralized local body should have a separate legal existence (Mawhood 1983:9).

3. A decentralized local body should have the authority to allocate substantial resources. This includes quantity of finances handled. Number and qualifications of the staff employed. Power to decide over expenditure. Power to vary revenues. Decisions over the staff-appointments, promotion, discipline (Mawhood 1983:9).

4. Decentralisation can be observed through the behavioural patterns of participation, the means of access for individuals to the bureaucracy (Mawhood 1983:xii).

5. Decentralisation effectiveness is dependent on behavioural, attitudinal and cultural factors. Most important among these is commitment of local officials to decentralizing development, the quality of local leadership, the attitudes of rural people toward government, and the degree to which traditional customs and behaviour were compatible with decentralized administrative arrangements (Rondinelli 1983:200).

6. Decentralisation is a result of the transfer of planning, decision-making or management functions from central government and its agencies to field organisations, subordinate units of government, semi-autonomous public corporations, area-wide or regional development organisations, specialized functional authorities or non-government organisations (Rondinelli 1981).

The development of the Decentralisation Construct is only a small step at listing all the criteria that would be conducive to reform and representative of a fair sample of cases. All that can be relied upon is the careful, continued observation of the reform of systems and processes which decentralisation attempts in the developing world and careful application of the right mix of policies for testing on a small scale.

In short, there is a theoretical case for devolving budgetary and management decisions to levels that maximise knowledge about the local situation and give consumers leverage (Burgess 1997). Experience in the United States and in the United Kingdom suggests that local administrative capacity is good and that decentralisation has been successful (Glennerster, Hills et al.
2000). However, in a society where local administrative capacity is weak and political processes challenge reform, the theory may have different outcomes.

Most important of all, the varying positions on the discourse suggest that judgements can be made about definitions of decentralisation by examining what is actually happening at the local level of the school. This is what this study sets out to do.
Chapter 2

Research Approach, Methods and Context

_It is not for me to remind you how that Government had kept Balochistan divided in several parts yet bound together in shackles of backwardness. Consequently, the people of the Province remained in a static position educationally, socially, economically and politically._

Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah  
Founder of Pakistan  
Speech at Sibi, Balochistan  
14 February 1948

2.1 Aims of the Study

In order to analyse the constraints of decentralisation, we need to review the local context if we are to understand it. This is a highly localised study in a 'state' environment with a centralist tradition and attempts to answer three basic questions:

1) How successful was the attempt to decentralise education administration in Balochistan?  
2) What were the policy constraints?  
3) What does this experience tell us about both the theory of decentralisation and its application to education in a developing country with a strong centralist tradition?
Pakistan's education administrative bureaucracy has a long tradition of centralisation. Throughout the last half-century, its leaders have embarked on building a nation where power and control are centralised. This has included the administration of education. Prior to Pakistan's partition from India, colonial rule had ingrained a system of administration whereby central and higher authorities retained most of the power and where district and local authorities were posted as 'agents of implementation of authority'. As Saqeb (1985) claims, 'there was no provision for any public interest groups to share in the functions of policy-making, policy adoption or policy articulation' (p.37). It is further claimed that 'this type of administration, as expected, made people rely for everything on the government and killed their sense of initiative and responsibility.' Pakistan's first and subsequent development plans articulate a continued central tendency. This statement implies that full social participation in Pakistan's public planning had not been realised but that it was considered to be desirable or at least important for future policy implementation. In fact, Pakistan went on to include as a prevailing objective in its Fourth Plan (1970) the strategy of encouraging 'the maximum decentralisation of responsibility and authority in all areas bearing upon plan implementation'. Yet recent attempts have been made to experiment with decentralised education administration prompted by international donors.

The aim of this study is to examine the decentralisation of primary education administration in Balochistan—particularly the institutions that manage public, primary education at the district level and to analyse the process of administration as well as the extent of devolved power or control. Balochistan is a highly centralised province administratively and this study analyses institutions at both the local and the central levels to understand how and why decentralisation policies in education are prescribed for this province. Local institutions in this context are the local district education offices, local NGOs, and less formally structured institutions such as village education committees (VECs) and Parent/Teacher/School management committees (PTSMCs) given their current, albeit marginal, role in managing primary schools in the villages throughout rural Balochistan. A further aim of this study is to consider the

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3 Twenty-six districts have been formally established in Balochistan for administering social services including education.
relationship that these institutions have with the central governing body of primary education known as the Directorate for Primary Education (PED). The system, by which primary education administration occurs, hence, is analysed through case studies that feature two specific education districts.

There were several reasons for undertaking this study. Critics have suggested that not enough evidence exist to support decentralisation as the definitive model for implementing administrative reforms particularly in the social sectors and specifically in education management in developing countries. Yet major donors were funding development projects that, in fact, emphasised decentralisation. The intention of this study was to try to understand why decentralisation has been so difficult to achieve by examining the process of decentralisation and the difficulties of translating policy prescriptions into practice at each level. In other words, decentralisation should be analysed down through the layers of administration all the way to the bottom to be able to understand the nature of the reform.

The reason for undertaking this study in Balochistan was the unique opportunity of investigating education administration there. The primary education sector in that province has been under enormous pressure to decentralise its education system through the advent of five-year development plans, Social Action Programming and subsequent large development loans provided by outside donors. In Balochistan, there existed the promulgation of a formal devolution plan through Primary Education Directorate annual workplans that drove the day-to-day operations of administration. Historically, this plan had been approved in joint meetings of Senior Provincial Government Officials and officials from the World Bank. On the other hand, there was an existing highly centralised system that was structurally less defined. This study hopes to identify points of departure between decentralisation prescriptions defined primarily by the World Bank and the day-to-day operations as seen against the backdrop of the cultural ethos of the province.

Finally, several management-consulting interventions in primary education administration have attempted to address organisational issues mostly related to district education officers and their staff through training. However, little
original research has been engaged to analyse the system holistically nor to determine whether the potential or capability of the province exists for altering or devolving the system of education administration in a functional way--the capacity in favour of decentralisation has just always been assumed.

### 2.2 Structure and Scope

Four major parts are incorporated in this study. The theoretical survey, first grounds the study in literature on administrative decentralisation but then focuses on the particular aspect of administrative decentralisation within the primary education sector. The concept of social participation is discussed and how, if at all, this notion overlaps with the dynamic of decentralisation given that community participation comprises a significant portion of the community schooling process in Balochistan. Secondly, building on this corpus of theory, the process of education administration in Balochistan is presented according to empirical evidence found in documents, interviews and observations. The policy process is described and variables for analysing education administration are presented and defined. Third, case studies are constructed around two education districts. Education administration in these districts is described and analysed according to the variables. Evidence collected through interviews and other methods are introduced which help to illustrate the case study and whether and to what extent decentralisation has occurred locally. Finally, conclusions are drawn through a theoretical matrix where data presented earlier are connected to theoretical interrogatories that stem from the primary research question.

The remainder of this first chapter explains the research methods employed in this study. Research instruments are described, as are the conditions under which this study was conducted. Also discussed are the characteristics of Balochistan that rationalise its use as the over-arching case for analysis. Geographical, social, historical, political, and economic data are brought together to lay the backdrop for the study.
2.3 Research Methods

The central research aims in this study relate to the process of primary education administration—not education outcomes. The sole use of statistical data would not be appropriate in the localised context of this research given that they would not be able to throw light on the nature of administration at the various levels. Hence, this thesis could possibly be the first stage of a larger study in which statistical data are collected and analysed to determine the effects as opposed to the process of decentralisation.

Qualitative research aims to provide a deeper understanding of the values, attitudes, motivations, and behaviours of target groups on their own turf. Moreover, qualitative research has been described as a "four-phase affair" consisting of invention, discovery, interpretation and explanation (Kirk and Miller, 1986: 60). These characteristics appear to be consistent with Hall and Midgeley's (1988) protocol for illuminating the study of development. They argue that a sociological and qualitative approach to inquiry is 'sensitive to those intangible social realities which defy quantification and objectification' (p.4).

The empirical methods used to achieve the research goals in this study were contemplated within the strategy of the case study design framework. Yin (1994) describes this approach as one that 'comprises an all-encompassing method—with logic of design incorporating specific approaches to data collection and to data analysis' (p.13). These methods include collection and analyses of documentary evidence, to gain an understanding of formal administrative policies, linkages and controls that exist between central administrative bodies and local institutions; field observations to learn first-hand how primary education administration is being administered; and semi-structured interviews which illuminate the process of decentralisation through first-hand accounts of administration.

The case study method...usually involves the in-depth study of a particular milieu (village, association, organisation, and institution) rather than of a random sample of individuals drawn more widely. The researcher, rather than briefly interviewing a large number of respondents using a
standardised instrument, relies on a repertoire of methods to gather data including informal interviewing, the use of knowledgeable informants in the locale being studied (to interpret that locale to the social investigator) and participation in and observation of events in the setting as and when they occur....they gain in greater richness of data and penetration of analysis (Bulmer and Warwick, 1993:9).

Finally, Hamel and Dufour's (1993) assertion that the case study design can add to theory construction and policy analysis is also a primary argument for its application here. Though the results of such a small study can neither be generalised to other parts of Pakistan nor greater South Asia, there are lessons to be learned about administration processes from this analysis that might help policymakers in their evaluation of different strategies to pursue in improving education administration in similar settings. Detailed information concerning reflections on methods, site selection, the challenges faced in the field, issues of reliability and validity, and observations on available data are presented below.

Reflections on Methods

My four-year association (1992-1996) with education development of the Province of Balochistan, Pakistan provided the motivation behind this thesis. During this time, I was employed as project co-ordinator for two comprehensive development projects that addressed primary education administration within Balochistan:

- the Primary Education Development Project (PED) sponsored by United States Agency for International Development;
- and a follow-on reform project known as the Balochistan Primary Education Development Programme (BPEP) sponsored by the International Development Association (IDA) of the World Bank.

Significant education decentralisation efforts have been attempted in Balochistan since 1992. Hence the study covers a period beginning with administrative reform initiative that took place in 1992 and covers a five-year period in which donor funding and programme activity reached an elevated plateau. The issues raised in this thesis are primarily the products of both observation and involvement with management reform strategies applied to this end in the province.
The relationships established with government officials in Balochistan; the insights gained through working intimately with technical advisors and locals; and the knowledge and access of reports, files and other relevant documents archiving the evolution of the reforms together underlie a solid foundation for the qualitative methodological approach that was chosen at the outset of the study. Research methods are described in greater detail below.

**Research Process**

Figure 2.1 below is a diagram that depicts the process that this study has followed. It began with the selection of three methods for data collection. These techniques included document review, semi-structured interviews and informal observations of site visits and interactions with respondents. The evidence collected through these three methods was combined through a further technique commonly referred to as triangulation. This technique is known for adding to the robustness of case studies. In the analysis stage of the research, the case studies were scrutinised according to five organisational variables. The analysis led to the final stage of the research or the conclusion that has provided further insights into the theory of decentralisation policy and practice.

Prior to the case site visits, *case study protocols* were developed (see Appendix I). Their development and use are an important aspect of this research. The case study protocols contain both the instrument and provide the instructions and guidelines for carrying out this strategy of research. Yin claims that protocols are 'essential' if using a multiple-case strategy and that 'the protocol is a major tactic in increasing the reliability of case study research' (Yin, 1994:63).
Interviews

The technique of interviewing aims to cover the range of views and experiences of the target groups and in this manner is sometimes called
‘purposive sampling’ (Yin 1994). Approximately thirty semi-structured interviews were conducted with a range of individuals and groups who were engaged in primary education administration in Balochistan (see Appendix II). Two thirds of the respondents agreed to be recorded and in some cases, multiple respondents were interviewed together. The reassurance was given that especially the taped interviews would not be disseminated to PED.

The respondents at the central level included senior government and World Bank officials, expatriate technical advisors, and Primary Education Directorate staff. At the district level, district education officers and their subordinate staff, learning coordinators and teachers, local NGO fieldworkers, and local education management committees were interviewed. Although the respondents were not chosen randomly, some were chosen on a ‘rolling’ basis. They were referred to me by respondents who had been originally selected and through word-of-mouth on the basis that they might be able to offer meaningful information to my research. The majority of respondents, however, were specifically chosen at the outset of the study. They had been earlier identified as the key players to central and district primary education management. Once in the field, initial contact with these chosen individuals further guided the selection process both as their availability and their interest were confirmed.

A majority of the interviews were recorded with the permission of the respondents. However, the fact that I had met and worked with some of the respondents both challenged and aided my data collection. For those I had already met, I had to reintroduce myself as an independent researcher not attached to the government. My previous relationship with the programme, however, did open access for many of the interviews.

Document Review

In Balochistan, a large amount of documentation has occurred on development aspects of education. These data have accumulated throughout the 1980s and 1990s given the marked donor activity that was concentrated on primary education. Documents ranging in content from donor memoirs and
correspondence, technical consultant activities, project workplans and other
government reports were all useful primary and secondary sources for this study.

As one World Bank official confessed, their investments in Balochistan in
terms of development projects had not been blindly based. 'The Balochistan
Programme was based on more knowledge than typical. The Harvard
BRIDGES4 studies provided the foundation including the 500-school study and
the Household surveys' (Interview with World Bank Task Manager, October 7,

Peter Abell and Nigel Gilbert (1983) have written about contrasting 'actions'
with 'accounts of actions' in their discussions about research methodologies.
Textual analyses were conducted on primary education workplans and national
education policy documents among other documents. These data analyses added
to the overall strength of the research by providing comparisons of documented
data with accounts of actions that were rendered in the interviews. Most of the
documents reviewed were accessed at the Directorate for Primary Education
Office in Quetta and in Washington, D.C. at the Academy for Educational
Development.

Observations

Informal observations can be made throughout a field study 'including
those occasions during which other evidence is being collected' (Yin 1994:87).
Observations in this study were not the classical or formal methods that are
generally attributed to direct observations. Rather the observations were more
informal and were documented in a written journal. Both my research assistant
and I conducted observations at the same time that we conducted interviews
and visited various offices. Yin contends that having more than one observer
adds reliability to the observational evidence.

4 The Basic Research and Implementation in Developing Education Systems (BRIDGES)
Project was directed by Harvard Institute for International Development (HIID) and funded by
USAID Contract #DPE-5824-A-5076. The goal of the BRIDGES initiative was to identify policy
options that would increase children’s access to schooling, to reduce the frequency of early school
leaving and repetition, improve the amount and quality of what was learned, and optimise the use of
fiscal and education resources.
Additionally, observations can be recorded in other ways. Dabbs (1982) suggests that photographs would help to portray important case characteristics to outside observers. In this study, photos were taken at the two case sites and references to the photos were entered in the observation journals. Observations are not only centred on research objectives. The researcher was alerted not to discount any cultural experiences that might be encountered while conducting the research. While living in Balochistan during my data collection, I experienced first-hand the context of local administration through daily interactions in contexts outside of my research, e.g., my registration with the local police, application for a visa extension, retaining a police security guard for my field visits and through networks I had established locally.

Reliability and Validity

The notion that triangulation increases validity was held by Denzin (1978) but has since been challenged. Fielding and Fielding (1986) postulate a different outcome of triangulation.

Theoretical triangulation does not necessarily reduce bias, nor does methodological triangulation necessarily increase validity. Theories are generally the product of quite different traditions so when they are combined, one might get a fuller picture, but not a more 'objective' one. Similarly different methods have emerged as a product of different theoretical traditions, and therefore combining them can add range and depth, but not accuracy. (p.33)

Uwe Flick (1992) suggests that triangulation could be used as an alternative to validation (p.179). In his studies, he triangulates different sorts of data (theories, interactions, and current official and historical data), different methods (interviews, conversation analysis, interpretation of documents and records), and theoretical backgrounds of these methods. He further notes that triangulation 'gives access to different versions of the phenomenon that is studied...'(p.194). Also, he summarises that 'there is no longer one reality against which results can be verified or falsified, but that research is dealing with different versions of the world.' Denzin (1989) later amended his ideas concerning the validity of triangulation. 'In-depth understanding, not validity, is sought in any interpretative study' (p.246).
The three techniques or methods used in this study were relied upon to help provide an in-depth understanding of the primary education administration process in Balochistan. Although consideration has been given to accuracy and objectivity through triangulation of data, fuller attention has been given to broadening the range of the story that these methods explored.

Site Selection

Eileen Kane (1995) advocates using more than one case particularly if it is used as the primary method of the research. She also suggests identifying cases that provide a clear contrast to the situation being studied (p.176). Two education districts in Balochistan were chosen for case study development specifically on the basis of contrast. Jaffarabad was a relatively economically advantaged and densely populated district whereas Barkhan was economically disadvantaged and more sparsely populated. In addition, in terms of social structure, Barkhan was considered to be predominantly tribal whereas Jaffarabad was more representative of a feudal system. Another contrast between the two districts is that Jaffarabad was a Summer Zone District with the school period lasting from approximately 1st January to 22nd December. Barkhan was a Winter Zone District with the school period lasting from 29th February to 16th December to accommodate extreme climates of these areas.

According to the April 1997 School Census, Jaffarabad had 693 government primary schools enrolling a total of 33,515 boys and girls. Barkhan had 335 government primary schools with an enrolment of 10,838 students. Jaffarabad's number of primary government schools was the highest of all twenty-six, education districts and Barkhan's was the lowest.

Upon consultation with technical consultants who were working in Balochistan at the time of the field study, Jaffarabad District was one that had shown promising signs of effective collaboration with NGO and other community partners in management of their schools. Barkhan, however, was among the bottom three rated as least effective administratively.

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5 BEMIS Data are inconsistent as to the precise enrolment figures for this time. Varying BEMIS documents indicate conflicting figures.
Jaffarabad also stands apart from Barkhan in its preliminary success at administering a teacher-training program and the collaboration between the district education office and a local NGO working in the district to promote girl's education. These two activities speak directly to the issue of decentralisation and provide insight into what types of organisational processes might contribute (or hinder) the efficient management of primary education. The research explores the application of decentralisation policies to primary education within a highly centralised administrative environment. Careful attention will be placed on the comparison of the alleged successes and failures with the reality of management, accounts of which are extracted from each of these districts.

Methodological Considerations

Field research was undertaken in Balochistan from October 1997 to March 1998. The following issues are presented in consideration of the methods applied during this time.

Entry

My prior association with the Directorate of Primary Education proved to be a key element in accessing information and resources in Balochistan. The pre-established relationships with primary education officials in Quetta provided immediate access to interviews and other important data. Other factors, however, proved to be a challenge in the collection of data. Investigative site trips had been planned in the initial stages of the fieldwork. These were planned early on to synchronise with staff and school schedules. Access to the interior was prohibited to foreigners, particularly Americans, for a brief period of time because of security threats. Travel to the case sites became possible only at the end of the six-month research period but limited my access to schools that were not open and staff who were on vacation.

Language and translation

A research assistant was identified to assist me who was conversant in Pashtu, Punjabi, and Urdu and was also knowledgeable in other local languages.
as well. Although I have studied Urdu, Pakistan's national language, I relied heavily on the assistant especially in far-flung areas where English was less frequently used and where other local languages were spoken. The respondents were given a choice of speaking in their language or English. Half felt more comfortable responding in Urdu and the other half responded in English. My assistant was also helpful in identifying and interpreting cultural situations that we encountered in our site visits.

Interview responses that were given in Urdu and recorded on tape were later translated into English by native Urdu speakers. These translators were not affiliated with Balochistan or the education system in Pakistan and therefore were considered neutral to the content of the data with which they were working. This would help to avoid any bias that might have been consciously or subconsciously inflicted in the translations.

**Presence as an outsider**

Social researchers face many challenges. They are sometimes viewed with suspicion and distrust. Also expectations of respondents must be diffused, e.g. outsiders are often perceived to be associated with donor or government authorities. In some studies, villagers perceived that researchers were sent to listen to their problems. 'They thought that the interviewers were there to record grievances for the government' (Bulmer and Warwick, 1993:209). During the course of contacts, interviews, and encounters with respondents and informants, reassurances were given that taped interviews, notes and other data collected would not be given to the government and that I was not associated with the government. In some cases, I had to dispel the false assumption made that I had control of resources that could be availed to the informants/respondents.

Given that my research involved travel to the interior, I was required as an outsider to hire a security guard to travel with me. In some cases, it became necessary to restrict the presence of the guard at my interviews in order to neutralise any negative perceptions about my status. Sometimes the presence of
armed guards or 'levies' as they are called in Pakistan can be mistakenly viewed as a status symbol reserved for notables or tribal leaders.

**Gender**

Although the cultural practice of *purdah* for women sometimes limits the access of male interviewers to females in Balochistan, it was not found to be a constraint. All the female respondents contacted for this research readily participated in the interviews conducted by myself and my research assistant, both males. This may be partially attributed to the cultural norms of the particular districts where these interviews were conducted. For example, in the village of Abdul Latif Umrani in Jaffarabad, mothers of the women's village education committee voluntarily joined the men including myself and my assistant in the interview.

**Analysis**

Atlas/ti is a software package used for qualitative data analysis. It handles more than just text analysis. It establishes a data corpus enabling the researcher to concentrate many documents around particular themes. Initially, textual data from interviews and observations were analysed using this software package. This practice was particularly helpful in organising the data. After a basic familiarity with the data had been established and given its relatively small size, manual methods of textual analysis were employed.

**Observations on a Data Source**

During my field trip to Balochistan, the Planning and Development Department of the Government of Balochistan completed the task of preparing district profiles for all twenty-six districts. These profiles proved to be a valuable source of information for the cases that I researched and developed. The profiles were a secondary source and the statistical data specific to each district was characterised as 'inadequate'. Despite cautions concerning the reliability of the data, however, it was a significant accomplishment that data had been collected and assimilated. Prior to the time of printing of the profiles, data had not been
co-ordinated and/or analysed in such a way at the district level. This exercise has been a first comprehensive trial to bring district-based data together for analysis. A CD-Rom database that encompasses all the data collected from the twenty-six districts accompanied the profiles and was consulted for this thesis.

2.4 Building the Context: Balochistan

The demise of development in Pakistan in modern terms is largely due to low human development and social sector investments (Noman 1997). The country's poor social indicators have continued to overshadow economic growth over the last fifty years since partition. Eight development plans later and millions of rupees channelled through foreign aid have leveraged very little success in their redress. Corruption, politics and inefficiencies are among the causes that inhibit the Government of Pakistan and other agencies from implementing change policies. The late Pakistani economist, Mahbub ul-Haq laconically summarises the economic condition of the country as a 'dilemma'.

The current dilemma of Pakistan is fairly basic: its previous pace of economic growth cannot be sustained without substantial investments in human development. But its ruling elite, divorced from the aspirations of the masses, is supremely indifferent to the provision of basic social services to the people. Without basic reforms in Pakistan's political and economic system, its prospects for economic or social progress appear somewhat clouded. Yet the question persists as to how and when such fundamental reforms will be engineered and who will engineer them (ul-Haq 1997:42).

Balochistan, the largest province in Pakistan geographically, is its least developed province. Its population of six and a half million is scattered throughout much of the arid and barren terrain. According to an Economist (May 22, 1999) survey, the average monthly household income in Balochistan was one hundred and nine U.S. dollars, the lowest of Pakistan's four provinces. (Respondents in this study, however, gave a much lower figure of approximately forty U.S dollars per month earnings in rural areas.) Despite its huge potential in terms of natural resources of gas, minerals, and coastal land, its people
remain disadvantaged both economically and socially. Much literature characterises its people and resource potential as being, in fact, marginalised (Titus 1996; Siddiqi 1991; Ahmed 1990).

Box 2.1: Snapshot of Balochistan's Development

Pakistani development planner Sultan Ali Barq of Islamabad wrote his characterisation of Balochistan's development problem:

I have never observed any parallel history of injustice and indifference towards a people and their resource system as the one in Balochistan. A snapshot of today shows that there are gross differences in the status of development and quality of life between the people of Balochistan and other provinces. Moreover, there are misplaced apprehensions and a feeling of distrust about the capacity of the leadership, bureaucracy and tribes to manage simple things and execute development projects. I believe that the Federal ministries and their few dozen institutions have never considered the province as anything more than a 'laboratory desk' and have got into a habit of running 'Pilot Projects.' The world has gone far beyond giving small doses of development.

Source: (Barq, 1997:4)

Complex problems underlie the difficulty that both Governments of Pakistan and Balochistan have experienced in improving social conditions in the region. These issues include declining quality, dire poverty, and conflicts between the central government and the provincial power structure. Box 2.1 further articulates Balochistan’s development problems.

The following sections provide further background information on Balochistan’s spatial attributes, social dimensions, politics and economic performance that all have relevance or wield influence on the provision of public services such as primary education in that province. Additional localised background data are presented in chapters five and six in correspondence with the administrative districts being analysed there.

**Territory**

Balochistan carries various stigmata in terms of the territory its borders encompass. It has been characterised as the ‘apex of the arc of geopolitical crisis’. The arc is a space that stems from the Eastern coast of India and the Western
coast of Africa all the way through the Arabian Sea to the conjoining of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran. This arc figuratively represents the string of countries throughout the late 1970’s that were embroiled in one insurrection after another.\(^6\) Balochistan has also been characterised as being the ‘crossroads’ amidst the Indian sub-continent, central Asia, the Iranian plateau and the vital waterway leading to the Persian Gulf suffering it to be ‘used’ but never settled or developed over past centuries.\(^7\) Balochistan’s early history is really a legacy of movement and migration. Many conquerors of India travelled through the area without leaving behind much of a trail.

One of the most striking features in the history of Balochistan is that, while many of the conquerors of India passed across the area, they have left few permanent marks of their presence. Macedonian, Arab, Ghaznawids, Mongol, Moghul, Durrani—all traversed the country and occupied it to guard their lines of communication, but they left neither buildings nor other monuments of their presence (Siddiqi 1991:19).

One explanation for the absence of permanent settlements in earlier times is the stark nature of the terrain. The province lies outside the monsoon system on which agriculture elsewhere in Pakistan relies. Therefore, with the exception of its northeastern districts, it has an exceptionally dry and arid climate with annual rainfall generally not exceeding fifteen centimetres. Rainfall is scarce and unpredictable. The temperature fluctuates from four degrees Celsius and below in the winter to fifty-four degrees Celsius in the summer.\(^8\)

Overall, its rugged and desolate mountain ranges, deserts and extreme climate preclude the practice of agriculture on any great scale and only small settlements or communities have evolved.

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Geographically, Balochistan encompasses approximately 347,193 square kilometres that accounts for approximately forty-three per cent of the total area of Pakistan. It is the largest of the four Pakistani provinces in landmass but accounts for as little as five per cent of the country's total population (see Figure 2.2). According to preliminary results of Pakistan's fifth population census conducted in 1998, Balochistan had a population of six and one half million with

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a population density of approximately eighteen people per square kilometre. By World Bank estimates, the majority of the population in Balochistan resides in rural areas. A settlement of five thousand or more people has been defined as an urban area. A semi-urban area is defined as a settlement within an hour's motor drive of an urban area. A rural area is defined as a settlement more than an hour's drive away from an urban area and difficult to access by road (World Bank 1993:1). A widely scattered population and the existence of unpaved roads, limited public-transport, and poor communication systems in many areas deter the provision of basic services.

Since 1970, Balochistan's provincial status has given borders to a major part of the ethnic territory inhabited by the Balochi people (Ahmed 1990:260). Anthropologist Paul Titus has suggested that it is ironic that given the vast ethno-territory in which the Balochi dwell (one of the largest in South Asia) and given that it has been and continues to be strategically positioned, its inhabitants 'are one of the regions least studied ethnic groups'.

In terms of civil administration, Balochistan is spatially divided into nine administrative divisions and twenty-six districts. The administration of education is coterminous with these administrative units (Malik 1992:40). District education offices are located in each district with the Directorate of Primary Education located in the provincial capital of Quetta located in Quetta District. Figure 2.3 illustrates the district borders within Balochistan. Case studies chosen for this research were Jaffarabad and Barkhan Districts. More details about these areas are discussed in chapters five and six respectively.

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11 See Preface written by Paul Titus in Marginality and Modernity, p. ix.
Figure 2.3 Balochistan: Provincial Map

Source: Balochistan District Database, Planning and Development Department, Government of Balochistan, August 1998
Society

According to the literature on sociology of Pakistan, its people have been misrepresented as being part of a largely uniform social structure with 'common values and norms' (Ahmed 1990:viii). Akbar argues that evidence exists to counter this notion, as does Mahbub ul Haq who argues that Pakistan possesses a 'fascinating combination of many contradictions'. He explains that widespread regional disparities, in fact, augment the condition of human development from poor to worse (ul-Haq 1997:37-38). Balochistan poses an example of the dissimilarity of social structure in Pakistan. It is a region that although is sparsely populated, comprised in and of itself of unique tribal and feudal structures that are accented with linguistic and organisational differences. This section highlights aspects of the major ethnic groups within the province.

Three principal ethnic groups are found in Balochistan: the Baloch, the Pathan, and the Brahui. These major ethnic groups are organised into tribes, with their ethnic and tribal identities playing a far more important role in their lives than either religious or national affiliations. Although there exists differences in the ways power and leadership issues are addressed among different groups, they subscribe to a more or less common tribal code of ethics.

The first of these ethnic groups is called the 'Baloch' which literally means 'nomads or 'wanderers' (Superintendent of Government Printing 1991:29). Because the Baloch were historically a society of nomads, no cities or permanent institutions were established solely by them. The tribe of the Baloch is self-contained according to Ahmed. He indicates that the sardar is positioned at the centre as the chief of the tribe (Ahmed 1986:188). In addition, tribes are known for their self-application of the jirga (assembly) system whereby justice is carried out. This system is performed outside the state civil law system.

Approximately nine principles have been outlined as Baloch 'code of honour' referred to as Baluchmayar. These include:

12 Paul Titus discusses the spelling of 'Baloch.' He indicates in his Preface to Marginality and Modernity: Ethnicity and Change in Post-Colonial Balochistan "prior to 1990, the term was spelled a myriad of ways—'Baluch,' 'Baloch', 'Belooch,' 'Biloch'—the most common being 'Baluch.' In 1990, the Provincial government of Pakistan Balochistan agreed that the official English spelling was to be 'Baloch' and this has become accepted standard in Pakistan." (page xi)
❖ Revenge;
❖ Refuge;
❖ Hospitality;
❖ Pardoning of an offence at the intercession of a woman;
❖ Penalty of death for adultery;
❖ Respect for weak and helpless persons;
❖ Trust;
❖ Promise; and
❖ Reminder of obligation to keep Baluchmayar

The first of these principles characterises the basic protection to the code of
honour. Revenge, in response to any wrong committed against a tribal member,
is a way of life. The basis of most intertribal feuds is zar, zan, or zameen (money,
woman, or land). The association of tribal honour with the purity of women
reduces them to objects of ownership, which have to be carefully guarded and
hidden from public. The practice of revenge is still prevalent in modern
Balochistan in spite of calls from educated Balochi to discourage inter-tribal
feuds (Baloch 1987:80-88).

In a more positive vein, attributes of ‘hospitality’ are recognisable in Balochi
culture. In fact, it has been noted as extending beyond tribal kin to strangers.
One Pakistani not of Balochi ethnicity, characterised hospitality that if a
stranger were to travel to rural Balochistan, he would be treated by the Baloch
as a brother and even offered a meal (Baloch 1987; Barq 1997). Gender plays an
important distinction in hospitality extended. Given that in Balochi and other
regional ethnic societies in the area are male dominated, men would most likely
be travelling as opposed to women.

According to interviews, secondary data, and observations, Balochi tribes
largely dominate the two case districts included in this study. It is interesting to
note, however, that while Baloch ethnicity is shared among the people of these
two districts, differences in the social structure are noted. One major difference
is that the feudal system of powerful landowners in Jaffarabad overshadows the
sardari system that prevails in Barkhan. The economy in Barkhan is more
depressed given lower agricultural production, thus sardari leadership and
tribal influence are stronger. Hence economic factors can and have influenced
social organisation. Language was another variable contributing to differences
among Balochi people in both districts. In Barkhan, Khetrani and Balochi are
predominately spoken but in Jaffarabad—Sindhi, Balochi, Saraiki, and Brauhi are spoken.

In terms of development, Balochistan’s social demography has been described as its most formidable threat. Thousands of refugees from Afghanistan, the majority of which are Pathans, have migrated over the past years to Balochistan. This has upset the balance of the scale between the prior predominate Balochi tribal and the Pathan. If Pathans outnumber Baloch, then political clashes could result. Even the name of the province, Balochistan, could be contested (Ahmed 1986:189). In terms of livelihood, the Baloch are primarily dependent on agriculture. By contrast, the Pathans are more involved in commerce. Because of limited arable farmland, however, areas such as Barkhan are limited in terms of profitability while Pathan traders and those involved in the informal sector are more economically advantaged (Titus 1996).

Given that both the Pathan and Balochi ethnic groups are generally recognised as subscribing to tribal societal structures, does not necessarily mean that Balochistan is entirely organised socially through tribal organisation. As Nek Buzdar (1991) underlined in his research, the Makran division of Balochistan ‘is the only division in Balochistan that presents a social organisation radically different from the rest of the province. Although people speak Balochi language and members of all-important Baloch tribes are found throughout the Division, Baloch tribal social organisation is completely absent. There are no tribal territories and there is no tribal hierarchical leadership patterns as is found elsewhere in Pakistan’ (Buzdar 1991:10). This finding is illustrative of the characterisation made above that the social structure of Balochistan is not uniform throughout the Province. A consideration of these differences is important in the formulation and implementation of policies for public services.

With the social and spatial background of Balochistan and Pakistan surveyed thus far, political cleavages emerge where provincial interests are pitted against central control. Rondinelli (1995) suggests that in any decentralisation intervention, analysts should assess the political situation. He suggests that they should have a clear idea of which groups and organisations
are likely to benefit from decentralisation, which groups are likely to perceive a loss of power and resources, and the degree of political support and opposition that is likely to arise from proposals to decentralise responsibilities for basic education' (Rondinelli 1995:SR3-2).

The following section further addresses two levels of power and control that bear influence on the development of education administration. The allocation of resources and the vulnerability of leadership are specifically examined.

1) allocation of resources

Over one hundred and fifty years, the Baloch have struggled to resist colonial and postcolonial governments. Even Pakistan's partition from India has been perceived by the Baloch as an attempt to deconstruct Baloch social life in order to produce the new Pakistani citizen. The perception of slippage of Balochi power is characterised below.

...to many Baloch...the power of the Pakistani State has expanded over the years [but] the number of its representative political institutions has not. They and other ethnic groups claim that the concentration of power in the hands of a bureaucracy controlled by Punjabis and (mohajirs) emigrants from India has failed to structurally assimilate them into a united Pakistan. Many Baloch see the centralised, unitary form of government functioning in the name of Islam to protect Punjabi hegemony by perpetrating discriminatory policies, and by labelling legitimate expressions of ethnic grievance as anti-national and subversive (Titus 1996:141).

The central demand of the Baloch movement within Pakistan has been greater autonomy for the province of Balochistan from the central government. A number of issues have been noted which have fostered the Balochi demand for autonomy. They include:

❖ Exploitative Federal development policies, particularly in regards to natural gas, coal and water;
❖ Under-representation in government decision-making structures;
❖ The political repression of Baloch dissidents; and
❖ Status displacement due to unchecked migration of Pushtuns and Punjabis into Balochistan. (Titus 1996:141)
These elements refer to specific perceptions of marginalisation of Balochistan. Historically these elements were evidenced through such measures as the State's appropriation of eighty per cent of the natural gas (taken from the Sui gas fields in Balochistan) to industries in the Punjab and Sindh provinces with a disproportionate return of gas royalties to Balochistan's coffers. As one respondent claimed, the finance of recurrent expenditures for provincial public service departments is a highly centralised system controlled at Federal level. Finance of recurrent expenditure of every province is dependent on the centre because they collect the gas royalty and exchange that gas royalty for public provincial financing. Natural gas is the main resource of Balochistan and is controlled under the constitution by the centre. In exchange they provide cash development loans and some of the finances including financial grants for running the administration of the province. Resources through appropriations to education, health and other sectors are made at the discretion of the Federal Government. The respondent indicated that the Federal Government was usually behind in its disbursements (Former Director, PED, Quetta 1997).

The Chief Minister of Balochistan, through whom the funding is disbursed, was making sincere promises that the backlog of funding would be released but could not make any guarantees except to release the funding once handed over by the Federal Government. Unfortunately for Balochistan was the fact that the Federal Government (Pakistan Muslim League or PML) did not have any political links to the provincial ruling party (Balochistan National Party or BNP). The weak political link from the Federal to the Provincial level is one claim to the marginalisation argument (Ibid).

Arguments made that Balochi people have been marginalised in terms of their provincial government's administrative and fiscal relationship with the Federal Government, however, have been refuted. As Ahmed notes, 'Islamabad counters Balochi complaints of marginalisation with the argument that rampant corruption has eaten up the millions of rupees which have been bestowed on the province' (much of the money finds its way into private pockets) (Ahmed 1986:190). Also, claims made by the Balochi that they are underrepresented in the civil service and military posts nationally have been dismissed. One former Pakistani Justice remarked that 'the Baloch had been given more than their
fare share of the civil service quota but that they didn't qualify' (Harrison 1981:158). This comment was made in reference to the 'backwardness' of the Province and the people as perceived by the ruling elite.

Despite the fact that the majority of Pakistan's natural gas is produced in Balochistan and that many of Pakistan's coal and other mining operations are situated in the province, the Balochi have little control over their operation and regulation (Harrison 1981:158; Wirsing 1987:8). The notion of marginalisation is depicted in Figure 2.4 Political satire presented in the *Dawn*, a Pakistani newspaper suggests popular belief that Balochistan has been subjected to Federal 'looting'.

![Figure 2.4 Central vs. Provincial Control](image)

"How can I drive when he takes away all that?"

2) vulnerability of political leadership

Provincial politics in many ways reflects national politics. One especially compelling example is the instability of governance. Noman (1997) has noted that a serious problem has existed in Pakistan since the 1980's and that is the incentive of the opposition political forces to destabilise the ruling party rather than act as a responsible opposition. In this assessment, Noman characterises
the contemporary political system, as being unstable as opposed to being democratic. The strength of the military and its track record of control and the limited tenure of civilian rule together suggest an indifference to economic progress if not altogether neglect. 'The [political] instability would not be quite as serious if the economy could be insulated from it' (Noman 1997:300).

The vulnerability of political leadership at the Federal level is mirrored at the Provincial level. One communiqué received for this research describes the instability issue at the provincial level. A consultant returning from an annual review mission of the health sector in the province indicated the necessity of having to close a project that would normally have been followed by another.

Due to the existence of the (then - pre-coup) coalition government, serious horse-trading has gone on to an extent that no management reform has been able to function; people trained have continuously been transferred, resulting in a total lack of sustainability of investments; and in the transformation of what had been a successful project into a failure in institutional reform terms (Personal correspondence from E. Hooper, 10/30/99).

The consultant further indicated that the comments could also stand for education. 'This failure of 'good' programmes due to political circumstances which impinge unduly on administrative reform certainly bear further thought, not least because it is the people of Balochistan who continue to suffer as a result'.

Common political behaviours exist among diverse territories of Balochistan involving the idea that 'might makes right' and that he who holds power should be obeyed. Pastner states 'A corollary of currying favour with those higher in the status hierarchy is lording it over those below'. And he provides an old adage from southern Balochistan: If your fortress is strong and your followers numerous, for you there shall be neither danger nor trouble" (Pastner in Ahmed 1990:280), a statement with strong implications for decentralisation.

Centralised political forces are not only found at the Provincial level, but also at the district level with the existence of landowners or feudals and sardars. Modernisation has resulted, however, in reduced tribal authorities. To ambitious
tribal leaders with strong political agendas, the integration of provincial economy with national and international markets/interests, the 'erosion' of authority is feared. Other political forces not mentioned such as political parties, student groups, and other organised political institutions such as unions are also factors in the complex equation of decentralisation. The following section takes a look at the economic challenges for decentralisation.

Economy

1) Pakistan's national context

At the macroeconomic level, Pakistan's economy has been characterised as fragile. Narrow bases for production, export, and taxation, high debt levels, low business confidence and weak governance all hamper savings, investment, public revenue mobilisation, and growth (Pakistan Country Brief 2000, http://www.worldbank.org/). Ironically, from 1970 to 1993, Pakistan's real income per capita increased by 231% which was the highest rate of increase in South Asia (ul-Haq, 1997).

Human development in Pakistan, however, has not mirrored such success. According to the 1997 Human Development Report for South Asia, human development data are 'dismal'. Over two thirds of Pakistan's adult population were illiterate. Seventeen million children were out of attendance to primary schools in 1995. Sixty million people did not have access to health facilities and sixty-seven million people were without safe drinking water. Eighty-nine million people were deprived of basic sanitation facilities. There were seven hundred forty thousand child deaths a year, half of which were linked to malnutrition. The population growth rate of around three per cent per year was the highest in South Asia. Thirty million people lived in absolute poverty. More than half of the cultivable land in fifty-acre holdings and above was owned by feudal landowners (Ibid:39).

The gap between stated economic growth and poor human development in the country has been attributed to a variety of factors, many of which bear testimony to a centralist environment.
❖ Skewed income distribution;
❖ The absence of land reform;
❖ Non-existence of income tax on agricultural incomes;
❖ A reliance of fiscal policy on indirect rather than direct taxes;
❖ Heavy burden of defence and debt servicing on limited budgetary resources;
❖ Political domination by an elite class that pre-empts the patronage of the State in its own favour;
❖ Corrupt ruling elite;
❖ Expenditure of less than five per cent of GNP on education and health services; and
❖ Low transfer of total income to the poor in terms of social security benefits—only 0.2% (Ibid:38).

As already pointed out, Pakistan's economic crisis has been the result of low investment in social development. This concept is also developed in Omar Noman's book, *Why Pakistan did not become a Tiger* (1997). Noman deals with what he calls the 'grand canvas' of economic development and social change in Pakistan. He measures social change through such indicators as education, health and demographic trends. Two strands of thought are presented for understanding the relationship between human capital and structural change. The first strand emphasises the instrumentality of human capital for economic development. Technology is the key driving force behind economic growth. The second strand offers an assessment of the extent to which basic social investment have accompanied economic growth and thereby benefited the poor directly. Through this strand, Noman has suggested that theoretically, social policy influences economic development particularly through human capital investments. This claim is based on evidence of comparison with other Asian countries (Noman, 1997:58-59).

The determinants of East Asian economic growth and subsequent success have been attributed to public policy reforms. Social, industrial, agricultural, financial and trade policies are all noted as shaping or influencing East Asian growth. Policy influences as well as sound macroeconomic management have produced rapid increases in per capita income stemming from intermediate variables of high levels of investment and savings, pace of technology acquisition and adaptation; and efficiency of resource allocation. In terms of the social policy inputs, two areas that have positively influenced East Asian growth have been identified 1) that education policy emphasised cognitive development and had a
strong technology orientation and 2) that health and population policy, along with primary education investments, eased supply side pressures on the labour market (Ibid:42).

In contrast to East Asian performance, Pakistan's investment patterns have been characterised as 'improper' thus influencing a 'vicious linkage' system shown below in Figure 2.5.

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**Figure 2.5 Social Policy and Economic Development: Pakistan's Harsh Linkages**

- Low spending on basic education and health
- No serious commitment to population and planning.
- Traditional roles of women reinforced by social policies.

- Poor literacy.
- High fertility and population growth.
- Low nutrition levels of children and mothers.

- Explosive demographic pressures are reflected in the labour market. Rapid annual growth in labour force seeking employment.
- High levels of child labour due to lack of basic education facilities.
- Low socio-economic status of girls sustains poor parental interest in their education.
- Lack of skilled manpower.

- Poor human development indicators.
- Lower per capita GDP growth.
- Diversification into higher productivity activities constrained by lack of skills.

Source: Noman 1997:61

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In 1997, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved a three-year financing package for Pakistan worth $1.56 billion in support of its medium-term adjustment and reform program. The approval of the package was based on the historical review of Pakistan's economic performance. The IMF suggested that in previous years, attempts by the authorities to address Pakistan's macroeconomic imbalances and deep-rooted structural problems were 'frustrated' by slippages in policy implementation which had adverse impact on growth, inflation, and the balance of payments.
The government's strategy was to rationalise further the public sector, shifting more of the primary productive role to the private sector and to strengthen local institutional capacity. In the public sector, the domestic tax base was to be broadened; tax administration strengthened; government expenditure to be shifted towards the social services and human capital formation; and key public enterprises restructured. The Federal Government in principle, however, typically agreed that corrective measures such as the ones suggested by the IMF in this situation have to be in place but have more difficulty being implemented in Pakistan (Balochistan Times, October 22, 1997).

2) Balochistan's resources

Balochistan has been characterised as a province in Pakistan that is economically dependent. Dependency in this case is largely correlated to the distribution of natural resources. That no single community or leader can develop a base of power broad enough to control the resources for such a large territory is the reason given for this economic dilemma. 'The resources found in Balochistan while significant do not balance the reality that the local or 'community' level is still economically dependent on financial and technological aid channelled through the national and provincial governments' (Siddiqi 1991:6). Box 2.2 below illustrates both the resources and challenges that Balochistan must manage.
Box 2.2: Profile of Balochistan

❖ Population of 7 million or 6% of Pakistan's total population;

❖ Approx. 1.5 million live in urban areas and the rest in rural areas; a small population is a "cherished asset" and yet paradoxically this disposition has turned out to be a weakness and a factor for unjust resource allocation in Balochistan's case;

❖ Balochistan has the lowest literacy and highest unemployment rates;

❖ Society is highly tribal, perceived to be static but has a history of constructing and maintaining the projects of common interests like the complex and difficult "Karez" systems despite inter-tribal feuds;

❖ Geographical area of Balochistan is 34.72 million hectares (43.6% of Pakistan) while the populated area is 18.60 million hectares. The rest of the area is comprised of barren mountains and desert. Forests comprise 1.09 million hectares, and 11.16 million hectares are not available for cultivation;

❖ The province has one of the most potent and able to be developed coastline for commercial production of aquaculture and fisheries for domestic market and export;

❖ The province has a large reserve of precious stones and marble valued at over Rs. 10 trillion; coal reserves of over 579 million tons and an estimated commercial value of Rs. 1.7 trillion. Source: Barq 1997

least developed in the area. This generalisation is offered with the caveat that scarce data are available for statistical comparisons on income distribution, morbidity rates, and life expectancy that might broaden the understanding of the standard of living especially in rural Balochistan. Researchers admittedly have determined that Balochistan and the NWFP are the two 'weakest' provinces economically well behind the Punjab. It is further posited that a local economy such as Balochistan's is slowly beginning to affect political stakes.

Balochistan's economy is slowly being integrated with the modern and market-oriented national economies and bureaucratic controls. In practical terms, this has meant the construction of roads and growth in transport, the spread of commercialised agriculture and the institutions and technology to sustain it, the promotion of land reforms and of
changes in systems of land tenure, increasing pressures for the migration of local manpower to distant cities and to areas abroad, the opening of new industries and — above all — a steady decline in the tribesmen’s traditional economy (Wirsing 1987:8).

Prime Minister Zulfiqar Bhutto accelerated this basic, economic transformation in the 1970’s ‘with his keen appreciation of the political uses of economic incentives’. However, the transition has been slight and what meagre growth has transpired, the tribesman have usually been under-represented in managing the commercial or industrial sector especially in the tribal areas of Balochistan.

Donor assistance from such agencies as the IMF has not always had positive effects throughout Pakistan’s provinces including Balochistan. According to Pakistani development specialist Barq, Balochistan's culture has developed into one that takes all services as free and without any cost liability. Implementation of policy reforms requires some structural and fundamental changes in administration. Barq recommends that these changes must be initiated from the top and then be filtered to the provinces. For instance, it is suggested that the Prime Minister and his Cabinet work very hard to change the attitudes of the Ministries. In this transformation, ministries would be encouraged to optimise the resource base ‘instead of sticking to the colonial psyche of considering development as a gift and funds as a charity or alms’ (Barq 1997:4).

Despite the base of natural resources that Balochistan possesses, the infrastructure and fiscal mismanagement of the Province make their exploitation very difficult. For fiscal year 1996-97, total revenues amounted to Rs. 13.426 billion while expenditures reached Rs. 17.908 billion. The gap/deficit was Rs. 4.482 billion. Given the resource base that has been outlined above, ‘there is no economic and logical justification for the budgetary deficit...’(Ibid:4). The overarching problem, however, rests not only with the province but also with the Federal Government. The basic conclusion here is that it is difficult to decentralise control to the provinces if revenues and resources are nationally collected and their allocation is controlled from that level.
Education

1) State of Education in Pakistan

While Pakistan had seen some improvements in higher education through the 1980s and 1990s, progress remained slow in terms of the overall sector. At the end of the twentieth century only forty percent of the population was literate, compared to an average of forty-nine percent in South Asia and fifty-three percent in low-income countries worldwide. Gender disparities in education were also significant. Only sixty-two percent of Pakistan's girls were enrolled in school compared to eighty percent of its boys (Pakistan Country Brief 2000, http://www.worldbank.org/).

Despite substantial economic growth, human resource development in Pakistan has lagged well behind other countries at similar stages of development and income levels. Pakistan's gross participation rate of 50% in primary education compares poorly with developing countries of similar or lower GNP per capita, e.g. Nepal at 64%, Laos 111%, Bangladesh 70%, India 98%, China 135%, Nigeria 70%. World Bank Country Economic Memoranda, as well as the Government's Social Action Program and a series of Five-Year Plans since 1955, have identified the low level of human resources development as a major constraint to a qualitative transformation of the Pakistani economy into a dynamic, middle-income country like its East Asian neighbours (World Bank, 1993:1).

At the bottom of the demonstrable record of investments to human resource development has been basic education. Despite considerable public rhetoric; numerous planned large-scale programs; and some increase in primary school attendance, Pakistan's educational base remains weak enough to constitute a serious threat to sustainable economic growth. The legacy of public expenditure on education as a percentage of GNP in Pakistan has been a little over two percent through the 1980s and early 1990s.

Added to this statistic are others exhibited in Table 2.1. In developing the phase of education policies beyond 1998, strategists in the Federal Ministry of Education in Islamabad saw the urgent need to double the outlay of expenditure
for education from two and two tenths percent of GNP to approximately four per cent. As shown in this table, education expenditure as a percentage of GNP had only risen from 0.88% to 2.2%—a 2.1% increase within a thirty-eight year time period (1955-1993). Also, the outlays were marginally utilised.

The chequered and uneventful history of five-year plans has brought to light the shortcomings and tendency to set unrealistic and unattainable education goals, objectives and targets. The decisions about or affecting education in too many instances, have been the product of political expediency (Ministry of Education, 1994:3).

But as Noman claimed, poor achievement may have had more to do with low investment than the setting of unrealistic goals. Qaisrani and Khawaja (1989) had earlier made this point. In their study of basic education in Pakistan, they list 'failure of policy' as the number one reason for the low investment made in education.

Pakistan has been spending approximately two per cent of GNP on education. A major share of this amount is transferred to higher levels of education. While primary education caters for the majority of the students and teachers in the educational system but its share in the budget is meager. Therefore, funds for primary education need to be increased (Qaisrani and Khawaja, 1989:16).

The present system offers a travesty of education in most rural areas. Thirty percent of primary classes meet in the open air, lacking any facility other than a chalkboard. Where schools exist, seventy percent are unsanitary, badly maintained and without learning materials. Supervisors are responsible for, on the average, 150 schools of all levels in addition to other duties and have little time for individual primary schools. The curriculum is standardised, ignoring rural/urban, male/female or language and cultural differences. (USAID, 1987:25)

From the time that USAID had made this assessment to the early 1990s, the state of education in Pakistan had changed very little (World Bank 1993).
Table 2.1 PAKISTAN: Public Expenditure on Education, 1955-1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plan</th>
<th>Total Outlay (Rs In M)</th>
<th>Education Outlay (Rs. In M)</th>
<th>Percentage of Total Development Budget</th>
<th>Education as % of GNP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Plan (1955-60)</td>
<td>4,863</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>4.23%</td>
<td>0.88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Plan (1960-65)</td>
<td>10,606</td>
<td>527</td>
<td>4.97%</td>
<td>1.55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Plan (1965-70)</td>
<td>13,204</td>
<td>677</td>
<td>5.13%</td>
<td>1.38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Plan (1970-78)</td>
<td>70,500</td>
<td>3,886</td>
<td>4.51%</td>
<td>1.53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Plan (1978-83)</td>
<td>226,000</td>
<td>5,643</td>
<td>2.50%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Plan (1983-88)</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>13,430</td>
<td>5.37%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Plan (1988-93)</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>22,680</td>
<td>6.47%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of Education 1994

During the planning for the Seventh National Education Policy, strategists in the Federal Ministry of Education indicated that the government would seek to raise the education budget from two and two-tenths per cent to four per cent of GNP, but the Balochistan Times reported that throughout six prior education policies [plans], 'none could practically be implemented'. The Education Ministry reportedly conducted a thorough study to determine the causes of their failure and identified thirteen reasons. The top three of these were lack of political will, resource constraint and political instability (Balochistan Times, Feb. 2, 1998:2). While not conclusive, this report suggests evidence of past plans not being met.

The government had already committed to provide Rs. 260 billion under the Social Action Programme. The World Bank had committed to pay the rest. Of these amounts, Rs. 225 billion had been earmarked for primary education. The Joint Educational Advisor indicated that this amount was the minimum, the country needed to develop its educational infrastructure. He also commented 'and if we don't have education, our other plans will fail' (Ibid). The critics of the
education policy, however, suggested that it was a long wish list that would be difficult to implement.

2) Balochistan's education

Educational status is probably the single most important social variable contributing to economic development, as the effects of most other investments are influenced by education levels. If this statement is true, the Government of Balochistan should be concerned with the very low education levels in the Province. Nearly 600,000 children are enrolled in primary schools: 390,000 boys and 202,000 girls (April 1997). In 1991, forty-five per cent of the urban boys (age-group six to ten years) were enrolled and forty seven per cent of the rural ones, while the respective shares for girls were thirty-five per cent and twenty per cent. This indicates a clear gender gap. Enrolment for boys increased by twenty three per cent from 1990 to 1997; while for girls the increase was one hundred fifty-one per cent. Literacy rates were among the lowest in the world. Only fourteen per cent of the rural population (national average twenty-nine per cent) are literate, with the poorest even dropping below ten per cent. There are six thousand nine hundred primary schools for boys and one thousand three hundred for girls; only four Districts (Quetta, Pishin, Jaffarabad and Turbat) have over one hundred girls' schools each (Planning and Development Department 1998).

Compared to the nation, the province of Balochistan had the lowest gross participation rate in primary education at thirty-four per cent (in 1993). The female participation rate of fifteen per cent was among the worst in the world. As a result of the low rate of participation in primary education, the base of primary graduates would not be sufficient to support any kind of significant expansion at higher levels of education (World Bank, 1993:1).

Also of public policy concern is the low financial investment that Balochistan has made to the education sector. Table 2.2 shows that for Balochistan within the time period spanning 1993 to 1998, approximately fifty per cent of the education line item in the Eighth Development Plan was actually allocated representing only 1.57% of the total development budget. The actual expenditure was roughly forty-eight per cent of the actual allocation.
Table 2.2: Education allocations and expenditures during 8th FYP period

(Rs. in millions.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>8th Plan Allocation</th>
<th>Actual Allocation (1993-98)</th>
<th>% of Total Budget</th>
<th>Actual Expenditure (1993-98)</th>
<th>% of Actual Allocation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>691.704</td>
<td>377.558</td>
<td>1.57%</td>
<td>181.904</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAP (Education)</td>
<td>5771.367</td>
<td>5771.367</td>
<td>24.07%</td>
<td>3255.480</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SAP=Social Action Programme

Source: 9th Five-Year Provincial Plan, 1998

Marlaine Lockheed expresses the donor rationale behind their emphasis to promote and fund primary education initiatives in developing countries.

Education is a cornerstone of economic growth and social development and a principal means of improving the welfare of individuals. It increases the productive capacity of societies and their political, economic, and scientific institutions. It also helps reduce poverty by increasing the value and efficiency of the labour offered by the poor and by mitigating the population, health, and nutritional consequences of poverty. As economies worldwide are transformed by advances and new production methods that depend on a well-trained and intellectually flexible labour force, education becomes even more significant (Lockheed and Verspoor 1991:1).

Analyses that correlate education with economic growth, however, must carefully consider the existing environment of the education experience. Jean Dréze and his research team have reported on the condition of administration of primary education in the Northern States of India. The Public Report on Basic Education or PROBE study (1999), among other findings, has assessed the conditions of the provision and administration of education as being unsatisfactory. This assessment, however, calls into question Dréze's public response that compulsory primary education makes a difference. The reliance on modelling, which in fact correlates economic growth to primary education assumes that the transfer of knowledge and various forms of learning are taking place. The report pointed out that education was substandard and that rarely few benefits resulted from compulsory education.
Attempts to derive the above correlation need to specify whether quality education is an input or merely schooling or attendance is being used as the input. Economic indicators among other issues, as expressed above for Balochistan, surely reflect the poor education received by children across the province, i.e. if it is possible to positively correlate economic growth to primary education.

Chapter three will discuss further the transformation of education policies in Balochistan to their implementation including the extent of investments made to that sector over the past years.

2.5 Conclusion

The central questions that this thesis sets out to answer are

1. How successful was the attempt to decentralise education administration in Balochistan?

2. What were the policy constraints?

3. What does this experience tell us about both the theory of decentralisation and its application to education in a developing country with a strong centralist tradition?

We have already seen that the social, political, and economic context of Balochistan make it very difficult to achieve decentralisation. These issues together comprise a complex, abstract canvas against which primary education is administrated in Balochistan and therefore among reasons already stated is the context upon which this study analyses decentralisation. The following chapters begin to chart how far Balochistan had actually succeeded in achieving this reform in the education sector between 1992 and 1997.
From Policy Formulation to Implementation: Education Administration in Balochistan

The broad sector goal of the Primary Education Development Programme is to strengthen the institutional capacity of the Balochistan Province to formulate and implement equitable policy that improves access to primary education and its quality.

United States Agency for International Development

In Pakistan, provision of public education is the constitutional responsibility of the provinces. This delegation to the provinces implies that the system of education in Pakistan is structurally decentralised. Constitutionally the provinces were guaranteed their autonomy in that the provincial Ministries of Education are primarily responsible for the planning and implementation of their respective education programmes. In fact, the 1992 National Education Policy (NEP) called for the provinces to bear an even greater responsibility for educational development. The NEP claimed that any 'sum total of educational progress' would have to be measured through individual progress of the provinces (NEP 1992:77).

Progress in the province of Balochistan, however, is difficult to measure or analyse without a clear definition of decentralisation policy for the province. Strategies calling for management reform were evident at least in the language
of formal education policy documents handed down from the Federal level. Prior to 1992, every successive government in Pakistan had consistently advocated and supported the development of primary education administration which was reflected in each of its national five-year, development plans (seven), its formal education policies (five), and in its provincial annual work-plans (three in Balochistan) (MOE 1994:2). These plans repeated the demand for the development of local school management capacities. The 1992 NEP is an example where the recommendation for improved provincial education administration was called for.

Accordingly, for efficient implementation of the Education Policy it is necessary that the management of education in the Provinces is professionally organised with men who are trained in the art of management and educational administration...The devolution of management will touch the local bodies, district councils, and even villages and mullhas. The implementation strategy therefore invites maximum devolution down the line of management scale ending at the community level and, of course, with feedback reaching the highest rung of the management ladder (Federal Minister, 1992:77).

All of the classic terminology was used in this and earlier policy statements to align theory with popular ideas on what constituted decentralisation. However, when these policies are compared with implementation realities, considerable divergences emerge. In Balochistan, for example, local development objectives ingrained in 'workplans' called for decentralised services in public education, but as some respondents claimed, these measures were long on promise and short on delivery.

This chapter introduces evidence that suggests a departure between decentralisation objectives in Balochistan and the reality of implementation. Smith (1986) as introduced earlier, sheds light on 'why' this classic divergence between policy and implementation sometimes occurs.

Centralisation in developing countries is not just a function of scarcity. It is in part a function of commitment. Those who recommend administrative reorganisation and have to implement it, the central government politicians and civil servants, have the most to lose if access, participation and responsiveness are strengthened by decentralisation. There
is thus a generally disappointing record as far as the implementation of decentralisation schemes is concerned (Smith 1986:460).

The evidence introduced in this chapter provides an important foundation for answering the research question. By analysing the nature of policy and implementation for primary education, some insights might be gained as to whether and to what extent 'decentralisation' plans existed in Balochistan from 1992 to 1997.

3.1 Education Policy in Pakistan

Public policy is a complex pattern of interdependent collective choices, including decisions not to act, made by governmental bodies and officials (Dunn, 1994:85). But as Robert Porter (1995) points out, 'knowledge utilisation' availed by policy makers is not at all straightforward: 'the adoption and implementation of policy entails more than analysis. Policy making is also, and inescapably, an organisational and political process' (Porter, 1995:6). To help us understand the nature of education policy in Balochistan, this section will provide insight into the policy process for Pakistan. First, the system of policy-making is described. Secondly, key administration policies established at the Federal level are presented and compared with provincial implementation plans. Finally, the question is raised as to whether linkages exist between federal policies and provincial implementation.

Historically, the Federal Government of Pakistan had been responsible for curriculum and textbooks, research and the general co-ordination of policy and planning for the provinces. Policy initiatives as early as 1947 were developed at the national level to guide reforms in education. More comprehensive policy documents were produced at the Federal level in 1959, 1970, 1972, 1979 and 1992 for restructuring of the education sector (Minister of Education 1992:1, NEP 1998:4).

Like their predecessors, the Federal Ministry of Education established the 1992 NEP in Islamabad and included major policy statements concerning
primary education (Farah, 1996:4-5). Participants in the development of the NEP included primary through tertiary level administrators and educationists who attended a series of provincial conferences on education. These conferences were held in an attempt to 'reshuffle the priorities, restate the policy, revise the strategy and re-examine the fabric of education so as to make it compatible with the demands of prospective economic activity, and social cultural and political development...' (Minister of Education, 1992:2).

In addition, a national conference was held in Islamabad in April of 1991 that reportedly brought together academics, journalists, scientists, teachers, and lawyers for mapping out the Policy. The Ministry of Education also independently solicited recommendations from 'known' intellectuals and educationists to be incorporated into planning the Policy. After preparing basic principles formulated through the conferences and surveys, the Minister of Education commenced discussions with the Education Committees of the Senate and National Assembly. The Policy publication asserts that policies were ultimately presented and discussed in an inter-provincial Ministers meeting 'and modified in deference to the recommendations of the Provinces' (Ibid:2). Whether or not the Provinces, in fact, returned recommendations to the Federal level, however, was not confirmed.

It has been argued that the linkages from policy development to implementation break down at this 'hand-off' stage from the Federal level to the provincial level. The World Bank noted in one of its institutional reform project papers for Pakistan that the reasons for poor education quality in Pakistan were numerous. However, at the centre of the problem was weak institutional capacity. The way the education system was structured did not help decision-makers to identify problems and actions to rectify them. From basic policy-making to day-to-day management, education agencies were inappropriately structured and staffed. Decision-making was centralised and politicised. Few officials at any level had clear spheres of responsibility, and most lacked professional training for their posts. Lack of motivation, enthusiasm, and accountability was prevalent, and strong political interests often interfered with

This argument for policy breakdown has also been characterised by Weiss (1991). As indicated below in Box 3.1, determinants of educational decision-making in Pakistan related more to political and personal pressures and preferences than research conducted on the basic educational needs of its citizens.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Box 3.1: Determinants of Educational Decision-Making in Pakistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>They asked me to look at the extent to which the research and statistical data reported to Pakistani officials was influencing educational decision-making and programming in the country. I found much the same thing that I found in other places: people in positions of authority say that research is very important and that they support it, but it doesn't have immediate or direct effect on what they do. This is true not only of the Pakistani situation but throughout the world. Research does not tend to have direct effects in determining policy. Moreover, decision-makers have ideological commitments. You are not going to change their opinion about, say, the value of educating girls in Pakistan, just by giving them information. They have deep-rooted beliefs and values. Decision-makers also have interests. They must satisfy certain constituencies, gain support from other agencies, abide by the rules and routines of their constitution, or even please some powerful political figure.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (http://hugse1.harvard.edu/~OIE/WEISS.html)
Professor of Education in Administration Planning and Social Policy, Harvard University, Graduate School of Education.

Although the Government of Pakistan (GOP) was responsible for general coordination of policy and planning between provinces, the Federal Ministry of Education based in Islamabad was responsible for major policy statements concerning primary education (World Bank, 1994:65). That this role is defined for the Federal Ministry of Education, however, did not necessarily mean that policy, as articulated above, was carried over or implemented in the provinces. In particular, Balochistan was noted for its 'policy vacuum' with regard to primary education in the province (World Bank, 1993:27).

\textsuperscript{13} See also Qaisrani and Khawaja 1989.
This characterisation of Balochistan's education policy raises the question of how and to what extent policy was developed for that province. From a macroeconomic perspective, the development of primary education policy appears to have been directed by primarily two different sources: 1) the Federal Government and 2) outside donors. The World Bank (1993) reported that educational policy in Balochistan, as elsewhere in Pakistan, had been largely driven by federal mandates which neither took into account the particular demographic, geographic and cultural conditions of the province nor were backed up by adequate evaluation, experimentation, or resources. Marked variations among districts and poor educational indicators testify to the absence of policies tailored to local needs (World Bank 1993).

Additionally, World Bank documentation indicated that the historical non-availability of timely and accurate data about the educational system resulted in the lack of real planning for the province. Precedent and political pressures traditionally and primarily guided policy decisions. Prior to 1990, planning activities for Balochistan's school system were the responsibility of the Planning Cell within the Provincial Directorate of Schools. Basic information about the school system collected and compiled manually by personnel from the Directorate of Schools was inaccurate and took too much time to compile (World Bank 1993:8).

The World Bank's finding that planning and the development of education policy in Balochistan was lacking and weak was corroborated with qualitative data collected for this study. These data indicate that the existence of education policy was in question in Balochistan prior to 1997. It was revealed in a majority of the interviews conducted that formal primary education policy did not exist in Balochistan prior to 1997. Respondents including government sources, district level staff, technical consultants, and World Bank officials all independently made this claim.

One senior government official indicated that 'basic policy comes from the Federal Level and that due to political changes, policies also change' (Additional
Secretary of Education, Quetta, 1997). Congruent with this claim were those made by district officers. Their responses ranged from uncertainty and some confusion to suspicion and distrust that policies were being made without their knowledge. One female officer's response is illustrative.

*What policy do they have for education? They have not developed any policies for education. I think they have never had any policy or have never developed one. They first take an action and then think about it, e.g. they started making PTSMC*\(^{14}\) *which was a total failure, so if they had planned first and started making them, it might have been a success. Policies—actually, we do not have* (Female DEO, Jaffarabad, 1998).

Another source that was closely associated with primary education projects in Balochistan articulated the perceived policy vacuum in another way:

*I think that up until 1997 perhaps late 1996 there were no policies. I think they were goals that were set up in lieu of policy. I think that a degree of policy of universal primary education, that was one thing that had been agreed. That was probably a policy. But all sorts of other things were really limited goal statements. (Chief Technical Advisor, Quetta; 1998)*

A majority of respondents shared the view that formal policy was non-existent prior to 1997. However, the broad programme goal of donors beginning in 1989 for Balochistan served as evidence that access to primary education, equity and quality were fundamental tenets that would drive the development of the education sector in the future. Whether these goals can be characterised as 'policies' is a very fine argument. The disconnect between peoples' views on what constitutes policy and the actual existence of policy illustrates a lack of information or understanding of the flow of policy from the Federal to the provincial level. In some ways, policy was left for the Province to flesh out but no 'real' knowledge existed as to the linkages of this policy between the two levels.

Given the recent heavy input of donor technical assistance and financial support towards primary education development in Balochistan, it is particularly noteworthy to include one donor official's insight on the subject.

\(^{14}\) PTSMC represents the Parent/Teacher/School/Management Committee scheme mandated by the Secretary of Education in 1996. The purpose of the PTSMC was to provide a locally representative committee with discretionary funding for school maintenance and responsibility for monitoring tasks.
When asked whether the World Bank had established an education policy for Balochistan, this official gave the following response:

*There is no education policy in Balochistan. The policy is driven by or determined by the program side of things that are ad hoc. There is not a lot of co-ordination. Two policy levels exist in Pakistan: one at the Federal level and one at the provincial level. At the two levels, however, policy reforms are only addressed in key areas the same as the program components* (Task Manager, World Bank, 1998).

The donor agencies and their participation and influence in the policy and implementation process will be discussed in detail below.

Flow of Policy from Federal to Provincial Level

The first annual workplan for primary education in Balochistan was generated in 1989. The plan was created in response to donor (largely USAID) advice for the improvement of education in the Province (PAAD 1990). However, over time this and subsequent plans had served the province as operational guides for primary education. As implied by the respondent above, broad goal statements were set out at the outset of primary education funding in response to Education for All Conference proceedings. Also apparent in the actual workplan document is language that identifies the impetus behind the statement. Rather than references to a National Education Policy, the referenced ‘broad goal’ is linked to the activities specified for an ‘intensive ten-year program’ to be sponsored by an outside donor (USAID). The ‘goal’ reads:

The broad sector goal of PED is to strengthen the institutional capacity of Balochistan Province, and to formulate and implement policy that improves access to, and the equity and quality of, primary education.

The correlation between the annual workplan activities and the 1992 Policy reveals that donor agencies bore greater preliminary influence in determining the goals for education development in Balochistan than the 1992 policy. Under the 1989 Primary Education Development (PED) agreement between USAID and the Government of Pakistan, USAID recommended that policy formulation and implementation would be adhered to as per the grant agreement objectives. "There will be semi-annual progress reviews of program activities, and progress
toward the policy and action benchmarks will be used to monitor the flow of funds so that they are tied to program accomplishments and increased GOP funds available for primary education' (USAID 1989:7).

The Action Benchmarks that were laid out in the PAAD for 'administration and management' were delineated for the Provinces of Balochistan and NWFP:

**Directorate of Primary Education:**
- Allocation of funds to establish the directorate;
- Assignment of space for a directorate; and
- Full assignment of staff, with individuals at post and supporting infrastructure including furniture and office equipment.

**Organisational studies:**
- Commissioning of full provincial and national organisational studies.

**Policy Studies:**
- Commissioning of provincial and national policy studies (Ibid:15).

The PAAD further explained that the programme process would be focussed by a continuing policy dialogue between the provincial government and the donor that would influence all related activities, and an annually revised set of policy and action benchmarks related to the programme goal and objectives. Dialogues concerning education policy began during the pre-programme planning and had been anticipated throughout the life of the project. USAID claimed that 'these dialogues w[ould] permit a joint GOP-USAID exploration of policy alternatives to meet the program targets established in th[e] PAAD' (USAID 1989:14). USAID, however, did not claim exclusive authorship to the policies it placed in the PED agreement. The PAAD explained that 'the PED Program builds on the Seventh Plan criteria to help the GOP achieve its objectives in primary education' (USAID 1989:9). USAID specifically stated its intent to support what it characterised as the 'decentralisation plans' of the primary system in Balochistan.

Box 3.2 below highlights policies concerning administration and management that were included in the 1992 NEP. The first policy strategy item that calls for the establishment of Directorates for Primary Education was interestingly already an agenda item in the agreement that the GOP made with
USAID earlier in 1989. Its inclusion as a major tenet to the 1992 NEP suggests that donors such as USAID had influenced the shaping of national education policy.

For this thesis, an analysis was conducted of the annual workplans for Balochistan against Pakistan's National Education Policy (see Table 3.1). This analysis only examined suggested activities related to the six major policy or 'strategy' statements expressed in the 1992 NEP (see Box 3.2). Information however, confirming whether an activity had been completed was not included in these workplans. Hence, reliance on other reports to confirm activity has been necessary. Policy strategy items two, three, five and six are more difficult to attribute to prior donor conceptualisation and activity. All of these policies, however, appear in some shape or form in Balochistan's operational workplans, which span 1990 to 1998.

Table 3.1 tracks the activity that was undertaken according to the workplan goals. As the title implies, it is difficult to necessarily correlate decentralisation activity to the six 1992 NEP strategy areas noted in Box 3.2. Though four of the five 'actions' could be said to advance the objective of decentralisation, the third did the opposite and was far reaching. The Minister of Education was given powers to appoint, promote, and transfer civil servants including teachers and ministerial staff instead of the district education officers at a time when these should have been rolled out to the district officers. The centralisation of these powers goes against the spirit and the letter of the 1992 NEP. The impact on district managers will be examined in chapters five and six.

The fact that implementation activities were well underway by the time the 1992 NEP was published calls into question what or who was driving the 'policy' for primary education in Balochistan. This assertion leads to the next discussion of outside donor influence and control of policy.
Box 3.2: Pakistan National Education Policy 1992-2002

Administration and Management of Education

POLICY STATEMENT

The process of decision-making will be decentralised. Educational development plans shall be effectively co-ordinat ed and monitored. Management of district level education will be improved by associating the local community.

BACKGROUND

Many of our failures in the past had been less owing to resource scarcity than to the administrative and managerial inadequacies. The management of education requires a special type of professional expertise. Not many of our educational managers are trained in this art. Furthermore, the existing administrative norms do not allow for the participation of the community in the management of educational institutions at the local level. Substantial changes are required to be made in the administration of education to improve the efficiency of the system.

STRATEGY

1. Separate Directorates of Primary Education will be established.

2. School Management committees shall be constituted at the village, settlement and institution levels.

3. The district education officer shall be delegated appropriate financial, administrative and personnel management powers.

4. All supervisors, headmasters and principals shall receive training in techniques and methods of educational administration and financial rules before appointment.

5. A manual describing the principles of educational administration and financial management shall be prepared.

6. A system of accountability and rewards based on performance evaluation of teachers and head of institutions will be developed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plan*/Year</th>
<th>Strategy #</th>
<th>Action:</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2nd/1990-91</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>Field Training For Headmasters and Other District Administrators Initiated</td>
<td>The design and conceptualisation of this training preceded the 1992 NEP. Full training of staff prior to their appointment, however, could not be confirmed. Institutionalisation of such a training program could not be confirmed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd/1991-92</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Primary Education Directorate Established (July 1993)</td>
<td>The establishment of a separate Directorate for Primary Education was more influenced by policy reforms that were delineated in the Program Assistance Approval Document of June 1989 and covenants agreed to by USAID and the Government of Pakistan under the Program Grant Agreement of June 1989 (AED, p.79). The National Education Policy came about later in 1992.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th/1992-93</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Minister of Education Reins in power to appoint, promote and transfer Basic Pay Scale Employees 16 and below (August 1993)</td>
<td>This notification SOR-I(3)S&amp;GAD-93 was valid from effective date of August 16th and was still in effect during field research 1997. District Education Officers were basically stripped of their authority to hire, fire, and transfer teachers and ministerial staff. Also, DEOs at this point are only authorised to administer funds for salaries and direct expenditure. Their financial powers were extremely limited.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th/1993-94</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Officer's Guides for Field Staff Completed (June 1994)</td>
<td>Officers' Guides were previously developed under the USAID sponsored portion of Primary Education Development Assistance in Balochistan prior to the development of the 1992 NEP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th/1994-95</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Parent/Teacher/School Management Committees Established</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th/1995-96</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th/1996-97</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th/1997-98</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Refers to Balochistan Annual Workplans for fiscal years July to June
3.2 Donor Influence

Balochistan’s education sector has been a major target of outside development assistance since the late 1970’s. Inefficiencies were presumed to be remedied through structural reforms within the Provincial Department of Education and a series of five-year plans called for decentralisation strategies to relieve these centrally burdened agencies. Approximately U.S. 556 million dollars had been invested through IDA credits alone from 1977 to 1993, towards education reforms in Pakistan as a fraction of social sector projects (World Bank 1994:9). Despite the growing external resources described here and below, poor social indicators continued to persist. It is therefore noteworthy to consider what aspects of management and administration in the sector continued to hamper improvements in the opinion of some observers.

For example, in 1992, the GOP initiated a Social Action Programme (SAP) with the explicit aim of providing access to basic services in education throughout the country (along with health and family planning and water/sanitation). SAP was supported by World Bank operations including province specific education investment projects. The Bank noted the following in 1996 as challenges to these reforms: vested political interests at various levels, weak institutional capacity, un-involvement of stakeholders. (World Bank Correspondence 4/10/1996:1)

The late economist Mahbub ul-Haq considered these challenges in analysing funding that Pakistan would be receiving and administering on behalf of the Social Action Programme.

Pakistan has recently undertaken the implementation of several, billion dollar SAP programs under the umbrella of the World Bank. While this represents some progress, many independent analysts have expressed serious misgivings about whether SAP will also be politicised and used as a patronage programme for political party workers rather than as a real breakthrough in human development for social engineering. Evidence of poor indicators in Balochistan is indicative of lack of efficiency in usage of funds. Pakistan has a legacy of assistance and sad results or benefits of all the monetary support since post-partition (ul-Haq, 1997:38,42).
This study cannot ignore the role that donors have played in the
development of the primary education sector in Balochistan whether or not their
role has been perceived as beneficial from the local perspective. Table 3.2 gives
an idea of the donor community for the two decades prior to 2000 and the
funding allocated through grants and loans to Pakistan as a whole. Between
1990 and 2000 approximately U.S. $934 million in external assistance had been
allocated to Pakistan for the development of primary education.

Table 3.2: Foreign Assistance for Basic Education in Pakistan
(1990-2000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Assistance (U.S. Million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World Bank (IDA)</td>
<td>592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Development Bank (ADB)</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>934</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Farah 1996

Figure 3.1 below is a summary of donor-assisted work that took place beginning
as early as the late 70s. Historically, the World Bank has played a dominant role
in Pakistan's basic education sector. The Bank, building on an already designed
AID project, initiated the First Primary Education Project (PEP 1) in Pakistan
in 1979 (USAID, 1988:6) Based on the analysis of these past initiatives, USAID
embarked on planning an effort to target the two provinces left out of these
initiatives, namely Balochistan and NWFP. For the PED program, AID claimed
that WB and ADB were consulted to avoid duplication of other donor activities
but rather build on the PEP 2 efforts. AID's target of new areas of development
included:

❖ girl's middle schools;
❖ methods of enabling female middle school graduates to achieve teaching
certificates; and
❖ Influencing incentives for teachers, students and communities to develop
more and better educational opportunities.

15 Author's emphasis
### Figure 3.1 Profile of Donor Influence in Education Development in Pakistan: 1979-1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Donors</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PEP 1: World Bank, 1979</td>
<td>$10 million</td>
<td></td>
<td>Focussed on rural primary schools in all provinces with special attention to increasing access, reducing wastage, reducing costs, increasing the quality of education provided to girls.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEP 2: World Bank, $52.5 million</td>
<td>Five year follow-on</td>
<td></td>
<td>The objective was to improve primary education quality in 14,000 schools in three provinces by improving teaching and learning materials, upgrading physical facilities, strengthening supervision.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEP 3: World Bank, CIDA, EEC, and GOP</td>
<td>$215 million</td>
<td>Targeted the province of Punjab and was designed to expand the programs of PEP 2 into all districts of Punjab.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEP 4: World Bank, CIDA, EEC, and GOP</td>
<td></td>
<td>Similar to PEP 3, but was to target the Sind Province.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADB—1988-1993: Asian Development Bank</td>
<td>$73.4 million</td>
<td>Five-year program country-wide program that would include construction of physical facilities, (65% of loan), upgrading teacher training, development of instructional materials in selected model primary schools, strengthen management and supervision of girls' primary education through in-service training of sub-district administrators and supervisors and through support of for a computerised management information system.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PED Project 1990-1994: USAID</td>
<td>$280 million originally earmarked</td>
<td>Ten-year project shortened to 4.5 due to US Foreign Policy concerning assistance to Pakistan. Targeted Balochistan and NWFP. Aimed to increase access to primary education and to improve equity, quality, and efficiency.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF:</td>
<td>$5 million</td>
<td>The purpose of this project was to evaluate the integrated curriculum.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (USAID 1988:6; AED 1994)
Donor involvement in education development in Balochistan is thus a reality that has powerfully shaped policy for the province. Porter (1995) suggests that donors may choose to influence the policy implementation process directly—for example, by tying development aid to various conditionalities that specify how implementation is to proceed. Alternatively they may try to influence the thinking of policy makers through policy dialogue—‘reasoned argumentation and persuasion’ (p.16).

Donor engagements have been structured both ways in Balochistan. Under a discussion of policy benchmarks, USAID indicated that a list of policy and action benchmarks was discussed with representatives of the provincial government of Balochistan. The public policy statement which spelled out the ten-year enrolment goals implied that with the government’s endorsement, they would be presented as government policy (USAID, 1989:15) At the same time, the release of funds for the Primary Education Development Project were contingent on certain conditionalities. These conditions were the agreed activities set out in Balochistan’s annual workplan that, in turn, led to achieving goals (benchmarks) agreed to by USAID and Pakistan (AED, 1994:38). Under the initial agreements some program agreements included:

1. **Enrollment Targets**—Endorsement of the ten-year enrolments, by province and gender, as GOP policy;

2. **Budget Support**—Agreement to increase the total (federal plus provincial) funds spent on primary education at the rate of ten percent annually for Balochistan over the next ten years, with FY 1990 the base year;

3. **Directorates**—Establishment of a Directorate for Primary or Basic Education in Balochistan (USAID 1989:3; see also Program Implementation Letter, 9/23/90 USAID.)

USAID saw its role as a facilitator of the development of policies of Balochistan that would engender change (USAID, 1989:9). When for political reasons, USAID had to terminate its activity in Pakistan, it handed off its support responsibilities to the World Bank who had in earlier years also been a major contributor to primary education development and policy formulation. Other donors were also playing marginal roles in addressing policy concerns with the Federal and Provincial Governments. However, the education development activity following USAID’s pullout of Pakistan was largely already entrenched in
the early policy reforms agreed to by USAID and the GOP. The necessary task of implementing these policies, as discussed in general terms in the next section, rendered the role of the World Bank as a 'task manager' to make good on its investments. The early effects of policies from the decade of the 70s to the 90s, however, had been poor as noted by the Ministry of Education:

As a social artefact, education so far, has not been able to assure good life for the individual and best arrangements for society. Its ability to build human capital that could provide high rates of return to society has remained minimal (MOE 1992:1).

3.3 Implementation

Organisation and Management of Primary Education in Balochistan

The establishment and management of primary schools are the responsibility of the Provincial Governments, whereas curriculum is developed by the Federal Government in consultation with the provinces. There are separate Directorates of Primary Education in each province.

Until 1992, a single Provincial Directorate of Schools under the Department of Education managed all primary, middle, and secondary schools in Balochistan. Within the Directorate, neither budget nor personnel were earmarked specifically for primary education. This lack of an organisational focus on primary education was further repeated at the division and district level. The neglect of primary education was evident in the severe shortage of facilities and materials in primary schools as compared to middle and high schools. Even within the same school, primary grades with majority of the student population were displaced into the schoolyard while middle and higher grades occupied the few available classrooms (World Bank 1993:6).

In July 1992, the Government of Balochistan (GOB) agreed to 'bifurcate' the existing Directorate of Schools by level, and to establish two separate Directorates for primary (K-5) and secondary (6-10) education. The bifurcation
was officially sanctioned in December 1992. Under this arrangement, the management of primary education became the responsibility of personnel from the Directorate of Primary Education located at both provincial and district offices.

Within the Department of Education, the administrative structure is segregated by gender from divisional level downward. Male District Education Officers are responsible for management and supervision of all boys' schools within their respective districts. Because of the small number of girls' schools, female divisional education officers perform the same tasks for girls' schools covering three to five districts within a division. Female administrators are therefore doubly constrained: first by the vast geographical territory falling under their jurisdiction; and second, by their having to rely (for cultural reasons) on the availability of official transport rather than public transport (World Bank 1993:7).

Pakistan's culture of education administration is based on the principle that organisation is administration and the best test of administration is compliance with orders from above (Warwick 1995:9). Since partition, the system of administration with its emphasis on control and top-down communication has been described as having an infinite capacity for obscuring and killing initiatives and innovations (Saqeb 1985). The style and structure of administration often meant that senior provincial administrators were not aware of what actually took place within schools. Administrators and decision-makers frequently lacked accurate and relevant information on which to base policy and resource allocation choices.

While provinces had control over the delivery of public education, they were dependent on the Federal Government for recurrent and development funds for implementation. After the funds were released, however, a process of disbursement through the provincial government did not always guarantee timely and efficient distribution according to the account of one respondent who worked in the finance office of the Directorate for Primary Education.
And with the recurrent budget, the Federal Government gives the allocation to the Provincial government and then the provincial government—they decide how much they will give to the health and other sectors. So the education department gets the budget and under education department they have three different categories. One is called primary education budget and the other is secondary education and the college budget. They also get one budget under administration. So for primary education, the Finance Department, Government of Balochistan, releases that budget to the Primary Education Directorate. And the Directorate further distributes this budget to different DEOs based on their staff and enrollment and everything. That's how it is done (Financial Administrator, PED, 1997).

However straightforward the above account describes the process of financial distribution and control, it does not account for the low expenditure on education both nationally and provincially. Table 3.3 indicates that within the period covered by the Seventh Year Plan (1988-92), Balochistan's expenditure on primary education barely reached eight per cent of total public expenditure for the province.

Table 3.3 BALOCHISTAN: Public Expenditure on Education 1988-1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>7th Year Plan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fiscal Year:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenditure on Development (Primary Level)</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenditure on Recurrent (Primary Level)</td>
<td>282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Primary Education</td>
<td>321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenditure on Primary Level</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>as % of Total Public Expenditure</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>as % of Total Education Budget</td>
<td>42.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source: (World Bank 1993)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As noted in Pakistan's 1992 NEP, policy envisioned that district education officers would be delegated appropriate financial responsibilities. The next chapter will examine to what extent these envisioned controls were extended; however, discretion of funding had been low and centralised. Other forms of
centralised administration were the development of curriculum, which has already been noted as a federal level function. Also, teacher appointments had been a function that was centralised at the provincial level. In assessing the structure of administration in Balochistan, it is apparent that little evidence of decentralisation existed in principle. Once source illuminates the dynamic of centralisation of administration.

If you... want to take the power out of the hands of the Secretariat in Quetta and devolve it to a person further out, I don't think that anybody's confronted that yet...I think that decentralisation is geographical rather than authority, power and accountability (CTA, BPEP, Quetta, 1998).

Balochistan and the Period of Devolution

With the advent of USAID, World Bank and other donor assistance, Balochistan became the laboratory for agendas that called for administrative decentralisation. The Balochistan Primary Education Programme, under donor advice, projected its final period from 1996 to 1999 as the period of 'devolution' with the objective of devolving further authority and responsibility from the 'centre' or the Directorate of Primary Education to the district, community, and school levels.

The Primary Education Directorate (PED) was located in the Provincial capital of Quetta. PED incorporated into its Annual Workplans formal decentralisation strategies as already discussed. These plans theoretically served to drive the day-to-day operations of primary education. The workplan delineated Government approved activities that were also sanctioned by outside donor agencies. In essence, these workplans became the policy guidelines for primary education. From the time that PED had been established, the workplans had been developed with external technical assistance advice and approved by a joint donor/government agreement. Throughout these agreements and plans was the call for improvement in the representation and the provision of administrative support at the district and community level. The rationale behind this goal was that improvement in the quality of administration should result in a more effectively managed school system.
The *Primary Education Development Project Final Report* (1994) claimed that at the end of the initial project in 1994, an enabling infrastructure for better local administration of primary education in Balochistan had been developed. A follow-up World Bank financed Balochistan Primary Education Development Project (BPEP) supported further the development of devolved education administration. These measures included the establishment of Village Education Committees (VECs); Parent, Teacher, School Management Committees (PTSMCs); and Women's Village Education Committees (WVECs); and the development of an NGO called the Society for Community Support for Primary Education in Balochistan (SCSPEB) which had worked under GOB funding as well as through outside donor financing to support these 'community' developments (AED 1994).

Thus by 1996, as far as the outside world was concerned, a programme of significant devolution was under way in the primary education of Balochistan. Internally, however, this programme had its drawbacks. For example, the organic nature of the education system in Balochistan as evidenced by the growing number of schools with increased enrolments had posed a very 'threatening' challenge to its effective management in such a widespread rural area. A former advisor to the Chief Minister in Balochistan was noted for objecting to this perceived 'burden' that the donor community was placing on 'successive generations' (CTA, BPEP, Quetta, 1997). How real these attempts at devolution were as well as further discussions of other challenges will be the subject of the next chapters.

### 3.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, we have explored the policy process from the 'top' down to understand the origin and nature of formal education policies in Balochistan. We have also explored the role played by outside donors and their influence over the policy process. Implementation of primary education has been discussed to
locate linkages between the decentralisation policies and any outcomes that implementation might have yielded. The following conclusions can be drawn:

❖ Outside donor assistance through ‘tied’ financing packages had more influence in introducing decentralisation policies than Federal and Provincial institutions.

Donors indeed not only influenced primary education policy in Balochistan but to a large extent have actually developed or shaped it. These initiatives sometimes alienated both Federal and Provincial governments. But the ‘program approach’ of USAID in the late 90s required local government to be a ‘necessary partner’ in the reform efforts. Thus, an indirect tension was evident from the outset.

❖ The very existence of an education “policy” in Balochistan prior to 1997 was in doubt.

Broad, formal education policy plans existed at the Federal level but there was little evidence of plans or policies at the provincial level in Balochistan prior to the establishment of PED. Even after the Directorate was established, workplans facilitated implementation but provincial policy-making mechanisms for primary education were absent. This was despite significant investment in Balochistan. The attempt to set out detailed plans and reporting procedures to the donor agencies in the 1990s was a new development.

❖ Decentralisation policies for Balochistan were made manifest in two ways—1) Federal policy filtered to provincial level; and 2) Donor tied agreements.

Chapters four, five and six provide further insights into the implementation of decentralisation plans. Insights of central and local agents and people captured in interviews and through observations describe the process of administration from the central and local level perspectives. These chapters further explore the gaps between nationally/provincially-developed policy and their implementation to determine how decentralisation has occurred at the local level and if so, to what extent.
Chapter 4

Education Administration: Central Roles and Responsibilities

The state functionaries are not interested in decentralisation. They don't want to part with their powers... Decentralisation is a good model but it requires certain influence by the government.

Former Director
Primary Education Directorate
Quetta, Balochistan

This chapter focuses on the role of central administration and perceptions of central actors as to the limits of decentralisation. In the first part of the chapter, we look in turn at the bureaucracy or rather a number of agencies within the government and examine the extent to which these agencies can be said to have decentralised its activities. In the second part of the chapter we undertake a function analysis looking at public service functions identified by Winkler (1989) and discuss how central actors felt it was feasible to decentralise and to what extent it was done.
4.1 Central Institutions

The 'centre' or central institutions in this study represent the administrative bureaucracy in the province above the district and divisional levels. Primary education administration in Balochistan, as in the other provinces in Pakistan, is situated in the hierarchy of a central provincial administrative structure. This section presents and briefly describes the institutions within this hierarchy. This will help illuminate the process of administration through an understanding of the primary actors who participate in the process from the centre.

As pointed out in Chapter Three, the provinces of Pakistan are constitutionally guaranteed their autonomy in the management and operation of the educational system in their respective administrative territories. This autonomy comes with the proviso that their administration is to be guided by the National Education Policy. The 1972 NEP recommendations that were implemented resulted in the formation of the 'more-or-less' uniform education structure including the formation of the provincial departments of education (Malik 1992:40). The departments of education are ultimately responsible for all layers of the education system including primary, secondary, college, and university education.

One World Bank Official observed that Balochistan was lacking a strong administrative 'centre'. It was further noted that accountability was also needed at this level (Task Manager, World Bank, 1998). The following sections are presented to explore this characterisation.

Provincial Department of Education

As mentioned above, the existing organisational structures in the provinces are the outcome of the implementation of the 1972 National Education Policy (see Figure 4.1). At the provincial level, there is a Department of Education (DOE). The Minister of Education, an elected official, heads the DOE and acts as the spokesperson for education in the Provincial Assembly. The Secretary of Education (an appointed position) reports to the Minister of Education and is
responsible for advising on policy issues. Also, as chief executive officer of the DOE, the Secretary is responsible to implement and evaluate policies and plans in the province. The Secretary is assisted by an Additional Secretary, Deputy Secretaries, Assistant Secretaries, Section Officers and other supporting staff—all who work at the Secretariat. The Secretary also oversees the work at the Directorates both for Primary and Secondary Education (Malik 1992:40-41). The organisation of the Directorate for Primary Education will be described in greater detail later in this chapter.

**Figure 4.1 Provincial Organisational Chart**

![Organisational Chart](image)

Source: Malik 1992

As we have seen in Chapter Three, active policy-making in rational form was essentially absent in Balochistan from 1992 to 1997. Though it has formal jurisdiction, most respondents interviewed in this study felt this role had not been actively filled. Insofar as policy emerged, external donor agencies
influenced them significantly. Explanations were given that the provincial annual workplans had almost been surrogates for policy. These had been policy interventions made by donors such as USAID. It was first noted that policy or 'goals' had been formed in agreements between the Provincial Government and the donors. Alternatively, it has been explained that policy was an outcome of provincial cabinet decisions in which the Minister of Education participates.

*Whatever the Cabinet decisions are, they are declared as policy matters or policy issues. So the policy as a document is now prepared. I have not seen any health policy or education policy that is prepared by the cabinet. We prepare the annual plan to reflect the cabinet decisions in implementation* (Former Director, PED, 1997).

Although no formal policy document for provincial education could be found, other examples of policy influences from the centre were given. The Director of Primary education had received a notification formed by a Cabinet decision that the powers of appointment, transfers, from basic pay scale (BPS) grades one to fifteen were to be handled by the Minister of Education. That Cabinet dissolved and the caretaker government took over. At that point, the policy was abolished. When the new government came in, the first thing they did was to adopt the same policy as it was given in the previous Cabinet—to give the authority of the Minister to appoint and transfer any government functionary. These explanations for the origins of policy, while not consistent, are neither mutually exclusive. Together, however, they suggest that the 'forum' for policy-making was centred at the top level in Balochistan.

The degree of power had been constrained to some extent, however, by external funding. Operationally, the DOE in Balochistan had been restricted in terms of resources for primary education. One senior government official in the Office of the Secretary for Education (Secretariat) indicated that Balochistan relied heavily on external funding from donors and that only two per cent of GNP had been allocated for education in terms of government expenditure *sans* external funding. Despite the low funding, however, the officer reported that from the mid 1970s to the mid 1980s, the education system was more decentralised as defined by the fact that DEOs were given discretionary authority over their budgets and administration for their respective districts.
For the following years, he described the inadequacies of decentralisation as a systems problem and one that was driven by changing politics at the centre (Additional Secretary, Quetta, 1997). In fact, between the years of 1992 and 1997, seven ministers of education and seven secretaries of education had been responsible for controlling the education system in Balochistan (Multi-donor Support Unit 2000).

The frequent transition of provincial leaders, the culture of centralising politics and the external power manifested through outside donors, explain the vulnerability of further devolving power and control of implementation to lower levels within the education system in the province. The following section examines the second tier of administration in Balochistan in terms of primary education management—the Primary Education Directorate—and its role in administration.

**Primary Education Directorate—Shadow or Reality?**

Although PED assumed foremost responsibility for all aspects of primary education in terms of administration, it also facilitated technical work to help develop such areas as teacher training and curriculum. These technical areas were divided into different cells all housed within the Directorate.

- Teacher Training and Supply Cell;
- Balochistan Instructional Materials and Development Training Cell (BIMDTC);
- Balochistan Education Management Information Systems Cell (BEMIS);
- Beneficiary Participation Cell (Community Mobilisation);
- School Construction Cell; and
- Assessment, Monitoring, Planning and Evaluation Cell

The fact that these cells were formed and housed within PED does not suggest that none of their functions pre-existed prior to the opening of PED. In fact, functions of two of the cells, Teacher Training and BIMDTC, were handled to some degree, in two different agencies. These two agencies are discussed in greater detail below. At times, they competed and/or overlapped with PED in terms of development and implementation of primary education work. Often the competition led to confusion over which agency was in 'control' or had more say.
than the other—a quagmire noteworthy in a discussion concerning decentralisation.

Each cell was developed and managed within the period of 1992 to 1997 by external technical advisors hired under the requirements of the donor contract through the BPEP modality. These advisors were instituted to shadow the government counterparts, who were line managers, and provide them with technical advice. However, the burden of donor demands for deliverables added with the specific skill sets possessed by the advisors in their area of work often intimidated the officials and resulted in their shadowing the advisors. It can be argued that to an extent the control and power of some of the deputy directors went as far as their will could be exerted. Often, however, some were reliant on the advisors leadership. From the donor perspective, though, this outside support was seen as 'essential'.

Close support of the situation by the donor and technical advisers is essential in promoting the process by which governments implement change. The number of times when donor requirements were used to stimulate a discussion or force a decision or the Technical Adviser was called in by government officials to assist in or facilitate an action or deliberation cannot be enumerated (AED 1994:94).

This observation is contrasted with evidence concerning control and authority that were wielded by government officials within PED. At the beginning of its formation, only a few government posts had been sanctioned at PED. Among these positions was that of Additional Director. Those initially posted were prime contributors to the metamorphosis that the small operation began to take. In fact, these individuals became quite powerful, if not political over time. Added with increasing responsibilities and authority, their interface with external donors yielded significant power. Also, they held permanent civil service status not threatened by constant transfers. For example, a majority of respondents claimed that one senior official in PED retained financial control of the external and recurrent budgets for primary education within the province. This one individual was not in a position of political appointment; thus, the position insulated him and by default gave him control over matters that both PED and district officers felt they should control. It was observed that these
other officers were politically inclined to ingratiate themselves with this officer to gain priority in getting their local needs met. Doing one's job is not in question here. The officer in question had merely begun working in a small organisation. Over time his scope of control was broadened but inevitably rendered him as a gatekeeper for a variety of functions performed within PED. This control at the top, in time, impeded progress to reform or decentralise the administration and management of primary education in Balochistan.

The Primary Education Directorate (PED) has already been described to some extent above and in chapter three in terms of its origination and development in Balochistan. Its establishment was seen as a structural move towards decentralisation (USAID 1989), although questioned in the discussion above. The organisation of PED, depicted in Figure 4.2, helps to illustrate these points. The Director of Primary Education oversaw a series of line directors or deputy directors who were responsible for the day-to-day functions of PED. Furthermore, two additional directors had line responsibility for district education officers positioned in two jurisdictions of Balochistan—the Southwest or the Northeast. It was assumed that through these positions, administration could be further devolved as explained by one respondent.

_The concept was that there would be decentralisation through the Additional Directors. and the Additional Directors would be based out of Quetta, most of the time. In fact, the Additional Directors are based in Quetta next to the Director. Logically the Director can allocate to the Additional Director a whole lot of responsibilities that are then effectively devolved to the Northern Areas or the Southern Areas. If that had happened and they had been placed into the province, then I think you could have had much more devolution. But in effect, they came back, and they centralised even more the power because they were so related to the Director, and they saw themselves also their powers being so dependent on the Director so being close to the Director was important to them. So it was better for them to be in the Centre. They didn't want to be marginalised out there._ (CTA, BPEP, Quetta, 1998).

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BEMIS=Balochistan Education Management Information System
AMPE=Administration, Management, Planning and Evaluation

Source: Government of Balochistan, 1994b
Attempts to decentralise power and authority to the districts was often accompanied with frustration and distrust towards those further down the hierarchy and further away from PED. The Director, for example, saw his role as delegating to government 'functionaries' rather than idealistically devolving authority for the engagement and the participation of people. He further claimed that he, in fact, had to retract the powers granted to district education officers after the initial formation of the Directorate.

"The [local] people [were] not honest in dealing with activities such as procurement, like giving information for merit-based criteria because they were always dodging it so we established the Balochistan Education Management Information System (BEMIS) [at the centre] just to develop a criteria" (Former Director, PED, 1997).

Another factor in the decentralisation equation is the relationship and interface between local government and school planning with central administration. One respondent claimed that social sector involvement by local government institutions was defunct. At the district level, a structure had been established known as the District Co-ordination Committee for co-ordination work with all sectors. The district education officer, by default, was the secretary of the committee. Also, locally elected Union Councils had no co-ordination with the district education officer (DEO). Prior to external funding for education, DEOs had responsibility for developing the annual development plans for the schools under their jurisdiction. Planning was made in consultation with the Deputy Commissioner of their respective district. These plans included construction of schools and up-gradation of older schools. Under this administrative set-up, it was reported that political interference was not as prevalent (Former Deputy Director, Planning, 1998).

As noted in earlier chapters, the creation of PED was seen as a move toward decentralisation in that attention to primary education would be separated within the education sector. However, most respondents viewed it as the bottleneck for future management reform. As one respondent observed, PED did not continue to push for further decentralisation but rather clung to powers and held them in Quetta.
I don't think there are many good examples of decentralisation at all. I think there are certainly examples of privatisation or NGO development which has carried with it some decentralisation, but I think within the structure of this Directorate my feeling is that it is as centralised now as it has ever been, that all crucial decisions are taken at the centre. There's not an example of decentralisation or devolution. Perhaps the real shift in that came from [a recent Secretary of Education]. He took all powers to himself, effectively. Nothing could be done without his approval. Even the Director couldn't do anything without his approval...the Secretary centralised everything (CTA, BPEP, Quetta, 1998).

While PED was given the mission for decentralisation, in interviewing people within it was evident that officials saw major constraints to which decentralisation was feasible. At no point was there any enthusiasm about decentralisation. For example, most officials felt that staff at the bottom or in the districts could not be trusted; the culture of the organisation itself was one that was dependent on a leading figure. This culture is antithetical to the way PED had been envisioned to work. Also, lack of accountability and fear of marginalisation if posted away from PED were other factors that combine to create the core ethos or central value of the Directorate. The establishment of PED affected other provincial institutions, which will be examined in the next sections.

Bureau of Curriculum and Extension

Policies for curriculum, instruction and training like other education policies for Balochistan were said to originate with the Provincial Department of Education according to the 1992 NEP. The implementing agencies were identified as PED and the Bureau of Curriculum and Extension (BOCE). The Bureau of Curriculum was the GOB's original education training organisation. In fact, it was the government agency responsible for developing and facilitating all of the primary education training programs. However, at the time of the research, the training programs at the primary level were being run by PED (BOCE Officer, Quetta, 1998).
The name of the agency was a misnomer according to one source that indicated that the Bureau of Curriculum and Extension historically always concentrated on *teacher training*.

*They have done little or nothing in curriculum development yet it is interesting because the Federal Curriculum Wing, if they want to hold a workshop dealing with the National Curriculum, they set up that workshop through the Bureau of Curriculum so that...Let's say it was in the area of primary education, there's a good chance that no one at PED knows that they are holding this workshop so that's odd too* (T.A., BIMDTC, 1997).

Also pointed out was the fact that the Federal Curriculum Wing controlled BOCE. 'The control, the focal point of control is the curriculum Wing. The Textbook Board has to get approvals from the Curriculum Wing. BOCE has to get approvals regarding teacher training curriculum from the curriculum and the Curriculum Wing pretty much calls the shots right now, at any level of curriculum' (Ibid 1997).

Basically, external funding 'stopped' the institutional development of the Bureau of Curriculum. Had the teacher-training cell within PED been housed in the Bureau of Curriculum then the subject specialists of the Bureau of Curriculum would have been trained as a function of the project. Therefore staff development programs suffered at the Bureau. One former officer indicated that by establishing a training cell within PED, programs planned by the Ministry of Education were overshadowed. In fact, his account indicated that PED-led initiatives in terms of teacher-training projects were developed without the approval of the MOE. It was quickly explained that this was possible given the power of the external funding mechanism (BOCE Officer, Quetta, 1998).

Respondents described what the functions of the BOCE were. First, the history of teacher training and examinations was described. There have been a variety of experiences in Balochistan. There was a time when the Director of Schools would conduct the teacher training examination. They later were decentralised and the principals of the Government Colleges of Elementary Teaching (GCET) were allowed to conduct the examination. But it was felt that it was a race among the principals to produce the best pass rates. Therefore one hundred per cent of teachers were passed, none failed. The principals, however,
were said to have complained that the materials they received were very weak and the trainees were very weak, still the results were one hundred per cent and the teachers did not perform well when they went to the classroom. It was also noted that from 1996 to 1997, BOCE had started conducting the examinations at the central level. The GOB through their trainers prepared the papers and the BOCE administered these papers. They were also marked, evaluated, by the teachers of the GCETs and sometimes by the BOCE. One respondent claimed that the outcome of this process had been mixed. *Though it has occurred for the last two years, we haven't seen much improvement* (Ibid 1998).

While in theory BOCE should have held responsibility for all teacher-training, its limited practice was attributed to other reasons besides low levels of funding. One respondent indicated that due to donor driven demands for BOCE's attention to various secondary education projects, attention was taken away from primary education. Therefore, under the BPEP, activity for developing teacher--training programs had been centred at PED. Given competition with BIMDTC and work pressures with secondary education, BOCE could not effectively decentralise its functions.

**Textbook Board**

The Textbook Board was an institution based in Quetta that had the general responsibility of printing educational textbooks. It hired editors to do editing and usually contracted all other activity including the making of illustrations for the textbooks. One respondent identified those employed by the Board as 'contract managers' rather than implementers. The Textbook Board is a provincial authority required by Federal law. Every province has their own. Federal law, from the Federal level, established textbook boards to print materials. This originally was perceived to be a good idea so that they could strike reasonable deals with printers who would not want to be bothered with small and scattered print jobs. Before, professional publishers were not interested in publishing special books for a province that had so few children enrolled in school such as Balochistan. Small print jobs coming from different places were found expensive. So the textbook boards assumed the role of brokering the textbook printing process including the bidding process.
One respondent explained, however, that new technology and progress and the publishing industry had gone beyond the textbook board model of consolidating the procurement and printing of books under one umbrella organisation. Also, the textbook board was characterised as not being terribly efficient at doing that or providing any cost savings (T.A., BIMDTC, PED, 1997).

As noted earlier, the Balochistan Instructional Materials and Development Training Cell (BIMDTC) was housed within PED. Its role of developing books overlapped with the responsibilities of the Textbook Board. Issues of competition and power or control are highlighted below in Box 4.1 to make the point that even at the centre of a system, sometimes functional roles are not clearly defined, thus negating opportunities for the engagement of power sharing or decentralisation.
Box 4.1: Who's In Control at the Centre?

Sometimes it is difficult to see the distinction but there is one. The Textbook Board has the authority to print all books that go to the schools. BIMDTC could do that perfectly well and PED could get cheaper books if they allowed BIMDTC to manage the print contract itself—because everything is done. When we hand it over to the Textbook Board, the Textbook Board wants and will get in the first year a twelve per cent cut on time and will add this twelve per cent on top of the cost of the books. The second year, they are likely to add another twenty seven per cent on top of the books further when they give them to distributors. Those distributors get a fifteen per cent cut on top of the cost of the books. So the books become very, very expensive.

Originally, the Textbook Board was supposed to be contracting all the development themselves so they were putting in work that justified the twelve per cent management fee and the twenty seven per cent was like a royalty fee. In our (BIMDTC) case we are developing the textbooks but by law we have to give the copy to the Textbook Board and so these same percentages apply to our books although the Textbook Board did no work except the contract for the printing. So there is this kind of unhealthy, unresolved relationship that PED has with the Textbook Board.

The chief overlap that is still not yet resolved is in the copyright—the copyright issue. By rule, not necessarily by law, but by rule, the Textbook Board is supposed to have the copyright of these books and the World Bank, as well as BIMDTC, feels like that since BIMDTC developed the books to camera ready copy, they should retain the copyright. If we do, that means that we can revise them anytime we want to and the textbook board cannot revise them anytime they want to unless they sought permission from BIMDTC. I think that in order for BIMDTC to address the feedback that comes in from the Districts and the schools and the teachers and the teacher training people, in order for BIMDTC to legally be able to revise the books in the future without having to go on bended knee to the Textbook Board, we need to have the copyright.

So that's a big overlap between the Textbook Board and us. After having said all of that, I think there is increasing co-operation and understanding between the textbook board and BIMDTC but I know the Textbook Board will never ever develop books as BIMDTC does. They will never have files of the books on the computer so that they can be revised from one year to the next as BIMDTC does and that's probably the chief difference between the way that they develop books and the way that we develop them.

Source: T.A. for BIMDTC, Quetta, 1997
Another experiment that was framed under an attempted plan for decentralisation was the development of NGOs. Local NGOs were established in rural areas and one in Quetta. The Directorate had de-concentrated certain responsibilities to them but not authority. According to one NGO representative, 'opportunity' was given to them to provide services to the community but that they were not always accepted in the field. Also, the NGOs were not so strong financially and could not stand on their own unless they had sufficient financial resources. Because of the lack of local financial resources, they had to depend on outside donors and state agencies. Naturally once they became dependent on these agencies, they became bound by the accompanying rules and regulations from the centre. These rules and regulations were not necessarily suitable for local situations and/or organisations (Former Director, PED, 1997).

The respondent further claimed that plans had to be developed to prepare local constituents for regaining control over primary institutions like primary schools, basic health centres, rural area police stations, or civil court. 'If they have some control and demonstrate to the government that they are responsible, then in the real sense, this will be a good model of decentralisation' (Ibid 1997).

Attitudes at the centre, however, represent a strong apprehension to NGO legitimacy in Balochistan. A former adviser relayed a dialogue between a former Secretary of Education and a donor representative. The Secretary was quoted as labelling NGO work in the Province as an 'NGO Mafia'. This comment was made in an attempt to thwart their further development. The donor's response, however, was that the development of 'NGOs were not negotiable' (CTA, BPEP, 1998). The problem with NGOs as described by the respondent was that while they were being developed there was a lack of policy prescriptions to govern them or rather guide the development of education. It was also suggested that no mandate had been formulated to suggest that NGO/GOB partnerships should be a shared process giving important and significant roles to NGOs and legitimacy with the GOB. The respondent further claimed that, in reality, donor documentation indicated that NGO and Government collaboration was indeed a working policy. However, he felt that this was an assumption worth questioning.
You've got NGO development but do you have NGO policy, which says that the development of education should be a shared process, which gives important and significant roles to NGOs in partnership with Government? Now, the reality is that that's what happens. The SAP document says that's a policy. But is it? In whose mind is it? Who actually owns the policy? I just think you could go through and find many examples where what is stated in the document as policy is not owned by that many people at higher levels in the government but is owned by the Bank and by the Donors and therefore is agreed to and activated by the Government (Ibid 1998).

Government ownership of donor objectives was not only questioned in the context of NGO/Government partnerships. It was learned through the course of interviews at the central level that often the GOB would agree to donor demands at the negotiating table but would walk away knowing that the demands could not be met. Given the political environment and the threat of losing power, the donor demands were sometimes considered as being peripheral to 'business as usual'.

Initiation of Community Involvement

Strategies for the involvement of communities in primary education were initially developed in Balochistan in 1992. A strategy paper was prepared and presented to the provincial DOE and donors. The DOE agreed to test and implement community involvement in three areas. Two of these areas encompass the case districts examined in this study: Barkhan is situated in the Zhob Division and Jaffarabad is situated in the Nasirabad Division. Through this initiative, a thirteen-step process was conceptualised and piloted for implementing a community support effort. One year later, the results of the pilot were presented to the DOE and the donors at the donor coordination meeting in February of 1993. A recommendation was made that a unit should be installed within the Primary Education Directorate for coordinating this effort. The Secretary of Education, however, reportedly disagreed for the following reasons:

- The Community Support Process (CSP) is successful because it exists outside the Government;
- CSP is implemented by committed people who are not Government staff;
- Employees within the new government cell or unit would pressurise the Government to give them permanent jobs; and
The BPEP project will be finished but the Government will be left with the burden of additional staff to support (Bakhteari, Final Report, 1997:6).

At the same donor coordination meeting, the decision was made to create an NGO or find an existing one that would conduct services under the community support process strategy for developing girls' schools in Balochistan. In spite of early scepticism and an unfriendly environment to NGOs in Balochistan, however, the CSP concept (see Appendix III) with the objective of involving local communities evolved that was fundamental to the creation of an NGO that would assist the government in this regard. Below is a discussion of this centrally located NGO.

**Society for Community Support of Primary Education in Balochistan (Society)**

The NGO known in Balochistan as the 'Society' was formed and registered in early 1993. Its stated goals were

- To create sustainable partnership between communities and the government;
- To institutionalise the Community Support Process; and
- To provide access to basic, quality education (especially for girls) (SCSPEB ca.1996).

Initially, PED provided technical assistance to aid the Society's development. Technical advisors to PED were also appointed as members of its board to strengthen the organisation's credibility in an otherwise sceptical environment.

This arrangement was basically made to satisfy the Government and ensure the NGO's financial, field operations and monitoring management. One can understand this requirement by the Government, as this was the very first time that Government was going into a contract with a non-Governmental Organization as a Partner in school establishment process. Nowhere in Pakistan had this happened before. The Government of Balochistan had its apprehensions (Bakhteari 1997:7).

Funding from USAID, CIDA, World Bank and UNICEF was provided initially and in January 1994 a formal two-year contract between PED and the Society
was signed. The Society was expected to establish 360 rural girl's primary schools through CSP. Once CSP had been piloted, PED contracted the Society to expand its operation to all twenty-six administrative districts. By 1994, six teams of Community Education Promoters (CEPs) comprised of both young male and females had been hired and were working throughout rural Balochistan. As the number of schools established under CSP grew, the resources needed to support them became stretched.

The tangible results of expansion of the CSP were seen as a success in terms of providing girls with the access to formal education where none had previously existed. Initially, schools were established in twenty-seven villages in the District of Loralai in 1992. By 1997, out of 1,500 communities where the CSP process had been initiated, 573 schools were established (Rugh, 1998:96) and approximately 28,000 students had been enrolled through these community programmes (PED 1997). In 1996, the Society realised the need to decentralise its functions of managing community school development to regional offices. Three NGOs were identified to take on the additional work of community development. However, contracts for the three regional NGOs were established with PED rather than with the Society. This became an important technicality that would affect the jurisdiction for implementation, accountability, and subsequently the future relationship between local NGOs and the centralised location of the Society. These organisational dynamics will be examined further in the case study chapters.

The success of the CSP process was attributed to its distinct operational function outside the provincial department of education. Recall the Secretary of Education's earlier scepticism of the government's ownership of the process. Personnel of the Society also held the view that the success of CSP had been due to its independence from the government bureaucracy as noted below.

While the Society's promoters may be right that the functions of the CSP promoters cannot be handled effectively through governmental agencies, putting the responsibilities in the hands of NGOs only puts off the day when government bureaucracies themselves must be reformed to handle what are ultimately their responsibilities (Rugh 1998:99).
This observation will be examined later in an assessment of CSP work conducted in Jaffarabad and Barkhan. In addition to the schools that were established under the CSP initiative, school committees were established to support this process. The next section briefly describes their formation.

School Committees

The NGOs, as explained above, were responsible for facilitating the CSP throughout the province, which included the establishment of village education committees (VECs). From 1992 to 1996, 360 VECs had been formed (PED Annual Plan 1997) and approximately 300 women's village education committees (WVECs) had been formed in the province during the same time period (SCSPEB, ca.1996).

While these committees had functionally aided community school, teacher appointments, and the management and maintenance of schools since the inception of CSP, the Secretary of Education launched another committee scheme. The discussion below is about the development of the parent/teacher/school/management committees (PTSMC). According to Rugh (1998), by 1997 the extraordinary number of 4,985 PTSMCs had been established in Balochistan. She claimed that 'originally, DEOs were requested to set up these committees but they usually did not comply because there was no compensation for the added effort and transportation costs (p.97).

Nevertheless, the PTSMC held promise in terms of decentralisation, given that they were conceptualised to supplement the government system of administration. It was projected that their active role in local school management would improve the quality of school maintenance and monitoring. This organisational scheme is presented here to contrast central control with district participation and response to forms of self-management. Further discussion of PTSMCs will be provided in Chapters Five and Six giving the district perspective on their development.

From the central perspective, decentralisation of education management through PTSMC organisation and funding was difficult to achieve given the
difficulties in the disbursement of funding from the centre. One respondent claimed that the Secretary of Education would not authorise the flow of funding (approximately forty million rupees) from the Directorate of Primary Education directly to the committees bypassing the controls of the DEO and SDEO. This officer indicated that when pressed by the Secretary to disburse the money, he refused with the caveat that he needed legal authority to take the action. The Secretary would not legalise this direct funding process subsequently; the process was not put into action. The hesitancy was perceived to have been motivated by a fear of loss of power, i.e., if money had been given to the committees, they would be in a position to control the schools and the teachers. The centrist view indicated resentment towards decentralisation because community citizens would be propelled into a monitoring role (Former Director, PED, 1997).

A financial officer of PED claimed, however, that funds would be better placed in the committees' hands rather than in the DEOs' control. Participation of people at the local level in the control of finances of schools has been negligible. If the funds were to be released to committees such as PTSMCs, they would have better knowledge of the way the funds are used and could hold themselves accountable for spending it in an efficient manner especially for school repairs and supplies. The point was also made that ideally, if DEOs were to receive their own recurrent budgets in a timely fashion, independent funding to the committees would not affect the DEOs' powers (Financial Officer, Quetta, 1997).

However, this scenario was later negated. When asked whether the existing primary education budget for the province could support the PTSMC funding scheme, the answer was negative.

*Based on the conditions we are facing now, I don't think so. Under the World Bank project we might be able to give them [PTSMCs] money through the IDA Credit but I don't think the Government of Balochistan is in the position to. Everyday we are talking about cutting down our budget and cutting our expenditures so I don't think we will have any money for extras* (Ibid, 1997).
The community support process to be administered by NGOs and PTSMCs and other village committees had been predicted to alter or leverage the nature of management of primary education and services. The leverage was meant to decentralise monitoring and maintenance tasks at the school level to these bodies. This plan, however, was characterised as not being very effective.

Facing the opposition of the government functionaries they (community organisations) are becoming dormant. Otherwise the community support process was a very effective process for decentralisation for controlling the institutions or promotion of primary education. But at the same time when the government functionaries realised that they are not effective as compared to the communities because their power is relegated to the community...so they don't have a say. Their authority is at stake...I will say. Whatever authority they have they think their authority at stake and the communities are becoming more powerful but the...unfortunately, the communities were not becoming powerful because they did not have any financial control (Former Director, PED, 1997).

It was explained that the World Bank was not giving direct grants to the communities in Balochistan under the community support process scheme. Instead, these resources were given to the government functionaries for distribution through the formal, financial administrative procedures. When a new provincial government was established in 1997, however, the process stopped. The claim was also made that officials sitting in the Directorate also opposed the community support process and funding scheme. The account was given that peers of one PED official challenged his interest and support to disbursing funds to the PTSMCs. They asked him what his interest was in a community that controlled their own schools and whether teachers were in attendance to their classrooms and accountable to these local monitoring bodies. He counter-challenged them that what harm would there be to establishing these local controls. The reply was that the central functionaries would lose control and authority over the teachers. The community organisations were seen as a threat to central power.

Also, it was pointed out that getting communities to mobilise their own resources would not equate to classical definitions of decentralisation. "Getting communities to kick in supplementary support for community schools does not
necessarily leverage full control or authority of local school management. So decentralisation being viewed as community development in popular policy prescriptions is only an illusion (CTA, BPEP, 1997).

While it may be premature to judge the process of decentralisation in Balochistan given the measure's formative stage, the institutions that we have surveyed in this section were observed to be struggling with it. The obstacles pointed out in the data were not only related to organisational, cultural and political agendas but also had to do with ambiguities in policy and immediate calls for changes at the centre without much consideration and preparation of the districts.

There are still vulnerable portions of the program that can only be strengthened through policy reform. As yet [1998], VECs and PTSMCs do not have legal status and therefore their ability to function as local management agencies for schools is limited. The NGO strategy to integrate them into the overall education program includes seeking Cabinet level endorsement of the approach, Parliamentary approval to legalise the committees, and the establishment of accounts so that annual funds can be deposited directly in the name of the committees. A remaining difficulty is that the committees have no legal authority over the teacher once she or he becomes part of the civil service (Rugh 1998:99).

To help us understand more about the nature of the process of primary education administration, the next session examines some functions of primary education administration and the locus of control for administering them in Balochistan from 1992 to 1997.
4.2 Educational Services and the Distribution of Control: A Functional Analysis

Winkler's functional analysis model that was presented in chapter one is used throughout the study but has been adapted to fit the scope—the continuum of control from the centre to the district in Balochistan. Originally, Winkler apportioned educational services into specific functions or components for analysis. These components were school organisation, curriculum and teaching methods, examinations and supervision, teacher recruitment and compensation, finance of recurrent expenditures, and school construction and finance.

![Centralisation-Decentralisation Typology Matrix for Public Education In Balochistan](image)

The model primarily assessed education services from a macro perspective and the relationship between the federal and provincial levels. This thesis makes an adaptation to Winkler's model but a more appropriate one in terms of analysing the relationship between the provincial and district levels.

The questions posed to respondents were composed according to service categories that mirror Winkler's key administrative categories. The four
categories in Figure 4.1 serve as guideposts for analysing not only the quality of the services, but also the measure of decentralisation, if any that has occurred in the prescribed timeframe of 1992-97. Winkler (1989) pointed out that his is a study of an alternative measure of decentralisation that would more directly reflect the distribution of decision-making authority. This measure, in his assessment reveals the degree of central government control over major kinds of educational decisions (p.6). His matrix depicts three varying states in which the locus of control could be designated for education services: 'centralised', 'mixed' and 'decentralised' and are conditions used in Figure 4.1. The remainder of this section analyses the functions of primary education in Balochistan to see overall if any change had occurred in activity that Winkler has recommended.

Supervision

As indicated in chapter three, workplans were being developed in Balochistan prior to 1992. These workplans largely drove implementation of donor agreed activities that were meant to improve the quality of service delivery. Supervision was an area that necessarily needed attention if 'quality' however defined, was to be improved. Job descriptions had been written for field staff to ensure that they understood their spheres of responsibility. For instance, DEOs' responsibilities were defined in five different areas: academic duties; administrative duties; supervisory duties; development duties and financial duties (Government of Balochistan 1994a). A majority of respondents, however, revealed that they lacked the necessary authority to enforce most of these responsibilities. In fact, they claimed that many of their supervisory duties had been retained by authorities at higher levels including PED and the Provincial Department of Education. Specific accounts to be revealed in the case studies that follow this chapter together with reasons already mentioned validate this. Accounts from both the centre and the district levels acknowledge that supervision in its broadest sense was weak. The following quote made by an official with a central agency in Quetta is illustrative.

_The supervision is very weak. It does not speak on the quality of education, it does not speak on the guidance to the teachers, supervision is therefore I would say the supervision is absent and the inspection is absent. It should be controlled by the Director of_
Primary Education, he should himself know what the supervision is. He should be aware of all these things. And once he is aware he can make the district education officer implement his programs and do something towards the quality of education. So first of all the Director of Education should be competent enough (Principal--PITE, Quetta, 1997).

This account taken five years after the formation of PED suggests that it was weak in its overall supervision of the education process and its ability to capably devolve the supervision process to the district level. It also suggests that PED, to some degree, was aloof to quality issues in the district level that needed recognition.

As already explained, the Minister of Education had the authority to hire, fire and transfer staff below the executive level. One respondent commenting from his experience at PED, however, clarified that the Minister usually manipulated operating procedures to administer these staff changes.

The Minister picks up the person and he doesn’t issue the orders, he asks the DEO male and female to appoint (as teachers) that man or appoint that girl in a particular school. Powers are enjoyed by them but it is not at their discretion. That’s why I said let us develop a testing program. Test the teachers of the persons who are ready to teach otherwise the Minister will say this is the man, you appoint that one (Former Director, PED, 1997).

Supervision of the hiring process of teachers by district level officers was one example of a control that should have been devolved to the local level. This would have enabled greater flexibility in supervision and would have avoided the appointment of unqualified teachers. Higher authorities, however, usually made the ultimate staffing decision on a political basis.

So supervision, as a function, cannot be characterised as having improved or properly devolved from 1992 to 1997. Written job descriptions prescribing responsibilities was not enough to improve quality. The powers and authorities whether abused in the case of the MOE or neglected in the case of PED thwarted a potential opportunity for decentralisation. The dynamics of supervision in the education system are multi-faceted. Some are presented below in the discussions of the other service categories which follow.
Monitoring of Curriculum

Officials responsible for administration of primary education saw the core functions such as curriculum development and teacher training as being centralised. Curriculum development for primary education is a function controlled at the Federal level. Although the development of curriculum is implemented at the Provincial level, the Federal mandate was viewed as being ‘constraining’. Within PED, the development of instructional materials including the primary curriculum was co-ordinated through a unit known as the Balochistan Instructional Materials and Development Training Cell (BIMDTC).

The Federal Ministry of Education controlled all contents of primary school textbooks. This power was exercised by a Federal Curriculum Wing which in turn controlled activities of the BIMDTC. BIMDTC had more control, however, over the development of supplementary materials such as teaching or learning aids like posters and charts and supplementary kits for teaching and learning.

To a certain degree, for an organisation like ours, there is an obligation to develop the books but it’s of greater interest to our organisation, I think by now, to deal with supplementary materials. Because as soon as they go into supplementary material category, you don’t have Federal approval of those materials (T.A.-BIMDTC, 1997).

Also, because of alternative external funding sources such as UNICEF, BIMDTC had further resources with which to develop these supplementary materials. This special funding gave BIMDTC some opportunities to address special needs that came to their attention without having to go through the approval process at the Federal level.

More and more it’s evolving into addressing materials--teaching and learning materials’ needs that are identified by those that are closer to the districts which include to a certain degree DEOs but more importantly those who are involved with teacher training and addressing the needs that the teachers identify (Ibid 1997).

Thus in school curriculum matters, decentralisation had only spread as far as materials that supplemented the federally endorsed curriculum were being developed within BIMDTC and with district input.
Central institutions such as the GCETs and BOCE controlled teacher training curriculum especially for pre-service training programs. In-service teacher training curriculum more flexibly lie under the purview of PED for developing and designing the content of the curriculum. As for the training of these curricula, respondents indicated that there was not a significant amount of ownership on the part of the DEOs and other field officers. This leads to another complexity concerning the control of the curriculum. The BPEP or donor funded project called for central planning and implementation of curriculum tasks by staff at the centre.

Almost everything has been organised by the Directorate and/or the Bureau. And I think that historically this has been part of the problem. It was, as far as training goes, we were doing things for teachers for the DEOs rather than having them take initiatives and take responsibilities to make sure it gets done right. And so that's part of the reason why we're now having to decentralise (T.A.-Teacher Training, 1997).

Despite the fact that central staff was controlling much of the planning for teacher training, the DEOs, SDEOs, and ADEOs were, nevertheless, responsible for monitoring the teaching of the curriculum in the field. One government officer working in the teacher training unit in PED commented however, that further training was needed for these field officers in this area.

Maybe they [officers] are very able to check the cleanliness in the classroom, attendance of the teacher, they are very developed with that. But to check the curriculum inside a school is a little bit difficult for them at this stage. Always when I talk to teacher they say that when a District Education Officer came to us, he just asked that how many pages of this book have you finished (BOCE Official, Quetta, 1997).

This official further explained the judgement of students' notebooks as the criteria for assessing the curriculum process in the schools. He indicated that the field officers were more concerned with the number of pages that had been copied or written by the students, than with how many activities had been done or how many illustrations had been prepared for the classroom. For example, if there were two hundred pages in total to be written by students, then often the officers would only check that exactly two hundred pages had been completed. It was expected that students would fill all those notebooks with the teacher's work. In other words, teachers gave the students the home assignment for copying.
I don't think that the student is learning from this. He is just copying... doing some labour without getting some knowledge. So this is another criteria for the assessment of the teacher to check if there are heaps of notebooks filled out together with the homework. Otherwise they [field officers] say, Oh! You're a poor teacher (Ibid 1997).

In terms of teacher training, the training packages were normally developed in Quetta in isolation from the teachers although some teachers had been involved in the process. DEOs were asked to nominate twenty teachers per district and up to thirty teachers per district for master trainers. 'So, here, we develop the master trainer cadre, master trainers and then they are trained in their own respective districts. It is totally managed by the Primary Education Directorate. It's monitoring, its payment, conduction; all are managed by the Primary Education Directorate' (BOCE Official, Quetta, 1997).

The capacity of district offices to handle, monitor and supervise a decentralised teacher-training program was identified as minimal. Most of the respondents at the centre or PED made this claim. Training is one area that if monitored properly, impacts the quality of the curriculum being taught--the two go hand in hand. One respondent claimed that the LC was the only member of staff within the DEO's office that was technically prepared for training. The LCs job description included the training of the teachers but it was reported that they had not been doing it properly and that DEOs had not been doing it either.

I would say that the district education officers don't have the capacity to train the teachers. Yeah, there should be some other mechanism for training the teachers at the District level and the Bureau of Curriculum also can know because the Bureau of Curriculum doesn't have the funds to run a primary training program (Ibid 1997).

Learning Co-ordinators were former primary school teachers that had been promoted without the proper qualifications and competencies. They had been promoted on the basis of their seniority, on the basis of their age, not on the basis of their competency. Therefore they were classified as not competent enough to train the teachers although the PED had arranged two or three training venues for them which in the opinion of one officer, had not proven successful. The idea of a 'learning co-ordinator' as envisioned originally was a good one that identified a
valuable role for them in the districts. A number of external factors compromised the LCs ability to do their job. First, there were not enough of them. The idea ratio was one LC for every fifteen teachers. It is rare to find LCs who are responsible for less than forty to sixty schools and teachers. One respondent claimed that the LCs could not possibly supervise such a range of teachers and schools. Because of their lack of supervision skills, they were continuing to focus on inspection (T.A.-Teacher Training, 1997).

Transportation of the LCs was another real problem. Motorcycles used by men were found in short supply and if motorcycles were available, there usually wasn't enough allowance given to maintain them. Petrol, oil, and lubrication (POL) charges were considered insufficient or commandeered by DEOs. The female side was even considered worse, in terms of numbers and no transportation. In theory, vans were to have been provided at each district headquarters. The respondent claimed that he had not seen any vans functioning in the districts he had visited.

So that what's happening is that LCs are basically peons of the DEOs. They spend ninety per cent of their time in the DEO office doing clerical work and gophering. Now, maybe in Jaffarabad when you go there you'll find the situation better than that. They're keen on their LCs down there. They seem to be over time more actively lobbying to get these problems solved than is happening in other districts. But I think in terms of decentralisation, to shore up the supervision side of it [in the districts] is really essential because we can't do that here in Quetta (Ibid 1997).

In contrast, if external factors could have been rectified, another official felt that a mentoring program would help to improve the capacity of field officers for training teachers. It was the belief that the development of the Primary Teacher Mentoring Program (PTMP) was one step towards the decentralisation of in-service training. Historically the in-service training had been conducted at PED. In the PTMP, however, PED was responsible for facilitating a one-day training on mentoring at the district headquarters with the teachers. Then the mentors would conduct training for two days back at the cluster site on the same topic with other teachers.
In some districts where DEOs are committed and competent, it’s going excellent. But on the other hand if in one or two districts he is not committed and he is not motivated, so it is affected. So it means that if we can provide some sort of training to all those DEOs I think it can work very easily (BOCE Official, 1997).

In-service teacher training programs were also characterised as being expensive. Travel and daily allowance (TA/DA) had to be given to teachers for travelling from their districts to Quetta for this training. Regular government budgets exclusive of external funding would not be able to handle all associated training costs once donor-supported projects had concluded. Decentralised programs such as the mentoring program that was conducted in the district was explained to be a cost-efficient way of handling the in-service training program. The government rule for providing TA/DA was travel in excess of sixteen kilometres. Clusters would then be formed of teachers within a sixteen—kilometre radius ensuring that no travel funds would need to be disbursed. In the opinion of one official, this program was showing signs of success in the district of Jaffarabad.

In terms of decentralisation, the explanation was given that the proximity of DEOs to teachers enabled the officer to know the difficulties and problems faced by his/her teachers in the district. If teacher training could be decentralised, it was hypothetically noted that through localised training, the DEO would be able to assess and address the needs of the teacher. Through this assessment, the DEO could then make a request to the centre or PED or BOCE for assistance with specialised training or provide feedback on the curriculum.

In terms of quality control and monitoring of curriculum, BIMDTC did make an effort to field—test their curriculum and supplementary materials. One source revealed, however, that once the materials were printed, it did not have the capacity to conduct observations in the field as to whether the materials were being used properly. It was further noted that BIMDTC relied heavily on the Teacher Training cell and through its mentors for feedback on the materials (T.A.-BIMDTC, 1997).
Finally, respondents commented on the budgetary controls associated with curriculum training for teachers. At the time of research, the training budget was controlled from PED and to some extent, the BOCE. One respondent indicated that instead of placing the training budget at the central office, every district education officer should get a training budget.

\begin{quote}

The district education officer should assess the training needs of the teacher and then come to the BOCE or the training cell at PED for the training of teachers. They should arrange training for their teachers to the training cell in accordance with the funds available to them and in this way I think training will become more effective (BOCE Official, 1997).

\end{quote}

The opinion expressed here assumed that DEO's had discretionary control as well as the necessary funds with which to facilitate local training programs. This false assumption is representative of the centrist viewpoints taken in terms of the broader financial management function which is discussed in the next section.

Budget Allocation

According to strict definitions of administrative decentralisation, it only occurs when local decision-making bodies have control over financial resources (Midgley 1986:33). Respondents at the centre agreed that in Balochistan, the process of budget allocation for primary education had never been decentralised.

During the 1992-97 research period, primary education operated from two budgets: 1) GOB recurrent budget; and 2) World Bank development budget. The process of recurrent budgets was described as a series of cascading steps. The Federal Government had allocated only two and one-half per cent of its overall budget to education. Incidentally, education was sixth on the priority scale with defence spending being first. So this two and one-half per cent then was apportioned to the provinces proportionate to population. Balochistan having one of the lowest populations did not get enough funding to cover their expenses (Financial Officer, PED, 1997). The Provincial Government, in turn, decided on the allocations of funding per sector and for education, divided the budget into three categories: 1) primary education; 2) secondary and tertiary education; and
3) administration. The Finance Department of the GOB then released funds to PED who in turn released funding to district offices throughout the province. District officers had been given the authority to draw the money from the government for its use locally.

It was reported that recurrent funds ideally would have been distributed to the districts on a monthly basis but that at the Directorate, the recurrent budget was released only twice a year—a recurrent budget and a modified recurrent budget. The DEOs were required to send expenditure statements by the tenth of every month to the Directorate but some of the officers failed to do so and consequently the Directorate estimated their budget based on their staff posts and other regular expenditure (Ibid 1997).

DEOs had the responsibility of providing to the Directorate the statement of their expenditures. But as several respondents indicated, submission of expenditure statements is no guarantee that the necessary funding would be disbursed. The bottom line was that whether or not statements of expenditure were submitted by the DEOs to the Directorate, the Provincial Government would generally disburse funds according to its own discretion and in uneven intervals. The salaries, however, were released on a monthly basis but other reimbursements were not made on a timely basis.

DEOs did not have discretionary funding for procurement of new items such as construction, purchase of furniture, reading and writing materials, vehicles and repair and maintenance and training. Under the external funding of the BPEP, these items were financed and controlled at the centre by PED. According to this account, the officer claimed that the new education policy that came out in 1998 and was to cover the period through 2003 exposed a problem of realism. Examples of this lack of realism were the expectation that fourteen thousand teachers would be added to schools upgrading from primary to middle schools. Five new rooms per upgraded school would be added and funding for training and materials would be allocated. The officer characterised these plans as not merely ambitious, but also unrealistic in the given timeframe.
Concerning capability, staff at the Directorate presumed that it did not exist at the district level for local planning and participation of district budgets. As one financial officer indicated:

*At the district level, I don't think we are ready for decentralised system of financial management because we don't have the trained and well-experienced human resource. I think we don't have even enough educated people, you know, who could do accounts and everything. So each of the DEOs they have assistants but most of them are not qualified enough to handle these accounts.* (Financial Officer, PED, 1997)

The second source of operational funding for administration outside the recurrent budget was World Bank development budget. For this World Bank Credit which was signed in 1993, a loan of U.S. $106 million from the World Bank was provided against a development budget. While the recurrent budget was permanent, the development budget would cease at the end of the project until 1999. The project process was structured in a way that an annual development plan would be developed every year according to the components of teacher training, curriculum development, construction of schools, and administration. Under each of these components allocations of funds were made to the different components and each of the sub-categories. For example, with construction, sites were selected where construction needed to be done and priority was given to the girl's school and throughout Balochistan, schools were selected based on criteria such as enrolment.

When the sites were selected in the various districts, those site nominations were sent to the World Bank for final approval. When the World Bank approved those, the tenders would be floated in the newspapers. After the selection process, the contracts were awarded to different contractors (T.A.-School Construction, 1997). When the schools were constructed, then the contractor would send those bills to the Director of Primary Education. Before these bills were paid, construction had to be verified. According to the credit agreement one hundred per cent funding was appropriated for construction from the World Bank. For other things, e.g., vehicles, the World Bank paid sixty per cent and the government of Balochistan was to pay forty per cent. So according to these distributions, a statement was prepared on a monthly basis and submitted to the World Bank for reimbursement. This expenditure would come under the development budget (Ibid).
Centralisation and control of this development budget had also occurred at an even higher level than the Directorate. For example, in the 97-98 fiscal year, funding for the Balochistan Primary Education Program was not forthcoming from the GOB. According to the Credit agreement, the World Bank would provide eighty-eight per cent of the funding amount and the Government would provide twelve per cent. The bottleneck to PED's appropriation and use of development funds was blamed on the slow and infrequent disbursement of funds from the Government of Balochistan. The World Bank's contribution was contingent upon the disbursement of the GOB's twelve per cent.

Every month when we send the application for reimbursement to the World Bank, they ask how much has the Government contributed and if you don't have that, then we cannot send the reimbursement application. So for this twelve per cent, we just keep on asking the Government that we need to get it otherwise the project will have trouble running; so we just keep on asking and the Director sometimes has to go to the Finance Department and talk to the Secretary (Financial Officer, PED, 1997).

Overview

Three points can be made respective of central administration. First, the claim was made that Balochistan was not ready or capable of handling a decentralised financial management system given the prevailing administrative environment. Secondly, it was noted that the cost of administration would definitely be increased if decentralisation policies were put into effect. 'The cost would go up because we don't have the equipment like we would need computers...Even if we provide the computers, still, we need skilled persons to do the accounts, to know the accounts and right now, I don't think we have that' (Financial Officer, PED, 1997). Thirdly, corruption was claimed as a major impediment to developing the administrative capacity for local budget planning and control at the local or district level. 'Already, sadly Pakistan has a problem with corruption so if we decentralise our financial management I think our corruption level would go up' (Ibid).

These observations corroborate the judgement of the literature that decentralisation processes fail to discuss the costs to the system. Decentralisation implies that the financial burden on the system will be lessened and the response
time will be increased. In many cases increasing the number of government levels, increasing level of communication, etc. all pose a financial cost and burden on the system.

In terms of guidelines or training in the procedures of financial management of primary education at the centre, sources indicated that such facilities were negligible. The financial officer interviewed for this research indicated that he had been working for six years but had not seen any such procedural guidebook.

It would have helped me a lot if there had been something. The things I learned were based on my own experience and like working with the Deputy Director. Because my job was to go with the current system, I had to work based on whatever was the current system (Financial Officer, PED, 1997).

It was further noted that no policies for financial management were readily accessible or available if even to be found in existence. If there were a formal policy vacuum, then it would be logical to assume that an informal system of administration could also evolve. If an informal system was operative, then we should ask what the factors were that significantly influenced the system, i.e., would they be individuals or events? Or might they be political? The data suggest a mix of factors. A combination of powerful individuals combined with weak administration has led to Balochistan's centralising tendencies.

4.3 Conclusion

In this chapter, we have looked at central institutions and the culture and attitudes within them. They were not conducive to decentralisation as a goal and this was brought out when we discussed their functions and the extent to which those functions had been decentralised.

We have seen evidence to explain why the establishment of the PED had centralising tendencies. Budgeting at PED became a central function that was controlled by not only federal and provincial ministries but once released
became the object of control and patronage to certain individuals within the PED. Also, the Bureau of Curriculum as the GOB’s formal branch for conducting teacher—training was marginalised through the establishment of a teacher-training cell within PED. Although external funding of teacher training hoped to achieve better co-ordination of education activities, in terms of decentralisation, this component became more centralised with the exception of cluster programs started in Jaffarabad and a few other districts.

NGO development was introduced through externally funded goals. PED implemented these plans but failed to formulate policies surrounding the roles of NGOs contrasted with roles of government education officers. Carrying mandates to conduct business of establishing monitoring committees and village education committees, the NGOs soon found themselves treading on government officials’ territories. Even teachers unions had been neglected from the beginning as a stakeholder in the education management process. This neglect later led to breakdown of community mobilisation for education development.

Finally, DEO’s powers were found to be weak. It is suggested that their authority had been scaled down with the advent of the formation of PED. Controls of budgets, construction, training, personnel, and procurement of supplies were all held at the centre under ‘single-authority’ practice where an individual or two could leverage most of the power. This chapter raises the question that what conditions would be necessary for the centre to let go of its power? The donor ‘flag waving’ did not seem to make a difference.
Chapter 5

Case Study: Jaffarabad

The stated intention of education reform in Balochistan was to devolve administration to a 'local' level. To test the reality of this claim, it is necessary to observe education policy and administration in practice at the 'local' level. Jaffarabad\(^\text{16}\) was selected as a case for reasons already stated but re-emphasised here. In 1997, this district was characterised as being relatively economically advantaged. The ample availability of surface irrigation water and its tropical climate set Jaffarabad apart from the other districts in Balochistan. The predominance of 'command' area (the majority of land in the district) irrigated with canal water, the comparatively high yields of wheat, rice, oilseed and cotton, and the dense population portray it as having the most potential for social and economic development among all the districts in Balochistan (Bureau of Statistics 1997:60). In short, the economic condition for successful implementation of decentralisation policy was greatest here.

This chapter is divided into four sections. The first gives the local context. The second introduces local institutions associated with primary education in Jaffarabad. In the third section, the locus of control over primary education management is analysed in connection with these district institutions. Evidence

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\(^{16}\) The Jaffarabad discussion relies heavily on the 1997 Bureau of Statistics Report; 1997 SCOPE Progress Report as well as field observation notes and semi-structured interviews that were documented in 1998.
collected through interviews, documents and personal observations will be used to identify the locus and level of control that the district had at its disposal.

Data collection concerning Jaffarabad occurred at two levels. At the district level, we conducted semi-structured interviews with education officers, ministerial staff, NGO representatives, villagers and community notables. In addition to these interviews, we documented field observations and took photographs. Reports and other documents were collected from offices that we visited. At the central level, Balochistan Education Management Information System's (BEMIS) data were obtained relating to Jaffarabad. Interviews were also undertaken of administrative staff at the provincial level to gain their perspectives of the administration situation in Jaffarabad. Together, this information provides the corpus of evidence for the case study.

Hartley (1994) informs us, however, that case studies cannot be defined by the techniques used to gather data for their formulation. Instead, definition must come through the case study's theoretical orientation. To this end, primary education administration in the Jaffarabad District is analysed using Winkler's Typology Matrix. This matrix analyses the various components of education administration as well as the level of management reform. Later in Chapter Seven, the evidence introduced in this chapter will be compiled with other data and analysed against five organisational variables that are crucial to decentralisation theory.

5.1 Background

Jaffarabad was named after Mir Jaffar Khan Jamali, a Muslim League political party veteran from Balochistan and an alleged close friend of Mohammed Ali Jinnah, commonly known as Quaid-e-Azam, the founder of Pakistan. The notification for the formation of the district was July 1, 1981. At the time of data collection (1997-98), Jaffarabad entered its sixteenth year of existence but with a growing disparity between its potential for economic development and its lagging social indicators (See Table 5.1). Despite the fact
that the district contained a series of canals and waterways for potentially wide
distribution of water, only twenty five per cent of the population had access to
water. Also, electricity served only fifteen per cent of villages. Population growth
projected at five per cent was above the national average for that same time
period. Jaffarabad also had an expanding labour force for which limited jobs
existed; i.e. primarily tenant farming and labourers. Education indicators for the
district will be presented in detail later.

**Socio-economic Indicators**

Jaffarabad is a long, narrow strip of land bordering the Sindh Province. It
covers a territory of 3,100 square kilometres. There are two sub-divisions—1) 
Usta Mohammed and 2) Dera Allah Yar (Jhat Pat) and there are three sub-
Tehsil's—1) Gandakha; 2) Panhwar; and 3) Sunehri. Area-wise Jaffarabad is the
second smallest of all districts in Balochistan with a geographical area of 244,510
hectares. The table below shows that eighty five per cent of the district is arable
land, while only 10,973 hectares (forty five per cent) is non-cultivable. The
district is densely populated with an estimated population in 1995 of 555,557.
The combination of a relatively small area of land (the second smallest district in
size) with a relatively high population (fourth largest) makes Jaffarabad the
most densely populated district in Balochistan outside the provincial capital of
Quetta.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5.1</th>
<th>Socio-economic Indicators for Jaffarabad District</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area</td>
<td>2,445 sq. km (244,510 hectares)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>555,557 (1995 NIPS projection)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Growth (from 1981 to 1995)</td>
<td>5.4% annual growth (NIPS projection)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Villages</td>
<td>589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Villages with electricity</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area Cultivated</td>
<td>189,377 hectares</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to Water</td>
<td>25% of population are serviced by water schemes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bureau of Statistics, 1997
The sub-division of Usta Muhammad was economically better off than Dera Alla Yar. Field observations confirm, for example, that there were more automobiles in Usta Mohammad than in Dera Alla Yar. One education officer explained why.

*The landlords in Usta Muhammad have a lot of land. Also people here are more educated and are in services. That is why the people are better off in Usta Muhammad. People of Usta Muhammad are in top government positions at the PCS and CSS level. There is a lot of agricultural land as compared to the population of this area. The land is very fertile. There are three or four industrial units in Usta Muhammad. There are 30 to 40 rice mills functioning here. Rice is supplied to Karachi and the interior of the Sindh province from here, it is exported as well* (Male SDEO Usta Muhammad, 1998).

There are various sources of revenue in the district. The major source is the land revenue on rice crops. This is particularly true for Usta Mohammad. The revenue includes taxes/income sources on property, vehicles, and agriculture. For this reason the district may be regarded better developed than others in the province.

The Bureau of Statistics of the Planning and Development Department for the Province has indicated in its study of the Jaffarabad district that their research concerning funding, transfers, and development funds for the district proved to be unsuccessful. Their intention was to collect data on resource mobilisation by government institutions in the district, on transfers from outside the district and on expenditures in or on behalf of the district. With this information, some insight would have been obtained with regard to the flows of money in and out of the district. Efforts to obtain complete data, however, failed. A collection of fragmented data resulted. It was concluded that the district did not collect enough resources internally to cover the costs of all public expenditures. The district is dependent on transfers from outside to run its affairs and to undertake development activities. Given the system, much of the decision-making process concerning the development of the district lay outside its boundaries (Bureau of Statistics, 1997).
Social Organisation

Jaffarabad is ethnically and tribally heterogeneous. There are three ethnic groups inhabiting the district: the Baloch, the Jamoot/Jat and the Brauhi. The two predominant Baloch tribes are Khosa and Jamah. Politically, the Jamali family (classified as feudal) is influential controlling most of the land of Jaffarabad and are sheltered by tribalism. Farmers are more or less the servants of feudals, a tradition of society that is not easily altered (See Box 5.1). Sindhi is the major language of the district. The other languages that are spoken include Balochi, Saraiki and even Brauhi.

Politics in the district are closely linked to these elites or landowners, rendering political parties virtually irrelevant. The limited role of political parties has been evidenced by the fact that all those who have succeeded in winning elections since 1988 did so due to their personal, family or tribal influence. The three provincial constituencies have been under the tribal/family influence of the Jamali elite. In the past the family unanimously agreed to forward candidates with clear mandates. Even nationally popular parties including the Balochistan National Party (BNP) and the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and Pakistan Muslim League have all had difficulty generating votes for the candidates against the landlords.

Four tiers of local government exist in Jaffarabad—District Council, Town Committee, Municipal Committee and Union Councils. Due to lack of funds and political circumstances, their performance had not been very effective as evidenced through its checkerboard past. The concept of local government can be traced to the Basic Democracies plan founded by the late Pakistani President, Ayub Khan. However, the institutions which he established were dissolved after Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto stepped into power in 1970. Later, President Zia ul-Haq reactivated the local government institutions throughout the country to elect tiers of the Local Unions and Tehsil Councils. Elections for the Local bodies in Balochistan were held in 1979, 1983, 1987, and 1991. On December 19, 1996, the local bodies were dissolved with elections pending.
Box 5.1 Feudals In Jaffarabad

The Jamahs have wielded a significant amount of political power in the district of Jaffarabad. The district was named after the late Jaffar Jamali, as is the name of the town 'Dera Jamali Khan' in the neighbouring district of Nasirabad. Oxford educated, the late Jamali was a large landowner whose legacy is carried out by his sons who are also educated elite and well travelled. The family continues to manage a significant portion of rice production in the district as learned through an interview with them. The brothers fear that national affairs are dominated too much by Punjabi political leaders. They claim that these rulers have taken away the rights of the people of Balochistan. One example noted was given by the brother who formerly served as the Provincial Food Minister to the Province of Balochistan. He noted that not enough attention has been placed on the means of food production in the Province and that also irrigation was crucial and needed to be further developed to thwart a drought that he felt was imminent to the province.

Evidence collected through other interviews suggests that while the Jamali family may feel marginalised from Federal attention, the family's control within the province is expansive, extending to the education sector. Some education field officers indicate that they have been approached and/or threatened by family members to hire unqualified relatives as teachers. Other evidence collected revealed that this family had been involved with education field officers and NGO representatives in site selections and school construction matters. While the feudals had made minor monetary donations to schools, they were in arrears in payment of the rent that they had promised to pay for two particular buildings in Jaffarabad. Their political power was also evidenced through the deference given to their name throughout the province, including their farmers as well as the fact that they have bodyguards/levies to protect them. Their power and influence have profoundly influenced education management and have done very little to support decentralisation reforms.

Source: Personal Interview with Aurangzeb Jamali, Jaffarabad, February 22, 1998

Local government falls under the provincial government. The role of provincial government is substantial in relation to the management of district affairs, with fifty-six departments. There were approximately 4,136 provincial government employees in the district of Jaffarabad as of 1996. The district administration is comprised of a Deputy Commissioner (DC), an Additional Deputy Commissioner, three Assistant Commissioners or Sub-divisional Magistrates, Tehsildar(s) and Naib Tehsildar(s). The important departments are those of levy, police, anti-corruption, irrigation, construction and works (C&W), livestock (animal husbandry), labour, jail, public health and engineering, local government, health social welfare, forest and wildlife offices. Excise and taxation, the treasury office and education all come under the direct jurisdiction of the provincial government.
The DC as head of the district has power over every department. However, a major role for the DC in socio-economic planning has not been fulfilled for two reasons. One reason was the frequent transfers within the government administration, including the transfers of the DC himself. Another reason was that the DC is usually pre-occupied with issues such as law and order and revenue. It was reported that if the DC failed to appease the sitting MNA, MPA or Senator, he could likely be transferred. Other government officials were also affected by the political manoeuvring of MNAs and MPAs. As one education officer pointed out, ‘In Jaffarabad, the MNA, MPA seriously influence the [education] department but I tried my best to avoid their disturbances’ (Male SDEO, Dera Alla Yar, 1998).

Livelihoods

The majority of people living in Jaffarabad reside in rural areas and are socio-economically disadvantaged. Income is primarily earned through tenant farming, small land-ownership, livestock, petty labour and low-scale government work. The two primary urban areas are the towns of Usta Mohammad and Dera Allah Yar. The district has a measurable number of Hindu citizens who live primarily in these two urban centres. It is reported that a large number of shopkeepers in Dera Allah Yar are Hindu and commute back and forth from the neighbouring town of Jacobabad in the Sindh Province and speak Sindhi.

There were two economic classes of people in Jaffarabad as noted by respondents in Jaffarabad.

There are two kinds of people that I find: very rich families (feudal) or very poor families. There are more poor families than the other kind of families. They have very low income and a very bad economic situation. During the year they cannot pay their expenses so they always live on loans. It is difficult for them to even send their kids to government schools... The middle class which is very rare, here, are sending their children to private schools locally which costs Rs./ 100 to 150 per month and the rich do not even send their kids to schools in Jaffarabad. They go outside the city or province or abroad (SCOPE M.D., Jaffarabad, 1998).
Jaffarabad is an agricultural district irrigated by four major canals. It has the largest agricultural production among the districts in Balochistan with the largest area of cultivated land. Rice, wheat, cotton, pulses, and various vegetables are the major crops of the area. The majority of people of both rich and poor classes were employed in agriculture given Jaffarabad’s agricultural based economy. Figure 5.1 depicts one of many rice mills found in Jaffarabad.

Figure 5.1 Rice Mill in Dera Allah Yar

![Image of a rice mill](source: Personal Photo, Jaffarabad, 1998)

Allegedly, the Jamalis as landowners (Zamindari) controlled most of the land by appropriating titles among family members and tenants to protect themselves against land reforms. A majority of this land was cultivated by two kinds of tenants: seasonal and permanent tenants who were in turn supported by another class of workers known as tillers. Tenants were either supervised by the landowner himself or by his family members. One education officer indicated that these labourers lacked awareness of educational opportunities because they spent all their time in the fields. 'Their life is in staying with the landlord, if the relations get worse with one landlord they move to the other to earn their living.'
So these people are less oriented towards education. They live on hope for a promise of work the following year' (SDEO, Dera Alla Yar, 1998).

In terms of education, one board member of the local NGO indicated that a key factor to reducing peoples' motivation for acquiring education was poverty.

The trend of education is not very common here... obviously the government cannot provide such a large number of jobs and as a result, the people do not see any benefit of it [schooling]. I mean the youth are not getting jobs after getting education so when they look at the situation that after sending a kid to school for twelve years, they return to agriculture (farming) again so what is the use of wasting this time and why not busy them in agriculture from the beginning? On the other hand, these NGOs should motivate them to inform the community that the real meaning of education is not to get a job but to become an educated person in a society. And in this way, if we are educated well, we can perform better in agriculture (M.D., SCOPE, Jaffarabad, 1998).

The majority of the population were characterised as living in poverty in Jaffarabad and that many families could not afford to send their children to any school. Also attendance was known to fluctuate in certain periods of the year, and decline especially during the harvest period. Most of the children were helping their parents with the harvest and did not have time for both study and work.

Infrastructure

Under Federal administration, the institutions that actively function at the district level are the elections office, the utilities provider known as the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA), the post office and the railways. WAPDA is responsible for providing electricity to urban and rural areas. It is also involved in expanding the Pat Feeder Canal system. The gas office (Southern Sui Gas) is also a federal department. There are other federal government units such as Intelligence Bureau (IB), and Inter Service Intelligence Agency (ISI), but their role was characterised as less visible.
Access in Jaffarabad to basic services such as water, electricity, sanitation, health and education was rated as being poor. Although the water supply in the district was viewed as adequate, the problem of clean drinking water and sanitation has remained constant. There were minimal water tanks and filtration arrangements, so that water could be purified. However most populations stored water from rivers and rain, which were not sanitary.

Sanitation facilities have not been managed or monitored through the Public Health Department. With the growing density of population that was recorded in 1997, the lack of human waste disposal services poses a serious threat to society. Although the district has many canals, the deficient availability of potable water and subsequent purification were also considered to be problematic.

Despite the fact that three quarters of the district had electricity, a much smaller proportion of the population could actually avail itself of that energy source. From January 1992 to November 1996, a total of eighty-nine villages had been electrified by the WAPDA in Jaffarabad indicating that seventy six per cent of the inhabited area in Jaffarabad district was connected to electricity. However, as there was confusion over what constituted a village, statistics indicated an electrification rate varying from fourteen per cent to seventy six per cent. Considering the number of connections compared with the average household size of seven people, not even ten per cent of the population had access to electricity in 1997.

Poor health services in Jaffarabad resemble challenges faced throughout the province as manifested through complaints about the equity and quality of health services including the lack of staff—especially female, and the lack of access to health care for women. There were very few health facilities. Dispensaries that were in existence in towns were not staffed sufficiently. Villagers interviewed in this study made a special request for dispensaries in closer proximity to their village. They indicated their inconvenience of having to travel great distances to get medicine as well as medical attention (Abdul Latif Umrani, Jaffarabad, 1998).
The supply of gas in the district extended to Dera Alla Yar, Sobhat Pur and Usta Mohammad. Few other villages were being provided with gas. However, for industrial and mechanical/agricultural purposes, electricity is the major source of energy. Both sources are used for cooking and heating purposes. Houses without electricity are reliant on kerosene oil and wood. The use of dung cake for fuel is very common among the poor, even in areas with electricity and gas. Middle and upper classes rely on diesel-powered generators for agricultural and domestic purposes in areas without electricity. Illegal electricity connections are common in the rural areas, in the sense that people have connected themselves illegally to the power grid or have sabotaged their meters.

In 1997, Jaffarabad had a high density of metalled roads, including a portion of the national highway, which extended from Quetta to the Sindh Province. These roads as well as a railway provide necessary linkages to large markets. The condition of these and rural roads, however, was poor as experienced by the author in travelling throughout the district. Observations of local respondents were also noted.

Mostly the roads around are 'katcha' (dirt) and the main road of Jaffarabad is also not in good condition. Link roads are also katcha and the transportation that is available on main road is not available on link roads so mostly the donkey or cow carts are used to go to the villages. Tractors are also used as a means of transportation." (M.D. SCOPE, Jaffarabad, 1998; see also Figure 5.2)
5.2 Education Administration

The Balochistan Local Government Ordinance of 1980 stipulated that the District Council of Jaffarabad would have express control of the following functions in relation to the education sector.

- Provision, maintenance and management of primary schools
- Construction and maintenance of student hostel buildings
- Payments of grants and subsidies to institutions and organisations engaged in the promotion of education
- Promotion of adult education (Bureau of Statistics, 1997)

In reality, however, these functions were not controlled within the district, but rather were organised or controlled centrally by the Education Department in the provincial capital. A majority of respondents acknowledged that education administration was centralised in the Province. One district officer articulated this in his account of some problems that his office faced with administration.
This is the disadvantage of centralisation that we do not get furniture and books on time. This is one of the problems faced by our children (SDEO, Dera Alla Yar, 1998).

In the following sections, education administration in Jaffarabad is first discussed according to the institutions that facilitate the administration of education. Next, Winkler's decentralisation-centralisation typology matrix for public education is used to identify the locus of control for activities in each component for public service delivery. It is hoped that this analysis will explain how and the extent to which the process of primary education administration was decentralised in the district. Before discussing institutions and the control dynamics, a description of the government school system is provided.

**Government School System**

Formal schooling in Balochistan is organised in a three-stage system of primary, middle and upper secondary or high school, and runs for a total period of ten years. Primary education comprises six grades, from *kachi* (kindergarten) to fifth grade. The age of entry into the system is varied, ranging from age four to age eight. On successful completion of all six grades, pupils are awarded a primary certificate. They are eligible then to enter middle school that runs for three years from grades six to eight. This is followed by two years of upper secondary or high school (grades nine to ten) ending in matriculation. There used to be mosque schools in the district but they were merged with government schools in 1993. A headmaster or headmistress manages middle and high schools. One or two teachers generally manage a primary school. In Table 5.2 below, the enrolment figures for the four levels of schooling are given.

**Primary Schools**

The total number of boys' primary schools in 1992 was 477 and increased to 568 by 1997. The numbers of girls' primary schools was 62 in 1992 and increased to 181 schools by 1997. The cost of schooling in the urban areas was different from the cost in the village. At the village level the cost was reported as being low because students were theoretically provided with books and other
educational materials. As one respondent suggested, 'a cost of Rs.200/- could be very helpful to the student and that the books at the primary level could be bought easily with this amount' (SDEO Usta Muhammad, 1998).

**Middle Schools**

A middle school comprises four classes from fifth to eighth. In 1997 there were thirty middle schools for boys with an enrolment of 5,254. There were only four middle schools for girls that same year with an enrolment of 930. All Middle schools are government owned.

**High Schools**

In 1997, there were a total of nineteen boys' high schools and four girls' high schools. The total enrolment in the boys' high schools was 2,610 of which 40 were girls (Bureau of Statistics, 1997). There were three hundred female students.

**School Buildings**

The school buildings (except private schools) belong to the government of Balochistan. The primary school building may be donated by MPA funds. They are government owned or donated by the Members of the Provincial Assembly but still become the property of the Balochistan Government. A primary school comprises basically of two rooms. The majority of them, including the female schools, have boundary walls. There is little consistency in construction and style of school buildings, though all are made of bricks. The majority of them lack playing grounds, boundary walls (primary schools), and latrine facilities. The district map (Figure 5.3) shows that the majority of primary school buildings are located near water canals. This suggests that families with children tend to populate these waterways in terms of their livelihood already indicated as farming and general survival. The Balochistan Education Management Information System (BEMIS) Cell stationed within the Directorate for Primary Education in Quetta created the map through a school mapping
initiative. The schools were mapped using a GIS system that beams the data via satellite to a database.
Table 5.2  Statistical Overview of Jaffarabad Government Schools

Number of Students Enrolled in Educational Institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enrolment (in public sector)</th>
<th>Number of Pupils</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary School</td>
<td>22,205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Schools</td>
<td>4,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School</td>
<td>1,247</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: BEMIS Data, August 1992—Report #1; April 1997

Number of Educational Institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Schools</th>
<th>Number of Institutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Schools</td>
<td>427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Schools</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Schools</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: BEMIS Data, August 1992—Report #2, April 1997
Figure 5.3: Distribution of Schools in Jaffarabad
5.3 Local Institutions

The physical characteristics of primary education in Jaffarabad, while important to the proper functioning of education, are not the life of the system. The lifeblood of the system are those local institutions and their staff who manage primary education on a day-to-day basis. Local administration of schools in Jaffarabad was handled through the district education offices that consisted of government hired, ministerial staff and executive staff. The district education office is discussed in further detail later in the chapter. Also, one local non-governmental organisation exists in Jaffarabad and employs staff locally. Institutions, however, are not limited to formal organisations. For example, this study found that small groups were also either playing an administrative role in some community schools or in some way effecting administration negatively. Below is a discussion of local institutions that aided in primary education development at the district level.

Community Support Process (CSP)

In Balochistan, the female district education officer's office and staff are responsible for supporting the process of the development of girl's schools in cooperation with villages and communities. In Jaffarabad, the female DEO reported that sixty-nine community girl's schools were functioning as of 1997 and that forty-five of those had been established in the 1996-97 period. She also stated her role and responsibilities inclusive of monitoring government girls' schools and supporting the development of community schools. In this respect, the government officer's role includes conducting the qualifying tests for the teachers, releasing the posts, verifying the building/structure and providing the certificate and conducting the opening ceremony of the school. The female DEO's office is theoretically supposed to work in concert with the local NGO known as SCOPE in supporting the CSP process. An account provided by the officer implied that the two offices at first had not co-ordinated their work so well. 'Now we prepare the work-plans together, she [NGO] does not herself come to do this but we do collaborate in these activities together now. But before this she [NGO] used to do the opening by herself and used to do the testing as well and used to send the papers for verification' (Female DEO, Jaffarabad, 1998).
Local observation suggested that the DEOs role soon became one of verification of the NGOs work. For example, the DEO would visit the newly formed village schools and ask students whether they belonged to this school or if they had been a part of another school. It was found that ten to thirteen children from nearby government schools were attending in order to meet the qualifying number of students for the CSP school. If the school did qualify, it could be opened. After completing the hurdle of verification, the DEO usually conducted an opening ceremony and sanctioned the teaching post on a three-month probationary period. Some confusion existed, at first, as to who was accountable for processing the final selection of staff/teachers.

When the first time it was initiated, nothing was decided and we did not know what to do and it was difficult then, but now it is clearer and we have defined the responsibilities for the DEO... We gave them these outlines and defined responsibilities of DEOs in the last workshop here at PED. We told the NGO to go and to complete the survey, make the list and find the teachers as well and when the case will come to us we will give the test to teachers and will verify the particulars thoroughly (SCOPE MD, Jaffarabad, 1998).

Tensions between the NGO and the district staff were evident, however. At one meeting, a field officer petitioned the Director of PED that he should abolish the NGOs role in developing the community schools. The DEO staff could establish these schools better than the NGO, she claimed, despite the additional resources the NGO possessed. The NGO could avail themselves of air-conditioned double cab vehicles and Rs. 200 per day as a travel allowance whereas DEO staff had small old jeeps and no petrol allowance the local official complained. 'Why not dissolve the NGO and channel those resources through the male and female district education offices to pay for good vehicles and petrol?' (Female DEO, Jaffarabad, 1998).

The Society for Community Organisation and Promotion of Education (SCOPE)

Only one NGO based in the district of Jaffarabad supported primary education. The Society for Community Organization and Promotion of Education (SCOPE) was registered in September 1995 under the 1860 Societies Act. SCOPE is a Non-Governmental Organisation that promotes girl's and women's
education in Sibi and Nasirabad divisions. SCOPE was initially funded through contract sponsorship under the World Bank, and the Royal Netherlands Embassy and its goals and objectives include:

❖ To promote education for building up a strong workforce;
❖ To facilitate co-operation between government and people;
❖ To bring awareness of education among the people especially for female education and to promote school construction and formation of rural education committees to this end;
❖ To create atmosphere of co-operation and contact among females;
❖ To struggle for the improvement of literacy;
❖ To provide recreational activities; and
❖ To hold workshops and seminars.

SCOPE's mission statement encapsulates these goals and objectives:

SCOPE is working for the improvement of primary education especially for females in Sibi-Nasirabad Region in which six districts are included: Jaffarabad, Nasirabad, Bolan, Jhal Magsi, Dera Bugti, and Sibi. SCOPE also seeks to make the parents responsible for the improvement of education and to bring co-operation between government and parents. (SCOPE Handout translated from Urdu to English, 1998)

SCOPE's employee structure has three administrative classifications. At the top is the Management Development Specialist (MD), which is SCOPE's Chief Executive. This position is responsible for all the administrative affairs and the implementation of the Institute. The second tier of employees is the Master Trainers/Field Co-ordinators. Their role is to train the field staff of the institute and to make sure the administrative and planning affairs are performed. The final tier of paid employees is the Community Education Promoters/Facilitators. Their role is to bring co-operation between the government and the community and to organise and motivate the community at the grass-roots level. In working with the government through the DEO and other officers, SCOPE aims to help the government's representatives so that the resources could be utilised in the best way.
Box 5.2: SCOPE--NGO Capabilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date Range</th>
<th>Activity Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July 1995</td>
<td>SCOPE formulated a four-month study in Jhal Magsi and Dera Bugti. Its main purpose was to get information about middle and matric pass female children in these districts and identify the villages where middle and matric pass female students are present. To find out the interest of parents in education and the source of income.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 1995 to Feb. 1996</td>
<td>SCOPE opened four CSP schools in Jhal Magsi District in which 194 female students are studying and the parents group was organized and provided with training.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 1995 to June 1997</td>
<td>SCOPE formulated one thousand seven PTSMCs and opened 468 bank accounts for these committees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 1996 to June 1997</td>
<td>SCOPE opened 29 CSP schools in which 1193 female children are studying and surveyed 155 villages. SCOPE, with the cooperation of PEQIP, trained 72 teachers in 10 days. SCOPE with the help of Allama Iqbal Open University formed two clusters (FATEH PUR and Noor Moh'd Mengal) in which 26 middle pass students would study until matric regularly. SCOPE is also training the rural education committees who have been giving schools responsibility.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SCOPE Handout translated from Urdu to English, 1998

SCOPE's objectives have been obtained with the help of the Education Department. All activities (see Box 5.2), given the funding base, were aligned with the PED annual workplan. Once a contract was signed, SCOPE's procedure was to provide an annual action plan of implementation. When queried, a representative noted that SCOPE's clients or customers were, in fact, driven by the donor source. 'Since we are only working on education, PED decides for the customers of SCOPE.' SCOPE's foremost aim was to serve the young girls of the districts where it worked by facilitating the CSP process. However, there were plans to undertake other initiatives. However, they were planning to provide a two-year middle level education program for girls who had passed primary levels. 'So we will be looking for the funding agencies for that project. But at the moment, PED tells us whether they (customers) should be boys schools or girls schools, what communities should it be, and what communities it should not be' (SCOPE MD, Jaffarabad, 1998).

In terms of the opening of CSP schools in Jaffarabad, SCOPE was faced with the challenge of coordinating its efforts with the provincial NGO known as the
'Society'. 'The problem we were having with opening CSP schools here was that the Society teams were working on it at the same time'. Neither of the NGOs had a clear understanding concerning the overlap in assigned territory and for this reason SCOPE invited the Society field teams to meet to discuss the identification of targeted villages for their work. However, co-operation was not offered except through a subsequent meeting between senior management of the Society and SCOPE. The respondent discussing this issue interestingly mentioned that the Society's jurisdiction had subsequently changed. At the time of the interview, the Society was responsible for supporting the fellowship school programs, for the training of DEOs for community work, and for a new contract with UNICEF to strengthen regional NGOs such as SCOPE.

SCOPE considered training as one of its basic functions. A fraction of this training was extended to VECs and WVECs as pointed out by several respondents. The first phase of this training dealt with the roles and responsibilities that these committees had in management and administration of community support schools. SCOPE teams provided follow-up support in terms of monitoring the schools for which VECs and WVECs were trained. Subsequent training was provided regarding duties on the day-to-day tasks of the committees such as record-keeping, fund raising, school monitoring techniques, how to interface with and approach government officers particularly the DEOs and PED, and how to handle issues and problems pertaining to teachers. The next phase of training was actually a review of the progress of the committees with members of the committee in attendance along with DEOs and a review the content of the training programs that had transpired.

SCOPE also offered a basic teacher-training course that ran for ten days. Teachers' needs were assessed by the NGO and passed to project staff in Quetta who developed a training package and SCOPE ran the training. These collaborators included the PEQIP programme in conjunction with the Mobile Female Teacher Training Unit (MFTTU). In 1997, seventy-two teachers were trained by SCOPE. MFTTUs were encouraged by PEQIP staff to try and replicate these training programs elsewhere in the province given their immediate success.
These teachers did not know how to maintain the registers and when the first time a teacher comes to the classroom she does not know how to keep discipline, how to keep the room clean, and how to hang the charts. The teachers did not know at the beginning of the program what could be the purpose of these charts but after the training they understood it well (SCOPE MD, Jaffarabad, 1998).

SCOPE had indicated that its VEC and WVEC training had two streams. The first was a one-day training program that is run with both teachers and committee members. The other was the training that committee members were provided with to help distinguish roles and duties among the NGO, the VEC and the WVEC. This training enabled a process of charting activities and also a signature sheet for visitations. For each visit, members could check their responsibilities on the written chart and check how many of them had been completed. In terms of the outcome of this training, it was noted that at first members did not participate in these activities but later members were even assisting the teachers with projects such as the making of mud toys and helping children painting them. The training of the teachers enabled, in some cases, teachers to manage their own meetings without the help of SCOPE or other officers.

Speaking on the issue of SCOPE's relationship with the district education officers, one senior SCOPE official claimed that they had a good working relationship with the DEO(M) and the DEO(F) despite specific problems encountered in the past. Conflict was pointed out that when SCOPE assumed its role of training government officials of the process of forming and working with the committees, the DEO did not always agree with management decisions. In one specific case, a DEO was asked to send LCs to the field for monitoring and training of CSP schools.

Our NGO’s main objective is to strengthen the education officers to such an extent, that if tomorrow the NGOs are removed, the DEO’s office should have a capacity through Learning Coordinators (LC) that they can perform the monitoring and training of these CSP schools. (M.D. SCOPE, Jaffarabad, 1998).

In one particular case of conflict, the DEO had recommended that an office assistant should visit CSP schools instead. It was alleged, without proof, that
they had received a complaint that this assistant had asked for money from the teachers in one of these monitoring trips. However, the DEO did not have solid evidence to prove this (Female DEO, Jaffarabad, 1998). As far as collaboration with the agenda of public or government education, SCOPE saw its role as complementing the government system and not short-circuiting it. One community education promoter explained,

We are trying to collaborate with the people and government. We are trying to make a link between community and government. Community participation as a process is also important but we are also providing ownership to the community. We are bridging the distance between community and government. We are not introducing anything that is new or something by ourselves, rather we are organising the links already there. People do not think that these activities are something other than the government process (SCOPE, Community Education Promoter, Jaffarabad, 1998).

Village Education Committee

The community school in the village of Abdul Latif Umrani (See Figure 5.4) was established on the January 1, 1997. The village education committee (VEC) consisted of five male members and five females. The school was established according to the process of the community support programme CSP (See Appendix III). It was further reported that the school had been built solely at the expense of the community. 'All of the members had a meeting and contributed their efforts in the construction of the school. All of the members did this job jointly. The male members constructed the school themselves,' explained one member. PED’s response to the committee for submission of an application for a school was positive. They sanctioned the teaching post and it became a government sanctioned (paid) posting. Her probation period was three months. The building and the school were the responsibility of the community for three years from the date of the establishment of the school. After three years, PED would advise whether a permanent building should be constructed and supported under a recurrent budget.
The functions of the committee were acknowledged as being varied. One member explained that the teacher would make reports at their monthly meetings regarding any problems that she had faced. She also updated the committee as to the children who had not been attending regularly. Committee members would follow-up by making visits to the parents of these children to encourage parents to send the children to school. Minutes of each meeting were recorded. In this particular school, the teacher taught the VEC members how to write their own names, an accomplishment that one member proudly relayed. This respondent's self-described role was one of checking and monitoring, i.e. to check the attendance of the teacher and students. If the students were not present, this member made it a personal task to go and find the students and bring them to the school.

Another issue that the school happened to dealing with at the time of the interview was the lack of supplies and books. They had petitioned PED for these materials. Females in the committee sat behind the males in the interview. However, when specifically asked what their role was in the committee, they included accompanying their children to the school each day and maintaining the hygiene or cleanliness of their children. They also discussed matters with the
teacher on an 'as needed' basis. The teacher's father, and the village's namesake, commented about the role of the women and commended their participation.

*They support the teacher in every way. Whatever help is required by the teacher, the women support her and extend their co-operation. When the application was submitted for the approval of the school, the women supported it with all means. Then they applied for sanction of a teacher's post for school and the building of the school, they supported the teacher* (Abdul Latif Umrani, Jaffarabad, 1998).

The majority of members interviewed desired to take on more administrative and managerial responsibilities of the school. 'We want more control and we can manage it ourselves in a better way;' was one response. Another indicated, 'we can become more productive and we can do everything in a more innovative way'.

In terms of training and strengthening of the teacher and the VEC, it was reported that both had received training. The teacher completed a ten-day training programme offered by SCOPE, the local NGO that covered basic school management issues. She also received three months training by the UNICEF sponsored mobile female teacher-training unit MFTTU conducted in nearby Dera Allah Yar. Additionally she received three days of training in Usta Mohammad in how to maintain registers. Similarly, the VECs were trained in Dera Allah Yar. Their topics of training included their roles and responsibilities and the teachers responsibilities. SCOPE promoters visit the school periodically for monitoring of enrolment, teaching and curriculum, and cleanliness of the children.

When queried whether religious leaders or politicians placed any specific pressures on the school or committee members, respondents indicated that these problems did not exist. 'The school is running smoothly and they are happy with it' (VEC member, Abdul Latif Umrani, 1998).

**Parent/Teacher/School Management Committee (PTSMCs)**

The formation of PTSMCs was based on the premise that parents have the right to demand proper education for their children. The role of parents is not a
surrogate for the government officers' role in monitoring schools and teachers but is rather complementary. Additionally, PTSMCs were viewed as fulfilling a need in the educational system to supplement district management.

Our objective was to improve the standard of education and teaching methods. Only through PTSMC, we had a chance to get closer to communities to get to know them and to solve their problems with mutual co-operation. And in that programme we also told the communities that if government is helping you in all aspects to provide education to your children then they [communities] should also add their efforts to it, e.g. to buy some books for their children too and check if the teacher is regular and doing a good job (Male SDEO, Dera Allah Yar, 1998).

The first PTSMC was inaugurated in Jaffarabad with parents from a local community, the DEO (M) and DEO (F) and other education officers, a management development specialist representing the local NGO, and a beneficiary participation consultant from the PED in attendance. These officials gave speeches to convince the community of the importance of the PTSMC in education.

We tried to influence them through different examples, like when a goat goes to the pasture and on return when the owner does not get the milk from the goat; he confronts the shepherd for not getting the milk. If a goat's milk has that much importance why not a child's education? In the same way the parents must make sure their children are getting proper education (Male SDEO, Dera Alla Yar, 1998).

Fifty-four PTSMCs were initially established and provided with instructional kits worth Rupees 1,400 each as a reading and writing allotment. Rupees 2,000\(^{17}\) were to be provided to the teacher of each of these PTSMCs for school maintenance and repairs. We told the teachers that with this amount we cannot buy your efforts but this is just to motivate you to work a little bit more for the schools (SDEO, Dera Alla Yar, 1998). This account by a government officer corroborates the one provided by SCOPE. A representative explained that the DEO was instructed to 'draw' and 'provide' these initial disbursements to the committees in the first six months of their formation. After this period, bank accounts were then to be established for each PTSMC so that future

\(^{17}\) The Treasury Office kept a small percentage in the amount of Rs.100 from each Rs. 2000 disbursement. So in effect, each PTSMC only received Rs.1900.
disbursements could be deposited directly into these accounts. It was further explained that the bank accounts were opened but the PTSMCs had no money. The female DEO explained why.

_This amount which was for reading/writing material, we provided the schools with boxes [instructional kits] and chairs and the money lying with us for repair is still with us except one school, we provided the repair budget to only one school in Sobhat Pur and the rest of the repair money is with us. They told us that when these schools set their accounts in the bank then we can release this amount to the schools. These schools have not set the accounts so Rs. 36,000 is in the government account of the DEO. We told the NGO many times to take this money from our account but she [NGO] said let them first set the accounts and then we will take this money._ (Female DEO, Jaffarabad, 1998)

Confusion also seems to emerge in terms of DEO's and the NGO's role in the formulation, monitoring, training and maintenance of the committees. Responses from both district officers and NGO officials were contradictory. Both accounts indicated that DEOs were given the money to distribute to the committees. However, SCOPE representatives indicated that they were given a contract by the Government to establish the committees, provide training and arrange with each committee to establish bank accounts.

_DeOs draw the money and DEOs spend the money during the next contract of the PTSMCs for ten months. PED signed the contract on that basis the PTSMCs opened their own accounts and that's why this next contract we are focusing on bank accounts_ (SCOPE M.D., Jaffarabad, 1998).

District officers argued that their learning coordinators (LCs) formed the committees, but the government (PED) did not send the money nor were the communities enabled to deposit the money in the bank so the programme was terminated. One former officer indicated that only the paperwork had been completed on the process of the PTSMCs and that the NGOs should have done more to support them. No specific advice as to how this was to have happened was offered. A SCOPE officer indicated that, during their first six-month contract with PED, PED issued a letter concerning the formation of PTSMCs that all TA/DA and POL would be paid to the LCs who would be participating in the fieldwork along with the NGO. However, PED never disbursed any funding for this purpose. Subsequently, for SCOPE's next ten-month contract, the DEOs
refused to conduct any work on PTSMC development. SCOPE, however, reportedly complained to the PED upon which some payments were made. These payments were made most likely as a result of those individuals who had been able to approach the one officer in PED who controlled all payments. ‘The one who knew [the right person] got the money, you know that’s how it goes, and payment were not made to those who did not have the approach’ (M.D. SCOPE, Jaffarabad, 1998).

Despite a report prepared by SCOPE on the progress of development of PTSMCs, it was reported by a SCOPE representative that only thirty or forty percent were active. The respondent explained that the other defunct PTSMCs were not functioning and that the NGO did not have a link with these. Another representative of SCOPE confirmed that, as of February 1998, SCOPE no longer had a contractual obligation to form PTSMCs leaving district officers to manage them. ‘In short I would say that the PTSMCs where the LCs are active on their own are functional otherwise other PTSMCs are not functional in the area anymore’ (Ibid 1998). Another reason given for the programme’s termination was that communities had been challenged by the GOB to deposit the same amount of money that was being allocated by the GOB.

In terms of active committees, information was provided that only one PTSMC had been functioning in the district from April 1996 to the time of the interview in 1998. She claimed that only two PTSMCs were remotely functioning.

*I visited one in Sobhat Pur, we called them at 10:00am but even at 8:00pm only four women turned up and the third day we could make one female PTSMC in Sobhat Pur and that was a failure too. I visited Noshki for making a PTSMC but there I made male PTSMC, which was a success and they had even utilised their own money on schools since 1995* (Female DEO, Jaffarabad, 1998).

Prior to June 20, 1996 approximately eighteen PTSMCs were reportedly formed but none were formed after that and in the opinion of the respondent there were no functioning PTSMCs in early 1998 (Ibid 1998). This evidence is contrasted with a SCOPE report (Parveen ca.1997), however, where 123 PTSMCs were listed as organised and functioning. In fact, detailed information
was given in the report as to the names of each committee member and their respective schools. The female DEO argued that these lists were of individuals who played no part in the running of the schools. She went on to argue that the NGO's method of forming the PTSMCs had been flawed. First she reasoned that men should have been contacted to be members given that they would be more inclined to do school maintenance and repairs of the schools. Secondly, she pointed out that the need had not started with parents' desire to monitor and participate in school affairs.

_Villagers used to say that their kids come to school so why should they bother about it, so they [NGO] used to go to the community and deliver several lectures about the programme and could only influence a few women. The Pathan women were illiterate, and they had their own work in the field and at home, so why should they be coming to school. The community used to say that the NGO and government have already taken our kids to school and now they are wasting our time, why? (Female DEO, Jaffarabad, 1998)._

Thirdly, PTSMCs were criticised as being committees on paper only.

_So they have not formed the PTSMC at the school but in the communities by sitting outside the schools they have formed these committees. Just one resourceful person in the community used to bring a few women and she used to write their names and that's it, and this is why they are a failure (Ibid 1998)._

It was not only parents who were unenthusiastic. The teachers unions saw more parental involvement as a threat. Evidence of apprehension concerning the further development and sustainability of the PTSMCS was found. The teacher's associations came to reject the PTSMCs. One SCOPE officer admitted that had the teacher's associations been co-opted at the beginning of the programme, they might have been more co-operative. 'In this way we sidelined the teachers unions' (M.D. SCOPE, Jaffarabad, 1998). Further elaboration of the unions and their organisation are presented later in the chapter.

The discussion so far indicates that the PTSMC scheme failed in Jaffarabad. It held the promise of community involvement with the management and administration of both boys' and girls' schools but lacked commitment on a number of fronts. Evidence revealed that it was not a scheme voiced or even
considered by communities, rather it was a role that had been decided for them from the top. This is not to say that they were of no value. Below are some isolated accounts of some of the benefits of PTSMC organisation.

**Successes of PTSMCs**

Communities, through PTSMC organisation did help to maintain some schools for example hand pumps were installed for drinking water from their own limited resources. Also, it was reported that some parents worked voluntarily at the schools, put up shelters on their own, and built barrier walls. Other tasks performed included whitewashing the buildings and paving the mud roofs. Even teachers and students assisted in the construction projects. Anecdote was given that even women crossing to a particular place to fetch water nearby where community meetings were held would curiously stand close to see what was happening. Community promoters would eventually talk to the women and instruct them as to the purpose of the meetings further advocating parents role in the activities of the local school.

Other examples of success were shared. In Sobhat Pur, the PTSMC for the boy’s middle school installed a telephone in the headmaster’s office, and they collected and deposited approximately Rs. 10,000 for the purpose of establishing a matriculate level examination hall. It was the first examination hall in Sobhat Pur. They also developed a petition to the Deputy Commissioner for the building of a barrier wall around their school. This school's PTSMC had even given warnings to the headmasters to stop cheating at all levels. The parents and members of the PTSMCs conducted a very large meeting that involved a community mobilisation consultant from Quetta.

**Unions**

Several officers described teachers' unions as counterproductive and corrupt in terms of local education administration. The largest union in Balochistan was the Government Teachers Association (GTA) with a smaller splinter organisation known as the Watan Teachers Association. These unions had elected bodies with elections transpiring every two years. All teachers were members of the unions and would elect local officers at the district level. The Union became powerful as
membership fees began to underwrite their activities. Because of their political strength, one officer of SCOPE indicated that rapport had to be maintained with union leaders to leverage continual support for education activities. One education officer noted that unions were notorious for their illegal activities. Some were listed.

- Bogus teacher certificates as a means for employing unqualified teachers;
- Illegal testimonies;
- Teacher transfers to suit personal and political agendas; and
- Controversy surrounding duty or tax on union members (Former Male DEO, Jaffarabad, 1998).

 Strikes, notices, processions were other actions taken by the unions that disrupted the education system locally. One incident was recounted that a PED official wanted to make a visit to observe the teacher cluster programme but was prohibited from doing so by the union (In-charge, In-service Teacher Training, PED, 1997).

 With regard to teachers unions and PTSMCs, it was told that at the time of the first disbursement of funding, SCOPE directly approached them and asked them what the basis was for their resistance to PTSMC formation. SCOPE further advised the unions that their role should be one not of resistance, but rather one that monitors whether the PTSMCs are getting their full allotment from the DEO's office.
5.4 Education Services and the Distribution of Control

So far we have provided local accounts of the extent to which experiments with decentralisation had collapsed. Now we turn to the more systematic analysis of what elements in the administration system changed. Below is an assessment of the data or responses to interviews according to Winkler’s (1989) key public service categories. The discussion for each category begins with a definition explaining what activities were subsumed under the respective headings. Data will then be presented against these categories that would help form a snapshot judgement of whether these activities have been decentralised and, if so, to what extent. Finally a summary will be provided to express what the data tells us about the state of decentralisation for each component with reference to Jaffarabad.

Supervision

In Jaffarabad, as was the case in all administrative districts in Balochistan, government schools were managed and supervised through district education offices. One male and one female officer who, with the support of their subordinate officers and ministerial staff, handle the administration of schools for boys and girls respectively headed these offices. In the district school system, the majority of the schools were government-run schools that came under the direct supervision of the District Education Officer. The female district education officer also supervised schools within the neighbouring district of Nasirabad.

One account of relations among district officers was positive.

*We [DEO, ADEO and I] have very good relations and have good teamwork where DEOs lead and we follow commands* (Male SDEO, Dera Alla Yar, 1998).

In contrast, other accounts suggested that the delivery of primary education had not been such a smooth process. ‘*It may be everybody’s opinion that Jaffarabad is better than other districts but it’s not that good and not easy to manage or handle*’ (Female DEO, Jaffarabad, 1998). The example of threats to transfer one particular DEO was cited. The DEO explained feudalist attempts to
influence her decisions and actions. ‘The day I don’t do their work, I will be the worst person for them and they will ask to transfer me’. Specifically, this DEO had been requested to transfer teachers based on nepotism. The DEO further explained her dilemma.

If I do something wrong a [feudal] will transfer me, I am not afraid of him. I have told him to transfer me if he feels like but I will not do any illegal work. A poor teacher is requested to be transferred out and their [feudal] relative to be accommodated at his/her place. Why should I do that? A poor person does not have any support so I should sack him/her, no I will never do that. A few weeks back [feudal] called me and instructed me to transfer the few teachers...I refused so they threatened me to be transferred from here and I told them to transfer me, I don’t care and I don’t want to stay here in this kind of condition (Female DEO, Jaffarabad, 1998).

Figure 5.5 depicts the organisational structure of the offices for both the male and female DEO for Jaffarabad. Physical offices for both the male DEO and his subordinate SDEO are located in close proximity of each other in the town of Dera Alla Yar. The female DEO also had an office in Dera Alla Yar. These offices contained several rooms including a storeroom for supplies and unused or broken furniture. Also contained in these buildings were the physical offices for staff, and a small kitchen. In the male DEO office, there was a room where a computer was being kept but the door was usually locked.
Figure 5.5: Jaffarabad District Offices—Organisational Charts

JAFFARABAD DISTRICT EDUCATION OFFICER (DEO)  
MALE

| SUB-DIVISIONAL EDUCATION OFFICER (SDEO)  
USTA MOHAMMAD |
| Assistant Sub-Divisional Education Officers (ASDEOs)  
2 Posts |
| Learning Coordinators (LCs) |
| Teachers |

| SUB-DIVISIONAL EDUCATION OFFICER (SDEO)  
JHATPAT |
| Assistant Sub-Divisional Education Officers (ASDEOs)  
2 Posts |
| Learning Coordinators (LCs) |
| Teachers |

| JAFFARABAD DISTRICT EDUCATION OFFICER (DEO) |
| Learning Coordinator (LC)  
1 Post  
USTA MOHAMMAD |
| Teachers |

| Learning Coordinators (LCs)  
2 Posts  
JHATPAT |
| Teachers |
The relationships depicted in the organograms from one hierarchical level to the next formally exist but evidence was provided indicating that there was no accountability along these lines on a day-to-day basis. Education officers in Jaffarabad all claimed that they had little control especially over the hiring, firing and transferring of teachers.\textsuperscript{18}

As some from the teachers' community are on the job they get salary, but they don't fulfil their duties at all. No one inquires about this; they are accountable to no one. They go to ministers, secretaries and The Chief Minister, but no one asks them from whom they have got permission to go there. Nowadays all the personnel in government departments are appointed with the consent of politicians if they have even one per cent interest in that posting. Even [local] police are appointed with their will. So teachers also get appointments on their consent. It is very hard to work in this kind of atmosphere. We have to mostly deal with the community. We are working this out without any powers and shelter (SDEO, Usta Mohammad, 1998).

Expressed here were concerns that community pressures as well as the lack of official control placed education officers in an awkward position.

Other daily management problems were expressed. Concerning the distribution of books, furniture and reading and writing materials, more than one officer complained that were these tasks assigned locally, their provision would be more efficient and timely.

Total power and control is centralised. If we had some authority at district level, we could have solved our minor problems on our own at this level. For instance, we take the example of material, the books, furniture, reading writing material and other requirements. The educational year is in its third month but we have not received books from PED. Our children don't have books, takhti, slate or taat to sit on. The teacher has no chair or table for himself. It is because of the centralisation of power (Ibid 1998).

One female education officer criticised the power structure in the provincial education system but gave some recommendations on how this could be improved.

\textsuperscript{18} See discussion in Chapter Three regarding August 1993 ruling giving Provincial Minister of Education full control for hiring, firing and transferring of teachers in Balochistan.
This centralised system is not good, one person has the power. This kind of centralised system is wrong. All should be working together so it should be decentralised...We can buy the furniture and can provide it there to schools by ourselves. They do not give us any TA/DA and no cash and send the furniture from there [Quetta]. If they give us the cash as compared to the same rate of what they purchase in Quetta, we can buy the material here and the fare [transport costs] will be saved as well but they do not do that....They mention a lot of furniture in the documents but we hardly get ten chairs and ten desks in a year, so where does that money go? (Female DEO, Jaffarabad, 1998).

As introduced in chapter three, job descriptions and service rules had been distributed to field officers. In 1994, they were revised and heralded for their potential function in aiding field officers with their required work. When queried about the validity of these manuals, however, education officers in Jaffarabad were critical. The response given by one SDEO is representative:

*It is on paper only. Nothing is acted upon; there is no question about it. All the terminations, transfers or punishments, all the rules exist only on paper* (SDEO, Usta Mohammad, 1998).

In terms of training for education officers, respondents revealed that training for management and administrative duties was negligible. While some training was provided to officers for the opening of schools, PED had neglected to solicit areas in which education officers specifically needed support. *PED directs and schedules the training but they never ask our demands and what we are doing and whether we need refresher training after every three months*’ (Female DEO, Jaffarabad, 1998).

Despite the lack of general training to field officers in their roles and responsibilities, one officer explained that training had been provided to male learning coordinators. He indicated that they had entertained detailed discussions with LCs over their job descriptions. In fact, they had conducted a three-day training session with LCs for the specific purpose of discussing how they were to provide guidance to schools (Male SDEO, Dera Alla Yar, 1998).
In short, control of day-to-day resources and staffing remained in the hands of PED and powerful local figures such as politicians and feudals. Another issue pertaining to the supervision function of field offices was the control of teachers.

**Budget Allocations**

Senior education officials and field officers were in agreement that prior to the establishment of the PED, field officers had more budgetary discretion than they did at the time of their interviews. Regular budget allocations stopped once PED came into existence in 1992. Earlier in her career (prior to 1992), the female DEO, as a headmistress was even given a budget for use at her school with more discretionary spending than she had as an officer. She indicated that prior to 1992, DEOs were 'powerful and had all kinds of control'. Examples of the type of discretionary power needed to run their offices more efficiently were given.

*We only need the monthly budget for petrol, TA and maintenance that we will spread all over the area and provide guidance to schools everywhere in the district. We are facing economic problems at our office. Due to non-availability of funds, our field staff are sitting in the office. We do not need any control on furniture but some basic funding to go to the field is necessary. And about our stationery, until last year we used to get it but we have received none this year. We even have to look around for ballpoint pens that we can use. The DEOs office is covering 335 schools and teachers ask for plain papers or other working papers but no use, and we do not have any kind of stationery now. And for the schools and the children the important and necessary things are Taat [matting], black board, desks, Takhti, slate, ink or chairs for the teachers* (Male SDEO, Dera Alla Yar, 1998).

Officers felt that they should be allocated funding for repairing their vehicles as well as maintenance funds to support the field visits that they and their subordinates were conducting. Due to fewer visits to the schools, the field staff had started receiving reports of absent teachers and the schools were subsequently adversely affected.

One officer offered a budget solution for ensuring that these expenditures be incorporated into the recurrent budget. He calculated that twelve months of
petrol, oil and lubrication (POL) for vehicles and repair costs for the same period should be figured and that this amount should be used as the placeholder in the budget. In previous years, funds were released four times a year based on specific budget requests and monthly progress reports were submitted. At the time of the interview, however, the officer indicated that officials from PED had requested that petitions for disbursement of funding not be sent and that instead, Rs. 5,000 to 10,000 at no fixed amount would be sent at the discretion of PED. In fact, repeated several times was the implication that PED was in arrears in meeting budget needs of field officers, for motorcycle maintenance, POL, and travel allowances. One officer claimed: 'they (learning coordinators) have spent from their own pockets to meet the expenditure of field for two years, but how long can they keep it up? Now all their bills are lying stuck with PED (Male SDEO, Usta Mohammad, 1998).

The allegation that maintenance funding was in arrears was reiterated by other officers. One claimed that reimbursement for expenditure from the previous three years had not been provided.

Our outstanding bills are with the primary education directorate for two years now; they get bills from us every now and then but have not cleared any bill. As far as we are concerned we cannot get together on the matter. In my own case as I am using the vehicle and attending to the field, we are getting along by borrowing from our friends and relatives (Ibid 1998).

It was admitted, however, that a tranche of Rs.10,000 had been distributed to this officer for POL that was suggested would allow them to operate for three or four months on a reduced activity schedule.

In terms of payment of utilities for district offices, one DEO commented that the officers paid the bills for electricity and telephone but that the process involved submitting the bill along with the request to PED. Once the funds were released, the DEO paid the bill to the treasury department. This particular officer, however, indicated that the budget and funding for this particular line item would be released only provided that funds were available.
In short, budgeting control from the point of view of the district office had been centralised not decentralised since 1992 with DEOs losing what limited budgeting discretion they did have.

**Monitoring of the Curriculum**

In 1992, the Primary Teachers Alternate Training course (PTAC) was arranged which in the opinion of field officers yielded some very good short-term results especially for the training of LCs. Subsequent refresher courses on curriculum content were provided by PED in Quetta which required staff to travel from Jaffarabad. The main problem with the training was the fact that TA/DA (travel allowance/daily allowance) allegedly was not being reimbursed. Alternative accommodations had been made in terms of beds being provided for the participants but the teachers preferred the TA/DA and thus boycotted the training. These courses were not only discontinued for participants from Jaffarabad but for other districts as well. Training programs were found to be implicitly useful given the chance of teachers, LCs and other officers meeting their colleagues from other districts and the visitation to other schools afforded to participants travelling to the provincial capital.

In terms of decentralisation, the DEOs felt that they could have developed a teacher training courses at the district level.

*We could have organised the teacher training better, with less expenses than any team or master planner coming from Quetta making lots of expenses in this regard. Our LCs have been master planners in terms of teacher training, they know a lot more about problems of teachers than a person or team coming from outside. Even now whatever problems or shortcomings we have in our project, are being pointed out from here (Male SDEO, Usta Mohammad, 1998).*

**The Teacher Mentoring Programme**

In 1996, a teacher, mentoring programme known as the Primary Teachers Mentoring Programme (PTMP) was developed for Jaffarabad. Prior to this, a small cluster concept had been piloted. The idea for the small cluster
programme originated with one officer in Jaffarabad who had participated in a study tour of Indonesia and Malaysia. Upon returning home, the officer discussed a plan with his supervisor. Together they drafted the objectives of the programme that were decidedly student-based rather than teacher-based:

❖ To find a way to motivate a kid who runs away from school;
❖ To make module lessons less expensive;
❖ How to differentiate between the intelligent and weak students;
❖ How to teach kids through the module approach;
❖ How to contact parents;
❖ How to maintain school records (some teachers were not able to issue leaving certificates);
❖ How to discipline teachers; and
❖ How to improve teaching practices such as where to stand in the classroom, how to hold a book at the blackboard, how to adjust the light in the classroom for students, how to improve handwriting, how to detect and motivate non-productive students.

(Male SDEO, Dera Allah Yar, 1998)

The planning process for the mentoring programme also included consideration of district management tasks which the government through PED could not solve locally such as addressing lack of drinking water supplies at the schools, the clearing of thorns and other obstacles in pathways that lead to schools.

In regard to the training of teachers, the DEO and SDEOs explained about each super cluster and told them about its importance. The fifth grade core course curriculum was placed in front of the teachers and asked they were asked openly if they felt any problem in teaching especially the instructional materials so as to avoid the habit of rote learning. So through different practical examples we taught students different lessons. That was the small cluster programme that was a great success at first but failed because of monitoring constraints. As one officer indicated, ‘We just cannot visit them in the field due to lack of resources’ (Male SDEO, Dera Allah Yar, 1998).

Using the model of small clusters, PTMP/super clusters came into being whereby experienced teachers and assistant sub-divisional education officers (ASDEOs) were chosen to be the mentors. The criteria for selection of mentors was described by one respondent as those individuals who were well educated,
were highly respected among their peers, were the cleverest among their colleagues and possessed a strong command of their subject area. A total of 618 primary schools had been divided into ninety-three small clusters (sixty-two in Jhat Pat and thirty-one in Usta Mohammad). Field staff visited these units on the 25th of every month at the cluster centres.

Activities on this day were described. Teachers used to spend their first two hours at school and then they would come together at a centre to participate in the programme. These sessions focussed on a variety of topics.

❖ how to improve the teaching methods;
❖ how to control first-time students;
❖ how to compel students to take interest in their studies; and
❖ how to motivate the parents to send their children to school regularly.
(Male SDEO, Dera Allah Yar, 1998).

Monthly meetings were held at Dera Alla Yar district headquarters and at the mentoring centres. In attendance were male and female DEOs, male SDEOs and LCs and the mentors. Together, these individuals would spend one day in meetings and two days in workshops to solve educational, syllabus, and curriculum problems. One SDEO pointed out a blackboard in his office used to facilitate meetings whereby these issues were discussed and solutions were worked out together. When issues arose that could not be solved or explained at the local level, they were escalated to PED in Quetta. The SDEO gave an example that there had been some confusion concerning the name of a common tree to the area that was featured in the curriculum and called Kirar. The team sent a leaf sample to the PED for guidance in determining the name. PED was not able to help so the matter came back to the district and was finally solved by an experienced teacher who knew that the tree was called Karir in Urdu.

Problems like this and other basic mistakes in the curriculum of PED happen. So through this [mentoring] programme we also guided PED in developing the curriculum. Most of the time we solve these problems locally' (Male SDEO, Dera Allah Yar, 1998).

This particular mentor was responsible for thirty-eight teachers in his cluster. He indicated that the ideal ratio was approximately thirty to forty teachers to each mentor. Healthy competition was said to have existed among
the clusters and that competitions in debates, education quality and in examinations existed at the cluster level, sub division level and at the district level.

Respondents considered the results of the programme to be positive. The following statement characterised the positive outlook on the programme.

*As far as primary education is concerned I must accept that it is a great stride towards the improvement of education. Each month these dream teams come here and prepare an advance lesson together. They discuss the question and issues together and try to solve them as well. They try to teach the local teachers with the help of the educational modules and especially during the two-day workshop that they hold here is very beneficial to improve the teaching methods. We were also provided with opportunities to learn* (Ibid 1998).

The application of the mentoring programme to teachers training beyond the primary school system was cited as an outcome of the mentoring initiative. Teachers from middle and high schools were making demands for similar programmes to meet their needs. Also, field officers were reliant upon mentors to assist them in handling minor local issues. In many cases, if problems were reported to the education officers, they would contact the mentor responsible for the problem in question.

Here then, staff monitoring has been successfully decentralised—at least as local informants saw it. The mentoring process is depicted in the poster shown in Figure 5.6 below. A tree has been used to symbolise the mentoring process. This diagram is a good illustration of decentralisation through a process that is not top down. Instead, the foundation that is represented by PED provides and nurtures the process of training and mentoring that eventually reaches the leaves that in this instance represent the students.

What stands out about the mentoring experiment is that it was 'home-grown'. A local official brought an idea back from a visit and implemented this idea. It was not introduced by an outside agency with financial backing. The NGO facilitated this local initiative, it did not originate it.
The Tree of learning - from PED to Students

Source: Primary Education Directorate Poster Contest, 1998 Calendar
Interview data suggest that costs being incurred by mentors for getting to the local training programmes had been subsidised largely out-of-pocket although an award of Rupees 2000 had been paid to the nine mentors who directed each centre. One mentor indicated that he was not paid any travel assistance for coming to the district headquarters for the monthly meetings.

*It is twenty-five kilometres from my home and I do not even demand this travel allowance because they are like my own children and I can do this for them. I have a motorbike with me. I spend my own money on petrol and I do not even demand TA/DA* (Male SDEO, Dera Allah Yar, 1998).

Costs incurred, however, in actually facilitating the training program were somewhat ambiguous. Although some respondents indicated that they were happy with the programme despite having to front travel costs, the cultural undercurrent in this mixed response implied that most likely that training costs had also not been reimbursed but that travel reimbursement was more of an issue.

*We think it is highly appreciated, and we wish it to continue because it is in the benefit of our children. I must also mention here that all the concerned persons in this programme are working wholeheartedly beside the TA/DA interest. I believe, that these LCs sometimes travel more than seventeen kilometres to attend these workshops and have never claimed extra TA* (Ibid 1998).

As to the partnerships developed under the cluster programs, most responses were favourable. The story was told of how the mentoring process had been introduced to SCOPE. The cluster programme was first introduced by education officers who then introduced the implementation process. While the NGOs had basically worked with female education, they still had a good working relationship with officers and were open to collaboration according to one source.

SCOPE did experience union interference in the work that they conducted on the formation and the orientation of these sessions. The unions reportedly told teachers not to attend these meetings and, in fact, restricted thirty to thirty-five teachers who were to participate. This issue was referred to a board member of the NGO who had strong acquaintances with union members. At one
specific meeting, the union agreed to back off from preventing teachers from attending the training. The union complied, however, with the caveat that they would continue their opposition of community initiatives and teachers meetings as far as the newspapers were concerned for the sake of maintaining a façade of union antagonists (M.D. SCOPE, Jaffarabad, 1998).

5.5 Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed the extent to which decentralisation has occurred under several administrative functions in Jaffarabad. Figure 5.7 has been adapted to illustrate the findings—namely that according to evidence collected in the district of Jaffarabad, powers for supervision, budget allocations were centralised from PED. The monitoring of the curriculum was to some extent, more decentralised through the experiment of the mentoring programmes that had been fostered by local officials. Funding for these programmes, however, was not at the discretion of the officers running the programmes. The universal response in terms of local government representatives was that they possessed

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<th>PUBLIC EDUCATION SERVICE CATEGORIES</th>
<th>(continuum for locus of control)</th>
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<td>Centralised</td>
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<td>Supervision</td>
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Adapted from Winkler, 1989
very few powers, if any, to manage primary education effectively within their
district jurisdiction. Their authority for the administration of staff including
teachers was viewed as irrelevant given the district interference of feudals and
the lack of lower-tier, staff accountability due to nepotism with provincial
officers.

Tensions between the local NGO and the DEOs that arose over jurisdiction
for the development of community schools suggests a lack of clear policy
guidance for the initiative. Additionally, the Society, at the centre, and SCOPE,
located in the district, were identified as experiencing problems in coordination
of work that was meant to be decentralised. Local interference caused by
feudals, unions, and politicians also handicapped local administration in
Jaffarabad. These factors played a major role in formulating the administrative
culture that was found to exist in Jaffarabad.
Chapter 6

Case Study: Barkhan

There is a big communication gap existing between education field officers and the Directorate for Primary Education. What are they doing in PED? What do they want us to do? I want to improve the system of education in my area but I don't have the powers and I cannot do it alone.

Female Education Field Officer
Barkhan, 1998

Traditionally, there was an expectation in Balochi culture of receiving haal or 'information' from visitors of other settlements. Given the proclivity of movement of Balochi tribes, news was often verbally shared by anyone visiting from another settlement—in fact, it was expected (Baloch 1987:78). This tradition is still prevalent among the tribals in rural Balochistan given the distances that still exist between villages or settlements. Communication of this type, however, is not swift and is often hampered by poor infrastructure, e.g., few phone lines and impassable road conditions. Poor communications, in terms of both public and private interests are severely impacted. Given that Barkhan District is considered a tribal territory of Balochistan, the reliance of word-of-mouth alone has impeded the effective and efficient delivery of public services.
The delivery of public education is one such service where local education workers claimed that the flow of information from the 'centre' had been infrequent and lacking. Also, to their knowledge, no education policy had been developed or shared with them through formal communication lines. In this and through other expressed concerns, they felt they had very little power with which to control the affairs of the district since information of important directives or other matters were infrequently passed along.

This chapter presents empirical data concerning the district of Barkhan and is divided into four sections. The significance of selecting Barkhan as a case for this study will first be introduced. Secondly, this chapter introduces local institutions associated with primary education in the district. Thirdly, the locus of control over management functions of primary education system is analysed in connection with these district institutions. Evidence collected through interviews, documents and personal observations will be used to identify the locus and level of control that the district had at its disposal. Finally, theoretical conclusions are drawn to answer the primary and secondary research questions.

Similar to data collected in Jaffarabad, the information concerning Barkhan was collected at two levels. At the district level, the author conducted unstructured interviews with education officers, NGO representatives, villagers and community notables. In addition to these interviews, the author documented field observations and took photographs. Reports and other documents were collected from offices that we visited. At the central level, BEMIS data were provided. Together, this information provides the corpus of evidence for the case study.

6.1 Background

Barkhan District is located in the Zhob Division of Balochistan and gained its status as an independent district on December 31, 1991. Barkhan is slightly larger than Jaffarabad with an area of 3,411 sq. km that. It is situated along the eastern border of Balochistan next to the Dera Ghazi Khan district of the

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19 The Barkhan discussion relies heavily on the 1997 Bureau of Statistics Report; LAFAM data; field observation notes and semi-structured interviews that were documented in 1998.
Punjab Province and is surrounded by four other districts. Barkhan Town is the headquarters of this district (Bureau of Statistics 1997:8).

The district consists of one main valley, called Barkhan, and several smaller valleys, which are separated from the main valley by low ranges of hills running in a southwest direction. The hills in the district belong to the Suleman range. The principal hills are known as Kala Pahar in the north, Karwada, Bibar, Jandra and Mar or Mukhmar in the west, Andari and Sukha in the south, Phulai and Khawaj in the east, and Mazara, Tagha, Diga and Deka in the centre or Rakhni areas. Some portions of these ranges are rocky and not easily accessible (Ibid).

The early history of the Barkhan district is obscure. The name of the district, Barkhan, is derived from Baro Khan, the founder of the Barozai family of Panni, who either ruled this area on behalf of the Governors of Sibi or owned it himself. In the time of Moghul rule under Akbar’s leadership, it was called Janjah. A Jat community of Hindus (caste) inhabited this area. They had allegedly mixed with a small Pathan tribe that had migrated from Vihowa, a neighbouring district known today as Dera Ghazi Khan.

Socio-Economic Indicators

Socio-economic data for Barkhan are displayed in Table 6.1. What is known about the district has more to do with cultural and geographical matters as opposed to economic indicators, although most available data are unreliable as suggested above. The annual growth rate is shown at roughly six percent, which is the highest of all the districts in Balochistan. This statistic, however, is tempered by the finding that Barkhan was the fifth least populated district in the province. Barkhan, in fact, is sparsely populated (in contrast to Jaffarabad) with an estimated population for 1995 of 147,599. Roughly thirty-two per cent of the land in the district is arable rendering the agriculture sector as very nominal in Barkhan.
Table 6.1: Socio-economic Indicators for Barkhan District

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area</td>
<td>3,411 sq. km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(341,113 hectares)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>147,599 (1995 NIPS projection)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Density (1995)</td>
<td>42 per sq. km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Growth (from 1981 to 1995)</td>
<td>6.4% Annual Growth (NIPS projection)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment per Sector (%)</td>
<td>70% Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30% Government Services and Informal Sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Household Earnings in Agriculture Sector</td>
<td>Rs./1,500 (£19)/month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area Cultivated</td>
<td>16,859 hectares</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to Water</td>
<td>20% of population are serviced by water schemes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Social Organisation**

Social organisation in Barkhan is mainly tribal. There are three main tribes in Barkhan district: Khetran, Marri and Buzdar. The principal tribe is the Khetrans which are divided into three main clans: Dharas, Ispani and Phaliat (Government of Pakistan 1972:15). Khetrani is the predominantly spoken language. The Marri and Buzdar tribes who have settled in Barkhan speak Balochi. People living in and around Barkhan town mostly understand Urdu as well as Siraki and Pashtu (Bureau of Statistics 1997:12).

Family and kinship are the most important social institutions, which command loyalty of its members. The tribal system has a characteristic social pattern in which each tribe is united and organised under a sardar, who is the social and cultural leader of the tribe. Each clan or section has a chief or tumandar and a headman or wadera. The Jirga system is the principal system of tribal responsibility. Rawaj (tradition) is accepted as law. Jirga membership as well as posting of sardars and levies passes from father to son (Shah 1988).
Ethnic or tribal identity remains the potent force for both groups and individuals. The *Jirga* System is static and curbs ambition, as a result of which tribesmen tend to compromise with fate. Society is modelled on the authoritarian structure of the *Sardari* system, governing the relationship between the male members of the tribe. The hierarchical system of authority flows downward from the *Sardar* to the youngest male members of the tribe. However, the *Sardar's* role has changed over the years from one of defenders of tribal independence to one of mediation between the tribe and the state.

The political organisation of the tribal system is built upon two principles: hereditary authority and a personal bond of allegiance, in which loyalty is exchanged for protection (UNICEF 1995:12). The persistence of tribal politics and the continuing power and influence of local chiefs or *sardars* have been seen to affect and change the working of the established parliamentary system. Many of the elected representatives are *sardars* and tribal chiefs. The *sardari* System, however, is said to be in a transition stage undergoing changes due to economic, social and political independence permeating society, commercialism and rapid urbanisation (Bureau of Statistics 1997:19). In rural areas and especially among uneducated people, however, the *Sardari* System is still very influential.

The tribal set-up is rigid and tribal affiliation is prominent. *Birathri* or brotherhood still exists very strong pitting one tribe against another. The people of different tribes have not yet developed any social connection to bring them together. This disconnection leads to a low level of tolerance for any opposition. For over a century, the Marri and Khetrani tribes were involved in family and inter-tribal skirmishes that resulted in casualties and continued enmity (Ibid).

In order to protect their property, almost every family in rural areas is equipped with traditional arms. Another reason for keeping arms was the tribal disputes, which were very common among the people. In various instances during my field trip to Barkhan, I observed the public display of arms. On one occasion a pick-up truck full of men each carrying weapons stopped beside my vehicle. As Barkhan is a tribal area, provincial rules required that a security guard (who carried an automatic weapon) accompany me, as an
outsider. My security guard, while eating lunch at a roadside *chai khanna* (restaurant) near Barkhan Town, prepared his gun with the clip as a man approached me since we were not sure of his intentions. In the photo presented in Figure 6.1, a representative of the Government Teacher's Association is shown with his weapon that he carried with him at all times, including the interview which I conducted with he and other education officers.

**Figure 6.1: Image of a Tribal Society**

![Image of a Tribal Society](image)

*Source: Personal Photograph at Basti Azmat Sheher, Barkhan, 1998*

**Livelihoods**

Almost seventy per cent of Barkhan's population are engaged directly or indirectly in some sort of agriculture or animal husbandry. A smaller percentage of the population are engaged in the informal sector. Mining and industry are almost negligible, except petty trades in which very few people work. Respondents in Barkhan independently claimed that farmers earned roughly Rs./1,500 per month (£25 in 1997).

The primary crops grown are wheat, fodder, vegetable, *jawar* (cereal), onion, garlic, melon and fruits. The major fruits harvested are apples, almonds, plums, apricots, pomegranates and peaches. The average production per hectare is low compared to the provincial figures. The reason for low average production is that the majority of the farmers are tribesmen who have little knowledge about
improved varieties of seeds and fertiliser. Most farmers use traditional methods of planting crops such as bull and oxen for ploughing.

Due to the law of inheritance, small land holdings are further fragmented, which makes the land economically less profitable for cultivation. The yield per hectare can be increased through the use of better quality seeds, fertilisers, pesticides and better irrigation facilities. One hurdle to agriculture, however, is that Barkhan is faced with monsoon rains during March which sometimes brings such harsh weather as hail that destroy the crops (Male DEO, Barkhan, 1998).

The production in barani (non-irrigated) areas fluctuates depending on rainfall, and thus the income for the farmers becomes uncertain. The marketing system is not developed and commission agents exploit the farmers by determining prices. There was a reported need to improve the marketing system and to assist in the establishment of farming market committees, so that the produce could be sent to the correct market, at a proper time and in preferred quantities. Farm-to-market roads are poor rendering access to markets very difficult (Bureau of Statistics 1997:35).

Livestock is the second source of income in the district. The people mostly keep sheep and goats, but also other animals like cattle, donkeys, camels and horses. These animals play a vital role in the economy of the district and provide food of rich nutritional value such as milk, meat and their by-products like wool, butter, oil, cheese, curd, skin and intestines. There are problems in the development of livestock sector with regard to grass and feeds, health facilities and marketing. Farmers reportedly dispose of large numbers of sheep, goats and cows during a hard year when sufficient grass and fodder are not available.

Farmers with cattle generally keep only three to six animals but some have more. The herd size of other animals varies, depending upon the availability of feed. Men, women and children supervise the grazing of these animals. Since this work is largely a family enterprise, these services are not compensated. Women look after the animals within the house. They also collect fodder and perform duties like milking of goats, sheep and cows.
The extent of child labour varies between urban and rural areas. In rural areas, the absence of education opportunities leave children with no alternative but to participate in the work-force at an early age. They perform tasks such as grazing of livestock, weeding and harvesting of crops. In urban areas, children work in small restaurants, automobile workshops, tailoring shops, carpenters and welder's workshops and auto engine shops. The children join most of these jobs as apprentices, so that after some years they will be able to work in their own businesses. Employers exploit this situation by treating them as trainees and paying them low salaries. In addition, children are required to help carry water (particularly girls) and fire wood. From an early age on, girls are involved in the daily routine of domestic work. During their mothers' pregnancies and childbirth, they remain at home and perform a variety of household chores. Absolute poverty and the lack of social security have been attributed as the key influences of child labour.

In the absence of updated census figures, the exact nature of growth of population and migration is not known. The underdevelopment of agriculture and livestock sectors and the absence of industries result in little job opportunities; the labour absorption in these sectors is insignificant. Unemployment figures were also found to be increasing. The only alternative left is self-employment in the informal sector. One respondent commented that some individuals were involved in smuggling goods from Quetta through Barkhan and across the border to Afghanistan (Female DEO, Loralai, 1998).

**Gender Roles and Relations**

According to the 1973 constitution, all Pakistani citizens are equal, with no distinction based on gender alone. The State may, however, make special provisions for the protection of women and children, which show up especially in labour legislation. The constitution ensures the full participation of women in all levels of civil of society. Women have the right to vote and to hold office, with a quota of seats reserved for women in national and provincial legislative bodies. But constitutional guarantees of equality have been superseded in many instances by discriminatory legislation or have not been enforced in actual
practice. Also the force of custom most often prevails over even the most enlightened official laws, making it difficult for women to claim the legal rights they are guaranteed (UNICEF 1995:47).

In most social circles men hold a monopoly of power in the public arena. In the political domain, local level chiefs and tribal authorities are always men, as are the members of local councils of elders or jirgas. It is rare to find examples of parallel women's groups, from which women leaders may emerge and collective action planned. Men also set the terms for moral and cultural values. Religious authorities are always male and local cultural codes of honour stem from a male value system that often have components based on the subordination of women. These may include denial of women's rights in matters of property and inheritance that are recognised in Islam, and exclusion of women from consideration as equals in maintaining social order (Ibid:39). The general characteristics of a tribal society are prevalent in the district as in other parts of the province. Barkhan society is patriarchal and male dominated. The role of women in decision-making is negligible, as men make the majority of the decisions. Their community role is also limited to a great extent as their social interaction outside the immediate household is limited. There are some occasions, like births, death, illness, marriages, etc. which serve as one of the few socially sanctioned forms of mobility available to women. These occasions provide women with a forum for exchange of information and ideas and improvement of social ties and alliances between themselves.

Economic participation of women differs from that of men. Women are traditionally engaged in household activities such as cooking, washing and fetching water and wood, taking care of the children and other dependent members of the family, and producing handicraft articles. Men do most of the outdoor work. A very small proportion of the female labour force is engaged in agriculture. Lack of education facilities and social and cultural bindings are the main constraints for women's active participation in economic activities (Ibid:19).

Women's status in society is very low. They are treated as an asset and are at the mercy of their husbands and relatives. A woman is not allowed to inherit property except in a few middle class families. Polygamy is still practiced by
many men. Sometimes it is socially approved to take a second wife, for example if it concerns the widow of a brother or other relative. In tribal society, people prefer to have more male children. This burdens women with multiple childbearing, affecting her and her children’s health. The position of a newly wed woman is often precarious, as she is both young and an outsider in the family. A woman without children always remains an outsider and the fear of her husband taking a second wife haunts her (Bureau of Statistics 1997:20).

Bride price has been a social phenomenon in Barkhan. In some cases more than Rs. 100,000 (£1,250 in 1997) is paid. The result is that men who cannot afford to pay the bride price have to wait until they are over thirty years for marriage. But the custom of paying bride price is slowly fading away among the educated classes. It was reported that if the husband dies, his family would sell her to another husband instead of returning her to her original family (Female SDEO, Barkhan, 1998).

Women are poorly represented due to socio-cultural public barriers. Constitutional and legal rights that are codified are not sufficient to change the attitudes of the society towards the role and rights of women.

**Infrastructure**

In Barkhan district the condition of physical infrastructure and the provision of local services are weak. The maintenance of roads is poor. There are one hundred eleven kilometres of metalled road and three hundred forty eight kilometres of shingled road in the district. Thirty-six kilometres of the metalled is national highway, the rest is provincial road. The Federal Government maintains the national highway. The maintenance of shingle roads is the responsibility of provincial government. Except for the national highway, roads are not properly maintained, due to lack of funds.

The main sources of energy are kerosene oil, electricity, wood and liquid propane gas (LPG). For lighting purposes electricity and kerosene oil are mostly used, for cooking purposes wood/bushes, LPG and dung cake. In urban areas mostly electricity and LPG are used, whereas in rural area, where electricity is
not available, kerosene oil, wood/bushes and dung cakes are used. Natural gas is not available although there is demand for it. Since the district is located far away from the main gas pipeline, it is too costly to supply gas. The district has no railroad or airport. Industrial development is negligible considering these deficits to Barkhan’s infrastructure.

Water-borne diseases are common. Lack of sanitation and lack of potable water sources are health risks. Health services are inadequate to meet the health requirements in the district. The number of health care facilities is limited and unevenly distributed, especially for women and children. Lack of female doctors and workers, who are unwilling to work in rural areas, add to the health problems faced by women in the district. Social and cultural constraints preclude women from seeing male medical practitioners. In Barkhan, maternal and infant mortality rates and fertility rates are relatively high. The concept of family planning is rarely promoted. Provision of services is concentrated in urban areas and severely ignoring the rural areas. The emphasis is on medicinal more than on preventive measures. The health care facilities also lack provision of clean water and sanitation. Working conditions are poor and human resources are limited as are medicines and supplies. Financial constraints also add to their weak capacity.

Means of communication are not spread to the interior of the district. PTV transmission is not available at all. Telephone facilities should be extended. Fax, courier and telegraph facilities are not available for public access. Although some areas are linked with the national power grid station, most areas are deprived of electricity. The supply of electricity for agricultural purposes is so limited, that out of the total of seven hundred forty tube-wells only twenty-three are electric generated and the rest are diesel fuelled.

The poor development of infrastructure is basically a result of a lack of resources. A major constraint is the weakness of institutions, lack of adequate planning, inappropriate choice of technologies and lack of involvement of communities.
Selection of Barkhan

The selection of Barkhan as a case study was made for several reasons as described in Box 6.1. According to the April 1997 School Census, Barkhan had less than half the number of primary schools located in Jaffarabad. The 1997 data indicate that there were 335 government primary schools in Barkhan, the lowest of all twenty-six, education districts. Barkhan's total primary school enrolment was 10,838 students. Upon consultation with technical consultants who worked in Balochistan in 1997, Barkhan was rated among the bottom three least effective administratively. Barkhan is a Winter Zone District with the school period lasting from 29th February to 16th December to accommodate extreme climates of these areas in contrast with Jaffarabad, which is a Summer Zone District.

The previous section provides more background on social issues within the district than on the economy of the district. This discussion suggests that the socio-economic condition of Barkhan is quite underdeveloped; a finding that makes the selection of Barkhan District for analysis interesting when considering the notion of decentralisation of public education.

Barkhan, as a case study, illustrates the dire social and economic outlook that shadows many districts throughout Balochistan. In terms of education, Barkhan has shown promise in its preliminary success at enrolling girls in primary schools within the period of study (see statistical data presented below). However, the social impediments to girls' schooling and the power that tribal leadership wields in society raises noticeable concerns for the future of administration of education in this area. These two issues are germane to the discussion of decentralisation and provide insight into what types of societal processes could help or hinder the efficient management of primary education at the local level. The research question asks how is it possible to apply plans for the decentralisation of primary education in an assumed highly centralised environment.

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20 BEMIS Data are inconsistent as to the precise enrolment figures. Varying BEMIS documents indicate conflicting figures.
Box 6.1: Rationale for Case Selection

Barkhan has been selected as one case in a multiple case study research approach. The rationale for its selection follows:

❖ Barkhan District belongs to the smaller districts in the province and has a relatively small population. The estimated population growth rate is higher than the one of the province as a whole and the population density is about twice the density in the province as a whole;

❖ Barkhan scores low on the indicators related to agricultural production. The absolute value of agricultural production and the value per hectare are the fifth lowest in Balochistan indicating a high level of poverty;

❖ The District holds a position in the middle with regard to the pupils/teachers ratio in primary schools, while the enrolment figures are relatively good for boys and bad for girls;

❖ Reports from PED project staff indicated that Barkhan has shown little success in local management and collaboration among local institutions involved with primary education administration;

❖ The coverage of the population by water supply schemes belongs to the lowest in Balochistan;

❖ Barkhan represents a ‘winter zone’ district in contrast to Jaffarabad that is a ‘summer zone’ district; and

❖ Fairly poor infrastructure is evident in terms of roads and communication.

Source: Bureau of Statistics, 1997

The remainder of this chapter develops the educational portfolio of Barkhan describing statistical data; enumerates the roles of educational institutions in Barkhan; and relays evidence to answer the question of the extent to which decentralisation has been achieved according to Winkler's matrix.
6.2 Education Organisation in Barkhan

The organisation of primary education in Barkhan resembles that of Jaffarabad and most other districts in Balochistan. For example, the number of female schools is significantly less than boys schools, district education officers are the government officials responsible for the administration of education, dropout rates among both sexes of students is high and literacy among boys but especially girls is dangerously low. This section provides a statistical overview of government schools in Barkhan.

**Government School System**

**Primary Schools**

In Barkhan district, the total number of primary schools in 1997 was 378, out of which 306 schools were for boys, 38 were government girls' schools and 40 were CSP community girls' schools. Of all primary schools in the district, 250 schools had one teacher, fifty-seven schools had two teachers, thirteen schools had three teachers, and two schools had four teachers and two schools had more than four teachers. The remaining schools are unaccounted. In 1992, the total number of primary schools for boys was 267. In 1997 the number was 306, which shows an increase of fifteen per cent. Over the same period the number of girls' primary schools grew from twelve to seventy two, showing an increase of an extraordinary five hundred per cent. Forty of the new girls' schools were CSP schools and could account for the fact that an increase of 156% in girls' enrolment was achieved between 1992 and 1997 so quickly. Boy's primary enrolments grew by 37% starting at a primary enrolment of 5,889 in 1992 and increasing to 8,075 by 1997 (see Table 6.2 for Barkhan school enrolment figures).
Table 6.2 Statistical Overview of Barkhan Government Schools

Number of Students Enrolled in Educational Institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enrolment (in public sector)</th>
<th>Number of Pupils</th>
<th>1992</th>
<th>1997</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary School</td>
<td></td>
<td>5889</td>
<td>1081</td>
<td>6970</td>
<td>8075</td>
<td>2763</td>
<td>10,838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Schools</td>
<td></td>
<td>1323</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>1398</td>
<td>1252</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>1318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School</td>
<td></td>
<td>545</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>561</td>
<td>739</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>761</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: BEMIS

Number of Educational Institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Schools</th>
<th>Number of Institutions</th>
<th>1992</th>
<th>1997</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level</td>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Schools</td>
<td></td>
<td>267</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Schools</td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Schools</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: BEMIS & DEO

Number of Teachers in Educational Institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Teachers Level</th>
<th>Number of Teachers</th>
<th>1992</th>
<th>1997</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary School</td>
<td></td>
<td>432</td>
<td>436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle School</td>
<td></td>
<td>120</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School</td>
<td></td>
<td>55</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>607</td>
<td>734</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: BEMIS
Middle Schools

The total number of middle schools in the district in 1997 was fifteen, out of which thirteen were for boys and two for girls. In 1992, the number of middle schools was fourteen. The new school was a girls' middle school. At the middle level, dropout rates are quite high, especially for girls. To reduce the dropout rate, private examination at middle level has been banned.

High Schools

The total number of high schools in the district was six during 1992 increasing to seven in 1997. The new school was a boys' school. Only one girls high school was in existence and high school dropout rates were high, again particularly for girls.

As shown below in Figure 6.2, the distribution of primary school buildings falls in the main valley of Barkhan that spans the length of the district. The Balochistan Education Management Information System (BEMIS) Cell stationed within the Directorate for Primary Education in Quetta created the map through a school mapping initiative. The schools were mapped using a GIS system that beams the data via satellite to a database. As shown on the map, a majority of the schools appear to be located closely to roads suggesting either that only accessible schools could be mapped or that populations are more concentrated along roads which serve as both economic and communication links.

*It is due to the distribution of population in this area, the tribes are scattered like this. To some extent the road also is the reason, as many schools are built on the roadside* (Male DEO, Barkhan, 1998).
Figure 6.2: Distribution of Schools in Barkhan

Legend 1
- Boys Middle
- Girls Middle
- Boys Primary
- Girls Primary

Legend 2
- International Boundary
- Provincial Boundary
- District Boundary
- Water Channel
- Railway Line
- Roads
  - Shingled
  - Paved
- Places

0  10  20
Kilometers

Data Source: ESRI Census 1997
**School Buildings**

Except the schools in urban areas, most of the primary school buildings in the district are in poor condition. There are forty-seven shelterless primary schools, with classes held under a tree or out in the open air. The primary school buildings are poorly ventilated and dimly lit and made of mud and straw only. Overcrowding in these buildings is the norm. The majority of the schools have only two rooms to accommodate six grades and are characterised by a dearth of even the most basic equipment, such as blackboards, chalk, and mats for the children. Most are lacking as well in basic facilities like clean water supply and proper sanitation.

**Figure 6.3: Primary School Building Under Construction Along the Main Highway—Barkhan**

![Primary School Building Under Construction Along the Main Highway—Barkhan](image)

*Source: Personal Photograph, March 1998*

The middle and high school buildings are to some extent in better condition. They are provided with facilities like water supply, toilet, playgrounds etc. Some of the middle schools are without a compound wall, however.
MPAs (members of public assembly) and MNA (members of national assembly) have influenced the location of construction sites for schools.

_The construction and site selection is totally influenced by the political powers. If the people have support of MPAs and MNAs, they can have a school, if not then there is no school for them_ (GTA Representative, Barkhan, 1998).

Also, for some schools local people have donated the school building. It was observed in one PTSMC report that the people of Barkhan were more interested in getting schools built for personal use than a sincere motivation to improve education in that District. Local families, in fact, used the school buildings for guestrooms and storerooms (Muhammad 1996). During our visit to one school, the female SDEO had to ask one of the children playing near the structure to fetch the keys from his relative so that we could gain entrance for inspection. She later told us that the waderas (tribal heads) take the keys for the school buildings and that her only access to what in most other districts is ‘government property’ was through tribal leaders. Other evidence indicated that schools were being built sometimes with four rooms that in reality only had an enrolment of five to ten students.

The female SDEO gave an insight into the power that the Waderas had over the construction of schools built under the CSP program.

_The waderas have a heavy involvement, because these community support process, our schools, are opened with their consent, until it is their will they cannot have these schools. Waderas are the sardar [chief] of the tribe and have the say in all matters of the area. In each and everything, he decides what is to be done_ (Female SDEO, Barkhan, 1998).

**Other Education Data**

According to 1997 data, the average pupil/teacher ratio in Barkhan district was 18:1. The ratio for boys' primary schools was 25:1 and for girls' primary schools the ratio was 27:1. The pupil/teacher ratio at primary level in Balochistan was 24:1 for boys and 43:1 for girls. So when compared to the whole
province the ratio in Barkhan was higher for boys and considerably lower for girls.

With respect to middle schools, the pupil/teacher ratio for both sexes in Balochistan was 22:1. The ratio in the district was 9:1, which is better than the whole province. It could be due to high dropout rates. The pupil/teacher ratio at high school level for both sexes in Balochistan was 7:1, while the ratio in the district is 6:1. Again the ratio looks better for the district, but the low ratio may again be attributed to high dropout rates and also to non-availability of schools for admission seeking students at high school level.

The average completion rates in Balochistan are six years to complete grade five, another three years to complete grade eight and yet another two years to complete high school. More-or-less the same figures are true for the district.

At middle school level the dropout rate for boys in the district is eighty-three per cent and for girls it is ninety-seven per cent. At high school level the dropout rate for boys is forty-four per cent and for girls is fifty-nine per cent. Dropout rates are high due to variety of reasons. It includes poor learning conditions and inappropriate teaching methods, irrelevant curriculum, corporal punishment and failure to pass from one grade to the next, leading to discouragement. Lack of support from parents and the need for children's labour at home are also contributing factors. The reported cost to attend a government school is only Rs. 20 per year (£0.25 in 1997) (Female DEO, Loralai, 1998). This cost is a fraction of average earnings of farmers in Barkhan but becomes a large expense when factored over a large number of children per household.

6.3 Local Institutions

The characteristics of primary education in Barkhan, while largely similar to the other districts, are distinct in character given the specific socio-economic and even cultural dynamics of the district. Local institutions in Barkhan and their effectiveness at managing the process of education were
assessed according to the available resources, staff, and social dynamics prevalent at the time of the research.

Female District Education Office

Because of the low number of girls schools in Balochistan, female district education officers are not posted in all twenty-six districts. Given the smaller distribution throughout the province, the female DEOs are responsible for covering three to five districts within a division. Female administrators are therefore doubly constrained: first, by the vast geographical territory falling under their jurisdiction; and second, by their having to rely (for cultural reasons) on the availability of very few staff members to assist with school supervisory visits, and appropriate transportation (World Bank 1993:7). Barkhan District is one of these districts in Balochistan that is managed remotely by a female district education officer who sits in a neighbouring district office. Figure 6.4 below illustrates the hierarchical connection between the Barkhan Subdivisional Education Officer and the Loralai Female DEO.

Figure 6.4 Female District Education Office, Loralai
Organisation Chart

![Organisation Chart]

Source: Female DEO, Barkhan, 1998
The female DEO for Loralai commented that she needed more employees to help supervise the one hundred thirty one schools that reportedly fell within her Loralai jurisdiction. She also was responsible for the supervision of SDEO offices in two other districts (Musa Khel and Barkhan) that were also under-staffed.

The SDEO for Barkhan was found to be working in an office in Barkhan Town. As shown in Figure 6.4, she was managing a staff of one assistant, one driver, and one other servant who worked as a night watchman to guard the office. The SDEO also had an assigned government vehicle for use in travelling to schools and other official business. In her interview, she indicated that she and her Learning Coordinator would spend on the average ten days per month visiting schools in the 'open' season. Her experience prior to her two years as SDEO was the position of headmistress at Barkhan Girls' High School. The SDEO mentioned that she prefers her former position of principal at the Girls Government High School because of the fewer headaches associated with her former position as compared with the SDEO post. In the observation made in this study, she spent more time in her old office (principal's office) than in her new one but this could have been the case due to the teacher—training that she was involved with at the Girls High School. However, when she unlocked her particular office for the first time during our visit, it appeared that very little business had been conducted there. There was only a large empty desk and very little other office furniture.

There were two posters on the door of her office. One was an announcement concerning the community support process (see Box 6.2 below). This poster was significant in that it provides guidelines to community members to assess whether they are entitled to the development of a community school for their particular village.

However, while the intention of this notice was to peak interest, anecdotal evidence suggested to us that the process had not been as clear-cut as claimed on the poster. During our visit to the office, a man approached us and
complained that many schools were built in favour of the waderas. He further indicated that in his area, which he described, as deserving of a school had not received one despite the fact that he had petitioned PED for a long time to build one. Each successive year he was promised a school and/or put on a list but one had not been constructed. Other people who were standing around us during this discussion also started complaining that they had been waiting for nearly two years to get a government school building sanctioned in their area.

Box 6.2 Community School Advertisement

Information for the Public

❖ Do you have a girls' primary school in your village?
❖ If not, then do you have a middle or matric pass girl in your village?
❖ If yes, then do you have 25 or 30 school going girls in your village?
❖ If yes, then do you want to teach your girls?
❖ If yes, then will you be willing to donate a piece of land for the construction of school to the government?

If your village meets the above conditions, then submit your request to the DEO (Women's) office, or contact the 'LAFAM' office directly.

Address: LAFAM (Registered), Poultry Farm Road, Loralai.
Fax/Telephone: 0821-410525

Source: Translated from Urdu; based on personal photograph taken in Barkhan, 1998

The second poster on the SDEO's office door was a quote from the Quran that talks about a time that wealth and human satisfaction will preoccupy people from doing good (See Box 6.3).

Box 6.3 Poster Against Corruption

Prophet's Saying (PBUH)

A time will come upon the people when their purpose will be their stomach, and wealth would be their honour, and women will be their Kibla (their desire), and income would be their religion. They would be the worst people, and they will not have anything in the hereafter.

Source: Translated from Urdu, based on personal photograph taken in Barkhan, 1998
The irony of this poster was that it was found attached to a building that was most likely a product of and a haven for corruption. This government office had been constructed in August of 1997 (approximately six months prior to our interview). Construction was accomplished with substandard materials and we observed that water leaks had caused shorts in the electrical hardware surrounding the light switches/electrical outlets. Other cracks and leaks were apparent. A few men who had gathered in the courtyard in front of the building approached my interpreter to inform us about the poor condition of this building. Construction data in Balochistan indicate that cheap materials are generally purchased and used to construct buildings while the major proportion of the funding goes to contractors.

In this building, we also observed that a store room contained ‘new’ classroom furniture but in very poor shape due to poor construction and low quality materials, i.e. the chair upholstery was ripped, tables broken, chalkboards were falling apart (See Figure 6.5).

**Figure 6.5: "New" Furniture in Storage--Barkhan**

![Image of broken furniture](source: Personal Photograph, March 1998)

This furniture was to be distributed to the teachers for their schools but was in such bad shape that it could not be used, thus it was in store. The poster (Box 6.3) is again haunting in that the quality of the furniture was substandard due to
the corrupt practice of using cheap materials to benefit those exchanging the money for it (GTA President, Barkhan, 1998).

Another observation at the SDEOs office was made concerning the disbursement of female teachers' salaries. The task of this periodic disbursement had been delegated by the SDEO to her assistant who was male. On one of our visits to her office, this superintendent was handling the disbursement of salaries. Cash was lying around on his desk and crowds of men were gathered around him to collect the salaries for their sisters, wives or daughters. The female teachers rarely collected their salaries because women were not able to travel in public (see Figure 6.6). The SDEO clearly did not feel comfortable being around such a large gathering of men on this day that she accompanied us to her office. Professional reasons for her uneasiness will be explained in greater detail below.

The DEO/Loralai listed her roles and responsibilities inclusive of monitoring government girls' schools and supporting the development of community schools. In this respect, the government officer's role included conducting the qualifying tests for the teachers, releasing the posts, verifying the building/structure and providing the certificate and conducting the opening ceremony of the school.

Figure 6.6: Collecting Female Teachers' Salaries in Barkhan

Source: Personal Photograph, March 1998
Male District Education Office

Whereas this study found female education officers controlled by male and wadera dominance, the male DEO and SDEO officers, in contrast, were observed as being heavily influenced and even controlled by the leadership of the local teachers union. At most points of contact that we had with the education officers, the head of the GTA (teacher’s union) was always present. The Union’s role in the education system will be explained in greater detail below. However, at this point it should be noted that the power that the Union wielded over teachers rendered the government management structure powerless. In fact, the DEO office served little more than a satellite or field office of PED by which to distribute school materials, furniture, and to disburse teacher salaries. The DEO and SDEO were observed as being merely figureheads for the management of education in Barkhan. The power dynamic could be a result of the fact that the post of DEO was a fairly modern creation established in 1993. The Union and the tribal leaders presumably were in control of matters relating to education administration for this area before the installation of the male district education office although this assumption could not be confirmed. The notion that the DEO’s authority had encroached on the pre-existing power structure carries some validity given the anecdotal evidence described below.

On our visit to the education field offices, we witnessed the distribution of furniture and salaries. In front of the SDEO’s office building were small clusters of chairs, tables, water containers, chalkboards, mats, etc. The office building was unprotected by barrier walls and the teachers were storming the yard in small pick-up truck swarming around the piles and loading the materials. One man was waving a piece of paper at us and telling us that this was the list of materials for his schools but he only received fifty per cent of what he had requested. The president of the district teacher association was present talking to the teachers and in some way supervising the distribution of the furniture. He pointed out that most of the furniture and materials were damaged indicating that PED ‘gets rich’ while sending this junk to them. ‘They tender it from there, appoint contractors and by the time they get here it is broken and completely unusable’. He encouraged me to photograph the poorly constructed furniture (see Figure 6.7).
We then proceeded to the DEO's office nearby. It had a barrier wall and we found that the SDEO was occupying a desk and office in this building because there was no barrier wall at his office that might afford some security for him. In fact, the SDEO indicated that his office was being used as a storeroom. While we were sitting in his office, the DEO ordered the peon to fetch tea. Upon returning to the office where we were sitting, the peon exclaimed that the teachers were not only taking the furniture, but that they were also taking everything out of the storeroom. The head of the teacher's union was also sitting in the DEO's office with us and indicated that the furniture that was being distributed would most likely never make it to the schools, but that the teachers would be taking it to their homes. He noticeably took no responsibility for this practice.

Figure 6.7: Distribution of School Furniture in Barkhan

Source: Personal Photograph, March 1998.

The DEO was sitting at his desk with the SDEO sitting at his right side. There were a lot of people given that this day was a busy one with the distribution of salaries (first of every month) and furniture. The SDEO periodically signed papers for visitors. The president of the District Teachers
Association, who was sitting in the office, appeared to be running the operation, giving orders. He was obviously regarded as a decision-maker.

Figure 6.8 Male District Education Field Office, Barkhan

Organisation Chart

Source: Male DEO, Barkhan, 1998

In terms of staffing, the DEO/SDEO's offices are well positioned. The organisation chart shown in Figure 6.8 indicates that the number of staff for such a small district should be sufficient for doing the work required. In fact, both field officers confirmed that all posts had been filled and that none were vacant. The SDEO explained that he was basically responsible for administration in the entire district of Barkhan and supervises one ASDEO and five learning coordinators. Each learning coordinator was responsible for inspecting sixty schools each given the total number of boys' schools was three hundred and six. The DEO appeared to be more removed from the system of administration, an observation revealed by his own reaction to questioning that the ASDEO and five learning coordinators were 'concerned with the SDEO' and not his office (Male DEO, Barkhan, 1998). The ASDEO was reportedly obligated
to provide monitoring tasks. The male DEO claimed that the ASDEO had to
inspect primary schools including Mosque schools. His inspection would include
a check on whether the teachers were present or absent, their capability of
teaching and he would provide advice when called upon by the teachers. There
were five learning coordinators (LCs) at the time of the research who were held
responsible for monitoring primary teachers in appropriated clusters of sixty
schools each. It was a requirement that each of the five LCs visit their sixty
schools each month. It was pointed out that the LCs normally only spent ten
days in making these school visits (Ibid). The learning coordinators
responsibilities included assisting teachers with problems encountered in
teaching the curriculum and handling any other problems facing the teachers.

Two other anecdotal facts that support the DEO's distance with the
workings of the district are described. First, in an interview with an education
administrator in Quetta, it was reported that the DEO/Barkhan was rarely in
Barkhan physically and that he had spent most of his time in Quetta with his
family. The other fact that a bed and heater were found in the DEO's office
would suggest that he might not have a permanent residence in Barkhan Town,
although this latter observation could not be confirmed.

Other staff members were observed working in the DEO's office, however
many rooms seemed to be shut. Although electricity and a telephone line was
available in Barkhan Town, no computer had been delivered to the DEO's office
even though one had been promised by a PED representative. It was reported
that no staff member was qualified to use a computer although the
superintendent had requested training.

Community Support Process (CSP)

The concept of community participation is not new in the district according
harvest time and other periods of labour peaks were noted as common among
people in Barkhan. Irrigation activities, such as digging and management of
karezes, are centuries old and were generally carried out together. Communities
have served important functions in many areas, and fluid irrigation systems,
including the construction of minor earth filled dams, were built and rehabilitated by the beneficiary communities. All users of these water schemes contributed labour and funds according to the size of the land they held. Such institutions were considerably weakened and began to disintegrate to some extent, following state interventions in rural development. These interventions in turn have fostered the expectation among the people that the government should provide funding and development projects for them. This dynamic has reportedly led to a social environment in which people are inclined to remain indifferent towards their fellow tribesmen and others for cooperation. This historical summary serves as context against which innovative beneficiary participation programs in education were to be confronted. Ironically, the CSP program as it became known throughout the province, began in the Zhob division with CSP schools and teachers identified in Barkhan.

In Barkhan, the NGO (LAFAM) in co-ordination with the female education officers were the responsible agents for supporting the process of the development of girl's schools in co-operation with villages and communities. Initially, it had been conducted through the support of the Society. The Female SDEO for Barkhan described the process:

*The NGOs come and see the whole process through, both LAFAM and the people from the Society. There is a survey of the whole village in which they see what is the number of girls and whether a school can be opened. Then they come to me and tell me that we have conducted a survey and that there are fifty girls there who want to go to school and that you should test the teacher. Then we take the teacher's test and if she passes we say OK, otherwise we give her a chance for one or two months (Female, SDEO, Barkhan, 1998).*

LAFAM's organisation and its activities in support of development and management of primary education are described below. Other community institutions where evidence has shown some education management activity both positive and negative are also described below, e.g., village education committees, PTSMCs, and the teachers' union.
Light of Awareness for Fair Advancement of Mankind (LAFAM)

Only one NGO was identified as actively supporting primary education development in the district of Barkhan. Although based in the neighbouring district of Loralai that is the division headquarters for the Zhob region, Light of Awareness for Fair Advancement of Mankind (LAFAM) had been working in Barkhan district at the time of this research. LAFAM was established in 1992 and was registered in 1994 under the Voluntary Social Welfare Agencies Ordinance of 1961. In 1994, LAFAM worked under OXFAM funding for the prevention of drug abuse in the town of Loralai. LAFAM, in fact, was a drug abuse treatment and rehabilitation centre. LAFAM’s policy document (1996) indicates that it was a non-governmental, non-profit, non-sectarian organisation. It is further stated that the organisation consisted of ‘volunteers dedicated and committed to health, education and management professionals’. LAFAM’s mission—statement suggested that community participation was a desired outcome of their work:

_LAFAM is working for the sustainable participatory development of semi-urban, rural and tribal communities of Balochistan_ (LAFAM 1996).

Further, LAFAM’s goal statement, in terms of its work in the education sector, also subscribed to the notion of participation:

_The goal of LAFAM is to ensure parents participation in an organised way to acquire their ownership of existing Government schools for effective utilisation of existing resources for enhanced quality and environment for education_ (LAFAM, 1996).

According to the account of LAFAM’s Field Manager, the NGO went through a significant transformation in its first five years. In 1992 a few doctors and professors together raised the concern that the town of Loralai was suffering from an epidemic of drug usage by local youth. In particular, there

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21 LAFAM was initially registered under the name _Loralai Awami Falahi Markaz_ (Loralai People’s Welfare Centre). The name was changed to reflect a more regional role it was assuming in terms of social support. That is why the name ‘Loralai’ was dropped and the new name substituted. The acronym ‘LAFAM’, however, remained unchanged (LAFAM interview, 1998).
were a significant number of heroin addicts. At that time, they established the NGO of LAFAM to aid in eradicating the drug problem. In 1992, LAFAM was registered through the Social Welfare Act of 1956 soon followed by the induction of the mandatory Majlis-e-Amala (Board of Directors). With an initial membership of forty-five individuals, seven members were selected as the first Board. The Board was responsible for overall policy-making process. They also established a direct education centre for initiating a social mobilization process. Awareness campaigns were launched in the community of Loralai as a means for combating heroin and other drug addiction. Additionally, the founding members started treatment centres given that a majority of the members of the Board were doctors. OXFAM and the European Union continued their financial support of LAFAM through 1996. From 1993 to 1996, more than 100 patients were reportedly treated and cured and most of them were reportedly rehabilitated in this region.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>LAFAM established in Loralai under OXFAM support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Registered as a non-governmental, not-for-profit organisation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994-96</td>
<td>Drug Abuse Treatment &amp; Rehabilitation Centre operational.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Department of Education, Government of Balochistan Primary Education Project contract for the establishment of PTSMCs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Drug Abuse Treatment &amp; Rehabilitation Centre closed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995-97</td>
<td>Contract awarded for Royal Netherlands Embassy sponsored project: Primary Education Quality Improvement Project (PEQIP).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Representatives of LAFAM indicated in their interview that organisational problems (undisclosed) caused the termination or closing of the drug abuse treatment and rehabilitation centre. Transitional issues were also noted at the beginning of the education work. For instance, Board members were described
as having some difficulty in administering policies that dealt with development agencies as opposed to charitable efforts conducted under the OXFAM support.

At about the same time, LAFAM had begun to transition into its role in supporting primary education development in the region of Zhob. In 1996, PED approached LAFAM with a contract to establish twenty-eight to thirty girls' community schools in the Zhob region.

The contract between the government and LAFAM was extended for the 1996-97 fiscal year. The terms included formation of PTSMCs in the remainder of schools within the Zhob region. Other requirements included the restructuring/strengthening of committees already formed by June 30, 1996 involving such tasks as clustering of schools, cluster training, information and promotion campaigns and opening of bank accounts in the name of PTSMCs (PTSMC Briefing Document 1997).

In terms of LAFAM's performance, the Loralai Female DEO commented that she was very satisfied with their work in establishing community schools.

 Actually, I am satisfied with the performance of the CSP schools. They are very good. There are so many people involved in the establishment, like VECs, WVECs and the promoters. The NGOs are also involved in the establishment and their performance is very good. That is why these schools are doing well. There is continuous monitoring which is the main cause of the success of these schools (Female DEO, Loralai, 1998).

The Female SDEO for Barkhan also commented that she felt her relationship with LAFAM to be a very good one claiming that, 'they cooperate with us and we cooperate with them'. LAFAM members, while indicating that there was a good relationship with the DEO and SDEO female officers, felt that the partnership of the NGO and the DEO seemed somewhat unbalanced. In fact, the development of a partnership with the government was considered 'difficult' (LAFAM representative, Loralai, 1998). The explanation was that LAFAM field promoters first had to mobilise communities for the creation of CSP schools. The communities in turn had to face the challenge of organising schools and communities against the hurdles of tribalism, tradition and customs of local society.
...when we reached to the government there we faced the problem. Because we have prepared the community. We have mentally prepared them for the partnership. So when they reached there, it was difficult for government to accept the partnership with community (LAFAM representative, Loralai, 1998).

It is noteworthy that the statement above shows that Government officials were apparently consulted at the end of the process of community development. Had the NGO co-opted the government in the community process, the Government-to-Community relationship could have been strengthened and perhaps government would have not felt alienated from the process and the communities. The statement, most likely, was referring to the Government not coming good on its promises of the timely release of the salaries for new teachers rather than for its provision of funds for the PTSMCs (Ibid). The latter explanation was validated with a personal experience by one of LAFAM's field promoters who was interviewed. He indicated that request for orders from the government to post teachers had been submitted three times. Finally after a year, the orders were released.

LAFAM representatives, however, cited other problems that their organisation had faced. One was that the BOD, in their opinion, was too removed from the implementation of the activities of forming CSP schools, materials distribution and the formation of PTSMCs. It was further claimed that the BOD was only interested in meeting the targets but not too readily available to help deal with field promoters and their issues. Issues included the lack of transportation to get to the villages, bad road conditions and difficult terrain, inclimate weather, responsibility for a large territory of six districts in which to conduct work, and the difficulty in finding potential teachers for the CSP schools, etc. On the other hand, LAFAM representatives claimed that they had reached their 'targets' which were the opening of schools in some very 'far flung' areas. It was also felt that the organisation had developed important links with communities that would have been difficult for a central organisation such as the Society to establish.

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22 Under the PEQIP contract, two vehicles had been promised but not delivered.
This is what we have achieved with decentralization...we believe we are quite close to the communities. Communities are close to us. And the same communities LAFAM has found quite easy to approach as opposed to other NGOs (LAFAM Representative, Loralai, 1998).

Village Education Committee

Village Education Committees (VECs) were reportedly formed for only the CSP schools. 'These committees are formed by parents whose children are studying in the school so that they can understand the problems of the children...so they know their own children and their own problems' (Female SDEO, Barkhan, 1998). This officer, however, indicated that she had never personally participated in a VEC meeting. She claimed that she only visited the CSP schools and would inquire of the teacher of the school if there were any problems and about the attendance of the students. Little evidence could be found to determine the actual scale of VEC/WVEC activity in Barkhan. In the interview at LAFAM headquarters, we met a VEC member from a neighbouring district. However, no committee members could be found for an interview.

Parent/Teacher/School Management Committee (PTSMCs)

Regarding PTSMCs in Barkhan, more quantitative information was found concerning projected targets than physical evidence of their existence and operation. The genesis of the PTSMC process in Barkhan was explained.

The PTSMC project was launched in 1995 when PED approached LAFAM's Board of Directors to consider undertaking this activity. The Board was interested given that LAFAM had already been involved in field activities such as drug addiction prevention. The Board considered education to be 'good cause' for a region such as Barkhan where school conditions were quite bad. As of June 30, 1996, the PTSMC initiative was formalised under a contract between PED and LAFAM.

The initiative, however, was met with various challenges. The teacher's associations were reportedly rejecting the establishment of PTSMCs. Specifically, the Teacher's Union (GTA) in Barkhan wielded strong influence
against the formation of PTSMCs. Union members made threats to district education officers, sub-divisional education officers and learning co-ordinators to halt the formation of these committees. On different occasions, union members warned government officers not to go along with LAFAM facilitators to the villages to prepare the establishment of PTSMC committees. The GTA also distributed a circular to all teachers encouraging them not to co-operate with PTSMC facilitators (Female SDEO, Barkhan, 1998).

Because of these pressures, teachers were not generally cooperative with the formation of the PTSMCs. The unions played an active roll in discouraging teacher participation in them in that they came to know that the PTSMC program was an open threat to illegal work in education. The union (GTA) reportedly influenced teachers and parents from time to time to oppose the PTSMC program and threatened NGO fieldworkers from doing the work of the PTSMC. Respondents indicated, however, that parents and teachers had a deep interest in improving education through PTSMC development despite the opposition. Thus, there has been some clear evidence of the people's desire to change the education standards of their area.

Commenting on her observations of the effectiveness of the PTSMCs, the female SDEO explained that they had not been successful. She indicated that she did not involve herself in forming these committees because she knew that once the implementers such as the promoters sent from LAFAM and Society, had left, that she would be held accountable for any problems.

*I was not involved at all in any of that, because I knew that I would be held accountable. That is how they work and go away, whereas I have to stay here. Thus when these people came to make PTSMCs I never went with them* (Female SDEO, Barkhan, 1998).

In fact, she noted a personal experience of where some *waderas* had approached her and claimed that the PTSMCs had each wasted Rs./100 that had been collected to open their bank accounts. The *waderas'* complaint was that the money had not been used by anyone for the benefit of the schools.
At the time of the interviews in 1998, no activity for the development of new PTSMCs or the training or development of new ones had taken place. One officer reported that there were a large number of committees but that without further instructions and funding to handle the management of the schools, the members were helpless. According to a report prepared by LAFAM, as of June 1996, fifty-five PTSMC committees had been established in Barkhan. Additionally, the report documented 'formation dates' and 'verification dates' for each committee entry, the same date is recorded for each category on all the PTSMC committee entries suggesting that while committees formed (with names of members) had been written on paper the day of the initial visit, that no evidence existed as to their progress over time.

By spring 1997, it was reported that LAFAM was no longer actively setting up PTSMCs (Female SDEO, Barkhan, 1998). The male DEO even described them as being failures. The claim was made that although PED had provided an initial disbursement of Rs. 2000 to each PTSMC for school materials, there was never any follow-up with funds or support.

LAFAM’s reasons for PTSMC failures had more to do with poor government follow-through than the poor performance of the NGO. Representatives of LAFAM claimed that just as they had mobilised communities to form CSP schools, so had their work been in forming the PTSMCs and that the Government had failed in its commitment to the partnership of providing funding for the committees to function properly. In any case, the blame for PTSMC inactivity seemed to be pointing in two directions. The communities were blaming the NGO with the frequent line of questioning: ‘you [NGO] said that now we will be involved...we will be given the opportunity to plan for our schools, to be decision makers in our schools...to look after our schools, we have been offered accounts’. The NGO in turn has blamed the Government for not providing the follow-up support. LAFAM emphatically stated that PTSMCs were no longer active in Barkhan as of the date of the interview (LAFAM Representative, 1998). Thus compared with Jaffarabad, even less was accomplished in the development of school committees to aid in the development of local schools.
Unions

In various data collected, the Government Teachers Association (GTA) was noted as being an extremely powerful force and influence in the control of education administration in Barkhan. These data include photographs, observations, and the interviews conducted with LAFAM. When contrasted with accounts given by government officials, however, differences of opinion emerge. For example, female district officers made no mention of union control over the DEO's work. Even the male district officers were silent on the matter but with good reason, given that the head of the GTA made himself present during their interview. In fact, his presence at this and all other meetings with the male education field officers supports the argument that the GTA was heavily involved in the day-to-day business of primary education management. This anecdotal evidence presents an image of a culture where a strong association existed with strong leadership and a popular subscription to it by a majority of male teachers. This culture was also found union activity in Jaffarabad in Chapter Five.

The GTA also opposed the establishment of PTSMCs. A representative for the GTA explained why:

_The government teachers also opposed these PTSMCs. In our opinion it was waste of time and money. We are of the opinion that when DEO, SDEO, ADEOs and Supervisors are present, there is no need to set up an extra body. Whatever programme is proposed to be implemented must be implemented through this structure. There is local politics prevailing in the area, if someone has personal differences with teacher he will complain against the teacher. The community members were only on paper, actually they did not work. According to my knowledge no PTSMC is active now (GTA Representative, Barkhan, 1998)._

LAFAM personnel characterised the GTA as not fully understanding the role of the NGO in the development of primary education in Barkhan.

_They [union] have a fear that NGOs are emerging as a parallel government. That is not true. We say that the involvement of government is indispensable for the sustainability of this programme. So we are of the opinion that NGOs could never be replaced by the government. It is not possible. The major role of_
NGOs is to facilitate this process. Now problems are there in the process of facilitation. NGOs have never liked to be parallel to the government, neither is it possible. So it is due to this fear that they are not cooperating with the NGOs (LAFAM Representative, Loralai, 1998).

Unlike the union reaction to the development of PTSMCs, CSP schools were not being pressurised by the GTA. The female SDEO claimed that the success of the CSP schools could be attributed to the fact that teachers of CSP schools were not members of the GTA. Normally, teachers who were already members of the union would not be hired to teach in CSP schools. She claimed that only teachers whose children were studying in the CSP schools were posted, so that the needs of the particular school could be best diagnosed by this close association.

Summary

As predicted, this impoverished district had even less fertile grounds for devolution. This summary of the devolving experiments in Barkhan demonstrates their failure on an even greater scale than Jaffarabad.

6.4 Education Services and the Distribution of Control

Below is an assessment of the data or responses to interviews according to the functions of the institutions administering education in Barkhan. As in the Jaffarabad case, Winkler’s model is used as a backdrop for analysing the process of education administration according to public service categories. Data will be presented against these categories that would help form a snapshot judgement of whether these activities have been decentralised and if so to what extent. Finally, a summary will be provided to express what the data tells us about the state of decentralisation for each component with reference to Barkhan.
Supervision

For Barkhan, supervision in both female and male offices was limited with little to no power or authority. In other words, perfunctory tasks were performed such as visiting schools, disbursing teachers' salaries and materials, etc. However, no real power or authority existed for making decisions concerning planning budgets and hiring and firing of staff. All district officers interviewed shared this notion. The male district officers further indicated that they had no real powers and added that they had been centralised by PED (Male DEO, Barkhan, 1998).

Management and administration of primary education in Barkhan was characterised as being more a monitoring function in contrast to an authoritative role of manager. The female DEO indicated that management to her included a variety of tasks.

...to check the efficiency of the teachers at the school, supplying of material (books, furniture etc.) to the schools, random visits to the schools and to check whether the teachers are regular and teaching the classes, to meet the teacher and know their problems, to help them and communicate these problems to the higher authorities...this is the description of my job (Female DEO, Loralai, 1998).

In terms of training that might enable her to better perform these duties, she indicated that none had been provided. She further mentioned that she had encountered many problems and requested training to handle them but her requests were not answered.

The female SDEO for Barkhan made similar claims. She first observed that the bureaucracy was highly centralised from PED. 'We have no real powers, we cannot do anything which we want, e.g. transfers, appointments [for teachers]; purchasing, everything is centralised' (Female SDEO, Barkhan, 1998). The Officer's Guide that prescribes responsibilities and powers was rendered irrelevant. The SDEO further stated that, in reality, these powers did not exist. 'Those things are in the book and we do not have so much authority as is written in the book' (Ibid).
For example, she told that she should have the authority to grant leave of absence to teachers. In reality, she had been told (undisclosed source) that she could not grant any leave over ten days that all other leave requests had to be escalated to the female DEO's office or even to PED. All teacher transfers, she noted, had to be handled by the Director at PED. In terms of teacher nominations, it was pointed out that individuals with political connections could get appointments without the consent of the designated government authority. The female SDEO said that if there is a need for a teacher that she does write up a nomination letter to PED but usually this request is superseded by local politics. The political pressure was also felt when pay of teachers would be stopped due to absenteeism or if a teacher were suspended for whatever reason, political influentials would force the pay or reinstatement of the teachers (Female SDEO, Barkhan, 1998).

The male officers confirmed that the Provincial Minister of Education had assumed all appointing and transferring powers. The notification, described in Chapter Three, was the governing document providing this authority. The authority basically removed the authority from the local district officers. The greatest challenge to managing primary education in their opinion was the political pressures that they faced.

_We cannot construct buildings according to our will. We cannot punish a teacher for his wrong doings. We cannot work smoothly under the political pressures. We face pressure from both sides [government and outside]_ (Male DEO, Barkhan, 1998).

In short, there have been significant obstacles to supervisory functions in Barkhan.

**Budget Allocations**

In terms of budget allocations, a very clear and direct response was given that very limited budget authority had been granted to the education officers. As indicated by one field officer, she did not have discretionary funds especially for procurement of materials. In fact she called for the adoption of a more systematic procedure:
...to know how many books are required in my district, they must ask this kind of questions. They should get written demand from us on how many books or furniture we require for schools of our region. They just don’t do so, they send books or furniture or other supplies without any prior estimate of the requirement. There is no systematic way. That’s why people are facing problems in the district with our schools. They provide us with some budget to purchase office stationery, but a system must be set up for supply of books and furniture for the schools (Female DEO, Loralai, 1998).

The Loralai DEO further indicated that the coordination between her office and the Barkhan SDEO’s office was lacking in terms of distribution of materials to the schools. Accounts from the male district officers, however, indicated that the distribution process was systematic but that the actual receipt of the materials had been random.

_They provide whatever textbooks, reading/writing material, furniture like chairs, tables, desks, Taat...according to the enrolment, according to the BEMIS record, then we prepare lists and send to them, and they provide the material. Sometimes they call us and we submit the list there and they send us the required material. [The delivery] is irregular_ (Male DEO, Barkhan, 1998).

Some funding was made available to the Barkhan female EFO. She reported that she did have a bank account for the distribution of teachers' salaries. These funds were not discretionary; however, she also reported that she received a small amount of funds for stationery (Rs. 200) and a one-off allotment of Rs. 5000 for fans, heaters or for wood to burn. Otherwise, equipment, materials and other items are sent to her without her direction or without any prior notice. The male district officers also indicated that they received funding once annually for teachers' salaries, POL (petrol, oil, lube), TA/DA (travel allowance/daily allowance) and office stationery. The process for the disbursement of funds, as explained by the officers, was standard. Bills were prepared and submitted to treasury offices. On the basis of these claims, the teachers' salaries were released to the drawing officer (normally the ADEO) in cash from the National Bank of Pakistan in Barkhan. Salaries are then given to the teachers on the first of every month as witnessed and described above.
In short, a minimal amount of budgeting had been devolved to education officers and none to local schools.

Monitoring of the Curriculum

While it is true that primary level curriculum is developed at the national level, evidence collected in Barkhan suggested that the capacity existed for its development or at least the development of supplementary materials by the education officers, locally. One officer indicated that the material is sent and that teachers were expected to teach it. The SDEO further indicated that she would write down problems experienced with the curriculum to be submitted to PED at the end of the year. The most compelling evidence, though, for the local development or at least participation in the development of the curriculum was that the officers had been mostly trained first as teachers before they become officers. So the experience base for monitoring the curriculum had been developed, at least, in Barkhan on the female side.

...Kachi Qaida (Kindergarten level curriculum) was originally a very [difficult] booklet which the teachers were having difficulty teaching. Now they have come out with the new Qaida, in which they have tried to teach with the help of cards and pictures, but in that they have not given the method for the teaching. Now, there has been some training. I got training from there and then gave training over here. Because we could not find anybody here so I did the training myself so I can observe how these teachers teach. Now, I am training them again... (Female SDEO, Barkhan, 1998).

This is an example of a local initiative in Barkhan that was locally sustained by a government district officer.

When asked what the procedures were for measuring the performance of students the following process was described. The Loralai DEO indicated that students were tested three times a year on a quarterly basis. The teachers who are given a model or sample question paper created these tests by the learning coordinators. The students who pass these tests are then promoted to the next class. In terms of actual participation in the development of curriculum and textbooks, however, the DEO claimed that they had none. The female LC for
Barkhan was also responsible for training teachers how to maintain their registers and logbooks; and to perfect their admission procedures and other teaching methods. The LC did not have her own vehicle and so she was restricted in her travelling to conduct this work. Usually the DEO and the LC would make school supervisory visits together.

On the male side, it was reported that local teachers prepared the examinations for classes one to five. For classes six and seven (middle schools) the heads of the middle schools and headmasters of the high schools prepared the examinations. However, in reference to the curriculum, the male officers were in agreement that they had no participation in the development of the curriculum.

**Teacher Training**

In terms of teacher training, the education officers' responses compared that they had very little control over the training and that the Directorate of Primary Education mostly controlled the design and timings of these trainings. All officers indicated that they only had the authority to nominate teachers for the training program but that the budgeting for the training and the training itself was controlled from PED.

Commenting on her subordinate’s constituency of approximately seventy-two girls' schools in Barkhan, the Loralai DEO exclaimed that with only one learning co-ordinator to assist her, ‘how [could] she manage to coordinate these schools in Barkhan?’ But when the DEO had visited less than half of her subordinate’s schools, she found that the performance of these teachers were less than satisfactory. She described that teachers were absent and that the few present were not performing satisfactorily.

In April of 1997, a validation examination was administered to determine whether the teachers holding positions in Balochistan were competent. The other purpose was to validate the credentials of the teachers to ensure they had the valid matriculation pass and identification papers to prove that they were the authorized teachers for their particular schools. The *Balochistan Times* (February 15, 1998:p.1) reported approximately one year later that twelve
teachers had been removed from Barkhan District. In total, one hundred and ninety teachers had been 'sacked' for all of Balochistan. The Loralai, female DEO remembered administering the exam and told that only a few of all of the teachers actually appeared for the exam and that some ultimately failed. It was her job to issue the termination letters to PED. These letters, in actuality, were recommendations since she did not have the ultimate authority to fire them. She also mentioned that she received pressure from the people to reinstate those she had recommended to be fired but she indicated that she ‘diverted the pressure towards PED’ (Loralai, Female DEO, 1998). Her actions perhaps illustrate a time when the central authority can facilitate a needed buffer between her and a hostile constituency.

In Chapter One, the point was made that sometimes quality education has no correlation to any systematic decentralisation plan (Hannaway 1995). This situation implies that if a 'school level' decentralisation effort were to presumably effect quality instruction in the classroom, quality would have been the result of more localised inputs rather than the decentralisation effort itself. Box 6.6 illustrates one teacher's efforts in Barkhan that were found to be successful but not resultant of any special public service rendered by the Government.
Box 6.5: An account of supervision of female teachers in the Barkhan area

You know that too many schools were just on papers. The village malik (leader) and some relatives of their teachers were taking the pay of these ladies (teachers). Some ladies were even sitting in the Punjab Province because the Barkhan area borders the Punjab. And I was so worried about this situation. You know that about 2 lak Rupees (£2,777) were being wasted on those teachers and I refused to give them their pay. I took severe action against them. And I gave all those names to the newspaper and I terminated those teachers. And the number of these teachers was about fifty-three. I was so upset seeing this situation that in reality education was not being done. And there was no output...and then we started that program...the CSP school program, the community support program. You know, we started this program from those girls who were given the UNICEF sponsored Mobile Female Teacher Training Unit, two-months training in 1990. And they were waiting for their orders. Those were 20 girls in that area: Loralai/Barkhan, Musakhail area.

We called those 20 girls and we took their test. It was very disappointing because they told us lies that they were belonging to some villages. They only wanted to get positions of Junior Varsity Teachers. And you will be surprised to know that only 8 girls were from the villages and the rest were from Loralai, from the city. Some were from Barkhan also. There is a small village called Nahar Kot in Barkhan. It was very astonishing that a lady (teacher) had died there but she was getting pay. She had been dead even for four or five years. And I closed that school also. Also in Nahar Kot there was a girl of that village who also got this training, MFTTU training. And we first started the school with this girl. That was an excellent school. And she was an excellent teacher. You know that she was teaching in her home to so many girls. At first, she was not our teacher, but she was teaching the girls of the community. This was something hopeful for us. She got the MFTTU training and she passed the test. And first of all we started there this CSP School with that girl. She got two months MFTTU training and until now that school is going on very well.

Source: Personal account by former Zhob Divisional Education Officer, December 1997)
Other District Administration

Communication between PED and the district offices was unanimously reported as neither being regular or efficient. Communication, however, has two directions and when asked how often she communicated with PED, the female DEO responded, 'not very regular communication, it is on an as needed basis, whenever they need something or you need something' (Female DEO, Loralai, 1998). She also suggested that she possessed the capacity to accept more responsibilities indicating that she knew better than anyone the needs of her schools. Social pressures, however, were reported as dashing even the current authority of this DEO. In fact, at one point she had to petition the Deputy Commissioner for a security guard at her home and accompany her around town because she was feeling threatened by various community members. She had been constantly approached by people to perform illegal favours such as providing to them the ghee (cooking oil) that was to be distributed for a local food program handled by her office; transferring of teachers illegally, and even the transfer of her own staff. She intimated that members of her own staff were politically backed by local influentials who were watching her every move. Should she make one judgement not in their favour, she felt that she would be punished. She also reported that a week prior to the interview, her office storeroom had been burgled and that one thousand cans of ghee had been stolen. She suspected her own staff of the theft.

6.5 Conclusion

In this case study we have reviewed the institutions that are essentially responsible for primary education in Barkhan. This chapter has also analysed district administration according to public service categories in an attempt to answer the question of how education was managed and to what extent decentralisation had occurred over the time period the study covered.
Figure 6.9 offers a graphical response to this question. Evidence collected concerning Barkhan's administration revealed that district officers felt isolated given the remoteness of the district from PED. District officers maintained representational roles for the government but assumed very little power, authority or control for day-to-day activities. As in Jaffarabad, interferences from unions and tribal leaders impeded what little capacity the officers did possess to manage.

**Figure 6.9: Centralisation-Decentralisation Typology Matrix for Public Education In Barkhan**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public Education Service Categories</th>
<th>(continuum for locus of control)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Supervision</td>
<td>![Centralised]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring of the Curriculum</td>
<td>![Mixed]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget Allocations</td>
<td>![Decentralised]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other District Administration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Winkler, 1989

From 1992 to 1997, evidence from Barkhan suggests that the community support process through the work of the Society, LAFAM, the female education officers and consultants from PED was beginning to give communities a voice in the affairs of their own schools. This active role was being first played out through the communication with communities and inquiries about the needs of families for education through door-to-door surveys (CSP Case Study 1997; Female SDEO, Barkhan, 1998).

These developing local institutions, however, were short-lived especially the PTSMC scheme. While evidence supports that these institutions were initially established by the Society and LAFAM (approximately fifty-five), none were
active at the time of the study. In fact, initial deposits of funding were made available but were given without direction. Without this support, communities in Barkhan were unable to sustain any activity.
Chapter 7

Education Administration in Balochistan: An Analysis of Organisational Variables

In Western education systems, conventional wisdom would say that schools could be made 'better' through reforms developed by their existing managing institutions. Chubb and Moe (1990) argue that institutions, however, cannot solve the problems because they are in fact part of the problem and the key to better schools is institutional reform. This argument was brought out very well in the case of educational development in Balochistan. In a way, institutional reform there took a 'backseat' to international attention that focussed instead on the deplorable educational indicators. Low primary attendance, low literacy rates, low female participation rates all dramatically displayed a problem that needed solving. Rightly so, something needed to be done.

In prior chapters, we have looked at the experiment of educational development in Balochistan that was cloaked in the shroud of decentralisation. We have reviewed the policy process from the 'top down' to implementation at the district level to determine the success to which decentralisation worked in the centralised environment. To an extent, the results have presented themselves but to help clarify the picture, however, this chapter develops the analysis further through a set of organisational variables. The variables were first identified in chapter one but have been instrumental to the structure of the research. Thus, this chapter is organised around this structure. In the first section, we briefly revisit the process undertaken to coordinate variables,
questions and theory. Secondly, aspects of organisational reform are conveyed through an in-depth discussion of the variable analysis. Finally, practical lessons brought out in this analysis are presented.

7.1 Institutional Reform: Deconstructing the Panacea

It is noteworthy that in this study the World Bank was the primary donor to the BPEP initiative in Balochistan. Although the World Bank had been involved in decentralisation initiatives through the 1980s and 90s in public administration reforms, it had established no formal policy on the matter. As Prud'homme admonished, 'the Bank needs to develop an analytical framework to clarify the issue, monitor the experiences undertaken and the design of research efforts in this area, and provide better-founded policy advice' (Prud’homme 1994:1).

In terms of institutional reform, the World Bank had recognised in its 1997 Annual Report that effective government institutions were the key to economic prosperity. In its assessment of the report, the Economist pointed out that this seemingly 'new' knowledge was behind the times. It argued that the state had been a strong force in poorer countries for at least half a century so the question was raised as to what governments need to do to become more effective. The Economist, summarised the 1997 Report to find out.

Beyond matching role to capacity, the Bank believes that governments need to make more of an effort to improve their own capability. This means designing effective ways to check arbitrary state action, through independent judiciaries for instance. It also means building a better bureaucracy. Bureaucracies that are dominated by political appointees and that pay civil servants meagre salaries are more likely to be inefficient and corrupt, the Bank contends...And, yes, encourage civic participation, so the state works in partnership with its populace...The test will be turning such...words into practical policy advice (Economist, June 28, 1997:93-4).

For improving our knowledge of governments under decentralisation initiatives sponsored by the World Bank, there is a need to deconstruct the process of policy formulation governing such an effort. The implication of the case of Balochistan is that while grounded research on parents' readiness to
educate girls existed (Rugh 1998; Thomas 1996), the format for doing so did not take into consideration formal policy measures that needed to be in place to institutionalise the reforms for managing access although they did mention them to be lacking.

In this study we have attempted to construct a tool for analysing whether institutional reform has taken place and if so to what extent. The analysis first, incorporated first basic and widely accepted definitions of decentralisation (see Box 7.1).

**Box 7.1 Decentralisation Construct**

1. True Decentralisation only occurs when local decision-making bodies have control over financial resources (Midgley 1986:33). A local body has its own budget (Mawhood 1983:9).
2. A decentralised local body should have a separate legal existence (Mawhood 1983:9).
3. A decentralised local body should have the authority to allocate substantial resources. This includes quantity of finances handled. Number and qualifications of the staff employed. Power to decide over expenditure. Power to vary revenues. Decisions over the staff-appointments, promotion, discipline (Mawhood 1983:9).
4. Decentralisation can be observed through the behavioural patterns of participation, the means of access for individuals to the bureaucracy (Mawhood 1983:xii).
5. Decentralisation effectiveness is dependent on political, behavioural, attitudinal and cultural factors.
   - Most important among these is commitment of local officials to decentralising development, the quality of local leadership, the attitudes of rural people toward government, and the degree to which traditional customs and behaviours were compatible with decentralised administrative arrangements (Rondinelli 1983:200).
6. Decentralisation is a result of the transfer of planning, decision-making or management functions from central government and its agencies to field organizations, subordinate units of government, semi-autonomous public corporations, area-wide or regional development organizations, specialized functional authorities or non-government organizations (Rondinelli 1981).

To formulate a healthy analysis, these general statements were then changed to interrogatories. Discovery is a useful way of determining greater confidence in the generalised statements of decentralisation. To guide the data collection for this study, variables of organisational analysis were used as a way of categorising the interrogatories in similar broad areas. Box 7.2 below
This matrix was a key element included in the case study protocols.

An analysis of decentralisation and its effect at the ground level is one way of determining whether it is such a positive model for education development. Mai-Brith Schartau's (1993) framework for decentralisation shifts the attention

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisational Variables</th>
<th>Theoretical Construct/Inquiry</th>
<th>Evidence</th>
</tr>
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</table>
| **Task**                 | (1) Has decentralisation occurred in any form over five years of intensive donor support from 1992 to 1997?  
(2) What was the state of primary education management across Winkler's functions of education when the project began? Has the nature of management changed from 1992 to 1997? |          |
| **Structure**            | (3) What evidence exists that education functions and decision-making authority have been legally and informally transferred from the centre to the district/community/school level? (Rondinelli 1981; Mawhood 1983) |          |
| **Procedure**            | (4) Do local decision-making bodies have control over financial resources? Are discretionary funds available?  
Is a budget developed locally? What is the quantity of the budget handled locally? (Midgley 1986; Mawhood 1983) |          |
| **Personnel**            | (5) A decentralised local body should have the authority to allocate substantial resources. This includes quantity of finances handled; number and qualifications of the staff employed; power to decide over expenditure; power to vary revenues; decisions over the staff-appointments, promotion and discipline (Mawhood 1983:9). What level of authority do local bodies have over subordinate field officers, ministerial and other staff, i.e., teachers' appointments, promotion and discipline? |          |
| **Culture**              | (6) Decentralisation effectiveness is dependent on political, behavioural, attitudinal and cultural factors. Most important among these is commitment of local officials to decentralising development, the quality of local leadership, the attitudes of rural people toward government, and the degree to which traditional customs and behaviour were compatible with decentralised administrative arrangements (Rondinelli 1983:200). To what extent did these factors play out in Balochistan?  
(7) Was decentralisation observable through the behavioural patterns of participation, the means of access for individuals to the bureaucracy? (Mawhood 1983:xii) |          |
from the macro dichotomy between a national government and its state or provincial institutions to the micro level where State or provincial authorities relate to the district and school levels. It is based on the belief that many important decisions must inevitably be made at the school level because it is at this level that professionals close to pupils can decide what to do and how to implement goals set at a higher level (p. 229).

As indicated in Chapter One, she declares that at all levels; good management is an important tool to reach the goals of efficiency and productivity. Schartau states that management is a vital function of the organisation and lists five variables for analysing it:

1. Task
2. Structure
3. Procedure
4. Personnel
5. Culture

These variables have been used to analyse the process of primary education administration in Balochistan, Pakistan.

7.2 Aspects of Organisational Reform: The Evidence

To complete the matrix above, it has been necessary to analyse the empirical data collected for each variable and their respective questions. Below is a summary of the evidence.

Task

The ‘Task’ variable was used to deconstruct two general aspects of the primary education system. First, it analysed policies that would influence decentralisation. Second, this variable was used to analyse the degree to which subsequent functions of the primary education system were decentralised. The functions that were undertaken throughout the system were fundamentally driven by plans whether they were formally or informally prescribed. Given the normal sequencing of policy development followed by task implementation, in general, it was implicitly important to clarify Balochistan’s education policy before analysing the functions of tasks of education administration.
While Pakistan's constitution granted its provinces responsibility for administering public education, this provision in no way guaranteed full decentralisation of education services down to the district level as was anticipated and hoped for through Federal planning ideology. Despite goals and objectives influenced by donors, formal provincial policy was never fully developed for education administration. In fact, analysis of the data collected in this study revealed that formal primary education policy did not exist prior to 1997 in Balochistan. Respondents including government sources, district level staff, technical consultants, and World Bank officials all independently made this claim. Instead, workplans were developed that drove task implementation. After 1993, World Bank task-managers monitored programme activities. They focussed their concern on a variety of issues such as criteria of selection for teachers, and the efficient use of funding for the construction of schools. However, policy prescriptions or goals for primary education were more a result of project workplans than a provincial education policy.

Two specific tasks illustrated a partial relationship between the province and the national policies of education reform such as the establishment of the Directorate for Primary Education and the development of field operational manuals for education administration. However these tasks were accomplished in Balochistan through the bidding of the donors rather than through a commitment to any formal provincial policy or plan.

From 1992 to 1997, these workplans drove the implementation of tasks that were meant to improve and reform the delivery of primary education. A policy vacuum resulted with tasks being allocated and controlled politically through patron-client relationships. Given that no formal policy language could be found in written or any other form, it is only possible to measure the extent of decentralisation according to task objectives and their implementation. From the perspective of respondents located at the 'centre', once PED was established, a majority of the planning for district education and administration shifted to the centre. The statement was made in the context of curriculum development that 'PED was doing things for teachers and DEOs rather than having them take initiatives and responsibilities'. The respondent felt that as a consequence
to the control of tasks from the centre, decentralisation initiatives were being introduced under the BPEP programme.

Other tasks were centralised with the establishment of PED. Prior to 1992, more discretionary budget power and control existed at the district level. Respondents at both PED and the district offices confirmed this. Reasons for centralising the control of activities included distrust of DEOs in handling their budgets and procurement honestly; the mishandling of teacher selection; and training. Respondents believed the scaling back of DEO controls for these, however, as being less a consequence of corruption than the fact that certain officers within PED had amassed extraordinary power. Through the dynamic of an externally funded program operating within a government agency, the possibility of amassing power and control for a range of activities became a reality—a profitable reality at that. This reality, however, must be properly characterised as having evolved as opposed to being innate.

From the perspective of two contrasting districts, the assessment of decentralised tasks bore relatively similar results. In both districts, DEOs were handling education administration functions to varying degrees of success. Officers in both districts, however, similarly claimed that no real authority or power existed for making decisions concerning planning, budgets, and personnel. They perceived their role as being functionaries rather than decision brokers. They further believed that they understood and were more aware of their own local administrative realities better than PED for which they should be granted more authority to handle. Two major functions were pointed out as being responsibilities without control. These were monitoring of schools and distributing teacher and staff salaries. Any further discretion or authority in these and other areas had not been at their disposal.

The NGOs that were operating in these two districts had aligned their functions to the activities prescribed by the 'centre' (PED) through the BPEP program. Because their mandates or orders were being taken from the centre, the allocation of tasks between the district offices and theirs was sometimes not clarified and competition resulted. This is further evidence of a policy vacuum. Had a clear vision of stakeholder roles been decided and communicated to all
parties through a provincial education policy, DEOs would possibly have had fewer grounds for resentment towards the activities of the NGOs. These resentments tainted relationships in both districts.

NGO activities were observed in two areas, teacher training and the formation of village committees and community schools. The analysis of their capacity for decentralisation bore contrasting results. In Jaffarabad, both SCOPE and the district education offices had successfully undertaken training programs. SCOPE had involved themselves with the training of committees for management tasks related to community schools. The DEOs were successful in launching a 'home-grown' teacher-mentoring program sustained through volunteered resources. These activities proved that educational tasks were capable of being planned locally—a step towards pure decentralisation.

On the other hand, in Barkhan, it was observed that all activities were clearly centralised. PED had sent their own team to train local teachers with marginal to no involvement of LAFAM or the DEOs. LAFAM felt that it had been 'successful' through the relationships it had established with communities and the committees it had formed. However no links had been established between the NGO and the district education officers to sustain centrally driven programs. In fact, at the time of the field study, little evidence was found of active local committee engagement in local school administration. LAFAM staff indicated that they felt they had 'completed' their work by documenting the formation of committees in the PTSMC initiative but was not aware of further instructions for training or nurturing these committees, a task it felt was meant for the DEOs to handle. The DEOs on the other hand were not inclined to engage in committee development for fear of local political repercussions. This dysfunctional process was further aggravated by the local political environment where *Waderas* and a teachers union clearly controlled all educational activities and where PED centrally controlled the procurement of supplies and educational materials.

The research questions that influenced the data collection according to 'Task' variable are presented below and is followed by a brief summary.
(1) Has Decentralisation occurred in any form over five years of intensive donor support from 1992 to 1997?

Based on the evidence of this study and based on a strict theoretical definition of decentralisation, no formal primary education decentralisation occurred between 1992 and 1997 in Balochistan. Functions of decentralising proportions were carried out and objectives met such as the establishment of the Directorate of Primary Education, the teacher mentoring program in Jaffarabad, the CSP school scheme including the development of VECs and PTSMCs to greater and lesser extents in Jaffarabad and Barkhan. However, these activities had centralising tendencies. The definitions of decentralisation expressed earlier in the theoretical construct help to elaborate this finding.

a) If we strictly apply the theoretical definitions of decentralisation, it only occurs when local decision-making bodies have control over financial resources and when the local body has its own budget. Also, the local body would have a separate legal existence (Mawhood 1983:9).

b) A decentralised local body should have the authority to allocate substantial resources. This includes quantity of finances handled. Number and qualifications of the staff employed. Power to decide over expenditure. Power to vary revenues. Decisions over the staff-appointments, promotion, and discipline (Mawhood 1983:9).

c) Decentralization can be observed through the behavioural patterns of participation, the means of access for individuals to the bureaucracy (Mawhood 1983:xii).

d) Decentralisation effectiveness is dependent on political, behavioural, attitudinal and cultural factors. Most important among these is commitment of local officials to decentralising development, the quality of local leadership, the attitudes of rural people toward government, and the degree to which traditional customs and behaviour were compatible with decentralised administrative arrangements (Rondinelli 1983:200).

e) Decentralisation is a result of the transfer of planning, decision-making or management functions from central government and its agencies to field organisations, subordinate units of government, semi-autonomous public corporations, area-wide or regional development organisations, specialised functional authorities or non-government organisations (Rondinelli 1981).

(2) What was the state of primary education management across Winkler’s functions of education when the project began? Has the nature of management changed from 1992 to 1997?
As illustrated below in Figure 7.3, Public service delivery in Balochistan from 1992 to 1997 was centralised. The evidence presented in this thesis provides the justification for this assessment.

![Centralisation-Decentralisation Typology Matrix for Public Education In Balochistan](image)

The state of decentralisation in Balochistan's primary education system additionally can be analysed according to other variables that take into consideration structural and/or legal arrangements between the central and local authorities that would make some indication of reform. This is presented in the next variable of analysis below.

**Structure**

The 'structure' variable measures the distribution of authority and the relationship between different roles or layers of administration. On the surface, the claims made that over 500 community girls schools had been established in Balochistan, the formulation of village education committees and women's village education committees and PTSMCs, would indicate that decentralisation reforms have been realised with the possibility of these institutions receiving financial control and other responsibilities for primary school administration.
However, a closer look at the relationships and operating procedures of the various levels of governance indicates otherwise.

From the highest level, education policy guidelines were established and included provisions for decentralising administration. As stated earlier, the provinces were constitutionally authorised to develop and manage their own education affairs. However, local politics and environmental and cultural constraints often sidetracked the translation of policy from the national level to implementation at the provincial level. Additionally, donor agendas and financially tied advice steered the development process but neglected to establish fundamental provincial education policy. Rather, benchmarks embedded in workplans served as policy markers. Some of these, like the establishment of PED, were expected to facilitate decentralisation.

The creation of PED had structural implications that led to centralising tendencies rather than furthering decentralisation goals. As a newly created institution, PED drew powers of education administration to itself rather than devolving these powers and controls out to the districts. It is true that the appropriate distribution of authority among different layers depends on the capacity of each level to foster decentralisation. As one respondent summarised, ‘The current system of administration with its emphasis on control and top-down communication has been described as having an infinite capacity for obscuring and killing initiatives and innovations’. The provincial Department of Education controlled the activities of PED only as far as politically or financially beneficial. Six policy statements included in the 1992 National Education Policy were analysed earlier in this study. Of these policies, one had a negative impact on the rest. The appointment of personnel at the district level, especially teachers, was a goal that was retarded by the fact the Minister of Education retained this power. That district government officers were not able to legally hire, fire, or transfer staff was reportedly a large impediment to local administration. Consequently, movement towards administrative decentralisation never fully materialised.

Likewise, the Curriculum Wing of the Federal Ministry of Education held full power for another function—the development of the national curriculum.
Although each province could develop its own supplementary materials, the Federal control of curriculum ignored local capacity within PED and the districts for managing all aspects of curriculum design and development. The development of formal primary school curriculum at the provincial level with nationally approved objectives would have eased the burden of developing a supplementary curriculum that often competed with the national curriculum, anyway.

Institutionalising reforms towards decentralisation were not always the easiest of goals for PED. Especially when agencies and units in and horizontal to PED were tasked with similar responsibilities. The example given was that of the Textbook Board, the Bureau of Curriculum and Extension and the Balochistan Instructional Materials Design Cell within PED. On the structural side, there were difficulties in determining the appropriate division of labour/responsibilities between these agencies and the functions of teacher training and curriculum development.

Other functions of PED exhibited centralising tendencies. In assessing the structure of district administration in Balochistan and its relationship to PED, it is apparent that little evidence of decentralisation existed from 1992 to 1997. One source illuminates this finding:

*If you...want to take the power out of the hands of the Secretariat in Quetta and devolve it to a person further out, I don't think that anybody's confronted that yet...I think that decentralisation is geographical rather than authority, power and accountability* (CTA, BPEP, 1997).

The claim was repeatedly made by DEOs that their 'hands were tied', that they had no decision-making authority to procure even stationery for staff in their offices. The DEOs had no legal control for financial matters other than distribution of salaries. In Jaffarabad, government officials reported that a majority of their tasks had been centralised at PED. These tasks included the procurement and distribution of materials and furniture. They further felt that controls in these areas would allow them the flexibility to handle minor management problems at the least. Officers in Barkhan believed themselves to be merely outposts with roles limited to some monitoring and distribution tasks.
Both district staff felt that, structurally, DEOs had the charge to cover all the schools and territory of their district but that they possessed no power or authority with regard to staff and other resources. Both district staff also felt that they possessed no legal rights or authority concerning budgets and district finances. In contrast, Jaffarabad did initiate a teacher-mentoring program from its own district resources. This initiative illustrated that local provision of training was, in fact, more cost effective at the local level and therefore could be worth the reform necessary for this function to be legally devolved and exercised.

Given Barkhan's distance from Quetta and its remoteness and its lack of infrastructure, staff there felt that they had no relationship with PED and that very little communication flowed in either direction. Additionally, external forces such as tribal leaders and unions contained or squelched any remaining authority that they might have possessed. Similarly, forces in Jaffarabad including feudal landowners and unions impeded the work of the district officers. So while the education department is represented geographically through the district education offices in twenty-six districts, powers for day-to-day management activities are extremely limited for a variety of reasons. In other words, geographical representation of government staff did not equal legitimate reform according to their perspective.

The structure and management of the community support process (see Appendix III) was shared among district officers, NGOs and communities. One source pointed out that 'resource mobilisation' of communities did not equal decentralisation. 'Getting communities to kick in supplementary support for community schools does not necessarily leverage full control or authority of local school management'. In fact, full control and authority had not even been legally transferred from top government levels to local district offices. Community organisation posed a threat to central power that communities would be monitoring teachers and schools—both tasks viewed as the responsibility of the government. At the beginning of the CSP initiative, NGOs and DEOs did not coordinate their work that led to tension, suspicion and mismanagement.
What evidence exists that education functions and decision-making authority have been legally and informally transferred from the centre to the district, community and school level? (Rondinelli 1981; Mawhood 1983)

The 'centre' institutions, or rather the state apparatus, were not willing to let go of its control, legally or informally. A lack of organised civil society and a lack of political will to decentralise formed a structure where no distribution or allocation took place in serious proportions. The structure of administration placed control at the centre and paradoxically through PED—an institution designed to decentralise primary education.

**Procedure**

As a variable, 'procedure' measures the methods used to carry out tasks of the primary education system. As observed in this study, innovative methods by which decentralisation tasks were undertaken were often challenged by a variety of forces. The treatment of this variable below will describe the most significant of these challenges.

External forces significantly influenced the methods used to carry out administrative tasks more so than formal procedural guidelines. They were open to corrupt practice. The example was given by a majority of respondents that the Minister of Education manipulated the procedures for hiring, firing and transferring teachers. District officers were pressured to make these personnel actions happen. Interestingly, the World Bank had rebuked district actions on several occasions especially the hiring of teachers on a non-criteria basis clearly overlooking the legal authority that the Minister had partitioned for himself for making these staff appointments.

As mentioned earlier, Balochistan has been divided administratively into twenty-six districts each containing district education offices. Additionally, the Directorate for Primary Education was bifurcated from the Directorate of Schools in 1992. According to senior government officials and district education officers, however, the field offices had more authority and discretion prior to the establishment of the Directorate for Primary Education. Once this body was formed, the control of both financial and administrative tasks was pulled back to the provincial capital, although, little specific detail was available on the extent
to which local authorities were active in managing administration and finances prior to 1992. In this respect, decentralisation had the opposite effect of the desired objective, to provide more efficient management of district government schools. Instead, DEOs lost controls as procedures changed.

Although the establishment of PED held the promise of decentralisation, standard operating procedures at PED challenged the possibility of reform. Procedures had been developed around donor guidelines and were streamlined by external advisors who carried greater clout than some of their government counterparts. Concurrently, officers within PED who had control of budgets developed their own operating systems with little accountability. These officers amassed certain powers that gave them procedural authority for handling most of the components of primary education financial matters. Although World Bank procurement and reporting guidelines were observed to be followed; the decision-making undertaken in carrying out these procedures was more ambiguously applied. For district officers, the service rules and job descriptions served less means for leveraging financial and resource transactions than the act of political lobbying with powerful individuals at PED.

Other controls were severely handicapped as well by the informal assumption of power at PED. Commenting on his experience with primary education administration in Balochistan, one government official said, 'the bottom line is that people in position of administration are not able to defend procedures and the system'. The example was given of the Member of Provincial Assembly who puts pressure on the DEO to falsify enrolment data provided to the Directorate so that a school could be built.

In terms of financial systems and controls, one respondent closely associated with the financial office at the Directorate for Primary Education indicated that in his six—year association, he had never seen any guide to financial procedures. This respondent further claimed that the procedures he followed were learned from his 'own experience' and were based on whatever informal system was already operational. So that while workplans continued to call for devolving financial planning and controls to the districts and the training of staff to handle these tasks, the procedures (both formally and informally articulated) remained constantly controlled from the centre.
Respondents located at the 'centre' in PED indicated that a challenge to the successful decentralisation of financial control to the district level would have to be a trained workforce adequately resourced with computers. Also, district officers were suspected of being corrupt. This was seen as a major impediment to developing the administrative capacity for local budget planning and control at the district level. Suspicion and distrust of local capacity for education administration also led to the evaluation of one donor official. Procedures for addressing decentralisation were questioned in a dramatic way. The official had suggested that district officers be bypassed and that NGOs and other agencies be used as the administrative arm of the government. Although this was never a serious policy position taken by the donor, it illustrates the distrust of the centre to relinquish control to the through the government's official administrative system.

Conversely, respondents at the local level held a different view of their own capacity to handle procedures for decentralisation. The example was given of the 'home-grown' teacher mentoring program initiative conducted in Jaffarabad. This innovative method of teacher training led to decentralisation reforms in that local knowledge, time and resources were utilised to address local problems. Also, officers at this level, especially learning co-ordinators, were valued as essential to district level supervision of teachers and initiatives such as the mentoring program. Local officers insisted that primary education could not be effectively managed alone from PED. District officers saw themselves as a useful mechanism for carrying out the business of primary education locally.

Greater challenges beyond the control of both PED and district officers, however, often outweighed district management aspirations for decentralised procedures. These challenges included:

- Local unions' resentment and blockage of NGO and community organisations monitoring of government staff (teachers) and schools in Jaffarabad and Barkhan;
- Tribals and politicians in Barkhan and feudals in Jaffarabad interfering with school site selections and teacher appointments; and
Lack of any real authority behind the job descriptions that local officers were required to fulfil.

Procedures, as analysed in this study were disjointed and often informal mechanisms were used for getting done the business of primary education. Donor support and advice offered some structure. However, centralising forces, be they culture, politics or other sources powerfully dictated an informal procedure for handling the fundamental business of financial management for the system. Answered below is the research question that solicited these data.

(4) Do local decision-making bodies have control over financial resources? Are discretionary funds available? Is a budget developed locally? What is the quantity of the budget handled locally? (Midgley 1986; Mawhood 1983).

Procedures for accomplishing the tasks of primary education were conditional in Balochistan on the provincial government's administration standards and adequate funding. The dissection of these two areas helps to address this related research question. Also, this question is easier to understand with the analysis of the funding process that starts with the Federal Government.

As we have observed, the Federal Government replenished the provincial recurrent and development budgets for all social sectors. This process, however, was not always guaranteed to be either timely or efficient, as described by several respondents. Additionally, external forces drove operational standards in the education sector. Politics and culture wielded significant influence on the appropriation, disbursement and use of funds that trickled down to the district level. Education finance in 1992 was a mysterious quagmire and as low educational indicators persisted in Balochistan, the donor community came to the rescue. As indicated in chapter two, though, poor achievement had more to do with low investment than the setting of unrealistic goals (Noman 1997) and this was evident in Balochistan. In fiscal year 1991 to 1992, Balochistan's total expenditure on primary education as a percentage of its total development budget was only three and eight-tenths per cent in contrast to an ambitious National Education Policy.
External donor funding aided Balochistan in reaching some of the goals addressed in the 1992 NEP. The establishment of PED was one such accomplishment. Primary education was subsequently centralised through this agency. Workplans were developed to bridge policy and implementation. However, these workplans were based more on donor objectives than any provincial strategy. Methods for implementing the workplans were operationalised at the discretion of government officials and advisors. The donors monitored activity through provincial staff situated in PED in the provincial capital.

Countering decentralisation and the spirit of the 1992 NEP, one of several goals was not accomplished. In particular the formal delegation of financial, administrative and personnel, management powers were never fully delegated to the district level. All respondents questioned in this study confirmed that between 1992 and 1997, district officers were responsible for disbursement of salaries and some local expenditure but held no discretionary powers over budgets. Hence, procedures for budget planning were analysed as being irrelevant.

Evidence was gathered that indicate district officers had not even been taken into confidence regarding systematic procedures for textbook procurement, school furniture procurement, office equipment and materials purchases, and vehicle maintenance. Procedures for acquiring these daily necessities were at the control of PED. It was observed that these items were distributed randomly with very little regard to formal requests.

**Personnel**

The variable of 'personnel' analyses the capacity of street level bureaucrats to work under devolved authorities. This variable not only captures the ability of the individual to handle tasks but also takes into consideration the accountability of the staff for their performance. In assessing the primary education system for staffing, the following findings emerged.
In general, data indicated that the agencies responsible for education administration in Balochistan were inappropriately structured and staffed. Decision-making was centralised and politicised. Few officials at any level had clear spheres of responsibility and most lacked professional training for their posts. Lack of motivation, enthusiasm, and accountability were prevalent and strong political interests often interfered with opportunities for management reform.

The 1992 National Education Policy projected the following goals for the development of personnel in a decentralised context:

- The district education officer shall be delegated appropriate financial, administrative and personnel management powers;
- All supervisors, headmasters and principals shall receive training in techniques and methods of educational administration and financial rules before appointment;
- A manual describing the principles of educational administration and financial management shall be prepared; and
- A system of accountability and rewards based on performance evaluation of teachers and head of institutions will be developed.

As indicated in Chapter Three, these goals were never fully realised in Balochistan. Attempts were made to conduct training for field staff and field officers' guides were developed. These guides, as indicated before, included ambitious job descriptions that comprised of tasks in five different categories: academic; administrative; financial; development; and supervisory. Officials of developed decentralised education systems in the West would have found the level of sophistication in these guides just as challenging. Hence, officers in reality had little authority, incentive or capability to fulfil all the expectations of government guides, much less donor workplans.

Prior to 1992 and the establishment of PED, no personnel were earmarked specifically for primary education. After December 1992 and the bifurcation of primary education from the Directorate of Schools, posts were created to fill the administrative and professional cadre needed to undertake the management of primary education including female posts. Male and female education officers
were placed in the districts under the ultimate supervision of PED authorities. PED, in turn, was accountable to the Provincial Department of Education and faced political tempest with the numerous transfers of Secretaries and Ministers of Education—seven each—from 1992 to 1997. Respondents indicated that the power brokerage of primary education was at the centre or in Quetta, the provincial capital. The argument was made that postings closer to Quetta were preferred to those in the districts where officers felt marginalised and neglected.

It is true that in many organisations, personnel are an undervalued resource. In Balochistan, it was noted that staff was not necessarily undervalued given the importance placed on political alliances but rather their potential contribution to education administration was underestimated. That the study revealed the problem of political patronage in existence in Balochistan is no great surprise. Personnel hired not on merit or qualification basis is a common practice that dates back to colonial rule and was even recently legalised to a certain extent. An official order dated August 16, 1993 reigned all authority for hiring and firing teachers, ministerial staff, etc. to the Office of the Provincial Minister of Education. This notification is significant because service rules that were established giving these authorities to the district officers while on paper and included in field officers' guides were not valid. In spite of numerous attempts at their annual mission meetings, and through memoranda, the World Bank was unsuccessful in compelling the GOB to transfer staffing controls to the district levels although it had promised to on several occasions.

By definition, a decentralised local body should have the authority to allocate substantial human resources to meet its task requirements. Given the patronage system and the power of politicians to hire, fire and transfer staff, however, this authority did not exist at the district level. One district education officer commented one morning when most of his administrative staff turned up late for work, that there was nothing he could do to challenge or correct this practice. Lack of accountability was not only noticeable among ministerial staff but also among teachers. A sub-divisional education officer highlighted this practice in his interview by his agitated response that how could teachers be accountable to newly developed monitoring bodies as suggested through PTSMC
structures outside the government when they were not even accountable to the DEO and SDEO officers posted in the government hierarchy.

Other respondents from the education department indicated that the province was not ready to decentralise authority and power because the staff at the local level was not trained to handle the new responsibilities that would accompany the process. Local personnel were conducting the basic requirements of monitoring schools and teachers but lacked direction in terms of quality issues. Evidence was also found that personnel were not always being used efficiently. One respondent claimed that learning co-ordinators were being used as 'peons' or servants of the district education office. In contrast in Jaffarabad, LCs were an integral part of the teacher-mentoring program. In this regard, the proximity of staff, particularly DEOs to teachers, enabled the officers to know the difficulties and problems faced by teachers and other staff in the district. Decentralised authority to manage staff, however, was blocked by MOE's and local politicos' control over personnel.

These findings make clear that in Balochistan, central-controlling authorities underestimated the great potential that could have existed in a trained and qualified workforce. Value had been placed on staff only as far as the 'pawn' could be moved for political and financial benefit.

(5) A decentralised local body should have the authority to allocate substantial resources. This includes quantity of finances handled; number and qualifications of the staff employed; power to decide over expenditure; power to vary revenues; decisions over the staff-appointments, promotion and discipline (Mawhood 1983:9). What level of authority do local bodies have over subordinate field officers, ministerial and other staff, e.g. teacher appointments, promotion and discipline?

According to evidence collected, district officers had little to no authority over subordinate staff or material resources from 1992 to 1997. In Jaffarabad, Respondents at the district level indicated that they held no power over teachers or ministerial staff working in their offices. District officers also claimed that they were threatened and influenced by feudals to recommend teacher and other staff appointments. Compounding the lack of authority over personnel was the lack of control over finances. District officers indicated that a dysfunctional cycle had developed in Jaffarabad. Fewer resources such as POL and cash for vehicle
maintenance and repairs led to fewer field visits. Due to fewer visits, reports had come in that teacher absenteeism had increased. It was also reported that some officers were using their personal funds and borrowing from relatives to support their transportation requirements to perform basic tasks such as school monitoring. One officer aired this frustration: 'It is very hard to work in this atmosphere, with no powers to manage staff.'

In Barkhan, corroborative evidence was collected. Officers indicated that they held no powers over personnel or material resources. One officer pointed out, 'we have no real powers...everything is centralised' (Female SDEO Barkhan, 1998). Added to this fundamental management constraint, female officers were disadvantaged given vast geographical territory to cover with too few personnel in the district to assist them in managing schools. On the male side it was observed that adequate staff existed but were not being utilised. In fact, because of the lack of control augmented by local unions and tribal politics, officers were observed as merely government puppets/representatives. It was even reported that the DEO was rarely in Barkhan but rather spent most of his time in Quetta. Additionally, it was pointed out that very little communication had been received from PED. With these constraints, management was characterised as not allowing the needed work to progress smoothly. Decentralisation was doomed in both districts from the outset of the restructuring of primary education.

Culture

There is a certain amount of disagreement in the social sciences as to the definition of the term 'culture'. The totalist definition of culture is applied in this analysis. Vivelo (1994), of the totalist tradition, views culture as 'an adaptive mechanism—as that totality of tools, acts, thoughts, and institutions through which a population secures and maintains itself' (p.16) He further suggests that this is the best way to view culture because it 'focuses our attention on the organization and function of a people's way of life rather than on the peculiar or curious nature of its custom' (Ibid). No doubt, culture affects the extent to which decentralisation strategies through development initiatives will be effective in certain environments. Culture used as a variable in this study analyses the extent to which organisational and societal structures are compatible with
decentralisation. Given the legacy of centralisation in Balochistan, management reform was viewed by a majority of respondents to be a process that could only be slowly introduced if possible at all. One senior government education official highlighted this point.

Complete decentralisation of the management won't work because we are not used to it. For centuries we have been experiencing centralised types of government and administration...since colonialism, even before that. Therefore decentralisation, total decentralisation will not work because total decentralisation demands efficient establishment at local levels that are presently absent (Principal—PITE, Quetta, 1997).

Donors and other agents, as planners, are found in this study as being negligent to certain cultural realities as exemplified in the following statement made by a former Directorate Official:

State functionaries are not interested in decentralisation...they do not want to part with their powers (Former Director, PED, 1997).

This statement reveals much about the culture of political organisation in Pakistan that is mirrored at the provincial and district levels. In fact, a recent Mission for developing an overarching social action plan for the province projected in their report that district officials were expected to become responsible for procurement of materials at the district level among other day-to-day activities. No mention was made, however, concerning legal adjustments to structures necessary for justifying these transfers of authority. More critical, however, was the absence of serious thought as to how to develop a change mentality among the constituency that would be responsible for such a cultural change. For this oversight, crucial consideration of culture has become a secondary issue. Answers to the following research questions will explore the 'culture' variable further.

(6) Decentralization effectiveness is dependent on political behavioural, attitudinal and cultural factors. Most important among these is commitment of local officials to decentralizing development, the quality of local leadership, the attitudes of rural people toward government, and the degree to which traditional customs and behaviour were compatible with decentralized administrative arrangements (Rondinelli 1983:200). To what extent did these factors play out in Balochistan?
The primary education system in Balochistan was observed as being dependent on a leading figure. It was also a commonly held belief at the centre that people could not be trusted at the district level. This culture was antithetical to the way PED had been envisioned to work. It is easy to see how difficult to devolve downward when central authorities were imbued culturally with authority. The observation that a civil society did not exist combined with the centralised nature of the system comprised the central value.

Centralisation, however, was a prevalent mode of governance in Pakistan. From politics (historically dominated by a Punjabi civil service) to other facets of Pakistan's geo-political existence, centralisation permeates from Prime Minister to peon level. In terms of finances, nationally collected revenues were controlled from the Federal level giving way to low appropriation and expenditure of funds for the social sectors in the provinces.

The structure, will, culture and the state apparatus at the centre were not willing to decentralise either right or wrong. The attitudes throughout the system were not conducive to decentralisation as a goal and this was brought out in the analysis of the functions of education public service delivery and the extent to which those functions had been decentralised. What was interesting to discover was the necessary conditions that were needed for the centre to let go of its power.

The World Bank had made the observation prior to the Balochistan Primary Education Program that education policy had been largely driven by Federal mandates which neither took into account the particular demographic, geographic and cultural conditions of the province nor were backed up by adequate evaluation, experimentation, or resources. Marked variations among districts and poor educational indicators testify to the absence of policies tailored to local needs.

The centralised culture of education administration in Balochistan prior to 1992 was characterised by its top-down administrative structure. Additionally, there was an established bureaucracy and political structure that pre-existed any reform notions of decentralisation. These features severely proved to
challenge functions that donors helped to develop for reforming education administration. In fact, they crept in to the way primary education was managed. Respondents observed that PED technical staff and officials were doing things for district officers and teachers rather than developing the initiative and responsibility at the local level. There was also a void of communication from the top to the district level. The lack of sharing information provided a culture of insulation and isolation for the local officers.

Senior provincial education officers often usurped their power and control of the education system in negative ways such as their legalisation of teacher appointments, dismissals, and transfers. Their passion for control was also exhibited in the refusal to disburse funding to the PTSMCs for reported fear that communities would be monitoring government authorities in charge of government schools—a perceived threat to power. Also, politicians and senior officials reportedly manipulated construction of schools to benefit their personal interests. The example was given of Members of Provincial Assembly who would force a decision of a school site without regard to enrolment data for that particular area.

The centralised nature of administration was evident in Jaffarabad and Barkhan as corroborated by a majority of respondents. Findings presented in earlier chapters conclude that DEOs did not have the necessary power and control at their level to manage the district affairs. Matters of control ranging from the insignificant task of procuring office stationery to the greater functions of hiring and supervising staff are proof. In Barkhan, centralising tendencies resulted from gender relations. It was observed that this particular district was male dominated as evidenced by the observation that the female district officer infrequently visited her office and that male family members handled all matters including the collection of salaries for the female teachers.

The culture of centralisation had other origins than the provincial government. Data collected form Jaffarabad and Barkhan illustrate this finding. In Jaffarabad, as indicated before, the feudal landowners wielded a significant amount of control over communities given their ownership of the land. This control spread to other areas as well including education administration. It was
demonstrated that party politics were irrelevant in Jaffarabad and that often feudals filled the political positions such as members of provincial and national assemblies. MNAs and MPAs were reportedly transferring District and Deputy Commissioners in the districts of Balochistan and in this way interfering with local governance. Also, DEOs reported that MNAs and MPAs interfered with the administration of education. Historically they designated where schools would be built (Weiss 1991). The feudal culture encroached on DEO prescribed jurisdiction through nepotism in staff appointments as already discussed. District officers, in reality, were being held accountable not only to provincial centralised bodies such as PED and feudals, but also by local institutions such as teachers unions. The teachers unions were opposed to the PTSMC scheme fearing the erosion of their powers especially with regard to PTSMC committee’s monitoring of local teachers. For this and other reasons, unions contributed to the local culture opposed to participation and decentralisation.

In Barkhan, tribal cultures as well as the GTA union have over-powered the administration of the district officers. Observations and evidence very clearly showed that these officers had been stripped of all powers and control. The weak-existence of organised civil society was evidenced in law and order being controlled by tribals, the individual possession and use of firearms, lack of regard to school property as seen through the tribal squatting. The Waderas also heavily influenced the site selections of schools. It was also demonstrated on the day the school furniture was to be distributed with the teachers carrying away resources for their personal use. Tribal social organisation was modelled on the authoritarian structure of the Sardari System. This hierarchical system of authority flows downward from the leader to the youngest male members. Barkhan’s district culture was consequently one that bred a low-level of tolerance for any opposition. Community initiatives such as the PTSMC were feared as opposing local authorities. This finding was surprising given historical evidence of pre-existing community participation on irrigation schemes. Local participation deteriorated following state interventions in rural development. These interventions in turn fostered the expectation among local communities that the government should provide funding and development for them.
Was decentralisation observable through the behavioural patterns of participation, the means of access for individuals to the bureaucracy? (Mawhood 1983:xii)

The World Bank and other international agencies have characterised the Community Support Process in Balochistan as a successful and innovative initiative in Balochistan. 23 Orfield (1999) has indicated that international organisations and governments are promoting community participation through school management committees as a strategy for decentralisation, to improve educational effectiveness and efficiency in developing countries. However, as data in earlier chapters suggest, because the process of local management in Balochistan was reliant upon PED (the centre) for funding and control, aspects of effectiveness and efficiency had little chance to mature. The NGOs that were facilitating the CSP were dependent upon funding that came from PED and donor sources and therefore were completely accountable to the centre rather than their constituency for local initiatives. Village committees and PTSMCs looked for support and assistance from the NGOs and district government officers who were themselves subsumed under a centralised bureaucracy. Additionally, the culture or environment in which these local institutions worked did not have the capacity to manage such tasks as quality monitoring of teaching and budget and finance. Though the CSP initiative, communities were showing signs of participation through their engagement in building schools and rallying of support for education through the formation of local education committees. One village committee interviewed in Jaffarabad indicated that they wanted to take on more responsibilities and control of administration and management of their local school. This attitude of local participation suggests that education reform through decentralisation would have local support. However, other findings in this study conclude that attitudes of communities were influenced by strong government control from the top down and that this control had killed local initiative and had built a reliance or dependency by communities on the government as their caretaker. In other words, the culture was not ready for decentralisation. World Bank and other donor flag waving, in the long run, did not make a terrible amount of difference.

Prior to the CSP initiative, there was little evidence of a culture in Balochistan that valued education, much less active parental involvement in the monitoring of the process. In this respect, the CSP and PTSMC activities did build an awareness of this role and the possibility of its effectiveness. Hence, the readiness for decentralisation had been fostered. However, in terms of strict interpretation as to what fully constitutes decentralisation, there had been a surge but faltering level of commitment by higher authorities for supporting local participation. Initially funding had been promised and mobilisation funds were advanced for PTSMCs. In the end, however, the funding evaporated. This initiative all but died out by 1997 according to evidence collected in both Jaffarabad and Barkhan.

7.3 Theoretical Perspectives, Practical Advice

The findings in this study, while revealing, serve a broader purpose than merely illuminating a story of decentralisation process in Balochistan from 1992 to 1997. As elaborated below, theoretical claims are more readily accepted for advice when developed against a backdrop of real practice.

The detailed knowledge of the organisation and especially the knowledge about the processes underlying the behaviour and its context can help to specify the conditions under which the behaviour can be expected to occur. In other words, the generalisation is about theoretical propositions not about populations (Cassell and Symon 1997:225).

Chapter One reviewed and analysed theoretical claims about the process of decentralisation in public administration and then more narrowly within the education sector. Theoretical frameworks were presented that provided a basis for understanding and analysing decentralisation initiatives. This study adopted two specific models with which to analyse the case of Balochistan—Winkler's Typology Matrix for Public Service Delivery (1989) and Schartau's (1993) organisational variables for education. Winkler's model aided in the functional analysis of Barkhan and Jaffarabad and the central PED's role in the management of primary education. Schartau's variables were presented in this chapter to frame an overview of the process of primary education administrative reform in Balochistan from 1992 to 1997.
It is curious to note that significant funding and subsequent development plans in support of decentralisation have netted very few results in improved conditions and increased administrative efficiency. This dilemma makes the centralisation—decentralisation debate worth revisiting. As pointed out in the literature, 'the question of centralization of control and the demand for decentralization in Pakistan have to be viewed in the light of this struggle between the people and the rulers of Pakistan' (Jahan 1972 quoted in Saqeb 1985:33). Centralisation, and its legacy in Pakistan, when contrasted with modernisation, has some very powerful implications regarding policies for management reform in education. More theoretical conclusions will be presented in chapter eight. However, the following general observations can be made about the Balochistan experience.

❖ The very existence of education 'policy' should be questioned in a decentralisation initiative.

In the U.S. context of public policy, it has been said that 'most citizens encounter government (if they encounter it at all) not through letters to congressman or by attendance at school board meetings but through their teachers and their children's teachers...Each encounter of this kind represents an instance of policy delivery' (Lipsky 1980:3). If the latter part of this statement can be applied to the case of Balochistan, the existence of policy there is in serious question given the perpetually low educational indicators reported there. Of course, qualitative data collected for this study makes the point that no formal primary education policy existed prior to 1997 in Balochistan.

Nevertheless, educational services were being delivered to some extent as observed in the case studies. The evidence suggests that the delivery of public education had been non-plussed by prior attempts of external agencies to improve provincial delivery (see also Noman 1997). Hence, we have to ask what the policy climate was like for the province if the delivery was shown not to be affecting any real change in the indicators.

The World Bank suggested that from basic policy-making to day-to-day management, education agencies in Pakistan were inappropriately structured and staffed. They relate these deficiencies of the system to the weak
institutional capacity of the provincial government. Yet instead of addressing improvements to the policy process, their influence and support seemed to be directed through implementation of projects and programmes as a quicker remedy. This observation leads to the next one about symptomatic solutions to development problems.

- **Symptomatic solutions for development sometimes neglect root problems—decentralisation should not fall prey to this temptation.**

Senge (1990) discusses an organisational concept of ‘burden shifting’. This concept is defined as an underlying problem in organisations that generates symptoms that demand attention. Senge argues that the underlying problem is difficult to address in these situations either because it is obscure or costly to confront. Hence, the burden of the problem is shifted to other solutions that are well meaning and ‘easy fixes which seem extremely efficient’ (p.104).

Senge’s management principle is applicable in education development in Balochistan. In this case, poor social indicators specifically those related to education in Balochistan demanded attention if not by the Federal Government, then by external agencies. Balochistan’s inherited problem of centralist control and lack of a specific goal or policy of decentralisation could be characterised as its underlying problem. For Balochistan, the donor community stepped in and set benchmarks for the improvement of student enrolments, literacy rates, and school buildings to address the symptoms of poor quality of education in that province.

Solutions that address only the symptoms of a problem, not fundamental causes, tend to have short-term benefits at best. In the long-term, the problem resurfaces and there is increased pressure for symptomatic response. Meanwhile, the capability for fundamental solutions can atrophy (Ibid:104).

Chapter Three exhibits the different iterations of development projects that have addressed primary education deficiencies in Pakistan. The broader implication of burden shifting in development is clear. All the financing and the external technical assistance possible cannot and did not make very much of a difference. Only when root problems are addressed in development can
fundamental changes have much of a lasting effect. Chubb and Moe's (1990) argument that institutions cannot solve problems sometimes because they are part of the problem is applicable to the Balochistan case.

- **Decentralisation reform requires institutional and cultural readiness**

As pointed out in Chapter Two, Pakistan's administrative cultural legacy of centralisation can be attributed to colonial rule. This legacy has also led to centralisation of the administration of education as claimed by Saqeb (1985). Reaction to centralisation and the social effects of it associated with bad governance has motivated among other initiatives, donor support through institutional reforms including decentralisation. This has been the case with Balochistan.

However, development strategies have not always been compatible with cultural and administrative nuances peculiar to a specific region (Rondinelli 1983b; Crook and Manor 1998:302). Nicholson (1994) argues that the legacy of bureaucracies influenced by colonials may be ineffective as a result of their inappropriateness to indigenous culture (p.68; see also discussion by Delen 1999). Her criticism of donors' similar lack of sensitivity to culture bears attention. For instance, she argues that long-term effects of development 'projects' have been negligible in many cases.

The establishment of projects as separate administrative units, run largely by overseas experts as enclaves of efficiency, has proved in many cases to be ineffective. When project funding ceases, there is little beneficial impact on local management capacities (Ibid:68).

Involvement with and empirical observation of the Balochistan Primary Education Programme (BPEP) support Nicholson's claim. Field research for this study coincided with the near completion of BPEP, which had been underway for nearly eight years. (The Primary Education Development Project (PED) ran the first four years and BPEP the final term). Yet, respondents at the district level unanimously claimed their capacity to manage had not been greatly
improved or helped. In one of my earlier business trips to Pakistan, a member of a village education committee in Pishin District directly asked me why projects come and go and the funding too. He associated the comings and goings of donors and funding, in his lifetime, to the dry Balochistan wind.

Cullen (1992) is cited for raising the point that the Weberian model of bureaucracy based on legal—rational, formal structures has been the baseline to which developing countries' are compared (see also Little 1999). However, she then suggests that even in the West, the ‘ideal’ bureaucratic structure does not exist based on her research in the U.K. She found in organisations there that various forms of corruption did exist sometimes to a negative degree but that in other cases, ‘deviance’ was necessary to augment policy implementation by averting the inflexibilities of the formal organisational system. However, she claimed, in general, that deviance is not necessarily negative. When used effectively, it can be considered as ‘initiative’ in line with indigenous values. So if the colonial model of administration has been ingrained contrary to Pakistani culture, we have to ask whether some acts of perceived corruption could, in fact, be acts of initiative.

In Balochistan, central administrators perceived district education officers as being corrupt. However, their ways and means for getting resources at the district level could also be seen as ‘initiative’ given that they lacked control over financial and other resources at their level. Of course we could only assume this if the end-use of these resources were for the benefit of education development.

Nicholson concludes that ‘rather than comparing Third World bureaucracies to an ideal model and finding them wanting, it would be more productive to compare them to the cultures in which they are operating and find ways to improve the fit’ (Nicholson 1994:83).

- **Geographical representation does not necessarily equal true decentralised reform**

Prior to Pakistan's partition from India, colonial rule had ingrained a system of administration whereby central and higher authorities retained most of the power and where district and local authorities were posted as ‘agents of
implementation of authority'. As Saqeb (1985) claims, ‘there was no provision for any public interest groups to share in the functions of policy-making, policy adoption or policy articulation’ (p.37). It is further claimed that ‘this type of administration, as expected, made people rely for everything on the government and killed their sense of initiative and responsibility’ (Ibid:37).

In terms of the provision of primary education, spatial or area divisions in Balochistan manifested themselves in two extremes: through the organisation of PED in the provincial capital and the district field offices located throughout the province. While the education department is represented geographically through the district education offices in twenty-six districts, powers for day-to-day management activities are extremely limited for a variety of reasons. Respondents claimed that they had; in fact, no local power to provide what was seen as a provincially controlled public service deliverable of education.

Centralisation is endemic in other social sectors in Pakistan. Noman (1997) analysed the health sector in Pakistan. He observed that there was no delegation of authority for operational decision-making at the district level.

Decision-making for matters such as programme budgeting and finance are restricted to the top level of the provincial and federal hierarchy. This kind of system obviously prevents local authorities from taking any initiative to improve health service delivery...Similar problems abound in the education sector (Noman 1997:283).

The claim was repeatedly made by DEOs that their 'hands were tied', that they had no decision-making authority to procure even stationery for staff in their offices. In assessing the structure of administration in Balochistan, it is apparent that little more than geographical representation existed. Although introduced earlier, the following quote illustrates this dilemma.

*If you...want to take the power out of the hands of the Secretariat in Quetta and devolve it to a person further out, I don't think that anybody's confronted that yet...I think that decentralisation is geographical rather than authority, power and accountability* (CTA, BPEP, 1998).

According to the theoretical construct presented above in Box 7.1, management reform is highly dependent on a number of factors including the
transfer of planning, decision-making or management functions from central government and its agencies to field organisations.

In Balochistan, Siddiqi (1991) argues that since 1882, British external control of Balochistan established a pattern of central control and geographical representation. That centralised administration was inherited from colonial authorities in many developing countries is indeed a reality. The chance to experiment in the local planning and control of education, if practical at all; however, still remains a hopeful dream.

These general findings will be explored further in the next and final chapter. Answers to the question why decentralisation did not work in Balochistan begin to aid in constructing a more meaningful policy and implementation dynamic for developing education institutions.
Chapter 8

Conclusions

*I wouldn't recognise the Balochistan problem if it hit me in the face!*

Henry Kissinger
Mission to Pakistan
1962

It has been argued that strengthening administrative processes at the local level in less developed countries could improve access, participation and policy effectiveness. Obviously Pakistan's planning language implied a certain amount of faith in this ideology of decentralisation:

We consider that the Government should visualise an active process of decentralisation...Planning in a free society must be based on a general consciousness of social purpose so that the people treat the plan as their own, intended for their benefit. They should have a sense of participation and be willing to extend their full support and co-operation in its fulfilment. Without the wholehearted participation of the people, the development programme will not achieve its full proportions; progress will be slow; and its benefits will remain open to question (Government of Pakistan 1958:103).

Smith (1986) stated that a regime's reaction to its inability to live up to its ideological message was often 'somewhat panicky' and took the form of
centralised planning, public service training programmes, and technical assistance from overseas' (Smith 1986:457). This 'panic' has led to centralised control especially in post-colonial nations where the nation-states also feared losing a power struggle against the rights and self-determination of its varied ethnic constituencies. This has been the case in Pakistan (Baloch 1987; Jalal 1998:231).

The purpose of investigating the extent to which decentralisation had occurred in the primary education sector in Balochistan largely responds to development rhetoric regarding the reform. Given the opportunities and hope that such a reform could offer, Pakistan, like many countries, had adopted goals for experimenting with it. Try as it might, however, Pakistan was not successful in breaking away from a legacy of centralisation. Balochistan, the largest province geographically in Pakistan, could be considered one of its most challenged provinces in conforming to a policy of decentralisation. It is largely rural making communication and the provision of public services extremely difficult. It is also faced with the self-determination, in these rural areas, of its varied ethnic constituencies as noted above. The hope that decentralisation could bring to Balochistan was emphasised by external donors rather than the harsh reality of the challenges facing it. These contrasting phenomena have provided an interesting backdrop for examination. This chapter first answers the primary research questions through a summation of the empirical evidence. It also draws out research-based conclusions through an evaluation of the research work itself and provides some insights for future exploration.

8.1 Lessons from Empirical Evidence

Problems were identified in chapter one in terms of the difficulty of defining decentralisation. That debate questioned whether management reforms associated with decentralisation are more likely to result in centralising outcomes. The research conducted on Balochistan is conceptualised in this debate. As specified in Chapter Two, primary research questions were raised regarding attempts to decentralise primary education administration in Balochistan from 1992 to 1997. This section sets out to answer these questions by taking a comprehensive look at the empirical evidence found in this study.
Before we attempt to answer these questions, however, it is important to recognise that caution should be observed in the interpretation of these answers. While they are demonstrable statements, they are limited in depth and perception to respondents' perspective in two districts and my observations through both working in Balochistan and conducting this field study. While careful attention has been paid to corroborating local district and provincial evidence that I gathered with other available data, albeit they were few, these answers are only specific to the two case districts' relationship with the Primary Education Directorate. One should not try to generalise these findings to other districts and provinces in Pakistan.

Also, at a glance, the results as revealed through these answers could be judged as harshly critical of BPEP, donor interventions and any development that took place from 1992 to 1997; when, in fact, very little time had transpired during this time period in development terms. Maturity and sustainability of projected outcomes of BPEP should be analysed after 1997 and beyond to the end of the programme. Measurements have been taken based on preliminary objectives or goals that USAID and World Bank initially made in agreement with the Provincial Government of Balochistan and the process that evolved within a five-year period. It will be necessary to look at the nature of the reform after 1997 to see if any significant changes occurred.

1) How successful was the attempt to decentralise education administration in Balochistan?

Low literacy rates in the province especially among females (roughly three per cent) were a recognised deficiency in the late 1980s that needed addressing. External donor support focussed attention on this need through the improvement of primary education and thus after several unsuccessful education initiatives, USAID sponsored the separation of PED from a central Directorate of Schools, a claimed step towards decentralisation of education administration for Balochistan. The claim was validated in that financial control and control for personnel at PED was largely devolved to the newly formed branch under the supervision of the Provincial Department of Education. This
measure was a successful attempt at decentralisation as far as structural changes that reached PED. Evidence gathered to analyse attempts to further decentralise administration to the district level suggests that little to no success had occurred.

As was argued in Chapter One, unless financial and administrative controls are shifted to local authorities, effective decentralisation does not occur. To this end, case study evidence presented in Chapters Five and Six revealed that this had not happened. Local officers could not plan their own budgets, allocate spending for office equipment and school materials; hire, fire and transfer staff. Rather, field officers were merely outposts or inspectors. Other determinants of decentralisation were not realised in Balochistan.

The environment and culture were not found conducive to decentralisation in Balochistan either. The case districts examined in this study had their own competing centralising forces as found in the control of tribal authorities in Barkhan and feudal leaders in Jaffarabad. Teachers' unions also combated attempts at administrative decentralisation in their districts. They were actively prohibiting teachers from participating in local school committees, teacher training programs, and the formation of PTSMCs. Even local politicians (MNAs and MPAs) were found to manipulate school construction site planning and the hiring of field education staff in district offices as well as teachers. Power wielded in this respect overrides local officers' authority to manage. In addition, 'central' esteem of the districts' capability of managing their own affairs was low as revealed in chapter three. Provincial officers, technical advisers and donors all claimed that local capacity did not exist for the full transfer of powers to be made further away from PED. Powers and controls were maintained within PED, in part, because of suspicion of local corruption and the lack of confidence in the district officers' ability to manage.

Development efforts to increase participation of communities in the affairs of locally developed girls schools were initially successful. With technical assistance from PED and through local NGO guidance, girls schools were established in increasing numbers. Local village education committees and women's village education committees were formed to help with school
management tasks. Just as these initiatives were developed from the centre, so their demise would be through central neglect. Centralised funding and the dependency that local NGOs had developed on central and external funding for institutional support could not be sustained on the recurrent education budget. It was expected that the financing of community schools would be placed on recurrent budgets after a probationary period. Getting communities to donate their time, land and resources did not leverage structural changes for adjusting the locus of control of administration.

The organisational culture established at PED did not naturally foster the devolution of planning, budgeting and personnel functions and controls to the districts. The culture at PED had evolved into single authority hierarchies, e.g., powerful government officials and even technical consultants. In addition the Department of Education as represented by the Minister and Secretary of Education, despite their frequent transfers, retarded decentralisation through limiting the powers that field officers could hold. This finding has been repeated throughout the thesis but represents a fundamental structural element that had the potential of legitimising decentralisation. As determined in the textual analysis that compared annual provincial workplans with National Education Policy in Chapter Three, the Minister of Education's legal role controlling the administration of personnel including teachers was one that ran counter to the spirit of national policy.

Chapter three described the education policy process and the lack of coordination between policy and implementation. While decentralisation had been a stated national policy goal, the very existence of a provincial education policy was in question. If the decentralisation of primary education administration was unsuccessful in Balochistan, we have to ask why?

Attempts to decentralise primary education administration in Balochistan were unsuccessful for several reasons. First, there was no genuine commitment throughout the system to see such a reform succeed. This is a strong assessment but one that is based on empirical evidence. State officials were not willing to part with their powers. This attitude was reflected in the way that administration had been carried out prior to 1992 when primary education
received very little attention at all. After 1992 and the establishment of PED, albeit a step in the right direction, the commitment to devolve controls further out to the districts was low. Data suggests that benchmarks satisfying task implementation were developed at the central level to satisfy donor requirements but that there was little commitment to seeing the control of these plans flow down to the district level. In fact, because formal policy for education did not exist in the province, there was very little space for holding the GOB accountable for any commitments. This was brought out in the textual analysis of annual workplans of PED. Workplans were tied to donor agreements as opposed to provincial policy. Interestingly, senior education officials had agreed with external agencies to correct practices of nepotism and political patronage. However, these formal agreements did little to change actual practice between 1992 and 1997.

Secondly, decentralisation attempts were unsuccessful because tensions existed between the opponents and advocates of the reform measure. This division was not only prevalent between provincial and district levels but was also found to exist within the districts. Opponents of the reform at the district level perceived their role and scope of control, in terms of education administration, as inherited and naturally placed. Unions, tribal leaders and feudal lords were never seriously considered as participants in the education system. Instead, their resistance to local management initiatives and their manipulation of administrative practices only fuelled crisis management responses. Nevertheless, these environmental and cultural opponents were not as instrumental in deterring decentralisation as the central opponents whose sphere of control pre-determined and limited district authority. The advocates for decentralisation were DEOs and other districts staff, NGO staff, and members of local communities. These groups were more valued, however, by central authorities for their geographical representation than their contribution to effective local management.

Finally, decentralisation was not successful in Balochistan because it was not technically feasible. The infrastructure required to sustain such a reform had not been adequately prepared. Respondents at the centre were partly right in claiming that the districts' capacity to manage finances did not exist.
However, little or nothing was done to remedy this. This study found that the 'potential' for management existed but that actual capacity was weak. Staff at the district level complained that they had received very little to no training regarding any of their responsibilities in the time period between 1992 and 1997. It was a technical oversight for the donors to require government institutions to improve the quality of education without first addressing quality issues of the institutions. The main reason, however, explaining the vulnerability of further devolving power and control of implementation to lower levels was that of the existence of policy. This finding implies that a crucial missing element had been left out of educational development planning conducted by GOB with strong donor influence. The feasibility of decentralisation in 1992 had theoretical merit but would be technically difficult to achieve in rolling out to the district level as determined in this study. This issue will be discussed in greater detail in the next section.

Interestingly, these observations confirm the four factors introduced in chapter one that affect the success or failure of decentralisation policy.

❖ central political leaders and bureaucracies commitment and support;
❖ behaviour, attitudes, and culture which are conducive to decentralisation;
❖ good and appropriate design and organisation of decentralisation programs;
❖ allocation of adequate finances, human and physical resources (Rondinelli, Nellis et al. 1984:46-7)

What do these observations tell us about the nature of decentralisation? It may be too early to tell but some indicators can be generalised. These were presented in Chapter Seven but are repeated below:

❖ The very existence of education 'policy' should be questioned in a decentralisation initiative;
❖ Geographical representation does not necessarily equal true decentralised reform;
❖ Decentralisation reform requires institutional and cultural readiness;
❖ Symptomatic solutions for development sometimes neglect root problems—decentralisation should not fall prey to this temptation.

The following section elaborates the above indicators through an examination of the second and third research questions. The second research
question addresses policy constraints while the third question relates practice to theoretical statements.

2) What were the policy constraints?

In chapter three, public policy was defined as a complex pattern of interdependent collective choices including the decision not to act. Policy-making was characterised as an organisational and political process. These definitions imply several things about policy and its formulation. First, the development of policy is not a random act but rather a more systematic process. Also implied is that an 'organisation' facilitates the process in a shared or cooperative manner. The Balochistan case provides ample evidence opposite to these definitions. This evidence begins to explain the policy constraints found in Balochistan.

As noted before, this study determined that policy-making in the province had been virtually non-existent prior to 1997. Such responses as those given by both provincial officers and the World Bank support this claim. In fact the World Bank considered Balochistan as a 'policy vacuum' and that primary education 'policy' had been established there in an 'ad hoc' fashion determined by program objectives. A formal or systematic process for policy formulation had not been established in the province. Also, respondents believed that coordination did not exist in the way the GOP interacted with the GOB to facilitate a process for mapping out provincial education policy.

Ironically, USAID recommended as its fundamental goals for primary education development in 1989 the need to strengthen institutional capacity in Balochistan and the need to formulate and implement policy. The World Bank recognised later in 1996 that poor quality of education was a result of the weak institutional capacity in the province and the lack of structure and staff for basic policy-making and day-to-day management. What is interesting is that both of these external agencies only supported institutional strengthening as far as the development of the Directorate for Primary Education was concerned. The formal process of policy-making at the provincial level or at the Directorate itself had never been formally introduced nor established per the initial goal. As we...
have stated in this study, donors may choose to influence the policy development and implementation in two ways. First, development aid is 'tied' to various conditionalities that specify how development is to proceed. Alternatively, donors can try to influence the thinking of policy-makers through policy dialogue. We found that both mechanisms had been used in Balochistan. It was revealed that donors, in fact, bore greater influence in decision-making than federal and provincial institutions.

Hence, policy constraints in Balochistan had more to do with donors, given their influence, than the provincial government. In reality, donor plans became the surrogate for policy as recognised through the annual workplans for the Directorate for Primary Education. Without a formal policy process in place, administrative reform through decentralisation would be hard-pressed to survive. The answer to the third research question attempts to explain further 'why' decentralisation reforms in Balochistan could not survive.

3) What does this experience tell us about both theory of decentralisation and its application to education in a developing country with a strong centralist tradition?

General theories about the nature of decentralisation can be applied in the context of education administration in this study. As previously pointed out, it was not the objective at the outset either to examine outcomes of education or to compare outcomes among various markets. Rather this study examined the education system as a function of the public policy process. This is important to bear in mind in the application of theory to the education sector as done in this section.

Figure 8.1 is a graphic representation of the dynamics of management reform in Balochistan. It is featured here to help understand the application of decentralisation in a developing country with a strong centralist tradition, as was the case in Pakistan. This figure is also used to highlight important aspects of theory with the process of the reform as investigated first hand. Key elements of the education system and of the education process are represented.
Two concentric circles are used to identify the space divisions or administrative levels identified throughout the thesis: the ‘centre’ and the ‘districts’. The inner circle represents the central sphere of control that existed through the Primary Education Directorate. Spatially, the outer circle represents the local or district level. This level is represented by key institutions that had a local role in the management of schools in Balochistan: district education offices, communities, NGOs and schools. The arrows moving away from the centre are representative of the idealism that existed in early government and donor plans to decentralise power, authority and control to the district level. As the evidence in this study suggest, instead of being extended or devolved, power, authority and control were, in fact, wielded by central institutions. Recall that the Typology Matrix for Balochistan in Chapter Seven identified the locus of control for all aspects of administration to be centralised.

Figure 8.1 Dynamics of Management Reform in Balochistan

PED = Primary Education Directorate
The tension between the circles is shown through two sets of forces. The forces emanating from the centre theoretically were functions of administration that district representatives needed in order to manage education locally. Forces that directly countered decentralisation were discussed in Chapter Seven. These were highlighted in the discussion of organisational variables of task, structure, procedure, personnel and culture. It was argued that good management is an important tool to reach the goals of efficiency and productivity (Schartau 1993). The forces that impeded decentralisation and subsequently 'good management' in Balochistan are represented in the figure as the barriers to power, authority and control.

The dynamics of management reform in Balochistan as graphically represented bring life to Schaeffer's arguments and other critics' theories on the nature of decentralisation in the literature. First, this study supports the notion that organisations are 'inherently centrist' by the very nature of their co-ordination role. The Primary Education Directorate (PED) was established because the work in administering primary education was being neglected and needed organisational representation. Similar to Schaeffer's hypothesis, PED became centralised through its own development of personnel structures, its distribution of power and by the way it was centrally situated in the provincial capital. The spatial orientation of PED and the district offices shown in Figure 8.1 'emphasises the political significance of centrality. Headquarters and branches are the visible statement of the centralising process which organisation of itself inevitably tends to mean' (Schaffer 1984:47-48).

Secondly, the assessment of the primary education management system in Balochistan revealed that, as Schaeffer (1982b) discussed, issues of central control, financial dependence and administrative weakness continued to 'debilitate' schemes of administrative reform because these issues were not addressed in 'local organisations to which responsibilities and powers are to be decentralised' (p.462). These local organisations in Balochistan included the district offices, NGOs, communities and schools. Functional analyses of these local institutions revealed that district officers did not have control over their own budgets and personnel that

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not only weakened their administrative role, but also hampered their ability to provide quality supervision to dispersed schools and students.

Observations made in the districts of Barkhan and Jaffarabad revealed that local education committees had relatively little power in the management of local schools. This finding is consistent with Moser's (1983) definition of 'authentic participation' that it can only occur when there is a redistribution of 'power' and that this implies 'strong' participation with structural change as its objective (p.4). PTSMCs, VECs, WVECs had been established not to compete with district officers in the management of local schools, but to help. Their help, however, became limited as the lack of financial resources for school maintenance, teachers' salaries, and other resources led to a dependence on PED, which in turn promoted centralisation further. This finding is also compatible with Smith's (1986) argument that the composite units of society represented in theory, as 'locals', communities and beneficiaries etc. are often secondary factors in the decentralisation equation. Questions of access and exclusion complicate often oversimplified, idealistic notions of participatory and community development (p.463). The establishment of community organisations in rural Balochistan was not a particularly unproductive measure (Thomas 1996). However, their dependence on PED for sustainability contradicts any claim that there was authentic participation.

Finally, Balochistan's experience with decentralisation from 1992 to 1997 raises an interesting question within the context of the literature advocating decentralisation. In chapter one, we saw Rondinelli's (1983) list of outcomes or 'desirable effects' of decentralisation. The language used by Rondinelli to spell out these effects of decentralisation implicitly suggests that some force has assumed the role of manipulating administration. Phrases such as 'seeks to redistribute authority', 'giving more political power to citizens', 'allowing services to be provided by community groups', and 'distributes investments in educational services and facilities more widely among cities and towns' are illustrative. Other phrases introduced by Rondinelli include (1983:14-16):
Delegates greater authority: 
De-bureaucratizes: 
Opens the flow: 
Promotes implementation: 
Allows for greater representation: 
Induces capability: 
Unburdens central managers: 
Creates a condition: 
Institutionalises participation; and 
Offsets the control.

In decentralised reforms, there will be winners and losers of power but more importantly and with greater implications for power, the language above suggests that some force is driving the decision-making and, in fact, deciding the allocation of responsibility. There is no escaping this phenomenon but we have to ask what that force is and what potential benefits does the source derive from making the decisions. The Balochistan experience tells us that power brokers in a centralist environment will not voluntarily or readily give up privileges of authority. The evidence is clear that even when donors exert a certain amount of flag-waving to influence decentralisation, central leaders who lack commitment will not threaten their own role and representation in the making of appropriation decisions through supporting drastic administrative reforms.

8.2 Research-based Conclusions

Evaluation of Research

First we look at what this research has accomplished. The design was a qualitative, process analysis that drew together data collection methods to analyse the phenomena of decentralisation. The examination of the Balochistan experience has allowed us to take a closer look at a process of education administration in a developing country from the top policy making authority all the way down to the provincial and district level implementation units. This is unique not only to the Balochistan experience but also to the literature on management reform of primary education administration. It has also allowed us to analyse general definitions of decentralisation against a backdrop of a centralised administrative environment.
Control patterns, as analysed through management reform, are shaped by diverse sources that cannot be well understood by any one perspective alone. One advantage of comparative analysis as opposed to a case study of any one system or any one type of institution in a country is that it brings out more clearly the diversity of forces at work. We would argue, however, that singular cases are necessary to explore a particular force in greater depth. Some assert that evidence from one situation is not generalisable to other situations. However, advice from case studies are useful feedback to planning institutions in that particular region to be, in fact, sensitive to local social control issues. Lauglo and McLean (1985) argue that outcomes of decentralisation policy for education should be analysed. A study of the consequences of such policies, of the implications of specific proposals in particular cases, may throw light on the feasibility of general decentralisation arguments and on the social, economic and political conditions in which they are introduced (p.2). It is hoped that to some degree this study has accomplished this.

Future Directions

Finally, we conclude with some insights for future study. We can no longer assume that centralised governments are amorphous bodies, which single-handedly pull powers, control and authority to itself. When the literature speaks of polarities, it generalises about governments that they are singular centralising forces. The tendency is to reify abstractions. What we have learned from this study is that by breaking down the policy and implementation process in Balochistan, we have been able to isolate those blockages to reform that were responsible for centralisation. Future decentralisation studies should thwart the temptation to generalise in such a way.

Also, we need more studies to critically analyse donor-stimulated development. By combining process with outcome studies in education and by using data from local contexts, a richer understanding could be derived concerning the feasibility of external assistance. More local cases should be studied and compiled. Area experiences could then be shared, and possibly categorised. These findings could be useful for the designing of more specific guidelines for defining the process of decentralisation. This study was not comparative involving different countries'
experiences; rather it was specific to Pakistan. Perhaps, more in-depth cases developed across areas could be used to find out what conditions hamper or impede decentralisation reforms.

To lay a foundation for research issues of education policy development and implementation particularly in a framework of decentralisation, it is worthwhile to note the merits of such a strategy and to assess the myths associated with the language surrounding the topic. As more and more implementation efforts are concluding and new ones beginning, analyses as to the outcomes of these projects are extremely critical to the field for valuable input into the development of sound theory and policy.

In 1962, Mr. Henry Kissinger was sent on a Mission to Pakistan for U.S. President John F. Kennedy. Kissinger, then a Harvard Professor said impatiently when being briefed on the region, 'I wouldn't recognise the Balochistan problem if it hit me in the face' (cited in Kalb and Kalb 1974:64). Apparently, Kissinger's oversight of development issues in Balochistan is endemic in the world today. The development 'problems' of Balochistan have been around since long before Pakistan's partition from India without much success in their redress. The complexity of these problems may be behind the difficulty with which both the Government of Pakistan and outside donors have experienced in implementing change policies. Our greatest challenge could be in mastering the art of education through learning and reflecting on past initiatives in order not to make oversights of critical importance.
Appendix I

Case Study Protocols: Guides to Field Analyses

❖ Jaffarabad
❖ Barkhan
I. Overview

A. Background Information

The over-arching research project is a process study designed to answer the question how have the ‘centre’ and ‘local’ institutions concerned with managing primary education developed the capacity to manage in a decentralised policy framework and what is the process. The design is qualitative, employing such methods as observation, project document review, and semi-structured interviews.

Mr. Randy L. Hatfield is currently a Ph.D. Candidate at the London School of Economics in the Social Policy and Administration Department where he developed his research proposal. Upon successful completion of the proposal and review by the department, Mr. Hatfield has begun his field research. With the assistance of Mr. Aamir Mirza of the Balochistan Education Foundation, this team is conducting case studies on two education districts within a multiple-case design.

B. Rationale for Case Selection

Jaffarabad has been selected as one case in a multiple case study research approach. The rationale for its selection follows:

❖ Reports from PED project staff that Jaffarabad has shown success in local management and collaboration among local institutions involved with primary education administration.

❖ Jaffarabad represents a ‘summer zone’ district in contrast to a ‘winter zone’ district.

❖ Jaffarabad has been included in many ‘pilot’ capacity building initiatives;

❖ Jaffarabad shows signs of economic stability with agriculture as a major source of income. Also, fairly good infrastructure is evident in terms of roads and communication.

❖ Jaffarabad is highly populated for Balochistan.

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24 This protocol is for the data collection from a single case and is not intended to serve the entire project.
C. Substantive Research Issues

The primary research questions are:

1) How successful was the attempt to decentralise education administration in Balochistan?

2) What were the policy constraints?

3) What does this experience tell us about both the theory of decentralisation and its application to education in a developing country with a strong centralist tradition?

Sub-questions are:

- Has Decentralisation occurred in any form over the past seven years of intensive donor support? If so, to what extent? (Successes? Failures?)

- What evidence exists that education functions and decision-making authority have been legally and informally transferred from the centre to the district/community/school level?

- Do local decision-making bodies have control over financial resources? Are discretionary funds available? Is a budget developed locally? What is the quantity of the budget handled locally?

- What level of authority do local bodies have over subordinate field officers, ministerial and other staff, i.e. teachers in terms of staff appointments, promotion, discipline?

- Which of Donald Winkler's designated education functions are controlled from the centre and which are controlled at the local level? Are they mutually exclusive or is there any overlap?

Identify the locus of control for the following functions of education administration: School organisation; curriculum and teaching methods; examination and supervision; Teacher recruitment; finance of recurrent expenditure; and school construction and finance.

- What was the state of primary education management across the functions listed above when the project began? Has the nature of management changed in the past seven years? If so, how?

- Has the community support process of opening girls schools in Balochistan positively leveraged or altered the nature of the management of education and the services provided?
C. Relevant Readings

Balochistan Planning and Development District Profile: Jaffarabad
SCOPE Six-Month Progress Reports on PTSMCs in Jaffarabad
Marginality and Modernity: Ethnicity and Change in Post-Colonial Balochistan
Balochistan Gazetteer, Vol. I & II
Miscellaneous Project Documents and Reports

II. Field Procedures

A. Gaining Access

Through a permission letter from Director of Primary Education and the Additional Secretary (Planning), a research visa was granted to researcher for conducting research on primary education management in Balochistan.

During any introductions that the team makes of itself in the field, it will:

- Clearly establish the purpose of the research and its contribution toward the Ph.D. degree at the London School of Economics;
- Establish that the nature of the research is independent of the Government of Balochistan and that findings will not be submitted to PED for formal scrutiny;
- Guarantee the anonymity of the sources that are interviewed/approached;
- Not be responsible for leveraging any results to problems voiced from respondents.

B. Tentative Itinerary

18 Feb. WEDNESDAY Depart Quetta for Dera Allah Yar

Activity: Upon arrival, meet with DEO (Male)
Find accommodations and settle in. Plan next days interviews/observations. Meet with DEO (M) and SCOPE to plan week meetings

19 Feb. THURSDAY District Education Office (Male) & Schools

Activity: Interview Field Office Staff and Ministerial staff; Observe DEO office operations and staff interactions. Meet with headteachers of both CSP and Government Schools and observe teacher methodology and student attendance, and observe school maintenance.

20 Feb. FRIDAY District Education Office (Female)

Activity: Interview Field Office Staff and Ministerial staff
Observe DEO office operations and staff interactions
21 Feb. SATURDAY SCOPE Office Visit, Dera Allah Yar
Activity: Interview NGO staff and observe NGO office operations and staff interactions. Go alongside staff on any project visits

22 Feb. SUNDAY PTSMC/VEC/WVECs
Activity: Meet with members of the committees

23 Feb. MONDAY Visit Schools and Return to Quetta

C. Resources Needed

Supplies needed for this study include:

- Hardbound Blank Registers (2)
- 2 Recorders
- Blank Cassettes (8+)
- 200 Speed, 36 exposure color film (2 rolls)
- Writing utensils and laptop computer
- Bottles of Mineral Water (7)
- Double "AA" Batteries

Vital Resources Needed:

- Field Accommodations
- Vehicle and Driver
III. Case Study Questions

A. Protocol Questions

**LEVEL 1: Questions asked for specific interviewees**

**DEO Office**

Has anyone from PED communicated to your office that policy was underway to devolve more authority and responsibility to you and your staff?

What is your current capacity to manage all of the responsibilities listed in the guide book? How could you best achieve them or is it impossible?

Who hires, fires, transfers, and appoints teachers? What is the process for doing each of these? How is it done? Any formal documents you are aware of that dictate this process?

Can you give a list of all the people working in your offices including teachers? Are all posts filled? Are there enough people to accomplish all of the work?

What funds (budgets) besides salaries do you manage? Who in your office actually deals with finances? Have they received any formal training for dealing with the finances?

Are any government finances provided for building maintenance and office supplies? Any development funds at your disposal? How much control do you have over district finances? Can you give the Rupee amount you are responsible for managing from month to month or per year?

How much of a budget are you given to work with? Are these funds disbursed regularly? On a receipt basis? Salaries--how does the money get allocated, disbursed?

Who physically distributes books and school materials to the schools in your district?
Who repairs broken furniture and replaces it to schools? Who hauls the stuff away?

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25 Questions are posed to the investigator, not to a respondent. The questions, in essence, are reminders to the investigator regarding the information that needs to be collected and why. In some instances, the specific questions also may serve as prompts in asking questions during a case study interview; however, the main purpose of these questions is to keep the investigator on track as data collection proceeds.

26 Distinguishing among levels of questions is crucial when a single case is part of a multiple-case study.
Whose responsibility is it to make repairs in the school?
Do you have any other jobs to support yourself besides the government post?
Do you have legal authority for hiring/firing/transferring all teachers in your district?

How do policies, responsibilities and duties get communicated to your office from PED, the Secretariat and the Minister of Education? If by a memo or letter, do you have examples? If by word, who is the messenger? Is there any follow up on whether not these new policies are being implemented?

Are any of your powers and authorities shared with VECs, PTSMCs, teachers? What degree of authority do you have over CSP schools? High, Medium or Low?

**NGOs**

What is your business? (Mission)
- What role do you play in supporting the management and administration of education?
- What percentage of your budget, time, and energy (human resources) is put on primary education and management of tasks within this sector?

Can you provide an organisation chart of your NGO?

Who are your major funding sources? Do you feel that these agencies dictate how you spend your time and energy or do you fully plan and implement your activities?

Who plans your activities and who manages your budget?

Who is your customer?
- Who are you most accountable to: Politicos, Board, PED, people, other?

What does the customer consider valuable?

What have been your results?

What is your plan?

What is your NGOs definition of capacity building? How do you build capacity with VECs, PTSMCs, parents? (Provide evidence)

**PTSMCs**

What responsibilities do you have for managing the schools in your district? (Role)

How many meetings do you organise per month? How many members attend the meetings on average? Who are the members?

What do you normally talk about in the meetings? How do problems get solved and new plans get initiated? Give example.
Do PTSMCs want to take responsibility for managing school affairs? What has been the experience since the formation of the committee? Can anyone give a brief history? What is the process for managing?

Have you performed duties above and beyond those that were initially decided? What other roles has your committee played in working with the schools besides those set out by the NGO or by PED?

What is your relationship of PTSMCs with teachers? With DEOs? With parents?

Are you feeling any pressure from political parties? Parents? Teachers Unions? Malik’s or Mullah’s?

How do you communicate with DEOs, NGOs, PED, parents, others? How many times per month? In your opinion how important is communication with these institutions?

Are you involved in any way with District Education planning? Have you received any training from outside to assist you in your school related duties?

VECs/WVECs

What responsibilities do you have for managing the schools in your district? (Role) How many meetings do you organise per month? How many members attend the meetings on average? Who are the members?

What do you normally talk about in the meetings? How do problems get solved and new plans get initiated? Give example.

Do VECs want to take responsibility for managing school affairs? What has been the experience since the formation of the committee? Can anyone give a brief history? What is the process for managing?

Have you performed duties above and beyond those that were initially decided? What other roles has your committee played in working with the schools besides those set out by the NGO or by PED?

What is your relationship of VECs with teachers? With DEOs? With parents?

Are you feeling any pressure from political parties? Parents? Teachers Unions? Malik’s or Mullah’s?

How do you communicate with DEOs, NGOs, PED, parents, others? How many times per month? In your opinion how important is communication with these institutions?

Are you involved in any way with District Education planning? Have you received any training from outside to assist you in your school related duties?
In your opinion, what is the main source of income of the people in your district? Would you say there is any relationship with poverty and non-attendance of children to both CSP and Government Schools?

School Headmasters/Mistresses, Teachers

The Community support process stipulates the specific responsibilities of the community in regard to school administration. Are these responsibilities being carried out? And if so, By whom?

Do you ever receive visits from DEOs, ASDEOs, LCs and if so how many times per month or year?

What is your relationship with NGOs, PTSMCs, VECs, WVECs? Do they provide any assistance in the day-to-day management of the classes? How often are you in contact with these committee members?

Are you currently serving on any committee or political party?

Students/Parents

How do you feel about the education provided by your child's school?

What kinds of responsibilities or tasks could you manage to assist the teacher and school?

Are you confident about the teachers ability and their training?

Other questions.

LEVEL 2: Questions asked specific to the individual case

Jaffarabad has been noted as a successful district in terms of management of education especially in decentralisation of teacher training. Would you agree? Who are the partners involved in creating the successes noted at the Directorate? What support has Jaffarabad received over the years in terms of management training and other kinds of training that have benefited primary education?

What motivates people in Jaffarabad to be interested in literacy and education? Stable Economy?

How are the cluster training programs (mentoring programs) organised? How did this program originate?...from the Directorate?

Would you agree with the assessment that Teacher Training in Jaffarabad is fairly decentralised? Are the finances provided along with the responsibilities of coordination?
What about other areas? Construction, Curriculum Development, Administration?

**LEVEL 3: Questions asked across multiple cases**

All questions in levels 1, 4, 5, 6 apply to this level.

**LEVEL 4: Questions asked of an overall study--calling on information beyond the multiple cases and including other literature that may have been reviewed.**

Have you ever heard anything about the process of decentralisation? Can you explain this concept?

What is Balochistan's Policy (if one exists) on education administration?

**LEVEL 5: Normative questions about policy recommendations and conclusions, going beyond the narrow scope of the study**

In your opinion, what is the main source of income of the people in your district? Would you say there is any relationship with poverty and non-attendance of children to both CSP and Government Schools?

What is your business? (Mission)
- What role do you play in supporting the management and administration of education?
- What percentage of your budget, time, and energy (human resources) is put on primary education and management of tasks within this sector?

**LEVEL 6: Questions asked to all interviewees**

Have you ever heard anything about the process of decentralisation?

In your opinion, what is the main source of income of the people in your district? Would you say there is any relationship with poverty and non-attendance of children to both CSP and Government Schools?

Can you provide an organisation chart of your organisation?

Do you receive any outside trainings or other administrative support? How often?

What is the process for getting training?

What is or should be the Government's responsibility in supporting education?

Do the people want more responsibilities for education at the local level or are they satisfied with the way the power is now balanced?
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Study Questions</th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sources of Data:</strong> DEO Officers, SCOPE Employees, PTSMCs, VECs; WVECs <strong>Sample Strategies:</strong> Interviews, Files, Photos, Drawings, Anecdotes, Observations, Other</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TASK</strong></td>
<td><strong>Evidence</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Has Decentralisation occurred in any form over the past five years of intensive donor support from 1992 to 1997?</td>
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<tr>
<td>What was the state of primary education management across Winkler's functions of education when the project began? Has the nature of management changed from 1992 to 1997?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>STRUCTURE</strong></td>
<td><strong>Evidence</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What evidence exists that education functions and decision-making authority have been legally and informally transferred from the centre to the district/community/school level? (Rondinelli 1981; Mawhood 1983)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>PROCEDURE</strong></td>
<td><strong>Evidence</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do local decision-making bodies have control over financial resources? Are discretionary funds available? Is a budget developed locally? What is the quantity of the budget handled locally? (Midgley1986; Mawhood 1983)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>PERSONNEL</strong></td>
<td><strong>Evidence</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>A decentralised local body should have the authority to allocate substantial resources. This includes quantity of finances handled; number and qualifications of the staff employed; power to decide over expenditure; power to vary revenues; decisions over the staff-appointments, promotion and discipline (Mawhood 1983:9). What level of authority do local bodies have over subordinate field officers, ministerial and other staff, i.e., teachers appointments, promotion and discipline?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CULTURE</strong></td>
<td><strong>Evidence</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Decentralisation effectiveness is dependent on behavioural, attitudinal and cultural factors. Most important among these is commitment of local officials to decentralising development, the quality of local leadership, the attitudes of rural people toward government, and the degree to which traditional customs and behaviour were compatible with decentralised administrative arrangements. (Rondinelli, 1983:200). To what extent did these factors play out in Balochistan? Was decentralisation observable through the behavioural patterns of participation, the means of access for individuals to the bureaucracy (Mawhood 1983:xii).</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
IV. Guide for Case Study Report

A. Background

Jaffarabad is an agricultural district of the Province and irrigated by major canals: Pat Feeder, Uch, Desert (Shahi), and Khirthar. People depend on agricultural production of rice, wheat, cotton, pulses, and various vegetables that are the major crops of the area. Due to non-availability of proper marketing facilities, however, the people are not able to utilise their production for the best price in the market.

Water logging is degrading the farmlands of Jaffarabad. About .15 million hectares of Eastern Jaffarabad and most of the land at the end of the Khair Canal are effected by water logging.

Jaffarabad is a district in Balochistan that borders the Sindh and covers a territory of 3,100 square kilometres. The population of the district is estimated at 356,288.

There are two sub-Divisions:
- Usta Mohammed
- Dera Allah Yar (Jhat Pat)

There are three sub-Tehsil's:
- Gandakha
- Panhwar
- Sunehri

In addition, there are 28 Union Councils.

Feudals are primarily in control of the area of Jaffarabad District and are sheltered by tribalism. Farmers are not in a position to compete given that they are more or less the servants of Feudals as is the tradition of society. This tradition is an obstacle for any attempt to change behaviour. The poverty of this area is due to the lower status of non-Feudals. Balochi, Brahui, and Sindhi are the major languages.

Out of the districts located in Nasirabad Division, Jaffarabad is one education district where, at least on the male side, most of the male officer posts are filled and clusters have been designed to organise education activities. Because of the hard work of prior and current officers, Jaffarabad has been targeted as a pilot district by the Directorate of Primary Education in its development initiatives. Because of the DEO (M) dedication and commitment, noticeable progress has been made. 618 schools have been divided into 93 clusters. These units are visited by field staff on the 25th of every month at the cluster centres. In these cluster centre


28Provincial Health Department Statistics, January 1995
meetings, teachers debate on each educational problem which they face. Solutions to these problems are developed. Further consultations with the DEO can be made if immediate necessary actions should be taken. Due to these accomplishments, reports have been made that indicate drop-out rates have been controlled, teacher absenteeism has decreased, and good communication lines between schools and district headquarters have been established.

Structure of DEO Offices in Jaffarabad:

(Male)
1 District Education Officer
2 SDEOs
   - Jaffarabad
   - Usta Mohammed
4 ADEOs
   - 2 Jaffarabad
   - 2 Usta Mohammed
26 Learning Coordinators
   - 15 Jaffarabad
   - 11 Usta Mohammed

(Female)
1 DEO
3 LCs
   - 2 Jaffarabad
   - 1 Usta Mohammed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Schools in Jaffarabad²⁹</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary Schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boys</td>
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<tr>
<td>Girls</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

123 PTSMCs have been formed in addition.

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²⁹Data updated according to BEMIS April 1997 Census.
Case Study Protocol

BARKHAN

I. Overview

A. Background Information

The over-arching research project is a process study designed to answer the question how have the 'centre' and 'local' institutions concerned with managing primary education developed the capacity to manage in a decentralised policy framework and what is the process. The design is qualitative, employing such methods as observation, project document review, and semi-structured interviews.

Mr. Randy L. Hatfield is currently a Ph.D. Candidate at the London School of Economics in the Social Policy and Administration Department where he developed his research proposal. Upon successful completion of the proposal and review by the department, Mr. Hatfield has begun his field research. With the assistance of Mr. Aamir Mirza of the Balochistan Education Foundation, this team is conducting case studies on two education districts within a multiple-case design.

B. Rationale for Case Selection

Barkhan has been selected as one case in a multiple case study research approach. The rationale for its selection follows:

❖ Barkhan District belongs to the smaller districts in the province and has a relatively small population. The estimated population growth rate is higher than the one of the province as a whole. The population density is about twice the density in the province as a whole;

❖ Barkhan scores low on the indicators related to agricultural production. The absolute value of agricultural production and the value per hectare are the fifth lowest in Balochistan;

❖ The District holds a position in the middle with regard to the pupils/teachers ratio in primary schools, while the enrolment figures are relatively good for boys and bad for girls;

❖ Reports from PED project staff that Barkhan has shown little success in local management and collaboration among local institutions involved with primary education administration.

1 This protocol is for the data collection from a single case and is not intended to serve the entire project.

2 These district indicators are reported in "Barkhan: A District Profile," prepared by the Balochistan Provincial Planning and Development Department, August 1997.
❖ The coverage of the population by water supply schemes belongs to the lowest in Balochistan;

❖ Barkhan represents a □ winter zone □ district in contrast to a □ summer zone □ district.

❖ Fairly poor infrastructure is evident in terms of roads and communication.

C. Substantive Research Issues

The primary research questions are:

1) How successful was the attempt to decentralise education administration in Balochistan?

2) What were the policy constraints?

3) What does this experience tell us about both the theory of decentralisation and its application to education in a developing country with a strong centralist tradition?

Sub-questions are:

- Has Decentralisation occurred in any form over the past seven years of intensive donor support? If so, to what extent? (Successes? Failures?)

- What evidence exists that education functions and decision-making authority have been legally and informally transferred from the centre to the district/community/school level?

- Do local decision-making bodies have control over financial resources? Are discretionary funds available? Is a budget developed locally? What is the quantity of the budget handled locally?

- What level of authority do local bodies have over subordinate field officers, ministerial and other staff, i.e. teachers in terms of staff appointments, promotion, discipline?

- Which of Donald Winkler’s designated education functions are controlled from the centre and which are controlled at the local level? Are they mutually exclusive or is there any overlap?

- Identify the locus of control for the following functions of education administration: School organisation; curriculum and teaching methods; examination and supervision; Teacher recruitment; finance of recurrent expenditure; and school construction and finance.
-What was the state of primary education management across the functions listed above when the project began? Has the nature of management changed in the past seven years? If so, how?

-Has the community support process of opening girls schools in Balochistan positively leveraged or altered the nature of the management of education and the services provided?

C. Relevant Readings

Balochistan Planning and Development District Profile: Barkhan
LAFAM Six-Month Progress Reports on PTSMCs in Barkhan
Marginality and Modernity: Ethnicity and Change in Post-Colonial Balochistan
Balochistan Gazetteer, Vol. I & II
Misc. Project Documents and Reports

II. Field Procedures

A. Gaining Access

Through permission letter from Director of Primary Education and Additional Secretary (Planning), research visa was granted to researcher for conducting research on primary education management in Balochistan.

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❖ clearly establish the purpose of the research and its contribution toward the Ph.D. degree at the London School of Economics;
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B. Tentative Itinerary

27 Feb. FRIDAY Depart Quetta for Loralai

Activity: Upon arrival, meet with LAFAM person; Find accommodations and settle in. Plan next day's interviews/observations.
28 Feb. SATURDAY LAFAM Office
Activity: Interview NGO staff and observe NGO office operations and staff interactions. Go alongside staff on any project visits

District Education Office (Female)
Activity: Interview Field Office Staff and Ministerial staff
Observe DEO office operations and staff interactions

1 March SUNDAY LAFAM & DEO (F) Follow-up Meetings
Travel to Barkhan

2 March MONDAY District Education Office (M)
Activity: Interview Field Office Staff and Ministerial staff
Observe DEO office operations and staff interactions

3 March TUESDAY PTSMC/VEC/WVECs & Schools
Activity: Meet with members of the committees, teachers and students
Visit Schools (CSP and Government)

4 March WEDNESDAY Follow-up Meetings and Return to Quetta

C. Resources Needed

Supplies needed for this study include:

- 1 Recorder
- Blank Cassettes (4+)
- 200 Speed, 36 exposure color film (2 rolls)
- writing utensils and laptop computer
- Bottles of Mineral Water (7)
- Double "AA" Batteries

Vital Resources Needed:

- Field Accommodations
- Vehicle and Driver
III. Case Study Questions

A. Protocol Questions

**LEVEL 1: Questions asked for specific interviewees**

**DEO Office**

Has anyone from PED communicated to your office that policy was underway to devolve more authority and responsibility to you and your staff?

What is your current capacity to manage all of the responsibilities listed in the guide book? How could you best achieve them or is it impossible?

Who hires, fires, transfers, and appoints teachers? What is the process for doing each of these? How is it done? Any formal documents you are aware of that dictate this process?

Can you give a list of all the people working in your offices including teachers? Are all posts filled? Are there enough people to accomplish all of the work?

What funds (budgets) besides salaries do you manage? Who in your office actually deals with finances? Have they received any formal training for dealing with the finances?

Are any government finances provided for building maintenance and office supplies? Any development funds at your disposal? How much control do you have over district finances? Can you give the Rupee amount you are responsible for managing from month to month or per year?

How much of a budget are you given to work with? Are these funds disbursed regularly? On a receipt basis? Salaries--how does the money get allocated, disbursed?

Who physically distributes books and school materials to the schools in your district?
Who repairs broken furniture and replaces it to schools? Who hauls the stuff away? Whose responsibility is it to make repairs in the school?
Do you have any other jobs to support yourself besides the government post?

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Do you have legal authority for hiring/firing/transferring all teachers in your district?

How do policies, responsibilities and duties get communicated to your office from PED, the Secretariat and the Minister of Education? If by a memo or letter, do you have examples? If by word, who is the messenger? Is there any follow up on whether not these new policies are being implemented?

Are any of your powers and authorities shared with VECs, PTSMCs, teachers? What degree of authority do you have over CSP schools? High, Medium or Low?

**NGOs**

What is your business? (Mission)
- What role do you play in supporting the management and administration of education?
- What percentage of your budget, time, and energy (human resources) is put on primary education and management of tasks within this sector?

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Who are your major funding sources? Do you feel that these agencies dictate how you spend your time and energy or do you fully plan and implement your activities?

Who plans your activities and who manages your budget?

Who is your customer?
- Who are you most accountable to: Politicos, Board, PED, people, other?

What does the customer consider valuable?

What have been your results?

What is your plan?

What is your NGOs definition of capacity building? How do you build capacity with VECs, PTSMCs, parents? (Provide evidence)

**PTSMCs**

What responsibilities do you have for managing the schools in your district? (Role)

How many meetings do you organise per month? How many members attend the meetings on average? Who are the members?

What do you normally talk about in the meetings? How do problems get solved and new plans get initiated? Give example.
Do PTSMCs want to take responsibility for managing school affairs? What has been the experience since the formation of the committee? Can anyone give a brief history? What is the process for managing?

Have you performed duties above and beyond those that were initially decided? What other roles has your committee played in working with the schools besides those set out by the NGO or by PED?

What is your relationship of PTSMCs with teachers? With DEOs? With parents?

Are you feeling any pressure from political parties? Parents? Teachers Unions? Malik's or Mullah's?

How do you communicate with DEOs, NGOs, PED, parents, others? How many times per month? In your opinion how important is communication with these institutions?

Are you involved in any way with District Education planning? Have you received any training from outside to assist you in your school related duties?

VEC/WVECs

What responsibilities do you have for managing the schools in your district? (Role) How many meetings do you organise per month? How many members attend the meetings on average? Who are the members?

What do you normally talk about in the meetings? How do problems get solved and new plans get initiated? Give example.

Do VECs want to take responsibility for managing school affairs? What has been the experience since the formation of the committee? Can anyone give a brief history? What is the process for managing?

Have you performed duties above and beyond those that were initially decided? What other roles has your committee played in working with the schools besides those set out by the NGO or by PED?

What is your relationship of VECs with teachers? With DEOs? With parents?

Are you feeling any pressure from political parties? Parents? Teachers Unions? Malik's or Mullah's?

How do you communicate with DEOs, NGOs, PED, parents, others? How many times per month? In your opinion how important is communication with these institutions?

Are you involved in any way with District Education planning? Have you received any training from outside to assist you in your school related duties?
In your opinion, what is the main source of income of the people in your district? Would you say there is any relationship with poverty and non-attendance of children to both CSP and Government Schools?

**School Headmasters/Mistresses, Teachers**

The Community support process stipulates the specific responsibilities of the community in regard to school administration. Are these responsibilities being carried out? And if so, By whom?

Do you ever receive visits from DEOs, ASDEOs, LCs and if so how many times per month or year?

What is your relationship with NGOs, PTSMCs, VECs, WVECs? Do they provide any assistance in the day-to-day management of the classes? How often are you in contact with these committee members?

Are you currently serving on any committee or political party?

**Students/Parents**

How do you feel about the education provided by your child's school?

What kinds of responsibilities or tasks could you manage to assist the teacher and school?

Are you confident about the teachers ability and their training?

Other questions.

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**LEVEL 2: Questions asked specific to the individual case**

Barkhan has been noted as a severely challenged district in terms of management of education in decentralisation. Would you agree? What are the challenges of collaboration and management?

What support has Barkhan received over the years in terms of management training and other kinds of training concerned with primary education?

Explain the Kacchi/Kaider Teacher training program that is being conducted in Barkhan. Is it working?

Are the people of Barkhan interested in literacy and education? If not, why? What about other areas? Construction, Curriculum Development, Administration?
LEVEL 3: *Questions asked across multiple cases*

All questions in levels 1, 4, 5, 6 apply to this level.

LEVEL 4: *Questions asked of an overall study—calling on information beyond the multiple cases and including other literature that may have been reviewed.*

Have you ever heard anything about the process of decentralisation? Can you explain this concept?
What is Balochistan's Policy (if one exists) on education administration?

LEVEL 5: *Normative questions about policy recommendations and conclusions, going beyond the narrow scope of the study*

In your opinion, what is the main source of income of the people in your district?
Would you say there is any relationship with poverty and non-attendance of children to both CSP and Government Schools?

What is your business? (Mission)
- What role do you play in supporting the management and administration of education?
- What percentage of your budget, time, and energy (human resources) is put on primary education and management of tasks within this sector?

LEVEL 6: *Questions asked to all interviewees*

Have you ever heard anything about the process of decentralisation?

In your opinion, what is the main source of income of the people in your district?
Would you say there is any relationship with poverty and non-attendance of children to both CSP and Government Schools?

Can you provide an organisation chart of your organisation?

Do you receive any outside trainings or other administrative support? How often?
What is the process for getting training?

What is or should be the Government's responsibility in supporting education?

Do the people want more responsibilities for education at the local level or are they satisfied with the way the power is now balanced?
### Case Study Questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sources of Data: DEO Officers, LAFAM Employees, PTSMCs, VECs; WVECs Sample Strategies: Interviews, Files, Photos, Drawings, Anecdotes, Observations, Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

| TASK | Has Decentralisation occurred in any form over the past five years of intensive donor support from 1992 to 1997? What was the state of primary education management across Winkler's functions of education when the project began? Has the nature of management changed from 1992 to 1997? | Evidence |
| STRUCTURE | What evidence exists that education functions and decision-making authority have been legally and informally transferred from the centre to the district/community/school level? (Rondinelli 1981; Mawhood 1983) | Evidence |
| PROCEDURE | Do local decision-making bodies have control over financial resources? Are discretionary funds available? Is a budget developed locally? What is the quantity of the budget handled locally? (Midgley 1986; Mawhood 1983) | Evidence |
| PERSONNEL | A decentralised local body should have the authority to allocate substantial resources. This includes quantity of finances handled; number and qualifications of the staff employed; power to decide over expenditure; power to vary revenues; decisions over the staff-appointments, promotion and discipline (Mawhood 1983:9). What level of authority do local bodies have over subordinate field officers, ministerial and other staff, i.e. teachers appointments, promotion and discipline? | Evidence |
| CULTURE | Decentralisation effectiveness is dependent on behavioural, attitudinal and cultural factors. Most important among these is commitment of local officials to decentralising development, the quality of local leadership, the attitudes of rural people toward government, and the degree to which traditional customs and behaviour were compatible with decentralised administrative arrangements (Rondinelli 1983:200). To what extent did these factors play out in Balochistan? Was decentralisation observable through the behavioural patterns of participation, the means of access for individuals to the bureaucracy. (Mawhood 1983:xii) | Evidence |

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IV. Guide for Case Study Report

A. Background

Barkhan District is located in the Zhob Division of Balochistan. It has only one tehsil called Barkhan. Barkhan typically has a very warm climate in the summer.

In this district, the Waderas have a strong hold over the people. Their problems are solved on the will of Waderas. Due to severe poverty in the district, the people serve the Waderas. This environment causes people to fight with each other and to complain. These problems seem to be the result of a lack of education. Due to a lack of employment, generally, people have a lot of free time, which can stifle any work/initiative that is being implemented.

Agriculture is very nominal in Barkhan. Even the cattle industry which depends on grazing areas is not possible due to lack of irrigation. Only the area of Baghan is agrarian due to the civilisation of people in that area more so than in any other area of Barkhan.

It was the observation of the Facilitator of the mentioned PTSMC report that the people of Barkhan were more interested in getting schools built for personal use than a sincere motivation to improve education in that District. It was also indicated that the people became selfish and began using the school buildings for guest rooms and storerooms due to their greediness. In several instances, it was learned that people built up schools of four rooms/Pucca that in reality only had an enrolment of five to ten students. In Rakhny, schools are running relatively well. With the increased enrolment of boys, resources became scarce such as teachers and rooms. Only on political basis did the communities get their school buildings.

Teachers have generally not been cooperative with the formation of the PTSMCs. The unions played an active roll in discouraging teacher participation in the development of the PTSMCs in that they came to know that the PTSMC program was an open threat to illegal work in education. The Union (GTA) misguided the teachers and parents time to time to fail the PTSMC program and threaten the facilitator for not doing the work of the PTSMC. Some parents and teachers, however, had a deep interest in improving education through PTSMC development. So there has been some clear evidence of interest in the people for a desire to change the education standards of their area.

The following problems were experienced in trying to establish PTSMCs by the Facilitator:

- In May, the GTA Union distributed a circular to all teachers urging non-cooperation with the formation of the PTSMCs.
- People were using the schools for personal use.
- The GTA union also threatened education officers including LCs to not to

34 Adapted from Six Month Progress Report of District Barkhan by Khair Muhammad, Facilitator, LAFAM.
go along with the facilitator in the development of the PTSMC.

- Schools were closed in some areas due to absence of teachers.
- Some teachers were still drawing salary even though they were absent from the classroom. In other words, there was no punishment for lack of attendance.
- Books were not being delivered on time.

Structure of DEO Offices in Barkhan:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field Officers in Barkhan</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DEOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
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</table>

| Number of Schools in Barkhan<sup>35</sup> |
|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Primary Schools | Middle Schools | High Schools |
| Boys   | 285  | 15   | 6   | 306  |
| Girls  | 50   | 2    | 1   | 53   |

55 PTSMCs have been formed in addition.

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<sup>35</sup>Data updated according to BEMIS April 1997 Census.
### Respondents

#### Semi-Structured Interviews

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<tr>
<th>Post/Title</th>
<th>Recorded?</th>
<th>Date Interviewed</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Former Director, PED</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>13/10/97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional Secretary of Education</td>
<td></td>
<td>21/10/97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Technical Advisor (BPEP)</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>06/10/97 &amp; 9/2/98</td>
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<tr>
<td>Technical Advisor for Curriculum and Instructional Materials</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td>Technical Advisor for Teacher Training &amp; Supply</td>
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<td>In-charge, In-Service Teacher Training (PED)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Technical Advisor for Construction</td>
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<tr>
<td>Former Director, Bureau of Curriculum and Extension</td>
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<tr>
<td>Principal, Provincial Institute of Teacher Training (PITE)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Task Manager, World Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>Additional Director, Planning</td>
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## Semi-Structured Interviews

### "District"

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<td>DEO (F) Loralai</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEO &amp; SDEO (M) Barkhan</td>
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<tr>
<td>GTA (Union) President, Barkhan</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEO (F) Jaffarabad</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td>LAFAM Representatives</td>
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<td>Feb. 98</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCOPE Representatives</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDEO Usta Moh'd/Jaffarabad</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Deputy Director</td>
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<td>Teachers Barkhan</td>
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<tr>
<td>VEC Member, Loralai</td>
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<td>VEC/WVEC Members</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abdul Latif Umraní</td>
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<tr>
<td>VEC/PTSMC/Teachers Jaffarabad</td>
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</table>
Appendix III

Steps in the Community Support Process

The NGO works with community members to identify a middle school or secondary school female graduate from the village or at a walking distance from the village.

1. The NGO verifies her residence in the village;

2. The NGO verifies her school certificates through the District Education Officer's office;

3. The NGO tests the potential teacher's proficiency in Urdu and mathematics;

4. The NGO and potential teacher conduct a household survey of the village to:
   ➢ Count the number of households;
   ➢ Count the number of families;
   ➢ Count the number of school age girls; and
   ➢ Discuss with each family the meaning and importance of education for girls.

5. The NGO and community members form a village education committee (VEC) with 5 to 7 members according to the following rules:
   ➢ 75% of parents must elect members;
   ➢ No two members of the same family can be VEC members;
   ➢ No blood relatives of the teacher can be VEC members;
   ➢ VEC members must have at least one school age girl.

6. The VEC provides a temporary building for the school and starts the school on a probationary basis. The NGO provides training to the VEC on how to fulfil its roles and responsibilities.

7. The VEC requests the District Education Officer to formally sanction the girls' school;
8. The VEC and the Government sign a contract specifying each party's responsibilities in establishing and monitoring the school;

9. The VEC decides on a suitable location for a permanent school and arranges to transfer ownership of the land (free of charge) to the Department of Education;

10. The VEC nominates the teacher for participation in a mobile female teacher-training course;

11. Upon successful completion of a three-month probationary period the teacher is given a regular appointment by the government and supplies are sent to the school;

12. The VEC and the government monitor the school on at least a monthly basis; and

13. The VEC holds an annual community meeting to discuss progress of the school and other issues.

Source: Thomas, 1996
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