The gendered politics of generational contracts
Changing discourses and practices of intergenerational commitments in West Germany

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ABSTRACT

In the context of policy recommendations to re-establish intergenerational equity this thesis enquires into the ways in which intergenerational relations in Germany became framed by the metaphor of the generational contract. Taking gender as an analytical tool, the thesis explored the discursive repertoires of generation and contract in a historical perspective. On this basis social contract theories are analysed with respect to the conflicting justifications they establish for the regulation of intergenerational relations. The analysis then focuses on how generational politics in the German welfare state drew on these justifications and how the generational contract came to be associated with fraud. It is argued that the ruse of the metaphor of the generational contract was its claim to embody social solidarity 'for all' Germans, while constituting and maintaining divisions of gender and social class in and by a social insurance system tailored to the male life course. Women's positioning in the proposed measures to restructure the generational contract reveals its inherent multiplicity and contradictory structure.

Arguing that intergenerational relationships in families have been mostly taken for granted, the thesis develops the heuristic framework of kinscripts in order to analyse the micro-politics of intergenerational commitments of members of two family generations that are cast as antagonists in the alleged resource competition: women of the welfare generation and their adult children. Deploying an innovative set of methods based on the problem-centred interview the empirical analysis produced rich evidence of the ambivalences of intergenerational commitments, their continuities and changes. The analysis uncovers the social logic of 'contracts of need' shaped by situational and contextual pressures and the constraints and possibilities that kin networks opened up for women in post-war Germany. In contrast the narratives of the adult children reveal as yet a more symbolic meaning of intergenerational relations although in the anticipation of parental care needs gendered and classed responsibilities reappeared. On the basis of the theoretical and empirical findings it is argued that the frame of generational accounting systems has to be broadened to include kin work. Implications for multigenerational social policies are outlined.
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INTRODUCTION

At the end of the twentieth century intergenerational relations, or to be more precise the cohesion between generations, is (again) seen to be at risk. In a plea for recognition of the contributions of older people and to mutual understanding between generations, the UN proclaimed 1999 'International Year for Older Persons'. The motto 'Towards a society for all ages' calls for the creation of multigenerational social policies, thus acknowledging inequalities, exclusions and potential tensions in intergenerational relations. By way of introducing the contemporary discourse on intergenerational relations I will present three very different genres of texts, the first a macro socio-economic analysis of intergenerational transfers, the second an outline of intergenerational family therapy and the third a depiction of the alleged confrontation of generations in two German popular science books. I suggest that these texts in their own way conceptualise mechanisms of intergenerational cohesion that in Germany are called the generational contract, and highlight the ways in which the scenarios of the generational contract under threat and the measures to remedy them are currently framed. They thereby exemplify dominant meaning systems and imageries of the generational contract. As outlined below the aim of this study was to explore both theoretically and empirically the underlying assumptions of the generational contract in a historical and gender perspective. By bringing out the gendered implications of generational contracts, the thesis aims to contribute to a shift in the current debates about mobilising 'new forms of solidarity' in order to maintain the German welfare state.

The metaphoricity of the generational contract

The essay 'Preventing conflicts between generations. For an active management of the allocation of resources between generations' by the French economist Denis Kessler
(1996) integrates a range of demographic and economic data into an interpretation of the current state of resource allocation between generations in industrialised countries. From this description he draws several guidelines for future policy development in the context of fundamental demographic change.

Kessler's essay suggests that intergenerational cohesion in western societies is manifest in and regulated by 'a permanent overlapping of a great many forms of exchange and transfers between coexisting generations' (Kessler op. cit., p. 12). Following the dominant conceptual divide between public and private the author distinguishes public transfers that are organised by the state and local authorities, from private transfers that are organised within families. According to Kessler these transfers rest on different foundations, that is, on assumptions about human self-interest and/or altruism in the case of private, and personal and structural factors such as the lack of forethought, information and resources of social actors to protect themselves adequately in the case of public transfers. Public transfers are mainly passed from the younger 'active' generations to the older ones, with expenditure on contributory pensions being the largest item, followed by health insurance spending. Whereas these transfers in most industrialised countries are paid by payroll taxes, the smaller amount of public transfers that benefits the younger generations, such as spending on education and training, is paid by the general budget. Private transfers, such as the financial assistance of children, inter-vivo bequests and inheritances are mainly passed in the opposite direction from the older to the younger generation. Yet, because they are smaller in volume, Kessler concludes that the net balance of private and public transfers favours the older generations, even though, as he admits, he has to disregard all non-monetary transfers such as assistance in kind and the giving of time and attention.

Kessler (op. cit., p. 2) holds that 'the relative equilibrium of present-day intergenerational transfer mechanisms', is currently threatened by an 'unprecedented demographic breakdown' in western societies. This breakdown refers to the well-documented predicted relative increase of older in relation to younger generations due to a sharp decline in the birth rate over the last thirty years and to a rise in life expectancy. Drawing on a range of projections by the OECD Kessler presents the scenario that from 2005 the working
population will age and shrink, concentrating the volume of primary income on a smaller fraction of an ageing population. This shift will threaten public pay-as-you-go pension (PAYG) schemes where people in gainful employment constantly pay through their social security contributions for the pensions of those retired, with a projected rise of public expenditure for retirement, in Germany e.g. by more than 40% (see also Kaufmann 1997). The three well-known measures for adapting the PAYG pension system are first, an increase in contributions and/or budgetary financing with expected adverse effects on economic competitiveness, unemployment, saving rates and public deficits; second, the increase of the average retirement age, which would require a labour market for people aged over 60; and third, a decrease of the relative value of pensions in relation to the income of the working population. With respect to changes in private transfers Kessler points to the expected increase in the volume of inheritance and wealth that the older generation accumulated under favourable economic conditions and will pass on to the younger generation.

To avoid unprecedented conflicts and competition between different age groups over the sharing of resources – that under the assumption of generational selfishness could be aggravated by the increasing power of decision-making by an ageing electorate – Kessler suggests several guidelines for a political management of resources. These guidelines claim to take into account both justice between coexisting and successive generations and to contribute to the renewal of ‘the fundamental social contract’ (Kessler op. cit. p. 30). They include an increase in investment in occupational training to assure that numerically smaller generations will be qualitatively better trained; the encouragement or compulsion of younger generations to vote; an extension of retirement age; a shift of financing transfers from payroll to a broad-based contribution system; a limitation of seniority rules that link salaries to increasing age; a limitation of health insurance spending; a limitation of public debts which places a burden on future generations; the encouragement of younger generations to finance their retirement by private savings to alleviate successive generations and promote investment; and the encouragement of the private transmission of wealth.

Without assessing the scenario of resource competition that are not limited to the German
case (for Britain see Jamieson 1990) or the political recommendations I will merely emphasise here that interrelations between what is constructed as private and public as well as any form of intergenerational support provided within and across household boundaries remain outside the dominant economic frame of reference. They can therefore not be included in any form of ‘intergenerational accounting system’ (Kessler op. cit., p. 33), whether or not such a system is desirable. Neither are transfers and their proposed changes reviewed with respect to gender or indeed any other parameter of social inequality such as class or ethnicity. A fundamental part of intergenerational cohesion is thus lacking.

The series of essays on transgenerational solidarity by the renowned North American family therapist Ivan Boszormenyi-Nagy (1987) expresses a commitment to acknowledging, maintaining and restoring balanced exchanges and reciprocal fairness in intergenerational family interaction. The family in this approach is conceived of as an ongoing social system held together by visible and invisible loyalties. Boszormenyi-Nagy metaphorically calls the mechanism of this intra- and intergenerational cohesion a ‘ledger of fairness’ (Boszormenyi-Nagy op. cit., p. 305). Its criterion of ‘relational justice’ is derived from the family members’ personal considerations of ‘balances of reciprocal fairness of both observable transactions and resultant interpersonal ... consequences’ (Boszormenyi-Nagy op. cit., p. 307). The author holds that family members incur responsibility for their exchanges. Whereas reciprocal fairness generates merited trust, ‘injustice’, such as the exploitation of a child’s feelings of loyalty, leads to imbalance, stagnation and lost of trust. Worst of all intergenerational injustice suffered is likely to be passed down the generational line.

The role of the intergenerational family therapist is to help family members to review their ‘side of mutual entitlements and indebtednesses’ (Boszormenyi-Nagy op. cit., p. 192) and design adequate action strategies. These can include the development of ‘appropriate terms of repaying’ one’s parents for care received earlier as well as the development of the parents’ acceptance of such repayments. The overall therapeutic aim is to rebuild and mobilise trust in close relationships with an emphasis on accountability, not self-denying altruism.
Although Boszormenyi-Nagy on the one hand holds that reciprocal fairness has to be determined in a 'committed dialogue' (Boszormenyi-Nagy op. cit., p. 191) between members of different generations the foundations of reciprocal justice on the other hand are assumed to be grounded in the biological 'facts' of generation. These facts are used to naturalise intergenerational rights and duties.

The legacy of parental accountability originates from the existential fact of reproduction. Having given life to a dependent infant, parents owe it nurturance. Conversely, the legacy of filial loyalty originates from the fact of conception, early human survival, and growth... it should be noted that in modified form the legacy of filial loyalty exists even when children have been given up or abandoned very early in life. Whatever the degree of parental responsibility or behavior after a child’s birth, the child’s relationship to the parents who give him or her life is a unique, nonsubstitutable, and unworkable fact of his or her existence.

(Boszormenyi-Nagy 1987, p. 220)

This acknowledgement of accountability for reciprocal intergenerational exchanges, Boszormenyi-Nagy argues, becomes increasingly important in a societal context of ‘disintegrating trustworthiness’ and decreasing family commitments. Threats of transgenerational solidarity are said to result from people’s increased mobility and geographical dispersion but also from ‘women’s more active pursuit of their careers’, the increase in divorces and ‘for certain segments of the society, the welfare support of mothers with their dependent children’ (Boszormenyi-Nagy op. cit., p. 289).

Again I do not want to evaluate these scenarios here but merely draw attention to the ways in which intergenerational relationships, by seemingly referring to biological facts, are vested with normative notions of obligations and entitlements. Gender is conspicuous by its absence in the discussion of ledgers of fairness and yet it reappears in the scenario of declining family commitments.

As stated above in Germany the mechanisms of intergenerational cohesion exemplified in these essays are called the ‘generational contract’. Although always used in the singular this term refers both to the distributive mechanism of contributory social insurance, particularly the pension system and to the exchanges assumed to link members of
different family generations. Its common denominator is that ‘in the history of human kind it has always been the active generation who provided for the other two’ (Biedenkopf 1996, p. 2), i.e. the oldest and youngest members of society. This provision of the ‘active’ generation is based on the trust that when they get older subsequent generations will provide for them. Although cast as a natural law, the foregoing texts illustrate that mechanisms of intergenerational cohesion and solidarity are currently considered to be under threat, with a hegemonic focus on the socio-political side of the generational contract, the social security system and in particular the pension insurance system (see below).

Crisis scenarios are disseminated and dramatised in the German media (see Chapter 3.6.) but also in the genre of non-fiction or popular (social) science books. In the context of the ageing of population, fiscal pressure and rising social expenditure generations are identified as competing interest groups in the distribution of welfare, a novel theme in the age-old discourse on intergenerational solidarity and conflict. The widely discussed popular social science books by the theologian and sociologist Reimar Gronemeyer (1991) and the ex-medical practitioner and journalist Heidi Schüller (1996) are notable examples of these emotionally loaded scenarios of a bellicose confrontation between ‘the young’ and ‘the old’ that allegedly will lead to a break up of the generational contract. Because these books had a wide dissemination and received great media attention, they can be expected to have some impact in shaping public opinion (Bräuninger et al. 1998). Schüller was designated shadow minister in the Social Democratic opposition and at the launch of her book in 1995 the ex-SPD prime minister of Saarland Oskar Lafontaine presented her theses ‘For a new generational contract’.1 Schüller’s book is woven around a critique of contemporary German society and social policy; Gronemeyer’s book consists of a sombre cultural pessimism. Their sensational rhetoric and alternating loose references to demographic and statistical data and everyday life encounters have striking similarities. Both authors take the generational contract, once the embodiment of social cohesion and solidarity, as a major cause for an impending ‘age class struggle’ that ‘from the turn of the millennium could divide the world deeper than racism, gender war or class struggle’ (Gronemeyer op. cit., p. 125).

1 All German quotes have been translated by the author.
In a mixture of statistics, generalisations and dystopian vision Gronemeyer corroborates the ‘death of the family’ and the inhuman institutionalisation and segregation of the youngest and oldest members of society. Whereas the family in the past had been a ‘community of interest’ (Gronemeyer op. cit., p. 7), the ‘bracket that held generations together’ (Gronemeyer op. cit., p. 23) its collapse now leaves ‘expelled elders, consumption addicted adults, neglected children’ (Gronemeyer op. cit., p. 171). The answer to the question ‘How could we get into this dilemma?’ is simple: ‘It’s Bismarck’s fault. … When Bismarck’s social legislation started to replace familial provision in old age, the family started to dissolve’ (Gronemeyer op. cit., p. 128-9). Schuller shares this view of the erosion of family structures for which she assigns responsibility to the current ‘women and family hostile politics’ (Schuller op. cit., p. 57).

Both authors argue that the inflated social security system in Germany has promoted a general ‘provision and insurance mentality’ (Gronemeyer op. cit., p. 43) and produced a self-serving expert system. Boundaries are drawn between the egoistic young old who benefit from early retirement and generous sick leave regulations and those in advanced old age who rely extensively on health and care provision. Referring to the alleged fraud of the public pension system under changing demographic conditions both authors evoke the metaphor of a ‘chain letter fraud’: ‘those who enter early take the cream, the late comers lose their investment’ (Gronemeyer op. cit., p. 126).

According to Gronemeyer this crisis of the generational contract is further aggravated by the legacy of the older generation of irreversible ecological destruction. As a result he envisions that the younger generation will end the contract with ‘administrative hardness’ (Gronemeyer op. cit., p. 128): spending on hospitals, elder care homes and pensions will be cut, the number of operations on older patients limited, and older people obliged to do ecological compensation work. Schüller presents her recommendations of cut backs and welfare retrenchment (‘the principle of equality has its limits at the scarcity of resources’ (Schüller op. cit., p. 188) and a simultaneous strengthening of self-help and friendship as constructive suggestions for building a ‘new generational contract’. Institutionally, the contributory pension system has to be replaced by a basic pension supplemented by
occupational and optional private pension schemes and eligibility criteria for social and health services have to be tightened. To compensate for state provision the ‘vertical’ generational contract (Schuller op. cit., p. 9) has to be extended horizontally: young old people have to help people in advanced old age as well as doing voluntary work in the social sector in support of younger generations. For these suggestions not to fail in a democracy where elders will constitute the majority of the electorate a limitation on the voting age is considered as well as an extension of the right to vote according to the number of children one has.

Whether the current state of the generational contract is phrased in terms of ‘break up’, expected ‘renewal’ (Kessler op. cit., p. 30) or ‘renegotiation and modification’ (Walker 1996b, p. 11) it is clear that no codified contract has ever been made between generations or their representatives. Even if ‘institutions and individuals ... behave as if such a contract exists’ (Walker 1996a, p. 2, my emphasis), how can the dominant assumption that contracts regulate things in a determinate manner be reconciled with the conception of a revisable contract that is continually open to negotiation (Laslett 1992)?

In order to explore the constructions of the generational contract I suggest that it is productive to conceive of the generational contract as a metaphor, which, as the foregoing extracts have shown, frames policy recommendations and knowledge. After briefly considering the characteristics of such metaphors I will set out the general questions of my study. A decisive criteria of metaphor is often conceived in the *metapherein*, the ‘carrying over’ of frames or perspectives from one domain to another (Schön 1993). Max Black, for example, asserts that the investment of an utterance with metaphorical force ‘works by “projecting upon” the primary subject a set of “associated implications”, comprised by the implication complex’ (Black 1993, p. 28). In this perspective the associated implications of contract would be projected on and frame the focus of generation, an equally metaphoric concept as the analysis in Chapter 1.3. will show.

In effect metaphors rest on and at the same time defy the common distinction between the literal and the figurative (Ricoeur 1981; Miller 1992). Since de Saussure’s (1966/1916)
contention that the signifier (the acoustic image of the sign) does not represent the signified (the concept), but meaning is constituted as an effect of articulation, that is through difference from and reference to other signifiers, some scholars have argued that words and concepts are necessarily defined in terms of one another (Lakoff 1993). Jonathan Culler (1981), for example, has suggested that the crucial aspect of metaphor is the metaphoric effect, not its structure. For there to be a ‘flash of insight’ it is often posited that there be a ‘semantic clash’ or tension between ‘focus’ and ‘frame’. In his insightful book ‘The reason of metaphor’ Donald Miller (1992) on the contrary has argued that undue privilege has been given to those ‘vital metaphors’ that according to Ricoeur (1981) go beyond the known polysemy of words. A worn-out ‘dead’ metaphor (‘the foot of the mountain’), Miller writes, is still a metaphor but one that has become part of common sense, and ‘seems to us to be the literal, the obvious, the natural, the true, the correct classification’ (Miller op. cit., p. 41).

[The metaphors] which we have worn away longest, which have become part of our unconscious and implicit knowledge have acquired a hegemony in our thoughts and are taken as the real. So, the most powerful metaphors in any society are ... the ones least likely to occur to us, the ones we have hidden from our conscious selves by constant wear and tear.

(Miller op. cit., p. 42)

I shall argue that the generational contract, even perhaps where it has become symptomatic of the crisis of intergenerational cohesion (‘the ozone layer of social policy’ as German ex-Minister of Health Seehofer (Der Stern 1996) put it), has obtained this pervasive guise of naturalness or, more recently, of a natural catastrophe. It is a metaphor that does not exceed, deform or deviate from the cultural code; it has become part of the cultural code. As such the generational contract operates as what Donald Schön has called a ‘generative metaphor’ (Schön 1993). Generative metaphors construct views of social reality ‘through a complementary process of naming and framing’ (Schön op. cit., p. 146), thereby setting problems and implicitly delineating the range of possible solutions. They convey a ‘sense of obviousness of what is wrong and what needs fixing’ (Schön op. cit., p. 148). This process is illustrated in Nadia Naples’s (1997) analysis of the ‘new welfare consensus’ in the United States, a discursive frame that focuses solely on the obligations of welfare recipients towards the state so that counterclaims based on the structural analysis of poverty could not be discussed or heard in the U.S. Congressional Hearings on welfare reform. Furthermore Naples draws attention to the resonances that some key concepts set
up. 'Certain statements within particular discursive frames achieve status and authority when tied to larger discourses that resonate with prevailing cultural constructions’ (Naples op. cit., p. 908).

Outline of the thesis

Taking the metaphoricity of generational contracts seriously is therefore the point of entry to this thesis. As Drucilla Cornell (1997, p. 48) has argued with respect to her use of psychoanalysis, ‘we need to have an understanding of both of how symbolic systems come to hold sway and of how they are inevitably governed by social fantasies’. I shall argue that to engage in the current debates about the generational contract at risk in Germany it is necessary to inquire into the ways in which it names and frames debates and practices by ‘decomposing’ (Nandy 1992, p. 9) this metaphor. By decomposing I mean to undertake a series of investigations across disciplinary boundaries into the ‘associated implications’ of the generational contract, its history, legacies and repertoires as well as into that which often remains excluded from hegemonic discourse: the practices of intergenerational commitments. Both its constitutive parts ‘generation’ and ‘contract’ have multiple meanings, ‘are carriers of some particular philosophy’ (Miller op. cit., p. 26) and tap into powerful western myth, for example, that ‘blood is thicker than water’. The thesis will unfold some of these discursive contexts, and ‘confront’ them with current debates and in particular with the narratives of a group of older German women and their adult children on their intergenerational practices and legacies.

Two broad sets of questions are addressed: First, what implicit and explicit knowledge makes the generation contract in Germany intelligible and effective as a powerful discursive frame? Or, put differently, what presuppositions of the generational contract are at work as ‘intertextual operator(s)’ (Culler op. cit., p. 113) that imply discursive contexts, which make possible the various effects of signification and omission in current political discourse? And second, what effects, if any, do these repertoires have on the micro-politics and practices of intergenerational commitments unfolded by members of two family generations who on the basis of their birth cohort are members of the so-called welfare and baby boom generation and cast as antagonists in the alleged resource competition? To what extent do generational contracts provide meaning structures,
scripts or repertoires of description and interpretation in the accounts of intergenerational practice?

In order to address these questions and inquire into the politics of generational contracts I propose the use of gender as an analytical tool. The heuristic assumption is that an interrogation of implicit gender relations will reveal much of the contradictory constitution of generational contracts and may work to denaturalise and destabilise its hegemonic hold. I will draw on the conception of gender by the historian Joan Scott (1988, p. 42) who conceives gender as 'a constitutive element of social relationships based on perceived differences between the sexes, and ... a primary way of signifying relationships of power' in and by which differential control over and access to material and symbolical resources is organised and legitimated. Importantly she argues that insofar as conceptual languages employ differentiation to establish meaning and ... sexual difference is a primary way of signifying differentiation, [g]ender... provides a way to decode meaning and to understand the complex connections among various forms of human interaction.

(Scott op. cit., p. 45-6)

Feminist scholars have argued that the 'institutionalisation of sexual difference' (Okin 1989, p. 6) is not a fixed structure of social organisation but a variable that must itself be explained and 'genealogized, i.e. framed by a historical narrative and rendered temporally and culturally specific' (Fraser and Nicholson 1990, p. 34). Gender must be held open for dissonances and analysed in its interrelations with other forms of socio-historical positionings such as class, generation and ethnicity. Only in this conjunction does it produce specific effects (Bhavnani 1993). Methodically Braidotti (1997, p. 27) has suggested that it is productive to start the analysis by bringing out the contradictions that are constitutive of the social and symbolic positions of women and to activate them towards the destabilisation of the socio-symbolic system and especially of the asymmetrical power relations that sustain it.

Using gender as a heuristic tool to decompose the metaphor of the generational contract Chapter 1 provides an exploration of the associated implications or repertoires of its constitutive parts, contract and generation. The analysis opens the view on the normative,
symbolic and practical work necessary for forging the generational reproduction-lineage nexus and delineates the dominant concept of the commercial exchange contract in order to use it as a heuristic tool to specify possible elements of contractual practice and elements that do not fall in this register. On this basis Chapter 2 investigates classical and neo-classical social contract theories on which the idea of the generational contract draws. Social contract theories have shaped common sense beliefs about intergenerational rights and duties and their gender implications that also inform German social policy. Its intergenerational policies and discourses are explored in Chapter 3. In a historical perspective this chapter traces the idea of social solidarity as a ‘cadre d’appertance’ (Frankenberg 1996, p. 74) of the German welfare state and focuses on the exclusions and inequalities its institutionalisation entails.

In both political philosophy and social policy the gendered practice of day-to-day support of the young and old remains to a large extent taken for granted and unacknowledged. For this reason Chapter 4 develops a novel heuristic framework of kinscripts that conceptualises the practical, symbolic, emotional and material work of maintaining intergenerational relations as kin work. It suggests that kin work is a personal and political activity and has to be analysed in relation to social institutions, cultural scripts and intergenerational legacies. The framework of kinscripts guides the empirical investigation of interpretation and orientation patterns of members of two family generations, whilst held open to the possibility that further conceptual qualification might emerge from the empirical accounts that inform the theoretical discussion. The design of the study and a set of innovative methods, their possibilities and constraints are discussed in Chapter 5. The remaining three chapters present empirical findings on intergenerational practices and legacies of members of the two generations. Chapter 6 uncovers the significance and social logic of need related households of mothers and daughters in post-war Germany from the perspective of women born around 1930. Chapter 7 analyses the kinscripts and ‘contracts of need’ of this group of women in later life, particularly support given to their grandchildren and older relatives with its underlying ambivalence between solidarity and constraint. Chapter 8 finally focuses on the dealing of the women’s adult children with these intra-familial legacies, their practices and anticipations of kin work in the context of a proliferation of service
Theoretically the text analyses are informed by theories that are often subsumed under the label of post-structuralism. Post-structuralist theories focus on the domain of language where the meaning of social reality is produced and negotiated, social organisation is defined and contested and subjectivities are constructed (Weedon 1997). My own understanding of language and discourse has been informed by reading some of the works by the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan and the French philosopher Michel Foucault. Although these bodies of thought are embedded in different contexts of psychoanalysis, philosophy and history, they have certain points of connection in attending to that which has been excluded from discourse or cannot be said. At the risk of greatly simplifying their understanding of language I will briefly outline some aspects that I have found productive in thinking about the representational systems of generational contracts.

Trained as a psychologist, my first encounter with theories of language has been the writings of Lacan. In a reinterpretation of the linguistic theories of Ferdinand de Saussure and Roman Jacobson, Lacan (1966/1977, p. 154) has argued that signifiers are connected with other signifiers in a ‘signifying chain’. Meaning, according to Lacan, ‘insists’ in the signifying chain without ‘consisting’ in any one of its elements. At the same time meaning always exceeds the concrete chain, as different contexts are associated with each of the elements. ‘There is in effect no signifying chain that does not have, as if attached to the punctuation of each of its units, a whole articulation of relevant contexts suspended ‘vertically’, as it were, from that point’ (ibid.).

Lacan argues that these horizontal and vertical axes of the signifying chain are constituted by two operations of the signifier: metonymy and metaphor. Metonymy horizontally constitutes the ‘word-to-word connection’ (Lacan op. cit., p. 156) of the signifying chain. The fact that meaning is never consistent in the signifier is a consequence of and presupposition for its continuous connection, the building of ‘communicative bridges’ that intend to fill the gap of a presence of meaning that they constitute. The vertical axis of the signifying chain is constituted by metaphor, ‘one word for another’ (Lacan op. cit.,
p.157). Meaning is produced in the brief moment when one signifier in the chain is replaced by another (repressed) one. The substituted occulted signifier remains present through its determined absence and its association with the chain. Through the horizontal and vertical connections of metonymy and metaphor, contiguity and substitution, intended meaning is articulated and displaced and subverted.

Without drawing on the psychoanalytic foundations and implications I take these (rather metaphorical!) considerations to be a plea for a dual analytic focus: ‘horizontally’ the analysis must specify the contexts in which the concept of the generational contract is deployed and its connection with other concepts and meaning systems. ‘Vertically’ it has to attend to the hidden legacies or ‘determined absences’ of the associated implications of those concepts. At the same time Lacan suggests that any act of reading is an interpretation through the reader or listener’s production of contexts. The same holds for social-scientific interpretations, which may open up new layers of meaning, but inevitably produce new exclusions, which continue to destabilise intended meaning. Marja Keränen (1993, p. 35) has suggested conceiving social-scientific interpretations not as ‘revealings’ but as ‘remaskings’.

I was introduced to the works of Michel Foucault during the social-scientific training I undertook in London. His writings are informative particularly where they attach the theoretical process of discourse analysis to the theoretical and material conditions of its production. Foucault rejects the method of hermeneutic interpretation, which he calls ‘commentary’ (Foucault 1963/1973, p. xvi). Although he does not deny ‘that things said say more than themselves’ (Foucault 1969/1972, p. 110), he holds that statements, defined as ‘enunciative functions’ composed of sentences, propositions or tables, have a literal (face value) meaning. This literal meaning can be separated from possible ambiguities of sentences and utterances. The task of the discourse analyst is not to interpret but to describe the statements in terms of their constituting specific discursive formations. Foucault holds that this ‘archaeological’ analysis (Foucault 1972, p. 113) ‘is concerned, in a sort of vertical dimension, with the conditions of existence of different groups of signifiers’ (Foucault op. cit., p. 109). Its aim is to reconstruct locally and historically specific rules that make it possible to construct particular discursive ‘facts’. 
Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982, p. 47-9) have argued that Foucault later agreed that face-value understandings always draw on a taken-for-granted shared background of practices. In what he calls genealogy attention is given to the effective formation and buttressing of discourse by non-discursive practices and regimes of power/knowledge. Thus discourses are not confined to speech acts or texts, but seen as bound up with material conditions and social practices, which are localised on the body and in material institutions. In discourse power and knowledge articulate themselves and produce historically specific effects of truth that have normative and regulatory functions (Foucault 1978). These discourses offer multiple and changing subject positions, which always are subverted in what Foucault calls counter discourses.

Even though I think that Foucault unjustly devalued processes of interpretation that are inevitably involved in reconstructing discursive formations and are necessary to understand the resonances they can set up, his conception of power/knowledge informed my considerations of the gendered politics of generational contracts and their effects on and constitution by specific social actors and institutions. The interrogation of the gendered politics of the generational contract thus does not presuppose that there is any one coherent policy shaping contemporary intergenerational relations. Rather the discursive field of generational contracts is seen as a dominant repertory of interpretation in relation to which politics and practices are formulated and diverge.

Perhaps the most important aspect of the power/knowledge nexus is that it also pervades the subject position of the social scientist and her conceptual apparatus (Butler 1997). Feminist scholars have demanded that the questions ‘who speaks? who writes? when and where? with or to whom? under what institutional and historic constraints?’ (Clifford 1986, p. 13) have also to be addressed to one’s own project. I suggest that to put this demand of self-reflexivity into practice, that is, to reflect on precisely how one’s own biography and positionality as well as the ‘micro-politics of the academy’ (Rabinow 1986), shape one’s reading and writing, is the greatest challenge in contemporary social science. Some of these issues are addressed in Chapter 5.5. Inevitably reading and writing will move between the poles of drawing on taken-for-granted background practices, creating subject positions of ‘meaning and desire’ (Moore 1994, p. 124) for both readers
Empirically my interest in enquiring into the gendered politics of generational contracts was incited by the compelling contradictory narratives of older German women about their intergenerational commitments, which confronted me with my own blind spots as to the significance of intergenerational relationships in women's (and men's) life courses. Receiving my sociological training-in-practice I was involved in a research project at the University of Bremen that investigated the interweaving of paid and unpaid work in the lives of a group of older women who underwent vocational training in two culturally contrasting regions in West Germany directly after World War II, and later started a family (see Appendix A). In the research the qualitative sample was theoretically based on a larger survey. In order to assist the memory of both interviewers and research participants the researchers had produced individual 'life course graphs' on the basis of the survey that were presented in the interview. The graphs marked individual periods of employment and family events over a time span of more than forty years for each research participant (Chapter 5.4.).

In the light of the women's narratives it became apparent that the way in which the researchers had visualised the life courses was useful to illustrate the often-unacknowledged diverse employment sequences of older women over the life course. On the other hand the markings of family events such as child birth(s), marriage(s), divorces and grandmotherhood were only inadequate representations of the constitution and dissolution of family ties, and they did not differentiate sequences of intra- and intergenerational family work. Notably the graphs did not take into account the substantial amount of time that the research participants had spent in supporting older relatives and grandchildren. The reasons for this 'de-representation' first, were grounded in the fact that we had not conceived these commitments as a normative and expectable part of older women's lives. Consequently they had not been addressed in the quantitative questionnaires. Second, the visualisation of individual life courses made it impossible to bring out 'interlocking trajectories' (Elder 1987, p. 180). Status passages that were brought about by transition of another family member, such as the giving up of paid work when a daughter re-entered the labour market and needed assistance with child care,
remained invisible.

However, even more sophisticated visualisations of interdependent life courses cannot overcome the fact that unlike the labour market, the family and the social institutions regulating it do not provide modes of ‘institutional stocktaking’ that differentiate and certify obtained positions on the basis of individual performance (Geissler and Krüger 1992). On an interpretative level the women’s depictions and evaluations of what I then started to conceive of as ‘the work of kinship’ (Di Leonardo 1987) were intriguing by their apparent contradictions between the voluntary and compulsory nature of their commitments, the stated presence and absence of symbolic and material remuneration.

It was only after the research project was officially completed that I came to realise that what the researchers had ‘forgotten’ in the standardised design of women’s life course analysis, and what in the social sciences is largely confined to the sub-field of family sociology and ageing, constitutes a tacit and invisible part of generational contracts. With this ‘new’ discursive horizon I proceeded to reanalyse the women’s narratives on intergenerational commitments and locate them in the context of family histories and the broader socio-historical context. What was the stuff that the women’s intergenerational obligations were made of? Would they change in the contemporary condition with its emphasis on partnership and rights and an alleged shift from the ascription of intergenerational responsibilities to negotiation and choice (Riley and Riley 1993)? Intrafamilial (caring) traditions as well as the practice of intergenerational commitments became therefore the explicit focus of selecting and interviewing a group of the women’s adult children in order to explore continuity and change in intergenerational practices. At the same time the research participants’ narratives provoked a journey into western repertoires of contract and generation, of freedom and obligation, duties and rights I had known little about and which cast the narratives into a new light. I hope the reader will enjoy this passage.

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2 Thanks to Claudia Born for help in developing this idea.
Chapter 1

REPERTOIRES AND LEGACIES OF ‘CONTRACT’ AND ‘GENERATION’

1.1. INTRODUCTION

I will begin the analysis of the generational contract by inquiring into the history of its constitutive components, the notions of contract and generation. When and how were these concepts applied and defined? What mechanisms of cohesion do the two concepts imply or constitute? How were they marked and constituted by gender differences? The underlying assumption of these questions is that concepts are produced in specific historical and institutional discursive formations, emerge within modalities of power and are a product of a marking of difference and exclusion, which are often signified by gender difference (Scott 1988). Concepts are key repositories of cultural values and meanings and can mobilize powerful feelings and emotions (Hall 1997b). They are a site of contention, negotiation and strategic reuse by social actors.

The attempt to outline and contextualise some of the western repertoires and ‘folk myths’ of contract and generation, then, is not an attempt to rediscover the origins of those terms but to unfold some of their discursive contexts, which may be evoked or obliterated in their current usage. At the same time this contextualisation and the delineation of dominant frames, particularly with reference to the patriarchal family as a site in which contract and generation acquired meaning-in-practice, provides the grounds for a further interrogation of the ways in which those concepts were combined in social contract theories (Chapter 2) and in the history of the German welfare state (Chapter 3).
The source material for this exploration is not ‘primary’ legal or medical documents but their descriptions and interpretations by philosophers, anthropologists and sociologists. The problem ‘that we cannot get to the peasant except through the lord’ as the social historian Sabean (1984a, p. 3) has put it with reference to the mediation of early modern peasants’ testimonies by court officials and authorities, needs to be acknowledged. But it should not be taken to suggest that any unmediated access to historical sources is possible. Analysts have to bear in mind that a reading of texts is always a re-interpretation and construction that ‘passes’ through the commentator. Furthermore, legal texts, for example, were always subject to continuous reformulation and commentary. In any case, the emphasis in the following chapter is on the repertories of contract and generation, not on questions such as whether ancient contracts ‘really’ followed the procedures described.

For the contextualisation of contract, I will first look at the dominant ‘paradigm’ of the commercial exchange contract, that is, the perception of a binding agreement secured by law. I will then focus on how self-interested ‘purposive’ contracts have been defined against so-called status contracts and what the gender implications have been. Status contracts are said to constitute the ties of kinship and political associations and to change the ‘universal position’ of an individual. The exploration of discursive contexts of the notion of generation, usually understood as a position in a family lineage or membership in age-based historical groups, goes in the opposite direction. Starting from its etymology I will look at interpretations of generation in ancient biological texts and then look at the legalization and ‘enactment’ of generational positions. The practical and symbolic role of families in constructing their genealogies and cohesion will be further developed in Chapter 4.

1.2. REPERTOIRES OF INTERPERSONAL CONTRACTS

The triumph of modern contract doctrine

In her ethnography of a community of Bedouins in the Western Desert of Egypt Lila Abu-Lughod (1986, pp. 45-6) describes how the Bedouins define their ‘code of honour’
in contradistinction to the dominant Egyptians. According to the Bedouins the Egyptians’ lack of honour is shown in their use of contracts in transactions whereas for a Bedouin a person’s word is sufficient. I will take this simple statement as a point of entry to ask why in Western society the principle of contract, contrary to the view of the Bedouins, became the embodiment of moral conduct and justice.

Although the British legal theorist Patrick Atiyah (1990b, p. 18) has argued convincingly that from a juridical viewpoint ‘there is no such thing as a typical contract’ or even ‘one central paradigmatic type of [contractual] conduct’ (1990a, p. 5), contract still is associated with the paradigm of the commercial exchange contract. Its underlying idea of an agreement (in the form of promise) between two or more parties that becomes legally binding through the congruent expression of will came to (new) prominence in 19th century political and economical liberalism with an increasing market orientation of western societies. Created at least by an implicit expression of intentions, a contract brings into existence and specifies duties and rights, or changes in existing ones.

The specific mark of contract is the creation of a right, not to a thing, but to another man’s conduct in the future. He who has given the promise is bound to him who accepts it, not merely because he had or expressed a certain intention, but because he so expressed himself as to entitle the other party to rely on his acting in a certain way.

(Winfield 1876/1950, p. 1)

The use of the male gender in this account is more then a grammatical convention. Although there always have been exceptions and periods of relaxation, women in western societies were by and large excluded from these kinds of binding agreement that secured personal reliance on agreed transactions and were necessary to make the market system work. Until 1935 English Common Law ruled that ‘a married woman has no power of contracting. Any agreement she purports to make “is altogether void, and no action will lie against her husband or herself for the breach of it”’ (Winfield op. cit., p. 66). Similarly the German Munt system for centuries legalised the conjugal ‘protection’ of the ‘unworldly legally incompetent’ married woman for her own good (Oekinghaus 1925, p. 38). Residuals of this gender tutelage were incorporated in the German Civil Code at the beginning of the 20th century.
The primary function of contract law was to encourage male citizens to comply with their agreements. In the heyday of 19th century political and economic liberalism the historian C.G. Addison (1847/1856, p. v), referring to his finding of a ‘surprising uniformity’ of contract law, suggested triumphantly that

the law of contracts may justly indeed be said to be a universal law adapted to all times and races, and all places and circumstances, being founded upon those great and fundamental principles of right and wrong which are immutable and eternal. (C.G. Addison op. cit., p. v)

Formulations such as these not only express the success of contract doctrine but also the naturalness of the fundamental exclusion of women (and non-property owning men) from contractual practice. This exclusion was tacitly understood to operate in ‘all places and circumstances’ and was seen as perfectly compatible with principles of justice.

Ideologically, contractual obligation was considered superior to all other forms of obligation because of the manner of its generation: the contracting parties did not merely follow norms, conventions or laws but they were considered ‘to make the law which governs their relationship’ (Downes 1993, p. 48, emphasis added). The possibility of this (self-) law-giving quality rests on conceptions that individuals have a ‘free will’, that is they have the moral and psychological autonomy necessary to make choices but also a propensity to comply with their own laws, to be bound by their own will. Individuals can give and keep promises. According to Charles Fried (1981, p. 1) contracts are based on the promise principle ‘by which persons impose on themselves obligations where none existed before’. ‘By promising’ he writes, ‘we transform a choice that was morally neutral into one that is morally compelled’ (Fried op. cit., p. 8). Promises are conceived as a ‘shared social institution that is intended to invoke the bonds of trust’ (Fried op. cit., p. 16). Atiyah (1990a) has suggested that a reference to the promise principle is therefore a reference to another concept imbued with our moral and social ideas.

Even though the concept of contract thus relies on and makes use of a moral institution (promising), in its more appealing form, it relies on the assumption of a ‘neutral choice’ situation (see Chapter 2). Contracts are generally seen as valid only if they are made voluntarily on the basis of a person’s well-considered interests. Individuals are not
expected to enter into contractual agreements that make them worse off than they would be without contractual cooperation. Thus the assumption of freedom and choice is the condition *sine qua non* of contract, which gives obligation created by contract its superior status. However, as Fried (op. cit., p. 5) points out, 'if, as we must, we insist that there be a fair choice to promise or not, we have imported external standards of fairness into the very heart of obligation'.

The foundations of theories of the will have been elaborated by classical contract theorists. Yet, if we look at the work of the founder of modern political theory, Thomas Hobbes, there is much less emphasis on choice than the dominant paradigm of contract theory suggests. In accordance with the foregoing discussion Hobbes defined contract as ‘[t]he mutuall transferring of Right’ (1651/1997, p. 94), which results from freely willed deliberation: ‘To convenant, is an act of the Will; that is to say an act, and the last act, of deliberation’ (Hobbes op. cit., p. 97). Contracts usually rely on the ‘Keeping of promise’ ‘being trusted’ (Hobbes op. cit., p. 94) and being motivated by self-interest. Transferring a right ‘is either in consideration of some Right reciprocally transferred to himselfe; or for some other good he hopeth for thereby. For it is a voluntary act: and of the voluntary acts of every man, the object is some *Good to himselfe*’. To be ultimately binding contractual performance has to be guaranteed by law for ‘the bonds of words are too weak to bridle men’s ambition, avarice, anger, and other Passions, without the feare of some coercive Power’ (ibid.). This of course is the argument of the social contract (Chapter 2).

Importantly, the assumption that voluntary acts are based on self-interest is also taken to mean that self-interested action (in the form of promise) in a coerced situation is voluntary and contractually binding. Hobbes did not seem to be opposed to the idea that for the overall purpose of keeping peace, contracts can be valid even if they are made under force. ‘Because preservation of life being the end, for which one man becomes subject to another, every man is supposed to promise obedience, to him, in whose power it is to save, or destroy him’ (Hobbes op. cit., p. 140).³

³ Similarly in the following passage there seems to be an emphasis on legitimisation of enforced contracts even though it is not clear in which cases civil law can release a person from contractual performance.
As Carole Pateman (1988) has shown, questions of what may still count as a voluntary entry into a contract and what kinds of agreements contract can legitimise (prostitution, slavery etc.), are subject to continuing debate. Yet the conception of contract remained enormously influential and productive because it assumed \textit{and} created the autonomous male individual as a rational self-interested agent. The freedom to contract appeared to exemplify this individual freedom and autonomy.

Historically the unrestricted freedom of contract remained more an economic ideal than a rule of law even in the 19th century. Only in the aftermath of the French Revolution was the right to contract in Germany extended to all male individuals. In the Prussian General State Law (\textit{Allgemeines Preußisches Landrecht, APL}) of 1791/94 that was in many ways the precursor of the German Civil Code, parents and children were defined as a 'house community', a term that was underpinned by the contract principle, even though married women and children remained under tutelage. By stating that a person could not sell his person, but only sell his time and labour, servants were transformed into legal subjects who entered contracts with their former lords whilst their rights of self-determination were \textit{de facto} limited (Koselleck 1981).

So we see, by drawing on the moral principle of promise and fidelity to one's word to which the Bedouins referred, assumptions of freedom and individual sovereignty were incorporated in, and at the same time seen as manifested in contractual practices. Associated with the commercial exchange contract, the concept of contract remained neutral and non-ethical with respect to morality and gender symbolism. Moreover, under the assumption of free choice, contract brought obligations into existence.

\textbf{The counter-model of status contracts}

Even though quasi-feudal relationships, as Koselleck (1981) has argued, largely remained in practice in the 19th century, the discourse of contract in a historical perspective was

\textit{'And even in Common-wealths, if I be forced to redeem my selfe from a Theefe by promising him money, I am bound to pay it, till the Civil Law discharge me. For whatsoever I may lawfully do without Obligation, the same I may lawfully Covenant to do through feare: and what I lawfully Covenant, I cannot lawfully break' (Hobbes op. cit., p. 98).}
defined against the idea of personal submission in feudal status relations. In Sir Henry Maine’s famous phrase, relations based on contract mark the progressive pole in the development ‘from Status to Contract’ (Maine 1861/1917, p. 100). In the order of status, Maine held, rights and duties were determined by a person’s position in the patriarchal family, characterised by absolute jurisdiction of the head of household over persons and property. According to Maine ‘the tie between man and man which replaces by degrees those forms of reciprocity in rights and duties ... is Contract’ (Maine op. cit., p. 99). Max Weber (1922/1978, p. 671) has argued that the ‘reciprocity in rights and duties’ in the feudal order of status, too, ‘was in its innermost essence based upon contract, and the expression “pactus” was applied with all seriousness’ to a range of statutory codifications. In his *Sociology of Law* Weber held that family relations just as political associations were constituted by ‘status contracts’ (Weber op. cit., p. 672).

Status contracts would have to work within the legal institution of *Munt* analysed by one of Weber’s students, the sociologist Emma Oekinghaus (1925). Etymologically the Old High German expression *Munt* (shield) corresponds to the Latin *manus* (hand), which Heusler (1885 as quoted in Oekinghaus 1925, p. 4) interpreted as the absolute power of the head of household, the *manus potestativa*. In Roman law the term *familia* designated everybody subjected to the *patria potestas*, the authority of the head of household, including servants and farmhands. As Herlihy (1985, p. 2) notes the *pater familias* thereby was excluded from the family, as he was not subject to his own authority. According to old Germanic law *Munt* guaranteed the *Hausvater* (*pater familias*) power and authority over free persons and serfs, humans and animals as *jus in rem* (law relating to things) (Gerlach 1996). Only men could obtain ‘*Selbstmunf*,’ the right to fend for themselves and regulate relations with other heads of households, which is related to the right to carry a weapon, acquire property in land and to represent oneself in court.

From the 8th century onwards *Munt* regulated only power over family members and servants who became legal subjects. Their legal capacities, however, remained at the discretion of the *Hausvater* who legally represented those ‘commanded by *Munt*’ (*Muntbefohlene*). In the 13th century *Munt* was further transformed from the power of the guardian to the protection of his dependants. Oekinghaus argued that this form of
'modern guardianship' (Heusler op. cit., p. 38) became the longest legally upheld inequality between adults.

Sir Henry Maine was not at all oblivious to the fact that the order of contract was a domain entirely reserved to (property-owning) men. ‘Ancient Law’, he writes, ‘subordinates the woman to her blood-relations, while a prime phenomenon of modern jurisprudence has been her subordination to her husband’ (Maine op. cit., p. 91). Given that in (late) Roman law the wife through marriage legally became the daughter of her husband, while in the late 19th century she was legally subordinated as a wife, the distinction for married women between the order of status and that of contract collapses.

Max Weber has pointed to the important fact that the patriarchal power of the Hausvater included the right to have sexual access to the women of the house. This right was institutionalised in a range of ‘sexual contract[s]’ (Weber op. cit., p. 689) such as prostitution, concubineage and marriage, including temporary forms of marriage. Marriage contracts commonly were concluded between husband and the male relatives of the wife, and they involved money payments. Whereas Maine (op. cit., p. 92) interpreted the husband’s payment of a bride price to the wife’s relations as a price ‘for the tutelage which they surrender to him’, Weber argued that the parental payments of a dowry in high status families guaranteed the protection of their daughter from absolute conjugal submission. Dowries were left in the possession of the wife and were a security in case of abandonment or death of the husband. Together with a written agreement that specified the legal position of her children and payments made to her in case of her husband’s death or her abandonment, the dowry distinguished the class specific ‘full marriage’ from other sexual contracts.

Despite the payment of money and the ‘modern’ specification of rights in writing Weber, in contrast to the views of the classical social contract theorists (Chapter 2), considered the marriage contract as a status contract. Status contracts are defined as the ‘more primitive type’ and counter-model of the quantifiable non-ethical commercial exchange contract, which he called purposive contract. Purposive contracts spread with the expansion of the market system. For the most part status contracts are considered to be
‘fraternization contracts’ (Weber op. cit., p. 672) by means of which another person becomes somebody’s child, father, wife, master, slave, kin or comrade. As will be shown in the second part of the chapter (1.3.), the fraternisation between a father and a child rests on the uncertainty of (biological) fatherhood, which requires the acknowledgement by the father in order to receive legal status. Whereas purposive contracts are based on a specific conduct or performance, status contracts involve a change in what may be called the total legal situation (the universal position) and the social status of the persons involved. To have this effect these contracts were ... acts having a magical significance. ... To ‘fraternize’ with another person did not, however, mean that a certain performance of the contract, contributing to the attainment of some specific object, was reciprocally guaranteed or expected... The contract rather meant that the person would ‘become’ something different in quality (or status) from the quality he possessed before. For unless a person voluntarily assumed that new quality, his future conduct in his new role could hardly believed to be possible at all. Each party must thus make a new ‘soul’ enter his body.

(Weber 1978/1922, p. 672)

By insisting that these irreversible status transformations are voluntary acts, status contracts are qualified as contracts. At the same time the reference to fraternisation effectively conceals inherent hierarchies and power relations and forestalls the question whether to assume the unalterable position of a wife or a slave, of whose ‘dependency relationship’ Weber (op. cit., 1010) is elsewhere critical, was free from coercion. As Shanley (1979 as quoted in Pateman 1988, p. 166) has argued with respect to 17th century marriage contracts ‘to contract a marriage was to consent to a status, which in essence was hierarchical and unalterable’. Although not confined to women, status contracts had particular gender significance. Status contracts between men were largely, but not exclusively fraternisation between comrades or fathers and inheriting sons. Entry into familial status contracts did not on the whole vest women with the rights to share familial and parental power of decision-making or have equal part in inheritance. Inheritance of their parents’ property was usually handed over to their husbands.

As indicated in the above quotation Weber also drew attention to a range of magical acts that ‘sealed’ and secured fraternisation contracts. In particular he focused on oaths. Oath, he claimed, presented a ‘conditional self-surrender’ to magical or divine forces that were believed to punish anti-fraternal conduct (Weber op. cit., p. 672). Thus it seems that
magical oaths are to status contracts what freely willed promise is to commercial contracts.

Life tokens and liability in person

However, a number of legal theorists, sociologists and anthropologists, including Weber himself, have contended that rigorous formalism was a central characteristic also of early monetary contracts. 'Form and ceremony were everything, substance and intention were nothing or almost nothing. Only those transactions were recognized as having legal efficacy, which fulfilled certain conditions of form' (Winfield 1876/1950, p. 107). In money lending contracts solemn formulas operated 'not by way of obligation, but as a grant of the sum expressed' (Winfield op. cit., p. 109). Similarly Weber (op. cit., p. 674) held that cash transactions 'were completely devoid of any promissory elements oriented towards the future'. Interestingly however, these solemn formulas *used* the language of promise. The Roman *stipulatio* bindingly concluded a contract by the ritualistic question of the creditor '... *spondesne*?' ('do you promise?') and the debtor's answer 'spondeo' ('I promise'). Winfield (op. cit., p. 5) suggested that this formula was 'almost certainly of religious origin [and] was in early times supposed to have a kind of magic effect'. At the same times it referred exactly to that which later was considered to exemplify the theory of the will: the promise principle.

Sociological and anthropological interpretations of ancient money loan contracts, such as the Germanic *vadiatio*, focus on the significance of symbolic pledges by which the debt was contracted. According to Weber early money loan contracts produced contractual obligation through the conditional liability of the *person* for non-compliance. In the *vadiatio* the debtor gave a symbolic pledge, often a tally or staff, to the creditor. Weber (op. cit., p. 738) claimed that the staff was believed to be an enchanted messenger's staff. Marcel Mauss (1924/1997, p. 62) has interpreted these pledges as 'life-tokens'. He pointed out that pledges were often personal items of little value like a glove or a knife. These items were believed to be infused with the individuality of the donor and to bind his honour.

The metaphor of a life-token gains weight in the light of common legal practices that in
place of a surety the debtor became his own surety and pledged himself. If the debt was not paid the debtor was forfeited to the lawful possession of the creditor or sold himself into temporary slavery. In the German legal institution Einleger the creditor could conversely move into the house of the debtor, who was obliged to serve and provide for him until the debt was paid. Imprisonment or even execution for debt was not uncommon. In Germany imprisonment for debt was only abolished in the 19th century. Against this background Weber argued that symbolic and obligatory pledges in money loan contracts were an attempt to avoid immediate personal liability and constituted a temporal deferral. I shall argue that if money loan contracts were, as Weber suggested, precursors of so-called purposive contract, then they too, like status contracts, changed the ‘total social status of the individual’ (Weber op. cit., p. 674) – if the contract was breached. Early money loan contracts thus obligated the debtor with ‘life and limb’. Mauss has argued that these contracts kept traces of archaic gift exchanges. Gift exchanges constituted what he called ‘total social facts’ (Mauss op. cit., p. 78) in which ‘all kinds of institutions are given expression at one and the same time - religious, juridical, and moral...’ (Mauss op. cit., p. 3). According to Mauss these exchanges were at the same time self-interested and obligatory, qualifications that under the modern contract paradigm are considered to be irreducible opposites.

In the history of contract, as unfolded in Maine’s philosophical account and Weber’s Sociology of Law status contracts, symbolic pledges and liability ‘in one’s body’ are interpreted as earlier and more primitive stages in the linear development of contract from form to intention, from the power of belief secured by magical forces to the power of will secured by law. Only by locating these legacies in the dim and distant past can the commercial or purposive contract become a morally neutral device that creates obligation where none was before and implies freedom and individual sovereignty. If one follows Weber’s (op. cit., p. 669) claim that the ‘juridico-economic position of an individual, i.e., the totality of his legitimately acquired rights and valid obligations’ is a product of inheritance based on family relationships and contracts made by ‘him’, then status and purposive contracts are the major distributive mechanisms in creating this position. Excluding the case of slavery, the combination of those two modes of contract reinforced each other in the case of (property owning) men and they mutually dismantled each other
in the case of women. Portrayed in simplified terms the entry into status contracts that
created family relations historically transferred inheritance to the women's husbands and
henceforth excluded them as wives from purposive contracts.

1.3. REPERTOIRES OF GENERATION

Generational perspectives

The term generation is notoriously polysemous even though people draw on
commmonsense understandings when they talk, for example, about the 'succession of
generations'. In their informative essay 'Generation, cohorts, and relations between age
groups' Bengtson and colleagues (1985, p. 306) have argued that generation is 'a
metaphor for [the] emergence of social realities... linking time and social structure'. The
multiplicity of reference points is intrinsic in its Greek root genos. The derivative verb
genesthai means 'to come into existence' and, according to The Oxford English
Dictionary (1989, p. 436), denotes both the action of generating and that which is
generated. Referring to the work of L.L. Nash, Bengtson and colleagues argue that
genesthai referred in Greek usage to a group of living organisms constituting a single step
in the line of descendent from a common ancestor, a group of individuals sharing a
specified status for a limited period, participating in a common event or living through
the same period of time. Generation is a relational concept and linked to
conceptualisations of social time: a generation (of siblings, peers, coevals etc.) comes
into being in relation to another one in a process that marks both continuity and renewal
(Lüscher 1993).

The constant stream of human births and deaths suggests that the act of defining a
generation is an act of interpretation and construction. Its promise and actual usage from
the ancient Greeks onwards has been the idea of marking the chronology of important
events, of describing the social location of individual actors and of explaining resultant
collective change (Bengtson et al. op. cit., p. 305). As Marinas (1968, p. 91) states in the
Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, 'the generational perspective introduces
discontinuity and articulation in place of an amorphous and confused whole'. Its
respective units have been defined from the viewpoint of the humanities, social sciences and positivism and last but not least, from that of the natural sciences (biology).

The approach in the humanities is illustrated by the contention of the German art historian Pinder (1928, as quoted in Dubs 1966, p. 26-7) that generations have distinctive worldviews, a communality of a specific way of experiencing life and the world, which he called the ‘entelechy’ of a generation. Generation refers both to contemporaries (those who live at the same time) and coevals (those who are the same age), a relation that Pinder has famously characterised as the ‘non-contemporaneity of the contemporaneous’ referring to the multidimensionality of social time, that is experienced differently by actors of different cohorts.

Everyone lives with people of the same and of different ages... but for each the ‘same time’ is a different time – that is, it represents a different period of his self, which he can only share with people of his own age.

(Pinder 1928, as quoted ibid.)

As Karl Mannheim (1997/1928, p. 284) has noted, this dictum of the non-contemporaneity of the contemporaneous challenges the idea of a homogenous temporality of a given epoch, but it does not link the entelechies of generations to social factors and does not account for different positionalities of coevals.

The modern social-scientific approach to conceptualising generations builds on the ‘formal sociological’ work of Mannheim who proposed defining generations and their entelechies socio-structurally. Individuals who are born around the same time, Mannheim (op. cit., p. 290) argued, have a similar social ‘location in the social whole’. This location [Lagerung] is based on similar birth age but also on belonging to the same culture and society, which excludes some modes of thought, practice and emotion and promotes others. Yet, a similar generational location contains only potentialities. Individuals of a similar age become an actual generation ‘in so far as they participate in the characteristic social and intellectual currents of their society and period’ (Mannheim op. cit., p. 304). Furthermore actual generations are often constituted by a number of ‘antagonistic generation-units’, subgroups that are differentiated along class or political lines and characterised by different ‘mentalities’ or ‘generation style[s]’ (Mannheim op. cit., pp.
306-310). A contemporary example of the alleged antagonism of generation units is their 
identification with respect to their different positionality, agency and interests in the 
development of redistributive mechanisms of modern welfare states (Thomson 1989, 
1992; see Chapter 5.2.).

This early social-scientific conception underlies the contemporary notion of ‘cohort 
generations’ (Miller 1997). In contrast to the notion of (birth) ‘cohort’, which is a 
demographic term denoting an aggregate of individuals born in or around the same time 
(Pilcher 1995), cohort generations are characterised by ‘common perspectives of 
interpretations of the generation’s joint experiences’ (Miller op. cit., p. 8). These 
perspectives are further differentiated by socio-structural variables such as class and 
‘race’. Whereas birth cohorts are defined pragmatically, the boundaries of a cohort 
generation are defined ‘qualitatively’. Boundary markers are demographic differences of 
a group born during the same period of time in relation to predecessors and successors 
and/or historical events that affected this group of coevals more ‘directly’ than their 
contemporaries (Miller op. cit., p. 6).

The recourse to what Mannheim (op. cit., p. 290) called ‘biological factors’, that is the 
fact that individuals are born and die, and have a limited life span, is most striking in the 
positivist-historical approach, where the life spans of generations provide the framework 
for the analysis of historical change. Its point of departure is the definition of generations 
as encompassing on average 30 years. This time interval represents the average age gap 
between parents and children (Dubs 1966), the time ‘until political power is handed from 
father to son’ (Rintala 1968, p. 93) and the period of decisive individual activity or the 
‘fact’ as Marinas (1968, p. 90) holds, referring to Ortega, that ‘history is made largely by 
men between the ages of 30 and 60’. Furthermore the approach draws on the assumption 
of a ‘primary biological-psychological tension between young and old’ (Dubs op. cit., p. 
28), in which the older generations is usually identified with a conservative, the younger 
with a liberal worldview. Claiming that resultant tension and conflict are linked to 
historical change, the task of the historian is to identify ‘decisive generations’ and link 
historical development to the succession of generations.
Despite their different focuses several points of connection appear in these three approaches. Emphasis is first put on difference in the attempt to define generations as distinct from others. Even though the discursive frames and defining criteria differ, the assumption that generations exist in the first place is anchored in the coexistence of individuals of a similar age in a socio-historically specific habitat. Furthermore the antagonism of different generations, or generation units, within the ensemble of contemporaries draws on the assumption of an innate tension between young and old. At the same time the fact that individuals are also members of specific family generations remains completely divorced from definitions of historical generations, a conceptual divide that according to Attias-Donfut and Arber (1999) also characterises contemporary debates.

Finally, gender difference remains both present and absent in the ‘classical’ conceptualisations of generation. On the one hand women are never explicitly said to be principally excluded from belonging to or participating in a generation, like they were, for example, from commercial contracts. On the other hand the illustration of intergenerational tension by conflicts between father and son and the emphasis on active civil participation imply that women have played a rather subordinate role in defining the boundaries of a generation and its tensions with other generations. The implicit or explicit basing of generational classifications on the male life course with its tripartite division between education, employment and retirement is still evident in contemporary classifications. The definition of the so-called welfare generation (Chapter 5.2.) is a case in point.

Whilst relatively marginal in countries such as Britain, generational perspectives continue to frame debates on the continent both in academia and society at large, in particular with respect to conflicts in the allocation of resources among generations. Whereas some commentators consider generations as the ‘last refuge of the addicts of homogeneity’ (Bude 1995 as quoted in Scherr 1997, p. 171), others hold that the multi-perspectivity of location and time frames inherent in the generational perspective is a fruitful way to approach tensions in the contemporary condition (Lüscher op. cit.). The question whether or not individuals identify with or are informed by generational perspectives is
considered to be subject to empirical investigation.

What usually remains beyond current debate is that the notion of generation denotes family lineages, or its constitutive ‘reproduction-lineage nexus’ (Collier and Yanagisako 1987, p. 3), as is suggested by the ancient Greek term genea (generation) for family. It appears trivial that a new generation comes into being as a result of the procreation of a man and a woman. In western societies the resultant lineage in anthropological terms is defined as a ‘cognastic descent [that] is bilateral, using both genders to define the boundaries of being a relative’ (Fry 1995, p. 131). Boundaries between generations appear self-evident because only in family lineages do we find ‘full intervals’ (Mannheim op. cit., p. 279) between one generation and the next, constituted by the time between the birth of an individual and his or her ability to procreate. Several contemporary writers have therefore suggested limiting the term ‘generation’ to signify lineages between grandparents, parents and child in order to avoid conceptual confusion (Pilcher 1995).

In the remainder of this chapter I will unfold some of the discursive contexts of this seemingly obvious link between reproduction and lineage. I will show that this link has been a product of social construction, of legal circumscription, moralisation and familial practice, and is closely linked to the construction and legitimisation of sexual difference.

**Framing blood ties: the father as genitor**

In both ancient Greek and Latin, generation denoted the process of procreation in the biblical sense of ‘begetting and bearing’ (Yanagisako and Delaney 1995, p. 7). The biological ‘facts’ of generation in the western world have been set down and disputed in ancient accounts of reproductive biology. Passed on by Arab scholars, the body of dogma they produced was rediscovered and disseminated in the Middle Ages and remained the doctrine of official medicine until the 18th century. In the light of new ‘knowledge’ on how generation occurs these texts have been re-examined. In the discussion that follows I will draw on the readings of earlier conceptions of generation suggested by the Italian anthropologist Gianna Pomata (1996) and the North American historian Thomas Laqueur (1990). Whereas Pomata focuses on the interrelations between medical and legal definitions of generation, Laqueur is concerned with the ‘making of sex’. According to
Laqueur, ancient biological accounts of generation are evidence of what he calls the one-sex model, in which the female body is considered as an inverted but ‘lesser’ version of the male body. Sexual difference was not attached to differences in sexual organs but to an invisible economy of bodily fluids, particularly of blood, milk and semen, which were thought to convert into one another through varying degrees of body heat.

In the ancient texts two models of generation are juxtaposed, the so-called one-seed and the two-seed model (Laqueur op. cit., p. 38). In the 5th century BC the Greek physician Hippocrates, or the authors of the writings attributed to his name, held that generation occurred when male and female seeds are melted together. Male sperm was refined out of blood through an excess of body heat. The sperm was considered ‘a foam much like the froth on the sea’ (Laqueur op. cit., p. 35). Due to lesser heat, the female body converted blood into milk and menstrual blood. Although the male originated from ‘stronger’ sperm Hippocrates maintained that both sexes could produce weak and strong versions and the outcome of generation depended on the respective quality inherent in the semen mix.

Aristotle’s influential one-seed model in the 4th century BC provided an answer to the hypothetical question that if women can produce strong seeds why they would need men to generate. Aristotle shared the view that men’s blood was converted into semen through innate body heat and that women lacked the capacity to produce vital heat, so that their blood changed to milk and menstrual blood. According to Aristotle the woman’s menstrual blood in generation provided the raw matter of the embryo, whereas the incorporeal pneuma of the male sperm gave the foetus form and soul. On the basis of a greater body heat the man thereby became the efficient agent in generation (Pomata 1996), even if blood itself was ‘ungendered’ (Laqueur op. cit., p. 38). In the light of Aristotle’s philosophy Laqueur (op. cit., p. 55-6) interprets ‘the strength of the sperma in generating new life [as] the microcosmic corporeal aspect of the citizen’s deliberative strength of his superior rational power, and of his right to govern’.

What is informative in the context of generation is the consideration that if in the economy of bodily fluids semen and menstrual blood, and also nourishing milk, were derived from blood, the ancient biological accounts suggest that the ‘stuff’ that links
generations is literally a tie in blood. In the 2nd century AD Galen endorsed and 
reformulated Hippocrates's two-seed model. Galen shared the dominant view that men 
were more perfect than women due to their excess of heat, but on his discovery of the 
'female testicles' [ovaries] held that women too produced generative seeds. According to 
Galen both male and female semen contributed spiritually and materially to generation, 
but female semen was conceptualised as the weaker auxiliary one, which nourished the 
male sperm. Pomata (op. cit., p. 57) points out that by maintaining that male sperm, 
derived from blood, constituted the foetus's vascular system Galen was able to 
demonstrate 'how the link between the child and the father is literally, materially a tie 
derived from blood'. This blood tie links the child to the father and by implication to a 
common ancestor.

I shall argue that the biological 'discovery' of intergenerational blood ties gives scientific 
weight to the apparently gender-neutral western folk myth that 'blood is thicker than 
water', that is the belief that 'natural' kinship ties are stronger than the ties of friendship. 
As Patterson (1997, p. 25) suggests in her discussion of Welsh kinship, the patrilineal 
symbol of blood is powerful because it is 'given by nature, not man-made'. The blood-
semen theory thus established what the anthropologist Pitt-Rivers has called 
'consubstantiality' (1973, p. 92), i.e. the idea of a prime nexus between father and child 
in 'blood' constituting a natural, positive and unbreakable tie between man and his blood-
relatives. In the case of the Bedouins in the Western Desert of Egypt blood is vested with 
claims of a distinct cultural identity and a nobility of origin, a connotation implied both in 
the Latin genus and in the Greek genos which have the meaning of birth, stock and race 
(Partridge 1966). Abu-Lughold (1986, p. 45) argues that for the Bedouins 'blood is the 
authenticator of origin or pedigree'. It is worth noting that existentialising references to 
ties in blood as a 'memory without language' (Oates 1990 as quoted in Bahr and Bahr 
1996, p. 549) that 'usually engender deep emotion and intense commitment' (Bahr and 
Bahr op. cit., p. 548) are made until the present day. Similarly Berscheid (1996, p. 563) in 
the same issue of the Journal of Marriage and the Family affirms 'that kin relationships 
are likely to be different from non-kin on the basis of the existence of blood ties alone'. 
The modern interpretation of shared blood refers to shared genes.
No blood transfusion, no surgeon's knife, no geographical distance can ever change one's DNA blueprint and its similarity to another's. The fact that another person is blood kin may be suppressed or ignored, but it is a biological fact that cannot be altered.

(Berscheid ibid.)

Despite the seeming ungenderedness of blood the emphasis on blood-ties can be found particularly in societies with patrilineal descent. The need to establish the father's blood tie to his descendants and his more superior part in generation has to be seen in the light of the need to legitimise and valorise claims about fatherhood. 'In the face of the more sensorily evident claim of the mother' (Laqueur op. cit., p. 20) fatherhood is existentially uncertain. Thomasset (1992, p. 48) has argued that at the same time as the blood theory of semen flourished 'much ... evidence attests to men's obsession with the possibility that women might give birth without their participation'. Similarly the accounts of the classical social contract theorists give ample evidence of the fundamental uncertainty of fatherhood (Chapter 2.3.) and Schultheis (1993) reminds us that only relatively recently has it been possible to determine fatherhood biologically.

That apparently contradictory theories concerning generation, for example that only men had generative semen, that only women had generative semen and that both sexes contributed to generation, were upheld over the centuries is well illustrated in the summary of ancient scientific theories by Isidore of Seville in the 7th century AD. Laqueur argues that these statements were compatible because they were linked to distinct legal circumscriptions of generational positions. As Pomata shows, these legal definitions legitimised the position of the father in two ways: through paternal power and paternal blood. I will briefly expand on these legal definitions in early Roman law because they illustrate how everyday concepts of generation were vested with a gendered legal significance that had vital consequences for inheritance rights as well as politico-economic citizenship rights. These implications remain concealed in any ahistorical usage of lineage categories by modern anthropologists and sociologists.

Early Roman law had three main intergenerational kinship categories: consanguinitas (literally: the sharing of blood), agnatio (patrilineal kinship) and cognatio (natural/civil kinship). Drawing on the Digest, one of the three parts of the Corpus Iuris Civilis in
which Roman law had been compiled and codified in the 6th century AD, Pomata (1996) points out that the term *cognatio* referred to kinship as understood by Natural and Civil Law. According to Natural Law *cognatio* was established by birth and hence included also illegitimate children. Natural Law thus gives evidence of the two-seed model elaborated above. In Civil Law on the other hand *cognatio* referred exclusively to birth in a legitimate marriage and also included adoption. Thus the *Digest* suggested that civil kinship really ‘is more accurately called *agnatio*’ (Pomata op. cit., p. 46). The principle of *agnatio*, according to Pomata, was bound up with the patriarchal family. *Agnati* were all those who by birth were under the *patria potesta*, the power of the head of household (1.2.). Yet a man legally became *pater familias* not through the birth of his child but through the death of his own father, which released him from his father’s *potesta*. I suggest that in an important sense the legal establishment of ‘paternity’ (paternal power) preceded corporeal paternity.

Pomata (op. cit., p. 46) rightly asserts that gender is a key distinction between natural and civil kinship. Whilst men could create both *cognatio* and *agnatio* and were able to bequeath their legal status to their sons, women could only create ‘natural kinship devoid of the privileges attached to legal kinship’. The same holds for the category *consanguinitas*. Although consanguinity in ordinary language denoted the sharing of the same blood, in Roman law *consanguinei* referred exclusively to the children born to a common father, independently of whether they had the same mother. According to Laqueur *consanguinitas* was based on the assumption that only men have generative seeds. He quotes Isidore who stated that ‘consanguinity is so called by that which from one blood, that is from the same semen of the father, is begotten’ (Isidore de Seville as quoted in Laqueur, op. cit., p. 56). As the 14th century jurist Baldus in his commentary on consanguinity in the *Corpus Iuris Civilis* remarks ‘properly speaking, neither a mother nor a grandmother can be called blood-relatives’ (Baldus as quoted in Pomata 1996, p. 43).

Pomata holds that siblings of the same mother and different fathers were called *uterini* (from the same uterus). According to Isidore an illegitimate child was called *spurius* after the female genitalia *spurium* (from the seed). Whether *uterini* or *spurius*, whilst the
legitimate child is generated from the seed of the father, her illegitimate counterpart is derived from the mother’s seed ‘as if the father did not exist’ (Laqueur op. cit., p. 56). Consanguinity was the closest agnatic relationship but it was not equivalent to *agnatio*. This is expressed the order of succession of inheritance that placed *consanguinei* who were still under the *patria potestas* before other *consanguinei*, and those before agnates. Thus intergenerational positions were shaped both by paternal blood and paternal power. But the power of the *patria potestas* was not subject to a man’s will power or conduct (being gained only by his father’s death) whereas the ties of blood, or more precisely their recognition by the *pater familias*, remained an act of will and deliberation. The latter case could be an example of what Weber meant by status contract.

In so far as this construction of fatherhood buttressed the status quo, we can assume that the state had a strong interest in the biological, legal and political establishment of paternity. Moreover the recognition of the father-child bond across many cultures is associated with ‘the dawn of civilization’ (Maynes et al. 1996). As the Austrian sociologist, writer and cofounder of the Austrian women’s movement Rosa Mayreder put it the

> "rise and fall of fatherhood constitutes a wonderful chapter of human history. From the level at which the father was zero ... he rises in a sphere of power and admiration, which lets him appear as God, who himself is thought of as father, as keeper, ruler and providence of the family, which was his absolute kingdom."

(Mayreder 1923 as quoted in Oekinghaus 1925, p. 9)

Much effort not only on the part of the legal state-apparatus and its changing generational politics (chapter 3), but also on the part of cultural and religious institutions and (high status) families themselves was necessary to make this rise of fatherhood possible and lasting. In the following section I want to highlight briefly some of these mechanisms, which are not usually considered as repertoires of generation.

**The making of genealogies: generational practices and consciousness**

The German economist Gustav Schmoller has described the history of the patriarchal family as one in which ‘children ... enter into a relationship of love and sympathy, faithfulness and admiration with the formerly more distant father in a conscious
continuation of his blood.’ (1919 as quoted in Oekinghaus 1925, p. 8, emphasis added). I take this proposition to suggest that even though blood ties were legally circumscribed it was still necessary to create what Schmoller (ibid.) called ‘a sense of genealogy’ in the individuals involved. Referring to the construction of the modern family Bourdieu has described what I would consider the making of genealogies as

the product of a labour of institutionalisation, both ritual and technical, [which] aimed at durably instituting in each member of the instituted unit, feelings that will tend to ensure the integration that is the condition of the existence and persistence of the unit.

(Bourdieu 1996, p. 22, emphasis added)

The practical and symbolic work involved is often concealed with references to natural intergenerational affection and solidarity that is allegedly inherent in kinship relations. This is illustrated, for example, in the writings of 19th and 20th century western anthropologists, who even when considering kinship as a social construct tended to presuppose the ‘facts’ of generation, that is the procreation-lineage nexus. Superimposing the genealogical grid on non-European cultures anthropologists frequently distinguished the physical ‘facts’ of kinship, that is generation and bloodline from the ideas projected upon these facts (Schneider 1984). Blood ties or ‘real’ kinship were conceived of as naturally entailing quasi-instinctual bonds of solidarity – ‘the feeling of kindred’ (McLennan 1865 as quoted in Schneider op. cit., p. 166) or ‘natural affection’ (Maine 1861/1917, p. 83).

Studies in European social history on the other hand suggest a very different state of affairs. Rather than merely representing family generations, genealogical trees in high status families were themselves a product of genealogical making. As Davis (1986) shows for France, a pater familias carefully planned the marriages of daughters and the careers of sons, and deployed adoption and godparentship in order to strengthen what Bourdieu (1996) calls the economic, symbolic and social capital of the family. Rituals gave intra- and intergenerational bonds permanence and legitimacy. These rituals were often linked to religion, which in turn built on ancient beliefs and cultural practices. This is illustrated in the display of pictures of ancestors on the house altar or the building of family vaults. Drawing on beliefs in the power of the dead the ‘Catholic economy of the mutual salvation of souls’ (Davis op. cit., p. 29) made parents oblige their children to
pray for their souls and have memorial masses on the anniversary of their death.

After the 14th century, expressions of linear descent multiplied in Western Europe whereas collateral kinship positions lost significance. Family histories or the ‘memories’ of the house (*libri di famiglia, livre de raison*) emerged as a new literary genre (Klapisch-Zuber 1996; Davis op.cit.). Developed from the account books of well-off households, sons or male heirs (and in rare cases their wives or sisters) wrote narratives about the history or origin of the family. Their intention was to pass family virtues and life style, careers and qualities of parents and ancestors on to their descendants. Illegitimate children and women were rarely mentioned. In her study of genealogical trees in 14th and 15th century Florence Klapisch-Zuber (1996) found hardly any women included at all, evidence of the ancient legal maxim “*Mulier est finis familiae*” - a woman is the terminus of the family’ (Maine op. cit., p. 87). Whereas the nobility constructed genealogies to consolidate their *race* or *sang* (blood), i.e. the nobility of their origin, *bonne race* was also understood as a predisposition to virtue. Exemplifying how blood ties were symbolically loaded *bonne race* was passed on by blood and obliged descendants to lead a virtuous life and to marry befitting their rank (Davis 1986). This is implied in the Latin *genus*, which also had the meaning ‘good (noble) stock’ (Partridge 1966).

There is not much socio-historical evidence on how intergenerational relationships were maintained on a day-to-day level. Statements that the patriarchal family ‘creates the most natural systematically and uniformly run division of labour, ... which is at the same time the simplest way to look after the ill, old, infirm, frail’ (Schmoller as quoted in Oekinghaus op. cit., p. 8) imply that this task was assigned mainly to women. This view is also suggested in religious writings and novels, which admonished women in particular to look after older family members. Responsibilities towards parents-in-law mirrored a relationship created through marriage in one created through ‘blood’. In her utopian novel *The treasure of the city of ladies* the 15th century Franco-Italian poet Christine de Pizan (1411/1985, p. 163) admonished younger women not only to honour and obey older people ‘as though they were all your mothers and fathers’ but to ‘help them compassionately and comfort them with the strength of your body and with your worldly goods in their illnesses and frailty’.
Thus it seems as if in Western European history the construction of genealogies in terms of honour and nobility of origin in high status families was the domain of men, whereas women were responsible for enacting these virtues ‘with the strength of their bodies’.

1.4. CONCLUSION

The aim of the preceding sections was to open up some of the discursive contexts of contract and generation in a historical perspective, taking gender as an analytical and sensitising tool to uncover some of their inherent power hierarchies. I have suggested that the legacies and folk models underlying these concepts can be of tremendous cultural force if invoked in current debates, even, or particularly, when they remain unacknowledged. Whilst referring to very different social ‘realities’ they describe and construct the concepts have a multiplicity of meanings. As a mode of acting, contract refers to a device that structures and shapes the interaction and cooperation of individuals. Generation on the other hand refers to the temporal and structural location of individuals, as well as the mode of ‘production’ of this location. I have argued that the commercial exchange contract and the family lineage are dominant discursive frames for the repertoires of contract and generation, which carry a ‘charge symbolique et imaginaire’ (Attias-Donfut 1995, p. 7).

The commercial contract marks the highest stage in a series of more ‘primitive’ devices of cooperation. It is associated with the onset of modernity and the market economy, and the triumph of rationality and individual sovereignty. In its modern gestalt it has ‘overcome’ once and for all contracts based on status, magical beliefs and liability in the body, as well as the exclusion of women, and now appears truly applicable ‘to all races and circumstances’. Strategic cooperation as the mutual transferring of rights is conceived as created through the force of will, expressed in words and secured by law (because as Hobbes (op. cit., p. 93) put it ‘nothing is more easily broken than a man’s word’).

Family lineages were assumed to be grounded in ‘nature’, that is heterosexual
reproduction, but often remain excluded in modern conceptions of socio-historical generations because lineage and kinship are said to lose their structuring impact in the contemporary condition. Gender is only explicitly named as a structuring force in the ancient texts of reproductive biology, where the prominence of the father was established against the evident fact of corporeal motherhood. Cohesion is conceived of as created through the force of nature embodied in ties of blood, which entail enduring solidarity. Blood is the cultural symbol par excellence for the stuff of intergenerational lineages. At the same time an innate tension between younger and older generations is seen to potentially threaten cohesion.

Historically the practices and positionalities referred to in contract and generation have always been at the intersection of moral, legal and political discourse, and formed and transformed by social institutions, including the family. Saliently their legacies have included legal codification. For the analysis that is to follow, which is concerned with the ways in which contract and generation are combined and what this combination constructs and describes, it is important to be sensitised to both the dominant frames of those concepts and their constitutive exclusions. I will take the repertoire of contract as one that entails freedom, self-regarding rationality, reciprocity and trust. By implication cooperative practices based on emotions, habit and values as well as constraints, prior obligations and liability in the body are excluded. The repertoire of generation entails bilateral descent and unbreakable blood ties, but also an innate tension between young and old. It excludes the power of fathers and men to define generational boundaries, as well as the work necessarily to maintain intergenerational cohesion and the fact that blood ties have been subject to freely willed acts, self-interested strategies and coercion.

These repertoires will be heuristically applied to explore more precisely what is said and not said when those terms are deployed. Thus I will ask where, in what appears to be non-ethical, rational and mutually advantageous contracts, elements of symbolism, morality, ethics and coercion are implied. Conversely, I will ask whether so-called status contracts can be found in contemporary societies and look at elements of coercion and self-interest. Franz Schultheis (op. cit.), for example, has suggested that status contracts are a mode of intergenerational relationships in so far as these relations are unalterable
and irreversible. Through being born into specific generational relations persons have a social identity assigned, embodied in the family name, and ‘become something different in quality’, even if one would have to qualify that persons become something qualitatively in the first place and do not enter these relationships voluntarily. The ways in which contract and generation are supposed to relate to one another is the subject of the following chapter.
Chapter 2

JUSTIFICATIONS OF INTERGENERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES IN SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORIES

2.1. INTRODUCTION

While the previous chapter explored some of the gendered legacies and repertoires of contract and generation in a historical perspective the following chapter is concerned with how those social constructs are related to one another in social contract theories. I investigate those theories because, first, their texts still inform contemporary western political thinking about the boundaries and the nature of the public and private in the late 20th century. Social contract theories developed the idea that political institutions including marriage and to some extent parent-child relations are based on convention, that is, on contract, consent and agreement. As Hirschmann and Di Stefano (1996, p. 18) have argued they created ‘new pictures and visions of politics and the state that captured the imagination of many and play a vital role in the structuring of social relations.’ Social contract theories inform the metaphor of the generational contract both qualitatively (insofar as they specify the justifications of inter-lineage commitments) and logically through the rationale of the social contract itself. Billig and colleagues (1988) have suggested that notions of liberal philosophy, such as individual freedom and equality have become transformed into everyday thinking. As such they can provide repertoires for the description and interpretation of intergenerational commitments by contemporary social actors that, following the analysis of the conflicting themes of liberal philosophy by Billig and colleagues, are likely to present dilemmas rather than systemized schemata.
I will explore the impacts of these repertoires empirically in Chapters 6, 7 and 8.

Second, while the notion of the generational contract draws in some ways on the concept of the social contract, built as it is on elements of individual sovereignty and mutually advantageous agreements explored in the previous chapter, the place of the social contract in the multi-faceted repertoire of contract has not yet been determined. It is the nature of this association between the generational and the social contract that is at issue in this chapter and provides the background to explore generational politics in the history of the German welfare state (Chapter 3).

After briefly recapitulating the logic of the social contract argument I will focus on the different themes and modes of justification of intergenerational relations in both classical and neo-contractarian theories. These theories draw on different repertoires of generation. Whereas the classical social contract theorists focus solely on intergenerational relationships within family lineages, neo-contractarians are concerned with issues of justice between socio-historical generations or cohorts, including the relation between non-contemporary generations and allude to some of the problems in the logic of the generational contract.

In the first part I will focus on the ways in which the prominent classical theorists Thomas Hobbes, Samuel von Pufendorf, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel Kant have described and legitimised intergenerational cohesion within family lineages. Are intergenerational commitments based on natural solidarity, as some modern anthropologists and family sociologists would have it? In this case the generational contract would be merely a contractual analogy: individuals in families are bound together by natural solidarity as individuals in the market sphere are by legally enforceable contracts. Or are they based on status contracts, i.e. on status obligations derived from social norms, as Weber (1922/1978) seemed to suggest? Or are intergenerational relationships based on explicit contractual agreements, and become norm creating as the repertoire of contract implies? And what are the gender relations implied? Judith Butler (1997) has asserted that theories always posit foundations, that is premises that function as legitimising grounds but are themselves constituted through
exclusion. Foundations are contingent and contestable presumptions and according to Butler (op. cit., p. 63) 'the task is to interrogate what the theoretical move that establishes foundation authorizes, and what precisely it excludes and forecloses.'

The analysis in this chapter of classical contract theories is inspired by the work of the political theorist Carole Pateman (1988). In her analysis of the status of gender in classical social contract theories Pateman has argued that although these theories were considered to be the emancipatory doctrine par excellence insofar as they superseded dominion based on ascriptive characteristics such as descent and birth, they were based on the 'sexual contract'. Whilst securing citizenship rights for men, the social contract, through which civil society comes into existence, presupposes and constructs the physical and political subjection of women through the establishment of men's political right over women and their sex-right to access women's bodies. Pateman argues that women have a contradictory role in social contract theories: on the one hand they have to be excluded from the original agreement on the basis of their inferiority. On the other hand, although they lack the status of civil individuals women must enter the marriage contract as equals if the universal freedom of civil society is to be maintained. The ruse of the social contract is thus to appear as a guarantee and example of freedom and choice whilst constituting modes of domination and subordination.

Nancy Fraser (1997) has criticised Pateman's approach on the grounds that it remains restricted to individual 'master subject dyads' and seems to assume that women are subjected to the direct command of an individual man. Furthermore she argues that Pateman does not offer an explanation for the propensity of male sex-right. Following Makus (1996) in this point I suggest that a focus on intergenerational relations and gender will shed new light not only on conjugal relationships but also on the interests of the state in justifying and codifying the father-child bond.

In the second part of the chapter I will explore conceptions of intergenerational responsibilities over time in neo-contractarian theories, taking as examples the neo-contractarian theorist John Rawls's conception of intergenerational justice and the distinction of the social scientist Peter Laslett between the intragenerational cohort trust and the intergenerational tricontract. It has been argued that a new generational contract
has to be extended vertically in time in order to draw attention to the interdependency of
generations removed in time and more specifically to the consequences of our own
actions for future generations (Busek 1997). In what ways do contemporary theorists
build on the modes of justification of classical contract theorists? What is the role of
lineage cohesion for the justice of generations in society at large?

Although the rights of future persons have been implicit in classical contract theories as,
for example, in Locke’s discussion of inheritance or Kant’s contention that individuals
‘must leave [the land] to the descendants as a treasured pledge’ (Kant 1792/1997, p. 74),
the problem of intergenerational justice over time was not conceptualised before the
1970s (Laslett and Fishkin 1992). It concerns questions such as environmental protection
and moral responsibility for previous injustices and poses the problem that contracts
between non-contemporaries cannot logically be conceptualised as mutually
advantageous. Contemporary generations can influence the lives of generations to come
while future generations can do nothing to influence their predecessors.

2.2. THE LOGIC OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT ARGUMENT

The heuristic idea of the social contract is to transfer the contractual justification of rights
and duties illustrated in the commercial contract (Chapter 1) to the whole of society. In a
‘thought experiment’ (Kersting 1996, p. 33) socio-political arrangements and principles
are interpreted as if they were grounded in the consent of all members of society. If
people were freely and voluntarily to agree upon a given order this would be binding:
Volenti non fit inuiria (the voluntarily agreed upon does not lead to injustice). It also
would be a superior arrangement as individuals would not merely obey external laws but
actively will the laws of their own conduct. Social contract theories thereby do not seek
to establish the actual historical antecedents of the state but rather its ‘logical
presuppositions’ (Gough 1957, p. 4) or, in the case of neo-contractarians like Rawls, the
grounding of principles of distributive justice.

Although it has elements that can be traced back to antiquity, social contract theory as a
theory of (state) legitimisation, grounded in a post-traditional consensual basis, is
commonly thought to have its origins in the 17th century. Generally speaking the logic of the contractual argument can be described as follows: a principle of social life is justified if it can be shown to be a result of a contract to which the persons affected would agree under well defined and generally accepted conditions. In order to justify their claims contractarian theorists construct a plausible initial state in which individuals are motivated to agree to a contract, and specify the conditions under which they can come to a fair agreement and the principles that would be rationally acceptable under these conditions. The argument thus encompasses a pre-contractual state ("state of nature"), the process of reaching an agreement on a contract (for example, negotiation behind a "veil of ignorance"), and the result of the agreement, a post-contractual state ("civil society"). I take these in turn.

By describing the situation that leads to contractual agreement "[t]he state of nature formulates the question for which the contract theory is the answer", namely, what principles can be adopted that would improve upon conditions prevailing without any principles (Kersting op. cit., p. 57). It defines the problem of coexistence, for example, a distribution of goods and/or modes of cooperation, so setting out a philosophical anthropology. Second, the contractual agreement specifies the parties to the contract, the structure of the negotiation of the contract and the content of the negotiations, while replacing subject and temporal variables of an actual contract with the universal constants of a hypothetical contract. The contractual agreement has to include a specification of judgements of validity of the contract, for only if a contract is valid can it be normative. The post-contractual state, finally, lays out the contractual result, the aim of the philosophical proof, the practical rationality of contract and the political order based on the agreed upon principles. (Kersting op. cit.; Koller 1986) For example, for Hobbes this was an absolute monarchy, for Locke, a constitutional government and for Rawls it is a liberal democracy.

An explanation of why we should find a hypothetical contract binding is sometimes made

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* For example, Glaucon, in Plato’s Republic, considered laws to be a pact made by the weak in defence against the strong.
by appeal to a tacit or implicit contract.\footnote{Interestingly enough, this can be traced back to Plato. In Criton Socrates refuses to escape from prison shortly before his execution, arguing that an escape would be a breach of his convenant with the state according to which he had agreed to be a citizen of Athens and honour its laws. Having not used his right to emigrate thus far he was bound by the laws even if they did not work in his favour (Ballestrem 1986).} The idea of tacit contract assumes actual consensus, expressed and renewed not with words but with 'behaviour that conclusively establishes consent' (Kersting op. cit., p. 36), such as recognising state law and refraining from emigration. To be a valid model of legitimisation, however, the interpretation of silence as consent has to reasonably presuppose that alternatives and choices were available (Ballestrem 1986; Okin 1995). Otherwise, tacit consent would not be 'worth the paper it's not written on' (Nozick 1974, p. 287).

2.3. INTERGENERATIONAL COMMITMENTS IN CLASSICAL SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORIES

Tacit intergenerational contracts as the expression of self-interest

The founder of modern political philosophy Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) grounded the establishment of an absolute monarch (*Leviathan*) on the contractual consensus 'of every man with every man' (Hobbes 1651/1997, p. 120). Hobbes conceived the state of nature as one where 'each man is enemy to that other whom he neither obeys nor commands' (1642/1983, p. 122). People are thus under permanent threat of war and there is no sovereign authority that ensures that promises and contracts made are kept. According to Hobbes, men and women are potentially equal in the state of nature as 'there is not alwayes that difference of strength, or prudence between the man and the woman' (Hobbes 1651/1997, p. 139). In contrast to dominant views of the father as genitor (Chapter 1) they have equal part in procreation. Hobbes conceived intergenerational relationships in terms of 'Dominion' (ibid.) that is political power.

In the state of nature, Hobbes wrote, parents are both capable and required to make a contract about who obtains dominion over the child, an assumption that seems to contradict the notion that contracts in that state are always at risk of being breached. In the absence of an explicit agreement the mother obtains dominion over the child because without marital contracts that only come into existence in civil society, 'it cannot be
known who is the Father, unless it be declared by the Mother' (Hobbes 1651/1997, p. 140). Having the first and unmediated access to her child it is then 'at her own wil, [to] either breed [the child] up, or adventure him to fortune' (Hobbes 1642/1983, p. 122). Interestingly Hobbes did not presuppose any maternal instinct of the mother to nourish her child nor do status relations come into play. On the contrary her decision to bring up her child is entirely motivated by self-interest insofar as the child will be obliged to obey her because it 'oweth its life to the Mother' (Hobbes 1651/1997, p. 140). As he put it in De Cive 'If therefore she breeds him ... she is supposed to bring him up on this condition, that being grown a full age he become not her enemy; which is, that he obey her' (Hobbes 1642/1983, p. 122). Thus his dictum that 'in the state of nature, every woman that bears children, becomes both a Mother, and a Lord' (ibid.). Again it is not entirely clear why children in this state would honour this covenant of obedience and loyalty in exchange for their upbringing.

Although generational dominion, according to Hobbes, is one mode by which civil society is constituted he holds that women conventionally lose their maternal and political power 'because for the most part Common-wealths have been erected by the Fathers, not by the Mothers of families' (Hobbes 1651/1997, p. 140). But if women were not necessarily of lesser strength, how could they be excluded from the contractual agreement that brings civil society into being and agree to enter into conjugal contracts in which 'the domestical command belongs to the man' (Hobbes 1642/1983, p. 124)? Hobbes remained surprisingly vague on the point why in civil society 'a woman for societie sake gives herself to a man on this condition; that he shall bear the sway' (ibid., p. 123, emphasis added). One of the 'justifications' seems to be the need of a supreme undivided authority in the family, because, and here he evokes the authority of Jesus (Mat. 6: 24) 'no man can obey two Masters' (Hobbes 1651/1997, p. 139). As in the state of nature paternal dominion is based neither on sentiment nor status but on an implicit contract of an exchange of obedience for upbringing between father and child based on 'the Child's Consent, either expresse, or by other sufficient arguments declared' (Hobbes 1651/1997, p. 137).

To fill in the gap in the logic of Hobbes's argument, one could additionally assume, as
Carole Pateman (1988) has suggested, that women in the state of nature were weakened in their self-defence by their responsibility for their offspring. This assumption however is difficult to reconcile with Hobbes's notion of maternal lordship. Moreover, it would contradict the claim of an original self-interest for nobody would care for subsequent generations if this were to compromise his or her own advancement. Ingrid Makus (1996) on the other hand has re-emphasized Hobbes's claim that the shift in parental authority is a product of mere convention. According to Makus, the fact that women were explicitly characterised as self-interested contradicts the idea that they were seen as unfit for civil society. Yet, Makus's defence of Hobbes does not explain foundations of this convention.

It seems to me that the logic of women's subjection in civil society, exemplified by their loss of maternal authority and conjugal submission, can be only upheld by assuming a fundamental inequality between the genders. Hobbes's discussion of inheritance suggests that he is ambivalent about gender equality. While he on the one hand had refuted gender inequality on the other hand he depicted it as grounded in nature. Taking the example of the monarch, inheritance according to Hobbes is first the domain proper of a man's will. Thus he is free to bequeath his property and succession to whomever he wants. If there is no will inheritance is subject to custom, even 'if the Custome were to advance the Female' (Hobbes 1651/1997, p. 137). Where there is neither a will nor a custom Hobbes who had legitimised intergenerational commitments solely on the basis of self-interest referred to what he calls 'the presumption of natural affection' (ibid.), embodied in the blood ties explored in the previous chapter. Namely

it is to be understood ... that a Child of his own, Male, or Female, be preferred before any other; because men are presumed to be more inclined by nature, to advance their own children, than the children of other men; and of their own, rather a Male than a Female; because men are naturally fitter than women, for actions of labour and danger. Thirdly, where his own Issue faileth, rather a Brother than a stranger; and so still the neerer in bloud, rather than the more remote; because it is at alwayes presumed that the neerer of kin, is the neerer in affection; and 'tis evident that a man receives alwayes, by reflexion, the most honour from the greatnesse of his neerest kindred.

(Hobbes 1651/1997, ibid.)

To summarise Hobbes's position on intergenerational relationship I want to emphasise first his insistence that generational dominion is political power, which suggests that
family and state were not yet seen as fundamentally different spheres. Second Hobbes’s assumption of individual rationality and self-interest does not allow for any notion of care or interpersonal connection beyond pure self-interest in families and politics. There is no conception in Hobbes that for either mother or father there arise any duties from procreation itself. Neither is the tacit contract of an exchange of obedience for upbringing grounded on freedom: parents have the choice to bring up children or not but children do not have the choice not to pay obedience to those who raised them. Yet filial duty does not entail anything beyond obedience and loyalty (for example, the duty to materially support older parents). I propose that Hobbes’ notion of paternal dominion as political power serves to secure both political continuity and the commitment of fathers in their families while the day-to-day necessity of looking after older and younger family members is tacitly assumed to be done by women.

**Tacit intergenerational contracts as the expression of Natural Law**

Next I want to contrast Hobbes’s conception of an implicit contract between father and child with the conception of such a contract in the work of the influential German Natural Law theorist Samuel von Pufendorf (1632-1694). Pufendorf held that universal moral dictates are authored and commanded by the will of God, and not derived as Hobbes had argued through the social contract. Yet ‘the law of nature alone is not directly sufficient to preserve the social life of man, but it is necessary that in particular societies different kinds of authority also be established’ (Pufendorf 1672/1931, p. 273). The ‘imperfect’, i.e. only morally binding obligations of Natural Law, have to be turned into ‘perfect’, i.e. also legally binding obligations, by contractual consent. Thus Pufendorf, even though a Natural Law theorist, employed contract arguments to provide the motivation necessary for individuals to adhere to Natural Law.

The first example and foundation for the cultivation of social life is matrimony, ‘the nursery of the human race’, which is given by the law of nature. By assuming a seemingly natural inferiority of women, Pufendorf can make the entry of women in the hierarchical and ‘unequal’ conjugal contract more plausible.

Since the position of the husband is better inasmuch as he enjoys the superiority of his sex, that pact partakes of the nature of an *unequal league*, in which the
husband and wife each owe the other something, the former protection, the latter obedience.

(Pufendorf 1660/1927, p. 860, emphasis added)

Yet Pufendorf insisted that a woman, ‘inasmuch as she is his equal’ (Pufendorf 1672/1931, p. 275) needs to consent to follow her husband’s will, promise fidelity, fulfil her ‘connubial duty’ and do her share for her husband when she devotes her energies to ‘bringing forth and rearing children’. Pufendorf seems to be more explicit than Hobbes that the function of the conjugal contract from the point of view of the husband is to assure his corporeal fatherhood. At the same time sex is put in the service of reproduction, which thus requires and limits a man’s sexual access to his wife. As Pufendorf (ibid.) put it, the conjugal pact grants the husband the ‘right to his wife’s body only in so far as is sufficient to enable him to be certain with a degree of probability that his wife’s offspring have been procreated by him’.

Whereas marriage is grounded on an explicit contract between adults, intergenerational relations, even though they are likewise predetermined by Natural Law, have to be turned into a perfect obligation by a ‘tacit pact’ (Pufendorf 1660/1927, p. 914) because they concern minors. But whereas in Hobbes’s account natural affection is qualified as a ‘presumption’ and does not come into effect in the upbringing of children at all, Pufendorf argued that natural affection underlies the pact between father and child but has to be transformed into freely willed behaviour. Moreover, just as in the commercial contract, according to Pufendorf rights and duties arise for both parents and children ‘in an agreement reasonably presumed’ (Pufendorf 1672/1931, p. 281).

Aside from the fact that nature herself has enjoined upon the parents the care of the children, it has enjoined upon the children reverence towards parents, for the reason, that, in taking up the infant, the parent, indeed, declares that he will fulfil the obligation laid upon him by nature, and will bring it up well, as far as in him lies. Here, although the infant, because it does not know the use of reason, cannot expressly promise the reciprocal offices enjoined by nature; none the less, by the nature of the transaction, obligation towards the parent contracted in its own person, no less than if it had been contracted by an express agreement, manifests itself as soon as it can understand what the parent has done towards it.

(Pufendorf ibid., emphasis added)

Pufendorf followed Hobbes in holding that civil society is solely established by men, arguing (as Hobbes did not) that ‘as men are in due order the heads of the family, so
private authority over the children rests with the fathers’ (Pufendorf 1672/1931, p. 282). Even though he used the same contractual vocabulary of an implicit intergenerational pact, the focus has shifted from self-interested dominion to the justification of paternal authority and care. Like Hobbes Pufendorf runs into the problem that children cannot consciously enter into mutually advantageous contracts. Instead obligation is supposed to be contracted ‘in the body’ of the child before it can be confirmed by the act of will. Pufendorf posited reciprocity of rights and duties, yet by anchoring them in Natural Law parents do not have the freedom not to ‘take up’ their child, and consequently a child does not have the freedom not to pay reverence to her parents. Furthermore although Pufendorf names both parents as being responsible for childcare, reverence and obedience only falls onto the father who alone is able to exercise paternal authority.

Rights and duties in the three-generational contract

Pufendorf’s English contemporary John Locke (1632-1704) likewise conceived of intergenerational relations in terms of rights and duties, which are anchored in Natural Law embodying the will of God. Locke extended the complementary relation of rights and duties temporally over three subsequent generations in a family lineage and qualitatively included the children’s duty to materially support their parents if they are in need. Although he used a contractual vocabulary Locke refuted the assumption of an implicit contract between parents and child, which he argued serves to justify lifelong paternal dominion. For Locke the purpose of civil society is to secure individual property by law and intergenerational rights and duties are linked to the universal and natural laws of passing on property down the generational line.

The first and strongest desire God Planted in Men, and wrought into the very Principles of their Nature being that of Self-preservation. ... But next to this, God Planted in Men a strong desire also of propagating their Kind, and continuing themselves in their Posterity, and this gives Children a Title, to share in the Property of their Parents, and a Right to Inherit their Possessions.

(Locke 1698/1988, p. 224-25)

In Locke’s account the duty to ‘preserve’ one’s children is not innately grasped but is rather a duty embedded in law that has to be recognised and understood so that parents can act upon it. As in Pufendorf’s scheme rights and duties of parental care and filial reverence complement each other in the absence of the assumption of a freedom of
choice. Given their initial dependency children 'have by the appointment of God himself ...
... a Right to be nourish'd and maintained by their Parents' (Locke ibid.). According to Locke the right of care and education then is a privilege of children and an indispensable duty of parents. Reverence and gratitude, equal to what 'the Father's care, cost and kindness in [their] Education has been more or less' (Locke op. cit., p. 330) is the indispensable reciprocal duty of children and the privilege of parents. The term 'privilege' refers to the fact that these rights of care and reverence are not enforceable by law.

Paternal power to 'govern the Minority of their children' (Locke op. cit., p. 327) as long as the child does not 'have any Will of his own to follow' (Locke op. cit., p. 324) on the other hand is such a right. According to Locke it is derived from the parental duty of care, 'in which the Mother too has her share with the Father' (Locke op. cit., p. 328). But this authority is temporal and does not include the 'Dominion over the Property or Actions of his Son' (Locke op. cit., p. 334) past his minority including the right to vote for a particular commonwealth. Hence Locke's account marks the shift from the absolute power of the pater familias over his dependants to modern guardianship as his protection of minors (Chapter 1). For Locke paternal guardianship ends when the child reaches maturity; henceforth father and child are equally free. Locke (op. cit., p. 332) held that 'these two Powers, Political and Paternal, are so perfectly distinct and separate' because only political power is based on contractual consent. Whether the mother can be a guardian of her children, Locke argued, is subject to civil law.

The end of paternal guardianship and provisions does not, however, end filial debt. Because the parental duty to provide care and education to their own children is indispensable and property has to be passed on down the generational line, fathers cannot usually inherit the property of their sons. Thus indirectly the 'Score of Education received from a Man's Father, is paid by taking care, and providing for his own Children... unless present necessity of the Parents require a return of Goods for their necessary Support and Subsistence' (Locke op. cit., p. 225-26). From the fact that (only) when a child does not have any children of his own a father legitimately inherits his property Locke argues that it follows that children too have to directly provide for their parents in specific instances.
Material support of older parents is a specific incidence of their ‘perpetual Obligation of honouring their Parents’ (Locke op. cit. 329), if parents are in need and this duty can be reconciled with their primary duty to support their own children, which is ‘made by Nature preferable’ (ibid.).

Like Hobbes, Locke did not categorically rule out women’s owning property, providing education and obtaining parental power. But although he insisted that women have equal part in procreation and require equal honour and support from their children as is laid down in the Scriptures, he presents parental care as paternal care, and filial duty as an obligation of sons towards their fathers. His account of the conjugal contract in which it is ‘necessary that the last Determination, i.e. the Rule … naturally falls to the Man’s share, as the abler and the stronger’ (Locke op. cit., p. 337, emphasis added), suggest that in cases of dispute, paternal authority is decisive. Even though mothers are explicitly included in the duty to provide care, women are less fit to obtain maternal authority in their own right.

In Locke’s account intergenerational relations are thus explicitly relegated to the private realm, which is distinct from political society. Yet, as Makus (1996) has suggested these relations have a political relevance in so far as the property-lineage nexus is likely to ensure political continuity. Children of property owning parents can be assumed to have a vested interest in opting for the continuity of a society that guarantees them their parents’ inheritance. These relations are supposed to be based on Natural Law, acted upon by reason and rational deliberation and they are constituted as being reciprocal over time in a three-generation model. Thus while the family is (still) not one governed by sentiment and altruistic fulfilment of need, it has incorporated the contractual idea of equal exchange, of a quid pro quo. In this way the idea of self-interest is re-introduced into a moral scheme (in the pervasive guise of a Natural Law) without supposing – as the commercial contract would – a free negotiation of equal partners that brings legally enforceable rights into existence. In so far as Locke held that the relationship between parents and children is derived from conjugal relations in which authority is assigned to the husband on the basis of status and ability, women's parental ‘privileges’ remain subject to their husband’s authority.
Of habit and nature

The writings of the French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), sometimes considered as the last proponent of classical social contract theory, mark a somewhat ambivalent turning away from the Natural Law tradition. Rousseau was sceptical about the attempts of (contract) theorists to conceptualise Natural Law and their assumption that people in the state of nature were able to understand and act upon such a law. Whereas the recourse to Natural Law meant for Pufendorf and Locke that intergenerational relations were the same in the state of nature as in civil society, Rousseau considered a fundamental difference between intergenerational relations in the state of nature and in civil society.

In his account individuals in the state of nature are ‘equal stranger[s] to war and to all ties’ (Rousseau 1755/1997a, p. 79). Social and sexual bonds are not lasting and devoid of domination and sentiment. In terms of intergenerational commitments mothers take on responsibility for their children, evidence of their natural amour-propre, an enjoyment in breastfeeding them and their compassion once ‘habit had made them dear’ (Rousseau op. cit., p. 65) to them. Yet as soon as the children are old enough to provide for themselves they leave their mothers and would not recognise them if they meet again. With the development of sedentariness and property, Rousseau held, the family emerged as the ‘most ancient’ and the only ‘natural society’ (Rousseau 1761/1997c, p. 182), united by ‘liberty and reciprocal attachments’ (Rousseau 1755/1997a, p. 88).

The sexes, whose manner of life had been hitherto the same, began now to adopt different ways of living. The women became more sedentary, and accustomed themselves to mind the hut and their children, while the men went abroad in search of their common subsistence.

(Rousseau ibid.)

Similar to the gap I highlighted in Hobbes’s argument between the dominion of mothers in the state of nature and their subjection in civil society, Rousseau failed to explain why the family gave rise to feelings of ‘conjugal love and paternal affection’ as well as a gendered division of labour. However, once the existence of the family and gender difference is thus posited in the later stages of the state of nature, the logical foundation is
laid for the establishment of civil society as an expression of the general will of all men. Against Locke and Pufendorf Rousseau held that conjugal and paternal authority only come into being and can only exist in civil society. 'Instead of saying that civil society is derived from paternal authority, we ought to say rather that the latter derives its principal force from the former' (Rousseau op. cit., p. 103). Yet as demonstrated by his naturalising account of gender difference this insight is not taken to suggest that civil society has produced conjugal and paternal authority as inherently unequal relations.

Paternal authority is justified first by the necessity of 'one preponderant voice to decide' (ibid.) over family affairs and the 'natural' incapability of women to do so. Although the duty to nurture children naturally falls to the mother, 'however lightly we may regard the disadvantages peculiar to women, yet, as they necessarily occasion intervals of inaction, this is sufficient reason for excluding them from this supreme authority' (ibid.). More explicitly than any of the other classical contract theorists before him Rousseau elaborated sexual difference in terms of complementary gender characters that he sees as grounded in nature. Sexual difference is not presented as hierarchical but as a complementary distribution of faculties in men and women, which 'is the work not of prejudice but of reason' (Rousseau 1762/1979, p. 361). According to Rousseau the first assignable difference in the moral relation of the two sexes [is that] one ought to be active and strong, the other passive and weak ... Once this principle is established, it follows that woman is made specially to please man ... and to be subjugated.

(Rousseau 1762/1979, p. 358)

At the same time Rousseau argued that the stronger sex depends on the weaker and to fulfil his desire a man must please a woman so that 'she will consent to let him be the stronger' (Rousseau 1762/1979, p. 360). As Sarah Kofman (1992, p. 50) comments 'an elaborate feminine strategy is required to actualize his potentiality' and to re-introduce the notion of voluntary consent in women's subjugation that is realised in the conjugal pact. Marriage ensures fatherhood as well as paternal commitment that I interpret as a primary requirement of society, not merely of individuals. According to Rousseau, authority is assigned to the husband who is thus 'able to superintend his wife's conduct ... to be assured that the children, whom he is obliged to acknowledge and maintain, belong to no one but himself' (Rousseau 1758/1997b, p, 129). Paternal and conjugal
authority is thus not merely justified by women’s lesser capability but by the necessity of men to ensure and enact their corporeal fatherhood. Indeed the order of civil society depends chiefly on the faithfulness of women, as for Rousseau the unfaithful woman dissolves the family and breaks down all the bonds of nature. In giving the man children who are not his, she betrays both. She joins perfidy to infidelity. I have difficulty seeing what disorders and what crimes do not flow from this one.

(Rousseau 1762/1979, p. 361)

In civil society intergenerational relations are conceived of as a complementary reciprocal giving of parental care and guardianship and filial gratitude, albeit in a gender specific way. As in other classical accounts the grammatical gender suggests that the child is always taken to be a male child. Rousseau exemplified filial gratitude as the son’s duty to love his mother and to materially support his father. Yet, because it is not based on contract gratitude is merely a moral duty ‘which ought to be paid, but not a right to be exacted’ (Rousseau 1755/1997a, p. 103). Parental responsibilities are strictly divided between maternal care and paternal authority. With recourse to Locke, yet contrary to Locke’s insistence that paternal guardianship is subject to civil law, Rousseau held that ‘by the law of nature, the father is the child’s master’ (ibid.) and that the duties of his temporally limited guardianship ‘are dictated to him by natural feelings’ (1758/1997b, p. 129). The mother, according to Rousseau, physically nurtures, cares and educates the child and also has to foster ‘his’ love and respect from an early age: ‘The child ought to love his mother before knowing that he ought to. If the voice of blood is not strengthened by habit and care, it is extinguished in the first years’ (Rousseau 1762/1979, p. 46-7, emphasis added). Even though gratitude is merely a moral duty, if a child does not reciprocate kindness and respect Rousseau exclaimed that ‘one should hasten to strangle this wretch as a monster unworthy of seeing the light of day’ (Rousseau 1979, p. 38).

From a contemporary point of view it is not difficult to identify Rousseau’s recourse to nature as a way of justifying gender difference as inequality that results in women’s confinement in the private sphere and their exclusion from the social contract. As Kofman (op. cit., p. 53) has argued ‘under the pretext of giving back Nature her suppressed voice and of defending Nature’s end, what is really being advocated, as always, are the phallocratic ends of men’. At the same time I have argued that Rousseau
was aware that 'natural' family feelings and duties have to be 'institutionalised' in individuals. Thus women have to be educated to care for men, husbands have to 'superintend' their wives' conduct and children have to be taught to love their mothers. Gendered intergenerational relationships and fatherhood in particular have to be established for the orderliness of a gender-segregated civil society. Kofinan has pointed to the fact that Rousseau himself has acknowledged the structuring force of institutions in some of his supposedly minor texts. 'Let us give women their due: the cause of their disorder is less in themselves than in our faulty institutions' (Rousseau, *Entretien sur les romans* as quoted in Kofinan op. cit., p. 47).

**Perfect and imperfect duties**

In his moral and political theory the German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) put the status of intergenerational relationships on a fundamentally new legitimating basis. Rights and duties are based neither on Natural Law nor on God's will, nor on individual self-interest but derived from the self-legislative power of practical reason. Arguing that human reason can only assign validity to rules and norms that stem from its own lawgiving, Kant sought to establish *a priori* principles and ideas of reason.

For Kant, the 'categorical imperative' is the metaphysical principle of morality. It is a generalising principle and formal rule of procedure that puts the individual in the role of a lawgiver. In one of its formulations, the categorical imperative reads: 'Act only on a maxim by which you can will that it, at the same time, should become a general law.' Freedom, that is, the autonomy of the individual, is considered both to justify and be justified by the categorical imperative. This idea is extended in the social contract, a rational principle that seeks to establish the rightfulness of public laws. The social contract, Kant wrote

> is in fact merely an *idea* of reason, which nonetheless has undoubted practical reality; for it can oblige every legislator to frame his laws in such a way that they could have been produced by the united will of the whole nation, and to regard each subject, in so far as he can claim citizenship, as if he had consented within the general will. This is the test of the rightfulness of every public law.  

(Kant 1792/1997, p. 79)

According to Kant laws first make an action a duty and, second, can make duty the
incentive for the action. In the *Metaphysics of Morals* he distinguished two kinds of lawgiving, ethical and juridical lawgiving. Ethical lawgiving ‘makes an action a duty and also makes this duty the incentive’ whereas juridical lawgiving likewise makes an action a duty but ‘admits incentives other than the idea of duty itself’ (Kant 1797/1996, p. 20). Kant drew the conclusion that juridical lawgiving creates only ‘external duties’, which he calls ‘duties of right’. Ethical lawgiving encompasses also ‘internal duties’, or ‘duties of virtue’ (Kant op. cit., p. 21). To keep a promise made in a contract, for example, is a duty of right, enforceable by law. Keeping promises where no coercion can be applied is a duty of virtue. Kant distinguished thus the political ‘doctrine of rights’, i.e. *perfect duties* which are regulated by law and evidence of the principle of outer freedom from the ‘doctrine of virtues’, i.e. *imperfect duties* which are regulated merely by self-constraint and evidence of the principle of inner freedom. Individuals prove their freedom when they freely adopt the duties imposed on them by their own rationality.

Intergenerational relations in the Kantian scheme are regulated both by duties of virtue and duties of right, and they include innate rights and acquired rights. In the state of nature every willing subject is free to ‘follow(s) its own judgement’ and insofar as there is no supreme authority to judge the merits of the case when rights are in dispute this condition is ‘devoid of justice’ (Kant op. cit., p. 90). The conception of *rights* regulating the ‘relations of persons in the domestic condition’ (Kant op. cit., p. 61) he argues is a product of the social contract, that is they are derived from ‘the particular wills of each’ active property-holding male citizen. Women and dependent men remain principally excluded from the right to vote in the original contract on the grounds that *active citizenship* requires self-dependence. Despite his unprecedented emphasis on the freedom of the will Kant discussed conjugal and parental rights in civil society under the rubric of the *acquisition of another person’s status* which is more reminiscent to the repertoire of the status contract (Chapter 1) than commercial exchange. ‘A man acquires a wife, a couple acquires children’ (Kant ibid.), that is he or they acquire the right to make arrangements for them. In Kant’s conception these acts are ‘rights to persons akin to rights to things’ in that they allow and necessitate the possession of a person as a thing
and his or her use as a person.

Similarly to Locke Kant maintained that children, who as persons are endowed with freedom, have ‘by the law of humanity’ an innate right to the care of their parents until they are able to look after themselves. According to Kant this right is not acquired by a (quasi)-contractual relation because the child is brought in the world without her consent on the initiative of her parents. For this deed ‘the parents incur an obligation to make the child content with his condition so far as they can’ (Kant op. cit., p. 64). At the same time this obligation limits parental freedom to destroy or abandon their child. Thus people have the choice to have sexual relations for which Kant argued they must enter indissoluble matrimony where the (sexual) acquisition of the partner as a thing is counteracted and restored in the mutuality of the act and life-long commitment. But from the standpoint of practical reason they do not have a choice not to bring up their children.

The parental duty ‘to manage and develop the child’ (Kant op. cit., p. 65) includes the duty to provide education. It includes the same right to a person akin to a right in the thing in respect to a child as spouses have to one another, namely a right of ‘taking control of them and impounding them as things’ (ibid.). With the emancipation of the child, however, the father not only renounces his right of guardianship but also any claim for compensation of his efforts. Again we can assume that Kant talks about the male child. The tutelage of wives ‘based only on the natural superiority of the husband’ (Kant op. cit., p. 63) on the other hand does not contradict the alleged mutuality in conjugal rights and is indissoluble.

Whereas parental rights are conceived as duties of rights, derived from the will of all men, the filial duty of gratitude is a duty of virtue. For Kant, the fulfilment of imperfect duties of virtues is merit and their transgression not culpability but deficiency in moral worth. The duty of gratitude consists in the duty to honour the benefactor and can include ‘active’ and ‘affective’ gratitude (Kant op. cit., p. 203). Gratitude is always temporally unlimited because the child can never redeem the debt of being raised and educated as

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6 The term acquisition is derived from Roman contract law and this discursive frame has been criticised as a ‘fusion of Roman dominion, absolute property, with modern subjective rights’ in a usurpatory notion of
moral superiority according to Kant always remains with the first benefactor, the parent. Furthermore, filial duty cannot include the duty to love as love 'is a matter of feeling, not of willing ... so a duty to love is an absurdity' (Kant op. cit., p. 161).

Kant continues the line of thinking of Rousseau on a new justifying basis when he distinguishes filial and parental duties as being based on different forms of self-legislation. Parental duties to raise the child are perfect duties and include and rest on the authority of the father. They are temporarily limited and derived from a doctrine of rights and thus can include other incentives than duty itself and are enforceable by law. Filial duties on the other hand are imperfect duties and temporally unlimited. They are derived from a doctrine of virtues, which have gratitude as an incentive and are directly dependent on a person's free will. We can assume that filial care for older frail relatives is not considered to be a duty of right because contrary to conjugal and parental duties, which are 'acquired rights' care needs of older family members cannot be logically derived from an act of the child. Yet the continuing significance of conjugal and paternal authority is expressed in the husband's and father's right of 'acquisition'.

'Generational contracts' in the philosophical imagination of classical contract theorists

The preceding exploration of the status of intergenerational relations in the accounts of classical social contract theorists has shown that intergenerational commitments were solely considered within family lineages constituted by heterosexual reproduction in matrimony. This cultural interpretation of the family as an 'intimate association based on matrimony' (Kaufmann 1990, p. 148) shapes western thinking to the present day. In various ways theorists justified the idea that parents must raise and guide children and children ought to obey them and express gratitude because paternal authority and generational order is vital for the stability and continuity of civil society. Because social contract theories were established against the claims of classical patriarchists that patriarchal rule is derived from the status of the father as a prime genitor, they did not merely draw on status relationships or on natural solidarity derived from blood ties. Obligations derived from status or force are always at risk of being overthrown.

freedom (Rose 1984, as quoted in Caygill 1995, p. 46).
Instead classical contract theorists used a contractual vocabulary of rights and duties between parents and children and rationalised the idea of intergenerational solidarity, although they did not deploy the term ‘generational contract’. By applying the dominant repertoire of contract (Chapter 1), however, I have shown that (with the exception of Hobbes) although assuming the self-responsibility of individual members of different generations and the equality of generations the authors did not directly refer to self-regarding rationality and the free bargaining power of parents and children to make mutually advantageous agreements. For natural law theorists such as Pufendorf and Locke obligations are pre-determined in nature, for Kant they were established through the practice of procreation. Even Hobbes’s conception of generational dominion based on self-interest does not assume contractual freedom. According to Hobbes children owe their life to the parents and are always rationally obliged to pay obedience.

Because of the initial dependency of infants and the involuntariness of their entering these relationships, intergenerational relationships are asymmetrical. I suggest that the persuasive power of the contractual language of rights and duties rests first on the presumption of reciprocity and second on the assumption that intergenerational commitments are freely willed. Reciprocity works by presupposing that the commitments or duties exchanged between parents and children, such as obedience for protection, reverence for education or care given (down the generational line) for care previously received, are somehow equal to one another or equal over time. This, however, is not the case. Because children are born helpless there is always a power differential between filial and parental commitments, which is further highlighted by the fact that women were (with the exception of Locke) categorically excluded from parental authority in civil society but not from filial reverence (which cannot be enforced by law). A consequence of the assumption of reciprocity and equality is that individuals are considered to freely assume these duties. This is well illustrated by theorists like Pufendorf and Locke who, although they assumed that duties are given by the Law of Nature, held that individuals have to recognise rationally duties and rights for them to become ultimately binding ‘voluntary’ commitments.
Furthermore I argue that whether derived from implicit contract, Natural Law or reason, classical social contract theorists used a contractual language to establish fatherhood as an attractive domain for adult (property-owning) men to engage in. Dominion, the inheritance of property and the acquisition of another person's status were deemed necessary for the continuity of civil society. Fatherhood ensured men (as a prerequisite and by-product of procreation) sexual control of and authority over their wives in supposedly consensual marriage contracts as well as obedience, reverence and in the accounts of Locke and Rousseau also material support by their children. Insofar as inheritance was linked to lineage it also ensured fathers the prospect of 'continuing themselves in their posterity'. This line of argumentation is different from Pateman's assumption that men necessarily 'desired' to engage in conjugal contracts, subjugate women and exercise conjugal and paternal power. Being themselves divorced from family caring responsibilities the theorists tacitly (in the case of Pufendorf, Locke and Rousseau explicitly) assumed that the day-to-day responsibilities to provide for younger and older family members are fulfilled by women as wives and daughter-in-laws, whilst honour and power are assigned to their husbands.

From a historical perspective the analysis has shown that – in line with the actual development of German law (Chapter 1.2.) – the absolute power of the father is limited from being 'the Sovereign' in 'a little Monarchy' (Hobbes 1651/1997, p. 142) to a temporary guardian whose paternal power is 'privatised'. Whereas property and citizenship rights always exceeded the 'private' domain, boundaries were drawn between the public and the private realm. The term 'private' originally denoted the absence of political power (Frankenberg 1996). More emphasis was given to the 'perfect' duty of parental authority that is enforceable by civil law than to the 'imperfect' duty of filial gratitude. Filial and parental duties increasingly appeared as different registers, the former of the nature of 'ought' the latter as a 'must'. Children ought to care for their parents but parents do not have a right to exact this. Here the social policy of the German welfare state will show a different state of affairs (Chapter 3). That the authority over children just as conjugal authority in civil society falls to the father and not the mother, on the other hand (with the exception of Locke), remained a historical constant, viewed ambivalently as a superiority by nature and convention. The alleged inferiority of women
and the insistence of their equality before the law always has to be seen in the context of her reproductive 'potential' and fears that the disorderly and unfaithful woman could mislead men as to their paternal status and threaten political continuity. I will now turn to the exploration of intergenerational responsibilities in neo-contractarian theories.

2.4. INTERGENERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES AND JUSTICE IN CONTEMPORARY CONTRACT THEORIES

The 'just saving principle' as the embodiment of intergenerational justice

The philosopher John Rawls tackles the issue of justice between contemporary and non-contemporaneous generations in his conceptual framework of justice as fairness that draws on Kant's conception of the social contract as a regulative idea. His idea of 'procedural justice' (Rawls 1973, p. 136) is based on the autonomy and rationality of self-interested individuals who agree on principles of distributive justice that regulate social cooperation in a 'just' society. These principles provide a basis to assign rights and duties and regulate social cooperation over time. To ensure an impartial choice Rawls constructs an ideal universal choice situation ('original position') in which all power relations are eliminated and individuals are situated behind a 'veil of ignorance'. Individuals are postulated to be mutually disinterested and denied all knowledge of their personal attributes such as class, ability, generation and fortune as well as of the characteristics of their society such as its level of economic wealth, civilisation and culture. But they know that these conditions and differential positionings as well as 'ties of sentiment and affection' (Rawls op. cit., p. 129) between individuals hold outside the veil of ignorance.7

The principles of justice chosen concern the distribution of 'primary social goods', such as rights, opportunities and income. They reflect a fundamental distinction and lexical ordering of basic liberties and socio-economic distribution of wealth such that restrictions of liberties cannot be legitimised by an increase in socio-economic wealth. Rawls's

7 In fact, as the same conditions in the original position apply at all times and individuals are considered equally rational and situated 'we can view the choice in the original position from the standpoint of one person selected at random' (Rawls 1973, p.139).
principle of equal liberty states that ‘each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for all’ (Rawls op. cit., p. 60). The principle regulating social and economic distribution is constrained by the principle of equal opportunity and the ‘difference principle’, which specifies that better expectations of the well-off can only be justified if they give an advantage to the position of the least well-off. It postulates that ‘social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality and opportunity’ (Rawls op. cit., p. 83).

One of the questions that interests Rawls is how a fair agreement on the proper distributive shares can be attained over time between temporally removed generations, given that to maintain a realistic perspective, the parties in the original position are contemporaries. In this case a contractual agreement is constrained by the fact that present generations can make their successors worse or better off, but the successors cannot help or harm their predecessors. With respect to an ideal choice situation Rawls (op. cit., p. 128) suggests the inclusion of a ‘motivational assumption’ of the parties in the original position according to which ‘their goodwill stretches over at least two generations’ to come. This motivational assumption draws on the dominant repertoire of generation (Chapter 1.4.). We must, Rawls writes, ‘think of the parties as heads of family, and therefore as having a desire to further the welfare of their nearest descendants’ (ibid.), just ‘as fathers say care for their sons’ (Rawls op. cit., p. 288). Such a motivational assumption will then rule out the possibility that contemporaries in the original position disregard the interest of succeeding generations. Choosing the principle of equal liberty, for example, includes the liberties of their descendants through the motivational assumption of ‘paternal’ concern.

Feminist theorists have rightly argued that in assuming that the parties in the original position are heads of families Rawls has reintroduced sexual relations in the initial state of equality and assumed that the family is a just institution (Pateman 1988, 1989; Okin 1989). Moreover in positing that the rational deliberator has a paternal motivation to care for his son Rawls draws on the existence of natural affection that for his predecessors had
been highly doubtful. Whereas classical contract theorists were aware that paternal concern had to be institutionalised by the conception of rational rights and duties, Rawls draws on paternal care as an ahistorical constant and grounds his rational account on a feeling-state. As Brian Barry (1989) has rightly argued, this would make the welfare of future generations dependent on the degree of goodwill of the contemporaries.

Regarding the principles of intergenerational justice thus chosen Rawls suggests that the parties in the original position would agree on a 'just saving principle' (Rawls op. cit., p. 285). The underlying idea of the saving principle is that to promote the full realisation of just institutions 'each generation must not only preserve the gains of culture and civilization, and maintain intact those just institutions that have been established, but it must also put aside in each period of time a suitable amount of real capital accumulation' (ibid.). Drawing on the Lockian three-generation model these investments or savings are to be passed on to the next generation in return for what had been received from the previous generation under the assumption that other generations save at the same rate over the whole span of accumulation. It is the task of the parties in the original position to piece together a just savings schedule by balancing how much at each stage they would be willing to save for their immediate descendants against what they would feel entitled to claim of their immediate predecessors. Thus imagining themselves to be fathers, say, they are to ascertain how much they should set aside for their sons by noting what they would believe themselves entitled to claim of their fathers. When they arrive at an estimate that seems fair from both sides, with due allowance made for the improvements in their circumstances, then the fair rate (or range of rates) is specified. Now once this is done for all stages, we have defined the just saving principle.

(Rawls op. cit., p. 289)

The problem Rawls encounters with this saving scheme is that the first generation would save without receiving benefits because there is no way for later generations to improve the situation of their predecessors. This, however, is prohibited by the difference principle according to which better expectations of the well-off members can only be justified if they advance the position of the least well-off. Rawls tries to accommodate the interests of the least well-off in any one generation by assuming that the just saving principle is always defined from the standpoint of the least advantaged in each generation. 'In any generation their expectations are to be maximized subject to the
condition of putting aside the savings that would be acknowledged’ (Rawls op. cit., p. 292).

In terms of the metaphor of the generational contract Rawls’s conception suggest that the generational contract is quite literally a social contract whose contracting parties are conceived as members of different societal generations and take intergenerational justice into account by virtue of acting as fathers. Yet, the motivational assumption of paternal care is taken to justify a rational formula on the distribution of ‘primary social goods’. The distribution and justification of intergenerational responsibilities of support with which classical contract theorists have taken issue (even though its day-to-day practices were always assumed to be taken on by women) falls outside the discursive frame of procedural justice. Issues of justice such as environmental pollution, disposal of nuclear waste or the destruction of species also fall outside of the frame of a just saving scheme based on natural affection. As Barry (op. cit., p. 193) has argued the consequences of environmental degradation could be neutral in the short-term but disastrous for generations remote in time. If care for the welfare of successors only extends over two generations there would be no injustice in profiting from such actions.

But even within the economic framework, in which family work is not counted as productive, Rawls encounters some logical problems. According to Rawls, generations removed in time practically cannot enter the original position at the same times, so that strictly speaking, Barry (op. cit., p. 192) argues, Rawls develops not justice between generations but ‘justice with respect to future generations’. An inclusion of all people who will ever live poses the problem that who will live depends on the principles of justice chosen. Consequently the principles of justice paradoxically would have to be already chosen. Including all people who ever could live, on the other hand would mean choosing principles of justice to advance the welfare of people, most of whom will never live. Barry holds that Rawls’s insistence on the contemporaneity of the parties is therefore not merely a practical consideration but necessary to the presentation of the deliberations in the original position as mutually advantageous.

Rawls’ dilemma is that because successor generations cannot affect their predecessors,
justice between non-contemporaneous generations cannot be mutually advantageous. The interval of time precludes any possibility of interdependence or reciprocity between non-contemporaneous generations. A limitation of the difference principle on the other hand, which is prohibited among contemporaries, ultimately justifies the implication that poor generations must make themselves poorer to make others richer. Thus Barry argues that self-interested and mutually advantageous choices that are generally considered to secure consistent rational moral choices in contract theories can not be the sole basis of securing justice between temporally removed generations.

**Tricontact and intracohort trust**

Whereas Rawl’s just saving rate attempts to hold for both contemporary and non-contemporary generations Peter Laslett (1992) has suggested that the distributive mechanisms in both cases are based on different foundations. Laslett proposed to distinguish what he calls ‘intergenerational tricontact’ from ‘intragenerational intercohort trust’, although they are not completely theoretically distinct. He defines a generation as an *assemblage of coevals*. Contemporaries are thus the ensemble of different birth cohorts living at any one time. Cohorts form different age groups at any one time, which by drawing on the repertoire of generation are conventionally marshalled into a dependent ‘child generation’, an economically active ‘parental generation’ and an economically dependent ‘grandparental generation’ (Laslett op. cit., p. 30-31). Thus a generation is at the same time an assemblage of coevals and of three mayor age groups. Whereas intercohort trust regulates relations within such an assemblage of coevals, the tricontact potentially regulates relations between temporally removed groups of coevals.

Similarly to the just saving rate the intergenerational tricontact gives expression to the conviction that ‘each generational entity must deliver the world to its successors in the condition in which it was received’ (Laslett op. cit., p. 29) and, if possible, improve it. But unlike Rawls who insisted that rights and duties agreed upon in the social contract do not presuppose any conception of the good, Laslett exactly starts from this premise. The principle regulating transfers in the tricontact is likewise mapped onto Locke’s three-generation model. Each of the three (non-contemporaneous) generations are conceived of having rights and duties which according to Laslett have a *temporal* dimension: ‘duties
point always forward in time and downward in the procreative succession... and rights
point always in the opposite direction' (Laslett op. cit., p. 37). Thus the rights that a
generation $x$, or more precisely all members of this generation, have in their predecessors
are met by the duties they perform for their successors.

By implication ‘any duties [that members of the generation $x$ have] to those anterior to
them, or any rights in those posterior to them’ (Laslett op. cit., p. 31) are excluded in the
tricontract. This includes moral duties to take responsibilities for past wrong doings of
their predecessors. Such moral liability of succeeding generations, according to Laslett, is
necessarily vague because it is not clear how far it stretches out in historical time and
place. Instead reparations and redistribution following, for example, dispossession and
racial discrimination must be sought in a political dialogue of the groups concerned on
the basis of historical knowledge. In other words these duties have to be negotiated
among contemporaries. Individuals under the tricontract are, however, morally obliged to
their contemporaries and future removed generations for actions taken during their
lifetime. Thus if predecessors have failed to do their share in maintaining, e.g., the
environment, members of generation $x$ are still obliged to better the damage if they can or
at least not to worsen it.

The intragenerational intercohort trust refers to the rights and duties subsisting between
cohorts, age groups and other collective institutions including the state, which share the
same time space. These rights and duties regard the distribution of ‘social goods’ and are
characterised by a trust relationship between cohorts, which characterises contemporary
welfare states (see also Thomson 1992). Whilst the trust remains constant, the terms of
the distribution may change over time. Intercohort trust regulates welfare flows ‘upward in
the generational order’, such as transfers regulated by pay-as-you-go pensions given by
the economically ‘active’ parental to the ‘inactive’ grandparental generation. Thus it
seems that among contemporaries, as Locke has suggested, duties can point upward in
the procreative succession. In the absence of the ‘quid pro quo character intrinsic to
contract’ (Laslett op. cit., p. 33) Laslett, however, insists on using the term trust.

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8 This is different from Locke’s model where duties down the generational line (to one’s children) did not
cancel out duties up the line (to one’s parents).
Intracohort trust is not a contract. Contributions are not made as a repayment for benefits received earlier (as in Locke's scheme), but given in advance in the expectation that succeeding cohorts will do the same. While in the intergenerational tricontract a generation is already indebted by having received benefits from the previous generation, the maxim of the intercohort trust in its institutionalised form is thus 'What you give to your father your son will give to you one day' (Schultheis 1993, p. 431).

According to Laslett the state that is part of the trust relationship can be conceived of as a trustee that legislates and administers a trust fund in so far as the social goods to be redistributed are derived from taxation. In the case of pension transfer, contributions of the trustors, i.e. those in regular employment, are managed to the advantage of the beneficiaries, i.e. those retired. Problems arising from the "'greying' of the welfare state' (Johnson et al. 1989, p. 1), that is the shifting balanced between contributors and beneficiaries that allegedly leads to a competition over resource allocation, in terms of intracohort trust can be conceived of as a mismanagement by the trustee, the state. As Laslett puts it (op. cit., p. 35), 'the trustees have failed to levy from the cohorts in possession of wealth and to put aside the resources necessary to even out the flow of transfers in the face of anticipated demographic vicissitudes'.

As in Rawls' just saving scheme, in Laslett's conception neither the tricontract nor the intercohort trust can be conceived of as a mutually advantageous contract. Generations cannot influence their (non-contemporaneous) predecessors and they cannot force their (contemporary and non-contemporary) successors to adhere to a redistributive mechanism they designed that is based on trust not investment. And as in Rawls the redistributive mechanism has an unquestioned gendered basis in so far as both practice and distribution of unpaid work is ignored. Importantly Laslett suggests that the so-called 'welfare contract' according to which 'people pay contributions during the productive phases in their life cycle, and draw benefits during childhood, in periods of sickness, and after retirement' (Johnson et al. op. cit., p. 5-6) is not a contract at all. This redistributive

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9 Norman Daniels has suggested applying a modified Rawlsian choice situation in order to design a fair allocation of scarce resources behind a 'veil of ignorance'. In his 'prudential lifespan account' Daniels (1988) argues for an institutionalised prudent allocation of resources over the life course. A prudent saving
gendered mechanism that is neither a contract nor insurance in Germany is called the generational contract. Because it remains always taken for granted and is not taken to be ‘productive work’, women’s work within families and their unpaid contributions to welfare always remains outside of the dominant framework of justice between generations.

2.5. CONCLUSION

The aim of this chapter was to explore how social contracts theories inform the understanding of how the concepts of contract and generation are related to one another in the concept of the generational contract. This exploration was motivated by my assumption that those modes of justification provide important cultural repertoires in western societies in and against which individuals and groups articulate their legitimate demands, anticipations and evaluation of (familial) welfare provision and thus need to be decomposed to highlight processes of naming and framing. By applying the repertoire of generation outlined in the previous chapter I have shown that there is no one ‘generational contract’, because the concept of generation in social contract theories is taken to refer to family lineages, coevals and contemporaries. Moreover, the application of the repertoire of contract as a reciprocal cooperative device serving mutual advantage has shown that strictly speaking there are no generational contracts at all. To be fair neither classical nor neo-contractarian theorists have used this exact term. But a number of them have used the idea that members of ‘generations’ are parties who enter a (hypothetical) contract of cooperation.

Classical theorists have referred to generations defined by the genealogical grid of decent and gender based on marriage contracts. The language of generational rights and duties is a prevailing theme in these theories because it justifies paternal authority by referring to reciprocity, rational deliberation and freely willed commitments. At the same time the theorists ruled out absolute freedom, self-regarding rationality and excluded the issue of family care practices and gender power differentials. Thus in the context of scheme would allow for differential treatment by age, as this would be consistent with equality of opportunity in the sense of equal treatment of persons over time.
intergenerational relationships contract works as an inter-textual operator that, while associating freedom and equality with filial rights and duties, rules out freedom and equality. Solidarity is ambivalently viewed as given in blood and grounded in (freely chosen) human practice.

None of the modes of justifications presented above has remained uncriticised. The foundation of intergenerational commitments in an implicit ‘procreative contract’ (Laslett 1992, p. 29) between father and children has been disputed since Kant on the basis that children do not give their consent to be born. Similarly, Norman Daniels (1988, p. 29) has argued that their need for care ‘cannot be the sole basis for claiming that they have ‘implicitly consented’ to being bound by the duty to care for their parents’. Nor is it conceivable ‘that a child would justify a claim to that [parental] generosity on the grounds that if parents denied that claim they would forfeit the right to support later on’ (Laslett op. cit., p. 29). Grounding generational obligations in Natural Law has been denounced as arbitrary: according to Jeremy Bentham’s famous dictum positive law can give rise to positive rights but Natural Law can only give rise to imaginary rights. Deriving filial obligations from the imperfect duties of gratitude derived from practical reason fails to hold as a clear-cut prescription. Daniels (ibid.) has argued that a duty to do good things for somebody generally does not incur the obligation to return an equivalent good. An appeal to the principle of reciprocity has to presuppose that goods are given as favours, but raising a child is more than a mere favour. Furthermore, as parental support in old age may be strenuous for the adult child, it exceeds what can be generally expected from the duty of beneficence. Help that requires considerable personal sacrifices is regarded as admirable but not obligatory.

Although there are thus no compelling philosophically principled justifications of intergenerational commitments the idea that parents must raise their children and that children ought to be grateful and that this relation is symmetrical, reciprocal and rationally willed and grounded in nature appears as a socio-symbolical system of tremendous cultural force. This can be shown, for example, in the argument of the German conservative minister of family affairs Würmeling (1956) who argued that the ‘arch-responsibility’ of education and upbringing of children is a good enough reason to
justify the claim that children have a duty to care for their parents. For the family therapist Boszormenyi-Nagy, cited in the introduction, these modes of justification were 'natural' and indisputable facts.

Moreover, the idea that filial obligations (downwards and upwards the generational line) are a corollary to parental duties and their interchanges symmetrical over time is an important metaphorical basis onto which intergenerational relationships between cohorts and age groups in society at large are mapped. This is shown in contemporary social contract theories where the intuitive idea is that just as the modern state is founded on a hypothetical agreement of all members of society, the redistributive mechanism of the welfare state is based on a hypothetical agreement of different generations or cohorts. Rawls conception of the just saving rate shows how, in order to conceptualise justice over time, the theorist has to turn to a rationale outside of his rational contract framework, drawing paradoxically on the notion of intergenerational solidarity given by blood ties, which classical theorists have rejected as the sole basis of commitment.

Thus even if lineage and cohort contracts were to work logically in the way they claim to, familial and societal generational contracts never could be considered as complementary because they are grounded on different foundations: one assumes what the other denies. As such generational contracts appear to be both grounded in nature and rationally willed. Apart from evoking freedom and reciprocity, one of the persuasive characteristics of a 'generational contract' in contemporary debates about resource competition is that the generational perspective identifies different generations in the sense of age groups as actors in the competition. Peter Laslett has rightly pointed to the role of the state as an important 'actor' in designing the redistributive mechanism of the welfare state. At the same time his emphasis on institutions reinforces a public/private divide that once again 'forgets' the institution of the family. That neo-contractarians continue to use the language of father and son relationships is not accidental. Women reappear, however, in contemporary social policy debates in Germany about the generational contract 'at risk', which I shall explore in the following chapter.
Chapter 3

GENERATIONAL POLITICS AND DISCOURSES IN THE GERMAN WELFARE STATE

3.1. INTRODUCTION

The following chapter explores in a historical perspective the institutionalisation of policies and discourses that have framed intergenerational relations in the German welfare state as well as producing and maintaining particular ‘gender regimes’ (Orloff 1993). To what extent and by what means has the cohesion between generations conjured up in the philosophical master narratives been institutionalised in Germany? A recapitulation of these forms of institutionalisation is necessary in order to critically evaluate political recommendations of new forms of (intergenerational) solidarity (Kaufmann 1990, p. 149; Busek 1997). Using the repertoires of contract and generation as well as gender as an heuristic tool, the chapter focuses first on some of the policies and legislation adopted, and second, particularly with respect to the post-WWII welfare state, on the rhetoric of the generational contract, in which they were framed. The chapter thereby provides a socio-political background for the subsequent empirical study of two contemporary family generations in two culturally contrasting regions in West Germany. Furthermore, ithistoricizes the idea of social solidarity, which underwrites the notion of the generational contract, whose normative implications I explored in the previous chapter. Particular emphasis is given to its changing imagery and connotations in 20th century social policy discourse. After the introduction of pay-as-you-go pensions in the mid1950s the generational contract was the cipher par excellence for the embodiment of social solidarity. Only recently has the morally charged metaphor of the generational contract come to stand for fraud and immorality.
German sociologists have suggested distinguishing collective intergenerational relations regulated by social institutions (‘Generationenverhältnisse’) from potentially observable social interactions between members of different generations in a family lineage (‘Generationenbeziehungen’) (Leisering 1992 as quoted in Kaufmann 1993). Informed by the contemporary feminist critique of distinct ‘welfare state regimes’, I will focus on the ways in which policies have regulated what has been constructed as public and private intergenerational relations. A persuasive tale in western societies is that with the emergence of the modern welfare state at the turn of the century a shift occurred from private provision in the household and in the market to public provision (Thomson 1991). In the context of rising public expenditure and the identification of the public sector with waste and inefficiency the opposite trend towards privatisation is seen. However, more recent enquiries into the history of welfare point to a complex mix of public/private welfare production throughout the history of welfare states (Conrad 1996) as well as highlighting the role of families and households. The production of welfare then is conceived as a multi-level process that involves the state, the market, the welfare sector and the individual/household.

Conceptions of welfare are contested and changing, and the categories of ‘public’ and ‘private’ are socially contingent. In the context of welfare provision public and private have different connotations referring to distinct loci of welfare responsibility and organisation.\(^\text{10}\) Still, most issues cut across public/private boundaries and the distinction itself changes with the location of the interpreter (Twigg 1999). From the point of view of the government, private refers to nongovernmental organisations: churches, charities, associations, firms etc., whereas from the point of view of the individual only family and household are private, market and services are considered to be public (Conrad 1996). Income from savings, rent and earnings can be seen as private as well as public and much of the ‘welfare sector’ is currently private provision and public finance.

\(^{10}\) According to Frankenberg (1996, p. 76-77) criteria of public and private responsibility refer to (i) the agent who expresses public concern (public institutions vs. private associations); (ii) the resources used to finance it (taxes, governmental infrastructure, municipal services vs. private savings, charity or self-organised
In view of these changing connotation of public and private, social historians have advocated a de-centring and breaking down of the common dichotomies of public and private, family and state to make the heterogeneity and interrelations of welfare provision visible. Social welfare can then be conceived of as a ‘problem formula of public communication ... that refers to the mediation between particular forms of life style and the state or the development perspectives of a polity’ (Kaufmann 1994, p. 364). A focus on the interrelations between public and private intergenerational relations highlights not only the embeddedness of public policies in their social milieu but also impacts on the conceptualisation of the welfare state itself. As Katz and Sachße (1996, p. 10) have suggested, restructuring the welfare state would essentially mean ‘to renegotiate the boundaries of public and private and reconsider their meaning’.

The standard genealogy according to which the German welfare state originates in the Bismarckian social legislation at the end of the last century has been challenged by Dorwart (1971) who takes the regulating and policing power of the state to promote ‘welfare’ as the defining criteria of the welfare state. On this basis he distinguishes three stages of welfare state development in the German speaking territories over the past 500 years. The first stage of the paternalist Policeystaat began in the later Middle Ages and continued into the 18th century. It was influenced by secularisation and Enlightenment philosophy of good government. The second stage is characterised by 19th century political democracy and liberalism. In the phase of liberal reform and a new self-regulating (self-policing) civil society, paternalistic state intervention was rejected and groups that were excluded from national political power began to self-assert their interest (Rosenhaft 1994). The third stage of the modern welfare state started with the social insurance legislation of Bismarck but obtained its characteristic form in the 20th century. Feminist scholars have identified this form as a gendered and racially structured two-tiered system of (male) wage earner entitlements based on labour market participation and (female) means-tested social assistance (Lewis 1993; Salisbury 1994; Fraser 1997).

This differing genealogy of the welfare state has inspired the following investigation into networks; (iii) the type of organisation (institutionalised, legal vs. personal) and (iv) the underlying motives (compensation for risks, solidarity contributions vs. motives such as charity, benevolence).

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the histories of the conservative-corporatist legacy of the German ‘social state’ and the idea of social and intergenerational solidarity. Drawing on socio-historical texts I begin by exploring the changing codified responsibilities of family lineages for support provision in Prussian and early German poor relief. Next I explore agrarian German retirement contracts, which appear to exemplify quite literally contracts between generations. I then consider Bismarck’s social security legislation in its relevance for intergenerational relations in the discursive context of the ‘social idea’, developed in the 19th century by economists, socialists and social philosophers. The second part of the chapter inquires into 20th century development of social security, particularly the pension system, in the context of the emergence of the discourse of intergenerational solidarity in the Weimar Republic and in the Federal Republic but also the long term-care insurance. Emphasis is given to the changing imagery and connotations of the generational contract, its promises and challenges and current devaluation in the FRG. Here I will principally draw on public discourse in the German print media.

3.2. ENFORCING INTERGENERATIONAL SUPPORT ALONG THE LINES OF INHERITANCE: EARLY GERMAN POOR RELIEF

Medieval Germany was at the same time a supra-national Empire and a conglomerate of provincial, feudal and culturally and religiously diverse states bound together in the institutional reality of the kingdom. Early bourgeois forms of living first emerged in the medieval Free Cities where from the 11th century onward municipalities were formed and administered by city councils (Sachse and Tennstedt 1980). New problems arose in the later Middle Ages through commercial expansion, urban growth, widespread poverty and the affluence of a new middle class, which challenged traditional morality and class structure. Dorwart (1971, p. 3) argues that these cities, whose legislative and regulative functions were later taken over by territorial and ‘national’ states, were ‘the microcosm of the future welfare state’. Emperor Charles V introduced the term policey from the French in the early 16th century to designate the responsibility of public councils for preserving ‘good order in society and to promote the general welfare’ (ibid.). It referred to a range of regional policies and institutions directed at regulating areas of individual and community activity. Good Policey embodied the new bureaucratic ethos of a state that was committed to rational
Subsidiarity that is the assignment of primary support responsibilities to the individual and family before communes and state organisations was the first principle of poor relief, organised and administered by the municipalities, paid through local taxes and complemented by private charity. The second basic principle was individualisation: in- and outdoor relief was given temporally in crisis situations without giving individuals any legal entitlements to support. On the contrary, relief often entailed social disciplining, such as the enforcement of labour and the loss of civil rights. The third principle of poor relief was the Heimatprinzip ('homeland principle'), whereby responsibility for public assistance was assigned to municipalities of birth, later of residence, so that non-local paupers could be expelled (Sachße and Tennstedt op. cit.). Like the principle of subsidiarity the assignment of responsibility to the Länder rather than to the Federal state is codified in the contemporary German Civil Code.

The grading of responsibility according to degrees of kinship and generation is exemplified in the Prussian General State Law (APL) of 1791/94 in which the patria potesta was abolished and support obligations between generations and family members were codified as part of civil law. The APL comprised the modern liberal ethos expressed in social contract theories, but although quite progressive in terms of divorce rights and women's legal competence, familial duties were meticulously regulated (Gerlach 1996). Whereas the law turned individual family members into legal subjects (see 1.2.) it codified the so-called Nährpflicht ('duty to feed') between spouses, parents and children and siblings. Duties of support were explicitly 'directed according to the rules of legal inheritance' (APL 1794 as quoted in Conrad 1996, p. 345), evidence of the discourse of reciprocal rights and duties, even when in practice no inheritance could be expected. In 1855 liabilities were extended to include illegitimate children who had to provide for their mothers and in the Code Napoléon in the German Rhineland even sons- and daughters-in-law were legally liable for family support. The important characteristic of the APL is not only that it assumed and created family obligations by means of private law, but that it considered failure to support relatives as a violation of public duties, which were enforceable by the police and could lead to detention in poorhouses and reformatories. As Sachße and Tennstedt (op. cit., p.
246) succinctly put it 19th century Prussian poor relief legislation codified ‘the principles of the bourgeois family by means of public law’.

After German unification the German Civil Code of 1896 (Bundes Gesetzbuch, BGB) ensured the status of the family as a ‘moral institution’. It did not include the detailed regulation of intra-familial relationships, but through the absence of regulations promoted a restoration of patriarchal structures (Gerlach 1996, pp. 85-87). Support obligations for spouses and relatives in direct descent were maintained. By the end of the 19th century the conception of the family by legislative authorities had thus contracted horizontally, whilst reinforcing duties over three generations in a lineage with descendants being ‘obliged to provide support before the relatives of the ascending line’ (BGB 1896 as in Conrad op. cit., p. 345). A BGB directive in Cologne in the same year imposed the support duties that were explicitly class-specific, for

spouses towards one another, parents, grandparents and great-grandparents toward their children, grandchildren, and great-grandchildren; children, grandchildren etc. toward their parents and grandparents; then also, under certain legal conditions, parents-in-law and sons- and daughters-in-law toward each other... In this way more than any other the consciousness of the duty towards impoverished relatives among the lower classes of people should constantly be kept alive.

(BGB directive 1896, as quoted in Conrad op. cit., p. 346)

Although there are no representative German studies it is important not to extrapolate from the legal codification to the actual enforcement of intergenerational support obligations. Regional studies in Britain, where the Poor Law of 1601 codified less extensive family obligations down the line of descent, suggest that enforceable obligations amounted to monetary payments only and showed great regional and temporal variations (Thomson 1991). A case study of Cologne also shows that laborious and often unsuccessful enforcement procedures were directed predominantly against husbands and fathers, not wage-earning children (Conrad op. cit.). Yet, adult children are legally responsible to contribute to their parents income to the present day. Walter (1997) has analysed contemporary actions for maintenance and shows how restrictive procedures that left children only a minimum income for themselves have only recently liberalised, interestingly with the argument that children already contribute to the maintenance of the older generation through the PAYG scheme (3.6).
3.3. RETIREMENT CONTRACTS AMONG THE PROPERTY-OWNING CLASSES IN AGRARIAN GERMANY

A long-standing legal mechanism to ensure filial support in old age among the property-owning classes was the so-called retirement contract. At least since the Middle Ages it had been common for men and women of the upper classes to secure their maintenance in old age by donating their fortune to a monastery or convent (Mitterauer and Sieder 1982; Wemple 1992). These institutional arrangements of a ‘soul gift’ (Gaunt 1983, p. 254) made well-off older people independent of their children and other relatives and appear to embody contractual freedom. However, the German 13th century legal code Sachsenspiegel, for example, required that legitimate heirs consent to the donation. In the late Middle Ages these quasi-contractual agreements with religious bodies were replaced by more secular ‘life annuity contracts’ (Mitterauer and Sieder 1982, p. 161) that guaranteed permanent pension entitlements in exchange for the donation of a certain amount of property.

Retirement contracts, in which elderly property holding farmers transferred their holdings, and by implication their patriarchal power, to an heir, usually a son, were more directly concerned with generational politics. In return the older couple received accommodation, food and clothing. These retirement contracts emerged in the early Middle Ages, particularly in central and northern Europe (Gaunt 1983) and in some rural regions in Germany survived until the 1930s (Wilke and Wagner 1981). Elaine Clark (1990, p. 191), referring to similar arrangements in medieval England suggests that ‘rights in property gave householders the necessary leverage to obtain labour and support from children, and thus to bargain for ... maintenance in old age’. Retirement contracts thereby appear to quite literally have been ‘intergenerational contracts’ (Smith 1991, p. 41) that exemplify contractual freedom.

Social historians have shown, however, that peasant retirement contracts were not only regulated by individual negotiation and peasant custom but also by public law. Pelling and Smith (1991) hold that legal institutions, such as manorial courts, exemplified state
interest in managing potential hardship in their supervision of the retirement of elderly tenants and in guaranteeing their material support. Apart from parish records and census data, court testimonies are a major source for the analysis of retirement contracts. Berkner (1976) argues that although legal records often concerned disputed rights over retirement agreements and are therefore to some extent a distorting lens, they indicate what was negotiable and what obligations were fulfilled or neglected. This may be true for the obligations of men. But in so far as women’s legal affairs were traditionally managed by their husbands, ‘the role of women in these transactions is difficult to see, ... apart from releasing their husbands to act for them, they do not come into the records’ (Sabean 1984b, p. 182). In German agrarian retirement contracts women appeared, if at all, as dependant parties to their husbands or as representative parties who substituted for their sons.

Transfer agreements or parental settlements were often laid down in so-called Übergabsverträge (literally, ‘handing over contracts’) (Gaunt 1983) and differed according to ‘the formal and informal structures of people who practice (or are forced to practice) particular ways of passing down rights over material objects’ (Goody 1976, p. 1). Agreements were dependent first on the size of the property and the form of land tenure. In 17th Germany, for example, land could fall under full manorial control (Meierland), it could be a kind of copyhold for which manorial dues were paid (Erzbinsland) or a freehold (Eigenland). Leaseholders could not set up retirement contracts because they had no claim to the land (Berkner op. cit.). Mitterauer and Sieder (op. cit.) point out that the lord of the manor who had a prime interest in replacing older tenants with the more physically able introduced retirement agreements. Lords of the manor had the legal right to approve every transfer of land laid down in marriage contracts, inheritance settlements and sales. With respect to the legality of forced evictions of older farmers (Abmeierung) in the 13th century, the authors were therefore sceptical that the retirement of the farmer had been ‘in its origin, a voluntary matter’ (Mitterauer and Sieder op. cit., p. 164).

Second, the transmission of the farm differed according to whether inheritance was partible, as in the southwest of Germany or impartible as in the northern and eastern
regions. *Impartible* inheritance, where one child inherited the holding and had to pay other siblings' shares as 'marriage portions', was often linked to the stem family, that is the co-residence of the parents and one married child. Retirement of the parents often coincided with the marriage of the heir. Inheritance that was *partible* opened a wide range of strategies and was often linked to nuclear household formation. Even if the laws prescribed equal inheritance among siblings, in practice often one heir, usually a son, managed the farm and bought out the others. David Sabean (1984b, p. 184) shows how the process of transmission in a *partible* region in 17th century Germany was 'protracted, with many tentative moves and reversals, and a complex intertwining of use-rights and obligations'. Parents frequently gave their children land to work, promoting their cooperation rather than their full independence.

In accordance with different practices, arrangements for the 'lawfully regulated form of care' (Mitterauer and Sieder op. cit., p. 162) had regionally specific names often designating the relocation of the old farmer, such as *Altenteil* (literally, old person's portion), *Ausgedinge* (stipulated right to maintenance), *Leibzucht* (smaller plot of land with dwelling) or *Leibgedinge* (stipulated income for life). Retirement contracts traditionally involved little or no cash transfer. Until the eighteenth century retired farmers often had a residual claim to ownership of their farms and thereby had power to control their situation (Gaunt 1983; Berkner 1972). Alternatively provincial laws meticulously specified what each party owed the other (Lee 1981). According to one of the oldest German legal codifications of retirement contracts (early 14th century), older parents were entitled to take 'the best bed, the best kettle, the best pot, the best plough, the best horse, the best wagon' from the former dwelling (Gaunt op. cit., p. 254). Smallholders had to enter into much less generous agreements and complemented the transmission of property with labour services in exchange for support in old age. Accommodation for the retired parents varied from a designated cottage or plot on the farm to a room or corner within the communal family room in the house. Apart from the parents' right to live on the farm rent-free, contractual agreements included the use of a piece of land, animals, furnishings and the exact provision of grain, fodder and wood. Furthermore, regulations could include specified rights of the old farmer to enter the front door or to use a particular chair (Mitterauer and Sieder op. cit., p. 167). This reallocation
of living space is evidence of the symbolic order of the peasant household and the patriarchal power attached to it.

Court testimonies give much evidence of disputes concerning retirement contracts. At the same time as these contracts emerged, complaints about the callousness of the younger generation, fighting, cursing, and parricide were reported by priests and civil servants (Gaunt 1982). The precariousness of retirement is expressed in the Old German word for retire *Ableben*, to give up living, and in a series of peasant proverbs such as ‘To hand over is no longer to live’ or ‘Do not take off your clothes before you go to sleep’. Conflict arose from the resentment of the father at handing his power of decision making to his son and from the offence of the son when the father had delayed the handing over of the farm or threatened to disinherit the son. Structurally the cost of keeping the older generation often caused the inheriting son, who already paid high taxes to the lord of the manor and/or to the state district, to fall into debt. As a result of these structural conflicts, evictions of old farmers were forbidden in the German territories of Saxony, Hesse and Baden in the 18th century, and in 1798 plans were discussed to establish a moral court of justice (*Moralgericht*) to settle intergenerational disputes (Gaunt 1982). Conflict concerning retirement contracts continued into the 20th century. Wilke and Wagner (op. cit.) report that apart from legal disputes, parents in Hesse in the 1920s brought the matter before the village in the form of malicious gossip or placed a curse on the defaulting household if obligations were not honoured.

The role of women in the practices and conflicts of retirement contracts is concealed not only by the fact that if a daughter was the only heir to the farm, responsibility was transferred to her husband but also through a male bias in historiography. Thus Berkner (1972) in his seminal essay on the Austrian stem family described ‘the phases of the *individual’s cycle*’ in the Austrian peasant society of the eighteenth century as ‘son and heir; head of household; retired parent’ (Berkner op. cit., p. 418, emphasis in orig.). Descriptions of a gendered division of labour in peasant households where cooking, infant care, cleaning and mending clothes were a female preserve, suggest that the day-to-day practice of support of older relatives fell to women as daughters-in-law. This goes unmentioned in the normal course of events, as illustrated in the passive gender-neutral
formulation that the older farmer ‘was taken care of when the need arose’ (Mitterauer and Sieder op. cit., p. 167). Like other taken for granted aspects of gender relations this responsibility is revealed in tales of the proverbial daughter-in-law who did not care for her mother-in-law and ‘persuaded her husband to throw the widow into the street (where) the widow died soon after’ (Gaunt 1983, p. 261).

Feminist historians have pointed to the fact that women’s inheritance rights varied widely in Germany. In the early Middle Ages, for example, a woman could inherit land purchased by her parents and the personal belongings of a female relative but not her parents’ patrimony (Wemple op. cit.). In the 13th century widows inherited property from their husbands and served as guardians of their children, rather than falling under their sons’ guardianship as was reinstated at end of Middle Ages (Opitz 1992). In areas of *impartible* inheritance a woman’s dowry in the 17th century was merged into the *impartible* estate, and she became sole heir to the farm when childless or a ‘residual heir’ (Goody 1982, p. 88) for as long as surviving children were under age and she remained unmarried. These arrangements served to maintain the farm as a tax-payable unit with no more than one retired couple at the time, not to promote women’s independence.11

Applying the repertoire of contract (1.4), retirement contracts are peculiar hybrids of purposive and status contracts. In their *quid pro quo* character and detailed listings of exchanges of property for means of sustenance they appear as purposive and quantitatively delimited contracts, enforceable by law. In so far as this exchange is based on age and the heir gains power, and changes his ‘universal position’ on the basis of a legally codified bloodline, independently of his own conduct, they are status contracts. Retirement contracts were not freely negotiable, but neither were they based on trust and affection. Importantly, the gendered part of the purposive agreement, the provision of care and support over and beyond material sustenance, remained uncodified (Lorenz-Meyer 1996). Women were excluded as formal agents in both the exchange and the status contract: excepting those periods where widowed women could inherit the estate from their husbands, women could not hold own land and thus lacked the power to negotiate
retirement agreements as mothers, wives and daughters-in-law. Gender relations were thus at the same time implicitly depended on and yet explicitly discounted. Given that these gender relations were assumed and buttressed by 'welfare legislation' it may not be accidental that these household communities have been characterised as 'miniature welfare republic(s)' (Hajnal 1982, as quoted in Smith 1991, p. 40).

3.4. THE ‘SOCIALE IDEE’ AND BISMARCK’S SOCIAL INSURANCE LEGISLATION

Bismarck’s introduction of social insurance legislation (1883-1991) is usually taken as marking the beginning of the modern German welfare state as a conservative-corporatist regime with its characteristic linkage of rights to class and status through a variety of insurance schemes. While on the one hand as a reform from the top it continued the tradition of paternalistic state intervention, social insurance legislation introduced the (retrospective) coverage of defined risks of workers. By pooling risks, insurance benefits were transferred from a gift to a legal right (Baldwin 1990). Insurance was not restricted to certain professions but applied nationwide. Benefits did neither entail social or political discrimination nor were they dependent on the worker’s family situation nor. Social insurance was therefore initially criticised for jeopardising family and intergenerational solidarity. At the same time it privileged the industrial worker over ‘the poor’ and women who were not regularly employed. Welfare assistance remained a residual system of strictly means tested, individualised, subsidiary public assistance (Ritter 1989). According to Frankenberg (1996, p. 85) the new regime ‘translated the distinction between deserving and undeserving poor into the selectivity of clients and the dualism of compulsory social insurance and the “casuistry” of welfare’. Feminist analysis has shown that this welfare/insurance dualism was inherently gendered (Salisbury 1994; Lewis 1993).

The ‘transition from “guter polizey” to “socialer Politik”’ (Pankoke 1986, as quoted in Ritter op. cit., p. 46) of the German monarchy was the result of particular economic and political factors, but also rested on an idea of social justice that was shared to some extent

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11 In fact the APL attempted to limit women’s right over disposal of their dowries. One of its codifiers forewarned the public that ‘the woman thereby, against nature and God’s commandments, would gain
by members of the working class and the bourgeoisie (Kaufmann 1997). The mortal
foundation of the ‘social idea’ (Schmidt 1998) emerged in the intellectual climate of 19th
century German civil society.

Influential ideas of social reform and a policy framework for nation-building (that has been
described as the ‘third way’ between liberal economy and state socialism (Schmidt op. cit.)
were developed by members of the German Historical School of National Economics,
whose leader Gustav Schmoller later became an economic advisor of Bismarck. One of its
key thinkers was the social historian and social scientist Lorenz von Stein. Von Stein
developed the idea of a ‘kingdom of social reform’ (Konigtum der sozialen Reform),
referring to the institutionalisation of a social reform by public administration based on the
corporate interests of industrial relations outside and above social movements. By the mid-
19th century von Stein had coined the terms ‘social state’ and ‘social democracy’. The social
state was conceived as a productive compromise between capital and labour, which aimed
to create a social infrastructure in order to integrate workers into society. As a Rechtsstaat, a
state under the rule of law the state had to secure the equality of law, but it also had to
promote with its power economic and social progress of all its members, because
the development of one is always the condition and just as much the consequence
of the development of the other; and in this sense we speak of a societal or social
state.

(von Stein 1876, as quoted in Ritter op. cit., p. 11)

Whilst the efforts to provide a theoretical foundation for the intervention of the social state
focussed on industrial workers, Friedrich List, another member of the Historical School, in
his critique of economic liberalism appeared to question the inherent division of productive
and unproductive labour. Adherents of liberal economics, List wrote, considered ‘bodily
labour as the only productive power. According to it, he who raises swine is accounted a
productive member of society; he who raises men is unproductive’ (List 1856, p. 220). His
view that both individuals were productive, the former by producing exchangeable values,
the latter by generating ‘productive power’, was far from a challenge to the gendered
division of labour on which the social state rested. For List the valuable producers of
productive power were teachers, scientists and musicians. Women’s work in the home was
considered unproductive and fell outside of the domain regulated by social insurance.

independence from man’ (Grollmann, date not given, quoted in Beer 1990, p. 173).
Von Stein’s work suggests that the economic-political vision of the social state firmly rested on the normative assumption that the family was – and had to be – organised by a natural and complementary division of labour by gender. Not unlike some of the classical social contract theorists he argued that

outside of the family there is no absolute difference in the determination of a man and a woman, nay without the idea of the family for the economic world of working life there is no man and woman at all but only humans albeit of different power but with essentially equal tasks.

(von Stein 1878, p. 230, emphasis in original)\(^1\)

The turning away from 18th century economic liberalism and the emergence of the ‘social idea’ was furthered by the Great Depression (1873-1885), which after decades of rapid industrial growth had discredited liberal economic policy and strengthened the labour movement. The informal networks of neighbours and family were strained in the context of population growth, urbanisation and fast economic and social change (Ritter op. cit., p. 98). In the second half of the 19th century agrarians, industrialists, artisans, philanthropists, academics and workers formed interest groups, which constituted forms of collective self-help. The emergence of the ‘third sector’ (private, non-profit organisations) beyond market, the family and the state included a range of bourgeois social reform associations, such as the Verein für Socialpolitik founded in 1872. Baldwin (op. cit.) argues that as individuals and groups subjected to misfortune surpassing their capacity for self-help, the middle classes too had a pressing interest in social reform.

Bismarck’s social insurance legislation is often regarded as a counter-policy to the restrictive anti-socialist laws, which outlawed organised labour organisations. It traded on the idea of social solidarity and aimed to convey the view that the state was also a beneficial institution for the property-less classes. Yet social insurance legislation did not advance

\(^{12}\) The question why women and men would live in families, described as unions in which ‘according to their character unequal producing economic forces are joint and are dependent on each other’ (von Stein op. cit., p. 230, emphasis in original) could only be answered with respect to a inherent gender inequality, which Stein had just refuted. The answer to his (rhetorical) question ‘How is it possible that nobody doubts the immeasurable significance of the household economy, and yet it has not found its place in any economic theory?’ (von Stein op. cit., p. 236) lies exactly in the familial division of labour by gender he advocated and assumed. According to their different gender character men were identified with production outside the home and women with consumption inside the home. Women’s work was conceived as
labour protection and coalition rights, and was built on gender and intergenerational inequality. As Bismarck argued in referring to freedom of (employment) contract,

> It was repugnant to my convictions and my experience so far to encroach upon the independence of the worker, in his professional life and his rights as the head of family, as to forbid him by law to exploit his own working capacities, and those of his family, according to his own judgement. (Bismarck 1971/1921)

Thus there is consensus that 'Bismarckian statutory paternalism' (Baldwin op. cit., p. 10) was not motivated by a vision of solidarity. Hockerts (1983) has argued that liberal democracies lacked both the paternalistic mode and the authoritarian power of the German state to initiate similar welfare state reforms. At the time, 'insuring' workers against loss of earnings due to invalidity and old age was an unprecedented and controversial idea (Hockerts ibid.). Reformers were accused of implementing insurance benefits that would destroy intergenerational solidarity. In response it was argued that a small pension income would make old parents attractive members in a joint household with their children and thus would ultimately strengthen family solidarity (Conrad 1996). The obligatory insurance systems built on previous bureaucratic structures were financed by different 'mixes' of employer/employee contributions and were administered by non-state associations. The Health Insurance Bill of 1883 offered protection against illness. Workers paid two-thirds of the contributions and received sickness benefit from the third day for up to 13 weeks with a co-insurance of dependent family members. The no-fault Accident Insurance of 1885 was solely financed by employers' contributions and offered benefits after the 13 weeks covered by the Health Insurance. Finally, the Invalidity and Old Age Pension Insurance of 1891 was financed through covering funds from equal contributions of workers and the employers and a state subsidy. Workers received a 'supplement to their living' from the age of 71 after 24 years of contributions, independently of their family situation. Contrary to the means tested basic pension introduced in England in 1908, the Old Age Pension incorporated the principle of individualisation by relating benefits to previous earnings.

housework and described as creating a kind of emotional surplus by rendering 'the common dear, the unusual pleasurable'. (von Stein, op. cit., p. 238).

13 Social security had already been institutionalised for civil servants, the military and miners. In Prussia one million workers were insured against illness, and partly against accident and invalidity in 1883 (Fischer 1985, quoted in Schmidt 1998, p. 23).

14 Social insurance did not include unemployment insurance, which in Britain was introduced in 1911 and in Germany only in 1927, despite the fact that in 1913 German labour unions were the largest in the world.
As a result of low wages and massive resistance by employers contributions initially amounted only to 1 to 2% of the wage and benefits covered around 18% of average net earnings (Hockerts 1980). These low benefits were justified with reference to the family and household economy, which was considered to provide the bulk of material and non-material support. Until 1912 bereaved family members were not covered. Women's access to first-class (insurance) benefits was limited by structural and cultural discrimination in the labour market. While potential or actual motherhood provided the justification for employment restrictions and lower wages, it was as wives rather than as mothers that women qualified for derivative social security benefits (Lewis op. cit.). Overall poor relief remained crucial. Instead of a shift from municipal to central government spending there was a de facto increase in poor relief recipients, the majority of which were women (Conrad op. cit.).

3.5. THE EMERGENCE OF THE DISCOURSE OF INTERGENERATIONAL SOLIDARITY IN THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC

Solidarity between generations as cohorts was explicitly invoked when the funds of the Miners' pension insurance were lost in the Weimar Republic. The Weimar constitution from 1919 marked a shift from the formal concept of the legal state (Rechtsstaat) that was limited to protecting negative freedom, to a substantive concept of the socially responsible legal state (sozialer Rechtsstaat), and from the state paternalism of the monarchy to the 'social state' of a parliamentary democracy. Social rights were incorporated in a constitution that was considered the most democratic in its time. They included the right to work (not legally enforceable), and the guarantee of social insurance, labour protection, the right to form trade unions and the legal acknowledgement of collective bargaining, which marked a breach with the liberal concept of individual work contracts. At the same time the belief in the power of the welfare state to promote integration and social harmony tenaciously persisted (Frankenberg 1996). With the social democrats as part of a coalition government, the social insurance legislation (Reichsversicherungsordnung) in 1924 was a step towards transforming traditional poor relief into a social right of (low) means-tested assistance. Free voluntary associations were expanded as part of the process of
organisational restructuring and individualisation of welfare services (Ritter op. cit., p. 105).

Yet, the situation of pensioners in the Weimar Republic was devastating with pre-WWI resources such as savings and occupational pensions lost or drastically reduced. In 1923/24 the social insurance nearly collapsed due to inflation and the loss of covering funds. Income was increasingly acknowledged to be the main source of income in old age while pensioners, widows and orphans essentially lived of a special form of social assistance (Hockerts 1983). Debates about the future of social insurance ranged from proposals to interrupt insurance payments altogether in order to re-accumulate covering funds, to propositions for universal 'citizen support'. The latter was rejected on the grounds that it undermined the individualising principle of equivalence between earnings and insurance benefits. The idea that was favoured by both unions and employers' associations, because it was cheaper in the short-run and was expected to guarantee an adjustment of pensions to economic growth, was the replacement of covering funds by the so-called cost-splitting procedure [Umlageverfahren], that is the pay-as-you-go pension scheme. Ritter (op. cit., p. 135) argues that the first references made to what was later called the generational contract were with respect to PAYG that was introduced in the Miners' Pension in 1923. The Christian leader of the miner's association Heinrich Imbusch advocated the principle of solidarity between generations, referring to the distribution of burden between different age cohorts.

The current generation has given blood and material sacrifices. These great sacrifices can hardly be born by one generation. I believe that the distribution of material sacrifices among different generations is necessary.

(Imbusch 1928 as quoted in Geyer 1987, p. 153)

Although this utterance may have evoked associations with family solidarity, the explicit reference point of intergenerational solidarity was the pension insurance system. This appeal for solidarity between societal 'generations' drew on 'Christian solidarity' (Ritter op. cit., p. 124), that is on a romantic anti-contractual ideology.\(^{15}\) Baldwin (op. cit., p. 33)

\(^{15}\) The influential representative of social Catholicism Oswald von Nell-Breuning however, has pointed to the legal origins of the term solidarity. In legal theory 'in solidum' denotes the joint liability of several debtors. According to Nell-Breuning (1957) the relationship between the debtors and the creditor is 'one for all', the relationship between the debtors is 'all for one'. Solidarity transfers a particular legal arrangement to the level of society and social groups. As a principle of social philosophy solidarity attempts to codify this mutual responsibility and interdependence ('all for one and one for all') as a normative basis of the state, delineating it from pure individualism and collectivism.
has argued that the interdependence of societal groups need not necessarily generate solidarity, but for a shared predicament to prompt mutual aid, solidarity requires some form of collective identity or community. As solidarity on the aggregated level of age cohorts is likely to lack this prerequisite, what later came to be called the generational contract is perhaps more adequately characterised as an 'ersatz solidarity represented and bureaucratically dispensed by the welfare state' (Frankenberg op. cit., p. 88). The inherent gendered welfare/insurance dualism of the German welfare state remained unquestioned by the solidarity discourse in the Weimar Republic.

Given the continuity of a conservative bureaucracy, the organisational structure of social insurance was widely maintained during the National Socialist regime, whilst liberal and social rights were gradually demolished. During the Allied Occupation (1946-48) the western occupying forces had intended to restructure social insurance, expand it to all employed people at the level of benefits for blue-collar workers and give unions a two-thirds majority in its administration. Yet, as social insurance was one of the few bourgeois traditions with which Germans identified after the national socialist policies of collectivisation, the plan was eventually dropped and an adjusted form of social insurance was maintained in the western occupation zones (Hockerts 1983). I shall suggest that the maintenance of the old style social insurance illustrates the degree to which solidarity was identified with a differentiating principle that tied benefits to labour market participation.

3.6. GENERATIONAL CONTRACTS IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC: PROMISE, CHALLENGE AND DISASTER

The generational contract as the embodiment of social solidarity

The specific welfare arrangement of the Federal Republic of Germany, founded in 1948, has been called 'Sozialstaat'. The political and juridical term 'social state' is codified in the Basic Law and defines the Federal Republic as a democratic and 'social federal state' (sozialer Bundesstaat) and a 'social state under the rule of law' (sozialer Rechtsstaat). As in other western countries the German welfare or 'social' state is not a separate institution but a characteristic and objective of the state that is in competition with other aims (Kaufmann 1997, p. 22). Its social and moral order is codified by the principles of subsidiarity and
solidarity. The subsidiary function of societal or state activity vis-à-vis the initiative of individuals and families was developed in the nineteenth century political economy of social Catholicism in opposition to state centralism and collectivism. According to the principle of subsidiarity, responsibility for support as well as decision-making should remain at the lowest organisational level possible, ascending only when necessary (Tester 1994). The principle of solidarity codifies mutual responsibility and is incorporated in the social insurance system, where people in employment contribute on equal terms with their employers to current health and pension benefits.

In the immediate post-war years with the high rates of women's labour market participation, divorce and illegitimate births, a central aim of social policy was to reconstitute the bourgeois family with a rigid division of labour between the breadwinning husband and homemaking housewife. As the German demographer Mackenroth put it 'in place of class, today the family must become the object of social policy, across all classes and strata' (Mackenroth 1953 as quoted in Collmer 1956, p. 54). Numerous family organisations were formed 'like worker's associations in the political situation of the 19th century' (Neundörfer 1956, p. 32) and the model of the Hausfrauenehe [housewife marriage] was codified in family law and institutionalised in a gender-segregated labour market. It was maintained by female 'labour protection laws' and the promotion of the male 'family wage', which reinforced the assumption that women were and should be financially dependent on a man (Ostner 1993).

In order to reconcile the male family wage with the capitalist principle of the performance wage [Leistungslohn] (the paying of wages according to economic performance, not to need) the theologian and political advisor Nell-Breuning suggested that

if necessary one has to reserve the higher valued and paid work for men – because the support of the family is the man's responsibility – until all fully productive men have found such workplaces and salaries, at least those who actually have to maintain a family.

(Nell-Breuning 1960, p. 170)

Complementary roles were an 'assumption of normality' characterising the familism that was supposed to secure the German nation (FRG) against the 'heartless' collectivist
practices in the east. Women’s full-time motherhood and housework was naturalised, taken
for granted and enthusiastically appraised.

What these 7 million ‘full-time housewives’ [Nur-Hausfrauen] do ... is real economically valuable work! ... If we try to calculate in market prices everything that our housewives naturally do on a day-to-day basis, without making any fuss, our gross national product would be infinitely increased.

(Neundörfer op. cit., p. 34, emphasis added)

After having dealt with the immediate consequences of the war the ruling Christian-Democrats had announced a ‘great social reform’ for the second parliamentary term. This terminology emotionally drew on socialist and Christian social values whilst the government merely aimed to reform the social security system (Zoellner 1981, p. 142). Given the hardship of pensioners whose average pension was only worth 30% of the average wage, their expected numerical increase and the prevalent normative view that older people should participate in economic growth and be able to maintain their achieved standard of living, the reform of pension insurance became its most important part. The proceedings of the voluntary association Deutscher Verein für öffentliche und private Fürsorge on ‘welfare and social reform’ give a comprehensive overview of debates between social policy experts, politicians and family activists on pension insurance and intergenerational family relationships. They show that in view of rising social expenditure, pejorative notions of the ageing of population [Überalterung, literally, ‘over-ageing’] and the labelling of older people as ‘social baggage’ [Sozialgepäck] were common currency, as were notions of ‘generational interests’ (Ohl 1956), commonly associated with contemporary debates. Intergenerational solidarity was advocated not only in material but also in moral terms of gratefulness – ‘despite everything!’ (Depuhl 1956), an allusion to the responsibility of the older generation for the Third Reich.

Justifications of generational politics such the expansion of child-care institutions, domestic and residential care and adequate pensions frequently referred to the romanticised image of the pre-industrial multi-generation family that was considered as a solidarity care association [Sorgeverband]. This image was used both to argue for individual responsibility and for responsibility of the state. Contrary to the view of the conservative family minister Würmeling that it was the ‘arch-responsibility’ (Würmeling 1956, p. 77) of ‘the family' to
provide care\textsuperscript{16}, the social policy expert Falkenberg argued that someone who had been employed all his life should not have to rely on his children in old age. Falkenberg made an analogy between the pre-industrial responsibility of the family and the responsibility of the state in industrial society.

The duty of material support in the pre-industrial extended family ... was based on its co-operative economy. As everybody took part in the generation of the family income he [sic] obtained a right to enduring maintenance ... Increasingly, in the modern economy only society itself is an autonomous economic unit to which the duty of care is transferred in return for the use of human labour. ... The right to full maintenance as a return from the family economy corresponds today to the right to comprehensive social security from the communally generated gross national product.

(Falkenberg 1956, p. 58-9)

For the social policy expert Arps (1956) on the other hand, the subsistence economy of the peasant with his separate plot on the farm, evidence of the ‘natural’ direct solidarity between father and son without any ‘monetary detours’, served as a model to justify individual responsibilities in industrial society. According to Arps the peasant knew what his farm could produce and in a timely manner planned for his needs in old age by building the cottage and securing long-lasting goods. In industrial society, wages should therefore allow for the possibility of building a house that can become a source of income when sold or rented out in old age. ‘It is natural that a person who is no longer employed consumes his savings’ (Arps op. cit., p. 299).

These images of the pre-industrial multiple-generation household illustrate both the naturalness and the rationality of the ‘generational contract’ (see Chapter 2) according to which simultaneously living generations always live off the goods produced by the middle generation. ‘The three stage life course [childhood, employment, retirement] is only possible because a society consists of all three generations: it is a social contract, a continuous restocking of the gross national product’ (Nell-Breuning op. cit., p. 191) where the productive generation gives support both to the young and the old. The emerging generation receives benefits in advance; the older generation receives benefits for their lifetime achievements. For this reason Nell-Breuning argued that those who do not

\textsuperscript{16}Würmeling’s claim that family rights were pre-state rights which therefore had to be protected against state intervention did contradict his condemnation of female employment: mothers who took up ‘foreign
reproduce in order to ensure the circle of give and take evade their societal responsibilities and (indirectly) fail to secure their own future.

This conception of the generational contract as a ‘contract of solidarity between two generations at the time’ (Schreiber 1955, p. 28) was advanced by the Catholic entrepreneur and economist Wilfrid Schreiber and gained the attention of Chancellor Adenauer who chaired the social reform committee. For Schreiber too this ‘contract of solidarity’ was realised in the pre-industrial family: ‘The parents raised the children and thereby gained the entitlement to receive support from their children in old age’ (Schreiber op. cit., p. 31). The task of social policy in modern society accordingly was to distribute life-long earnings over the economically ‘unproductive’ periods of the life course. Schreiber suggested that old age pension should no longer be funded but based on PAYG, and introduced a new formula for the calculation of pensions. Benefits were not calculated as nominal money equivalents of contributions, but as ‘pension entitlement points’ calculated as the percentage of the individual salary to average earnings. The yearly quotient of the sum of actual contributions and the sum of entitlement points constituted the yearly pension value of each entitlement point. In so far as the contribution revenue reflected the development of earnings, pensions were automatically tied to the standard of living of the employed. The ‘dynamic pension’ thereby guaranteed the continuing purchasing power of pensions. Schreiber was opposed to state subsidies and covering funds, which he argued, would aggravate cyclical effects when used in times of crisis to finance benefits.

It is rarely mentioned that Schreiber’s contract of solidarity included a second pact: symmetrical to the provision in old age, Schreiber suggested the introduction of a youth pension to allow (families with) children to participate in the dynamic increase of production. Whereas older people could in principle plan ahead and save for their old age, income could logically only be transferred to childhood via the ‘active’ generation. Holding that this transfer was insufficiently secured through the performance wage of the male breadwinner and tax-financed child allowances [Familienlastenausgleich] Schreiber suggested

that workers make a contract of solidarity amongst themselves which allows the

work’ [fremde Arbeit] were accused of evading their family responsibilities.
worker's child an advance on its own future income. This children's pension is financed by the entity of all adult workers at any one time and is naturally paid to the guardian as the trustee of the child.

(Schreiber op. cit., p. 32)

According to this contract, a child is entitled to this pension up to the age of 20 and from the age of 35 the adult (child), who is encouraged to start his own family early, has to start paying back 'his' pension until 'he' retires. Schreiber held that the specific rates of repayment should depend on family status. A married person with two children only paid half of what an unmarried person has to pay, and a married person with four children paid only half of the repayment of a person with two children. Thereby the youth pension gained an element of pro-natal and family politics. But Schreiber insisted that it was neither a premium for procreation, nor a recompense of married persons with children as each individual only paid back the pension 'he' has received as a child. Furthermore contributions and benefits of the two pensions did not have to be determined once and for all but could be altered if the 'numerical bases of the contract' changed. Private insurance, savings and provision were to complement the publicly administered state pension.

I consider the 'Schreiber-plan' as a quite remarkable idea. On the one hand the author in a Christian-Catholic tradition took the institution of the family and its gendered division of labour for granted. On the other hand he did not attempt to strengthen or encourage 'natural solidarity' but built his redistributive mechanism on economic rationality. Schreiber drew on the device of the social contract (2.2.) when stating that workers freely make a contract about the distribution and allocation of resources whilst conceiving of the state as a designer of intergenerational politics (Laslett 1992). As in the social contract the actors and deliberators were obviously conceived as men. Once they agreed on the formula he suggested, contributions were automatically subtracted from wages so that repayment becomes compulsory for all people in full employment. One could also imagine that those who did not pay back their youth pension did not qualify for their old age pension. Schreiber did not spell out that his model of solidarity requires that people in full employment pay dual contributions towards both the youth and the old age pension. His redistributive mechanism thereby relies heavily on a growing economy and a stable numerical relation between the three generations involved. Neither does he conceive of the consequences that his model could have on gender relations, namely that with the youth
Pension parents could buy in child care and women could contribute towards their own old age pensions in participating in the labour market.

Whereas a modified version of Schreiber's old age pension as a PAYG scheme was passed in 1957 with the support of the Social Democrats, the youth pension was omitted against Schreiber's fierce resistance. 'People always have children', Adenauer reportedly had said, tacitly assuming women's unpaid childcare responsibilities.

PAYG was implemented in 1957 with a covering fund of a year's contribution revenue. Pensions were tied to average gross earnings. Furthermore, pension credited periods were introduced, which covered unemployment, illness and further education but not periods of child rearing or familial care giving. Neither was there a substitution for low lifetime earnings and/or irregular contributions because the pension insurance was explicitly not designed as a means to correct the wage structure of the labour market. On the contrary with the principle of 'contribution equivalent benefits' the pension system reproduced labour market stratification, which became a main characteristic of the conservative-corporatist welfare regime.

In many respects women were therefore structurally disadvantaged in the very system that was meant to embody social solidarity because of their 'private' intergenerational responsibilities, particularly child care that was not credited for pensions until 1986 and elder care that was not credited until the introduction of the long-term care insurance in 1995. Because of structural wage inequalities and the casualisation of predominantly 'female' labour market sectors, women's earnings were likely to be both in absolute and percentage terms below the average wage. A reform that tied pension benefits to average earnings without differentiating between the average of men and women's earnings resulted in substantially lower pensions for women. At the same time the reference to women's lower average wage was used to justify the fact that women only received 75% of the credits given to men for periods of further education. In addition voluntary insurance during periods spent outside of the labour market, which had mainly to be taken by housewives, was no longer possible. The newspaper Die Zeit (1956b) claimed that in the PAYG scheme both individual women and widow pensions were lower than they were according to the old
formula of pension calculation that had included a basic state subsidy.\textsuperscript{17} The fact that periods of family care-giving were not credited for pensions is of importance because according to the German principle of contribution density, other periods like unemployment or sickness were only credited when at least 50\% of contributions had been made.

Although the ‘generational contract’ never made up for women’s lost earnings due to family responsibilities, and its combination of patriarchal welfare and market mechanisms magnified gender inequalities, the main objections to the dynamic pension did not come from women’s organisations. Opposition to the linking of the pension to gross average earnings came from the employer associations, the organisations of banks and building societies and private insurance. A representative of an insurance association, for example, using the generative metaphor referred to the dynamic pension as ‘the worst deformity [\textit{Mißgeburt}] that a stork ever put into a mother’s cradle’ (\textit{Die Zeit} 1956a). Not without irony the German Press Agency (\textit{Deutsche Presse Agentur} 1956) noted that the representatives of the workers, known for their preference for collective solutions, demanded benefits equivalent to individual contributions, whereas the employers and representatives of private insurance suggested a collective basic state pension.\textsuperscript{18}

Despite old and new disparities between the genders and between those in receipt of an additional occupational pension, who were usually already employed in the more secure and better-paid sectors of the economy, and those who were not, the pension reform was immensely popular. It was said to have had positive material and psychological effects on

\textsuperscript{17} I gained access to articles in newspapers and magazines by consulting the German print archive of the public broadcasting agency Nordeutscher Rundfunk (\textit{NDR}). Since 1949 the \textit{NDR} has collected and chronologically filed articles from a wide range of German newspapers and magazines. My analysis of 128 articles from 16 different newspapers and magazines is based on the collection relating to ‘social security’, ‘family politics’ and ‘intergenerational relations’ and focuses on the periods from 1955-57 and from 1988-98. Unfortunately no detailed information about the scope of the print archive was available.

\textsuperscript{18} The criticism of these organisations first concerned the threat of inflation. It was assumed that the dynamic pension would jeopardise the stability of the German Mark and create a ‘double currency’: a ‘soft saving Mark’ and a ‘hard pension Mark’ (Hockerts 1980, p. 379). Prices would increase as a result of the sudden gain in purchasing power of the pensioners and would lead to new demands for pay raises setting off a wage-price spiral. Secondly, the critics pointed to the threat to investment: Private savings as an important means of capital accumulation would drop and the necessary decrease of current covering funds would lead to cutbacks in state investment in social welfare. The third and currently most relevant objection concerned the projected long-term costs of the reform, particularly in the light of projected demographic change. The image of ‘grandpa as breadwinner’ (\textit{Süddeutsche Zeitung} 1956 as quoted in Hockerts 1980, p. 384) was evoked: families will have to rely on the pension of the grandfather in the future because the son’s diminished income will no longer be sufficient.
both pensioners and on the expectation of people in regular employment. Although contributions increased from 11 to 14% pensions never reached 60% of gross earnings. The reform led, however, to an increase of the average pensions for blue-collar workers of 65.3% and for white-collar workers of 71.9%, which was considered restitution for previous restraint on consumption (Hockerts 1980, p. 422). As intended by Adenauer, whose policies, like Bismarck's, were strategic rather than merely based on solidarity, the reform contributed largely to a consolidation of the state (Zoellner 1981). Christian Democrats won a landslide victory in the election of 1957.

The generational contract as fraud and immorality

Like other western and non-western societies the German social state faces the demographic challenge of population ageing. Generations reproduce themselves only at a level of 65% and the so-called dependency ratio, that is the relation of people aged over 60 to those between 20 and 60 is expected to rise from currently 35 to a 100 to 68 to a 100 in 2015 (Höhn 1996). Social expenditure in Germany has risen from 29.2% in 1990 to 34.4% in 1997 when the individual gross salary included 42% of social security contributions jointly paid by employer and employee (Kaufmann 1997). Considering present demographic and economic developments, an increase in contributions and/or a decrease in benefits appear inevitable if the social insurance system is to be maintained in its present form, which threatens economic performance and/or the standard of living of pensioners, respectively.

Although there had always been critical voices referring to an 'abuse [of] the interests of the whole nation, whose fate is not dependent on the standard of living of its pensioners but on the educational standards of its children' (Handelsblatt 1967), since the recession in the 1980s, rising mass unemployment and a related increase in social expenditure the institutionalised generational contract has been characterised as a 'time fuse' (Geißler 1980, p. 166). But only since the late 1980s have 'new discourses of burden' (Dinkel 1997) emerged, which, based on the differential positions of generations (as age groups) in the distribution of benefits and contributions to the welfare state, cross-sectionally locate a conflict between generations as competing interest groups.

Discourses of burden are characterised by the combination of rational-economic cost-
benefit analysis and model calculations with emotionally loaded scenarios of bellicose confrontation between 'young' and 'old': 'Grey Panthers against contribution payers' (Süddeutsche Zeitung 1996). Individuals on the one hand are seen as cost factors in an insurance economy that threaten national competitiveness (Dinkel op. cit., p. 1). On the other hand they are seen as ruthless protagonists in a struggle around 'jobs, pensions, positions' (Focus 1996 as quoted in Dinkel ibid.). In political statements, media reports and popular science publications the generational contract is identified as both a major cause and symptom of the new confrontation between age groups. Thus problems of distributive justice are perceived as a consequence of welfare state development itself. Yet, they frequently cast 'the old' and more recently the childless members of society as the makers and beneficiaries of an unjust contract.

The analysis of the discourses of generational struggle suggests that it is politicians and journalists rather than organised representatives of different age cohorts, who are 'actors' and 'makers' of this confrontation. Particularly where they link the 'burden' of social insurance with environmental damage, the alleged decline of the family and the changing age and power structure of society (e.g. Textor 1994; Schüller 1996), the critique of the generational contract turns into scapegoating of 'the old'. As Allport (1959 as quoted in Binstock 1994, p. 158) has stated, 'an issue seems nicely simplified if we blame a group or class of people rather than the complex course of social and historical forces'. The fact that economic growth and employment are of primary importance to demography for the sustainability of generational contract usually is ignored (Dinkel 1997).

Critics of the present system have questioned whether the generational contract is constitutional. Thus the director of the Institute for Economy and Society Miegel has posed the question 'Can and may the legislator constrain citizens to contribute to a system where it is certain from the beginning that they will lose a part of their money?' (Die Welt 1997). And the judge and family activist Jürgen Borcherts has asked: 'By what right ...does the state coerce children via its transfer systems to provide more for foreign childless people than for their own parents?' (Tagesspiegel 1996b).

Youth organisations of the major political parties in Germany are adamant critics of the
generational contract. Liberal and Christian Democrat youth organisations have suggested a return from the PAYG scheme to covering funds. Drawing on the repertoire of contract, the leader of the conservative youth organisation Escher has denounced the generational contract as an 'immoral agreement chargeable to a third party' (Escher 1996 as quoted in Dinkel op. cit., p. 6) that is therefore invalid. The youth organisation of the Green Party has demanded a 'solidarity contribution of well-to-do elders' in a paper entitled 'Give me my future, grandpa, and I give you your pension' (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 1996b). Indeed press reports frequently cast the elderly as 'master consumers' (see critically Jamieson and Victor 1997):

Because the welfare politicians 40 years ago fancied giving voters the most money when they least needed it – in old age when mortgages are paid off and the children have left home – pensioners developed into a class of consumers... who have in abundance those goods at their disposal that are scare for most others: money and time.

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 1998b)

Critics have suggested extracting so-called 'insurance-external benefits', such as costs for WWII reparations, credits for periods of child raising and subsidies for East German pensioners from social insurance payments. Other reformers have suggested the inclusion of a 'demographic component' of life expectancy in the calculation of pension entitlement points, which would effectively decrease benefits (Der Spiegel 1997). More radically, politicians have favoured a return to covering funds and/or the introduction of a basic pension. Interestingly, the interests of women are suddenly taken into account in the argument that tax financed basic pensions would increase their pensions (Miegel 1997, as quoted in Der Spiegel 1997).

Both major political parties, the Social and Christian Democrats, on the other hand are committed to maintaining the current social insurance system against recommendations of the World Bank that recommended a three-pillar model of a (contribution dependent) basic state pension based on taxation in conjunction with occupational and private pensions (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 1996a). A major objection to the three-pillar model is that the transition from PAYG to a funded scheme would be impossible to finance. Contributors to the present system have gained entitlements, which according to the German Basic Law are considered as quasi-property and cannot legally be reduced to a minimum basic
pension. Consequently the younger generation would have to make dual or triple contributions to pay into the present and future system and ensure their own provision. Yet media commentators have suggested that the two large ‘people’s parties’ merely adhere to the current social insurance system to gain votes from ‘the old’ (Rheinischer Merkur 1996).

The debates have also opened new fault lines alongside old lines of argumentation. Apart from the antagonism between young and old, childless persons are set against families with children ‘who in contrast to the childless fulfil their part in the generational contract’ (Die Zeit 1999). The influential Catholic charity Caritas has characterised an alleged continuing discrimination and impoverishment of families as a ‘social time bomb’ (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 1998a). Every sixth child in the FRG currently grows up in households that rely on social assistance. According to Caritas redistribution must not occur from richer to poorer families but ‘from non-parents to parents and from old to young’ (ibid.).

According to the motto ‘pay or procreate’ (Der Spiegel 1996b) numerous suggestions have been raised to calculate insurance contributions according to the number of children (Die Zeit 1999; Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt 1997; Breyer and v. d. Schulenburg 1990). The German judge Borcherts has even suggested annulling the newly introduced long-term care insurance on the grounds that it allegedly disproportionately burdens families with children. ‘One mustn’t continue to shell out money and give it as a present to singles and older people’ (Borcherts 1996 as quoted in Tagesspiegel 1996).

At the same time the decline of intergenerational family solidarity is deplored. Here it is the middle generations, and more or less explicitly women, who are blamed for having neglected both children and elders. As a result of separations and divorces children ‘have grown up subjected to a constant erosion of values’ (Neue Ziiricher Zeitung 1992), experienced family disharmony and are therefore likely to have fewer children themselves. Older family members are said to be treated as mere ‘care objects’ and the German Press Agency speculates about a further increase of so-called ‘granny dumping’ following the alleged practice in the United States (Deutsche Presse-Agentur 1993, p. 14).

The Christian Democrats had long heralded a ‘moral and political offensive for the family’ (Geißler 1980, p. 168). Policies such as the introduction of parental leave and the increase
in pension-credited periods from one year to three years per child have targeted women and consolidated the breadwinner model. Pro-natalist efforts have often been bluntly sexist, illustrated by the statement of the economist Engels who claimed that the institutionalised generational contract contributes to low fertility rates and that

we must plan in the long-term in this area because the product that we turn out, a young girl, needs 20 years until she becomes a mother. And consequently we have to provide for the mothers of tomorrow ... already today.

(Engels 1984, p. 48)

In response, the Social Democrats have denounced pro-natal policies as simplistic in the assumption that (further) childlessness is not a choice but merely a consequence of economic restraint.

Interestingly, although commentators have occasionally claimed that the new long-term care insurance repeats the mistakes of the pension system by disadvantaging people with children (Habisch 1998) the metaphor of the generational contract is not directly evoked in the context of care insurance. After more than two decades of debate long-term care insurance (*Pflege-Versicherungsgesetz*) was introduced in 1995 as the fifth pillar of the German insurance system. For the first time the need for care is legally codified as a ‘function of protection’ (*Tatschutzbestand*), evidence of changes in the ‘politics of need interpretation’ (Fraser 1989). Yet, the insurance does not offer comprehensive, but only partial basic cover of specified care needs and explicitly aims to strengthen self-help and family care (Bundesministerium für Arbeit 1998; Meyer 1996). With the introduction of the care insurance family and intergenerational solidarity are no longer seen as threatened by social security but are to some extent acknowledged and supported by social security. Contractual relations encompass the insurance contract between the person insured and the care insurance scheme, the service provision contract between insurer and service providers and the care contract between service provider and client (Schulz-Gödker 1996). In contrast to the notion of the intra-familial caring contract (Walker 1996b) these contractual relations do not regulate the relationship between informal carer and care Receiver.

Prior to the introduction of the care insurance system, the need for social care was not covered by any of the existing insurance schemes. Medical aspects were covered by
health insurance; non-medical aspects were regulated by means-tested social assistance. The existence of hierarchies and the fragmentation of different systems and funding sources, as well as the emphasis on self-reliance and family care, prevented the development of integrated community care services geared to meet individual needs (Tester 1994). Whether and how integrated, need-orientated and self-determined care provision is furthered by long-term care insurance is subject to ongoing debate (see n. 19).

The care insurance system offers insurance based (partial) support designed primarily as services (Sachleistungen) to those who ‘because of the severity of their care needs have to rely on solidaristic social support’ (§ 1 Abs. 4 SGB XI as quoted in Griep and Renn 1997, p. 92). Contributions of 1.7% of the gross salary are jointly paid by employers and employees after abolishing a public holiday to compensate for the employers’ contribution. Spouses who are not regularly employed and children are co-insured (Meyer op. cit.). All those who were insured under public or private health insurance are covered, that is currently more than 80 million people. In the maxim ‘ambulant vor stationär’ domiciliary care is defined as taking precedent over residential care (Bundesministerium für Arbeit op. cit.; Mager 1997). Walter (1997, p. 84) has argued that whereas legally codified financial support obligations between parents and adult children have recently been ‘de-familialised’ social support provided under the care insurance system is ‘re-familialised’.

Health care professionals are employed to assess individual need in terms of basic activities of daily living (bADL) and instrumental activities for daily living (iADL). Support is based on three levels of disability and only provided if a person needs help at least once a day in two or more bADLs and several times a week in iADL. He or she can then choose between supports in kind or in cash or a combination of the two. In the first case private or voluntary sector services are arranged under contract by the insurance scheme, in the second a substantially reduced care allowance is paid to buy informal support. The monetary allowance is substantially reduced because of the non-professional character of informal support. Family members or friends must provide care for at least 14 hours per week to receive the care allowance and are then entitled to training, qualify
for paid leave (up to four weeks per year) and are covered by the Accident and Pension Insurance if they work less than 30 hours a week (Mager op. cit.). If informal support is not available and domiciliary or day-care care is more expensive than residential care, the insurance pays set amounts for care in residential institutions while care receivers have to pay for food and board (Haug 1995). So far 80% of people cared for in their own homes have opted for the care allowance and requests for residential care have decreased (Griep and Renn 1997). As a result of the care insurance scheme, expenditure on social assistance has decreased but remains crucial for all supplementary services not required on a daily basis or not covered by the insurance (Blüm 1997; Hein 1997).\textsuperscript{19}

Gender equality is usually not explicitly addressed in scenarios of an alleged confrontation between the old and the young or between people with and without children, or in the debates about restructuring the social security system, such as the long-term care insurance. Yet, women constitute the majority of people in advanced old age, and by implication constitute the majority of those who receive benefits and services in old age and the majority of an ageing electorate. According to current legislation women retire two years earlier and due to intra-familial responsibilities and resultant discrimination in the labour market pay fewer lifetime contributions. But just as 'solidarity' was not questioned when the generational contract was institutionalised in the PAYG scheme, the question of how women would fare in a restructured social security system is not publicly debated.

Women (as well as pensioners) are, however, addressed as potential saviours of

\textsuperscript{19} There are a range of problems associated with the care insurance, notably its restrictive definition of care that is based on a (medical) deficiency model and largely excludes needs for communication, counselling and the promotion of social participation (Meyer op. cit.). Jansen and Klein (1997) have argued that the pre-professional notion of home care and the one-sided emphasis on domesticity (\textit{Häuslichkeit}), qualified as adverse for the development of young people, negates the significance of semi-public and public spaces for the dignity and identity of care receivers and informal carers. Eligibility practice is restrictive and the insurance is said to promote expert dependency rather than considering care as cooperation and coproduction. It is often argued that the insurance scheme was introduced for economic reasons to decrease expenditure on social assistance (Backhaus-Maul 1996), which indeed has decreased. The care insurance includes the principle of a set budget and contribution stability independent of actual need as well as promoting competition between service providers through provision contracts, which is said to lead to a decrease services quality (Griep and Renn op. cit; Meyer op. cit.; Haug 1995). Despite the new language of pluralisation, marketisation and consumer sovereignty measures of quality control, particularly in home care arrangements, remain inadequate and choices \textit{de facto} limited because services are not an 'experiential good' (Heinze \textit{et al.} 1996, p. 49; Busch 1996). Bäcker (1991) has argued that receipt of the care allowance is class-based and poorer families may not be able to afford to lose it whether or not they would want to provide care.
generational contracts and bearers of a 'new solidarity' both as mothers and daughters, and as paid and unpaid workers. Whereas retired men and women are considered for all kinds of community work and payers of solidarity contributions (Thomson 1992; Schüller 1996), women across age groups and class are targeted to bear and raise the number of children needed to meet the requirements of the pension system (Schunter-Kleemann 1991). They are targeted as the 'daughter care potential' (Klein and Salaske 1996) by the long-term care insurance. Women's age of retirement has been successively increased (to 65 years in the year 2000) and voluntary services professionalised to make them more attractive for women (critically Backes 1985). The introduction of a year's compulsory community service for women has been demanded (Wessels 1994). These suggestions indicate a consensus that it will not be possible to remunerate what Kaufmann (1990, p. 149) has called 'shadow work' in market prices and that it will not be sufficient to appeal to women's altruism alone. But they also confirm that 'policies emanating from a the welfare state “in crisis” represent not so much a break with past practice as an intensification ... of elements of a familism, a nationalism and a variety of racism inherent in the development of the welfare state' (Williams 1989, p. 12).

Taking these policy recommendations together they point to the impossibility of women playing a positive role in the generational contract, and consequently they point to the contradictory structure of generational contracts themselves. If they engage in the labour market and contribute to the institutionalised contract women are held responsible for neglecting their family responsibilities. If on the other hand they engage in the family they are not considered as contributors to the social insurance system, as is shown in the recent discussion to cut out the 'free' co-insurance of not regularly employed family members as insurance-external benefits. Even though it reinforces family care-giving by including informal carers in social security the long-term care insurance is a step towards mitigating these contradictions, without however promoting full economical independence of women with caring responsibilities. Importantly Lister (1995, p. 29-30) has suggested the criterion of 'defamilialization' to assess the extent to which welfare state policies alter power relationships between men and women and allow adult individuals to maintain an acceptable standard of living independently of family relationships.
3.7. CONCLUSION

By focussing on both welfare regulations of support relationships within families and of relations between generations as age cohorts, this chapter has explored institutionalised generational contracts and their constitutive inequalities in the German welfare state. The investigation of early German poor relief has shown that the codification of duties of intergenerational support drew on the repertoire of generation as 'blood line' and conceived support responsibilities as a corollary to the rights of inheritance, thereby presupposing reciprocity and symmetrical exchanges. However, what was defined as bloodline historically contracted and changed according to the needs of the state to limit its subsidiary function. Agrarian retirement contracts drew on the repertoire of contract, even if contractual freedom was absent and retirement and filial support not necessarily voluntary. Women were excluded from the contractual agreement as negotiators, but not as tacit suppliers of intergenerational support.

This taken for granted aspect of a division of labour by gender also continued to underwrite the institutionalisation of social insurance in industrialised Germany at the turn of the last century. The regulation of relations between societal generations of workers was initially conceived as jeopardising intergenerational relationships within families, an argument that reappears in contemporary discourse (Gronemeyer 1991, Engels 1984). Drawing on the idea of social solidarity, solidarity referred to the cohesion of different generations of workers whilst the 'solidaristic' social insurance constituted and maintained a gendered dualism between first class insurance and subsidiary social assistance. As in modern political theory solidarity refers to both Christian values of supporting those in need and to a voluntary mutual taking of responsibility of self-interested individuals. As Kleinhenz argues it is rational for people to enter into collective 'insurance contracts' because everybody can principally get in situations of need and disadvantage (Kleinhenz 1997, p. 72). The post-war mechanism of the generational contract as the PAYG scheme was ideologically mapped onto the pre-industrial solidaristic multi-generation household, 'an association of mutual insurance' (Engels 1984, p. 36) with its gendered division of labour, albeit ignoring the degree of its actual state regulation. The contractual vocabulary of the generational contract similarly was used as an analogy to the moral obligations within
families, drawing on Christian social values of mutuality and altruism as well as on the contractual repertoire of self-regarding rationality. But as in the agrarian retirement contract, the practice of family support remained a taken for granted female preserve whereas 'social solidarity' remained a predominantly male domain. This hierarchy is to some extent challenged by the long-term care insurance. Although discussed outside the framework of the generational contract the care insurance effectively acknowledges caring work by incorporating specified care needs into a social insurance and insuring informal care-givers while re-familialising (gendered) social support.

Meanwhile the generational contract institutionalised in the pension system is currently heavily criticised by turning the contractual and solidaristic association complexes of fairness and mutuality against the generational contract in changing contextual conditions. But as my analysis of articles that have appeared in the German print media shows, this critique is not based on its inherent status and gender inequalities, but cast in ageist and familialistic terms of a confrontation between age and social groups. It is precisely the moral 'flavour' of the contract terminology that 'backfires', resignifies the generational contract as an immoral agreement and feeds the harshness of the present debates that scapegoats older and childless members of society for having unduly enriched themselves in the German social state. In these debates the hypothetical deliberators of the generational contract have turned in 'real' actors in the scenarios of resource competition.

Women's contradictory role in generational contracts, or more precisely in intergenerational family relationships and aggregated intergenerational relations, is most clearly shown by policy recommendations to maintain the current system which simultaneously demand their participation in two 'contracts' that undermine each other. But whereas the contradictory structure of generational contracts in social contract theories has posed logical problems, the contradictory structure of generational contracts has 'real' material effects for those who are dual contributors as will be shown in the empirical analysis.
Chapter 4

RESEARCHING THE MICRO-POLITICS OF INTERGENERATIONAL RELATIONS:
THE HEURISTIC FRAMEWORK OF KINSCRIPTS

4.1. INTRODUCTION

The preceding chapters have shown that intergenerational contracts in Germany have always been at the intersection of changing legal definitions, economic and welfare policies, moral discourse and family practices and custom. This chapter aims to develop a heuristic framework for the empirical analysis of what philosophical and socio-political conceptualisations of the generational contract have been implicitly depended on and yet largely ignored: intergenerational commitments within families or what in Germany has been labelled the "small" generational contract (Bien 1994, p. 5). The heuristic framework aims to guide the empirical analysis, while at the same time holding open the possibility that the empirical data will further qualify the conceptual formulations and the theoretical discussion. As outlined in the introduction, the empirical investigation of the intergenerational commitments of members of two family generations in West Germany, members of the welfare and baby-boom generation, will ask if, and to what extent, the generational contract provides repertoires and images for social actors to describe and interpret their intergenerational relationships.

From the preceding analyses I delineate three criteria that a conceptual framework of intergenerational family commitments must accommodate. The first criterion is historical specificity. Intergenerational relationships get their meaning in historically specific social contexts. Hence, I suggest that the framework must account for a) the generational
politics shaping intergenerational relationships (Chapter 3) and b) the dominant cultural meaning systems which provide orientation and interpretation patterns of intergenerational commitments (Chapter 2). The second criterion is practice. Intergenerational commitments get their meaning in practice and these practices and their subjective interpretations may change over time and circumstance (Chapter 1). Furthermore the fact that generations are always constituted in relation to one another suggests a third criterion, the accounting for intergenerational legacies. Intergenerational commitments build on (historically specific) family legacies, which they reproduce or transform.

Despite an increasing interest in intergenerational relationships in the course of the ageing of populations and the expectation of an increase in care needs of older family members, relationships between generations remain an under-theorised field in the social sciences (Lüscher 1998). A dominant theoretical model has been the theory of intergenerational solidarity (Roberts and Bengtson 1990) and in a more psychological perspective the attachment model (Cicirelli 1986), both of which attempt to measure quality of parent-child bonds. More recently, work has begun on a theory of intergenerational ambivalence (Lüscher and Pillemer 1998). Feminist scholars on the other hand have provided more localised accounts of the micro-politics of intergenerational relationships but rarely integrated them in a theoretical framework. Most significant is the work of Finch and Mason (1992) whose focus on commitment, identity and implicit and explicit negotiation and time has informed the framework building. Yet, perhaps because the authors focussed on wider family networks too much emphasis was given to the idea that commitments are always created and negotiable to apply it straightforwardly to the analysis of the accounts of parents and adult children. I therefore decided to build on the framework of kinscripts (Stack and Burton 1993) that conceptualises intergenerational commitments as kin work and gives emphasis to cultural and family scripts, albeit at the expense of the broader economic and social political context. I suggest that the framework has an unexplored theoretical and sensitising potential to guide the analysis of historically specific intergenerational practices.

After briefly reviewing the dominant theoretical models I will rework the framework of
kinscripts by first delineating three socio-historical dimensions inherent in the theoretical traditions Stack and Burton draw on, in relation to which kin work has to be analysed. Each dimension encompasses aspects of generational contracts elaborated in the previous chapters. Next I will highlight some of the functions and conceptual dimensions of the concept of kin work that pose questions to be addressed in the empirical research.

4.2. THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO INTERGENERATIONAL COMMITMENTS

In the sociological tradition solidarity has been considered the 'glue' of group cohesiveness 'which overcomes the centripetal tendencies of human self-interest' and drives 'the pursuit of the common good' (Roberts et al. 1991, p. 12) both in families and society at large. In its initial formulation, the solidarity model conceptualised intergenerational solidarity as a linear-additive composite of the interdependent dimensions: association (interaction), affection (positive sentiment) and consensus (similarity in values and beliefs) between parents and adult children (Bengtson et al. 1976 as quoted in Roberts and Bengtson 1990, p. 13). The model posited five direct predictors among which shared socialisation was considered as a predictor for consensus, residential propinquity for association and helping behaviour for affection.

This model has found little empirical support. Testing its five direct predictors, Atkinson and colleagues (1986) found that only 'objective solidarity' (association) could be predicted by residential propinquity and helping behaviour. The statistical insignificance of the predictors for 'subjective solidarity' (affection and consensus) on the other hand suggested that the three factors were independent, rather than different dimensions of the same construct. Roberts and Bengtson (op. cit.) proposed a reformulation of the model in which attitudinal consensus was omitted and normative orientations of familial closeness and balanced exchanges of assistance and support were integrated as predictors of mutual association and affection. Furthermore the new model separated the perspective of parents and children and thereby allowed for differing perspectives. Although normative solidarity potentially integrates dominant cultural meaning systems, the model remains ahistorical and decontextualised.
The same holds for the attachment model, which posited that the emotional or affectual bond (constituted in childhood) is an explanatory factor for adult children’s helping behaviour rather than the other way around (Cicirelli 1986, pp. 56-9). The causal path model distinguished the independent variable ‘feeling of attachment’ from attachment behaviour such as contact and communication. In contrast to the solidarity model, negative feelings such as frustration and resentment were separated from feelings of attachment and could result from adult children’s helping behaviour. A strong bond of attachment was said to temper negative feelings.

The positive bias towards solidarity and attachment is one target for criticism of these models. With respect to the solidarity model, critics have pointed to the built in assumption that positive feelings serve to maintain the family system and negative aspects of intergenerational relationships are interpreted as the absence of solidarity (Lüscher and Pillemer 1998). A conceptualisation and measurement of contradictory feelings between parents and children is thereby ruled out. Lüscher and Pillemer (op. cit.) have suggested that a focus on the role of ambivalence generated in intergenerational relations is a more fruitful theoretical perspective for understanding the dynamics and commitments between generations.

Feminist scholars in particular have pointed to the complex interplay of emotions, moral identities and family practices, which are incorporated in the histories of intergenerational relationships. For example, in their influential study of British families, Finch and Mason (op. cit.) have argued that the negotiation of intergenerational commitments is not only about material provision and sentiment but also about the personal and moral identity of family members, their moral investments and ‘reputation’ of being a good mother or daughter. Abel has addressed the shortcomings of quantitative studies by pointing out that

if we learn only that a women prepares meals for her mother, we know very little about her work as a caregiver. Is she assuming this task despite her mother’s objections? Is she trying to please her mother? Is she cooking in order to avoid talking with her mother?

(Abel 1991, p. 62)
Yet, qualitative findings have rarely been integrated into a conceptual framework. The framework of kinscripts is an attempt in this direction. It was developed from studies of low-income African-American families in the US to facilitate the analysis of the assignment and negotiation of the work of constituting and maintaining families across life spans and generations. In particular it focussed on tensions that were produced and negotiated between individuals in the families in response to scripts. Scripts were understood as ‘mental representations that guide the role performances of family members over the family life course’ (Stack and Burton op. cit., p. 160). The authors proposed three related concepts, in relation to which tensions were analysed. The concept of *kin work* conceptualised the labour of constituting families and kin groups in response to the economic, social, physical and psychological needs of the family. *Kin time* referred to the sequential ordering of family events according to so-called family timetables, defined as expectations regarding the timing of transitions generated and transmitted within families (Hagestad 1986a). And finally *kinscription* described the processes of assigning and negotiating kin work over time.

I consider the idea of conceptualising the labour involved in the constitution of intergenerational relationships as kin work, and a focus on both assignment and negotiation (usually considered as sequential in the process of modernisation (Kaufmann 1990) as highly productive for the analysis of intergenerational commitments. The concept of script allows for a conceptualisation of dominant scripts or meaning systems, as well as of intergenerational family traditions and their reproduction or transformation. Yet, the framework in its original formulation is confined too narrowly to the context of the immediate kin group at the expense of broader social and historical circumstance. Thus it does not allow for a conceptualisation of the interrelations between generational politics, dominant cultural scripts, family legacies and the micro-politics of intergenerational relationships. I will therefore revisit its theoretical constituents, namely sociological life course approaches, anthropological kinship studies and script theories, which I argue provide the necessary ingredients to develop a historically grounded framework.
4.3. REVISING LIFE COURSE, KINSHIP AND SCRIPT THEORIES

Life course approaches

Conceptualisations of the life course have reintroduced the dimension of time (in the triple sense of individual time, family time and historical time) into sociological enquiry by focussing on the individual life cycle, continuity and social change (Thompson 1981). The life course is conceived as a series of life events and turning points or transitions that structure the life cycle temporally, in a sequence of phases such as education, employment etc. Whilst requiring individual agency, life course transitions are shaped by socio-historical contexts and are often regulated by social institutions or institutional jurisdiction (such as compulsory school attendance or mandatory retirement). They are therefore subject to social change. At the same time the social structuring of the life course – what Kohli (1985) has termed the 'institutionalisation of the life course' – entails standardisation and provides normative frames of orientation and practice. Parameters of social inequality such as gender, class, ethnicity and so on produce different effects, that is, they open or close off possibilities of social participation at different phases of the life course. In a life course approach transitions or status passages, such as the ones between family work and waged labour, are considered to be both sites of the reproduction of social inequality and sites of social change. They can serve as units of analysis that allow for an investigation of the reproduction of social institutions as well as the ways in which they are maintained or challenged by innovative practice at the level of the individual (Sonderforschungsbereich 186 1993).

Life course approaches thus emphasise temporal and contextual distinctions in life histories and the cumulative impact of historical processes that influence life transitions across generations. They highlight individual decisions 'which cumulatively, not only give shape to each life story, but can also constitute the direction and scale of major social change' (Thompson op. cit., p. 299). In particular life course approaches can further the analysis of the impacts, the interrelations and the gendered logic of social

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20 Cross-cultural studies have shown that this concept of the life course is bound up with the western context shaped by an industrial economy. Thus for the !Kung in Botswana, for example, 'age, per se, is not as salient in organising their lives nor is the life course perceived as a series of stages' (Fry 1995, p. 138).
institutions. Institutions such as the family, the law, the health care system and the labour market often present contradictory and simultaneous demands and cross-pressures, particularly for women (Krüger 1995; Okin 1989). Consequently what can appear as an individual choice and product of interpersonal negotiation is always shaped by solutions, which suggest themselves by a cumulative institutional logic. For example, the ‘choice’ of a woman to temporarily leave the labour market and look after her child is in part a product of unequal labour market prospects for men and women and the time-tables of schools, kindergartens and nurseries, which often require the part-time availability of a person in the home.

I therefore suggest that social institutions, conceived of as multiple and often contradictory culturally consolidated systems of order that are materialised in organisations and organisational practice and incorporate social norms (Krüger 1995), constitute the first dimension in relation to which intergenerational commitments have to be analysed. Life course approaches open up a novel perspective for the analysis of social institutions by focussing on the ways in which the law, the labour market, social policies and the family in conjunction regulate and shape intergenerational commitments over time, as well as providing biographical orientation patterns. As has been shown in the previous chapter the institutionalised generational contract can be considered as a social institution as well. Methodically, the impact of social institutions can be assessed at the level of life course transitions and counter-transitions, that is, transitions brought about by turning points in the life of another family member such as grandmotherhood (Hagestad and Neugarten 1985).

Theories of kinship

The significance of social institutions is highlighted further by anthropological theories of kinship. Kinship theories have contributed to overcoming the conceptual habit of reducing the family to an institution with visible (household) boundaries in favour of conceptualisations that focus on the ‘political significance of the ties of kinship beyond household boundaries’ (Casey 1989, p. 2). As elaborated in Chapter 1 kinship has no ‘natural substance’ but is constituted, modified and reproduced by individuals and institutions, and can include adoptive and ritual kinship (Needham 1971; Schneider 1984;
Collier and Yanagisako 1987). Ritual kinship is usually excluded from the juridical domain, which regulates the institution of kinship, for example, in the allocation and transmission of property and resources down the generational line. Feminist anthropologists have called attention to the fact that it is not only the politico-juridical domain that is subject to social change but also the meaning of reproduction and what is constructed as the mother- or father-child bond (see Chapter 2). Rather than presupposing the reproduction-lineage nexus, kinship theories in a feminist perspective attempt to explain 'how reproductive functions come to be cast as the enduring core of the family' (Collier and Yanagisako op. cit., p. 3).

Bourdieu (1996) has focussed on the construction of family bonds. He delineated dominant cultural meaning structures, such as the assumption that the family exists, as ‘a separate social universe’ (Bourdieu op. cit., p. 20) that maintains its boundaries towards the outside, and is oriented towards the sacred sphere of ‘privacy’, where calculation and interest are allegedly suspended in favour for solidarity and mutuality. For Bourdieu the family is a social construction produced by statisticians and the state. At the same time it is ‘a realized social fiction’ (Bourdieu op. cit., p. 21), maintained by habitus and ‘a tacit law (nomos) of perception and practice’ (ibid.) and the various social conditions by which families are enabled to enhance their economic, symbolic and social capital (see Chapter 1).

To understand how the family turns from a nominal fiction into a real group whose members are united by intense affective bonds, one has to take account of all the practical and symbolic work that transforms the obligation to love into a loving disposition and tends to endow each member of the family with a ‘family feeling’ that generates devotion, generosity and solidarity. ... The forces of fusion (especially the affective ones) must endlessly counteract the forces of fission. (Bourdieu 1996, p. 22, emphasis in orig.)

This approach re-emphasises the contextual, dynamic and temporal perspective that life course approaches suggest by focussing not on life course transitions but on everyday

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21 Statisticians are actors in constructing families, which they usually equate with households with children under the age of 18. Borchers and Miera (1993) have pointed to the fact that family members have a life expectancy of over 75 years and during the majority of these years neither live as minors nor with under age children in a ‘family household’, and therefore are not defined as family members. Recurrent diagnoses of the withering of the family often rest on these statistical definitions and ignore the fact that even though the proportion of so-called family households in relation to all households is less than 50%, almost twice as much people live in family households.
practices. I propose that in a temporal perspective material and symbolic *intra-familial legacies*, as a resource and liability, constitute a further dimension in relation to which the practical and symbolic work of the ‘making’ of intergenerational commitments has to be elaborated. Intra-familial caring traditions as enacted and lived intergenerational solidarity can be such a personal liability. Vierzigmann and Kreher (1998) have argued that the continuing narration of the family history across generations with its eloquence or silence around specific family events and experiences is a process of transmission by which generations are constituted. Rosenthal (1997, p. 59) has suggested that values and experiences are not simply ‘transferred’ from one generation to the next but ‘mutually enacted and thereby interactively experienced’.

Conceiving kinship as an institution constituted by law, culture and politics as well as by day-to-day practice and interaction is a productive approach to the exploration of potentially ‘complex kinship configurations’ (Hareven 1994, p. 457) that are emerging in contemporary ageing societies through rising rates of divorce, remarriage and cohabitation. These configurations have been described as a ‘latent web of continually shifting linkages that provide the potential for activating and intensifying close kin relationships’ (Riley and Riley 1993, p. 173). As Hareven (op. cit.) has argued little is known about the rules and principles by which support is activated in the contemporary condition, where the family has lost the structuring force it had among the pre-industrial property owning classes.

**Script theories**

Kinship theorists have already pointed to the need to analyse cultural meaning structures of the parent-child relationship. I suggest that approaches to script theory offer a fruitful conceptualisation of a further dimension of the framework of kinscripts: the concept of *cultural scripts*. They also offer a development of the dimension of *intra-familial legacies* mentioned above.22 Introduced in cognitive psychology, scripts are defined as a

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22 As the following discussion of script theory shows, the concept of script bears resemblance to Bourdieu’s (1972/1985; 1996) concept of *habitus*. *Habitus* is conceptualised as a set of (culturally and materially incorporated) dispositions, which incline actors to act and react in certain ways. It is an enduring orientation to action, which, in turn, is constitutive of social structure. One of its constituents is ‘a mental structure which, having been inculcated into all brains socialized in a particular way, is both individual and
specific form of knowledge structure, one that governs the behaviour and interpretation of routinised everyday life activities. Scripts are context-specific, complex, and multi-functional: they set expectations, aid comprehension and organise memory (Galambos et al. 1986). Operating largely outside conscious awareness, scripts are both based on ‘experience’ and practice, and structure them. The work of Tomkins (1987) on personal scripts has drawn attention to the role of affect, which he considers the most important dimension along which individuals co-assemble experience in the process of individual script formation. Scripts are thus conceptualised as ‘ideo-affective construals’ (Demorest and Alexander 1992, p. 645), a set of ordering rules developed to predict, interpret and respond to interpersonal experiences. Importantly they are also a ‘base for designing strategies and/or tactics’ (Tomkins op. cit., p. 151) in responding to ‘experiences’.

The malleability and changeability of scripts make script theory an attractive heuristic concept in practice (family therapy) and research (discourse analysis). According to the family therapist Byang-Hall (1995, p. 24) the concept of family scripts refers to scripted family roles and ‘posits that everyone has the whole family drama encoded in their minds but identifies more with certain roles, and, in turn, is identified by others as playing particular roles’. Family scripts include ‘intergenerational scripts’ regulating the interaction between generations and ‘transgenerational scripts’ where patterns from the previous generation are transferred (replicated/re-created or modified) to current interaction (Byang-Hall op. cit., p. 32). Byang-Hall (op. cit., pp. 58-9) explicitly locates family scripts in the context of broader cultural scripts (‘cultural mythology’) which, mediated by ‘family myths’, that is transgenerational scripting and (unspoken) family expectations, provide meaning structures for individual family scripts.

In so far as transgenerational scripts (or what I have called intra-familial legacies in order to distinguish the concept from broader generation scripts such as the solidarity script) can be constituted in contradistinction to dominant cultural scripts I suggest keeping the two conceptually distinct. Family timetables, shared understandings about on-time and collective’ (Bourdieu 1996, p. 21). Moreover, through its link to practice habitus is the embodiment of cultural principles, cultural values ‘made body ... beyond the grasp of consciousness and hence cannot be touched by voluntary transformation’ (Bourdieu 1972/1985, p. 94). A particular practice is always a
off-time transitions can be part of an intra-familial legacy. Seltzer and Troll (1986) have pointed to a further aspect of intra-familial legacies which they call ‘expected life history’, i.e. a sequence of events and conditions that is expected to occur at different ages. The authors argue that expected life histories are shaped by the experience of family members. Thus they found that the expectation of people’s own death was less dependent on general life expectancy than the time of death of their own parents. Expected life histories influence courses of action in the present and shape reconstructions of the past. If expected events occur they are integrated into the ‘life script’ whereas unexpected events tend to be viewed negatively and independently of their outcome.

The multiplicity of scripts on an interpersonal level underlies the concept of ‘counterscript’ (Gutierrez et al. 1995) that in discourse theory refers to particular social, spatial, and language patterns, which evolve in response to, and in an appropriation and ‘re-keying’ of, dominant (cultural, moral and gender) scripts. Gutierrez and colleagues consider social roles as ‘frames of reference that lead to patterned ways of being and doing’ (Gutierrez et al. op. cit., p. 449). Members of a community acquire a ‘repertoire of strategies as well as content and socio-cultural and linguistic knowledge’ (Gutierrez et al. p. 468) in interaction and practice. The authors suggest using the notion of script and counterscript as a heuristic tool to explore power and intersubjectivity in social relationships. Both scripts and counterscripts consist of ‘internal dialogizations’ of a particular cultural experience. They are constituted in relation to a broader dominant script, which is invoked and re-invoked. Yet in institutional contexts scripts and counterscripts are often not available to one another. Social change can occur in the confrontation and dynamic interrelation between the official and the unofficial script by which the larger societal script is contested and disrupted.

The element of practical embodiment of locally specific scripts tends to be lost in approaches to discourse theory, which consider scripted versions of personal experiences as ‘rhetorically designed, or interactionally constituted constructions of events’ (Edwards 1994, p. 214, italics in orig.). Thus, Edwards argues, scriptedness can be built into events product of habitus, the specific social context and the actor’s ability to play the game of social interaction. The concept of scripts is a more individualised, plural and fluid form of habitus.
through their reporting in order to render them intelligible and normalise them. The aim of script analysis, then, is to reveal the ‘conceptual resources that people use in producing and understanding event descriptions’ (ibid.).

To sum up, in reconsidering some approaches to life course, kinship and script theory I have suggested that social institutions, intra-familial legacies and cultural scripts are relevant interrelated conceptual dimensions for the development of a historically grounded analysis of the micro-politics of intergenerational relationships (see Figure 4.1.). All three dimensions capture aspects of the generational contract, namely the institutionalised pension system as an social institution, the normative script of intergenerational solidarity as a cultural script and family caring as lived solidarity as an intra-familial legacy. The dimensions are actualised in events and transitions, everyday practices and interpretations of kin work that maintain or challenge institutions, legacies and scripts. The cumulative logic of institutions as social systems of order that entail normative orientation patterns can be analysed around the life course transitions of members of the kin network, such as taking on or declining full-time support responsibilities. Intra-familial legacies as the material, practical and symbolic heritages that generations pass on to their successors are a resource and liability, which are reproduced or transformed in practice and interaction. Cultural scripts as dominant meaning systems, such as the assumption that kin networks are a sphere of solidarity, reciprocity and trust, are broad reference frames in relation to which the micro-politics and counter-politics of kin work are interpreted. They can be analysed as conceptual

Figure 4.1 Socio-historic dimensions of the framework of kinscripts
resources that underwrite subjective interpretation pattern as well as strategic repertoires of practice and interaction.

Conceiving of scripts as knowledge/meaning structures and practices entails a shift of perspective from viewing them merely as ‘mental representation(s)’ that guide kin work (Stack and Burton op. cit., p. 160). The refined framework of scripts suggests an analytical focus on affect and conflict and on the multitude and changeability of scripted practices and their narrative construction over time. Individuals need not be consciously aware of the impacts of social institutions, intra-familial legacies and cultural scripts.

I suggest that a refined conceptualisation of kin work can accommodate and specify these focuses on affect and conflict of a multiple and changing scripted kinship practices.

### 4.4. DEVELOPING THE CONCEPT OF KIN WORK

Insofar as I have interpreted kin time as one aspect of intra-familial legacies the following sections only consider the concept of kin work and the category of kinscription proposed by Stack and Burton (op. cit.). The concept of *kin work* was introduced by Di Leonardo (1987) to conceptualise the work of maintaining family bonds within and across household boundaries through communication and contact. Rather than being merely a descriptive category, kin work as an analytical concept opened new paths of enquiry by challenging the conventionally perceived dichotomies of private/public, subject/object and emotion/reason.

While Di Leonardo (op. cit., p. 443) brought into focus publicly invisible symbolic activities, such as gift-giving, the ritual celebration of family events and the mediation of a ‘sense of family’, I use kin work as a *generic concept* for all activities between people who are considered to be kin. Kin work thus includes what has been termed ‘social support’ (Antonucci 1985, Borchers and Miera 1993), that is, practical and economic support; accommodation; personal care; (grand)child care; and emotional and moral support. This conceptualisation of potentially supportive practices as activities of ‘making’ or maintaining the kin group allows for a more comprehensive analysis of
intergenerational relationships. Visits, telephone calls, kindness and attention continuously create ‘family feeling’ or the ‘affective principle’ (Bourdieu 1996, p. 22) of intergenerational cohesion by which a latent web of connections that may be activated in times of need is symbolically constituted and maintained. Not separating support from other forms of family relationships also reflects the view of family members, who regard care-giving ‘as an extension of family or personal relations’ (Twigg et al. 1990, p. 3), and do not perceive themselves as ‘carers’.

**Challenging the public/private divide**

In relation to the concept of care the generic concept of kin work is thus more encompassing and at the same time narrower. It is more encompassing in including ritual and symbolic activities. It is narrower in excluding a broad range of institutional and organisational settings, in which care is given by professionals (Twigg et al. 1990; Thomas 1993) as well as by volunteers (Abel and Nelson 1990, pp. 17-22; Bagilhole 1996; Jamieson 1990). Kin work is necessarily embedded in personal relationships, which are considered as kin relations, although the mediating role of family members in establishing contact with formal (voluntary or statutory) services is a key activity of kin work. Inasmuch as ‘home-based kin-care’ (Graham 1991, p. 74) can be considered to be the most intense form of kin work much insight can be gained from the conceptualisations of caring work and the ways in which it ‘trespasses and re-orders’ public/private distinctions (Twigg 1999, p. 381). In particular the view that because ‘caring depends for its accomplishment on resources, the allocation of resources is always a political process’ (Tronto 1996, p. 146) offers a fruitful approach to analysing conflict and power in the allocation of resources and the ‘politics of need interpretation’ (Fraser 1989) in kin work. In the context of kin work, resource allocation tends to not match perceived responsibilities.

I suggest further that the theoretical concept of welfare production [Wohlfahrtsproduktion] (Kaufmann 1994) can serve to locate kin work in a broader societal context. While the value-laden term ‘intergenerational solidarity’ presupposes cohesion, consensus, stability and a commonality of interest, kin work, by naming work, ‘denaturalises’ solidarity by emphasising labour, investment and the production of
‘value’ in the creation and maintenance of kin and quasi-kin networks. Economically the movement and cooperation between households and their members has been considered ‘an extended productive unit of social welfare’ (Netten 1993), which promotes a change of perspective from the family as a site of welfare consumption to the family as welfare producer.

As elaborated in Chapter 3, the production of welfare is located in and across different institutional contexts and simultaneously involves the state, the economy, the welfare sector and ‘private’ households. According to Kaufmann (op. cit.) this multi-level process of ‘welfare production’ is normatively framed by the right to self-organisation and opportunities of action, and the right to participation in the results of publicly mediated welfare production. On an institutional level, welfare production involves the definition and (state) regulation of welfare programs, which in turn depends upon the degree of institutional independence and self-regulation. On the individual level, welfare production involves the forging of a fit between personal dispositions and (given and perceived) opportunity structures. Individual welfare production therefore is a competence to mobilise resources and to interact with formal (and informal) structures rather than a function of disposable income.

The kin group as a producer of welfare is implied in Kaufmann’s contention that welfare production includes all activities, which maintain and develop human capabilities [Humanvermögen]. Human capabilities, he argues, connote both (paid) work and ‘vital’ (non-profit) capabilities at the micro-level of individual competence and at the macro-level of collective social resources. Yet ‘individual’ and ‘collective welfare’ do not necessarily reinforce each other. An increase in welfare, Kaufmann argues, has to be obtained through a simultaneous increase of state intervention and societal self-regulation. If one conceptualises welfare as an aspect of generating and maintaining human capabilities, kin groups and families are of central importance in developing and promoting a range of competences, which potentially spill over to other contexts. Within kin groups the level of available resources consists not only of time, income and capital (Netten op. cit.) but also of ability factors such as skill, knowledge, emotional strength and improvisation. Fisher and Tronto (1990, p. 43) have pointed to the fact that women
often have little command over resources but have to create and improvise them – a process that has its limits and its price in shortages of time and available resources for other activities.

Kin networks thus constitute a *Schattenwirtschaft*, a hidden economy of non-bureaucratic, non-monetary and untaxed service provision which increasingly complements or substitutes for public sector services or formal ‘opportunity structures’ in the provision of social support (Pitrou 1993). In its emphasis on the necessary capabilities of persons to interact with formal and informal structures kin work as welfare production cuts across the divide between public and private spheres and goes beyond the concept of ‘household production’. Household production refers to ‘the nonmarket use of household time (including volunteer work) employed in conjunction with non-market capital and land, to produce goods and services that could be, but are not, marketed’ (Snooks 1994 as quoted in Bryson 1996, p. 210). At the same time excessive demands on the kin group can ‘foster exclusivity and privatism rather than a sense of collective responsibility’ (Abel and Nelson op. cit., p. 7).

**Beyond the subject/object and the emotion/reason dualism**

Apart from challenging the boundary between public and private economic realms, the concept of kin work also aims at cutting across the boundaries between the conception of the kin worker as subject or object, actress in solidarity or victim of patriarchy. Kin-work in western societies is organised largely along the lines of a gendered division of labour. Considering kin-workers as victims places their practical and symbolic work in the context of the exploitation of women’s unpaid reproductive labour, into which they are compelled by a variety of material and ideological forces. This lack of viable alternatives has been expressed in the notion of women’s ‘compulsory altruism’ (Land and Rose 1985). Womens’s taken for granted responsibilities for the kin group are further assumed to justify their unequal position in the labour market (see Chapter 3). Time out of the labour force or reduced working hours have negative impacts on women’s future earning capacities by reducing their experience and seniority (Bryson 1996; Okin 1989), which in turn furthers women’s availability as kin workers. The victim perspective thus emphasises the structural context over and above individual agency.
The solidarity perspective of the kin-worker on the other hand, promoted in particular by adherents of a female ‘ethics of care’, focuses on women’s moral orientation, motivation and particular skills to be in and create close relationships. Women are considered more open, receptive and other-directed, and able to set aside their own views and preoccupations and attune to another person’s inner world and to attend to her needs. Whether grounded in women’s practice, their moral attitude or their ‘pre-moral’ basic sympathy with others and longing for relatedness, the ethics of care is not based on abstract moral principles and rules. It highlights a central aspect of a mutuality of giving and taking, empowerment and fulfilment. This ‘psychological-cum-moral’ perspective (Bubeck 1995, p. 152), conversely, can exclude socio-structural inequalities and constraints, as well as interpersonal conflicts of interest and needs, between the kin worker and other members of the kin group.

I suggest that a focus on kin work in relation to the socio-historical dimensions, social institutions, cultural scripts and intra-familial legacies outlined in the previous section, will go beyond the victimisation/solidarity divide, insofar as kin work is conceived as embedded in a social context, which it both reproduces and challenges. Kin work can entail empowering and disempowering aspects. Further, although gendered responsibilities are a major theme in any kind of family work, the concept of kin work must not reify gendered responsibilities but must be held open to include ‘male’ forms of, and participation in, kin work. Kin relations among men have been a widely neglected area of investigation and Boxer and colleagues (1986, p. 95) argue that existing studies have frequently used ‘a deficit model... including an implied feminine standard of what constitutes a “close” or “nurturant” bond’ in intergenerational relationships. Providing access to employment after migration, for example, is a typical male working class variant of kin work. Moreover, British representative surveys have shown that men do engage in caring work (Arber and Gilbert 1989). Yet, the majority of male caregivers are aged over 65 and provides intra-generational support for their frail spouses. If men are primary caregivers for their elderly parents they are usually young and unmarried. In either case they are more likely to receive support from formal services (Qureshi 1996;
The subject/object divide is also challenged by multiple and contradictory emotions and rationalities, which underlie and drive kin work and are often linked to normative frameworks. Its most intense form, personal care-giving, has famously been characterised as a 'labour of love' (Graham 1983) that requires rational planning, judgement, knowledge, skill and emotional commitment. At the same time the formula 'labour of love' implies normativity. In his contention that kin work continuously creates 'the obliged affection and affective obligations of family feeling' (Bourdieu 1996, p. 22), Bourdieu has indicated that emotions and morality are deeply intertwined. This link of emotions and morality bears the potential for conflict. Care has been characterised as a 'labour of love, in which the labour must continue even where the love falters' (Graham op. cit., p.16), a labour where the love must falter in order to continue the labour (Ungerson 1987) and as a labour in order to get love (Dressel and Clark 1990).

Guilt and ambivalence can become the 'motor' of kin work, sometimes reinforced by a family member in need (Nydegger 1983; Aronson 1992). It has been argued that women's refusal to provide kin work, their assertion of independence and pursuit of self-defined goals can induce guilt. But even if they take on kin work, guilt is often a concomitant feeling because the support provided is never seen as sufficient (Purtell 1963; Walker et al. 1992). Equity theorists have explained caregiver's guilt as the impossibility of reciprocating enough to compensate parents for their child rearing activities and other past sacrifices. As reciprocity is considered a universal norm for interaction, receiving more than what one gives leads to the feeling of guilt and shame (Rook 1987). Psychologically, denial or repression of negative and unacceptable feelings towards other members of the kin group can cause guilt (Brody 1985), as does the perceived discrepancy between the feeling of no substantial affection and the cultural metaphor and norm of closeness and love in the family (Jarett 1989). All these examples point to a link between emotions and normative scripts, particularly the potent idea of reciprocity and natural affection (see Chapter 2).
Reconsidering the category of kinscription

Stack and Burton (op. cit.) have put forward the concept of 'kinscription' to conceptualise the process of 'recruiting' or conscribing certain family members to take on kin work but also to exclude or release them. Positing that responsibilities are created not predetermined, kinscription focuses on individual strategies and processes of negotiation of kin work over time although negotiation is never 'structure free'. As Elder argues 'instead of viewing family norms as “givens” we can see them as agreements worked out through family interaction' (Elder 1987, p. 186). The literature on social support has suggested that women must take negotiation more seriously because they are more likely to have to rely on the kin network for assistance (Nestmann and Schmerl 1989).

Negotiation always has a transformative element. According to Bruner (1986 as quoted in Hansson 1993, p. 69) it is 'the art of constructing new meanings by which individuals can regulate their relations with each other'. Similarly Finch and Mason (op. cit.) have argued that people construct social meanings through the process of negotiation. In this sense negotiation is a human capability and competence, not merely a means to an end. Boxer and colleagues (1986) have argued that the negotiation process can be more important than its content insofar as conflicts are acknowledged and resolutions attempted. It can be a way of developing problem-solving abilities and in the context of intergenerational relationships often serves to maintain the proper balance between dependence and independence. Yet, in the absence of perceived alternatives, responsibility can be assigned 'through a process of non-decision-making' (Finch and Mason op. cit., p. 159). The authors have shown that the 'reputation' of kin members provides a structure for negotiations about assistance, in that they offer guidelines about whom to approach and whom to leave alone. They argue that people invest something of themselves in particular relationships and that their personal and 'moral identity' and reputation (of being 'generous', 'reliable', a 'good daughter' etc.) is at stake, which can make it difficult to retreat or acknowledge conflict once one becomes locked into a set of commitments. Taking on particular commitments means often being more likely to attract further commitments. Negotiations therefore have to be understood both in the horizon of the past and anticipated future.
The analysis of kin work negotiation (or kinscription) thus has to focus on implicit and explicit processes, on what is said and what remains unsaid, keeping in mind that resistance can remain a closed and silent process.

Revisiting the literature around kin work, i.e. the personal, symbolic, material, emotional and practical activities of constituting kinship and generation, and its negotiation and assignment over time (kinscription) has highlighted some analytical and sensitising dimensions that have to be addressed in the empirical research. Functions and conceptual dimensions of kin work are illustrated in Figure 4.2.

![Figure 4.2. Functions and heuristic dimensions of kin work](image)

Empirically these conceptual dimensions have to be developed in relation to the interrelated socio-historical dimensions outlined above.

### 4.5. CONCLUSION

I have suggested that a refined framework of kinscripts can guide a historically grounded analysis of kin work, its strategies, assignments and negotiations over time. This modified framework of socio-symbolic kinscripts aims to link local practices and macro-structures. It draws attention to the social and symbolic practices of men and women across...
private/public boundaries in the context of intergenerational relations. The framework first delineates the socio-historical and interrelated dimensions of social institutions, intra-familial legacies and cultural scripts, which can be in a state of tension at the level of the micro-politics of inter-generational commitments. The concept of *kin work* opens new paths of enquiry by crossing the boundaries of conventionally perceived dichotomies such as family and work, subject and object, and emotions and normativity. It calls attention to the political process of welfare production and the allocation of resources, empowerment and disempowerment as well as to the competences, emotions and implicit and explicit negotiation processes involved.

Although not included at a conceptual level by Stack and Burton (1993), contracts can be one organising principle at the level of practice, negotiation and interpretation to ease potential tensions between self-interest and the interests and needs of other kin members. From a contractarian perspective *kin work* could be organised as a negotiated exchange of support and cooperation over the life course, coordinating family related transitions in a way that mutual help can be given in congruence with other roles. *Kinscription* can strategically incorporate forms of recompense to facilitate the recruitment of kin workers or to make up for their release. The *possibility* of contractual agreements requires a shift of perspective to incorporate the practical and interpretative agency of individuals more saliently than in the original formulation of the framework albeit without obscuring structural forces and constraints.

While the refined heuristic framework gives the research a heuristic orientation, the idea is to empirically enhance what Strauss and Corbin (1994, p. 274) call ‘conceptual density’, that is ‘the richness of concept development and relationships’ as well as to explore the significance of generational contracts. Conceptual dimensions are conceived of as sensitising: ‘whereas definitive concepts provide prescriptions of what to see, sensitizing concepts merely suggest directions along which to look’ (Blumer 1986, p. 148). They lay open the researcher’s pre-knowledge and prejudices, which have to be put at risk. As Strauss and Corbin (1998, p. 102) have suggested ‘by the very act of naming phenomena, we fix continuing attention on them [and]... can begin to ask questions about them’. 

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Chapter 5

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS

5.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter focuses on the research design, the sampling strategies and specific generational positionings of the younger and older research participants, the socio-cultural context of the research and the methods and the analysis. The data collection was organised within two research projects at the University of Bremen. Both projects combined studies of the life course, conceived of as a sequence of life phases structured by significant turning points and institutionally regulated transitions, and studies of ‘biography’, that is, the actors’ subjective interpretations of their lives. Methodologically they combined different ‘types of data’ (Born et al. 1996) in an innovative way. Life course transitions such as the age of obtaining an educational qualification, age at childbirth or grandmotherhood, are often officially registered in birth certificates or employment records and were investigated in a quantitative survey. Biographical interpretation patterns or the ‘world of imagination’ [Vorstellungswelt] of the research participants were investigated in face-to-face semi-structured interviews.

Yet, for the analysis of kinscripts this multi-method design could not be applied because kin commitments initially had not been a sampling criterion and periods and transitions of kin work were not explored in the quantitative survey. Not choosing research participants by virtue of their being ‘kin-keepers’ or family caregivers, however, allowed

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23 The research projects ‘Status Sequences of Women between Employment and the Family’ (1989-1991) and ‘Patterns of Status Passages and Intergenerational Inheritance’ (1994-1996) were directed by Helga Krüger at the Special Research Centre 186 ‘Status Passages and Risks in the Life Course’ at Bremen University, Germany.
for the exploration of a range of intergenerational commitments as well as 'ordinary' processes of assuming or declining kin work responsibilities over the life course. I attach an overview of the objectives and the sequential sampling procedure of the two studies in Appendix A. The sampling procedure for the qualitative interviews aimed to include a range of theoretically relevant socio-structural variables for the older and younger research participants based on the results of the analyses of the quantitative surveys.

I joined the research project 'Status Sequences of Women between Employment and the Family' after the sampling, the interviewing and coding for the analysis of the interweaving of paid work and family work were completed. For the purpose of the analysis of kinscripts in the lives of the older women I listened to the tape-recorded interviews and recoded the material with respect to kin work. I also drew on the life course graphs and protocols of the interviewers (see below). In the project 'Patterns of Status Passages and Intergenerational Inheritance' I was involved in the qualitative design from the onset. I developed the sampling criterion of 'intra-familial caring traditions' and the part of the topic guide focussing on those experiences, as well as on care giving anticipations illustrated in Figure 5.4. I interviewed 15 of the 49 younger research participants included in the qualitative sample, coded the interviews and produced life course graphs.

The interview method in both studies was based on the 'problem centred interview' (Witzel 1982). The text analysis was 'theme-centred', aiming at the exploration of the 'social logic' of kin work rather than the reconstruction of individual cases. In the sections that follow I will describe and reflect upon the research design and context in more detail. Much has been written about reflexivity and the specific location of the researcher, which is seen as guiding and constraining research. Although there is a consensus that 'the unavoidable task of the genuine methodological treatment is to identify and assess these premises' (Blumer 1986, p. 25) the procedures for accounting for a researcher's partiality and location are less clear. Reay (1996, pp. 68-70) has suggested the need to focus upon emotive 'non-intellectual' responses, seductive alliances with some research participants and distance from others in order to 'address the difference my difference made'. I will address some of these issues in section 5.5.
5.2. SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS AND GENERATIONAL POSITIONINGS OF THE RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS

As is described in Appendix A the sequential sampling procedure followed the principle of a deliberate sampling for heterogeneity. The group of older women was not selected on the basis of their kin commitments but their vocational training, apprenticeship, in two culturally contrasting regions in West Germany. The women had all completed secondary school and had finished their vocational training around 1948. They were thus born between 1928 and 1931 and currently at the actual or potential transition to retirement. All 52 women included in the qualitative sample had married and had between one and five children. In terms of family events this group can be considered as typical for women of this birth cohort in Germany. The sample further included women trained in the five most common occupations after the war as well as four dominant status configurations: women who had permanently left the labour market and were homemakers; women who had predominantly worked in their trained occupation; women who mainly worked in other occupations and women who had predominantly worked in temporary positions without paying social security contributions.

This form of sampling allowed for a systematic comparison of different (sub)groups to investigate the relevance or irrelevance of theoretically significant structural characteristics for specific interpretation patterns. For example, it was possible to explore whether women who were predominantly homemakers developed different practices and views on kin work from women who were mostly employed. It also allowed accounts that the women shared and which may relate to dominant cultural scripts to be distinguished from those shared by specific subgroups, which may refer to contextually specific modes of perception and coping.

In terms of the diverse use of the term generation (Chapter 1.3.) women at the transition to retirement can be assumed to occupy (or to recently have occupied) a position ‘in the middle’ of their family lineage (Brody 1981). Brody has argued that the position of having both adult children and a surviving parent entails competing role demands and
kinship obligations. (She has not, however, taken into account the caring role of grandparents.) Support given to older relatives might be added to employment as well as commitments as wives, mothers and grandmothers. The notion of ‘women in the middle’ intended to call attention to agency and conflict in this lineage position as well as to the impacts of social policy in shaping it (Brody op. cit.). In the German context the so-called ‘sandwich generation’ is also associated with the position of the middle generation in the institutionalised generational contract, which provides for those who are not yet or no longer in regular employment (Borchers and Miera 1993, pp. 20-21). Older women, however, tend to be associated exclusively with the lineage position.

On the basis of their birth cohort the group under study are members of the ‘pre-war generation’ (Becker and Hermkens 1993). During their childhood and adolescence the pre-war generation experienced economic crisis, restricted options for secondary education and WWII. Most of their adult lives fell in the decades of economic growth characterised by the reconstruction, the ‘economic miracle’ and the building of the post-war welfare state. The economic recession of the late 1980s coincided with the actual or potential retirement of the pre-war generation.

In terms of their position in an inter-age group or generation conflict, Becker and Hermkens note that the pre-war generation contributes to the ‘problems experienced or foreseen with regard to the “greying of the nation”’ (Becker and Hermkens op. cit., p. 22). According to David Thomson (1989) it is not merely their increased life expectancy but more saliently their actions that define the position of this generation in a conflict of interest. As members of the so-called welfare generation, defined inclusively as cohorts born between 1920 and 1945 (Thomson 1991 as quoted in Hills 1996, p. 57) members are said to constitute ‘the prime beneficiaries of the welfare state throughout their adult lives’ (Thomson 1989, p. 35). Generalising from his analysis of the New Zealand welfare state Thompson argues that the welfare generation, whose members were young adults in the first 25 years of the modern ‘youth-centred welfare state’, gained greatly from highly subsidised property purchase, family benefits, family health services and education for their children. Growing older however they ‘revealed (no) interest in sustaining the youth-state’ (Thomson op. cit., p. 40) but – out of self-interest, ‘though not ... in an overt
or even conscious manner’ (Thomson op. cit., p. 36) – furthered a restructuring of the welfare state that benefited the aged over other age groups.

The qualitative sample of the women’s adult children was equally selected on the basis of a life course survey and included women and born between 1953 and 1964 (see Appendix A). The 49 participants for the qualitative study were selected so as to represent heterogeneity with respect to their education and family status (skilled training vs. university degree and children vs. no children) but also to represent similarities and differences with respect to the life courses of their mothers, namely their employment and elder care-giving histories. Ten sibling dyads of different gender and three sibling triads were included. In comparison to representative studies the group was educationally more qualified than the national.

In terms of their generational positioning, men and women aged between 30 and 41 (at the time of study) may occupy the second position in a three- or four-generation family. If the young adults have children competing role demands are more likely to occur between family and paid work than between different kinship obligations because parents are likely to live independently and in relatively good health. In terms of their birth cohort people born between 1953 and 1964 have been defined as the ‘lost generation’ (Becker and Hermkens op. cit.). The predicate ‘lost’ refers to their unfavourable position in the labour market. In childhood and adolescence, members of the lost generation are said to have grown up better housed, fed, clothed and educated than any generation before them and did not experience war or depression. They went through their formative years in the mid-1970s, a period of fundamental social change and a destandardisation of living arrangements in Germany.

In terms of family patterns, the mid-1970s were characterised by the first radical decline in birth and marriage rates and a sharp increase in cohabitation, divorce rates and one-parent families. Furthermore, part-time work expanded on a large scale and, through educational reform, higher education became more accessible to all social classes, with a subsequent increase in women’s participation in higher education and in the labour market. The mid-1970s were also a time of the expansion and legitimisation of the
kindergarten as a pedagogic institution. Compared with the pre-war generation the lost
generation thus faced a multitude life style choices and a larger degree of sexual self-
determination, but also tardy careers, longer periods of unemployment, and the
deregulation and retrenchment politics of the welfare state.

Regarding their position in an inter-age conflict, members of the lost generation are
expected to cease to care if their older parents are in need (Becker and Hermkens op. cit.,
p. 23) and are thus to some degree held responsible for the erosion of family solidarity.
As members of the so-called baby boom generation they are projected to lose out in the
institutionalised generational contract. Due to their number, high life expectancy and low
fertility rate, members of the baby-boom generation are the obvious losers in Thomson's
scenario of an inter-age conflict. While they support and contribute to a redistributive
mechanism of the welfare state, which secures the pensions of those currently retired,
they do not have the guarantee of equivalent benefits in their own retirement (Chapter
3.6.). The more numerous ‘late boomers’ (1955-1964) additionally also have to
contribute to the pensions of the ‘early boomers’ (1946-1954).

Figure 5.1. gives an overview of the qualitative sample characteristics of the two groups
under study.
FIGURE 5.1. Characteristics of sample of older German women and their adult children

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Older German women (Age 58-61)</th>
<th>Adult sons and daughters (Age 30-41)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>no.</td>
<td>no.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample size</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level of occupational qualification</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University degree</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Current employment status</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed or self-employed</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housewife/ maternity leave</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pensioner</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Current family status</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohabiting</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With children/ grandchildren</td>
<td>52/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widowed</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorced</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.3. THE SOCIO-CULTURAL CONTEXT OF THE STUDY

As elaborated in section 5.2., the older women research participants were recruited from two culturally contrasting regions in West Germany. The actual distribution in the
qualitative sample of women born around 1930 was biased towards the Protestant city. Thirty-three women lived in the city of Bremen (0.54 million inhabitants) in the north-western Land Bremen, 19 women in the rural and small-town administrative district of Koblenz (1.52 million inhabitants) in the south-western Land Rhineland-Palatinate. Similarly 33 of the younger research participants were born in Bremen, 16 in the district of Koblenz. Due to social mobility however, more than half of the younger research participants had moved away (13 from Bremen, 11 from Koblenz), although mobility, as the map (Figure 5.2.) shows, is somewhat regionally bound.

Together with Saarland and Bavaria, the Land Rhineland-Palatinate has a predominantly Catholic population, whereas Bremen in the Protestant north is overwhelmingly Protestant. Based on the analysis of German census data and representative family surveys of the German Youth Institute (DJI) that allow for differentiation at regional level, Bertram and colleagues (1993) have found that confessional differences are still correlated with differences in attitudes and behaviour. In comparison with the Protestant north and even rural Protestant areas, the valuation of children and marriage is much higher in rural Catholic districts, where most children live and households therefore tend to be larger. Women’s labour market participation rate decreases with an increase in the Catholic population, whereas support for the German conservative party CDU/CSU increases proportionally.

Research participants who were interviewed in the district of Koblenz, one of the three administrative districts in Rhineland-Palatinate, all lived in villages and small towns of between 600 and 40,000 inhabitants. The major city in the district is Koblenz. Most people in the district of Koblenz are employed in trade and industry. Although the service sector is the second largest employer, employment in this sector does not even account for one fifth of all jobs (Landesinformationssystem Rheinland-Pfalz 1999). The proportion of family labourers is relatively high. Six per cent of the people in the district do not hold a German passport. Politically Rhineland-Palatinate used to be a heartland of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU). From its foundation in 1947 to 1991 it had a Christian Democrat government that held an absolute majority between 1971 and 1987. Conservative voting is associated with its agrarian and (particularly in the northern part)
Catholic milieu where the support of the CDU was considered to be a social norm (Arzheimer and Weins 1997).

The Hanseatic City of Bremen has the second largest port in Germany after Hamburg. Together with the city of Bremerhaven, Bremen is the smallest *Land* in Germany and an enclave in Lower Saxony. In view of its history as a member of the Hanseatic League and its strong support of the Protestant Reformation, the city prizes its ‘Hanseatic republican consciousness’ (Senatskanzelei 1996). As in other urban centres and in contrast to the rural Catholic region the perceived importance of marriage is relatively low, and the rate of single households is high (Bertram *et al.* 1993). Over 12% of the population do not hold a German passport. Most people in Bremen work in the service sector. Employment in industry rose sharply in the first decades after the war, but since the mid-eighties Bremen has been hit by the recession and has above average rates of unemployment. Politically Bremen has been a heartland of the Social Democrats, who have been in government since 1970.
FIGURE 5.2. Geographical areas of research and mobility of the younger generation

Key
- Areas of research of older women and majority of adult children
- Social mobility of adult children
5.4. THE PROBLEM-CENTRED INTERVIEW

Interviews are at the same time a tool for exploring views and interpretation patterns and a practice that produces situated meanings grounded in specific interactional episodes—a process that itself requires analysis and reflection. From the multitude of interview techniques available (e.g. Flick 1995; Fontana and Frey 1998) we adapted the method of the ‘problem-centred interview’ (Witzel 1982), that builds on elements of ethnomethodology, symbolical interactionism and biographical methods and was developed in focus groups, for single face-to-face verbal interchanges. The problem-centred interview consists of a brief standardised questionnaire by which socio-demographic information is separated from the conversational interview, the interview itself that follows a flexible topic guide to explore themes and ‘structures of relevance’ in the interpretation of social actors, and an interview protocol. In the protocol the interviewer after the interview notes down her impressions of the communication, the environment, the respondent and her own behaviour and feelings. In different ways the questionnaire and the protocol thus provide contextual information in addition to the audiotaped interview. Although qualified as a contextualisation of the emerging data the systematic use of data from the questionnaire and protocol in the interview analysis has not been conceptualised by Witzel.

According to Witzel (op. cit.) the method is characterised by (i) an orientation towards a ‘socially relevant’ problem and must explicate the views of the respondents in order to develop theory; (ii) an orientation towards the subject matter: methods and their practice must be developed and modified in relation to the subject matter; and (iii) an orientation towards process: ‘understanding’ and analysis develop gradually and impact on further research strategies. In terms of research strategies the pre-knowledge of the researcher has to be organised in a flexible topic guide. The topic guide should sensitisise and direct but not close off perception in the exploratory interview procedure that aims to unfold the views of the research participants through immanent and ‘external’ questions and probes. As with other kinds of semi-structured interviews this method addresses some of the problems encountered in structured and unstructured interviews while also making use of their strengths. Structured interviews, whilst being economic and seemingly unambiguous, do not enable respondents to develop their own versions of the social
world and unfold their narratives and concerns. Unstructured interviews, on the other hand, give ample room for the unfolding of the individual narrative, but are seen as uneconomic, unsystematic and ambiguous. Both interview strategies have been seen as prohibiting the engagement of the interviewer who is committed to standardised friendly and non-judgmental behaviour. Critics point out that this lack of engagement contributes to the researcher's invisibility and conceals processes of interpretation and construction within the interview process (Fontana and Frey op. cit.).

Witzel (op. cit.) on the contrary holds that the questions and active engagement of the interviewer are evidence of her genuine interest. Interviewers are required to listen actively but also to bring in their problem-centred interests, initiate thematic changes and probe. The topic guide is organised in a spectrum of thematic fields, key words and open narrative incentives, which aim at generating narratives both on the level of description and evaluation. The topic guide and the conversational techniques should enable research participants to express and assert their views also in contrast to the interviewer's preconceptions. Witzel distinguishes general and specific probes. General probing aims at additional information and details, whereas specific probing aims at clarifying the understanding of what has been said through reflection and feedback by the interviewer who is requested to address contradictions and ambiguities in the accounts. Thus the aim is that problems of understanding encountered in the interview should be addressed and explored rather than glossed over. According to Witzel this is an attempt to increase clarity, generate shared understanding and thereby increase the 'validity' of the interpretation already in the interview process.

Although Witzel himself has characterised the interview as an interactive 'text production' (Witzel op. cit., p. 108) his assumption of the self-evidence and presence of understanding in the interview is problematic. This assumption is built on the conception of language as a 'means of reason' (Witzel op. cit., p. 61). Yet, in arguing for the need to transcribe the entire interview Witzel has pointed to the fact that some interview passages gain significance only after the interview. I therefore suggest that the task of the interviewer is to question her own instant understandings and to enable the research participants to express ambivalences and contradictions in the interview, rather than
closing those off and encouraging the research participant to present rationally congruent views. For the same reason (that is the presumption of a presence of shared understanding) it is not justified to privilege spontaneous narratives over and above descriptive and evaluative utterances. An example of such privileging in the German phenomenological tradition is provided by Schütze (1983), who argued that narratives offer a more direct access to the inner world of research participants. Schütze suggested that biographical interviews should aim at generating narratives because social actors are experts in their own lives and have a lot of implicit experiential knowledge that is not integrated in subjective theories or available in argumentative form.

Life Course Graphs

Although the method of the problem centred interview involves problematic assumptions and critics have argued correctly that the combination of elements of different research traditions in the problem-centred interview has not been acknowledged and developed systematically (Flick 1995, p. 108-109) the method does generate some productive ideas. In the research design of the Bremen studies socio-structural information had been investigated before the actual interviews (see Appendix A). As a 'memory aid' for both the interviewer and the research participant a novel technique was introduced in the interviews: information provided in the standardised questionnaires was visualised in individual life course graphs. For each respondent a graph was produced that marked the participant's employment periods chronologically as horizontal bars on a time axis, differentiated according to the kind of employment and social security status. Family events such as marriage and the birth of (grand)children were marked as vertical lines. In addition, as a reflection of the increasing plurality of life courses, graphs for the younger generation also depicted changes in living arrangements and partnerships (see Figure 5.3.).
Insofar as the interviews spanned decades of adult life, the graphs were used to relieve research participants from the strain of dating life course events and transitions in favour of the in-depth exploration of experiences and meaning systems around the life course transitions. At the beginning of the interview the individual graph was presented and checked for accuracy. Interview accounts increased the validity of the survey data insofar as the majority of older women confirmed that employment details had been given by consulting their pension related employment records. At the same time the narratives revealed that one third of the women had worked informally as family labourers, home workers or in ‘cash in hand’ jobs which had not been included in the questionnaires and graphs based on them. Adding these periods into the graph during the interviews generated additional explanations of why they had not been considered as ‘work’. The life course graphs also initiated discussions when some of the older women stated that they had not been employed when they had young children while the life course graphs indicated that they did. Again discussion produced insights in perception and evaluation patterns. Overall – and quite unexpectedly for the researchers – the presentation of the life course graph had a positive motivational effect on both older and younger research participants to engage in the interview.

The construction of the topic guide

For both sub-samples theoretically relevant dimensions of the research topic were organised in a topic guide that consisted of thematic fields, key words and ‘narrative incentives’ that introduced these themes and initiated thematic changes. Key words reminded the interviewer to check for relevant theoretical dimensions if they were not brought up by the research participants. In order to integrate them into the conversation while allowing for flexibility they were not formulated as questions (see Figure 5.4.). Following Witzel the topic guide aimed at generating descriptions and narratives but also evaluations of practices and decisions and what he called ‘taking stock’ of the life course. In the topic guide for the study of older women, themes included the women’s apprenticeship and status passages between employment and family as well as the overall evaluation of the family and employment history. Although the topic guide did not include direct questions referring to kin work, questions referring to the women’s
apprenticeship, family formation or exits from the labour market - unforeseen by the researchers - 'demanded' that the research participants situate themselves in the socio-historical and intergenerational context of their families of origin. These accounts became the basis of the empirical analysis in chapters 6 and 7.

The topic guide for the younger generation aimed to address dimensions of social change in life styles across two family generations. These dimensions included: the structuring impacts of family traditions vs. social institutions; the reproduction vs. transformation of the parental legacy; and gender-specific differences with respect to possible discrepancies between normatively accepted and actual lifestyle and were organised in five thematic fields. The first theme in the topic guide addressed the recalled experiences and retrospective evaluation of the mother’s employment and family care-giving. The second theme addressed the life style of the younger generation; the third addressed life course events and decisions with respect to changing structures of relevance in an intra-familial comparison; the fourth anticipated life changes; and the fifth gender equality.

In contrast to the study of older women, I explicitly included kin work and anticipated family care-giving responsibilities in the topic guide for the younger generation. These issues had points of connection with other parts of the interview, such as the perceived caring responsibilities of the mother (thematic field I), questions about intergenerational differences in norms and obligations (thematic field II) and gender equality (thematic field V).

The narrative incentives were formulated so as to address different 'modes of knowledge and depiction of experience' (Flick op. cit., p. 115), that is description, spontaneous narratives and evaluation. On the level of description, research participants were asked to describe courses of events or status passages, or give concrete examples of their more abstract statements. On the level of evaluation they were asked for a range of comparisons. First, in an intra-generational comparison with people of the same 'generation' (friends, classmates, colleagues etc.) they were asked to assess the subjectively perceived conformity or non-conformity of their practices and views. Second, in an intergenerational comparison with members of younger and older
The topic guide thereby encouraged research participants to shift their location of perception to allow for a different accentuation of their views in different contexts/against different backgrounds. Becker-Schmidt (1980) has called this interview strategy 'topical change of perspective'.
FIGURE 5.4. Illustration of the topic guide (thematic field IV)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Themes</th>
<th>Key words/cues</th>
<th>Narrative incentive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Wishes/plans/changes for the near and more distant future | Areas of change  
- Employment (different, more, less)  
- Family  
- Free time  
- Other activities | If you imagine your life in the future, do you plan any changes? |
| Support of and care-giving for parents | Anticipated commitments  
- Own contribution  
- Home care vs. institutional care  
Family caring experiences  
Perceived expectations  
Negotiations with parents(in-law), siblings, partner  
Perceived norms  
- Intragenerationally  
- Intergenerationally  
Desired institutional changes | At some point in the future you might encounter the situation that your parents/mother is in need of care. Have you ever thought about how you would or will deal with it? |
| Anticipations of old age | Anticipated sources of support  
- Children  
- Institutions  
Politics and policies | How do you visualise yourself in old age? |
| | | In your view, what policy measures have to be implemented to allow for an adequate life style in old age? |

In the interview encounters the conversation was much less orderly than suggested by the illustration of the topic guide. An example for a probe on the level of intergenerational
comparison in the topic guide of the older women was the following narrative incentive that aimed at addressing a dimension of social change: ‘If you compare the relationship between you and your daughter to the relationship between you and your mother, is it rather similar or is it different?’ The flexible handling of the topic guide, whereby questions should be addressed in the flow of the conversation, meant that this dimensions of social change was adapted to themes that emerged in the interview. This is illustrated in the following example, where a woman had spoken extensively about her care-giving responsibilities. The interview passage illustrates the extent to which questions of the woman interviewer (a colleague in Bremen) shaped the interview although she purposefully attempted not to pre-structure emerging views. In contrast to Witzel’s claim, the passage shows that contradictions, such as the simultaneous foregrounding of the obligatory and voluntary nature of the participant’s family commitments, could not be ‘clarified’ or ‘solved’ in the interview. Such contradictions may not be perceived as contradictory by the research participants and they may be grounded in contradictory societal demands, which cannot be reconciled at the individual level. They must, however, be opened up and discussed in the interview analysis.

Int: Do you think that this relationship between you and your mother, this obligation that you had, seemed to have felt, that you have to care for your mother
Resp: yes, yes I had to
Int: -care because nobody else is there
Resp: Nobody is there
Int: Do you think that young women today see this similarly? Or is this something that always
Resp: I wouldn’t count on that. I mean, our [daughter] is - when something happens somewhere - when I’m still upset, then she is so practical, well that she instantly does the right thing ... but I wouldn’t assume that she would over a longer period-
Int: do it in that way
Resp: would say: I have to do it this way. ...
Int: And how do you see this - well, I call it ‘a bit more distance’ - or I don’t know, how you should call it that they say, well
Resp: more egoistic you mean or
Int: No, I don’t know whether I would
Resp: No, you can’t
Int: I don’t want to say it negatively
Resp: No no
Int: only this change ... do you think it is better? Or would you wish that in this respect it should rather stay the same?
Resp: I really can’t say. Because I went through it twice. You can’t demand it of someone. If someone doesn’t do it voluntarily - you can’t force it. (ID no. 003, 158
Interview protocols

The third methodical strategy of the problem-centred interview was the interview protocols in which the interviewers noted contextual information and their own feelings about the interview. The protocols suggested the importance of recording information on the arrangement of the interview, the length of the visit, interruptions, tape recording, environment and appearance of the research participants, atmosphere and conversation, age relation, own feelings and ‘other noticeable things’. All three women interviewers in the study of older women filled in these protocols and discussed their feelings in the team. In the study of the younger generation, however, the other two interviewers were reluctant to put down their personal impressions and feelings in writing so that only my own protocols were available. Because I interviewed the younger research participants separately and lived in London, whereas I had lived in Bremen during the study of the older women, I had more personal information about the interviewing experiences from the interviewers of the older women even though I did not take part in those interviews. Yet, the collaboration with Bremen University meant that I received extensive interview training in the problem-centred interview technique when I interviewed younger research participants in and around Bremen. Training was provided by members of the research team in Bremen who listened in detail to my tape-recorded interviews and assessed my questions as well as suggesting different kinds of questions by which contradictions in the account could have been addressed.

5.5. THE PROCESS OF THEME-CENTRED ANALYSIS

The theme-centred analysis drew on three sources of data: the interview protocols, the socio-structural information of the life courses generated in the survey and illustrated in the life course graphs, and the transcribed interviews. Working with and through interview transcripts is based on the assumption that two to three hour long conversations can give entry into the concerns of research participants and their perceptions of their practices. At the same time not only are the narrative and its interpretation a construction
but also the ‘time-manipulative structure of the recording’ of the interview, which separates the conversation from its social and temporal context, has a constructive moment. As Flick argues with reference to Bergmann (1985 as quoted in Flick 1995, p. 188) the fact that the interview can be listened to over and over again not only enables new insights but also constructs a new version of the interchange. This raises questions about the construction of meaning. Indeed, several of the older research participants initially appeared uncomfortable with the recording of the conversation, which might indicate insecurity and perhaps a feeling of powerlessness about how the researchers would interpret their testimonies and what they would do with them. Whilst the researcher can assure confidentiality, the question arises of how to discuss with the research participants the interpretations and research findings of the researcher.

Interviews were generated in what has been called a ‘research bargain’ (Warren 1988, p. 39): the research participants were paid a small ‘expense allowance’ and in turn ‘provided’ their stories. But the research bargain entailed much more: the interviewers were invited into the research participants’ homes, coffee or tea was offered, time was exchanged, a readiness to listen, to talk, to remember, to engage. Given that the allowance was not very high and several research participants did not know they were receiving one, money alone cannot be regarded as the primary motivation of people to participate in the research. In his study on welfare organisations Flick (1995, p. 74) has pointed to the symbolic status of ‘scientific research’, which in his study had made it very difficult for public service organisations to refuse their participation. On the individual level it is difficult to assess the factor of ‘participating in the generation of “knowledge”’. The interview protocols show that older women in particular were aware of and concerned about making aspects of their lives (semi) public, which was at the same time a reason for participating in the research. Thus one research participant was reported to have told her neighbour who came by during the interview ‘‘I’m sorry I have an important talk with a woman from the university’’ and then to the interviewer ‘‘It’s so nice to talk with an adequate interlocutor’’ (Protocol 525).

On the other hand women were concerned about confidentiality and wanted reassurance that they did not have to sign anything and only had to say what they wanted to say.
Referring to the state authorities they maintained however, "well why should they be interested in my life" (Protocol 516) or "I don't have anything to hide" (Protocol 073). In contrast to the younger generation, several of the older women were interested in receiving the transcribed interview and some results of the study. For the Bremen participants we therefore organised a meeting to report some of the findings, which was well attended and seemed to receive very positive feedback.

Working with (my own and others) transcripts and protocols generated at least two different experiences (or interpretation of experiences), the 'interviewing experience' and 'the text experience'. Both experiences were different for the two groups or 'generations' I was researching. I will elaborate on them in turn.

In the study of the older women, the women interviewers had often come back from their interviews dejected. Looking back on their lives for the older research participants had also meant reflecting on missed chances, losses and feelings of powerlessness and 'voicelessness' often encountered also in their immediate environment. Yet, life histories showed a considerable degree of independence and strength that the interviewers found difficult to reconcile with positions of subordination in the family and which sometimes produced feelings of anger:

The Xs have moved into this new flat only a fortnight ago. [The interview was interrupted several times due to renovation work of the husband and son-in-law] The husband who kindly drove me back to the station made a few remarks such as 'when we are gone, you can clean up where we have drilled'. Whereupon she [the research participant] winked at me and said 'Yes, yes that's the women's fate' ... I found it astounding how little a woman, who has lived and worked so self-confidently, manages to get her way with her husband. It makes me angry if this man then speaks of dirt that has to be cleaned up.

(Protocol 550)

The impression of subordination was reinforced by the fact that in 10 of the 38 interviews with married women their husbands were present periodically or were 'semi-present' (e.g., reading the paper). This meant that they were often in a position to 'overhear' the interview and did at times present their own views to the interviewer or 'corrected' the accounts of their wives. Although elements of melancholy and sadness were 'present' in the interview transcripts, my in-depth reading of the narratives brought into the
foreground the women’s humour, their struggles and fights and attempts to break out and make changes to their life-style. Moreover, the interviews had also opened up a different historical period to me that incited my interest and made it easier to contextualise the narratives.

Most of the younger research participants on the other hand were still in the process of establishing their lives and felt that a large part of their lives was still before them. Overall, they seemed much less melancholic but those who had children in particular appeared to be ‘caught up’ in their everyday-lives of establishing (or cutting back) their careers and committing time to their children. Listening to their accounts I often felt disappointed by what I perceived as an exclusive retreat into their private existence and noted down their ‘dreamlessness’, that I found ‘terribly tiring’ while interviewing. Members of the younger generation not only lived in the same ‘age’ as me, but also were in a life stage that I myself was approaching. The traditional division of labour between the husband as breadwinner and the wife as homemaker and part-time worker of those research participants who had children confronted me with a discomforting feeling of ‘déjà vu’. Whilst conducting the interviews I felt that the resistance that I had encountered in reading and listening to the narratives of the older women was absent. Both women and men saw gender equality not only as non-existent but also as not attainable (see Chapter 8). I found that the ‘lack of outrage with which this is presented outrageous’. At the end of an interim summary of my interviewing experience I asked frustratedly ‘why should I go and re-search if the people themselves do not search for anything. What am I looking for?’

These notes highlighted my different positioning with respect to the two groups of participants. Because of my age, the lives of the older women had less bearing on my own life, although their sadness and reported frustration affected me. By contrast, the lives of the younger generation, and in particular the implications of children on possibilities of engaging in broader ‘political’ as well as personal issues, were more threatening so that I initially distanced myself more.

Yet, working with the textual material into which the research is inevitably transformed,
shifted my focus. The theme-centred interview analysis proceeded from the identification of specific themes, which were then analysed across all research participants. Not having to cope with the ‘whole’ biography of the research participant at once allowed me to focus in more depth on the things said and the way they were said. For example, I came to realise that ‘the retreat into privacy’ and moments of enjoyment of the younger participants could be interpreted as resisting the work ethics and discipline of their mothers.

After a full transcription of all interviews, ‘categories’ were developed on the basis of especially ‘rich’ and complex interviews in a process of close reading and discussion in the research team. Categories were thematic units, such as (for the older generation) the family of procreation, and specified in categorical fields such as birth of the first child, negotiations around re-entries into the labour market and the meaning of family after retirement. Categorical fields could be part of more than one thematic field. The hand-coded passages including those passages that did not fit into any of the existing categories were read into the computer program Ethnograph. To make use of the theoretical composition of the sample, a heading of socio-structural characteristics was attached to each coded passage. In the case of the older women the heading denoted region, occupational training, number of children, dominant status configuration (predominantly homemaker, employed in vocational area, other occupations or without national insurance) and current marital status. In the case of the younger generation, it denoted gender, sibling position, educational level (skilled, academic degree and no occupational training), family status, current employment status and number of children.

As stated above the emerging focus on kin work led me to recode the interviews of the older women.

I started the interview analysis for the kin work project with a thematic comparison of older women’s accounts of family care giving, and the care anticipations of the younger generation. These medium-range themes were a point of entry into the analysis of kin work. Within these thematic units accounts were first compared for similarities and differences in interpretation patterns, tone and emotional content. To correct my own perception I frequently counted patterns and looked for counter-examples. Within and
across interpretation patterns, I looked for potential differences between descriptive and argumentative utterances. I also applied my theoretically informed focus on the repertoires of contract and other modes of justification in order to assess to what extent they provided images, vocabularies and symbols which shaped thinking on what is desirable and thinkable. Attention was given to ‘negative’ cases and the contradictory, marginal, and quantifiably insignificant.

Second, to increase an understanding of what respondents meant by certain concepts, such as ‘self-evidence’ I searched for other contexts in the interview, in which these terms were used. Here I deployed a simple search function in the word processing program. Third, guided by the framework of kinscripts emerging pattern were re-contextualised in the context of social institutions and socio-economic context and of the histories of relationships. The analysis proceeded thus on several levels, moving between the ‘microanalysis’ of terms and concepts to a contextualisation within the history of family relationships and a focus on institutions, legacies and cultural scripts. At each step I checked whether interpretation patterns changed across (sub)groups with similar socio-demographic characteristics to explore the impact of variables such as region, gender or marital status on the interpretation pattern. The process-orientated approach also allowed the analysis of subgroups; for example, whether employed women use different arguments than homemakers.

Overall the analysis was orientated towards the structure and ‘social logic’ of kin work in different contexts, rather than to the reconstruction of individual biographies. Interview-protocols and further (historical) sources provided additional means of re-contextualisation. At the end of the three major parts of analysis (Chapters 6-8) I reflected on how the findings suggested the need to modify or transform the framework of kinscripts. The themes identified in the narratives have a claim to reliability, yet my voice and research interests as unfolded in the previous chapters shape their specific presentation. Although the analysis attempts to bring out differences, contradictions and tensions between competing accounts and voices, this interpretation inevitably produced new points of closure and fixation that have to be addressed in further research.
5.6. CONCLUSION

In the preceding chapter I have accounted for the design and methods used for the empirical study of two family generations in two culturally contrasting regions in West Germany, particularly the sample characteristics, the problem-centred interview technique and the theme-centred analysis. Interview techniques encompassed a visualisation of socio-structural data on life course transitions in individual life course graphs, a flexible topic guide that focused on specific themes while allowing the concerns and views of the research participants to be expressed, and contextual interview protocols. The process- and theme-orientated text proceeded from the identification of broader themes, which emerged in the interview, to an identification of a range of interpretation patterns and their re-contextualisation in social circumstance. Attention was not only given to what the research participants had said but also to how it was said. Interpretation patterns were compared with respect to their correlation with socio-structural characteristics of the sub-groups in the samples.

The method of the problem centred interview structured the research in several ways. Investigating socio-structural characteristics before the interview, and illustrating them in life course graphs had meant that as an interviewer I already had some foreknowledge of the research participants and often had developed questions about particular coincidences of turning points in respect to, for example, the coincidence of childbirth and an exit from the labour market. At the same time in the absence of representing kin work, the graphs pointed to the researcher’s blind spots in the construction of the quantitative questionnaire. Graphical representations were productive insofar as they initiated discussions in the interview. Research participants appeared to feel positive about attempts to represent their social ‘life courses’ and were encouraged to correct and add to them. Periods of kin work were re-integrated in the graphs where they concerned unpaid work in family businesses. Despite the absence of questions on kin work both in the survey and topic guide for the older generation women addressed these commitments and thereby encouraged me to integrate these issues in the topic guide of the younger generation. I suggest that the extent of productivity of the presentation of graphical material in the interview situation does therefore not depend on its ‘accuracy’ but on the
extent to which they are discussed as social scientific constructions and enable the generation of discussion, disagreement and possibly consensus. Establishing agreement about socio-structural variables is a crucial ingredient for an analysis that is committed to linking interpretation patterns to socio-historical contexts.

Deploying an interview topic guide, however much it aims at allowing open conversation and the possibility of the research participant’s maintaining her view against the researchers preconception, means nevertheless that researchers/interviewers have predefined areas of interests. In addressing and introducing thematic fields during the interview, power is located on the side of the researcher. Although the older research participants particularly were at times overwhelmed by painful memories that came up unexpectedly, interview transcripts and protocols suggest that research participants had an irreducible power of framing their narratives and sharing or withholding ‘information’. Aspects of kin work practices that were of personal significance were repeatedly brought up in the interview although the topic guide did not address them. At the same time a number of research participants also conveyed through body language that they did not want to talk about particular family relationships. In the interview encounter and the arrangements that led to it, some of the younger research participants appeared to attempt to re-balance power inequalities by presenting themselves as local specialists, recommending accommodation, deciding on places to meet.

To increase transparency of the ways in which I have used the narratives I will have to disseminate the findings and interpretations of my research to the research participants. Carrying out this uncodified part of the research bargain must be a central concern in future research.
Chapter 6

OPPORTUNITIES AND CONSTRAINTS IN CONTRACTS OF NEED BETWEEN MOTHERS AND DAUGHTERS IN POST-WAR GERMANY

6.1. INTRODUCTION

The following analysis focuses on intergenerational kin work practices and the mechanisms of its assignment and negotiation in post-war Germany as depicted in the narratives of women born around 1930. As elaborated in Chapter 4, the framework of kinscripts with its socio-historical dimensions of social institutions, cultural scripts and intra-familial legacies and the sensitising dimensions of kin work, as well as the repertoire of contract, provided a heuristic orientation for the analysis of kin work in the interwoven life courses of members of different family generations. At the same time the empirical accounts were used to render specific and possibly modify the framework. By shedding light on the histories of family relationships, the chapter also contextualises the analysis of the kin work commitments of this group of women in later life (Chapter 7).

In post-war Germany a number of qualitative family studies were undertaken to determine the state of the family and its alleged ‘disintegration and disorganisation’ (Schelsky 1953, p. 17) particularly the suspected decline of the patriarchal authority of the father. The diagnosis of the ‘crisis of marriage and the family’ (Seeler 1984, p. 96) had a long history. As early as 1912 Müller-Lyer referred to the ‘disintegration of the family’, the economic and personal emancipation of women in the course of which ‘the old form of marriage, the indissoluble patriarchal coerced monogamy is more and more
perceived as outdated' (Müller-Lyer 1912 as quoted in Baumert 1954, p. 187). During and directly after WWII ‘fathers’ had been absent from families while women as heads of households had maintained, provided for and represented the family. Marriages were frequently jeopardised by alienation and conflicts of authority between wives and homecoming husbands who ‘had lost the war’. Divorces and illegitimate births increased. 1948 has been described as the ‘record year’ of divorces (Ruhl 1988).

Although the focus of the post-war family studies was primarily on conjugal relationships and on ‘disorientated youth’ they were principally concerned with family solidarity. Adorno in a preface to Baumert’s (op. cit.) family study stated that the equality of the Notgemeinschaft [need related community], that is the suspension and levelling of social status after the collapse of the Reich, had only been temporary. Schelsky (op. cit., p. 260) referred to the primacy of family solidarity ‘vis-à-vis the demands and threats of the outside world’. In Schelsky’s interpretation, the demands of solidarity led to a decrease in intergenerational conflict as different views on politics, morals and lifestyle were set aside to secure survival. The views and concerns of women were not investigated in their own right.

Yet, given the numerical shortage in men, part of the solidarity discourse in the immediate post-war referred to single mothers. Measures for strengthening the position of single and unmarried women were discussed, most spectacularly perhaps being the proposition by Dorothea Klaje to institutionalise and legalise the ‘mother family’ as an economic unit between an employed woman and her children and a single homemaking woman. Klaje’s legal draft was published in 1947 and submitted to the parliamentary committee in 1949 (Seeler 1984). Although the proposal was rejected, the openness of the public debates, illustrated in the continuing discussion of the proposal in women’s magazines, is remarkable against the background of the cultural and structural restoration of the bourgeois family that was to follow.

Feminist historians have highlighted the primary significance of women’s dual contribution to production and reproduction for the capitalist reconstruction in Germany. They have criticised the conventional conceptual divide between politics and everyday
life in analyses of the post-war period. Annette Kuhn (1984, p. 197), for example, refers to the contradictory simultaneity of capitalist (primary) production and ‘archaic forms of subsistence economy’. After the war, there were 7.3 million more women in Germany than men. 3.7 million soldiers had died and 11.7 million men were prisoners of war. As in the war, women often were heads of households and lived together in families consisting of women and children. Apart from compulsory community services and a continuation of employment in the formal sector, including work in traditionally ‘male’ occupations, women were constantly trying to obtain food through foraging, black market activities and barter. Social differences, the German Institute for Economic Research noted in 1947, were no longer maintained by differences in income but by differing possibilities for accessing means of consumption (Schubert op. cit., p. 240). Feminist historians argue that women’s work after (and during) the war had been heroicised but de-historicised and never supported or acknowledged as a politico-economic factor. On the contrary, ‘housewives’ in the immediate post-war years received the lowest category of food-ration cards. Reports from this period indicate that women were often underweight, had a high rate of miscarriages, were unable to breastfeed and suffered from gynaecological disorders, nervousness and irritability (Ruhl op. cit.).

To date feminist approaches to uncovering the importance of material housework and the subsistence economy for the capitalist reconstruction in Germany have not included an analysis of the significance of intergenerational kin work as a form of welfare production within and across household boundaries. How did women who were around 15 years old at the end of the war conceive of the ‘matrilineality’ (Hagestad 1986b, p. 156) of family cohesion as well as the solidarity and constraints it entailed? What were the impacts of cultural scripts, social institutions and intra-familial legacies in what has been termed Germany’s ‘coerced matriarchy’ (Kuhn 1984, cit., p. 171)?

The following four sections are organised around specific themes such as the contribution of daughters to the survival of families and childcare provided by grandmothers. Although the narratives show that kin work commitments did not follow any predictable order, the re-assemblage of the narratives loosely follows a chronological order to maintain a sense of the history and development of intertwined intergenerational
trajectories, particularly of mothers and daughters.

Based on narratives where the research participants positioned themselves in the context of the post-war and their families of origin, as well as on accounts systematically generated through a focus on parental support for the women’s vocational training and a comparison between their relationships with their mothers and daughters, sections 6.2 to 6.4. explore kin work in the so-called Frauenfamilien ['mother families'] (Schubert op. cit., p. 243) of the war and particularly the post-war period. Intergenerational relationships in these families are viewed from the position and recollection of the older women as young women and daughters. Although none of the women’s mothers could be included in the research, the much criticised ‘exclusively daughterly stance’ (Hirschberg 1989 as quoted in Ruddick 1994, p. 30) in research of mother-daughter relationships is to some extent counteracted by the subsequent perspective of the older women on their positions as mothers (6.5).

The text that follows is assembled by a ‘reading together’ of narrative accounts on a range of different constellations of kin work. To highlight the social structure of kin work, ‘gaps’ in one narrative can be illuminated or problematised by other narratives in cross-case comparisons. Interview passages have been included to illustrate the ways in which practices and views were reported. In order to highlight differences and commonalities I have attempted to include a maximum variety of accounts of research participants from both cultural regions. To increase the transparency of my translations of the narratives, the German quotations are listed in Appendix B, in order of appearance. Where possible, I have tried to contextualise the narrative accounts by providing additional historical information, information from the interview protocols and the quantitative surveys, and by referring to other findings on the extracted themes.

### 6.2. KIN WORK OF DAUGHTERS: OBLIGATIONS AND EMOTIONAL DISTANCE

Post-war Germany was an ‘austerity society’ (Ritter 1989, p. 9), marked by the fundamental Zusammenbruch (breakdown) of the socio-political system on the one hand
and personal as well as politico-economic continuities of a patriarchal-capitalist society on the other. For civilians the distribution of supplies worsened considerably between 1945 and 1947 (Ruhl 1988). In 1945, 45% of houses and flats in the western occupied zones were completely destroyed. Capital and labour were primarily put into primary industries. Thus in 1946 in the British and American occupied zones, where the research participants lived, the production rate of electricity and gas had reached 85% and of mining 78% of the production in 1936 (Abelshauser 1975, as quoted in Schubert 1984, p. 237). At the same time there was a fundamental shortage of basic consumer goods, such as food, heating material, and clothing. The production rate in the textile industry in 1946, for example, only reached 20% of the production in 1936 (ibid.). Like gas and electricity, food was rationed and fell to between 1150 to 950 calories per person per day. In Hamburg, the daily rate of death from malnourishment in 1946 was 1.2 and some people froze to death in their flats in the harsh winter of 1946/47 (Kuhn 1984).

The families of the research participants, who predominantly came from a working class or lower middle class background (10 parents were running a family business or were self-employed), had often been displaced. None of the women came from a Jewish background. Two women had fled with their mothers from the former Eastern territories (in Poland), three fled over the border from the Soviet occupied zone, one of them on her own. More than half of the research participants’ homes were bombed out. The women’s personal and family situation depended on their means of access to food supplies and accommodation with relatives. Due to the war-related absence of fathers and older brothers, the majority had first hand experiences with ‘women headed households’ either consisting of their mothers and siblings, and/or of other relatives, particularly grandmothers or grandparents who temporarily accommodated eleven of the 52 women interviewed.

On the other hand the women had also spent considerable amounts of time apart from their families, mainly through the evacuation of children for safety to the rural areas (Kinderlandverschickung (KLV)) where they stayed in families or camps. Furthermore girls had to undergo a year of compulsory community service (Pflichtjahr) both under the Nazis and the Allied occupation. In 1941 14.5 million girls, organised in the Nazi youth
organisation *Bund Deutscher Mädels* (BDM) did compulsory community services in Germany (Reese 1981 as quoted in Wiggershaus 1984, p. 45). The *Pflichtjahr* was bound to food ration cards and to the possibility of obtaining vocational qualifications.

Descriptions of the relationships to mothers (and sometimes grandmothers) were an important and integral part of the self-presentation of the research participants, which was confirmed in a range of interview protocols. Against the background of the vivid descriptions of insecurity and deprivation in the war and post-war years, I had expected narratives of particularly ‘close’ mother-daughter relationships. Henwood and Coughlan (1993), however, have rightly pointed out that an unquestioned equation of positive affection with practical support often underlies the construct of ‘closeness’ in mother-daughter relationships that requires critical investigation. Indeed whilst pointing to the existential necessity of ‘close’ cooperation, the characterisations of this relationship from the viewpoint of the daughters seem to refute the assumption of emotional closeness.

‘I had to - my mother was always out and about, as you say, to get us something to eat. She was in the country a lot. And then sometimes I had to cook for the older ones and for my little sister too... My mother didn’t think about us too much really. We pretty much grew up - without anything, right.’ (1)  

126, p. 1/3, city, mother divorced and employed, 3 siblings

From the standpoint of an uninvolved observer, it is plausible to define the mother’s foraging as a form of maternal care. The phrase ‘growing up “without anything”’ does indeed leave the exact referent unarticulated. In the context of ‘not think about’ the expressed lack with respect to the mother could refer to personal interest and caring about (as opposed to caring for), whilst literally connoting a complete absence (‘without anything’) that may include, for example, the absence of bodily contact and material security. The substitution of an unspecific term for a concrete one (‘that time is missing’) or the quantity of something for its quality (‘I’ve seen too much’) to refer to something that the women do not want or cannot speak about is not uncommon. This reading of a more encompassing lack in the relationship with their mothers gains weight in the context

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24 In order to provide a minimum of contextual information, socio-structural information is attached to the interview passages. Here it denotes the interview identification number, region, marital and occupational status of the mother and numbers of siblings referring to the post-war period, in later accounts also the women’s occupational status, their dominant status configuration and the number of their children.
of other narratives. Time (together), talking openly, emotional sharing, warmth and physically shown affection were identified and felt as missing, even though some of the mothers were perceived as having done ‘everything for us’ (525, see below). The lack of emotional closeness was presented in the context of the strains and multiple obligations of mothers in the survival work of the family, but also in the context of historically specific cultural scripts of respect and obedience towards the older generation (see, for example, Förster 1934 on the Nazi ideology of maternal ‘education work’) and long periods of absence and separation during evacuation.

The other side of maternal absences is that the women frequently introduced themselves as providers or co-providers for the family. Rather than presenting themselves as receivers of maternal care, the women reported that – in the absence of institutional support – as girls and adolescents they ‘had to’ contribute to the survival and welfare of the ‘women headed family’. As they described it, family responsibility developed in and through practice. From the perspective of the women interviewed, their contribution consisted of work that was done in the place of the mother, such as looking after younger siblings or organizing refugee permits or monetary exchanges as well as work that was done in cooperation with the mother or grandmother, like foraging for food. Occasionally the research participants were providers, for example when they obtained access to agricultural products whilst working on farms during the Pflichtjahr.

‘My mother didn’t have much time for us. She had seven children, she had the business, there wasn’t much time to look after the children. We were dressed, we had enough to eat, we had to help. ... We were fond of our mother, and she did everything for us. But there was no warmth between the parents and us. To give a hug sometimes, to give a kiss and say ‘well done’ there wasn’t any time, we were too many. And we missed that.’

525, p.12/26, country, mother married and self-employed, 6 siblings

Resp: Well, the whole flight, we were in a reception camp for four months, in X. There I had to look after the family. My mother was ill and I had to carry the main burden ... and that’s why you felt responsible for the whole family. I mean that was big in our family anyway. All siblings really. Later on, also now. That one cares for the other ... I could never talk to my mother. I think I went straight from being a child to being an adult. The time in between is missing. And, and I believe that something was always missing between my mother and me. You see, I was never actually at home during the war years, never with my mother. First I was at the KLV camp at Y, then I was at Z - both for six months or so. Then I
was at U, then in the V. And all the time I was away from my mother. You can say what you want, but something’s missing there.

Int: You became alienated from one another?
Resp: Oh yes. And even today, I still wonder sometimes how she could do that. How could she do that, how can anyone -
Int: Did you feel pushed out?
Resp: Oh yes, that time – it’s missing. ... On the other hand I say, God, the times were so hard, maybe she couldn’t do otherwise. The war ... And through this people hardened. And that’s how my mother was, rather than a cuddle, I got hit with a stick. That’s how it was. (3)

822, p. 26, city, mother married and not employed, 4 siblings

Both the absence of emotional closeness and the necessities of what I shall define below as daughterwork were strongly anchored in the socio-historical context of the war and post-war period. These contextualisations forestall narratives of ‘mother blame’ (Walters 1992, p. 37). While adult intergenerational relationships came to be characterised as ‘intimacy at a distance’ (Rosenmayr and Kockheis 1963) mother-daughter relationships during and after the war from the perspective of the research participants were characterised as ‘distance in proximity’ – at least for those periods when the women headed families were physically together. With reference to Patricia Hill Collins’s (1994, p. 59) notion of motherwork this form of kin work can be called daughterwork. According to Collins, motherhood for women of colour is closely linked to the concerns of racial ethnic communities and quests for physical survival and empowerment. The term ‘motherwork’ challenges the conventional divides between work and family, public and private, individual and collective. Yet, the question of whether the research participants viewed their practices as a social political practice and thought about it as empowering needs further exploration.

From the perspective of the research participants, grandparents and in particular grandmothers were viewed as a source of stability, dominance, authority and care. Grandparents provided shelter, food and care for many women headed families and/or the children. This support however, was usually seen as support for the respondents’ mothers. As one research participant put it ‘I was with granddad and grandma, they kept me then so as to make it a bit easier for her [her divorced mother]’ (022). For those women who remained alone with their mothers and siblings the absence of fathers was described as a loss in two respects: directly, as a loss of a potential source for love and
support for the women themselves, both in adolescence and in later life; and indirectly, as a loss of support of their mothers, whom the women saw as overburdened, hardened and sometimes in despair in the struggle for survival. Apart from practically taking over family responsibilities, the women tried to make things as easy as possible for their mothers in sparing them from their personal worries. This can be regarded as a further invisible aspect of daughterwork. The narratives often point to a tension between the mothers' hardness, their perceived strength that frequently was a source of positive identification, and their fragility.

'I often thought if my father were still alive then I think some things perhaps would have gone differently, I might have broken out. But my mother - I always wanted not to worry her.' (4)

857, p. 32, country, mother widowed and employed, 3 siblings

‘In any case we didn’t dare to clarify our positions towards our parents. We always tried not to hurt them as well, and always were anxious that we hurt them.’ (5)

814, p. 25, city, mother married and not employed, 2 siblings

As to the practical help they had given, no respondent spoke of having negotiated the extent of her contributions. On the contrary the formulations ‘I had to cook’ (126), ‘We had to help’ (525), ‘I had to look after the family’ (822) suggest that those practices were required by socio-economic circumstance and need. In times of existential insecurity women had to rely on each other; analytical categories of self-interest or bargaining power become obsolete. Just as some of the grandmothers provided for the children of their daughters, the research participants cooperated or stood in for their mothers. This cooperation is thus not necessarily an act of solidarity or free will, but the feeling of responsibility evolved through practice (‘I had to carry the main burden... and that’s why you felt responsible’ (822)). If one were to employ a contractual vocabulary, daughterwork in the post-war can be defined as an exchange, not in the sense of giving something for an equivalent good, but in the sense of replacing someone with another (woman), as an act of substitution which promoted a ‘new’ intergenerational division of labour.

In the kin work narratives referring to their childhood, family obligations appear as an all or nothing commitment. Resisting family responsibilities is visible and articulated only when women as adolescents left the family household altogether to pursue their own
interests, in which case a younger sister was likely to stand in for the one who left. This practice of substitution appeared as a natural and self-understood kinscript that did not need further explanation.

Resp: I was her oldest daughter and Dad hadn’t come back ... and I was practically Mum’s main support as it were. Everything that she needed, we went to the forest, sawed up trees so that we had any heating material at all and had a wood collection card

Int: So that you were a bit -
Resp: She needed a bit - but then I was very selfish and said, I’m still going to Bremen! [from the Soviet zone]
Int: Which you managed too
Resp: Yes, but then, my sister is three years younger than I. Then it was her turn. Right, well, that’s how it goes. (6)

Notwithstanding the woman’s courage and desire ‘to make something out of my life!’,
evoked in the dramatic account of her illegal crossing of the border between the Soviet and British zone, her exit from family responsibilities in her family of origin was enabled not only by her sister’s substituting but also by quasi-family relationships in Bremen. Thus, the chance to accept an offer of an apprenticeship in Bremen depended on the possibility of being accommodated by a close friend of her mother who was the godmother of her brother. As the research participant herself indicated, if she had wanted to leave with no particular goal, her mother would not have allowed it.

The narratives of women born around 1930 thus suggest that women were born into intergenerational relationships that required their help as daughters. Daughterwork was a self-understood part of growing up in wartime and post-war Germany and was neither based on a free choice nor on emotional closeness. Women of all ages substituted for the absence of institutional support and other family members without necessarily following an intra-familial tradition. The question of whether vocational training was more generally seen as a step towards a more independent, less family bound lifestyle, or whether kin responsibilities empowered women to pursue occupational training is considered in the next section.
6.3. WOMEN'S APPRENTICESHIP AFTER 1945: BETWEEN THE QUEST FOR INDEPENDENCE AND PLACEMENT IN THE KIN NETWORK

Standing on their own two feet

The women's narratives about their vocational training in the post-war period indicate that an apprenticeship was not necessarily their desired goal. At least 18 women had wanted to obtain higher school education, which in most cases they failed to do because their mother or parents were not able to raise the money for school fees, clothes and books. In any case the women's school careers were interrupted by frequent evacuations; schools were often destroyed or temporarily closed in 1945 and some families had fled from the districts in which the girls were registered. If a child could be sent to school it was most likely to be the research participants' brother(s). Only three women obtained their A-level equivalents. For those who did not, an apprenticeship was the 'very least' that they had wanted. Finding a place, however, proved difficult. Newspaper reports from the post-war period show that the demand from girls and young women for skilled training was much higher than the offers available. Women's difficulties in finding an apprenticeship have to be seen in the context of economic collapse and high rates of unemployment in the post-war years, particularly in the traditionally female occupations (Schubert 1984).

Political, cultural and legislative initiatives were directed at (re)establishing the bourgeois family model as a unit of bread winning husband and homemaking wife. As soldiers and later the 11.7 million German war prisoners came back to Germany, women were banned from jobs, such as, for example train conductors and builders, that had been considered legitimate female occupations during the war (Born 1989). In dual income families, wives employed in the public sector were sacked on the grounds that they were taking jobs from men. Labour protection legislation was used to exclude women from certain occupations but usually was repealed when women were needed for (unpaid) reconstruction work. With respect to compulsory community services, after 1945, the authorities explicitly stated that this service should not lead to a vocational qualification for women: 'the use of women is almost exclusively restricted to unskilled labour. ... In general women's commitment to typical male occupations that develops with training is unwelcome' (President of Westphalia 1946 as quoted in Ruhl 1988, p. 50).
Despite the fact that unskilled factory work or domestic work was more easily available and sometimes better paid, a number of women reported that they went in search of an apprenticeship on their own. Firsthand experiences of the unreliability of male provision during and after the war, aggravated by the so-called ‘marriage squeeze’ in this age group, but also the feeling of responsibility for contributing to their family’s reconstruction, and the hope of escaping the confines of poverty, were given as motives to pursue an apprenticeship. As one research participant said you wanted to ‘have something in your hands’ (006), a qualification which in the medium-term was considered to provide access to more qualified and better paid work.

“Well, behind it for me was that I had an occupation, that I was independent, that I could earn my own money, that I stood on my own two feet. That was behind it for me.” (7)

546, p. 10, country, mother married and family labourer, 3 siblings

“I didn’t like it at home that much. [My parents] had a lot of problems with each other. And that was bad. ... And then I went there and got this [training as a shop assistant] ... But it was somehow - that was natural for me because my parents had to start all over again as well, and then I thought: they lost this and it wasn’t their fault, so I have to help there.” (8)

071, p. 12/27, city, mother married and at home, no siblings

Formulations such as these seem to refute the idea that the actual assumption of kin responsibilities during the war had empowered the research participants. Their lack of self-confidence as young girls is frequently brought up in the interviews and often stands in contrast to the responsibilities that the women had taken on. Over half of the respondents reported that they sought occupational training for better income prospects and personal worth. The contradiction between their wish to leave the family household and the perceived obligation to contribute to the family finances, however, did not pose itself in practice. For structurally, even ignoring the severe housing shortage, the women’s apprenticeship earnings were too low to enable them to leave the parental home in the short-term, a desire articulated by a substantial minority of women. On the other hand the kin network was not only considered as a restraint and a liability but also as a source of support (and at times pressure) for the girls in obtaining occupational training.
Mothers (and sometimes other female relatives) were perceived as a mainstay of support in finding an apprenticeship, sometimes against the explicit resistance of the research participants’ fathers who did not see the need for women to obtain vocational qualifications.

Generating human capabilities

On the basis of their own experiences of hard and underpaid work and the realisation that marriage did not necessarily provide economic security, and occasionally also with reference to their positive experiences with having received skilled training, the majority of mothers saw the provision of occupational training as a substantial part of their motherwork. Often it was they who accompanied their daughters to the employment exchange and sometimes placed their daughters in an apprenticeship that they thought would fit in terms of the needs in the family. In the case of the trained childminders who had to pay school fees during their training, the women reported that their mothers raised this money. In providing access to the formal sphere of employment this form of maternal support illustrates a particular aspect of kin work, namely the generation of human capabilities (see Chapter 4.4.).

‘Especially my mother, she was very talented in sewing, but girls didn’t get occupational training in this generation. All her brothers were trained for some occupation and she had to ‘go into service’ as you said at the time. And then she vowed that if she ever had a girl she shouldn’t have to do that. She should get some training.’

115, p. 10, city, mother married and not employed, no siblings

Resp: My mother initiated it, yes.
Int: Did she go without you [to the exchange], or?
Resp: Yes, she must have gone without – well, I didn’t go with her, I only introduced myself to the master ... I was just 14, right. Well, at that time you didn’t have [confidence], like a child is today with 14 years, you didn’t have that then.

034, p. 2, city, mother married and not employed, 4 siblings

As all the women interviewed underwent vocational training it is likely to be a characteristic of the sample composition that those women who said that their mothers openly opposed their training found support from other relatives, notably aunts and grandmothers. These female relatives were seen as ‘standing in’ for missing fathers and
supporting the overburdened mothers.

'I have to say, I had a lot of support from my aunt, regarding the vocational training. If it had gone by my mother, if she would have decided alone – my aunt really interfered ... we never had much money at home, and my mother always said: if I send you all to X, that was this paper factory, we would have more money. Then we wouldn’t have to count [money] that much. And then my aunt was always there and said: but the children need to get training. ... Well at home it was that my mother or rather my aunt, who mainly looked after us, because my father wasn’t there anymore, felt a bit responsible for us.' (11) 549, p. 8, country, mother widowed and not employed, 4 siblings

Transforming intra-familial legacies

An intra-familial tradition could consider apprenticeship as a promotion of women’s self-sufficiency – at least in time of crisis. This expected life history or kinscript, which positioned women in the kin network that supported them, included the daughter’s continuation of the family business as well as gender specific expectations of her support of her older parents. Here regional differences come into play. The practice of keeping one daughter in the parental household or family business as a source of parental support seemed to be particularly (but not exclusively) widespread in farming families. Such kinscripts were characteristically formulated in the passive (‘it was planned’, ‘it was thought’), highlighting the subordinate role of negotiations of women’s family responsibilities in the war and post-war period. Instead it seemed as if these plans became part of the personal identity of the women in question.

Resp: I have to say in advance, I myself have grown up in a grocer’s shop
Int: Ah, your parents
Resp: My parents had a grocer’s shop and as a child I worked there from early on, also when my father was drafted in the war... Well, it was actually thought: I would train as a shop assistant, would take over the business of my parents and would be as it were the life insurance of my parents.
Int: Yes. Were you the only child?
Resp: I was the only child. That’s how it was planned and I loved that job but it just wasn’t possible after the war. (12) 805, p. 1/3, city, mother widowed and self-employed, no siblings

'For me it was actually planned that I should remain at home. Like it used to be in families where there was farming, that one daughter remained at home and supported the parents. My older sister stayed with my aunt whose husband was the first here in the village to die in the war and she had nine little children. And naturally my sister had to stand in at my aunt’s. She was 16/17 at the time. Well,
These pre-war gendered intra-familial kinscripts are noteworthy because they combine ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ elements: on the one hand daughters were designated to be the traditional family carers but at the same time they ‘had to’ obtain occupational qualifications in order to take over the family businesses. For both respondents quoted above the war-related destruction disrupted these plans – yet, the women both became self-employed for most of their working lives and temporarily or permanently lived with their mothers. Thus the socio-economic Zusammenbruch, whilst often taking away the accumulated bases of family support (the family business), opened up possibilities for women to detach or divert from familial arrangements or scripts, as well as modifying and redesigning them.

Following intra-familial legacies in changing circumstances could change their meaning, as is illustrated by the case of a woman who lost her parents and decided to maintain the family business for her bother. Whereas subordinating her own interest (in not pursuing higher education, as she had wished, but rather vocational training) and taking responsibility for the future of her brother conforms to women’s traditional gender role, the courage and initiative in taking over the business with the help of relatives and her father’s employees fundamentally challenged conventional gender and age norms. Again kin support was a liability but also opened new possibilities.

‘And because my parents weren’t alive anymore, and the company was there, and I had a younger brother who was supposed to take it over one day, something had to happen to maintain the company for him. And well then I had - completely spontaneously - decided: I will go into the company. And that was only possible with vocational training. ... We had to take in a partner of course. I was too young... Well, I think that was - it simply was in the air so to say. It was like this: you started again with nothing. Everything was over and you couldn’t - at least I as a 17 year-old - couldn’t predict what would come next. It was - the only thing that remained was the family. Well, my grandparents were still alive, they accommodated us at first, and then there was the business. ... But things had to go on... it was clear to me that now I had to provide for the livelihood for the two of us so to say.’

Substitution arrangements did not follow predefined scripts but were made up as the need
arose. Yet, the fact that they tended to be seen as ‘self-evident’ or natural responses to crisis situations and seemed to have had the support of the wider kin network, gives them a predictable character which turned the extraordinary into the ordinary. In so far as new employment opportunities were defined as beneficial for the family or kin network and natural responses, this view contributed to both the obfuscation of social (and kinscript) change and the invisibility of kin work.

As has been shown in the example of the accommodation of children by grandmothers, it is not exclusively daughters who substitute. In three cases the research participants’ mothers too as ‘quasi-kin’ took children of friends who either died or lived in a different occupation zone as foster children into their households and provided for their education.

**The moral power of money in assigning family responsibilities**

With respect to these kinscripts of substitution none of the research participants referred to the idea of reciprocity or exchange. Particularly in the rural areas, when there were several siblings family traditions suggested that one daughter took over major family responsibility and thereby released the other siblings. As an exchange of labour and time (in the sense of the generational or procreational contract (Laslett 1992)) these arrangements can only appear from the point of view of the mother/parents. For siblings the formula of solidarity was ‘one for all’ – which did not usually include ‘all for one’. Thus the benefits of occupational training for one daughter sometimes occurred at the expense of another daughter who worked in the family household. Yet, families did not renounce the idea of equality and fairness. At this point, what Weber (1922/1978) considered to be the contractual element par excellence – money – comes into play. In the process of kinscription or assigning of kin responsibilities, money served both as an incentive and recompense to the person who was thought to be under-benefited in the arrangement. This ‘compensation’ was either paid by a third party who benefited by virtue of being released from kinship obligation or by the party who felt over-benefited by an arrangement that was never ‘freely’ negotiated and was not always perceived of as

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25 At a time when women’s demand for vocational training largely exceeded the availabilities the same can be said about the female apprentices. Four of the research participants got their apprenticeship in the post-war period after other young women had died or dropped out because they had to support their families.
fair.

‘There was the agreement at home, because my younger sister wasn’t allowed to get training - there my mother got her way: yes, the youngest, one daughter stays at home and later has to be there for me - I had to share everything with her. My sister always got half of my wage ... I would have liked to give her more, if I’d had more, very much so. Because I always had a guilty conscience about her. What are 40 Marks if I can’t get trained in anything? It is a pittance.’ (15)

851, p. 13/14, country, mother married and not employed, 2 siblings

It is apparent that the speaker, despite her monetary payments to her sister, did not perceive the exchange of money for time and labour as fair. The interviewer had noted in the protocol that at the time of the interview the mother was widowed and had moved to and was being taken care of by the research participant’s sister ‘which mother had always wanted’ (Protocol 851). Contrary to Weber who explicitly conceived of the money contract as non-ethical and quantitatively delimited, the power of money does not seem to lie so much in its material but in its ‘moral’ value: it appears as an instrument of reinforcing support arrangements by enforcing the idea of equality. In the following account the payment of insurance appeared as a strategy that made refusal of kin work more difficult, but likewise did not guarantee fair and equal bargaining in accordance with the women’s well-considered interests.

‘I came back in April 48 and then I first looked after my grandmother for half a year who was very ill. My mother couldn’t do it, because she had the household and we also had a little farm with it.... My grandparents said ‘no, please stay and we will pay for your insurance.’ But only later when we listed everything for the pension did we realise: well, where is it then? Yes, yes, during that time only health insurance was paid but no social security contributions. Well and that wouldn’t have made up much either. I didn’t earn anything anyway because I didn’t want that either.’ (16)

118, p. 8/9, city, mother married and self-employed, 1 sibling

The women’s accounts indicate that kin work in the post-war years was a two-sided legacy. On the one hand motherwork facilitated access to the formal sphere and vocational training as a resource and competence outside the family network to enable their daughters to lead a more (economically) independent life than they had. At the same time the apprenticeship could be embedded in or be part of an intra-familial legacy, which limited (or jeopardised) personal independence and career development. The narratives suggest that kin work was passed on both collaterally and vertically to
descending or ascending female relatives if a woman or man could not fulfil their family responsibilities. None of the women mentioned that their brothers substituted in this way. These pathways of kin work were constructed situationally in response to need and availability, usually targeting female kin. Moreover, the reliability of substitution has the character of an inbuilt pledge or guarantee that if a woman can temporarily or permanently not fulfil her part of kin work, a close female kin in the family lineage will substitute for her.

In the context of the *Zusammenbruch*, where as one respondent said, ‘you couldn’t rely on the traditions anymore’ (805) intra-familial legacies were both activated and transformed. Insofar as they were reported, strategies to deal with kinship demands did not consist of an outright resistance or rejection of kin commitments but rather of a partial continuation of those legacies, combined with novel ‘quasi-contractual’ elements such as the payment of insurance contributions for periods of familial care. Yet the involvement of money or its equivalent (such as insurance payments) does not allow us to infer a woman’s self-interest: none of the women said that she took on kin responsibilities in order to receive money.

If occupational training did not release women from family responsibilities, what room for manoeuvre did the women’s subsequent employment after the 1948 monetary reform open up when the German economy began to recover?

### 6.4. THE REORGANISATION OF NEED RELATED HOUSEHOLDS: DAUGHTERS AS BREADWINNERS

Women’s need related shared households remained a common phenomenon in Germany particularly in the cities. In Bremen 52.2% of women lived without a male partner in 1946 (Census 1946 as quoted in Hoecker and Meyer-Braun 1988). In the sample of women born around 1930, slightly more than a third of the research participants’ mothers lived without a male partner in the 1950s. The narrative accounts indicate that these women were in a vulnerable economic position: as family labourers or in informal employment, they often had not paid social security contributions and after divorce did
not receive allowances in their own right. Widow's pensions took a long time to be granted, particularly when husbands were 'missing', and on the whole did not cover basic expenses. But also on a personal level some of the mothers were seen as needing support. In this situation, 18 out of 52 women in the sample continued to live in need related communities with their mothers, another eight lived with their parents due to a continuing housing shortage. This section looks at the significant subgroup of women who lived with their mothers in need related shared households.

The intergenerational division of labour often shifted after the research participants had finished their apprenticeship and their actual or potential earning power exceeded that of their predominantly home working mothers. Given the insufficiency of institutional support in situations of severe financial need all respondents continued to contribute their wages to the household income. Although they had rarely chosen their vocational training, the overwhelming majority of women had identified with their jobs as they obtained more responsibilities and half of the women interviewed had developed some kind of career plans (Born et al. 1996). The need to contribute to their mother's income was an additional incentive to career development for some respondents.

At the same time, however, the limitations of typical women's occupations became apparent. Women were at most considered to be additional earners, not breadwinners, and wages in those occupations structurally remained relatively low (see Chapter 3). Ten of the 18 women who lived with their mothers 'decided' to leave their occupation and (temporarily) take up better-paid factory and piecework. Perceived responsibility was particularly high when there were no other siblings to contribute. Interestingly, it was often the same mothers who had supported their daughters practically and sometimes financially during the apprenticeship who now accepted or suggested that their daughters gave up qualified work to do unskilled factory work. Fathers too were supported through factory work in the larger sample, but their need was never said to be the purpose of taking up this work in the first place.

Where women substitute for male earners waged labour becomes another form of kin work in the post-war period. The assumption of financial responsibility evolved
unplanned in response to need, but contrary to subsistence work it was discussed and negotiated in the women headed families. The research participants usually emphasised that their mothers had not demanded their financial contributions. Given their positive identification with their occupation on the one hand and the perceived need of their mothers on the other, the accounts oscillate between perceived constraint ('I had to'), the insistence on 'self-evidence' or naturalness and conscious solidarity ('I did this of my own free will', 'I wanted to'). These expressions are underlined in the following narratives to highlight the women's ambivalent motives. Formally, the narratives vary between description and the inclusion of direct speech, by which discussions are 're-enacted' for the interviewer/listener. In this sense, the narratives are less 'theorised' than the descriptions of kinship obligations in their childhood. Direct speech is often used to literally express differing voices. At the same time the marked 'and then' structure in the narratives, highlighted in italics, conveyed the impression of an inevitable sequence of action, which superseded potential doubts and debates.

Resp: My father died in an accident at his workplace in 1951. And then my mother got very little money, a very small pension. And then I had to hand over [my wage], I didn’t have to but it was natural that did it.... And what did my mother get as a pension then? She started with 35 Marks per month, when I got 95 per month as a salary. ...it was very difficult to get along on this. That’s why you thought about earning a bit as well... If I had more siblings it might have been different perhaps. I did this of my own free will.

Int: But also have simply accepted this difficult situation.
Resp: Saw it and then well, you lived together and you had to live together. (17)

Then I was told by the company that I should take over the branch in X. I was 19 years old then, the youngest branch manager in Y! ...And then when my father died in March ‘50, I wasn’t even 20, and my mother didn’t get a widow pension immediately, that took several months. And we had no savings.... and we didn’t get along with the money and then someone, an acquaintance said 'you know where you have to go? You have to go to Z, there you can do piece work and earn a lot of money to make a good living with your mother.' And then I said to my mother ‘Do you think I should do that, so we can live better?’ Then she said ‘Child, well, I don’t know whether you can start there again later.’ I said ‘it doesn’t matter, then I can also work somewhere else’. And then I did piece work at Z. (18)

In contrast, the following research participant described the intergenerational division of labour between her home working mother and herself, particularly her assumption of
factory work as a voluntary and obligatory sacrifice. This underlying conflict was still so emotionally upsetting that the woman started to cry in the interview and the recording was stopped. The research participant had worked in a factory for ten years and also financially supported her husband who took a university degree.

Resp: Yes, I had to hand it over [her wage]. There was no other way, right. But then it often happened - I still remember there was a hairdresser in our house and she always got such tremendous tips and she gave a lot of presents to her mother and I couldn’t do that. And I always found that sad that I couldn’t do that. And then sometimes there was ‘Yes, she earns so much and you earn so little.’

Int: Did your mother say that?

Resp: Yes, yes. And then I thought, man, you can’t really afford this, you have such a wonderful job and only work part-time. Sure, I had to continue at home because she was at the sewing machine, right, and run the household there, we had a huge garden. And I did work into the night, but not in my occupation and for cash, you know. And then I felt sometimes a bit shabby and was sad too. Yes, with a heavy heart I – but I didn’t want to tell them in the kindergarten that I wanted to go into the factory. — I didn’t want to tell them. And I still have the proverbs that the children wrote me. They all knew that I suffered enormously from this.

Int: Did this have to do with a different status?

Resp: No, not status but – I was so attached to my job, right. And today I reproach my {cries} today I say to my husband, man that I did that, right.

Int: Uhm. So you always had to support your family there?

Resp: {cries} Yes. — Always. I did it later too. And I liked doing it too.

Int: Uhm. — Should we have a short break? (19)

This is not the only account where research participants started to cry when expressing both their desire and obligation to provide for members of the family (see Chapter 7.3.). As the narrative indicates, the boundaries between mere financial need and the wish to live more comfortably were not clear-cut. Indeed other accounts suggest that it was not merely ‘economic need’ that tied women together in need related households. Phrases such as ‘she [the mother] needed me so bad’ (857) might also allude to personal need that some of the women referred to when they spoke of the unfortunate position they felt their mothers were in, having lost husbands and sometimes sons and forced to do hard and low- or unpaid work over years. In the process of need interpretation, feelings of compassion and responsibility were expressed as feelings of guilt and obligation, or to use Mauss’s (1924/1993, p. 52) term as ‘quasi-culpability’, only when the research participants reported that mothers had ‘used’ references to their misfortune to make their daughters stay with them.
The notion of quasi-culpability refers to a feeling of guilt, which motivates reparation, without actual misdemeanour. According to Mauss quasi-culpability is the binding power of (ancient) contracts where the giving of a loan or gift was not considered as a loss but on the contrary put the giver in a position of moral superiority and power (Chapter 1.2.). In contrast the war-related losses of the respondents' mothers had occurred involuntarily and did not entail a position of moral superiority but need. Yet losses could be turned into capital and used as a trump card to exercise power. In my reading of these accounts power was exercised by instilling in the women the hope, desire and obligation that they could and must 'make good' or ameliorate their mother's misfortune. The interviews of very entangled mother-daughter relationships indicate that this reparation could never work fully. One way in which dependency was created and maintained, it seems to me, was by keeping final and durable reparation on the horizon as a possibility. In retrospect, these research participants described their mother-daughter relationship as dependency relationships. One respondent expressed mutual dependency and need in terms of 'growing together' \( \text{[Verwachsung]} \), which in German also has the meaning of 'deformation'. 'Growing together' was strongly grounded in the historical circumstance of wartime and sometimes considered as a generation fate.

Resp: You know, I've always had a guilty conscience about my mother. I would - although I'm not for it – I was always sorry that she – that Dad didn't come; the others came back then. And then you were happy that one or the other came back to the family, and she always just cried and cried. I had such a dependency relationship with my mother that was so bad... Well, this growing together \( \text{[Verwachsung]} \) with my mother, the flight, and then the loneliness here. I think it was the same for many of my generation. The husband never came back and then the mothers just clung to their children. ... You see, also my husband later could have bettered himself in his work... And he didn't do that either because of my mother. Because then she said: 'yes, then I'm alone and I've never had anything in my life.' But she has...

Int: Did she blackmail you a little bit with that?
Resp: Yes. Above all, I always had the feeling everything was my fault.
Int: If you hadn't been there, you mother could have married again or
Resp: No, that's not it. I – I was so sorry that she was always alone and she- and she took advantage of that, right. (20)

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26 For conceptual clarity it seems helpful to follow the German etymology of \textit{Schuld} and distinguish between culpability (from Latin \textit{culpa}) as the actual offence that requires atonement and guilt as the accompanying feeling (Siebers and Vetter 1992). Quasi-culpability refers to indebtedness (from Latin \textit{debitum}), the obligation for repayment in the absence of \textit{culpa}.
016, p.10/11, trained childminder, mother not employed, 0 siblings

‘Well, really I had such a dominant and despotic and – well, a mother who put incredible pressure on me. I can only formulate this today. Because with respect to being independent, yes, when I got married, it was like this I – my husband wanted me to move out here... my mother was on her own in the meantime. Everybody had left... and we – my husband and I – had already rented a flat... And then my mother came and said: ‘You won’t do that, will you, to leave me here alone with the house?’ And then we rented here, I persuaded my husband that we rent here. And then I was stuck here again. We did renovate however... I had already finished my apprenticeship when I finally had my own room. I always had to sleep together with my mother. My father died in the war. And this was the bedroom. I had to go to bed when she wanted and I had to stay up as long as she wanted. Yes, well until you realise this. I, at least I was a twit, I was a stupid girl.’ (21)

037, p. 11, city, trained dress maker, mother employed, 2 siblings

Focussing on processes of need interpretation problematises any romantic or harmonious picture of women’s need related households and give a different emphasis to the notion of Germany’s ‘coerced matriarchy’. But they do not denigrate the immense support that women voluntarily and involuntarily gave to each other. The narratives indicate that the research participants had indeed an active part in shaping need related households – but their perceived room for manoeuvre and negotiation, as they presented them, were narrowly confined by severe economic need and a perceived loyalty and dependency. Economic need could create an unprecedented ‘script’ of the daughter as the family wage earner in substitution for an absent father. This script often remained ambivalent and was not based on emotional closeness. Economic need could, but did not need to be, intertwined with personal dependency. Personal dependency was sometimes underpinned by a quasi-culpability that entailed the daughters’ inclination to reparation. I suggest that the – historically contextualised – mutual personal dependency referred to an emotional need for connection and support in both mother and daughter. Its inherent power frequently manifested itself in the continuation of co-residence rather than the payment of subsistence. The research participants indicated that to work through this dependency relationship could take a lifetime (see Chapter 7.3.).

Other research participants reported that they cut family ties without much difficulty. Thus in contrast to the previous accounts, for the following speaker marriage was the ‘exit card’ from responsibility in the family of origin. Interestingly, the research
participant likewise referred to her mother’s losses, which were, however, made perceived as lessened by a history of the mother’s ‘unfair’ behaviour. Thus, references to the mother’s unfairness were used to justify the respondent’s leaving.

‘One year before the marriage I went to X ... And I also used this somehow as a springboard to get away from home. My mother had made it very difficult for me. She let my siblings go, but she didn’t want me to go. And then I really practically cleared out... And I didn’t find that difficult either. But I have to say I never had a good relationship with my mother. Well, it was all so – I think because my father died so early a lot went differently from when a family is together. I mean it wasn’t easy for her with five kids and very little money. But still I felt treated unfairly all those years... Then she gave way to her feelings – I mean always only to me – she unburdened everything onto me: ‘If I didn’t have you, I’d be much better off. I didn’t want any of you’ and so on.’ (22)

549, p. 55/60, office clerk, country, mother not employed, 4 siblings

Insofar as it affected the continuity of the research participants occupational trajectories daughterwork, like other forms of kin work usually remained invisible, but it contributed to much of the greater complexity, variability and discontinuity of women’s life courses in comparison with the continuous employment careers of their husbands (Erzberger 1993). In any case, although more than a third of the research participants had first-hand experiences with the insufficiency of public provision, daughterwork was not interpreted as a political economic activity but as personal fate.

The focus on daughterwork must not conceal the fact that the respondents’ mothers did their share too in the reorganised women headed families. They were the ones who provided accommodation, cooked and washed for their daughters and in more than one third of the women under study had also looked after the research participants’ children, which not rarely reproduced an intra-familial (wartime) tradition.27

27 The circumstances of the research participants’ family formation are analysed elsewhere (Born et al. 1996). In the present context it is of interest to note that contrary to common perceptions it was the husbands-to-be who initiated and pursued marriage (a finding that is confirmed by the husbands who were interviewed in a follow-up study (see Braemer 1994)). Although none of the women actively opposed what
6.5. THE CONTINUATION OF WOMEN'S COOPERATION WITHIN AND ACROSS HOUSEHOLD BOUNDARIES: MOTHERS AS GRANDCHILD MINDERS

Childcare facilities were rare, under-funded and controversial in post-war West Germany. Whereas in the German Democratic Republic the creation of nurseries and day-care centres was part of the first five-year plan, the institutionalisation of childcare in the Federal Republic was associated with communist attempts to undermine the family. Although they protested against the lack of childcare institutions, even women trade unionists did not oppose the view that day care was always deficient in comparison with mother care (Moeller 1993, p. 175/176). Despite the western ideal of the full-time mother and structural discrimination against the employment of women and mothers, the quantitative analysis showed that more than a quarter of the 220 women surveyed had continued to work beyond of the birth of the first child. In the light of the women's narratives this finding is likely to be an underestimation. Twelve of the 17 women who stated in the questionnaires that they had left the labour market with the birth of their first child reported that they had actually continued to work as family labourers, home or temporary workers after their children were born.

The interview analysis clearly indicates that the vast majority of the research participants did not consider employment merely as an economic necessity but overall as an enjoyable and rewarding activity that provided gratification, self-esteem and increased their power of decision making in the family (Born et al. 1996). If women wanted and/or had to remain employed after their children were born they usually relied on their mothers and/or mothers-in-law to look after their children as their own mothers had done. Nineteen out of 52 women in the qualitative sample had benefited from childcare by their mothers at some point in their lives; only two women stated that they had put their preschool children in a kindergarten. The extent to which grandmothers were considered as an almost 'natural' substitute and support for working mothers both in the urban and rural areas was expressed by those women who stated that 'I didn't have a granny' (841) or 'I had to raise my children myself!' (069) because their mothers were not available.

they largely saw as a biographical certainty, those who did not 'fall' pregnant often postponed marriage in
Where they occurred grand-maternal childcare arrangements in the post-war period varied in time and extent. They included temporarily or permanently shared households that were also initiated when a daughter became widowed or divorced, as well as day care, or full-time childcare during the week. Depending on availability and need, childcare was provided by one or both grandmothers. There was no case where a woman reported that her father had taken over major (grand)childcare responsibilities. In her study of intergenerational transfers Wilson (1987), however, has suggested that due to gendered perceptions and categorisations of men’s activities in the family, grand-paternal child caring responsibilities may be underestimated.

Childcare arrangements between employed mothers and home-working grandmothers became one further link in the continuation of women’s need related shared households. In so far as the respondents’ need for childcare was complemented by their mother’s need for financial support these practices were sometimes depicted as an exchange or ‘circle’ (130). Mothers looked after their grandchildren and thereby enabled their daughters to pursue paid work who in turn contributed to their mothers’ keep. At the same time it is evident that both practices were not necessarily correlated: research participants supported their mothers without, or prior to, their having children and mothers looked after their grandchildren without receiving financial support. Although arrangements might have been more comfortable when they appeared mutually beneficial, respondents also characterised them as Notlösungen (805), ‘emergency solutions’ that resulted from severe economic need and so combined necessity and benefit, rather than being planned and negotiated on the basis of self-interest.

‘I lived together with my mother. And she was alone too and she was completely wrapped up when we had the baby. And she looked well after my child, right …. And I still could do a lot. If I hadn’t had her, I don’t know how I’d have coped. I wouldn’t have given the child away. I wouldn’t have done that. Then I would have had to look for another husband. Somehow. But this way you remained independent and I didn’t want to anymore either.’ (23)

849, p. 13/24, dressmaker, country, divorced, 1 child
(Permanently joint household with mother)

Resp: Well, that was also a transitional phase, when we were very badly off financially. When I was supposed to pay for my mother and didn’t want to let her down. And time in order to remain in the sphere that was associated with pleasure: paid work.
then for that reason she lived with us for one and a half or two years. Then it was help to her and she helped me in looking after the boy... But I did it somehow, so it had this circle... And then my mother had to go back to Bremen. There was my nephew who needed looking after. Because then problems arose with the illness of my sister. And that was the reason, that she — she was needed there more than with us. Then we gave her money secretly. And this — was not supposed to be known...

Int: Known by the authority?
Resp: Yes. She received assistance... And we didn’t need to provide for her. And what we did privately was nobody’s business, right. (24)

130, p. 23/26, childminder, city, married, 2 children
(Temporarily joint household with mother)

The theme that grand-maternal childcare was indispensable for the continuation of employment is a thread that runs through the majority of the narratives of those women who had remained in employment. Whether or not this is seen as a family tradition, the availability of mothers and mothers-in-law was the crucial factor for the initiation of these arrangements that required flexibility, reliability and responsibility on the part of the grandmother. In the same way as they perceived support by their grandmothers as a form of motherwork, grand-maternal childcare was conceived of as a support of adult daughters. As with other forms of kin work, it was not free from conflict. From the point of view of the research participants conflict evolved when the women felt that their mothers(in-law) were not temporary stand ins but personally substituted or attempted to substitute for the mother so that children became more attached to their grandparents than to themselves. In no case, however, did these conflicts directly end childcare arrangements.

‘I didn’t see much of my child. My mother-in-law had bound it to her so much.... I collected the child on Saturday and on Sunday lunchtime my mother-in-law had come already and took her back. ... I stayed at home on Mondays. But then I had to fight for my child. And then she said: “well, you have housework to do. Take your time to do that.”’ (25)

513, p. 18/19, hairdresser, country, 3 children
(Eldest child lived at grandmother’s during the week)

But even when grand-maternal childcare was perceived as unproblematic and wanted, and employment was successful and fulfilling, some women reported a feeling in

28 The woman who said that on the basis of her own experiences as a child of a working mother raised by her grandmothers she did not want this kind of care arrangement for her daughter is indeed the exception among those mothers who had mothers or mothers-in-law available.
retrospect of having missed 'the best years' with their children. Consequently, the advice that the research participants gave to their adult daughters could divert from their own practice.

'The children didn't miss me. The grandmother was in mother’s place and everybody knows how a granny is with her grandchildren. They didn't lack anything. But I always say: keep your children yourselves in the first years. I don’t know.... If you get older you think: you didn’t have the best years with your children, like other women did, right.' (26)

516, p. 28, shop assistant (self-employed), country, 5 children (Joint household with mother)

The questions of how the research participants viewed grand-maternal child care when their own children had children and childcare facilities expanded and considered as valuable pedagogic institutions is explored in the next chapter (Chapter 7.2).

6.6. CONCLUSION

In the preceding sections, I have explored intergenerational kin work in the post-war period as it was unfolded and produced in the interviews with women born around 1930. Although women’s subsistence work and the resources and competences it required were publicly visible and sometimes idealised before the founding of the Federal Republic in 1948, they disappeared from public discourse and perception thereafter. By playing the women’s accounts against the framework of kinscripts the analysis suggested that on the contrary, need related shared households and cooperation across household boundaries particularly between mothers and daughters, were of lasting significance in Germany during the 1950s. In the narratives, intergenerational kin work appeared not primarily as a symbolic and emotional practice but as a flexible tissue of material provision and support in which men were physically or practically absent.

In the interaction with the younger interviewers, the research participants described and anchored their kin relationships and practices firmly in a historical-economic context of material deprivation and subsistence economy in which they became meaningful. The historical-economic context of the war and post-war period was rendered concrete in the narration of its material and personal effects. The impact of social institutions was
principally depicted as a lack of provision, more specifically as an insufficiency of means of consumption, of education and employment opportunities and (women's) wages, childcare institutions, pensions and other allowances. The kin work of women as mothers, grandmothers and daughters encompassed household related work, the provision of accommodation and childcare, as well as waged labour and the facilitating of access to the formal sphere, particularly vocational training. In its household and subsistence related aspects, kin work was a taken for granted aspect of women's work that developed in and through practice and did not necessarily enhance the women's self-worth. It was not based on emotional closeness, although emotions played a role in the interpretation of need of their mothers.

The women interviewed interpreted kin work to a large extent as acts of substitution for absent or missing family members, not for public and private institutional provision. 'One for another' according to Lacan (1977, p. 157) is the formula of metaphor, where one signifier replaces another one that remains associatively linked to the chain of signifiers. It is this dual process of replacement and association, Lacan argued, that sparks off new meaning in a metaphor. Similarly, the substitution for absent family members often initiated a novel intergenerational division of labour in which the 'unavailable' (father) or non-responsible (brother) relative was released from family responsibilities, but gave meaning and justification to new arrangements such as the role of daughters as breadwinners. Areas of tension were identified as the obligation to contribute to need related shared households vs. the wish to leave the family household, the (grand) childcare of their mothers vs. the alienation of their children, and the entangling of economic and personal needs of their mothers. This interweaving of structural and personal dependency could foster the continuation of need related shared households between mothers and daughters that characterised interrelated life courses of more than a third of the women interviewed.

Debates and contrasting voices around processes of kinscription were sometimes conveyed by the use of direct speech. But foregrounding the 'hard times' meant that wilfulness, independence and rational deliberation – elements of the repertoire of contract – did not feature in the kin work narratives. The women reported that quasi-contractual
strategies such as money or insurance payments for care-giving activities were sometimes deployed to balance or mitigate inequalities in kin work arrangements. These practices point to a cultural script or repertoire of reciprocity and fairness in family interaction, but the presence of contractual elements did not suggest that practices evolved as a result of self-regarding rationality or were necessarily fair.

More explicitly the research participants referred to cultural scripts of obedience and respect towards parents, a further ingredient of the assignment of kin work. A regionally specific script was the practice that one daughter remained in the household or family business to support parents in old age. This script could also be part of an intra-familial legacy, where the family business embodied the material, symbolic and practical legacy. Yet, in the context of a fundamental societal rupture, family arrangements often failed to follow unmodified intra-familial legacies. The narratives suggest that the political and economic breakdown, apart from underwriting support liability, offered new possibilities for re-keying or modifying family scripts. Taking the example of daughters as main family providers and wage earners, the notion of kin scripts may be misleading insofar these practices were not a predefined continuation of scripted family practice but became an innovative yet common response to unforeseen and unforeseeable circumstance and need. The commonality and predictability of women as ‘stand ins’, conveyed in the frequent ‘and then’ structure which linked narrated events in terms of an inescapable linear sequence, however, concealed processes of social change and contributed to the invisibility of women’s kin work.

Put differently, although the research participants were aware of insufficient resource allocation and reported that state support had not been adequate for the survival of mother and children, and frequently used the phrase that female relatives had ‘had to stand in’, women’s kin work was not considered as a political-economic factor of welfare production, but privatised as work for the family. Neither was kin work perceived in terms of the generation of competences and human capabilities. I suggest that a crucial element of this ‘privatised’ and partial view was the (retrospective) reflection on the interdependence of structural and personal dependencies between daughters and mothers. Intertwined with material need in some accounts was the need and desire for personal
togetherness, which sometimes was underpinned by a ‘quasi-culpability’ of the daughter if relatives used their misfortune to elicit support. Furthermore, although kin work practices were implicitly characterised as *women’s* experiences, in and through the references to the historical context they were often interpreted as a ‘generation fate’. References to a historical generation on the other hand, even though they were based on the research participants’ positions as *women*, tended to obfuscate the significance of gender in the micro-politics of intergenerational commitments.

The narratives suggest that the historical-economic, social-institutional and cultural context were the constitutive outside of kin work practices in the post war period, promoting ‘contracts of need’, evoked in expressions such as ‘that’s how it was’. Contracts of need are not interpreted in terms of enhancing competences and entailing empowerment. Kin work practices appear as variations of a broader cultural script across the two regions, namely that ‘the family’ holds together with a subtext of women’s responsibilities for creating cohesion through practical and personal support. Insofar as cultural scripts and institutions incorporated assumptions of women’s taken for granted kin work practices, the ‘unofficial’ script of women’s substitution could not be confronted with a dominant counterscript.
Chapter 7

CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN OLDER WOMEN’S KIN COMMITMENTS IN THE GERMAN WELFARE STATE

7.1. INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter has presented an analysis of the kinscripts of a group of women born around 1930 in post-war Germany and shown how kin work operated as acts of substitution in the context of severe material need. This chapter continues the analysis of kinscripts in the narrative accounts focussing on intergenerational commitments in mid and later life when the German welfare state had expanded. The research guiding question is whether an extension in public and private provision in an expanding economy had provided resources to open up perceived room for manoeuvre for negotiating and delimiting older women’s intergenerational commitments. Furthermore, would the introduction of the discourse of intergenerational solidarity in the context of the implementation of the PAYG pension scheme in the late 1950s provide new images, symbols and vocabularies with which the research participants could describe and interpret their family and kin commitments in mid and later life? Notions of contract, reciprocity and exchange were almost completely absent in the interpretation patterns referring to kin work practices in the war and post-war period.

German social theorists have argued that life styles since the mid 1960s are no longer embedded in traditions and regulated by prior obligation, but increasingly structured by requirements of the labour market and the welfare state, which draw on and create individual agency and strategic planning (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 1993). As life
choices, networks and identities become, in principle, open to negotiation for both men and women, opportunities for choice and negotiation are seen to finally have penetrated the 'social backwater' of the family. Hareven (1994) speaks of an increasing individualisation of intergenerational relationships and Hess and Waring (1983) have argued that intergenerational relationships have shifted from the obligatory to the voluntary.

The social science literature on family and kin relationships in later life has to some extent corroborated the thesis of an increased mutual independence between parents and adult children and a decrease of fixed normative rules of family obligation between members of different generations. I will briefly illustrate some of the shifts in debate around support of grandchildren and older relatives, which have been key themes in the narratives of the older women and will be explored below.

In North America the relationship between grandparents and grandchildren has been rediscovered as a 'vital connection' (Kornhaber and Woodward 1985) that links people across generations. Much attention has been drawn to the diversity and increased length of the relationship (Hagestad 1986b). It has been argued that grandparents have lost their roles as mentors, models and caretakers, and that authority and feelings of obligation have decreased so that the relationship is increasingly voluntary and based on affect and friendship, initiative and negotiation (Wilk 1993). Grand-maternal childcare appears as merely one possible 'style' of grandparenting. German studies show substantial regional differences in this respect with the percentage of grandmothers looking after grandchildren much higher in the small town rural areas than in the cities (Sticker 1991). Overall, however, grandparents are assumed to remain free of parenting responsibilities, which interfere with new mid-life opportunities as well as with time for themselves after retirement (Jerrome 1996). In Germany the 'fun-seeking style' is found to predominate for grandparents with grandchildren under the age of 12 (Sticker op. cit.).

Interestingly, those North American writers who deplore the break up of the 'primordial bond between grandparents and grandchildren' have invoked the concept of a 'new social contract' (Kornhaber and Woodward op. cit., p. 92), according to which parents decide
whether and to what extent grandparents are involved with their children. By interpreting giving and receiving support in terms of interference and dependency, this new contract allegedly aims to maintain mutual independence between parents and grandparents, at the expense of grandchildren. At the same time, however, there is much evidence both from Europe and the United States that grandparents continue to be the ‘second line of defence’ (Jendrek 1993) who actively engage in the life of their grandchildren if and when they are needed. Their emergency valve function for the family includes the provision of temporary shelter for divorced daughters and their children (Furstenberg and Cherlin 1991) as well as financial support and childcare (Hagestad 1986b; Wilson 1987).

In a similar vein, just as the grandparent-grandchildren relationship is seen as dissolving, the relationships of adult children and their parents are perceived to be under severe threat (see also Chapter 8). The contract metaphor is invoked in a different way when it is argued that the ‘interpersonal caring contract’ (Walker 1996b, p. 12/13) is currently being renegotiated or, more drastically, that even Turkish migrants in Germany will ‘coercively and one-sidedly terminate the (generational) contract’ (Nauck 1990, p. 117). Whereas grandparent-grandchildren relationships are depicted as originally organic and then replaced by contract and regulation, solidarity in adult parent-child relationship is considered to be regulated by contract from the onset and subsequently ‘deregulated’ in the course of individualisation.

Studies of intergenerational elder care have repeatedly found that caregivers feel obligated to provide care, and that obligation often underlies the characterisation of caregiving as ‘natural’ (Döhner et al. 1992; Lewis and Meredith 1988). More recently, emphasis is put on power and processes of negotiating care-giving responsibilities (Finch and Mason 1992; Twigg and Atkin 1994). Caregivers, as King and Chamberlaine (1994) rightly point out, are not victims of oppressive relationships but persons with their own strategies and power. In both expert discourses and narratives of care-givers Thompson (1995) has identified an emerging counter-discourse that challenges the ‘imperative to care’ by acknowledging the responsibility of the state, as well as care givers’ rights to choice, independence and self-determination.
The following sections focus on these themes in the narratives of women born around 1930. Subsequent to the analysis of kinscripts I consider the women’s own expectations of support in old age and the evaluation of pension entitlements in order to assess whether the research participants linked the entitlements they have received from labour market participation with family and kin commitments.

7.2. AMBIVALENT SUPPORT FOR THEIR CHILDREN: MINDING GRANDCHILDREN

When interviewed at the actual or potential transition to retirement half of the research participants were grandmothers themselves of up to eight grandchildren who were born between 1970 and 1990. The overwhelming majority reported that they felt attached to their grandchildren and welcomed their increased self-confidence. Regarding the employment commitments of their daughters, sons and/or daughters-in-law, however, the research participants found themselves in an ambivalent position. On the one hand they shared the dominant view that children need a ‘person to relate to’ (074) and argued that mothers should stay with their children at least for the first years. This is justified not only with respect to the children but also for the benefit of mothers. The recommendation that ‘those are the years you should take with you in life!’ (516) was put forward even if the research participants themselves had made considerable efforts to remain employed after their children were born, sometimes by hiding part-time work from their husbands. On the other hand, the research participants were not only understanding and sympathetic to their daughters’ (in-law) employment interests but, on the basis of their own experiences of loss of qualifications and small pension entitlements, often actively encouraged their employment. Opposing voices were often presented in direct speech.

‘And I often told her [the daughter], right, I say, “man”, I say, “particularly now, these years”, right, I say, “you miss the best time!” I say, “once he goes to school it’s different. Then you can go to work again”. “Well, but now I have a good job and I should give it up? Who knows whether I will get it back again” and that’s how it goes - well, it’s very difficult to say anything.’ (27)

809, p. 30, city, employed after childbirth, 1 grandchild, not employed

‘Well I also recommend - well, our son has for 6 months - we have a grandchild now, and the wife is a civil servant, she works with the railway. And because they
live in a house with her parents, I always say: “don’t give up your job!” Particularly not because she is a civil servant. She’ll profit from that later on, won’t she? She can work with a child. Sure, I mean she doesn’t need to. Our son earns well, but anyway.’ (28)

840, p. 21, country, family labourer after childbirth, 1 grandchild, employed

Like their own mothers, the research participants at times supported their daughters in finding a suitable ‘mother substitute or grandmother substitute’ (118). However, when it was not possible to place the child in kindergarten or find a suitable day mother, more than half of the grandmothers in sample (18/26) once again ‘stood in’ for female relatives and the lack in adequate childcare provision.

‘I mean we looked for a day mother for him. I have to say that I’m at home at the moment [on sick-leave], which is lucky ... Well, and then when she said she couldn’t find anyone, I went with her and then we really saw some day mothers, where I said: No. Never in my life!’ (29)

822, p. 23, city, employed beyond childbirth, 3 grandchildren, employed

Childcare arrangements varied in extent and duration. ‘On call’ engagements alternated with or complemented regular day care arrangements that ranged from the coverage of fixed days (in alternation with the other grandmother or institutional childcare) to full-time care in their own homes. Childcare was given regardless of whether it was a daughter or son’s child, whether the women were employed or wanted to re-enter the labour market, or whether they had other plans and ambitions.

As grandmothers, the research participants did not see themselves as a first resort for childcare and they did not consider their involvement as an opportunity to relive parenting, as has been suggested in a psycho-dynamic perspective (Thomas 1986). On the contrary, the narratives confirm earlier findings of Albrecht (1954) and more recently of Cotterill (1992) that neither grandmothers nor grandfathers desire extensive care-giving responsibilities. Like their own mothers and grandmothers, the research participants considered grandchild care as a part of their motherwork, which enabled their sons and daughters to study or be employed. Grandfathers, even after retirement, rarely took on childcare responsibilities, although they sometimes helped with transport. The narratives suggest that the research participants did not demand their participation either. In fact
some respondents 'explained' their husband's lack of commitment in this respect with the same individualised and gender-neutral argument that 'he is not that type of person' (022) as they used to ground their own sense of responsibility in the context of parental care ('They'd have to find out for themselves how to manage. But I'm not that kind of person, I can't do that' (068)).

How were childcare arrangements negotiated and evaluated? The research participants reported that they frequently got drawn into childcare even if they had set time limits or explicitly ruled out the possibility that they would ‘raise children’ in the first place. It seems that only when their wage labour was necessary for their own subsistence did women feel that they had a legitimate reason to refuse regular childcare. Although the respondents enjoyed spending time together with their grandchildren and seeing them growing up, they also felt 'boxed in' by having to organise their own activities around the arrival and departure of grandchildren – or foregoing them entirely. The simultaneity of perceived solidarity with their children in the context of precarious employment prospects and the felt obligation to support them is illustrated in the shifting of the narratives between their insistence on their self-determination and passive constructions that 'it was fixed' (060) that they would look after their grandchildren.

Resp: Today I do in many respects what I want to do. Although I rather have locked myself in at the moment. I have my grandchild in the mornings...
Int: But it sounds as if that's a bit much, having your grandson here every day as well.
Resp: I don't have much time for myself. Not at all. And I feel a bit — boxed in. They've asked me first for a year...
Int: But it's OK for you that your daughter-in-law works now?
Resp: That's OK, yes. Yes, well, I've thereby locked myself in, it's a long time from 7 in the morning til half 12. ... I can't go to any seminars or anything. I always have to be there, right.
Int: And your husband [retired], he wouldn't be confident being alone with him in the morning?
Resp: No, he wouldn't like that. — My husband wouldn't like that. He's not that type of person.
Int: And you don't want to say that sometimes you'd like to-
Resp: I've already said, I already said. It's like this: the children asked me if I would take the lad for longer than a year. Then I thought that with him being four in May that then he'd start kindergarten. But it doesn't work that way. Until autumn, and that's too long.
Int: And how do you want to-
Resp: Now I've said A, I have to say B
Int: So that means you’ll carry on until autumn?
Resp: Yeah, right, I have to. I have to carry on! (30)

022, p. 34, city, worked beyond childbirth,
1 grandchild, part-time employed

Given the lack of ‘legitimate’ excuses to limit or end regular childcare it is doubtful whether the research participants will be ‘retiring’ from these responsibilities, which a number of women articulated as their plan after retirement. But even if they were to succeed, women did not, as Kornhaber and Woodwood (op. cit.) have suggested, ‘follow’ their husbands into retirement. Rather the women felt that after years or decades of employment and/or childcare responsibilities (depicted in the descriptive ‘and then’ format) they have ‘earned’ the right to time for themselves.

‘My eldest daughter got married and then I looked after my granddaughter again for three years, from half eight to half three/three, and again we had a small child in the house. Then came the accident with the 16 year old, the child bride. And there I did everything too, practically brought up the child alone. And straight after that came the third, and I had the children again. ... And that was so until the present day – well, let’s say until last Saturday that I was always there for the grandchildren. Always was available via telephone: Mum, are you free? ... Only now I have to say that I will turn 62, I’d like to get some peace. Well, for an hour or two it’s O.K. but I’m not keen. All of a sudden that’s enough, don’t want to anymore.’ (31)

126, p. 34, city, not employed after childbirth,
4 grandchildren, not employed

The narratives thus show that as with the childcare provided by their mothers and grandmothers the research participants frequently had stood in if and when the need arose and substituted for inadequate childcare facilities. Even though the personal relationship between grandmothers/parents and grandchildren might have changed to be more egalitarian, as the respondents suggested, it is not evident that motives for childcare, that is their daughter(in-law)’s need for support, have changed as well. Like their mothers, by taking over child care responsibilities the research participants continued to be agents of social change – with respect to the generation of younger women who they enabled to combine family and occupation in the absence of sufficient day care institutions. But from the perspective of the women concerned room for manoeuvre had not expanded: these responsibilities were neither freely negotiated nor entirely determined by the younger generation, as the metaphor of a ‘new social contract’ suggests. On the contrary the old ‘contracts of need’, whereby women felt that they had to substitute for each other
on the basis of a family relationship, appeared to remain unchanged over three
generations of grandmothers. The fact that some of the research participants planned to
reduce regular child care after retirement may indeed be evidence of a new counter-
discourse of women’s right to self-actualisation.

7.3. THE FALLACY OF SELF-EVIDENCE: CARE FOR RELATIVES OF
THE OLDER GENERATION

The imperceptibility of support for older relatives

The previous chapter on the continuation of need related shared households has already
shown that patterns of intergenerational support over the life course in this group of
women were more varied than is suggested by the two-phase model of the procreational
contract where support is given merely at the ends of the life course. Households
frequently had been separated and temporarily rejoined. Need for assistance by older
relatives was one further reason to maintain or recreate shared households, move them
geographically closer together, or intensify cooperation across household boundaries.

At least 25 of the 52 research participants had shared a household with their
mothers/parents or in-laws at one point in their adult lives. Twenty-three women from the
rural and the urban area reported that they had given some form of regular assistance to
their older relatives, including 11 women who had given intensive personal care to
relatives confined to bed. As with other forms of kin work, timing, extent and duration
varied enormously. Support for household chores could turn into, alternate or overlap
with full-time personal care, which was usually co-residential. A substantial minority of
the research participants had been primary and/or secondary carers for different relatives
and the (often unforeseeable) need for assistance by older relatives could occur at the end
of their occupational training, at the point of marriage or later in life. Assistance given
coincided with employment or lead to its temporary reduction. Given that this theme had
not been part of the topic guide and women tended to underplay their caring
commitments and strains (see also Döhner et al. 1992) it is likely that the extent of care
for older relatives is underestimated. This is confirmed in the interviews with the
women’s adult children.
The narratives indicate that the identification of periods of support for older relatives was
difficult not only because the need for support developed gradually but also because, as
routine or commonplace activities, kin support often remained below the threshold of the
respondents’ perception. The research participants frequently only considered periods
where they looked after a relative who was bedridden as care [Pflege]. If mentioned at all,
regular help with household chores, gardening, transportation or short-term care-giving
after illness were considered as ‘trivialities’ or ‘natural things’ [Selbstverständlichkeiten]
(860). Although differently elaborated, regular personal care was often introduced with
the same casualness (‘I sometimes stood in’), as practical assistance. To emphasise this
underplaying, the relevant expressions are underlined in the following transcripts.

‘I only helped with the laundry. Well, 20 years the laundry [of her mother], for
my father-in-law almost 15 years ... My God, I don’t count that really. First she
still ironed it and darned it. Then this got, you didn’t really realise it, little by
little always something got less. Then she couldn’t drive anymore and do the
groceries. Then the shop at the corner closed and then to the supermarket and
then that was that. Then she only went to the butcher and to the cemetery on
Saturdays. Well, and then gradually this got less too. And then she only cooked
stew, and I prepared the meat at the weekend. And then she let everything get
burned, then this didn’t work anymore either ... Other people always say, well,
they only get dependent because you do everything for them. But could you do
that – when you come home and upstairs everything is burnt? ... The time when
Mum was bedridden was very bad. Then I slept for 3 to 4 hours, at most. That
brought 20 pounds [weight loss] in this half year until Mum passed away. And I
ate normally. Only this not getting any sleep, that for me is the worst.’ (32)
003, p. 42/24, city, 1 sister, married, part-time employed,
joint household with mother

‘The mother of my husband is still alive, she is turning 90. And she lives next-
door upstairs, but is fully supported by us and cared for too. And because of this I
sometimes stood in ... It naturally got always a little more over the past months.’
(33)
093, p. 17/23, city, no siblings, married, not employed,
attached house with mother-in-law

The interviewers mentioned in the interview protocols that the histories of living close to
their relatives and the demands and burdens placed on these research participants, who
not rarely had been primary and secondary carers for different relatives, had depressed
them. While the women managed to integrate the provision of support with transport,
household chores and short-term care into their every day lives, day-to-day personal care
changed this structure completely if relatives’ needs were to be met. Intensive personal care was therefore not compatible with other full-time commitments unless an additional formal or informal helper was available. Because it often included the ‘all round organisation’ of the relative’s life, personal care was by far the most intense form of kin work. The narratives confirmed that despite the physical strains – paradoxically expressed as having ‘brought’ (not lost) 20 pounds – the emotional strain, constant worries and the compassion for their relatives’ deteriorating well-being were experienced as at least as stressful (Bowling 1989; Döhner et al. op. cit.).

Deconstructing the notion of self-evident care-giving

The descriptive sequential and matter of fact format of the narratives around elder care is concordant with the repertoire of self-evidence or naturalness that was invoked implicitly and explicitly. Whatever their family commitments a substantial number of the research participants maintained that providing support for older relatives was self-evident (natural or obvious) [selbstverständlich], a pattern of interpretation also found in British, North American and Canadian studies about family care (Ungerson 1987; Qureshi and Walker 1989; Cantor 1983; Aronson 1992). Literally the German Selbstverständlichkeit means something that is understood in and by itself, self-explanatory. To give care and assistance self-evidently or naturally is described as standing in without hesitation if and when a need for support arises. It is a spontaneous but predictable way of doing what has to be done.

'I don’t know, that was all so self-evident for us. It wasn’t really talked about or thought about for long. If there was a need, it was natural for us that everybody put back [their own interests] and that we helped there, just as when we were in need my mother was there. My sister [ill] would do it as well if she could. And I mean my father was a completely different type I unfortunately have to say, right. He wasn’t concerned.'

130, p. 35, city, married, employed, 2 sisters, temporarily joint household with mother

'And then I have to say, she always was very faithful and good to me. And then it was self-evident that I had my mother here until she died.

849, p. 25, country, employed, 1 brother, separate households in joint house

A closer reading reveals that usually a context was evoked in which a practice appeared
as 'self-evident' or 'self-explanatory'. A contextual qualification is first indicated through the preposition for. Thus, 'self-evident for us' in the above account seems to refer to a specific gendered intra-familial legacy of mutual support. From this established practice the father is explicitly excluded with reference not to his gender but to his personality ('my father is a completely different type' (130)). 'Self-evident for me', can likewise refer to a shared history of support but also connotes an individual 'natural' caring disposition or character that is defined in contradistinction to the unconcerned or self-concerned personality of other men and women ('I'm not that sort of a person' (068)).

Self-evident can also refer to a specific 'generation' of women connoting a specific gendered socialisation and in particular the socio-historical circumstance of war and post-war (see Chapter 6): 'If I look at my children - it's quite different. I think this will die out with our generation' (016). In all three contexts 'self-evident' or 'self-explanatory' referred to something taken as both normal and taken for granted, as well as, through the differences highlighted or implied, particular and special. This need to contextualise self-evidence challenges the idea of a universal and natural norm of exchange or reciprocity.

Apart from being embedded in a personal and/or social history, self-evidence was also linked to situational aspects. It is not the gendered/generational/individual injunction to care per se but the (perceived) unavailability or 'non-responsibility' of other possible carers or care arrangements, which made the personal commitment 'obvious' (Quereshi and Walker op. cit.; Twigg and Atkin op. cit.). In the interviews several of these explanatory contexts were often called forth at the same time. Self-evidence thereby paradoxically encompassed both voluntariness and obligation: on the one hand the women maintained that the support they gave 'naturally' was not (and logically could not) be prescribed by any norm or contract. Neither was it to be claimed nor expected by relatives in need. Family support, the women unanimously agreed, had to be given voluntarily: 'I think they would notice if you do it only by constraint. And this isn't that it becomes something good' (06) (003). Finch and Mason (op. cit.) have pointed to the script that kin support can neither be expected or nor claimed since this would impinge on the right of the donor to give or withhold support. Only if there were fixed duties of family obligation could there be complementary rights to claim family support. On the other hand, in contrast to the stated voluntary nature, the women assumed that their relatives
had hidden hopes for assistance. Importantly, references to the absence of alternatives, to obligation through benefits received previously and importantly, the allusion to the very ‘nature’ of their (caring) personality connoted the absence of a voluntary or freely willed commitment.

Resp: I cared for my parents-in-law later on. They were ill. My mother-in-law had a heart attack, then my father-in-law was with us for 8 weeks, and later I always went there three times a week, cooked for them, I did everything for them. We also made sure that they moved here close to us, so that I could get there at least with a bike. But that was also self-evident for me that I did it. And they were very happy of course, right, because they didn’t have any other child, daughter or anything.

Int: Yes, was he the only son?
Resp: Yes.... My mother died. Then I had my aunt, my mother’s sister-in-law and she didn’t have any children. We always were at Christmas - we always had extended family. Then I looked after her... Or they would have had to see by themselves how they could cope. But I’m not that sort of a person, I can’t do that.

Int: Well that you would have thought more about yourself at that moment?
Resp: Uhm, no, I can’t do that.
Int: And was it also expected that you did it?
Resp: Oh no, I don’t think it was, they didn’t expect it. Maybe they would’ve been sad, the parents-in-law, if I hadn’t done it, but they didn’t expect it.
Int: And was it was completely clear to you, when this situation arose, that you would go there?
Resp: Yes, that was completely obvious to me. I did it. I saw it was necessary and there wasn’t anyone else either. And my husband was very close to his parents. And they’d done a lot of good to us. Well, it was obvious for me.

In the interview protocol the interviewer noted that although the research participant did not seem very interested in theme of an interweaving of employment and family work, she had asked at the end of the interview whether her life course was quite normal in comparison to other women who were interviewed. Read in the context of ‘self-evidence’ this highlights the tension between stated normality and the compulsion for its explanation. In terms of processes of kinscription her paradoxical utterance ‘they didn’t have any other child, daughter or anything’ indicated a dominant gendered script of hierarchical caring responsibilities, similar to the ideal hierarchy of preferences of primary carers found by Cantor (op. cit.) in the US and Qureshi and Walker (op. cit.) in Britain. This scripted hierarchy reflects both peoples’ beliefs about what it is right to do, as well as their conviction that they have followed this model. In the British study
spouses were ranked first, a relative in a lifelong joint household second, daughters third, daughter-in-law fourth, then sons, other relatives and finally non-relatives (Qureshi and Walker op. cit., p. 126).

In the present study when both parents were still alive and one spouse was in need of support spouses were indeed reported to have cared for one another. To complement or substitute for spousal care, daughters in general were expected to be primary carers and they actually felt primarily responsible. They were also most likely to live in the same household with their mothers/parents ‘and when you live together, you care too’ (813). If there was no daughter (available), daughters-in-law were principal caregivers. In the sample an equal number of women cared for their parents and parents in-law. Seven research participants permanently lived with their mothers/parents or in-laws. Apart from parental support, care for (often childless) aunts who might have supported the research participants previously (see Chapter 6.3.) was the second most common support relationship. But personal care was also given to a cousin and to a stepmother.

It has to be emphasised that this scripted hierarchy of caring responsibility that included the mechanism of substitution explored in the previous chapter, not only assigned responsibility but was also strategically used by research participants to refuse responsibilities. Thus, daughters-in-law or more distant female relatives rejected caring responsibilities with the reference to the availability of a daughter, when a daughter was available. Among women ‘blood ties’ and the rights and duties attached to them were thus considered to be more binding than relations created through marriage – but this did not include sons. Both in thought and practice, men as sons(-in-law), brothers, nephews and husbands were presented as largely freed from caring responsibilities and assisted at most with transport or bureaucratic issues around the organisation of formal helpers. Yet, given the strains on family life that care-giving sometimes entailed, men’s practical help or at least their consent to women’s caring responsibilities were emphasised and highly valued by the research participants. Finch and Mason (op. cit.) correspondingly note from their British study that the symbolic significance of male help was at least as important as its practical value.
Within the scripted hierarchy of support responsibilities, marriage became a major distributive mechanism of obligation: while men were largely released from parental care through marriage, for women, caring responsibilities potentially doubled. However, female responsibility could be passed along the marriage chain downward and horizontally in the generational line to include, for example, the assistance of a respondent’s daughter-in-law or sister-in-law. That the respondents’ daughters or daughters-in-law were reported to support their mothers (-in-law) confirms Qureshi and Waker’s (op. cit.) finding that additional or secondary helpers were often chosen on the basis of their relationship to primary caregivers. Additional helpers also included female friends of the research participants. But friends were usually reported to offer their help. Whereas female assistance thus at least in part was obtained through the marriage contract of brothers and sons, the absence of a marriage contract normatively released women from caring responsibilities for their in-laws and increased the likelihood that sons would get involved.

Care receivers were presented as persons with their own strategies and power. Decisions about what kind of support was given and received, how it was given and for how long, were a co-product of situational aspects, cultural scripts and the material and psychological resources of the parties involved. In the following section I will focus on three kinds of strategies: strategies for reinforcing care-giving, initiated by the care receiver, strategies for providing and coping with care-giving and strategies for resisting caring responsibilities by actual or potential caregivers.

Strategies of reinforcing, maintaining, renegotiating and resisting elder support

The narratives suggest that actual or potential care giving was reinforced by what I consider to be ‘quasi-contractual strategies’: inheritance of property, payment of money and the assurance of support by promise. I call these strategies quasi-contractual because they evoked fairness in exchange but in a concrete situation appeared to merely have reinforced, not causally determined responsibilities assigned within the kinscript of a gendered hierarchy of primary carers. The strength of the cultural script exchange and reciprocity lies in its association with fairness and equity (see Chapter 2).
The transmission of inheritance and property to adult children during the older person’s life-time is an old contractual strategy to secure filial support in old age (Chapter 3.3.). The research participants reported that adult children (or other relatives) were invited to move into or remain in the parental house with the prospect of inheritance. In return for ‘taking over the parental house’ (845) the parents were granted a lifelong ‘right of residence’ [Wohnrecht] (003), i.e. a right to remain in the house rent-free. Implicitly this right included the privilege of assistance and support in the case the parents needed care. Although the hierarchy of carers by Qureshi and Walker (op. cit.) included the binding power of co-residency, a number of interviews suggested that if a more distant relative, such as a cousin or grandchild, shared a house with an older parent and a daughter lived nearby, the daughter still was supposed to carry primary responsibility.

On the other hand property was not always given to an adult child but in cases of hereditary leasehold was bought by the child. Even if the home was given as a gift or inheritance the child still had to compensate other heirs who were at the same time freed from primary caring responsibilities. At times the accounts suggest that older people gained the right of residence and support by virtue of having lived in a place for decades rather than by bequeathing property.

More directly connoting the idea of fairness and exchange, but rarely mentioned in family caregiver studies, is the payment of money for familial support by the care receiver (see Chapter 6.3.). The narrative accounts, however, suggest that none of the research participants provided support in order to receive money. Rather money appeared to have been given symbolically by the person in need of support to achieve ‘a proper balance’ in the relationship. In two cases money was also used strategically to make it harder for the potential care provider to decline support with reference to wage-earning necessities.

‘She had already been ill for a long time, then I came home from the farm for four days every fortnight and helped to care for my mother, right. Because my sister who lived in the house [parental house of mother] said “I won’t do it on my own”. She couldn’t do it on her own, right. And later when she was bedridden, that year I came more often. But then we had a nurse at night who slept with mother and when I came I slept with mother. And then she gave me every time, every month 100 Marks and always 20 Marks for the fare when I came. If I hadn’t taken it she would’ve been angry. Then I couldn’t have come anymore,
Not only when a father wanted to secure support for the research participant’s stepmother, but also in cases where mothers had lived together with their daughters all their lives, the ultimate binding strategy of the potential care receiver was to make a relative promise that they could die at home. This promise implicitly entailed the promise of personal support. Philosophically the promise principle has been considered as the moral basis of contract, by which persons impose morally compelling obligations on themselves where none existed before. This implies the assumption of a freedom of choice over whether to promise or not (Chapter 1.2.). In the context of intergenerational relationships however, their scripts and family histories but also the anxiety and helplessness on the side of the older relative, the ‘choice’ to promise was never ‘morally neutral’ (Fried 1981, p. 8). Not to give this promise when approached by an older relative is like declining a last wish.

‘She [mother] was completely in need of care. Then she had the wish if it’s possible to die at home. Then I said, granny, I grant you this wish. Only when I can’t take the responsibility [any longer], but she was so calm, she passed away like that.’ (40)

Resp: If you think about it, five times a day I had to go out of the house, over there-
Int: To your father-in-law?
Resp: Yes. And him only in diapers, and wash and everything, and a whole house there also by himself
Int: But you wanted him to stay in the house?
Resp: Uhm. I had promised him that sometime. As long as it is at all possible, he could stay there.
Int: Goodness me.
Resp: You’d managed it somehow. (41)

‘And I had said [to her mother]: when it isn’t possible any longer, you come here... Also my stepmother, I have to say, like I promised my father, right... and my stepmother was very hard, really, a real stepmother, never had children, which you perhaps can’t reproach her for, right. But it was self-evident for us, also for my children. When my stepmother was in hospital my children regularly went there in turn to visit her.’ (42)
Even though from the position of the potential care receiver, there appeared to have been a need to secure a caring relationship, from the point of view of the research participants these quasi-contractual strategies did not usually stand in opposition to their emphasis on the self-evidence of their (actual or potential) support provision. If taken out of context, inheritance, money and promises may suggest equality and negotiation, while the accounts indicate an emphasis on fairness in the absence of unconstrained negotiation and choice. On the contrary, the ways in which these elements were deployed and operated suggests that family support is not a series of choices about the proper and rational allocation of time and resources (apart perhaps from the point of view of the state) (Twigg and Atkin 1994).

For those 23 women who provided support as well as for the minority who declined to give it, strategies were necessary to maintain, limit or rule out caring responsibilities. Contrary to the dominant view that parental support is a recompense for care received previously, a number of women born around 1930 did not feel that they had reasons to be grateful to their mothers who they saw as hardened, bitter and ‘unjust’. To provide support despite, sometimes very negative memories and experiences that should have prevented them ‘paying back’ previous care-giving, sometimes required them to ‘forget’ and ‘put aside the past’. The strategy of forgetting is illustrated in the following account.

Resp: And that’s how my mother was – rather than a cuddle, I got hit with a stick. That’s how it was.
Int: And that didn’t change later? Sometimes when one gets older and has more distance then one says-
Resp: No, no, no. Couldn’t. I cared for my mother at the end. And sometimes my children said to me ‘how can you?’ I said, ‘come on, don’t remind me of the past. If I think about those times I can’t do it.’ That time, I just have to forget it/ push it aside.
Int: Did she live with you in the house?
Resp: She lived here with me at times. And then I cared for her with love, I have to say.

Against the background that the majority of research participants felt that in relation to
their mothers/parents ‘you always remained the child’ (813), the more pro-active strategies for maintaining shared living arrangements and support aimed at renegotiating the relationship with their mothers in order to create more equality and self-determination. In the same way as some of the research participants tried to limit their (grand)child care responsibilities at the time of their retirement, those women who felt entrapped in ‘dependency relationships’ with their mothers described strategies of asserting themselves, particularly their right to self-determination. Transferring tacit arrangements into explicit ones, expressing feelings and making them available to one another, potentially also empowered the mother who could articulate her feelings and wishes more specifically.

‘She always saw me still – well, she was always a bit dominating as well... And then we had, that was about four years before – she was 86, 87, then we really had a row. It wasn’t nasty. But then I said, “I’m still treated like a child! Do this, do that”. She always had it good here too. That now I’m a granny too myself, and also want to be a free person sometime. And I said, “I feel as if I’m in chains!”’ (44)

849, p. 30, country, 2 stepbrothers, divorced, employed, shared house with mother but separate households

‘Well, I turn 59 next Monday and only now I am starting to get independent from my mother, right. Although she still lives in the same house... Well, I’m always exercising. For example I said to my mother: “Listen, I can’t read your mind! I can do it, but I don’t want to anymore. You have a mouth, you can say if you want something! I won’t do anything anymore, if you don’t tell me that you want it.” I say, “and then I will still consider whether it’s appropriate that I do it!”’ (45)

037, p. 12, city, 2 sisters, retired, widowed, life-long shared household with mother

As with the practice of kin work more generally, these practices of changing and renegotiating personal relationships, despite their empowering and political character, usually remain below the threshold of public discourse and perception.

Although several research participants mentioned that their older relatives at the end of their lives had to go to a nursing home, only three women in the sample who were almost continuously employed reported that they overtly declined to care full-time for their mothers. As Finch and Mason (op. cit.) have pointed out, not to provide care for parents (-in-law) is seen as requiring ‘legitimate excuses’, such as ‘objective’ inability to provide intensive care due to other commitments, physical incapacity or geographical distance. In
the absence of such 'objective' hindrances the decision of a daughter (-in-law) not to be a full-time caregiver requires resources and strategies. Personal and institutional/expert support as well as a continuous employment career can be resources in this sense, but they sometimes were re-keyed as legitimate excuses. In the following account a reference to a hypothetical hindrance helped to view the situation as if there were legitimate excuses.

Resp: And I went there every night [to her mother-in-law]. We [with sister-in-law] put her to bed together. She had to be carried from one chair to the next. But it wasn’t my main responsibility. I’ve only helped.

Int: But if you’d had to do it, it wouldn’t have been possible to combine it with your job?

Resp: You can’t, you can’t and I wouldn’t have done it either. If I’d have sent her somewhere and then continued to go working. I wouldn’t have done that. Although that would’ve been really tough for me. My mother-in-law has criticised me for carrying on working when my mother was old and not so fit anymore. Once she had a real go at me and said I mustn’t do that. Then I talked to the doctor, then he said “your mother could be alone and you could live in America. Then you wouldn’t be able to do anything either”. (46)

070, p. 39, city, 5 siblings, married, part-time employed, attached house with in-laws

Strategies of coping with, renegotiating and declining caring responsibilities were always interpreted in their situational context. By focusing on the research participants’ strategies the question becomes not whether or not a woman has provided support, but how and to what extent it was given and assigned and negotiated over time. Despite the expansion of the welfare state the subjectively perceived room for manoeuvre of the group of women interviewed, however, remained narrow. Like other forms of kin work, care giving was not considered as a political economic factor and attempts to limit kin support were negotiated interpersonally although experts could provide crucial support. What did the research participants expect from their children with respect to support in old age against the background of their own commitments and experiences? This question also aims at a further exploration of how older women evaluated their own kin commitments in retrospect, in particular care given to older relatives.

7.4. EXPECTATION OF FILIAL SUPPORT IN OLD AGE
Contrary to Hareven's (1994) findings in the US that parents expected their children to assist them in old age, the research participants doubted that their children would be willing and able to care for them should the need arise. Overall, both sons and daughters were perceived as more independent and self-determined than they had been themselves. Not a single research participant said that she expected support in old age from her children. Even when children explicitly offered support, the women tended not to trust these assurances – and importantly they did not want to jeopardise the emerging processes of self-determination by ‘new’ dependencies on their children. Despite the sinister scenarios that some respondents evoked in relation to elder care homes, fearing that they would become a burden and lose their independence, the majority of research participants planned to go into a home voluntarily.

‘Well, one thing in life was important for me: never become dependent on my children. ... How it’s going to be later, I don’t know. The youngest once told daughter-in-law, ‘mother is not going into a pensioner bunker.’ Like youth talks. ... But I don’t get under their feet. ... I’ve seen enough. If I’m ten years older one simply says, “mother, sit on this chair and don’t get up”. No, not with me!’ (47)
069, p. 20, city, widowed, retired, 3 children

‘Even our youngest says – I don’t know what they will think later – he says, “Mum, you will never go to a nursing home”. He experienced the misery there now. They are good to them, I saw it myself. But they don’t have anybody to talk to. Well, and that’s the sad thing, the people need conversations and become stunted. He always says: “you never-” but you don’t know how they will think later on, when they have a family themselves. But I always say, I won’t become a burden on my children. We’ll go ourselves because we already know this from our club. They almost all go into a nursing home.’ (48)
026, p. 23, city, married, 2 sons, not employed

Overall, the research participants appeared to welcome their children’s increased choice of decision making with respect to family care-giving and particularly granted their sons the primary importance of their responsibility for their own families. The emphasis on choice is concordant with their insistence that care has to be given freely to be beneficial. This insistence on a voluntary commitment appeared to be necessary because the commitment that personal care demands is greater than could be enforced by mere obligation or constraint. As pointed out earlier Finch and Mason (1992) have argued that a right to demand family support would jeopardise the donor’s freedom to give or withhold support. I would suggest that if the family were a sphere of freedom and choice,
as is suggested by notions of a new ‘social’ or caring contract, people would be able to freely ask for support and grant it or freely reject it. It is precisely because family members cannot ‘freely’ refuse to give support that relatives cannot openly ask for it. Thus, I suggest that the norm of ‘non-articulation’ (Patterson 1997) serves to conceal the absence of choice by seemingly maintaining it. For the women concerned, this norm of non-articulation and their lack of trust in their children’s assurances meant that they could not count on the family and planned to rely on service provision for their own old age.

The preceding analysis has shown that even though the eleven women who did provide intensive personal care felt that they had little choice to do otherwise, they characterised their kin commitments as voluntary.

‘And I would say, I don’t hold anybody in contempt — and if someone says they can keep the granny at home, I’m the first to say, “You can’t say that without a second thought”. If somebody can do it and wants it... but you can’t tell anybody, you have to do it. And as I said, I personally don’t expect it either... from my son, and from a daughter-in-law you can’t expect it anyway. But I wouldn’t have expected it from a daughter. You either have to go for it, to want it or else you let it be; one or the other. But not to be forced into it. And I’ll tell you, I volunteered for all that. Looking back I’d say, I’d do it again if I had to. Though I had my doubts for a while. When my son was very small and my mother very ill that wasn’t good for the little boy... But I couldn’t do anything else, I had to pull through ‘cos I had the feeling I had to do it.’ (49)

006, p. 48, city, 1 son, widowed, not employed, cared for both parents and parents-in-law

I argue that contradictory accounts such as this suggest that the research participants women did not merely refer to competing discourses of different acceptability and normativity but that they ‘wanted to help’ and ‘make it easier’ for their relatives — while at the same time they felt that they had no alternative. Defining kin work as a personal choice, as they must, not only conceals the constraints that are at work but also individualises problems that can arise in the course of care giving. If social scientists speak either of choice or of obligation (Lewis and Meredith 1988) they perpetuate the concealment of ambivalent feelings and motives and the interweaving of explicit and implicit processes of negotiation.
Given that the extent to which kin work in the group of women studied was considered largely as ‘private’ cooperation between kin members I want to conclude this chapter by asking whether the research participants conversely regarded their entitlements from the institutionalised generational contract as merely a ‘reward’ for their labour market participation or whether they considered those in conjunction with their intergenerational commitments. Furthermore, were their expected entitlements a sufficient base to realistically plan a life independently of their children?

Being around 60 years old, the research participants had started to search for their employment records and often quite painfully realised that their pension entitlements would be in many cases too low to allow for an independent lifestyle in old age. Although only twelve women were selected on the basis that they were primarily housewives (among whom there turned out to be seven family labourers), only 23 of the 52 research participants were expecting a (small) pension in their own right. To claim the minimum pension that is only paid from the age of 65 (instead of 60 or 63 when the women had more substantial credit records) women used to have been employed as National Insurance contributors for at least 15 years, later for five. The wish to reach this benchmark and/or to better their financial situation was one of the reasons, apart from a strong work orientation, that 18 research participants were still employed at the time of the interview. Other research participants knew that they would not qualify for a pension.

At the end of one of the postal questionnaires in the initial survey (see Appendix A), one of the respondents had attached the following note:

'I think that women of my generation, as well as a family also wanted to have an occupation. My attempt has unfortunately failed. I regret this a lot. Also I would have liked to claim the small pension granted to me at 60 instead of at 65. For unpaid social commitments, we are of course particularly in demand.'

Another women had exclaimed in the interview

'They dictate to us anyway what we [women] have to do. It doesn’t matter when, at what time and under what regime and so on. Because it was simply necessary.
Accounts such as these allude to a consciousness of older women that ‘the state’ or society needed and took advantage of women’s lifelong paid and unpaid work commitments. Furthermore, the first account indicates that the woman considered low pension entitlements as a consequence of unpaid family and kin work. At the beginning of their work lives, however, few women said that they had thought about or were informed [aufgeklärt, literally: ‘were told the facts of life’ (840)], about the significance to work with social security contributions. Here fathers were sometimes reported to have insisted on the importance of pension relevant employment. Yet, many women followed the then widespread practice of ‘paying out’ the wife’s insurance contributions to the married couple on the birth of their first child. These disbursements offered some capital for the young family to build up a household but also meant to make women give up their claims of an employment career and a pension in their own right. In retrospect the disbursements were characterised as ‘an unforgivable mistake’, often assigned to the research participants’ husbands.

The situation of family labourers who were neither paid nor insured was particularly precarious. The financial situation of the following widowed research participant who also looked after her disabled daughter was very insecure. Because the new owners of her house had already moved in and she was only ‘tolerated’ there, she came to the university for the interview. The interviewer noted how she was affected by the discrepancy between the impression of the participant as a long standing businesswoman and her apparent insecurity with respect to her living situation. Although the woman is one of the few who formulated claims to state responsibility, she laid the responsibility of the lack of insurance contributions primarily on her father-in-law.

Resp: Because my husband was the sole heir I was in the business almost the whole day, but also when the children were there later on, right? ...
Int: So practically you were also employed
Resp: Yes, you can say that, but without remuneration. My father-in-law, he did not even pay disability stamps for me. He said, give me your [insurance] card, and for himself he paid stamps for the maximum amount and when he gave me the card back after 12 years, nothing had happened with it once. ... Yes, and then my husband died so early and I don’t receive a pension yet, well, I will perhaps get
around 300 Marks per month ... well, I've already eaten half of my house, right? Yes well minimum pensions are simply too low. I think, so much money is pumped in everywhere, then they should do something there so that the people don't have to go to the social assistance office. Well really, right? (52)

074, p. 13/14, 5 years employed, 20 years family labourer, widowed, no pension

With respect to the lack of pension entitlements and security in old age, some of the research participants thus repeated in an uncanny way the 'fate' of their mothers by relying on the male breadwinner model.

'My mother helped my father in the workshop ... And then my parents made the mistake, which my mother always regretted, that they didn't pay contributions for her. Well, my father was self-employed. They thought if they saved and built a house that would be the old age insurance ... And then it turned out that the house didn't bring much rent at all... But my father at least got a small pension. And when my mother finally got it, then she kept saying "if we only we had paid in for me too"... Yes, I saw it with my parents how it goes when you aren't insured. But at that time, when we married or shortly afterwards my husband became a civil servant. And then I always said to myself, well you, for you it isn't that important. I also didn't know what and how I could start [working] again. And I never thought that you'd be on the street, that this ends with a divorce.' (53)

121, p. 25/26, 5 years regularly employed, 17 years employed without National Insurance, divorced, no pension

Overall, the research participants' approach to and evaluation of their often meagre entitlements was incredibly modest, sometimes accompanied by sadness but not openly expressed anger. Depending on the women's marital and financial situation, pensions were at times not only seen in terms of material remuneration but also in terms of public acknowledgement. Thus although she stated that she did not 'want more anyway', for the following married research participant receiving the minimum pension entailed the hope of finally receiving some acknowledgement by the state.

'I have my months full now so that I get at least a pocket money of a pension. You don't want more anyway. That perhaps later it will be acknowledged by the state, what you have done.' (54)

126, p. 28, 5 years employed, 5 years temporary work without National Insurance, married, pension

The accounts show that the women rarely articulated a critique of the kin work they had provided intra- and intergenerationally or indeed of a social security system tailored to a male life-long employment career. Having themselves contributed to both the familial and the institutionalised generational contract the advice they give to their own daughters...
and women of the younger generation, similarly to their own mothers, was to work within the system more successfully.

'But I always would say and say to every woman: “Continue to pay stamps for your minimum claims of pension, so that you won’t be dependent later or be so much worse off than the man/husband!”' (55) 037, p. 36, 25 years regularly employed, widowed, pension

In so far as this recommendation (realistically) assumed that structurally their daughters and daughters-in-law were more pressured to interrupt or reduce their employment when they have children, it had, as I have shown above, considerable repercussions on their own life-style. Once again the research participants felt that they had to stand in as grandchild minders to make up for the structural inequality of this very system.

7.6. CONCLUSION

In the preceding sections I have investigated the kinscripts of women born around 1930 in mid and later life, in particular the practical and personal support the research participants reported they had given to grandchildren and older relatives. These practices were contextualised, not primarily with reference to the historical-economic conditions and intra-familial legacies, but in the case of childcare with respect to a dilemma between the lack of adequate social institutional provision on the one hand and the need of their daughters (in-law) to remain in paid work (i.e. the requirements of the labour market) on the other. Providing for older continues to be based on the political question ‘But who else is going to do it?’ (Aronson 1992). Despite the general currency of the notion of the generational contract in Germany (Chapter 3) and the fact that social scientists use the contract metaphor of a ‘new social contract’ or ‘caring contract’ none of the research participants explicitly deployed a contractual vocabulary. Repertoires of the generational contract such as the cultural meaning systems of reciprocity and back payments (articulated only by three respondents) and emotional closeness had a minor role in justifying kin support.

Assistance and care-giving of older relatives were often characterised ‘self-evident’. Yet
the notion of self-evidence or naturalness entailed a series of contextualisations, referring to the women’s personality and generational position, an implicit script of a gendered hierarchy of carers and last but not least to situational needs. Although the participants insisted that care had to be given voluntarily these contextualisations pointed to felt obligation and constraints. Thus the notion of self-evidence paradoxically encompassed both voluntary and obligatory aspects of kin work.

I have suggested viewing the dominant gendered hierarchy of support obligations as a cultural script. This script incorporates mechanisms of substitution analysed in the previous chapter and also the distributive mechanism of the conjugal contract, which tends to release men as husbands and sons from caring responsibilities while potentially doubling them for women (Lorenz-Meyer and Grotheer 1999). The narratives suggest indeed that the release of men as husbands and brothers from day-to-day responsibilities, as Conen (1998) has stated, remains legitimate and unquestioned. But women too used the script as a basis for designing strategies to reject responsibilities in particular by pointing to those relatives who were held responsible before them.

More generally, I have argued that a focus on strategies is a productive way of understanding how support relationships were created and upheld given the inherent tensions between felt solidarity and constraint. The notion of strategies as an important dimension of kin work would complement the focus on tension suggested by Stack and Burton (1993) in a modified framework of kinscripts. Pro-active and defensive strategies were used in contexts of constraint and show that negotiation and assignment of kin work responsibilities are not of an order of either/or. Elements of inheritance, money payments and promise could be interpreted as patterns of exchange and contract but the narratives suggest that these elements had rather a symbolic (and sometimes moral) than a straightforward material significance in reinforcing family care giving. Making a younger family member promise to be able to die at home implicitly entails an implicit assurance of support and together with strategies of renegotiating intergenerational relationships was an exception of a more general script of non-articulation of expectations or wishes of kin support. I have shown how this script whilst seemingly maintaining the freedom of potential caregivers to decline support concealed the stated need to present ‘legitimate
excuses' for this decline, that is the absence of 'free' choice.

The focus on strategies highlighted defensive strategies such as 'forgetting' previous conflicts, disappointment and anger as well as strategies of renegotiating family relationships. These strategies often required personal and institutional resources, such as the support by experts or a long established employment history. Renegotiations first concerned a decline of further regular childcare responsibilities as they were seen as conflicting with a demand of own interests after retirement. Second, they concerned renegotiations of dependency relationships between the research participants and their mothers described in Chapter 6.4. The important characteristic of renegotiations was the emphasis on the open articulation of perceived strains and an assertion of the women’s interests, that is, of transferring tacit arrangements into explicit ones. Where they occurred they appeared to have an empowering effect. In no case did the research participants report, however, that they renegotiated relationships with relatives confined to bed or with those who were normatively released from primary responsibilities.

Finally I would like to draw attention to the fact that the research participants at least in part interpreted intergenerational commitments as 'work', but only cautiously and indirectly formulated claims of acknowledgement and recognition by 'the state' as has been shown in the analysis of the evaluation of their pension entitlements. Put differently, being experts in the identification and interpretation of the needs of others does not necessarily entail an open articulation of their own needs. Approaching the final quarter of their lives this group of older women found themselves to be systematically disadvantaged by a pension system that linked entitlements to a continuous (male) employment biography. By providing childcare they (not always whole heartedly) aimed to secure this continuity for their daughters and daughters-in-law. Encouraging asking questions about the allocation of resources the framework of kinscripts helps to open up these contradictions. On this basis the framework more generally lends weight to a social-scientific focus on 'generation' that does not surpass but has to incorporate the axes of gender and class. This shift of focus then allows a re-keying and re-politisation of the term of the welfare generation by identifying women of the 'welfare generation' not as those who enriched themselves unduly from welfare state benefits, but as those who were
chief contributors to the production of welfare both in the employment sphere and in the kinship network. From this new point of departure questions of intergenerational equity and accounting can and must be posed again.
Chapter 8

NEGOTIATING AND TRANSFORMING INTERGENERATIONAL LEGACIES: KIN WORK PRACTICES AND ANTICIPATIONS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF ADULT CHILDREN

8.1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter continues the analysis of kinscripts in the life courses of a group of the women’s adult children who were born between 1953 and 1964. As elaborated in the previous chapter, in the context of welfare state expansion and an increasing economic independence of young adults from their parents, intergenerational relationships are increasingly perceived as being governed by sentiment and choice rather than by obligation (Jerrome 1990; Eckart 1989; Hareven 1994). Family care is widely believed to have lost its reliability (Lüscher 1993, p. 42) and is said to have become a matter of personal discretion, with the older generation having fewer possibilities for reinforcing the provision of filial support in old age. In the context of an impending ‘care crisis’ this alleged ‘detraditionalisation of family bonds’ (Kaufmann 1993, p. 107) has a gendered subtext. It is primarily younger women who are seen as not willing or able to uphold the ‘caring contract’ and held responsible for the erosion of family solidarities (Chapter 3.6.). As I have shown in the analysis of generational politics and discourses in the German welfare state this diagnosis is nothing new (and indeed, Skolnick (1993, p. 47) has pointed out that ‘every generation on record seemed to have believed it was witnessing “the decline of the traditional family”’). Counterclaims such as the assumption that individualism and a retreat from solidarity will occur in extra-familial relationships rather than within kin relationships, which continue to be ranked highest in value surveys (Pitrou 1993, p. 87), remain less audible.
Against the background of these claims, this chapter explores the descriptions, evaluations and anticipations of intergenerational practices of German men and women aged between 30 and 41. Here it is important to recall that the research participants were selected by contact established through their mothers (Appendix A). Thus those children who have broken off contact or have a problematic relationship with their parents may have been excluded from the sample.

Applying the heuristic framework of kinscript and the focus on the repertoire of contract and gender I first explore the description of kin work practices and 'family feelings' or sentiments between the research participants and their parents, including the views of the younger generation on grand-maternal child care responsibilities. Next, I will look at the description and modes of dealing with material and immaterial transfers and family legacies, both in terms of personality/character and lifestyle. In the third part I focus on adult children’s anticipations and possible negotiations and plans for supporting their parents in old age. More specifically I analyse the models of care provision the research participants anticipated and justified, taking into account possible intra-familial legacies, cultural scripts and social institutions. To explore whether scripts have changed across generations I examine the following questions: (i) what repertoires, vocabularies and symbols do younger Germans draw on to justify their anticipations of care-giving? (ii) How do their plans build on previous relationships with their parents and to what extent are they affected by intra-familial legacies and social institutions? (iii) To what extent is parental care giving part of reflective life planning and openly negotiated in families of younger Germans as the term generational contract and the theory of an individualisation of intergenerational relationships suggest? Finally, in the light of the emerging findings I will explore the views of the younger generation on gender equality in order to assess possible demands addressed to the welfare state.

8.2. KIN WORK COMMITMENTS AND FAMILY FEELINGS BETWEEN PARENTS AND ADULT CHILDREN

Given the unexpectedly high number of temporary or permanently joint households in the
group of women born around 1930, it is perhaps not surprising that 15 of the women’s adult children (including 3 brother/sister dyads) from both the urban and rural area had grown up with their grandmothers/parents in the same house. Five other research participants had lived temporarily with their grandparents. Among those who had experienced them, three-generation households were described as not uncommon. In comparison with the older women’s depiction of their childhood and youth (Chapter 6.2.) there was less emphasis on obligatory housework contributions and perceived deprivation. Yet, the introductory accounts of these research participants, generated by a question referring to the perceived scope of their mother’s employment, read quite similarly to those of the older women who grew up in three-generation households. A comparison of siblings’ narratives suggests that there were no systematic gender differences in the perception of household arrangements and the inter-generational kin work they entailed, apart from the fact that women appeared to have felt emotionally closer to their grandmothers.

“We had a business at home. My mother was often there the whole day although she tried to balance that with the children somehow, in the afternoons at home. And because we had a granny in the household it wasn’t so much noticed, right. Well we children were not really directly deprived... and – yes, granny covered a very big part: cooking, looking after the children... well, for me granny played a big role. She compensated a lot.” (56)

Woman 516, p. 1/2, country \(\rightarrow\) city, 4 brothers, skilled, married, no children

Women often described their grandmothers as strong, the ‘centre point of the family’ (w845) who counterbalanced maternal absence. Independently of their own relationship to their grandmothers and in accordance with some of their mothers’ accounts, shared inter-generational living arrangements, and grand-maternal child care in particular, were sometimes remembered as problematic. Conflicts centred around the dominance of grandmothers and what mothers sometimes were reported to have considered as their interference in family and business affairs.

“And I know of the conflicts that my mother had with her unloved mother-in-law in the same household which for years lead to terribly stressful situations and to heavy and great rows, both between my father and my mother and between my mother and my granny which we children were affected by too. You always had to take sides. And there was the mother and there was the granny whom you liked as well.” (57)
Being between 30 and 41 years old at the point of the interview, the overwhelming majority of the younger research participants had established their own work and family lives. At this point households between parents and children were mutually independent. Yet, a substantial minority of both men and women in the rural and urban areas (8/49) had moved into or next to the house of their parents or parents-in-law and in four cases continued the family tradition of close intergenerational households. As with the generation of the older women, shared households entailed expectations — but not necessarily the practice — of kin support both with respect to help with child care and assistance in old age.

'It’s expected of me because this house belongs to my husband and he got it shortly before our wedding with a life-long right of residence for the parents-in-law with the thought that when one dies, the other one — they have their own room upstairs.' (58)

Woman 831, p. 10, city → country, 2 siblings, skilled, cohabiting, 1 child [grew up with grandmother]

Kin work practices between parents and adult children, however, were neither bound to co-residence nor did they follow set expectations or intra-familial legacies. Although patterns of contact and desired closeness varied, all research participants visited and/or were visited regularly by their parents. In line with empirical research on intergenerational relationships the overall flow of financial, practical and emotional support was reported to pass from the older to the younger generation (Attias-Donfut 1995). Yet, although singular intergenerational practices such as financial advice or practical assistance given and received could be very similar, the narratives of the younger generation suggest that they attached a different quality to assistance given and received or expected. I will focus on these differences in turn.

Different perceptions of assistance given to and received by older parents

The research participants’ parents, who were in their 60s and (early) 70s when the younger generation was interviewed, were still perceived as largely ‘getting on by themselves’. Occasional or regular practical help by the younger generation was described as limited to set tasks such as dealing with bureaucracy, garden work or
renovating, although it was more substantial in those families where mothers were
widowed or divorced (12 out of 49). As in the narratives of the older women kin workers,
this form of assistance was characterised by both women and men as not being expected,
'not an issue' (Man 022) and 'self-evident' (Man 840) and, at the same time, sometimes
as obligatory. The following research participant, who I met in the house of his widowed
mother and co-resident brother, explained his decreasing family commitments to his
family of procreation with his obligations to his mother and brother.

Resp: I also have a certain obligation let's say. My mother has a huge thing [house] here
and my brother has already been unemployed for a long time... I support my
mother as much as possible ... we have renovated the house here, downstairs, I've
done that a lot on my own mostly at weekends and in the evening with a friend of
mine, my brother helped. We have converted my father's former business area
and turned it into a flat.

Dim: For your mother
Resp: No, to it rent out here ...

Dim: Is it also that your mother can live off the rent or is this not an aspect that she can-
Resp: Yes, it's a source of income... I support her in legal affairs and other matters
where I know more than her because of my training... She doesn't expect it, that I
look a bit after her or my brother, she doesn't expect it but it is self-evident for
me. (59)

Man 840, p. 19/38, country, 1 brother, mother widowed,
university, married, 1 child [grew up with grandmother]

Likewise emotional support and exchange, and attempts to encourage a parent to live
more socially after life events such as illness or widowhood were described by men and
women as spontaneous and necessary interventions that did not require much thought or
discussion. Apart from two women who provided regular personal care for an older
relative (see 8.4.) these delimited 'natural-obligatory' kin work practices were not
described as conflicting with other commitments.

By contrast, the assistance the adult children received from their parents, particularly
where they involved long-term financial support, regular child care and temporary
accommodation of a (divorced or widowed) daughter and her children, was interpreted as
having a major impact on their parents' lives. Once it exceeded the period of child raising
this support was not explicitly termed 'self-evident'. But adult daughters in particular,
perhaps because they had a sense of their social vulnerability when they separated from
male partners, characterised this form of parental support as reliable and actually or
potentially unconditional. That is, parents were expected to stand in for their children and often did regardless of their own feelings and concerns.

'And I knew if I had dared or taken this step [divorce] my mother would have been there for me. That I had known where to go, that I could have arrived with child and everything in front of her door – I still could stand in front of the door today – and that without asking it would have been accepted that I were there. Yes, that’s how I see my mother.' (60)

Woman 845, p. 24, country, 1 brother, mother widowed, skilled, married, 1 child [grew up with grandparents]

Two women in the sample reported that they had experienced exactly this kind of unconditional parental support. Furthermore, apart from receiving financial and practical advice, loans and support during periods of unemployment or study, 17 of the 32 research participants with children had relied on their parents or parents-in-law for regular or occasional child care. The respondents often were aware that regular child care commitments clashed with their parents'/mothers’ lifestyle and interests, which was one reason why a number of research participants explicitly rejected this form of child care even if they lived in close proximity or in a shared house. Yet other sons and daughters felt they had no alternatives to their mother(-in-laws) complementing or substituting for inadequate institutional child care. Here grand-parental childcare could be a point of contention among siblings when research participants felt that this assistance had not been equally distributed between the siblings.

The accounts of mothers and adult children corresponded in that childcare was interpreted as support of the adult child. Yet, in the following case the daughter also referred to her mother’s reproaches for her being employed and her commitment to the well-being of her grandchild, which had been left unsaid in the mother’s account (see Chapter 7.2.).

'Well, if I didn’t have my mother, and let’s say if she hadn’t been willing to look after S, it wouldn’t be possible [to be employed]. Because I certainly wouldn’t have given him somewhere else, I’m away for too long for that because I work full-time... We have tried to put him in the kindergarten at three and a half to take some of the load off my mother, so that he doesn’t sit round in the living room there all day... Well she has her own interests too. And that didn’t work out, it was too much for him... And then she said well OK if it is necessary, right. Because she always has compassion for the child too because I’m such a bad mother so that the child isn’t harmed she was willing to do it. But I think maybe
she was glad too that she had somebody, that she had a task again.'

Woman 809, p. 10/17, city, 1 brother, skilled, divorced, 1 child
[grew up with grandparents]

Family sentiments

The research participants not only considered the contact between grandparents and grandchildren as practical help but, on the basis of their own childhood experience, saw it as important for promoting a sense of family, continuity and communication between the generations. If mothers/parents appeared to have different priorities and/or did not want to interfere with the family lives of their children, their retreat from intergenerational kin work was regretted and criticised. Here the younger generation appeared to become the bearers of family tradition.

'I sometimes would like that she [mother] doesn’t come spontaneously when it suits her but arranged with us or at fixed times so that it’s easier for the children, that they know Wednesday granny comes. ... It’s also my own interest that I want that yes, that the children have a granny, they already don’t have a grandfather and I think that it must be fun for her... Sometimes I think that her family is not that important to her... OK, for me granny and grandpa were very important, maybe it’s coming from there. And then I think my wife would have a bit of a break.'

Man 115, p. 39/40, city → country, university, married, 3 children
[grew up with grandparents]

Although they were not described as unproblematic from the perspective of adult children intergenerational relationships often gained importance with increasing age and when they had children of their own. In the younger generation kin members were also seen as important in acknowledging each other’s life styles, histories and identities. If this was not possible contacts were reduced or temporarily cut off. Even though the research participants differed in how closely they believe intergenerational ties should be knit, these ties appeared to be symbolically and psychologically laden with feelings of connection. Family feelings in this sense did not presuppose positive affection but entailed a stable feeling of belonging, of being part of a generational line.

'Well, family is, sometimes you can argue with them or discuss or something, also fall out and say nothing to for years. But it is family. They are always still somewhere to be reached or ... whereas everything else is often final, right.'

Woman 857, p. 62, country → city, 4 sisters, divorced, cohabiting, 3 children

Yet, rarely were parents sought as confidants. It may be a historically specific feature of
these particular generations that feelings, sympathies and sometimes criticism were reported as almost never directly expressed in face-to-face contacts, but more often mediated through others.

Resp: When we meet we talk only about banalities but everybody worries an awful lot about the other. Well when there was the story about the divorce of my sister the telephone lines ran hot and-

Dlm: How you can support her or?

Resp: Yes, yes and then we think and talk and give our opinions... But when we meet, it's very rare that we really have personal conversations.\(^{(64)}\)

Woman 546d, p. 39, city → city, university, cohabiting, 1 child

‘[In our family] nobody harasses the other with his feelings I would sum it up... What I see [also] with my friends is that the sense of family grows with age and also the closeness to the parents grows. Never really was terminated. Well, I hardly know anybody who completely broke off with his parents... People still travel to see their parents and there is a close connection... and with it also come feelings of responsibility.’\(^{(65)}\)

Man 011, p. 60, city, university, married, 1 child

These accounts suggest that research participants were aware that feelings of generational belonging and responsibilities were created through contact and practice. Although not without conflict intergenerational ties overall were perceived as indissoluble. In contrast to the narratives of the older women, where emphasis was put on making and maintaining the family through kin work, intergenerational bonds in the younger generation neither necessarily entailed geographical proximity nor continuous contact, but were conceived of as latent yet reliable caring about rather than caring for relatives.

The creation of family feelings as well as differences and conflict will be further explored in the narratives that refer to dealing with and working through intergenerational legacies.

8.3. INTERGENERATIONAL LEGACIES

Contextualisation of generational belonging in the historical context

Whereas the research aimed at exploring material and immaterial transfers and perceived similarities and differences in the lifestyles of the two generations on an individual and family level, the research participants often placed generational differences in their
historical context. In fact the characterisations of different historical generations was one template in and against which the characteristics of their parents, sometimes grandparents, and their own, were interpreted. Very schematically and across possible working/middle class divides, the research participants identified the parental generation as the 'reconstruction generation' [Aufbaugeneration] with a predominantly materialistic orientation and lifestyle. This generation was juxtaposed with what was occasionally termed the 'break out generation' [Ausbruchgeneration] (Man 814) with a post-materialistic orientation.

In comparison with the break out generation, members of the reconstruction generation were regarded as having lacked 'development opportunities' (Man 851) and as having had to respond to necessities. Because of 'fear of impoverishment' and 'security needs' (Woman 011) they were seen as work oriented and striving towards social advancement, property and savings. Practically, this 'will to work' (Man 124) was organised to fit a normative division of labour by gender within which women’s employment and men’s household contributions were sanctioned and, where they occurred, had to be hidden or denied. Families in this context were considered as 'purpose' or 'compulsory' communities' (Woman 011) and leisure and pleasure activities confined to a marginal place.

As an ideal type, the break out generation was defined in contradistinction to the reconstruction generation. Members of this generation were seen as having more opportunities and the means to question and change materialistic and gender specific lifestyles. Family roles and responsibilities were seen as in principle negotiable: 'nothing is definitely fixed' (Man 508) anymore. Emphasis had shifted from work to leisure, money was more readily spent than saved, property rented rather than bought.

In contrast to the accounts of their mothers some of the younger women, who grew up in close proximity to their grandmothers, related this non-materialistic orientation to the generation of their grandmothers. The grandmaternal dominance that their mothers had seen as determined by hardship and need was interpreted by some of the granddaughters as female independence. Some younger women constructed these intergenerational
continuities even if they had never been employed for longer periods.

'Those were the so-called 'women of the rubble'... who in this generation really often led their own lives, simply because they had to. ... That was what I admired in her [grandmother] the most, her independence, this to manage your whole life really alone without being orientated towards someone... I think my mother never understood my grandmother. She never felt about it that way. She only simply always saw the work she did, and my mother as a child had to suffer a lot from this of course and work a lot. My mother really wanted to do better, well that we as children would have a secure existence, materially, limited to material things. That is I think the difference between my granny, my mother and myself. For my mother it was about material things, with my granny and myself it is perhaps more about ideal things.' (66)

Woman 508, p. 40/42, country, no training, married, 2 children, not employed [grew up with grandmother]

These differences in interpretation highlight not only women’s different generational positionality but also underline how legacies, traditions and intergenerational continuities were sometimes constructed as integral parts of younger women’s identities. That is, perceived similarities were affirmative of certain desirable aspects of their identities and lifestyles and at the same time linked the research participants to other women (predecessors) and turned them into bearers and preservers of family traditions. At times the legacy of female (grand) maternal independence was described as if it was passed on by blood relationships.

Dlm: Would you say that there is something like a family tradition, if you-
Resp: From the side of my father yes. Those were all women, my grandmother too, who were dominant, who, also from what I’ve read, always led their own lives... And I think I take after this side rather than the side of my mother. (67)

w845, p. 28, country, skilled, married, 1 child, f/t employed [grew up with grandparents]

When describing aspects of the lives of their own parents and their own lives and dealing with family legacies and scripts in more detail, the schematic characterisation of historical generations appeared to be far less clear cut, was explicitly gendered and more contradictory. The legacy of mothers from the perspective of younger women sometimes was considered as ambivalent. The research participants did describe their mothers as work-orientated, ‘always busy’ (Woman 845), ‘slogging way like a horse’ (Woman 546d) and not having time for leisure activities, but they also saw them struggling with their family and other work commitments, their sense of obligation, standards of perfection
and the articulation of a woman’s ‘right’ to enjoyment. More often than their fathers, mothers were characterised as ‘dominant’, but this dominance often coexisted with a subordinate position in their marital relationship. In accordance with the older women’s own accounts, the younger research participants considered their employment or attempts to re-enter the labour market as attempts to ‘break out’ and ‘have something for themselves’. In contrast women who had been homemakers for the most of their lives, were often considered to be ‘unhitched from life’ (Man 700d).

Evaluating the maternal model, younger women often admired their mothers’ energy and commitment ‘to get down to it’; they sometimes longed for a set order of things and at the same time unanimously rejected marital inequality. Moreover, intergenerational legacies included parental ‘counter-recommendations’, that is mothers sometimes advocated a different model of combining employment and family or gave advice on handling conjugal conflicts differently than they had. At the same time mothers were said to try to enforce certain life forms, such as the desirability and reliability of marriage even when they had had contradictory experiences themselves.

**Working through, modifying and repeating family traditions**

The research participants described often in detail how working through these intrafamilial legacies was a hard and ongoing process. Men and women differentiated between paternal and maternal legacies and between modes of practice and modes of thinking. Practices included the imparting of particular skills such as cooking or mechanical knowhow as well as passing down property. Drawing on the popularised psychoanalytic notion of the unconscious, the research participants tried to distinguish between what they consciously ‘liked’ and ‘chose’ to live and pass on, and what was ‘drummed into them’, ‘sunk in’, what they have ‘internalised’ and repeated, sometimes against conscious efforts to counter-act family traditions.

‘I now start to sort: what do I like and what not... My siblings say I take after my mother a lot. I notice that too in some things, if it’s only household, little things. Whereas from the thinking I tend more towards my father. A little bit more in a liberal direction that I think you first have to look at everything, not simply take over all traditions because that’s the way it was done. But this is hard because through your upbringing it is in you, you can’t simply shake it off. The wish is
There and perhaps you succeed too. But always accompanied by this comparison."

Woman 516, p. 20, country, skilled, married,
f/t employed, no children

Although 'conscious' and 'unconscious' reproduction and modification of intergenerational legacies were not always separable as the paradoxical formulation 'I like having to have to continue this' (Woman 093) suggests, I will explore four modes of relating to intergenerational legacies: conscious 'choice' of parental life-style or personality aspects; conscious rejection or change; unconscious wishes to maintain legacies; and unconscious or 'natural' rejection and counter-structuring of family traditions.

To describe a family legacy as a 'choice' seems to be a contradiction in terms unless one takes into account the constructive efforts of the heirs highlighted above. Perhaps it is more accurate to talk about aspects of the parental lifestyle and/or personal approaches that the research participants positively affirmed, 'took over' (Woman 707), 'appropriated' (Man 508) and sometimes wished to pass on to their children. These qualities included the (grand) maternal tradition of female independence, education and employment, certain family rituals, making timely provisions for old age, as well as openness, tolerance and reliability. Intergenerational legacies in this sense appeared as assets and resources for living/shaping their own lives.

'And this I have from my mother, that it's clear: a woman has her own money. And from my father I got: a woman has an education, or my girls get the same education as my son... and that is important to me. And what I also take on/with me is the reliability of my parents. Well for all you can hold against them, if something goes wrong with their friends as much as with their children then they are there and you can rely on them. And then they help no matter what they think about it.' (69)

Woman 011, p. 22, city → city, university, married, 1 child,
p/t employed

Attempts to consciously modify or change intergenerational legacies are equally numerous and expressed in the proverbial exclamation: 'I never wanted to become like my mother!' They include the almost consensual rejection of a hierarchical or unequal marital relationship, continuous full-time motherhood as the 'only-purpose in life' (Man 700a), the injunction 'to put your whole life last' (Woman 831), Catholic beliefs and
practices and the rejection of an ingrained lack of emotionality, open conversations and bodily contact. Modifying and changing these legacies was described as hard work. Both men and women sometimes made the disturbing discovery that ‘in the attempt to define myself as different I imitate them much more than I want to’ (Man 851). Yet, perhaps because maternal legacies were conceived as encompassing both dominance and subordination and were bound up with traditional gender roles, women respondents described this process of counter-acting legacies at more length, more emotionally and often as more painful than men.

‘I rebelled from an early age at being a girl and moaned at the thought that I could have breasts. Yes, and I didn’t want to admit that I was gifted in languages and against my mother’s instigation chose the natural sciences in upper school and not languages... It was always my mother who affected me badly... Particularly because I’m very similar to her in some respects, and I often found myself with inner conflicts when I was fighting sides, which are similar to my mother, in myself, right.’ (70)

Woman 700a, p. 7/26, country, university, married, f/t employed, no children

In contrast the narratives of the interviewed men, who become aware of unintended ‘unconscious’ continuities and similarities with their fathers’ lifestyles, were much less full of consternation. As the formulation ‘playing the role of my father’ in the following account suggests possible similarities appeared to be divorced from questions of personal identity and more attributed to habit and external circumstance.

‘I would say that I’ve tried hard where it was possible, not to be an absent father... but I find that I rather tend to repeat the role of my father, whereas P. [partner] evens out more and she licks me into shape for example she says, you have to take the children more seriously, you can’t always play the authoritarian. Well there I have to say for myself that I have to watch myself that I don’t continue to play the role of my father.’ (71)

Man 054, p. 33, city, university, cohabit, f/t employed, 1 child

Interestingly, even where men had transformed family roles and legacies quite substantially in comparison to their fathers, by, for example, integrating periods of part-time child raising, male respondents did not necessarily define these changes in conscious contradiction to their parents. Rather changes were considered to have happened ‘naturally’ in changing historical circumstances.

‘Well, it wasn’t any conscious resolution, I want it differently from my parents, not like that. It was simply – well I never had the feeling that I needed this
boundary-drawing, but it was logical for me. Well, I don't have the feeling that I'm a particularly emancipated man because I do it like this [taking on childcare] because I find this natural and I don't need a man's group and P. [partner] doesn't need a women's group to somehow deal with it. It's simply like that. ... I had a fixed world view that I followed for me but I didn't see it in contrast to the life of my parents.'

Man 814a, p. 45, city, university, married, 1 child, f/t employed

As I have shown at the beginning of this section research participants often located intergenerational change in its historical context. Many research participants referred to impacts of the state subsidised and politicised educational system in the 1970s, which had opened up new possibilities both with respect to working class children getting access to higher education and with respect to new models of lifestyle. Yet this 'break from the outside' (Woman 821) was not merely seen as providing resources to counteract and modify family legacies but at times as generating novel pressures and challenges that required a break with family traditions and produced new generational dilemmas. Enabling and discomforting aspects of intergenerational change are highlighted in the following two contrasting accounts of a woman who combined childcare responsibilities with part-time employment and a single woman who wished and feared to have children because they would put her job at risk.

Resp: My parents were strongly Catholic... and in this sense we were of course raised a bit strictly, whether it was relationships with boyfriends or no, we didn't have open conversations at home... my daughter can ask questions [about menstruation, sexuality], she was willing to talk to me about it.

Dlm: So the changes occurred in your generation although you were brought up that way?

Resp: No, my parents have changed not me. I mean my parents brought us up in that way, but it wasn't -- we wanted to talk about it, only we couldn't. We were relatively free, even though our parents brought us up very strictly, but through the surroundings, the social area/climate where we grew up, friends and so on, school, it was relatively liberal. And there was also this radical change at the end of the 60s and that was basically the big outbreak where you liberated yourself from all constraints and so on. That everybody could express his views and that -- that was really hard for my parents.

Woman 546b, p. 54, city, skilled, married, 2 children, p/t employed

'I didn't want to live like my mother, on no account. That I knew from when I was little. I never wanted to be always at home, like she had shown it to me... Well at school in the 70s you should, wanted, had to break out. You were almost frowned upon if you didn't. And I went along with it. But it is completely torn, I think this is also a dilemma of our generation that our parents and grandparents
passed on quite traditional things, which we have somehow in us and wish for, but at the same time there is this break from outside. I think particularly as a woman you are completely - at sea somehow. Because well yes, always this decision, occupation or mother. ... Those fine inner structures [of her mother], they are exactly like mine. I'm often shocked that it repeats itself so much.' (74)

This last account highlights perceived intergenerational similarities despite fundamental differences in lifestyle between this single and full-time employed participant and her married mother who had three children and was a housewife for most of her adult life. Moreover, it suggests that social and familial changes were not always perceived as complementary or mutually reinforcing. Even though the subject of intergenerational life course comparison was part of the topic guide and often introduced by the interviewer, dealing with and working through intergenerational legacies appeared to have been an issue for most research participants, particularly for women. Older women's kin work commitments however, were not a point of reference with respect to a possible reproduction or transformation by the younger generation. This topic is therefore further explored in the following section, which deals with the parental care anticipations of the younger generation.

8.4. THE ANTICIPATION OF PARENTAL CARE: 'WHY SHOULD THIS AGAIN BE UP TO WOMEN OF ALL PEOPLE?'

As elaborated in Appendix A one of the sampling criteria for the younger generation was the aim to include equal numbers of women and men whose mothers did and did not provide regular support for an older relative. I had expected that previous experiences of familial care giving would have a decisive impact on the models of dealing with parental care needs anticipated by the research participants. My assumption was that those who had previously experienced through their mothers the demanding nature of co-residential care would be less inclined to commit themselves, and that feelings of obligation therefore would be weakened for both men and women across socio-economic differences. The problem in determining intra-familial caring traditions had been that due to the absence of questions concerning kin work in the standardised questionnaires of the older women I only knew the family histories of those 30 adult children whose mothers
had been interviewed. Aiming to include particularly these children, the interviews with members of the younger generation showed that I had finally included 28 research participants with and 21 without maternal care-giving experiences.

As with the perception of other household arrangements the accounts of siblings of different gender did not differ systematically in the recollection of familial care-giving arrangements for older relatives. Both men and women were aware of a multitude of arrangements. They included the ‘sharing’ of parental care-giving responsibilities between siblings and their spouses, arrangements involving a transfer of property and money payments, co-residential and residential care as well as an understanding of the strains that these arrangements often entailed particularly for their mothers. The narratives suggest that the research participants were also aware of a scripted hierarchy of care-giving responsibilities (Chapter 7.3.). But because periods of care-giving and their own presence at home had not always overlapped and their own contributions had been minor many of these ‘experiences’ were often merely based on their mothers'/parents' accounts.

But detailed reports were passed to adult children also by siblings, friends and colleagues who had provided part- or full-time care for their parents (-in-law). Moreover, two women in the sample had first-hand experiences in providing co-residential care for an older relative. In an uncanny way these women continued the kinscripts of their mothers, releasing their brothers and/or husbands and substituting for female relatives and adequate social service provision. On the other hand the husband of the following research participant was said to have played a major role in providing hands-on care for his grandfather-in-law, support that as in the case of daughters-in-law was based on his marital relationship rather than a shared personal history with his grandfather-in-law.

Resp: My mother had a very negative attitude to her parents-in-law, very negative. And it was after my father died my grandfather lived with my grandmother at my mother's, right? ... And there was always rage and quarrels, there was no point in it. And then the grandfather stayed with me.

Dlm: Was it discussed that your grandfather could also stay with your brother or was it clear that when your mother dropped out, so to say, that you would take it over as a granddaughter?

Resp: I think, nobody thought about that {laughs}, it simply was like that. I know I can
remember very well, once my husband really went on strike and said 'you know, your brother can just as well do it sometimes.' And he came that same evening. And then he said 'K. now you come with me and then we get granddad out of bed!' Well my brother went with him and all of a sudden somebody came down the stairs. I thought he – as if someone was after him. And then he jumped under the shower in full gear.

Dim: In full gear? {laughs}

Resp: In full gear. The urine bottle had fallen over and over his shoes. ... I will never forget this, right. That was an example, right. And from that moment my husband has never asked him again. It simply was like that. He can't do it and there is no point in it. (75)

Woman 845, p 38/39, country, 1 brother, f/t employed, 1 child [maternal caring tradition]

(Not) Approaching the issue of parental care

Independently, however, of their familial experiences, their gender or occupational status, the research participants were very reluctant to reflect on the issue of potential care needs for their parents. This does not mean that they were merely threatened by the frailty and eventual death of their parent(s) or had not thought this issue through. On the contrary the narratives confirm that the anticipation of parental care needs had become a normative event (Cornway-Turner and Karasik 1993) and suggest that the respondents were worried about the extent of help that they might be called on to provide. Their concern appeared to focus simultaneously on two extremes: to put them in an 'Anstalt' (institution), a word that connotes confinement and constraint, or to provide care themselves in their own home, thereby 'sacrificing [their] personal freedom' (Woman 700a). In the light of these options, which often entail what Cicirelli (1988) has termed 'filial anxiety' participants not rarely drew on the popularised psychoanalytic notion of repression, suggesting that they rather 'forget' about this hypothetical event.

'Yes, of course I thought about it. And either I’ve repressed it or I’ve come to the conclusion that there is no - no satisfactory solution. Well, what I actually wouldn’t like to do would be to move back home, because my parents needed care. Because that would mean a change of job, that would mean changing your whole life context.' (76)

Man 508, country → city, 1 sister, university, cohabiting, f/t employed, no children [maternal caring tradition]

Some research participants proceeded to argue that because of the hypothetical and unpredictable nature of this event there was no need to think about or plan concrete care arrangements until infirmity actually occurred. Six men appeared to deploy this argument
as a strategy to avoid specifying the scope and limits of their own possible commitments. Yet both the (initial) rejection to anticipate specific options and the articulation of a dilemma suggests a sense of filial responsibility and a pressure to act on the part of the younger generation. Indeed feelings of gratitude and obligations to repay their parents were articulated by a number of men and women both with and without familial caring traditions, seemingly confirming the view that norms of filial responsibility constitute a cultural source to justify plans and anticipated behaviour (Sørensen and Zarit 1996; Cornway-Turner and Karasik op.cit.). Members of the younger generation thereby deployed the language of the generational or procreative contract (Laslett 1992). By contrast, the older women, even though they largely provided kin work for older relatives, had not used any of those terms and modes of justification. On the other hand adult children often qualified and questioned, not simply stated reciprocity, and the expectation of gratitude was sometimes identified as pressure.

'The first thing that of course is always expected is gratitude, right. If there is a reason for it. If you were always on very bad terms with your parents, then nobody will ask for it. But if you have had a good relationships, the parents perhaps not explicitly but also all the relatives who sit around and observe it will somehow expect that you look after them and repay what you received from the parents in affection and investments. I do believe that there is somehow this pressure behind it.' (77)

Woman 811, p. 54, city → country, 1 sister, skilled, married, not employed,
2 children [maternal caring tradition]

'I also have the feeling, I owe my parents a lot, because they have supported me for a long time, because they made it possible that I had a good life for a long time, still always support me.' (78)

Man 011, p. 67, city, 1 sister, university, married, f/t employed,
1 child [parental caring tradition]

'It's always a question of mutuality. It depends, as I said I've somehow experienced my parents mostly as tolerant, caring and devoted and would be willing to repay them, even if I know that they will be that old.' (79)

Woman 710c, p. 47, city → city, 2 brothers, skilled, single, f/t employed,
no children [no caring tradition]

Despite these apparent qualifications of reciprocity parents were not always characterised as having been 'caring and devoted'. The last research participant (Woman 710c), for example, had talked at length about the conflicts that she had with her mother. She also had to give up her study of law because her father had withdrawn his financial support to
force her to separate from her boyfriend of whom he did not approve. Furthermore, the reference to the cultural script of reciprocity did not necessarily indicate that reciprocal support was considered as a social norm, nor indeed did it necessarily entail anticipated commitments of personal care-giving.

When asked about social norms or the ‘normal’ way of dealing with parental care needs in their generation, some research participants saw a trend towards accommodating older people in elder care homes. This trend was contextualised in terms of a broader development towards a ‘society of singles’ (Man 124), with rising levels of independence and ‘egoistic concerns’ but also structural constraints such as geographical distance, small flats and family responsibilities for one’s own children. A minority of research participants saw the opposite trend. In the context of long-term care insurance and domiciliary services, more older people were being cared for at home. These opposing views fit together with the fact that the majority of men and women did not perceive any fixed norm or guideline on how to deal with parental care needs. But although as one respondent put it ‘you have to decide for yourself what you do and there are many different possibilities’ (Man 022), family bonds and moral concerns for filial responsibilities, as voiced above, were not absent. Women in particular anticipated feelings of guilt should they not be willing or able to provide for their parents, evidence of the morally charged relationship.

**The assumption of unarticulated parental expectations**

Despite a vocabulary of responsibility and repayment (of what is called the generational contract) and although the research participants often knew from previous family experiences that the unpredictability of a decline in health required communication and timely planning, potential care needs of older parents were for the most part not openly discussed in families. The fact that some of the adult children feared offending their parents when expressing their anticipated commitment and by implication its possible limits confirmed the tacit character of ‘family feelings’ as ‘caring at a distance’. Talking about care needs demanded a definition of boundaries between caring about and caring for older relatives that was assumed to be potentially hurtful.
‘I didn’t dare to ask whether they have registered somewhere. Years ago my father talked about a senior citizens’ house... I don’t dare asking because I’m anxious that if you make suggestions they think you don’t want to look after them. I’ll go there at Christmas, perhaps I’ll raise it then. Because my sister has asked me, to talk to them because she doesn’t dare to either. Because they have a house and when the children move out they even would have the space. Well she is the one who is concerned there, and is a bit anxious... And of course when they raise it, it’s something different from when I raise it. Because I’m so far away, I wouldn’t be available for long-term care... But I think this is a subject that you simply must talk about with your parents in time.’ (80)

Woman 546d, p. 43/44, city → city, 4 sisters, university, cohabiting, f/t employed, 1 child [no caring tradition]

In accordance with the accounts of the older women, the research participants stated that their parents had not raised expectations of familial support and often said that they did not want to burden their children, but would rather move to an elder care home. From the perspective of adult children this does not rule out unarticulated wishes and hopes of familial support, and sometimes was even interpreted as a ‘threat’ to incite filial assurances to the contrary. Other research participants insinuated that their parents deployed the same strategy of ‘repression’, of a conscious not wanting to know, as they did. ‘That is repressed too. But they know that they repress it to a certain degree’ (Woman 811). Only three parents were reported to have actually put their name on a waiting list for an elder care home. Against this background of non-articulation and/or unspoken mutual assumptions, the expectation of one male respondent that an open rational negotiation of a caring ‘contract’ (Man 834) would take place, when care needs actually occurred, seemed unlikely.

‘She [widowed mother] always says, ‘well, then I go into an elder care home!’ Although I know exactly that she doesn’t want to go there at all. And we [he and his wife] always say when it’s due to be dealt with we will have to see together, then you come to us, no problem. ‘No, no I don’t go to X!’... You have to negotiate it when it occurs... then we will both state our conditions, well mother hers and we ours and then we see how we can bring them together.’ (81)

Man 834, p. 30/31, country → city, no siblings, university, married, f/t employed, 1 child [maternal caring tradition]

In the context of assumed antagonistic expectations, communication about parental care needs was also often said to be avoided among siblings. However, the absence of communication and planning tended to have different effects on brothers and sisters. Whereas brothers, as long as their sister had not explicitly stated anything to the contrary,
were often implicitly or explicitly expecting that a sister would 'stand in', pressure increased on the part of those who felt that they might be the first line of resort. As in dealing with intergenerational legacies, women appeared to be more emotionally pressured than men when addressing their responsibilities, whose inescapability was sometimes expressed as physical pain. Yet none of the women interviewed openly reproached their brothers.

Resp: Three years ago we had the case that my grandfather needed nursing ... And that was basically a horrible time, which also had to do with the fact that in this family many things have gone wrong for thirty years. Which means things, important things weren’t talked about, which was simply catastrophic in this situation. But I think, if there is more communication from the beginning it doesn’t have to get that bad. But the subject actually gives me stomach aches because I have the feeling that I’m stuck with it because my brother, I’d simply say, has a troubled/disturbed relationship to it...

Int: So you probably haven’t talked about this with your brother?
Resp: Yes, sure, I have, um attempted, or let’s say, I let him know my worries or that I thought about it in this context. And well what I learned from the situation with my granddad is that you can never plan it anyway. (82)

Woman 707a, p. 56/57, city, 1 brother, university, cohabiting, f/t employed, 0 child [caring tradition]

This *de facto* gendered sense of responsibility stands in stark contrast to the notion of a generational contract where ‘all family members should – whether it is a woman or a man – all have the responsibility, because they are the parents of all and were there for the children’ (Woman 516). Despite the unforseeability of care needs and resources available and the lack of family communication, the majority of research participants had more or less tentatively developed and sometimes ‘privately’ discussed with their partners a number of different models of how to deal with parental care needs. Past familial caring experience thereby could be a script to continue or modify. Yet, although siblings have detailed and congruent memories of these experiences, the models that they develop on this basis could differ fundamentally according to gender and employment status.

**Models of parental care and their justifications**

In the sample of younger Germans at least five alternative, sometimes sequential, models of care emerged that often build on family caring experiences. Whereas in the ‘sister model’ a sister was expected to take over primary (usually co-residential) care-giving
responsibility, in the 'commuter model' parents were expected to stay with or being looked after by different siblings in turn. In the 'co-residential care model' on the contrary the participants themselves expected to provide day-to-day care in a shared household. In the 'domiciliary care model' social services and/or adult children were assumed to provide practical and emotional care in the parents’ home. Lastly, in the 'residential care model' parents were expected to move into a nursing home and research participants anticipated to give complementary emotional support.

The ‘sister mode’ and the ‘commuter model’

The sister model could, but did not have to, be evidence of the reliance on gendered care-giving responsibilities outlined above. Factors that made adult children consider their sister as a primary carer were not so much personal but structural, in particular the sister’s residential proximity and/or the fact that the mother/parents looked after the sister’s children. In one case a woman defined such an exchange of childcare and shared living from which future care will ‘naturally’ evolve explicitly as a ‘generational contract’ (Woman 857). In contrast to this perception of contract as lived practice the only other man in the sample who used the term contract referred to the anticipated rational negotiation of the terms of a caring arrangement (Man 834). In some of the men’s accounts, the emphasis on structural and personal factors of their sister’s ‘appropriateness’ as a carer obfuscated the gendered nature of care-giving responsibilities. Both as brothers and husbands men had interests in enforcing or relying on the sister model.

Resp: The ideal case naturally would be that my parents move to X. (laughs) That they buy a house there
Int: To your sister or what?
Resp: Yes... With the caring it will most likely amount to my sister doing it. That doesn’t mean that I somehow exclude myself, but merely because — ... my sister is there much more often and also has the best relationship with my mother. But I think that um in any case I will care about it too.
Int: What would be, let’s say, the maximum of what you can imagine?
Resp: I really can’t imagine anything... Well, to take the mother into the house, I could imagine that my wife would grumble there too. She also has a mother ... she is the only daughter...
Int: It sounds a bit like, um well, your sister has rather a contribution there and now you say your wife is the only daughter. Do you think that women are a bit responsible there?
Resp: You know, but I think you also have to look at with whom the mother has the relationship. If the phone rings here every day it's (her) mother... For this reason it probably also will be that the two brothers would say: You live there, then you can also look after your mother a bit more. It’s mostly like that. Well, that’s what you hear. It’s most likely still the thinking. And I have to say too that my sister would basically be the most sensible because she has the best relationship with my mother. (83)

Man 816, p. 35/37, city → city, 1 sister, university, married, f/t employed, no children [no caring tradition]

Whereas the mother of the last participant had accommodated her mother in a home, an intra-familial legacy that seemed to have little bearing on his care anticipations, the maternal grandparents of the following research participant had stayed with different children in turn because the co-resident son had refused to support his parents on his own. But whereas the family tradition emphasised an equal sharing of responsibility, the research participant modified the 'commuter model' in that she assigned primary responsibility to her sister who in her view benefited the most with respect to grandparental childcare. Anticipating the consequences of this arrangement on the side of her parents, however, she continued to refer to the experience of her mother-in-law who had relied on domiciliary care. Fusing the two models she anticipated an arrangement in which the children would commute to their parents to provide care in turn.

Resp: Well my husband he is of the opinion - I mean I have to give my opinion - but he says - I can't do it, I'm a very emotional person, I would drop everything, if something were to happen. But my husband, he says 'your parents have never done anything for us. They always went to A [sister], so they can take care of it', right? Because my mother - when my sister needed somebody for her daughter, my mother was always there...

Dlm: So you're saying that concerning the need for care you wouldn't feel responsible in the first place?

Resp: I would feel responsible, they are my parents after all. Well I would take the responsibility. Only if I consider the - how should I say - the situation, as a matter of principle, right, then I’d say ... ‘A, you had the greatest benefit, you take the greatest responsibility!’... I think it could work like it did with my grandparents... it depends on the situation whether you can do it, whether you could really say: yes, we take them for a couple of weeks but mainly they stay with you, right... [or] that you can arrange it and go over there [like her mother-in-law did], that you take it in turns ... with the caring, then I think you can somehow arrange it at home. Because it is like this that you always feel most comfortable at home. (84)

Woman 546b, p. 12/13, 4 sisters, skilled, married, p/t employed, 2 children [no caring tradition]

These examples illustrate that, in contrast to male participants, women, independently of
their marital and occupational status, sometimes developed several models and changed perspectives to accommodate both their own and their parents' needs.

The 'co-residential care model'
Accommodating one's parents or moving back to live with them and giving up paid work to provide personal care in the sample of adult children was only anticipated by women. Co-residential care was seen as a means of avoiding residential care and sometimes continued a family tradition. None of the women who expressed this option had a university degree and it was expressed mainly by the housewives in the sample. In all cases the anticipation of home care was based on a strong sense of gendered family responsibility, but not necessarily on personal closeness. The plan to provide personal care varied, however, in the degree of perceived constraint: whereas some women saw providing co-residential care as a last resort only, others seemed more willing to give up their jobs and care for their parents at home. In the case of the following research participant, who was divorced and employed full-time the viability of this option was doubtful. Although she felt she had not received parental support during her divorce and referred to the problematic co-residential care arrangement between her mother and paternal grandmother, she anticipated this model of care against her mother's explicit advice, which again illustrates both the complexity of family legacies and a distrust in parents' stated expectations.

'If it gets really serious, well, I would sacrifice my job. ... The problem only starts if somebody is really in need of care, either bedridden or with other afflictions ... And my mother has said now, because she experiences it live every day, she said: “Goodness me, if this happens to me, don’t worry, just put me in a home”. She says “you ruin your life, really, the strain is immense, don’t do that to yourself”. That’s what she says now, right? It’s a different thing whether you say it in such a situation when it concerns you yourself. And you always imagine, or I imagine that if it happened to my mother I could somehow cope with it. I think maybe you have a different relationship to your own mother than to your mother-in-law ... Well, I’d try it and if there is no other way, well you have to consider putting them in a nursing home.' (85)

Woman 809, p. 52/53, 1 brother, skilled, cohabiting, f/t employed, 1 child [caring tradition]

The 'domiciliary care model' and the 'residential care model'
Domiciliary service provision, such as meals on wheels or the assistance by a community
nurse, and the accommodation of one’s parents in an elder care home were sometimes seen as sequential models and viable alternatives for those who stated that they would decline to provide full-time personal care in the future. Interestingly, more women than men in the sample anticipated residential care. A substantial minority of men, however, did not articulate any caring model at all. The anticipation of institutional care provision could be based on previous problematic family care-giving experiences, as well as on family traditions of residential care of older relatives and an unwillingness to give up one’s life plans.

Resp: We have regular contact, yes, and if it came to a caring situation I wouldn’t take her here, we already talked about that.

Int: With your mother?

Resp: Um. She had her mother in a nursing home too...

Int: Do you have a guilty conscience saying: I put my mother in a home. I really should care for her at home?

Resp: No. I’d rather find it difficult if – or with the fact that I stayed here in Bremen and continue to have contact with her, I’m always in touch if there are any problems or things that she can’t deal with, then she calls me and we do it. So that, in principle, considering my opportunities, kids and school, I’m always there for her if there is something. In this way I practically cover my responsibility constantly.

Man 805, p. 41/42, city, 2 sisters, university, married, 2 children, f/t employed [no caring tradition]

This example illustrates the finding, reported already in dealing with intergenerational legacies, that men appeared to be less entangled in intergenerational relationships and were able to interpret regular practical kin work as fulfilling their filial duties. Whereas the wish to keep their (family) lives separate was a legitimate reason for men to anticipate domiciliary and residential care provision, women were concerned about their ability to continue their work lives, which is a domain seldom questioned by men. Overall women appeared to be more pressured by assumed family expectations. They were more likely to explain that they ‘were not ungrateful’ (Woman 811) and even when they thought that residential care was the right option, anticipated that they ‘would reproach [themselves] or feel guilty’ (Woman 821).

‘I probably would not take my parents. I thought about this very specifically, because my sister had a case, she had to take her mother-in-law into the house, seriously disabled, and that ruined the marriage. ... Being in need of care means more than cooking, it means that they ring the bell at night, and you have to get up and things like that, right? ... I would see that they get into a good home. That
might sound hard but they have it better there. And I would do everything to keep them in their familiar environment as long as possible with these community workers ... because as soon as they loose the security within their own four walls, they go into a rapid decline ... But in a decent nursing home, they have speech therapists, they have carers who can give time and attention to the old people, right? I think you can’t do it that way ... Basically the person sits in front of the telly all day. It’s so isolated, it’s a (prison) cell, a family cell although it is not depicted like that.’ (87)

Woman 546c, city, 4 sisters, skilled, married, p/t employed, 3 children [no caring tradition]

The statements, that older people go into a rapid decline when they have to leave their homes and deteriorate when they are cared for within the family, demonstrates once again their view of the impossibility of a satisfactory solution to parental care. Anticipating service provision for her parents the woman had to depict institutional services in a positive light whilst at the same time excluding positive effects of a familiar environment. Yet, social service provision was not anticipated out of disinterest or indifference but also, for the most part, also out of positive concern for the well being of the parent. The long-term care insurance, introduced around the time when the interviews with the younger generation were conducted had no effect on prospects and anticipated commitments.

Younger Germans thus anticipated a range of models and drew on multiple, often conflicting, intra-familial caring experiences. These largely gendered family experiences offered the chance to identify with both carers and care receivers and thus did not provide one ‘right’ way of dealing with potential parental care needs but constituted a legacy to modify and transform. In contrast to the generation of older women, younger respondents deployed a vocabulary of reciprocity and repayment. But open negotiation of prospective arrangements with siblings and parents remained largely absent, and a gendered (and classed) hierarchy of primary caring responsibilities surfaced in care-giving anticipations. In comparison with the older generation, the younger research participants thus both reproduced and transformed gendered responsibilities: compared to their fathers (Erzberger 1993), younger men prospectively took on more family responsibilities. Yet, as an expansion of their traditional role this was considered as a voluntary act that must not jeopardise their own life plans. Women on the other hand felt more pressured to uphold traditional care-giving obligations. Whereas some women with lower educational
status intended to care for their parents at home, others struggled for a more equal
distribution of care giving tasks among siblings and brothers- and sisters-in-law. More
often than men, they considered social service provision. Welfare provision though not
explicitly services provided under the care insurance thus contributed to an expansion of
perceived life choices, particularly for those women who were employed. Women’s
anticipations were overall more complex and often included multiple changes of
perspectives in the quest for a ‘fair’ solution for both parents and adult children.

Given that both men and women had a detailed implicit and explicit knowledge and
understanding of the gendered nature of parental care giving I would finally like to draw
attention to the question of how this knowledge was reflected in the discussion of gender
equality that usually followed the topic of care anticipations in the topic guide.

8.5. CONTEMPLATING GENDER EQUALITY:
‘MY IDEALS HAVE BEEN RATHER SCATTERED IN THE LAST YEARS, I
HAVE TO SAY’

The intergenerational increase in opportunities for women previously mentioned was
seriously compromised when it came to evaluating gender equality. Overall the research
participants’ views on this issue were surprisingly consensual: the participants agreed that
there was more equality between the genders in their own generation than in that of their
parents. But they almost unanimously found that women were still discriminated against
and were highly sceptical that this inequality would be ever erased. On the contrary,
progress towards more equality that was conceived of as initiated predominantly by
women, was seen as moving forward only ‘inch by inch’ and sometimes was seen as
reversing.

The first point of reference to inequality for both men and women was usually first-hand
experiences of women’s discrimination in the work place. Labour market inequality, with
its repercussions on income and pensions, was thought to be caused not by gendered
differences in qualification or ability but in a personal and structural discrimination
against actual or potential motherhood. The research participants agreed that structurally
paid work was not made for people with childcare responsibilities. From an employers’ perspective the price of temporarily losing work force due to motherhood appeared uneconomical and ‘the gentlemen in power’ (Woman 034) who could implement measures to promote gender equality were seen as too much divorced from family life and responsibilities to do so.

At the same time the respondents agreed ‘that women have somewhat enlarged their circle but I don’t think that this reduces the chances of men’ (Man 093). Put differently, women’s increasing labour market participation had not been paralleled by men’s participation in family work or indeed by a public debate on a reduction in men’s working hours. Both men and women critically stated that although some men might have an increased interest in spending time with their children, their commitments in childcare and housework were often enforced by their female partners and fundamentally lacked the scope and the ‘self-evidence’ that family work had for women.

The majority of women had little trust in men’s voluntary commitment to change. Therefore solutions were sometimes envisioned on a structural level. Crucial for many women, apart from more flexible work hours and better childcare facilities, was a redistribution of work hours, which the most radical research participants held had to be enforced rather than merely offered.

‘I would see it as big progress if you if there weren’t any 8-hour jobs anymore, but six hours at the most... It shouldn’t be that a man has the possibility to work six hours but he is not allowed to work more than six, right. He isn’t allowed to earn anymore either.’ (88)

Woman 857, p. 57, country → city, skilled, divorced, cohabiting, 3 children, housewife [maternal caring tradition]

Affirmative action on the other hand was regarded sceptically insofar as it impinged on ‘fair’ competition between the genders not only by some of the male respondents but also by some of those women who identified gender inequality as institutionalised, inescapable and unchangeable.

Resp: I think we women will always have it more difficult. Because we automatically have and will always have a dual and triple burden, that’s not going to change.

Dlm: This is your prognosis?
Resp: Yes, as simple as this. And I think it is a huge mistake if you introduce quotas
that well, women are to be preferred.

Dlm: I didn’t think about that but yes

Resp: It is a risk for every employer today through our legislation to employ women. I wouldn’t want to be an employer either who has to work with women.

Dlm: Because of maternity leave or?

Resp: Maternity leave yes...

Dlm: And who benefits then from or does anybody benefit from this debate on equal opportunities between men and women?

Resp: No, I think, those women who really want to have a career will never get themselves a family, they will always have their career... although they have it more difficult than men... We always have to prove, women have to be twice as good as men... there the equality legislation is good, because simply if payment is equal. What I don’t like is the quota legislation. I don’t want to be a quota woman. Simply either I manage it through my own energy, with my own conviction and not because I’m lucky that the quota says you have to take a woman, right.

——Woman 845, p. 40-41, country, skilled, married, f/t employed, 1 child [maternal caring tradition and elder care experience]

Interestingly, despite their complex analysis of structural gender equality both women quoted above suggested that ‘if I as a woman want to have the same chances as a man, I have to decide against [having] children’ (Woman 857). This imagined escape from inequality through the renouncing of having children did not only contradict their own analysis of structural discrimination but also highlights to what extent the debate on equal opportunities focuses on childcare responsibilities, ignoring the fact that all children have parents who might need assistance at some point in their lives. The answer to the question of how gendered intergenerational responsibilities were reflected in the research participants’ views on gender equality is thus simple: even if they had been discussed minutes before, intergenerational responsibilities were without exception completely divorced from the evaluation of gender equality — by both the interviewer and the research participants.

8.6. CONCLUSION

The preceding analysis of intergenerational relationships from the perspective of a group of German young adults suggests that contrary to fears of a withering of family solidarity, the cohesion between generations remains strong. Even where family relationships were described as problematic and ambivalent, those adult children who participated in the
study never completely broke off contact with their parents but worked through and often attempted to modify family legacies. Kin work practices, particularly grand-maternal childcare, remained a vital safety net and source of actual and potential support contradicting the thesis of a 'de-traditionalisation' (Kaufmann 1993) of intergenerational relationships. At the same time the analysis suggests that intergenerational relationships had changed towards more reflexivity. In the (preliminary) absence of contracts of need both men and women consciously aimed at creating family feeling through interaction between members of different generations. Family sentiments were described in terms of a latent connection of belonging that was vital for the construction of identities and family histories. It was not necessarily equalled with positive affection but with a caring about family members.

The research participants' generational belonging and that of their parents was contextualised in the dominant frames of two historical generations, the 'break out' and 'reconstruction generation' respectively. Connections and differences were constructed by drawing on these dominant frames -- discourses about the so-called welfare generation and resource competition were completely absent. On a level of personal and generational identity grandmaternal independence was one symbolical intra-familial legacy that women sometimes described quite literally as a hereditary disposition and resource of lifestyle. Maternal and paternal legacies of a strong work ethic and traditional gender roles were considered as more ambivalent and often as a charge that the research participants had to work consciously through and yet at times involuntarily reproduced.

Anticipating parental care the research participants produced a variety of possible care models, which reflected different needs and experiences, but also were marked by impacts of gender and socio-economic status. Cultural script, intra-familial traditions and social institutions provided resources and constituted a framework within which adult children sought to reconstitute the generational contract. Although not articulated as social norms, seemingly ungendered cultural norms of filial responsibility that were described by drawing on notions of reciprocity and back payments often corresponded to an intra-familial tradition of largely female responsibility for the care of older relatives. Moreover, the widespread practice of not (being able to) articulating preferences,
expectations and the boundaries of a care-giving involvement appeared thus far to remain unchanged over two family generations.

The gendered legacy of tacit caring responsibilities was thus both reproduced and transformed. The development of domiciliary services and elder care homes constituted an expansion of opportunity structures for anticipating potential care arrangements. For the majority of both German men and women, service provision in its various forms was an important input to their anticipated care models. Albeit ambivalently, institutional support was thought of also as being in the interest of the parents, and included the anticipation of complementary practical and emotional support from the research participants. However, the persistence of women's caring responsibilities is indicated not only by the substantial minority of German women with lower educational levels who, sometimes against their parents advice, envisaged providing personal care, but also by the intention of brothers and husbands to rely on their sisters' and wives care-giving.

In the group of young adults interviewed, personal relationships with their parents and emotional closeness were far less important in the anticipation processes than cultural, and particularly socio-structural, resources. In the absence of more encompassing service provision that considers social and emotional needs generational policies such as the long-term care insurance, are likely to strengthen rather than challenging gendered intergenerational commitments. The findings presented here suggest that women, although they are the majority of those who explicitly promoted social service provision, will continue to be responsible for the organisation of personal and intergenerational care in the German welfare state. Given the exclusion of kin work and its insufficient resource allocation from private and public debates on gender equality this form of welfare production is likely to remain invisible.
CONCLUSION

This thesis has enquired both theoretically and empirically into the history of intergenerational relations and the ways in which they became shaped by the discourse of the generational contract. The context of the investigation has been the alleged scenarios of resource competition between contemporary generations and various policy recommendations on how to remedy the imbalance of material transfers that benefit 'the old' and 'the childless' and on ways of promoting new forms of intergenerational solidarity. Taking gender as an analytic tool, the analysis uncovered the inherent multiplicity of generational contracts and the things being said and not said, being visible and invisible when this 'generative metaphor' that frames politics is deployed in changing historical conditions.

The thesis has focussed on the metaphor of the generational contract from a variety of perspectives. In order to widen the horizon of the discursive associations of its constituting components 'contract' and 'generation', the analysis started by unravelling their repertoires in a historical perspective. It was shown how *contract* became associated with the commercial exchange contract, denoting freedom, self-interested rationality, reciprocity and fairness in quantifiable and legally enforceable arrangements between (male) individuals. This distinctly modern dominant conception made use of a moral institution (promise) and supplanted earlier ritual exchanges and so-called status or fraternisation contracts where women and men were conceived to give something of themselves, change their personal identity and were liable with their bodies. In these earlier conceptions contracts appeared to be both voluntary *and* coerced.

By offering a temporal perspective that draws attention to the socio-historical location of
social actors and the temporality of their experiences, the concept of generation is a highly productive frame of analysis that highlights difference and diversity. Yet, whereas processes of social construction are more visible in the identification of historical generations, in its most narrow sense of family lineage the concept entails a set of often unquestioned assumptions of natural solidarity and positive sentiment embodied in unbreakable positive ties in 'blood' between man and his blood relatives. While the legal and moral circumscription of the father-child bond, the linking of blood to material benefits (historically predominantly for men), and the practical work of families in creating genealogies tend to be ignored in current discourse, the myth that blood is 'thicker than water' and entails positive sentiment is a powerful image that is evoked in studies of intergenerational relations to the present day.

The next step in the analysis focused on the ways in which contract regulated intergenerational relations in classical and neo-classical social contract theories insofar as the construct of the generational contract draws on the image of the social contract. These social contract theories developed the idea of contract as a rationally willed, hypothetical agreement between all members of society that serves to justify the order of society. In terms of the regulation of intergenerational relations, classical theorists focused on lineage relationships based on the conjugal contract. In opposition to an order of status relations they elaborated the idea of intergenerational rights and duties between fathers and sons, which were meant to supplant yet partly drew on assumptions of natural solidarity given by blood. Rights of paternal and conjugal authority served to make the family an attractive domain for adult men. By presupposing reciprocity and equality (over time) these rights and duties appeared to be rationally willed, but were obligatory to secure the cohesion of the patriarchal family and the order of society. Women's responsibility for the day-to-day-necessities of intergenerational support were for the most part not acknowledged or appeared as natural consequences of the conjugal contract.

Neo-classical social contract theories focus on relations of contemporary and non-contemporaneous generations as ensembles of age groups over time. Hypothetical deliberators are concerned to design a fair redistributive mechanism, but because
contracts between non-contemporaneous generations cannot logically be mutually advantageous, theorists had to draw on constructs of natural lineage solidarity between fathers and sons and term certain redistributive mechanisms trust relations. By reconsidering social contract theories that may provide imageries and rationalities for contemporary actors and policy makers, the analysis revealed a multiplicity of generational contracts referring to family and welfare state relations and their conflicting, yet pervasive justifications that ambivalently draw on rationality and sentiment.

In a further step, the analysis focussed on the ways in which these generational contracts had been institutionalised in the German welfare state or generational politics were mapped onto those modes of justification. Indeed the idea of reciprocal intergenerational rights and duties between ascending and descending relatives had been institutionalised in early modern German poor relief and peasant retirement contracts by assuming and creating lineage care obligations which served to legitimise the subsidiary function of the state. The subordinate inclusion of women in agrarian retirement contracts was carried over into the modern German social security system. Social insurance ideologically drew on the idea of social solidarity both as the embodiment of Christian brotherly love [Nächstenliebe] and a rational redistribution of resources over the life course between workers of different cohorts. Chapter 3 showed how in the context of economic recession and a fundamental devaluation of metaphysical foundations such as religion or tradition, the notion of the generational contract in the Weimar Republic and particularly in post-war Germany became a new ‘cadre d’appartenance’ (Frankenberg 1996, p. 74) linked to the PAYG pension system and mapped onto the image of the solidaristic pre-industrial multi-generation household. Intergenerational commitments in families were conceived as threatened and were idealised. For the most part, however, they remained taken for granted and were not acknowledged as a political-economic factor.

The use of the metaphor of the generational contract up until the late 1980s was its claim to embody and guarantee social solidarity ‘for all’ Germans, while constituting and maintaining divisions of gender and social class in a social insurance scheme termed generational contract. The insurance scheme was financed by contributions based on labour market participation and reproduced its gendered and classed stratification. But it
is not the inherent inequalities of the institutionalised generational or welfare contract, but changing contextual conditions, particularly rising mass unemployment and decreasing fertility, that currently are said to threaten the generational contract. Turning the underlying moral charge of fairness and equality against the generational contract itself, this contract is currently denounced as an immoral agreement chargeable to a third party, that is, to subsequent generations who will not receive in benefits of what they have paid in. Moreover, the hypothetical deliberators of the welfare contract are now identified as ‘real’ actors who have enriched themselves, effectively expressed in the notion of the welfare generation (Thomson 1989; 1992).

As a result, measures that target older men and women in particular have been proposed to redress the perceived imbalance. Although an alleged decline of intergenerational family solidarity had been deplored throughout the history of the German welfare state, the crisis scenarios of the generational contract, especially in their populist variants, now merge the alleged erosion of lineage solidarities with the alleged bankruptcy of the insurance system and themes such as the degradation of the environment and the ageing of the electorate. The dual targeting of women as saviours of family solidarity and as contributors to the PAYG system reveals the inherently contradictory structure of generational contracts where women’s commitments under the welfare contract are interpreted as a neglect of their responsibilities in the family and vice versa. The long-term care insurance scheme can be considered as a means of institutionally resolving this structural ambivalence in targeting women for informal support but incorporating both care needs and informal support to some extent into social insurance.

Theoretically the analysis thus suggests that the generational contract became a powerful discursive frame through its association with solidarity. Solidarity was doubly justified by rationality (via the contract metaphor) and sentiment (via the generation metaphor). The history of legal and state regulations of intergenerational relations as well as personal and institutional constraints forging intergenerational cohesion is obfuscated in this image of solidarity.

Against the background of a hegemonic focus on the welfare contract with its
contradictory justification in solidarity based on moral/emotional and rational behaviour, the empirical analysis in chapters 6, 7 and 8 focused on the social logic of intergenerational commitments and contracts in historically specific families. With the family being constructed as a sphere of trusting and giving where contractual and self-interested forms of cooperation were suspended (despite the legal codification of support obligations between parents and children), these commitments were for the most part taken for granted and ignored by the dominant discourse that equated the generational contract with the social insurance system. The empirical research question was to what extent repertoires and the institutionalised procedures of the welfare contract impacted on the interpretation of intergenerational practices and commitments by members of different family generations. The basis for the empirical analysis were narratives produced in the research encounter with family members from two culturally contrasting regions in West Germany, older women and their adult children, who were at the same time cast as antagonists in the scenario of resource competition on the basis of their cohorts. The sample composition purposefully included older women who had all been trained for skilled training but who had different work histories, and young adults, including a number of sibling dyads of different gender, with different educational backgrounds, marital status and differing intra-familial legacies. Contextual information was provided by a life course survey and interview protocols.

As the field of adult intergenerational relations is still an undertheorised area in the social sciences the thesis proposed the heuristic framework of kinscripts for researching and representing the micro-politics of intergenerational commitments. The framework built on the work of Di Leonardo (1987), Stack and Burton (1993) and Finch and Mason (1992). It proposed social institutions, cultural scripts and intra-familial legacies as socio-historical dimensions in relation to which intergenerational commitments have to be analysed. The framework is located across conventionally perceived boundaries of public and private and aims to link broader societal conditions and the micro-politics of intergenerational relationships. Each of the socio-historical dimensions encompasses contradictory and gendered aspects of the generational contract. Thus social institutions include the social insurance system, cultural scripts include the norm of solidarity and intra-familial legacies include kin support given previously. The concept of kin work,
defined as the practical, symbolic, emotional and material work of kinship that creates and maintains family feeling and cohesion, secures support within and across household boundaries, produces welfare and human capabilities and constitutes generational identity, is a central concept of analysis. Kin work is thus considered as a personal and political activity. Heuristically it poses questions as to processes of need interpretation, the politics of resource allocation, empowerment and disempowerment, emotions and normative frameworks and implicit and explicit processes of negotiation and ascription of kin work over the life course that have to be addressed and worked out in the empirical analysis.

Applying this heuristic framework to the analysis of kin practices in the two generations who were differently positioned according to their age and life cycle position, as well as their location in historical time, produced rich evidence of the subtleties and ambivalences of intergenerational commitments, their continuities and changes over two generations. Unambiguously the research showed that the discourse of intergenerational resource competition had no bearing on family relationships: research participants did not perceive their parents or children as antagonists in a dispute over scarce societal resources. The narratives of the group of older women born around 1930 illustrated the extent to which the kin network in post-war Germany has been a resource and a gendered liability for women throughout their lives. Following Wilson (1994) kin support was likely to change repeatedly as boundaries from a relatively problem free organisation of daily living to possible ‘care’ needs were crossed and recrossed over time by members of the kin network. The women firmly located the substantial amount of their material, practical and emotional kin support in a historical context of material deprivation in the immediate post-war period and an ongoing inadequacy of child and elder care services, which was paradoxically also expressed in the contextualisations of defining kin support as self-evident or natural. Historical material showed that the lack in investment in consumer and service industries compared to investment in primary industries after the war had been a political decision that counted on and at times idealised but did not remunerate women’s subsistence work. Thus women’s kin work had never been completely invisible but was never formally acknowledged as a political-economic factor. Practical kin support frequently remained below the threshold of perception of the
women themselves, and, insofar as emotional and material need was often intertwined in the relationship with their (widowed) mothers, was never considered as a political-economic activity. Although requiring competences and skill, neither was kin work perceived as empowering.

Following the cultural script that the family holds together with a gendered subtext that female relatives have to stand in in times of need, kin work was both assigned and negotiated over the life course with relatively little perceived room for manoeuvre. Women wanted to support their parents, children and grandchildren and felt they had to. At the same time kin networks opened new possibilities. Mothers and aunts facilitated access to the formal sphere of employment but also required temporal exits from qualified work when they needed help and support themselves. Intra-familial legacies or kinscripts that daughters were the life insurance of their parents opened up possibilities of taking over family businesses and becoming the family breadwinner in a new intergenerational division of labour.

Although the social logic of intergenerational kin work for this generation of women is better described by contracts of need where women, just as in traditional status contracts, gave with their bodies something of themselves, than as mutually advantageous contracts, ideas of fairness and equality were never completely absent in intergenerational relationships. This is shown in a number of quasi-contractual strategies deployed to secure kin work such as the payment of money or insurance for periods of family caregiving. Yet, despite the increased currency of the generational contract in the public arena, a contractual language of reciprocity and payment in return was largely absent in the narratives. I have suggested that a focus on strategies is a productive way of conceiving how women followed and used cultural scripts to their own ends. Strategies included defensive coping mechanisms such as ‘forgetting’ previous conflicts when support was needed but, particularly after retirement, they also included proactive strategies of redefining the boundaries of the relationship and articulating constraints and personal demands in order to limit the practical support they gave to grandchildren and older relatives. These publicly invisible forms of resistance and change went beyond the more cautious semi-public expression in the interviews of a request for societal
recognition for their dual paid and unpaid contributions to the generational contract.

By contrast the analysis of the narratives of a group of the women's adult children, born between 1953 and 1964 who had grown up better fed, housed and educated than any generation before them showed that as yet these young adults were not main providers in contracts related to need. As children of healthy and independent parents these research participants still were predominantly at the receiving end of material and practical kin support, particularly with respect to childcare. Not being under immediate pressure to 'stand in' apart from providing emotional support around critical life events and occasional help with bureaucratic issues or gardening, these research participants appeared to have more time and resources than their mothers had had to think about and work through intra-familial legacies, such as the ambivalently perceived strong work ethics of their mothers. Members of the younger generation defined themselves both in terms of a historical ('break out') and a family generation, a combination that offered possibilities of positive identification but also new challenges and constraints. Although parents were sometimes sought for advice and appeared important in acknowledging lifestyles and identities, intergenerational family cohesion was perceived not as a given but as explicitly created, also as passing on a sense of family to their children. In this sense the research supports the thesis that as for the older women after retirement intergenerational relationships have become more reflexive across boundaries of gender and class.

On the other hand in the context of anticipating the care needs of their parents, the cultural script of a gendered (and classed) hierarchy of primary care-giving responsibilities reappeared. Contrary to their mothers' generation, younger research participants did use a language of reciprocity and back payment, that like the script of family cohesion, had a gendered subtext. The anticipated care needs of their parents posed a dilemma given the participants' multiple commitments on the hand and the negative image of residential care on the other. But young women and men were no more able than their mothers to discuss the possibility of parental care openly with their parents and siblings, even though or perhaps because social service provision had become for many an integral part of anticipating parental care. I have argued that mutual distrust of
assurances of filial care or plans to go into an elder care home, and particularly the cultural script of non-articulation, seemingly secured freedom of choice, while actually increasing pressure on the part of those who felt and were held most responsible: adult daughters.

In practice the younger research participants had developed a range of models that drew on intra-familial legacies and experiences, which they prospectively reproduced and transformed. Social services (though not yet long-term care insurance) had become an institutional not a cultural resource to justify anticipated limitations of care-giving commitments but remained gendered and classed: it was exclusively women with lower educational background and longer periods spent outside the labour market who prospectively committed themselves to provide co-residential care to their parents. Two women in the sample already had first-hand experiences with personal care for the grandparental generation. Yet, both women’s and men’s demands to promote gender equality focused on combining paid work and childcare and did not include kin work responsibilities, evidence of its ongoing de-politicised character.

To return to the question posed at the beginning, the empirical analysis suggests that repertoires of the generational contract in the sense of solidarity connoting fairness and unconditional (gendered) kin support, had effects on the narratives of both older women and adult children. Given its conflicting character the generational contract is not a univalent script but a cultural repertoire including an array of meanings that allowed for differing interpretations. The research confirms that ‘the selection from the culturally available pool of meanings is likely to reflect situational and contextual pressures as much as, and probably more than, internalized norms or values’ (Marshall et al. 1987, p. 411).

Even though it is not clear to what extent contracts of need will be reproduced by women of the younger generation the findings of the empirical analysis, in conjunction with the theoretically uncovered multiplicity and contradictory structure of generational contracts point to several substantive issues and challenges. Such issues have to be addressed if multigenerational social policies are to be created in Germany. And they may pose
challenges for contemporary social theory more generally.

The uncovering of the substantial amount of kin work – conceptualised as the production of welfare – in the narratives of the older women points to the necessity of broadening the reference frame of ‘generational accounting’ to include informal intergenerational support provided mainly by women. Generational accounting, typically calculated on the basis of paid taxes by a ‘representative individual’ or ‘economic subject’ (Raffelhüschen and Walliser 1997, p. 69) subject to state transfers received, aims to represent net payment obligations of contemporary and future generations (cohorts) to the state in order to promote intergenerational equity. A widening and gendering of such accounting systems by including kin work leads to a refutation of the inclusive notion of the welfare generation as those generations ‘who have failed most to play a full part in these [welfare] exchanges’ (Thomson 1992, p. 230) by highlighting that older women of this socio-economic background were not net beneficiaries but often dual contributors to the generational contract. Disaggregating ‘the’ welfare generation according to gender and class makes use of the analytical value of the concept of generation that emphasises the different positionalities of members of a generation. Without acknowledging the gendered structure of kin work Thomson has refused to take it into account by arguing that these ‘contributions are also being made by other generations born both before and after the welfare generation’ (Thomson op. cit., p. 234). This of course may well be the case, but injustice does not cease to be unjust because it is perpetuated. Furthermore, although women have long worked outside the home, for example as family labourers, their subordinate inclusion in the formal labour market in Germany was promoted by women of the so-called welfare generation (defined as cohorts born between 1920 and 1945). At the same time intergenerational commitments are likely to have increased for women of these cohorts due to an increased life expectancy and periods of war and depression.

In a more inclusive system of representing generational contributions proposals to recruit older women into unpaid voluntary work would have to be assessed by taking into account the kin work they provided over the life course. Furthermore, the findings of this small-scale study indicate that women of this generation and socio-economic background
will for the most part not be able to afford to pay the ‘solidarity contribution of current pensioner generations’ (Raffelhüschen and Walliser op. cit., p. 87) as part of the promotion of ‘a flow from old to young’ (Thomson op. cit. 233) even though they were qualified workers. Instead these women would be likely to qualify for solidarity contributions if their dual contributions were taken into account.

The argument more generally is as Binstock (1994, p. 162) has rightly pointed out, that ‘the very description of the axis upon which equity is to be judged tends to circumscribe the major options available for rendering justice’. If justice for coexisting and successive generations were to be taken into account a more inclusive representation of generational contributions would require policy recommendations such as those by Kessler (1996) to be assessed with respect to gender, class and race/ethnicity. Thus if the retirement age were to be increased for women, kin and caring work would have to be distributed more equally between men and women over the life course. Similarly younger generations should be better trained but equal employment opportunities would also have to be open for men and women. As has been discussed with respect to the transmission of wealth by this group of older women, younger generations, particularly younger women, will only be able to make private savings if they will find regular employment and adequate service provision to complement and assist their kin work. Importantly the empirical finding that intergenerational ‘exchange’ often meant that female relatives had to stand in and substitute for other women and a lack of service provision, points to the necessity to assess the constraints that opportunities for some women can intergenerationally place on others.

The thesis suggests that the major challenge for a representation of kin work is not how to measure what has consistently being de-represented. Time budget studies have shown ways of measuring the breadth and depth of practical and material kin work, even though they do not as yet capture its emotional and symbolic value (Gerstel and Gallagher 1993). The more difficult issue is that even practical kin work was frequently not represented by the women interviewed themselves. Moreover, the research has shown that intergenerational commitments in families for both younger and older members appear to be a domain where interests, demands, expectations and limits of commitments are
frequently not articulated despite the novel cultural family script of 'communicative conflict resolution' (Kaufmann 1990, p. 147) and assumptions that adult children 'typically' do communicate with an elderly parent with respect to care-giving decisions (Cicirelli 1991). That the family may not be the place where a 'committed dialogue' takes place as envisioned by Boszormenyi-Nagy (1987) at least where full-time personal commitment is required, has to do with the fact that those needs pose irreconcilable dilemmas between the wish (and felt obligation) to assist others and the wish (and obligations) to lead one's own life. Furthermore gendered responsibilities are difficult to challenge in a context where cultural scripts of reciprocity already have an inbuilt tacit gendered character. More generally the research suggests that articulating interests in intergenerational relationships requires adequate alternatives. It was shown that contracts of need were frequently forged by the question 'but who else is going to do it?' (Aronson 1992) thus pointing to the lack of perceived choices.

I suggest that issues of non-articulation have to be addressed by social theory more generally, such as the assumption in theories of reflexive modernisation that networks and identities become in principle negotiable or the focus on including different groups with different styles of argumentation in theories of participative democracy. What has to be called into question is the assumption that people have unambivalent interests and loyalties and can (easily) represent and negotiate them. The theoretical focus has to shift to what is not articulated and why. In the context of intergenerational relations research has shown that the non-articulation of cross-pressures can have detrimental effects on health and well being. Importantly articulation is necessary to access social services as well as interpersonal help. Twigg and Atkin (1994) have shown how in a context of scarce resources service providers give services to those who most effectively articulate their needs. Further the invisibility of carers can be a barrier to their incorporation in service provision and decision-making. One of the contributions of this thesis is to point to the paradox that articulation requires choices and effective choice requires articulation.

Shifting the subject of the contradictory and gendered structure of generational contracts and the significance of implicit and explicit kin work in all its aspects (emotional, practical, material and symbolic) into the public and political arena therefore becomes a
major task of multigenerational social politics. Yet, we must not envision such policy discourse as a battlefield of people/generations with unambivalent and antagonistic interests but as a domain where, as suggested by the framework of kinscripts, the questions posed are not whether but how, by whom and under what conditions existing obligations are fulfilled. Obligations, as Hirschmann (1996) has argued, are a matter of degree, not a matter of all or nothing. By showing who has contributed what under what circumstances a more inclusive system of representing generational contributions points to the politics of resource allocation and can serve to increase transparency and accountability of generational contributions so that claims become more debatable and necessary contributions can be distributed in a more equitable manner.
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APPENDIX A

OBJECTIVES AND SEQUENTIAL SAMPLING PROCEDURE OF THE BREMEN RESEARCH PROJECTS

The research project 'Status Sequences of Women between Employment and the Family'

The research project 'Status Sequences of Women between Employment and the Family' investigated the interweaving of paid and unpaid work in the life courses of the first generation of women in West Germany whose adult lives were not interrupted by the war in the context of normative 'phase models' (Myrdal and Klein 1968). The women had undergone skilled training after WWII and later started a family. Whereas during their vocational training the 'two-phase model' was valid according to which employment was conceived as a temporary phase between leaving school and marriage later the 'three-phase model' (employment before and after a period of exclusive child-rearing) became legitimate. On the basis of quantitative and qualitative data the project explored the significance of these phase models for actual life styles and subjective interpretations, as well as exploring what arrangements of combining employment and family older women expected of and recommended to the generation of their daughters (Sonderforschungsbereich 186 1989).

Methodologically, the sampling procedure aimed at 'theoretical representativeness', that is an adequate representation of theoretically relevant characteristics of the social context in the sample (Kelle et al. 1993). This method is different from the theoretical sampling suggested by Glaser and Strauss (1967) where the analyst provisionally analyses her data and on the basis of emergent findings, which in turn theoretically informs further data collection (ongoing inclusion of comparison groups) to develop grounded theory. In the sampling procedure developed in the Bremen project, the results of two sequential quantitative surveys provided results in their own right and on this basis informed the composition of the qualitative sample. The qualitative sample did not aim to test the findings of the surveys but to produce new results, which referred to the same subject matter. The connection of results generated by research methods and different paradigms that constitute their subject matter in specific ways, was secured by several research
strategies outlined in Chapter 5.

Two decisions regarding the sample selection of the group of older women were made from the onset. First, in order to analyse family commitments in conjunction with women's employment histories, only women were chosen who had started a family and had a period of employment prior to having a family. To assess the previously unexamined impact of initial occupational qualification on the life course, women with the most common vocational qualification in post-war Germany were chosen, i.e., the level of skilled training or apprenticeship. One-third of the cohorts of women who came of age after the war obtained this, a number almost identical to the percentage among young age cohorts in Germany in the late 1980s (Born 1989). Shifts in women's vocational qualifications show a decrease in unskilled labourers in favour of women with degrees in higher education. For the sample construction it was assumed that the same level of initial vocational qualification would provide a relatively homogenous group of women in terms of their level of school education (completion of secondary school) and in terms of their age when they first entered the labour market. Possible differences in the timing of family events were thus not based on different educational careers.

Second, in view of a possible impact of different regionally embedded family values and practices, equal numbers of women were chosen from two culturally contrasting regions in West Germany, one a rural Catholic and the other an urban Protestant area. It was assumed that in the rural Catholic area a more rigid gendered division of labour would be predominant normatively whereas in the urban Protestant environment the regime of gender specific life styles would be loosened. By implication these selection criteria excluded women who were never married and/or remained childless as well as women without occupational training and the minority who obtained higher education after the war.

The process of sequential sampling comprised three parts. Part I of the study investigated

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29 The life courses of never-married German women born between 1919 and 1933 have been analysed by Wilken (1991). In the US Allen (1989) investigated the life courses of never-married women born in 1910.
the distribution of women's occupations on the level of skilled training. A collection of primary data through the local chambers of commerce, trade corporations and vocational schools was necessary because leaving certificates in Germany were lost in the turbulent post war years and representative surveys only started after 1953. The rural Catholic district of Koblenz in Rhineland-Palatinate and the Protestant Free Hanseatic City Bremen were chosen on the basis of existing records and socio-cultural regional differences. The study consisted of a one hundred percent sample of women with vocational qualifications in 1948. The results showed that in both regions the five most common occupational qualifications of women in 1948 had been clerk, shop assistant, hairdresser, dressmaker and child minder. These occupations were thus neither bound to the specific economic conditions in the two regions, nor were they the result of a different normative attachment of occupational training to dominant gender roles.

Part II of the sequential sampling procedure explored the social structure of the life courses of the women in the five most common occupations. The current addresses of the ex-apprentices were traced via the residents' registration offices and one hundred women for each of the five occupations equally distributed over the two regions were contacted using a mail order company to maintain anonymity. They were sent standardised questionnaires and asked about the timing of family events, periods of employment and their willingness to be interviewed at a later date. Family events included the timing of marriage(s), child birth(s), grand-motherhood(s) and divorce(s). Periods of employment were differentiated according to jobs in the occupation they were trained for, in other occupations and in jobs not covered by social insurance. Excluding incomplete questionnaires and the minority of women who had never started a family, 220 cases were eligible for inclusion in the quantitative analysis of approximately 50 cases per occupational group. 140 women (64%) sent back their current address as an indication

Her findings reveal the strong commitment of never-married women to kin relationships despite their almost continuous employment records.

Note that the German vocational system on the level of apprenticeship established at the end of the last century is differentiated into two tracks, one offering training in trades traditionally reserved for men such as baking or construction where the apprentice receives money during his training, and the other track consisting of full-time vocational schools for occupations traditionally reserved for women such as nurses or childminders where the 'apprentice' has to pay for her training. Most importantly the first track offers
that they were willing to be interviewed.

The quantitative analysis of the survey showed that the women who finished their apprenticeship around 1948 had indeed begun their occupational training directly after they had completed secondary school and were thus of the same or similar age (that is, they were born between 1928 and 1931). At the time of the survey they were at the actual or potential transition to retirement. A comparison with representative surveys showed that this group of women with respect to family events (average age at first marriage, number and placing of childbirths, rates of divorce and widowhood) could be considered as ‘typical’ for women of this birth cohort. Their employment participation compared with statistically representative samples at ten-year intervals, was slightly higher in 1960, lower in 1970 and again higher in 1980 than the national (Born et al. 1996).

A cluster analysis for small samples of the added employment periods over each life course, differentiated by insurance status, revealed surprisingly that entries in and exits from the labour market were strongly correlated with differences in the women’s occupational training. Employment patterns were not related to family events, did not follow distinct phase models (neither the traditional ‘two-phase model’, nor the ‘three-phase model’) and did not vary according to regional location. The overall length and status of the women’s employment histories in the five occupations under study appeared to be structured by the kind of trade or schooling they had received before they first entered the labour market.

Four ‘dominant status configurations’ emerged that were related to different occupational training: women who left the labour market and were predominantly homemakers (predominantly hairdressers); women who were predominantly in the labour market in their trained occupation (predominantly office clerks); women who mainly worked in other occupations (dressmakers and shop assistants); and women who mainly worked in uninsured occupations (childminders). At the same level of qualification different occupations thus offered different opportunities to combine family and employment.

career prospects (‘master craftsman’) whereas the second leads to dead-end occupations (Krüger 1991).
Given that the women surveyed were not ‘exceptional’ with respect to family events or occupational training these results are likely to have significance beyond the group studied.

Part III aimed at the exploration of subjective interpretation patterns focused on turning points between family and employment in the context of the women’s life history and the constitutive structural patterns. On the basis of the quantitative findings in Part II, the qualitative sample was selected according to the ‘model of deliberate sampling for heterogeneity’ (Cook and Campbell 1979 as quoted in Erzberger 1995). The sampling ensured that the theoretically relevant socio-structural variables (occupational training and dominant status configuration) were included in large enough numbers to develop ‘explanatory power’ in the analysis. The researchers therefore aimed to include an equal number of women from the five occupations in the two regions and crosscutting these occupational groups an equal number of the four dominant status configurations. Previous research experience had shown that the principle of theoretical saturation (Glaser and Strauss op. cit., p. 61) is fulfilled in sub-groups of 10-12 persons. Saturation means that further data of the same group of persons does not provide additional information to develop relevant categories.

Applying these considerations to the pool of women who in the standardised questionnaires had indicated their readiness for an interview, 52 women born between 1928 and 1931 were included in the sample: 12 trained office clerks, 11 shop assistants, 11 dress makers, 9 hairdressers and 9 childminders. With four exceptions all women had completed secondary school and three women had A level equivalents. All women started their apprenticeships at the end of the war. They started their families in the 1950s and had between one and five children. The dominant status configurations cut across these occupational groups: 13 women were predominantly homemakers, 12 were predominantly employed according to their occupational training, 19 were in other occupations and 8 were employed predominantly in uninsured positions.

Qualifications in full-time vocational schools are often neglected in analyses of occupational qualifications.
The research project ‘Patterns of Status Passages and Intergenerational Inheritance’

The research project ‘Patterns of Status Passages and Intergenerational Inheritance’ investigated processes of change within family life patterns and explored the life courses of a group of adult children of women (and men) studied in previous projects. As a cohort the group of children aged 30 to 41 belongs to the first generation to benefit from the expansion of the education system, considered responsible for an increase in marriage age and women’s labour market participation and decreasing birth rates. Being at the same time sons and daughters of parents previously studied the project analysed complex changes in family life and their dependence on institutional regulations and family traditions. The research-guiding question was whether asynchronic gender-specific modernisation processes in the older (parental) generation where women but not men had expanded their traditional life domains were expanding and had influenced the lifestyles of the younger generation (Sonderforschungsbereich 186 1994).

As to the sampling, access to the older women’s adult children could only be gained through their mothers. Therefore all 140 women who in the previous survey had declared their willingness to be interviewed and whose addresses were thus available were contacted again (whether or not they had been interviewed) with the request to provide contact to their children. From 326 existing children 149 took part in the quantitative survey and completed a postal questionnaire on their education, employment and family history, including information about living arrangements and cohabitation, maternity/paternity leave, military service and unemployment. Ninety-eight of the research participants indicated their willingness to be interviewed at a later stage.

The quantitative analysis showed that 89 women and 60 men had taken part in the survey. Their year of birth ranged from 1948 to 1974, with the average being 1959. The survey showed a generally high level of educational and occupational qualification. Eighty-two individuals (55.8%) obtained the highest school qualification (A-levels equivalents) and only 19 (12.2%) obtained the lowest level of school qualification, with men overall doing slightly better than women. Almost one third of the respondents had more than one
occupational qualification; only 6 had none at all. Seventy-one persons (47.7%) were
evocationally qualified and 72 (48.3%) had an academic degree. Comparisons with
representative studies showed that the level of educational and occupational qualification
was above the national average for the group born between 1953 and 1964. In
comparison with the life courses of their parents the generation of adult children, as could
be expected, were more qualified and thus appeared to be indeed the beneficiaries of the
educational reform in the 1970s. Women in particular often had obtained higher
qualifications than their mothers.

Employment careers (including times of unemployment and part-time work) were similar
for the younger men and women, at least for those who did not have children. At the birth
of the first child a traditionalisation in life style occurred: it was predominantly women
who took maternity leave and then changed to part-time jobs whereas men consolidated
their employment careers. Only 5 men (4.3%) as opposed to 44 women (37.6%) of the
117 research participants with children indicated that they had spent time as full-time
homemakers, mainly due to parental leave and child rearing but also due to
unemployment and in one case due to caring for a mother-in-law. In an intergenerational
comparison women were employed for longer periods than their mothers in the same
time interval whereas due to periods of prolonged education, unemployment and part-
time work young men spent comparatively less time in paid work than their fathers.

The quantitative analysis corroborated changes in family patterns. Both men and women
cohabited for long periods of time, had several long-term relationships and if they
married, did so at a later stage. Marriage usually occurred at or around the time of the
birth of the first child. Fifty-nine per cent of the research participants surveyed had at
least one child (two women had 4 and 5 children). At the age of 35 more than 60% were
married, c. 20% were cohabiting and 20% were single. Of the 74% who had had
experience of marriage, 18% were divorced and almost half of those had remarried.

For reasons of comparability only the age groups born between 1953-1964, whose
formative years fell in the period of social change in the 1970s, were included in the
qualitative sample. As gender had proven to be a salient marker of inter- and intra-generational life course differences we also aimed for the inclusion of an equal number of men and women, approximately 10-12 persons for each group. In addition we aimed to include an equal number of siblings of different gender who could illuminate potential gender-specific differences in the perception of the life style of their mother and its impact on their own life style. The sample aimed at approximately 40-46 persons (10-12 women, 10-12 men and 10-12 sibling dyads).

Crosscutting the gender and sibling dimension, four further (two-dimensional) sampling criteria were included. In terms of the heterogeneity of the younger generation, the sample reflected differences in occupational and family status. To account for differences in educational and employment status we aimed to include an equal amount at skilled and degree level. In terms of family status children had a decisive impact on life style for younger women. Therefore both persons with and without children were included. In terms of the potential ‘model function’ of the maternal life style, the mother’s employment and familial caring experiences were relevant sampling criteria. It was decided to aim for an equal number of children whose mothers had been predominantly employed (defined as >18.5 years in the labour force) and mothers who had been predominantly homemakers (defined as <18.5 years). Given the interest in intra-familial legacies I aimed to include an equal number of children of women who had provided care for an older relative and those who had not. As a commitment to kin work had not been explored in the postal questionnaires I drew on the results of the qualitative study of the older women for this criterion, thereby aiming for a maximum of younger research participants whose mothers had also been interviewed.

Applying these considerations to the pool of 78 men and women born between 1953 and 1964 who had indicated their willingness to be interviewed, 49 persons were included in the qualitative sample: 10 brother-sister dyads, two sibling triads, and 8 men and 15 women whose siblings were not interviewed. The four two-dimensional criteria were distributed as follows. Employment status: 25 persons with an academic degree and 23 persons with skilled vocational training were included (one woman did not have an
occupational qualification); Family status: 16 persons without and 33 with children were included; Employment history of the mother: 28 children came from families where the mother was predominantly employed and 21 children came from families where the mother was predominantly a homemaker; and Familial caring experiences of mothers: 28 children had mothers who had provided personal care to older relatives and 21 came from families without caring experiences. Given that in the group of those who were willing to be interviewed there were only 6 men who were skilled workers, occupational status in the qualitative study was conflated with gender in that persons with academic degrees were predominantly men and skilled workers were women. The other characteristics were broadly equally distributed over the 21 men and 28 women in the sample.

**Distribution of sample criteria by gender in the qualitative sample of adult children**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender and occupational status</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Skilled</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender and family status</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No children</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With children</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Gender and family status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>children</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### Gender and employment of mother

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employment of mother &gt;18.5 yrs</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment of mother &gt;18.5 yrs</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Gender and familial caring experience

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elder care experience of mother</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No elder care experience of mother</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX B

INTERVIEW PASSAGES QUOTED IN GERMAN

Chapter 5


Chapter 6

(1) ‘Ich mußte – meine Mutter war ja immer auf Achse, wie man so sagt, um irgendetwas zu essen zu beschaffen. Die war viel auf dem Lande. Und dadurch mußte ich dann schon mal die beiden Gröberen bekochen und meine kleine Schwester auch... So viel Gedanken hat meine Mutter sich eigentlich gar nicht gemacht. Wir sind so ziemlich – ohne irgendwas aufgewachsen, nicht.’ (126)

(2) ‘Meine Mutter hatte nicht viel Zeit für uns. Die hatte sieben Kinder, die hatte das Geschäft, da war nicht viel Zeit sich um die Kinder zu kümmern. Wir waren gekleidet, wir waren satt, wir mußten helfen... Wir haben die Mutter gerne gehabt, und sie hat auch alles für uns getan. Aber das war keine Herzlichkeit zwischen den Eltern und uns. Mal liebhalt, mal ‘n Kuß geben und sagen, das hast’ gut gemacht. Da war keine Zeit, wir waren zu viele. Und das haben wir vermißt.’ (525)

mitsorgt... Mit meiner Mutter konnte ich nie reden ... Ich glaub, man ist vom kleinen Kind gleich Erwachsen geworden. Was da so zwischen, die Zeit die dazwischen war, die fehlt. Und und ich mein auch immer zwischen meiner Mutter und mir hat was gefehlt, denn, sehen Sie mal, ich bin die ganzen Kriegsjahre eigentlich immer aushäusig gewesen. Nie bei meiner Mutter. Ich war erst im KRV-Lager Y, dann war ich in Z und immer so'n halbes Jahr. Ja, dann war ich der U und dann im V. Und die Zeit immer von der Mutter weg, und da kann mir einer sagen was er will, da ist irgendwie, da fehlt was. Int: Da haben sie sich entsfremdet? Resp: Ja ja. Und heute grübel ich manches mal noch, wie konnte sie das überhaupt machen. Wie konnte sie das machen, wie kann man ein Kind so- Int: Haben Sie sich so weggeschoben gefühlt? Resp: Ja, ja. Das fehlt, die Zeit.... Denn wiederum sag ich, Gott, die Zeit war so hart, vielleicht konnte sie auch gar nicht anders.... Und dadurch sind die Menschen ja auch hart geworden. Und so war meine Mutter halt, bevor ich mal gestreichelt wurde, kriegt ich eher 'n Schlag mit dem Stock. So war es.' (822)


Jedenfalls unseren Eltern gegenüber wagten wir nicht, irgendwie so unseren Standpunkt klarzumachen. Wir versuchten immer da, denen nicht wehzutun auch nicht, und wir hatten immer Angst, daß wir denen wehtun.' (814)

Resp: Ich war ihre älteste Tochter und Vati war noch nicht da ... und ich war praktisch Muttis Stütze kann man sagen. Alles was sie so brauchte, wir sind in'n Wald gegangen, haben Bäume gesägt, damit wir überhaupt Heizmaterial hatten und hatten dann so'n Holzsammelschein. Int: Also daß Sie schon auch so'n bißchen- Resp: Sie brauchte eigentlich 'n bißchen, aber ich war dann doch sehr egoistisch und hab' gesagt, ich geh doch nach Bremen! Int: Haben Sie ja denn auch geschafft. Resp: Ja, aber dann, meine Schwester ist drei Jahre jünger als ich. Dann kam die dann dran. Nech, wie das denn schon so ist. (073)

Also für mich stand dahinter, daß ich einen Beruf hatte, daß ich selbständig war, daß ich mein eigenes Geld verdienen konnte, daß ich auf eigenen Füßen stand. Das stand für mich dahinter.' (546)

Ich bin ja nun nicht so gerne zu Hause gewesen. [Meine Eltern] hatten auch viel Probleme untereinander. Und das war schlimm. ... Und da bin ich da hingegangen und hab mir dieses da gesucht. ... Aber das war auch irgendwo - das war mir alles sehr verständlich, weil ja meine Eltern auch wieder von vorne anfangen mußten, und da hab ich gedacht: die haben das ja verloren, ohne daß sie schuld dran waren, also muß ich da mit helfen.' (071)

Besonders meine Mutter, sie war sehr begabt im Nähnen, aber Mädchen lernten ja nichts in der Generation. Ihre Brüder lernten irgendeinen Beruf, aber sie mußte eben, wie man so sagte früher, in Stellung gehen. Und da hat sie sich geschworen, also wenn sie mal ein Mädchen kriegt, das soll das nicht machen. Das soll was lernen.' (115)
Resp: Das hatte meine Mutter angefangen, ja. Int: War sie gleich ohne Sie hingegangen oder? Resp: Ja, sie ist scheinbar ohne - also ich bin nicht mitgewesen, ich hab mich nur vorgestellt bei der Schneidermeisterin... Ich war mal grade 14 Jahre, ne. Also – man hatte ja auch damals noch nicht, so wie heute ein Kind ist, mit 14 Jahren, das hatte man damals ja noch gar nicht. (034)

Resp: Ich muß sagen, ich hab sehr viel Unterstützung in meiner Tante gehabt, was Berufsausbildung anging. Wenn es meiner Mutter nach gegangen wäre, wenn es allein nach ihr gegangen wäre - meine Tante hat sich da ganz schön eingenmischt, .... bei uns war das Geld knapp zu Hause, und meine Mutter sagte immer: wenn ich euch alle nach X, das war diese Papierfabrik, schicken würde, dann hätten wir mehr Geld. Int: Ja, haben Sie mehrere Geschwister auch? Resp: Ja. Dann brauchten wir nicht so rechnen und so. Und da war also meine Tante immer da, die da sagte: die Kinder müssen aber ne Ausbildung machen... Also bei uns zu Hause war das also so, daß meine Mutter oder so meine Tante, die sich hauptsächlich ja auch um uns gekümmert hat, bedingt dadurch, daß mein Vater ja nicht mehr da war, hat sie auch so’n bißchen so sich verantwortlich gefühlt auch. (549)


‘Über mich war an und für sich geplant worden, daß ich zu Hause bleiben sollte. Wie das früher war in der Familie, wo Landwirtschaft war und so, daß eine Tochter zu hause blieb und die Eltern hält unterstützte. Meine ältere Schwester war bei der Tante, wo der Mann als erster hier im Ort im Krieg umgekommen war und die hatte 9 kleine Kinder. Und selbstverständlich mußte die Schwester bei der Tante einspringen. Die war damals 16/17. Ja, und da mußte ich, wenn ich hier zu Hause bleiben wollte, eine landwirtschaftliche Berufskunde machen.’ (516)

‘Und dadurch, daß jetzt meine Eltern nicht mehr lebten, und die Firma da war, und ich einen jüngeren Bruder hatte, der die Firma eines Tages übernehmen sollte, mußte ja irgendwas passieren, um die Firma für ihn zu erhalten. Und da hab’ ich mich da also – so ganz spontan – entschlossen: ich trete in die Firma ein. Und das war eigentlich nur möglich mit ‘ner Lehre... wir mußten natürlich einen Teilhaber aufnehmen. Ich war ja zu jung, ich war ja nicht volljährig....Also ich denke, das lag einfach so – das lag in der Luft. Das war ja so: man fing ja praktisch mit Nichts wieder an. Es war ja alles vorbei, und man konnte – also ich zumindest als 17jährige, ich konnte überhaupt nicht abschätzen, was jetzt kommen würde. Es war ja - das einzige, was eigentlich noch so war, das war die Familie. Also meine Großeltern lebten noch, und die hatten uns auch erst aufgenommen, und dann eben - ja, das Geschäft war da, wenn auch so äußerlich nicht mehr viel davon
zu sehen war, nicht viel übrig geblieben war. Aber irgendwie mußte es ja auch weitergehen ... das war mir eigentlich klar, daß ich da jetzt erstmal eben für die Existenz von uns beiden sorgen mußte, sozusagen.’ (027)

‘Es gab zu Hause die Abmachung, da meine jüngere Schwester ja nicht lernen durfte - da hat meine Mutter sich durchgesetzt: Ja, die Jüngste, eine Tochter bleibt im Haus und die muss auch später mal für mich da sein - mit der mußte ich immer teilen. Meine Schwester bekam immer die Hälfte von meinem Lohn. ... Ich hätte ihr gerne noch mehr gegeben, wenn ich mehr gehabt hätte, sehr gerne. Denn ich hatte immer ein schlechtes Gefühl ihr gegenüber. Ich konnte was lernen und sie nicht. Was sind 40 Mark, wenn ich nichts lernen kann? Es ist ja ein Almosen.’ (851)

‘Ja, ich bin 48 im April wiedergekommen und habe dann erstmal ein halbes Jahr lang meine Großmutter gepflegt, die sehr krank war. Meine Mutter konnte es nicht, denn sie hatte Haushalt, und wir hatten auch kleine Landwirtschaft dabei. Meine Großeltern haben gesagt: ‘Nein, also bitte bleib, und wir bezahlen auch die Versicherung’, damit war aber - wie wir jetzt erst hinterher festgestellt haben beim Auflisten, wo’s jetzt an die Rente geht: Ja, wo ist das denn? Ja, da ist nur in der Zeit Krankengeld bezahlt worden, für die Krankenkasse, aber keine Sozialabgaben, nicht? Und das hätte wohl auch nicht viel ausgemacht. Also, ich hab sowieso verdient ja nichts, denn das wollte ich ja auch nicht.’ (118)


Resp: Ja, doch, ich mußte das abgeben. Das ging ja gar nicht anders, nicht. Aber da kam denn oft - und ich weiß noch so, das war eine Friseuse bei uns im Haus und die


(21) 'Also es, wirklich, ich hab eine derartig dominierende und despotische und — also eine Mutter, die also unwahrscheinlichen Druck auf mich ausübt hat. Das kann ich aber heute auch erst so formulieren. Denn von wegen unabhängig sein, ja, als ich heiratete, da war’s so, daß ich da – daß mein Mann da wollte, daß ich hier rausgehe. Also mein Mann wollte, daß wir hier ausziehen. Denn inzwischen war meine Mutter jetzt allein. Alle sind sie gegangen... Und zwar war das so, daß wir schon - mein Mann und ich - uns schon eine Wohnung gemietet hatten im Souterrain.... Und dann kam meine Mutter dazu und hat gesagt: Das wirst Du doch wohl nicht tun, mich hier mit dem Haus alleine lassen? So. Und dann sind wir zur Miete hier – da hab ich meinen Mann rumgekriegt, daß
Wir haben dann allerdings gebaut... Da war ich auch schon mit der Lehre fertig, da hatt
Mein Vater war gefallen. Und das war hier so das Schlafzimmer. Und ich mußte ins Bett
gehen, wann sie wollte, und ich mußte aufbleiben, wie lange sie wollte. Ja, also ehe man
das durchschaut und ehe man das erkennt. Ich war jedenfalls – ich war ‘n Dussel, ‘n
dusseliges Mädchen.’ (037)

(22) ‘Ein Jahr vor unserer Hochzeit, vor der Eheschließung, bin ich nach X gegangen...
Und ich hab das auch irgendwie als Sprungbrett benutzt, so rauszukommen von zu
Hause. Meine Mutter hat’s mir sehr schwer gemacht. Meine Geschwister ließ sie alle ge-
hen, und mich wollt sie nicht gehen lassen. Und da hab ich mich also dann wirklich
regelrecht abgesetzt... Das ist mir auch nicht schwergefallen. Ich muß allerdings auch
sagen, ich hatte also nie ‘n guten Kontakt zu meiner Mutter. Ach, das war alles so, ich
denke, dadurch, daß mein Vater so früh gestorben ist und so, da ist auch einiges anders
gelaufen als wenn ne Familie so zusammen ist. Ich mein, sie hat es ja auch nicht leicht
gehabt, mit 5 Kindern und dann nur wenig Geld und so. Aber trotzdem hab ich mich so
ungerecht behandelt gefühlt all die Jahre, nicht... sie hat dann ihren Gefühlen freien Lauf
gelassen und hat – ich mein, immer mir nur – ich weiß nicht, ob sie meinen anderen –
also meinen jüngeren Geschwistern mit Sicherheit nicht, aber ich denk immer, bei mir hat
sie so alles abgeladen: Wenn ich Euch nicht hätte, ging’s mir ja viel besser. Ich wollt
Euch alle nicht und so.’ (549)

(23) ‘Ich hab mit meiner Mutter zusammengelebt. Und die war ja auch allein, und die ist
ganz aufgegangen, wie wir das Baby hatten... Und die hat für mein Kind ganz gut
gesorgt, gell. Und ich konnte doch vieles machen, wenn ich die jetzt nicht gebah hat, dann wüßte ich nicht wie das gegangen wäre. Ich hätte ja das Kind nicht irgendwo
hingebahen. Das hätt ich nicht gemacht. Dann hättte ich mir einen anderen Mann suchen
müßen. Irgendwie. Aber so war man da unabhängig und ich wollte auch nicht mehr.’
(849)

(24) Resp: Also das war auch so ’ne Übergangsphase, wo’s uns eben auch finanziell sehr
schlecht ging. Wo ich eben für meine Mutter zahlen sollte, und ich sie auch nicht
hängenlassen mochte. Und dann ist die aus dem Grunde bei uns, anderthalb oder zwei
Jahre hat sie gewohnt bei uns. Dann war ihr geholfen, und sie half mir, indem sie den
Jungen versorgte, nich. ...Aber das machte ich wieder irgendwo, daß es also diesen Kreis
hatte, nicht.... Und dann mußte meine Mutter nach Bremen zurück. Da war ja auch mein
Neffe, der irgendwie auch versorgt werden mußte. Denn da traten dann Probleme auf mit
der Krankheit meiner Schwester wieder. Und das war schon ein Grund, daß sie da - da
wurde sie mehr gebraucht als bei uns dann, nich. Dann haben wir’s, wie gesagt, so
gemacht, daß ich ihr denn heimlich Geld gab. Und- das durfte nicht bekannt werden...
Int: Wie bekannt werden, von der Behörde her? Resp: Ja. Sie kriegte ja Unterstützung. ...
Und wir brauchten ja nicht für sie aufkommen. Und wie wir das nun privat machten, das
ging ja keinen was an, nich. (130)

(25) ‘Ich hab mein Kind dadurch wenig gesehen. Meine Schwiegermutter hat das so an
sich gebunden. Wenn ich abends heimkam, war’s dunkel, im Winter... Ich hab das Kind
dann samstags abends geholt, und dann kam meine Schwiegermutter sonntags mittags
schon wieder und hat's schon wiedergeholt... Weil montags nicht so viel zu tun war, bin
ich dann montags zu Hause geblieben. Aber dann mußte ich noch um mein Kind
kämpfen. Dann hat sie immer gesagt: „ach, Du hast doch Hausarbeit. Mach das mal in
Ruhe“ (513)

(26) ‘Da haben die Kinder, so gesehen, mich nicht entbehrt. Die Großmutter war an
Mutter’s Stelle da, und wie ne Großmutter zu den Enkelchen ist, weiß ja jeder. Da haben
die nichts vermißt. Aber ich sag immer: Haltet Eure Kinder in den ersten Jahren selbst in
der Hand. Ich weiß es nicht ... So, wenn man älter wird, dann denkt man: Ach ja, die
schönsten Jahre haste dann doch all nicht so gehabt mit den Kindern, wie andere Frauen
das damals hatten, woll.’ (516)

Chapter 7

(27) ‘Ich hab ihr das so oft gesagt, nich, ich sag, mensch, sag ich, gerade jetzt diese Jahre,
dein Junge, nich, ich sag, du versäumst die schönste Zeit! Ich sag, wenn der erst zur
Schule geht, dann ist das was anderes. Dann kannst du auch wieder arbeiten gehen. Tja,
nun hab ich aber den guten Job und den soll ich nun aufgeben? Wer weiß, ob ich den
wiederkrieg, und- so geht das denn los, nich. Also da kann man ganz schlecht was zu
sagen.’ (809)

(28) ‘Also ich, ich rate auch – also unser Sohn, der hat jetzt seit 6 Monaten haben wir ein
Enkelkind. Und die Frau, die ist auch Beamterin, die ist an der Bahn beschäftigt. Und weil
sie auch im Haus wohnen, sind die Eltern dabei, und ich sag immer: gib Deinen Beruf
nicht auf. Vor allen Dingen, wo sie Beamterin ist. Sie profitiert ja nachher davon, nicht. Sie
cann mit Kind ja arbeiten. Sicher, ich meine, sie brauchte’s nicht. Unser Sohn verdient
gut, aber trotzdem.’ (840)

(29) ‘Ich mein, wir SUCHT ne Tagesmutter für ihn. Ich mein, daß ich nun zu Hause bin,
im Moment, das ist Glückssache... Naja, und da bin ich dann, wie sie sagte, sie findet
keinen, da bin ich halt mitgegangen, und dann haben wirklich Tagesmütter gesehen, da
hab ich gesagt: Nee. Nicht im Leben!’ (822)

(30) Resp: Heute mach ich in vielen Dingen das, was ich will. Ich habe mich zwar zur Zeit
ziemlich eingesperrt. Ich hab morgens mein Enkelkind, von sieben Uhr bis mittags
halbeins... Int: Aber ich hör so, daß Ihnen das doch ein bißchen viel ist, daß sie nun jeden
Tag auch noch Ihren Enkelsohn hier haben. Resp: Ich hab nicht viel Zeit für mich.
Absolut nicht. Und ich hätt mich ’ne bißchen- eingesperrt. Sie haben mich ja erst gefragt
ein Jahr, und als das Jahr rum war...Int: Aber daß sie [Schwiegtochter] jetzt arbeitet, das
finden Sie richtig? Resp: Das find ich ganz in Ordnung, ja. Ja, nun, ich hab mich dadurch
selber eingesperrt, das ist ein bißchen lange von morgens um sieben bis mittags halbeins.
Nun ist das so, daß mein Sohn auch Schichtdienst hat.... aber ich kann ja trotzdem, ich
kann kein Seminar mitmachen und nichts. Ich muß ja immer wieder da sein, nicht. Int:
Und ihr Mann würde sich mit ihm alleine den Vormittag das nicht zutrauen? Resp: Nee,
das macht der nicht gerne.— Das macht mein Mann nicht gerne. Da ist er auch nicht der

(022)


(032) 'Ich hab nur die Wäsch mitgemacht. Also 20 Jahre die Wäsche, für Schwiegervater fast 15 Jahre die Wäsche. ... Mein Gott, das zähl ich ja im Grunde gar nicht. Erst hat sie sie auch noch gebügelt, auch noch gestopft. Das wurde dann eben, man hat das gar nicht so gemerkt, so peu a peu wurde immer irgendwas weniger. Dann mochte sie nicht mehr fahren, einholen. Dann machte der kleine Laden zu und denn zu X, dann war's aus. Dann fuhr sie schon nur noch zum Schlachter und zum Friedhof sonnabends. Ja, und denn so allmählich wurde das auch weniger. Und dann hat sie nur noch Eintopf gekocht, und das Fleisch hab ich denn so am Wochenende gemacht. Denn ließ sie alles anbrennen, dann ging das auch nicht mehr. ... Andere sagen immer, ja, nur dadurch werden sie unselbständig, wenn man ihnen alles abnimmt. Aber können Sie das denn, wenn da kommen nach Haus, und da oben ist alles angebrannt?... Die Zeit als Mutti lag war ganz schlimm. Da hab ich 3-4 Stunden, mehr hab ich nicht geschlafen. 20 Pfund hat das gebracht in dem halben Jahr bis Mutti eingeschlafen war. Und hab normal gegessen. Nur dieses keinen Schlaf kriegen das ist für mich das Schlimmste dabei.' (003)

(033) 'Die Mutter meines Mannes lebt noch, die wird 90. Und die wohnt nur nebenan oben, aber die wird von uns voll versorgt und gepflegt auch mit. Und dadurch bin ich da mal eingesprungen... Das ist natürlich in den letzten Monaten immer 'n bisschen mehr geworden.' (093)

(034) 'Ich weiß es auch nicht, das war für uns alles so selbstverständlich. Es wurde da eigentlich nicht drüber geredet oder lange drüber nachgedacht. Wenn da Not war, war's für uns selbstverständlich, daß jeder von uns zurücksteckt, und daß wir da helfen, genauso wiederum, als bei uns Not war, war meine Mutter da. Meine Schwester würd's sicherlich auch machen, wenn sie's könnte. Und ich mein, mein Vater war da ein ganz anderer Typ, muß ich leider sagen, nich. Der hat sich nicht gekümmert.' (130)
Und dann mußt sagen, sie war mir immer treu gewesen und gut gewesen. Und dann war das ja auch selbstverständlich, daß ich meine Mutter bis zu ihrem Tod auch hier hatte. (849)

Und ich denke, die würden das auch merken, wenn man das nur gezwungenerweise macht. Und ist auch nicht das, daß das was Gutes wird. (003)


Sie war dann voll pflegebedürftig. Dann hatte sie auch den Wunsch, daß sie einmal, wenn es geht, hier zu Hause stirbt. Da sag ich, Oma, den Wunsch erfüll ich dir. Nur, wenn ich es nicht verantworten kann, und die war so ruhig, die ist so eingeschlafen. (849)

ist, dürfte er da bleiben. Int: Meine Güte. Resp: Hat man ja irgendwie geschafft. (003)

(42) 'Und ich hab gesagt: wenn es gar nicht mehr geht, dann kommst du hierher. .. Auch meine Stiefmutter, muß ich dazu sagen, wie ich es meinem Vater versprochen hab, nich. Und meine Stiefmutter war sehr hart und, echt, die so 'ne richtige Stiefmutter war, hatte nie Kinder, das kann man ihr vielleicht auch nicht vorwerfen, nich. Aber es war für uns **selbstverständlich**, auch für meine Kinder. Als meine Stiefmutter in X lag, sind meine Kinder regelmäßig im Wechsel dahingefahren, sie zu besuchen.' (130)


(44) 'Die hat in mir immer noch, also sie war auch so'n bißchen beherrschend. ... Und da hatten wir mal, das war also so vier Jahren etwa, bevor-, war sie so 86, 87, da hatten wir mal wirklich 'ne Auseinandersetzung. Also nicht bösertig. Aber da hab ich mal gesagt, ich werd immer noch wie 'n Kind behandelt. Jeder wollte, mach so, mach so. Sie hatte es auch immer gut hier. Daß ich auch jetzt selber Oma bin, und doch auch mal 'n freier Mensch sein möchte. Und sag ich, ich komm mir vor, als hätt ich Fesseln an!' (849)

(45) 'Also ich werd 59 Jahre nächsten Montag, und fange erst an mich von meiner Mutter zu lösen, nich. Obwohl sie noch im selben Haus wohnt. ... Also ich bin jetzt so immer am Üben. Ich hab beispielsweise zu meiner Mutter gesagt: Hör mal zu, ich kann kann deine Gedanken doch nicht lesen! Ich kann das zwar, aber ich will es nicht mehr. Du hast 'nen Mund und kannst sagen, wenn Du was möchtest! Ich tu jetzt nichts mehr, wenn du nicht zu mir sagst, daß du das und das möchtest. Ich sag, und dann prüf ich noch, ob das angebracht ist, daß ich das tue!' (037)

‘Also eines im Leben war mir wichtig, nie abhängig von meinen Kindern zu sein. ...Wie’s nachher mal wird, weiß ich nicht. Der Jüngste hat mal gesagt zur Schwiegerトchter: „Mutter kommt nicht in ‚n Rentnerbunker.“ Wie die Jugend dann so spricht. ... Aber ich laß mich nicht unter de Füsse kriegen. ... Ich hab genug gesehen und von wegen hier Mutter. Wenn ich noch zehn Jahre älter, dann sagt man einfach, Mutter, da setz’ dich auf’n Stuhl und steh nicht auf. Nee, mit mir nicht!’ (069)


‘Die schreiben uns sowieso vor, was wir zu machen haben. Das ist ganz egal, wann, zu welcher Zeit und in welchem Regime und so. Na, weil das einfach nötig war. Wir brauchten die ja. Und ich sag mir auch: die Frauen haben immer gearbeitet.’ (011)

Resp: Dadurch daß mein Mann ja nun der alleinige Erbe war, hab ich nachher denn auch fast den ganzen Tag im Geschäft, aber auch als die Kinder denn nachher da waren, nich? ... Int: Da waren Sie ja praktisch auch berufstätig Resp: Ja, kann man sagen, aber ohne Entgelt. Mein Schwiegervater, der hat nich mal für mich die Invalidenmarken geklebt. Hat gesagt, gib mal deine Karte her, für sich selber den höchsten Satz geklebt und mir hat er nach 12 Jahren die Karte wieder gegeben. War nicht einmal etwas drauf
geschehen... Ja, und dann starb mein Mann ja auch so früh und ich krieg noch keine 
Rente, also, bei mir wird sich das auch vielleicht auf 300 Mark, also ich hab' schon mein 
halbes Haus ungefähr aufgegessen, nich? Ja, also die Niedrigrenten, die sind einfach zu 
niedrig. Ich finde, da wird so überall so viel Geld reingepumpt, da sollten se da mal was 
für tun, damit die Leute nicht zum Sozialamt müssen. Also wirklich, nich? (074)

(53) 'Meine Mutter hat bei meinem Vater in der Werkstatt mitgeholfen.... Und da haben 
meine Eltern allerdings den Fehler gemacht und den meine Mutter auch immer bedauert, 
daß man für sie keine Beiträge gezahlt hat. Also mein Vater war selbständig, die haben 
damals geglaubt, wenn sie sparen und sich noch 'n Haus bauen, ist das die 
Altersversorgung... Und dann stellte sich heraus, daß dieses Haus so wenig an Miete 
einbrachte. ... Aber mein Vater bekam dann ja wenigstens 'ne kleine Rente. Und als 
meine Mutter dann dahinter kam, da hat sie eben immer wieder, ist sie immer wieder 
davon angefangen, hätten wir doch bloß für mich auch etwas eingezahlt... Ja, ich hab's ja 
bei meinen Eltern gesehen, wie es so läuft, wenn man nicht versichert ist. Aber damals, 
as wir heirateten, oder irgendwann danach, wurde mein Mann ja beantragt. Und dann hab' 
ich mir immer wieder gesagt, also du, für dich ist es nicht so wichtig. Ich wußte ja auch 
nicht, was und wie ich das wieder anfangen sollte. Und ich hab'aber auch nicht darüber 
nachgedacht, daß man vielleicht mal so auf der Straße steht, daß das mit 'ner Scheidung 
endet.' (121)

(54) 'So daß ich doch jetzt meine Monate da voll hab, daß ich jetzt wenigstens ein 
Taschengeld an Rente habe. Mehr will man ja nicht. Daß das vielleicht später auch mal 
vom Staat anerkannt wird, was man da so geleistet hat.' (126)

(55) 'Aber ich würde immer sagen und jeder Frau sagen: Klebt Eure Mindestansprüche an 
Rente weiter, damit ihr selber nicht abhängig werdet oder nicht so viel schlechter dasteht 
wie der Mann nachher!' (037)

Chapter 8

(56) 'Wir hatten ein Geschäft zu Hause. Sie war dann oft ganztags dort, obwohl sie halt 
versucht hat, das irgendwie mit den Kindern wieder auszugleichen, nachmittags hält zu 
Hause. Und dadurch, daß wir 'ne Oma hält im Haushalt hatten, ist das nicht so 
aufgefallen, ne. Also haben wir Kinder eigentlich nicht so direkte Entbehrungen 
gelitten.... Und – ja, die Oma hat 'nen sehr großen Teil abgedeckt: Kochen, Kinder 
betreuen so. ... also für mich hat die Oma 'ne sehr große Rolle gespielt. Die hat 'nen sehr 
großen Ausgleich gebracht.' (W 516)

(57) 'Und ich weiß also um die Konflikt die meine Mutter mit ihrer ungeliebten 
Schwiegermutter im Haushalt. hatte, was also jahrelang auch zu Hause zu fürchterlichen 
Streßsituationen und- zu schweren und großen Auseinandersetzungen, sowohl zwischen 
meinem Vater und meiner Mutter, als auch zwischen meiner Mutter und meiner Oma 
guß hat, und wir Kinder letztendlich auch davon in irgend'ner Form betroffen waren. 
Das war halt irgendwie immer so, daß man auch Partei beziehen mußte. Und da war die 
Mutter und da war die Oma, die man auch gern hatte.' (M 054)
(58) 'Es ist so'n Stück Erwartung, die in mich gesetzt wird, weil dieses Haus hier gehört meinem Mann, und das hat er damals gekriegt kurz vor unserer Hochzeit mit Wohnrecht auf Lebenszeit für Schwiegereltern und schon irgendwo mit diesem Hintergedanken, daß wenn mal einer nicht mehr ist, der andere eben hält – die haben ihr eigenes Zimmer da oben.' (W 831)

(59) Resp: Ich hab 'ne gewisse Verpflichtung, sagen wir mal so. Meine Mutter hat 'n Riesending hier und mein Bruder ist schon längere Zeit arbeitslos ... Ich unterstütze halt meine Mutter so gut wie möglich.... wir haben umgebaut hier im Haus, unten, das hab' ich also viel allein gemacht mehr oder weniger am Wochenende oder abends, mit 'nem Freund von mir, mein Bruder hat geholfen, haben wir das ehemalige Geschäft von meinem Vater umgebaut und 'ne Wohnung erst einmal aufgemacht, da Dlm: Für Ihre Mutter dann. Resp: Nö, zum Vermieten hier... Dlm: Ist es denn so, daß Ihre Mutter auch von der Miete leben kann weiter, oder ist das jetzt kein Aspekt, daß sie dann- Resp: Ja, gut, das ist 'ne Einnahmequelle. ich unterstütze sie halt bei irgendwelchen rechtlichen Angelegenheiten oder sonstwie Belangen, wo ich halt aufgrund meiner Ausbildung halt besser mich auskneffe als sie ... erwarten tut sie's nicht, daß ich mich da 'n bißchen kümmere, oder mein Bruder, das erwartet sie nicht, ist aber für mich eigentlich selbstverständlich. (M 840)


(61) 'Also wenn ich meine Mutter nich' hatte, und sagen wir mal – wenn die sich nich' bereit erklärt hätte, also – ja – auf S. aufzupassen oder ihn zu betreuen, also wäre das nich' möglich. Weil ich ihn sicherlich nich' woanders hingeben hätte, dafür bin ich also zu lange weg, oder dadurch, daß ich ganztags arbeite ... Wir haben versucht, ihn mit dreieinhalb also schonmal in den Kindergarten zu geben, um auch meine Mutter zu entlasten, damit er ihr nich' da von morgens bis abends im Wohnzimmer rumhockt, ...also sie hat ja auch eigene Interessen auch. Und das hat nich' geklappt, da war er total überfordert ... Und dann hat sie gesagt: naja, gut – wenn's denn unbedingt sein muß, nech. Da sie ja auch immer viel Mitleid mit dem Kind hat, weil ich ja so'ne Rabenmutter bin, damit das Kind ja nicht zu Schaden kommt, hat sie sich denn dazu bereit erklärt. Aber ich denke, vielleicht hat sie sich auch gefreut, daß sie jemanden dann hat, daß sie wieder 'ne Aufgabe hat.' (W 809)

(62) 'Ich hätte das so manchmal schon ganz gerne, daß sie nicht so spontan, wenn ihr das paßt kommt, sondern schon mit uns abgesprochen oder auch zu festen Zeiten, damit das für die Kinder auch einfacher ist, daß sie wissen, mittwochs kommt die Oma oder so... 's ist auch mein eigenes Interesse, weil ich eigentlich auch möchte, daß ja, die Kinder dann ne Oma haben, die haben schon keinen Opa und ich denke eigentlich auch, daß ihr das Spass machen müßte. ... Manchmal hab ich so den Eindruck, ihre Familie ist ihr gar nicht so wichtig. ... Ok, mir war mein Opa und meine Oma halt sehr wichtig, vielleicht kommt das auch daher. Und dann denk ich hätt meine Frau mal 'n bißchen – Pause.' (M 115)
(63) 'Also Familie ist, ist, mit denen kann man sich auch mal streiten oder, oder diskutieren oder sonstwas, auch überwerfen und jahrelang anschweigen. Aber es ist Familie. Die sind doch immer irgendwo noch erreichbar oder ... während alles andere dann oft endgültig ist, nich.' (W 857)

(64) Resp: Wenn wir uns treffen, sprechen wir nur über Banalitäten, aber jeder macht sich fürchterlich Sorgen um den anderen. Also wenn – als diese Geschichte mit der Scheidung meiner Schwester war, dann liefen hier dieTelefone heiß und - Dlm: Wie kann man sie unterstützen, oder? Resp: Ja, ja, und dann wird überlegt und geredet und Meinungen dazu gesagt... Aber wenn wir uns treffen, ist also - also daß mal wirklich so richtig persönliche Gespräche geführt werden, das ist ganz selten. (W 546d)

(65) 'Niemand belastigt den anderen mit seinen Gefühlen quasi, würde ich mal so auf den harten Punkt bringen... Was ich bei meinen Leuten sehe ist: das Familienbewußtsein mit dem Alter wächst und auch die Nähe zu den Eltern jeweils wächst halt. Auch nie richtig gekündigt war. Also ich kenne' kaum jemanden, der so richtig 'n Schnitt mit seinen Eltern macht, sich total verkracht hat mit seinen Eltern halt so. ... Die Leute reisen auch teilweise zu ihren Eltern immer noch und da 'ne enge Verbindung auch ist.... und da auch gewisse Verantwortungsgefühle aufkommen.' (M 011)

(66) 'Das waren die sogenannten Trümmerfrauen... die wirklich ihr, in dieser Generation oft ihr eigenes Leben geführt haben, ganz einfach, weil sie mußten... das war eigentlich das, was ich immer so an ihr bewundert habe', ihre Selbständigkeit, diese, ihr ganzes Leben zu meistern wirklich alleine und da irgendwie ohne sich nach jemandem zu richten.... meine Mutter hat, glaub' ich, meine Großmutter nie verstanden. Sie hat das nie so empfunden. Sie hat einfach nur immer die Arbeit gesehen, die sie gemacht hat und meine Mutter mußte als Kind natürlich auch viel dadrunter leiden und auch viel arbeiten. Meiner Mutter ging's, glaub' ich, einfach nur dadrum, es besser zu haben, also daß wir als Kinder es später mal gut haben, 'ne gesicherte Existenz und in, materiell, auf materielle Sachen beschränkt. Das ist, glaub' ich, der Unterschied zwischen meiner Oma, meiner Mutter und mir. Bei meiner Mutter geht's um materielle Sachen, bei meiner Oma und bei mir ging's vielleicht, geht's vielleicht mehr um ideelle Sachen.' (W 508)

(67) Dlm: Würden Sie sagen, daß es so was wie Familientradition gibt dann in dieser wenn sie das jetzt alles so Resp: Von der einen Seite meines Vaters ja. Das waren eigentlich alles Frauen, auch meine Großmutter, die dominierend waren; die also, auch was ich so gelesen hab', immer ihr Eigenleben geführt, auf irgend'ne Art ihr Eigenleben geführt haben, diese Frauen, ja. Und ich glaub', ich schlag' also eher in diese Seite rein wie in die Seite meiner Mutter. (W 845)

(68) 'Ich fang jetzt an zu sortieren: was find' ich gut und was find' ich schlecht... Meine Geschwister sagen, ich wär' sehr stark auf meine Mutter geprägt. Ich merk' das auch in manchen Sachen, wenn das nur im Haushalt ist, Kleinigkeiten. Wobei ich so vom Gedankengut eigentlich mehr zu meinem Vater hin neige. Mehr so'n bißchen in die liberalere Richtung, daß ich denke, man muß sich erstmal alles angucken, nicht einfach alle Traditionen übernehmen, nur weil's gemacht wurde. Fällt aber schwer, weil durch die Erziehung das in einem drinnen steckt, das kann man also nicht abschütteln so einfach. Der Wunsch ist da, und man macht es vielleicht auch. Aber immer wieder begleitet von
diesem Vergleich.’ (W 516)

(69) ‘Und das hab' ich von meiner Mutter, das ist ganz klar. Ne Frau hat ihr eigenes Geld. Von meinem Vater hab' ich so mitgekriegt: 'ne Frau hat 'ne Ausbildung, oder meine Mädchen kriegen die gleiche Ausbildung wie mein Sohn, so ... Und das ist mir wichtig. Und was ich auch mitnehme, ist die Verläßlichkeit meiner Eltern. Also das ist eben so, also wenn - bei allem, was man gegen sie sagen kann -, wenn's irgendwie knickt, also sowohl bei ihren Freunden als auch bei ihren Kindern, dann sind die da, und man kann sich auf sie verlassen. Und dann helfen sie auch, egal, was sie da nun von denken.’ (W 011)

(70) ‘Ich [hab] also schon sehr früh dagegen rebelliert hab', daß ich ein Mädchen bin, ja, und also gezetert hab' bei dem Gedanken, daß mir Brüste wachsen könnten. Ja, und auch von daher also gar nicht wahrhaben wollte, daß ich meinetwegen in Sprachen begabt bin, also gegen das Betreiben meiner Mutter dann auch eben in der Oberstufe den naturwissenschaftlichen Zweig gewählt hab', und nicht etwa den sprachlichen... Das war eben immer meine Mutter, die mir zugestehet hat... Insbesondere, weil ich meiner Mutter auch in gewissen Punkten sehr ähnlich bin, und auch mich selber häufig – ja, also in inneren Konflikten gefunden habe, wenn ich eben meine Seiten, die meiner Mutter gleichen, in mir bekämpft hab', ja.’ (W 700)

(71) ‘Ich würde sagen, daß ich mich bemüht hab', wenn es denn möglich war, nicht nur ein abwesender Vater zu sein...wobei festzustellen ist', daß ich eher dazu neige, die Rolle meines Vaters zu wiederholen, während also die P. da eher ausgleichend ist, und die auch mich zurecht stutpt z.B., daß sie eben sagt: du mußt die Kinder ernster nehmen und du mußt die Kinder für voller nehmen, kannst nicht immer den Autoritäten raushängen lassen. Also da könnte ich für mich sagen, muß ich immer verflucht aufpassen, daß ich da nich' die Rolle meines Vaters weiter spiele.’ (M 054)

(72) ‘Ja, über bewußte Beschlüsse, ich will das anders als meine Eltern, sowas nicht. Das war einfach, also diese Abgrenzung hab' ich nie das Gefühl nötig zu haben, sondern es war für mich logisch. Also, ich hab' auch nicht das Gefühl, ich bin jetzt 'n besonders emanzipierter Mann, weil ich das so mach', sondern ich finde das selbstverständlich und brauch' da keine Männergruppe oder G. keine Frauengruppe, um das irgendwie aufzuarbeiten. Das ist einfach so... Ich hatte dann festes Weltbild, was ich für mich verfolgt hab, aber nicht im Gegensatz zu dem Leben meiner Eltern gesehen hab.’ (M 814)

(73) Resp: Meine Eltern sind sehr streng katholisch.... Und in dem Sinne sind wir natürlich auch ein bißchen streng erzogen worden, ob das nun Beziehungen mit Freunden war oder nee, also ne offene Aussprache gab es auch zu Hause nicht... Meine Tochter konnte auch Fragen stellen [Sexualität], sie war dann auch bereit darüber mit mir zu sprechen. Dlm: Also ist hat die Veränderung hat dann bei Ihnen eigentlich stattgefunden, obwohl Sie so erzogen worden sind Resp: Nee, bei meinen Eltern hat die Veränderung stattgefunden, nicht bei mir. Ich mein, meine Eltern haben uns zwar dementsprechend erzogen, aber das war nicht so, wir wollten ja darüber sprechen, nur wir konnten nicht. Wir waren also relativ frei, auch wenn unsere Eltern uns relativ streng erzogen haben, aber durch das Umfeld, das soziale Umfeld, wo wir aufgewachsen sind, Freunde, Bekannte usw usf., Schule, war das also relativ frei. Und da war auch dieser Umbruch dann so Ende der 60er
Jahre und das war ja im grundsätzlich der große Ausbruch dann damals, wo man sich befreite von allen Zwängen und so, ne. Und das, das war also, daß jeder seine Meinung äußern konnte und daß man, das war für meine Eltern war das unheimlich schlimm. (W 546b)

(74) 'Ich wollte auf keinen Fall so leben wie sie. Also das wußte ich von klein auf eigentlich. Ich wollte also nie immer nur zu Hause sein, so wie sie mir das halt vorgemacht hat... Aber das ist halt - ich denk' - wenn man das so vorgelebt kriegt, man verinnerlich das halt irgendwie... in den 70er Jahren in 'ner Schule kriegt man sowas mit, daß man eben aussteigen sollte, wollte, mußte. Da war das schon bald verpönt, wenn man das nich' tat. Und da bin ich halt mitgegangen. Aber das ist eigentlich total zerissen, und ich glaube, das ist' auch 'n Dilemma unserer Generation, daß wir wirklich also von unseren Eltern und Großeltern noch irgendwie so ganz tradierte Sachen mitgekriegt haben, die wir auch irgendwo in uns haben und uns auch wünschen, aber eben gleichzeitig von außen dieser Bruch kommt. Und grade als Frau - denke ich - is' man da total- also schwimmt man irgendwo auch. Weil also ja, ständig eigentlich diese Entscheidung, Beruf oder Mutter... so diese ganz feinen inneren Strukturen, die - denke ich - sind genau so bei mir. Ich erschrecke da auch oft drüber, daß es sich denn so wiederholt.'  (W 821)


(76) 'Ja sicher, hab' ich mir schon Gedanken darüber gemacht. Und entweder hab' ich's verdrängt oder bin zum Ergebnis gekommen, das gibt da keine - keine befriedigende Lösung. Also was ich eigentlich ungern machen würde, wäre jetzt nach Hause zu ziehen, weil meine Eltern pflegebedürftig werden. Weil das würde bedeuten 'nen Jobwechsel, das würde bedeuten, das ganze Lebensumfeld zu ändern.' (M 508)

(77) 'Das erste, was natürlich immer erwartet wird, ist Dankbarkeit, nich. Sofern's 'nen Grund dafür gab. Wenn man jetzt sowieso mit seinen Eltern ewig zerstritten war, dann wird da keiner nach fragen. Aber wenn man eben ein gutes Verhältnis gehabt hat, werden
die Eltern vielleicht nicht ausdrücklich, aber auch alle die Verwandten, die da drum herumsitzen und das ganze nur betrachten, die werden irgendwo erwarten, daß man sich dadrum kümmert und das dann zurückzahlt, was man von den Eltern mal an Zuwendung und Investitionen bekommen hat. Das glaub’ ich schon, daß dieser Druck da irgendwo ein bißchen hintersitzt.‘ (W 811)

‘Ich hab auch das Gefühl hab, ich schulde meinen Eltern eine ganze Menge, weil sie mich lange unterstützt haben, weil sie mir ein gutes Leben lange ermöglicht haben, mich jetzt auch immer noch unterstützen.’ (M 011)

‘Das ist auch immer ‘ne Frage der Gegenseitigkeit. Kommt drauf an, wie gesagt, ich hab’ meine Eltern sonst überwiegend als tolerant und fürsorglich und hingebungsvoll irgendwie erfahren und wäre bereit, das ihnen auch wiederzugeben, auch wenn ich weiß, daß sie so alt werden.’ (W 710)

‘Ich hab’ mich nicht getraut, irgendwie zu fragen, ob sie da sich irgendwo angemeldet haben. Mein Vater hat vor Jahren mal von einem Seniorenwohnhaus gesprochen... weil ich hab’ dann schon Angst, daß dann so kommt - also wenn man dann so Vorschläge macht, daß sie dann denken, man will sich nicht um sie kümmern... Weihnachten fahr’ ich hin, vielleicht sprech’ ich das dann einfach nochmal an. Weil meine Schwester, die hat mich auch gebeten, ich soll’ ich noch mal ansprechen, weil sie sich auch nicht traut. Weil, sie haben das eben eigenes Haus, und wenn die Kinder aus dem Haus sind, hätten sie sogar Platz. Also sie ist diejenige, die so betroffen und da auch so’n bißchen Ängste hat. Und wenn sie das natürlich jetzt ansprechen, dann ist schon was anderes, als wenn ich das anspreche. Weil, ich bin so weit weg, ich käm’ zunächst mal für so’ne Dauerpflege gar nicht infrage... Aber ich denk’, das ist schon ‘n Thema, was man mit den Eltern rechtzeitig besprechen muß einfach.’ (W 546d)

‘Sie sagt dann immer: och, dann geh’ ich in’s Altersheim. Obwohl ich genau weiß, daß sie da gar nicht hin will. Und wir sagen immer: „du, wenn das ansteht, dann müssen wir zusammen gucken, dann kommst du halt zu uns, ist gar kein Problem.“ „Nä, nä, nach X geh’ ich nicht!“... Das muß man dann verhandeln, wenn’s ansteht... werden wir beide unsere Bedingungen sagen, also Mutter ihre und wir unsere und dann gucken, was uns zusammenbringen könnte.’ (M 834)

Resp: Wir hatten vor drei Jahren den Fall, daß mein Opa ’n Pflegefall war... Und es war einfach im Grunde genommen ‘ne ganz schreckliche Zeit, was allerdings auch damit zusammenhing, daß viele Dinge in dieser Familie einfach so quergelaufen sind seit 30 Jahren. D. h. es wurde so wenig geredet, wenig wichtige Dinge geredet, was dann natürlich in so ‘ner Situation, einfach nur noch zu ‘ner halben Katastrophe führte. Also ich denk’, wenn da von Anfang an auch mehr Kommunikation ist und, muß es ja nicht so schlimm werden. Aber das Thema bereitet mir eigentlich Bauchschmerzen, weil ich so ’n bißchen das Gefühl auch hab’, es würde an mir hängenbleiben, weil mein Bruder da so ’n bißchen, sag’ ich mal einfach, gestörtes Verhältnis hat... Int: Über das Thema hast Du auch mit Deinem Bruder wahrscheinlich noch nicht gesprochen? Resp: Ja klar, doch, ansatzweise; äh, oder sagen wir mal so, ich teil' ihm eher meine Befürchtungen mit so, oder daß ich mir mal darüber Gedanken gemacht hab' in dem ganzen Zusammenhang auch. Und also, was ich einfach auch gelernt hab' aus der Sache mit meinem Opa ist, daß
man so was natürlich eh nicht planen kann. (W 707)

Resp: Im Idealfall wär's natürlich so, daß meine Eltern nach X ziehen. (lacht) Daß sie da 'nen Haus kaufen. Int: Zu Deiner Schwester oder wie? Resp: Ja... Mit dem Pflegen, ich denk' mir, daß wird höchstwahrscheinlich doch viel darauf hinauslaufen, daß meine Schwester das mitmacht. Und das heißt nicht, daß ich mich da irgendwie ausklinke, aber rein jetzt vom vom Verhältnis, das wir auch zueinander haben. Meine Schwester ist einfach wesentlich öfter da und hat auch 'nen das beste Verhältnis zu meiner Mutter. Aber ich denk' mir, daß ich eh auf jeden Fall da auch eh mich mit drum kümmern will. Int: Was wär denn, sagen wir mal, das Maximum was Du dir vorstellen könntest? Resp: Ich kann mir da wirklich nix vorstellen.... Also die Mutter mit nach Hause nehmen, ich könnt mir vorstellen, daß da meine Frau dann auch dicke Backen macht. Sie hat ja auch noch ne Mutter... sie ist die einzige Tochter... Int: Es klang so'n bißchen durch, eh, daß also Deine Schwester sich da auch eher beteiligt und dann sagst Du jetzt, Deine Frau ist die einzige Tochter. Meinst Du, daß die so - die Frauen da so'n bißchen zuständig sind? Resp: Weißt Du, ich denk' aber auch irgendwo, muß man vielleicht auch so gucken, wohin die Mutter jetzt das Verhältnis auch hat. Also, wenn das Telefon Klingelt einmal am Tag, dann ist das die (Schwieger)Mutter... Aber darum, aus dem Grunde wird's höchstwahrscheinlich auch so sein, daß die beiden Brüder vom Typ her auch eher sagen würden: Du wohnst da, dann kannst Du Dich doch auch 'nen bißchen mehr um Deine Mutter kümmern. Und das ist auch meistens so. Das hört man also. Das ist nicht, eh, ich weiß nicht, das ist höchstwahrscheinlich immer noch so in den Köpfen ziemlich drin. Muß ich bei mir auch irgendwo sagen, daß meine Schwester im Grunde genommen die sinnvollste da wäre, weil sie hat das beste Verhältnis zu meiner Mutter. (M 816)

Resp: Also mein Mann, der ist ja dann immer so der Meinung - ich mein', muß ja meine Meinung äußern - aber dann sagt er - ich kann das ja nicht. Ich bin ja ein unheimlich gefühlsmüder Mensch. Ich würde also alles liegen- und stehenlassen, wenn was wäre. Aber mein Mann, der sagt also: Deine Eltern haben nie was für uns getan. Sie sind immer nur nach A. gelaufen, dann können sie dafür auch gradestehen, ne. Weil, meine Mutter - also wenn meine Schwester jemanden für ihre Tochter brauchte, war meine Mutter immer da.... Dim: Also so daß Sie aber jedenfalls zur Pflegebedürftigkeit sagen, Sie würden sich da erstmal nicht zuständig fühlen? Resp: Ich würde mich schon dafür zuständig fühlen, es sind ja nun mal meine Eltern. Also die Verantwortung übernehm' ich schon. Nur, wenn ich jetzt vom reinen - ja, wie soll ich das sagen? - jetzt vom vom - von der Situation bedingt her sehe, der Ordnung halber, ne, will ich mal so sagen, ... A, Du hast den größten Nutzen davon gehabt, also trag' auch die größte Verantwortung!... Ich denke mir mal, daß das vielleicht so ablaufen wird wie das bei meinen Großeltern war... das kommt immer auf die Situation, ob man das machen kann, ob man jetzt wirklich sagen kann: ja gut, wir nehmen die mal ein paar Wochen, aber hauptsächlich sind sie bei dir, ne, so... [oder] wenn man das so regeln kann, daß man dann eben da hinfährt, daß man sich abwechselt... in der Pflege, dann denk' ich, kann man das schon irgendwie häuslich regeln. Denn es ist ja nun mal so, daß man sich zu Hause immer am wohlsten fühlt. (W 546b)

'Also gesetzt den Fall, es kommt hart auf hart, also ich würde auf meine Berufstätigkeit verzichten... Das Problem setzt ja dann erst ein - sagen wir mal - wenn
entweder jemand stark pflegebedürftig ist oder entweder bettlägerig ist oder sonstige Gebrechen hat ... Und meine Mutter hat jetzt gesagt, also aufgrund dessen, daß sie das also ja nun live da hat jeden Tag, hat sie gesagt: also mein Gott nochmal, also wenn mir das passiert, also nimm da bloß keine Rückblick drauf und steck mich in irgend'n Heim. Also sagt sie: bloß ja sowas nich'. Also sie sagt: das ist – machst dir dein Leben kaputt, das ist also wirklich, die Belastung also ist immens, und du dir das nich' an. Gut, das sagt sie jetzt, nech? Das is' natürlich immer so'ne Sache, ob man das jetzt aus so'ner Situation heraus sagt oder dann selber betroffen is'. Wobei man sich ja auch immer einbildet, oder ich bilde mir ein, naja - wenn das denn meiner Mutter passiert, also irgendwie käm' ich schon mit ihr klar. Ich denke, man hat vielleicht zu der eigenen Mutter auch noch 'ne andere Beziehung, als zu seiner Schwiegermutter... Also versuchen würde ich es, und wenn's gar nich' anders geht, ja gut, dann bleibt einem da nichts anderes übrig, als so'ne Heimunterbringung in Erwägung zu ziehen.' (W 809)

Resp: Wir sind regelmäßig in Kontakt miteinander, ja, und wenn's dann zu 'ner Pflegesituation kommen würde, ich würde sie nicht hierhernehmen, ja, und wenn's dann zu 'ner Pflegesituation kommen würde, ich würde sie nicht hierhernehmen, ja, und wenn's dann zu 'ner Pflegesituation kommen würde, ich würde sie nicht hierhernehmen, ja, und wenn's dann zu 'ner Pflegesituation kommen würde, ich würde sie nicht hierhernehmen, ja, und wenn's dann zu 'ner Pflegesituation kommen würde, ich würde sie nicht hierhernehmen, ja, und wenn's dann zu 'ner Pflegesituation kommen würde, ich würde sie nicht hierhernehmen, ja, und wenn's dann zu 'ner Pflegesituation kommen würde, ich würde sie nicht hierhernehmen, ja, und wenn's dann zu 'ner Pflegesituation kommen würde, ich würde sie nicht hierhernehmen, ja, und wenn's dann zu 'ner Pflegesituation kommen würde, ich würde sie nicht hierhernehmen, ja, und wenn's dann zu 'ner Pflegesituation kommen würde, ich würde sie nicht hierhernehmen, ja, und wenn's dann 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Möglichkeit hat, 6 Stunden zu arbeiten, sondern der darf nicht mehr als 6, nich. Der darf auch nicht mehr verdienen.’ (W 857)