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ABSTRACT

Analysing the processes and relationships of political territoriality and collective identity in the American borderlands, this thesis examines the narrative and material dimensions of policies increasingly favouring securitised border 'control'. This 'reterritorialisation' contrasts markedly with concurrent moves to increase economic integration under the North American Free Trade Agreement and with long patterns of transnational socio-cultural interaction, emblematic of larger relational, transnational 'mobilities' fostered by globalisation.

Through a historical and transdisciplinary survey, borders are examined as representations and socio-political constructs: a unique, contingent, political cartography connected to a precise, early modern notion of space and identity. Borders are in a continual process of being reproduced through both material means and supportive state-produced 'texts' or narratives. The analysis is part of a larger project in International Relations: the development of the 'identities/borders/orders' heuristic triad, designed to narrow and produce new theoretical and empirical insights by coupling three key concepts and exploring the co-constitutive relationships.

Focussing on the identity-border link within the triad, the first case study analyses 'Operation Hold the Line' and related events in the securitisation of the southern borderlands against undocumented migration. The second case study provides an account of major official documentation and public debate framing current developments on the northern border, including a reading of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996.

Border policy is understood as an example of reflexive territoriality, suggesting continual, ever speedier revision, monitoring, and reproduction of a state's constructed strategy responding to control defined 'risks', such as migration. These regulations are fed and actualised by new information flows and technologies, as the state's attempt to 'control' its borders by making them political realities of difference with particular material and normative outcomes. Here, the politics of representation involves an image of border 'security' which effects the socio-spatialisation of collective identity, specifically the reinforcement of difference and a secure nationalism narrative. The securitisation also reflects a modern understanding of knowledge as regulation and order.
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.0  OVERVIEW

Very little is more central to the human experience than the notion and experience of a ‘boundary’—whether it is the uncomfortable feeling we have when someone sits too close us, standing in the immigration queue at the airport, or the struggle between states over a swaths of land. Much of our life is spent figuring out the proper limits of borders. Most of the difficulty surrounds figuring out which borders are unnecessary—but also determining and maintaining those that are required.

Borders are all around us; they are an essential part of every system or object, a ubiquitous ‘metapattern’ found throughout the social, natural, and political worlds.\(^1\) They help construct reality by structuring and defining what is in and what is out, who ‘we’ are and who ‘they’ are. ‘Define’, in fact, derives from the Latin word for ‘boundary’, *finis*. In the political world, in many ways they are at the heart of international relations, serving as the predicate for a Westphalian system of unique, sovereign states in interaction.

Such a key concept seems ripe for problematisation in the discipline of International Relations (IR) because it presents numerous trajectories of inquiry. Surprisingly, however, few IR scholars have taken up the study of borders, with most accepting them as given, static, legal demarcations or issues fostering conflict. But the patterns of state policies of inclusion and exclusion over interstate frontiers, such as migration control, economic integration, or information flows, are intensely salient social and political practices that have particular relevance in an increasingly globalising world. Moreover, how borders and territorial control are represented has much to say about the ethics and politics of difference, identity, and territory, just as the drawing of personal boundaries does. With these complicated and contradictory characteristics, borders are prime ‘laboratories’ for social and political research of many stripes.

\(^1\) On metapatterns, see Tyler Volk, *Metapatterns: Across Space, Time and Mind* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995). Metapatterns are broad phenomena occurring repeatedly throughout the social and natural worlds. A basic template for a leaf, for instance, is found in most
This thesis embarks on a journey of exploration that begins with these premises. It is concerned with the processes of building—and representing—these boundings of the modern state and the dynamics of political territoriality and collective identity enmeshed in them. It evaluates how borders, often enshrined or reified in the discipline, are in practice socially and politically constructed through intricate, complex, and varied processes—such as border ‘control’ policies and their supportive discursive or narrative frameworks. These impact collective identity and, generally, differentiation in international and domestic politics. The research is thus dedicated to evaluating some of the many complexions and facets of international borders. Borders are considered crucial elevating links between larger, ongoing discussions of identity and order in IR.

In seeking a deeper understanding of the modes of representing political space and identity—which are important factors in the substantiation and reproduction of the state—political territoriality and collective identity fall under examination. These two highly important, modern socio-political processes form some of the principle organising frameworks of the international state system.

The conditions of modern political territoriality, for example, have formulated the boundaries of modern political state at least since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 which helped organise the globe into discrete ‘containers’ encased by rigid territorial boundaries; within these borders space and identity were meant to coincide, overseen by governmental authorities with particular powers to regulate and stake claims to legitimacy. These units then constitute IR’s chief cartographic ‘blueprint’: a sharply defined world of states with clearly demarcated, exclusionary borders that operate on the basis of power in a supposedly anarchical international society.2

Most often the drafting of boundaries in the West was a generic and homogeneous process. Indeed, it was in early modernity that the idea and practice of a fixed, linear state border, as we now understand the term, was first established. How such ‘maps’ of territoriality and collective identity are drawn, however, has major political, practical, and disciplinary significance. From the inception of

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modernity—and indeed dawning from before Westphalia—these maps have served to frame and help reproduce a strong, statist-oriented global political discourse, reinforced by positivist forms of IR scholarship.\(^3\)

The modern bounded state, however, is only one unique form of socio-political organisation in history. Because of the historical contingency of these particular forms of socio-political organisation, and in order to understand the current formulations of territority and identity and in the contemporary international system, the development of modernity's 'dominant spatial story' that crafted our current situation must be analysed. This involves an exposition of pre-modern forms of political territority and the transition, both processually and epistemologically, to our modern dominant state form.

At the new millennium, however, these historical conditions and images of modern political territority may, in fact, be increasingly challenged by the intensification of what can be usefully called 'mobilities' of international system: flows of information, trade, capital, and information across state boundaries that promote the intensified transnationalisation of economic and social practices and potentially weaken sovereign state control. Much of this falls into our conceptions of 'globalisation'. Part of this process can be understood as 'deterritorialisation', and is generally driven by inclusionary state or non-state policies and forces, such as capitalism and information technology.

At the same time, as we shall see in the case studies, states can respond to some of these pressures of mobility by 'reterritorialisation', re-imposing official authority and control through political territority and exclusion, often actualised through the medium of its interstate borders. Forces both of inclusion and exclusion thus may be in tension, or in different states of flux, under globalisation. Moreover, as the thesis will argue, the policies which regulate this contingent political territority are increasingly reflexively organised in advanced states in the West.

Globalisation, then, is seen as an imprecise, uneven, and evolving—but increasingly intensifying and transformative—process that is not necessarily a zero-

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\(^3\) See, for example, Jim George, 'Discourse of Modernity: Toward the Positivist Framing of Contemporary Social Theory and International Relations', in Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to International Relations (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994), 41-69. For an overview of post-positivism, see Steve Smith's 'Positivism and Beyond', in International Theory: Positivism and Beyond, eds. Steve Smith, Ken Booth, and Marysia Zalewski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 25. Determining that 'positivism and its epistemological foundations, empiricism, are seriously flawed', Smith outlines a field of alternative approaches, including critical theory and hermeneutics (two perspectives touched on in this study) as well as scientific realism, feminist standpoint epistemology, and postmodernism.
sum game for the state or transnational forces. In discursive terms, it can be seen as representing in geographical terminology the scale where economic, social, and political processes occur at a global level. This thesis, by not engaging in the wider scholarly debate, does not take globalisation as its focus, but rather as a context: it suggests how political territoriality may be reflexively changing given trends and responses to some of these transnational conditions. Borders may in fact be useful metaphors for understanding conditions of globalisation as a feature of the broader contemporary order.

'Borderlands', the distinctive, often interdependent, multicultural swaths of land that surround international boundary lines, are focal points for globalisation pressures as the real, local junctions, valves, and barriers of transnational processes. Like the situation in many contemporary borderlands, the North American cases under study here are representative of some of the dimensions and paradoxes of globalisation world-wide. Economic integration under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), for example, has created 'dual regimes' for the regulation of particular mobilities: freedom of movement for goods, capital, and services, but not labour.

Tensions and contradictions result from this situation, and a strict state sovereignty approach is unable to deal with the complexities and problems of the region, especially concerning flows such as undocumented economic migration into the U.S. A sense of reflexivity in policy there is increasingly indicated, in fact, in issues like migration: demand by business and public interests in the U.S. creates the conditions the dual regime approach seeks to affect and regulate. The perceived policy need to counter the territorial 'risk' here is reflexive: the 'hazards' to be combated (for example undocumented workers) are the product of industrialisation and demand (the need for inexpensive labour in the U.S.) itself.

How such contentious issues are framed to justify and support regulation becomes of import. Beneath what we accept empirically and epistemologically as the international state system and its borderlands lie multiple narratives of differentiation and collective identity—the representations of interstate borders. These, along with other material policies, help 'write' the political space of the state as owned and bounded, as an imagined community with a concomitant (and

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4 This is unlike that of the EU which relies on supranational institutional structures. NAFTA regulation stems from the harmonisation of state laws and creates few overarching authorities to handle transnational questions such as labour flows.
seemingly congruent) political identity. Thus, both the political symbols and images of borders—and their socio-political construction—are of concern to this study.

Accordingly, this thesis seeks a deeper understanding of representations of political space and identity; in particular, those narratives that help substantiate and reproduce collective identity and territoriality vis-à-vis borders. The policy issue (and metaphor) of international migration is seen as the key to unlocking many of these relationships. And borderlands, as the sites and junctures of transnational flows like migration, trade, and information, are thus crucial regions for study.

To access them, the thesis works from a critical, reflective, and pluralistic perspective. In doing so, it helps introduce and employ two relatively new research tools for theoretical and empirical exploration: the identities/borders/orders (i/b/o) triad and a methodology of narrative analysis, inspired by studies of discourse, to look at one segment of the triad in particular borderland situations. This segment is then linked back to the triad in the conclusion to approach wider international order questions, such as globalisation.

The thesis moves first, however, to ask how modern political territoriality affected the change from loose, variable frontiers into solid, discrete borders in history and what changes in our conceptions of space and collective identity went hand-in-hand with this transformation. It then explores what the field of 'border studies' has made of these modern political and social differentiations, and what tools may be available in IR and other disciplines to study them. In the case studies, questions how and why, when unprecedented economic and social integration under NAFTA is occurring, the effort and image of ‘border control’ is being so heavily fostered as an official U.S. narrative strategy. It considers how, in fact, the American borderlands are represented discursively and reinforced territorially, and how this reflects a modern understanding of knowledge as ‘regulation’ and ‘order’. Finally, it asks what the often marginalised but paradoxical nature of borderlands narratives tell us about local and normative experiences of globalisation, securitisation, and national identity.

1.1 **The Argument in Brief**

One overall goal of this study is to begin to understand how contemporary boundaries are socially and politically reproduced; this is done by taking an historical, socio-political, and transdisciplinary perspective on borders—seeing them as contingent, unique, but always constructed, phenomena. Moreover, their material and discursive dimensions have definite impacts on collective identity construction as individuals are socialised as members of a bounded political community.

To explore this relationship, and find out not only why but also how the securitisation of borders, and by extension migrants, is proceeding worldwide—and importantly how this tends to be represented, this thesis explores the American borderlands with Mexico and Canada under the economic integration logic of NAFTA. The U.S.-Mexico border is the best example of a joint boundary between an advanced developed state and a developing country. Since the early 1990s, it has increasingly been 'militarised' and securitised at the cost of billions of dollars. The U.S.-Canada border presents an excellent and complimentary counterpoint: as a previously heralded 'undefended' frontier, that status now is coming under doubt, as the prevailing American policy and narrative strategy introduces new 'threats' like terrorism and promotes securitisation there as well. Both borders are classic illustrations of modern political territoriality, formed processually and epistemologically through violence and a discrete, linear notion of space—and corresponding identity—first formulated in early modernity.

Finally, both borders are also representative of a form of political territoriality that is increasingly reflexively organised, that seeks a modern understanding of regulation, control, and order, or at least their image. The notion of 'reflexive territoriality' is drawn from an overarching reflexive modernisation concept and connotes the dynamic, technical, continual, and ever-speedier revision and reproduction of a state's strategy of constructed control over a particular territory in the face of ontological insecurity and newly defined 'risks' to the state, such as migrants. Such regulation of state borders is fed by new information flows and advanced surveillance technologies, and expressed through control of its borders through both material-technological and discursive means.

This concept works in concert with a schema of regulation and emancipation in modernity. The case studies suggest the exclusionary process and representation
of border 'control' are dominant manifestations of 'regulation' as a form of knowledge in modernity. State actions can attempt to achieve a perceived ideal knowledge-goal of regularity and 'order' (or at least the image thereof) amidst system mobilities and 'disorder' brought by globalisation and its undesired flows, mainly of drugs and migrants. This disorder or 'chaos' (connoted by inclusive movement of individuals and heterogeneity of identity and culture), is projected against knowledge as 'order' (suggested by exclusionary securitisation, homogeneous, stable identity and territoriality), the goal of the new border policies.

The case studies will argue that the major discursive and material dimensions of current border policy in the United States realise this particular end, applying both advanced technology and narrative control to attempt to realise a particular political territoriality and collective identity relationship and achieve the privileged goal of 'knowledge-as-regulation'. Both concepts of reflexive territoriality and regulation thus work as a package here to help analyse contemporary border practices and discourses.

By analysing both material policy ramifications and discourse, the cognitive and linguistic possibility structures created and reproduced in the political debates on 'border control' in the U.S., we have a convenient and intriguing window into the processes of framing a bounded community and consolidating national identity. The thesis argues the politics of representation involved in the political presentation of this image of border 'security' has implications for the socio-spatialisation of identity in borderland situations, specifically the reinforcement of difference and a 'secure' American nationalism story. This is partly forged against transnational pressures and the 'other'. Official state narratives, particularly those that involve conceptions of national collective identity, can serve to fuel a modern territorially based conception of the American borderlands and promote an impression of the state's borders as 'secured' against flows of migration and illegal drugs (and the problems which are seen to accompany such movements), when in fact evidence suggests they are anything but closed to these flows.

More specifically, in the U.S.-Mexico case, the emergent material and discursive dimensions of reterritorialisation operates to help consolidate notions of national American collective identity. The securitisation of the frontier recasts the social and historical construction and discourse of the border and changes

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'socio-spatial consciousness', the way in which individuals and communities are socialised as members of a territorially bounded community. This is directly related to an understanding of social consciousness created by a clearer, exclusionary notion of collective identity that illuminates the 'us' and the 'other' division. That dichotomy is both symbolised and materially reinforced by the existence of the territorial boundary as well as the tighter U.S. policy along it; it also depends in part on larger scripts of national myth.

The policy in the southern borderlands is representative of 'reflexive territoriality', especially its advanced technology dimension. Moreover, as noted above, the perceived policy need to counter the territorial 'risk' is also reflexive: the 'hazards' to be combated (in this case of undocumented workers) are the product of industrialisation and demand (the need for inexpensive labour in the U.S.) itself. Finally, the 'metanarrative'—the dominant discursive framework—emerging from this case advances a representation of border security (regulation) to the public of a particular 'order' in the face of perceived societal 'chaos' from migrants. This image, which has particular political purposes, emerges despite evidence that the securitisation policy has not stemmed cross-border flows of labour.

In the U.S.-Canadian case, the thesis also examines the practices and narratives there which help reproduce modern norms of political territoriality and collective identity. Drawing from the conceptual literature on discourse and narrative, the thesis helps to 'denaturalise' these conditions and power frameworks through a constitutive theory of language. A discussion of the nature of life on this interdependent frontier follows, particularly in the context of NAFTA-inspired deterriorialised flows. The focal point is on the 'threats' to collective identity, like terrorists, and the state's official responses to these—read through narrative analysis.

To evaluate this, an analysis of major public 'texts' relating to northern border issues follows, concentrating on the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996—a major milestone in contemporary U.S. immigration and border control—and its provisions to establish strict control of entry and exit along the northern line. This reading includes both official and non-official public statements, legislative language, as well as a survey of material policy changes. The chapter concludes with an evaluation of more recent policy developments which help formulate the emergent metanarrative—and several

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counter-narratives—of the northern border, many of which operate via perceived threats from terrorists and migrants.

1.2 ORGANISATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARGUMENT: A CONTEXT OF TRANSFORMATION

The next chapter discusses how state borders and national collective identity became linked to the same conception and practice of political space in modernity. These trends contrast markedly from pre-modern forms of political organisation. The shift between the two is detailed with an eye toward critical theoretical implications for understanding potential transformations of space in the contemporary world.

The chapter begins by looking at the definition and historical development of 'political territoriality': a state's constructed strategy for control, access, and regulation of its land, and by extension, of its borders. Control is actualised through symbolic and material representations of reified, impersonal power. Territoriality is perhaps one of the most important concepts in IR, but has received surprising little scholarly attention. Here, it is engaged with as an important way of examining historical and contemporary changes in the international system.

But the modern interstate boundary is only one specific, contingent, and unique form of geopolitical and cartographic 'mapping'—and is particular to modernity. To contextualise the evolving phenomena of territoriality, and provide clues into its real nature and potential changes, the chapter next examines the transition from pre-modern to modern territoriality—this is specifically done with an emphasis on how space and collective identity help order international politics. This section considers how the modern state order began to form from these looser and more fluid forms of political organisation that involved different jurisdictions and identity patterns. In many ways, this can be seen as the transformation from 'frontiers' into the 'borders' emblematic of the modern Westphalian state system: solid, discrete, abstract and precise linear demarcations; this was the carving up of the earth's surface for centralised political authority and legitimisation.

The conceptual work concentrates on the changes in identity and territoriality that occurred as firm modern international borders were set. This involves a rigorous

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‘unpacking’ of how our now-naturalised perspectives of a seemingly ‘static’ modern cartography and its supportive epistemology (such as the historical development of the single-point perspective idea from the Renaissance) informed modern territorial and international political practices. These perspectives were framed by a discourse that defined epistemologically a new concept of linear, precise, and ‘empty’ space; on a process level, it also meant the key development of political and social structures, including bureaucracies, capitalism, information control, and, in effect, the sovereign state system. All these helped constitute an early modern worldview that produced a unique political subject. That subject was constructed from a premise that often sought to match a homogenous collective identity to a unified and discrete territory.

Now, with globalisation and transnational flows and pressures of capital, ideas, information, and individuals—what has usefully been called various ‘mobilities’—disjunctures emerge in the state system. They challenge states as static, rigid ‘containers’ that correlate identity, citizenship, and territory.9 These transformations pose intriguing new challenges for the dominant way of ‘mapping’ global politics in IR theory. The intensification of mobilities and development of new forms of global civil society and international organisation all pose questions about the function and conception of borders.

New issues of identity and difference emerge, especially as the prevalent old Cold War discourse which efficiently organised dichotomous worldviews and enemies continues to fade: regions, virtual communities, identity-driven conflicts, migrants and diasporas who travel across the globe (and stay) in increasing numbers are just a few such phenomena.10 The borders in and of this turbulent, ‘post-traditional’ world can simultaneously change, shift, strengthen, and weaken with these flows, creating greater complexity and uncertainty as well as demands for new

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forms of political organisation and democracy. The 'deterritorialisation' brought by flows of peoples, ideas, and capital suggests a moment of reflexive late modernity, and perhaps a point of transition, but as the case studies will indicate, this is constantly in tension with dynamics of 'reterritorialisation' imposed by the territorial state and made possible by the modern state-based frames of policy and public discourse.

This study, accordingly, seeks a more active, dynamic view of political territoriality—as a continually contested, constructed process which, in some cases, is reflexively organised. Reflexivity is often invoked in response to an ontological insecurity when new 'threats' or risks are defined. Because state borders constitute the metaphoric/symbolic and material representations of the dynamics of de- and reterritorialisation under globalisation, transformations can be evaluated by the degree of territorial, e.g., border control of particular mobilities.

Increasingly, many state institutions have ever greater resources at hand to develop, implement, and continually readjust a particular territorial strategy to meet these perceived threats, including advanced information and technology. This is especially the case on the physical boundaries themselves where advanced surveillance and security technologies are now in place. Both monitoring and data gathering, as well as reflexive public input into policy formulation, are factors in the self-confrontational (in the institutional sense) process of redefining policy goals or regulation—and their public representations.

Dominant representations and practices of political territoriality are in fact linked here to a particular concept of regulation: modernity's 'knowledge-as-regulation' form. This innovative schema, introduced by the sociologist Santos, posits a trajectory of regulation in modernity between what is understood as ignorance and designated as threats or 'chaos' and a privileged point or goal of knowledge, understood as 'order'. Thus, a state can reflexively seek and re-evaluate policies that are designed to combat what is seen as 'disorder'—somehow a

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12 As will be detailed in chapter four, Boaventura de Sousa Santos posits the paradigm of modernity involves two main forms of knowledge: hegemonic 'knowledge-as-regulation' and 'knowledge-as-emancipation' which involves a trajectory between 'ignorance designated as colonialism and a point of knowledge designated as solidarity'. His work provides an important epistemological clarification and unmasks a neutralisation which has allowed 'human suffering...[to] be justified in the name of the struggle of order and colonialism against chaos and solidarity'. See 'The Fall of the Angelus Novus: Beyond the Modern Game of Roots and Options', Current Sociology 46, no. 2 (1998): 101.
less enlightened, retrogressive condition to be released from—by seeking a future condition of regularised control and order.

1.3 **Borders and Border Studies**

Chapter three focuses on intellectual contexts for both the thesis as well as future research. Specifically, the chapter outlines the nature of what could be called 'border studies', recognising that this is an underdeveloped and undertheorised area of study, particularly in the IR discipline. Most examinations of borders in IR have traditionally focussed on territorial conflicts or the status of international legal boundaries, and in those cases, work tends to accept them as abstract or given expressions of modern political territoriality: they become static reifications of what are, beneath the projections, socially constructed and arbitrary phenomena characteristic of a particular form of territoriality. Scant attention has been given to the active, material, or discursive dimensions of borders, such as securitisation or narratives of national identity which support border policies. Fewer still take a critical approach.

This study, however, does. Borders, in fact, open themselves to such an examination; they are extremely complicated, multidimensional, and contradictory, requiring careful, wide theorisation. A broader vision of the very concept of a 'border' can be potentially insightful into the larger dynamics of the international state system. New developments outside IR now insist on thinking of borders as active, *constructed* forms of limits, of difference, of identity. They are not fixed lines, but seen as processes and relations which are continuously reproduced and sustained by the material, sociological, and discursive practices of the state and other actors and the international system.13 Some of the literature now understands all borders to be socially and politically 'constructed' phenomena. That kind of approach connects particularly well with those that also consider the socialisation of identity to be related to space and discourse.

Few surveys of this border literature exist. Accordingly, the third chapter attempts one of the first assessments of recent developments in border studies with

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the intention of firmly situating the thesis in this increasingly fruitful field. It
operates conceptually in a kind of flexible academic ‘borderlands’, looking to
synthesize work on the questions of borders, discourse, identity, and territoriality
from several disciplines, including Cultural Studies, Sociology, and Political
Geography. These works concentrate on the ‘writing of political space through
discursive practices and seek deeper understandings of international boundaries and
identity under conditions of globalisation.

This kind of thinking leads to a vision of border studies for IR that can treat
boundaries from a transdisciplinary perspective: as wide patterns in the social and
political worlds, central to defining and comprehending entities and processes like
collective identity. This approach is especially concerned with processes of
inclusion and exclusion over state boundaries that impact territoriality and identity.
International boundaries can thus be seen as political representations of power that
have much to do with the spatiality of self, identity, and the state; they are a
cartography that ‘connects territory with social order’.14 In the end, they can be seen
as processes which help configure political and cultural difference.15 As some
scholars have shown, numerous symbolic and ideational relationships emerge from
territorial organisation achieved through border practices; the ‘spatial socialisation’
or constitution of identity, for example, often follows the ‘borderlines between
human and “something else”’.16

The chapter thus illustrates the value of the border concept within a more
‘mobile’-oriented approach. This breaks it from its traditional Geopolitical and
realist IR moorings and enriches it with concepts from other disciplines, thinking
that offers insight into increasing heterogeneity under globalisation. In the end,

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of dominant forms of political mapping, unmasking presumptions and biases in modern cartography
and how this has served to help structure our worldviews.

15 Much new work in critical geopolitics deals with many of these questions such as the juncture of
‘postmodern’ forms, space, and questions of identity. See, for example, Edward Soja, *Postmodern
Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory* (London: Verso, 1989); John
Agnew, ‘Representing Space: Space, Scale, and Culture in Social Science’, in *Place/Culture/Representation*,
ed. James Duncan and David Ley (London: Routledge, 1993); Gerard Toal, *Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space* (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1997); and Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974),
among others.

16 On the concept of spatial socialisation, see Paasi, *Territories, Boundaries and Consciousness and
Boundaries as Social Processes: Territoriality in the World of Flows*, in *Boundaries, Territory and
Postmodernity*, ed. David Newman (London: Frank Cass, 1999). See also the seminal work by
Frederik Barth, *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Cultural Difference*
(Boston: Little Brown, 1969). See also Mathias Albert, ‘On Boundaries, Territory, and
Postmodernity: An International Relations Perspective’, in *Boundaries, Territory and Postmodernity*,
borders understood in this way as both metaphorical and political spaces highlight issues of migration, trade, and other socio-political interactions; their study may be a key to understanding some of the larger relationships between order and identity in international politics.

1.4 TOOLS FOR ANALYSIS

The Identities/Borders/Orders Triad

Understanding modern transformations in international politics, as Quentin Skinner suggests, can requires ‘a willingness to emphasize the local and the contingent, a desire to underlie the extent to which our own concepts and attitude have been shaped by particular historical circumstances, and a correspondingly strong dislike...of all overarching theories and singular schemes of explanation’.

Whilst recognising single paradigmatic approaches to IR and broad-stroke theories may fall short of Skinner’s ideals, the research here looks for ways to focus inquiry in this way by looking at the local and regional experiences of globalisation, in this case through the prism of borderlands.

This stance acknowledges that both change and continuity seem to characterise international politics in the current environment. Accordingly, the thesis adopts a reflective, ‘engaged pluralist approach’ to theorising border and identity practices which can perhaps better cope with the puzzles, complexities, and subtleties that increasingly characterise international relations. This is done within the wider framework of border studies and IR’s turn to culture and identity, heeding the call by leading theorists like Ruggie for re-interrogations of fundamental, ordering concepts like territoriality, especially under globalisation.

Specifically, chapter four helps introduce the ‘identities/borders/orders’ (i/b/o) project in International Relations theory. The i/b/o ‘triad’ is a heuristic tool,

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18 See Lapid’s ‘The Third Debate’ for a discussion of post-positivist approaches and such a research framework.
20 Several scholars (Lapid, Albert, Jacobson, Bigo, Brock, Brown, Harvey, Heisler, Koslowski, Kratochwil, Lipschutz, Mansbach, Newman, Wiener, and Wilmer) are beginning work on the identities/borders/orders project and have recently produced the first volume circulating these themes: *Identities, Borders, Orders: New Directions in International Relations Theory*, eds. Mathias Albert, David Jacobson, and Yosef Lapid (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001). This thesis is a partial contribution to this effort. For an introduction, see Yosef Lapid, 'Identities/Borders/Orders:
an open, 'pre-theory' instrument which may help us deconstruct and re-evaluate the mutually constituting processes and relationships between these three key concepts. In the end, it may generate interesting findings at a 'mobile'-oriented moment characterised by globalisation and fluidity.

The triad draws on conceptual insights from several disciplines; for example on identity from Anthropology and Sociology, on orders from IR, and on borders from literary analysis and Geopolitics (among others) which enrich and synthesise each other. Each component of the triad interacts and is interdependent with the other two, but is not necessarily a dependent variable. This allows for interesting postulations. Identity, for instance, may be both constituted by and constituting of borders, but borders do not exclusively determine identity. Similarly, both identities and borders impact and affect orders. I/b/o-oriented analyses can thus be more concrete than the fuzzy, macro debates about globalisation because they help examine the interaction between the processes and, most importantly, narrow and focus the scope of inquiry.

The i/b/o triad is deliberately designed to be wide and open to enable scholars from many perspectives freedom of approach; it is neutral about ontological, epistemological or methodological preferences. For the research here, however, a specific ‘leg’ of the triad is the starting point: the interplay between identity (i)—particularly collective identity based conceptions of nationalism—and borders (b) as interrelated social and political processes. A theoretical section in this chapter accordingly looks at the interrelationship of borders and identity as co-constitutive social processes of socialisation that demands analysis. The argument returns to the triad later in the thesis by recognising some of the larger order (o) issues for IR that ‘i-b’ relationship—and, by extension, each of its ‘points’—help structure.

More specifically, collective identity is investigated here by integrating the spatial dimension of politics, which involves setting control over particular territory, and its historical dynamics into discussions about identity change and constitution. This can be an undertheorised and misunderstood link. The resulting phenomena is closely related to the concept of ‘socio-spatial consciousness’, first elaborated by

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A Rationale for a New Voyage in IR Theory', idem. The i/b/o project is being spearheaded at New Mexico State University by Lapid but is being theoretically developed and expanded in different directions by these scholars world-wide. It should be noted, however, the initial coupling of the concepts and theoretical sketches of the larger project are his alone. This thesis, however, provides some additional theoretical work on the triad and the two cases studies included here are some of the first original empirical movement at the its intersections.
Paasi, whereby individuals and communities are socialised as members of a territorially bound community.\textsuperscript{21}

To understand how this process actually works in practice, the analysis looks at the relationship between narratives and policy in official discourse which help construct the state ‘order’, made up of material and representational practices and politics which discretely designate individuals as national citizens separate from others. This is a key part of how certain naturalised and reproduced identification processes and relations legitimate the state and connect it to a designated national collective identity or myth.\textsuperscript{22}

Interfacing contemporary literature on nationalism, the analysis rests on a notion of a constructed national collective identity that is modern and state-centred, involving unification and substantiation on civic, and to some extent ethnic, grounds. Official state discourse—and the material interstate border policies—which it reinforces are some of the tools of such consolidations. In taking a discursive and modern, instrumental view of nationalism in the drive to consolidate collective identities, a high priority is given to elites and symbolic practices.

Thus, the thesis argues that there is a strong constitutive and socialising link between borders and collective identity within various territorial practices and discourses world-wide. This theoretical section, then, informs the basis for the empirical work developed later in the thesis, in particular concerning i/b/o dynamics on the U.S.-Mexico and U.S.-Canada borders.

\textit{A Narrative Analysis Methodology}

Navigating the ‘i-b’ component of the i/b/o triad for empirical research purposes can be done in several ways. The chief methodological tool and employed in the thesis to understand identity-border relationships in the case studies is \textit{narrative analysis}. This is a preliminary, multi-step, post-positivist form of discourse analysis that examines some of the defining ‘scripts’ of international relations: ‘texts’ (broadly understood as public documents, speeches, legislation, and other symbolic resources) and their connections to power, policy, and collective identity. In effect, the texts work as ‘framing’ devices which help formulate the

\textsuperscript{21} Paasi, \textit{ Territories, Boundaries, and Consciousness}.
possibilities and justifications for particular material initiatives, such as border control or neoliberalisation. Official policy texts help identify the ‘problem’ or risk facing the public, set a field of potential solutions, and introduce rhetoric and symbolisation to support particular political preferences. This narrative can circulate in both official and wider public circles, and the case studies look to both for clues on its content.

Through a conceptual overview of major scholarly work on discourse, the chapter seeks to denaturalise prevailing conditions and power frameworks of border policies. This involves taking a constitutive theory of language and positing the ways in which language and symbolism articulate political positions, power, and space. In effect, they help constitute our understandings and naturalisations of the boundaries around us by setting the fields of interpretation and possibility. The emphasis is here is on the particular practices embedded and sanctioned by these narratives which help reproduce modern norms of political territoriality and collective identity.

By analysing this discourse, we have a convenient and intriguing window for understanding some of the possibilities of bounded communities or the limits of particular domestic and international political projects. This sort of analysis can offer new insights into where, how, and why territoriality is being ‘unbundled’, to use Ruggie’s term, or ‘re-inscribed’ through socio-political practices, and what impact state action or globalisation has on notions of community or identity. Material political initiatives like border securitisation, the argument goes, are bolstered and authorised as continual processes through a variety of state-produced ‘texts’ or official discourse.

Ultimately, the final steps in a narrative analysis methodology can help us uncover a dominant, officially preferred ‘metanarrative’. The metanarrative emerges as the chief structure for policy implementation (such as territorial control strategies) and becomes naturalised and reproduced through actual implementation on the ground.

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23 See the seminal article on territoriality by Ruggie, ‘Territoriality and Beyond’.
1.5 **Empirical Research in the American Borderlands**

Frederick Jackson Turner's pioneering 'frontier thesis' set out one of the most influential interpretive histories of America in 1893.\(^{24}\) Turner advised that attention be paid by social scientists to conditions in the boundary regions of expanding states, arguing they were formative of the national experience. Well ahead of his time, Turner urged particular attention be placed on social and environmental factors, such as immigration, international interaction, and generally foreign contact. Because of this, he argued innovation occurred at the frontier where 'the cake of custom is broken, and new activities, new lines of growth, new institutions and new ideals, are brought into existence'.\(^{25}\)

Turner was, in many ways, an early theorist of borders and their role in identity construction.\(^{26}\) If this early work connotes the importance of the western frontier during the continental consolidation of the United States, it seems equally appropriate to return to study these boundaries now. This is especially necessary at a time of increased transnational flows, for these forces, now rapidly increased and intensified since Turner's time, find their way through the medium of the American borderlands.

The settlement of both the Mexican and Canadian borders as frontiers followed Turner's thinking about the American west; while they are now 'set' examples of modern political territoriality, they continue to have major significance. The North American NAFTA case at the moment presents a good social science laboratory; there the late modern forces of intensifying transnational capital, information, and culture flows suggest greater continental integration and more porous borders whilst at the same time political contestation emerges over questions of migration, regionalism, and identity. Much of this is centred in the borderlands, the unique, interdependent, bi-national zones of exchange, synthesis, and differentiation that are, in many ways, the 'joints of continental articulation'.\(^{27}\)


\(^{26}\) For a problematisation of Turner and his image of western American expansion, see Patricia Limerick, *The Legacy of Conquest: The Unbroken Past of the American West* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1987) and *Something in the Soil: Legacies and Reckonings in the New West* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2000).

\(^{27}\) Victor Konrad, 'Borderlines and Borderlands in the Geography of Canada-United States Relations', in *North America Without Borders? Integrating Canada, the United States, and Mexico*, eds. Stephen
Moreover, the North American case involves unique tripartite interactions between a hegemonic, highly advanced state (the U.S.), another advanced country (Canada), and a developing polity (Mexico), thus implicating different variables and issues. No other set of borderland situations in the world has this particular composition, and accordingly the choice of cases here offers multiple insights into other borderland situations in the world that may only have one set of similar characteristics.

In examining the changing meanings of boundaries in both the U.S.-Canadian and U.S.-Mexican cases, the new post-Cold War, exclusionary securitisation of borders and migrants is seen as one response to a new kind of defined uncertainty and 'threat', as well as a partial means for national identity consolidation. Such border policy in the United States also reflects the deployment of two new policy regimes: economic integration through decreased restrictions on capital and trade flows in North America with a concurrent, exclusionary tightening of labour flows.

In the American case, the material policies and narratives of border security construct an 'order' made more from the illusionary 'image' of 'control' rather than actually addressing some of the public policy questions, such as undocumented migration or drugs, it supposedly set out to do. Recent empirical evidence suggests securitisation has actually done nothing to stem these flows. Instead, the policies further 'knowledge-as-regulation' on an epistemological level, but also help justify exclusionary 'control' over suffering human elements (migrants) in the name of the struggle for order. The situation also has a role in identity consolidation for Americans.

Several research questions are offered for the case studies: how has the modern, Westphalian model framed social and political thinking and practice, particularly in regards to political territoriality and national collective identity in America? How can narrative policy analysis and the identities/borders/orders conceptual triad serve as a useful tools to examine both the complex nexus of these key relationships in the post-Cold War era of NAFTA? Finally, what 'metanarrative' is emerging within contemporary American border discourse as a whole and what are its wider order implications for territoriality and identity?

The U.S.-Mexico boundary was set through violence in the era of American 'Manifest Destiny', an imperial policy that underpinned the movement of the frontier westward as an expansion thought to be sanctioned by God. Through the course of the 19th century, the United States acquired nearly half of Mexico, the 'borderlands' of Spain's former northern empire. This process of acquisition, and the determination of the current boundary line, is a classic example of modern political territoriality. The establishment of the international boundary in 1853—when the Gadsden Purchase finally consolidated the continental American state—was a function of state narratives of expansion and national myth, and a need for sovereignty over a previously porous and, in many cases, vague borderline.

Chapter five thus begins by looking at the historical and political forces of this process which are embedded with modern, rational principles and assumptions. The historical review evaluates the evolution of the international boundary and the order and identities it helped produce. This pattern is briefly traced to more contemporary developments which solidified the boundary and more recently have reinforced it in new ways. In particular, heightened concerns about illegal narcotics and illegal immigration in the 1990s brought a renewed interest in 'controlling' economic migration and conducting drug interdiction. Two years after the end of the Cold War, a radical new policy of 'border control' through securitisation and militarisation was put in place. The Clinton administration—whilst advocating continental free trade and economic integration under NAFTA—sought to 'get tough' and 'seal' the southern borderlands from economic migrants filling the huge demand for unofficial work in the United States, primarily in the agricultural or service sectors.

The development, goals, and justification of this narrative strategy that defines and delegates the 'problem' of migration and 'disorder' to the southern U.S. frontier are very much the subjects of this chapter. Paradoxically, the reterritorialisation or securitisation strategy has developed amidst massive transnational economic development (largely through border industrialisation) and trade flows which mean an unprecedented dynamism in the borderlands and the fostering of large-scale social, demographic, and political changes.

Chapter five thus argues that American foreign policy has established two regimes for the continent: free trade and transnational interaction and increased
border securitisation and restrictions on the free flow of labour. The U.S.-Mexico borderlands, however, are the more extreme crystallisation of these somewhat paradoxical regimes. The chapter details the gradual build-up of the securitisation policy through a reading of U.S. policy documents and decisions that have authorised major increases in U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), Border Patrol, and military budgets and operations.

The main anchoring component of the case study looks at the effects of 'Operation Hold the Line', a U.S. Border Patrol initiative launched in 1993 in El Paso, Texas and subsequently exported to other sectors of the borderlands. It is the exemplar of the new 'get-tough' policy of prevention of undocumented migration 'through deterrence'. The initiative places a restrictive 'line-watch' strategy to attempt to control the entry of undocumented workers into the United States by the strategic placement of Border Patrol officers within line of sight of one another to guard the boundary. In addition, it involves building walls and barriers and the use of sensors, electronic monitoring devices, low-light goggles, aerial reconnaissance, and other military measures known as 'Low-Intensity Conflict Doctrine'. Some of the most advanced security technology in the world is now in place along the border.

The case study research is centred on the narratives of identity and territoriality that authorise the policy's development, justification, and implementation. Following the multi-step narrative analysis set out earlier, in-depth interviews and a review of the major texts involved with the policy were undertaken to examine the way the initiative impacted worldviews of borderlanders. Residents are experiencing the radical changes of rigid governmental control through new physical and psychological borders of exclusion. The research also looks to identify the underlying narrative structures that define the threat, justify securitisation, and signal the 'goal' of the policy: presenting an image of 'control' and order in the borderlands.

Following this discussion of Operation Hold the Line, the analysis then proceeds by highlighting recent developments along the border since 1993 which have introduced even more tension to this turbulent region: further militarisation, shootings, vigilante violence, and deaths of migrants attempting to cross. These are exposed by examining the material, narrative, and normative dimensions of securitisation.

The chapter concludes that the policy changed the cultural and political reproduction of the U.S.-Mexico boundary through both the physical construction of
the border but also the rhetoric of nationalism surrounding the initiatives. The launch of Operation Hold the Line, and the subsequent securitisation along the entire length of the frontier, has helped recast the social and historical construction and discourse of the U.S.-Mexico border and changed socio-spatial consciousness, helping to consolidate notions of national American collective identity. The policy also indicates reflexive territorality, especially in its advanced technology, surveillance, and policy monitoring control measures.

Finally, the metanarrative emerging from this case fosters and presents a representation of border security (regulation) to the public of a particular 'order' in the face of 'chaos' brought by Mexican migrants and concomitant shifts in identity, culture, and demographics. This image, which has particular political purposes, persists despite strong evidence that the multi-year, multi-billion dollar policy has not radically stemmed cross-border flows of labour across the southern frontier.

**Narrating the U.S.-Canadian Borderlands**

Chapter six also monitors the politics of writing space through the narratives of territorality and identity, especially as they help formulate the key processes of identities/borders/orders—but this time surrounding what was seen as the longest undefended border in the world, the U.S.-Canadian boundary. The narratives there also help construct an order made more from the image of control rather than actually addressing some of the public policy questions, such as preventing entry into American land by terrorists, drugs, or undocumented economic migrants, as it supposedly set out to do. A new discourse of tightened control there has a role in national identity consolidation through the casting of a perceived threat. This flies in the face of a history of especially close binational interaction and interdependence created through seemingly analogous social and political systems along the frontier.

In this chapter, the development of the U.S.-Canadian boundary is highlighted as a particularly good example of 'modernity's dominant spatial story'. After detailing the highly interdependent, unique, and binational nature of border communities there, a discussion of contemporary developments in the context of NAFTA-inspired deterritorialisation follows. An examination of recent U.S. government policy texts or public transcripts on boundary control, as well as supporting and contending policy speeches made by key officials and border residents are the points of crystallisation for the case study. In particular, the chapter
offers an analysis of the official documentation and public debate—the narratives and counter-narratives—which surround both current developments on the border and the watershed IIRIRA legislation of 1996.28

One exclusionary component of the law, Section 110, is highlighted as an excellent example of a futile state attempt to reterritorialise. This provision seeks to establish strict entry and exit controls for each and every one of the hundreds of millions of individuals who cross the border each year. The official narrative justifications for such a policy are windows into the processes of reflexive political territoriality. Such discursive formulations help write (and ultimately partly construct) exclusionary space by seeking to establish strict control of entry and exit in the regulatory frame of 'protection' against the defined threat of terrorists and migrants transgressing the northern line. These policy and narrative developments have much to do with image, identity, and trade but in the end are further examples of exclusion like that which is occurring in the southern borderlands with Mexico.

1.6 CONCLUSIONS

The thesis emerges from its journey through the borderlands with some concluding thoughts that both review and evaluate the findings of the project but also broaden the discussion to outline in-depth specific theoretical and empirical concerns requiring further research. The multidimensional nature of borders and identity indeed present many more questions than this study poses or can answer—intriguing challenges for both theory and practice. The conclusion also considers some of the important normative, ethical questions surrounding current U.S. border securitisation policies—and potential policy alternatives—a move that seems increasingly required in our continual quest to figure out both necessary and unnecessary borders.

CHAPTER TWO

FRONTIERS INTO BORDERS: POLITICAL TERRITORIALITY AND MODERNITY

2.0 INTRODUCTION

Given their bedrock nature, it seems logical to begin an inquiry into international borders with two, often inaccurately presumed ‘twin’, issues in IR: territoriality and identity. Contemporary practices and discourses of territoriality, such as those in the American case, are historically unique and contingent political differentiations; they are immersed in a large web of long-standing political and social processes and relations which are socially and politically constructed, partly through regulation. In order to understand borders as representative of this control, then, we must first explore the nature of political territoriality as a spatial strategy of power and control itself, as well as the historical, sociological foundations and conditions upon which it is predicated.

Often concomitant with particular territorialities are particular collective identity formations, and these too must be understood in a similar fashion. The conditions and interplay between modern territoriality and collective identity are extremely important, for together they both form the principle differentiating and organising dynamic of the international state system. Thus, this chapter seeks evaluate the historical, socio-political ‘mapping’ of space and its connection with national collective identity within the dominant state order—in effect to begin to understand the historical development, organisation, and production of borders in the international system. This is done to lay the groundwork for the later analysis of changes in contemporary political territoriality and the accompanying patterns of regulation.

The chapter thus begins by providing a brief genealogy of political territoriality from the pre-modern to Westphalian through to the late modern with the state under globalisation, outlining the development of current patterns of bounded organisation by tracing how they emerged from both pre-modern and early modern modes of social and political life. Two key and linked developments are most responsible for these patterns of the territorially-based interstate, Westphalian
system: the maturation of capitalism which replaced the old feudal economic order, and Western consolidation and expansion, which is based on a definition of space from the Renaissance that emphasised single-point perspective and modern mapping methods. These introduced an entirely new, radical, single subjectivity and technologies which completely readjusted political space.

As a metaphor for this development, it is one main goal of this chapter to understand how the word ‘border’ came to mean the precise spatial demarcations of a state as ‘container’—which seemed to encapsulate the perceived promises of modernity: stable and coherent collective identities, citizenship, division of labour, and social differentiation. In effect, this considers modernity as a process of territorialisation. The claim is made here that borders are predominantly modern and constructed phenomena. To read how borders came to be the instruments of spatialisation, the key underlying modality which organises the world, is to explore the state project as an evolving socio-spatial geography involving layered forms of identity and territoriality, but now potentially in a stage of transformation.

Contemporary political territoriality is linked to these institutional, social, and political changes brought on by the rise of modernity, but what makes it interesting are the dynamics of a global order characterised by both change and continuity amidst intensified transnational pressures. The rise of the processes of globalisation, powered by strengthened international economic, social, and political links, calls some aspects of state borders into question, and with its concomitant social and cultural changes (often defined as societal ‘risks’ and ‘dangers’), may disturb (or in some cases reinforce) the typical dimensions of the ‘container’ idea.

The past decade has seen globalisation become a key concept in the social sciences and beyond. Scholars, however, vary widely on its nature and dimensions, ranging from those who posit the decline of the state to those who regard transnational processes as epiphenomenal. Exploring the nature of that debate is not the objective here, nor is globalisation the point of concentration. However, for broad context within the discussion of territoriality and identity, the chapter does accept growing empirical evidence which is suggestive of changes in the international system brought on by what can be considered transnational ‘mobilities’: goods, services, information, production, and increasingly, even people which are intensifying and ‘flowing’ more quickly and easily across state boundaries.
Given this, the focus is recast to suggest that globalisation may encourage transborder flows as well as consolidate state sovereignty; globalisation need not be seen as a zero-sum game for the nature of the state. Examining this conceptually is a challenge, but the social theory of reflexive modernisation has emerged as one of the most salient frameworks for understanding such contemporary socio-political phenomena and it is taken up here.

Moreover, research channelled by the i/b/o triad can isolate several of these salient manifestations of continuity and change in late modernity. In some advanced states, contemporary political territoriality (b) and collective identity (i) relationships—within a changing global order (o)—can be understood through a notion of 'reflexive territoriality'. This concept suggests continual, ever speedier revision, monitoring, and reproduction of a state's strategy of constructed control over a particular territory. This is done through impulses of inclusion and exclusion, or 'deterриториisation' and 'reterritorialisation', in response to particular defined risks or opportunities—such as opening a border to trade but not individuals.

What makes this conception of political territoriality different now is the fact these regulations are fed by new information flows—knowledge is applied through advanced technologies and then reflexively expressed through a state's varied, adjusted operationalisation of its borders. They are made political realities of difference through both material-technological and discursive means. Globalisation can thus be understood as characterised by de- and reterritorialisation impulses which are not necessarily mutually exclusive. In the end, the key point is that borders are arbitrary and not inevitable forms of political differentiation, having changed through history; they must be constantly maintained through a variety of embedded processes and relations which can be reflexively organised.

The map of the chapter itself is as follows: first, we begin with an historical genealogy of political territoriality, starting with a theoretical exploration of what it is and then moving to trace key examples of pre-modern forms of socio-political organisation. Then, preceded by a brief discussion of modernity, the chapter moves on with this review to evaluate movement in history to the modern territorial forms of political organisation we know as the clearly bounded state. This was fuelled by

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1 See work advanced by David Held, among others: David Held, ed., *A Globalizing World? Culture, Economics, Politics* (London: Routledge, 2000) and David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt,
massive socio-political changes as well as epistemic transformations, such as the rise of single-point perspective in cartography. Several representative and intriguing primary examples of historical border practices are pointed out. The discussion then turns to globalisation and the impact transnational mobilities are having on territoriality and collective identity, particularly in border situations. The concept of reflexive territoriality is considered as a means by which some advanced states seek to achieve particular goals or knowledges. Connected with this, the chapter concludes with the presentation of a schema of knowledge as ‘regulation-emancipation’ to help understand the policies connected with such state actions of inclusion and exclusion across borders. In some cases, border ‘control’ is seen as an outgrowth of larger processes of regulation that attempt to affect a perceived ‘ideal’ knowledge-goal of ‘order’ under globalisation.

2.1 POLITICAL TERRITORIALITY

It is truly astonishing that the concept of territoriality has been so little studied by students of international politics; its neglect is akin to never looking at the ground that one is walking on.

—John Gerard Ruggie

Ruggie’s comment issues a stern call for action in IR to examine the principle organising dynamic of the international state system: territoriality, the ‘ground’—in more than one sense—of the discipline. This chapter agrees, maintaining that territoriality is a key ‘hook’ to help understand both historical and contemporary international transformations, particularly as it may be ‘unbundled’ (what is referred to as ‘deterioratisation’ in this text) or ‘rebundled’ (reterritorialised), under globalisation. This thesis argues that changes in territoriality, in particular border change, are important dynamics of globalisation, and indeed their study may be one of the more effective ways to analyse larger contemporary transformations, something Ruggie argues the discipline is not very good at doing.

But before investigating how territoriality may be changing, and its relationship to collective identity, it will be important to examine just exactly what it


is and how it operates in international politics. Following Ruggie’s suggestion, we seek a re-interrogation of the concept, for it has often been ignored or taken objectively, as a static given in much IR work. In seeking a proper definition, our most reliable source comes not from the field of IR, but rather Human Geography. Robert Sack is widely acknowledged as one of the leading figures in the social sciences to explore the nature of territoriality; in doing so, he moves beyond earlier scholarly efforts which situated the concept only within a biological, needs based framework or failed to provide a systematic analysis. His 1986 book, *Human Territoriality*, remains the landmark text in these explorations. In it, Sack provides a theory and history of territoriality which begins with a concise definition:

Territoriality...is best understood as a spatial strategy to affect, influence, or control resources and people, by controlling area...[it] is an historically sensitive use of space, especially since it is *socially constructed*.

Thus, territoriality is ‘intimately related to how people use the land, how they organize themselves in space, and how they give meaning to place’ and it is ‘a primary geographical expression of social power’. The crucial element from this definition for our purposes is the focus on the interrelated factors of social construction and power. In fact, as the case studies will demonstrate, this spatial strategy is often a manifestation of official state border policies and narratives which seek to affect and maintain a particular territoriality-collective identity relationship that is reflexively organised, an argument developed later in this chapter.

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3 For an important exception that also departs from Ruggie’s analysis, see Hannes Lacher, ‘Historicising the Global: Capitalism, Territoriality and the International Relations of Modernity’ (Ph.D. diss., University of London, 2000).
5 Ibid., 1-2, emphasis added.
6 Ibid., 5.
Sack extends his discussion, but only cursorily, to the issue of borders, the bounds of a territorial space: he views borders in terms of communication—"a territorial boundary may be the only symbolic form that combines a statement about direction in space and statement about possession or exclusion".\(^7\) Thus, borders are the vehicles to differentiate political projects. From this limited starting point, we can expand his discussion into the international realm to formulate a concept of political territoriality which becomes important in understanding its precise effects and impact.

A modern interstate border signifies constructed political territoriality in at least three ways: first, classification and control through inclusion of citizens and exclusion of the other, e.g., non-citizens or, more often in the discourse, 'aliens'; second, possession through sovereignty and its accompanying effects such as a monopoly on violence; and third, and especially vital for our analysis here, the symbolic and material representation of reified, impersonal power.\(^8\) Borders must be maintained constantly via these three dimensions in order to be sustained and accepted—precisely because of their largely symbolic nature; at base they are relatively arbitrary material delimitations.

Ultimately, political territoriality came to be used by governments to control resources and people by creating and enforcing the boundaries of the state. As the next section points out, however, imprecise borders and technologies in the pre-modern era limited the effectiveness of this control. But as will be illustrated, when it was eventually established, by controlling access and through other hallmarks of sovereignty such as monopolising the use of force and easing the creation of hierarchical bureaucracies, territoriality gave state power relationships permanence and feasibility; the logic of territorial control then extended in time to eventually consolidate and regulate strict external boundaries. Nevertheless, as Anderson and O'Dowd point out, some of these strengths are also some of its weaknesses:

[Territoriality] is arbitrarily divisive and disruptive of social processes, particularly at borders. In the interests of control, it reifies power, de-personalizes social relationships, and oversimplifies and hence distorts social realities.\(^9\)

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\(^7\) Ibid., 21.
\(^8\) It should be noted this definition does not generally apply to pre-modern borders or, as will be pointed out later, 'frontiers'.
Accordingly, we need to find a relatively critical perspective which can question territoriality's development and its effects—best examined through the symbolic and material 'markers' of borders. Moreover, because the phenomena is historically contingent, and of a socially constructed nature, it is important to situate political territoriality within a particular historical stream to understand its development and potential transformation. The next section examines pre-modern political organisation to this end.

2.2 ‘MAPPING’ PRE-MODERN POLITICAL TERRITORIALITY

Territoriality in the traditional, or pre-modern age, as in modernity, can perhaps be best understood from a starting point that considers the concept of 'mapping': the process of delineating the limits and structure of a spatial system. From a theoretical and critical perspective, we can see mapping as a discourse of power, reflecting the assumptions, values, and culture of the mapmaker; mapping is fundamentally political.10 Foucault, among others, articulates the point that mapping is a central political act in part because knowledge represents and reproduces power.11

Since even before relatively recent technology began to provide the means to precisely measure and chart the earth's surface, humans have carved the globe into units—not only distinct, tightly bound territorial units but also more fuzzy and overlapping structures. In doing so, the practice of cartography has strongly influenced the way in which we perceive and reproduce our social and political world. Richard elaborates on the usefulness of this metaphor, particularly as it applies to political order:

Maps are one of the most common cultural metaphors in our conception of the world...the history of cartography is also the history of a certain rationalization: of how an order measures and cuts up surfaces to articulate territories of signification and representation is, itself, subject to order.12

10 See Jeremy Black, Maps and Politics (London: Reaktion Books, 1997) for a superb explication of this idea.
11 See Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge (New York: Pantheon, 1980).
In this sense, and for this study, ‘mapping’ correlates to determining the bounds of ‘the political’, a term defined by Beck as ‘an ambivalent, multilevel “expressionistic concept of politics” (Habermas) which permits us to posit the social form and the political as mutually variable’. To ‘map’ in some senses, then, is to set a geography of power, to help determine the outcomes, status, and future of actors and resources through territorial demarcations or territorially defined parameters. The important point is to recognise common political maps and boundaries as expressions of dominant discourses of power and representations which are connected to particular interests and worldviews.

Modernity has embedded a particular set of images and frameworks for understanding political space. This worldview—as simple as interpreting states as geometric abstract ‘colours’ on any run-of-the-mill contemporary political map—is now so ingrained that it becomes necessary to withdraw from this historically peculiar perspective and reinterpret our assumptions historically.

Pre-modern understandings of political space were not so clear cut or ingrained and, in fact, non-exclusive forms of territoriality based around the ‘frontier’ concept predominated; ‘virtually no pre-modern societies’, Giddens writes, ‘were as clearly bounded as modern nation-states’. The modern applications of land surveys, and technology like satellite imaging which produces crisp, clear linear demarcations on top of ‘empty’ topographical space were not available. Instead, we see a much cloudier, nebulous and ‘fuzzy’ picture.

Indeed, no borders as we understand them can be found on maps of this period. The prevailing conception of political territoriality in the pre-modern world was of *social definition*. Relations were local and bound by the prevailing imperial or socio-political structures, such as those imposed by the church; only with modernity would this change to a more abstract territorial definition. Conceptions of geography were as restricted and imprecise as to the contours and limits of empire and rule. With some exceptions, ‘zones’ tended to be more common than precise

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jurisdictional boundaries. 15 While some major forms of stricter political
differentiation existed (such as Hadrian’s wall which marked the frontier of Roman
rule in the British Isles, or the Great Wall of China—‘a genuine palladium to the
heart of the Chinese Empire’—which differentiated the Chinese from the
‘barbarians’), precise demarcation, or in some cases even knowledge of where the
limits lay, was rare; such a situation illustrates that political systems need not
necessarily be territorially set. 16 Even the Roman empire, for example, despite
Hardrian’s wall and natural boundaries, scarcely had any borders as we might
understand them today.

Some pre-Westphalian societies, in fact, existed ‘which seem not to
“possess” any territory of their own’, conforming to a general pattern of
nonexclusive territoriality. 17 Maurice Godelier, in a landmark survey of the matter,
points to several representative examples. The Peul WoDaabe, a tribe from the south
of Iran and pastoralists of the Niger and the Bassari, are indicative of nomadic
societies which use the same territory and the same watering places in rotation and in
a definite order. Godelier also illustrates this with the pre-modern Inca and pre-Inca
Andean societies which followed a similar pattern. The Kingdom of Lupaqa, he
explains, exploited several territories on the east and west sides of the Andes and
comprised two separate ethnic groups speaking both Aymara and Uru; they shared
the same territory and resources. These forms of loose boundaries, overlapping,
shared social and territorial mappings, persisted until the Inca Empire consolidated
and reordered space, and transcended these arrangements. 18

15 See Stephen Jones, ‘Boundary Concepts in the Setting of Place and Time’, Annals of the
16 See Owen Lattimore, Inner Asian Frontiers of China 2d ed. (New York: American Geographical
Society, 1951); Jones, ‘Boundary Concepts’; George Nathaniel Curzon, Frontiers: The Romanes
17 Maurice Godelier, The Mental and the Material: Thought Economy and Society, trans. Martin
Thom (London: Verso 1986), 86
18 Ibid., 88-90.
Feudal medieval Europe, dominated by rituals of inheritance, a system of nobility, and a higher church order, also lacked clearly defined frontiers and was characterised by overlapping territories and jurisdictions. Medieval maps reflected this pattern. The *Mappa Mundi* is a superb example of this pre-modern territorial discourse in the Middle Ages; it is the oldest surviving medieval map from England, drawn around 1290 A.D. Whitfield calls it 'the largest, most detailed and most perfectly preserved medieval map in the world'.19 It illustrates how medieval scholars interpreted the world in spiritual and geographical terms: primarily this is a text of religious or social cosmography. The *Mappa Mundi* is actually based on Roman cartographic traditions, which placed Rome at the centre of the projection. The map illustrates a conception of political space which plots Jerusalem (and thus Christianity) at the centre, with overlapping jurisdictions and provinces, fuzzy boundaries, and unclear realms. The map also sought to demonstrate the compendium of existing knowledge; it depicts illustrations of human achievement and the natural world. Myths predominate: races, beasts, and people and supernatural beings of all sorts dot the map, such as the 'Sciapod', an extraordinary being who sheltered himself from the heat of the sun with his single enormous foot. Christ, sitting at the Day of Judgement on the top of the map, is of course central in the text, seen as the true path to salvation above a complex and confused world.

The *Mappa Mundi*—particularly compared to our contemporary conceptions of what a map should be like—gives us a clear sense of the changes in territorial discourse brought on by modernity. As Jancey puts it, 'to the modern mind much of the content seems so wildly fanciful that it is difficult to believe that the same people who created the vast stone cathedrals, abbeys and castles of the medieval period, should have been persuaded so easily by the map's incredible claims'.20

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Anderson’s seminal work, *Imagined Communities*, is particularly insightful on this point. Anderson suggests that, in the pre-modern era, ‘the fundamental conceptions about “social groups” were centripetal and hierarchical, rather than boundary-oriented and horizontal’.\(^{21}\) He goes on to suggest that, ‘in the older imagining, where [monarchical] states were defined by centres, *borders were porous and indistinct*, and sovereignties faded imperceptibly into one another’.\(^{22}\) Decentralised, ‘[d]iscontinuous holdings were common’, producing ‘a patchwork political map’.\(^{23}\) Better then, perhaps, to understand them as ‘frontiers’ rather than ‘borders’.

These blanket suppositions of geographically imprecise frontiers in pre-modern societies, however, need a bit of tempering. In a pioneering study, Grosby argues for ‘a more nuanced understanding of not only certain collectivities of antiquity and their respective territories, but modern nationality as well’.\(^{24}\) His recent work on nationalism and territoriality in the ancient Near East and Armenia is that kind of revealing study that shades the argument on mapping made so far in a new way. Political communities remarkably similar to seemingly ‘modern’ nation-states did exist, in his view, as early as the Greek city state in the 9th century B.C. and in Assyria in the 8th century B.C. These communities were unified trans-locally by a certain common factor—in this case religion—which, in Grosby’s view, constitute them as ‘nations’ with ‘territorial referents in the mutual recognition through which a sociologically relatively homogenous “people” is formed’.\(^{25}\) But in the end, most forms of pre-modern political organisation were informed by the prevailing historical patterns of flexible boundaries where ‘fuzzy’ jurisdictions prevailed. There are, however, significant degrees of variance with which these communities maintained clearly defined identities and territoriality, such as these notable exceptions identified by Grosby.

Marxist and Weberian influenced approaches would offer various explanations for these pre-modern territorial patterns so different than our own. A Marxist analysis, for instance, would possibly point to the pre-capitalist mode of production which characterised many ancient and feudal societies, arguing the

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\(^{22}\) Ibid., 19, emphasis added.


oppressive nature of capitalism had not yet consolidated within a state structure. Similarly, Weber would likely maintain the modern institutions of state bureaucracy and hierarchy were not present to consolidate monopolies of territorial control; in the end, pre-modern political territoriality could not create impersonal relations and ‘empty’ space conceptually, and thus fundamentally lacked the definition of social relationships through territoriality.26

As the next section will illustrate, however, the development of Newtonian-Descartian technologies, the rise of single-point perspective in art and cartography, the development of new institutional forms, as well as capitalism fundamentally altered political territoriality, leading to the precise demarcation of ‘empty’ ground and the consolidation of the inter-state system. This occurred first in the West and then gradually throughout the globe with colonialism. While still lingering in the initial stages of modernity, pre-modern political territoriality became washed away when the new, technologically advanced maps of global political life restructured international relations on paper and in practice. That fundamental change is still with us today as technology is increasingly applied to survey and control state boundaries but increasingly now in a reflexive manner.

2.3 MODERNITY AND THE RISE OF MODERN STATE TERRITORIALITY

Anthony Giddens manages perhaps the most successful exposition of the features of modernity and the dynamism which makes it very different than pre-modern or traditional societies.27 Broadly, he suggests ‘modernity refers to the modes of social life or organisation which emerged in Western Europe from about the seventeenth century and which subsequently developed a world wide influence’.28 Giddens goes further by identifying the factors which led to place (the local) being ‘emptied’ from space within the development of modernity. This change was part of a greater trend of ‘dismembering’ of social systems where relations were

25 Ibid., 2.
26 Ibid. For another treatment of territoriality and historical materialism, see Lacher, ‘Historicising the Global’.
27 See Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity.
‘lifted’ from the local situation to regional or national structures. This is accomplished through the development of ‘symbolic tokens’ (such as a national currency) and ‘expert systems’—state bureaucracies, for instance.\textsuperscript{29}

This section is particularly concerned with questions of space and identity within the development of modernity. Such an examination is useful to set the context for a discussion of contemporary bordering practices—situating them as contingent historical processes—and to establish a historical framework to explore future transformations centred around changing border practices and discourses.

Ultimately, a \textit{unique} territoriality developed historically which was ‘the central attribute of modernity in international politics; it became the primary symbolic and material mode of political difference for a community’.\textsuperscript{30} We proceed in its exploration by examining two powerful developments in the West: \textit{epistemic/discursive} changes which altered the worldview of both the modern subject and \textit{empirical} transformations within and among early modern polities resulting in the emergence of the modern state. While these are clearly interrelated and interdependent, for schematic reasons, they may usefully be taken in turn.

\textbf{Epistemic/Discursive Changes}

A major epistemic shift in early modernity allowed subjects to re-imagine their political communities in the form of ‘states’; new knowledges gradually ‘authorised’ and wrote a new vision of territory. Most importantly, the concept of place was released from reliance on a privileged locale which forced a particular vantage-point from which to understand the world. This change from the pre-modern territorial perspective meant the spatial focus in people’s lives altered dramatically: textual representations within the discourse re-ordered the world into a generic and abstract (if still Eurocentric) map of exact latitude and longitude, no longer placing a particular location at the centre, such as Jerusalem in the \textit{Mappa Mundi}. In cartographic terms, the new discourse of modern maps reinforced this radically altered worldview; while Ptolemy’s system of projection and co-ordinates had been available to medieval civilisations in the West, it was not until the fifteenth century that it was rediscovered to map and finally used to ‘master’ the earth’s

\textsuperscript{29} Ibid., 23.

\textsuperscript{30} Ruggie, ‘Territoriality and Beyond’, 144.
surface. His co-ordinate system united discrete and precise space and time as a single frame of reference for territorial space. Similarly, the West’s ‘discovery’ of the ‘outside’ world reflected this development—especially as space was ‘cleared’ for colonisation and exploitation.

Indeed, by the advent of the Renaissance in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, precision was re-discovered and radical changes in concepts of space occurred. These early modern definitions of space began to rest on Cartesian–Newtonian principles, primarily understanding it as a natural element or container which was highly abstract and discrete. Highly influential in this process was the invention of single-point perspective in the golden age of reason between 1405 and 1515 that dramatically affected worldviews; this came from Raphael, who perfected the last remaining technical mysteries of the image through perspective.

Concomitant with this new Renaissance worldview was also strict reliance on delineated, abstract, and mathematically determined cartographic and geographic systems; all was discrete and precise—representing the enigmatic penchant for exact technical mastery of nature through technology. Maps were completely revised, destroying the ‘archaic’, pre-modern ambiguous and amorphous landforms and recasting them as precise positions on a grid. Fundamental pre-ontological distinctions were made: nature and man, mind and body, and nature and state, and this extended to an understanding of socio-political organisation. Later Enlightenment principles of reason, universalistic progress, and science would further underpin these narratives.

By the seventeenth century, a persuasive definition of political space developed: borders could finally be precise and known; in turn that worldview reinforced itself, repaying its producers, cartographers, and elites with seemingly easy understandings of identity and space relationships as well as resources for national control and differentiation within a newly established, constructed state system.31 Space became organised on great scales for the dynamics of capitalism and the practices of statecraft to replace the old feudal economic order. The world became conceptualised as a linear matrix of empty space, divided along strict

31 Ultimately, all this helped produce the norms of the nation-state system and sovereignty and interstate relations as we understand them today emerged. Researchers have suggested several explanations as to how the state system developed, especially as partly a social construct depending on a variety of processes and relations, economic and technological. See, for example, Alexander Murphy, 'The Sovereign State System as Political-Territorial Ideal: Historical and Contemporary.
territorial borders into ‘coloured’ nation-states. This idea became rapidly entrenched so as to dominate how we understand the world and ‘write’ its spaces; it is now so naturalised that it is hard to imagine now how pre-modern Western societies envisioned the world.

**Borders as Consequences of Modernity**

Hand in hand with these radical epistemic worldview changes went concrete material transformations in political organisation. Modernity, to a great extent, was a process of territorialisation. The sharp spatial borders of the modern state, as illustrated in the previous section, have few precedents in pre-modern societies. The approach to explain this follows very roughly and supplements that attempted by Giddens in detailing the nation-state, but does not undertake or suggest an all-encompassing treatment of the state, which is attempted elsewhere. Giddens does not have a focus on boundaries as his centrepiece, nor does he deal with territoriality sufficiently. He does, however, usefully take a Political Sociology approach and applies it through a critique of historical materialism, which is a relevant jumping off point for such a discussion.

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Through his critique, Giddens outlines how 'the political'—which, for him 'concerns...[the] capability of marshalling authoritative resources [and] administrative power'—has functioned in the consolidation of the nation-state form through history. Similar to Weber, he understands the state to mean a polity with the control of the means of legitimate force, developed bureaucracy—and importantly, a monopoly over territory. A modern state, then, is built through structural aspects of modernity's social systems: 'signification (meaning), domination (power), and legitimisation (sanctions)', expressed through discourse and reproduced systemically.

Giddens argues two broad categorical factors within the matrix of capitalism are responsible for this change: material factors (industrialisation, military power) and discursive or information control. In a spatial sense, territoriality as both concept and process became used as an instrument to guide and mould fluid individuals, events, and identities within a conception of abstract, 'emptiable' space to then build institutions, states, and contain capitalism.

Frontiers into Borders

The development in the West of some early forms of socio-political organisation (the city-state, feudal polities, or empires, for example) can be partially understood in terms of the concept of the frontier. A frontier, as will be explained in the subsequent chapter, suggests the limit of a settlement extension. More 'fuzzy' and imprecise than modern, linear boundaries, vague frontiers characterised much of the political world until the modern age. As illustrated, political community in the ancient and Middle Ages was not generally imagined along strict territorial lines, drawn by statesmen, demarcated with fences or monitored by sensors. 'Few reflexively ordered relations [of states and territoriality] existed' Giddens writes, and the 'notion of “international relations” made no sense'.

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34 Ibid., 19.
35 Ibid., 19.
36 See Sack, Human Territoriality, 78.
Not surprisingly, some IR theorists like Hedley Bull, have described this situation as one of multiple, overlapping authority structures, which varied from local feudal to ‘transnational’ papal control from Rome.\textsuperscript{38} The idea was extended by Bull to characterise Western Europe in the 1970s, and recently revived by Andrew Linklater in his suggestion of the emergence of a ‘neo-medieval’, ‘post-Westphalian’ order, characterised by similar authority structures and new citizenship concepts.\textsuperscript{39}

Western methods of political organisation via the frontier began to change, however, as the modes of production shifted from feudalism to mercantilist and industrial forms following the ‘general crisis’ of the Dark Ages.\textsuperscript{40} Gradually, the forces of territorial production tied to land ownership, private property, and industrialism began to consolidate state power in Western Europe by the decline of the Renaissance period.\textsuperscript{41} The medieval world ended with deep socio-economic changes occurring by the early 15th century. In the wake of this crisis, the outlines of the modern political map with firmer sovereign states began to form, especially following the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 and mutual sovereign recognition.\textsuperscript{42}

This emergence of modern territoriality expressed in the Westphalian state system may thus be seen as marked by the transformation of loose frontiers into solid, delineated international borders, which generally only exist in the state as we now understand it. Borders conceptualised in this way, then, are predominantly modern phenomena.

\textbf{Correlating Fixed Identities and Modern Borders}

The state’s institutions began to employ the naturalised visual representation of territory to confer legitimacy as well as to continually re-establish the image of the ‘nation’ of collective identity as limited in its bordered, constructed chunk of


\textsuperscript{41} In Eastern Europe, however, waves of successive nomadic invasions lasting from the end of the Roman empire to the 13th century impacted political order and territoriality; as Anderson maintains, ‘no commensurate political forms emerged from [the invaders] territorial advances—in contrast with the state formation of the epoch of the German migrations in the West. See ibid., 227.

\textsuperscript{42} Recent research, however, has suggested the rudimentary roots of the sovereign state system may date earlier, to the property rights and church-king relations set out in the Concordat of Worms of 1122. See Bruce Bueno de Mequita, ‘Popes, Kings, and Endogenous Institutions: The Concordant of Worms and the Origins of Sovereignty’, \textit{International Studies Review} 2, no. 2 (2000): 93-118.
political space. It easily and logically followed that precise boundaries would naturally correlate to precise collective identities. Paradoxically, at the same time, of course, modernity was accompanied by a variety of new forms of displacement: travel, exploration, expatriation, and migration to name but a few.

Even so, the concept of geometrical boundaries became highly popular by the 18th century. A rational, neo-classical quest for 'order', exemplified by Thomas Jefferson in America, gained momentum. This tradition of delimiting empty space with constructed, precise lines continued and was critical in establishing most boundaries around the world, including one of the case studies here: the 49th parallel as the international boundary between the United States and Canada.

By the late 19th century, the idea of fixed, solid borders and a 'naturally' corresponding collective identity had become entrenched in the Western worldview. John Stuart Mill, writing in 1872, illustrates the strength of this position in the minds of the West:

It is, in general, a necessary condition of free institutions that the boundaries of government should coincide in the main with those of nationality...Where the sentiment of nationality exists in any force, there is a prima facie case for uniting all the members of the nationality under the same government, and a government to themselves apart.

Increasingly, from the Peace of Westphalia on, patterns of modernity promoted the deceptively seductive equation: 'certain space = certain identity'; the state came to be seen as the unifying container of a single, homogenous national identity for its members. To reinforce this point, Blaney and Inayatullah's recent analysis of modern sovereignty and identity concludes

[the doctrine of sovereign power was necessarily related (by Bodin, Grotius, Hobbes, and Locke) to the conception of a 'body politic', bringing together people, state, and territory into a unified, harmonious whole.]

This sort of discourse is patently embodied in Fawcett's influential 1918 work, *Frontiers: A Study in Political Geography*. In it, he outlines the assumptions of this system of understanding the world:

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43 Jones, 'Boundary Concepts', 252.
In modern times the political map, especially of the newer lands, bears many patently artificial boundary lines. The English traditions of order which have dominated settlement in North America and Australia are partly the cause of the prevalence of artificial straight-line boundaries there. The laxer system of occupation of South America by the Latin peoples is reflected in the less regular boundaries on that continent.46

But clearly, this method is somewhat peculiar. How can the earth's surface be (correctly) 'demarcated'? On this question and very much also of the modern period, the influential Lord Curzon, Viceroy of India from 1898-1905 and British Foreign Secretary from 1919-24, somewhat unknowingly validated the point in his classic work of border literature, the Romanes lecture 'Frontiers'. He pointed out as early as 1908 the artificiality (and sometimes arbitrariness) of modern political mappings:

The straight line from point to point is also a method very popular in America, where it has been employed in laying down the internal Frontiers of States, and is in keeping with the mathematical precision commonly applied to the laying out of cities and streets. Like the Frontiers of latitude or longitude this type of boundary is a useful and sometimes an indispensable expedient; but it possesses no elasticity, and it is apt to produce absurd and irrational results.47

Consider also the following modernist prescription for delimiting a contested frontier, as advised by the Peru-Bolivia Boundary Commission in 1913:

On each boundary pillar shall be marked the exact longitude and latitude in which it is placed, the date of this placing...the serial number, the words 'Peru' and 'Bolivia' inscribed on the sides which correspond, and the signs which may be adopted to prove the identity of each boundary pillar.48

This is clear-cut example of the nature of modern territoriality that presupposes a nation-state correspondence. The emphasis is clearly on solid, uncontested delimitations of the earth's surface, a goal premised on a worldview of artificially constructed lines of longitude and latitude which 'create' space politically. Each marker of the boundary becomes a locus of a uniform, 'exact' method to organise human life—through reified horizontal and vertical lines. Moreover, serial numbers on each pillar both quantify and scientifically authenticate and authorise the boundary's location and function, thus conferring political legitimacy on an otherwise arbitrary border. The nation-state designators 'Peru' and

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'Bolivia' confer immense connotations of identity and meaning to an ordinary physical object, a pillar: when facing the side of the boundary that says 'Peru' one automatically visualises the geographical representation of that state and calls forth the meanings of that nation. Moreover, if you are Peruvian, you most likely feel 'at home' when on that side of the pillar, no matter how abstract, distant, or remote from your actual residence you might be. The early modern marriage of state space and collective identity through the nationalism project is repeated in this way around the world; this is part of the fundamental framing of the modern subject.

Such a case, then, becomes a useful, if anecdotal, example of the power/knowledge nexus that boundaries, maps, and state assumptions have on connecting and communicating territoriality and identity. The Peruvian-Bolivian border—as all other political frontiers—becomes reified, as Sack argues, and comes to be seen as a 'real' entity, reproduced by both the assumptions and interests of the actors who built it. The border as represented pays little regard to those who would dare cross or subvert it, perhaps, for example, an indigenous group.

The classic, intriguing, and highly employed 'how-to' on boundary making in this vein is Jones's *Boundary Making: A Handbook for Statesmen, Treaty Editors, and Boundary Commissioners*. Jones prescribes—without being truly aware of it—a strongly realist, modernist framework for appropriating and demarcating the world's surface. From regionalism, to nationality, to language, to 'native peoples,' he provides clear tips and tactics for setting territorial limits of nation states. This is his understood fulfilment of modern historical mission and progress embodied in the Westphalian moment. As he opens his introduction:

> We are in—perhaps emerging from—a historical period in which the dominant feature of the general situation has been the political organization known as the nation state...The boundaries of the near future almost certainly will limit the domains of governments with many and complex functions and so will deeply influence the lives of the people whose homelands they traverse.

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Jones proceeds to note by the beginning of the 20th century, 'the geographical expression of nationalism perhaps reached its ultimate in the territorial clauses of the Paris Treaties of 1919', which consolidated certain colonial claims and now mainstream state practices. Concomitant with this historical development was Mill's notion of a strong and ideal correspondence between nation and state.

*Exporting Strict Borders through Imperialism*

Intrinsic to the West was the export of these practices and knowledges. The precise demarcation and delimitation of the earth's surface was seen as something 'civilised': it was man's fulfilment of his historical destiny to map and conquer the world. Fawcett, deeper in his text, expresses this view, as late as 1918:

> It is clear that the tendency towards precise demarcation is universal among civilized powers. The territories of savage tribes or barbarous states had precise limits where they were bounded by the sea, or a great river, or some other very definite and strong natural barrier.

The implications, of course, are clear: unless one's state-territory is precisely delimited, one is 'savage' e.g., non-modern or non-western. The western project of modernity, in seeking to ensure a nation-state correspondence, transmitted this concept to its colonies. During the imperial era from the 16th to the 20th century, non-western forms of political organisation (which often tended to be flexible, overlapping, and sometimes ill-defined) were transformed, 'developed', and moulded into the rigid statist containers of the West—with especially clear international boundaries.

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All this was influenced on an epistemological level by the abstract geometric system, detailed earlier, of precise spatial references: longitude and latitude, which from the Renaissance onwards enabled exploration itself. And this territorial appropriation process was further assisted by secular and religious sanction. Initial colonial claims and grants can be traced to the Alexandrine Papal Bulls of 1493 which were the first ‘stark metrical territorial definition of social relationships’ and set into motion vast colonial expansion by the West. In this decision, a huge global area of control was granted to Spain and Portugal and divided for the first time in history by an abstract line of latitude from the northern to the southern pole. As the ideology of colonialism took root, the ability to appropriate native lands (which were seen as ‘empty’) and then subject them to the structure of modern political territoriality grew easier; hand-in-hand with this was an understanding of native peoples and lands as ‘savage’, ‘untamed’, and generally sub-human.

International boundaries, in Africa, for example, were increasingly imagined as ‘walls’ built through existing ethnic groups with little or no regard for the consequences. Evaluating ‘artificial’ frontiers, Curzon clearly explicates his (and seemingly the West’s) preference for ‘superior’, ‘modern’ forms of territoriality of the kind of territoriality represented by borders in the British Isles. He asserted:

Artificial Frontiers...have been artificially or arbitrarily created by man. These may be classified as ancient and modern, the distinction between them—which is one of method only and not of principle—roughly reflecting the difference between the requirements of primitive and of civilized peoples.

The disastrous drawing of state boundaries in Africa is but one stirring reminder of both this propensity to categorise territorially as ‘primitive’ and ‘civilised’ and the dangers which follow from such an authorisation; problematic state boundaries drawn from this perspective still exist world-wide and are the cause of much conflict.

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54 For example, John Smith, in his history of the colony of Virginia, describes the Indians he encountered as ‘perfidious and unhumane people; cruell beasts [with] a more unnaturall brutishness than beasts’. With such an understanding, land could be easily appropriated by Western ‘conquerors’ without violating international law. Quoted in Francis Jennings, *The Invasion of America: Indians, Colonialism, and the Cant of Conquest* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1976), 78
To return to our metaphor of maps, the new cartography and epistemology formed a certain dependent relationship; they both served to help record and *reproduce* the modern, Western narratives of identity and territory, the dominant worldview of politics and geography. Modern maps, like those on every policymaker’s wall, remain ‘specific images of spatiality [which] reflect the structures of knowledge which define the philosophical and cultural thinking of a tradition’—modernity.\(^5\)\(^6\) Maps may be the guiding documents of modern political discourse and practice. They are not natural, however, nor immutable; the conditions of social and economic production are historically contingent. Godelier elaborates: ‘no absolute referent exists [such as the state], no particular line of evolution which has the privilege of displaying a supposedly universal line of humanity’s condition’.\(^5\)\(^7\)

To summarise, the rise of political territoriality went hand in hand with the development of modernity in two broad dimensions: the epistemic/discursive and the material.\(^5\)\(^8\) The process involved expanding sovereignty through centralised control and resulted in an exact correlation between a state’s administrative purview and its territorial delimitation. In the end, as Mann usefully points out, it is the territorial centralisation of the modern state which remains its touchstone characteristic.\(^5\)\(^9\)

We can accordingly suggest that the construction and organisation of a particular polity can be understood historically in terms of its borders and may be expressed along a spectrum: loose, allocated frontiers with heterogeneous borderlands and overlapping interaction—which are not extensively controlled—on one side of the spectrum, and on the other, highly administered and controlled international boundaries maintained discursively and materially, through walls, border patrols, and regulated ports of entry. All of these, are reproduced through a variety of practices and discourses in modernity, including surveillance and

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\(^5\)\(^7\) Godelier, *The Mental and the Material*, 74.

\(^5\)\(^8\) See Giddens, *The Nation-State and Violence*, 49.

policy actions which the state can undertake to attempt to preserve the 'purity', homogeneity, and integrity of its space (connected with national collective identity).\textsuperscript{60} State practices can vacillate along this spectrum in response to a variety of national and international pressures.

2.4 \textbf{TRANATIONAL 'MOBILITIES' IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM}

We are living on the edge of history, embarking on a grand historical adventure, comparable only to the late 18th century in its degree of transformation.

—Anthony Giddens\textsuperscript{61}

The preceding sections outlined the development of political territoriality and some of its associated collective identity relationships from the pre-modern to the modern eras. In the past several decades, however, social scientists, and increasingly scholars and commentators from other fields have begun to suggest the emergence of new forms of economic, political, and social organisation—transactions and linkages in the West which might challenge established political territoriality. These processes, they suggested, are increasingly constructed across state boundaries, potentially challenging certain modern assumptions about territoriality. Driven by innovations in transportation, communication, and information technologies, time and space are seen to be 'shrunk' through ever-speedier interaction and transaction time. Transnational forces are understood to place both individuals and institutions in a more outward-looking frame, increasing global consciousness and changing social, cultural, and political relationships across the local, state, and global levels. Internationally, some point to the development of transnational networks, a burgeoning international civil society, and new norms which foster alternative networks of identity and order construction. These transformations are often most attributed to advances in the information technology and economic realms, such as major neo-liberal reforms to bolster multinational firms and increase trade and capital flows, leading to integrated economic spaces such as the European Union and the U.S., Canada, and Mexico under the NAFTA.

\textsuperscript{60} Ibid.
All of this is generally referred to as ‘globalisation’ and it has become the ‘new mantra for our times’. It can perhaps be usefully framed as a prevailing discourse that represents in geographical terms the scale where economic, social, and political processes occur at a global level. The positions of many scholars on globalisation can usefully and roughly be split into at least three camps. The first, the ‘hyper’ globalists, such as Ohmae, argue the nation-state is nearly irrelevant given these changes, that territoriality is being washed away in a net ‘loss’ for the state. Similarly, those like Appadurai maintain these changes mean identities and culture are also becoming de-linked with traditional political forms.

The second are the ‘sceptics’ like Hirst and Thompson who attempt to challenge empirical accounts of change and end up arguing either the world has seen previously ‘stronger’ forms of globalisation, such as during the industrial revolution of the 19th century, or that the current changes are epiphenomenal. Finally, the third, what could be called the more ‘critical’ camp of scholars, seek to understand globalisation as an uneven process and discourse, often ambiguous and laden with neo-liberal ideology—but with real material effects—that, as Kelly usefully points out, ‘need not reach some notional globalized state in order to be important’.

This chapter allies itself to the third camp, seeing globalisation as an imprecise, especially uneven, and evolving—but increasingly intensifying and transformative—process without simple implications for the state or anything else.\(^6\)\(^8\) This approach recognises the discursive as well as material nature of globalisation. For our purposes here, it is not possible nor necessary to provide a thorough critique of globalisation, but rather to suggestively illustrate how political territoriality and identity may be reflexively changing given trends in some transnational flows.

Given these caveats, it seems reasonable then to posit a degree of qualitative change in social and economic interaction is underway world-wide, forming the outlines of an environment perhaps best seen as marked by both change and continuity. As Amin points out, in any event, ‘the growing number of chains of economic, social cultural and political activity that are world-wide in scope’ may be leading to the ‘intensification of levels of interaction and interconnectedness between states and societies’; thus globalisation can produce many complex dynamics.\(^6\)\(^9\) In relation to identity and the state, as Marden argues, such globalising tendencies ‘are producing a complex mix of responses centred around identity’ which make ‘the distinction between the global and the local...quite complex and problematic’.\(^7\)\(^0\)

Thus, it is fair to now suggest some specific ‘middle range’ dimensions of real material transformation in the international system. Some of these can be best understood through the useful heuristic ‘hooks’ of borders and territoriality because, at bottom, globalisation is highly connected with both. While this comment cannot undertake a comprehensive examination of the myriad characteristics of globalisation in the international environment, some key facets may be mentioned as they pertain to territorial change, border discourses, and identity formation.\(^7\)\(^1\) These may be usefully be framed as ‘flows’ and ‘mobilities’.

\(^6\)\(^8\) For example, at least 80 to 90 per cent of all computers exist in the developed world. See Hamid Mowlana, ‘Information Hunger and Knowledge Affluence: How to Bridge the Gap’, Development 3 (1993): 23-26.
\(^7\)\(^1\) A full an account of the nature globalisation is well beyond the objectives or scope of this work and is attempted elsewhere.
Flows and Mobilities

International relations must address the basic question of whether it is adequate as a mode of understanding global life given the increasing irruptions of accelerated and non-territorial contingencies upon our political horizons, irruptions in which a disparate but powerful assemblage of flows—flows of people, goods, money, ecological factors, disease, ideas, etc.—contest borders, put states into question (without rendering them irrelevant), re-articulate spaces, and re-form identities.

—David Campbell

Campbell’s passage is suggestive, if somewhat exaggerated, of the increasing importance and transformative potential of new flows over boundaries in international politics. Increasingly, the Enlightenment fantasy of a unified, homogenous space coinciding in a perfect ‘fit’ with a straight corresponding national collective identity is being eroded away by changes in the international system; difference is becoming an increasing reality. This has prompted Blaney and Inayatullah to recently make an ‘interpretation of international society in which the problem of difference is pervasive’; they are driven by a concern that ‘the principle of formal equality among states...intensifies the difficulties in culture, religion, and mode of life’; inertia in the system, they argue, has delayed adequately dealing with the problem leading to what they call ‘The Westphalian Deferral’. The dynamics of globalisation only exacerbate the problem these scholars identify and, as argued below, can lead to reflexive territorial responses.

In such a situation, the concept of ‘mobilities’ may be the most appropriate metaphor to conceptualise potential changes in territoriality. This is an active, dynamic vocabulary in-line with the phenomena it seeks to examine. In confronting the challenge of globalisation for sociologists, Urry recently proposed a ‘mobile’-oriented approach, concerned with

the diverse mobilities of peoples, objects, information, and wastes; and of the complex interdependencies between, and social consequences of, these diverse mobilities.

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To apply this idea in IR, we can usefully list flows of peoples (refugees, migrants, both undocumented and documented), capital, goods and services, and information, among many others across international boundaries. These phenomena, Urry argues, are best made sense of through metaphors like heterogeneous 'networks' and 'fluids', conceptions of space which connote interconnectedness, or transient and flexible borders fostered by new technologies which shrink time and space.75 Mobilities, Urry suggests, are radically changing the nature and subject of study in Sociology, requiring a re-orientation of perspectives beyond rigid 'national' containers increasingly unable to regulate the flows already underway and which are intensifying. Transnationalism, the process of extending or going beyond state borders by such mobilities, thus might be considered the means to an outcome understood as 'globalisation'.

While it is not necessary to fall back into dichotomous ideas of state decline or strengthening in the face of such flows, thinking in terms of mobilities may be useful in IR to help us move beyond the ideas of sovereignty and social governmentality as isolated issues that are theorised as such.76 In particular, it lets us theorise about transnational processes as just that: interrelated processes which open, constitute, and reconstitute the state and its political parameters. The interdependence of these relations, as well as the inherent self-regulation within polities, helps constitute states. Thus, thinking about 'relational' mobilities seems apt; rather than re-using a reified concept, it offers an account of the state which points not only to solidity but also to its fluidity.77


76 This is the point of interdependence Mann makes clear in his recent work. See The Sources of Social Power.

77 The question of relationality is important, particularly as it concerns processes of borders, and is alluded to in the conclusion of this work. Innovative new work is being done in this area, looking to prioritise process over things and activities over substances. Process relationalism looks at the configuration of ties, of social webs and interaction, as the basis for social activity. For preliminary work on this project, See Patrick Thaddeus Jackson and Daniel H. Nexon, 'Relations Before States: Substance, Process and the Study of World Politics', European Journal of International Relations 5, no. 3 (1999): 291-331 and Emirbayer Mustafa, 'Manifesto for a Relational Sociology', American Journal of Sociology 103, no. 2 (1997): 281-317.
Examples of Mobilities: Economic and Individual

Given the overall concerns of this thesis, the focus is on two categories of mobilities: goods, services, and capital over state borders, particularly in the North American context, and movement of individuals (economic migrants) across those same boundaries. Taking the first, within the current round of neoliberalisation, free trade regimes and economic integration have become highly desirable politically, as they are seen as able to ‘unleash’ the seemingly creative and benevolent power of capital, investment, and production across state boundaries while driving multinational corporate accumulation. The NAFTA, which creates a nearly tariff-free transnational economic space for these particular mobilities between Canada, America, and Mexico, is an excellent case in point; the agreement has radically transformed economic relations between the three states, allowing free movement of capital, goods, and services irrespective of boundaries. The treaty will be examined in more detail in chapters five and six.

In terms of movement of individuals, we live in an era were more and more people are crossing borders. Migrant flows, constituted by legally admitted immigrants, undocumented migrants, temporary workers, asylum seekers, and refugees are variously estimated to number at least 150 million globally, are increasingly moving transitionally and especially from north to south. Many such members of diasporas around the world seek or have dual-citizenship, and participate politically through transnational networks. The past several decades have also seen major surges in the numbers of refugees and homeless, driven by complex humanitarian emergencies: cross-border conflicts, intrastate war, ethnic cleansing as well as natural disasters such as earthquakes.


79 Mexican migrant political activists, for example, are lobbying to obtain the right to vote in Mexican elections for those citizens living abroad. Moreover, Mexico has officially sanctioned dual-nationality status for its citizens. See Gaspar Rivera-Salgado, ‘In Search of Mexican Communities Abroad: Transnational Immigrant Politics Across the U.S.-Mexican Border’, paper for Workshop on ‘Perceptions and Policies of Sending Countries’, London School of Economics, London (10 July 2000).
In the United States alone, recent demographic changes point to an increasingly diverse, multi-ethnic population driven by these migration patterns which are expected to increase given the need for low-cost manual labour. For example, according to U.S. Census Bureau in 2000, nearly 1 in 10 residents of the U.S., some 26.4 million, was foreign-born (nearly one-third were born in Mexico), the most since 1930, when 11.6 million were natives of another country; almost 1 in 3 of these foreign-born residents was a naturalised citizen.\textsuperscript{80} The conceptual and empirical implications of these individuals' identity preferences on states are only now beginning to be examined or understood by innovative, often transnationally oriented, social science work.\textsuperscript{81}

Migration flows are but one example of the increasingly complex and changing environment of national identity patterns and implicate questions of membership directly connected to globalisation. This is increasingly impacting the policy world. As the new Mexican Foreign Minister, Jorge Castaneda recently commented

\begin{quote}
what is clear is that globalization also means people moving around in ways which are much more constant, fluid and massive than before. This is not new... but obviously the quantities and the impact on societies is growing.\textsuperscript{82}
\end{quote}

Throughout the world, international boundaries respond to the flows of migrants and forced refugee movements in various ways, as states implement policies of exclusion or inclusion. In any event, the responses often relate to different values, with migration often conforming to a general pattern of undesirability. The interplay between the dynamics of these two particular mobilities, economic and human, will frame much of the following discussion, especially in terms of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation.


\textsuperscript{81} For an excellent examination of the identity questions and impact on state politics the Haitian diaspora is having, see Michel S. Laguerre, 'State, Diaspora, and Transnational Politics: Haiti Reconceptualised', \textit{Millennium: Journal of International Studies} 28, no. 3 (1999): 633-51.

\textsuperscript{82} Jorge Castaneda, quoted in Barry James, 'A Plea to Accept Immigrants: Globalization is Mover, Mexico Foreign Minister Says', \textit{International Herald Tribune} (1 March 2001) [http://www.iht.com] (1 March 2001).
Globalisation as De/Re-Territorialisation

Globalisation can result in manifestations of 'reterritorialisation' and 'detrimentalisation', of exclusionary and inclusionary policies on the part of a state concerning different sorts of mobilities and flows. These are terms first originated by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. Deleuze and Guattari formulated an understanding of the state informed by a concept of 'desire', a productive force that produces subjects by organising or 'coding' society in particular ways. Territoriality, in this sense, becomes important when the state acts to inscribe a boundary with meaning.

Reterritorialisation here refers to the reconfiguring and re-imposition of political territoriality as understood in the modern framework set out earlier: as precise, linear, collective identity bound, and state controlled. Deterritorialisation, on the other hand, denotes a disembedding of social, economic, and political relations from their prerequisite territorial status connected with the state. Capitalism, for example, is a deterritorialising phenomena, but is most often actualised by state regulation and institutions and, in the process becomes territorialised. As Doty helpfully maintains, 'detrimentalisation always has reterritorialisation as its flipside'; they tend to be interrelated. Thus, the transnational processes of globalisation can prompt de- or reterritorialisation at multiple levels, from the local/regional, to the state, to the global, even at the same time.

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84 Doty, 'Racism, Desire, and the Politics of Immigration', 592.
It is important to note the processes of de- and reterritorialisation are not 'zero sum' games where either the 'end of the state' emerges or the 'prevailing of the state' occurs, an ad nauseam debate circulating recently in IR. The approach in this thesis does not see either process as necessarily resulting in a simple loss (or gain) of power to the state. While the state may reassert itself, for instance, by hardening its borders to migrants, this does not necessarily mean globalisation is not occurring, nor does opening its boundaries to capital suggest the end of its sovereignty over economic matters. In a more nuanced vein, Ruggie clarifies this idea by suggesting a condition of 'extraterritoriality' can emerge, as territoriality is 'unbundled' through institutional and social processes such as regimes, common markets, political communities, and others, effectively negating exclusivity of territoriality in the world system.85

These two concepts of territorialisation are used here to simply help problematise bounded space by allowing us to isolate certain state processes—for example border regulation as a form of reterritorialisation. Regulation may fluctuate due to the social and political meanings assigned to different mobilities. Borders, in fact, as the case studies will indicate, may or may not be reinforced as markers of sovereignty in the face of the perceived growing incongruence between society, state, and economy. We must examine the particulars of these new institutional responses of reterritorialisation—and their meanings and representations—taken up by states with regard to transnational pressures, especially as they relate to collective identity. Moreover, there is a need to see these emerging spatial relationships of governance and identity as relational, non-hierarchical processes in flux; in such a schema, neither the 'local', 'state', or 'global' is necessarily privileged but considered contingent and interconnected. This is evaluated later in this chapter through the joint concepts of 'reflexive territoriality', and regulation, as well as illustrated empirically through the case studies in chapters five and six.

85 Ruggie, 'Territoriality and Beyond', 165
2.5 **GLOBALISATION AND 'REFLEXIVE TERRITORIALITY'**

The disparate and sometimes perplexing nature of contemporary developments in the international order have led scholars in several different directions and produced a confused set of responses. Most of the debate, as noted above, centres on what exactly globalisation is, if anything, and if it does exist, what implications result. Some posit the disappearance of borders and dawn of a 'post-national' era; some maintain the state system is as strong as ever; and yet others assert the dawn of some kind of vague 'postmodernity'. This latter group maintains the West has moved 'out' of modernity into 'postmodernity', its structures vaguely characterised by 'hyper' flows of information, people, and technologies which result in a 'blurring', and often somehow 'virtual', reality.

A better way of coming to terms with some of these changes may not be positing the emergence of a new era of 'postmodernity' (as though modernity as we have understood it has somehow been eclipsed), but rather suggesting a more nuanced understanding of modernity itself, recognising its inherent ambivalence. Globalisation is thus understood as the intensification and expansion of these modern relations over ever-longer distances. Such an approach has the advantage of not requiring a reconfigured ontological perspective or engagement in the myriad, intractable 'modernity versus postmodernity' debates which have plagued IR. Rather it offers a framework within modernity which is reflexive and critical that revolves around two, interconnected theoretical concepts: first, reflexive modernisation, particularly a notion of reflexive territoriality and second, a 'regulation-emancipation' schema which is useful for understanding inclusion and exclusion across state boundaries.

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86 Among others, see for example, David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity* (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1989); Andrew Herod, Gearoid O Tuathail, and Susan M. Roberts, eds., *An Unruly World? Globalization, Governance and Geography* (New York: Routledge, 1998);
Reflexive Modernisation

The concept of reflexive modernisation has emerged in social theory as one of the most interesting frameworks for understanding some contemporary socio-political change. It denotes a new, distinct phase of modernity which has left all traces of 'tradition' behind. The idea of reflexivity in this is crucial; it was initially explored by Giddens in The Consequences of Modernity and several of his other older works. There he exposed the reflexivity of social and institutional practices, arguing they are constantly examined and reformed in a confrontational manner in light of new information on the practices themselves; this reflexivity, he argued, is a dominant feature of late modern forms of modernity.87

Several years after his initial exploration of the idea, Giddens joined with Beck and Lash to provide an initial, if varied, development of the concept in their 1994 work Reflexive Modernization.88 There, Beck gives a thorough, but at times problematic, analysis of the concept.89 He begins by suggesting many modernities are possible, including 'simple' modernity and 'reflexive' modernity. 'Simple' (or orthodox) modernisation means, 'at bottom, first the disembedding and second, the re-embedding of traditional social forms by industrial social forms' while 'reflexive modernization' means 'rationality reform of existing historical ordering categories of modernity, or first the disembedding and second the re-embedding of industrial social forms by another modernity'.90 For Beck, like Giddens, there has been a 'structural and epochal break' in this move to a moment of reflexive modernisation.91 This has been prompted by the inherent complexity of the new information driven industrialism that makes calculating external risk much more difficult than in the past. This, Beck suggests, implies the 'radicalization of modernity...breaking up the premises and contours of industrial society and open[ing] paths to another modernity' involving 'risk society.'92 He defines risk as

87 See Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity. For Giddens, 'high modernity' is roughly tantamount to 'reflexive modernisation'.
88 Beck, Giddens, Lash, eds., Reflexive Modernization.
89 See Ulrich Beck, 'The Reinvention of Politics: Towards a Theory of Reflexive Modernization', in Reflexive Modernization. In praise of Beck, Wolfgang Zapf has written his work 'is so fascinating because it holds firm to both the programme of modernization as well as to a fundamental critique of current society, including the majority of today's sociology. Beck wants a new modernity and a more insightful, more conscientious and more reflected, in short a reflexive theory. It is capable of winning over the adherents of the Critical Theory of the 1930s and 1960s, for whom Adorno's dictum applies: the totality is the untrue'. See Wolfgang Zapf, 'Entwicklung und Zukunft moderner Gesellschaften'
a systematic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by modernization itself.\textsuperscript{93}

Given this, ultimately the prevailing problem for advanced developed societies now is the creation of ‘ontological security’ and the construction of particular dangers and risks to it.

Giddens goes in a slightly different direction when considering ‘Post-Traditional Society’, which in his view has emerged in era of reflexive modernity (also with the inherent problem of ontological security) and left modernity as such behind.\textsuperscript{94} For Giddens, the new transformation involves two factors: first the ‘extensional spread of modern institutions, universalized via globalizing processes’ and second,

processes of intentional change, which can be referred to as the radicalizing of modernity. These are processes of evacuation, the disinterring and problematizing of tradition.\textsuperscript{95}

Within this, ‘reflexive modernisation implies coming to terms with the limits and contradictions of the modern order. The existing social order or structure becomes the object of its own forces’.\textsuperscript{96} Contra Beck, Giddens considers reflexive modernisation as open and contingent because of ‘the knowledge that we have accumulated about ourselves and about the material environment’.\textsuperscript{97}
All of this involves knowledge, not as a concept of reflection, but rather as 'self-confrontation' of the effects and products of modern institutional structures in an increasingly self-critical society. This encompasses uncertainty, ecological crises, sub-politics, risk, and individualisation ('the disembedding and, second, the re-embedding of industrial society ways of life by new ones, in which the individuals must produce, stage and cobble together their biographies themselves'). Within such an understanding, one could group some of the issues and 'risks' of globalisation, such as rapid, interdependent economic change and integrated, diverse labour structures.

Reflexivity, then, is defined as scenarios where

Decisions have to be taken on the basis of more or less continuous reflection on the conditions of one's action. 'Reflexivity' here refers to the use of information about the conditions of activity as a means of regularly reordering and redefining what activity is.

While Giddens’s focus in most of his work is on narratives of the self in the light of uncertainty, he does hint at how this might work in institutional cases in *Modernity and Self-Identity*:

What distinguishes modern organisations is not so much their size, or their bureaucratic character, as the concentrated reflexive monitoring they permit and entail.

Thus, we can suggest the presence of institutional reflexivity in the face of particular uncertainties, especially in advanced information-driven societies, where policy agents confront themselves vis-à-vis their relationship to the environment and other actors. They then, through various knowledges, formulate discursive and material strategies, or in governmental cases, policies in response to these dangers and risks.

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Scott Lash's insightful post-structural analysis of reflexive modernisation in the volume is also useful to us in exploring territoriality, particularly in terms of understanding it vis-à-vis is 'unarticulated other', its unspoken assumptions, its own 'radical alterity'. Through a hermeneutic foundation, aesthetic reflexivity is developed to provide a critique of ontological assumptions in the theory as formulated by Beck and Giddens.\(^{101}\) Lash's work can provide additional insights into the reflexivity of border practices in the American borderlands evaluated in the case studies which follow.

Reflexivity, he argues, can be expressed in 'structural' terms (where agency reflects on its 'social conditions of existence') or 'self' terms, the self-monitoring of agents.\(^{102}\) Beck and Giddens (through a double hermeneutic involving interpretation and expert-systems) focus their work on the structural component, and this is of most relevance here. But Lash also suggests structural conditions of reflexivity underpin networks of information and communication. Applied to the thesis, this means reflexivity can exist in transnational, but primarily state-anchored economic and political elite networks which inform and formulate policy discursively and materially.

Lash alludes to, but does not expand upon, the formation of a 'new' lower class connected to these expanding networks characteristic of new structural conditions of reflexivity. That idea bears exploration for some of the issues of this thesis. Exclusion from these dominant and hegemonic information and communication structures, which facilitate transnational and national political and economic action and capital accumulation, means insertion into the 'new' lower classes. For instance, workers in the garment industry, or in maquiladoras, the thousands of 'twin-plant' assembly factories for large multinational firms which utilise low-wage labour on the Mexican side of the U.S.-Mexico border, might be considered part of this class. Importantly so too can the marginalised undocumented worker who labours for cheap wages in poor conditions in the informal sector of the economy such as domestic service or in farming. These individuals, which current border policies attempt to exclude from U.S. territory, are members of this emergent lower class. They are driven by transnational wage pressures and the realities of

\(^{101}\) See Scott Lash, 'Reflexivity and its Doubles: Structure, Aesthetics, Community', in Reflexive Modernization.

\(^{102}\) Ibid., 116.
reflexive economic policy structures. Dominant territorial practices and discourses of the state are fuelled by accelerating information and given over to transnational economic integration, but they actually reinforce the development of this class and connote the re-imposition of Beck’s more abstract, ‘simple’ form of modern territoriality. In this sense, exclusion (potentially through the formation and maintenance of strict territorial borders) of this class (or other threats such as drugs or terrorists) becomes a prerequisite of the dominant policy discourse.

'Reflexive Territoriality'

Taking this analysis further and applying the general arguments to a specific concept, we can consider the classically understood, linear state patterns of territorial control as expressions of a ‘simple’, or more usefully, an ‘abstract’ modernity as set out in Giddens, Beck, and Lash’s theory. This is embodied in homogeneous, ‘controlled’, discrete space and time; the state as symbol and structure is reproduced, understood, represented, and interpreted as a universal and abstract phenomena, not particular or concrete, and as a clear reflection of the Westphalian ‘nation-state’ concept. Collective identity, as will be demonstrated in later chapters, was seen to correlate with (and be influenced by) these territorial bounds.

Similarly, within the framework of reflexive modernisation, we can then build a notion of what might be called ‘reflexive territoriality’ that represents a qualitative change for some advanced information-driven states in how political territoriality is conceptualised. This term suggests, in the face of ontological insecurities, the continual, ever speedier monitoring, revision, reproduction, and implementation of a state’s (institutional) strategy of continually constructed and technologically-enabled control over its particular territory to counter defined dangers and ‘risks’. Some may be real and others may be perceived. And some risks are reflexive themselves, as they may be actually generated by the state which then has to paradoxically deal with the ‘hazard’. Information, as Giddens suggests, is used to reorder and redefine the conditions of institutional action—or may present the ‘image’ of the action the actor may seek to affect—such as the defined policy ‘problem’ or, in this case, the particular issue of ‘control’ through reterritorialisation.

State borders, as policy vehicles for reflexive territoriality on the ground, are symbolic and material manifestations of de- and reterritorialisation under
globalisation; they often are in flux due to forces of inclusion and exclusion from within and without the state. Globalising tendencies can feed and inform the institutional and structural reflexivity of state territoriality in two ways: creating high speed, comprehensive flows of information and also encouraging individuals to transgress boundaries. Thus, knowledge becomes increasingly critical in the discursive and material strategies at hand.

This implies a different mode of territoriality than seen in prior forms of modernity, one influenced by greater uncertainty, increased speed and information accumulation and reflexive operationalisation by state institutions in response. But how is this reflexivity actually 'fed'? The reflexive regulation within international processes and organisations (such as treaties, conferences, diplomatic recognition, and so forth) is one way which encourages the development of territorially bound units—states themselves—to become the central 'power-containers' of modernity and still help order the system. In democratic polities, publics and interest groups also generally provide input into policy making and are monitored reflexively as such.

But increasingly, applied knowledges—technologies—also have a major role to play in a reflexively-organised territorial strategy. More and more, state institutions have greater resources at hand to develop and implement—and continually adjust—a particular border strategy than ever before, including advanced information and technology. Many of the world's borders, with the U.S.-Mexico and U.S.-Canadian cases as the vanguards, are now high-tech 'nets': these are sites of continual surveillance and intelligence gathering. There, surveillance cameras and advanced sensor technology capture heat and movement and then inform physical defences, becoming the new instruments of territorial control and information gathering. In addition to this information, states also increasingly use statistics, public opinion gathering mechanisms, and other devices to monitor the 'effectiveness' or appeal of particular territorial practices, such as border securitisation initiatives against undocumented workers or widening trade flows under open trade rules.

Several examples will illustrate the concept of reflexive territoriality a bit further. Based on nightly flow patterns of border crossers, for instance, defences on the U.S.-Mexico border are continuously and quickly re-appropriated to new areas of increased activity. Moreover, a special provision of immigration legislation in the
United States, to be analysed in chapter six, seeks to record the entry and exit record of every person crossing the U.S.-Canadian border. As examples of Giddens’s modern institutions, growing territorial bureaucracies like the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) (and within it, the U.S. Border Patrol) concerned with immigration and border control are the fastest growing American federal agencies. The INS compiles, monitors, and presents entry data to legislative and executive authorities and elites who are increasingly revising and testing border policy ‘effectiveness’ which can be characterised in terms of a regulative scheme. The monitoring is strategic, as authorities implement ever more complicated, high-tech and pervasive instruments of surveillance, control, and information gathering on many borders around the world, moves illustrative of this kind of reflexive control of territoriality.

Strategies can also be channelled in various concrete ways, some of which impact collective identity. The case studies, for example, will illustrate this through elite-led policies that construct particular spatial narratives of exclusion and help consolidate national collective identity. As the research will also indicate, the rigidity or fluidity of borders in the current system can rely on the reflexive ordering of the state system partially via these institutional or elite responses. The argument here suggests reflexive modernisation has a tendency to alter the balance of competing ‘modernities’ in some border situations; current policies of strict, ‘hardened’ territoriality in evidence around some boundaries may be seen as a move to ‘push back’ conditions in a reflexive way to what Beck calls a prior modernity—where space and identity could be correlated and ‘controlled’, especially in the face of new socio-economic mobilities under globalisation.

2.6 Reflexive Territoriality as Regulation and Emancipation

To link this discussion of territoriality to the empirical work which follows and advance the argument, we can understand the inclusive or exclusive manifestations of reflexive territoriality as ‘regulation’ or ‘emancipation’. The concepts of reflexive territoriality and regulation/emancipation thus work as a package to help analyse contemporary border practices and discourses. The general idea here is adapted from a recent schema developed by the Portuguese sociologist
Boaventura de Sousa Santos and is remarkably useful for coming to terms with some contemporary state border practices.103

Santos is concerned with what he considers 'the most fundamental of all the problems confronting us...the problem of the collapse of social emancipation into social regulation'.104 The prevailing paradigm of modernity, he argues, suggests a dialectical tension between social regulation and social emancipation; history follows a pattern of crisis followed by regulation followed by emancipation and so on, culminating with the welfare state. Emancipation, then, is 'the other of regulation'. The development of the social sciences has only reinforced this progression with its overriding idea of the future as progress.

Santos is concerned, however, that this dialectical tension has never actually existed and instead, 'rather than being the other of social regulation, social emancipation has become its double': it is degenerated and conflated, thus leading to a dearth of any progressive emancipatory projects.105 He argues any emancipatory project in modernity is likely to lead to new forms of social regulation which are actually less progressive and ultimately more deleterious for society.

Thus, he seeks to rethink social transformation without 'rethinking the past' and tries to retrieve an idea of progress through a framing of a 'roots' and 'options' equation within modernity. 'Roots' are permanent, singular, consistent, large-scale; options are small-scale, variable, ephemeral, and replaceable. Medieval society, for example, was a society of roots, but modern society operates on a logic of options. Globalisation, he argues, has brought an end to the equation, massively destabilising it and making each side interchangeable, subject only to an effect of scale or intensity. This has only served to accelerate the conflation of emancipation and regulation.

104 Ibid., 81
105 Such projects, for Santos, would revolve not around an abstract idea of 'progress', but a principle of hope, human initiative, and non-conformity. See ibid., 82.
Santos then moves on to posit a paradigm of modernity that involves two main forms of ‘knowledge’ which can only be understood in relation through a trajectory to a particular kind of ‘ignorance’. This point has particular relevance for us here. The first form he identifies is hegemonic ‘knowledge-as-regulation’, which furthers the trajectory between ignorance—designated as ‘chaos’—and a point of knowledge understood as ‘order’; this is widely seen as progression to the future within most modern thought.106

The second form, ‘knowledge-as-emancipation’, ‘consists of a trajectory between a point of ignorance designated as colonialism and a point of knowledge designated as solidarity’.107 ‘Knowledge-as-regulation’, however, he suggests, has won in the contest between the two forms to become a hegemonic force in recent history. Now the future must be considered as ‘order’, and the past is seen as some sort of ‘chaos’ to be released from. Suffering, particularly among the disenfranchised (minorities, women, children, and migrants, for example) has resulted, given they were, and often still are, considered ‘dangerous’ representations of ‘chaos’ in the face of order and colonialism.

Drawing on Walter Benjamin’s allegory of history,108 Santos’s ideas provide important epistemological clarifications by unmasking a neutralisation which has allowed ‘human suffering...[to] be justified in the name of the struggle of order and colonialism against chaos and solidarity.’109 In his view, ‘solidarity’ and non-conformity as forms of knowledge are antidotes to this kind of human suffering. In the end, knowledge-as-regulation can turn human initiative into a form of ignorance, especially when combined with dangerous hegemonic globalisation.

To apply his thinking to the project at hand, in the face of ontological insecurity, the reflexively organised modern state, in this sense, can be understood to desire regularity, order, and overall shape, and, can seek to displace those elements, defined as ‘risks’ and ‘threats’, which might disrupt these goals. Ultimately, the reflexive state is concerned with ‘taming’ the undesirable mobile flows that impact it, or at least presenting the image that it has such ‘chaotic’ matters under ‘control’.

The previous section introduced the concept of reflexive territoriality as a qualitatively different way of conceptualising territoriality. Its use in conjunction

106 Ibid., 101.
107 Ibid.
with this regulatory scheme should now emerge: increasingly, territorial ‘control’ is reflexively organised and sought, partly via surveillance and information gathering technology, at boundaries. State bureaucracies concerned with immigration and border control compile, monitor, and present this data to legislative and executive authorities and elites who are increasingly revising and testing border policy ‘effectiveness’ in a contingent way, according to the degree of regulation towards ‘control’ or ‘order’—or at least the image thereof—desired.

This kind of regulation is unlike earlier historical forms of territoriality when the state was less concerned with such detail and ‘order’, sought a means-end approach, or did not have the technical abilities for vast information gathering or advanced boundary monitoring and security. Moreover, the questions of insecurity about ‘threats’ were not the same. The key point is new knowledge and power structures can be productive of one kind or another of ‘order’, or territoriality.

Interestingly, the modern project of ‘controlling’ space in such a way may be increasingly at odds with the scope of migration movements as well as other mobilities in the system. As illustrated earlier in this chapter, the regulation of space and identity in modernity sought a coincidence of people (identity) and territory, subsuming difference and ‘chaos’ into a kind of cultural and social homogeneity and national ‘order’. Concomitant with this reflex within political territoriality are moves to ‘secure’ and reinforce external boundaries, largely through increased reinforcements and technological infrastructures, in an attempt to realise this idealised state against the ‘other’, the political and social threat (often to national or social identity) brought on by flows of individuals across those same boundaries.

To return more concretely to Santos’s understanding of modern knowledge, the politics of representation involved in presenting the image of territorial or border ‘security’ and a stable, unified collective identity relies on modernity’s ‘knowledge-as-regulation’ form. Regulation—to produce a particular ‘order’ of border security—is the privileged point of knowledge. This is cast against the kind of ‘chaos’, e.g., ‘ignorance’ which is seen to result from flows of individuals over borders, multinational or mixed identities, and diverse cultures: the newly defined ‘dangers’ and risks. This argument will be illustrated empirically through the case studies later in this thesis.

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2.7 CONCLUDING REMARKS

This discussion of political territoriality, identity, and borders in the international system sets the subject of inquiry for the next chapter: an exploration into what frameworks have been used, and those now available both inside and outside the discipline of IR, for understanding borders, regulation, and identity. This involves examining what scholarship in 'border studies' from different disciplines has to say about the changing nature of territorial and identity relationships, particularly under globalisation. To analyse these complex and salient relationships, the subsequent chapter also introduces two theoretical tools which might be used for such explorations, particularly at an unclear moment of both change and continuity in international politics. The case studies in later chapters then turn to examine the concrete empirical dimensions and implications of current, reflexive border regulations and their supportive discourses in the American borderlands.

CHAPTER THREE

THE CONTEXT OF BORDER STUDIES

3.0 INTRODUCTION

Presumably, these territoriality, identity, and regulatory dynamics would be fertile ground for the study of borders in IR and other disciplines. Unfortunately, this has not generally been the case. When Lord Curzon introduced his 1907 Romanes lecture, ‘Frontiers’, he in fact reflected the realist-inspired mode of thinking about boundaries that would come to dominate the disciplines of International Relations and Geography.\(^1\) Until recently, the concept of borders was chained to such rigid disciplinary channels, strictly confined to analysis of the delineation of the world’s political boundaries, and conflicts over them, and often done using blunt or poor conceptual tools. The study of borders was primarily conducted by international lawyers, diplomats, and IR scholars adhering, quite understandably at the time, to state-centric realist assumptions surrounding existing ‘lines’ on political world maps. The framework of modern political territoriality, and our concomitant cartographic biases exposed in the previous chapter, informed thinking about these matters nearly carte blanche. Studies were (and to a large extent still are) largely technical or diplomatic matters: increasingly ever more precise technologies are rationally applied to determine the exact mapping of the earth’s surface, understanding states as static, reified empirical objects for scientific examination or borders as issues of conflict.\(^2\)

IR was indeed in a slumber until the last decade concerning territoriality; ironically, few substantive studies of borders exist in the field. As Albert aptly points out, ‘it seems surprising that the discipline of international relations did not take up the issue of substantive change in the quality, shape, and construction of territorial spaces earlier’.\(^3\) When the issue was discussed, it was done in a highly positivist manner. Political Geography, where we might expect to find innovation in work on territoriality, as Newman argues, was also dominated by similar tendencies, with almost all work on boundaries being done from a research agenda that focussed

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on strategic issues (including the suspect associations with the fascist-linked German school of Geopolitics in the 1930s and 1940s), or on the state, and was chiefly non-theoretical and descriptive. Work by Friedrich Ratzel, C.B. Fawcett, and Halford Mackinder—a ‘father’ of Political Geography—among others, concentrated on an assumed deterministic link between geography and politics and carried with it a state-centric locus as well as concepts like balance of power. This corpus of thought, and its assumptions, in turn, found its way into mainstream IR as we shall see in this chapter.

Only in the past decade or so has the sense of a potentially qualitative transformation in statehood emerged with new discussions of ‘globalisation’. Transnational issues have caused pause among some scholars and refocused attention on boundaries. But even now, the debate tends to be characterised as either the disappearance or new relevance of boundaries or in broad dichotomised terms, e.g., ‘states versus markets’ or ‘global governance versus state governance’. These all cast too sweeping dichotomies and lack recognition of the real, complex, and contradictory implications of globalisation. Instead, what is needed is a more subtle, wider, and sensitive understanding of the processes and relations driving the production of and change in world borders. It is in what widely has been called ‘border studies’ that some fresher conceptual approaches can be found to the changing territorial and identity patterns outlined in the last chapter.

Following a brief survey of the ‘older’ state of border studies—and the impact it had on IR thinking—this chapter proceeds to seek other insights by examining and synthesising major developments in border thinking in the 1990s, when ‘border studies’ expanded and became a transdisciplinary field of study. Developments in ‘critical’ Political Geography, Cultural Studies, literary theory, and Anthropology all did much to further our thinking about the role of borders in social and political life, but have yet to be properly introduced into IR; thus their contributions may be unknown to many scholars. Those that deal with globalisation and transnational issues are particularly important. An engagement with geopolitical analysis, for example, can offer crucial views on the spatial dimensions of politics;

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5 For an overview of this traditional, mainstream work on boundaries in Geopolitics, see Charles B. Hagain, ‘Geopolitics’, The Journal of Politics 4, no. 4 (1942): 478-90. Hagain surveys early theoretical work on the relationship between geography and politics, and those scholars who asserted the deterministic, ‘scientific’ nature of this dynamic, an assumption common in much early work in the field: ‘Geopolitics’, he writes ‘may be summed up as an attempt to find a deterministic principle which controls the development of states’. Idem, 489.
territoriality, borders, and sovereignty are but only three bedrock IR concepts that might benefit from such an evaluation. In-line with its emphasis on certain alternative theories, the study adopts a critical view of Geopolitics, defined by Ó Tuathail as the ‘politics of writing global space’ through discourse—often in foreign policy, elite-driven situations. This concept and its potential impact for IR theory in general and this thesis in particular are explored in the chapter.

This chapter offers a transdisciplinary survey of the new border thinking, and is done with the intent to apply the concepts to an IR theory agenda as well as the empirical research which follows—particularly as they inform thinking on the relationships between space and identity. Accordingly, this chapter asks, given the centrality of borders in modernity and the international system, how have the social sciences and other disciplines explained and understood boundaries, widely defined? Moreover, what do border studies have to say about the changing nature of territorial and identity relationships, particularly at a moment of reflexive modernity, where mobile flows increasingly put pressure on modern territorial organisation? After a thorough exploration of these questions, we end with a brief summary and synthesis of the conceptual grounded covered. This sets the stage for the following chapter that offers several ‘tools’ for probing the multifaceted nature of American border practices and discourses—and their impact on collective identity—as well as providing a preliminary basis for exploring other such dynamics around the world.

3.1 BORDERS AND BORDER STUDIES

Borders in the international system have myriad characteristics and meanings, many of which are contradictory. An international boundary, such as in the U.S.-Mexico case, may be completely open to capital and trade, but shut to the movement of labour. Moreover, every border in the world is unique, and as argued in this thesis, must be seen as a particular, historically contingent web of processes and relations that is always under construction by certain actors and forces. Seemingly, then, a narrow, regional studies-like focus on a particular boundary would presumably be the proper starting point for research. Why then is a wider conceptual examination of what we call a ‘boundary’ necessary, or for that matter, why should we examine the field of ‘border studies’? Why unpack the notion of a ‘border’?

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6 Gearóid Ó Tuathail, *Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space* (Minneapolis:
There are several reasons for this. First, because of their unique nature as 'junctions' of a variety of different political, cultural, and social processes and systems—particularly as transnational situations which expose the dimensions and implications of globalisation in local, personal, and direct ways—borders serve as fruitful 'laboratories' for social science research. Often, as is the case with the U.S.-Mexico boundary, borders can be the most visible interface between very different social, economic, and political systems. Second, because they are so often familiar, and in a sense, 'invisible' (and have often been treated as such in IR), borders can be difficult to de-reify and really understand. As this section argues, because of their complicated and multidimensional nature, borders can only be analysed within a wider theoretical contextualisation which appreciates the larger dimensions of what borders—understood as constructed mechanisms of political and social difference—actually are: how they arise, how they function, and how they change. Supporting this line of research, Anderson and O'Dowd persuasively argue that particular case studies of local boundaries and their associated regions 'whether political, economic, social, or cultural can only be understood in terms of wider conceptualizations'.7 Especially in a world of intensifying mobilities and the changes they bring (which can be difficult to grasp and predict), a multidimensional and transdisciplinary approach to an analysis of borders in a deterritorialising and reterritorialising world is necessary. Accordingly, this chapter proceeds with such an examination. Moreover, as much of this literature may be unfamiliar to IR scholars, the highlights are included here as both an exercise in hopefully fruitful intellectual 'hybridisation' but also as a prelude to future research directions.

Borders and Limits

We live in a time and space in which borders, both literal and figurative, exist everywhere...A border maps limits; it keeps people in and out of an area; it marks the ending of a safe zone and the beginning of an unsafe zone. To confront a border and, more so, to cross a border presumes great risk.

—Alejandro Morales8

The construction of reality, quite simply, depends on borders. Meaning, content, and form in the physical, social, and political worlds require distinct

delimitations, differentiations, differences—all of which are formulated by, through, over, and under different kinds of borders and 'boundings'. If we follow Morales's thinking above, we are taking a lot of risks lately; the end of the Cold War, as just one example, signalled a need in international relations to reconfigure difference as the Soviet Union no longer provided a convenient backdrop for American foreign policy and major unforeseen divisions in the world emerged. This is to say nothing of the late modern trends of transnationalism fostering globalisation, and cultural/information technology flows alluded to in the previous chapter which all too pose new (and even sometimes familiar) arrangements for borders and the state through their de- and reterritorialisation tendencies. But while they may assert new challenges to the bounded territorial apparatus, states are likely to remain the key form of socio-political organisation, as will be demonstrated in the empirical chapters of this thesis. The challenge for border studies, then, is not to reproduce existing 'end of state' arguments nor rigid statist scholarship, but rather engineer approaches which appreciate the changing meanings—and representations—of borders in a dynamic world and do so in a critical way.

So to begin to understand how de- and reterritorialisation actually play out, we need to thoroughly investigate the notion of a 'border'. We need to take step away from easy and familiar understandings of boundaries which tempt us to see them as familiar 'lines' on maps and instead explore a more holistic view of difference and limits. Our entire social and political order is predicated on these ways in which we separate or 'border' things—our family from strangers, moral from immoral, English from Scots, Americans from Mexicans, Mexicans from Canadians.

Only through the boundaries of difference can the unique exist. The process of differentiating is generally done to assign meaning and uniqueness to things, thus giving us a sense of identity, distinctiveness, order, and ultimately security. As such, borders are crucial for identity formation in addition to being important markers for ethics, justice, and other normative considerations. Numerous social and ethical judgements underlie those differentiations. Where we draw, in Zerubavel's term, that 'Fine Line' is of major importance in order to understand our social world.9 The flexibility or rigidity of that line (for example in including or excluding certain

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kinds of refugees from the state), and thus our perception, is reflected in both theory and practice.

Because different terms conceptualise difference in this way, some clarification may be useful before proceeding. Confusion often results in the varied and sometimes inconsistent usage of ‘border’, ‘boundary’, and ‘borderlands’. A boundary, in its deployment here, typically refers to a legal (constructed) political line of difference—commonly an interstate boundary. A border, of course, can refer to this as well (and is also used in this way here), but is also employed in this study in a much wider, more figurative sense as well. ‘A border’, Anzaldúa poetically reminds us, ‘is a dividing line, a narrow strip along a steep edge’ but a ‘borderland’, alternatively, is ‘a vague and undetermined place created by the emotional residue of an unnatural boundary’. This term was first used in 1921 by Herbert Eugene Bolton to describe the Spanish Borderlands, Spain’s then-northern frontier which began to be established in the early 16th century. Today, borderlands are zones adjacent to an arbitrary, binational political border, infused with interesting and singular ethnic and social patterns that are often termed ‘border culture’.

Noted scholar Martínez, in what is probably the definitive study on life and society in the U.S.-Mexico borderlands, calls the unique forces that shape borderlands around the world, such as international conflict and accommodation, separateness, and transnational interaction, the ‘borderlands milieu’. The truly ‘international’ environment of borders gives residents numerous opportunities for symbiotic interaction through trade, tourism, migration, information, and generally, exchange. People on borders must often deal with strife, territorial disputes, and conflicts over natural resources and conversely, can also offer co-operative, accommodating solutions. Ethnic conflict may also be present in borderlands; cultural friction or accommodation may be the end-products of a mixed, heterogeneous population.

Separateness often affects border communities torn between identities, nationalisms, and cultures that may emanate from the ‘centres’ of states. The exposure to ‘foreign’ values and norms can often, nevertheless, lead to tolerance of ethnic and cultural differences. Martínez argues those who live in borderlands are

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generally unique individuals who are often shaped by a transnational processes and an environment that is distant from the 'centres'.13 This can be a universal phenomenon since many borderlanders share the same functional experiences across the world. Going further to generalise about these functional experiences and international relationships, Martinez has in fact created four models to characterise borderland interactions: alienated, co-existent, interdependent, and integrated.14

Since they are unique sites for research because they serve as microcosms of larger systems and trends, borderlands and their boundaries—particularly those that are socially and politically created—have become an intriguing transdisciplinary phenomenon increasingly attracting artists, writers, and scholars from many disciplines, including Cultural Studies, literary theory, Anthropology, gender studies, Chicano studies, and Geography.15 Even the emergence of the Internet as an unparalleled global communications tool which bypasses state frontiers has pushed notions of boundaries into the popular imagination and introduced major questions of regulation and control.16 This new—if still limited—general swelling of interest is largely due to the fact that borders may be 'simultaneously historical, natural, cultural, political, economic, or symbolic phenomena'.17 They present themselves as interfaces and points of transitions between ideas, concepts, and movements and thus make themselves open to various lines of inquiry.

These varieties of border studies tend to be isolated in select (and often marginalised) spheres of social theory. Yet, according to Welchman, 'as much as any other manifestation in the early 1990s' they 'marked a new stage in the debates over postmodernism, cultural studies, and postcolonialism'.18 The resulting 'border

13 Ibid., xvii.
14 Ibid. Martinez's analysis, however, can rely too heavily on traditional state assumptions that serve to reproduce those discourses and moreover suffers from a lack of contextualisation in wider processes and systems like globalisation.
15 For but a few illustrative examples in Geography, see, for instance, John House, Frontier on the Rio Grande: A Political Geography of Development and Social Deprivation (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992); in Anthropology, see the seminal work by Frederick Barth, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Cultural Difference (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1969). In planning and transport network analysis, see Peter Nijkamp, ed., New Borders and Old Barriers in Spatial Development (Brookfield, VT: Ashgate, 1994).
16 Much is also being written about borders (primarily the lack thereof) in cyberspace. See, for example, Maureen A. O'Rourke, 'Fencing Cyberspace: Drawing Borders in a Virtual World', Minnesota Law Review 82, no. 3 (1998): 609; Brian Kahin and Charles Nesson, eds., Borders in Cyberspace: Information Policy and the Global Information Infrastructure (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997).
17 Anssi Paasi, 'Constructing Territories, Boundaries and Regional Identities', in Contested Territory: Border Disputes at the Edge of the Former Soviet Empire, ed. Tuomas Forsberg (Brookfield, VT: Edward Elgar, 1995), 42.
theory', however, has not found its way to any significant extent into IR nor has it ever been surveyed and analysed from an IR or transdisciplinary perspective. In an effort to fill this void, the following constitutes a brief review of how borders are treated, modified, and appropriated in a variety of disciplines. This is provided to canvass existing knowledge, identify gaps in this corpus, and finally offer new and previously unexplored insights on how border thinking might be applied to IR theory and the identities/border/orders project.

The 'transdisciplinary' approach utilised here is also inspired by an attempt to transcend often reified lines of division between academic disciplines. Zerubavel, for instance, outlines the process of sculpting academic identity as a 'mental act of “lumping” supposedly homogeneous clusters of identity (selves, organisations, religious denominations, generations, ethnic groups, nations) and “splitting” them off from one another as distinct, separate entities'. In turn, intellectual inquiry tends to be mapped and organised in a separate manner; while this is occasionally useful to organise the act of research, if the lines are too rigid, they may in Zerubavel’s view, ‘allow no “contact” whatsoever between them [and] also eschew any effort to build “bridges” across those divides’. Rigidity, then, can lead to compartmentalisation and little contact between, for example, the social sciences and the humanities. Innovation and change are thus restricted.

In the end, he calls for a more flexible outlook:

intellectual boundaries inevitably promote a certain ‘closing’ of the mind that often produces the kind of intellectual tunnel vision we aptly call ‘narrow-mindedness’...Envisioning discrete islands of scholarship presupposes the use of intellectual blinders that inevitably confine scholars’ mental vision to certain ‘intellectual ghettos’.

A flexible intellectual approach can seek a wider—yet ordered and coherent agenda—that allows for complex, intricate academic identities and draws on multiple fields for conceptual development in a dynamic and fluid way. That spirit informs what follows.

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We proceed with our survey by beginning in what might broadly be grouped as ‘cultural studies’. Anthropology, in particular, may be one of the initial fields where boundaries were extensively studied. The prominent Norwegian anthropologist Frederik Barth in his seminal 1969 work, *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*, was one of the first to analyse the symbolism of borders, surveying the social and cultural separation and differentiation that formulate social attitudes. Barth ‘examines the border guards and boundary mechanisms that separate and differentiate social groups in their attitudes and perceptions’. Boundaries for Barth are both attributes and causes of the ‘principles of separation’ that the national community is concerned with—they differentiate the other and thus define the self: ‘[t]he ethnic boundary’, he famously writes, ‘defines the group, not the cultural stuff that it encloses’.

More recent work in Anthropology is returning to the meaning of boundaries in relation to spatial and social organisation, but still struggles to fill a major dearth in anthropological perspectives on borderland and cross-border cultures. Donnan and Wilson sought in 1994 to be the first develop an ‘anthropology of frontiers’ which seeks to examine ‘the cultural constructions which symbolise the boundaries between communities, and between nations [which] are lost in the midst of the “big picture” of “national” and “international” relations’. Similarly, 1996 saw the publication of *Setting Boundaries*, a major collection in Anthropology devoted to examining the cultural encoding, social construction, and enactment of borders and the ‘dynamism in...lines of marking—[their] changes, transformations, interactions, redefinition’. The authors take an approach to boundaries which, like that of some literary critics, considers borders as physical but also social, temporal, conceptual, and/or symbolic entities which may be permeable and negotiable, driven by inclusion and exclusion. As such they are ‘separating and unifying, divisive and inclusive, definitional, invisible, transforming, and transformative’ but always

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21 Ibid., 1095.
22 Barth, *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*.
defined in relation to a *socio-cultural* context—as ‘spatial manifestations of culture’.27

Scholars working in this area tend to explore the spatial design of social relations, the control of boundaries and the boundaries of control, and the interface between conceptual and physical boundaries.28 Human or social classification is prominent here; they argue boundaries and the flows of public, private, or collective spaces are increasingly intertwined, complex, and ambiguous. Borders mark the obvious limits of symbolic, administrative, and physical space but must be uncovered because they are ‘recognizable, accepted, and unproblematic’ making them too often familiar and invisible. They are also highly linked to a reflexive understanding of the self, a claim born out by extensive anthropological fieldwork and illustrated by the case studies in this thesis.29 Important for IR, anthropologists have also asserted the control of space and struggle over its definition is also deeply related to *power*; as Pittin suggests, urban design, for example in Nigeria, controls movement, identity, and class structure in many settings.30

To take a similar example, recent Israeli government policy uses and produces space for the literal and symbolic exclusion of Palestinians in the settlement pattern of the West Bank; middle class homes with prominent expensive red tile roofs are built on desirable hills that overlook Palestinian settlements mired in poverty. Moreover, new highway bypasses into the West Bank deliberately have few exits for Palestinian settlements and serve to connect only new Israeli towns and enclaves in the West Bank with the employment centres of Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. The construction of these borders, according to the Israelis, ‘is to prevent confrontation between the two groups’ while the Palestinians maintain the policy’s ultimate aim is ‘to block an independent Palestinian state and to destroy any geographical continuity between Palestinian territories’.31 The geography of power and identity here suggests the deep borders of the conflict. Order, for many cultures and societies, is clearly connected with spatial, power structures: boundaries.

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27 Ibid., 1.
30 Pittin, ‘Negotiating Boundaries’.
Anthropological perspectives on war have informed some IR and conflict theory in the past and, given the impact of political boundaries on the conditions and causes of conflict, the appearance of new work from a conflict resolution perspective that elaborates an 'anthropology of frontiers' is not surprising.\textsuperscript{32} Drawn initially from studies of the Ireland-Northern Ireland boundary, central insights here form around the processes taking place at both old and new borders; local border communities, Donnan and Wilson suggest, are in 'extremely dynamic dialectical relationship[s] with people and institutions of other ethnic groups and nations, both within and outside of their states...they are often major agents of change in socio-political processes of significance'.\textsuperscript{33} An ethnography of borderlands, in this case, can impart 'distinct and concrete views of social, cultural, and political identities at the most tangible interface of nation-states' where they mark ""home" from the ""foreign""'.\textsuperscript{34}

At least three important insights for IR theory emerge from these studies of boundaries in Anthropology. First, we see the problematisation of borders as a 'key concept' in the study of social organisation and culture; this illustrates its growing salience in a related field to IR. Moreover, the concept is widened beyond the understanding of boundaries in a static, legal sense and instead expanded to include conceptual boundaries which are no less real than physical ones. Second, borders are considered as spatial manifestations of culture which—like the state—are no longer understood to be necessarily clearly bounded or unproblematic. The spatial aspect of culture in particular helps 'anchor' understandings of, for example, ethnicity, gender, and conflict.\textsuperscript{35} Duchacek was moving towards this idea in IR when he argued territoriality can refer to either geographical or social spaces.\textsuperscript{36} While the balance of this comment argues the organisation of spatial relations is not fundamentally cultural as some anthropologists argue, but rather a complicated combination of cultural, economic, and political factors—identities and orders—at least the dialogue can now be reinvigorated.\textsuperscript{37} Finally, this work illustrates the tie between social and cultural 'ordering' (and organisation) through the drawing of boundaries which is tied up with power. The anthropological dimension of the

\textsuperscript{32} Donnan and Wilson, \textit{Border Approaches}.
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., 2.
\textsuperscript{34} Ibid., 3.
\textsuperscript{35} See Barth, \textit{Ethnic Groups and Boundaries} and Pellow, \textit{Setting Boundaries}.
\textsuperscript{36} Ivo D. Duchacek, \textit{Comparative Federalism: The Territorial Dimension of Politics} (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1987).
cultural nature of boundaries, then, gives us another clue into identity/border/order relationships, particularly those in borderlands.

**Literary Theory**

While Anthropology advanced its thinking, literary analysis is the field where the concept of 'the border' is most embraced and where it has received most of its exciting analytical development. This move is related to the advent of 'border theory' in 'critical' literary studies. The border and its intersection with the themes of postmodernity is providing a rich lode of fresh insightful paths of inquiry. Giddens, while not directly articulating the theme of 'the border', suggests that this development is not surprising, arguing it is precisely in the fields of literature, art, and design that the strands of new thought tend to grow in fecund ground.38

In recent years, the surge in 'border' related work in the fields of literary and cultural criticism has soared; Rosaldo's *Culture and Truth: The Remaking of Social Analysis*, Hicks's *Border Writing: The Multidimensional Text*, Behar's *Translated Woman: Crossing the Border with Esperanza's Story*, and collections by Calderón and Saldivar, *Criticism in the Borderlands* are but a few key examples.39 These volumes examine the prevailing discourse of their academic disciplines and the concept of a 'borderlands' identity seen through literary interpretation. Many of these works deal with Chicano or Latino identities, and indeed it is Chicano studies, as Johnson and Michaelsen contend 'more than any other [which] has refocused critical attention on the concept of the border', precisely as the Latino population in the United States soars and the state becomes more heterogeneous.40 Overall, this corpus attempts to move 'border identities' beyond simple postulations for their own sake to deeper and more subtle forms of analysis. The key insights are the critical problematisation of borders as arbitrary and the move to identify them as sometimes oppressive or homogenising representations of dominant political and economic systems, not unlike what may be needed in IR. They thus invite a more subtle understanding of difference, of fluid, multi-dimensional identities.

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However, it was Gloria Anzaldúa’s trailblazing book *Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza*, which anchored these literary explorations of borders and continues to strongly influence the field.\(^{41}\) By fashioning herself as a multidimensional persona, Anzaldúa poetically seeks out the multiple cultural possibilities of borderlands, exploring the bending and bleeding of identity, violence, and creativity latent in the U.S.-Mexico case—the birthplace of border studies—but also subjectivity in global borderlands more generally. Anzaldúa’s text is repeatedly cited in the literary theory field and beyond; her complex positioning of identity, homosexuality, Chicano, Native American, and Mexican culture is unique and important and may prove increasingly important to examinations of culture and identity in IR theory, particularly as an articulation of a different way of understanding subjectivity and the political.\(^{42}\) Anzaldúa’s work is a powerful articulation of alterity in expanding global zones (like the U.S.-Mexico borderlands) of contested meanings, space, and identities. To live in the Borderlands, she poignantly writes, means you:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{are neither hispana india negra espa\ñola} \\
\text{ni gabacha, eres mestiza, mulata, half-breed} \\
\text{while carrying all five races on your back} \\
\text{not knowing which side to turn to, run from...}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{put chile in the borsht,} \\
\text{eat whole wheat tortillas,} \\
\text{speak Tex-Mex with a Brooklyn accent;} \\
\text{be stopped by \textit{la migra}}^{43} \text{ at the border checkpoints...}
\end{align*}
\]

To survive the Borderlands
\[
\begin{align*}
\text{you must live} \textit{sin fronteras}^{44} \\
\text{be a crossroads.}^{45}
\end{align*}
\]

Attempting to come to terms with this influx of literature on border studies, a recent collection entitled *Border Theory: The Limits of Cultural Politics* manages the most definitive articulation yet of these concepts, seeking to ‘rethink the place of the


\(^{41}\) See Anzaldúa, *Borderlands-La Frontera*.

\(^{42}\) Peter Mandaville in a recent article heralds Anzaldúa’s work as an innovative exposition of subjectivity and identity, but he lacks a theoretically informed concept of the border to push the analysis further. See Peter Mandaville, ‘Territory and Translocality: Discrepant Idioms of Political Identity’, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 28, no. 3 (1999): 653-73.

\(^{43}\) *La migra* — the U.S. Border Patrol, the branch of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) responsible for apprehending migrants and controlling access into the state.

\(^{44}\) *sin fronteras* — without borders

\(^{45}\) Anzaldúa, *Borderlands-La Frontera*, 194.
border in border studies'. Johnson and Michaelsen introduce the volume by suggesting the contributors' foci are 'on the sorts of “soft” borders produced within broadly liberal discourse: benevolent nationalisms, cultural essentialisms, multiculturalisms, and the like—in short, the state of border studies'. The essays theorise the idea of 'the border' by taking it across transdisciplinary and paradigmatic ground—blending histories, Sociology, feminism, post-structuralism, and other theory: identity and difference are problematised.

As a result of this work, we have the sketches of a broad based ‘border theory’ emerging in the literary and cultural studies fields: concern with inclusion and exclusion (core concepts in much of critical theory), a multicultural approach to rhetoric and difference, and a need to probe relational and oppositional agency in attempt to go beyond the binary. It seeks to understand the border—and more importantly the future—as the

place in short of a certain property, and of a certain properness. You might say that one belongs there, that we will find ourselves there, facing one another across that divide.

Here we can find the limits and possibilities of identities by probing and criticising both unnecessary and necessary boundaries. Moreover, the theory as applied can suggest a move toward the deterritorialisation of culture and language where ‘crossings’ of various kinds occur across time and states but are in tension with the reterritorialisation impulses produced by state practices (such as the exclusion of persons socially or physically).

This kind of border thinking is useful in a critical sense because it uncovers the researcher’s often unintentional bias towards the dominant territorialisation of the world which can occur not only through state-based physical and symbolic means, including violence, but also through key complicit discourse embedded in most academic inquiry. Beck has recently, in fact, issued a call in Sociology to release the

46 Johnson and Michaelsen, ‘Border Secrets: An Introduction’, 28. Another extremely useful recent contribution is Reading the Shape of the World: Toward an International Cultural Studies, eds. Henry Schwarz and Richard Dienst (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996) The focus is on cultural studies as contributors seeks a ‘reading’ of images, texts, and otherness in a heterogeneous world. Borders are a key theme; Azade Seyhan’s piece in the collection, ‘From Minor Literature, Across Border Culture to Hypenated Criticisms’ is an analysis of forms of cross border cultural inquiry detailing new voices of political identity can emerge from the other in the literature of spatial, temporal, and historical cultural borderlands. This new approach, she suggests, is a more open and mutual encounter which offers the powerful possibility for both contention and agreement—and synthesis—between cultures and ultimately understanding.


48 Ibid., 15.

49 See Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987). See also Hicks, Border Writing.
field from a mutually dependent relationship with the state 'container' (such as their focus on 'domestic' statistics) which formulates the limits of epistemology and inquiry and is no longer, in his view, as relevant in a transnational world moving into a 'second age of modernity'.\(^5\)\(^0\) It should be remembered that this sort of emphasis does not imply a rejection of the state or its boundaries as units of analysis (they are, in fact, utilised in this way here) nor does it suggest embracing simplistic arguments put forward by scholars such as Ohmae that boundaries are things of the past, implying sovereignty has fundamentally changed in the international system.\(^5\)\(^1\) Instead, border thinking as developed here seeks to disrupt what Agnew, like Beck, calls 'methodological nationalism', the acceptance of the state and nation as pre-given within the confines of the 'territorial trap', if only to self-reflectively examine our assumptions.\(^5\)\(^2\)

The relevant points developed from this transdisciplinary thinking in what we might broadly call 'cultural studies' include thinking about border discourses in a critical manner, both for their use in destabilising or reinforcing dominant direct nation-state/identity correlations, or simple understandings of culture, but also problematising borders of all kinds, as well as the material and discursive processes which support them. This also means resisting the temptation to assume such an approach is necessarily a more 'inclusive' or 'progressive' mode of analysis. Instead, these scholars argue strongly for elevating it as a key cultural-political indicator and tool—especially as it can help us understand what Johnson and Scott call the 'secret' of border insights: 'the border of identity, the limit between inside and outside', a recommendation taken on here for IR in a changing world under new pressures.\(^5\)\(^3\)

This stance is broadly in-line with a critical approach to IR that emphasises emancipatory agendas within a modern, but self-reflective, rationality. As Hoffman maintains, such a pluralistic 'essence of rationality' which is drawn from Habermas, 'entails a limitless invitation to criticism...point[ing] to open ended knowledge which is continually subject to critical assessment'.\(^5\)\(^4\) In much the same way,

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\(^5\)\(^3\) Johnson and Michaelson, 'Border Secrets'.

thinking about borders and limits in this way follows this critical, self-reflective route.

3.3 **BORDER STUDIES: GEOPOLITICS**

Continuing with the border as an underlying problematic, this section broadly examines Political Geography, particularly Geopolitics—its roots, conceptual basis, and connections with IR theory through new strands of critical thought. Geopolitics has a direct bearing on a borders-oriented research agenda in IR, chiefly because it is an organising approach to the study of political space. One of Geopolitics' most salient contributions to IR may in fact be the manner in which its spatial problematic and disciplinary assumptions have informed some mainstream realist thinking in IR on the state and territoriality.

While understood in different ways historically, Geopolitics has traditionally been conceived of as the study of the geography of international relations, of foreign policy and territorial or strategic considerations, often in great power rivalries. Among others, geographers like Isaiah Bowman and Alfred Mahan, Friedrich Ratzel and C.B. Fawcett were highly influential early on in the field, undertaking studies concerned with the vision, dynamics, and structure of the contemporary political map—and the state's organic connection to territory (e.g., *Raum* for Ratzel) that extents to its frontiers—all generally imbued with considerations of power.

It was Halford Mackinder—a 'father' of modern Political Geography—though, who established many of the outlines of modern Geopolitics and framed some early foundations in mainstream IR thought on territory and power. In establishing his 'new' conception of Geography, Sir Mackinder saw a world of zero-sum power games in a closed system consisting of blocs of states where one must 'think imperially...as a theatre for British activity'. In this 'general struggle for

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58 Halford Mackinder, 'The Teaching of Geography from an Imperial Point of View, and the Use Which Could and Should be Made of Visual Instruction', *Geographical Teacher*, no. 6 (1912): 83.
national survival', Mackinder, Mayhew notes, 'allow[ed] geographical facts presented in narrative and visual forms to drive his political analyses', and modelled political positions accordingly. The parallels of his thought with those of IR realism (and the assumptions a critical perspective would point to) could not be clearer.

This entire geopolitical tradition, then, began by understanding international politics as a unified, deterministic phenomenon influenced largely by geographical facts. Most often, Geopolitics was a state-centric, 'non-discursive phenomenon', somehow distinguished and objectively 'above' dominant social, political, and ideological narratives. The field tended to focus on the physical environment as the location (and determinant) for international politics and foreign policy. In this regard, Newman and Paasi remind us that 'boundary studies have had a long, descriptive, and relatively non-theoretical history in geography'. Borders in Geopolitics were simply largely seen as lines delineating separate territories to be fought over. As Ó Tuathail suggests, Geopolitics, traditionally understood, 'promotes a spatial way of thinking that arranges different actors, elements, and locations simultaneously on a global chessboard', much like mainstream realist IR.

Much of this work and its assumptions, in fact, found its way into mainstream IR; like Lord Curzon's writings, this corpus of Political Geography was reflective of a powerful mode of thought in the field from the 1930s. Many realist accounts in IR, as Goltmann's illustrative period piece of 1951 suggests, draw elements of their worldview from this kind of thinking. Donnelly's new comprehensive survey of realism and International Relations, which examines the nature of power politics in the field, notes the influence of power, interest, and the state in realist accounts from Carr and Morgenthau in the first generation, to Waltz and Mearsheimer more recently. These, in part, owe some of their foundational concepts like balance of power to earlier developments in Political Geography including those made by Mackinder.

On a pedagogical level, these geographers' ideas were also considered key for the study of international politics and for policy formulation. Coones has

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61 Ó Tuathail, 'Thinking Critically about Geopolitics', 1.

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documented the heavy impact Mackinder's conception of geography had in educational institutions and curricula.\textsuperscript{64} As early as 1948, Fifield set out in a fascinating and influential article on 'The Introductory Course in International Relations' to recommend the 'ideas of men like Ratzel...[and] Mackinder'.\textsuperscript{65} In terms of application, Flanders, for example, advised in a wartime article that the 'balance of power approach was the use Mackinder intended should be made of his geopolitical analysis' and its application meant a policy whereby 'the United State exploit time-space-power relationships'.\textsuperscript{66} Such geopolitical sentiment was common in a good deal of mainstream post-War thinking in IR.

Geopolitics then grew in popularity during the Cold War as a codeword for the superpower struggle to dominate global politics through a broad cast of national interests manifested in diplomacy, military might, economic and political alliances, and ideology. At least in the U.S., the spatial strategy and spatial meaning of the Cold War (defined in terms of an official geopolitical enemy—the Soviet Union) became senseless when this era drew to a close and new issues and configurations emerged. Geopolitics is now being reformulated to move beyond dealing with only territorial conflict and instead towards non-statist political forms which pose new problems (ethnic conflict, terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and environmental degradation, for example). Some have represented this as the 'New World Order', the 'End of History', the 'Coming Anarchy', or the 'Clash of Civilizations', among others.\textsuperscript{67} But it remains very unclear if these, and other simple diagnoses of current 'geopolitics', are on target. Instead, the global order is up for debate; its study has enjoyed a recent revival in contemporary discourse, because as Ó Tuathail maintains, 'in a shrinking and speeding world of intense time-space compression wrought by telecommunications revolutions and globalising economic networks and webs, the desire for perspectives offering “timeless insight” is stronger than ever'.\textsuperscript{68} We must, as Ó Tuathail asserts, however 'refuse the rush to essentialize change and delimit it

\textsuperscript{64} Paul Coones, \textit{Mackinder’s ‘Scope and Methods of Geography’ After a Hundred Years} (Oxford: Oxford School of Geography, 1987).
\textsuperscript{65} Russell H. Fifield, ‘The Introductory Course in International Relations’, \textit{American Political Science Review} 42, no. 6 (1948): 1193.
as a kind of geographical antagonism' as 'the best intellectual defence against the nostrums of geopoliticians seeking to “sell” us a world where the dramas are simple, the identities pure and the antagonisms clear'.\(^6\)\(^9\)

**'Critical' Geopolitics**

Given the above, can Geopolitics offer anything to IR to help understand borders and identity under globalisation? Much, if we turn from traditional to *critical* Geopolitics. This new, critical movement in the field, spearheaded by Ó Tuathail, Dalby, Agnew, and Harley, among others, has emerged with some force.\(^7\)\(^0\) Those working in this school set out to determine the 'politics of writing global space' by unpacking traditional geographical assumptions in international political practice and theory. Politics is no longer understood as a struggle over a political map of nation-states but rather as *discourse*, 'a culturally and politically varied way of describing, representing and writing about geography and international relations'.\(^7\)\(^1\) These scholars seek to

> critically reconceptualize [Geopolitics] as a discursive practice by which intellectuals of statecraft 'spatialize' international politics in such a way as to represent it as a 'world' characterized by particular types of places, peoples, and dramas.\(^7\)\(^2\)

Ó Tuathail, for example, has recently undertaken a cogent analysis of Mackinder's influence in the field.\(^7\)\(^3\) Similarly, like the work here, Radcliffe has sought innovative answers to the questions surrounding 'multiple geographies of identities'—the relationships between national identities and space expressed in state actions and discourses.\(^7\)\(^4\) These kinds of critical approaches, like some of those emerging in IR, seek to 'ask how the cartographic imagination of here and there,

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\(^6\) Ó Tuathail, 'Thinking Critically about Geopolitics', 1.
\(^9\) Ibid., 104.
\(^7\) For representative work, see Ó Tuathail and Dalby, *Rethinking Geopolitics*; John Agnew, *Geopolitics: Re-visioning World Politics* (London: Routledge, 1998).
\(^7\) Ó Tuathail, 'Rethinking Geopolitics', 3.
\(^7\) This critique is provided in Gearóid Ó Tuathail, 'Understanding Critical Geopolitics: Geopolitics and Risk Society', *Journal of Strategic Studies* 22, no. 2-3 (1999): 107-24.
inside and outside...work to both facilitate some political possibilities and actions and exclude and silence others'.

This task is to understand dominant discourses which seek to represent their own truths and agendas, framed as non-objective 'knowledge' by elites as a political project. In reality, political spaces are far from natural or given phenomena and are created, in part, by particular knowledge production processes, driven by actors such as the media and political elites, thereby crafting a discourse which helps set the ontological categories in which politics is developed. In a similar critical vein, Agnew argues questions mainstream IR's tendency to begin with certain ontological assumptions about statehood that can lead us to think of power as a historical constant; instead of reproducing this, he seeks in recent work to understand the 'historically changing character and spatial structure of power'.

Discourse analysis, not surprisingly, is central to the critical Geopolitics project, as it is to this thesis. As will be discussed in the next chapter, discourses—modes of verbal and textual production—are virtual 'sets of capabilities' or 'systems of possibility for knowledge' which enable actors to realise agendas and 'write' international politics. They are textual and transitory, employed by those in positions of influence, such as writers, statesmen, officials, academics and others who act, comment, and help frame politics. This kind of knowledge takes a particularly important role in the design of foreign policy; rhetoric (i.e., a 'New World Order', a 'Line in the Sand', the 'Evil Empire' just to note a few key phrases of American foreign policy discourse of the past years) reconceptualises and thus helps reformulates political objectives. This, according to scholars interested in critical Geopolitics, has tremendous implications for the formulation of enemies, objectives, and the general economic and political restructuring now occurring.

Like some of the border studies work in literary theory and cultural studies, critical Geopolitical approaches present problematics based on resistance and power relationships. They are premised on the Foucaultian notion that 'the exercise of

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78 O Tuathail, 'Thinking Critically', 10.
power perpetually creates knowledge and, conversely, knowledge constantly induces effects of power'.

Examining these forms of resistance which impact identities and borders and manifest themselves in the ‘orders’ of the current environment will be a central task for critical Geopolitics and the associated IR research proposed here. Some of the tools applied later on, for instance, seek to ‘unmask’ this discourse in theoretical and empirical terms. Much of the work being done in this area is concerned with finding ways to ‘move beyond the state when trying to map domestic and international developments’ and seeks to avoid ‘privileging of a Western, masculinized, seeing subject as the authoritative, transcendent reader, and practitioner of international politics’.

These scholars often work along post-structuralist lines to identify discourses and practices of power which are played out in international politics.

Thus, this body of work is important for this study for several reasons. First, it provides an alternate viewpoint and approach to the study of borders that is taken up with the identities/borders/orders heuristic tool and applied in the case studies. By reconceptualising political space as a field of power relationships and discourse, critical Geopolitics opens a boundary study like this one to question inclusion and exclusion and ‘boundedness’, also important in any critical International Relations theory that seeks to challenge some realist notions.

The work pushes boundary studies beyond legalistic analysis to instead seek the less studied, but complicated practices of writing space; Ó Tuathail puts it well: ‘the geographical heterogeneity and hybridity of the world is always much messier than our geopolitical maps of it’. Critical Geopolitics has thus helped move some geographic study beyond modernity’s ‘territorial trap’, the image of the world as strict and distinct territorial units Agnew eloquently pointed out in 1994.

Second, while geographers typically take boundaries to be products of the territoriality of states, ‘not least because geographic process of socialization have taught us to acknowledge the state system—a spatial system which is characterized by more or less exclusive boundaries’, we can understand the discursive power relationships behind the setting

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79 Foucault, Power/Knowledge, 52.
80 Jeremy Black, Maps and Politics (London: Reaktion Books, 1997), 120.
81 See, for example, Andrew Linklater, The Transformation of Political Community (Cambridge: Polity, 1998).
83 Agnew, ‘The Territorial Trap’.
of these boundaries which are indicative of political limits and practices. Third, in relation to identity and closely linked to the concept of multilayered identities is the idea of ‘multiple geographies’. As Rose and Routledge suggest, ‘geographies are about the interwoven processes of symbolic meanings, communicative processes, political discourse, cultural practices...physical settings...and envisioned desires and hopes’. Constructed in part by identities and power dynamics, geographies, then, can be layered and contested. Finally, we need to understand the complex and important relationship between cartographic practices and political decisions, realising there is nothing fixed or final about a historical map, and that mapping is a structure of power which connects territory with social order. Both case studies will illustrate these ideas.

3.4 BORDERS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Armed with a rough sketch of how borders and space are being theorised in other disciplines, we can now turn to a more engaged and tailored examination of how borders are treated in International Relations. Surprisingly, as Donnan and Wilson argue, ‘very few scholars have sustained an interest’ in borders in IR. But space is one of the bedrock concepts that predicates international politics; from the earliest attempts at philosophising about space, such as over the polis in Plato, to Lockean social contract theory proclaiming a function of government is to arbitrate private property—control over space has been a key underlying problem for IR. The differentiation of space, indeed, is the structure upon which the territorially based system of states rests; boundaries make space possible and, as a dynamic of inside/outside, create the realm of international relations. Mainstream IR theory has often simply accepted a limited understanding of the concept which understands it as a ‘container’ of politics and identities, leading to approaches dominated by (and partially reproducing) a very particular view of states as closed, fixed, security minded units. The bounded state is the standard starting point for the majority of

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analyses in IR. But it is important to remember this is a process of social construction. Scholars, policy makers, and observers therefore need to ensure that these concepts are not reified or accepted carte blanche.

What the discipline does well with the concept is recognising the political nature of space. Keith and Pile highlight this idea in a recent collection devoted to exploring this idea:

We believe...that all spatialities are political because they are the (covert) medium and (disguised) expression of asymmetrical relations of power...there must be a commitment to the continual questioning of location, movement, and direction—to challenging hegemonic constructions of place, of politics, and of identity.

Foucault—even more eloquently—elaborates:

Securing space, in whatever form, is a political act...The occupying of space is an assertion of power, and continual displacement is power's spatial effect.

And thus the basic problematic for both traditional and modern border studies in IR is set out.

'Traditional' and 'Modern' Border Studies in IR

To understand the spatial dimension of politics, most IR scholars have grappled with interstate boundaries. Borders are symbolic and material delineations of space and thus representative of territoriosity. Classical Political Science has generally drawn rigid conceptualisations of the state, primarily concerned with territory and borders as areas of conflict and the modern state system, centred on concepts of nationalism, territoriality, and sovereignty. 'Traditional' border studies with these concerns are marked by a legal and empirical work often focused on conflict over disputed borders, particularly as the number of borders in the world increases. Spener and Staudt call this 'old-style border studies', complaining it has a 'relatively narrow spatial agenda'.

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90 Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*.


92 Ibid.

Scholars working along more pluralist lines in IR engaged in 'modern' border studies such as Kearney, Strassoldo, and Taylor, however, have conceptualised new ways of looking at the world system and borders that focus on socio-economic aspects such as community, interdependence, and transnationalism. These approaches assess the way the world is changing because of growth in global interactions illustrated in the previous chapter.

The globalist 'end of the state' argument, or at least movement towards it (despite many debates about the empirical extent of changes), in particular has opened up border analysis beyond the realist’s static, statist framework, widening numerous avenues for the study of transnational border processes and interactions. Giddens’s concept of the state as a ‘power container’ of economic, cultural, and social forces is altered by Taylor and others who see it now as a ‘leaking container’. In that sense, clearly, the state’s ‘leaks’ are springing at its borders. But this sort of thinking has had a paradoxical effect: it reinforces the conceptual ‘state container’ idea, e.g., that states are the only given forms of political organisation. For those who take further steps beyond the state, such as Mandaville and Soguk, other kinds of alternative, non-state politics are emerging which cross borders. And all of these pose considerable questions about the relationships between borders, territory, and identity.

In this 'modern' branch of border studies in IR, interstate boundaries around the world are considered ‘filters’ of transnational flows whose ‘mesh’ varies in size and composition. Borders in this conception may be zones of transition, separation, or integration which include or exclude. Sometimes this occurs in a highly contradictory way, such as practices which allow free transit of capital but not labour over a particular international boundary. Moreover, state control may paradoxically be strongest at a vulnerable border amidst transnational changes. Boundaries, then, within this school of border studies, are understood as empirical manifestations of state power and territoriality.

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The approach to border studies offered in this study—whilst depending deeply on the core problematic of territoriality and the ‘mobile’ ‘flows’ of late modernity discussed in the prior chapter—goes one step further than this, along what might be considered critical lines. To illustrate, consider two IR scholars of note, David Campbell and Michael Shapiro, who bring important assets to border studies in IR theory. The begin in their work with Richard Ashley’s contention that where a boundary exists is not the question for IR, but rather the issue is what conditions and practices produce and naturalise it.88 Campbell understands foreign policy as a collection of discourses which create boundaries to produce territoriality and identity.89 Politics, he writes, is a practice of ‘writing space’, of setting frames and limits of the political; in effect, drawing borders. Shapiro, in another post-positivist account, seeks to follow from the scholarship of Derrida and Levinas to critique ‘sovereignty’s moral cartography’.100 By ‘unreading’ global histories and opposing dominant spatial discourses, he seeks to recover other forms of bordering practices, other kinds of socio-political organisation. This involves unpacking existing, geographically-tied ethics (such as the moral worth of the state) which is primarily premised on dominant geopolitical traditions of sovereignty in the classical school. From his work, we receive important reminders that territorial practices have largely been representations of overriding ethical and political problematics, such as European policies against the other—and often the imposing of a universalising, spatial narrative of identity imbued with a particular ethical resonance that may obscure other alternative configurations.101

So whilst the approach here incorporates this ‘modern’ school of border studies, especially work which develops the transnational perspective, like Shapiro, it tries to go further by incorporating this critical perspective which questions the representation of borders and practices in the international system.102 Nor does the thesis take the state container idea as necessarily central to research, but rather is open to the kind of heterogeneous border theorising elaborated earlier in this chapter.

88 See Ashley, 'Untying the Sovereign State', 227-62.
101 Ibid., 172-209.
102 For examples of transnational communities developing, see Kearney, ‘Borders and Boundaries’. Kearney examines how borders are being eroded but argues difference is still produced in anthropological terms along boundaries.
This is in line with Tomblin's appeal for 'thinking critically about borders...in an age of shifting boundaries and paradigms'.

This view is partly inspired by a critical theory perspective in IR, important since it renders identity, inclusion, exclusion, and boundedness problematic and disputes (or reflexively re-evaluates) space-identity relationships. This critique, headed recently by Linklater, seems a worthwhile project for the study of 'identities, borders, and orders' that characterise the global environment. This tactic can also seek to understand and question borders as sets of practices and discourses which are not confined to material state borders; borders manifest themselves in a variety of discourses and practices, which are often symbolic. Territoriality can be justified through many discourses and narratives, including imagery, legislation, popular culture, and so forth, practices often exuded from the 'centres'. The next chapter on methodological tools, in fact, focuses on narrative analysis with this in mind. This more critical approach gives us additional conceptual resources to understand the complicated and changing meanings of borders and how this translates politically.

Our approach eschews taking 'the border' for granted or associating it with an exclusively progressive agenda but instead probing the limits of diversity and inclusion. Instead, we can understand borders as sites of cultural production which are tied to and utilised by states; they extend, modify, and cross oppositional socio-spatial consciousness, sometimes reinforcing state identity, sometimes offering more flexible or hybrid versions. The border becomes both an end and a filter between systems. The step offered here, through problematising the border itself, questions the regulatory forces of inclusion and exclusion production along it, accepting the concept of the border works at many levels: the cultural, spatial, symbolic, psychological, social, and political. Placing the work within this transdisciplinary emphasis on limits reminds us of the complexities of difference and heterogeneity operating in many borderlands (and even 'centres') today.

More importantly, however, the approach focuses our attention on the forces and processes which produce given outcomes. By denaturalising the concept of the border, analysis can be sharper, less assuming, and perhaps more insightful. The objective is to unpack phenomena taken for granted in the geographical 'writing' of political space. Such an evaluation would be premised on the notion that some

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borders are necessary to respect difference, but perhaps question those that reproduce
the conditions for conflict.\textsuperscript{105}

However, the single biggest problem with existing attempts in IR and related
fields to construct a theory of international borders, such as those by Strassoldo and
Martinez, is the fact that they lack immersion within a larger social theory, especially
one that deals with change. While not attempting to undertake the task of
developing such theory, this study does modestly seek to embed IR discussions of
borders within a reflexive understanding of modern territoriality and identity:
processes and relations, such as regulation and control (both discursive and
material), sustain interstate boundaries and identities. Moreover, the thesis attempts
to develop the important idea that within the socio-political realm, all borders are
constructed phenomena, historically contingent, and dependent on continual forms
of political and social production to exist. They are not inevitable or unalterable.
They cannot be reified as the edges of static, essentialised nation-state ‘containers’
nor can policies which regulate them be evaluated unless the discourses which frame
such practices and constructions are examined.

3.5 **CONCLUDING REMARKS**

This chapter began against the backdrop of an international environment
increasingly characterised by system ‘mobilities’ under globalisation that are
affecting identities, borders, and states in interesting, sometimes contradictory ways.
To a large extent, disciplines attempt to reflect their perceptions of their political and
social worlds and times. Border studies in IR and elsewhere, until recently, indeed
reflected an older worldview predicated on particular static geographic and territorial
assumptions. The study of borders in IR in the past was largely non-theoretical and
historical, concerned chiefly with static delineations and disputes over pre-given
legal ‘lines’ over the globe which went hand-in-hand with a realist-inspired
understanding of the state system as the chief level of analysis. The deeper
dimensions of the discursive and material factors inherent in borders was largely
ignored as they rapidly became ‘invisible’ and highly naturalised phenomena or
‘givens’. Unfortunately, as a result few proper border studies exist in IR.

But by demonstrating the usefulness of the ‘border’ concept in a more
‘mobile’-oriented approach, by breaking it from its traditional Geopolitical and

\textsuperscript{105} Strassoldo, ‘The Study of Boundaries’. See also ibid.
realist IR moorings, we instead can draw on useful theorisation of the concept occurring in other disciplines. Cultural Studies, broadly defined, first moved theorisation of the concept of the border forward, seeking to understand the spatial dimensions of identity and the power relationships which surround the cultural aspects of borders. Anthropologists have examined the interplay between culture and borders, and the dimensions of difference and conflict which sometimes result from their interaction. In literary theory, borders were critically problematised as arbitrary and moves were then made to identify them as sometimes oppressive or homogenising representations of dominant political and economic systems. Together, these studies invited a more subtle understanding of difference, of fluid, or multi-dimensional identities in a world which grows more heterogeneous and old Enlightenment fantasies of single territories to match unified, homogeneous populations are increasingly irrelevant in reality—but are ideas that still are major political weapons in popular discourse.

Even in a complementary field to IR like Geopolitics, where one might expect to find useful explorations of borders, until recently border studies were also moribund. In fact, the *realpolitik*, realist-oriented work of Mackinder and others was highly influential in the foundations of mainstream IR, lending weight to concepts like balance of power and national interest formulated in part by geographical determinism. But the new ‘Critical Geopolitics’, which focus on the ‘writing’ of political space through discursive practices has sought deeper understandings of international boundaries and the political-social process which maintain and change them, especially with conditions of globalisation. The sensitivity paid here to discourse and its impact on collective identity and the way power is accordingly exercised across and through boundaries globally is important for IR.

This corpus of work from outside IR offers multiple insights for an inquiry within the discipline concerning territoriality and identity, specifically the processes of inclusion and exclusion over state boundaries. First, the emphasis on seeing borders as a ‘key concept’ which are complicated, contradictory, and multidimensional and fruitful opportunities for social analysis and theorisation is prescriptive; they must be unpacked and analysed on their own terms, as is done here. These works have ‘opened’ the concept of the border, creating space for rigorous thinking on the real implications of boundaries on the ground. Particularised case studies of borders in international studies, then, must be evaluated in this way but also within larger conceptual and historical contexts as well. Second,
on this point, seeing borders as inherent *constructed* metapatterns in social and political life—as limits which are both spatial and non-spatial in nature—opens up lines of inquiry into the connections into other forms of difference, such as identity. Third, the work re-introduces the element of power in forging discourse and difference across and around boundaries, both international and social, a point which will be taken up in the next chapter. Finally, when work in these other disciplines is able to view border discourses in a critical manner, this becomes useful in questioning dominant direct state/identity correlations, or simple understandings of culture by problematising borders of all kinds, as well as the material and discursive processes which support them.

The more innovative thinking on borders in IR is increasingly situated in the more critical sectors of the field, especially those informed by transdisciplinary work and those concerned with the implications of globalisation outlined in the previous chapter. This kind of ‘border thinking’ advocated here understands borders as interesting, constructed and contested *sites* of political and social production which are tied to and utilised by states; they impact socio-spatial consciousness, sometimes reinforcing state identity, sometimes promoting more flexible or hybrid versions. Borders become seen as both ends and filters between states and systems, as metaphors of identity and difference, and ultimately as complicated, multidimensional phenomena. They are thus opened as ripe avenues for research on limits in social and political life. This thinking, coupled with chapter two’s examination of the contemporary implications of change and continuity for territoriality and identity, constitutes the contextual locus for the balance of the thesis. Moreover, it points us to look next for appropriately tailored, specific theoretical tools that can structure productive empirical studies of borderlands as well as larger identity and order issues in IR. The following chapter undertakes this task.
CHAPTER FOUR

TOOLS FOR EXPLORATION: THE IDENTITIES/BORDERS/ORDERS TRIAD AND NARRATIVE ANALYSIS

4.0 INTRODUCTION

Moving from the wider framework of border studies provided in the previous chapter, this chapter follows on with the identification and articulation of specific research tools. First, it helps introduce and justify the 'identities/borders/orders' (i/b/o) project as the basis to explore the issues of borders within IR. The project, under development by Yosef Lapid and other border-oriented researchers, launches a heuristic or orienting tool—known as the i/b/o triad—which focuses on the processes and relations associated with these three 'key' concepts as they apply to international political and social questions. Inspired by new 'border thinking', the triad encourages a controlled evaluation of the dynamics of identities, borders, and orders at a moment increasingly impacted by globalisation and fluidity.

The i/b/o project and its supportive triad are deliberately designed to be open to a variety of methodological or theoretical approaches. It is also amenable to research that converges on specific relationships between the concepts. Before exploring wider 'order' questions and connections in the conclusion, the thesis' case focus on a specific 'leg' of the triad: the interplay between identity (i)—particularly conceptions of national identity—and borders (b) as social and political processes. The chapter argues that there is a strong co-constitutive, socialising link between borders and collective identity within territorial discourses world-wide, and this, in turn has implications for international order. State re- and deteritorialisation policies and narratives are some of the methods of inclusion and exclusion that create differentiation along the triad, particularly important in collective identity construction. This theoretical chapter, then, sets out the basis for the subsequent empirical discussions developed later in the thesis concerning the U.S.-Mexico and U.S.-Canadian borderlands.

Collective identity is therefore investigated by considering the impact of the spatial dimension of politics—which involves settling control over particular territory—on historical dynamics of identity change and constitution. This is an undertheorised and sometimes misunderstood link. The 'i-b' concept is closely
related to the idea of ‘socio-spatial consciousness’, first elaborated by Paasi, whereby individuals and communities are socialised as members of a territorially bound community.\footnote{Anssi Paasi, \textit{Territories, Boundaries, and Consciousness: The Changing Geographies of the Finnish-Russian Border} (Chichester: John Wiley, 1996).} Specifically, the i/b/o triad will be applied to help understand the impact of modern space and place, enforced through official state practices and discourses, on identity construction for those living in borderlands.

The analysis then proceeds with a discussion of nationalism as a particular and powerful political form of collective identity mobilisation, impacting large components of the global order. Nationalism is an especially salient concept in contemporary discussions of IR because it is an important form of identification, especially when paired with the state; as is well-noted, the nationalist surge has strongly erupted in the globalising post-Cold War world. The theoretical disjunction between territory and nationalism is especially important in the current mobile-oriented global environment.\footnote{Anssi Paasi, \textit{Territories, Boundaries, and Consciousness: The Changing Geographies of the Finnish-Russian Border} (Chichester: John Wiley, 1996).} This disjunction is examined through the symbolic and material impact of boundaries on identity in the socio-political construction of ‘imagined communities’ of bounded space, often forged against transnational pressures or the other.

In an increasingly transnational environment, the ‘sites’ where such tensions of national identity and order in real people’s lives emerge are often borderlands. These junctions of the state system can be where nationalism—used here to mean state substantiation and consolidation of identity on civic (and to a certain extent ethnic) grounds—becomes a political force brought into relief against an other. In fact, this chapter argues because it is a powerful and often problematic expression of identity which can be \textit{constructed} and manipulated politically against the other in such territorial discourses, nationalism in border situations presents important policy implications. This is particularly true in both case studies of this thesis: the U.S.-Mexico and U.S.-Canadian borderlands. Thus, a necessary, but cursory review of the rich literature on nationalism (limited to its application to borders and the other) is warranted, as is a working and limited definition which acknowledges the problematic (and often misused) nature of the term.

Second, to help undertake research to understand some of these i/b/o relationships, the balance of the chapter introduces \textit{narrative analysis}. This is a preliminary methodology designed to partially unlock some of the language, power,
and spatial relationships—within the triad—which help set the political conditions for particular territoriality and identity positions. The focus is on the narratives of representation, the ways in which language and symbolism articulate and impact policy problems and viewpoints and then authorise possible solutions.

Narratives which surround borders and territorial practices serve as symbolic resources for collective identity formation, helping constitute our understandings and naturalisations of the boundaries around us by setting the fields of interpretation and possibility. This is, in a sense, the politics of 'writing space'. In doing research informed by this interpretive methodology, we can begin to evaluate changes in collective identity when boundaries are 're-inscribed' through particular socio-political practices that are articulated in official state 'texts' and manifested, for example, in securitisation policies.

The chapter asks several research questions: given the reflexive nature of political territoriality in some situations, and its accompanying deterritorialisation or reterritorialisation policy impulses, how do we come to terms with contemporary territoriality and identity patterns, especially as exemplified in local experiences (e.g., in borderlands) of globalisation? What theoretical frameworks are in place or can be developed to study borders and identity in more revealing ways, more closely probing their complicated and multifaceted nature and their relationships to global order? What tools might be available to make theoretically informed and controlled empirical studies of border practices (such as policy and discourse) in the U.S.-Canada and U.S.-Mexico cases, as well as unlocking the larger implications for international order such processes evoke?

4.1 THE IDENTITIES/BORDERS/ORDERS HEURISTIC TRIAD

This section details the development and application of the identities/borders/orders (i/b/o) analytical triad to study global patterns of change and provides some justification as to its necessity. This discussion then proceeds with an overview of how it works with the two specific case studies. The i/b/o triad is an

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4 As noted in the introduction, the i/b/o project owes its genesis to Yosef Lapid but is being theoretically developed and expanded in different directions by other scholars as well. The two case studies included here are some of the first original empirical work at the triad's intersections.
open, orienting, heuristic tool part of a larger research project designed to produce new theoretical insights by gathering and then coupling—in a triadic but non-hierarchical way—three key concepts in International Relations and then analysing the resulting interrelated and co-constitutive relationships. It is thus constructed to try and provide new research results in addition to pushing theorising of the concepts themselves further. Thinking in terms of the triad helps focus and narrow scholarly attention on particular, illustrative facets of a complex, dynamic international environment.

Before proceeding with an explication of the triad, some initial rationale and justification for this new project is of import at the outset. Amid all kinds of projects advertised as ‘new’ in IR, why this one? Why do we need this triad in IR now? What can it do for IR beyond that which existing resources already provide? Why wed this triad with a narrative approach?

Whilst few new undertakings in the field could completely insulate themselves from a thorough ‘justification’ critique, the i/b/o project group has several reasons to maintain cautious optimism that some of this sort of criticism may be overcome if some innovation does occur. First, the i/b/o project takes as a starting assumption that new or improved conceptual devices or vocabularies are necessary given a period of possible transformation under globalisation, as chapter two suggests. The current ‘problematic salience’ of the triad is deduced from a variety of policy issues: to suggest but a few, fragmentation and integration developments such as the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, African states, and regional integration (EU, NAFTA) along with the implications of mass movement from migration, refugees, capital, and information.

While these are not all ‘new’ issues, as Lapid maintains, they are increasingly problematic because in the post-Cold War era, i/b/o issues are increasingly driven by patterns of ‘complexity’ and ‘fluidity’. Developments that involve contradictions and changes in identity (ethnic conflict, for example), borders (globalisation, for example), and the international order (configurations of ‘nation’ and ‘state’, for instance) pose these sorts of puzzles. IR has begun to respond to these problematics in what he calls the ‘X without Y’ and/or the ‘W plus Z’ fashion; recent publications in the discipline discuss ‘Sovereignty without Territoriality’, ‘Nations without

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6 Ibid.
Borders’, or ‘Order without the Other’, or ‘glocalisation’ and ‘fragmagination’. While these suggest a new problematisation or focus, they unfortunately deploy a simplistic ‘either/or’ dynamic that can miss some nuances of contemporary transformation.

Furthermore, system mobilities (diasporas, migration, transnational economic actors) suggest a need to problematise both identity and place, and then look at any overarching changes in the international system. The clear correlation between who one is and where one lives has been deeply ingrained in the modern worldview, a pattern that extends far back in history. For centuries, people tended to stay put. Kinship structures dictated that roots be laid in a particular dimension of space—perhaps a hamlet, region, fiefdom, or more recently, a nation-state. The lack of advanced forms of communication and transportation limited mobility and the transfer of ideas; most people kept their lives (and thus their identities) tethered to a territory. This is now under possible transformation.

Given the complexity, puzzles, and turbulence of the current period where international politics is increasingly transitory and uncertain, however, previously easy categorisations may not be able to come to terms with a changing global environment. But interest in the relationships between identity, space, gender, representation, and difference consolidating in the field of border studies discussed in the previous chapter has, according to some scholars, led to very fruitful unraveling of older, enlightenment “ways of seeing”. In the end, an ‘engaged pluralist’ approach, considering multiple techniques of inquiry, and an emphasis on ontological, not exclusively methodological issues, seems wise. The i/b/o project is being developed in that spirit.

Three Key Concepts

Of all the concepts used to understand the social and political world, why isolate and gather these three? Because they are abstract or generic ideas generalised from a particular instances or phenomena, certain ‘key’ concepts should be adopted for study because they canvasses an important slice of reality. When looking at

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8 For a further discussion of issues of approach, see Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil, eds., The Return of Culture and Identity in International Relations Theory (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner, 1996).
many aspects of the international political realm, the broad, interrelated concepts of 'identity', 'border', and 'order' seem to characterise a surprising amount of activity.

In the case of 'identity', instead of seeing it as an appendix to basic social structures or an epiphenomenal phenomena which would eventually give way to larger universalisation projects, as traditional IR scholars once did, identity emerged after the Cold War with increased status in a field that usefully began to take a 'cultural turn'. From the question of identity, it may be suggested, many other issues flow. And indeed, this concept will maintain its centrality because of its existential, fundamental nature and its continued—if always contested—application in various socio-political practices, from conflict to popular culture and demographics. The increased political relevance of difference in a more heterogeneous world has gone hand in hand with renewed wider theoretical engagement with identity in the field.

The salience and richness of the 'borders' concept should be clear from the previous discussion in chapters two and three, so no additional space will be spent on it here. With the resurgence of the concept in other fields of social analysis, it seems apt to include it in an IR study, because, like identity, borders too are ever-lasting components of any bound political community—and phenomena which are always 'crossed' in some interesting way. Moreover, they are universal experiences in many social and political realms; researching them, as Keith and Pile point out, can reveal 'injustices and old polarities, naturalized in our imagined geographies where everybody is ascribed a popular place, [which] can be deconstructed through the politics of location'. Because they posit the limits of 'inside' and 'outside', of self and other, as this thesis illustrates, we can use them as vehicles for many kinds of research.

Including borders on the same level as the more established concepts of identities and orders may be surprising to some in IR, particularly given its non-theoretical and unremarkable conceptual background in the field. However, as indicated earlier, the concept's productivity lies in revealing questions of difference and territoriarity in many social and political classifications and interactions.

The inclusion of 'orders' in the triad should be clear to most IR scholars, as this is one of the 'bedrock', traditional issues of inquiry in the field, connoting political control and form or generally alternatives to formlessness in the system (or

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9 See Yosef Lapid, 'Culture's Ship', in The Return of Culture and Identity.
in extreme cases, anarchy). Many of the great questions of war and peace, governance, regulation, diplomacy, and international regimes, to name but a few, concern order—its components, norms, actors, direction, and changes. Debate over the nature of the emerging post-Cold War ‘order’ or ‘disorder’, for example, or the impact of globalisation seems to dominate the field. Post-Cold War foreign policy structures all, in some way, try to come to terms with what the emerging ‘order’ actually is indeed and how it can be dealt with. As economic and social expansion, instability, and change emerge as foci of policy considerations (markedly differing from prior state-centric and strategic encounters between superpowers), questions and descriptions of ‘order change’ are proffered with increased frequency by many IR scholars, including Kratochwil, Ruggie, Duchacek, Taylor, Rosenau, among many others. One common strain in their thinking is a sense that the international order is being altered and, somehow, possibly integrated by transnational forces, democratisation, a globalising political economy, and increased socio-cultural transaction and, generally, some sort of change. The resulting questions of order, from multi-level governance, to regimes, to splintered federalism, suggest a world where anarchy, norms, and interaction may be increasingly socially constructed factors that can be reflexively understood. Indeed, many of these issues of social and political constitution are being intriguingly theorised within what has become known as the ‘constructivist’ school in IR which is rising in prominence as the so-called new ‘middle ground’ of the discipline. Regardless of approach, order should be also considered a ‘lasting’ concept as any particular ‘world order’ is a temporary and contingent situation.

**Analysis of the Triad**

But why assemble these three concepts together in this manner? The i/b/o project envisions the grouping will be productive for several reasons. First, as Lapid asserts,

they form a triad because they are not merely related to, but strongly implicated in, each other. It follows that, if we want to study problems associated with one of these concepts, we cannot avoid—or, at least, we can richly benefit from—also considering the other two.14

Thus, the nexus of the concepts are interrelated in an interesting way because they are *co-constituting*, not simply associated with one another in some way. They are best studied as processes in relation. These are triangular relationships that tie, ironically almost ‘circularly’ to one another. Because the triad probes interrelated, mutually constituted relationships in space and time, it represents the potential for opening up new directions in social theory. Natter and Jones, articulating support for such a rationale agree:

> inasmuch as social relations constitute and embed both identities and space, theorizing the linkages between these moments is an important task for social theory.15

The i/b/o triad, and other similar pluralistic analyses, are well designed for such an exploration.

Second, by mining and then integrating cross-disciplinary research on each concept—beyond the rigid disciplinary channels in which they are typically studied—fertile ‘hybridisation’ and new ideas may result from i/b/o research.16 As Dogan maintains, this process of hybridisation begins with borrowing and lending of concepts, methods, theories, and praxes.17 Since scholars in a variety of disciplines have particular expertise on each concept, it makes sense to invite such dialogue vis-à-vis the triad’s connections.

For the IR field in particular, Lapid maintains the triad can be useful in developing theory for several reasons: first, conceptual orientation on the new map

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of global politics can proceed without resorting to pre-given categories of analysis. Second, it can help integrate a theoretically fragmented IR, ‘balancing fragmenting…tendencies’ in a ‘divided discipline’ with ‘integrative concepts and opportunities through a flexible tool like i/b/o’.\(^{18}\) This is done in the spirit of a flexible academic mindset and an engaged, pluralistic approach to theorising. Work that has the triad in common, but may approach the issues with conflicting worldviews or metatheoretical positions, could be shared because of this common point of reference and thus may potentially be less likely to be ignored \textit{a priori} by the discipline.

Finally, the triad provides something often needed when examining complex issues like globalisation or migration: focus. This is done by narrowing and isolating three key concepts and their relationships to one another. Too often, many studies of globalisation can lack clarity because they get lost in the large field of questions at hand or ignore the local or regional perspective. Taking even just one segment of the i/b/o triad (for instance identity-order relationships in the study of ethnic conflict and multilateral intervention), may help a researcher pinpoint specific questions and find the best lines of approach.

As a cautionary note to all this, it is important to recognise that triads like i/b/o are not to be accepted as unproblematic \textit{prima facie} nor should they be assumed to be ‘critical’ as such. There are both theoretical and political implications and problems with these kinds of moves; as noted earlier, the triad is only intended to help de-couple rigidity, to open up new cognitive possibilities and then highlight certain relationships that partly inform and constitute a changing global order. It cannot, nor does it, pretend to begin to explain the whole of reality or international politics, or offer all the dimensions of particular socio-political phenomena like borders. Rather it simply intends to offer a new, slightly different path of approach which may help shed new light on some of the puzzles of a changing global order.

\textit{Methodological Issues and Critiques}

There are several methodological issues worth noting here. First, it should be remembered the i/b/o model is a \textit{pre-theoretical}, orienting tool. The project, as it is currently set out, does not seek to engage in formal theory building, nor does it prioritise one particular component of the triad or posit causal dominance. Each

\(^{18}\) K.J. Holsti, \textit{The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory} (London:
component of the triad interacts and is interdependent with the other two, but is not necessarily a dependent variable or privileged theoretically.

Second, as alluded to above, the i/b/o tool is itself neutral about ontological, epistemological, or methodological preferences. The empirical work informed by it may be approached from a variety of pluralistic perspectives (such as post-structuralism, discourse analysis, neo-realism, interpretivism, positivism, feminism, and others). Recognising different epistemological assumptions, however, does not necessitate relativism in distinguishing between them. While using the tool, for example, we can hold on to a critical theory perspective that seeks to maintain notions of progress, foundational ethics, and reason. Or, a researcher could, for example, undertake a realist analysis of the role of force and nationalism in boundary construction during a conflict. This study in particular is committed to a critical, sociological perspective on the i/b/o triad, as applied in the case study chapters.

While the tool is wide and open, the individual researcher's approach and usage of the concepts need not be. For the purposes of this study, it is necessary to set out some initial narrowing limits for the discussion: 'borders' will be considered examined generally as interstate boundaries (but to a degree also as metaphors and representations)—and the American borderlands in particular; 'orders' denotes the patterns of governance and modes of domestic and international interaction in the North American case (under NAFTA); and 'identity' here is explored in terms of collective identity, understood often as nationalism. The approach is broadly interpretive, utilising narrative analysis as a methodological tool for explorations around particular 'legs' of the triad.

### 4.2 Collective Identity and Space—An 'I-B' Dynamic

Any discussion of identity, whether couched in terms of gender, sexuality, race, or class, necessarily involves the questions of boundaries—as in where and how identity becomes circumscribed.

—Wolfgang Natter and John Paul Jones

Pointing to the importance of 'boundaries' in identity issues, Natter and Jones echo in a poststructural voice a well-known, mainstream political geographer working years ago. Writing in 1978, J.R.V. Prescott offered a relatively standard analysis of borders in *Boundaries and Frontiers*. After surveying border typologies,
terminology, and border disputes around the world, he offered this claim about identities and borders:

It was suggested...that a boundary may exert some influence upon the attitudes of persons living in the borderland and on the policies of states separated by the boundaries. The studies have not yet been made which would justify or reject this concept.20

The i/b/o triad, as applied here, undertakes exactly this goal: evaluating attitudes, and identities that are intimately related and sometimes co-constituted by both material and discursive border practices. Part of the overall i/b/o agenda calls for research that can interrogate the socially constructed nature of identity, particularly under conditions of globalisation. This, in turn, has implications for world order: a tension, this comment suggests, may exist as collective, state-identity (civic and to a certain degree ethnic-centred) moves higher or lower within an individual’s schema of identification priorities and allegiances, thus lending support or resistance to the variety of official state projects which may draw upon these symbolic resources. As the case studies will illustrate in the U.S., the manipulation (or highlighting) of national collective identity through the vehicle of the border, for example, can lend political support to particular elites, institutions, and policies.

This section takes a specific, identity-border (‘i-b’) dynamic in the triad to study theoretically. The move from triad to dyad in this section is largely a schematic exercise, designed to isolate a key relationship (‘i-b’) for intense study and then proceeding in the case studies and conclusion to draw larger connections with order. Here, political territoriality, the processes of regulation and control over territory, is seen to be important in identity consolidation, connecting space to a sense of group uniqueness or elements of national myth. Identity consolidation is a historically contingent process which fluctuates, based partly on state policy action in reterritorialisation or deterritorialisation and other transient factors. Understood in another way, the effect can be related to state inclusion and exclusion of certain transnational mobilities at international borders—of undocumented workers or asylum seekers, for example. This works in the American case, and probably others around the world, to help reconfigure and strengthen a coherent sense of collective national identity.

While much of the IR literature acknowledges the relationship between territory and identity by analysing how nationalism is tied to notions of the ‘land’,

e.g., one’s ‘motherland’ or ‘fatherland’, the theoretical implications of bordering practices and border ‘settings’ through narrative and material practices—the concepts under examination here—are surprisingly underdeveloped. This leads Natter and Jones to complain the spatial component of collective identity formation is woefully under-conceptualised. They attempt to redress this through a post-structuralist vein, drawing upon Derrida and Mouffe’s work. Their task is to ‘envision a post-structuralist, or non-essentialist, theory of space that is commensurate with post-structuralist identity theory’; to do this, they attempt to ‘dislodge remaining essentialisms from spatial thought’.

Such a post-structuralist route, while promising in that it questions established ontological and methodological premises, need not be the only approach to the study of identity formation and borders. ‘Spatialised’ narratives of identity can also be explored from more ‘traditional’ starting points. Marable, for example, has linked a notion of ‘bordering’ with processes of exclusion, arguing that the concepts of ethnicity and race involve differentiation, processes that tend to operate in an opposite directions against the other; in the case of African-Americans, for instance, exclusion was used to help realise difference from white Americans (but not inferiority towards whites), but in the case of white Americans, bordering was used to affect and indicate subordination of Blacks.

Surprisingly few scholars read in IR, with the notable exception of Anderson, Barth, Conversi, and select others, however, set out to examine these complex and varied relationships between identity and borders. Those that do, such as Anderson and O’Dowd, usefully point out the core i/b/o relationship at stake as they discuss the relationship between borders and those peoples and things they enclose:

Territorial borders both shape and are shaped by what they contain, and what crosses or is prevented from crossing them. The ‘container’ and ‘contents’ are mutually exclusive.

It should be remembered there is no necessary (or generally empirically demonstrated) congruence between culture, society, and state. While, as pointed out earlier, borders may be arbitrary simplifications and designated limits of the political, the relationship between this bounded space and the identities within them

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21 Natter and Jones, ‘Identity, Space, and Other Uncertainties’, 143.
22 Ibid., 142.
is still important. Few scholars have examined this relationship, and most studies of collective identity formation, although they may deal with the factor of territory (such as a ‘homeland’ especially in cases of ethnic identity), have neglected to examine the edges of that space: the borders and their discourses which themselves act in the production of collective identities.

When considering the formation of collective identity for this study, then, at least three factors must be considered. First, the making of identities is seen as an active, constructed, and modern process that involves inclusion and exclusion against others; the resulting form is one of potentially many identities an individual might hold or prioritise. Like any other act of classifying reality, constructing an identity is a creative process of actively ‘sculpting’ distinct mental clusters, and as noted earlier, there are multiple ‘maps’ of overlapping and competing identities each of us carry. National identity is one of several possible overlapping identities but nevertheless is often the most salient and politically manifest identities which the state is in a position to territorialise and help construct. It remains a highly important form of collective identity in international politics. Second, the imaginary process of creating traditions and of activating collective memories extends through time and is historically contingent. Third, collective identities have a spatial referent under analysis here, the reinforcement of which can help create difference against an other.

The example of Europe anchors these points. The quest for an overarching political structure in the EU, for instance, demands a rethinking of the nature of the borders of ‘nation’ and ‘state’ where, as Platt and Jones suggest, ‘frontier-fixity dissolves [and] no neat pattern of region and/or nationality seems likely to replace it...the feuds of tomorrow are likely to be far more avarice than has been anticipated: state-nations, long-buried nationalities, immigrants, new regional identities and rising city states are all jostling for houseroom inside the new Europe’. Europe is simultaneously undergoing processes of centralisation and of fragmentation as boundaries are devalued and valued simultaneously, overlapping different spheres of identity as well as economic and social management.

Exclusionary practices may help solidify collective identity. Conceptions of national ‘security’, for example, are increasingly correlated to political identities which exist partly through the construction of boundaries with the dangerous other. As Campbell has successfully illustrated with his landmark study of the Gulf War, the narratives of security in that military action were written through a process of ‘othering’ the Iraqi enemy, essentially drawing borders: a ‘line in the sand’.  

Recently, Takacs has persuasively demonstrated anti-immigration discourse in the U.S.-Mexico case works on a symbolic level to recuperate a coherent sense of national identity in response to the social and psychic ‘alien-nation’ caused by the global penetration of capitalism.

She goes on to argue that under conditions of transnationalism, ‘containment’ is sought by certain state actors through forms of exclusion, such as Proposition 187, a harsh anti-immigration measure approved by voters in California in 1994; this is a notion which will be explored in greater depth in the case studies. For strength and distinctiveness, she argues, nations constitute themselves against the other. Indeed in the first instance, the idea of a bordered nation necessarily implies the existence of others, as Gellner often asserted. This line of argument has recently been extended by Triandafyllidou who argues nationalism must be understood as ‘double-edged’ or ‘inclusive-exclusive’: thus in addition to limiting who is included in the civic or ethnic community, ‘the quest for authenticity of the national self is inseparable from the conception of others’. This is particularly true for those individuals or groups that pose a perceived and/or real ‘treat’ (such as migrants or terrorists, as suggested here). The argument in this thesis goes further—connecting the spatial dynamic within the i/b/o triad—suggesting state borders serve to help realise the material and discursive practices of reinforcing national identity, separating the included from the excluded and actualising difference and sometimes division.


Proposition 187 was a public referendum in California which was highly exclusionary; it denied undocumented workers access to many public services, including welfare, non-emergency medical care, and other social benefits. Officials were obliged to report individuals they suspected to be ‘illegal’ to immigration authorities. A U.S. Federal District Judge later ruled many of provisions unconstitutional, however, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), the subject of later chapters on the U.S. borderlands, re-imposed many similar welfare restrictions.


All of these notions, however, rely on particular conceptual and theoretical notions of nationalism as collective identity. Because of continual misuse by scholars, the term ‘nation’ has lost much of its meaning, leading Tishkov to usefully assert ‘nation and nationalism...are not academic or politically functional categories’.\textsuperscript{34} Weberian or historical approaches understand nationalism as a global phenomena localised within particular states; over the years, this dominant ‘meta-categorical’ usage has resulted in terminological confusion surrounding ‘nation’, ‘nationalism’, ‘multi-national’, and ‘transnational’. The distraction in many contemporary IR accounts caused by the synonymous, inter-changeable usage of ‘nation’ and ‘state’ is another example; all of this often moves far beyond the ethnic designations many scholars employed when first using the term.

While this is not a project on nationalism per se, this conceptual problem is acknowledged and more disciplined use of ‘nationalism’ is sought which depends on a highly state or polity focussed account, broadly understood as a unification of a group on civic (and sometimes ethnic) grounds, over a particular territory with a shared, perceived historical framework and myth, culture, and economy. Accordingly, this account seeks to see it as a form of collective identity that is predicated on the concepts of instrumentality and malleability in explaining a particular ideological movement centred around a civic group identity, e.g., ‘nationalism’, and its change.\textsuperscript{35} The focus is on the state which can substantiate a collectivity through particular power-imbued practices and discourses, the primary tools of such consolidations.

Ultimately, this rests on a theory that argues for the social construction of identity.\textsuperscript{36} This is by no means an uncontested notion. Before proceeding, then, with an analysis of the interplay between nationalism and bounded space, some discussion of this particular school of national identity formation and change, within the larger context of nationalism studies, is necessary.

\textit{‘Modern’ Nationalism: A Brief Theoretical (De)tour}

As discussed, because it is difficult phenomenon to define and theorise, the study of nationalism is a large and complicated enterprise, splintered, sometimes

\textsuperscript{36} For an excellent overview of this literature, see Craig Calhoun, ed., \textit{Social Theory and the Politics of Identity} (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994).
misappropriated, and in any event involving many scholarly debates well beyond critique or explication here. One debate relating to the nature of the bond between nation, territory, and borders, nonetheless, is of import and relates to the question: is nationalism a modern, socially constructed phenomenon with a role for elites and susceptible to change or a transcendent, 'primordialist' phenomenon that is generally unchangeable?37 This distinction remains critical as it is brought to bear on the premises of critical theory and the socially constructed nature of boundaries.

Scholars who advance the instrumentalist perspective include Hobsbawm and Brass; they see nationalism (as understood here) as generally an elite-oriented, modern phenomenon.38 Indeed, as Motyl suggests, while different theorists provide different answers on how the nation is formed, most 'premise their arguments on the centrality of elites'.39 Hobsbawm, for instance, argues the nation is an 'invented' tradition devised by political elites to legitimise their power—collective identity, then, is an artificial and epiphenomenal phenomenon that can be manipulated. Moreover, ultimately, they suggest, the nation 'belongs exclusively to a particular and historically recent, period'.40

Similarly, Brass rejects the primordialist view that every person carries with him or her certain attachments derived from place of birth, kinship, relationships, religion, and language that are 'natural' and not subject to choice. While such attachments may have 'emotive significance', Brass suggests they are 'variable', especially when people command more than one language, change religious affiliation, and move globally through the new milieu of social and economic space, illustrated by the increases in mass travel, migration, and diasporic activity, for example. For these thinkers, the study of elite competition and manipulation is the key to understand nationalism. Such perspectives clash quite clearly with those of the primordialists like Van den Berghe who argue nationalism is a natural, deep seeded, pre-modern, socio-biological event associated with kinship and the believe the nation-state is a kind of 'super-family'.41

The modernist/instrumentalist perspective (while simplified here), however, can be more telling because it can explain the growing fluidity of identities drawn out and overlapped in part by the breakdown of multinational states, the proliferation of multinational corporations which draw power away from the state, and rapid technological and economic transformations such as large migrant worker/expatriate populations—the developments drawn out in chapter two. Multiple and hybrid identities characteristic of late modernity, such as Turks in Germany or Mexicans in the United States, are becoming more common. While not a 'modernist' as such, Anthony Smith traces a key historical point made by one set of nationalism scholars that explains why the modernist approach is so salient in these situations. These scholars, he points out, argue the resistance to economic exploitation by core states in the 16th century took the form of nationalism as a force for industrialisation and mass mobilisation. Anderson, and Marxist analysts like Naim, point to similar economic factors as clearly modern underpinnings of nationalism while Gellner suggests the most frequently recurring element of nationhood is a common culture.

More importantly, Smith identifies another 'modern' school premised on the understanding that

ethnic and national units afford convenient 'sites' for generating mass support in the universal struggle of elites...ethnic symbols and boundaries are able to evoke greater commitment...under a single banner. This view, Smith asserts, holds 'ethnicity as fundamentally instrumental', lending support to the argument here identities are, to a significant degree, socially constructed and able to be altered and manipulated as the political community widens or narrows, potentially excluding or reinforcing ethnic or national feelings. This melds well with a border-oriented approach to identity construction that relies on narrative, symbolic, state manifestations of difference and consolidation in civic or ethnic collective identity situations within and across boundaries.

_Borders and Nationalism_

Borders, indeed, are critical to the study of nationalism. Conversi goes so far as to maintain 'nationalism is a struggle over the definition of spatial boundaries'.

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43 Ibid.
His argument goes on to suggest 'no nationalism is conceivable apart from the nation-state'; and in fact, nationalism has a 'crucial border-generating function'.

He has recently extended the argument to include a renewed emphasis on cultural selection in nationalist mobilisations through boundary setting. Ultimately, boundaries are needed to provide distinction between groups and symbolise important aspects of national identity. They are critical state substantiation practices to consolidate civic-ethnic identity, especially in shifting borderland zones sometimes subject to 'foreign' influence. Lanternari places the debate back in the realm of critical theory:

> groups tend to define themselves, not by reference to their own characteristics, but by exclusion, that is by comparison to 'strangers'.

Nationalism and collective identity formation, thus, can be a process of reterritorialisation, excluding and differentiating against the other. Such boundaries, Wolin asserts, 'are a metaphor of containment' that proclaim identity and difference.

Barth reinforces this argument through his discussion of the symbolism of borders, surveying the separation and differentiation that formulate social attitudes. Paralleling Smith’s second school of modernists, Barth ‘examines the border guards and boundary mechanism that separate and differentiate social groups in their attitudes and perceptions’, to a large degree the goal of the empirical work that follows. Boundaries, then, are both attributes and causes of the ‘principles of separation’ the national community is concerned with—they differentiate the other and thus help define the self.

Similarly, Anderson’s more symbolic-focused analysis follows Barth’s model, highlighting the

> various 'border guards', symbols that make the barriers between 'us' and 'them' (the strangers and outsiders) visible.

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47 Ibid., 75.
51 Barth, *EthnicGroups and Boundaries*.
These kind of distinctions are precisely the kind of analysis critical theory seeks because they allow us to begin to answer Linklater's challenging question about how we understand 'separateness'. Through what Conversi calls 'transactionalism', i.e., the exchanges and relationships between human groups, 'separateness' of identity and nationality are constructed. The contesting forces over and under boundaries, then, ultimately help create difference. And as Paasi reminds us, borders and their meanings of national identity are historically contingent and part of the production and institutionalisation of territories and territoriality, and thus of order. Collective identities, in the end, as Zúñiga persuasively writes

are essentially unique combinations of temporal (historical) dimensions and of spatial (territorial) dimensions. Common history and common territory—this pair permits affective, symbolic, and intersubjective recognition among human beings—where territory touches narrative.

These views, as noted, are not without opposition; Grosby’s work on territoriality is an important counter-critique worth discussion. He understands territoriality as a ‘transcendent primordial’ feature of modern societies that would seem to stand in opposition to this thesis. Grosby rejects the assertions of Giddens, Gellner, Anderson, and Hobsbawm that ‘territoriality and nationality are exclusively modern phenomena’ preferring instead a deeper, ‘structural, symbolic condition’ for territory. Interestingly, Grosby admits the modern proliferation of communication, technology, and global markets have made larger territories possible and even suggests smaller heterogeneous societies tied to territoriality can exist within larger bounded communities. That admission, however, weakens his earlier claims about the seeming powerful ‘transcendental’ nature of territoriality. While territorial attachments, borders, and nationality certainly have important emotive significance, they are not natural and immutable. As the theoretical background suggests, and the case studies on the U.S. borderlands will empirically illustrate, national sentiment and territorial ties are instead quite modern, malleable, and in particular, often

55 Conversi, 'Reassessing Current Theories of Nationalism', 77.
60 Ibid., 154.
tractable by elites who influence perceptions through material (e.g., physical boundaries and infrastructure) and discursive (policy and textual) means.

*The Concept of Socio-Spatialisation*

The identities/borders/orders triad as applied here is inherently concerned with how humans understand and are socialised by space and, by direct extension, by borders (e.g., the 'i-b' link). As noted, the way in which identity is impacted by these political delimitations—both material and discursive—is of considerable interest and has implications for order as well. In a recent analysis, Goff argues for this point:

> Despite the penetration of porous national boundaries by foreign goods, people, ideas, and capital, borders delineate a bounded space in which members share a common idiom. Therefore, states can imbue borders with new meaning through the (re)construction of the political community that lies within them.61

But political community can also be reconstructed from without, through reterritorialisation. Two prominent scholars, Shields and Paasi, are at the forefront in contemporary explorations of the dimensions of this relationship in the social sciences, calling it 'social spatialization' or 'socio-spatialization', respectively.62 For Shields, social spatialisation designates

> the ongoing social construction of the spatial at the level of the social imaginary (collective mythologies, presuppositions) as well as interventions in the landscape.63

The landscape, for example, could be an international border or a cityscape, perhaps an inner-city ghetto. Social spatialisation, in these terms, suggests imagined geographies, metaphors, and divisions driven by socio-political practices. Similarly, Shields goes on to argue that through social spatialisation, 'places and spaces are hypostatised from the world of real space relations to the symbolic realm of cultural significations'; material and discursive means transfer the external social world to the inner, personal realm of individuals.64

The approach used in the case studies, however, follows Paasi on the construction of 'socio-spatial consciousness' because it has a more strictly socio-

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64 Ibid., 47.
political perspective. Socio-spatial consciousness is the process whereby individuals and communities are socialised as members of a territorially bound community. Because the power structures which govern borders dictate their material and symbolic dimensions, they construct narratives and traditions of social cohesion and common fate. They thus are directly connected with collective identity formation. This is a fascinating relationship not explicated enough in IR nor constituted in process or i/b/o terms. Of particular interest to this study are the official state narratives that, as the next section of this chapter argues, help construct modern border discourses which impact collective identity formation. These narratives, Paasi writes, are

constructed on national identities and threats, and on bounded, exclusive spaces, [and] are expressions of national socialization processes...boundaries usually play a key role in these narratives.66

People, as Somers and Gibon suggest, locate themselves in social narratives they are often not responsible for.67 States, as argued here, have a major role to play in this socio-spatialisation process, crafting the meanings of the collective (the national) and its boundaries through narratives that often involve divisions between 'us' and the other. National collective identity, in the end, is a discourse partly guided and constructed by official state texts and practices. The inscription of borders and sovereignty vis-à-vis immigration regulation, for example, is well noted by Waever and Doty and will be a subject of analysis later in this thesis.68 The important point here is that borders can be understood as narrative processes impacting collective identity formation rather than simply static modern lines. We examine how in the next section.

65 Paasi, Territories, Boundaries, and Consciousness.
4.3 **Narrative Analysis: A Theoretical and Research Outline**

Writing is the continuation of politics by other means. 
—Philippe Sollers

The premise of this section holds that the reproduction of political space and collective identity are partially driven by the processes and relations of the state system and the intersubjective construction of norms of territoriality and spatiality. Moreover, as previous sections of this chapter suggest, a clear interrelated dynamic of space and identity exists, particularly given the starting assumption that both are socially and politically constituted. In fact, as chapter two illustrated, territoriality, political control over space, is continuously exercised in various ways. Practices of differentiation and representation are key in this ‘maintenance’ project, impacting the wider identities and orders which they link to. Borders, of all kinds, it seems are seen to require patrols. Clearly, actual deployment of state force or the imposition of physical barriers, for instance, are standard practices for such support, as is the international ‘status’ given by other states and international organisations to boundaries. But so too are the discursive *narratives* which allow and support these possibilities, even if they simply serve, as the case studies will suggest, to help create images of ‘control’ whilst transnational flows persist at the same or greater levels—and the underlying ‘chaos’ (designated epistemologically as ‘ignorance’) is somehow ordered in a variety of ways.

In addition to studying new kinds of deterritorialising movements such as globalisation, the interesting question that emerges from a look at these border practices, however, asks under what conditions are these possibilities maintained? How does a democratic state like the U.S. legitimise its control or securitisation of its borderlands? How does it set the parameters for what constitutes national collective identity within and against its borders? How does it re-inscribe national consciousness and differentiation against a growing tide of transnational economic and social forces? In effect, what processes and relations set the limits of political possibility? What current political initiatives and discourse, including symbols, help ‘write’ that space?

In answering these sorts of questions, *discourse* and *narratives* are instrumental. Accordingly, this section suggests a methodology for this sort of
analysis and in the case studies that follow. Discourse analysis is increasingly being used in the social sciences in conjunction with cultural theory and critical theory to unlock the relationships between language and power.\textsuperscript{70} Whilst they of course cannot completely account for the existence of borders, they do set out the possibilities and rules for their operation and continuity, or the official or historical order of discursive and political possibility. Borders simply do not exist; they are constantly in the process of \textit{becoming}, constituted in large part by the interrelationship between identities and orders. The policy narratives which play a role in this relationship are thus the critical objects for examination here: words and symbols have constitutive power in making meaning and creating images which can impact political action. This thesis asks what role representational practices embedded in official policy discourses have in conceptions of identity.

Discourse analysis is an approach that can involve many dimensions; unfortunately the term is now so widely used as to dilute some of its theoretical impact and meaning. Thus, before turning to the empirical studies of recent discourse surrounding the U.S. borderlands and U.S. border control policies (and some of the wider theoretical and practical implications of these practices) the following section provides some working definitions of discourse and an overview of some of the theoretical considerations it involves.

\textit{Discourse: Definitions and Theoretical Implications}

The fluidity of meaning of the term ‘discourse’ makes it a challenge to come up with a precise conceptual definition; its recent vogue in fields like Social Theory, Cultural Studies, Literary Theory, and increasingly IR, has resulted in it being deployed in a variety of consistent and inconsistent ways. Some scholars, for instance, use it interchangeably with ‘text’ whilst others differentiate the two.\textsuperscript{71} Some rely on the strict, more technical examinations of discourse applied in linguistic analysis. Others, like Foucault, link it to power and socio-political structures. His indeed was perhaps the most significant contribution to our understanding of discourse, and some of his thought is examined here.


\textsuperscript{70} Because of the dominance of positivist and rationalist models which use quantitative methodology, IR has often spent ‘little attention to the role of the symbolic in the political process’. See David Kertzer, \textit{Rituals, Politics, and Power} (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988), 7.
The move from its general usage (to signify conversation), to the sense that it embodies a system of rules and representations of experience, was perhaps the most important development in its use in social analysis. As Fowler asserts,

Discourse is speech or writing seen from the point of view of the beliefs, values, and categories which it embodies; these beliefs etc. constitute a way of looking at the world, an organization or representation of experience—‘ideology’ in the neutral non-pejorative sense.72

This definition is very useful for our considerations, particularly if paired with Foucault’s deployment which treats discourse ‘sometimes as the general domain of all statements, sometimes as an individualisable group of statements, and sometimes as a regulated practice that accounts for a number of statements’.73 Through this denotation, Foucault expands our understanding of the term to account for a thematic coherence of statements (such as a ‘discourse of post-colonialism’, for example) and he further broadens this by seeking analyses of the ‘regulated’ rules and structures which produce supportive texts.

This move leads to the association of language as a system that helps to determine how people think and express themselves, or in this context, sets the social and political context of possibility. As Mills helpfully clarifies

a discourse is not a disembodied collection of statements, but groupings of utterances or sentences...which are determined by that social context and which contribute to the way that social context continues its existence.74

Symbols like metaphors are important elements of discourse, and are of particular interest in the case studies. The study of symbols—what Cohen defines as ‘objects, acts, relationships of linguistic formations that stand ambiguously for a multiplicity of meanings, evoke emotions, and impel men to action’75—emulates the goals of Turner, Levi-Strauss, Geertz and others who maintain ‘good social science involves finding the symbolic meaning of everyday social practices’.76

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74 Mills, Discourse, 11.
Metaphors, in particular, are a well-established important component of communication. Because of the connotations they carry, studying them can be productive in uncovering deep meanings. Metaphors help people make sense of politics, often a largely symbolic process. Specifically in the case of some borderlands, metaphors and symbols underpin much of the discourse about national collective identity. Political symbolism, such as signs, walls, and maps, as well as economic and social symbols (the poverty on the southern side of the U.S. Mexico border, for example) compete in the identity games and narratives along the frontier.

Also important here is recognizing that discourses in general are often organised in an exclusionary way: the 'unsayable' is a result of the naturalisation of a particular discourse. Moreover, discourses are in continual contestation with one another and the winning narrative has a highly significant impact in how one interprets a text. Discourse, then, can be seen as the 'practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak': it is instrumental in the production of an outcome.

Within it, a structure emerges, which, as Mills asserts, consists of the 'systematicity of the ideas, opinions, concepts, ways of thinking and behaving which are formed within a particular context, and because of the effects of those ways of thinking and behaving'; the dominant discursive structure, as Foucault would argue, in any particular instance, is constructed and supported by power interests which formulate the 'lenses' through which truth and knowledge are accessed and understood and social relations are formulated. The relationships between social structures, economics, and politics and discourse, Foucault maintained, are complex and non-hierarchical, but each part of a network of overarching power relations.

This formulation, for Foucault, meant altering the notion of subjectivity:

One had to dispense with the constituent subject, to get rid of the subject itself, that's to say to arrive at an analysis which can account for the constitution of the subject within a historical framework. And this is what I would call genealogy, that is a form of history which can account for the constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains of objects, etc., without having to make reference to a subject

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78 As Denzin suggests, 'the metaphor is chiefly a tool for revealing special properties of an object or event'. Ibid., 46. Habermas sees the 'grammar of language games...governs not only the combination of symbols but the interpretation of linguistic symbols through actions and expressions'. See Jürgen Habermas, 'On Hermeneutics Claim to Universality', in *The Hermeneutics Reader: Texts of the German Tradition from the Enlightenment to the Present*, ed. Kurt Mueller-Vollmer (New York: Continuum Press, 1994), 297.
79 Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, 49.
which is either transcendental in relation to the field of events or runs in its empty sameness throughout the course of history.81

Such is the partial goal of a critical discourse analysis or ‘archaeology’ which can unlock and identify struggles over power structures and language and what maintains them.82 In this case, dominant narratives, institutionally produced through a variety of texts, constitute the objects and limits of policy formulation. Moreover, they can be easily rarefied and reproduced; norms and institutional pressures restrict the theoretically infinite number of statements that can be made. Foucault was quick to suggest the order of discourse was thus a highly constrained phenomenon because of these unwritten rules.

Discourse analysis, then, seeks to understand

Any connected discrete linear material...which contains more than one elementary sentence, some global structure characterising the whole discourse or large sections of it. The structure is a pattern of occurrence (i.e., a recurrence of segments of a discourse relative to each other.83

Thus, an analyst looks to language as constituting both the subject of the discourse (the speaker and audience) and the possible objects (desire) of the text.84 Foucault maintained the objective is to show how a particular textual formulations ‘derive (in spite of their extreme diversity, and in spite of their dispersion in time) from the same set of relations’.85 It should also be noted that the discourse need not necessarily reflect political reality, but rather can help construct a variety of political imaginaries.

Accordingly, this approach assumes a ‘constitutive’ theory of language as opposed to ‘referential’ theory which ‘sees language as a neutral medium, passively connecting thoughts and actions’.86 A constitutive theory recognises the processes and relations between language and meaning ‘develop through the strategic

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82 ‘Archaeological’ analysis, for Foucault, involves exactly this sort of analysis of discursive structures, to access not the truth of a statement but the support mechanisms (processes) which keep them in place. See The Archaeology of Knowledge. We should note, however, that many critics point to two ‘phases’ in Foucault’s work. The first, his ‘archaeologies’, concentrates on the autonomous nature of discourse whereas the second, or ‘genealogical’, understands discourse more as an instrument of institutional practices.
83 Zellig Harris, Discourse Analysis Reprints (The Hague: Mouton, 1963), 7
84 This is consistent with critical theory’s collapse of the subject/object distinction.
85 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, 68.
application of discursive practices and *strategies*. The strategies in play suggest the linguistic, rhetorical, or symbolic practices which help realise particular goals by representing individuals, identities, and spaces in various historical modes. But, as Mehan notes, the word 'strategy' can suggest deliberate action but in reality 'participants in discourse seldom choose strategies consciously from a roster of alternatives; they most often use discourse strategies quite unintentionally'. Because of this, he maintains discourse strategies are dependent on the socio-cultural context in which they are deployed; the corresponding political effect means the narrative moulds 'are largely shaped through discursive practices'.

So, whilst this modification is a highly productive theoretical formulation, it still presents questions of agency and also begs the question if it, or this critique itself, is somehow independent of the discursive structures at stake. The short answer is that they are not; the analysts' own theoretical statements are indeed not free of the existing frameworks, but they may or may not challenge dominant discourses and express their own 'truth' within overall limits. Here, the 'reading' of the texts proceeds as an *interrogation*, asking why the discourse takes the particular structure it does, what relations and processes this structure derives from, and what effects the discourse has on state regulatory policies—ultimately the goal is to place the narrative in relationship to state practices. A further difficulty emerges when 'in the quest to use discourse as an attempt to make coherent the incoherences of public life...one discourse trades on the other, borrowing metaphors for justification, creating an inevitable layering of meaning'. The task for the scholar then is to understand intertextuality, acknowledge it as such, but recognise that no discourse, in this sense, stands alone.

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89 Ibid., 252.

90 One could possibly specify the questions asked (the question of authorship; the question of readership (who reads the text); what is the object, the political dynamics, of the text; the question of how the text deals with dissent or other perspectives/paradigms.

'Narrating' Borders: Official State Discourse

Embedded within discourse is narrative, the widespread, interrelated matrix of 'stories' which help make sense of both the cultural-social and the political worlds. 'Story' here does not connote fictional, non-'objective' tales, but rather suggests the knowledges and social 'truths' embedded in particular textual (written, spoken, or visual) representations which help construct the limits of political possibility. Narratives provide key 'framing' devices which contextualise and render intelligible the discursive practices alluded to in the previous section. Schram and Neisser, two leading scholars on the connection between narrative and politics, assert

narrative practices...are embedded in all discourse, making the unavoidable political selectivity of narrative—sometimes called 'bias'—an ineliminable part of all representational practices, including even those of the state.

Ultimately, they assert, narrative 'helps constitute the world as we know it'. Thus, it serves an important role in the socio-political construction of borders of various kinds—political, social, even ethical.

Narratives circulate throughout politics and culture in varying degrees, importance, and dominance. 'Hegemonic' narratives, in fact, may be so pervasive as to go unnoticed, continuously reproduced through a variety of practices (or 'orders' in i/b/o terms), deployed or bolstered by commonly accepted imagery (the guise of national foundation myths or neo-liberalism, for example), some of which are identified in this thesis but often go unexamined. Important to study also are the 'counter-narratives' (to the prevailing power-embedded hegemonic narratives such as the 'New World Order', 'globalisation', the 'American Dream', and so forth) which are often not accessible through prevailing positivist/rationalist epistemologies and ontologies or are simply ignored. Indeed, as we shall see, narrative analysis

92 Falling under this definition are a variety of documents: records, court decisions, legislation, speeches, interviews, reports, essays, maps, and other data: texts is 'a generic term that refers to various forms of written, verbal, and non-verbal communication...that are subject to study and interpretation'. See Danny Balfour and William Mesaros, 'Connecting the Local Narratives: Public Administration as a Hermeneutic Science', Public Administration Review 54, no. 6 (1994): 559.
93 Schram and Neisser, introduction to Tales of the State, 2.
94 Ibid., 5.
opens the scholarly arena to sometimes marginalised approaches to policy, such as social constructivism, cultural theory, poststructuralism, Marxism, and others.

The study of narrative is increasingly being recognised as a productive and interesting inquiry, particularly as textual analysis proceeds along poststructural or critical lines in cultural studies, literary theory, Sociology, and other fields. Narrative policy analysis, which is applied here, stems from a new, post-positivist literature in International Relations and other social sciences which offers new perspectives on problems conventionally analysed from positivist positions; the work focuses on 'how representational practices (whether they are rhetorical, discursive, or symbolic) contextualize, fame, or narrate policy problems and their solutions'. As Dolan and Dumm argue, policy analysis must focus on these representational practices by unearthing how the public, scholars, and policy-makers understand the issue at stake and what is developed on the public agenda.

This kind of analysis can also reveal how narratives become 'particularly effective medium[s] for reinscribing race, gender, or class identities', many of the issues at stake in an i/b/o-oriented research project. Representational practices, as Connolly, Shapiro, Edleman, and others argue, are crucial in designating the naturalised and reproduced identification processes and relations that legitimate the state and connect it to national collective identity. Understanding them is the task at hand here.

In addition to unlocking some of the identity and power/knowledge dynamics surrounding a dominant policy structuring discourse (and how they are perceived publicly), narrative analysis can also be helpful in seeking alternative choices or at least shedding new light on old problems: Neustadt and May, prominent mainstream public policy scholars, for instance, now advise that the question 'What is the story behind an issue?' is a more revealing query for the public policy analyst than 'What

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99 Dolan and Dumm, *Rhetorical Republic*.
100 Schram and Neisser, *Tales of the State*, 2.
is the problem'? Schram and Neisser, in pointing to the possible emancipatory potential of narrative policy analysis, argue it can then 'become a critical practice as well as a theoretical activity'. By deconstructing and denaturalising the narratives implicit in the reproduction of political space, for example, the possibility for transformation or inclusion is opened.

Thus, narrative policy analysis is a salient approach to help understand the dynamics and frameworks articulated by policymakers (and by extension, publics) which support and constitute policy claims and choices. It lets us reflect on the role narratives play—as constitutive forces—in contemporary political controversies and developments. Policy often proceeds after and through a process of contestation between prevailing (or ‘hegemonic’) and counter narratives. Thus a ‘metanarrative’ (small-m, non-homogenising non-totalising), Roe suggests, emerges—even as a temporary stability—as the preferred policy candidate. This tends to be told by comparison to non-stories, or counter-narratives. The case studies and conclusion of this thesis argue in-depth about this process, partly seen as what Bakhtin calls a ‘dialogism’. The emergent metanarratives then set the options for policy deployment, defining the ‘problem’, ‘risk’, or ‘opportunity’ and possible solutions at hand. In such a way, they are not unlike Foucault’s ‘discursive formations’ that mould around certain themes, such as sexuality. They can, however, be extended to classic IR or policy concepts and issues, like the nation-state, immigration, and borders, among others. In studying them, Roe goes on to suggest looking at

stories commonly used in describing and analyzing policy issues [which] are a force in themselves, and must be considered explicitly in assessing policy options...they continue to underwrite and stabilize the assumptions for decision making in the face of high uncertainty, complexity, and polarization.

What is important to remember in a reflexive sense is that because narrative is so pervasive, both the terms in which a policy is deliberated and the policy itself

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103 Schram and Neisser, *Tales of the State*, 5.
104 Ibid., 4, 52.
106 Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. Discursive formations, can be found, according to Foucault, ‘whenever between objects, types of statement, concepts of thematic choices, one can define a regularity (an order, correlations, positions and functionings, transformation)...subjected [to] the rules of formation. The rules of formation are conditions of existence in a given discursive formation’. Idem, 38.
107 Roe, *Narrative Policy Analysis*, 2
are narratives; public policy, in effect, is a politically selective narrative between the state and its citizens.

A frequent charge lodged against narrative analysis (and indeed much of qualitative research) is that it is somehow 'soft', 'relative', or 'non-objective'. Again, the dynamic of discursive/narrative analysis itself helps us sort out that question: because we are entering into the i/b/o-informed research from an interpretive, critical standpoint, research can be done in a reflexive, pluralistic, qualitative manner which examines the processes and relations which constitute both the narrative as well as the real-world policy changes which it allows and reproduces. The approach here does not attempt 'to fit program activities or people’s experiences into predetermined standardized categories' as used in quantitative analysis; thus qualitative research instead seeks to 'understand the point of view and experiences of other persons'.

More importantly, this may be able to unlock some of the power relations and processes which continuously sustain (and constrain) particular narratives. Foucault persuasively illustrated the discursive formations, the connections, orders, correlations, and positions between texts. A good analysis, then, would also 'unmask' or 'unpack' the prevailing framings of international political phenomena, such as territoriality and collective identity, and open these to potential conceptual and empirical transformation in a system of plural values. In the end, we can never truly understand the object of analysis independent of how it is mediated and represented in existing narratives. Even facts, as Lyotard argued, are constructed through narratives.

In this case, as Presnell maintains, however, narrative analysis does provide a firm footing for knowledge claims by analysing source data (interviews and policy texts, in this study) to 'make explicit the implicit meanings' of the 'authors' in the context of their identity and worldview. In terms of falsification, counter-examples to the claim that discourse can explain the political actions studied might be offered (from a different social science perspective, for example). But, as Larsen states, 'the discourse [or narrative] framework is very general (as its aim is to present general structures in the language) and the limits to the nature of the politics which

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108 Patton, Qualitative Evaluation Methods, 22, 36.
would fall within the discourse framework are wide'; this is not, he writes, ‘qualitatively different from other macro approaches in the social sciences’ such as realism in IR.\(^{111}\)

Accordingly, it should also be noted a discursive or narrative analysis does not rule out other explanations but rather seeks to complement them in a pluralistic way; as discussed earlier, other structural explanations (material, for example) are possible. As Waever suggests, discursive analysis, can even begin to ‘link’ different theories, such as domestic pressures, psychological factors, interest groups, and other commonly accepted factors in political actions.\(^{112}\)

One of the main institutional sanctioning, control, and production sites in modern states is official government discourse. Governments have a special role in both deploying and writing policy (in a discursive sense) and crafting a particular ‘order’. Here, a highly salient example of the power/knowledge nexus comes into play. Official narratives play a key ideational role in affecting the structures of knowledge surrounding policy initiatives, formulating the constrained and unwritten rules within which they are decided upon, and representing solutions; these are then supported or rejected among the public in democratic situations.\(^{113}\) The parameters of official discourse could potentially range from mild social regulation to a desire, expressed through metaphor and paradigmaticity, to ‘repair the state’s legitimation deficit’ through the creation of ‘a distinct object that is fashioned from the discourses of law, epistemology, social science, and common-sense’ to help maintain existing ideological and state apparatuses.\(^{114}\)

In this sense, official state narratives fall within what Bakhtin calls an ‘authoritative discourse’, an automatically privileged, non-interpretable narrative:

The authoritative word demands that we acknowledge it, that we make it our own; it binds us, quite independent of any power it might have to persuade us internally; we encounter it with its authority already fused to it. The authoritative word is located in a distanced zone, organically connected with a past that is felt to be hierarchically higher. It is, so to speak, the word of the fathers.\(^{115}\)

Thus, it makes sense to speak of an official discourse, of a dominant narrative (reproduced both through international systemic forces and domestically through

\(^{111}\) Larsen, *Foreign Policy and Discourse Analysis*, 33.

\(^{112}\) Waever, ‘The Language of Foreign Policy’.


\(^{114}\) Burton and Carlen, *Official Discourse*, 30, 34.

texts: official policy documents, policy speeches, administrative rules, websites, and so forth) which has a distinct and important role in reproducing, for example, the authority of the state over its borders and its practices which have an impact on collective identity. Indeed, as Somers and Gibson write, these ‘struggles over narrations are...struggles over identity’. Where and how that ‘border’ is set, both literally and discursively, is a window on how ‘the political’ is set and realised. Narratives play a key role in constructing this political space and thus constitute an important area of i/b/o examination. How the ‘problem’, in effect, is defined in the narrative is vitally important; as Burton and Carlen suggest, ‘official discourse places subjects within sets of knowledges and modes of recognition that produce specific and meaningful readings’.

Important too are the ‘stories’ which are not told. Stone, Schram, and Neisser in fact contend that the goal of a critical policy analyst should ‘not be to distinguish reasoned deliberation from instances of rumormongering, but to interrogate all policy-making activity for its narrativity and asses the consequences given the persuasiveness of particular tales’. We must, as Shapiro persuasively suggests, ‘unread’ narratives, looking for their ‘remainders’, or what has been left out in order to understand the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion. In that spirit, some of the counter-narratives of the American borderlands, for instance, are identified later in chapters of this thesis.

As will be argued in the next two chapters, however, the metanarrative there seems to be in tension with the dynamics of reterritorialisation (such as neo-racism, border ‘control’) and deterritorialisation (NAFTA, for instance). This is consistent with the assumption that the process of formulating such subjects in discourse and practice is continual and always contested. At a time of post-Cold War uncertainty, some communities are at odds with increased global or regional integration and a propensity to turn inward to national, regional, or ethnic identities for expression under globalisation emerges. The discursive search for new ‘enemies’ in ‘illegal immigrants’, for example as Mehan indicates, is on—just as is the concomitant

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117 Somers and Gibson, ‘Reclaiming the Epistemological “Other”’.
118 Ibid., 46.
119 Schram and Neisser, *Tales of the State*, 6; Stone, *Policy Paradox*.
121 For an excellent example of French reterritorialisation practices which is informed by Giles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s work on coding desire, see Doty, ‘Neoracism and the Politics of Desire’.

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narrative supporting border control and securitisation to ‘protect’ American sovereignty (and identity) as the balance of this thesis suggests.

The critique in the empirical component of this thesis examines how the components and structure of official state discourse on the U.S. borderlands is framed, how this can in some cases present a ideological or ideational ‘closure’ and then turns to other theoretical and policy implications the official narrative poses.\(^{122}\) This is done recognising official state discourse has the tendency to ‘set up its own credentials in such a way that it can both hammer home the point of its own study and adjudicate between other versions of the story, incorporating some versions, over-ruling others’; it is pedagogical in the sense it presents ‘proper’ examples and must be analysed as such.\(^{123}\) Before moving on to do this, however, it will be useful to trace existing work on narrative analysis and then set out a methodology for the studies.

**Narrative Policy Analysis in Action**

In addition to the case study developed here, several recent, important studies of narrative and politics have illustrated the salience and productivity of this approach. One IR scholar who has worked extensively in these terms is Michael Shapiro. Utilising innovative textual analysis methods and texts, Shapiro’s writings on various kinds of ‘representations’ like language and imagery have illuminated many debates in an informed poststructural/critical way.\(^{124}\) While only encompassing a portion of his work, his studies of narratives are controversial, but stimulate debate as they denaturalise commonly accepted IR concepts and narratives.\(^{125}\)

Shapiro’s work on immigration and political narratives in the United States is of particular relevance here, not only for his theoretical contributions, but also because of what he has chosen to examine: migration and the American political and

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\(^{122}\) Burton and Carlen argue that official discourse is largely a ‘signifying practice’ manifested as a ‘technology of ideological closure’ which only extend legitimacy to the capitalist politico-judicial structures of the state. See *Official Discourse*, 8-13.

\(^{123}\) Ibid., 77, emphasis in original.


\(^{125}\) See his groundbreaking co-edited collection, *Challenging Boundaries*, which marks a crucial turn in ‘border’ related work and is dealt with in the literature section of chapter three: Michael J. Shapiro and Hayward R. Alker, eds., *Challenging Boundaries: Global Flows, Territorial Identities* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996),
identity community. Seeking to understand the aftermath of the 1994 U.S. Republican party’s ‘Contract with America’ as it relates to anti-immigrant sentiment, Shapiro deploys a narrative analysis of the construction of immigrants and ‘illegal aliens’ who transgress borders as ‘threats to valued models of personhood and to images of a unified national society and culture’, images which have important political manifestations: ‘they are continuously recycled in the narratives that constitute the “American” nation’.

Using an historical analysis of several ethnographical and sociological reports from the early twentieth century to today (ranging from President Theodore Roosevelt to E.A. Ross to Peter Brimelow), Shapiro argues this widely read work ‘questions the ability of American society to assimilate culturally the current influx of people to (what they construct as) an American cultural core’, supposedly necessary for the sustenance of the American democratic ‘idea’. Important here is Shapiro’s ability, through the narrative analysis, to link identity and the national story, which, he argues, has been written to ‘connect personhood with the national identity...particularly contentious during periods in which the boundaries of the self have been altered’; arguably the case under current conditions of globalisation. The notion of borders is critical in this process of ‘constituting Americans’.

A focus on narrative and borders is supported by Shapiro’s contention that ‘the story of a unified national culture, designed to legitimate the ethnic and spatial boundary policing of the modern state, retains its force’. Through key textual illustrations which illustrate—although incompletely—the debate over immigration in the United States (perhaps one of the most widely recognised abilities and hence support-generating factors for ‘strong’ borders), Shapiro shows how narrative analysis can uncover the ‘alienating scripts’ which produce the alien other. He does this as an attempt to create an opening to ‘relax territorial models of identity and [recognise] the amoeba-like existence of cultural boundaries’, which would lead to the important recognition ‘there can be no culturally dangerous others, only dangerous ways of estranging others’.

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127 Ibid., 17-18.
128 Ibid., 19.
129 Ibid., 21.
131 Shapiro, Winning the West, 26.
132 Ibid., 26.
been conducted on subjects ranging from the discourses of so-called ‘Welfare Queens’, to myth and stereotype in American policy in Apartheid South Africa, to ethnic demography. Thus, the construction of identity narratives is a contested process of political and social representations and tracing them can reveal much about both the spatial and non-spatial ‘borders’ in play in determinations of the political.

*Foreign Policy Analysis*

Significant advances in the study of discourse and politics were made in the 1990s. Waever and those in the ‘Copenhagen School’ of International Relations began several pioneering works on discourse in Europe, particularly emphasising the notion of ‘security communities’\(^{133}\). Like Waever, Larsen’s recent work, *Foreign Policy and Discourse Analysis*, uses discourse analysis to examine several foreign policy cases in contemporary Europe. Larsen’s book sets out a helpful theoretical introduction along the lines suggested here, but is important in its deployment of these principles to study actual empirical policy disputes among states (France and Britain) and the European Union. Moreover, he successfully points out both the benefits and limitations of such an analysis.

Larsen identifies several gaps in the existing foreign policy analysis literature, namely a propensity to concentrate on the individual decision-maker; a predominating positivism; and finally, heavy assumptions that language is ‘transparent’ and thus unproblematic.\(^{134}\) These constraints tend to ‘narrow’ work and can mask larger trends: the totality of beliefs, and the interrelatedness of beliefs and the decision-makers themselves. While traditional analyses may be useful in understanding many foreign policy decisions, he suggests, they can obscure the additional dimensions that a discursive approach can yield, such as insights into the role of language in a system of values and rules (his definition of discourse) and the connection between autonomous language, power, and identities (a la Foucault).

This work is also helpful in pointing out some of the limitations of a discursive or narrative analysis. First, he clarifies that ‘a change in discourse is not a complete change of discourse’; thus components of the discourse (which are derived

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\(^{133}\) See, for example, Ole Waever, ‘The Language of Foreign Policy’, *Journal of Peace Research* 27, no. 3 (1990): 334-43.

from 'governing statements') might change without altering the main discursive
rules and themes.\textsuperscript{135} This is important as it allow us to deal with individual
component changes or differences (in, say policy bills on immigration) drawn from
the overarching structural narrative (e.g., 'border control'). It is also important to
note that discursive fields are always contested by other discourses. Larsen limits his
inquiry to 'discursive practice', 'the way in which the discourse is projected onto
society...that is, its effects in the social world such as the arguments of social
actors...or the actions or beliefs emanating from societal institutions'.\textsuperscript{136} The
discursive/political structure is one source, for example, of foreign policy (but
foreign policy does not reduce to this only; economic structures, for instance, are
consequential as well). As Larsen notes, geopolitical or historical factors can exist
and are often simply reflected in the political discourse. The key point is that the
study of the narrative provides insight into the framing devices which operate and
connect other factors. The applied analysis here proceeds along similar lines.

The political discourse Larsen uses takes in the written and oral contributions
made by actors (and framed by the governing discursive pattern) in a universal way;
it includes both elites and the products of other actors, like newspapers. This breaks
from the traditional foreign policy literature which tends to focus on elites; as Larsen
writes, discourse is 'not primarily a locational concept; it is a particular structure of
meaning which is carried by actors in a particular situation'.\textsuperscript{137} He extends this
theoretical framework to several case studies bolstered by much textual analysis on
Britain, France, and the EU, and reveals new insights into their relationships and
stands towards 'Europe'.

Principles for a Preliminary Narrative Analysis Methodology

From both the theoretical work set out earlier in this chapter, as well as the
case examples by Roe, Shapiro, and Larsen, we can begin to draw a preliminary,
four-part methodological outline to analyse narratives in the American borderlands
case studies and that may also be useful for future research.\textsuperscript{138}

Step One - Textual Identification: Identify and relate the key, source
documents (texts) surrounding the issues a stake, which include official state
documents, such as legislative bills, but also supporting speeches, interviews, and statements by policymakers as well as important interest groups and publics. Both traditional ‘political’ documents such as legislative bills, committee reports, administration statements and the like as well as other texts, especially those written by elites, such as editorials, academic reports, imagery, stories, and so forth are part of the narrative or counter-narrative. Research and space considerations, however, require the discussion to be limited to key, representative policy documents and pronunciations, as well as select public statements from major interest groups or individuals. Selection should be made, according to Larsen, so as to ‘understand the language and broad societal nature of the discourse’. This must be done while qualifying that the material under examination is not fully representative of all aspects of the debate.

**Step Two — Analysis of Dominant Narrative:** Examine the historically contingent developments which set the context for the texts, thus presenting the political environment in which the policy germinated. In posing the particular ‘problem’, ‘threat’, or ‘risk’, discursive regularity is displayed. Next, trace the reoccurring elements of the narrative where this is set out and policy is proposed as a concrete aim of the state to solve the ‘problem’ at hand. A narrative analysis would seek to explicate these actions and their pattern. Often, the narrative history of the problem is provided and built with an implicit argument; the state may then use official discourse to neutralise any potential objection. This can be done by reaffirming its ‘just’ nature and rights or authority, possibly asking the public to understand how such problems arise or pointing out how they are mistaken; or they may in the end resort to common sense, natural reason, or patriotism. Alternative paradigms can be suppressed through these legitimised statecraft practices.

Ultimately, then in this second step, the stories which underwrite or stabilise the assumptions for policymaking in the given context must be exposed and analysed. As noted in the theoretical review, actors (institutional and otherwise) speak and write out of existing political power

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138 This can, if developed, include a ‘process-relationalism’ component discussed in the conclusion.  
139 Ibid., 33.  
140 Ibid., 33.
structures and discourses which are historically contingent; (no discourse is entirely original), but rather temporarily stabilised and appropriated.\textsuperscript{141}

\textit{Step Three – Analysis of Counter-Narratives:} Through the same method, identify and examine alternatives to the official narrative, and, if applicable, illustrate how these competing scripts play out empirically.

\textit{Step Four – Analysis of Metanarrative and Critical Openings:} Uncover a 'metanarrative' which is told by the comparison of the two stories and is reproduced materially and discursively through policy implementation. Ultimately, a good analysis will illustrate the discursive formations—the connections, orders, correlations, and positions between texts—that gets a metanarrative in place. Evaluate whether this metanarrative, as Roe argues, 'recasts the issue in such a way to make it more amenable to policymaking'.\textsuperscript{142} This may be followed by a further step of 'reconstruction', or suggesting particular critical alternatives, such as favouring tolerance or creating strategies to amplify marginalised interests or perspectives.

This methodology is applied in the subsequent empirical chapters along the lines of open, qualitative research: as one way to navigate the i/b/o triad by probing the co-constitutive relationships between national identity, interstate borders, and, by extension, international order.\textsuperscript{143} More specifically, the narrative analysis approach allows us to access, as Paasi does, the social and historical construction of boundaries and socio-spatial consciousness, particularly with regard to the state; he too understands 'the representation of state boundaries [are] laden with strong visible/non-visible, local/non-local, ideological, and metaphorical dimensions'.\textsuperscript{144}

Along with the underlying analysis of official narrative structures manifested in public texts such as legislation (the chief 'data' in the U.S.-Canada example), because direct interviews were also employed in the case study on the U.S.-Mexico borderlands, they require a brief methodological note. The interviews follow Smith and are based on a 'semi-structured' approach, with a set of questions on an interview schedule that guides but does not confine an extended, informal,

\textsuperscript{141} Ibid., 252.
\textsuperscript{142} Roe, \textit{Narrative Policy Analysis}, 4.
conversational session. Thus, they seek a phenomenological ‘open-ended narrative’ to achieve greater depth and detail. Smith maintains this phenomenological position ‘tr[ies] to enter, as far as is possible, the psychological and social world of the respondent’. Because, as Paasi helpfully reminds us, the ‘use of language and discourses’ is a major factor ‘in the social construction of spatial demarcations and boundaries—and of the world’; this research tactic is similar to a hermeneutic method which ‘seeks to discover...meaning...by examining how the individual consciousness [of the subject] reflects and refracts the spirit of the age’.

The questions asked in the interviews were neutral and both ‘experience/behaviour’ centred, dealing with what the respondent does, and including opinion/value/feeling queries that attempt to access the ‘cognitive and interpretive process of people’. Most were open-ended to allow the respondents full range to describe their thoughts, feelings, and perceptions about Operation Hold the Line, undocumented workers, and the U.S.-Mexico border in an attempt to unlock the respondent’s construction of social and territorial identity. Direct quotations from the interviews and selected secondary sources, then, are presented as the basic sources for this qualitative measurement and inductive analysis (within the narrative method) used to identify ‘patterns, themes, and categories’ from the data.

The method here follows sociologist Lofland’s technique in gathering data:

The commitment to get close, to be factual, descriptive, and quotive, constitutes a significant commitment to represent the participants in their own terms. This does not mean that one becomes an apologist for them, but rather that one faithfully depicts what goes on in their lives and what life is like for them...A major methodological consequence of these commitments is that the qualitative study of people in situ is a process of discovery.

144 Paasi, Territories, Boundaries, and Consciousness, 63.
147 Smith, ‘Semi-Structured Interviewing’, 12.
148 Pattnaik, Territories, Boundaries, and Consciousness, 7. See also Presnell, ‘Postmodern Ethnography’, 22. A thorough explication of interpretive and hermeneutic approaches is impossible here, however, the chief objective is to unlock the respondent’s construction of social and territorial identity. For an excellent discussion, see the work of Jürgen Habermas who is paramount among scholars who probe the depths of hermeneutics. In his view, hermeneutics fundamentally seeks to ‘understand the meaning of linguistic communication...focus[ing] on the semantic content of speech’, but also on the meaning of identity narratives. See Habermas, ‘On Hermeneutics Claim to Universality’, 294.
149 Patton, Qualitative Evaluation Methods, 207.
150 Ibid.
This kind of active, involved role in qualitative measurement is inspired by phenomenological traditions that, in the words of Bogdan and Taylor, are 'concerned with understanding human behaviour from the actor's own frame of reference...the phenomenologist examines how the world is experienced. For him or her the important reality is what people imagine it to be'. Thus, the social world is examined from the participant's awareness and perspective, not the researchers; the method then emphasises returning to the empirical world to examine how the analysis fits the phenomenon at hand. Situating the local view in the 'small narratives' that describe the daily lives and events for borderlanders is particularly appropriate for a study of regional changes. So too are determining the metaphoric practices that are key in the construction of national identity narratives. When this data is brought together with official policy texts, multiple dimensions of border narratives are available for study.

4.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS

This chapter began by departing from the premise that it is useful to think about borders in a time of globalisation and possible transformation. Border studies in various disciplines, including IR, have move forward from the days where the study of boundaries was largely non-theoretical and historical, concerned chiefly with static delineations and disputes over pre-given legal 'lines' which went hand-in-hand with (and mutually reinforced) a realist-inspired understanding of the nation-state system as the chief level of analysis. But the deeper dimensions, the discursive and material factors, inherent in borders were largely ignored as they became 'invisible' and highly naturalised phenomena. Moreover, the concept was rarely coupled with other insightful ideas, such as identity or order.

153 Patton, *Qualitative Evaluation Methods*, 47. The 'objectivity' sought here is in line with Scriven's emphasis on accuracy of observation rather than the maintenance of distance from the subject. See Michael Scriven, 'Objectivity and Subjectivity in Education Research', in *Philosophical Redirection of Educational Research: The Seventy-first Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972); this tact seeks qualitative objectivity through the quality of observations. We proceed, then, with the understanding that hermeneutical consciousness, as Habermas explains 'demolishes the objectivistic self-conception of the traditional human sciences' because of 'the bond between the interpreting scholar and the hermeneutical situation from which he starts'. See 'On Hermeneutics Claim to Universality', 299. Impartial understanding is thus found through 'reflection on the effective relationship in which the knowing subject always stands to its object', idem, 298.
But, as argued in chapter two, the dynamics of political territoriality in a world of intensifying mobilities and flows is a particularly rich avenue of social research; thus international borderlands are productive 'laboratories' for inquiry. But beyond simply understanding them as isolated social phenomena (or even using them as a single concept) they, like their very empirical functions, are best analysed in conjunction with other aspects of social and political life; by definition, they implicate order and identity. One new tool to understand the relationships between territory and identity, and more importantly, how this plays out politically, is the \(i/b/o\) heuristic triad. The \(i/b/o\) project seeks to evaluate the myriad, co-constitutive processes and relations which produce and reproduce identities, borders, and orders in international politics. The triad is deliberately open and wide, and amenable to a variety of approaches, from both mainstream and less traditional avenues.

The approach utilised here for the case studies on the American borderlands seeks to operate between the identity (i) and border (b) points of the triad and then connect these to wider considerations of order (o) questions as well. The chapter illustrated the connection between space and collective identity. That analysis relied on a notion of a constructed 'national' collective identity as modern, state-focussed phenomena of unification and substantiation on civic, and to some extent ethnic, identity grounds. Official state discourse and the material borders which it reinforces are some of the chief tools of such consolidations. This takes a modern, instrumental view of nationalism as a movement to realise such collective identities, giving a high priority to elites and symbolic practices. Because the state 'container' and its 'contents' can be mutually formative, it is important to look at how these two sectors of the \(i/b/o\) triad interrelate and then explore implications for order. The concept of 'socio-spatialisation' was introduced as a particular way to examine the connection between how political collectivities understand their identity vis-à-vis various kinds of borders.

Finally, the chapter illustrated a methodology of narrative analysis as one way of examining this particular \(i/b/o\) link. Narrative analysis, as a form of discourse analysis, seeks to understand the defining 'scripts' of international relations: texts and their connection to power. In effect, these are the framing devices which politically and socially set definitions and create the possibilities for particular, political formulations of problems and policies, such as 'border control'. With the methodological exposition detailed here, narrative analysis is the means for travelling along the 'i-b' link in the triad in the case studies which follow.
Ultimately, this methodology will help uncover a dominant metanarrative in the official American borderlands discourse that seeks to reinforce an existing domestic and international order and consolidate national identity.

Why are the American borderlands amenable to such an approach? An open, flexible methodological outlook is particularly useful in borderlands studies, because, as Spener and Staudt suggest, borderlands cannot be ‘disciplined with one way of knowing; their map cannot be drawn from any single vantage point’. The unique, multiple, transnational aspects of borderlands life cannot be pigeonholed into one academic discipline or approach. Accordingly, useful contributions and methodologies are sometimes necessarily drawn from the margins. As Ashley and Walker maintain, ‘marginal sites thus resist knowing in the sense celebrated in modern culture, where to “know” is to construct a coherent representation that excludes contesting interpretations and controls’.

This approach informs the empirical i/b/o work on the case studies of the U.S.-Canada and U.S.-Mexico borderlands in the next two chapters. Specifically, the research is conducted by clarifying and analysing U.S. border and immigration policy through an in-depth examination of the textual ‘data’—the rhetoric, documents, and comments, what Scott calls the ‘public’ and ‘hidden’ transcripts—which continually affect boundaries and patterns of identity, territoriality, and the movement of migrants. The texts analysed are representational, but by no means exhaustive, of the entire debate which goes on. Following Mehan and the methodological principles set out above, representative documents from the public discussion surrounding the new border policy were collected were read and reread to highlight the narrative strategies—and the very language of the law—employed by individuals who are often institutionally representative (such as Congressmen) to represent space and difference and persuade the public, partially by setting out discursive possibilities for policy action which invoke national myth.

Moreover, the chapters which follow are also concerned with the material dimensions of U.S. border policy, such as militarisation and physical boundary

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construction, which cannot be ignored despite this discursive, theoretical focus; their 'authorisation' is indeed related to the narrative strategy. Thus, developments on the ground are examined and understood in conjunction with the official language and policy narration of the borders—using the legislation, supporting statements, and direct interviews with policymakers—as well as 'official' and 'non-official' counter-narratives. The overall goals remain bringing to light new understanding of the processes and politics of bordering and identity construction as they affect political and social orders in North America.
CHAPTER FIVE

THE TURBULENT U.S.-MEXICO BORDERLANDS

5.0 INTRODUCTION: THE SECURITISATION OF THE U.S.-MEXICO BORDERLANDS

That fence over there—the Americans make a big deal of it.

—Charles Boyer, Hold Back the Dawn, 1941

At the stroke of midnight on 19 September 1993, the ‘Thin Green Line’ swept along the American banks of the Rio Grande river. In a dramatic fashion Charles Boyer would have approved of, 450 U.S. Border Patrol agents moved within line of sight of one another along twenty miles of the international boundary that thinly divides El Paso, U.S.A and Juarez, Mexico. Using night scope goggles, a network of linked electronic sensors to detect heat and motion, and employing a large cadre of agents who maintained a constant watchful gaze across the river into Mexico, ‘Operation Blockade’ began as a high-profile and high-intensity vigil to attempt to seal the international boundary from unofficial incursions into United States territory, chiefly undertaken by poor undocumented Mexican migrants seeking work in the informal service or agriculture sectors across the country.

This reterritorialisation initiative (later renamed ‘Operation Hold the Line’)—and its supporting narratives—have become the regulatory cornerstone of contemporary American territorial policy. As part of a larger, national securitisation plan, Operation Hold the Line was more than a simple or cosmetic change in U.S. policy. It was the most significant development along the border in decades. It has had a significant material effect on the boundary and has also worked to help consolidate collective identity. Indeed, as the new exemplar of ‘border control’ in the U.S., the initiative and subsequent developments play a major role in how borderlanders understand, reconstruct, and deal with the border, because of both its real material effects as well as its supportive official narratives. Both will be examined in this chapter.

These material and discursive changes came at a critical moment, at a time of both increased dynamism and tension at the border; the booming maquiladora (twin
assembly plant) industry and the trend towards increasing economic integration under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) have injected a surge of transnational economic opportunity and development into the border ‘order’ while at the same time increased exclusionary restrictions on legal and illegal immigration temper the mix. Both economic and political developments take place against a long historical backdrop of extensive cultural and social interaction across a state frontier with unique identity patterns. In fact, in many ways cities on both sides of the boundary have been considered single communities; they enjoy a variety of economic, social, and cultural ties that span the line and constitute a unique ‘zone’ or borderland extending hundreds of miles into each state.

The current situation in the U.S.-Mexico borderlands is representative of the kinds of challenges, especially those posed by the intensification of various transnational mobilities—capital, trade, information, and labour—facing states and border regions globally. To fully understand these issues, however, the kind of multifaceted and transdisciplinary approach to border studies outlined in chapter three—in conjunction with the focussing prism of the i/b/o triad—are necessary to explore what exactly the U.S.-Mexico border is beyond simply a 2,000 mile political frontier that separates an information age superpower and a rapidly developing state. That kind of analysis involves looking at material factors, such as militarisation, as well as constructed socio-political borders that are economic, ethical, or psychological in nature. This is particularly important as globalisation, securitisation, and nationalism affect the lives of the 23 million citizens who live along the U.S.-Mexico border.

Indeed, the policy dynamics and discourse of the U.S.-Mexico borderlands constitute elements of an important social laboratory to critically examine some of the mounting issues of the post-Cold War era. As the premier ‘joint’ between the first and third worlds, the U.S.-Mexico borderlands are the only area of their kind in the world and thus are of thus of high importance and interest for study, particularly for International Relations. The resulting kinds of identity and territory relationships (e.g., ‘i-b’ dynamics) in particular present numerous questions of policy and theory surrounding this unique unit of analysis in an IR inquiry.1 Some of the ‘tools’

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1 As chapter three pointed out, the social sciences can have a tendency to rely on the state as the principle organising unit of politics and socio-cultural identity. Phenomena such as borderlanders,
presented in this thesis are equipped to do this, particularly a narrative analysis methodology within the i/b/o triad. Such a study also presents the opportunity to evaluate the normative implications and alternatives to current border policies.

The case study begins with an historical and contemporary reading of the U.S.-Mexico borderlands. This is a boundary representative of modern political territoriality, produced through expansionary violence and delineated in the epistemological and process fashion characteristic of Western modernity, examined in chapter two. Despite this, the borderlands have emerged, especially under NAFTA, as a dynamic, unique, ‘interdependent’ zone of intense economic and social interaction among the two states. Here, transnational forces for free trade and socio-cultural interaction clash with new American restrictions on the movement of labour. After recognising and evaluating this historical and contemporary pattern of ‘order’ in the borderlands within the i/b/o triad, the chapter then moves to undertake an extensive empirical analysis of the narratives of Operation Hold the Line—which is still in effect not only in El Paso, but clear along the southern frontier and thus is representative of contemporary U.S. border ‘control’ policies that are often reflexively organised. The chapter also considers more recent developments, such as increased militarisation or securitisation and barrier construction. By applying the theoretical i/b/o tool (particularly focussed on the ‘i-b’ link between national collective identity and borders established in the last chapter) and using the method of narrative analysis to study how the policy was initiated, justified, and received in both official and public circles, we can begin to understand how modern territoriality and identity patterns and processes in the U.S.-Mexico borderlands have changed and are now being produced through a dominant metanarrative.

This chapter will then argue for three main points that rotate around the i/b/o triad. First, the emergent material and discursive policy of reterritorialising the border serves to help consolidate notions of national American collective identity. The discursive and material launch of the Operation, and the subsequent securitisation of the frontier, partly recast the social and historical construction of the diasporas, or migrants with complex identities, can defy this presumption and only further the call for a reflective and critical approach concerned with difference.

2 On the concept of ‘securitisation’, see the groundbreaking work by the Copenhagen School who have released the issue of security from its traditional moorings in IR, seeing it as an active and important dimension of many processes, including the environment and society. For example, see Ole Waever et al, Identity, Migration, and the New Security Agenda (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993).
U.S.-Mexico border and changed socio-spatial consciousness whereby individuals and communities are socialised as members of a territorially bound community. This struggle over the redefinition of space is directly related to an understanding of social consciousness that creates a clearer, exclusionary notion of collective identity by illuminating the ‘us’ and the ‘other’ division. That dichotomy is both symbolised and literally reinforced by the existence of the territorial boundary as well as the U.S. Border Patrol’s tighter policy along it. In this case, national collective identity is being partly reconstituted through the vehicle of nationalism—actualised by supportive official material and narrative strategies that rely in part on spatial demarcations as well as larger scripts of national myth and stereotypes.

Second, the policy is representative of reflexive territoriality: informed, affected, and readjusted through advanced technology, surveillance, and policy monitoring—all of which are employed in the drive to ‘control’ the boundary, a clear ‘borders-orders’ (‘b-o’) dynamic. The perceived policy need to counter the territorial ‘risk’ here is also reflexive: the ‘hazards’ to be combated (in this case undocumented workers and illicit narcotics) are the product of industrialisation and demand in the U.S. itself.

Finally, the metanarrative emerging from this case fosters and presents a representation to the public of border security (regulation). The image is of a particular ‘order’ being advanced in the face of ‘chaotic’ threats to the state and nation—the shifting and mixing of identities and cultures and large-scale demographic changes in the borderlands encouraged by economic and socio-cultural mobilities under NAFTA and globalisation. This border ‘image’, which has particular political purposes, emerges despite strong empirical evidence that the multi-year, multi-billion dollar policy has not radically stemmed cross-border flows of labour. Instead, it robustly implicates a notion of ‘knowledge as regulation’, as set out in chapter two.

5.1 THE U.S.-MEXICO BORDERLANDS AT THE MILLENNIUM

The U.S.-Mexican border es una herida abierta where the Third World grates against the first and bleeds.

—Gloria Anzaldúa

Why research the U.S.-Mexico borderlands? The U.S.-Mexico borderlands are one of the most intriguing, yet understudied, areas of cultural, political, and economic transition in the world. No where else do the conditions of the first world meeting—or ‘grating’ as Anzaldúa vividly puts it—against the third exist, sharply manifested along and through a contested international boundary. This situation alone presents several important dynamics. Surprisingly, these unique—and relatively convenient—research conditions have attracted little scholarly interest, perhaps in part because of the relative neglect of the region politically and its assumed ‘peripheral’ status. As Spener and Staudt suggest, ‘relatively few academic studies to date have been able to provide...detailed accounts of recent developments along the border’. Like border studies in general, the area has, until recently, received scant treatment in the social sciences, and very little theoretical or empirical attention in International Relations. The case and possibilities for involved and critical IR inquiries seems evident.

The 1,951 mile boundary separates an economic superpower racing into the information age with overflowing abundance and a struggling developing state burgeoning with youthful energy, a vibrant culture, but plagued by myriad social, economic, and political challenges. Here, several cultures, identities, economies, and histories collide, often in an asymmetric manner. Indeed, it is a land not just of

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5 The dynamics of this third-first world situation are highly interesting on a variety of levels. For example, infectious disease rates along the border are higher than average on the American side, yet well below Mexican national averages on that side of the boundary. Many other similar relationships exist. See Anthony I. Asiwaju, Borderlands Research: A Comparative Perspective (El Paso, TX: Center for Inter-American and Border Studies-University of Texas at El Paso, 1983), 34.
7 Major social, political, and economic reforms taking place in Mexico, including the end of over 70 years of one-party domination with the recent election of President Vicente Fox and his radical rethinking of the border (such as pushing for openness), may begin to hasten that progress.
a single geopolitical boundary formed in violence and mapped out in rational manner, but also of multiple zones of contestation where identities and movement collide with state structures, policies, police, and people. More so than in the Canadian case, two separate cultures and political systems come face to face in a way unlike across any other boundary in the world. Border cultures and subcultures extend along multiple fault lines—stretching into each state and varying significantly even among different sections of the line.

These multiple layers of interaction, contestation, and production that help continuously formulate the border and make it a rich venue for the embryonic research that does exist. The fascinating situation has brought some scholars to conclude the ‘Mexican-U.S. border [has become] the model of border studies and borderlands genre throughout the world’. And indeed, the U.S.-Mexico borderlands constitute one of the most economically, socially, and politically important boundary zones in the world. Considered as a region (Mexico calls the borderlands El Tercer Pais, ‘The Third Country’), it is the ‘fourth member of NAFTA’ with a population of over 23 million and a gross product of over $300 billion a year. An astounding 450 million crossings occur over the border each year.

Mexico is the second largest trading partner with the United States (behind Canada) and the source of 27 per cent of its petroleum imports. Mexico, like Canada, represents a huge potential market as North America integrates economically under NAFTA. In fact, neoliberal free trade under NAFTA is burgeoning at the border (trebling since the treaty was signed) as new jobs are created in Mexico in the booming maquila industry which employs over 1.6 million individuals in over 4000 plants, most of which are operated by multinational firms. Given deregulated, nearly tariff free conditions by 2004 (which have reduced the role of the state), trade of goods and services through the continent has increased

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11 Ibid.
dramatically in this new economic space. Since NAFTA was implemented, for example, truck crossings between Texas and Mexico alone have increased from just under 1.5 million in 1993 to more than 4.3 million in 1999.

Tremendous population growth is another prominent trend in the borderlands; at current rates, the population of the borderlands will double in 22 years. Many of these individuals are of Mexican origin and the growing number of Latinos on the border has fostered extensive social and cultural linkages and interdependency. This situation presages changes in the U.S. as a whole at the dawn of the 21st century: the Latino population in the United States is now at 35 million and is the fastest growing ethnic group, nearly the country's largest ethnic minority. Lowenthal now points to North America as the 'Intermestic Hemisphere' where international spill-over of domestic trends into international policy involving Latin America is occurring. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the U.S.-Mexico borderlands. These trends point to an increasingly complicated dynamic centred to some degree on transnationalism which Kearney argues means a 'blurring' or 'reordering...of the binary cultural, social and epistemological distinctions' of the modern state system.

But beneath all the dynamism, the borderlands are also a complex and often violent zone of contested space, symbols, and meanings, many created because of the asymmetric order there. It is at the border where the contentious issues of U.S.-Mexican relations emerge; law enforcement, narcotics trafficking, transboundary environmental degradation, and migration all appear to be increasing in very interdependent relationships (demand by U.S. agribusiness for cheap undocumented

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17 In the larger bilateral context, Mexico is also its main conduit for narcotics. See Ganster and Sweedler, United States-Mexico Border Region, 421. See also Lowenthal, 'The Intermestic Hemisphere'.
19 Lowenthal, 'The Intermestic Hemisphere', 37.
21 Ibid.
labour, for example, will continue to drive migration flows). Interestingly, commerce, information, and culture easily pass over the boundary—supporting an argument for deterritorialisation, but borderlanders now face what is rapidly becoming a ‘militarised’, and thus in some senses, a ‘closed’ border. Understanding this and these developments of the current order in the U.S.-Mexico borderlands can usefully proceed by suggesting the emergence of ‘dual’ regimes concerning the regulation of mobilities: the free movement of trade and capital but exclusionary restrictions on economic migration. The case study will point out the evolution of this position, which is linked to the implementation of NAFTA, and may be untenable in the long-run due to increased transnational pressures which impact the state’s abilities of economic regulation.22

5.2 A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE BORDERLANDS

The historical development of the U.S.-Mexico boundary is a clear pattern of modern political territoriality, settled through force and then delineated on maps and the ground with precise, modern mechanisms and epistemologies—the same orientations outlined in chapter two. As Kearney suggests, the region is marked historically by shifts in the strength of the boundary, but, not in its sovereignty.23 Thus, it is a clear example of a political border produced through violence and imperial reach: most of the southwestern United States was acquired by force in the Mexican-American war by 1848. Indeed, as one of the best instances of American ‘Manifest Destiny’, U.S. expansionism ‘from sea to shining sea’ sought significant territorial advances in the southwest. Through the war and the vastly unbalanced peace treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, America won a boundary that ran along the

22 The issue of immigration under NAFTA is complex; the agreement does not have specific provisions for free movement of labour (aside from some specific temporary entry allowances for business personnel) but was signed with the future goal of reducing migratory flows. See Joyce C. Viallet, 'A North American Free Trade Agreement and Immigration', CRS Report for Congress 93-62 EPW (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 1993). Also as Sassen points out, NAFTA does include provisions establishing unaccountable bodies of 'experts' comprised of multinational firm representatives to make decisions. This, combined with the larger forces of globalisation, suggests the dual regime contradiction may be untenable in the long run, a problem the European Union has already sorted out. See Saskia Sassen, 'Transnational Economies and National Migration Policies', in Free Markets, Open Societies, Closed Borders? Trends in International Migration and Immigration Policy in the Americas, ed. Max J. Castro (Miami: North-South Center Press-University of Miami, 1999). Provisions of the treaty, such as Chapter 12, cede authority to external bodies. There is increasing evidence that transnational economic pressures will continue to mean that migration will increase as long as undocumented workers are valuable to the U.S. domestic economy.

23 Kearney, 'Borders and Boundaries'.

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centre of the Rio Grande river between Texas and Mexico and then stretched in a
discrete line of longitude across the southern part of what is now New Mexico,
Arizona, and California to the Pacific Ocean. Additional portions of American
territory in New Mexico were acquired with a $10 million deal of 1853 known as the
Gadsden Purchase. That transaction marked the final continental consolidation of
the Westphalian American state.

While the exact political boundary is no longer in dispute (from an American
worldview),\(^\text{24}\) defining the U.S.-Mexico border region for study is perhaps a more
unclear and contentious issue among border scholars because of the ambiguity of
what can be seen as 'non-spatial' borders—questions of identity, ethnicity, influence,
and migratory patterns—which defy the abstract political line. More critical
linguists and sociologists, for instance, see the area in historical and cultural terms
based on ethnicity and its limits of influence. Nostrand, as an example, views it as a
wide zone 'where the sharply contrasting Anglo and Latin cultures have converged
to produce significant subcultures'.\(^\text{25}\) Latino influences extend far past the
immediate political boundary; witness San Antonio which bears signs of the border,
or Oregon, where the Mexican economic migrant harvests fruit, or Los Angeles
where over 63 per cent of the students in the LA school district are of Latin
American descent.\(^\text{26}\)

The term 'borderlands', as discussed in chapter three, helps capture this idea,
especially because the term originated to refer to this particular region. For
demographic and statistical purposes, most U.S. scholars accept a 100 km swath of
land through American and Mexican states.\(^\text{27}\) This study seeks the wider vision of
the borderlands for the purposes of illustrating functional, non-spatial transnational
processes such as trade and social ties that are helping build border communities but
contrasts this view with the position of the policy community which tends to
understand the border in strict terms of the international boundary.

\(^{24}\) Interestingly, some relatively mild resentment of this massive, and in their view unfair,
appropriation of territory remains in certain Mexican circles.


\(^{26}\) Lowenthal, 'The Intermestic Hemisphere', 38.

\(^{27}\) This encompasses the four American states (California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas) and the six Mexican states (Baja California, Sonora, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, and Tamaulipas), as well as their respective internal political divisions, that line the nearly 2,000 mile border.
Life in Interdependent Borderlands

In order to examine some of these transnational interactions, a brief look at life in the U.S.-Mexico borderlands is helpful since it is here that interdependence and interaction are a way of life, common elements of the ‘borderlands milieu’. While the level of interaction depends on the nature of the binational relationship, strong symbiotic relationships tend to develop. Social and familial interaction across the boundary is frequent; U.S. residents or recent immigrants often travel and communicate on a daily basis with Mexican nationals. The several million Mexican nationals working in the United States overwhelm wire transfer services (sending over $7 billion back to Mexico in 2000—a crucial source for economic development) and flooding transportation networks over the border. Cultural exchanges are frequent; border literature and film is vibrant and expanding, and binational schools are being developed in some areas, such as Columbus, U.S.A. and Palomas, Mexico.

The twin-city phenomenon is particularly illustrative; sister cities Ciudad Juarez-El Paso share an economic relationship to a degree that peso devaluations in Juarez destabilise and depress downtown El Paso, forcing numerous shops to close while over 10,000 El Pasoens work in the maquiladoras in Juarez, the most important sector of the Mexican economy. These are companies operating under a special customs regime which allows them to temporarily import into Mexico on a duty free basis machinery, equipment, materials, parts and components and other items needed for the assembly or manufacture of finished goods for subsequent export. El Paso-Juarez, in fact, is the second largest area of such transborder manufacturing in the U.S.-Mexico borderlands. Production capital in the industrialised nation often utilises raw materials and inexpensive labour on the other side, as is the pattern with this industry. Maquiladoras are a sector very representative of globalisation.

The U.S.-Mexico border has generally fit into Strassoldo’s ‘peaceful co-existence’ model and is an example of ‘interdependent’ borderlands since a relatively

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29 An accurate and timely count is nearly impossible. Twin Plant News, published monthly in El Paso, publishes periodic counts. Some 275 plants run in Juarez, employing over 170,000 workers including over 10,000 El Pasoens. See Mexican Maquila Information Center, Maquila Overview.
stable international relations and economic climate has often existed between the two states.\textsuperscript{30} This is exemplified by historical patterns of informal co-operation. As Strassoldo notes, though, either state can easily pursue a policy of 'closure—avoidance, dissociation, and separation', possibly manifested by the construction of fences, walls or a 'no man's land' in a situation of peaceful co-existence.\textsuperscript{31} The border has in fact experienced varying degrees of centralised control, ranging from benign neglect to allow \textit{de facto} migration but more recently, heightened militarisation. This is exactly the situation developing now with new border policies centred on the Operation Hold the Line model.

5.3 **THE MILITARISATION OF THE U.S.-MEXICO BORDERLANDS**

The most recent trend in the history of these interdependent U.S.-Mexico borderlands is the reflexive securitisation of the international boundary in response to newly defined 'threats' and 'risks'—specifically from flows of undocumented labourers and narcotics. The new policy was introduced in the wake of NAFTA which liberalised trade between the U.S. and Mexico but amid increased unemployment, social, and environmental distress on the border. The 'boundary maintenance' policy is designed out of a dominant, official narrative strategy which influences discourse and helps reinforce national sentiment through a security problematic and construction of the other.

The discursive and material manifestations of militarisation—physical fortifications, armed military forces, and high tech surveillance equipment—taken in conjunction with Border Patrol policies of exclusion such as 'Operation Hold the Line', this chapter argues, have at least three dimensions. First, they are seen as elite attempts to consolidate collective identity through creating territorial distinction against the backdrop of a border wide open under NAFTA to capital and trade, but not to movement of labour—a perceived and defined 'threat'. Second, they help create an image of 'order' and 'control' against undesired mobilities (such as undocumented workers) that are seen to bring 'chaos' to American territory and society. And third, they are representative of a particular, reflexive territoriality.


\textsuperscript{31} Strassoldo, 'The Study of Boundaries'.

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pattern which is informed, revised, and implemented by high technology and information flows at the boundary.

Because of the national security dimension (and public sensitivity) of the militarisation operations, open information on border activities of this nature is somewhat scarce. However, the initial germ of the policy narrative can be traced to a then-confidential 1993 analysis conducted by Sandia National Laboratories (a U.S. national science laboratory known for nuclear weapons research) under authorisation by the INS and the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy. This report became highly influential in congressional policy circles and with the numerous federal agencies and military departments active on the border in anti-narcotics (the 'War on Drugs') strategies. The analysis advised:

Significant improvements in border control could be achieved by introducing new or improved technologies and that the application of these could lead to reduced manpower and significant control of the Southwest Border.

Immediately, the reliance on technology and the desire for state 'control' is apparent—the two key ideas under analysis in this study which suggest a reflexive territorially strategy and an understanding of knowledge as 'order'. Moreover, the premise that the border can actually be 'controlled' sets a defined parameter of the narrative strategy. The recommended procedure given to policymakers for 'improved control of the border' was based on two tactics:

(1) Border enforcement: the use of heavily patrolled multiple barriers on the border to control the large number of illegal aliens and drugs crossing in the urban areas of the border; and

(2) Containment: additional 24-hour highway checkpoints to minimize the number of illegal aliens.

Operation Hold the Line was initiated eight months after the publication of this report.

Following the replication of the Hold the Line strategy along the length of the southern boundary, the securitisation policy was open for public evaluation, even if it

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32 Sandia National Laboratories, Advanced Systems Integration Department, Systematic Analysis of the Southwest Border, vol. 1 (Albuquerque, NM: Sandia National Laboratories, 1993). A much earlier analysis of the issue was conducted by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration in 1974, but this received little attention as the focus on the border only emerged after the Cold War. See U.S. Department of Justice, A Secure Border: An Analysis of Issues Affecting the U.S. Department of Justice (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, 1974).

33 Ibid., ES-2.

34 Ibid., ES-4.
received relatively little national attention. In 1994, Williams and Coronado set out to study the securitisation, and their work was followed by Dunn in 1996 on militarisation and Low-Intensity Conflict doctrine (LIC). Both studies provide further empirical evidence for the 'hardening' of the border (such as steel walls, armed border patrol agents, and military equipment and personnel) and analyse the causes of the securitisation, including undocumented migration, narcotics trade, and cross-border crime.

LIC doctrine and militarisation on the frontier, Dunn claims, means

the use of military rhetoric and ideology, as well as military tactics, strategy, technology, equipment and forces originally designed to meet perceived security threats in the third world.

Employing tactics developed for American military operations in Central America during the 1980s, the strategy involves the construction of chain link fences, the use of night-vision goggles, infrared weapons, electronic sensors, and helicopters—all to reinforce and 'control' the border, and all on domestic soil. Much of this technology comes from the Central Intelligence Agency, including high capability cameras which can look into vehicles for hidden passengers, facial recognition systems, and even prototype devices which send an electric shock current to halt escaping cars.

Also worrisome, LIC doctrine calls for

so-called humanitarian aid [and] psychological operations to influence political and social attitudes among civilian populations.

As the balance of the chapter will illustrate, the need to be seen as 'controlling' the border manifests itself in these attempts to direct the dominant public discourse on the policy—and this has an impact on national collective identity.

Also in 1996, *International Defense Review* published a little-noticed study on the technological aspects of border control measures being developed globally

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37 As an INS Associate Commissioner stated, the CIA technology, such as a facial recognition system, 'is a clear example of this administration's initiatives to convert military and intelligence technology to domestic applications'. See Sandra Dibble, 'Star Wars Arrives at the Border: High Tech Developed by the Military, CIA May Aid Enforcement', *San Diego Union Tribune* (18 March 1995): B1.

38 Ibid., 29-30.
and those increasingly undertaken by the United States, suggesting the U.S. 'in particular, has been motivated to develop systems and equipment tailored specifically to the role of border patrol'. Their conclusions—and those of the case studies—both suggest the booming nature of the security and military industries in developing this new area of control as well as an increasing reliance on applied technology to monitor and securitise boundaries world-wide.

This is also further support for the reflexive understanding of territoriality set out earlier in the thesis; the authors concluded that the technology enables American officials to quickly and continuously reflexively re-evaluate their territorial strategies and adjust implementation (without having to wait for an open war conflict). And this all occurs with the prevailing official narrative strategy:

The resultant demands on the technology...can exceed even those imposed by more conventional military operations. What works, and what does not, soon becomes evident during repeated daily use; border-patrol forces do not have to wait for 'once-a-decade wars' to test their equipment in earnest.40

As the 1997 National Drug Strategy report (which detailed presidential strategy for the border) advises:

The use of technological resources...has moved the Border Patrol into the 21st century of law enforcement. These devices enable field managers to more effectively apprehend and accurately track the crossing patterns of illegal entrants.41

Combined with technology programs such as 'IDENT', which is a biometric identification system to identify 'aliens' and is hailed as the 'linchpin' to new official efforts on the border—this strategy and infrastructure serves to create high intensity, co-ordinated knowledge flows that reflexively inform policymakers' actions and, by extension, help condition their views on the border and its problems.

**Military Involvement**

U.S. military involvement along the border has gone beyond simply lending these technologies and tactics to the Border Patrol to direct force deployment. The Pentagon became involved with border operations amidst some controversy, given

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40 Ibid.
prior legal prohibitions on the domestic use of military personnel. In a narrative phrased as the ‘War on Drugs’ and on ‘illegal aliens’, however, the U.S. Congress stepped in beginning in the early 1990s to provide additional military support to domestic law enforcement which was previously under the exclusive jurisdiction of the U.S. Border Patrol. U.S. Defense Department participation was authorised and directed by the Congress under the National Defense Authorization Act of 1991. This ‘national security’ strategy directed the INS to ‘gain, maintain, and extend control’ of the U.S.-Mexico borderlands in conjunction with the Pentagon. Since 1993, major military resources have been allocated to the southern borderlands.

One of the most prominent divisions publicly known to operate there is called ‘Joint Task Force Six’ or JTF-6. JTF-6, which is comprised of co-ordinated military service components, provides ‘infrastructure and operational support’ to the INS along the U.S.-Mexico border. Implementing its mission requires the use of military personnel and techniques, such as intelligence gathering (i.e., high technology listening, viewing, and radar operations), air patrols, ground sensors, ‘terrain denial’, ‘defence’ building (fortifications), deployment (ground patrols), ‘fence and barrier construction’, and operational support services—all acts theoretically consistent with foreign combat mission training. Indeed, as the military asserts, this work gives units ‘actual and realistic field reconnaissance training that would facilitate their combat readiness’.

Initially designed as an anti-drugs unit, in the mid-1990s JTF-6 became heavily engaged in anti-immigration operations, even outside the border region; by 1998, JTF-6 had ‘coordinated more than 72,000 troops on some 3,300 missions in 30 states’. This was fuelled by funding for Pentagon operations along the border which topped $100 million in FY1998.

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42 The 1878 Posse Comitatus law eliminated federal troop activity in domestic police operations; in the name of ‘national security’, however, new laws have weakened these restrictions.
The normative and practical implications of the military involvement are evident—from human rights concerns in the treatment of intercepted individuals, to military presence and patrols on U.S. mainland territory, to environmental damage. More recent events detailed below illustrate some of these issues. But as a reading the rhetoric of the initiatives suggests (e.g., 'terrain denial', 'targets') the mindset here is one of a highly dangerous situation requiring militarised solutions and massive 'securitisation' through defence technology. As the *Defense Review* report concludes:

The requirement to provide uninterrupted, in-depth surveillance of border areas is best met by harnessing complementary strengths of different sensor types and, ideally, integrating them into a centralized command-and-control system. For example, a chain of unattended ground sensors along a frontier can alert a surveillance radar to the presence of intruders, and the radar may then cue an electro-optical camera for target identification.\(^{48}\)

All of this is part of a larger wave of major technological innovation and investment by defense contractors and governments around the world for border surveillance systems that can detect, identify, and eventually intercept movement across boundaries—all built with technology originally designed for conflict situations.\(^{49}\)

As first suggested in chapter two, the epistemological and implementation emphases again attempt territorial 'mastery' through the vehicle of technology.

### 5.4 'Operation Blockade' and 'Operation Hold the Line'

In conjunction with the militarisation of the border, 'Operation Blockade' began in 1993 as an endeavour to seal the border to undocumented workers attempting to enter the U.S. Most entrants come from economically desperate areas of Mexico seeking low-paying, unofficial work in the agricultural or service sectors in the U.S. The new Border Patrol Sector Chief for El Paso (and now U.S. Congressman) Silvestre Reyes began the initiative that spread 450 Border Patrol agents along the border on a 7-day-per week, 24 hour-a-day watch under LIC doctrine. According to Border Patrol spokesman Doug Mosier, Reyes initiated the operation as

\(^{48}\) Hewish, 'Security Systems', 52.
\(^{49}\) As Hewish maintains, a large cache of military systems are being developed and implemented to these tasks. Ibid.
a response to El Paso resident outcry of crime and danger attributed to illegal Mexicans.50

Reyes proclaimed it 'an overwhelming success of historical proportions' pointing to figures that indicated detentions of undocumented workers—importantly in urban El Paso itself, but not the surrounding areas—fell to about 140 a day from a typical average of 1,000 a day.51

The policy reversed a standing, tacit tradition that allowed many undocumented workers access to El Paso, particularly to work in the informal sector of the American economy (such as for domestic work) for wages that far exceeded those available in Mexico. The blockade also effectively cut off the informal crossings of many residents of Juarez who could not afford official papers to work or visit friends and families in El Paso. Moreover, it inverted the Border Patrol's focus from interior enforcement (such as sanctioning employers who hired undocumented workers) to concentrate security activity at the physical boundary line.

Initial criticism was lodged from the Mexican government and the some in the civil society sector: Roman Catholic bishops, America's Watch, the Border Rights Coalition, a group called 'Operation Bridge Builders', and the American Friends Service Committee.52 Protests on the international bridges were conducted but appeared to fly in the face of seemingly overwhelming public support for the Operation. While the name of the operation was changed from 'Operation Blockade' to 'Operation Hold the Line', the policy in effect continues, as it wins support from Washington, D.C. and is emulated along other sections of the U.S.-Mexico border. President Clinton called it his 'get tough policy'. In fact, as Krouse notes, 'Operation Hold the Line became the basis for the comprehensive border control strategy adopted by INS in 1995 known as "prevention through deterrence"',

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51 David Sheppard, "Silvestre Reyes: His Blockade Changed City, Patrol", The El Paso Times (1 January 1994): 1A.
52 Interestingly, Mexico's border policy is radically different. While the U.S. commits increasingly extensive resources to attempt to reinforce the boundary, Mexico's traditional position does not involve discouraging its citizens to cross the international boundary illegally nor does it generally impede crossings on its side. In response to questions about this policy, Fernando Solis Camara, former head of the Mexican migration service said 'At no time will we take any action that could discourage Mexicans from emigrating to the United States. That is because these are people who leave their families and their homes with the legitimate goal of bettering their lives'. See Anthony DePalma, 'Border Deaths Don't Change Mexico's View of Crossings', The New York Times (25 August 1998) [http://www.nytimes.com] (30 August 1998).
designed to supposedly prevent migrants from even attempting to cross the border illegally.53

Militarisation and Operation Hold the Line attempt to ‘seal’ the border to such flows, and in doing so signal a major change in the territorial discourse of the boundary. The following section is an empirical analysis of the major official narratives which underwrite the policy. Moreover, the evaluation is extended to help explore the worldviews of local residents, in particular the identity-territoriality relationships (the ‘i-b’ dynamic) impacted by militarisation (a component of order change). Drawing from the theoretical relationship between national collective identity and borders established in the last chapter, the study illustrates the reterritorialisation practice and discourse helps provide distinction between groups and symbolises important aspects of national identity. These are critical state substantiation practices used to help consolidate civic-ethnic identity, especially in a borderland zone characterised by foreign contact. The metaphors, rhetoric, and symbols, as the ‘texts’ involved, are major factors in the social delineation of space and help articulate the political narratives of identity (particularly nationalism); these are the constitutive elements of the official supportive narrative strategy.54 Collective identity thus is partly guided and constructed by these official state texts and practices which are reflexively organised.

The examination of the border securitisation policies which follows works within the i/b/o triad and largely follows the narrative analysis methodology set out in the previous chapter. As that chapter indicated, the study of the narratives which support and connect boundaries, identity, and policy is a relatively undeveloped enterprise and has yet, generally, to utilise new perspectives on discourse analysis.55 The approach here does take this up in an examination of the narratives surrounding militarisation and Operation Hold the Line, and is highly qualitative and interpretive. It includes direct interviews designed to uncover the border residents’ experiences,

55 Exceptions include Anssi Paasi’s work, for example, and approaches coming from other fields. See, for instance, a linguistic perspective from Donna M. Johnson, ‘Who is We?: Constructing Communities in U.S.-Mexico Border Discourse’, Discourse and Society 5, no. 2 (1994): 207-31. An excellent compilation from IR on these issues is Michael Shapiro and Hayward Alker, eds., Challenging Boundaries: Global Flows, Territorial Identities (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996).
attitudes, beliefs and thoughts—as well as analysis of the accompanying policy discourse: key public statements made by officials in Washington and the borderlands. The goals in this part of the study were to both uncover the dominant policy narrative and help understand the way participants in the debate see their collective identity and the border, illustrated through their use of metaphors and language. Their rhetoric and symbolisation are critical elements in the social construction of the self and the other, often vis-à-vis the official border policy discourse.

The empirical work, then, follows the preliminary steps of narrative analysis methodology: first broadly surveying and then identifying critical, representative texts—including interviews with some of the major participants in the discourse on Operation Hold the Line (major policymakers, activists, and residents in the El Paso, Texas borderland community). In-depth, conversational interviews were conducted or representative public statements identified in the discourse and key highlights selected. The second and third steps are done here by presenting and analysing the data along several broad dominant and alternative narrative lines. Finally, a metanarrative is established and explored, leading to conclusions about the study.

5.5 NARRATIVES AND COUNTER-NARRATIVES OF OPERATION HOLD THE LINE

Americans and the Other

One main narrative concerning national collective identity that emerges from the research is that of 'Americans' and the other, e.g., undocumented Mexicans. The premise behind the construction of the other, as Paasi contends, is 'an external entity

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56 Data in this study was partly collected through a series of in-depth, open-ended qualitative interviews conducted in by the author in late 1996, designed to access the 'cognitive and interpretive process of people' and allow the respondents full range to describe their thoughts, feelings, and perceptions about Operation Hold the Line, undocumented workers, and the border—in a sense to partially understand their identity and worldviews. See Michael Quinn Patton, Qualitative Evaluation Methods (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1980), 207.

57 Select portions of their comments are reproduced here. Following the narrative analysis methodology established in the preceding chapter, the participants represent a cross-section of civil society as well as official policymakers—from the local to the federal level. They vary in their occupations and positions on border issues but were key and representative participants who helped construct various narratives and counter-narratives in the debate over border securitisation. For a list of respondents and their occupations, see the bibliography. Some of these comments are collected from secondary sources when direct interviews were not granted or possible. Sources are indicated in each reference note.

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against which "we" and "our" identity is mobilized. This relationship can flow from an understanding of symbolic, social, and psychological 'borders', alluded to in chapter three, and is a clear 'i-b' dynamic. Nationalisms and other conceptions of collective identity spring from these boundaries of difference.

The U.S.-Mexico international border is of course the ultimate symbolisation of the 'us'- 'other' schema because it structures both social, political, and territorial space. But that symbolic representation was only extended and reinforced with Operation Hold the Line, encouraging the development of a dominant nationalism narrative that operates in at least two dimensions: a dichotomous understandings of national identity and sovereignty, and also a depersonalised terminology concerning individuals. In the first case, the question of clashing national identities came to forefront with some respondents:

The Operation is to reinforce American versus Mexican. That's the worse thing about it. It flows out of this historical condition.

This borderlander, an immigrant rights advocate and outspoken opponent of the initiative, starkly identifies how she feels about being cast in strokes of nationalism.

Several of the respondents also addressed the question of nationality as they discussed the broadly positive reaction to Hold the Line in the Mexican-American community. Their comments are insights into prevailing concepts of identity, the other, and citizenship in the community:

There is this misperception that non-Mexicans have that the Mexican population is very homogeneous population that breeds this inbred loyalty and nothing could be further from the truth. [Reyes] wedged down that wedge because of the rhetoric he surrounded the operation with and with the context he really exploited the image. There's a definite case of 'us' versus 'them'.

The interviewee here, a local journalist and opponent of the policy, nods to Reyes' role in forcing 'a wedge' into the community—a clear symbol of what she feels the Operation did to change both sides of the border—specifically, reconstructing the other in the undocumented Mexican. In turn, this can help strengthen the bond

58 Paasi, Territories, Boundaries, and Consciousness, 12.
60 Debbie Nathan, interview by author, El Paso, Texas, 7 November 1996.
between citizen and state for those that are members of the dominant political community, the U.S.

A respondent observed a similar phenomenon during his work in Hatch, a small farming community of mostly Mexican immigrants 70 miles north of El Paso:

the recent immigrants want to close the door behind them as they come across. I don't know if it is a nationalistic viewpoint or 'I'm in, it's too crowded' or 'being a good American' or what but the recent immigrant Mexican-Americans are some of the biggest advocates of Hold the Line. In Hatch, there is probably more support of it among Mexican-Americans even than the Anglo population.62

Thus, a narrative of national myth—in particular an instrumentalist and modernist perspective—is particularly telling here especially as it affects identity through norms of 'proper' citizenship (such as being a 'good American') among recent immigrations who now wish to 'close the door'. The 'door' symbol is a strikingly similar to other strong barrier images utilised by others in the debate—blockades and lines.

Finally, another view echoes this, pointing to the role of identity and citizenship, and the contradictory impulses of ethnicity and civic duty, play in responses of Mexican-Americans:

I think Reyes really understood the tension between Mexicans and Mexican-Americans. He understood the national tensions in this community which nobody talks about. I think that's a lot of what Operation Blockade is all about...it's not just about the nation's fears about immigration but also the local tensions between Mexicans and Mexican-Americans—it makes it very concrete, easy to do.63

In addition to explicitly discussing the other, these respondents—and borderlanders in general—use a variety of revealing terminology and rhetoric when referring to their perceptions of Mexican migrants, which helps underpin their understandings of U.S. policy parameters on the border. In many ways, these also help construct the other and consolidate a particular identity. Some people, for example, rely on the American Friends Service Committee's axiom that 'no human being is illegal' and consciously employ the term 'undocumented worker'.64 This is a deliberate, if relatively rare, counter-narrative intervention. Most others, and especially those in the policy community, on the other hand, use the term 'illegal alien' to describe migrants, reinforcing the idea of the other and the non-legal status

62 David Steffen, interview by author, Las Cruces, New Mexico, 27 November 1996.
63 Nathan, interview.
of such individuals, ideas associated with traditional conceptions of sovereignty and citizenship. The term ‘illegal alien’ is, in fact, dominant in most of the official narrative and helps further the criminalisation of economic migrants.

In addition to this, part of the construction of national identities within the prevailing narrative of exclusion also involves the collective representation of identity by ‘depersonalising’ membership through a stereotype of collective features. The use of stereotypes is often such a basis for deligitimation and moral exclusion. A borderlander, expresses this representation:

You have all these brown Mexicans on welfare and taking our jobs.

This language of the ‘brown Mexican’, surprisingly common in some portions of the community, is consistent with Barth’s understanding of ethnic boundaries and their role in constructing and consolidating national collective identity. As we will also see in the next section, this use of stereotypes as foils for identity is indeed prevalent in the discourse strategy surrounding the initiative.

The dominant narrative strategy works to reinforce the social construction of the border by locating the ‘problem’ as undocumented Mexicans. An El Paso scholar pointed to the contradictions this entails:

We are constructing the problem as being a Third World problem to separate ourselves from it. We are related to Mexico economically. But we don't want to extend that relationship to a social one. We have an internal cleavage.

The specialist on borderland public health, however, takes a rare, more optimistic position towards interaction fostered by international flows as ‘innovation’, rejecting notions of static, statist identity:

We may as well have that intermixing, prepare for it, and understand it as opposed to just having it completely separate.

64 Nathan, interview; Kern, interview.
65 Paasi, Territories, Boundaries, and Consciousness, 59.
69 Steffen, interview.
Reyes as Political Elite: ‘Order’ and National Identity

Border Patrol Chief Reyes was crucial because he both devised the initiative and participated in framing the official policy narrative. Some see him as an elite who capitalised on the latent sentiment in the community and then led, constructed, and galvanised a discourse of national sentiment, in part for personal political gain. Many Border Patrol agents themselves suggested privately Reyes’s political ambitions influenced his decision to launch the initiative. As this activist notes:

‘Hold the Line’ became this campaign slogan, and I was told by Border Patrol agents after the blockade that he just did it because he wants to run for Congress. He’s a very ambitious guy politically.

Reyes was indeed successful in attracting increased attention and funding for border control operations; as the thesis illustrates, Congress approved funding for thousands more agents and enhanced Border Patrol operations. Even the head of INS called the operation ‘an extraordinarily successful innovation’. Congressman Lamar Smith, chairman of the U.S. House Subcommittee on Immigration, praised Reyes and his insights in a Committee Meeting on ‘Border Security’ and Hold the Line:

Securing our Nation’s borders against illegal immigration is the first priority of our immigration policy...It took the insight of a single person to change our whole outlook on this issue...Silvestre Reyes.

Also noting the way public perceptions—‘socio-spatial consciousness’ in Paasi’s terms—had changed through Operation Hold the Line, the main local newspaper, the El Paso Times lauded Reyes, revealingly writing he ‘almost single-handedly changed the way we view the border’; the paper went so far as to name him ‘newsmaker of the year’.

According to some, even Reyes’s uses of crime statistics and his ‘rhetoric of fear’ about the ‘dangers’ of the undocumented migrant solidified public support

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70 A Border Patrol agent who requested not to be identified, interview with author, El Paso, Texas (11 November 1996).
71 Nathan, interview.
74 David Sheppard, ‘Silvestre Reyes: His Blockade Changed City, Patrol’, The El Paso Times (1 January 1994): 1A.
behind him. Certainly they helped define the ‘threat’ the reflexive territorial policy
was designed to attempt to thwart:75

We are talking about racism and the way the picture is fomented by politicians for
their own benefit.76

Seizing upon the ‘success’ of the initiative and a wave of popular support in
the community, Reyes launched a victorious bid for the U.S. Congress, winning 71
per cent of the vote, complete with campaign adverts that emphasised he ‘held the
line on the border’. He is now ascending leadership positions in Congress, having
recently been elected Chairman of the Hispanic Caucus. Clearly, Reyes—and indeed
much of the policy community who supported and adapted the operation elsewhere
on the border—understand separateness in a very strict way and fit into Hobsbawn
and Smith’s conceptions of an elite.

His work, nonetheless, did not meet with universal praise among those
opposed to the policy in the civil society sector. An activist accounts, albeit
anecdotally, for Reyes’s success:

When Reyes justified it, he said we were going to protect the city from
transvestites, another incredibly sexual metaphor. All this stuff about AIDS,
beggars. He said ‘at least now we’ll have our beggars’. He knows this community
really well.77

These comments tentatively suggest Reyes’ role in manipulating public
opinion by emphasising collective stereotypes, furthering a criminalisation discourse,
and then defining the ‘disorder’ of the border as the policy ‘problem’; this too would
coincide with an instrumentalist, elite-led role in helping consolidate national
sentiment.

The implication of regulation as ‘order’ is the dominant feature of the official
narrative of Operation Hold the Line. In discussions, Border Patrol agents
repeatedly emphasised the ‘disorder’ caused by undocumented workers entering the
borderlands:

There is a very serious havoc that can be reeked by unchecked illegal
immigration.78

75 Kern, interview; Nathan, interview.
76 Kern, interview.
77 Nathan, interview.
78 Doug Mosier, interview by author, El Paso, Texas, 7 November 1996.
This comment, by the Border Patrol spokesman, reflects the agency’s new policy of tighter control and serves to reinforce spatial consciousness in response to the ‘havoc’ of a more interactive, ‘disordered’, and fluid situation brought on by the interdependence and transnationalisation that tends to characterise the border region—driven by demands for cheap labour in the U.S. Immediately, the ‘threat’ and ‘problem’ for the policy to try and solve is defined in the narrative strategy.

Reyes himself articulated his own vision of the situation in the borderlands before he stepped in, and in doing so formulated this main premise of the narrative strategy:

The situation was simply out of control. I’d never seen anything like it—you couldn’t go anywhere in the city without meeting panhandlers...In short, you had chaos and I didn’t like that.79

The focus creates a dichotomy of unprecedented ‘chaos’ and of order, requiring the ‘control’ of the borderlands by reconfiguring difference and separation and, in effect, meant reterritorialisation. His next statement unknowingly, but directly, further implicates Santos’s ‘knowledge-as-regulation’ schema:

There was a disorder here when people were running around here which is scary to people.80

As argued in the pervious section, the regulations involved with the operation had a major impact in strengthening socio-spatial separateness when Reyes attempted to create ‘order’ (in the scheme suggested in chapter two, a form of ‘knowledge’) out of ‘disorder’ (‘ignorance’) and galvanise ‘us’ against ‘them’. Regulation, in the guise of reterritorialised border control, could be applied and justified as a dominant, ‘proper’, and hegemonic knowledge: with securitisation, the future would presumably mean border communities would be released from the ‘disorder’ created by ill-informed public policies of the past.

Reyes was not the only elite to articulate the problem of order in these terms. In dramatic rhetoric, Alan Bersin, the U.S. Attorney General’s Special Representative for border issues—President Clinton’s ‘Border Czar’—also expressed this central component of the narrative strategy, complete with nationalist zeal:

[O]ur duty and responsibility is to manage the border satisfactorily, to manage it away from the epic of lawlessness that has characterized that border for the 150 years that the American Southwest has been a part of the United States, as contrasted with the northern half of Mexico.81

Security ‘management’ (e.g., proper application of knowledge or technology) can be the future solution to the ‘epic of lawlessness’ and ignorance of the past (and, by extension, that which is seen to characterise the Mexican state).

The Border Patrol’s spokesman, representative of numerous Border Patrol agents and indeed many El Pasoens, also promotes the perceived ‘success’ of the recent initiatives in similar terms:

I think people are very happy...[we] are cleaning up of a lot of problems—that was a positive effect of having the Operation.82

Another Border Patrol chief responded similarly:

Chaos reigned on the border. Not today.83

The border is projected to be ‘cleaned up’—those outside the bounds of the American political community have been rejected, and presumably the borderlands restored to a more ordered state. All of this narrative supports the reterritorialisation practices on the ground, helps provide distinction between groups, and symbolises important aspects of national identity, becoming a critical state substantiation practice to consolidate civic-ethnic identity, especially in a borderland ‘threatened’ by chaos and ‘illegal aliens’.

Finally, the spokesman voiced a comment representative of his worldview of sovereignty, isolationism, and the American national myth, dismissing any attempts to question securitisation:

First off, you have to respect the fact that there is an international boundary. It would be nice if we could say as a country that we will take care of all of the world’s economic and social problems. I don’t think it is realistic to assume that we can do that.84

82 Mosier, interview.
84 Mosier, interview.
Metaphors of Inclusion and Exclusion

A further analysis of the very terminology and symbolisation (often expressed through metaphors) within the overarching narratives and counter-narratives of these Border Patrol operations reveals the patterns of inclusion and exclusion operating in the discourse through particular territoriality-identity relationships. Looking at the language, Operation 'Hold the Line' was designed specifically to exclude 'illegal aliens' from crossing the 'line'—the abstract representation of modern political territoriality and the exclusionary political limit.

To reinforce national difference, as Manzo reminds us, 'the idea of the alien must be ever revived' hence the painting of undocumented workers here as, quite literally 'illegal aliens', 'national security threats' that 'invade' in 'tides' and 'waves'. When such rhetoric is advanced—especially at an official level—its impact is readily apparent. Prior to these recent efforts, for example, the Border Patrol ran an initiative in 1954 called 'Operation Wetback', a highly derogatory moniker, to attempt to prevent similar incursions.

These are the kinds of stereotypes of identity that emerged in the discourse. A respondent discussed her opinion of the American public's view of undocumented workers trying to enter the U.S.:

[Americans] are still scared to death of the Mexican hordes coming over the border.

Or, in the hyperbolic words of a border resident and retired Border Patrol agent:

The United States is in a crisis of catastrophic proportion...[it] is undergoing a large-scale invasion of Mexican, Central and South American entrants...adding to the poverty level and social problems. The United States has become a home for unwed mothers.

This language of 'invasion' and 'chaos' are words used by some Border Patrol agents but also exist in the popular imagination of residents along the American side of the border. Within the dominant narrative, they help construct the prevailing threat and risk the territorial strategy of reterritorialisation is designed to confront.

87 Kern, interview.  
These 'risks', a necessary result of mobilities of economic labour under globalisation, are cast to mean importing 'poverty', 'unwed mothers', and social disruption, creating a national 'crisis', presumably of a purportedly solid, homogeneous 'American' national identity and culture.

Indeed, in response to this kind of sentiment, Operation 'Blockade' and the militarisation efforts complete with LIC doctrine were introduced by the state in an attempt to curb such flows, or at least show the American people something was being done about the 'illegal alien problem'. This rhetoric, though, was coolly received in some quarters, including the Mexican government. As an El Pasoean put it:

The word 'blockade' was the most unfortunate names ever chosen...it's a word used to define an enemy and it implies stopping all trade and commerce.89 Language such as 'Blockade' and even 'Hold the Line' also served a major role in the overriding narrative strategy: it discursively aided the creation of a hostile border image in need of 'control'.

In response to some of this kind of public pressure, the Border Patrol changed the name of the operation to 'Hold the Line', more subtle and diplomatic language. The agency explains the reasoning behind the name change:

I think the business community was very concerned about in their words the message that this kind of a name was sending to the business communities of El Paso and Juarez during a time when NAFTA was being promoted very heavily and this whole idea of trading and economic stimulation was being conveyed. Chief Reyes recognized that and as a courtesy very quickly changed the name to something they felt was more palatable.90

The use of ‘palatable’ here is of note; while the actual policy remained unchanged, this indicates the move was a crafted public relations attempt within the narrative strategy to promote acceptance of the policy. This is consistent with the psychological component of LIC doctrine. Some, though, had different feelings about the name change:

We have on the border all this military imagery and I’m sure it seemed real natural for Reyes to use military imagery...but that was a little too threatening to diplomatic relationships to use such a negative term. I continue to use the word blockade, it’s more honest word.91

89 Manny Aldana, quoted in Carlos Hamann, 'Public Supports Dramatic Change', The El Paso Times (20 March 1994): 1A.
90 Mosier, interview.
91 Nathan, interview.
In the end, the Border Patrol, however, could not be clearer about rhetorical and material implications of the policy:

Operation Hold the Line was very simple—very symbolic of what we were trying to do and the name stuck.\textsuperscript{92}

The Border Patrol's public comments also clearly respond to a dual-regime, post-Cold War situation where economic integration and transnationalisation goes on under NAFTA just as exclusionary restrictions on labour are sought. They liken any comparison, however, to 'apples and oranges':

I think they [the Mexican government and critics] were concerned about the message that this operation sent at a time when NAFTA was on the front burner. We maintained then and we still maintain that it is apples and oranges. You cannot stimulate trade without a sound immigration policy.\textsuperscript{93}

Irrespective of the economic argument that could be made, the metaphor of 'apples and oranges' is a crystallisation of the dominant pattern of inclusion and exclusion this study suggests—capital is admitted across the border while the undocumented who help drive economic expansion are sought to be excluded. As part of the counter-narrative, a resident gave her sentiment on this apparent contradiction, and how alternatives are perceived:

[People] see [the border] in economic terms and they understand that trade barriers should come down and that we should have this commerce and cultural exchange—they understand it, but when they get right down to the grass roots and talk about people, poor people, and the impact on poor people's lives and shouldn't poor people have the right to seek jobs here that they can't find in Mexico—that's where people go no—that's where they want to draw the line...So that's a hard place to reach.\textsuperscript{94}

\textit{A Counter-Narrative of Community}

One counter-narrative that emerged in the debate about the Operation concerned the notion of community. The idea of a binational community or integrated borderland with its own, unique normative and territorial dimensions apart from those of the state is of course the obvious alternative to closure and militarisation. A concrete proposal to do just that surfaced in El Paso early in 1993

\textsuperscript{92} Mosier, interview.
\textsuperscript{93} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{94} Kern, interview.
with the formation of Unite El Paso, a mainstream, blue ribbon citizens group with real questions about the border. One of their proposals, made right before the Operation Blockade began, suggested delineating a kind of free zone of movement between Juarez and El Paso, erasing the existing international boundary and moving ports of entry to the outskirts of both cities. As a person involved with the organisation explains:

[Unite El Paso] was a direct questioning of the border. They were talking about that in the spring and summer of 1993, before the Blockade. And I think that the Blockade just shut all that discussion down because all of a sudden the whole city was polarised...

I think it opened up a space for people to stop thinking about the border as this arbitrary line. And then that whole discussion got cut off.95

These representative statements suggest a different understanding of socio-spatial consciousness: this was an alternative attempt to create a transnational ‘space’, an integrated borderland and thus a kind of communitarian-like structure with new parameters of inclusion and exclusion. Migrant workers, for instance, would have limited access to the El Paso component of the community (as current guest worker proposals, in fact, now seek), and vice-versa. The community would also address the status of such migrants and their ethical responsibilities to them.

The Blockade, however, reoriented the community’s consciousness, as the chairman of the group argued:

Blockades tend to increase the stereotype and mindset that we’re supposed to be separate. It’s not the answer, it’s a Band-Aid to our problems.96

Nevertheless, Unite El Paso was a groundbreaking initiative in opposition to a strict territorial consciousness of identity and a worldview of separateness. It involved a new principle of separability, and irrespective of its real prospects for material change, injected alternatives into the discourse:

We talk about that in ways—border communities on both sides should have some input into the ways the borders are administered. Here in El Paso a real interesting image is moving the inspection away from the border and moving it out to the checkpoints just like it is in Mexico—opening the area so El Paso/Juarez can function more as a joined city. We talk about that in ways—border communities on both sides should have some input into the ways the borders are administered.97

95 Nathan, interview.
96 Manny Aldana, quoted in David Sheppard, ‘Officials Try to Fix Border’, El Paso Times (13 October 1993): 1A.
97 Kern, interview.
Here we see the fluid language of ‘joining’, spatial ‘opening’, a problematising of the boundary, and a call for localised, bi-national decision making.

Reflecting this communitarian idea, a director of a refugee centre in El Paso asked a central question about securitisation during a 1993 forum:

What happens to a community that prior to [Reyes’s arrival] was trying to discern what was best for both sides of the border? We are the ones who should decide the quality of the relationship.98

This is a call for a fostering of binational relationships and local control of decision making in the community. This kind of idea relies on the notion that border communities have more in common with one another—a closer common identity—than their respective state ‘centres’.

Counter-narratives like the Unite El Paso idea also emerged in the environmental and public health communities, which tend to recognise the arbitrariness of borders when thinking about their issues. One official elucidated his office’s proposal to create a similar sort of community:

In a lot of ways we wanted to have like a free trade zone a free health zone. But that has been very very difficult—the autonomy and sovereignty issues are huge. It hasn’t been able to happen.99

He suggests a different outlook:

Ultimately to me [the current policy] is a negative piece... because I believe to have barriers and borders and homogenizing pieces decreases the amount of innovation we have. Cutting down on that communication also, from a public health perspective also boxes things and makes you not as readily available to understand the issues that come from intermixing of populations and that’s going to happen without a doubt.100

His term ‘homogenizing pieces’ is an interesting metaphor that seems to vividly conceptualise what the Operation seeks to do—reinforce both spatial, cultural, and national separateness.

The border as a ‘region’ was a popular theme among the respondents as well. This consciousness can suggest an identity that recognises a certain interconnectedness apart from the static or state-centric identity most hold on to:

99 Steffen, interview.
The border is a 'region'—it is this way of getting people to take one step to the side and look at it. We truly do have more in common with people in Juarez than we do with people in Austin and certainly people in Washington, D.C. And this whole strip of border—all our problems are so interdependent—Juarez has more in common with us than they do with Chihuahua or Mexico City.101

Later, this resident proposed a new metaphor that does not involve opening the border but would constitute a reordered political territorial identity and a form of moral inclusion:

We like to talk about not having no borders at all, but having a border that is a kind of permeable membrane that is not a line and a border that is mutual, not just where one nation ends, but where two nations join.102

This kind of communitarian, ‘permeable’ membrane that ‘joins’ is an image that presents different dimensions of inclusion and exclusion. Previously excluded undocumented people might have a limited opportunity to pass through this new space.

The public health official offers us similar image of the border:

I think of it as a semi-permeable membrane, an osmotic membrane you have this diffusion going through and the concentration of where people go and were the membrane is also wealth, it’s really economics.103

While these proposals for critical alternatives in the borderlands may have not been politically feasible at the time—nor even now—they do mark an important, counter intervention in the discourse by simply advancing the idea other possibilities exist.

**Material and Discursive Turns: Walls and Fences on the Border**

While Unite El Paso proposed moving the current international boundary outside the city limits, and counter-narratives questioned further build-ups, the Border Patrol moved in conjunction with Operation Hold the Line to construct a variety of ramparts along the U.S.-Mexico boundary itself; this was an easily recognisable method or strategy of creating separateness in the political discourse and on the ground. The INS built a new 10 foot high fence at the border between

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100 Ibid. In the interview, he emphasised that national distinctions and exclusionary impulses are secondary: 'from a public health perspective we don’t distinguish between documented and undocumented persons'.
101 Kern, interview.
102 Ibid.
103 Steffen, interview.
Anapra, Mexico (a poor *colonia* or ‘neighbourhood’ of far northwest Juarez, without water or public utilities) and Sunland Park, New Mexico. Originally envisioned as a steel wall, INS altered its plans amid public protest and built a steel reinforced, chain-link fence with underground barriers to prevent digging beneath it.

Interestingly enough, the public seemed receptive to a the symbol of a ‘fence’ but not a ‘wall’. One respondent pondered this concept:

> They put all this junk underneath so that nobody can dig their way down and they’re going to have some barbed wire at the top? Who cares? This is just as terrible a message to send. It is very symbolic. That wall image is real potent.104

But local residents, asking that a border crossing point be built instead, made their own, symbolic counter-narrative intervention: near the wall, they placed a clever home-made sign:

> The 10,000 residents of Puerto de Anapra protest against the Berlin (Anapra) Wall.105

Unhappily, a resident of the poverty-stricken *colonia* asserted:

> They’re building a corral around us like we are animals.106

The Border Patrol has a radically different view of the fence:

> We feel very passionate about the idea of implementing tools that give us more efficiency, more manageability, in troublesome areas.107

These are clearly narratives in opposition; to the Border Patrol the wall is less a symbol than a ‘tool’ to help ‘manage’ their monitoring of the line. This kind of outlook represents their efforts to concentrate resources on the ‘front line’ in the struggle against illegal incursions into the U.S. The blockade, some felt, was simply a different kind of barrier:

> The interesting thing about the wall—there was a lot of opposition and it was growing in El Paso—everyone thought the Blockade was fine, but a wall was something different in their minds, aesthetically, metaphorically, whatever. The blockade was just a human wall but they didn’t like this idea of this concrete, tangible wall that you can’t see through.108

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104 Nathan, interview.
105 Author observation, 11 November 1997.
106 Jesus Ruiz, quoted in Brandon, 'U.S.-Mexico Border'.
107 Mosier, interview.
108 Kern, interview.
Perhaps the physical composition of the barrier does make a difference—since, as noted in the theoretical review, walls and boundaries are 'metaphors of containment' that signify identity and difference, borderlanders may be tacitly acknowledging interrelationships by embracing a transparent fence and are unwilling to impose further difference with construction of a solid wall that blocks a gaze into Mexico.\textsuperscript{109}

The division of self and other is often paramount in various kinds of socio-spatial groupings and is forced into play here by the construction of these kinds of physical barriers. The role of spatiality and division (through the physical manifestation of a fence) can be directly correlated to the construction of otherness.\textsuperscript{110} Where this border fortification policy has been extended elsewhere, some residents have expressed similar views: a Naco, Arizona resident recently described a life of 'constant surveillance...and constant suspicion', heavily discouraged because the city is no longer open.\textsuperscript{111}

Back in El Paso, a long-standing local resident in an editorial for the \textit{El Paso Times}, seemed to strike the heart of the matter:

\begin{quote}
We have to confront the fact that this isn't one big community anymore. And pretty soon, there will be a wall to remind us about that.\textsuperscript{112}
\end{quote}

### 5.6 \textbf{RECENT DEVELOPMENTS}

Operation Hold the Line was so well-received in the policy community it became the cornerstone of American border policy from the mid-1990s; its initiation set into motion a broad pattern of securitisation along the southern frontier (and as the next chapter will illustrate, also to some extent in the northern borderlands). This 'success' can be better understood only within the context of more recent developments. The material and narrative dimensions of these more recent changes (largely manifestations of reterritorialisation), detailed below, serve as additional


\textsuperscript{110} Anssi Paasi, 'Constructing Territories, Boundaries and Regional Identities', in \textit{Contested Territory: Border Disputes at the Edge of the Former Soviet Empire}, ed. Tuomas Forsberg (Brookfield, VT: Edward Elgar, 1995).

\textsuperscript{111} Linda Morales, quoted in \textit{Interpreter Releases} 77, no. 26 (10 July 2000), 672

support for the prevailing territoriality-identity dynamics elaborated in the previous section. They are also illustrative of a regulatory understanding of knowledge as 'order' and are important reminders of some of the normative implications of the policy.

The official, dominant narrative of border securitisation—in the words of the INS's latest budget requests—'to improve our control over our international borders' has continued to frame policy formulation increasing at a furious pace since the unveiling of Hold the Line. Support derived from public and congressional meetings, hearings, and both the Clinton and Bush administrations has meant burgeoning budgets for the INS at a time when most government agencies have been cut back. Funding of 'technological capabilities' for surveillance is a high priority, as is staffing of agents and the building of walls.

Much of this stems from immigration legislation of the mid-1990s. The 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) built on the reterritorialisation impulses to authorise wide changes in American border policy. While the bill is detailed extensively in the next chapter, its provisions and narrative have had a profound effect on the southern borderlands as well in the north by continuing and bolstering securitisation while devoting few resources to interior regulation. In the legislation, the U.S. Congress (among other immigration control measures) mandated the INS hire 1,000 agents per year through 2001, bringing the FY2000 total to over 9,000 agents, which represents more than a doubling of agents since FY 1993. According to the INS, the Border Patrol has grown by more than 123 per cent since fiscal year 1994 and now has a $4.6 billion annual budget. It is now the largest body of domestic law enforcement authorised to carry firearms.

References:

114 Numerous congressional hearings bolstered official narrative support for the radical build-up of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. See U.S. House Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims, Border Security and Deterring Illegal Entry into the United States and Border Security.
115 Division C of U.S. Public Law 104-208, 104th Cong., 2d sess., 30 September 1996.

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Violence in the Borderlands

The militarisation of the southern borderlands all this set in motion has indirectly taken the life of many undocumented persons by forcing them to cross the border in increasingly desolate and inhospitable areas. As will be illustrated below, urban securitisation has not stopped flows, but rather shifted them to dangerous rural areas. In 1997, however, the military presence on the border had direct, tragic consequences for a young American citizen on American soil. On 20 May, a U.S. Marine unit attached to JTF-6 was on a covert surveillance mission on the border near Redford, Texas. The team of four camouflaged Marines, armed with M-16 assault rifles, pursued, shot, and killed Esequiel Hernandez Jr., an 18 year old American tending his goats in the area.

The killing dramatically highlights the dangers militarisation and violence pose along the borderlands, as well as the inherent issues surrounding U.S. military involvement with civilian law enforcement. In the Hernandez case, a congressional inquiry concluded that his death was attributable to a series of failures on the part of Justice Department and Defense Department personnel who were negligent in their training and preparation for the border surveillance mission, and who failed to respond adequately to an emergency situation as it developed.\footnote{Lamar Smith, 'Oversight Investigation of the Death of Esequiel Hernandez Jr.', U.S. House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims Report, 105th Cong., 2d sess., 1998, Serial 11, 1.}

These Marines were ill-trained for this kind of operation, as their background instruction (as is the case with most military units on the border) was designed for conflict situations. No JTF-6 personnel, nor any INS officials, were held accountable for the Hernandez killing, and U.S. Justice Department and INS were sharply criticised in the inquiry for withholding vital information to the case.\footnote{Ibid. See also Roberto Suro, 'Report: U.S. "Failures" Led to Border Death', \textit{Washington Post} (13 November 1998): A3.}

Moreover, Hernandez was targeted because he supposedly fit the profile of a drug-runner, injecting a negative stereotypical view of Latinos into the prevailing political discourse. The killing also reinforced the projection of violence on the border, a
process already underway with militarisation. Armed infantry patrols were suspended after the shooting, but are now an option again, and JTF-6 continues to be active on the U.S.-Mexico border, recently employing Army attack helicopters for its missions. As an analyst recently commented:

There’s just so much out there already that has created an image of a fortress mentality like the Berlin Wall... The pressure from several hawk legislators and anti-immigrant groups is to put the military on the border. Now, we’re getting closer to that reality.

Over Defense Department objections, the House of Representatives recently approved an amendment to the 2001 Defense Authorization bill (H.R. 4205) that would authorise the assignment of military personnel to assist in patrolling the Southwest border.

More broadly, the process of securitisation that began with Hold the Line and entails the enlistment of the military in domestic law enforcement—at first limited to drugs, and now including migration—is an inauspicious omen in a dangerous cycle. Faced with self-inflicted, contradictory flows of migrant labour, the logic of regulation and order only fuels the state’s reliance on larger and more complex military-police structures and narratives to support these operations. Policy officials claim that if they can only get enough resources, they can finally solve the problem. The consequences are both immediate and potentially far-reaching. For migrants from Mexico, and for some Latinos in general, the results are already manifest in an increasing hostility in both material and discursive terms. Other shooting incidents by the Border Patrol along the border, mostly directed at Mexicans, are still occurring.

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Vigilante Actions

In addition to pushing migrants to desolate areas of the border, militarisation has created a conflict-charged atmosphere, spawning hate groups and vigilantes to take up action along the southern borderlands which has resulted in civil and human rights violations and a climate of hatred and criminalisation. The pattern of violence reached new levels in 2000 when a variety of groups along the southern borderlands organised initiatives to enforce what they called ‘vigilante justice’; their assaults and shootings of undocumented workers have doubled. An armed group of ‘volunteers’ in Texas called ‘Ranch Rescue’ recently organised to ‘provide security’ for ranchers ‘under invasion’ from ‘wanton criminal trespassers’, e.g., Mexican migrants. The group claims it is conducting armed patrols along the border and now solicits volunteers.

In the words and metaphors of another group called ‘American Patrol’, the call is to ‘Defend our Borders’ and ‘Maintain Our Sovereignty...Close The Border...Stop Importing Slave Labor and Poverty’; they further outline ‘What and Who is Behind the Mexican invasion of the American Southwest’. While much of this is still largely confined to the rhetorical realm, two of the two most infamous of the vigilante groups, ‘Republic of Texas’ and ‘Neighborhood Ranch Watch’, are active in the borderlands. Republic of Texas has made and plans further armed patrols to take undocumented workers back to Mexico. Neighborhood Ranch Watch is tied to Roger Barnett, a rancher who conducts armed patrols of his ranch, and claims he has rounded up ‘4,000 undocumented workers to date, 176 alone on a good weekend’. According to the League of United Latin American Citizens, more than 450 migrants have been detained by ranchers, who allegedly have attacked 32 of the migrants and killed two.

123 Jose Matus (Coalicion de Derechos Humans-Arizona Border Rights Project), letter to author, 23 May 2000.

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Barnett wants the military to be posted at the U.S.-Mexico border, and further advocates American troops ‘invade Mexico and take it over’ before the Mexicans bring the U.S. ‘to its knees...It’s going to be anarchy. There’ll be fighting in the streets before too long...If the government can’t take care of it, we’ll have a civil war’. Neighborhood Ranch Watch recently published an anonymous, terrifying ‘invitation’ to tourists to

have some fun in the sun...help keep trespassers from destroying private property...[placing] trip wire launchers...spotting illegal aliens.

In May 2000, representatives from the vigilante groups met in Arizona to co-ordinate their efforts; members of the Ku Klux Klan and the National Organization for European American Rights attended. In response, former Mexican Foreign Secretary Rosario Green denounced the civilian patrols as ‘brutal displays of xenophobia. This is racist behaviour that violates all international rules’. But the nativist discourse creates a charged, tense atmosphere along the border and promotes erosion of civil rights already under strain with the securitisation policies and criminalisation of economic migrants.

5.7 AN EMERGENT METANARRATIVE

The dominant ‘metanarrative’ surrounding the initiatives presents an image of ‘order’ and ‘control’, achieved through regulation against a defined ‘threat’; fear and disorder is projected onto the border—consolidating and creating public support for securitisation and helping solidify a civic notion of national collective identity. In addition, this representation of U.S. border policy since Hold the Line may also serve raw political interests instead of actually ‘solving’ the contradictory problems it purports to deal with.

Operation Hold the Line, and similar urban securitisation measures along the frontier, have not stopped undocumented migration; in fact, they encourage it around the edges of the blockade, redirecting flows to less militarised, and more remote and hostile environments while at the same time fuelling the growth of transnational

128 Ibid.
human smuggling cartels. While the latest round of reterritorialisation of the U.S.-
Mexico borderlands is the largest yet, previous, similar efforts have failed. Even
with the new resources, undocumented migration, in fact, as has at best not slowed,
and at worst, increased under the new strategy, reaching near-record highs in
2000.132

While the data is somewhat unclear due to practical difficulties in gathering
accurate figures, a recent report by the U.S. Congress' own investigative agency, the
General Accounting Office (GAO), concluded the evidence for claims that the
strategy was reducing flows of undocumented workers was 'inconclusive', despite
seven years of effort and billions of dollars appropriated to the 'problem'.133

Other data, in fact, indicates few determined migrants have been deterred by
the new policy; even the INS does not now claim overall levels of undocumented
migration have fallen in the post-Hold the Line era—despite maintaining levels
would significantly drop when the policy was unveiled. As immigration specialist
Wayne Cornelius asserts, militarisation has only worsened conditions on the border
while not actually reducing flows:

It's a failed policy...This approach has not generated any appreciable deterrence.
The apprehension figures keep ratcheting up along the border.134

It has not done anything to reduce the hiring of workers by American
employers...There are more undocumented workers today than before the build up
started.135

That the image that does not correspond to the reality of these mobilities is further
underscored by a recent analysis by the University of California:

The best data thus far indicate that adding 4,000 additional agents since 1995 and
doubling border control expenditures did not reduce illegal entries significantly.136

132 See U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Fiscal Year 2001
133 U.S. General Accounting Office, Illegal Immigration: Southwest Border Strategy Results
estimates put the 7 year cost of securitisation in the San Diego sector alone between $6 and $9 billion.
134 Wayne Cornelius, quoted in Joe Cantlup, 'Arrests Up Since 1994 Crackdown at Border: Costly
Effort Fails to Deter Illegal Flow', San Diego Union-Tribune (20 February 2001)
136 University of California, Davis, 'INS: Is Gatekeeper Working?', Migration News 7, no. 9
Furthermore, their report concludes that militarisation has not slowed the hiring of undocumented workers in the farming and agribusiness sectors. Instead, growth of two to four per cent is expected, bringing the percentage of farm workers who are unauthorised up to 52 per cent.\footnote{Ibid.} The report did indicate the new policies increased the length of average stays in the U.S. of undocumented migrants and smuggling activities—and the concomitant temptations for official corruption. Moreover, the anticipated (and publicly claimed) decline in crime in the borderlands because of the securitisation is also inconclusive.\footnote{Ibid., 6.6.} In some cases, many migrants who used to cross illegally have now simply regularised their crossing status.\footnote{Catherine Orenstein, ‘Illegal Transnational Labor: Mexicans in California and Haitians in the Dominican Republic’, 

A recent, high-level bilateral study conducted by the Carnegie Endowment for Peace has introduced a surprising critique of the current reterritorialisation policies into the official discourse, urging a radical rethinking of the border and migration towards more openness, co-operation, and mutual responsibility:

It is increasingly recognized that current enforcement policies regarding unauthorized migration from Mexico are broken. Presently, the United States maintains a rigid patchwork of laws and mounts extensive unilateral law enforcement efforts. These have proven largely ineffective at achieving the intended outcomes of channeling migration through legal entry points and reducing unauthorized migration...As a result, too many migrants die trying to cross into the United States, too many hardworking immigrants are subject to exploitation...


This recognises many of the narrative justifications in official and public circles which support the metanarrative of image and control are based on flawed premises. For example, the assertion that economic and social instability originates from south of the border is untenable. Narrative claims that migrants are a ‘drain’ on the domestic U.S. economy, ‘sucking’ away social services, are contradicted by major empirical studies, including two by the respected non-partisan Urban Institute that suggest instead they are an aggregate *gain* for the economy, taking less than they
invest into the system, largely due to the boon they create for business because of low wages and the fact they rarely collect social security benefits (as this would expose their illegal status). Other research now suggests they actually have been a major reason for the unprecedented economic expansion of the U.S. during the 1990s.

Moreover, the metanarrative that drives current reterritorialisation is focussed on the external boundaries of the state, but not the actual regulation of migration (undocumented workers) away from the boundary; the INS’s professed goals of reducing illegal immigration seem little served by devoting less than 5 per cent of its budget to interior enforcement at workplaces, making only 110 raids in 2000 (down from 290 in 1999). The metanarrative diverts and directs attention only to the southern borderlands, compartmentalising, distancing, and simplifying the policy and the perceived problem. But, in fact, as the Urban Institute maintains, out of every ten undocumented workers in the U.S., only four crossed the southern border. Yet 90 per cent of those arrested are Mexican nationals and 85 per cent of the resources for border control are allocated to the southern borderlands. The majority of ‘illegal aliens’ in the United States, in reality, are visa overstayers who came to the country legally.

‘Sealing’ the U.S.-Mexico border is impossible. What instead emerges in the metanarrative is a politically constructed, highly successful, official image of

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This is conducted within the unyielding official narrative goal of 'being tough on illegal aliens'. An orderly, patrolled, and unified boundary projects a picture of a homogenous, stable territorial identity and serves, as in the case of some elites like Reyes and those in Border Patrol, to further political careers and bolster institutional resources. But the negative side effects—from militarisation to vigilante groups to deaths of migrants—remain, along with the complexity and contradictions of NAFTA economic integration to say nothing of the increasing poverty of the region.

At the heart of the issue, reflexive territoriality is at play: advanced information and surveillance technology on the borders in conjunction with a transnational labour market is both the 'cause' and, ironically, the 'effect' of a dual North American economic regime. That regime attempts to restrict labour but frees trade and capital mobilities—but still seeks cheap undocumented labour in its domestic fields, gardens, and factories.

5.8 CONCLUSIONS

As one of the most dynamic areas of the world, the U.S.-Mexico borderlands offer an IR scholar a direct laboratory in which to examine important changes in international politics—particularly those involving territoriality, economics, technologies of security, and national collective identity. As we have seen, the border was forged in the linear, discrete pattern of modern political territoriality in the West, imposed and set through imperial violence. Despite the asymmetric nature of the boundary, a unique, complicated bi-national zone has developed that defies seeing the border in simple or abstract terms. The region is marked by a long history of social, cultural, and economic interaction of 'mobilities', a pattern of interaction now accelerating under globalisation and NAFTA, rapid industrialisation, and heavy population growth and movement of labour. Because migration in particular presents numerous challenges to the dominant official state narrative by introducing heterogeneity, ambiguity, and contradiction within previously 'stable' conceptions of national identity, it is perhaps a key issue for consideration in an i/b/o-directed study of borders and identity.

Why is this high cost (both in financial and human terms) reterritorialisation policy against economic migrants continuing, despite its seeming failure? This
chapter’s evaluation of the ‘turbulent’ southern borderlands can answer this for us in three ways that operate within the i/b/o triad: the projection of an ‘image’ of control for particular political and knowledge ends in a metanarrative, the consolidation of a notion of national collective identity, and the conditions of transnational economic integration and labour flows. The projection of fear into the border through discursive and material means, including militarisation, can be interpreted in part as a political project to win additional political support and resources for INS/Border Patrol activities. The early but crucial 1993 Sandia weapons lab study, which helped establish the official narrative strategy, outlined how that might be done. The report, in fact, highlights the importance of discursive control, candidly recommending

A good public relations program...one which emphasizes the barriers are not an act of unfriendliness, but an act of control.146

Managing image and manufacturing a dominant narrative, then, becomes highly important in the overall strategy.

The official narrative strategy can indeed be interpreted as an issue of ‘control’. As the study illustrated, the dominant metanarrative framed the policy problem as one of ‘chaos’ and ‘disorder’. The official stated loss of ‘control’ (incorrectly presupposing the border was ever ‘controlled’) resulted in a reflexive move by the state to tighten and centralise power and resources territorially: focussing reterritorialisation on the borders also delegates the ‘problem’ to the periphery, and the concentration on technological ‘solutions’ an easily perceived answer. This helps rally popular support, given the new appearance of ‘control’ on the boundary. And it also furthers an understanding of ‘knowledge-as-regulation’. As ‘control’ over ‘chaos’ is reflexively sought, both discursively and materially, so to is as sense of ‘progress’ and knowledge, directly correlated to ever more intense territorial regulation.

Ultimately, however, the need to counter this ‘risk’ territorially is reflexive: the ‘hazards’ to be combated are the product of domestic demand itself. The North American economic system favours low wages and profits for multinational firms, and ‘illegal immigration’ is an efficient component of transnational economic flows; territorial policies along the southern border, it can be argued, are actually designed to fail because labour is more valuable to the U.S. economy when it is illegal and

146 Sandia National Laboratories, Systematic Analysis, ES-10, emphasis added.
undocumented—in fact, it is now seen as partly responsible for supporting the unprecedented economic boom of the 1990s. Interior enforcement by the INS through workplace controls is notoriously weak, with congressional and business interests often resisting such actions.147

Reflexivity is also indicated by the state’s reliance on advanced military technology to both attempt to ‘secure’ the boundary through surveillance devices, and also its data collecting and monitoring which allows it to re-appropriate border resources to stem new flows and manage the image of control politically. The creation of a poor class of individuals excluded from expanding networks and channels of information and control is also a product of Lash’s understanding of the structural conditions of reflexivity, highlighted in chapter two.148

The metanarrative, as illustrated, revolves around a particular representation of border control that does not necessarily correlate with current transnational realities under NAFTA and masks alternatives.149 With the dynamics of mobilities in the international system, including never before seen flows of goods, individuals, and capital, even more massive allocation of border resources and security cannot hope to stem illegal flows, especially any policies that restrict corporate or private sector interests. Further tightening under the logic of the global economy is infeasible given the sheer numbers of ‘legitimate’ crossings (which are only projected to dramatically increase over the next twenty years); even a vast expansion of Border Patrol agents could not hope to cope with the force of North American economic integration and global flows. A re-evaluation of current policy, therefore, seems appropriate.

Significant normative implications also result from the reterritorialisation policy and are fostered by elements of the narrative, including a charged atmosphere at the border (spawning the Marine shooting and vigilante violence) as well as the

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deaths of migrants. The Center for Immigration Research at the University of Houston has documented at least 1600 deaths of undocumented migrant crossers from 1993-1997.\textsuperscript{150} According to Mexico, 491 reported deaths occurred in 2000.\textsuperscript{151} Reterritorialising policies of exclusion dating from 1993 (the beginning of Operation Hold the Line) can be implicated in this, largely due to the shifting of migratory patterns to highly treacherous and inhospitable (i.e., hot and rugged desert terrain). Both Amnesty International and the UN Human Rights Secretary Mary Robinson have condemned the militarisation for this reason.\textsuperscript{152}

As the case study demonstrated, reterritorialisation on the border also helps consolidate a notion of national collective identity. The 'imagined community' of American civic national identity is a constructed entity rather than a somehow naturally occurring evolution; it is a continually sustained through a particular narrative.\textsuperscript{153} Securitisation, as illustrated, plays its part in this. In this case, it is mobilised against a foil of the 'alien' other, against crime and disorder, and depersonalised stereotypes: existential 'threats' that require reflexive solutions.

The border discourse of identity and migration is ripe with metaphoric practices, key political symbols.\textsuperscript{154} Metaphoric practices produce and latch meaning within a particular narrative to policies and subjects—and in this case help realise the constitution of national identity. Here, they tend to be centred around exclusionary talk of 'aliens', 'floods' and 'invasions' which 'poison' the local communities and thus criminalise economic migrants who seek jobs for the taking in America that helped build the economic success of the 1990s. Racist undertones can also colour the debate—although it is framed in terms of 'immigration' control.

The voices in the border discourse exposed here illustrate the processes and dynamics of one of the foundations of this study—the social construction of boundaries. Ultimately, the dominant material and discursive dimensions of Hold the Line helped alter the way El Pasoeans understand their boundedness by changing


\textsuperscript{152} See Dunn, 'Border War'.

\textsuperscript{153} This formulation does not imply it is a weak construction nor does it deny real material effects.

\textsuperscript{154} George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, \textit{Metaphors We Live By} (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 94.
the dominant territorial discourse of the border, even amidst economic integration and various mobilities. Conversi addresses this issue: ‘when identities slide into each other, borders “must” be established, although this effort is also presented by nationalist elites as an attempt to maintain a pre-existing or primordial national boundary’.155 Border Patrol Chief Reyes, from an instrumentalist perspective, helped shift that bond between citizen, ethnicity, and state through both policy change on the ground and a new narrative strategy that garnered mass public support. This was illustrated when the respondents discussed the broadly positive reception of his initiative in the Mexican-American community and public opinion polls which draw the same conclusion.

From an i/b/o perspective, we can return to Paasi’s concept of spatial socialisation as the process by which individuals and collectivities are ‘socialised’ to belong and identify with a particular bounded territorial community.156 Operation Hold the Line, the border, the other, and collective identity are inherent in the rhetoric, metaphors and symbolisation that help constitute this socio-spatial grouping. The ‘us’ - ‘them’ or ‘I’ - ‘we’ constitution of identity directly follows the ‘borderlines between human and “something else”’.157 Those exclusionary ‘borderlines’ in the spatial consciousness of residents are being drawn along the southern frontier.

Some in the study offered counter-narrative interventions, applauding attempts to forge a binational community similar to an integrated borderland in the Unite El Paso effort or visualising the border as a ‘region’ or a permeable ‘membrane’. Some rejected the rhetoric of exclusion and stereotyping, and the construction of further walls. However, the metanarrative here is extremely powerful and popular—few choose to question it.

The international scene at the millennium is marked by the same kind of changes impacting the U.S.-Mexico borderlands; concomitant with this transformation are new discourses of identity and constructions of boundaries. The borders of bounded communities appear to be hardening in an exclusionary fashion, not to capital, but to individuals, particularly in cases where the state influences boundaries and discourse to promote or demote conceptions of order and identity.

156 Paasi, ‘Territories, Boundaries, and Consciousness’.

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New critical perspectives and forms of border studies like this one will be increasingly important to understand the nuanced play of identities, borders, and order in a turbulent and 'shaken' world.\textsuperscript{158}

The future of the U.S.-Mexico border region remains uncertain and continues to be contested. As economic interdependence is fostered, and as Mexico develops, perhaps a move towards an communitarian-like 'integrated' borderland might be possible; the democratic election of Mexican president Vicente Fox has uncorked new enthusiasm for change, as he seeks an open, EU-style border arrangement in 20-30 years. New guest worker proposals in 2001 also suggest the possibility of more regularised, legal labour flows.

All of this would pose not only greater theoretical questions for IR, but also possibly foster the construction of a distinct, binational 'border' identity and ethical community for the residents of the region.\textsuperscript{159} Anderson's notion of 'imagined communities'—the imagined limits of national communities, their boundedness—might be helpful in such conceptions because it suggests the possibility for change, for altering, under the proper conditions, the conscious reconstruction of the limits of the national community.\textsuperscript{160} Ultimately, this is a goal of some critical theory—to question inclusion and exclusion and ensure the 'fine lines' we draw—our principles of separability—are just and lead to positive social change. At the very least, they may open up the future possibilities for transformation.

Perhaps Gloria Anzaldúa found the best way to understand the border when she wrote

\[\text{To survive the Borderlands} \]
\[\text{you must live } \text{sin fronteras}\textsuperscript{161} \]
\[\text{be a crossroads.}\textsuperscript{162} \]

This will increasingly become the challenge of identity in the turbulent southern borderlands.

\textsuperscript{157} Ibid., 9.
\textsuperscript{161} 'without borders.'
\textsuperscript{162} Anzaldúa, 'To live in the Borderlands means you', 194.
Accepting this, the next chapter turns to the U.S.-Canadian borderlands, which in some ways is an excellent counterpoint to this case. Despite a more symmetric binational relationship, dynamics there are surprisingly similar to some of the same pressures and narratives of the southern borderlands: reterritorialisation and economic integration under NAFTA may manifest different questions of identity and order, but still a similar metanarrative emerges.
CHAPTER SIX

NARRATING THE U.S.-CANADIAN BORDERLANDS

6.0 INTRODUCTION

The thesis has begun to theoretically and empirically unpack some of the phenomena that seek, on one level, to challenge traditional interstate borders but on another, only serve to replicate them; these include transnationalisation and globalisation especially noticeable in interdependent borderlands states. The deterritorialisation driven by mobilities—intensified flows of peoples, information, and capital—and the corresponding state responses of regulation informed and achieved by surveillance and other technologies—suggest a pattern of reflexive territoriality. This is typically imposed by the advanced information state and made possible framing contemporary policy and public discourse.

The identities/borders/orders heuristic tool can help us deconstruct and re-evaluate some of the constitutive processes and relationships surrounding globalisation. In this chapter, the triad is put to use to critically examine the relationships between official state narratives and policy which help construct a particular state 'order'. The focus is on those representational practices and policies surrounding the U.S.-Canadian border which help designate individuals discretely as citizens, identify threats, and construct national sentiment. In regards to the 'identity' component of the triad, for instance, these practices have a key role in legitimating the state and connecting its territory to national collective identity, a dynamic explored theoretically in the latter half of chapter four.1

As chapter three suggested, borders in general, and the North American NAFTA case in particular, present excellent opportunities to study intensifying flows of transnational capital, information, and labour. These can promote greater continental integration and more 'porous' borders also prompt contestation over questions of migration, regionalism, and identity as the 'joints of continental

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articulation'. 2 Where one would expect liberalisation of border controls (especially between Canada and the U.S., for example) tightening is underway.

The last chapter argued the new post-Cold War, exclusionary securitisation of borders and migrants is one response to this uncertainty and a partial means for collective identity constitution on the U.S.-Mexico border. Taking just that case, border policy in the United States would appear to be informed by new initiatives to securitise state boundaries, reflecting the development of two policy regimes: economic integration through decreased restrictions on capital and trade flows in North America with a concurrent, exclusionary tightening of labour movements. There, the ‘national’ worldviews of borderlanders are partly consolidated by exclusionary state territorial activities and securitisation narratives, creating a ‘turbulent’ region.

But does this pattern of securitisation and identity formation apply to the U.S.-Canadian borderlands, which have enjoyed stable international relationships that historically allowed for an undefended boundary? In this more symmetrical situation, what do the dynamics of seemingly similar identity and economic development patterns between the U.S. and Canada mean for border practices and differentiation narratives, in contrast to the U.S.-Mexican case? What additional or different considerations are involved in the reflexive formulation of political territoriability in the northern borderlands?

To a large extent, this chapter will suggest in the U.S.-Canadian case, the politics of representation also involves the presentation of an image of border ‘security’. This reinforces the generally accepted exclusionary role of modern borders, based on an idea of ‘knowledge-as-regulation’ set out in chapter two. 3 Reterritorialisation strategies work to help construct the same ‘threats’ and ‘risks’ the state seeks to control. Even then, in considering border policy with Canada, like that in the southern borderlands, official U.S. narratives and representations construct an ‘order’ made more from the ‘image’ of control rather than making actual policy advances on issues like terrorism.

Like in the Mexican border research, to see how political space is written on the U.S.-Canadian border, this chapter examines discourse and narrative, the ways in

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which language and symbolism articulate political positions and power and constitute our understandings and naturalisations of the boundaries around us by setting the fields of interpretation and possibility. Shapiro reminds us of the usefulness of such an approach:

Given that our understanding of conflict, war, or more generally, the space within which international politics is deployed is always mediated by modes of representation and thus by all the various mechanisms involved in text construction—grammars, rhetorics, and narrativity—we must operate within a view of politics that is sensitive to textuality. Political processes are, among other things, contests over the alternative understandings (often implicit) immanent in...representational practices.

Accordingly, the focus here is on the ‘scripts’ and representations of international relations, and in particular, those of borders—often reified or taken as static legal ‘givens’ in the international system. Again, a narrative focus does not imply the rejection of competing explanatory facts, such as material demands, but rather serves a complementary clarifying lens to the politics and, in a sense, the ‘orders’ at hand and their possibilities.

Unlike the previous case study, however, the examination here is largely devoted to government policy texts and supportive policy speeches, thereby gaining access to different aspects of policy development and justification. In particular, the chapter offers an empirical analysis of the official documentation and public debate forming the narratives which surround both current developments on the border and the watershed Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA). These discursive structures help write (and ultimately physically construct) exclusionary space by attempting strict control of entry and exit along the northern line. Increasingly, the ‘defence’ of the previously considered undefended northern borderlands is becoming the sought-after reality in some policy circles.

More specifically, several research questions are offered: what do the changing modes of differentiation and integration suggest for the link between territory, borders, and national identity in the U.S.-Canadian border case? How can narrative policy analysis and the identities/borders/orders conceptual triad serve as a useful tools to examine the complex nexus of these key relationships in the post-

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5 Division C of U.S. Public Law 104-208, 104th Cong., 2d sess., 30 September 1996.
Cold War, NAFTA era on the U.S.-Canadian border? How are political space and identity being produced there? Finally, what ‘metanarrative’ is emerging within this exclusionary border discourse?

This chapter proceeds with an emphasis on the practices and representations embedded within these narratives which help reproduce modern norms of territoriosity and identity vis-à-vis Canada and defined threats. Drawing from the conceptual overview of work on discourse, the section looks to help denaturalise the conditions and power frameworks through a constitutive theory of language. The work is informed by a narrative policy analysis methodology set out in chapter four. The next section examines the development of the U.S.-Canadian borderlands as a modern political cartography. The analysis of major public texts relating to border issues, especially the IIRIRA of 1996, follows, and the chapter concludes with an evaluation of contemporary developments which help formulate the counter-narratives and emergent metanarrative of this border. While one might expect vast differences from the southern borderlands case just detailed, the research here will suggest that, even in these borderlands between ostensibly analogous and relatively integrated socio-political states like the U.S. and Canada, the dominant trends towards reterritorialisation persists.

6.1 ‘Reading’ the U.S.-Canada Borderlands

Canada is unthinkable without its border with the U.S.A.

—Martin Kuester

As the chapter on border studies noted, boundaries are socially and politically constructed phenomena which require continual processes and relations to be reproduced. Borders, moreover, are political representations of power that have much to do with the spatiality of self, identity, and state; they configure political and cultural difference and ‘connect territory with social order’. As some scholars have shown, there are numerous symbolic and ideational relationships between the territorial organisation achieved through bordering practices and kinds of socio-political groupings; the ‘spatial socialisation’ or constitution of identity, for example,

The article itself is a good example of reinforcing an image of ‘problems’ and lack of ‘control’ as the predominant policy problems on the northern American border with Canada.

1 Martin Kuester, ed., Canadian Studies: A Literary Approach (Bochum: Universitätsverlag Dr. N. Brockmeyer, 1995), 9.
often follows the ‘borderlines between human and “something else”’. Moreover, bordering practices are historically contingent, drawing on and being reproduced by various, unique patterns of socio-political organisation and notions of difference.

‘Identities, borders, and orders’ are indeed in play along the U.S.-Canadian frontier. As the textual analysis will illustrate, recent political developments and enabling narratives serve to help construct a ‘threat’—of terrorism and undocumented migration—to the national political idea and territoriality of the United States. In place too are nationalism narratives which increasingly complicate and resist movement towards heightened integration and border liberalisation in North America (something, as chapter five indicates, is even more clearly in evidence in the southern borderlands with Mexico).

The construction of identity narratives and territoriality in the U.S.-Canadian borderlands is embedded in a long historical pattern surrounding the three i/b/o nodes. In order to understand the current dimension of these late modern geographies of identity, order, and the implications of change in the northern borderlands, we must first contextualise the historical evolution of this region—and importantly, the processes of modernity that constructed the boundary. The borders of the United States are illustrative of the kind of political mapping distinctive to modern socio-political organisation. The historical and theoretical survey of that process was set out in chapter two of this study. This section, then, goes on to examine the event of the demarcation of the northern border as a concrete example of this process. It was settled partly by diplomacy and partly by violence, but as an evolving historical discourse it continues to represent a ‘solid’ view of modern borders and political territoriality despite new ‘cartographic anxieties’ spurred by transnational pressures under NAFTA.

**Historical Overview**

The establishment of northern international boundary of the United States is an excellent illustration of the forces of territoriality and nationalism (borders and identities) in the birthing environment of the American state—and indeed the larger

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North American political and economic order. In effect, the boundaries of the state were achieved through the violent production and movement of fixed and exclusive borders gradually westward, re-mapping the space of the continent in a rational manner, over pre-modern forms of political organisation; the frontiers of American society gradually progressed followed to establish the sovereign state.

The consolidation of the 49th parallel as the northern border of the United States, in fact, is a classic exemplar of the processes and discourses of modern boundary determination; Fawcett called it 'by far the best known astronomical boundary line' in the world.\textsuperscript{11} In setting the boundary, diplomats relied on a deep Western tradition in political thought which operates on early modern epistemological principles; this required strict, sharp differentiation of political entities, meant to be territorialised 'containers' of collective identity and national mission.\textsuperscript{12} As elaborated in chapter two of this work, these processes are realisations of modernity's major cartographic frameworks; in effect, this contingent political representation of space has had a direct impact on norms and practices of territoriality, power, and order both metaphorically and on the ground.\textsuperscript{13}

Ignoring alternative, older methods of presenting political space, as modern cartographic and delimitation technologies advanced, the earth's entire surface was 'rendered equivalent' and 'all localness...vanish[ed] in the homogenisation and geometrisation of space'.\textsuperscript{14} What was left denied a multitude of diverse identities, ecological and cultural factors (including vast Native American holdings); this boundary setting through violence served as a vehicle for a variety of knowledge-power relationships, primarily backing the sovereign state and modern, bureaucratic, and even imperial control. In the end, this process helped create a powerful narrative of 'exclusive spatial notions of identity'.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{11} C.B. Fawcett, \textit{Frontiers: A Study in Political Geography} (Oxford: Clarendon, 1918), 68.
\textsuperscript{15} Black, \textit{Maps and Politics}, 57.
The advancement of the frontier as boundary and idea was instrumental in forging the sovereign U.S. state; the various stages of solidifying the border with Canada (largely by 1846), marked steps toward the consolidation of the United States into the Westphalian system. As Konrad writes,

in the long run, the frontier thesis has defined the place of the United States in North America, and it has differentiated the United States from Canada and from Mexico...this differentiation has delineated the borderlines and overlooked the borderlands.

The first step in the delineation of the border, however, was in 1783, when the northern boundary was established with Britain, running from the St. Croix river's mouth to the 'highlands' between Maine and Quebec (but was only finally 'settled' in 1842 with the advent of more precise scientific cartographic techniques). 1814 saw the Treaty of Ghent confirming most American claims. In 1818, the northwestern border, the 49th parallel—a perfect longitudinal line—was chosen as the delimiting marker to the Rocky mountains. This was extended in 1846 when the Oregon territory was organised. The 20th century witnessed a handful of fishing boundaries disputed, but the majority of the 5,535 mile boundary is now uncontested. The Canadian border, sometimes rugged and desolate and frequently intersecting large bodies of water, was in the end a nineteenth century mapping very much in the terms of the modern, Western territorial project.

The irony interlaced with the setting of all these firm boundaries with the belief they would serve as solid edges of a nation-state 'container' is the fact they are actually the intense developed sites of cross-border interaction and integration, not to mention metaphors for the wider issues of national identity between and within the U.S., Canada, as well as local, sub-national or regional identities (such as indigenous tribes, Quebekers, or even the east-west divides in both states). All of these represent various integrations across and beneath the northern border. As one

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16 Zúñiga makes an important distinction here between 'borders' and 'frontiers': 'there are only a few societies in the history of the world that have specialized in producing borders. These have included the Chinese, Ottoman, British, French, Portuguese, Spanish, German, and Russian empires'. In the American case, however, he goes on to note that the United States is a unique historical agent: 'Americans for more than a century regarded their frontier as the point of contact between "civilization and barbarism" and invented a new way of creating borders: filling empty spaces...to justify expansion' whereas most other nation-state boundaries are the product of colonialism and its discourses. See Victor Zúñiga, 'Nations and Borders: Romantic Nationalism and the Project of Modernity', in The U.S.-Mexico Border: Transcending Divisions, Contesting Identities, eds. David Spener and Kathleen Staudt (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998), 37.

17 Konrad, 'Borderlines and Borderlands'.

18 On questions of identity, see for example Ian Angus, A Border Within: National Identity, Cultural Plurality, and Wilderness (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1997) and Seymour Martin Lipset, Continental Divide: The Values and Institutions of the United States and Canada (London:
writer put it, the 49th parallel is ‘itself a synecdoche, a rhetorical part standing for
the rhetorical whole—at once joins and divides two nation-states, permits contact,
influence, choice...and difference as well’. In the prairie/plains region, for
instance, Kaye argues,

the border is most abstractly a geometrical concept, impl[ing] a distinction between
the two sides of the border...it may imply both a region of bending and a region
where contrasts are most precise simply because two cultures, two nations, meet
face to face on territory differentiated only by that political abstraction, the border.

The larger bilateral relationship has been built on a similar colonial history, a
common dominant language, similar culture, and now booming commerce.

The Northern Borderlands Today

Since the establishment of the 49th parallel as the northern boundary of the
United States and the southern border of Canada, both states have boasted they share
the ‘longest undefended frontier’ in the world. The northern borderlands are what
border expert Martinez, in his typology of borderlands, would call ‘interdependent’,
possibly moving toward an ‘integrated’ status. If only because of the larger
continental integration issues at stake, these borderlands are a significant metaphor
or ‘joint’ between the two states, even as it is distinct and integrated itself. The
geographical orientation of Canada places a large degree of its population near the
borderlands, well-placed for trips to the U.S.: indeed 90 per cent of Canada’s 29
million people live within 60 miles of the U.S. border. Nearly 30 million people
make trips through the Detroit ports-of-entry each year; almost as many follow in the
Buffalo region, and 20 million cross in the Seattle area.

Nearly $1 billion in commerce takes place each day between the two
countries, making Canada America’s largest trading partner. 45 per cent of U.S.-
Canada trade passes through the Michigan/Ontario Port-of-Entry and 30 per cent

Routledge, 1990). On sub-national cultural linkages, see Lauren McKinsey and Victor Konrad,
Borderlands Reflections: The United States and Canada (Borderlands Monograph Series 1) (Orono,
19 W.H. New, Borderlands: How We Talk About Canada (Vancouver: University of British Columbia
20 Frances Kaye, Borderlands: Canadian/American Prairie/Plains Literature in English (Orono, ME:
University of Maine Borderlands Project, 1989), 1.
21 See Oscar Martinez, Border People: Life and Society in the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands (Tucson, AZ:
University of Arizona Press, 1994).
22 See U.S. House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims, Hearing
on “The Impact of Section 110 of the 1996 Immigration Act on the Canadian-American Border”,
23 A good degree of this comes from daily commutes for shopping and jobs.
goes through the Buffalo/Fort Erie/Niagara region. The Ambassador Bridge in Detroit accommodates the largest commercial exchange in the entire United States (almost 11 million vehicles in 1997, including more than 2.5 million trucks).24

The northern border straddles mutually interdependent communities; numerous examples of the international line literally bisecting community churches, restaurants, and even homes exist. Residents of these binational communities cross the line with regularity and have enjoyed years of prosperous and vibrant interaction. In many places, the boundary is unmarked or demarcated by a post or sign; multiple free crossing points have tended to exist, hence its long-standing 'undefended' moniker. Derby Line, Vermont, for instance, is physically spliced in two in places where Vermont collides with Quebec, and the two share municipal services, neighbourhoods, and even a library where the international line crosses. 'We function here like one community', says Kim Prangley, a second-generation librarian with dual citizenship who lives in Canada, 'so if they really tighten up on border crossings, it would make life tougher not only for the library, but people on both sides of the border'.25

Because it cuts in some cases like 'a cleaver' through towns which have more in common with one another than their respective national, state, or provincial capitals, the border often is treated as 'more nuisance than necessity'.26 Interconnectedness in some places in the borderlands means hybrid communities, divided often by only a painted stripe that can run through places as bizarre as community churches and libraries, leading even a U.S. Border Patrol supervisor to maintain in 1990 when asked about a proposed wall along the border to respond

"You cannot do it—absolutely not...People here have their farms on the other side, their aunts and uncles too. The U.S.-Canada border is a living organism—a life and culture. We try not to disturb it."27

The historical discourse is almost one that suggests a highly relaxed territoriality that belies the arbitrary political demarcation. And a Canadian Mohawk Indian reminds us of even older, non-western forms of territoriality and political organisation:

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26 Prit J. Vesilind, 'Common Ground, Different Dreams', National Geographic 177 (February 1990): 100.
27 Wayne Preston, quoted in ibid., 104.
This line—this imaginary line where the two white people couldn’t get along—does not affect us...It goes above our heads.28

Nevertheless, the border as a political representation has often cast the shadows of collective identity problematics in play in both the U.S. and Canada because the border can represent the foil against which collective identity can be realised. As the Canadian historian Pierre Berton remarks, ‘We know who we are not, even if we aren’t quite sure who we are. We are not American’.29 The questions surrounding collective identity are only increasing under increased economic and social interaction under NAFTA, leading some to call for measures to protect Canadian cultural and social resources.

In addition to illustrating the significance and interrelatedness of the two states, as well as the uniqueness and interdependence of the borderlands on their own terms, the important theoretical note here is that this particular political territoriality any seemingly ideal nation-territory relationships are not given, but continuously constructed through a variety of practices (such as narrative) commissioned by state, cultural, and social agents. Even since it was initially delineated, the politics of writing this space and the state’s inclusionary/exclusionary impulses through it are tied to collective identity formation (particularly nationalism) and their sustaining political discourses. Current material and discursive political developments, as the next sections will illustrate, suggest an end to the era of an ‘undefended’ frontier may be coming, in the form of increased U.S. policy action directed at stemming a variety of cross border flows and a perception such ‘controls’ will somehow decrease terrorist activity and migrant labour activity.

28 Francis Boots, quoted in ibid., 110.
29 Pierre Berton, quoted in ibid., 111.
6.2 Changing Narrations of Bounded Space in the U.S.-Canadian Borderlands: A Textual Analysis

This bill will secure our borders, protect American lives, make America more competitive in the global marketplace...and encourage immigrants to be self-reliant.

—U.S. Representative Lamar Smith, on the House of Representatives floor upon the introduction of H.R. 2202 (IIRIRA).

On 30 January 1996, with this hopeful remark Representative Lamar Smith introduced to the U.S. Congress H.R. 2202, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA). This was the most sweeping immigration legislation in 10 years. On 30 September 1996, U.S. President Bill Clinton signed this massive regulatory scheme into law. The act, subsequent developments, and the deployment of Operation Hold the Line examined in the last chapter, are the main points of crystallisation for American policy in the borderlands—and will have a far more reaching impact than anyone imagined at the time.

This landmark legislation officially marked a significant change in government policy in the American borderlands, which began to change and evolve with the end of the Cold War and the signing of NAFTA. The move, as we shall see, signalled a propensity for what can be termed as ‘Free Trade, Open Societies, and ClosedBorders’, and served to help consolidate the securitisation of migration and borders in the U.S. The long-standing patterns of unofficial cross-border migration into the U.S. has been largely ignored or inadequately dealt with for many years (exemplified by the lack of any substantial discussion of the free movement of

31 The House bill was H.R. 2210, the Senate version (which differed very slightly) was S. 1664. Congress eventually passed the conference report for the legislation, but the bill was then consolidated into a large omnibus spending package enacted late in the second legislative session of the 104th Congress to appropriate spending for FY97. This omnibus spending bill is known as the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY 1997 (H.R. 3610, U.S. Public Law No. 104-208). Subsequent references are to the public law.
32 U.S. Public Law No. 104-208.
labour within the NAFTA negotiations). But finally the flows, along with pressures of globalisation and domestic politics (primarily fears about terrorism), increased the sense of 'insecurity' that, in Congress' view, required at least the symbolic protection of American borders.

The legislative change—and the subsequent modifications in law and political discourse—officially consolidated a pattern of American policy in the borderlands with Canada and Mexico. The IIRIRA articulated the degree to which 'border control'—and immigration in the context of a changing economic regime—had begun to dominate the American political landscape. Border control, immigration, and the 'war on drugs' moved higher on the foreign policy agenda of the state than they ever had been during the Cold War.

A reading of the IIRIRA and subsequent policy developments reveals distinct transformations in policy towards the securitisation of migrants and the physical boundary, a process serving, in part, to reconfigure the cultural and political production of America's international boundaries. The current borderlands milieu is now at a new and sensitive moment. As examined in the previous chapter, in interdependent borderlands, identity and culture are particularly subject to the pressures and changes of globalisation—which can 'produce a complex mix of responses centered around identity'.

With the passage of IIRIRA, the status of the northern frontier of the United States suddenly became re-contested as the discourse of territoriaility shifted. Massive security resources were shifted to the border zones. Long-held assumptions, like the nearly automatic entry of Canadians into American soil, were no longer necessarily valid. In particular, an often unnoticed component of the act known as Section 110 required, within a two year period, the registration of all entrants into the United States through the establishment of a high-tech, 'secure' entry and exit system at the boundary, a clear practice of reflexive territoriality.

The legislation presents a major public policy concern for the United States and Canada. Before examining the specifics of this legislation and proceeding with a reading of the narrative strategies and representations used to support this text of inclusion, exclusion, and identity—a brief survey of the political dynamics surrounding the bill will be appropriate.

Major studies are underway elsewhere on the highly complex and intricate politics of immigration reform in the U.S.; only a cursory and superficial but necessary overview may be given here. The 1996 IIRIRA was passed in the midst of Republican (GOP) party control of the U.S. Congress; the GOP swept into office two years earlier gaining their first majority in 40 years. The IIRIRA came at a time when GOP partisans in the House pushed for welfare reform, tax cuts, regulation sunsetting, and other conservative agenda items. The political air in Washington was charged as usual—particularly with a Democratic White House—but not as volatile as it might have been as President Clinton positioned himself along popular centrist lines. Moreover, his administration aligned itself with several conservative initiatives, including border control. As a result, many GOP proposals, like the IIRIRA, stood excellent chances as the legislative session of the 105th Congress began. The rhetoric surrounding the debate and evolution of the policy in these political terms provides useful insights to help understand the dynamics of border policy within the theoretical framework elaborated earlier, especially as they were formulated by the dominant power structures and actors in Washington.

The American economic recovery of the 1990s had yet to fully begin when House Resolution 2202, the initial IIRIRA legislation, was introduced by U.S. Representative Lamar Smith. Smith, a Republican from Texas, is the powerful chair of the Immigration Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee and an ardent supporter of immigration restrictions, reduced welfare rights for immigrants (maintaining the position, which as we will see later, that both undocumented and documented workers should receive no public assistance), and increased border controls. His political agenda, then, along with many members of his party and some Democrats, was to draw a stronger moral, political, and legal boundary between Americans and the other—migrants, both legal and undocumented. Their inclusion, despite the fact they take unattractive, low-paying manual labour jobs going for the taking, was seen to create real ‘problems’, such as ‘draining’ public services.

The political momentum behind this legislative move had been building for several years, awaiting the proper climate to be released. Interest groups mobilised behind the plan, responding to pleas to reduce immigration by ‘regaining control of our northern and southern borders’. One in particular, known as FAIR (Federation for American Immigration Reform), renewed its calls for increased funding and infrastructure to achieve ‘border security’, and was influential in agenda setting. This influence was laced with a highly nationalistic, exclusionary, and militant rhetoric; the group went so far as to produce texts lamenting the ‘chaos on our borders’ and outlining ‘Ten Steps to Secure Our Borders’ such as massive tripartite fencing to ‘hold back the flood’ and ‘barrage of aliens’ thereby ‘regaining control of our northern and southern borders’.37 Their militarisation strategies were cited and endorsed in the influential Sandia Laboratories border study discussed in the previous chapter.38 Other conservative interests groups similarly aligned themselves behind the bill.

In response, then, to a variety of international and domestic political inputs, and, as argued later here, in an effort to help constitute national identity and present a metanarrative that presented the image of border control, the emergent legislation was packed with unprecedented resources devoted to border security. The law, in effect, is a keystone to any analysis of border policy in both the northern and southern borderlands. It is divided into six titles: Title I (border control, legal entry, and interior enforcement); Title II (alien smuggling and document fraud); Title III (inspection, apprehension, detention, and removal); Title IV (employment restrictions); Title V (public benefit restrictions); and Title VI (asylum, consular procedures, foreign student, and miscellaneous provisions). Those relevant to the analysis here—which elucidate the narrative strategies at work—Titles I and V, in particular, will be evaluated in turn, with special emphasis on crucial provisions in certain sections. This is followed by a discussion of subsequent developments in the debate and recent calls for the border to be ‘secured’ against terrorist threats.

Title I is largely dedicated to high resource allocations for boundary securitisation. Section 101 of the bill ‘Increases the number of Border Patrol agents by 1,000 in each of the next five years (FY 1997 to 2001)...in those areas of the

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border identified as areas of high illegal entry into the United States in order to provide a uniform and visible deterrent to illegal entry on a continuing basis. Section 102, 'Improvement of Barriers at Border', authorises the U.S. Attorney General to 'take such actions as may be necessary to install additional physical barriers and roads (including the removal of obstacles to detection of illegal entrants) in the vicinity of the United States border to deter illegal crossings in areas of high illegal entry into the United States'.

Section 103, 'Improved Border Equipment and Technology' allows the Attorney General 'to acquire and use, for the purpose of detection, interdiction, and reduction of illegal immigration into the United States, any Federal equipment (including fixed wing aircraft, helicopters, four-wheel drive vehicles, sedans, night vision goggles, night vision scopes, and sensor units) determined available for transfer by any other agency of the Federal Government upon request of the Attorney General', thereby implicating the 'technological answer' to the problem, a strategy representative of reflexive territoriality.

With all of this, the bill effectively more than tripled the INS budget from FY 1993 to FY 1999, boosting funding dramatically from $1.5 billion to $4.2 billion; Border Patrol appropriations in particular approached $1 billion in FY1999. The bill sought to add extra 1,000 Border Patrol agents per year, pushing the overall total to nearly 8,000 (over an 80 percent increase since FY 1993, and a near doubling of the size of the Border Patrol by 2001). As a result of all this, during a time of government cut-backs (and GOP rhetoric of a 'smaller federal government'), the INS is one of the fastest growing federal agencies and now makes up the largest corps of federal civilian employees able to make arrests and carry firearms.

Section 110

In addition to massive new resource allocations, the IIRIRA set into law a stringent new initiative to help reterritorialise the northern border, creating prohibitive restrictions on cross-border travel despite the transnational pressures to

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39 H.R. 2202.
40 Ibid.
42 The agency, however, is now finding it difficult to find new recruits and complaints about inexperienced agents mishandling some duties have surfaced.
43 Krouse, 'Immigration and Naturalisation Service's FY1999 Budget', 2.
liberalise such regulations. This narrative is a salient example of the securitisation and regulation of the boundary. It relies on a narrative of strict, linear modern territoriality. This provision is known as ‘Section 110: Automated Entry-Exit Control System’.44

This component of the law required the INS to implement, within two years, an automated entry and exit control system that will collect a record of departure for every alien departing the United States and match the records of departure with the record of the alien’s arrival in the United States.45

The language of ‘every alien’ was drafted by Representative Smith and added in legislative conference ‘without knowing the effect’, thus catching many legislators by surprise.46 In a classic example of an attempt at late modern, technologically-organised state control, the system would electronically report on all non-U.S. citizens crossing the border; in effect it would require inspections by an INS officer of all entering individuals across both the northern and southern borderlands. This data, in addition to denying entry in many cases and effectively gutting the visa waiver program, would also gather information ‘regarding aliens who have remained in the United States beyond their authorized period of stay’, thereby theoretically allowing expulsion of those who overstay their visas.47 Thus Section 110 is a measure which is highly illustrative of reflexive state organisation of territoriality, as it constituting massive information flows for policy (re)evaluation.

The practical implementation of this measure, however, would cripple cross-border interaction and severely interfere with the neo-liberal NAFTA goals of free trade. Some estimates say it could cost as much as $3 billion a year to document each of the 100 million people who cross the border each year. The data collected in a few months alone would be greater than that currently stored in the Library of Congress.48 Official after official in Canada and some in American border states have decried the measure, afraid the law will have a catastrophic effect on trade and movement across the border, where hundreds of thousands of people now cross daily

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44 Title I, Section 110, ‘Automated Entry-Exit Control System’ of U.S. Public Law 104-208.
45 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
with just an oral declaration of where they were born and limited delays or issues.\textsuperscript{49} Even at a minimum of thirty seconds for each crosser, it would, as some congressional staffers fear, effectively close the border; former Senator Abraham's office estimated the border controls would create backups of two to 17 hours at the busiest crossings with Canada. Operators of the Ambassador Bridge between Detroit and Windsor, Ontario, the busiest crossing, have said the record keeping would effectively 'shut down the border' and disrupt the hundreds of millions of dollars a day in trade at that crossing alone.\textsuperscript{50} The provision, in addition to crippling economic growth of the borderlands and day-to-day interactions, would also severely disrupt the commerce which increasingly depends on 'just-in-time' manufacturing techniques in fabrication plants on both the southern and northern American borders.\textsuperscript{51}

Section 110, despite its obvious shortcomings, was included in the IIRIRA for a variety of reasons. Many, as we shall see, are drawn from the narrative strategies and assumptions used to construct and pass the overall legislation. These, rather than the question of actual enforcement of Section 110, are at issue here. It might seem as though Section 110 would be meant only for the Mexico-U.S. border. Ironically for its proponents, however, the NAFTA-inspired 'architecture' of North American politics, as Cohn argues, made it 'more difficult to separate Canada-U.S. from Mexico-U.S. cross-border travel issues'.\textsuperscript{52} Symmetry in dealings with both states on such matters is mandated in the treaty. NAFTA's main impulse was the reduction of trade boundaries and so this results in a strange paradox.

In the case of Section 110, there are a variety of pressures for freer movement of individuals—not further restrictions—ranging from the macro globalisation level to the subnational level. These pressures were severely constrained by the legislative inclusion of the provision fed by anti-immigrant sentiment and other variables of domestic politics.\textsuperscript{53} Perhaps the most important of these was Representative Smith's own influence and ability, as we shall see, to set the possibilities for the debate. In

\textsuperscript{50} Author interviews with congressional officials; Barry Brown, 'INS Seeks Relief From New Law Seen Slowing Border Crossings', The Washington Times (27 February 1998): 2A.
\textsuperscript{53} For more on this, see ibid.
effect, the discursive structure which constructed anti-immigrant and terrorism fears, as well as internal congressional dynamics (such as a decentralised committee process and the complexity of the entire IIRIRA bill), helped make Section 110 a reality; they defined the policy problem framework for the rest of Congress. Through legislation enacted in the 106th Congress in late 2000, implementation has now been delayed until 2004 but will proceed then with even more advanced technological surveillance measures—a further example of reflexive territoriality in practice.54

Textual Analysis

The IIRIRA, and in particular Section 110 (despite its eventual implementation delay), were chosen to be illuminated as the chapter's case study because they are key exemplars of the overall shift in border policy in the United States, of the processes of state inclusion and exclusion in flux through de- and reterritorialisation occurring globally. In order to go into greater depth on this, the following section is a textual analysis of the key language of the legislation, major supporting committee reports, and public statements that make up the policy narrative.

The congressional committee who handled the legislation generated a report which argues, from the first page, the bill is

intended...to increase control over immigration to the United States [and] reduce aliens' use of welfare and certain other government benefits.55

From the beginning, then, the discourse of 'alien' and 'control' is set—these become the terms or frame for the rest of the restrictions; they are assumed problematisations, reduced beyond even 'undocumented workers' (a term preferred by those more sympathetic to these individuals).56 Instead, migrants are cast as a burden upon the state. In this report and elsewhere, Smith and his co-sponsors go further to cast the migrant as a new 'threat' facing the U.S. in the post-Cold War era:

54 See H.R. 4489, 'Immigration and Naturalization Service Data Management Improvement Act of 2000'. This bill became Public Law No. 106-215.
56 Refugee and migrant activists, among others, prefer this term for two reasons, arguing it better reflects the reality of the situation (i.e., that these are individuals filling open undesirable jobs) and because it does not demean a human as somehow 'alien'.

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Increasingly, the failure to secure our borders threatens our national security. Our ‘porous border’, he says, needs to be disciplined to ‘dramatically curb the entry of illegal aliens and narcotics across it’. His political agenda, then, along with many members of his party and some Democrats, was to draw a stronger moral, political, and legal boundary between Americans and the other, particularly migrants, both legal and undocumented. This is a narrative that casts these mobilities as what Shapiro would call ‘threats to valued models of personhood and to images of a unified national society and culture’: dangers to the constitution of traditional American collective identity.

In introducing the bill and garnering support for its brand of immigration reform, its powerful sponsor Representative Smith set into motion the dominant narrative for the debate. Smith invoked American ‘national interest’ at an almost seemingly apolitical moment in the story of American statehood:

Congress has a historic opportunity to create an immigration policy that serves America’s national interests—not the whims of special interests.

Before going on to list the supposedly ‘non-special’ interests who endorsed the bill (seemingly all wholesome groups—the Hispanic Business Roundtable, United We Stand, Veterans of Foreign Wars, The National Association of Manufacturers, Information Technology Association of America, and American Council on International Personnel, among others), Smith cast the bill as reasonable, broad-based legislation—but implicit in the narrative was a tendency to draw a stronger moral, political, and legal boundaries, built on the larger, selective discursive structure:

This bill will secure our borders, protect American lives, make America more competitive in the global marketplace...and encourage immigrants to be self-reliant.

In doing so, the appeal to ‘proper’ patriotic Americans was clearly made; here is the story of myth of American identity clearly spelled out, presumably something that can only be achieved by securitising borders and migrants; these are

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58 Ibid., 2.
61 Ibid.
clear examples of what Shapiro calls ‘alienating scripts’. Moreover, the bill (evident from even its title) consists of a narrative strategy which paints immigrants as somehow ‘irresponsible’, not ‘self-reliant’, despite a rather large body of evidence which suggests, if anything, they are more self-reliant and less ‘draining’ of social services than long-standing citizens, given what they contribute to the system and economy. From narrative position, and within larger welfare reform initiatives, severe public benefit restrictions were imposed in the bill (Section V) on both legal and undocumented migrants in the country, focussing on the working class. These restricted migrants’ rights to bring relatives over and bared legal immigrants from programs such as SSI (social security pension benefits), food stamps, and from Medicaid (state health care for the indigent) for five years. Moreover, it also gave states the ability to permanently deny AFDC (disability care) and Medicaid to legal immigrants.

Speaking in support of this provision, Representative Dana Rohrabacher asserted

We are supposed to be watching out for our own people. When we allocate money for benefits...it is supposed to benefit our citizens, the people that are paying taxes, who fought our wars. Instead [these] are drained away to illegal aliens.

Thus, with a harsh, exclusionary and nationalist narrative strategy at work, some of the most severe anti-migrant, anti-family, divisive provisions of the bill were passed through a normatively exclusionary processes, even against those in the state legally and working towards citizenship.

Also embedded in this narrative strategy, and representing the Clinton Administration on the bill, Representative Ed Pastor continued the tale of enforcement and control, emphasising its popular political salience:

I would like to take this opportunity to highlight the Immigration and Naturalization Service’s [INS] efforts to control illegal immigration...The administration has made

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62 Shapiro, Winning the West, 26.
64 Title V, U.S. Public Law 104-208.
the enforcement of our borders a high priority...[and] has made control of illegal immigration a top priority.66

Later in his speech of support, Pastor expressed an unyielding faith in the modern narrative that maintains that regulation through technological mastery is somehow the simple answer for such public policy problems. Furthering the logic that additional enforcement resources and techniques can somehow effectively 'seal' the border (as seen in the case of Section 110), Pastor continued to argue 'the INS did not have the personnel or the equipment to properly control this important frontier'.67

As a case of 'knowledge-of-regulation', this reflexive narrative strategy suggests that if only the proper technology and resources are employed, regulation is possible:

the goal is unambiguous: a border that deters illegal immigration, drug trafficking, and alien smuggling.68

By ‘providing the Border Patrol and other INS enforcement divisions with the personnel, equipment and technology to deter, detect and apprehend illegal aliens’, he argues, the administration can realise ‘the over-arching goal of the strategy...to make it so difficult and so costly to enter this county illegally that fewer individuals even try’.69 Hence, we can see the outlines of a reflexive territoriality approach which uses advanced technology resources to help inform—and implement—policy choices.

Other supporters sought to even more radically alter the bill in an effort to militarise the U.S. borderlands, a strategy outlined in the preceding chapter. Representative James Traficant offered an amendment to H.R. 2202 to authorise the use of military troops along the border to prevent ‘terrorists, drug traffickers, and illegal aliens into the United States’ which would allow the Secretary of Defense to make not more than 10,000 Department of Defense personnel available to assist...at the request of the Attorney General, the Immigration and Naturalization Service in preventing the entry of terrorists, drug traffickers, and illegal aliens into the United States.70

While this particular amendment failed, a similar measure was passed by the House in June 1997. This particular amendment did attract a good degree of attention and

67 Ibid., E391.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
heightened the public alarm about the seeming 'chaos' of the borderlands. Traficant was an enthusiastic supporter of efforts throughout the 1990s to utilise troops in the borderlands and was a chief architect of plans to use Low Intensity Conflict doctrine (LIC) in such operations, which tragically cost a young American citizen's life in 1998. During the debate, some Clinton administration officials even recommended increasing the size of the Border Patrol to 20,000 agents; the new Bush administration is expected to support or bolster such proposals.\(^1\)

One of the few counter-narratives to be discussed in the original public debate on H.R. 2202 came from Congressman Patrick Kennedy, a Democrat from Rhode Island. While ostensibly supporting checks on illegal immigration, Kennedy invoked the narrative of 'America as immigrant society' and ethnic identity in his vote against the bill:

> This mean spirited bill...heightens the fear, hysteria, and anti-immigrant fervor that is running rampant across this country...It is a travesty that in an effort to curb illegal immigration, the authors of this bill have chosen to scapegoat children. Have we become so desperate that we must resort to these drastic measures? Creating an Orwellian society in which individuals must present a card to verify their legality refutes everything that is right and good about America. It is blind and unfair. It fans the flames of prejudice.\(^2\)

In the end, however, such counter-discourses lost to a wave of large political support; the bill passed with a large margin and was signed into law by President Clinton.

**Recent Developments**

In early 2000, the Canadian border issue returned to the public stage. Millennial tensions spawned concern at the New Year that the Canadian border would be used as a conduit for terrorists wishing to 'infiltrate' American soil. In December 1999, Algerian-born Ahmed Ressam, a Montreal resident, was caught trying to enter the U.S. from Vancouver Island with a car full of explosives and was arrested. Taking this as a sign of still too loose a border (despite the restrictions imposed in the 1996 legislation), Congress initiated hearings on the 'threat' of terrorists, illegal aliens, and drug smugglers crossing the 'porous' U.S.-Canadian

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As in the southern borderlands, the narrative strategy again posed the problem as one of ‘threat’, ‘disorder’, and calls for ‘security’ re-emerged.

These hearings were spearheaded anew by Congressman Smith. In his opening statement, Smith claimed border policy has ‘created a situation where terrorists, and also illegal aliens, alien smugglers, and drug smugglers, are increasingly using Canada as a transit country en route to the United States’; he went on to call Canada a ‘Club Med for terrorists’. This narrative move served to implicate the other and create the impression of disorder and threats lurking in the borderlands which hearken a call for national interests and protection.

Accordingly, signs of the securitisation of the northern borderlands, while not proceeding at the same scale as in the south, are now appearing. A plan to boost the U.S. border patrol presence at the Canadian border by 50 per cent may be the first step toward transforming the border into an armed frontier more like the Mexican case. Much of this discourse translates to surveillance techniques based on LIC doctrine, first outlined in the previous chapter: essentially borrowed military tactics and high technology equipment such as night vision goggles, underground sensors, day and night-vision cameras that may capture anything from armed drug smugglers to wild animals. Other new devices include seismic monitors that detect footsteps, metallic sensors that react to jewellery, and infrared detectors which sense heat. As part of the Border Patrol’s reflexive territorial strategy, these devices are continuously relocated to various parts of the northern frontier to electronically survey remote roads, trails, and rivers which cross the international boundary. Activity detected by this surveillance equipment is instantly sent to Border Patrol sector headquarters to be relayed to agents on the ground which then, often unsuccessfully, pursue the individuals. This advanced control strategy is well-received by the agency:

The technology significantly enhances the border patrol’s ability to maximize effectiveness and officer safety.

76 Doris Meissner, quoted in Peter Morton, Marina Jimenez, and Charlie Gillis, ‘Human Smugglers Turn to Canada as U.S. Cracks Down on Southern Border: Americans Install Underground Sensors in
So argues Doris Meissner, former Commissioner of the INS. Territorial policy, in these terms, can thus be reflexively understood and resources re-appropriated or shifted according to perceived needs, threats, or goals. Virginia Kice, spokeswoman for the INS’s Western region affirmed this self-confrontational strategy that readjusts itself as needed within the particular narrative frame:

By deploying technology, we can make the agents that we do have more effective...I think it’s a work-in-progress.77

And the larger concerns about security now envelop the northern borderlands, as Steve Garret, assistant chief of the Border Patrol’s Spokane, Washington state sector asserts:

In the past the [northern] border wasn’t an issue...really, the border was more of an afterthought.78

This comes in response to perceptions increased flows of undocumented migrants, smuggling rings, terrorists, and drugs are impacting the northern frontier. Keith Olson, a senior agent in the Blaine, Maine sector of the U.S. Border Patrol, for instance, argues

We’re getting hammered by Koreans right now...You only got two hands. You catch what you can catch.79

presumably he refers to syndicate smuggling, but his language reflects that of the dominant narrative: ‘invasion’, ‘catching’ as many humans as possible.

Before 1993 when Operation Hold the Line began, while the international borders of the U.S. where loosely monitored, most enforcement activity was focused on the interior, with checkpoints designed to intercept travelling undocumented workers, workforce raids conducted on employers who hired these workers, and so forth. This pattern came to an end with agribusiness pressure given a general worker shortage and the refocusing of attention to the boundaries themselves.

But the extension of securitisation northward signals ‘a fundamental change’ in how the United States treats the Canadian border, said Massimo Bergamini, vice-president of the Canadian Trucking Alliance whose organisation represents Canada’s 2,000 trucking companies:

Bid to Catch Illegals’, National Post (Canada) (17 March 1999), [CISNEWS@cis.org] (18 March 1999).

77 Virginia Kice, quoted in Paton, ‘Along the Other U.S. Border’, emphasis added.
78 Steve Garret, quoted in ibid.
79 Keith Olson, quoted in ibid.
They want to manage [the northern border] like they handle the southern border [with Mexico].

The IIRIRA allocated massive resources to 'defending' the U.S.-Mexico border with high steel fences, barbed wire and 24-hour armed patrols; the Canadian border is woefully understaffed by comparison. But the discourse here is significant because as a force in itself, it continuously underwrites and stabilises the assumptions for decision making. For instance, Smith and other Republicans have again called for the implementation of the draconian measures originally imposed in the 1996 Act. In another major recent hearing on border security, he maintained

The U.S. now needs, more than ever, to develop and implement a system to track the entries and exits of foreign nationals.

He then called for the immediate implementation of Section 110, with its strict exit and entry checks. Smith, in attempting to reinvigorate the narrative strategy, pushed for enforcement in strong terms: 'I expect Congress will continue to protect Americans from threats at our borders'. Smith said that any proposed repeal of new border checks 'threatens every American community' because of 'illegal aliens, drug smugglers and terrorists who cross our borders at will...Considering the threats we face at our borders, a repeal would be short-sighted and dangerous'. Instead, Smith furthered the discourse of sovereignty:

If Canadians want more liberal immigration and drug policies, that is their decision. And if Americans want to act on security concerns, that is our decision. The issue is one of sovereignty, not who is to blame.

In the vein of the chief narrative strategy, Smith tells a tale of the seemingly sovereign, independent state where national identity is under pressure by economic and social forces under NAFTA integration, changing demographic and social patterns in the state as a whole. In doing so, he implicates the power structures and representations which sustain this conceptualisation and suggest the range of options available for political action. Other 'expert' witnesses at his hearing backed this up, furthering calls to securitise the border:

To protect America, in my view, it is imperative that we accelerate the establishment of an entry-exit control system ...The future Ressams will travel to more remote

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81 Smith, Hearing on 'Terrorist Threats to the United States'.
83 Ibid.
locations that are less secure. So we must also enhance security between checkpoints. This can best be accomplished by technology and by increasing the number of Border Patrol agents and other law enforcement resources.\textsuperscript{84}

As the narrative strategy took root—and the problem was defined in selective terms—high-profile attention increased. While Section 110 was originally largely Smith’s initiative, the threatening nature of the narrative attracted further attention from other Republican legislators—who also now seek to take policy action within its parameters: ‘Understaffing at our northern border is jeopardizing the security of our nation’, U.S. Senator Slade Gorton, has recently warned.\textsuperscript{85} Even U.S. House of Representatives Speaker Dennis Hastert has expressed concern during discussions with the White House on plans to increase funding and manpower; another typical sentiment, ‘we are definitely pushing for additional resources to be sent to the northern border’, came from Jim Troyer, a spokesman for Jack Metcalf, a Republican congressman from Washington state.\textsuperscript{86}

6.3 FADING COUNTER-NARRATIVES: IDENTITY AND INTEGRATION

In keeping with the goal in a narrative analysis methodology to elucidate the ‘marginal’ counter-narratives, to seek the ‘remainders’ of narratives in order to understand the alternative dynamics of inclusion and exclusion, at least two counter strands centred around identity and integration can be identified in the debates over American border policy.

\textit{Identity}

As illustrated earlier, there are complex collective identity dynamics in play. The foreign born population in the U.S. is at its highest level in a hundred years; heterogeneity in both its borderlands and increasingly in its centres is a growing reality.\textsuperscript{87} For example, the crackdown on undocumented migrants, especially those near the borders, as we saw earlier in the thesis, tends to be predicated on racial grounds; officials under the 1996 IIRICA act and as a result of conservative U.S.

Supreme Court rulings, now have wide scope to stop individuals who may look ‘suspicious’. Some have suggested that this ‘racial profiling’ implicates the ‘dark side’ of new American border control. Those opposed to the 1996 act felt it unfairly discriminated against minority migrant workers in favour of businesses who could use their ethnicity and legal status as reverse pressure on wages; the act was widely criticised for its lack of emphasis on employer sanctions. Funding for additional INS inspectors, in fact, was eliminated in back-room conference meetings, according to some reports because of large agribusiness lobbying.\textsuperscript{88}

In some of the dissenting opinions contained in the conference report on H.R. 2202, Representative Jerrold Nadler of New York expressed a counter-narrative view:

\begin{quote}
This bill…has been poisoned with unconscionable provisions that violate fundamental American values. Do we need to undercut public health efforts, destroy our environment, debase our fundamental values, violate the rights of American citizens and waste taxpayer dollars on foolish or dangerous enterprises in order to enforce our immigration? Of course not.\textsuperscript{89}
\end{quote}

His statement was followed by a similar message from Representative Luiz Gutierrez of Illinois:

\begin{quote}
For generations immigrants have played a vital role in our economy, but today immigrants play the role of villain in the Republican’s morality play. By exploiting a false image of millions of illegal immigrants crossing the border into the United States, Newt Gingrich and his Republican allies have crossed the border from decency to indecency.\textsuperscript{90}
\end{quote}

Nonetheless, the restrictions were included in the final bill which passed and was signed into law. While legislation several years later restored some of the public benefits to legal immigrants, in the midst of the very recent border alarm, there are but a few opposing voices against the call for more stringent profiling against minorities and the stepped-up enforcement efforts. Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee, at recent hearings, was one voice of dissent:

\begin{quote}
[W]e must not forget that a fundamental requisite of our freedom is a balance between control of the comings and goings at the border and our civil liberties…Stopping or searching individuals on the basis of race is not effective law enforcement policy, and it is not consistent with our democratic ideals, especially our commitment to equal protection under the law for all persons. It is neither legitimate nor defensible as a strategy for public protection...
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{90} Ibid., H11086.
Racial profiling at the border...is simply wrong...The recent border apprehensions in anticipation of Y2K problems were made with good, old fashioned police work, not with repressive efforts that militarize the border, discriminate based on race, or infringe on due process rights or diminish the right to an adequate hearing.  

Integration

The re-imposition of the dominant narratives of difference, even if actual quantitative flows persist, also generally weakens continental integration and the restricts development of integrated borderlands by fostering distinct national identity patterns and a strict, ‘nation’-'state’ correspondence which is so often predicated in much of IR literature, consistent with some Enlightenment thinking that postulates a ‘natural’—and often homogeneous—correlation and control between place, culture, and identity, a notion that is increasingly becoming outmoded in a globalised world of mobilities. Thus, some counter-narratives seek to expand particular political possibilities, such as increased integration. As the Canadian Ambassador to the U.S. Raymond Chretien recently said

Our relationship is a one-way mirror...Canadians don’t want a Wall of China at our border.

On the ground, some borderlanders respond to these new divisive moves; for instance, International Falls grocery store owner Phil Paulbeck said he hopes Canada and the United States eventually ease up. He calls the restrictions at the international bridge over the Rainy River ‘a kind of Berlin Wall’ that can inhibit traffic and make it harder for citizens of the towns to interact:

In Europe you can drive between many countries just like you’d go from Minnesota to North Dakota here...We live in a place with fewer problems than Europe, yet we have this Checkpoint Charlie.

The recent narrative strategy and moves to reterritorialise the borderlands sets back counter-narratives which have promoted increased, not decreased, integration and even put forth the idea of effectively removing the border. This would, of course, signal a fundamental shift in the North American ‘order’. Some senior immigration officials are convinced Canada and the U.S. should eliminate the border.

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92 See, for example, Marden, ‘Geographies of Dissent’, and Zygmunt Bauman, Postmodern Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993).
94 Phil Paulbeck, quoted in Associated Press, ‘Canada Border Security Increased: Travelers at Falls Facing Longer Stops’ (28 December 1999), [CISNEWS@cis.org] (28 December 1999).
altogether and concentrate their efforts on perimeter defence, but the idea is considered too sensitive (or disruptive of the main narrative) to be seriously voiced.95

The narrative strategy of Lamar Smith and others who are now calling for the new security measures to be put in place along the Canadian border sends chills through government circles in Canada. Canada seeks co-operation with the U.S. on security matters because of its interests in the easy movement of goods to and from the U.S. It is one of the reasons Canada is keen to shift the discussion away from increased border controls and toward an examination of perimeter security similar to that developed in Europe under the Schengen treaty. That treaty requires each visa application to be approved by all 15 EU countries.96

Martha Nixon, Assistant Deputy Minister in charge of immigration operations in Canada, said she does not think the two states will ever be able to erect enough border controls ‘to really deter terrorism...to me that’s not a solution, which is why we’ve been trying very hard with the Americans to talk about this whole idea of perimeter’; instead

If you look at perimeter then you rely on your immigration control officers, your interdiction capabilities overseas, rather than allowing the problem to come here. We think we have to get at the problem before the problem gets to North America.97

This is clearly a strategy of integration and collective identification around the theme of ‘North America’, which also draws a clear parallel to the European Union.

The post-Cold War, NAFTA-inspired integration policies ostensibly encourage the facilitation of cross-border travel (deterritorialisation) along with other liberalisation initiatives are in tension with the impractical, difference-enforcing movement restrictions of reterritorialisation in the 1996 IIRIRA. As even President Clinton’s 1994 ‘Report on Immigration’ admitted

the openness of the world economy requires making commercial travel and tourism easier and friendlier. The U.S. economy clearly benefits from playing an energetic role in encouraging travel...[this] may conflict with the need to establish closer controls on cross-border traffic to enforce immigration laws.98

96 The EU is also working toward a common asylum system that would create a standardised approach to the handling of refugee claims and provide a uniform status for those seeking protection.
Mutual interdependence and international or sub-national pressures under patterns of globalisation, in fact, place inherent stress on the capacities of the state for such regulation.

More liberalised border arrangements that foster deterritorialisation are widely perceived as a hallmark of integration and in certain academic and policy circles, historical ‘progress’ in a general sense.\(^9\) Ironically, though, this kind of counter-narrative is cast as somehow retrogressive and damaging. Dan Stein, for example, director of FAIR, a major anti-immigration right-wing interest group recently proclaimed

\[\text{The porous nature of our northern border is inappropriate to the modern age...The legacy of the world's largest unguarded land border will soon be history. What we need is a land border that requires inspections.}\]^{100}

Fewer stronger indictments of globalisation and integrated borderlands ('porosity') might be found.

Following our steps in narrative analysis, then, we can see a clear difference between the dominant and counter-narratives of the U.S.-Canadian borderlands, between policies seen as problem-solving, 'ordering' and regulative of 'disorder' and situations of 'porosity' and 'threats'. The two counter-narratives of identity and integration, however, have been relatively marginalised in the current debate, qualifying as Shapiro's 'non-stories'. As recent events testify, the new political climate instead is only reinforcing the dominant narrative of state control. Representative Smith has, as noted, called for enactment of the tough immigration measures in Section 110 and repeal now seems unlikely, even if implementation is delayed. Irrespective of the outcome of the political debate, the narratives of an 'unprotected' and 'porous' borderland have done much to rally public support and an understanding of separateness, further justifying the securitisation of the border and migrants.

Most recently, the call has grown louder to begin securitising the northern border like the southern; surprisingly even several border-state politicians, including former Senator Spencer Abraham of Michigan and Senator Patty Murray of Washington, have prodded the Clinton and Bush administrations to put as much effort and staff into defending the northern border as it does in the south. In a letter

\(^9\) The influential *Wall Street Journal*, for example, has historically always called for open borders and free labour movement in North America.

to former President Bill Clinton, Mr. Abraham, a staunch critic of Section 110 (ironically called the ‘illegal alien’s best friend’ by an anti-immigration group\textsuperscript{101}), called for a 50-50 split in resources. Abraham, who wants 5,000 new border-patrol agents hired over the next five years, held Senate immigration committee hearings on the issue in 2000.\textsuperscript{102} He used the rhetoric of a battle to reinforce political differentiation and tell us what is at stake: ‘It is real people on the front lines who make a difference’.\textsuperscript{103} The recent installation of sensors and high technology surveillance cameras, designed from the Mexican model, along the Niagara river is an ominous omen.\textsuperscript{104}

The new George W. Bush administration is indicating it will continue strengthening the dominant narrative by bolstering the securitisation policy and further limiting alternatives. Bush’s proposals will mean over 11,000 Border Patrol agents will be deployed on the northern and southern borders by 2003, a 175 per cent increase since 1993.\textsuperscript{105} In the name of ‘strengthening border control and enforcement’, Bush plans ‘intelligence units along the Northern and Southwest borders [to] collect, analyze, and disseminate information to identify and interdict illegal entrants to the United States; monitor potential terrorist activity’ and will also fund intrusion detection technology including high-resolution color and infrared cameras and state-of-the-art command centers as force multipliers to supplement the new agents and provide continuous monitoring of the border from remote sites. The proposed combination of intrusion detection technology, and a substantial number of new Border Patrol agents will permit INS to enforce the rule of law and enhance border management over larger portions of the border.\textsuperscript{106}

It is clear that the new administration has simply accepted the defined frame of the dominant narrative established in 1993 which crystallised in 1996; they too seek to rely on ever more force as well as high technology and surveillance, as ‘force multipliers’ in the drive for regulation of the border. ‘Continuous monitoring’ of the borders from ‘remote sites’ connotes a continued reflexive approach to territoriality.

\textsuperscript{102} Mckenna, ‘Critics Assail U.S. Plan’.
\textsuperscript{104} Canadian Press, ‘Residents Decry Surveillance Cameras at Border’ (16 August 2000), [CISNEWS@cis.org] (16 August 1998).
\textsuperscript{106} Ibid.
6.4 THE METANARRATIVE OF IMAGE

All of this leads us to the final step of our preliminary narrative analysis method: identifying the resultant ‘metanarrative’, told by the comparison of the two stories and then reproduced in policy terms. In this case, the counter-narratives employed in the debate are highly marginalised, due to the power dynamics and policy interests which frame the main dominant narrative which lend it wide, bipartisan political support. By understanding the border in a modern territorial, sovereign frame, reducing transnational flows to ‘chaotic’ problems which can be solved by the proper application of technology, ‘control’ becomes the overriding and seemingly realisable objective. Regulation, as Santos reminds us, is often seen to lead to order and knowledge, as opposed to chaos and ignorance.107 Much of the emergent policy that seeks to regulate flows follows this pendulum, and because of this dichotomy, the metanarrative is thus able to ‘recast the issue in such a way to make it more amenable to policymaking’.108

Put another way this particular metanarrative can be understood through the concept of image. Earlier in this thesis, the question of the image of border control was raised. There are several significant, but often overlooked studies, which actually suggest that transnational mobilities (both ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’) persist despite the ‘hardening’ of the borderlands imposed by the legislation under analysis here. In effect, the representation of border security serves a particular political purpose—collective identity construction and resource appropriation—when the actually policy, in its own terms, is failing. As one Senate staffer candidly admitted, ‘the state is making a feeble effort to control the uncontrollable’.109

Yielding support to this line, current data collected from the experiments to aggressivel securitise the border (detailed here and in the last chapter) suggests that seven years and billions of dollars later, undocumented migration and drugs have not slowed. If the unprecedented, aggressive border security strategy prompted by the INS is reviewed, the agency itself is unable to illustrate any sign that the flow of migrants has slowed; indeed, the flows may have actually increased despite this reterritorialising strategy. Using the standard (and INS’s own) measurement statistic (apprehensions of undocumented persons crossing the boundary illegally), the strategy appears to be failing; agents apprehended just over 1.6 million people in

109 Kesler, interview.
2000 (with apprehensions in early FY 2001 down by of 20%). This is approximately 400,000 more individuals than 1993 (when the policy began) but roughly equivalent to the 1.6 million in 1986 before the securitisation strategy. Importantly, at no point in the overall policy narrative does the INS actually claim that they are reducing the overall flow of undocumented workers or terrorists into the U.S. As noted here, while some busy parts of the northern border are reinforced using the techniques identified in chapter five, crossers appear to simply shift to areas less stringently controlled, and often times are more desolate and dangerous.

Moreover, the narrative policy creates an image of control at the margins or the ‘front-lines’, i.e., on the boundaries themselves, but neglects the real effect elsewhere. Interior enforcement of immigration laws, for instance, is vastly neglected; estimates suggest 40 to 50 per cent of all undocumented individuals actually entered the state legally and have simply overstayed their visas, yet 85 per cent of resources to deal with the ‘undocumented problem’ are directed at border securitisation. Seventy to 85 per cent of the drugs in the U.S. come through legal ports of entry—thanks to NAFTA, conveyances on the Mexican side are not checked, leading the Attorney General of Texas to call it the ‘North American Free Trafficking Agreement’. A recent Carnegie study found that

no evidence suggests that even in places [along the border] where anti-smuggling/anti-drug effort is most dedicated, the inspection system currently in pace....actually intercepts most would-be violators.113

A major U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) report in fact recently reviewed American border policy and found ‘inconclusive results’: ‘despite the allocation of billions of dollars’, GAO ‘did not know whether the was producing the intended results’ .114 Moreover, there is no deadline for completing the strategy, and the Border Patrol cannot say how much money or how many agents it will ultimately

need. Outside estimates go as high as 20,000 agents, nearly 2.5 times the existing force.

Moreover, this metanarrative of control and image, along with what is not being told, casts doubt that extending the strategy, as Bush intends to do, would be ultimately any more 'effective' in the northern borderlands with Canada than it is in the south, especially given the historic bilateral relationship between the two states. In terms of Section 110, the fact that INS has no current plans to implement the rules (and does not even know how to go about it) contradicts claims that the new border checks do not pose any threat of slowing legitimate cross-border traffic. Whilst the image that drugs and terrorism would be blocked was the main stated public justification for Section 110, reduction in these flows would be negligible as the proposed entry/exit system, even with advanced technology, cannot prevent their entry. As Flynn lucidly argues,

for drugs, thugs, and terrorists, borders pose little in the way of a barrier. In most instances they can find ways to move about the international system with virtual impunity.115

The overall focus on tightening, especially in an increasingly global economic situation, also masks any counter-narrative frameworks to create opportunities for co-operation on these matters, one of the better mechanisms for effective counter-terrorism or a logical migration policy.

This evidence reinforces the argument here that the narration of the U.S.-Canadian borderlands, like that in the southern case, creates to some extent, the illusion of true 'border control' realised through the strategic metanarrative. The new strategy simply ends up securitising the border, disrupting borderland communities, and by doing so solidifies strict territoriality and difference. Some of the most telling data in the end speaks to just how large the transnational flows are in comparison to the public policy issues at hand: with hundreds of millions of crossings per year), less than one per cent of all entries, north and south, are illegal.116

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6.5 Conclusions

From its inception as a paramount instantiation of modern geopolitical mapping, the U.S.-Canadian frontier has given the appearance that it, like all others around the world, separates strict, delineated collective identities which are contained in two modern states. Even the geographical deployment of the boundary (mostly along the 49th parallel—itself a product of the modern cartography) suggests the sharp, differentiated ‘sovereign’ political representation of states which are the ‘container(s) of all cultural meaning and sites of sovereign jurisdiction over territory, property, and abstract space’. Drawn from a long intellectual strand in Western political thought, this clear realisation of modernity’s ‘dominant spatial story’ has largely formulated the parameters for the political representation of the U.S.-Canadian borderlands.

Moreover, as Shapiro and Soguk have pointed out, these dominant genealogical and spatial stories create ‘dominant practices of intelligibility’ which structure ‘international relations’ and thus limit alternative ethical and political problematics. The epistemological and ontological structures they rest on are similarly entrenched. Border discourses that support this dominant cartography and impose a spatial narrative of identity, as this study suggests, are metaphors of political limits.

Zúñiga argues the symmetrical relationship in the U.S.-Canadian borderlands Ironically tends to diminish interaction and internationality much less than those dynamics produced by an asymmetry, such as along the U.S.-Mexican border. But a closer examination of the U.S.-Canadian borderlands, in fact, uncovers anything but completely differentiated spatial identities and interaction. Instead, a rich, vibrant historical mosaic of cultural, social, and economic interaction transcends this arbitrary political boundary. Moreover, growing transnational flows and contacts (among migrants and others) under NAFTA are prompting increased integration to

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118 Whilst covered in chapter two of this thesis, the discussion of this lineage is too large to be developed here. However, it is widely recognised that modern sovereignty claims and representations follow from a tradition which begins with Plato, stretches through Locke, Hegel, Hobbes, and others. Some poststructural scholars (such as Richard Ashley, R.B.J Walker, David Campbell, and others) interrogate this pattern.
potentially contest the collective identities within the greater North American political 'space'. But, as this chapter has illustrated, these identities are instead being partly consolidated through narrative strategies of difference that underpinned American border policy in the 1990s. These culminated in the 1996 IIRIRA, including Section 110, and continue with recent developments to tighten the northern boundary. 'Strategy', again, is not used here to suggest a necessary deliberate selection among a variety of alternatives, but rather a potentially unintentional selection of representational practices of identity and space at a particular moment. The policies also draw on the modern penchant to attempt to simply reflexively 'control' the boundary as the easy solution to complex problems of identity and movement.

Zygmunt Bauman maintains these attempts appear at precisely the moment when 'in today’s world the great modern project of achieving a unified, managed and controlled space is facing its most critical challenge' from processes of globalisation such as migration, global civil society links, and other transnational flows.120 Ash Amin and others further argue this change is now located in 'diverse relational webs', as individuals may be reshaped in contrasting ways in spaces that are not defined as separate 'national', 'local', or 'global', but rather 'transversal'.121

But understanding such conditions may require alternative ways of examining and deconstructing this political space, of bringing volume to a variety of counter-narratives. As this chapter has attempted to show, textual analysis which relies on a constitutive theory of language, while not intending to replace or subvert other analyses such as those based on material factors, tries to begin to unlock certain power/discourse structures to help understand the power/knowledge dynamics inherent in the dominant scripts and strategies of politics and its possibilities.

Narrative analysis fits well in the i/b/o heuristic tool, especially as a mechanism for empirical work at its intersections. What is significant here is the interrelationship between these three key concepts: reterritorialisation can not be explained solely in terms of one variable (e.g. identity) but rather at least two (identity and borders) if not all three. Identity is continuously differentiated, the border is reinforced discursively and politically through securitisation, and the corresponding socio-political order shifts. The i/b/o triad thus assists us in

120 Bauman, Postmodern Ethics, 16.
understanding the more complex and subtle dynamics at work in this case of writing space: the northern border is being securitised through an emergent, exclusionary metanarrative strategy to help present the image of ‘control’ and differentiation (a particular order). By seeing each component in the triad not as static, but rather in the process of becoming, we can better conceptualise, understand, or potentially change these dynamics.

The attitudes and narratives enabling border ‘control’ and securitisation have typically been understood to be cyclical, pegged to a variety of factors, including economic and political conditions. Most studies suggest when economic downturns occur, immigration is often clamped down on and borderlands closed to satisfy political demands that the other is not ‘stealing’ an American’s job or promoting further cultural and social heterogeneity. This chapter, however, has illustrated that current developments date from the 1996 Immigration Act are connected with the need to project the image of a firm, distinct border with Canada (and Mexico) under increased control and surveillance and occur despite an unprecedented economic boom in the U.S., which if anything, demands less restrictions on labour and whose overarching neo-liberal economic philosophy emphasises freer trade and integration. Counter-narratives, such as those which might recognise terrorism, and to some extent migration, as global phenomena increasingly tied to globalisation that are problems best solved by co-operative methods and shared information, have been marginalised.

What emerges from this is a metanarrative authorising border policy centred on technology, regulation, and image; this enables and supports a reflexive regulatory border policy increasingly foreclosing possibilities for increased integration or liberalised movement. It also reinforces static notions of collective identity created against someone (the undocumented worker or refugee) or something else (the ambiguous threat of drugs or terrorism)—defined ontologically as threats and risks to the state.
CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION

7.0 Overview

This thesis took as its main premise that a transdisciplinary study and problematisation of borders could begin to unlock some of the many dimensions of contemporary political territoriality and collective identity. Because borders are a significant 'metapattern' that formulate limits, definition, and difference throughout the personal, social, and political worlds, they are both excellent metaphors and subjects for exploration. In the form of interstate boundaries, they are crucial politically, making international relations as we understand it possible by circumscribing and producing unique, bounded communities in interaction.

But moreover, borders—and the social and political practices that help construct them—have an important role in national identity consolidation. A state's policy for its borders—and its representations thereof—are thus key prisms for a researcher evaluating the nature of political community. Examining how the processes of inclusion and exclusion across boundaries work, and who and what it is admitted or denied, gives us real insights into both foreign relations and domestic politics.

Political territoriality, as a constructed strategy of border control, is continuously exercised by states in several ways. As chapter two indicated, practices of differentiation are key in this maintenance project; in a sense, they are also important to sustaining collective identities and various 'orders', such as integration or isolationism, world-wide. Borders, of all kinds, seem to require patrolling. Clearly, the actual deployment of force or the imposition of physical barriers are standard boundary-producing practices, as is the international status given by other states and international organisations to borders. But so too are the narrative strategies which allow and support these possibilities, even if, as in the U.S. case, they only serve to help create images of 'control' whilst transnational flows—designated epistemologically as 'chaos'—persist at the same or intensified levels.
A study like this one, then, that begins to question border practices and representations—beyond static legal lines on a world map—can help refocus IR theory by isolating some of the complexities of difference and change that seem to increasingly characterise the maps of both global and domestic politics. In this vein, this conclusion reviews the terrain covered in this thesis and opens new research directions, posing potential policy alternatives and trajectories for further study.

This conclusion is divided into three main components. The first recaps the theoretical ground examined: the history and changing nature of political territoriality as a modern form of control—particularly a notion of reflexive territoriality and regulation; globalisation and 'mobilities'; transdisciplinary thinking on borders as limits and forms of difference; the identities/borders/order heuristic triad; identity-space relationships; and a preliminary narrative analysis methodology.

The second component reviews the major empirical findings of the study on the American borderlands. In a section that compares the two case studies, the discussion is extended to draw out the larger order ('o') implications for North America, synthesised from the i/b/o-directed case study research. This highlights the emergent political narratives which are currently helping write space and identity on the frontiers of the U.S. In particular, it re-identifies a metanarrative of representation associated with American border control policy as a form of reflexive political territoriality within an increasingly mobile-oriented 'order' of globalisation. Wider order implications for other borderlands around the world are also suggested.

The third and final component of the conclusion outlines a number of main directions for additional research, partly by pointing out some limitations of the thesis. The multidimensional nature of borders and identity present many more questions than this study poses or can answer—intriguing challenges for both the discipline of IR and policymakers on the ground in these increasingly key regions. Keeping true to the generally critical approach in the work here, the emphasis is on both alternative policy formulations for U.S. lawmakers facing border issues and new ontological and epistemological approaches for IR and social theorists to study questions of identity, border, and order constitution.

From a disciplinary perspective, several research strands emerge. The i/b/o triad is very young; further theoretical work on some of the salient relationships it suggests would likely be useful for a discipline often searching for new ways to understand a changing world. The many relationships between territoriality, identity,
and order—the process of socio-spatialisation for example—which this thesis begins
to explore need to be more thoroughly unpacked. Narrative analysis is an interesting
methodology that can be applied to many policy situations in different contexts. The
new literature on reflexive modernity may be also be useful in approaching
mobilities and institutional change in states and the international system.

Drawing from the premises here that borders are dynamic, active, constructed
forms of political territoriality and difference, new thinking in terms of processes and
relations—viewing borders and other socio-political phenomena not as discrete,
static entities but rather in a continual process of ‘becoming’ that depends on
sustaining social connections—may be a promising ontological backing to future
research. The sketches of such a ‘process relationalism’ understanding of
international relations are suggested here as a productive, undeveloped theoretical
component to fuel future exploration of identities, borders, and orders.

Much more empirical attention to global borderlands is also necessary; some
potential directions for the American case are considered in this section of the
conclusion. To develop additional understanding of the discursive formulation of the
borderlands, national identities, and ‘problems’ like undocumented migrants, further
narrative analysis can be conducted, both on the official level, and also on different
local texts—such as those presented by undocumented migrants and more generally
to encompass Mexican and Canadian perspectives. As more and more resources are
dedicated to their development and deployment, an in-depth look of the
technological issues surrounding border securitisation and reflexivity would also be
intriguing.

The last section highlights some options for several policy alternatives to
address some of the failings of current border policies in the American borderlands
concerning issues of migration, trade, and terrorism. The conclusion ends with a
look at some of the many normative, ethical questions surrounding current
securitisation and exclusionary policies—which manifest themselves too often in
migrant deaths and border tension—a tact that seems increasingly important in our
continual quest to figure out both necessary and unnecessary borders.
7.1 Theoretical Contributions

The theoretical terrain covered in the thesis comprised at least four strands. The first was an investigation of the little-explored concept of political territoriality from the pre-modern to the contemporary: constructed strategies for political control and power over space through access and regulation. The historical change from loose, ambiguous frontiers to discrete, lineal boundaries went hand-in-hand with the rise of modernity and the consolidation of the state system, both epistemologically and materially. Concomitant with this process was the linking of some forms of collective identity to the state and the rise of dominant forms of cartographic mapping.

Empirical changes in the international system, represented in the thesis by the idea of transnational 'mobilities' of goods, information, capital, and individuals, mark a uneven, contradictory process of globalisation that fosters both change and continuity for the state. As both metaphor and practice, the intensification and linked relations of these mobilities, especially under economic integration regimes, suggest challenges for political territoriality; globalisation can thus result in manifestations of 'reterritorialisation' or 'deterриториalisation', concepts which capture how states may inscribe their boundaries through exclusion or inclusion.

Mobilities present states with various kinds of threats or opportunities; this fact, coupled with new high-technology information flows (such as surveillance) can propel self-confrontational policy formulation, a trend which indicates increasing reflexivity in some advanced information-driven states. The discussion of political territoriality thus culminated with the notion of 'reflexive territoriality', drawn from existing literature on reflexive modernity to capture some dimensions of border policy, practices, and representations.

Connecting the concept of reflexive territoriality to border policy formulation was accomplished by adapting a schema of knowledge in modernity developed by Santos. His understanding of modern social regulation is based on a trajectory of knowledge that stretches from points designated as 'ignorance' to 'emancipation'. Regulation is seen to lead to a privileged 'order' while 'chaos' is designated epistemologically as ignorance, something to be released from in the future. This thinking gives us insight into the implicit backing of much policy formulation—here, how territoriality can be reflexively oriented to attempt to achieve the goal of 'order'
through boundary regulation in the face of system mobilities (such as undocumented migrants) defined as threats or risks.

The second strand of theory developed in the thesis focused on 'border studies', seeking to find transdisciplinary contexts for problematising borders in this international environment. Traditional studies of borders in IR and other disciplines like Political Geography unfortunately tend to be chiefly non-theoretical and descriptive or positivist, centred on disputes over these 'lines' on political maps and largely operating from realist assumptions. New, more critical work, however, is directed toward the socio-political construction of boundaries, both political and social, and the manifestations of difference, power, and culture they represent. These contributions, when drawn into an IR study like this one, question the practices and representations involved with 'writing' these political demarcations and connecting territory with socio-political order.

Finding tools within this wide intellectual framework to probe borders and border discourses in this way constitutes the third theoretical contribution of the thesis. While much of its theoretical development is underway elsewhere, the thesis contributes to the evolution of an open, heuristic, orienting tool called the 'identities/borders/orders' (i/b/o) triad. The main supposition behind the triad is that these three 'key' concepts are interrelated, and moreover co-constitutive. And as both discrete concepts as well as interconnected processes, the triad and its component parts describe interesting and problematic phenomena in the social and political worlds. As a pre-theory instrument, it offers conceptual guidance and focus to researchers seeking to investigate implications of, for example, globalisation (as an 'order' issue) on border or identity change.

The fourth and final theoretical component of the thesis suggests a particular methodology—narrative analysis—to help drive selected empirical work navigated by the i/b/o triad. Narrative analysis, as a form of discourse study, seeks to unlock the dynamics of some of the major 'scripts' and 'texts' of international relations. Operating from a constitutive theory of language, it uncovers some of the ways in which language and symbolism, like metaphors, structure political positions and possibilities through 'metanarratives' within policy debate and formulation. As applied here, the methodology works on the 'i-b' leg of the i/b/o triad to reveal particular territorial-identity relationships (the socio-spatialisation of national
identity) in the discourse on U.S. border policy before connecting back to larger order questions.

7.2 **EMPIRICAL FINDINGS**

*Emergent Metanarratives of the American Borderlands*

Operation Hold the Line, as the vanguard border securitisation initiative, became the model for U.S. policy as a whole in the 1990s. It was turning point in how the border was reconstructed in the wake of the Cold War: as a 'problem' conduit for a variety of defined 'threats' to the United States—terrorists, narcotics, undocumented economic migrants, and, more generally social instability and poverty. Helping to define the discursive parameters for action, the legislative blueprint for the policy can be traced to several important texts in Washington, but the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) is the landmark authorisation for border securitisation, earmarking hundreds of millions of dollars for Border Patrol agents, security systems, and fortifications. In conjunction with official policy documents, public statements from officials, and symbolism, these texts helped weave a dominant metanarrative of representation and control.

The empirical research of this thesis, guided by the theoretical context and tools reviewed above, undertook an extensive study of contemporary U.S. border policy and its supportive narratives. The findings can be grouped into three areas: the nature of interaction and community in the American borderlands; the material/technological aspects of securitisation policy; and the impact reterritorialisation has on national identity—all revealed in the thesis through an analysis of both local and state narratives.

While the interstate boundaries of the U.S. were violently forged in the epistemic and material fashion of modern political territoriality—as static, linear demarcations—cross-border communities have since developed because of long historical patterns of international interaction; the cases under study here may be classed as interdependent (U.S.-Mexico) or integrated (U.S.-Canada). Unique patterns of exchange, especially on the northern frontier, have meant the political boundary often bisects communities and even families. Because the U.S.-Mexico
boundary separates a developed from a developing state, it in particular presents a unique set of issues and challenges, from demographics to environmental degradation to economic development.

Extensive economic integration under NAFTA, and larger globalisation pressures which manifest themselves culturally and socially, have only accelerated change in the borderlands and present a number of major policy problems. High labour demands in the U.S for inexpensive workers in the agribusiness and service sectors of the economy, for example, pull individuals across both the northern and southern boundaries. Transnational economic pressures and liberalisation seek to link production and trade capacities, and information technology connects individuals and businesses to new degrees. Border factories (maquiladores) are increasingly utilised by multinational firms because of cheap labour conditions; such industrialisation, however, has also meant massive population growth and pollution.

The relatively open nature of both borders provides opportunities—even with reterritorialisation—for determined crossers and narcotics to cross illicitly and meet American demands. Indeed, the need to counter these 'risks' territorially is reflexive: the 'hazards' to be combated (in this case of undocumented workers) are the product of industrialisation (the need for inexpensive labour in the U.S.) itself.

In the face of several of these cross-border mobilities, particularly narcotics and migrants, the U.S. began a high-profile, high-intensity campaign in the 1990s to 'seal'—or at least project the image it had sealed—its international boundaries. The history and process of this policy development are extensively profiled in the case studies. Costing billions of dollars, much of the regulation manifests itself through high technology and militarisation. Relying on a narrative that places faith in the power of technology to reflexively guide and regulate border control, policymakers borrowed knowledges from the military and directly applied armed forces and equipment to bring America's borders under 'control'. In the case of the Canadian border especially, Congress included Section 110 in the IIRIRA to deploy a tracking system that attempts to record entry and exit records for every individual crossing the border—an impractical and expensive initiative that, if implemented, threatens to effectively close the border; it is representative of the dominant parameters of the policy discourse. Technology thus helps fuel the state's ability to reflexively organise its regulatory efforts.
These narrative dynamics, expressed in both public discourse and political symbolism, combined with these material developments, have served to reconstruct America’s northern and southern borders through reterritorialisation. They also help consolidate notions of national collective identity. By invoking elements of national myth, by drawing firm symbolic, material, and rhetorical boundaries between ‘us’ and the alien ‘other’, and by relegating and presenting the ‘problems’ of disorder, poverty, and terrorism to the border, the case studies demonstrated the effect securitisation policies—and more importantly their political representation—have on American identity. In the case of the U.S.-Mexico borderlands and the narratives of Operation Hold the Line, the study’s analysis of interviews with and statements of residents and policymakers suggest the real impact reterritorialisation plays on socio-spatialisation. In the northern borderlands, a narrative analysis of official policy documents and statements uncovers the way that threats (e.g., of terrorism) are constructed and identity tales scripted, partly through the attempt to securitise by imposing strict control and exit along the border.

The thesis thus found the politics of representation involved in the political presentation of an image of border ‘security’ has implications for the socio-spatialisation of identity in borderland situations, specifically the reinforcement of difference and a ‘secure’ American nationalism narrative forged against transnational pressures. This dominant representation, the specific case studies argue, is based on modernity’s ‘knowledge-as-regulation’ form which furthers the trajectory of regulation between ignorance, designated as ‘chaos’ (inclusive flows of individuals, heterogeneity of identity and culture), and ‘knowledge’, understood as ‘order’ (exclusionary securitisation, homogeneous, stable identity and territoriality), which is sought by the new border policies.

In the American borderlands case, in fact, the narratives and images actually construct an ‘order’ made more from the image of ‘control’ rather than actually addressing some of the important policy questions, such as undocumented migration, it supposedly set out to do. Importantly, this must be seen as a continual, but not inevitable, process of constructing a dominant policy metanarrative. As a result, dual regimes now characterise the borderlands concerning labour and trade.
Comparing the Two Case Studies: Examining the North American Order

The i/b/o triad assists us in making some comparative evaluations of both the southern and northern borderlands and then drawing out suggestive implications for a developing North American political structure. Because borders can be instruments of control that shape a particular order and identity (and vice-versa), policy in this area has an extremely important role. The i/b/o-directed study revealed patterns suggestive of U.S. national identity consolidation through state border practices and representations, despite intensified transnational mobilities emerging within North American under NAFTA. The policy narratives and linked practices examined help create dual regulatory regimes of exclusion of undesired 'threats' like undocumented labour and inclusion of desired flows, such as capital and production.

This policy is increasingly constructed and implemented reflexively but ostensibly is directed to maintain equal treatment of both the northern and southern borderlands. This official policy line under NAFTA dictates equality and parallel treatment of both neighbouring states. For instance, NAFTA-inspired constraints on policy-making made application of Section 110 to only Mexico infeasible, despite language in Congress seeking to do so anyway because 'of a closer relationship with Canadians'.

Unequal treatment, however, plays out in practice along each boundary: at the end of September 1999, about 1,200 U.S. customs agents and about 300 border-patrol agents were stationed along the U.S.-Canada border. The U.S.-Mexican border, while about half the length, had about 2,000 customs agents and 7,400 border-patrol agents, wearing bulletproof vests and carrying sidearms. While this has been the historical pattern, recent developments point to an increasing convergence of northern and southern border policy. This is particularly evident in Section 110 and other provisions of the 1996 IIRIRA act, and even with more recent developments on the border which include renewed calls to securitise the northern borderlands. Some lawmakers have in fact claimed security at the Canada border is 'woefully inadequate' and should be modelled on the U.S.-Mexico border.

Department of Justice internal reports now advise revising the INS’s ‘Strategic Border Plan’ to include more emphasis on the northern frontier: ‘securing the northern border requires...knowledge and insights of individuals experienced in securing the northern border, as well as lessons the Border Patrol has learned while implementing the strategic plan on the southwest border’.4

The dynamics of the U.S.-Mexico borderlands were once called by Tito Alegria ‘the adjacency of difference’ where interaction and identity are both accentuated and modified, particularly by the asymmetric nature of the border. If this is so, the adjacency of relative ‘sameness’ in the U.S.-Canadian case would seemingly present less interesting relationships.5 The U.S.-Canadian situation is however intriguing as a counterpoint to the U.S.-Mexico study not only because it is was once the longest undefended frontier in the world, but also because of the subtle and complex identity relationships between Canadians and Americans.

To some degree, this is in relief when compared to the U.S.-Mexico borderlands where somewhat different patterns of identity and exclusion are practised and represented through narratives which emphasise the nationalist stories of America, such as the ‘American Dream’, and promote difference against an other in the ‘brown’ Mexican who drains social services. But as the thesis’ textual analysis illustrates, like in the southern case, recent political developments and enabling narratives also serve to help construct ‘threats’ ‘from the north’ as well, i.e., terrorism and refugees, to consolidate the national political idea and territoriality of the United States. Accordingly, political space and difference is ‘written’ there too in a similar fashion, helping to project a normative order which ‘protects’ the imagined and intersubjective sovereign status of America against Canada, called by one lawmaker a ‘chaotic’ ‘Club Med for terrorists’.6

Ultimately, the overall, dominant metanarrative directs the problem and risk to both boundaries and the ‘sending’ states, be it Mexico with its migrants or Canada with its perceived lax refugee or terrorism policy. That political strategy formulates

the possibilities for greater border securitisation on both the U.S.-Mexico and U.S.-Canada boundaries. The continuance of this trend seems inevitable, as reflexive territoriality operates by furthering the attempt to seal both frontiers from incursions by undocumented economic migrants or terrorists, increasingly through surveillance and 'terrain denial' technologies from the Pentagon and CIA. The pattern of allocating massive resources to 'border control'—in both cases—is set to continue into the foreseeable future; the new Bush administration has signalled its willingness to do so. The representations of these policies also play well among many American voters; numerous public interest groups and research centres in Washington continue to produce panicky studies that assist in constructing these 'threats'.

Who this serves seems clear: NAFTA has been an economic boom to large multinational firms able to appropriate low-wage labour (for example by shifting operations to Mexican *maquila* plants or using undocumented workers in domestic production) and those companies able to take advantage of massive trade liberalisation. Moreover, with the current high-level movement on an expanded trade agreement for the entire western hemisphere by the mid-2000s, it seems clear that U.S.-led policy seeks increased openness for international trade and economic development, largely in favour of transnational economic actors.

All of this points to the development of a somewhat contradictory dual order emerging in North America that has very real co-constitutive impacts on borders and identity. Boundaries are opened to facilitate expanded opportunities for transnationally-geared economic integration—encouraged by larger patterns of globalisation—while the state attempts to shut them to the flip side of such integration: 'undesirable' (yet demanded) mobilities such as the economic migrant so necessary for large sectors of the U.S. economy or illicit narcotics. Amidst greater trade liberalisation, securitisation policies try to dampen borderlands interaction, despite long-standing traditions of community and histories of migration that are developing an increasingly heterogeneous U.S. population with many foreign links and diverse cultural or social interests. This focus also accentuates the danger of further economic exploitation, degradation of environmental conditions, and growth in poverty, especially in the southern borderlands.

The question remains, however, is this new order sustainable? Some political economy scholars, for example, suggest that as the volume of trade, shipping, and travel burgeon with expanded economic agreements, state attempts to 'seal' U.S.
borders from these undesired mobilities will grow increasingly futile. This is an issue taken up below in the discussion on policy alternatives.

7.3 FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS: THEORY

*Border Studies*

The area of 'border studies' seems the appropriate place to ground future explorations of boundaries and identities, especially given its emphasis on thinking about these issues in fluid, unique ways. New work in the literature, in fact, is aggressively seeking insights into possible transformations, for example, in how we conceptualise multiple or hybrid identities, such as those held by diasporic communities, dual citizens, indigenous peoples, and even some borderlanders. Research also seems necessary to determine the way in which information technology and other facets of globalisation affect communities across boundaries, such as fostering political participation back at home while abroad as a refugee or migrant (as the Mexican government is attempting to affect).

Most importantly, this area of study encourages the problematisation and continuous questioning of the many kinds of 'borders' society constructs, from the homogeneous and hegemonic to the ethical and inclusive. Nonetheless, as Minha-ha reminds us in an important warning: we cannot 'run the risk' of using the term 'border' in a way which would 'reduce it to yet another harmless catchword expropriated and popularized among progressive thinkers'. Furthermore, flexibility is the key which allows us to recognise the need and possibilities for boundaries while also avoiding intellectual closure by seeing them as permanent or thinking only in static or fixed terms.

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The i/b/o project is an unfinished initiative, open to further exploration, maturation, and refinement. Its very construction is seen as an open-ended development process and different scholars are undertaking eclectic i/b/o-oriented work. Both its constituent elements—and their co-constitutive relationships—promise to provide researchers with many open puzzles and questions to ponder. All three concepts will be of lasting importance in discussions about international relations for the foreseeable future and much work remains to be done to thoroughly explore each of them. And, as indicated in the thesis, the relationships, for example, between borders and identity, or discourse and order, remain relatively underdeveloped theoretical undertakings. In particular, work on socio-spatial consciousness may help unlock the many symbolic, ideological, and material representations of boundaries.

As a triad itself, the tool also implicates the question of metaphors and additional work in this regard seems a clear and necessary direction for a critical, interpretive research agenda concerned with political symbolism and representation. Although relatively understudied in IR, metaphor is often important in thinking about international politics; many theories, such as realism and liberalism, rely on metaphors to conceptualise and assemble systems and order (such as anarchy or the market). While they may be crucial in denoting and constructing borders, threats, orders and identities—as suggested in the thesis—this function is extremely complex; it can highlight certain political possibilities and obscure others. A deeper examination of how borders, identities, and orders are metaphoric—and why this is important—would formulate an excellent study.

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Beyond the avenues of exploration inherent in the triad itself, in just its basic form it already offers the potential to structure and guide many future research undertakings. One promising i/b/o-oriented approach for future study, for example, involves the further development of the relationship between identity and security. Migration is a particularly salient example of a phenomena that is increasingly being 'securitised' and defined as a threat, particularly after the end of the Cold War. This move is being drawn out of initial work by the Copenhagen school that widened our understanding of security beyond its traditional use in IR denoting force, weaponry, and armed conflict. Some scholars now understand security as a speech act, a construction of threat that involves a referent object, an inside via an outside, which is prior to or reconstructed in the process of securitisation. From this, some have suggested other ways of thinking of security, such as economic or social. Future i/b/o analyses might deal with the link between identity and security, widely defined, and explore how this helps and structure political communities. They might ask the question, for whom is security? Even relying on more traditional notions of security, the i/b/o triad might orient research directed at ethnic conflict, especially over questions of boundaries and identity.

As alluded to in the thesis, the globalisation debate seems another apt area for further i/b/o engagement. Because globalisation is implicated in many contemporary order issues, a variety of interesting research questions emerge. What happens, for example, to identity or diversity in the face of the homogeneity created by globalisation? What do the local, regional, or transnational experiences of globalisation mean for individuals or international actors? Many other potential questions could emerge from this productive framework.

Process Relationalism

To take the discussions opened in the thesis to a deeper, more metatheoretical level, future research might also consider developing process relationalism (p/r) as an interesting and potentially useful ontological basis for IR. Process relationalism, informed by a philosophical approach pioneered by Heraclitus and carried forth by Dewey, Whitehead, and Sheldon, is now being slowly developed and incorporated

15 See, for example, Ole Waever et al, Identity, Migration, and the New Security Agenda in Europe (London: Pinter, 1993),
into IR, but requires substantial work. The process relationalism approach carries promise to help move IR debates beyond substantialism, which takes entities as primitives, and relationalism, which takes processes of social transaction as the basic building blocks of theory. This may also serve as a productive critique of constructivism, the so-called new ‘middle ground’ of the discipline.

P/r adopts a framework of analysis that focuses on the continuous ‘configurations of ties—recurrent socio-cultural interaction—between social aggregates as the basis building blocks of social analysis’. This differs quite markedly from the dominant thinking in the social sciences of substantialism, which holds that ‘things’ or ‘entities’ are ontologically primary and fundamental, e.g., existing before processes and relations—which, in the end, are only conceived as occurring between entities. This divide, as Mustafa Emirbayer asserts, is no less than the current ‘fundamental dilemma’ in sociology: ‘whether to conceive of the world as consisting primarily in substances or in processes, in static “things” or in dynamic, unfolding relations’.

The outlines of a similar problematic in IR appear to be emerging. Yosef Lapid, for example, has issued the call for a relational, ‘mobile’ approach to International Relations theory, which, among other things, would seek to understand how the ‘political’, the ‘inter’, and the ‘national’ are constituted. ‘Mobilities’ or forms of processes, he suggests, are a useful way of understanding change in the international system. The identities/borders/orders project is one such application in this direction. However, the integration of process philosophy with International Relations a relatively new enterprise. IR traditionally understands ‘process’ to mean or reduce to ‘process-tracing’ but process philosophy is an ontological approach that allows the incorporation of post-structural insights beyond simple interpretations of ‘texts’.

17 Charles Tilly, International Communities, Secure or Otherwise (New York: Center for the Social Sciences at Columbia University Pre-Print Series, 1996), 2.
18 Emirbayer, ‘Manifesto’, 287.
19 See Lapid, ‘On the Move’.
One foci for advancing a possible framework within a p/r approach is the concept of 'trans-action'. Trans-action, in brief, is a specific understanding of process which sees the socio-political world as a series of relational transactions between non-detachable 'entities' (states, for example) which themselves are bundles of processes; the relation between them is the focus, not the entities themselves. Trans-action thus occurs 'where systems of description and naming are employed to deal with aspects and phases of action, without final attribution to “elements” or other presumptively detachable or independent “entities”, “essences” or “realities”, and without isolation of presumptively detachable “relations” from such detachable “elements”'. This approach means that the units or entities in the transaction 'derive their meaning, significance, and identity from the (changing) functional roles they play within that transaction...which becomes the primary unit of analysis rather than the constituent elements themselves'.

In this way, a trans-action understanding is similar, although in some ways significantly different, than structuration theory, as elaborated by Giddens as well as by some constructivist critics. Although the concept of trans-action was first articulated in the early twentieth century by John Dewey and Arthur Bentley, prominent process philosophers, any application for political analysis has not been undertaken, and so it might be usefully developed.

Process relationalism's emphasis on 'becoming', rather than traditional substance philosophy's reliance on categories of static, 'thing-oriented' being, may be particularly appropriate for a view of borders, territoriality, and identity as processes of becoming, situated in larger, interconnected manifolds of process of the international system. Seeing these only as static 'things' can mask the conditions which make them possible and sustain them—as well as imply their inevitability. Finally, implicit in process metaphysics is the concept of change and transformation, which may possibly be made available for critical theory applications.

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21 Emirbayer, 'Manifesto', 287.
22 Dewey and Bentley, Knowing and the Known, 108.
7.4 **FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS: EMPIRICAL ISSUES**

The prospects for future empirical research on borderlands, both those detailed here and others globally, seem bright. Border situations in North America provide excellent research scenarios because of the multiple characteristics and variables both the U.S.-Canadian and U.S.-Mexican cases present: a junction between an advanced state and a superpower, and one between that superpower with a developing state. Underlying these particular dynamics are the overall forces of economic and social integration between all three states under NAFTA. These factors make research here extremely productive for scholars from a variety of fields looking at issues as varied as health, the environment, demographics, and trade as well as for more traditional political studies.

In terms of additional work on the American borderlands case studies in this thesis, the analysis could be easily supplemented by further investigation of the narrative patterns occurring on the other side of each boundary: in the Mexican and Canadian discourses. Such a move would enrich the overall project by injecting views of those also highly affected by current American reterritorialising policies, and thus present a less U.S.-centric analysis. That sort of project would require large resources to accomplish but might prove highly interesting if the structure of the current study is expanded upon to uncover Mexican and Canadian metanarratives.

Comparative borderland analysis also has the potential to further expand our understandings of borders on a global scale, and in the process, highlight unique aspects of the North American cases. Such analyses are particularly relevant given the many questions of migration management and economic development, among other issues, facing all states. For example, the Russian-Kazakhstan border, as a membrane between the Western and Oriental civilisations and as a conduit for flows similar to those in the U.S.-Mexico case, would be a prime candidate for comparative exploration; similarly the Russian-Ukrainian border has parallels to the U.S.-Canadian boundary.

Some promising comparative work on borders and borderlands in Europe too is underway; of particular interest are those studies emphasising securitisation, especially between economically asymmetric states or between those in the EU and
those that are not, such as Germany and Poland and Spain and Morocco. In many cases, scholars like Bigo argue that the EU has shifted its policing and securitisation priorities under the Schengen agreement to reinforce the external boundaries of the community, particularly to refugees and migrants.

Many useful and similar avenues for i/b/o-directed research in this regard are available; a researcher could, as just one example, compare pressures of economic integration and globalisation in the EU and NAFTA cases and the corresponding demands on migrant labour in states. An analysis of the new means for reflexively organising border practices in advanced states would also be fruitful, as would very different work on borderlands in conflict situations or those in the developing world.

7.5 **CRITICAL AND NORMATIVE POLICY ALTERNATIVES**

Unfortunately, there is a dearth of national debate in the U.S. on its borderlands and policies on immigration, poverty, and trade. Worse, few policy alternatives or counter-narratives circulate, limiting opportunities for more progressive solutions to the problems these regions face; the dominant metanarrative has, in fact, often prevented serious consideration of critical alternatives in Washington.

In order to develop other options, it seems important to first recognise a new mobile-oriented environment of globalisation and economic integration under NAFTA where diversity and interdependence need to be the hallmarks for future policy orientation. Finding balanced policy approaches that belie the current, ill-conceived and highly representational U.S. border 'strategies' is the next step. Re-orienting the policy debate requires breaking the reliance on the dominant metanarrative that relegates problems only to the borderlands and leaves an incorrect impression of control and order.

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In the case of the attempt to harden U.S. borders, especially the northern frontier, to terrorists and refugee crossings—such as Section 110 attempts to do—policymakers must first endorse the sensitive, highly integrated nature of the northern frontier and the long-standing patterns of cross-border interaction, including highly-prized trade flows—up to $1 billion per day. Instead of some of the myopic policies detailed in chapter six, the goal of screening terrorist activity and refugee movements might be better be served by co-operative, binational ‘perimeter’ measures or mutual intelligence sharing strategies. These are efforts that do not further securitise and project violence on boundaries that separate vibrant, interlinked communities. Further reterritorialisation of this border takes the bilateral relationship backward and threatens delicate international alliances.

In the case of undocumented migration, particularly from Mexico, problem solving also first involves understanding the unique, interdependent nature of the southern borderlands and then noting some of the failures of unilateral reterritorialisation policies by the U.S. As chapter five illustrated, these initiatives have proven largely unable to achieve the intended outcomes of reducing undocumented migration, instead they have fuelled the growth of international crime networks who smuggle migrants or push crossings to desolate and dangerous areas. Additionally, current policy frameworks fail to consider the transformational impact mobilities and agreements like NAFTA have on the state’s ability to regulate flows—especially over economic concerns such as labour. For example, fewer than one in 20 cars coming into the U.S. is inspected, borderland courts are overwhelmed by drug and deportation cases, and only one per cent of the 1.6 million undocumented migrants detained each year are prosecuted. Demand for illegal narcotics too remains high in the U.S., and NAFTA has eased the ability to smuggle drugs throughout North America. Inevitably, both the northern and southern


27 Much of the drugs are carried in some of the tens of thousands of trucks that cross the border each day, a procedure eased by NAFTA. See Kris Axtman, ‘Rising Border Traffic, More Drugs’, Christian Science Monitor (8 May 2001) [http://www.csmonitor.com/durable/2001/05/08/lp10/s2-csm.shtml] (10 May 2001).
borderlands will remain open to determined migrants, terrorists, and narcotics.\textsuperscript{28} In response to this post-Cold war uncertainty, the attempt to continue to contain these issues within a security framework seems likely.

The wider dimensions of securitisation indeed flag major contradictions in U.S. policy, especially towards migration. To explore them entails making a counter-narrative move: acknowledging the valuable, long-standing role migrants have played in economic development and their status as non-'alien' individuals. Increasingly coveted by businesses as well as private citizens, the over six million undocumented workers in the U.S. perform the vast majority of jobs in the service and agricultural sectors at wages most Americans refuse to accept, and usually do so without benefits and under fear of detection. Were they not present, the U.S. economy would breakdown because of a severe labour shortage.\textsuperscript{29} As even some Republican lawmakers like Senator Pete Domenici now quietly assert, 'We are encouraging a hypocrisy...At the border we arrest, but once they get here everyone opens their arms and says we've got a job for you'.\textsuperscript{30}

Some progress on migration reform is being made. Spurred by the election of President Vicente Fox in Mexico, some policy alternatives were recently advanced through a positive counter-narrative intervention by a high-level working binational working group at the Carnegie Institute that included policy elites from both Mexico and the U.S.\textsuperscript{31} Recognising increased economic integration and the contradictory dual regime regulating different kinds mobilities, the group seeks to openly acknowledge and incorporate labour into wider discussions about the border. Their recommendations include expanding worker visas; co-operatively reducing transnational smuggling activity; jointly improving the border region and preventing dangerous crossings; and boosting the Mexican economy to limit migration

\textsuperscript{28} An internal U.S. Department of Justice study conducted in 2000 found that the northern border in particular was 'wide open to criminal activity' and would-be crossers. See Office of the Inspector General, \textit{Border Patrol Efforts Along the Northern Border.}

\textsuperscript{29} Interestingly, on the opposite end of the wage-spectrum, in 2000 Congress doubled the quota for high-skilled immigrants—mainly in the information technology sector—to 195,000.


incentives. Other interest groups, including large business and labour organisations are also now calling for immigration reform, and in some cases, regularisation or legalisation of migrants.

These developments follow an encouraging, if little noticed, recent set of studies on immigration. The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics predicts that by 2008 the United States will have over five million more jobs than people to fill them, and that very large proportions of the newly created jobs will require only high school level education and modest training. Even if this proves to be an optimistic prediction, historical evidence suggests the need for low-wage migrant labour would still persist. Moreover, if the Mexican economy continues to experience sustained growth (7 per cent in 2000), and if reform and investments in social sector occurs, migration pressures are expected to recede gradually over the next 15 to 20 years. In addition, with fertility rates now falling below replacement level in Mexico, it is unlikely that high levels of migration will continue, minimising any long-term impact on the U.S. The rate of increase in the proportion of immigrants in California, one the heaviest immigrant states, for example rose only 12 per cent during the 1990s and will increase by only 8 per cent during the next 20 years; furthermore, the poverty rate among foreign-born fell from 19.8 per cent in 1990 to 18.2 per cent in 2000 and is predicted to fall to 16.9 per cent by 2010, according to a University of Southern California study. The larger inter-state relationships these studies allude to justify special multilateral agreements; interdependence, in fact, could be seen within the context of globalisation as a means to strengthen global competitiveness.

In addition to Mexican and borderland economic development, the wider and easier availability of temporary legal work visas may be the best pragmatic

32 Ibid.
33 Major labour organisations such as the AFL-CIO now support amnesty for undocumented migrants and seek their organisation in unions.
35 According to conservative United Nations estimates, the 2000-2005 Mexican rate is 2.49 children per woman, and the low variant, which may be closer to the actual rate, is 2.27, slated to shrink still further to 2.02 in 2005-2010, below the replacement level. See United Nations, UN Population and Vital Statistics Report: July 2000 (Washington, D.C. United Nations Press, 2000).
37 University of Southern California, Population Research Laboratory, Demographic Futures for California [http://www.usc.edu/org/pop/] (23 January 2001).
alternative to current reterritorialisation policies: a well-conceived programme can create incentives for migrants to enter the U.S. labour market legally, instead of attempting hazardous border crossings or paying smugglers. Temporary work visas, with possible options for the future regularisation of immigration status, could be granted through a well-regulated guest-worker programme aimed at farm labourers and the hospitality, service, and informal labour sectors, but must be humane, ensuring proper social support, such as housing. This should help the United States advance one of its major foreign policy objectives—reducing unauthorised migration—while also meeting labour needs and recognising an increasingly integrated and heterogeneous state. Migrants would also earn higher wages in a more secure environment and would pay taxes to support an ageing U.S. population. Legislation to establish such a program is now under consideration by Congress.

Counter-narratives that inject critical alternatives to reterritorialisation policies, like the visa proposals, begin the process of change. The open border proposals by the new Mexican President Fox—and the co-operative interest in his administration from many U.S. officials, including President Bush—also suggest hope. As Fox maintains, 'in my vision, there is no place for steel barriers or barricades that have been built to divide us'; he has envisioned open borders in five to 10 years. While not a practical idea now or even in this time frame, Fox’s concept—and now also some positive gestures by the U.S. government—are themselves kinds of openings.

Furthermore, dealing with the contradictions of a dual regime policy on mobilities by adjusting perspectives more positively requires addressing the
normative implications of migration (some of which are suggested below) and
acknowledging the role migrants play both economically and socially, adding up to
$10 billion a year to the U.S. economy.42 Increased liberalisation, regularisation, and
integration of migrant flows is a long-term and difficult but positive goal. So too is
reducing demand for illegal narcotics in the domestic U.S., given the increasing
inability to stem these flows under NAFTA.

**Normative Implications and Future Research**

The border securitisation initiatives authorised by the dominant metanarrative
in the U.S. and detailed in this thesis have important normative implications which
sadly have received little scholarly or popular attention. These concerns emerge due
to the projection of violence and tension on the borderlands with vigilante citizen
operations—especially as confrontational incidents between these groups and
migrants increase—as well as official state-sanctioned actions of militarisation and
surveillance in its ‘tough’ stance in its ‘war’ on undocumented migrants and drugs.43
As noted, these initiatives have a tendency to polarise and galvanise border
communities and identities, illustrated in the case studies through the presence in the
discourse of nationalistic rhetoric, stereotypes, and irrational fear from these state-
defined ‘threats’. Borderlanders are also increasingly threatened by transnational
criminal groups engaging in smuggling migrants or trafficking drugs.

Developed from the dominant metanarrative, the new policies also create
dangerous and life-threatening conditions on the border, especially for migrants
attempting to cross the southern border. Line-watch, securitisation strategies by the
Border Patrol like Operation Hold the Line and Operation Gatekeeper have, to some
degree, ‘sealed’ urban areas, meaning crossings are now directed to remote and
inhospitable routes and this means more migrant deaths: nearly 400 in 2000 and at
least 1600 between 1993-1997.44 In an average year, more die attempting to cross

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42 Anonymous, ‘Let the Huddled Masses In’, *The Economist* (29 March 2001)
43 Much of the recent vigilante violence—including recent shootings of migrants—and propaganda is
documented in a report by the Southern Poverty Law Center, ‘Blood on the Border’, *Intelligence
Report* (spring 2001) (Montgomery, AL: Southern Poverty Law Center)
44 See Karl Eschbah, Karl, Jacqueline Hagan, and Nestor Rodriguez, ‘Death at the
the U.S.-Mexico border than did in the entire history of the Berlin wall. The normative implications of this policy in particular remain largely ignored.

Militarisation and Defense Department involvement means troops and military technology at the border, increasing an atmosphere of conflict and the chance for accidental deaths (as the case of Esequiel Hernandez illustrates) as well as human rights violations because troops are not trained for domestic law enforcement. The expanded presence of police officials along the border also invokes a variety of civil liberties issues. Fear of possible deportation, for instance, has led some migrants to not obtain medical care for themselves or their children (who may be actually be U.S. citizens), or simply live in an atmosphere of harassment: routine traffic stops, for example, can be a pretence for nationality checks. The massive resources allocated for control and security might, in the long term, be better invested in sustainable economic and social development in both Mexico and the borderlands.

Further normative questions must be asked in future research, such as what forms of proper democratisation can be rendered under transnational forces? Where will the boundaries for majoritarian procedures (which are never simply given) be set? How can drug dependency be reduced? Have integrated North American solutions, such as harmonised, co-operation on screenings upon initial entry into North America, been foreclosed? How can other emancipatory agendas be realised? In future work, we must maintain a critical eye by returning to the final step in narrative analysis: reconstruction in favour of tolerance and for strategies to amplify marginalised narratives, interests, and perspectives.

7.6 Final Thoughts

American history, as Frederick Jackson Turner suggested, has the frontier as its heart. As one of the first frontiers of colonial exploration and exploitation, the European powers, and the U.S. itself, utilised new mapping techniques and imposed forms of modern political territoriality on North America to create borders. Within its initial development as a state, the frontier was key in formulating social and

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political relationships in the U.S., partly through patterns of social-spatialisation that involved expansion, capitalism, individualism in a rugged environment—all seen as sanctioned by God. The frontier gradually shifted west, north, and south to engulf the entire continental span by 1890. In the process, a clear connection of the frontier to collective identity was established and endowed with these national American narratives of progress and exceptionalism.

Within these developing boundaries grew impersonal space, intensified capital structures, and bureaucracy, ultimately leading to a concentration of power at the federal level; frontiers become fixed as modern, reified expressions of power. The nature of borderland discourse in American today can still be read as an outgrowth of this historical lineage; the frontier remains the membrane to the foreign and a main testing ground for national identity as well as a mechanism for economic and social integration. While no longer expanding in the same sense, the reterritorialisation and deterritorialisation of the border—within and subject to larger transnational processes like globalisation—still represents critical activities of political socialisation. Borders, as this thesis has suggested, never simply exit: they are always in the process of becoming. Their narratives, policies, and representation to a large degree continue to attest to the measure and nature of America’s national political community.

In the end, the many processes of social ordering—and thus the construction of boundaries—will always involve fascinating dynamics of difference and unity. These dynamics reveal the intriguing but problematic nature of borders: they are mechanisms to inscribe both inclusion and exclusion in many important, but sometimes complex and contradictory, ways. Continuing to study and question their production and representation and will be vital in a changing world.

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- Laura Baxter (General Counsel for the U.S. House Immigration Subcommittee; key in drafting Section 110 of the IIRIRA)
- Alan Bersin (U.S. Attorney General and 'Border Czar' under President Bill Clinton)
- Raymond Chretien (Canadian Ambassador to U.S.)
- Ruben Garcia (Director of Annunciation House in El Paso which serves refugees)
- Steve Garret (Assistant Chief, Border Patrol Spokane, Washington state sector)
- Luiz Gutierrez (U.S. Congressman favouring amnesty for undocumented workers)
- Patrick Kennedy (U.S. Congressman opposed to border securitisation)
- Suzan Kern (Co-ordinator of the El Paso/Juarez Border Rights Coalition)

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1 This list details participants from both case studies. Following the narrative analysis methodology of chapter four, they are a carefully selected cross-section of individuals from civil society as well as official policymakers—from the local to the agency to the legislative level—with varying, but outspoken views on ‘Operation Hold the Line’ (for the U.S.-Mexico borderlands) and the IIRIRA/Section 110 (for the U.S.-Canada borderlands). The respondents vary in their occupations and positions on border securitisation, but made key and representative interventions in the public discourse, especially at the official level. Much of this, as the case studies indicated, helped frame a variety of narratives and counter-narratives of the U.S. borderlands. Some of these comments are collected from secondary sources when direct interviews were not granted or possible. Sources or interview details are included in the chapter notes.
- Lisa Kesler (General Counsel for the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee; key player in the legislative struggle over Section 110)
- Virginia Kice (Spokeswoman, Immigration and Naturalization Service)
- Sheila Jackson Lee (U.S. Congresswoman opposed to immigration changes in the IIRIRA)
- Jack Manson (Public citizen and El Paso resident)
- Jose Matus (Coalicion de Derechos Humans - Arizona Border Rights Project)
- Doris Meissner (Former Commissioner of the INS)
- Doug Mosier (Executive Assistant and Spokesman for the U.S. Border Patrol in El Paso active during the initiation of Operation Hold the Line)
- Jerrod Nadler (U.S. Congressman opposed to securitisation legislation)
- Debbie Nathan (Freelance journalist; founder of the League for Immigration and Border Rights Education)
- Martha Nixon (Assistant Deputy Minister in charge of immigration operations in Canada)
- Keith Olson (Border Patrol Agent, Maine)
- Ed Pastor (U.S. Congressman active on immigration reform)
- Phil Paulbeck (International Falls shopkeeper)
- Wayne Preston (U.S. Border Patrol Agent, northern border)
- Sylvestre Reyes (Border Patrol Sector Chief/U.S. Congressman and architect of Operation Hold the Line)
- Dana Rohrabacher (U.S. Congressman supportive of IIRIRA)
- Jesus Ruiz (Store manager in Puerto de Anapra, NM)
- Lamar Smith (U.S. Congressman, leader on immigration issues in U.S. House of Representatives)
- David Steffen (District Director for the New Mexico Public Health Division)
- Garry Stubblefield (Security expert and advisor to Congress on securitisation)
- Richard Taylor (Transit driver in downtown El Paso near border)
- Jim Toyer (Spokesman for U.S. Congressman Jack Metcalf)
- James Traficant (U.S. Congressman supportive of border militarisation)
- U.S. Border Patrol agents (Requested anonymity)
- William T. Veal (Border Patrol chief in San Diego)
- Ricardo Vela (Editorialist for the El Paso Times newspaper)
- Pablo Vila (Sociology professor at the University of Texas at El Paso)

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