ETHNIC NATIONALIST CHALLENGE TO MULTI-ETHNIC STATE:
INNER MONGOLIA AND CHINA

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Thesis submitted to the University of London in partial fulfilment of the requirement for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations, London School of Economics and Political Science, University of London.
This thesis examines the resurgence of Mongolian nationalism since the onset of the reforms in China in 1979 and the impact of this resurgence on the legitimacy of the Chinese state. The period of reform has witnessed the revival of nationalist sentiments not only of the Mongols, but also of the Han Chinese (and other national minorities).

This development has given rise to two related issues: first, what accounts for the resurgence itself; and second, does it challenge the basis of China's national identity and of the legitimacy of the state as these concepts have previously been understood. During the period under examination (1979-1993), an important shift in the basis of the legitimization of the Chinese State occurred. This shift paralleled the decline in significance of the Communist ideology both in China and worldwide and the corresponding rise of Chinese nationalism officially designated as patriotism (ai guo zhu yi). These developments have shaped the re-emergence of Mongolian nationalism in China, which in turn challenges aspects of the basis of China's statehood.

In order to chart the complex inter-relationship between the Mongols and the Chinese state, it is necessary to adopt an historical perspective. The history of Mongolian self-rule, the struggle for autonomy, and the titular regional autonomy are reviewed to show that the resurgence of Mongolian nationalism is closely linked to the deterioration of the political and economic situation of Mongols in China. During the period of reform, the political ideal of a socialist nation that had unified ethnic and non-ethnic Chinese in the early years of the People's Republic was weakened. In opposition to the ideal of socialist unity, the traditional view of the identity of the Chinese nation that stresses cultural, ethnic, and historical ties has been strengthened. These developments have weakened the authority that the Chinese government exercise over what the Chinese call "national minorities" (shao shu min zu). This weakening of authority may be seen as an example of the problem that arises when the power of coercion replaces political authority.

In terms of foreign relations, Mongolian nationalism has complicated important dimensions for China's relations with other countries of northeast Asia, especially in the post-cold war era. Moreover, the increasing nationalistic basis on which the identity of Chinese people is based, together with the problems this raises in regard to Hong Kong and Taiwan, have profound implications for the international identity of the Chinese state. Consequently, the way in which Chinese "national minorities" have emerged as a problem within China also has clear international implications.

In conclusion, this thesis suggests that the rise of Inner Mongolian nationalism threatens to undermine the concept of an unitary Chinese nation (for example in the guise of a supposed Chinese family). As a result, Mongolian nationalism weakens the basis of Chinese statehood as presently conceived. Furthermore, the challenge of non-Chinese nationalism to Chinese statehood suggests the problems of nationalism as state legitimisation in general.
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Temtsel Hao
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NOTES ON NAME SPELLING AND HANYU PINYIN

The pin yin system, the official romanisation system in the PRC, has been adopted by the UN and other international organisations. It has become the system most universally used in Scholarship and journalism in the West. However, we should notice that pinyin is called han yu pin yin in its full name, which designed to Romanise the Chinese language only. There are many other non-Chinese languages in China as well, which have different pronunciation systems. Most of these non-Chinese languages use alphabets, and have a more direct way of romanisation than Chinese.

In recent years, there has been more and more evidence that to use han yu pin yin to spell words from non-Chinese languages implies an assimilationist tendency. Inner Mongolia was spelt as Nei Monggu in han yu pin yin, in my thesis, non-Chinese names are spelt in their own language or in well-known English spellings, such as Uighurs, Ulanhu, Ordos, Hohhot etc. In my thesis, the han yu pin yin system is only used to spell Chinese names. However, some well-known Chinese names of places and people are exceptions because they are more easily recognised in the old way, such as Hong Kong, Confucius, Chiang Kaishik, Sun Yatsen, etc.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CCP</td>
<td>Chinese Communist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMINTERN</td>
<td>The 3rd Communist International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IM</td>
<td>Inner Mongolia</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMAR</td>
<td>Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region</td>
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<td>IMKMT</td>
<td>Inner Mongolian Kuomintang</td>
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<td>IMPRP</td>
<td>Inner Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>KMT</td>
<td>Kuomintang (Nationalist Party)</td>
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<td>MPR</td>
<td>Mongolian People’s Republic</td>
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<td>MPRP</td>
<td>Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party</td>
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<td>NIMPRP</td>
<td>New Inner Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party</td>
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<td>OM</td>
<td>Outer Mongolia</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLA</td>
<td>People’s Liberation Army</td>
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<td>PRC</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
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<td>SEZ</td>
<td>Special Economic Zone</td>
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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION

This thesis examines the challenge posed to the legitimacy of the Chinese state by the resurgence of Mongolian nationalism since the onset of the reforms in China in 1979. Nationalism in nature is a legitimation principle. Nationalism, by Ernest Gellner's definition, is a political principle by which "the cultural and the political units should be congruent."\(^1\) Nationalism is often justify itself with national self determination which is in accordance with the generally accepted international norm that the sovereignty is vested in the people of a given territory.

Nationalism as a political principle of national self-determination is clear and less controversial, but to decide which group is a nation and thus entitled to self-determination is a difficult issue. Since most states within their current territorial bounds have been formed on the basis of succession to a previous authority\(^2\), problems can and do arise when such states include within their borders peoples with claims to belong to diverse nations.

In such cases problems may become acute when the predominant national group uses its nationalism as the principle for state legitimacy in such a way as to use the instruments of statehood to assert that others belong to the same nation irrespective of their own declared views. Problems may also become manifest when smaller national groups claim the right of secession on the basis of the nationalist principle.

Chinese nationalism or state nationalism ("ai guo zhu yi" in Chinese) is an such example in which nationalism is used as a state legitimation principle. The key point of Chinese state nationalism("ai guo zhu yi") is its emphasis upon the state rather than upon the nation: Since all peoples live in one state, therefore they are of one nation, and by the nationalist principle, they should be loyal to state.

However, nationalism as a legitimation principle is a two-pronged sword. While nationalism can be used to justify state legitimacy, it can be also used to defy a state and justify a separatist movement.

Chinese state legitimacy has many origins: the imperial legacy, the nationalist past and Marxist ideological influences. For example, Chinese state nationalism partly originates from the sino-centric past and culturalism\(^3\), assimilationism before 1949 and it also finds justification in historical materialism.

The relationship between Nationalism and state legitimacy arguably has been an important source of tension in international relations since the 19th century. But it has acquired even greater saliency in the 1990s following the end of the Cold War. Most of the international conflicts have stemmed from intra-state rather than inter-state wars. And these conflicts have hinged on which national groups have the right to exercise state power or what should be the territorial basis for new states upon the break-up of multi-national states. These issues have acquired greater significance. Firstly, because the end of bipolarity has removed the constraints exercised by great powers involvement in local conflicts. Secondly, the collapse of Communism as an alternative economic system and as radical ideology has removed a system that once ever-rode national divisions for much of the Eurasian peoples.

China too has not been exempt from these changing currents. During the period of reform since 1979, an important shift occurred in the basis on which the legitimization of the Chinese State. This shift paralleled the decline in significance of Communist ideology both in China and the world as a whole and the corresponding rise of Chinese nationalism officially designated as "patriotism" (ai guo zhu yi or "state nationalism").

The decline of Marxist ideology has reduced the supranational nature of Chinese statehood with the result that the formal identity of Chinese state has become more nationalist. In this sense China has changed from being a supra-national empire to a nationalist state. These developments have shaped the re-emergence of Mongolian nationalism in China, which in turn has challenged aspects of the basis of statehood as asserted by China's Communist party rulers.

In the world as a whole, nationalism has played a more important role in state legitimacy in the post-Cold War era. Sub-state and inter-state nationalism have had a heavy impact upon state legitimacy and inter-state relations. I will examine the development of Mongolian nationalism to see the extent to which the development in post Mao China correspond to the above those trends.

In order to chart the complex inter-relationship between the Mongols and the Chinese state, it is necessary to adopt an historical perspective. The history of Mongolian self-rule, the struggle for autonomy, and the titular regional autonomy are reviewed to show that the resurgence of Mongolian nationalism may be said to have arisen in part from the deterioration of the political and economic situation of Mongols in China.

During the period of reform, the political ideal of a socialist nation that had unified ethnic and non-ethnic Chinese in the early years of the People's Republic was weakened. In opposition to the ideal of socialist unity, the old traditional view has re-emerged. According to this, the identity of the Chinese nation is defined principally by the cultural, ethnic, and historical ties that bind the Chinese people together in the state.

Since this view is dominated by perspectives and interests of the Han Chinese, the developments since the beginning of the reforms have combined to weaken the authority that the Chinese
government has exercised over what the Chinese call “national minorities” (shao shu min zu). This weakening of authority has resulted in the more overt use of force and it may be seen as an example of the problem that arises when the power of coercion replaces political authority.

In terms of foreign relations, Mongolian nationalism has complicated important dimensions of China’s relations with other countries of Northeast Asia, especially in the post-Cold War era. Moreover, the increasing nationalistic basis on which the identity of the Chinese people is based, together with the problems this raises in regard to Hong Kong and Taiwan, have profound implications for the international identity of the Chinese state. Consequently, the way in which Chinese “national minorities” have emerged as a problem within China also has clear international implications.

1. Explanations of Nationality Issues in China

In the Chinese language, nationalism is referred to in many different ways: patriotism (ai guo zhu yi or statism) that is usually translated as nationalism, is in fact statism and carries a favorable connotation in Chinese, but nationalism (min zu zhu yi), the supposed neutral term, is regarded as bourgeois and narrow-minded in the Communist ideology, and ethnic splitism or secessionism (min zu fen lie zhu yi), has a straightforward pejorative connotation. Even though, these terms all refer to nationalism, they denote the official Chinese attitude toward minorities whose nationalism is at best particularist and at worst threatens the current Chinese state and the concept of the Chinese nation.

It can not be simply said that the concept “nation” is entirely a European invention, but at least we can say that it first appeared in European political and academic language and that European scholarship has produced the most literature on nationalism.

Nationalism as a political principle and belief is clear, but the specific definition of “nation” is more elusive. “The basic problem arises because the political utility of the national idea is not matched by its analytical clarity. The difficulty lies in defining the nation itself.” According to Ernest Gellner, nationalism as a political principle holds that “the cultural and the political units should be congruent.”

But most problems in understanding and in practice are created over the difficulties of defining a nation. In the real world, there have never been clearly defined cultural and ethnic maps as there have been political maps. In the various theories of nationalism, how to define a nation or how to conceive of a nation is where the differences emerge.

It would be inadequate to explain the Chinese case using only one approach and to regard the Chinese nation or the Mongolian nation as the product of a single intellectual model, say, as the result of

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industrialization and modernization, or simply as a modern revival of historical roots. But the different approaches are useful in understanding the case of China since they all shed light on aspects of the Chinese nationalist phenomena although some theories are more applicable than others. The discussion on Chinese and Mongolian nation and nationalism reflects these different approaches.

Perennialists view the Chinese nation as having long existed since remote ancient times.\(^6\) The perennialist view makes no distinction between ancient ethnic centrism, racism and modern nationalism. Joseph Levenson referred to pre-modern Chinese centrism as culturalism to distinguish it from modern nationalism. The modern state system and the external differentiation it provides promotes the idea of nation and nationalism.

The Chinese nation is believed to have been born two thousand years ago. While the Chinese nation is believed to have begun at the time of Qin’s unification two thousand years ago or even earlier, Mongols as a nation can be traced to days of Genghis Khan’s unification in 1206.

The perennialist view plays quite an important part in Chinese historical education and propaganda, in which, the ancient Chinese state and modern Chinese state, ancient Chinese and modern Chinese people and non-Chinese peoples in China are fused together. Ancient Chinese heroes are treated in the way modern national heroes are treated.

Some English literature on Chinese nationalism can also be categorized as perennialist since it distinguishes a proto Chinese nationalism in pre-modern Chinese history, thus differ from the view that nationalism is a clear cut modern phenomenon.

James Townsend argues a type of ethnic proto nationalism existed along side the elite’s identification with Chinese culture. He claims that the Chinese case is not that of clear-cut classic nationalism. Consequently he differs from Gellner who wrote that “It is nationalism which engenders nations and

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\(^7\) Chinese leaders claim that the emergence of Han Chinese nation began with the Qin dynasty, but that China as a civilisation started 5,000 years ago. The legendary "Three Kings and Five Emperors" are known to average Chinese people as the beginning of Chinese people. The first legendary king Fu Xi is dated back to 2852 BC. Western scholars usually date a 4,000-year Chinese history, referring to the first powerful Chinese state Shang (1766-1122 BC) basing this on the oldest conclusive documentary evidence that survives from the time. Hugh Seton-Watson, *Nation and State: An Inquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism*, (London: Nethuen Co & Ltd., 1977) p.274.

not the other way around9 and from Eric Hobsbawn who wrote “nationalism comes before nations”.10

The intellectualist view11 traces the origin of Chinese nationalism to racist thinking and anti-Mongol ideals in the Ming period and anti-Manchu ideals in the early Qing period, and even earlier to Confucius who after all made the distinction between Chinese and non-Chinese barbarians.

Dikotter, in his book The Discourse of Race in Modern China, gives a historic description of Chinese view on race. He also shows the continuity of traditional Chinese racial views into modern time12.

European ideas are another important intellectual source for Chinese nationalism. Many early Chinese nationalists, Sun Yatsen and Zhang Taiyan for example, were exposed to modern European ideas. But more important is the force that brought foreign ideas, i.e. Western intrusion and its superior technology and social organisation had profound impact on the Chinese intellectual and political elite. Western intrusion as a major outside force gave Chinese a new perception of the modern world.

The Chinese modern world outlook was not generated by a modernisation that happened internally, rather it was stimulated by a modern force from outside. In this sense, nationalism is viewed as a modern phenomenon13.

11 Ernest Renan’s definition of the nation as a form of morality, its solidarity is sustained by a distinctive historical consciousness, ‘Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?’ in John Hutchinson and A.D. Smith, Nationalism, (Oxford University Press, 1994)p.17. Max Weber claims that nations are too various to be defined in terms of any one criterion, but he affiliates nations to ethnic communes as populations unified by a myth of common descent, Max Weber, ‘The Nation’, in A.D. Smith,(op. cit)p.21. Other early literature on nationalism, such as by Carlton Hayes and Hans Kohn, also regarded nationalism mainly as an intellectual product originating from the European tradition. Elie Kedourie’s analysis of nationalism’s ideological origins is based on the experiences of whole of Europe; he regarded nationalism as a product of a tradition of irrational thinking. Elie Kedourie, Nationalism(Oxford: Blackwell, Fourth, expanded edition, 1993)
12 Frank Dikotter, The discourse of Race in Modern China, (Hurst & Company, London 1992)
13 Modernization theorists regard nations as constructed and invented entities. Because a nation could be viewed as a construction arising out of modernization or the rise of bureaucratic state, nationalism is thus sociologically rooted in modernity. Gellner argues that the concept of the nation is created by the need of modern societies for cultural homogeneity. Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism(Basil Blackwell, 1983). Karl Deutsch regards nations as a functional entity in modernity in which communication is both the cause or the purpose of the nation, and the objective of nationalist organizations is to strengthen and extend the channels of communication which can ensure a popular compliance with national symbols and norms. Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication, 2nd edition, (the M.I.T. Press, 1966). Marxist theorists such as Eric Hobsbawm and Benedict Anderson base their theories on historical materialism and put nationalism in the context of historical development, such as Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger’s “invention of tradition”, and Benedict Anderson’s “imagined communities”. Hobsbawm and Ranger, ed. Invention of Tradition(Cambridge University Press, 1983). Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities:
Chinese nationalism can be regarded as a phenomenon of the modern age, but many have found the link between pre-modern Chinese centrism and modern nationalism, and even Chinese communism. The Chinese nationalist revolution drew on the pre-modern racial revolution and also influence of social Darwinism. Early Chinese nationalist thinking was influenced by the ideas of racial salvation and racial war, thus Sun Yatsen’s nationalist revolution started with racial slogans.

Levenson found that the centricity of culturalism surpassed the outlook of Chinese communism. Wang Gungwu writes that the Communist revolution is an extension of the nationalist revolution led by Sun Yatsen. According to Wang Gungwu, the communist triumph of 1949 brought with it a narrow, increasingly exclusive view of nationalism even while party leaders believed themselves the purveyor of world revolution; in retrospect they were more Chinese than revolutionary, more inward-looking than outward-looking.

Relating to the nationalist nature of Chinese revolution, Chalmer A. Johnson’s book on the nationalist nature of peasant revolution suggests the Chinese Communist revolution was more nationalist in character than just a Soviet style revolution.

Li Weihan as an official authority on the CCP’s standing on the issue of nationalism, made a political interpretation of how the Chinese nation came into being, but he did not make a good materialist narrative of modern Chinese nationalism, as may have been expected from an avowed Marxist. Li Weihan put more emphasis on political factors and issues of class struggles. This may reflect a more general problem of Chinese communism, i.e., China’s lack of the materialist conditions prescribed by Marx.

In the Marxist tradition, nationalism is treated as an interim phenomenon and is not given the importance it deserves. The communist analysis, as outlined by Li Weihan, of the international and

References:

- Minzu Lilun he Minzu Zhengce De Jige Wenti (Several Issues on Nationality Theories and Policies) (Beijing: People’s Press, 1980)
domestic situation which provided the Chinese nation with a particular sense of self-consciousness suggests the importance of external differentiation provided by the outside world in Chinese nationalism.

Fei Xiaotong's theory that claims that the Chinese nation emerged from plural origins argues in the same way as Li Weihan's official theory, except for his functionalist explanation of the Chinese nation. His view of the Chinese nation as functioning as a system adds a more materialist explanation to the Chinese nation. But his view of the Chinese nation is also perennialist.21

As a matter of fact, Chinese official theorists such as Li Weihan and Fei Xiaotong have never drawn the distinction between the ancient Chinese and the modern Chinese nation in the same way as European theorists. As Fei put it, the Chinese existed as a nation for thousands of years, and the self-consciousness of the Chinese nation began several hundreds of years ago.

In many ways, the literature on Chinese nation in the post-Mao era is the same as Li Weihan's Marxist theory. Thus the Chinese nation is presented as a timeless notion, which modern socio-economic changes are credited for generating Chinese national self-consciousness. One major difference, however, is that the Marxist logic of social development has been replaced by Fei Xiaotong's functional theory. Another difference is that the inevitability of a communist future is replaced by a nationalist vision, i.e., an economically prosperous and politically powerful China in the world.

A wider range of issues concerning Chinese national identities have been discussed in recent Western literature, e.g., traditional Chinese identity, the role of Chinese intellectuals in Chinese nationalism, regional sub-state identities and official national identity which is the self-perception of Chinese identity in international relations.22 More recent issues such as Chinese intellectuals in Chinese nationalism during the reform period is also discussed.23

The meaning of the Chinese nation and the content of Chinese nationalism is also regarded as having been transformed and monopolized by the state.24 But Lucian Pye has written on non-state driven national identity, arguing that the modernisation of Chinese culture has been driven by the coastal treaty ports.25 This is illustration of a literature which emphasises that Chinese nationalism is shaped

by the impact of modern age.

Peter Van Ness wrote on the relationship between proclaimed national identity and the success or failure of a particular foreign policy undertaken under its auspices.26 Michael Ng-Quinn27, Michael H.Hunt28, James L. Watson29 and Richard W. Wilson30 wrote on traditional Chinese identity and the intellectual and ethnic origin of Chinese national identity.

The regional identities in China is an issue particularly related to the Chinese reform period.31 Usually economic explanations dominate the discussion of regional identities and the regionalisation of economic interests. Economic regionalism does not necessarily lead to disintegration because economic factors form only one of the many causes of nationalism. More emphasis should be put on the differences of varying sub-state identities such as regional identities and non-Chinese identities. Non-Chinese identities are another complicated issue, which is different from regional identity and yet has international implications. The role of external differentiation functions differently with regard to regional and non-Chinese identities.

Christopher Rene Hughes' writing on the controversial issue of Taiwanese nationalism shows how what Chinese and indeed the Chinese government regard as merely a regional identity has developed into a separate identity of international significance and how Taiwanese nationalism has acquired a new meaning that has gone beyond traditional ethnic and cultural nationalism.32 He analysed in particular one aspect of Chinese nationalism, namely, its transformation from an ethnicity with a cultural basis into one with a civic basis. Hence he associates the transformation of nationalism with the legitimacy issue. According to Hughes, the new legitimacy in Taiwan and the social solidarity were cultivated not in terms of ethnic identity but rather on the basis of civic criteria of shared interests amongst the population of Taiwan.33

2. Contribution

The national identities such as those of Chinese nationalism and non-Chinese nationalism are usually studied within the disciplines of sociology, anthropology and political sciences. In China, issues of

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26 Peter Van Ness, “china as a third world state: foreign policy and official national identity”, relationship between a proclaimed national identity and the success or failure of a particular foreign policy is undertaken under its auspices”, Ibid. p.195
27 Michael Ng-Quinn, “National Identity in Pre-modern China”, Ibid.
29 James L. Watson, “Rites or Beliefs? The Construction of a United Culture in Late Imperial China.” Ibid.
31 Lynn White and Li Cheng, “China Coast Identities: Regional, National, and Global”, Ibid.
nationality and national identity fall into the sphere of anthropology and sociology. There is, therefore, a certain gap between the international and internal study of national identities.

International and area studies deal with the state as a whole and treat China both as a nation and a state as a whole without distinguishing some sub-state factors such as non-Chinese national identities and its interaction with the idea of the Chinese nation and Chinese self-identity, and its international implications. Sociological and anthropological studies of non-Chinese nationalism within China do not deal with the international implications of sub-state nationalism.

The nation state may be seen as constituting a barrier for the study of nationalism both in its international context and sub-state context. My approach by which nationalism is examined in 4 different dimensions avoids the constraints put on the study of nationalism by statehood and state borders. I shall include in my thesis information and approaches derived from a wide variety of disciplines and sources encompassing Chinese studies and Mongolian studies, International Relations, domestic nationality policies, and theories of nationalism from various fields of the social sciences.

This multi-disciplinary approach requires that Nationalism in my thesis is examined in a multi-dimensional way. The idea of a Chinese nation has been given various interpretations by Chinese leaders and writers throughout modern history. In order to summarize effectively the distinctive development of Chinese national ideas and different Mongolian national ideas, they will be reviewed on a comparative basis. These national ideas can be separated into the following four different categories, that is, justification of a common past, justification of a common future, some inner mechanism which makes a particular nation distinctive, and certain outside contrasts.

Historically, the formation of nations has not been necessarily dependent upon statehood or upon the roles that states may play. But where the state has been instrumental in the formation of the nation and in the spread of nationalist ideas to the intelligentsia the process can be better understood in the wider context of theory about the system of states.

James Mayall writes on the development and role of nationalism as influences upon the character of international relations. In my thesis, I try to look for the opposite causal relations, i.e. how the international world shapes nationalism.

The major theoretical models of nationalism mostly deal with the internal mechanism, the intellectual origin, and the revival of the pre-modern roots of the nationalist phenomenon, all of which can be applied to the Chinese situation to some degree. But one additional important factor in the formation of group that is given considerable attention here is the external differentiation factor in nationalism.

I will deal with the role of external differentiation upon nationalism, particularly the Chinese and Mongolian nations. The perception that different national groups have of each other, and their

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Christopher Rene Hughes, Ibid. p.2.
perception of the international world is vital to the formation of national identity.

James Mayall defines nationalism in a wide international framework. According to him, the nationalist principle "also holds that the world is (or should be) divided into nations and that the nation is the only proper basis for a sovereign state and the ultimate source of government authority." Therefore nationalism has a two-fold meaning: the first is a view of nationalism that an ethnic group's self-identity should be expressed in the form of a state, and the second is an international consciousness wherein each nation is aware that there are other nations of equal status.

Self-identity of a nation in most cases is impossible without a feasible outside contrast and an awareness of the international arena. Apart from internal conditions such as modernization, intellectual tradition or ethnic revival, national self-identity is dependent on external conditions. Nation and nationalism are inseparable from the states system; they come into being when the states system or international relations develop to a certain stage. A single nation is inconceivable without the contrast of other nations in an international system.

The ancient Chinese had a strong sense of self-identity; they had very clear ideas regarding their cultural uniqueness and superiority, but they did not have any concept of the international or interstate world. Chinese referred to their country as the "middle kingdom" not only in a geographical sense, but also in a cultural and moral sense. To the ancient Chinese, external to the middle kingdom, instead of other equal states or nations, were to be found all the different types of barbarians. This centrist view does not provide the international view that has been so fundamental to the emergence of nationalism elsewhere. Therefore, outside contrast is an important element for understanding modern nationalism.

The idea of nation and the principle of nationalism originated in Europe of the late-18th century, and the national idea has spread from Europe to other places of the world. As Miroslav Hroch says, the "(national) idea could not flow through Europe by their own inspirational force," intellectuals cannot invent a national community out of nothing, there must be some objective preconditions for the invention. While the underlying ethnic and cultural communities before the age of nationalism may form the basis for such a national invention, the international world on the outside provides the inducement.

The concept of nationalism that originated in Europe comprises territorialization of state, legal equality, economic unification, mass education, scientific communication, and so forth. National ideas help to add governmental structures to nations which were pre-modern ethnicities originally.

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Certain criteria or standards for a nation were set up during the modern history of nation building. The European nations such as Britain and France who became self-conscious and manifested themselves as nations set the criteria for other peoples. This was true even nations, such as the Chinese who adopted the same standards later, that may have had a much longer history than the nations who first set the standards. The outside pressure for these peoples to adopt the European model and to regard themselves as nations is the states system. Nationalism has had a great impact in shaping modern international society; on the other hand, the international system or society has also influenced greatly the emergence of many nations. The states system provides an external differentiation for the re-invention and strengthening of the existing group identities and the expansion of the state system facilitates the emergence of new national identities.

The nature of the external differentiation influences the imagination of a national community. This is especially so when the states system expands to cover the globe, leaving no political vacuum on earth. The last 300 years have witnessed the emergence of a states system which covers the entire planet. This saturated states system forces people to choose either to accept the state they are in and its national identity or to oppose the imposed political identity for a new identity.

The view of internal sovereignty and international anarchy reinforces the belief in the principles of nationalism. In the late Manchu Qing dynasty, Chinese nationalists began to comprehend the pluralistic nature of the international world, and the universal values found in ancient Confucianist classics were overshadowed by redefined group identities or even racism. Under such circumstances Chinese nationalism was born. The Chinese nationalist perception of international anarchy was strengthened by European imperialist invasions and by the unequal treaties imposed on the Manchu empire. This perception of both international anarchy and geo-politics in international relations gave an urgency to the early Chinese nationalists' understanding of the necessity of national self-strengthening and national sovereignty.

To the early Chinese nationalists of the late Qing period, nationalist doctrine was there to be borrowed, there were already numerous states known as nation-states. To those states already exposed to a sovereign states system, socio-economic conditions were no longer the primary condition of nationalism, nor was its own tradition of thought. The concept of a territorially-based Chinese nation is not possible without the influence of the European nationalist ideas. The ready-made nationalist principles together with the reality of the states system are a much more powerful stimuli for the development of nationalism which came after these two facts. Nation construction for these new nationalists was mainly a task of justifying the newly discovered nationhood. Nation building also involved recognition of the need to change the domestic system of the empire, hence even the Manchu Qing empire in its last 10 years sought to reform its constitutional and political systems.

Nation building is an on-going process, but it is always under the constraints of the states system. The

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states system set up constraints and limitations for the fusion and fission of nations. Economic integration and a world economy do not replace the external differentiation of the states system, nor guarantee political integration of nation states.

The European colonial empires did not become enlarged nation states, nor were those colonizing nations expanded to include the non-European peoples in the colonies. As for the non-European peoples in the colonies, it was true that their economies had been integrated with that of the colonizing power, and that some of them were able to read the same language as the colonizers and share the same information made possible by modern mass printing technology, nevertheless they were never regarded as part of the European nations. The boundary of the imagined community is limited by the already existing saturated states system which provides external differentiation for the later nations-to-be.

3. Chapters

Chapters are so arranged to illustrate four dimensions of nationalism in both Chinese and Mongolian cases, i.e., historical justification of nationhood and nationalism, ideological justification of a common future, internal mechanism and external differentiation provided by the international world.

3.1. History and Nationalism

Chapters two and three, respectively, are on the historical background of Chinese nationalism and Mongolian nationalism. Also, the historical relationship between the Mongols and the Chinese is examined to show that, as in other cases of nationalism, history is interpreted differently by the different parties to serve their modern nationalist agenda.

One major myth about the Chinese view of history is that Chinese history is regarded by the Chinese as an uninterrupted history with a series of consecutive Chinese states since Neolithic times. Yet, history before the onset of the modern Chinese state was not an uninterrupted line of consecutive Chinese states. From the official Chinese perspective, Chinese history is viewed as a scheme, the present state of the PRC is viewed as the endpoint, the culmination of all previous Chinese history. This ideological view of history is interpreted to justify today’s Chinese state by either Marxist historical materialism or nationalist logic.

In more or less the same way, Mongols have their own view of history. They trace the beginning of the Mongolian state to the Hun state two thousand years ago. The period when Chinese history and Mongolian history was most inter-woven was during the what Chinese call the Yuan Dynasty when China was ruled as part of the Mongolian empire. Whether Genghis Khan was a Chinese emperor and whether the Yuan dynasty was a Chinese dynasty are contested questions for Chinese nationalism and Mongolian nationalism.
The state is regarded differently in the Marxist view and the nationalist view. The Marxist view places the Communist Chinese state into a worldwide scheme, at the end of which both states and nations will disappear in the envisioned utopian communist commonwealth. In this larger view, the Chinese nation and the Chinese state are only interim phenomena. Modern history is seen as an important part of the historical scheme for the Chinese nation to be awakened and to become conscious of its revolutionary mission.

In contrast, the nationalist view of the state is a view on a smaller scale in which the Chinese nation state is the ultimate end value in and of itself. The Chinese state is worshipped and fulfills the destiny of a powerful and prosperous China, regarded as the appropriate and successful culmination point of Chinese history. In contrast to the merging worldwide commonwealth of the Marxist scheme, a social Darwinian view of the international world is part of this nationalist vision.

Although the Chinese Communist revolution maybe regarded as a component part of modern Chinese nationalism, the CPC's attempts to copy the Soviet model of nationality theory and practice did provide some chance of finding a middle course between the claims of Chinese nationalism and non-Chinese nationalism, with the ideal of a Chinese nation based on a common ideology and class interests.

3.2. The Soviet Model of Nationality Policy

It is now clear that China's Communist leaders never seriously thought through the significance of the Soviet model. The CCP has always been more chauvinistic than internationalist in its outlook.

The Soviet model of nationality policy provided a middle ground for a compromise between Han Chinese nationalism and that of other ethnic groups, including the Mongolians in China. Before the Inner Mongolian National Autonomous Region was established up in 1947, there were different Mongolian nationalist movements in Inner Mongolia demanding national independence or a merger with the Mongolian People's Republic. There was also the CPC-controlled autonomous movement led by Ulanhu and this became decisive. Although the Inner Mongolian autonomous movement leading to the IMAR was controlled by CPC, most Mongolian cadres in the movement were trained in Soviet Russia or in the Soviet-influenced Mongolian People's Republic.

Given that Ulanhu was a Chinese Communist party member, a member of the Inner Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, and someone who had experience in both Moscow and Ulaan Baatar, he proved to be the most eligible leader for the united autonomous movement. With the backing of the CPC, he successfully unified the different Mongolian nationalist forces. Apart from being backed by the CPC's military strength, Ulanhu and the CPC also made a promise of autonomy for Inner Mongolia in order to win over those Mongolians who were in favor of national self-determination. All previous oppressive policies toward the Mongols by the Manchu-Qing, and during the Republic
and KMT periods were repudiated by the CPC in order to win the Mongols' support.

The Soviet nationality policy model in China had been a formal part of the CPC programme from the early beginnings of the CPC when it copied the Soviet policy of allowing ethnic minorities national self-determination. At the time that the Chinese Communist leaders began their campaign to control the whole country, they retreated from their original position which allowed national self-determination for non-Chinese peoples. Instead, they instituted a plan to establish nationality regional autonomy in ethnic minority areas. This can be easily understood since that the Chinese communist revolution was based on a strong Chinese nationalist motivation.

In principle at least autonomy of a most limited kind was applied in the first twenty years. But in 1967 in the early stages of the Cultural Revolution and Ulanhu was removed from power in Inner Mongolia. All autonomous policies pursued by Ulanhu were reversed, and the Soviet model was replaced by a radical ostensibly class based policy that was highly assimilationist in practice and that lasted until 1976, for the duration of the Cultural Revolution. In 1978 after the Cultural Revolution, radical ideological rhetoric began to be replaced by nationalist rhetoric. The period of the Cultural Revolution saw the negation of the Soviet model in practice; but since the end of the Cultural Revolution, Lenin and Stalin's theory on nationality issues began to disappear from official ideology altogether.

The demise of the Soviet Union and the changes in Eastern Europe reinforced the Chinese leaders' belief that the Soviet nationality practice was not suitable in China. From the perspective of the Chinese leaders, the Soviet model gave non-Russian minorities too much leeway in maintaining their separate identities and later this was seen to have played an important part in the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The CPC took a lesson from the collapse of the Soviet Union: believing that the disintegration of USSR came from the Soviet leaders' being too soft on ethnic nationalism. Chinese leaders applied the lesson by suppressing non-Chinese nationalism and by speeding up the mechanisms of assimilation.

### 3.3. The Reform Period and Rising Nationalism

During the period of economic reform that followed the Cultural Revolution, economic pragmatism

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37 As early as 1922, in the second Congress of the CCP, the declaration of the CCP condemned "warlords and KMT's oppression of Mongolian autonomy under the name of unification" and advocated that "Mongolia, Tibet and Moslem Frontier could establish Republics within a Chinese Confederation.", see "Declaration Of 2nd National Congress Of CCP", July, 1922, Collection Of CPC Historical Documents (the CPC Party School Press, 1992)

38 When exactly CCP shifted from the position of advocating nationality secession to that of autonomy is difficult to tell since in the late 1930s-40s the CCP mentioned both policies on different occasions. The time that the CCP still mentioned the right of self-determination and secession must be later than it is indicated in CCP history textbooks today. Mongolian communists in Inner Mongolia must have still used the slogan of national self-determination even later than the CCP. Mongolian nationalists, however, always regarded the Soviet Union and the Mongolian People's Republic as their models.

39 The internal publication by the IM Institute of East Asian Studies, Oct. 11,1993, on Pan-Mongolianism, by Zhao Chunguan, p.6.
and politically moderate policies were adopted by Deng Xiaoping. As the radical ideology was abandoned, Chinese nationalism came to be utilized increasingly to justify state authority. Ethnic tolerance never resumed its pre-cultural revolution level. In this period, the Chinese nation has been increasingly regarded as both an historical and a modern entity rather than a multi-ethnic group based on the modern state and socialist ideology. The Chinese state began to be viewed as a nation-state rather than a socialist family of many nationalities.

On the Chinese side, the emphasis is on economic rationalism rather than socialist egalitarianism. Since the commencement of the reforms the market has begun to play an increasingly important role; emphasis has been put on the more prosperous coastal and southern Chinese areas, while the non-Chinese peripheral areas have been more and more marginalized in the national economy. And within the regional economy of non-Chinese areas, the freer market allows and justifies the capital-rich Chinese to have an even greater economic share.

All this adds up to a "perceived deprivation" in the non-Chinese frontier areas. The dissatisfied non-Chinese minorities have found encouragement in the new waves of nationalist secessions following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the changes in Eastern Europe are encouragement. But the Chinese authorities have viewed these waves are an alarm. The de-communisation of the MPR and the concomitant liberalization in the MPR has been a great source of inspiration to Mongols in Inner Mongolia although the enthusiasm has been curbed by the present economic difficulties in the MPR. These international changes reinforced the Chinese belief that the Soviet model of nationality policy is no longer suitable in China, and the ethnic problems in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have strengthened the beliefs of Chinese leaders that the Soviet nationality policy partly contributed to non-Russian nationalism by creating/strengthening non-Russian identities.

3.4. Chinese Nationalism and Mongolian Nationalism in the International World

The international world is no longer viewed by China in terms of class struggle, but in terms of harsh Realism. The international world is regarded as a jungle of nations, and the Chinese nationalist belief is that China is destined to survive and prosper in the arena of international competition. Yet, the impact of the conception of the Chinese nation and nationalist world outlook, has exceeded national limits. The Chinese reunification issue involves Hong Kong and Taiwan, which are of international concern. This creates tension with the economic policy of dependency and inter-dependency with the international economy and the Asia-Pacific in particular. Chinese nationalist ideas also have an impact on neighboring states, e.g., Mongolia. Additionally, how the international world regards the Chinese self-perception as a nation is an international issue.

Nationalism as a political principle is defined as the congruence of state and nation. Between state and nation, there are two different directions contained in the definition. The first is from state to nation:
the nation is regarded as a result of the state. According to the socio-economic view of nationalism, the nation is largely defined by the state, i.e., territory and administration, the economy protected by the state, a national culture promoted by the state. The second is from nation to state: nation is regarded as the reason for the nation-state, and that nations by right should be expressed by a nation-state.

Current Chinese nationalism shows both directions in the state-and-nation relationship. The PRC’s position on the reunification issue, as seen through its external policy regarding Hong Kong and Taiwan, indicates a nationalist view that the same nation should be expressed by a single state. The nationalist belief is embodied in the formula of “one country, two systems”. The PRC’s solution to the Hong Kong and Taiwan issues, “One country, two systems” is a straightforward nationalist principle. It shows that a perceived unitary Chinese nation is the ultimate value, that all Chinese should live within one state despite their political differences.

But the Chinese nationality policy towards non-Chinese minorities within the PRC reflects a different logic, which downplays ethnic, cultural and historical differences between Chinese and non-Chinese minorities, and emphasizes the state’s role in forging a new nation, i.e., the socio-economic structure of the state provides the primary standards for the great Chinese nation (“zhong hua min zu”)

If nationalism is viewed in two stages, that of defying old imperial rule and of nation-building, then Chinese nationalism has passed the stage of defying the old political order by the anti-Manchu nationalist revolution and by the later class revolution led by the CPC. However, the previous two revolutions left two different legacies: a traditional and cultural concept of the Chinese nation, on the one hand, and an idealized Chinese nation based on socialist ideology, on the other. The task which is currently facing Chinese nationalism seems to encompass both legacies at the same time: reunification based on a traditional nationalist principle, and assimilation of non-Chinese minorities in the name of socio-economic progress.

While Chinese nationalism is in its assertive second stage, non-Chinese nationalism in its defying stage has more problems in the clarification of distinctive separate national identities. To non-Chinese minorities, e.g., Tibetans, Turkish Moslems and Mongols, oppressive Chinese nationalism provides them with some common but separate identity. Non-Chinese nationalism in China is more anti-colonialist in nature.

Non-Chinese national movements at present are largely a response to rising Chinese nationalism although they also have their own historical roots. Recent waves of secessionist nationalism following the demise of the Soviet Union and changes in East Europe are merely outside influences rather than direct causes for the resurgence of non-Chinese nationalism in China.

In the case of Inner Mongolia, although there is an independent Mongolian state across the border, the Mongolian state has little irredentist intention toward the PRC. The independent Mongolian state serves only to remind the Mongols in Inner Mongolia of their different identity from the Chinese. But
an independent Inner Mongolian state is not the ultimate goal of Inner Mongolian nationalism as currently expressed. Secessionism and the demand of a merger between Inner Mongolia and the Mongolian state is not the content of current Mongolian nationalism. The impact of the independent Mongolian state on Inner Mongolian nationalism depends upon the desirability of its economic and political system. After the de-communization of the MPR in 1988, the Mongolian state began to evolve towards a western-style parliamentary democracy. If the merit of the newly gained democracy is proved by a more prosperous economy and improvement in people's living standards, the Mongolian state would increase in attraction to Inner Mongolians and have a bigger influence upon Inner Mongolian nationalist sentiments.

But Chinese nationalism faces challenges not only from non-Chinese nationalism, but also from those Chinese with a different national conception, i.e., those in Hong Kong and Taiwan. Some may agree on the idea of one Chinese nation, but not necessarily the strict principle of nation state. Some will be satisfied with the "one country, two systems" formula, others will not. There is an increasingly stronger Taiwanese nationalism which refuses to identify with idea of one Chinese nation.

One aspect of the impact of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is the lesson provided for the leaders of the CPC to strengthen their belief in its nationality policy. The differences between the Soviet theories and practices of nationality affairs and those of the Chinese, in China's view, is the reason why the Chinese nationality issue has been more successfully managed. As a result, Chinese nationality policy continues to depart even further from the Soviet influence, and the assimilationist policy has been accelerated in non-Chinese regions.
CHAPTER II. ANCIENT CHINA AND MODERN CHINESE NATIONALISM

To understand the character of Chinese nationalism, it is useful to make a distinction between the two dimensions of the Chinese nation: historical China and modern China. The former is defined more by ethnicity and culture; and the latter is more territorial and political in its focus. In many current theories on the Chinese nation, the difference between pre-modern Chinese people and the modern Chinese nation is not made clear. Neither the Marxist views in mainland China nor the non-Marxist views in Taiwan pay sufficient attention to the transformation from pre-modern ethnicity into a modern nation. For example, Li Weihan and Fei Xiaotong, the major Chinese nationality policy spokesmen and theorists on Chinese nationality affairs, do not question whether the existence of a Chinese nation throughout Chinese history should be treated as an objective fact; they do not regard the concept as an invention or construction, they simply accept it as a given. According to Chinese Marxist theorists on nationality, nationhood belongs to the sphere of objectivity instead of subjectivity. For them the existence of a Chinese nation several thousands years ago is an objective fact. An historical figure such as Su Wu in the Han dynasty two thousands years ago was appraised by Fan Wenlan as a character possessing national integrity, while Fan accuses another ancient figure from the same period of being a national traitor.

The idea of a modern Chinese nation-state involves a transformation of the idea of a traditional culture-based China to one that follows the modern territorial-based China. The transformation encompasses the following two aspects. The first is longitudinal or historical, which views the past in a way so as to serve the contemporary needs of justifying a coherent modern nation. In such revisionism, historical China is regarded as already a multi-national state, and the dynastic successions are considered to embody a certain historical logic in the unfolding scheme of the Chinese state and the development of the state political legitimacy. The second aspect of the transformation, is latitudinal or contemporary, such as how to deal with non-Chinese nationalities and include them into a unitary Chinese nation.

China, many would agree, is the only civilization that has existed almost uninterruptedly for 5,000 years in the same land. A long history of a unitary culture, a unique written language, political ethics, and a centralized bureaucracy based on a common written language are the major features which some see as the proof for setting China aside from other civilizations in human society. Despite

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1 Taiwan scholars such as Hu Qiu Yuan also support the view that the Chinese nation is a solid, fixed objective fact rather than an invented and imagined entity. The view is expressed in his “Origin of Oriental Society”, Zhongxi Lishi Zhi Lijie (Understanding of Chinese and Western History) (China Magazine Press, 1967)
2 Su Wu was the diplomatic envoy sent by Emperor Wu Di of Han Dynasty, who was captured by the Xiongnu (Huns) and held as a prisoner for 19 years before he finally returned to Han dynasty. During his capture he remained loyal to Han dynasty. Li Lin was an Han general who surrendered to Xiongnu. See Fan Wenlan, Zhong Guo Tong Shi (General History of China), Vol. 2, (Beijing: People's Press, 1956) p.105
3 This was a major point made by Joseph Levenson in his Confucian China and Its Modern Fate: The
frequent invasions by non-Chinese; periods of partial or complete conquests of the country by Turk-related Tongus, Nuzhen, Mongols and finally Manchus; and periods of disunity and weakness, the Chinese structure of government and society is seen as continuing to function and survive. But this 4,000 or 5,000-year old China survives to modern times as a culture rather than as a state.4

According to Fan Wenlan's Comprehensive History of China, China was formed as a nation-state as early as the Qin and Han dynasties from 221BC to AD 220. If judged by Stalin's five criteria for nationality, the Chinese people already “qualified” as a nation having satisfied the four standards: common language, common territory, common economic life and common psychological character embodied in a common culture.5 Evidence for national unification by the Qin was cited from the Book of Rituals (Zhongyong Pian) which described the situation thus: “nowadays all under the heaven, carts use the same wheels, people use the same written characters and abide by the same ethics”. The Qin dynasty first set up a centralized bureaucracy with the emperor ascendant. Second, written Chinese characters were standardized. After the Qin unification, the Chief Minister Li Si standardized the various written Chinese characters by using seal characters. Later, Cheng Miao, a prison warden, invented Li Shu scripts with even simpler strokes which then became the official script in the Han dynasty. Third, the Qin was regarded as having established a more clearly defined territory which stretched from Lintao (today's Gansu Province) in the northwest to Liaodong (today's Liaoning Province) in the northeast and, in between, to the north with the Great Wall built by the previous kingdoms as the northern border. The Qin territory to the south reached Wu Ling (today's Guangdong province). Fourth, a standard highway system for carts was built. The measurements of length, capacity, and weight were standardized. Massive migrations were implemented. All these strengthened economic links within the state and promoted a sense of unity. Fifth, Confucian ethics were emphasized by the first emperor as the norm of conduct for his subjects throughout the country. At first the Xunzi school of Confucianism with its emphasis on legalism played an important role, later giving way to what became orthodox Confucianism, Mencius' school.6

The Chinese nation, envisioned as existing throughout both the pre-modern and modern ages, was conceived both by current Chinese theorists such as Fei Xiaotong and by previous Chinese Marxist theorists such as Li Weihan. Fei Xiaotong, in his much publicized theory of the Chinese nation, argues that the Chinese nation (including Han Chinese and the other 50 or so officially recognized

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4 China is referred by Chinese people as a civilized state with 5,000-year history. The legendary "Three Kings and Five Emperors" are known to average Chinese people as the beginning of Chinese people. The first legendary king Fuxi is dated back to 2852 BC. Western scholars usually date a 4,000-year Chinese history, referring to the first powerful Chinese state Shang (1766-1122 BC) basing this on the oldest conclusive documentary evidence that survives from the time. Hugh Seton-Watson, Nation and State: An Inquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism, (London: Nethuen Co & Ltd., 1977) p.274.


non-Chinese nationalities) has existed throughout the thousands of years of Chinese history, with the Chinese nation gaining self-consciousness in modern times; according to him, it is improper to define the Chinese nation by the limits of the territorial state. Li Weihan, who was for a long period in charge of CPC's United Front and Nationality Works, argued that the more than fifty peoples living in China have been so since the very early ages and they all created the ancient civilization together, and formed a Great Chinese nation together throughout history

However the evidence of the Chinese nation as an objective fact is not so easily established when the multi-ethnic reality in China is considered, with each different ethnic group having widely varying understandings. Therefore, it is impossible to establish concrete criteria for the Chinese nationhood as incontrovertible fact; to start with, nationhood here is better regarded, as in many theories, as a matter of people's inner identification. Why a people imagine and identify themselves as a national community when it is too large for them to know each other personally can be explained in many ways by various major theories of nationalism. People's inner identification with a particular nation can be explained by the various processes of modernization. Nationhood is generally regarded as a modern phenomenon. It can be viewed as a result of modernization, industrialization, or as an intellectual movement brought about by the modernization process. Thus, as a nation, the idea of the Chinese nation can be also said to be a modern creation, but one that has been based upon a considered reconstruction of the past. It is inadequate to regard the Chinese nation merely as a modern phenomenon as in many general theories that do not take into consideration its historic legacy. But attempts to depict the Chinese nation merely as a timeless entity throughout the thousands of years of history fails to make any distinctions between the ancient Chinese community, the Chinese civilization, and the modern state-based Chinese nation.

In order to understand whether the Chinese nation can be both an historical and a modern phenomenon, or a combination or a transformation of the two, it is useful to go back in time to find a historical basis for the Chinese sense of identity and, armed with this knowledge, then see what links may be established between the modern and ancient Chinese. The Chinese nation as outlined here, is a different phenomenon from the European style of nationhood, because modernization and industrialization have played different roles in China. Modern Chinese national consciousness or nationalism has not been generated by a process that transformed the Chinese from agricultural communities into a new socio-economic community. The major factors facilitating the imagining of a Chinese nation are first, historical; and second, the result of modern influence. The latter was initially brought about by Western intrusion but subsequently served as no more than a catalyst or stimulus for

9 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on Origins and Spread of Nationalism (Verso Editions and NLB, 1983)
transforming the ancient Chinese into modern Chinese.

The ancient Chinese community was based mainly on the belief in common blood, morals, and ethnicity, such as in culture and written language. In contrast, the modern Chinese nation has been based on the notion of the territorial bounds of the modern state encompassed by the administration as that claimed to have been the domain the previous ruling dynasty.

China is described by Lucian Pye as a civilization pretending to be a state. The comment shows Chinese obliterately rather than clarify the difference between the ancient Chinese and modern Chinese.

Despite many different official attempts to bridge the gap and minimize the differences, there have been always contradictions between the traditional sense of the Chinese community and the modern idea of the Chinese as a nation. The lack of clarity and the confusion has resulted in many misunderstandings and disagreements in contemporary domestic Chinese politics and indeed in international politics. For example, the issue of reunification with Taiwan, which turns on the perception of the nature of Chinese nationhood, continues to be the root cause for the many major quarrels between the different parties.

The need to envisage China as a nation did not come until the Chinese began to be exposed to the international world in the late Qing dynasty, the beginning of modern Chinese history. The process of transforming the concept of a traditional Chinese community to that of a modern Chinese nation began in the late Qing dynasty and it is a process that still continues. Although revolutions have taken place and the western ideas have been imported, the perceived links between the ideas of the modern Chinese nation and the ancient Chinese civilization still remain very strong.

1. Historical Chinese Community

There are many reasons that could be adduced to explain why a pre-modern Chinese community managed to exist more or less intact through thousands of years of history. Under Communist Party rule, Stalin's definition of nationality has been very frequently used by Chinese scholars as the standard. The existence of an identifiable Chinese people throughout history is believed to be based upon geographical, economic, cultural and common psychological factors. Language can be included as part of the cultural dimension. A relatively stable Chinese community has been possible because of a shared sense of togetherness and this sense of identity has been the result of a geographical affinity, political forces, and a common culture. Moreover there has always been an external referent to highlight a shared sense of identity. From the perspective of the historical Chinese community, the outside referents were non-Chinese barbarians.

12 Joseph Stalin, (op. cit) p.8.
Both historical China and modern China may be analyzed in terms of their physical, spiritual and intellectual aspects. Physical aspects include geographical and economic factors. Spiritual and intellectual aspects include culture, ethics and ideas. The factors in both categories are interrelated in their causal relations. In the Materialist Marxist view, the common spiritual character may be regarded as the result of socio-economic environment and changes. The idealist view would regard the issue otherwise. In the modern age, the dynastic power of China has been replaced by the modern sovereign state, the traditional agricultural economy has given way to the nation-wide drive toward industrialization, and traditional culture and values have come into conflict and compromise with westernization. The Chinese understanding of nation and state has also changed. The physical transformation of the Chinese people and state from dynasty to modern nationhood has taken place on the same ground which has long been known as China, and on its peripheral frontiers; similarly, the idea of modern state and nation is also born out of pre-modern conceptions of China as a state and an ethnicity.

Before the Han dynasty, Han Chinese were known as Hua or Xia people, and their activities took place within the Yellow River valley area. The legendary Xia dynasty is believed to have been founded forty-two centuries ago by King Yu in the Yellow River valley. Even today ethnic Chinese still regard themselves as the descendants of the Xia ("hua xia zi sun"). Having inherited a rich agrarian culture that extended from the Neolithic period, the ancient Chinese founded a unified political state, Shang(1700BC-1100BC) in North China during the Bronze Age.

The Shang state was placed by the Zhou state(1100BC-256BC). In the Spring and Autumn (Chun Qiu) period in the seventh century B.C., the Zhou dynasty was challenged repeatedly by vassal states. The era of military feudalism ended with the rise of King Cheng of the Qin kingdom, who unified China in 221 B.C., declared himself the First Emperor, and inaugurated a centralized bureaucratic system of government. When the big Kingdom Chu on Yangtze River valley was defeated by the powerful Qin Kingdom (221BC- 206BC), the Hua Xia people’s sphere of activity was expanded to include the Yellow River and Yangtze River valleys.

During the next two millennia, the Chinese governmental system gradually evolved (without the development of alternatives) from the foundation of the Qin political institutions, which rested mainly on the secular Confucian philosophy and other philosophies such as remnants of Taoist, cosmological, and Legalist ideologies, and with a complex but well-organized bureaucratic administration. Although China was divided for about half of this period the Chinese way of life continued and China’s various conquerors had no alternative but to rule in the Chinese bureaucratic style an essentially unchanged economy and society.

Since the Han dynasty (206BC -AD 220), the Hua Xia people have been known as the Han people. And, since then, the Han/Chinese people have dwelt in basically the same areas for about two

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14 It was in Han Dynasty when Confucian teachings were dogmatized and became the ideology that underpinned political and social relations. Fan Wenlan, Zhongguo Tongshi (Comprehensive History of China), Vol.2, 5th Edition (Beijing: People’s Press, 1978) p.120.
thousand years, until the Republican period. Traditional Chinese dwelling areas were confined to the basins of Yellow River and Yangtze River. Prior to the Manchu Qing dynasty, Chinese people never lived beyond the so-called 18 provinces.\textsuperscript{15}

The Han/Chinese economy was mainly agriculture. And the agricultural economy directly influenced and determined much of the content of Chinese culture. The tribe of the Yellow Emperor, the legendary ancestor of Chinese people, were originally nomads in north-west area who had migrated into Yellow River valley and had gradually become agrarian. The legend of King Yu harnessing the river reflects this evolution from nomadic life to agricultural life.

In the time of Xia period (2200BC-1700BC), the Xia people knew how to dig irrigation canals and they invented a chronicle to guide their agricultural activities. In the Shang dynasty (1700BC - 1100BC), the Shang people knew how to harness the ox to plough and cultivate the land. Considerable progress then, had been made in ancient Chinese agricultural techniques up until the Qin and Han dynasty and since then, over the next two thousand years to the Republican period, there was no dramatic new development in Chinese agriculture.

The handcraft industry and animal husbandry existed as supplementary to agriculture and accounted for only a very small part of the agricultural economy. Division of labor did not go beyond family boundary with the men of the family working the fields and the women sitting at the loom (nan geng nu zhi). And for two thousand years this “nan geng nu zhi” has reflected the basic character of Chinese agricultural society.\textsuperscript{16}

Chinese (Hua Xia) culture had many influences on its origins before Han dynasty. From Xia, Shang Chun Qiu and Warring states were the famous periods in which (bai jia zheng ming) a hundred schools of thought contended: Confucianism, Moism and Legalism were the most important schools. From the Han dynasty to the Republic, Confucianism dominates as the most important intellectual factor in the formation of the pre-modern Chinese community.

The distinctiveness of the relative stability of the Chinese agricultural community and culture has been given several rationalist explanations. The socio-economic explanation is the need to harness the Yellow River for agricultural purposes.\textsuperscript{17} Wittfogel’s thesis of Oriental Despotism was echoed in Fan Wenlan’s narration of Chinese history according to the Marxist view. In the Comprehensive History of China (zhong guo tong shi)\textsuperscript{18}, Fan argued that harnessing the Yellow River demanded unitary

\textsuperscript{15} The 18 old Chinese provinces with their archaic names are Zhili/Hebei (Ji or You Yan), Shandong (Lu or Shan Zuo), Shanxi (Jin or Shan You), Henan (Yu or Zhong Zhou), Jiangsu (Wu), Anhui (Wan), Jiangxi (Gan or Yu Zhang), Zhejiang (Yue), Fujian (Min), Hubei (Er), Hunan (Xiang), Guangdong (Yue or Yue Dong), Guangxi (Gui or Yue Xi), Yunnan (Dian), Guizhou (Qian), Sichuan (Shu), Shaanxi (Qin or Guan hong) and Gansu (Long).

\textsuperscript{16} Sun Yatsen, Sun Zhongshan Xuanji (Selected Works of Sun Yatsen) (Beijing: People’s Press, 1956) p.637.

\textsuperscript{17} Karl Wittfogel, \textit{Oriental Despotism: A Comparison Study of Total Power}, (Yale University Press, 1957) see also Mark Elvin, \textit{The Pattern of the Chinese Past} (Cambridge University Press 1973)

management, and he cited a story by Mencius to emphasize the importance of harnessing water in ancient Chinese society. The moral of the story is "do not use your neighbor's field as a drain". In the story, Mencius told Bao Gui that Yu, the legendary Chinese sage king, had used the surrounding sea as a drain. Yu's wisdom and spirit in his water works were used to show the highest ideal for a unified Chinese community.

The other explanation is a political and military one, which argues that the organization arose from the need for defense against northern nomads. But today the sense of uniqueness of Chinese community is usually referred to the spiritual and ethical heritage.

1.1. Zheng Tong, Ancient Chinese Political Legitimacy

"zheng tong", in Chinese means "correct rulership" or "proper bloodline" in reference to legitimacy. "zheng tong" refers to the ruler's mandate and to the recognition the genealogical transmission of the imperial family. It conveys the Chinese sense of a ruler's legitimacy. The term originated in two separate words: "zheng" means "correct", "proper", "rectified", "upright", "legitimate", "orthodox"; "Tong" means "system", "square", "filiation", "tradition", "succession" or "unification".

"zheng tong" has two-fold meanings in both blood and moral dimensions: succession along the right bloodline, and mandate from the heaven. The two aspects strengthen the sense of Chinese dynastic continuity. Si Maqian, the Han dynasty historian observed that the reason why the "Han state is prosperous is because it carried out changes according to the law of change. That is the reason why people are happy, and thus it (Han state) has the mandate of heaven.

"Zheng Tong", as a compound, first appeared in early documents of the Late Han Dynasty, it meant "correct filiation", "proper bloodline", in reference to genealogical transmission of the imperial family of Liu Bang, the founder of the Han Dynasty. Later it was invoked to legitimate Liu Xiu (Guang Wu), who was inaugurated in the Han Dynasty in A.D.25, and to show that he inherited the bloodline of the dynastic progenitor in the restoration after the demise of the usurper Wang Mang. Later "zheng tong" has been used as a reference to legitimate succession.

Before the Shang dynasty and even in the early Xia state, "shan rang" was said to be the practice of political succession. "Shan Rang" means that a king abdicates in favor of a chosen able man. But in the later Xia, the earliest Chinese state in which political power passed through succession from father to son, it became necessary to have various legitimation theories to justify political authority and succession. Some scholars hold that the hereditary system began from the time of the Shang, while

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21 Ibid. p.21

22 Ibid. p.22.

23 Zhang Su & Gu Chao, Zhongguo Minzheng Shihua (History of Chinese Civil Administration) (Heilongjiang Education Press, 1992)
during the Xia, the Xia Chinese were still a community more based on blood link than territorial and political link.  

Shang Kings first practiced religious worship of the deities and their ancestors, since they regarded divination as the most sacred duty of the theocratic king. Then the basis of Shang political power was derived from Shang kings' ancestors. In terms of political legitimation, the Shang's ancestral worship was replaced by Zhou state's mandate of heaven.

The Zhou state succeeding Shang was "the golden era of classical China, which was distinguished by its organization of feudal institutions and the cultivation of humanistic philosophies". The Zhou Dynasty was founded by a coalition of ethnic and cultural groups from the western frontier of the North China plain. The Zhou Dynasty developed a different theory of political legitimacy: the Mandate of Heaven. The theory was designed to maintain that the Zhou kings as Sons of Heaven owed their rise to power to its blessings, and that the Zhou kings, having deposed the Shang because of the latter's moral unworthiness, thus were bestowed the Mandate of Heaven. Hence the change of bless of heaven(tian) and change of dynasties is justified.

Confucianist View of the Mandate of Heaven

Since the Qin and Han dynasties, the mandate of heaven has been an important part of Confucianism as the apogee of moral justification of political authority.

The concept of the Mandate of Heaven evolved and was strengthened by the Confucian idea that "Heaven embodied the people’s will" in the Zhou dynasty.

Confucius said: "The Mandate of Heaven is not permanent" (tian ming mi chang). He was further credited with saying, "Heaven will follow the people's will", so a king can not rely solely on having been granted the Mandate of Heaven, but he should cherish it, and always be "conscious of his surroundings,(and) know people's suffering".

According to Confucius, Heaven is the Ultimate Truth or Reason and it holds command over human beings, over both morality and emotion. Confucius said: "it is difficult to know Heaven". He did not advocate the worship of Heaven from a religious point of view, but regarded it as the essence of

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24 Chinese historians argue, according to Marxist theory on historical stages, that the earliest hereditary in Xia indicates the beginning of class society in Chinesehistory, slavery society. According to Marxist theory on state origin, class society is the prerequisite of state. Therefore before Xia state, Chinese society was at the stage of a primitive commune. See, Zhang Su and Gu Chao, (op. cit). Guo Moruo, Nuli Zhi Shidai (The Time of Slavery), (Beijing: People's Press, 1954) p.3.

25 Hok-lam Chan, (op. cit)


29 Confucius, Lun Yu (Anelects), annotations provided by Tang Manxian (Jiangxi People's Press, 1982)
everything. Mencius linked human inner world to Heaven, saying that self-cultivation would lead to knowledge of the ultimate will of heaven.

Mencius’ political doctrine that “people are the most important, the state is less important and the monarch is the least important” is extremely significant in Chinese political thought. Throughout history, almost all politicians have used this notion for different purposes. Mencius summarized the experience of administrations in various states as: “there are three treasures for monarchs: territory, people, and policy. Jewelry is a harmful thing for a king.” He also said that “all under the heaven are for public, not for one person or one family. Heaven’s will is so.”

What Mencius meant is that the Mandate of Heaven is the sole source of morality and authority, and that people are more important than the monarch because people can better reflect Heaven’s will. As I understand it, Mencius did not mean that that people are the source of the political power. Therefore, the political ideas of Mencius can not be equated with modern ideas of democracy and popular sovereignty.

Confucianism as a Way Of Life

Confucianism, the thoughts of Confucius, and their elaboration by his disciples during the fifth century B.C. during the Eastern Zhou period, had a very important influence on Chinese political thought. Vying with Taoism and Legalism, it was basically a humanistic philosophy that attempted to re-establish what were seen as the harmonious feudal society of the early Zhou by inculcating in both rulers and people the cardinal virtues: righteousness, uprightness, loyalty, reciprocity, and, above all, humanness or benevolence.

The Han Dynasty (206BC - 220AD) was founded on the basis of the unification of the Qin dynasty. The 400 years of the Han Dynasty is regarded as one of the most brilliant periods in Chinese history, and as one which left an imperishable mark upon Chinese political institutions. So many of the permanent elements in Chinese life were foreshadowed during the Han Dynasty that the Chinese have ever since referred to themselves as Han people. During the reign of Emperor Wu (Wu Di,146-86BC) of the Han Dynasty, Dong Zhong-shu, the state theorist, advised Emperor Wu to establish Confucianism as the political and educational orthodoxy.

In the two millennia since the Qin and Han dynasties, Confucianism, both as an attitude to life and as a concept of the ideal political order, has played a key role in sustaining the centralized Chinese state,
providing the stable Chinese community with an ethical base. Because of the shared ethical base, together with the need for defense and a common economic mode, some contemporary Chinese historians argue in accordance with Stalin’s definition of nationality, that the Chinese community as early as in the Qin and Han times was not simply an unstable military-political alliance, nor anything like the separated feudal states in European history, but a stable nation-like community33.

As an attitude to life, Confucianism is mainly about “Ren” (benevolence), “Xiao” (filial piety) and “Dao” (ultimate truth or reason). “Ren” is the basis of all morality, an attitude of life and the highest principle which has its meaning within family, society, and state politics. “Xiao”, filial piety, is an ethical basis within the family unit. “Dao” or “li” is the ultimate truth or reason, and is equivalent to “tian” (heaven) which is the philosophical basis for the individual and society.

According to Confucianism, a cultured Gentleman (jun zi) should possess these virtues. They could be attained through learning, conformity to established customs, and self-cultivation, and it was a Gentleman’s duty to educate the uninitiated34.

Confucianism about State Power

The Confucianist idea of the state may be described as the extension of family ethics to the state. According to Confucianism, an ideal state should be ruled by a benevolent and morally upright sage-king assisted by the cultured elite, whose views and actions were based in Confucian principles. A Confucianist governmental structure may be accurately looked upon as the consistent extrapolation of the idea of the ideal family. The people were the children, the emperor, the father; confidence and obedience were expected on one side; protection and benevolence on the other: such was the relationship between ruler and subject in familial China, just as the ancient classic says: "the son of Heaven is the parent of the people and rules over the empire...the whole universe is but a large family".35 In the Book of the Late Han Dynasty (Hou Han Shu, Yi Ming Lie Zhuan, Jiang Yin Fulao), the monarch was depicted as "the son of heaven is set up to father the world" and "the world labor to serve the son of heaven".36

The moralist view of state power is based on the Confucianist view of human nature. Mencius had a gentler opinion in this as in other respects which eventually evolved into orthodox Confucian doctrine. He regarded man as instinctively social, requiring only the humane presence of a virtuous ruler, a “true king” sympathetic to human moral needs, in order to live at peace with himself and with others.

35 Confucius, “Chapter Hongfan”, Shangshu Jiyi (Shu King), ed. by Qu Wanli (Lianjing Publishing Co(Lian Jing Shiye Chuban Gongsi), 1983) p.120.
Government, in the Mencian view, is the spontaneous reward of such rulership, for "the people turn in allegiance to Humanity, as surely as water flows downward or as a wild animal takes cover in the wilderness." Because man's nature is originally good, people follow right by nature and it is human nature that they need a righteous monarch and harmonious order.

There was also a pessimistic view of human nature in the Confucian tradition that was presented by Xunzi. He thought that human beings were not motivated by benign instincts, but rather by selfish passions, so it is necessary to have a coercive authority. He believed that social order is created by a righteous person and inherited by the people. Both Mencius and Xunzi thought that education was necessary.

Either way, social order is not the result of conflicts of will, nor some social contract, but a reflection of the ultimate order of the universe. The ruler's position, as Mencius envisioned it, was not one of prerogatives definable by law or reducible to the terms of a contract. The ascendancy of the Confucian ruler was moral, not social: he was not elevated by the community to safeguard its common interests but was rather, by virtue of his own moral character, the natural focal point of loyalty and source of authority.

The absolute monarch was restrained in his exercise of authority by Confucian benevolent political ideals and by the need to share power with his supporters and administrators. Civil authority dominated the military in a government staffed by bureaucrats recruited through competitive examinations in the classics and letters, and Confucian ethical precepts were cultivated. Confucianist ideology, by emphasizing a hierarchical scale of authority and value for all members of society at the expense of sectarian interests and individual aspirations, was the primary source of rule and order.

1.2. The Distinction Between Chinese and Non-Chinese ("Barbarian")

The standards for maintaining the distinctions between Chinese and non-Chinese, between the civilized and the barbarians, were almost as old as Chinese history. The distinction originally drew on many dimensions: geographical and biological, linguistic and cultural, ethnical and political. Yet, as the historical Chinese states were continually interrupted by non-Chinese intrusions, it became more and more difficult to justify a Chinese state based on a strict ethnic distinction between Chinese and non-Chinese.

Regarding non-Chinese rule over China, in the beginning, the indigenous Chinese, harking back to the doctrine of the Spring and Autumn Annals, kept up a strict distinction between Chinese and non-Chinese on ethnic and cultural grounds. Confucius' comments on the barbarians, Yi, and the Chinese, Xia, were to abandon the racial standard and instead employ a cultural gauge as the basis for his


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Since northern nomadic peoples often stayed as threats and even invaded China, the reference was usually to the "northern barbarians" (bei lu or bei hu). Since the standard for deciding who was a barbarian and who a Chinese fluctuated according to the rise and fall of the level of culture, the standard therefore, more often than not, lost its racial significance and became mostly a cultural measure.

The Confucian distinction between Chinese and barbarians primarily emphasized cultural standards, hence pre-modern Chinese "nationalism" is called culturalism by Joseph R. Levenson since the state authority was often justified by cultural rather than racial standards.40

The distinction shift to cultural criteria was complete when the Chinese became willing to consider the non-Chinese as one of their own as long as they adopted the Chinese culture and political tradition. In the course of social and political integration, the Chinese gradually assimilated these former outsiders and broadened their ethnic base.

The Chinese, interestingly, also accepted these non-Chinese peoples as bona fide rulers of China and regarded their rule, especially of those who were sinicized, as part of the unbroken chain of Chinese history. This ethnocentric view can be found throughout Chinese history until modern Chinese nationalism. The anti-Mongolian sentiments in the Ming Dynasty and the early anti-Manchu nationalism were exceptions.

Maybe the cultural standard is also the reason that the Chinese like the Mongolian Yuan dynasty less than the Manchu Qing dynasty because it was the least "Chinese" dynasty out of all the dynastic "successions". Compared with the eventually assimilated Manchu dynasty, the Mongol Yuan dynasty is more "international" and less a Chinese dynasty, thus it was not so helpful for strengthening the sense of being Chinese, although to consider the Mongolian Yuan Dynasty as a Chinese dynasty helps to emphasize the historical continuity of China.

Confucianism provided an early assimilationist view for the Chinese regarding state and nation. Those who use the racial concept to distinguish the barbarians from the Chinese comprise a distinct minority, such as the example in Zuo Zhuan: "If he is not of our race, he is sure to have a different mind" and, in the "Zhou Yu"41: "(As for the Rong and Di barbarians...) they do not govern their passions; they are like the birds and beasts."42

But since the Chinese were disturbed by the alien nomadic peoples from the north, they emphasized the distinction using racial rather than cultural terms such as the strong racial element in proto-Chinese nationalism after the Mongolian Yuan dynasty and during the late Manchu dynasty. Even the

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racial view allowed for the possibility of assimilation through acculturalisation – just as both Mencius and Xun Zi agreed the need for education and self-cultivation. An example diametrically opposite is the Tang dynasty which was quite cosmopolitan with Persians, Arabs, Moslems, and Jews becoming officials.\(^{43}\)

The distinction between the Chinese and the barbarians is a cultural and political idea with a legacy persistent throughout Chinese history. It is very important to the sense of historical Chinese identity and remains so even to the concept of the modern Chinese nation.

The sense of a nation is impossible without an effective contrast from outside, between a "we" and a "they". Throughout history although the sense of the Chinese we-group was an evolving notion, the early Chinese sense of community with the belief in common ancestry developed into a sense of community based on common culture, and finally into a territorially based modern Chinese nation. Whether the standard for Chinese and non-Chinese distinction is racial, cultural or political, there is always a contrast between the idealized Chinese and the evil barbarians in history, even down to the Chinese people versus the hostile Western powers in modern times.

1.3. Sino-Centric View Of State

The traditional Chinese state is characterized by a sense of the ascendant centricity of the Chinese in many aspects such as in territory and ethnicity, and above all, in the significance of superior culture and moral values. All these views generated a sense of confidence and destiny, which can still be discerned in the modern Chinese state and nation.

**Territory**

The term for "China" in ancient classical Chinese means "great or magnificent" (hua) and "glorious, beautiful" (xia) and the Chinese view of the world was Chinese-centered. China began to also refer to itself as the "Middle Kingdom" (zhong guo) as early as the Han dynasty. In territorial terms, the "middle kingdom" (zhong guo) "under heaven" (tian xia), and "surrounded by four seas" (si hai) or "four directions" (si fang) defined no limitation around the center that was China.

Of course China as the center was a changeable entity, as when the more powerful Chinese dynasties expanded their administrations beyond the Great Wall to the north, and at times also included the areas to the south of the Yangtze River. There were also those middle zones between the civilized center and the surrounding uncivilized land, those were the territories where the local political powers set up links with China in recognition of China's centricity in different ways such as tributary relations.

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When modern Chinese sought to define the territorial extent of China, this traditional open-ended view on the extent of territorial domain was difficult to reconcile with the modern state system which originated from European international experience.

**People**

Apart from the geographic sense, the centric self-perception of the Chinese people and state has ethnic and cultural significance as well. While Chinese ethnicity was demarcated by the distinction between the Chinese and the non-Chinese barbarians, more and more the measure of the distinction was Chinese culture rather than blood.

This has raised difficulties for those Chinese nationalists who have tended to distinguish Chinese people from others by real or imagined blood ties, except in emphasizing policies of assimilation. The Confucian distinction of Chinese (as civilized) and the rest as barbarians not only became a political slogan, but also remains an ethical principle. Political legitimacy therefore can be conferred only upon those people who occupied the center position in China in geographical, ethnic and cultural terms. By the same reasoning, the authority of the Zhou Dynasty which succeeded the Shang, in spite of its different ethnic origin, was accepted. And many other later non-Chinese regimes which occupied the center position in China were accepted into the line of Chinese Confucian statehood.

But it is a modern nationalist view that the Chinese together with the different more or less assimilated non-Chinese peoples made up a continuous and uninterrupted Chinese dynastic succession.

Who were Chinese and what “China” encompassed in history were debated in 1950s when Chinese historians argued that all minorities in the PRC were equally part of the Chinese nation, all wars in the past between Han Chinese and any other groups, be they Turkic, Tibetan, Mongol or Jurchen-Manchu, were simply brotherly quarrels that happened within the family. That view has remained basically unchallenged throughout the Cultural Revolution until now.\(^4\)

The slightly different arguments in the debate all try to bridge the two different notions of modern and pre-modern China. However, the effort to bring two different notions together has brought more confusion than clarity on the question. There is a contradictory view that is currently advanced to justify the multi-ethnic reality of the modern state. The view argues that China has always been a multi-ethnic state in its history. The ambiguity of the present views draws on ancient inconsistencies as well as illustrating the problems of converting pre-modern ideas and realities to suit the modern international system.

**State Nature**

With regard to the nature of the state, Confucianist intuitive thought would more likely lead to

metaphysical explanations, such as some unquestionable order quite beyond the average people's capacity for reasoning rather than a physically and directly induced theory of popular sovereignty as suggested by contemporary nationalists. The idea of the state (guo jia, literally means state and family) is viewed as an extension of the ideal of the family, which is an embodiment of the higher order that is supreme over both the rulers and the ruled. It is a political virtue to follow and obey the order to achieve harmony.

It is a holist view of state authority that the order of the universe, state and family in essence reflect a single entity. A social hierarchical order, such as King and Subject mirrored by father and son is beyond an individual's capacity for reason. Kantian individual self-determination has no proper place in this conception of man and state. Nor would the Kantian notion be believed a supreme virtue according to Confucian political philosophy. The individual is not believed as the sovereign of the universe but is regarded as defined by social relations and subordinated to the mandate of heaven.

The Chinese state is not viewed as a collective expression of individuals but as part of the ultimate natural order whose ruler is the Son of Heaven following the imperial way subject to the mandate of heaven. The metaphysical nature of state is so beyond an individual's power of reason that the Chinese have to hearken back to the ancient classics to find out what the sages meant by legitimacy or "zheng tong". In the same way, in modern communist China, people are not allowed to judge state authority by their individual beliefs rather by what authority and Marxist sages have said.

This viewpoint is deeply embedded in Chinese political thought and practice and it is diametrically opposed to western individualistic values. Therefore the idea of national (collective) self-determination as a consequence of the irreducible authenticity of the individual is simply outside the logic of modern Chinese nationalism, in contrast to European type nationalism.45

For the forerunners of modern nationalism represented by Zhang Taiyan and Sun Yatsen, the idea of self-determination of the state and of the national revolution was regarded as no more than the means by which to restore the glory of Chinese civilization and to return it to its original, and rightful, supremacy. For most Chinese, China as a state is still a subject of worship rather than a subject of rational probing. By contrast it was only after the transformation of its state legitimacy from ethnic and cultural connotation to civic rights that Taiwan Chinese began to think otherwise of statehood.46

But despite the general support for democracy as a principle among the different viewpoints current in China, a consensus can easily be formed with the position that the Chinese nation should remain intact as one unified nation-state in its current form.

The following is a typical official rhetoric on national integration: "China has always been one from the very beginning, which is a unitary nation; it include ideas and history in politics, geography, nation, history and traditions (combination, integration of many notions). No matter how many times dynasties change, China remains a single organism which has never tolerated any of its part to be

separated out. This is the cardinal principle of Chinese nationalism and the ideal of Chinese nation.\(^{47}\)

Although the above view is published as official propaganda in the Party's newspaper, it shows at the very least that the Chinese leaders place much importance on utilizing nationalist emotions as a means of bolstering their claim to rule. Of course we should consider the fact that it is impossible to write about the state and its various connotations in mainland China. The legitimacy of the CPC and its ideas of state and nation are based on a particular reading of history and no other readings are tolerated. Nevertheless we should not underestimate, however, the extent to which some of the official propaganda ingrains popular sentiments especially in the matter of nationalism.

**Sense of Destiny**

The Mandate of Heaven can be understood as a universal view of political authority because it carries the intrinsic meaning that Heaven is the only authentic source of rulership. The political ideal under the rubric of the Mandate of Heaven is a universal state ruled by the Son of Heaven.

The sense of China's centricity or as the Middle Kingdom is not complete without the sense of the superiority of Chinese culture as well as the distinction between Chinese and barbarians. The belief in the Mandate of Heaven and the sense of Chinese cultural supremacy are interdependent. The former is the general law and belief, the latter explains why the mandate is conferred upon the Chinese. Faith in the incontrovertible fact of Chinese cultural superiority over the rest of the world was reflected in the Chinese self-description of China's policy toward the surrounding non-Chinese states as a conciliatory policy of winning over conquered tribes with restraint and kindness. The Chinese state, from its own point of view, was regarded as so superior that it would attract the non-Chinese voluntarily and they would want, of their own accord, to become Chinese. This concept of the state was expressed at an early stage by Confucius: "All under heaven is the realm of our King, and all inhabitants are his subjects."\(^{48}\)

The ideal of a single political authority presiding over a political unity has persisted throughout Chinese history even though Chinese history has also seen periods of division and the lack of unity\(^{49}\). When Mencius met King Liangxiang, the king asked Mencius how could stability in the world be maintained, his reply was that "the world should be ruled under one authority".\(^{50}\)

Xun Zi advocated that "the whole world is like a family". He argued that "If the world had not been unified, the lords would have rebelled and the king would have been unqualified", "the reason why

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\(^{47}\) Liu Wenzong, "those die-hards will be historical culprits - on Lee Denghui's UN bid", (People's Daily, 19 August 1995)

\(^{48}\) Confucius, Shi Jing Quan Yi (Complete Shi Jing with Annotations) ed. by Jin Qihua, (Jiangsu Ancient Books Press, 1984) p.515

\(^{49}\) See Rossabi, China Among Equals: the Middle Kingdom and its Neighbours, 10th-14th Centuries, (University of California Press, 1983) pp.6-11.

\(^{50}\) Mencius, "Mengzi, Lianghui Wang Shang", Mengzi Yizhu (Collection of Mencius with Explanations), edited and explained by the Chinese Department of Lanzhou University (Chinese Book Press(Zhonghua Shuju), 1960) p. 12
Yao and Shun were sage kings is that they had unified the world\textsuperscript{51}. And according to Xun Zi, "a great scholar is the one who helps the king to unify the world".\textsuperscript{52}

This sense of superior political legitimacy coupled with destiny has survived into modern times in the guise of differing political ideologies, of both the nationalist and communist varieties. The ideal can be perpetuated in metaphysical forms other than the Mandate of Heaven including those based on the "logic of history" or the "will of the people". Thus, in the late Zhou period (770BC-256BC), although there were many de facto independent kingdoms, there was still a nominal universal king. There was always the ideal of orthodox universal rule, which caused the periods of equal relations between separate kingdoms in Chinese history to be regarded as short, interim, and intolerable.

The modern version of the ancient ideal is still utilized by the CPC to stir up Chinese nationalism. Official propaganda often invokes rhetoric on the cardinal principle of the Chinese nation being that of unification and of the one-China principle, so that the existence of separate political identities such as Taiwan and, before 1 July 1997, Hong Kong is presented as intolerable and therefore of limited duration.

The unique sense of Chinese continuity is yet another dynastic legacy: it is a continuity in terms of people, territory, and political authority. The sense of political continuity is in part due to the idea of "zheng tong", and therefore it is possible to regard dynastic changes, including those changes from Chinese to non-Chinese dynasties, as successions rather than as revolutions.

2. From Traditional China to Modern China

As the official ideology, Confucianism heavily influenced people's viewpoints about the proper way of life and moral standards and provided a strong sense of community and society. This conformity of mindset together with the common pattern of the agrarian economy and the centralized state are regarded by Chinese historians as the necessary conditions for identifying the pre-modern Chinese nation.

Because Chinese society never experienced self-motivated modernization and enlightenment as that in Europe, it never experienced fundamental social deconstruction and reconstruction in the way that the process of industrialization brought to the nations of Europe. In the case of Chinese nationalism, the role of modernization and industrialization should be viewed in a different fashion.

The modern Chinese nation has its origin in early Chinese history. Of course that is not to say modernization played only a minor role in the formation of Chinese nation. The Chinese nation was heavily influenced by its exposure to westernization and the modern international world at the turn of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century. Maybe the most obvious impact is the notion of a sovereign state based on a clearly defined territory.


\textsuperscript{52} Ibid. p.122.
On the other hand, some fundamental ideas of the Chinese nation or Chinese perceptions of that nation have survived the impacts and shocks of modern times. As Asian countries, esp. those NICs (newly industrialized countries) and China gain more economic power, they tend to turn to their own tradition to justify their road to modernization separate from the western model. In the Chinese case, the first major intellectual response to western intrusion was "zhongxue weiti xixue weiyong" (Chinese study as the essence, western knowledge as the utility), and it is still not out of fashion now so that modernity issue facing the Chinese people remains unsolved just as it did one century ago.

The transformation from traditional China to modern China involves changing ideas regarding territory, people and ethnicity, and state legitimacy. The ideas may be seen as transforming from a moral emphasis to a legal emphasis; from a cultural sense to an administrative sense; from a dynastic to a nation-state, from agriculture to industry, from a sense of timelessness to a sense of change. The development of modern Chinese nationalism both encompasses and is encompassed by this transformation.

2.1. Modern Age and Modern Chinese State and Nation

One of the changes in the transformation from traditional China to modern China can be seen in Sun Yatsen's changing position on the Chinese nation and Chinese nationalism. His initial attitude toward the Manchu Qing dynasty was no different from those of the racist revolutionaries in the Ming and Qing dynasties. Later his xenophobic attitude was replaced by an assimilationist stance toward the non-Chinese within the Manchu empire. By making this intellectual and emotional switch, he could envisage a new Chinese state whose territorial bounds encompassed the entire domain of the Manchu Qing empire which incorporated vast non-Chinese frontier regions such as Tibet, Xinjiang (Chinese Turkistan), Mongolia, and Manchuria. He was also ambitious enough to include Korea, Vietnam, Bhutan, and Nepal as the territories China should inherit from the Manchu empire as reclaimed territories since they had once numbered among the Manchu's tributary states.  

As an alien dynasty, the Manchu dynasty could not possibly be utilized as the basis for a so-called official nationalism since that would have provided the dynasty with a new legitimacy in the era of rampant Chinese nationalism. However, the job was accomplished by the Chinese nationalists, in that they replaced the diminishing imperial authority with a secular ideology of the nation state. Sun Yatsen said that the loyalty that the Chinese had formerly reserved for the emperor should be transferred to the new nation state. In the new Chinese nation, the authority of the new nation state would take the place of the Manchu monarch, therefore rightly inheriting a similarly divinely sanctioned authority.

55 Sun Yatsen, 'The 6th Lecture on Nationalism', San Min Zhu Yi (The Principles of Three Peoples) (no publisher, held in SOAS Library, c.206 s.15) p.122
It is in the Chinese Communist state that the state is understood in a less divine sense, which can be understood as a vehicle for the CCP in its agency to advance historical and social progress. And in the Communist state, non-Chinese minorities began to be treated as equal to the Chinese in the sense that the non-Chinese are not to be absorbed by the Chinese Han nation, but one day they are to be all absorbed together with the Han into a Communist society.

2.2. Age of Chinese Nationalism

Under the influence of western historiography, the end of the feudal system and the beginning of the nation-state are regarded as important criteria for demarcating the beginnings of modern Chinese history. There are some Chinese scholars who think that modern Chinese history began much earlier.\(^\text{56}\) Just as modern Western history is dated from the ending of the feudal period, these scholars argue that the earliest Chinese nation state emerged in the Qin dynasty when the feudal system ended and the bourgeoisie class began to emerge. Some Chinese and Western historians date the beginnings of modernity back to the Ming dynasty when they identify what Mao used to describe as the “budding sprouts of capitalism”. But this, too, reflects a nationalistic outlook as it suggests that China would have modernized by using on its own inner resources and that it did not need the West. Indeed Mao argued that the West suppressed China’s own “indigenous sprouts” of capitalism. In the end, the dominant view is that modern Chinese history started around 1840 when the western intrusion brought about deep changes in Chinese society.

The first Anglo-Chinese War (Opium War 1840-1842) rather than the mid-17\(^\text{th}\) Century when the Manchu dynasty was first founded (and when European international relations first took its modern shape) is generally regarded as the beginning of modern Chinese history.\(^\text{57}\) It is the sense of loss, rather than a parallel to European enlightenment, that is regarded generally as the starting point of modern Chinese history.

In addition, Chinese confidence in their traditional self-perception of being the center of the world in many ways began to be destroyed by the superiority of western material progress since mid-19\(^\text{th}\) Century. Formerly, the Chinese sense of being the center of world civilization remained intact during the recurring and period intrusions and conquests by northern nomadic peoples such as the Turkic peoples, Nuzhen, Mongols and finally Manchus. This is what Joseph Levenson distinguished as the modern character of Chinese history\(^\text{58}\): it is that the sense of being the center has been irreversibly damaged. When China was first subject to the intrusion of western powers and exposed to its modern technologies, the Chinese began to have a real sense of collective psychological loss and to question their alleged superiority.

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\(^{57}\) Hu Sheng, From Opium War to May Fourth Movement (Cong Yapian Zhanzheng Dao Wusi Yundong), p.6, Shanghai People’s Press, 1982.

It took several wars from the first Anglo-Chinese War to the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 to persuade the mandarins that the Manchu Empire was no longer an equal among the great empires. According to Chinese analysis of history based on Marxist historical materialism, the modern age began when China was transformed from the feudal society of thousands years duration into a semi-feudal and semi-colonialist society. Modern imperialism and colonialism became the principal contradiction that that brought China into the modern age and that has colored the character of its history since then. The driving force for historical change was then embodied in the struggles between the Chinese people and Chinese feudalism on the one hand, and with western imperialism on the other. Mao Zedong saw Chinese peasant rebellions as representative of the progressive historical force in the several-thousand-year Chinese history, and in the modern age, he argued, the historical mission was conferred upon CCP which then developed the long line of peasants' struggles to a much higher level and to its final conclusion.

All the new ideas springing up in China at that time, republicanism, anti-feudalism, anti-imperialism, democracy and the scientific spirit, communism etc., are related to the creation of a new Chinese nation. Modern history for the Chinese is about how to take China as a nation and a state and adapt it to the modern international world.

2.3. Modern Chinese

The word “China” appeared in the English language as early as in 16CC which referred to the China of the Ming Dynasty. China under the Chinese Ming dynasty, being a much smaller state than the Manchu Qing dynasty, did not include the frontiers such as Manchuria, Mongolia, Xinjiang, and Tibet. Chinese, meaning natives of China, did not include Manchus, Mongols, Central Asian Moslems, and Tibetans. “China” was mostly a geographic term and “Chinese” was a cultural and anthropological term. In this sense, the English-language “Chinese” is now usually a reference to a number of different Chinese terms each with their own connotation, i.e., “han ren”, “hua ren” and “tang ren” in Chinese. The meaning of “han ren” (Chinese) was originally limited to the historical and cultural sense, and this term denoted those people whose name derived from the unified Han dynasty and whose lives were mostly influenced by Confucianist ethics.

As the modern idea of the Chinese nation developed, new meanings have been added to the sense of being “Chinese”. From the modern political and legal point of view, the term “Chinese” in English, which Chinese would equate with “zhong guo ren” in Chinese, is also used to refer to the citizenship of the Chinese state which includes non-Chinese people as well as Chinese. Both “zhong guo ren” in Chinese and “Chinese” in English have ethnic and political connotations. However, because of the multi-ethnic reality of today's China, the political and ethnic content of Chinese are not congruent. Within Chinese nationalism there has been always a tendency to commingle the ethnic meaning and legal meaning of being “Chinese” and to confuse “peoples of China” with the Han (ethnic) Chinese.

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This mixed use of the term to the point of interchangeability of the two meanings often has assimilationist overtones. To avoid any assimilationist connotations, here I use "Chinese" only in the ethnic sense as it is traditionally and usually used. It is used to referred to Chinese people in the PRC (hua ren, han ren), Chinese in Taiwan, Chinese in Hong Kong and Macao (Taiwan tong bao, gang ao tong bao), and overseas Chinese (hai wai hua ren, tong bao, qiao bao, and hua qiao). In the Chinese language, all of the above categories of Chinese are referred to as the descendents of King Yan and King Huang ("yan huang zi sun") or as "long de chuan ren" (descendents of the dragon). Ethnic minorities (minorities as described by the Chinese state) are referred to as non-Chinese here.

In dynastic times, the identification of Chinese people was de-limited by the bounds of Chinese culture and Chinese ethnicity. The cultural distinction between Chinese and barbarians was convenient for the political and military purposes of the different dynasties. The word "Chinese" caused little confusion until ideas of nationalism were imported from the West and people began to express their senses of their ethnic, cultural identities in political terms. In order to create a modern identity to cope with conditions created by China's confrontation with the Western world, the Chinese were obliged to deal with foreign concepts, including that of nation-state, territorial integrity, sovereignty, citizenship, and race. More recently they have had to come to terms with their cultural and ethnic identities. When China entered its nationalist era, non-Chinese peoples were incorporated as members of the one Chinese state and this raised particular problems for justifying the territorial bounds of the modern state and the integrity of the Chinese nation. The Chinese nation is similar to those nations that were born out of the self-reform of empire, with a major difference in China being that the reform is not carried out by the empire itself, but by revolutionary nationalists and later nationalist revolutionaries.

The earliest expressions of Chinese nationalism in the late Manchu Qing period were anti-Manchu sentiments, by which the Manchu dynasty was regarded as an alien dynasty which should bear the blame for China's backwardness and its defeats at the hands of the western powers. The initial anti-Manchu and non-assimilationist stand taken by Chinese nationalists reflected the Chinese sense of wounded superiority because the Manchu dynasty was blamed for selling out Chinese interests to western imperialists. The nationalists at first insisted that the Chinese nation should be based on ethnic ties, namely that the Han people and the Chinese state be congruent with Chinese nation. But quickly this radical ethnic standard upholding the old Chinese and barbarian distinction was replaced by a cultural standard, and the sinicized Manchu dynasty was no longer regarded as an alien dynasty.

As a matter of fact, the Chinese had flourished and reached new heights in the course of the Qing period in terms of population, territory, cultural, and political influence while the dynasty itself experienced a decline. After the first Anglo-Chinese war, the Manchu dynasty changed its long-standing frontier policy. Formerly it had regarded Manchuria and Mongolia as ancestral lands (for

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Manchus and Mongols) and as the site for military reserves; but after the 1860s, a new policy was carried out according to which the northern territories like Manchuria and Mongolia were no longer regarded as a secure backyard but as a threatened frontier. The fact was that the Manchu dynasty no longer needed to keep up a Manchu and Mongol alliance, as it had come to be increasingly allied with the Chinese officials and the Chinese gentry class on whom it had gradually come to rely for the administration of empire. This made the Chinese people identify more closely than ever before with a non-Chinese dynasty.

The ascendant and finally dominant Chinese influence during the Manchu Qing Dynasty gave Chinese nationalists the confidence to change their formal anti-Manchu racist views and adopt an assimilationist attitude. They advocated that the Chinese state should be a commonwealth of five major peoples: Chinese, Manchus, Mongols, Tibetans and Moslems. The nationalists' deliberate identification with the Manchu empire was motivated mainly by geopolitical reasons, namely, the perceived territorial legacy of the empire.

Sun Yatsen believed the integration should be achieved by "assimilating all different peoples in China into one single nation". He advocated "by copying the United States, Chinese, Manchus, Mongols, and Tibetans will be assimilated into one Chinese nation and form a nation-state." Although after the Sun-Joffe Manifesto of January 1923, Sun Yatsen granted in principle that those non-Chinese peoples could practice autonomy and exercise the right of self-determination, but this principle was copied from that of the Soviet Union and it is generally believed to have been adopted only in order to gain more help from the Soviet Union. Sun actually still continued in practice to insist that the Chinese state should be a single cultural and political whole. Chiang Kaishek, his successor, was less capable in terms of theory, and simply did not recognize the difference of nationalities and said that all the different peoples within China were of the same racial stock. The “Chinese Nation”, according to him, “was formed by the blending of numerous clans. This blending of various clans continued, dynasty after dynasty, but the motive power was cultural rather than military, and it was accomplished by assimilation rather than by conquest”.

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65 Ch’iang Kaishek wrote “Our nation is of one stock, and due to its fertility the population has greatly increased and the nation has become stronger and bigger.” “…After the period of the ‘Five Emperors,’ written records were kept in greater detail so that the organization of different clans can be studied historically. Within the Four Seas, the clans of the various localities were either descendents of a common ancestor or were interrelated through marriage. The Book of Odes states: “The descendents of Wen Wang extend to hundreds of generations, but all came from the same family tree”, this means that the main and branch stocks all belong to the same blood stream. The Book also states: “He is not an outsider but a cousin or an uncle.” That is to say, among all the clans, there were either blood relationships or connection by marriage. This is how the Chinese nation was formed in ancient times.” See, Ch’iang kai-shek, *China’s Destiny and China Economic Theory*, with Notes and Comments by Philip Jaffe (New York: Roy Publisher, 1947) p.29, pp30-31.
66 Ibid. p.30.
In 1928 when the KMT took over Peking, they changed their national flag of five colors which symbolized the commonwealth of the five nationalities.

In as similar fashion, as their power position changed, the Chinese communists also changed their position on the conception of the Chinese nation. In their early period they copied the Soviet Union's admission of the right of self-determination for minority nationalities. But later they denied that right though they still recognized that different nationalities were entitled to separate legal status. Notwithstanding Lenin’s position on national self-determination question, the CPC gave much greater emphasis to the integration of classes and expression of class interests than their agreement to recognize nationality differences and separate interests.

As for modern explanations of the Chinese nation, it is widely agreed that the Chinese nation (zhonghua min zu) is a notion with both modern and historical dimensions. In a modern sense, it includes all 56 peoples dwelling in today's People's Republic of China (Han Chinese account for 93.3% of the whole country's populations); which historically includes all the peoples who had lived on what is today's territory of China.

Marxist theory on social progress provided theoretical justification for such an entity. According to Marxist historical materialism, Communism is the ideology or the end of history. Chinese Marxist theorists identified each nationality with a certain social development stage by using Marxist ideas of the different stages in historical development. Therefore each of the nationalities within the PRC has been categorized as relatively advanced or backward along the line of social progress, following Marxist theory.

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Modern and contemporary Chinese historians view all these peoples (such as Toba-wei, Liao, Jin, Yuan and Qing) who intruded into China not as foreigners, but as minorities of the Greater Chinese race that includes the Han, Mongols, Tibetans, Manchus, and others. But Japanese and Western scholars, who regard the Han People as the indigenous rulers of China, have applied the notion of "foreign conquest dynasties" to the writing of Chinese history. They contend that China under the Toba-Wei, Liao, Jin, Yuan, and Qing was conquered by alien nomadic or tribal peoples. These notions of course have been rejected by Chinese scholars and they hold that those non-Chinese dynasties in China were only temporarily ruled by national minorities who were subsequently assimilated, culturally if not also ethnically, by the Han people.
Since the (Han) Chinese people happened to have reached such an advanced position in historical progress according to the Marxists, while all the other non-Chinese nationalities were still located at relative backward stages of social development, it followed that non-Chinese would then have to ally themselves with the Han Chinese in their struggle to defeat their common enemies such as their own oppressing class as well as outside imperialism in order to realize socialism. Thus, according to this theory, their incorporation into the Chinese nation has become their historical destiny. Thus, the Chinese sense of being at the center has carried over into the new political ideology although it no longer has a Confucianist tint.

After the world-wide decline of the appeal of Communist ideology and after the Chinese engendered reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 1978, this Marxist historical logic that supposedly underlay modern Chinese history and the development of the modern Chinese nation increasingly came into question. In Mao Zedong’s time there was a variant of national communism but since Deng Xiaoping began the reforms the communist dimension has ended leaving nationalism with a shell of communism left as a means of upholding the formal legitimacy of the PRC. But, in a repeat of history from the time of the Republic, Han Chinese found that this was precisely the moment that Chinese nationalism began to replace of Communism as a buttress to state authority.

The Chinese nation needs to be envisaged in a different way and therefore the concept of the Chinese nation is being explained increasingly on historical, cultural grounds rather than in terms of the modern political theory previously advanced under the Communist ideology. Fei Xiaotong’s explanation of the character of the Chinese nation is a major explication among the new adaptations of the old theory. His view of the Chinese nation is indicated by the title of his article, “Unitary Chinese Nation of Pluralistic Origins.” Basically there is nothing new in his theory, as he still views Chinese nation as a timeless entity (both modern and historical). The only difference seems to be that instead of a Marxian historicist logic underpinning the great Chinese nation, he provides a functionalist logic.

**Chinese Nationalism**

Modern Chinese nationalism was born mainly as a reaction to outside stimulus in the post-dynastic transition. It first expressed itself as a reaction to western intrusion, a reaction to the cruel competition and struggle for survival imposed from outside. Most writers claim it was a response to the defeat by Japan in 1895 that aroused the initial spurt of nationalism.

Nationalism was first espoused as a means to save China and restore its previous central status. Accordingly it was different from the liberal nationalism emergent in Europe, because there was no concomitant Chinese parallel to the European intellectual enlightenment that exalted science, reason, and the autonomy of the individual.

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By the fall of Manchu Qing dynasty there was despair about "old backward China" that sparked off the May 4th movement with its embrace of the new (Communism as well as liberalism) and its rejection of the past. The rejection of the past was to prove a weakness of the kind of nationalism that May 4th engendered.

Although there was the May 4th Movement that called for the spirit of science and democracy, the theme of science and democracy ("Mr. Science and Mr. Democracy") and the westernization, and there was also the strand of Chinese Communism which argued for a social revolution so as to make China strong and effective in the modern world, they were comparatively short-lived and limited in influence.

Other political agendas, such as national salvation and the Communist revolution, for the most of time, became the top priorities in political and social life. Therefore at the nascence of modern Chinese nationalism, the traditional basis for political legitimacy was replaced more by the requirements of self-strengthening and the aim of restoring past greatness than by invoking popular sovereignty based on individualist values.

**Chinese-Centric Character of Chinese Nationalism**

With its intellectual inspiration drawn partly from ancient classics, Chinese modern nationalism evolved mainly as a result of disillusionment and the resolve to back the self-strengthening resolution. Chinese nationalist forerunners such as Kang Youwei and Zhang Taiyan all found their nationalist and even revolutionary inspirations in Chinese classics.

In the eyes of the nationalists, the victimization of the Manchu dynasty caused by the western imperialist intrusion was tantamount to the victimization of the entire Chinese people. Further, the dynastic decline was equivalent to the decline of the Chinese people. The survival crisis of the Manchu Dynasty was in fact a crisis of the Chinese nation and state. Among the concessions and rights surrendered to western powers and to Japan by the Manchu dynasty, there were those concerning the non-Chinese territories such as Manchuria, Mongolia and Xinjiang as well as those concerning traditionally authentic Chinese areas, yet Chinese nationalists treated the non-Chinese areas in the same way as Chinese areas. They believed that the dynastic interests were Chinese interests as well, and could not be, should not be surrendered. Chinese nationalism was born out of such a sense of crisis.

Sun Yatsen symbolize modern Chinese nationalism largely because of the success of the KMT and later CPC who both claimed Sun as their founding father that his ideas gained currency. Sun Yatsen

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71 The major humiliations imposed upon the Manchu dynasty by western powers in modern history are the Opium War of 1840-42, the Anglo-French invasion of 1857-60, Russian's occupation of Ili in 1871, Japan's take-over Liuqiu in 1874, the Sino-French war of 1883-5, smashing Japanese victory over China in 1894-95, the scramble for concessions in 1898 and the Boxer War of 1900. See Denis Twitchett and John K. Fairbank ed. *The Cambridge History of China*, Vol.10 Late Ch’ing, 1800-1911, Part I (Cambridge University Press, 1978) p.3.
blended nationalism, the democratic idea and humanitarianism together and presented his amalgam as “the Three Doctrines of People”. Although his position on the Chinese nation evolved over time, it retained a basically Chinese-centric assimilationist view.

In the early stages Sun Yat-sen’s nationalism was mainly an anti-Manchu nationalism. He blamed the Manchu for all of Chinese backwardness. The aim of his nationalism was to restore true Chinese culture and virtue, restore Chinese (Han) sovereignty and nation-state. In November 1894 in “Constitution of Strengthening China Society”, he wrote “expel Manchu barbarians, and restore China and set up a republic”. Sun Yat-sen, in the declaration of the tong meng hui, said that the goal was to continue the cause of the Ming and Taiping revolution, with the only difference being the goal of establishing freedom and democracy. He said, ”...get rid of 260-years of rank smelling (metaphor for northern nomadic peoples), restore 4000-year mother country”, “drive northern barbarians and restore Chinese rule”.72

Later he removed the anti-Manchu element from his doctrines and adopted an assimilationist stance. In November 1922, he said that “what I mean is to integrate all the peoples of China into a single nation”. “Following America’s example, we should put Han Manchu, Mongols, Tibetans and Muslims into one Zhong Hua (Chinese) nation, and form one nation-state”?3

Before his death, he rejected his view of there being a commonwealth of five peoples. He regarded it as inappropriate, because he realized there were many more than five peoples in China and that the solution would seem to be based on national self-determination. But he still believed that the self-government or autonomy of other peoples would depend on Chinese support, and that after the defeat of imperialism and the warlords, they should all form together as part of a unitary Chinese republic.74

Sun’s ideal nation state is based on the (Han) Chinese nation. He distinguished state and nation as: the state is founded by force/violence; and nation by natural forces which are the moral and cultural bindings75. The so-called natural forces include bloodline, way of life, language, religion and customs. According to him, the (Han) Chinese people are bound by the sense of justice and morality, they are culturally integrated, they are the only people with the capacity to form a nation state, and they constitute the core of zhong hua min zu (Chinese nation). To accomplish this end, he invoked traditional teachings. He appealed to a modified Confucianism in the effort to restore China’s “old virtues,” without which the nation could not “recover its viability.”76

**Traditional Character of State**

Apart from his traditional Chinese-centric attitude, another character of his doctrine, as Anthony

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73 Ibid.
74 Zhu Yizhi, Sui Qiren,. “Chinese KMT 1st National Congress Declaration”, *Sun Yat-sen’s Thoughts and Path, 1866-1925* (Jiangsu People’s Press, 1987)
Smith suggests, is Sun’s revolutionary nationalism with a family resemblance to fascism. Sun Yatsen was deeply convinced that the Chinese faced virtual extinction unless nationalism could be reinvoked among the passive, ignorant, individualistic, and selfish masses of China. China’s problem, in Sun’s judgment, was that the Chinese had, for too long, enjoyed too much individual freedom. He sought to create a new “nationalist man,” one who would dedicate himself to the survival of his people, who would sacrifice his personal interests and his individual freedoms in the service of his community.

“The grains of sand are individually very free. If they were mixed with water and cement they would harden into stone. The concrete would be a solid body, but the freedom of the individual grains of sand would necessarily be sacrificed. Thus it is with our people. We enjoy too much individual freedom... The fact that we are as incohesive as sand establishes and we have too much freedom. Because of that excess of individual freedom we have no solidarity.”

The above-mentioned view of the state has enabled Chinese nationalists to regard China as the legitimate successor to the Manchu empire. This is especially true in the context of the attitudes and policies developed towards the non-Chinese peoples. The success of the Manchu dynasty’s revised policy towards its non-Han Chinese peoples increased the empire’s size both geographically and ethnically, and this lay the territorial foundation for the modern Chinese state. Generally the area known as China throughout most of Chinese dynastic rule is the area covering the main 18 Chinese provinces which covers some 1,532,800 square miles, only 41% the size of today’s P.R.C. In the late Qing dynasty, even though the empire had shrunk considerably from its fullest extent, it still covered an area of 4,278,000 square miles in the 18th CC. Another reason why modern Chinese nationalists identified so easily with the Manchu dynasty is that during the decline of the Manchu dynasty, the Chinese experienced a steady growth of the population, an enlargement of the areas they could inhabit and an expansion of cultural and political influence.

Chinese nationalism is further different from European liberal nationalism in terms of the relationship between the individual and the nation or state. As Seton Watson argues, Chinese nationalism bears less resemblance to the Kant and Mill tradition, and more to that of Fichte and Mazzini, as well as to Fascism. The Nation is depicted as a natural creation based on Chinese culture, which is seen as natural as the family and the universe. The culturally based nation is a part of a natural order outside

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the realm of human debate. The order is maintained by obeying authority rather than as the result of agreement among equal individuals. This reasoning upon which the modern Chinese nation and state rests also has strong links to dynastic heritage. The metaphysical righteousness of the individual’s integration with the whole is what justifies the demand that individuals must subordinate their interests to the whole.

Both Confucian righteousness and later the Communist cause demanded self-sacrifice and martyrdom from the people. It could be concluded that the shared nature of nationalism and communism is the absence of individualism, or that Chinese nationalism in some fashion inherited the traditional Chinese value that denies individualism. In the historical interpretations of the Chinese Communists, there is never a shortage of examples of the heroic sacrifice of individual interests for the sake of the whole. It is this aspect of Chinese nationalism that makes Chinese people ignore the lack of, and even tolerate the low level of individual freedom in return for economic prosperity, stability and unity of the state. Of course, besides this intellectualist explanation, there is always a materialist explanation that, rather than decided by the legacy of the political culture, Chinese people enjoy choices as consumers that have been opened to them and therefore they are willing to ignore temporarily the low level of individual freedom.

The Sense of Destiny

The faith in the prosperity of China’s 5,000-year ancient state survives in different ways of modern Chinese political thought, from the nationalism of the KMT to the CCP revolutionary nationalism. The self-strengtheners and reformists from Zeng Guofan (1811-72) and Zuo Zongtang (1812-85) to Kang Youwei (1858-1927) and Liang Qichao (1873-1929) sought to change China mainly in terms of gaining equality in wealth and military strength, and established only certain aspects of modernity such as more efficient political institutions and scientific education. Even when Sun Yatsen (1866-1925) and his followers first pronounced the need for “nationalism”, they still identified China with other empires in the world.

This confidence in China is often supported by the Chinese vision of a glorious past based upon the enormous historical record. However, when looking back to the past, often a “Disneyfied history” has been created. In the Chinese-centric view of history, the development of Chinese history is mainly about Chinese civilization, so that non-Chinese peoples are neglected or regarded as unimportant or secondary. This provides a historical basis for the assimilationist view. Another view has it that dynastic history provides an account of successive ruling houses in command of the Chinese people including as many different nationalities as at present with all the different nationalities living in harmony. The Chinese nation, according to this view, not only includes all the various present


83 The term is used to describe a false sense of history held by many people which has little to do with historical fact, see David Lowenthal, *The Past Is A Foreign Country* (Cambridge University Press, 1985) p.xv.
nationalities in China horizontally in spatial terms, but also longitudinally in time, it includes all peoples that have ever lived on today’s China’s territory throughout history. This view of the Chinese nation has been constantly modified in modern Chinese history from Sun Yatsen to the Chinese communists without however challenging the centricity of the Han Chinese.

Behind this strong faith in Chinese historical destiny is an imagined and beautified Chinese history. The imagined past has never been experienced by devotees and the strong nostalgia it creates sustains the nationalistic belief in China’s glorious destiny. In contemporary Chinese nationalism, the evocation of historical destiny has been best illustrated by the CPC within the China’s framework of historical materialism.

The sense of loss was expressed most deeply by the early Chinese nationalists in considering the modern age. But the Chinese revolutionary historical view added a sense of historical mission, which created a belief in an attitude of ultimate optimism regarding modern China’s fate. According to the CCP’s historic view, the main theme of modern Chinese history is to rebuild a powerful and prosperous new China. The CCP’s achievement is the final and summary stage along the line of this modern nationalism. The Chinese nationalist movements that developed following the collapse of Manchu Qing dynasty, including the CCP’s campaign of liberation, were depicted as laying the foundation of the modern Chinese state. Quite successfully the modern Chinese state has been built so as to include nearly all the territories considered to have been incorporated within the Manchu empire. These included the vast areas of Manchuria, Mongolia\(^8\), Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang in addition to the traditional 18 Chinese provinces\(^5\).

When Mao declared on October 1\(^5\), 1949 at Tiananmen “from now on Chinese people stand up” in the world, he meant a new Chinese nation was born, which was different from those envisioned by Sun Yatsen and Chiang Kaishek. The powerful combination of ideology and nationalist claims set up a new orthodoxy in place of the battered Confucianist culture\(^6\), therefore most Chinese did not doubt the congruence between the new Chinese state and the new Chinese nation. This strong ideological belief laid a solid foundation for the new state’s legitimacy. But neither of the two claims, socialism or nationalism, proved adequate to support the legitimacy of the state in subsequent developments. Severe problems arose in the period of reform after the Cultural Revolution.

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\(^8\) Outer Mongolia first declared its independence from the Manchu dynasty on December 11, 1911, but did not get the Manchu’s Chinese successors' reluctant recognition until three decades later.

\(^5\) The 18 old Chinese provinces together their archaic names are Zhili(Ji, Youyan), Shandong(Lu or Shan Zuo), Shanxi(Jin or Shan You), Henan(Yu or Zhong Zhou), Jiangsu(Wu), Anhui(Wan), Jiangxi(Gan or Yu Zhang), Zhejiang(Yue), Fujian(Min), Hubei(Er), Hunan(Xiang), Guangdong(Yue or Yue Dong), Guangxi(Gui or Yue Xi), Yunnan(Dian), Guizhou(Qian), Sichuan(Shu), Shaanxi(Qin or Guan hong) and Gansu(Long).

\(^6\) Joseph R. Levenson, *Confucian China and Its Modern Fate: The Problem of Intellectual Continuity*, (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958) p.97. One of his argument is CPC set up a new orthodoxy, a sense of mission in the place of Confucianism
3. National Ideas and Political Legitimacy of Modern Chinese State

Nationalism has been an important legitimation of modern Chinese state since the end of Manchu empire in spite of the fact that different concepts of Chinese nation are contradictory.

Theories have explained nationalism in various ways, nationalism has been described by different theorists variously as a result of socio-economic development, of ideological inspiration or of the revival of historical remains. But no single theory can cover convincingly all aspects of such a vastly diversified phenomena as nationalism.

Nationalism can be regarded as either a help to or a resistance against existing political authority by searching for new identities amid competing cultures, ideologies and different visions of modernity. The Chinese nation as envisaged by the communists, for example, is different from that conceived of by early nationalists after the weak Manchu empire.

In modern Chinese history, the state legitimacy of China as a nation state has been justified differently according to different interpretations of the Chinese nationhood. In the Chinese Communist revolution, the entity that the Communists idealized in order to mobilize the people involved shifting balances between the priorities given to the proletariat class, the peasants and all other working classes, and those non-working classes which could be included within the united front against the major enemy. Those included in the united front embody the new Chinese nation as envisioned by Chinese communists. Since a Chinese nation was first conceived, its precise identity has always changed and its connotation has been continuously modified to match the outside contrast or national enemy and to challenge or reinforce a particular political order.

When Chinese nationalism was called out to rally mass support for such differing nationalist goals as the toppling of the Manchu dynasty, the defeat of the warlords, the defense against imperialist invasions, and the strengthening of the state power in both domestic and international sphere, the concept and content of the Chinese nation was emphasized differently. It is as if the Chinese nation were to be conceived as made up of an alliance of different constituent parts with the different parts being emphasized at different times, and some parts being excluded altogether at other times. In anti-Manchu nationalism, the Chinese nation may have an ethnic and cultural emphasis, in the CPC’s revolutionary nationalism, the Chinese nation had a class emphasis.

It was not until the Sino-Japanese war when the CPC gained considerable strength that large scale social mobilization took place and made rural as well as urban Chinese more used to the idea of belonging to a common Chinese nation. The Chinese nation that was then envisaged by the CPC in a

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87 The People's Democratic United Front policy is summarized by the CCP as one of the secret formula for its revolution success. The United Front is a wide alliance under CCP's leadership, which includes other nationalities, democratic classes, democratic parties, societies of the people, and patriots of various professions. The working class (led by Communist party) is the leader of the United Front and the alliance of workers and peasants is its basis. There are two alliances within the United Front: the worker-peasants alliance and the alliance between the working class and non-working classes (mainly national bourgeoisie). About the united front, see Li Weihan, *Issues on the United Front and Nationalities* (People's Press, 1980) p.3.
politically unitary sense that corresponded more closely to the identity of most Chinese people as a whole. It was a nation based more or less on political class, and the nation’s enemies were the imperalist powers, big bourgeoisie represented by KMT and compradors, also feudalism as represented by landlords and traditional leaders of ethnic minority groups. The CPC’s united front policy was the way to unite all possible allies to fight against common enemies; at the same time the policy also expanded and reinforced the Chinese nation by adding other ethnic and cultural elements to the nation based mainly on class interests. The united front policy is referred to by the CCP as one of the three magic formulas (fa bao) to success.

Although nationalism has not been summarized as one of the formula for the CCP’s revolutionary success, Chinese nationalism has been always an important component of the United Front strategy. As early as 1922 when the CCP joined the Comintern it began to apply the United Front policy according to the Comintern’s instruction. In 1923 CCP members joined the KMT. The United Front policy was to “expand the national liberation front, accept all nationalist forces who are against Japanese and other imperialist invasions”. The Anti-Japanese National United Front in 1935 was aimed at uniting all nationalist forces in anti-Japanese warfare. Because the ultimate purpose of the United Front policy is to strengthen the CCP itself and to weaken its enemy, so the UF is urgent especially when CCP is not very strong. As it grows stronger, the need for and the sincerity to practice the UF policy diminishes. After the Sino-Japanese war when the CCP’ military strength grew considerably, the UF policy became not so much a means of survival but a tactic to confuse and weaken its enemy, the KMT. The united front after 1945 was called the Peace Democratic United Front. After 1949 in a Socialist United Front, the need for domestic united front work decreased for the CCP as the country was under its tight control, and the emphasis of UF was shifted to the international sphere, the targets being the US and KMT in Taiwan. So through these few stages of the workings of the CCP’s united front, as the difference within the country, among Chinese and between Chinese and non-Chinese peoples decreased, the need for such a United Front also decreased.

At a policy and theoretical level, the nationalist attitude is made intrinsic in that Chinese practice and Chinese characteristics are most valued above any doctrine or theory. The point has been repeatedly emphasized by Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping that the essence of Marxism is to adhere to practice, and at the same time, that Marxism or socialism can not be genuine unless they are applied to Chinese practice. The CCP likes to say that the spirit of Mao Zedong thought is to combine Marxism and Chinese practice together, in other words, a true follower of Maoism has to be a nationalist in the first place.

The CPC’s war mobilization during the Sino-Japanese war for the first time in Chinese history effectively politicized the masses of peasants, making them aware of the whole of the nation to which they belonged by linking their economic interests. It was the CPC who for the first time successfully

harnessed the nationalist forces nationwide by mobilizing the masses with both its nationalist appeal and the communist ideological appeal of social justice, and which finally toppled the KMT regime and founded a unitary modern Chinese state. This war-time mobilization functions in approximately the same way as Karl W. Deutsch’s theory of “social mobilization” even though the process was not directly driven by modernization as in the social mobilization theory. But the process involved substantial parts of the population which resulted in considerable changes to their traditional way of life. The propaganda by the Chinese Communist army was very powerful and in those remote areas controlled by the CPC, it was the only source for illiterate peasants to be presented with an understanding of what had happened in China as a whole and to some extent it also improved the peasants’ literacy. The commissar system actually worked to feed illiterate soldiers with the information in written Chinese. As early as in the Resolution of the Gutian Conference, Mao Zedong mentioned the army’s educational role as well as its combat duties: “our army should be a combating team, but in the meantime it should also be a guiding team and production team.” The wartime mobilization increased assimilation, increased people’s participation in politics in the same manner as indicated in the theory of overall social mobilization in modernization process. These processes increased the commonality of people’s experiences and further increased the group’s identity as well as the coercive processes of the group over the individual.

The common bases of the Chinese nation were strengthened even further after 1949. The idea of a new Chinese nation free of feudal and imperialist oppression was first envisaged during the May 4 movement, and since then the struggle for this new Chinese nation had become the main theme in the so-called new democratic revolution as interpreted by CCP. The new nation was finally pronounced by Mao Zedong in 1949.

It was not until the nationwide industrialization drive after the CPC came to power that modern Chinese nation began to gain a modern economic base. During this period, not only a social mobilization process could be seen in the solidarity of Chinese nation, but also the industrialization strengthened the new unified socialist culture.

According to Gellner, “The minimal requirement for full citizenship, for effective moral membership of a modern community, is literacy.” This was recognized in principle during the May 4th Movement(1915-25), but the most complete nationwide educational system within China was set up only after 1949. In order to facilitate the nationwide education needed for the new state required standardization of the linguistic media, and therefore the People’s Republic of China government began a serious effort to popularize the Chinese written language, and they standardized spoken

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Chinese and reduced illiteracy nationwide.

Socialist industrialization together with various political movements added so many new elements to Chinese culture that the culture of the socialist Chinese nation can be distinguished quite sharply from those of other Chinese peoples in Hong Kong, Taiwan and among the overseas Chinese. In both written and spoken Chinese, the difference between mainland China and Taiwan and HK have been now made obvious by the different educational system in place for more than four decades since 1949. Another interesting sign is that since China put more emphasis on the notion of cultural China for the purpose of reunification, the increased exchanges between China and Hong Kong, and Taiwan have reduced the language gap between them to some degree. There is also a trend that mainland Chinese prefer to use formal Chinese character as used outside the PRC instead of the simplified character which is a result of Communist language reform.

During this period of creating a new sense of Chinese nationhood since 1949, cultural markers such as linguistic and cultural differences between Chinese people and non-Chinese people were erased considerably both through deliberate efforts and by indifference. But still some cultural and linguistic cultural marks survive and remain, such as the many non-Chinese languages, cultural customs and religions. Although many different cultural and linguistic aspects remain in non-Chinese minority regions, the territorial and economic autonomy and distinctiveness have not survived in these non-Chinese regions. And without developing their own particular modernization process, those cultural markers seem unlikely to be powerful enough to define their own national boundaries. Nevertheless, the cultural, linguistic and religious differences serve as a separating force.93

With the aim of encouraging non-Chinese peoples to feel a sense of “togetherness” with Chinese, the CCP drew new ideological distinctions to separate outsiders from the envisaged Chinese nation. It propagated an historical analysis that depicted the common enemies, the so-called “big three mountains” obstructing the advance of the Chinese peoples: imperialists, KMT and comprador bourgeoisie, and the feudalist class. This vision of the new Chinese nation is based more on the new socialist state than on traditional Chinese culture or an imagined ethnicity.

In contrast more than thirty years later in the era of Deng Xiaoping more and more emphasis has been put on the traditional cultural heritage of China as the common basis of the identity for the Chinese nation. That is because the explanatory power of the official Communist ideology is helplessly diminishing. Today’s idea of a Chinese nation is the result of a long evolution of concepts in modern Chinese historiography. This is also true of evolution of the legitimacy on which the state is based. The legitimacy is now drawn from a view of the Chinese nation and state that owes more to the cultural roots of China than to any newly invented concept. While the different emphasis satisfies some who see the Chinese nation in a more traditional sense, it will dissatisfy others.

93 Ernest Gellner, (op. cit) p169.
CHAPTER III. MONGOLIAN HISTORICAL IDENTITY AND MODERN NATIONALISM

Nationalism is not possible without a national history and conflicting nationalism have conflicting interpretations of history. The history of Sino-Mongolian relations is interpreted differently by Chinese and Mongols. Historical interpretation also plays an important role in generating Mongolian nationalism, but as to the question why Mongolian nationalism succeed in the north and fail in the south, the answer is mainly geopolitical.

The degree that national sentiments and nationalism depend upon national history can be best summarized by an old Chinese saying, “yu wang qi guo, xian wang qi shi”, which means that “to destroy a nation, its history has to be destroyed first”. A different interpretation of history may generate a different national consciousness. Therefore study of the history of relations between ethnic groups in China’s past is vital for understanding the contemporary justification by China’s leaders of the historical foundations for, and the continued existence of, a multi-ethnic Chinese nation.

One of the fundamental issues in the developmental and linear interpretations of Chinese history is to discern the main trends in historical ethnic relations. Since the present-day Chinese nation-state needs historical justification, it is necessary to show not only that a multi-ethnic state of China existed in the past, but also that there is a historical trend showing that all the different non-Chinese peoples had long been attracted to Chinese culture before they finally became members of the big family of 56 nationalities of the great Chinese nation.

Thousands of years of Chinese history have been depicted mainly as the uninterrupted development of a mostly unified Chinese state. Ethnic harmony and historical continuity are generally depicted to be the fundamental truth of Chinese history. The predominant Chinese view is that the multi-ethnic state of China was originally formed in the Qin and Han periods (BC221 - 220AD). From the Chinese perspective, as far as Mongolian-Chinese relations are concerned, all historical conflicts, wars, confrontations, and conquests have been put on a backstage, and a harmonious and mutually dependent line of existence has been sought to justify the above argument.

The history of ethnic relations is no longer simply that of “embracing an imagined past never experienced by their devotees or perhaps by anyone”. It is the sense of the past, rather than the truth of the past, that matters. It is not only that the present-day China must be a happy family of different nationalities, but also that the past must depict a happy family as well. Many different theories of the Chinese nation and state, on both the earlier and the recent periods, offer a rationale for the history.

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behind the perceived multi-ethnic harmony or unity. The justification is constructed either in terms of logic to seam political ideological needs or in terms of the unfolding of economic rationality.

In all the different theories, it is considered historically imperative to show that Inner Mongolia should stay within China and that the emergence of the state of independent Mongolia was a result of imperialist evil intentions and interventions. But it is obvious that the Mongolian view of history directly contends with the Chinese view. Just as the Chinese like to create a story of an uninterrupted history, so the Mongols like to supply their nationalist traditions with a long history independent of the Chinese. They base their claims on descent from the Huns empire in 209 BC and the Mongolian empire founded in 1206. In September 1991, the Mongolian College Student Union held the first World Conference of Mongolian Students to celebrate 2200 anniversary of the founding of Hun State, 785 anniversary of Mongolian Empire and 80 anniversary of modern Mongolian state. The Huns who in earlier times had lived in today’s Inner Mongolia are treated in folk belief as ancestors of the Mongols. An example of the way in which different symbolic meaning is given to historical events may be seen from the significance attached to the dispatch of Wang Zhaojun by the Han emperor to be a consort to a Hun chief. Mongolian historians present this as a gesture of appeasement but the Chinese depict it as evidence of traditional friendship between the Chinese and the Mongolians.

In this chapter, Mongolian history is briefly reviewed in two periods, the pre-nationalist period and the modern nationalist period. The first period demonstrates that the wars and confrontations between the two peoples remain basic facts of history and that the Mongols had not been assimilated into China as had many other non-Chinese peoples. The latter period shows the process by which Mongols became increasingly associated with the Chinese. Examining the two periods shows that the claim that the Chinese state has a timeless and seamless notion is simply a historical myth created to support today’s Chinese nation-state. What comprised Mongolian-Chinese relations and the emergence of their respective national identities must be seen within the context of the historical events associated with the rise of modern nationalism and, in examining the historical record, a much more complicated picture emerges.

In the period that pre-dated modern nationalism, Mongolian independence was evident from the founding of the Mongolian empire by Chinggis Khan in the early 13th century to the middle of the 18th century when the last defiant Mongol faction was defeated by the Manchu emperor. During this period of independence, the Mongols refused to be assimilated by the Chinese. In terms of culture and religion, they established much closer and stronger ties with the Tibetans rather than with the

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3 One recent book on the topic by the Chinese is *Menggu Duli Neimu (The Inside Story Of Outer Mongol Independent)* by Shi Bo (Press of People’s China, 1993)

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When Kublai Khan decided to make Peking the capital of the Mongolian empire, he met considerable resistance from the more conservative Mongols. In terms of political legitimacy and sense of succession, the Mongolian Yuan dynasty did not adopt the same assimilating stance as the previous non-Chinese dynasties such as Nuzhen Jin and Kitan Liao and, later, the Manchu Qing dynasty, which in the end were all assimilated by the Chinese. The Mongols did not derive their power from previous Chinese dynasties, not did they claim to be the legitimate successors of the previous Chinese dynasties in the Zheng Tong line.

Before the 1911 replacement of the Manchu dynasty by the Chinese republic, in theory the Mongols had never been ruled under Chinese political authority. Subordination to the Manchu court was based on “feudal” ties, wherein the Manchu emperors at least presented themselves as the legitimate successors to the Mongol’s great Khans. But it was difficult for the Mongols to accept immediately the new authority of the Chinese nationalists who followed the Manchu dynasty, because of their revolutionary nature and the depth of the cultural differences between the traditional Mongols and the relatively modern new Chinese leaders.

Confronted by the authority of the Chinese republic and by Chinese nationalist forces, the Mongols tried to realize their own proto-nationalist goals by adapting to the situation. As a result, Northern Mongolia’s efforts were rewarded with its independence in 1911 and by the formation of the socialist Mongolian Republic in 1921. In Inner Mongolia, which was largely controlled at that time by Chinese in one form or another, Mongolian nationalism had to put on a disguise of various political ideologies and was closely interwoven with Chinese politics. Nationalist sentiments took different forms and could be found variously in the upper-class-inspired reform, the revolt by the lower class, collaboration with outside forces to counter Chinese nationalists, and finally, allying with the CCP and using the ideology that it represented to counter the most virulent forms of Chinese nationalism.

1. Mongolia In The Pre-Nationalist Era

1.1. Historical Ethnic Relations
To support today’s conception of China as a nation-state, historical China is viewed as a multi-national state dating from the first unification of China by the Qin dynasty. This view is related to the following two observations. The first view is that the Chinese state has survived all the way through a several thousand year history without interruption. The second view is that of Chinese centrality, and a China-centric worldview that the ancient world of the Chinese and many non-Chinese peoples is a

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7. ‘Ethnie’ and ‘nation’ are used almost interchangeably in the Chinese language, “min zu” is the term for both. Race in Chinese is “zhong zu”. In the beginning, Chinese
closed system. In the evolution of the system between Chinese and non-Chinese peoples, integration and assimilation is depicted as the main tendency, and confrontations and conflicts are viewed as only aberrations.

However, this multi-national view of historical China cannot explain the role of the distinction between the Chinese and non-Chinese which was actually essential to the Chinese identity in history. It is a modern historical myth that pre-modern China had an undisturbed sense of being in the middle of the world until suddenly the modern western imperialist powers posed an outside contrast convenient for the identity of the more modern Chinese nation. As a matter of fact, the distinction between Chinese and non-Chinese had always been vital to distinguishing Chinese identity in both pre-modern and modern times. The distinction evolved from a formerly racially and culturally based distinction into a politically and territorially based distinction.

According to the Chinese view, Chinese culture has a 5000 year history, which implies that the Chinese state as well has lasted for 5000 years without interruption. The non-Chinese dynasties such as Mongolian Yuan dynasty are interpreted simply as short episodes in the overall uninterrupted Chinese history. But this view contradicts the historical fact that throughout its history, China was many times invaded and conquered by non-Chinese peoples.

These invasions and conquests by the northern non-Chinese peoples together with the periods of separate Chinese regimes lasted for around 2,000 years, almost half of the purported 5,000 years of "unbroken" history. There were 17 dynasties of infiltration. (wu hu luan hua) The most prominent are the Five dynasties that resulted from military conquest: Tabghach-Wei (386-557); Kitan-Liao (907-1125); Jurchen-Chin (1115-1234) Mongolian Yuan (1260-1368) Manchu-Qing (1644-1911). If today's Chinese nation including 56 officially recognized nationalities and today's PRC's territory are used to judge the historical Chinese nation and state, China both as a people and as a state have never been unified even once in all the history preceding 1949.

In the 2000-year period since the Qin's unification, unification is emphasized by the Chinese as the main trend in their history. To solve this contradiction, the Chinese are usually called upon 'to identify the general trend in the history'. Therefore the study of historical facts becomes a matter of subjective interpretation for the sake of today's needs.

China's problem of 'international relations' from the Chinese Han dynasty to the Chinese Ming
dynasty (1644) can be summarised as a tribute system. The Chinese assumption of the tribute system is that the "Chinese civilisation was superior to the cultures of its neighbours. They believed that their literature, their Confucian ethics, their technology and their magnificent cities and palaces, all of which the frontier peoples lacked, assured them a position of world leadership. They rejected international relations on the basis of sovereign equality", instead, foreigners who came to China were treated as vassals of the Chinese emperor.\textsuperscript{11}

Yet, the Han dynasty pursued a policy of 'heqin' (Chinese dynasties' attempt to cement relations with rulers of non-Chinese powers in the border areas by marrying daughters of Han imperial family to them) toward the Huns to the north under which the Han court presented gifts and offered Chinese princesses in marriage to the Hun rulers in return for a pledge of peace. Another Chinese policy is called 'yi yi zhi yi' which means to use barbarians to control barbarians. The policy is to use the means of gifts and diplomacy to generate or exploit hospitality among tribal peoples by favouring first one group, and then another. The purpose was to take advantage of their internal conflict to control them. The policy was deployed especially by the Ming emperor Yongle to fight against east Mongols and west Mongols (Oirad Mongols).

In the Chinese view, ethnic relationships are mostly described as those between Chinese and non-Chinese, and little importance has been placed on the relationships between different non-Chinese peoples. In the relationship between Chinese, Mongols and Tibetans, most of the official history related Chinese-Mongolian and Chinese-Tibetan relationship.

From the Mongols' point of view, in terms of cultural influence, Tibetan culture was easier for Mongols to accept than Chinese. According to Jagchid Sechin\textsuperscript{12}, the reason was that the Tibetan nomadic culture was closer to the Mongol way of life than the Chinese agricultural culture. In 1362, Prince (Ayorchiridara) said that "Li Haowen has taught me for so many years Confucian knowledge, but I still do not grasp its meaning. Now only one night's listening to Buddhist doctrine has made me enlightened".\textsuperscript{13} And this happened one hundred years after the founding of the Yuan dynasty.

Khublai Khan was condemned by the Mongke Khan's court because he used Chinese scholars and Chinese laws to rule China. The problem was regarded so seriously by Khublai Khan's more conservative brothers that it almost caused a war between them. Compared to Mongols as well as Tibetans and Uyghurs, the agricultural peoples at the periphery of China, such as the Japanese, Koreans and Vietnamese, all accepted Chinese cultural influence with more ease.

The Chinese hierarchical view of the ancient world was further strengthened by a perceived rationality


\textsuperscript{13} Jagchid Sechen, (op. cit.) p.143.
that was supposedly behind the historical progress which led to today's final realization of ethnic unity. Although the ancestral origins between ethnic groups may be different, the Chinese see a logic behind an inevitable merging process which leads to a bigger Chinese nation. The Qin unification and the Hun unification took place at the same time, but the two confronting powers have been viewed differently by Chinese historians. The Chinese unification in the agricultural areas are viewed as progressive, while northern non-Chinese nomadic unification has been regarded as negative to historical progress.\(^\text{14}\) Although this biased view has been readjusted by more recent official Chinese historians, it is still the same standard used to judge the non-Chinese dynastic unification in their historical writings. The Hun unification is regarded now as positive because it was on step on the road of the integration of a larger Chinese nation which therefore represents the already perceived general historical trend.\(^\text{15}\)

When history is studied to serve the needs of the present nation-state, historical China is envisioned on the basis of today's P.R. China's territory. Inevitably in the revisions of history, some "unneeded" parts have been cut out, and some parts have to be enlarged to fill the vacuum. If more of the relationships among non-Chinese peoples and if a wider scope were investigated and traced, the Chinese-centred sense of history would be greatly reduced.

Before the Mongols set up their power to the north of the Great Wall in 13CC, there were many other nomadic powers such as the Hun, Turk, Kitan, Nuzhen and Liao, etc. Many of them simply disappeared in the world as recorded by the Chinese. If the wider scope were studied, a much larger process of ethnic interactions can be found than merely the Chinese-centered one. In this wider scenario, it would be clear that some peoples recorded by ancient Chinese in fact migrated away and their modern descendants are not necessarily PRC citizens. There were also many latecomers to what is called the great Chinese nation. Therefore it is impossible to say that all the peoples who are living within the current PRC as well as all the peoples who had ever lived on this same land should be included in the Chinese nation, as in the official view of China.\(^\text{16}\) According to the official view of the Chinese nation and historical ethnic relationships, the origins of non-Chinese peoples in China can be traced within the same scope as today's PRC territory.

When historical China is regarded as a multi-ethnic state since the unification of the Qin, then the argument that the Chinese peoples have always occupied this land mass actually becomes stronger, while at its periphery, various non-Chinese peoples continuously came from nowhere and disappeared into oblivion. In this model, a historical trend favouring Chinese people can be easily distinguished; therefore, all traditional heroes defending the Chinese against the non-Chinese are transformed into

national heroes for the modern Chinese nation which is supposed to consist of the Chinese and 55 non-Chinese peoples. The reason for continuing to elevate these heroes is obvious, given that their struggles are consistent with the perceived historical trend.

The ancient myth of being the middle and the self-belief in the Middle is somewhat preserved by contemporary the Chinese in the above view of historical China. If ethnic unity were truly the main trend of history as in the official Chinese view, then there would be no need for the important outside contrast as a defining notion for Chinese-ness, and therefore non-Chinese ‘barbarians’ would never have existed as in important for the sake of Chinese identity and superiority.

A group identity is unimaginable without a feasible outside contrast wherein there is a sense of “we” and “they.” It seems that when a Chinese state is under alien threat such as the late Ming dynasty, then the Chinese tend to pay more attention to their Chinese-ness and to the distinction between Chinese and non-Chinese barbarians. In times of the more powerful and confident dynasties, such as the Tang, the Chinese were more open and ‘international’.

To have the requisite sense of common ground to justify a multi-ethnic Chinese nation, there had to be a different outside contrast that would now serve to confront both the Chinese and the non-Chinese. In the thought of Sun Yatsen’s nationalism and in the Chinese communist view of modern history, this outside contrast to the modern West is crucial to the new common identity. This supposed common identity between the Manchu Qing’s territorial peoples and the Chinese is reinforced then by identifying, in common, an outside contrast in the West.

1.2. Independent Mongol Powers

Historical confrontations and conflicts between Mongols and Chinese make for outside contrast to each other which is today counteracted by a blurring of ethnic identity and the creation of a sense of unity that is reinforced with the help of an outside contrast. But today’s Chinese historians have covered the historical confrontations and conflicts under the rewritten mantle of a titular tribute and relations of bestowal to indicate historical Chinese centrality.

The history of north China was one of constant ethnic change and assimilation, the long-term result of which has been the enlargement of Chinese ethnicity and territory. Even so, the Chinese-Mongol contrast and confrontations remained in place up to and includes modern times. The Mongols managed to keep their separate identity in the north Yuan dynasty after they were driven out of Beijing by the Chinese Ming troops in 1368. Even in the Manchu Qing dynasty, Mongols largely lived separately from the Chinese. It was the integration efforts made by the later sinicized Manchu government that gave an important motivation for the rise of modern Mongolian nationalism.

Within the short 30-year period after the death of Chinggis Khan in 1227, there were four great Khans consecutively, Toli Khan, Ogtai Khan, Kuyuk Khan and Mongke Khan, after which Kublai became the great Khan. After Khublai Khan moved the capital from the Mongolian ancestral land of Khara
Khorum to the Chinese territory of da du (Beijing), the Mongolian empire became more and more loosely organized.

In Kublai Khan's reign, the empire was reduced to an alliance of 5 Ulus, and the power of the Mongol Empire under the Great Khan became limited to the territory of Mongolia and what is today known as Xinjiang along with some traditionally Chinese areas. It was during this time that the Mongols became associated directly with China. In the beginning, there were very strong objections voiced against Kublai Khan's decision to move the Mongol Empire capital to Beijing. Kubilai Khan adopted Chinese institutions to rule China, but, unlike the later Manchu dynasty, the Mongol Yuan remained unsinicized throughout the Yuan dynasty.

In 1368, when the last Mongolian Khan, Toghon Temur, together with 6 tumen of Mongols\textsuperscript{17} were driven out of the capital by Chinese Ming forces, the Mongol Yuan dynasty collapsed. But the Mongolian royal family set up a North Yuan dynasty and managed to maintain their rule outside of the Great Wall. While Chinese historical records show that 1368 was the time when the Mongolian Yuan dynasty ended, from the Mongol perspective, this was the time when the Mongolian Yuan dynasty retreated to the north.

After the Yuan dynasty was driven out of Beijing, other ulus (states) such as the Golden Horde and Chahtai Khanate persisted and are recorded in Mongol history. Of course, the end of the Yuan dynasty in 1368 contributed significantly to the ultimate demise of the Mongolian empire. The Mongolian empire collapsed as its main branches broke away: “Persia in 1344, China in 1368, Borhara and Turkestan in 1370, and by 1380 the Golden Horde had been defeated and fragmented into a series of separate territories (finally ceasing to exist by about 1500).”\textsuperscript{18} Until the Manchu Qing dynasty was set up in 1644, Mongolian power in the north remained independent, although for most of the time in a disintegrated condition, with unification under the rule of Chinggis Khan’s lineage (Borjigid) being interrupted by other Mongolian chiefs.

Relations between the Chinese Ming dynasty and the Mongols to the north were characterized by periods of temporary peace interspersed by various trade wars, and with restored Mongolian power at its peak even trying to regain its previous rule in China.

According to Sanang Sechen's chronicle, the Mongolian Yuan dynasty fled to north with six tumen of Mongols and four tumen stayed behind in China. The six tumen of Mongols remained unified under the rule of the royal family of the northern Yuan dynasty for some time. However, in the 1400s two warring factions appeared: Oirad and Mongols.

\textsuperscript{17} Tumen is the military and administrative unite of the time that refer to 10 thousand households. According to Sanang Sechen’s chronicle, the Mongolian Yuan Dynasty fled to north with six tumen of Mongols and four tumen stayed behind China. Sanang Sechen, Daruntiv, translated, \textit{Menggu Yuanliu (Erideni Tivch)} (Inner Mongolian People’s Press, 1981) p.227

\textsuperscript{18} Urgunge Onon and Derrick Pritchatt, \textit{Asia’s First Modern Revolution: Mongolia Proclaims its Independence in 1911} (E.J. Brill, 1989) p.1.
Later, Esen Khan, a chief of the powerful Oirad Mongols in the west, usurped political power from the Borjigid royal clan and once again unified all the Mongols. The rule of Esen Khan became so powerful that they captured the Chinese Ming emperor in 1449 in a place called Tu Mu Bu\textsuperscript{19} (tu mu Fortress) and they even surrounded Beijing. The incident was called “The Insult at Tu Mu” (tu mu zhi ru) in the old Chinese history books. In more recent history books the incident is recorded in less emotional terms such as the “Tu Mu Incident” or “Coup in Tu Mu” (tu mu zhi bian).

Like many other analyses of such embarrassing cases in the Chinese history books, most of the blame for the Chinese defeat has been put upon Chinese traitors, whereas nothing is mentioned about the superiority of Mongolian cavalry.\textsuperscript{20}

The second unification of Mongolia that restored Mongolian royal rule under Dayan Khan (Batu Mongke, 1464-1532) in 1570 was so powerful a unification that Dayan Khan even considered restoring Mongol rule in China\textsuperscript{21}. In the later years prior to the Manchu annexation, the central authority of Mongolia for the most time remained weak especially when local chieftains became powerful. The most prominent among the local chieftains was Altan Khan (1507-83) who founded Huhhot in 1554. His unification became very powerful and several times he besieged Peking demanding that the Chinese lift a trade embargo.

It is typical of the economic relationship between nomadism and agriculture that the mutual dependence is not even. The Mongols relied more on agricultural goods from China than the Chinese relied on animal products from Mongolia. The Mongols pressed for open trade and Chinese dynasties often refused thus causing wars, or they reluctantly agreed. Jagchid Sechen argues that throughout history, northern nomads launched war mainly for economic gains, whereas the Chinese launched expeditions to the north mainly for to political and security reasons.\textsuperscript{22} This is also the reason that the Chinese interpretation of the Mongol-Ming relationship in terms of tribute relations never reflects the real power pattern.

The so-called “tributary” relationships between the Mongols and the Chinese Ming dynasty were usually initiated by the Mongols for economic reasons because their dependence on agricultural economy was greater than Chinese on nomadic economy. In 1551, Altan Khan concluded a treaty with China, and two horse-trading markets were opened in Da Tong and Xuan Fu (Xuan Hua). The high-ranking Chinese official in charge of market affairs at Da Tong reported to his superiors “The market was opened at Da Tong for four days, from 25\textsuperscript{th} to 28\textsuperscript{th} of the fourth lunar month (28 Feb-3 Mar). The

\textsuperscript{19} Tu Mu Bu is in today's Huailai County, Hebei Province.


\textsuperscript{21} Roy A. Miller, ‘Biography of Butu Mongke’ in L.C. Goodrich, ed., Eminent Chinese of the Ming Period, see Morris Rossabi China and Inner Asia: From 1368 to the Present Day (Thames and Hudson, 1975) p.45.

\textsuperscript{22} Jagchid Sechen, “Patterns of Trade and Conflict Between China and the Nomadic People of Mongolia, Essays In Mongolian Studies, Volume 3 in Monograph Series of the David M. Kennedy
horses the Mongols brought to the market are far from being sold out! But the supplies of silk and clothing which we brought to pay for the Mongol horses are exhausted and so we closed the market."\textsuperscript{23}

To Mongols, what is recorded in the Chinese history books as "tribute" and "bestowal" were forms of trade rather than forms of political submission. The trade conducted was actually always favorable to the nomadic peoples, contrary to the tribute relationship between China and the petty agricultural states to the south. In the latter cases, it was often the case that China forced the relationship upon the smaller agricultural states and the trade was in favor of China, with the tribute was a symbol of obedience.\textsuperscript{24}

During the Chinese Ming dynasty, Mongolian leaders demanded to "pay tribute" to Chinese emperors. When their requests were refused by Chinese courts, Mongols usually launched wars against China.

In one of Esen Khan's talks with a representative of the Chinese Ming dynasty, Yang Shang, Esen justified his attack on China by asking, "Why have you continually reduced the prices of Mongolian horses and given us bad quality silks?" The Chinese representative replied: "We are not guilty of reducing the value and price of Mongolian horses - it is really your fault because the number of horses you send to China increases from year to year. Since we do not send back your horses, we have no alternative but to reduce the prices of the horses."\textsuperscript{25}

In a memorial to the Ming Emperor (1571) expressing gratitude for the rank of "Shun-yi Wang" for himself and for other official titles granted his relatives, it is reported in the Chinese history books that Altan Khan referred to himself and his clan as vassals and said: "... grown up among the Northern Barbarians., Imperial Decree has shown mercy on us and has bestowed upon him the rank of Shun-yi Wang; as Chinese emperor's vassals, I am very grateful for the heavenly mercy...pledged never rebel again".\textsuperscript{26} This is quoted in the Chinese official history on northern ethnic relations. But the same story was recorded differently in Mongolian history. Sagang Sechen Taiji, in his notable work, Eridni-yin Tobchi, said: "Altan Khan dispatched troops into China, invading and plundering. The Ming were greatly threatened and sent envoys to Altan Khan, gave him the title of Sun Ong, and presented to him a gold seal to carry out a great rule together with Emperor Lung-ch'ing of the Great Ming.\textsuperscript{27}

Today in Chinese history studies, the Chinese perspective of the political implications of Mongolian-
Chinese tributary relationship are more important than historical truth itself. Chinese emperors granted noble ranks and official titles to nomadic leaders to show that their authority was accepted. That the nomadic leaders accepted the titles does not mean that they accepted Chinese authority, it was understood as a means of diplomacy on both sides. The trade wars between the Mongols and the Chinese Ming show that economic exchanges do not necessarily lead to political unity as Chinese historians now argue in Marxist fashion, and the perceived economic rationality between the supposed historical ethnic unity is open to question.

1.3. History And Mongol Identity
The principle of nationalism is used when a nation generates the need for a national political authority, a national state. It is also true in reverse that political power and order can cultivate a national identity. Political power and authority is crucial to the Mongolian people's belief in a common ethnicity. The sense of an independent history and the ideals of political unification still play a part in Mongols nationalistic sentiments today and in Mongol-Chinese relations.

The 1206 Mongolian unification by the founder of the Mongol empire was the first and among the most powerful of political factors which contribute to a Mongolian ethnic sense. The belief in a common origin has been reinforced by the cult of Chinggis Khan. Mongolian nomadic society, unlike most pre-modern secluded communities, was rather a fluid community without a strictly defined territory. This very fluidity and the periodic military actions it facilitated are important sources of the sense of pan-Mongolian-ness. Different outside cultures and ethnicities also strengthened the sense of political cohesion among the Mongols.

The Mongolian Yuan Dynasty did not follow the examples of previous non-Chinese dynasties such as the Liao and Jin. The Mongols did not regard themselves as the rightful successors to the Chinese orthodoxy and as successors to the previous Chinese dynasties. The Mongols (particularly in pre-Yuan times) and the Manchus had a strong belief in an intelligent Heaven, who had destined their rulers to govern and to whom they were personally responsible. In the beginning of the Secret History of Mongols, Chinggis Khan's birth into the world and the legitimacy of his rule was described as being derived from "Monggke Tenggeri."

"Monggke Tenggeri", the everlasting Heaven, was the highest deity of Mongolian Shamanism. Veneration of heaven, of course, was more than just the expression of a religious emotion since the Mongols regarded heaven as the source of all power. The very first sentence of the Secret History claims that the ancestors of Chinggis Khan were born by mandate of heaven. And also, the record

continually emphasizes that the success of the Khan stemmed from the power of Heaven and Earth.30

Prior to modern Mongolian nationalism, the Mongols' political loyalty was given to their own Khans. Even when they submitted to the Manchu emperor, the Mongols accepted Manchus authority in the belief that the Manchus were the successors to the Mongolian Khan's supreme authority.

Historical ethnic relations still influence present-day relationships between Chinese and other minority nationalities. With peripheral non-Chinese peoples, China established a superior-inferior relationship on the assumption of her cultural ascendancy. This enabled China to enforce a divide-and-rule policy, or at least a policy of trade control, so as to maintain peace on her borders. According to Chusei Suzuki, the validity of this assumption rests upon the extent to which the Chinese claim of cultural ascendancy was actually effective across her frontiers.

"We can readily agree that China's claim of cultural superiority was more or less effective toward such countries as Korea, Japan, and Vietnam, agricultural societies resembling that of China which regarded Chinese culture as advanced and worthy of adoption. But the situation was quite different in the case of northern and western nomadic and semi-nomadic peoples. Mongols under Chinggis Khan and his successors did not much respect Chinese culture".31

Mongols, together many other north and west non-Chinese peoples, have a historical relationship with China distinct from the ethnic minorities of agricultural societies. This gives Mongols a sense of historical importance and a different collective consciousness which to this day has influence in the conduct of relations between nationalities. The extent of the sense of non-Chinese-ness among non-Han minorities is related to their historical power and status in relation to both China and the outside world, and to the time that they were finally incorporated into Chinese political system.

In Mongolia, from the time of the Mongolian empire, through many wars and conquests, there survived an ethnicity albeit not in form of a unified entity but as a political ideal. Other non-Chinese to the north and west such as the Tibetans and Xinjiang Muslims retain the same kind of political ideals related to their own political histories.

1.4. Mongols' Annexation By Manchu Qing Dynasty
The Manchu Qing dynasty began the annexation of Mongolia into China because, from 1644 to 1911, the Manchus had been sinicized and this paved the way for a successive Chinese republic. The process of the decline of the Manchu dynasty was at the same time also inadvertently the process of Chinese expansion: As the Manchu dynasty relied more and more on Chinese officials to maintain the empire, Chinese migration extended the Chinese population to areas more remote than ever before.

Ironically, it was the Manchu Qing Dynasty that began the process of the annexation of Mongolia into

China and that authorized the first migration of Chinese settlers into Mongolian lands. In effects it paved the way for the absorption of Inner Mongolia by the successive Chinese republics. As the Manchu dynasty declined from about the 1750s onwards it inadvertently encouraged the process of Chinese expansion. As the dynasty came to rely more and more on Chinese officials to maintain the empire Chinese migrated to areas hitherto considered remote and on the periphery.

When the Manchus rose to power in the early 17CC in Manchuria, the first alliance they made with Mongols was with the Khorchin Mongols Aimag in eastern Mongolia. The alliance was formed in 1624 against the Chinese Ming and the Mongol Ligden Khan of Chakhar.

Ligden Khan (1592-1634) was by genealogy the legitimate Great Khan of all Mongolia and he had led many other Mongols into the fight against the Manchu expansion. But his authority was not accepted by all Mongols. Oirad Mongols and most Khalkha Mongols (Tusheet Khan et al) refused to submit to his authority. During the wars between Ligden and the Manchus, some of the princes of minor tribes in Southern and Eastern Mongolia preferred to submit voluntarily to the Manchus rather than to be conquered by Ligden. These princes seem to have been mostly descended from Khasar, brother of Chinggis, while Ligden was descended from Chinggis Khan himself. There had been a traditional political hostility between the descendants of the Chinggis and of Khasar, that was still being played out.

Ligden Khan, as the last great khan of Mongols, was defeated by the Manchu Emperor Tiancong (Hung Taiji, or Arvkhai in Mongolian) in 1634, and his son was captured by the Manchu in 1635. From 1634 to 1636, South Mongolia was annexed to Manchu Qing dynasty. In 1635, 16 Mongolian tribes and 49 feudals/lords (excluding west Turned and Ordos) convened at Shengjing (Shen Yang, the capital of the Manchus before they captured Beijing) to recognise the Manchu's authority in Southern Mongolia. In 1636, the Manchu emperor Tiancong (Arvkhai) was elevated by South Mongol princes as their khan and in the same year he changed the name of his state from Jin to Qing. The year 1636 was also the year when the distinction of South Mongolia/Inner Mongolia was first mentioned by the Manchu dynasty.

It was almost half a century after the Manchu captured Peking in 1644, that Northern Mongolia (Khalkha Mongolia) recognized the Manchu's authority and protection in 1691. The Northern Mongols sought Manchu's protection against the West Mongols' conquest. Galdan Boshigt (1651-96), leading the Oirad Mongols, invaded Outer (Khalkha) Mongolia in 1688. Facing the invasion, in the ninth lunar month of that year, the Khalkha aristocracy held discussions on whether they should approach the Russian Tzar or the Manchu Emperor for military aid. In the end, the Manchu emperor was chosen because the Manchus were closer to the Mongols on cultural and religious grounds than the Tzarist Russians. Later the Tusheet Khan Chakhundorj and his brother, the 1st Javzundamba

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Khutagt (1635-1723)⁴, of Khalkha Mongolia fled to the Manchu’s territory to seek help. At the same time, Mongols near Siberia began to go over into what is now Buryat Mongolia to ask for Russian protection.⁵

To get the protection they needed, Khalkha nobles had to accept the authority of the Manchu emperor. In 1691 Emperor Kangxi (Enkh Amaglan Kangxi) was elevated as the Great Khan of All Mongolia. In 1696 Galdan Boshigt was finally defeated in the last decisive battle at the hands of the Manchus.

However, West Mongolia (Jungharia) remained independent until the 1750s when an Oirad-Khalkha joint-rebellion effort was defeated by the Manchu emperor Enkh Amgalan Kang Xi.⁶

Two things should be noted about the Manchu-Mongol relationship that are pertinent to the incorporation of the Mongols into the Manchu Dynasty. First, it was a military alliance, though not equal alliance, it was not a domination of one over the other. Second is that in the beginning of the Manchu-Mongol alliance, the Manchu emperors justified their authority over Mongols by admitting that they simply had succeeded in the ruling line of previous Mongol Great Khans.

The Manchus legitimized their succession to the Mongolian Khan by inventing a legend that the Seal of the last emperor of the Mongolian Yuan dynasty was in the possessed of the Manchu emperor who received it from the son of the Ligden Khan of the Chakhar Mongols when the Manchus captured him in 1635. This seal supposedly gave the Manchu emperor the legal right to be the successor to the Yuan orthodox lineage at the capital at Beijing, which was the former Yuan capital.⁷ Great khan was the title for the Manchu emperor until later in Shunzhi and Kangxi times, when the Manchu texts began to use the word “Huangdi” (emperor) or “abkai jui” (Son of Heaven), a literal translation of the Chinese “Tianzi”, for the Manchu emperor of China.⁸

The early alliance between the Khorchin Mongols and the Manchu was a relationship between the Manchu emperor and Mongol chiefs. In the early Manchu-Mongol alliance, Mongols and Manchus referred to themselves as two separate nations. In the ceremony on which Manchu-Kharachin alliance was sworn, Manchu Abakhai Khan (Emperor Tian Zong) and Kharachin Mongols said: “We two nations, the Manchu and Kharachin, in order to form an alliance, offer a sacrifice to heaven of white

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⁴ In the Qing dynasty, North Mongolia (Khalkha) was ruled by four khans: Tusheet Khan, Tsetsen Khan, Zasagt Khan and Sain Noyon Khan. A Khalkha noble Avtai (1544-86) was first granted the title of Tusheet Khan by the Dalai Lama in 1578. Later his fellow nobles were given the titles of Tsetsen Khan and Zasagt Khan by the Dalai Lama. The title of the Sain Noyon Khan was granted by the Manchu emperor in 1725. See Urgunge Onon and Derrick Pritchatt, Asia’s First Modern Revolution: Mongolia Proclaims its Independence in 1911 (E.J. Brill, 1989) p.3.
⁵ Owen Lattimore, Nationalism and Revolution in Mongolia (Oxford University Press, 1955) p.30.
⁶ Amarsanaa (1718-51) of the Oirad and Chingunjab of Khotgoid (in Zasagt Khan aimag) had fought against the Manchu invasion of that territory during the 1755-8 war. See Urgunge Onon and Derrick Pritchatt, Asia’s First Modern Revolution: Mongolia Proclaims its Independence in 1911 (E.J. Brill, 1989) p.3.
horses, and to earth black cows and a cup of liquor, and then we shall unite our nation.”

Alexander Baranov, a Russian traveller in the beginning of the century, wrote in his travel, Khalkha, Aimag Tsetsen-Khana, that the union between Southern Mongolia and Manchuria in 1636 when they were personally united under the ruling dynasty has been proven by Mongolian sources. In his trips (1905 and 1917) through Mongolia, Baranov managed to obtain a transcript of the decree of the Bogd (Holy) Khan Degedu-Erdemu (Manchu emperor Tiancong, Avkhai, Deed Erdemt in Mongolian) relating to the time of his elevation as Khan of Southern Mongolia.

The essential part of the decree is the promise to follow the example of former Mongolian khans and give identical treatment to the Outer (i.e. Southern Mongol) and Inner (i.e. Manchu) princes without distinction between them. The decree suggested that Manchu emperor was elevated by Mongolian princes voluntarily to be their great khan in accordance with the custom of the time, at their own Congress (Khuraltai). The decree stipulated a mutual relationship between the Manchu emperor and the southern Mongolian princes, it recognized Manchu suzerainty and promised Mongolian princes full autonomy. It read at the end of the decree that should the Dynasty fall, all laws previously existing should come into force again.

The decree in 1636 seems to be the first document dealing with Manchu-Mongol relations. Regarding the assembly of Mongol princes at Doloon Nor in 1688 when they decided to submit to the Manchu emperor, the Chinese today maintain that it indicates the formal annexation of Mongolia, but for the

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40 Decree of the all-merciful prosperity-spreading Bogd Khan, now acceding to the throne of the will of heaven.

Ever since the time when it was determined by heaven and earth that the Bogd Khan of each governing dynasty should unfailingly have the independent princes assisting him in government, their exploits and names were recorded from ancient times by the Bogd Khans. Thus it has been from the beginning until the present time.

Acceding now to the Great throne, and following the example of the former Bogd Khans, I will make no distinction between the Inner and Outer (Princes), I shall think of all uniformly and, distinguishing their exploits, I will honor all the independent princes with charters given with my own hand and establish the degrees of the honorary titles (Wang, Beil, Beis and gung). Persons receiving and accepting these charters given in my own hand should act sincerely, and justly in accordance with the law and faith, and help in the government of the country as their consciences dictate; from beginning to end do not forget your duty and loyalty. Thus if you are in a position to fulfill this, the favor will extend to your fathers and grandfathers, and the happiness which has spread to them will remain with your children and grandchildren from generation to generation, honor and fame will eternally be with you; try not to be remiss. If you embark on mutually hostile acts, if you fall away or revolt, you will be deprived of the four honorary titles (as above). If your fault should be committed in time of war, then by established law you will be executed.

Apart from this, for faults of every other kind, you will not be deprived of these degrees and your children and grandchildren will inherit them successively and without interruption.

In the event that the Dai Ch’ing dynasty should fall, then you will exist in accordance with the former basic laws. With this in view, by permission of Heaven, I present this adorned charter on the 23rd of the First Summer Moon (27 May) of the First Year (1636) of the Reign of Ubedekshi-Erdemu of the Dai Ch’ing dynasty by order of the All-Highest favored with the affixing of the Great State Seal.”, See Urgunge Onon and Derrick Pritchatt, *Asia’s First Modern Revolution: Mongolia Proclaims its Independence in 1911* (E.J. Brill, 1989) pp.72-73.
Mongols at that time, it was just as a personal homage paid to the Manchu emperor. The homage was formally extended in 1691 in Doloon Nor where the Emperor Kangxi met 21 regional princes of Khalkha and received an oath of allegiance. The above promise for Mongols to return to the existing laws was repeated by the emperor⁴¹. Since the Manchu emperor took note that some Mongols had turned to Russia for protection, he made the policy in Outer Mongolia one of minimum interference, so that the princes themselves would prefer to adhere to the Manchu empire rather than to that of the Russians.⁴²

2. Independence Of Mongolian State

The independence of Khalkha Mongolia at the end of Manchu Qing dynasty is regarded very differently by Mongols and Chinese. In the Mongolian perspective it was a manifestation of nationalism. But most Chinese have been taught through historical textbooks that the independence of Khalkha Mongolia was mainly the result of foreign imperialist intervention, one of the many humiliations forced upon China by foreign imperialist powers. Among the various causes for the independence of Mongolia in 1911, were the changes of Manchu Qing dynasty which proved very important in drastically affecting and changing the Manchu-Mongol relationship.

Yet, this independence was not a sudden event. Long before 1911, many changes appeared in the Manchu-Mongolian relationship and created tensions between the Manchu and Chinese on one side, and the Mongols on the other, and in 1911 these tensions reached a breaking point.

According to Owen Lattimore⁴³, Manchu society was already semi-agricultural before they ruled China and they admired Chinese culture. This attitude of the Manchus to Chinese culture was totally different from that of the Mongols. Even by the time of the conquest of China by the Manchus, in 1644, the Manchus' Chinese education was far advanced⁴⁴. In addition to the cultural and economic moving proclivity to China, Manchu rulers also seemed to recognize Chinese centrality in a political sense. In a note that Nurhaci, the founder of Manchu dynasty, wrote to the king of Korea in 1619 as follows: "There are all sorts of countries under Heaven; but only the great country [China] will flourish, while all the small countries will be destroyed?"⁴⁵ As a dynasty of an ethnic minority, the Manchus' policy since the early period had been increasingly blurring and de-emphasizing the racial distinctions in order to stabilize their dynastic rule. According to what Sun Yatsen said later, this

⁴¹ According to Urgunge Onon, Kangxi said in 1691 to the princes of southern and Northern Mongolia: "Should the Dai Ch'ing (Da Qing – the name of the dynasty) fall, you lead your own way of life." See, Urgunge Onon and Derrick Pritchatt, Asia's First Modern Revolution: Mongolia Proclaims its Independence in 1911 (E.J. Brill, 1989) pp.73.
policy had greatly weakened Chinese national consciousness.\textsuperscript{46}

\section*{2.1. Changed Manchu-Mongol Relations and Manchus' New Policy}

As mentioned earlier, the Manchu-Mongol relation in the beginning, was an alliance rather than a straightforward conquest, and Mongols used to think they were voluntary auxiliaries and allies rather than conquered subjects of Manchu dynasty\textsuperscript{47}. The Manchu-Mongol forces entered the Great Wall together in military campaigns against the armies of the Chinese Ming Dynasty and of the peasant rebels. Mongol aristocracy enjoyed a privileged status almost the same as the Manchus, since they “entered the Great Wall together with the dragon” (“sui long ru guan”). The rank of a ruling prince of Mongolia was the same as the rank of the Manchu princes. The highest rank a Chinese official could obtain was the red button, which was equal to the second or third rank of the princely banner in Mongolia.\textsuperscript{48}

The Mongolian and Manchu ancestral lands were protected from Chinese influence to keep them as the dynasty’s military reserve and as a place of retreat in case of a Manchu failing in their rule of China. In Manchuria, Chinese immigrants were allowed to settle only in the Liaodong Plain. During the reign of the Emperor Shunzhi (1644-1661), the Willow Palisades were built specifically to separate Mongolian land and Manchus ancestral land from the Liaodong Plain and the influx of Chinese immigrants. During the reign of the Emperor Kangxi (1662-1722), new parts were added to the Willow Palisades and it was completed in 1681. The Willow Palisades ran from Shanghaiguan northeastward to Kaiyuan (near Jilin), and from Kaiyuan south-eastward to the Yalu River. Chinese immigrants were forbidden to go beyond the Willow Palisades into Mongolian land, to the west of the Liaodong Plain and to Manchu ancestral land to the north of the Liaodong Plain.\textsuperscript{49}

Chinese colonization was first allowed in Qinghai and Jungharia in 1700s. There were Chinese settlements in Manchuria when the settlements were forbidden. In 1803 the rules forbidding Chinese settlement in Manchuria was relaxed, seasonal Chinese farm labors had been permitted to come in and were supposed at the end of the season to go home. A century later in 1908 when the New Policy was started, the old administration of the Manchuria as a special domain of the Manchu imperial house was abandoned, and a provincial system was set up which followed the norms of provinces inside the Great Wall.\textsuperscript{50} In Manchuria, Chinese settlements large enough to be organized as counties(xian) were allowed to be established as counties (Mongolian banners were only allow to accommodate several hundreds of Chinese peasants, one and two thousands at most). Chinese counties were set up at an accelerating speed. Nine counties were set up between 1729 and 1882, 25 between 1900 and 1911,

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{46} Sun Yatsen, “San Min Zhuyi Juti Banfa (the Practice of Doctrines of 3 Peoples)”, \textit{Sun Zhongshan Xuanji (Selected Works of Sun Yatsen)} (People’s Press, 1956) p.633.
\bibitem{47} Owen Lattimore, \textit{Mongol Journey}, Jonathan Cape Ltd. 1936, p.112
\bibitem{48} Urgunge Onon and Derrick Pritchatt, \textit{Asia’s First Modern Revolution: Mongolia Proclaims its Independence in 1911} (E.J. Brill, 1989) p.198.
\bibitem{50} Owen Lattimore and Urgunge Onon, \textit{Nationalism and Revolution in Mongolia} (New York: Oxford
more than 20 between 1921 and 1931.51

In 1791, the ruling Mongolian prince, Duke of the Front Gorlos Banner near Jilin (Kirin) memorialized the throne for permission to open tribal land for colonisation in order to legalise the status of many Zhili (Hebei) and Shangdong peasants who had already settled there. In 1799, the Manchu government agreed to set up the Chang Chun Sub-Prefecture in the settled area in order to administer the settlers by putting them under the direct jurisdiction of Jilin (Kirin) authority.52

Many factors caused Manchu dynasty to change its Mongolian policy. Mainly as a result of the encroachment of Tzarist Russia and other imperialist powers, the former homeland of Manchuria and the military reservoir of Mongolia began to be viewed by the Manchu house as frontier areas.53 As both internal and external crises escalated during the Manchu’s decline, the dynasty had to rely more and more on the Chinese to maintain the empire. The military Manchu-Mongol alliance lost the importance that it had before the Manchu’s conquest of China. The Manchus were by this time sinicized not only in a cultural and political sense, but also in an ethnic and psychological sense, and it began to be regarded by Chinese officials as the successor to and protector of the orthodox Confucianist culture.

The Manchu dynastic decline actually witnessed the expansion of Han Chinese power as noted before above. The Manchu dynasty was forced to break down the Manchu bannermen’s monopoly of military might and put the command of armies into Han Chinese hands.54 More and more Chinese officials occupied important military posts. The Manchu dynasty is the fourth greatest peak in the history of Chinese population growth55. The pressure of the population increase highlighted the shortage of farmland and the need to open more in non-Chinese frontier areas.

As Russian and Japanese intrusions in Manchuria and East Inner Mongolia put pressure on Manchu rulers, especially after the Manchu Qing’s defeat in the Sino-Japanese war in 1895, the sense of crisis felt by Manchu-Chinese officials and intellectuals deepened. Officials and statecraft scholars began to advocate for the reform of self-strengthening and to attack the segregation policy which forbade Chinese people to migrated to Manchuria and Mongolia. The New Policy is promulgated by Manchu

51 Owen Lattimore and Urgunge Onon, Nationalism and Revolution in Mongolia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1955), p.20
53 In 1907 Russo-Japanese Treaty was signed after Russian-Japanese War(1904-5), which set a dividing line between Russians and Japanese spheres of influence, that the term “Eastern Inner Mongolia”(i.e. east of the line) derives. See Ernest B. Price, The Russo-Japanese treaties of 1907-1916 concerning Manchuria and Mongolia, (Baltimore, 1933) in, Owen Lattimore and Urgunge Onon, (op. cit.) p.20.
55 Wang Long-di, "On the historical tendency of Mongolian population development and the prosperity of nationality’s population", Collection Of Papers: The 1st Annual Conference Of Nationality Society in IMAR, Edited by IMAR Nationality Society, 1982
dynasty was one of the modernizing and self-strengthening measures.

Seeking a solution to solve the dynastic and social crises, Chinese stagecraft scholars like Gong Zizhen and Wei Yuan advocated that the landless Chinese peasants should go to colonize Xinjiang and Mongolia to consolidate the frontiers, and also to relieve the pressure of lack of farmland in the traditional Chinese provinces. Wei Yuan, a forerunner of Chinese nationalist thinking, wrote in 1888, "The weakness of the Mongols is China's strength. To tame the Mongols of the Yellow Religion is China's best policy; and, indeed, from the point of view of Mongol interests, it is much better for them to live quietly, and multiply, with no other cares than those of finding pastureland water, then to swoop down upon frontiers as the Huns and Turks used to do, keep China under perpetual arms, and drench the plains with human gore. The policy is in fact, what may be called dispelling ferocity through charity, and guiding untamable men with the doctrine of rewards and punishments..."\(^5\)\(^6\)

There were some high-ranking officials in charge of the frontier regions who advocated setting up provincial administration in place of dependency administration, Fu and Xian ("Fu", Chinese for prefecture, "Xian" for county) to replace the leagues and banners.\(^5\)\(^7\) In 1887, the Shanxi Governor Hu Pinzhi suggested opening Mongolian land for the military cultivation [tun ken, the soldiers stationed in the frontiers also cultivate land and farm. In 1901, Chinese officials Zhang Zhidong and Liu Kunyi presented memorials to the Manchu emperor suggesting changes in the Manchus' Mongolian policy.\(^5\)\(^8\)

Before Jia Qing's reign, the Manchu court had consistently issued decrees forbidding the cultivation of Mongolian lands by Chinese immigrants, but the combination of famine-driven peasants and profit-seeking Mongolian princes continued to frustrate the decrees. During the reign of Jia Qing emperor (1796-1821), Manchu Qing dynasty began to officially change its Mongolian policy. In 1803, Manchu dynasty began to relax the rules forbidding Chinese settlement in Manchuria (including Jehol and eastern Mongolian areas). Emperor Jia Qing once said: "Mongolian's prosperity is China's misfortune; Mongol's weakness is China's fortune".\(^5\)\(^9\)

There were 3 large-scale cultivation openings (Fang Ken) during the 130 years from 1803 to 1930.\(^6\)\(^0\)

As Chinese immigrants flooded in, many Chinese administrations were set up in Inner Mongolia:


\(^{57}\) Yu Barn, (op. cit.) p.138.

\(^{58}\) Ibid. p.136.

\(^{59}\) *Da Qing Ren Zong Shi Lu (Records of Ren Zong Emperor's Reign)*, Vol. 8, *Da Qing Li Chao Shi Lu (Administrative Records of Qing Dynasty)*, Pack No.65, see, Yu Barn, Nei Menggu Lishi (Inner Mongolian History, Shanghai People's Press, 1958) p. 130.


Chaoyang, Jiangchang, Jiangping, Linyuan, Fuxin, Suidong, Chifeng, Kailu, Linxi, Changtu, Liaoyuan (Zhengjiatun), Huaihe, Fenghua, Kangping, Zhaonan, Jingan, Anguang, Zhendong, Kaitong, Jiuquan, Zhangwu, Fadu (Fakumen), Changchun (Kuaichengzi), Nongan, Changling, Dehui, Dalai, Zaozhou, Changwu, Anda, Baotou, Salaqi, Tuoketuo, Helinger, Qingshuihe, Fengzhen, Ningyuan (Liangcheng), Xinghe, Wuchuan, Wuyuan, Taoln, Dongshen, Hailar (Hulun-buir Cheng), Lubin (Manzhouli Tiedaona), Jilalin (Shiwei), and so forth.

In 1902, the Manchu dynasty decreed an order to cultivate Mongolian land and to allow Mongolian princes to open Mongolian land for bidding. Special commissioners were sent to take charge of the cultivation and in cultivated areas many related administrative organs were set up such as the Cultivation Bureaus, Animal Husbandry Companies, Agricultural Companies. In the Mongolian areas that were open to Chinese cultivation, Chinese administration areas were set up such as Fu, Ting, Zhou and Xian (Ting was later called Xian in Republic period).

In 1906 the Chinese official Zuo Shaozuo suggested that the three provinces of Jehol, Chakhar and Suiyuan be created in Inner Mongolia. In 1908, the old administration of the Manchurian provinces as a special domain of the Manchuria imperial house was abandoned, and a provincial system was set up which followed the norms of provinces inside the Great Wall.

In 1906, “the New Policy” was promulgated by the Manchu Dynasty to modernise and strengthen the declining empire, but to Mongols, the “New Policy” accelerated Chinese migration into Mongolian homeland. The “New Policy” contained 14 articles altogether, according to which following changes were made. The Council of Dependency (Li Fan Yuan) was renamed the Ministry of Dependency (Li Fan Bu), within which two bureaus of investigation (dian cha) and editing (bian zhuang) were created. The purpose of these organization changes were to investigate Mongolian land, make policies concerning the reform of Mongolian land in the aspects of animal farming, cultivation, administration, opening of mines, forestry, fishery, schools, training a modern army, and so forth. The Immigration Bureau (Yi Min Ju) was established in 1906-7 in Peking, to encourage Chinese farmers to settle in Northern Mongolia.

At the same time, the Qing government also declared the following points to the ambassadors of all countries: Firstly, Mongolians should not be in contact with other countries directly; Secondly, no countries should give loans to Mongolia. To carry out the policy, a foreign office was set up in each Mongolian banner to handle foreign affairs.

In 1909, the Manchu court demanded that local generals, ministers, governors and governor-generals

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62 Houhe, Ibid. p.281.
63 Yu Barn, (op. cit.) p.136.
64 Those three Mongolian regions mentioned weren’t set up as provinces immediately, they were set up first as special administrative regions in 1914 by Yuan Shikai’s government, then KMT government changed those special administrative regions into Chinese style provinces in 1928.
of frontier provinces were to discuss how to open Mongolia. In 1910, all bans on cultivating Mongolian land were lifted, and landless Chinese peasants were encouraged to migrate to Mongolia together with their families. The decrees forbidding Mongol-Chinese marriages were annulled, Mongols began to be allowed to learn Chinese, adopt Chinese names, use Chinese clerks, and issue documents in Chinese.

In the same year, the Ministry of Dependency, following the Emperor’s decree, set up the Department of Constitutional State Preparation, merged the two bureaus of investigation and editing, set up the Research Institute of Dependency Politics, and appointed Consultative Officials do study the dependency politics with the officials in the Ministry of Dependency. In all Mongolian banners, Chinese and Mongol schools were established, and in Manchuria, a Mongolian language newspaper was founded.66

As Onon Urgunge concluded on the New Policy in the Outer Mongolia, “the Manchu dynasty’s New Policy in Outer Mongolia was adopted. This was firstly, to prevent Russian and Japanese influence from spreading in Mongolia and, secondly, to protect the Chinese money lending capital in Mongolia.”67

As a result of the New Policy, Chinese merchants flooded in Outer Mongolia and dominated trading and other industries. In 1909, the Manchu government surveyed 9.25 million acres of farmland in Tusheet Khan Aimag for Chinese settlers. In the same year, the Manchus started to take a census of both men and livestock in Outer Mongolia. More than 20 new governmental organizations were established in Khuree, in addition to the office of the Imperial Resident. The expense of the new office buildings and the military barracks and food and firewood were paid for by the Mongols. By 1911, the Mongolian economy was bankrupt and Mongols owed about 11 million tael (one tael = one ounce) of silver to the Chinese shops in Mongolia. By 1924, the total debt reached 30 million taels of silver, equal to the worth of half of all the livestock of Mongolia.68 In addition to these debts, the Mongolian commoners had to pay official Chinese taxes and levies.

The political policy toward Mongolia was that of divide and rule to frozen and permanent the division, prevent the merger and emergence of inter-regional leaders. The Manchus set up the League and Banner system in Mongolia which reduced the possibility of Mongolian unification by institutionalizing the divisions further. Mongolia was divided into 213 banners. South Mongolia (Inner Mongolia) was divided into 6 leagues (aimag in Mongolian) according to the six autonomous khanates established after Dayan Khan’s unification. North Mongolia (Outer Mongolia) was divided into 4 leagues.

Under the New Policy, the economic policy can be summarized in Chinese words as “borrow

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66 Yu Bam, (op.cit) p.138.
68 Urgunge Onon and Derrick Pritchatt, Asia’s First Modern Revolution: Mongolia Proclaims its
(Mongolian) land to nurture (Chinese) people" (jie di yang min). The Cultural policy of obscurantism to encourage the monastic establishments in Mongolia and encourage Mongol males to join the monastaries as a means to control Mongols was changed. An assimilationist policy was adopted. Before the new policy, Mongols were not allowed to learn Chinese and marry Chinese. Since the New Policy began, Mongols were encouraged to learn Chinese and marry Chinese. Because of the Manchus' Mongolian policies, Mongolian nomadism began to decay in 18CC and the Mongols were no longer capable of launching wars to consolidate and defend the now dispersed and impoverished nomadic Mongols. The New Policy indicated that Mongols had lost their former importance to Manchu dynasty and the former Manchu dynastic rule based on Manchu-Mongol alliance had changed into one based on Manchu-Chinese alliance.

The Mongolian decline was also reflected by shrinking population. The Chinese population grew from 100 million at Qian Long's reign to more than 400 million at the end of Qing dynasty, increasing by three times. In 1800, the Mongolian-speaking population was estimated at around 3.5 million, among which 700,000 were in Outer Mongolia, 2.6 million were in Inner Mongolia, and 200,000 were in Xinjiang and Qinghai. At the end of the Qing dynasty, the Mongolian-speaking population was only 2.52 million, among which only 1.18 million were in Inner Mongolia. In contrast to a four-fold increase in the Chinese population, the Mongolian population in the 100 years from 1800 decreased by 70%, and further decreased by 30% from the end of the Qing dynasty to the beginning of Communist China.

2.2. The Independence Of Khalkha Mongolia
The causes for the independence of North Mongolia (Khalkha Mongolia) were more than a scramble between Tzarist Russia and Manchu China; and the independence as declared by the Khalkha Mongols was provoked by the Manchus New Policy in Mongolia. It also should be noted that the 1911 Mongolian independence was also pan-Mongolian in nature.

Independence activities had begun as early as 1900 among Khalkha princes and high ranking lamas when Badamdorj, a high-ranking lama, and Tseren-odsor were sent as representatives of Bogd Javzundamba (1870-1924) to Russia for to ask for assistance for Mongolian independence. Bogd Javzundamba Khutugatu (saint) was the head of the Yellow sect in Mongolia. In the Khalkha

Independence in 1911 (op. cit.) p.4.
70 Wang Long-di, (op. cit.)
72 Quoted from Thorough Ching Documents Supplementary, issue 25, in Wang Long-di, "On the historical tendency of Mongolian population development and the prosperity of nationality's population", Collection Of Papers: The 1st Annual Conference Of Nationality Society in IMAR, Edited by IMAR Nationality Society, 1982
73 Urgunge Onon and Derrick Pritchatt, Asians' First Modern Revolution: Mongolia Claim its Independence in 1911, E.J. Brill, 1989. p.15
Mongolian region, he ranked third after the Dalai Lama and the Banchan Erdeni (Panchen Lama) in the hierarchy of all of the Yellow Sect. Although he was a religious leader, he also wielded great political influence and led the independence movement.

He sent Chin Van Khanddorj, Da Lama Tserenchimid and Khaisan, a high-ranking official from Southern Mongolia, on a secret mission to seek arms and capital from Russia in order to fight the Manchu army. It should be noted that Chin Van Khanddorj was representing the secular lords and Da Lama Tserenchimid the ecclesiastical lords of Northern Mongolia, while Khaisan’s representation signified the inclusion of Southern Mongolia in the movement, which therefore shows its pan-Mongolian character. The delegation left for St. Petersburg in July 1911 and returned in October soon after the Wu Chang Mutiny (Oct. 10, 1911) that signaled the end of the Qing and the birth of the Chinese Republic.

Russia’s reaction was not to offer straightforward support since they feared arousing the suspicions of the Japanese. Nevertheless, the Russian government decided to send 200 Cossack soldiers with machine-guns to Khuree. And the Russian Secretary of the War Ministry, Sukhomlinov, at this same time, gave 15,000 Vintov rifles and 75 million rounds of ammunition to the headquarters of the Irkutsk military region for transfer to the Mongols.

On 28 November 1911, Mongolian princes ordered the mobilization of 4,000 Mongols soldiers from the neighboring khushuu of Khuree on the pretext of sending the Mongolian army to Peking to protect the Manchu emperor from the Chinese revolts. At the same time, about 800 well-equipped Russian soldiers arrived in Khuree to guard Russian consulate personnel. On 1 December 1911 the Mongols issued an ultimatum to Sandoo, the Manchu Imperial Resident, that he leave within a few days. Sandoo at the time could call upon only 130 poorly-equipped Chinese soldiers, and he and other Manchu and Chinese officials left Outer Mongolia on 4 December 1911 for China.74

On 29 December 1911 (the 9th day of the middle winter month (11th lunar month) of the White Female Pig Year), Khalkha Mongolia declared its independence. In the proclamation of the elevation of the Bogd as Great Khan, it read “We have elevated the Bogd, radiant as the sun, myriad aged, as the Great Khan of Mongolia,...”. Khuree will be the capital, and the official name of the nation will be ‘Olnoo Orgogdson’ (elevated by all), We have established an independent nation...”75

Some Mongol historians later named their newly-established nation in the Great Chinggis Khan’s tradition, “Ikh Mongol Ulus” (great Mongolian nation) or “Ikh Mongol Tor” (great Mongol dynasty). The national flag with the emblem of “Soyombo”(a Buddhist design symbolizing the triple function of looking with eyes, hearing with ears, and meditating with mind, the symbol is still used as the emblem of the Mongolian state76) was housed in Khuree for the first time since Tsogt Taij (1581-1636) had

74 Urgunge Onon and Derrick Pritchatt, (op. cit.) p.15.
75 Ibid.
used it against the Manchus.

With the Wu Chang Mutiny in 10 October 1911, Mongolian independence was also intended to prevent the new Chinese government from claiming sovereignty over Outer Mongolia. Bogd Javzundamba was elevated to the throne of the Great Khan as a successor of Chinggis Khan’s lineage even though he was a Tibetan born in Tibet. It also meant that Mongols again got the title of “Great khan” back from the Manchu emperor who had ceased to function. The Great Khan was meant to cover all the Mongols of Southern and Northern Mongolia. The new state declared that all Mongolian-inhabited territory north of the Great Wall was the legitimate land of the Mongolian state.

Political changes in the independent Mongolian state between the initial declaration of independence 1911 with a theocratic rule and the establishment in 1921 of the People’s Republic of Mongolia show that the Mongols were less sure of the new political authority they were going to have than the traditional one they wanted to replace. In 1915 the Khiahta Tripartite Treaty signed by Russia, China and Mongolia made Mongolia abandon independence but remain autonomous under Chinese suzerainty. In 1919, Xu Shuzheng, a pro-Japanese Chinese warlord invaded Mongolia and briefly cancelled Mongolian autonomy before he was driven out by “Mad Baron” Ungern-sternberg. The independence of Mongolia was possible because Mongols got necessary help from Tsarist Russians and the Soviet Union to fend off Chinese intervention.

Mongols in Inner Mongolia faced a more difficult situation: they had to deal with the new Chinese authority, and with Chinese nationalists and their concept of a modern Chinese nation. It is relatively easy for a Mongolian lordship to be transferred to or succeeded by a Manchu lord as long as the latter functions in the same way. But in an age of nationalism, it is more difficult to convince Mongols to accept nationalist authority from another people. This is difficult because the justification of the authority is more individual and it has to convince each Mongol that they were not what they always thought they were, they were now part of new nation with a different way of life, with different cultural and political traditions.

The independence of Mongolia in 1911 and De Wang’s collaboration with the Japanese both indicate that Mongolian interests are interests separate from those of the Chinese, and that when faced with outside forces, they chose “the lesser among two evils”. Regarding the fact that some Mongolian nationalist forces came under Ulanhu’s leadership, their collaboration with the CPC can be explained by their goal against a common enemy for both the Mongolian nation and the CPC: Jiang Kaishek and local warlords like Yan Xishan and Fu Zuoyi.

3. Mongolian Nationalism in Inner Mongolia

3.1. Chinese Colonisation In The End Of Manchu Qing And Chinese Republic
Inner Mongolia had been divided into 49 banners when Mongols were organized in the same banner system as Manchus in the Manchu-Mongol military alliance before 1644 when they entered the Great
Wall. The head of an aimag (league) was only an honorary position without real power. Being more divided than Khalkha Mongol, there was no political and religious leader in Inner Mongolia as powerful as the 8th Jevzundamba was in Outer Mongolia. Because of the reality of a divided Inner Mongolia, the traditional Mongolian aristocracy was unable to provide a powerful leader for revolt and resistance against the Chinese assimilationist pressures. More unified and nationalistic movements did not emerge until various modern political ideologies were introduced to Mongols.

The first modern political party in Inner Mongolia was the Inner Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (IMPRP) founded in 1 March, 1925. Because it was founded during the time of cooperation between the CCP and the KMT, it was under the sway of the competing influences of the Russians, Chinese Communists, Northern Mongolians, and Chinese Nationalists. After the IMPRP was founded, it was an autonomous movement led by the Prince Demuchigdungrub, and although he belonged to the traditional ruling class, he represented modern nationalism. After World War Two when Japan was defeated, a pro-Chinese communist autonomous movement led by Ulanhu began to gain power in Inner Mongolia. Although they was subject to substantive and diverse external influences, these political movements in Inner Mongolia all centered upon a nationalist theme.

On Jan 1, 1912, the Chinese republic was established in Nanjing (Nanking), Sun Yatsen was appointed provisional president while the north was controlled by Yuan Shikai in the name of the Manchu monarch. Sun Yatsen's Provisional Constitution was promulgated in February 1912. Article 2 of the constitution provided that the "territory of the Republic of China includes 22 provinces, Inner and Out Mongolia, Tibet and Kokonor (Qinghai)". Under such provision, in theory, Chinese colonization was no longer needed to be carried out in accordance with the Manchu dynasty's excuse of "borrowing land". The initial reaction from Mongolian princes in Beijing towards the Chinese republic was negative.

In December 1911 negotiations started between Sun's republic in the South and the representative of the Manchu dynasty in the north on the matters of unification, abdication, treatment of the imperial household and Mongolian princes, and so forth. Sun Yatsen demanded that Chinese provinces be set up in Mongolia, but the request was turned down by the north because of resistance from Mongolian princes. Mongolian lobbying took place in the forum of the Association of Mongolian Princes and Nobles. Prince Nayantu as spokesman for 24 banners (8 Manchu banners, 8 Mongolian banners and 8 Chinese banners), spoke in favor of Manchu monarchism and against the republic. A compromise was finally reached between the two sides, with the Mongols supporting the Chinese republic and in return, the Mongols were promised that the traditional Mongolian system (both Inner and Outer Mongolia) would remain intact. A final compromise reached by the two side was the conclusion that "all Manchus, Mongols, Moslems and Tibetans are equal to Chinese so as to protect

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77 Jagchid Sechen, "Inner Mongolian Response to the Chinese Republic, 1911-1917"(op. cit.)
78 He later became an enthusiast supporter of Yuan shi-kai’s restoration of the monarchy. See, Jagchid Sechen, (op. cit.)
private property and preserve ranks among the nobility.

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In March of 1912 when Yuan Shikai became the president of the republic, he had a two-handed policy toward Mongols. On the one hand, he promised to protect the old system in Mongolia. On August 19, 1912, Regulations on Treatment toward Mongols was published by the Chinese government which promised the Mongolian ruling class that all the privileges and rights they enjoyed under the Qing dynasty would remain unaltered. It was also a gesture to the Outer Mongolian ruling class to win them back. On the other hand, he accelerated the policy of "divide and rule" in Inner Mongolia. The purpose was to control Inner Mongolia more tightly to avoid further separation.

To strengthen its control of Mongolian banners and leagues in Inner Mongolia, the Yuan Shi-kai government carried out two important measures: one was to set up a Mongolian-Tibetan administrative organ under the Beijing government; the other was to set up the three special administrative regions of Jehol, Chakhar, and Suiyuan in Inner Mongolia.

In May 1912 the Beijing government set up the Department of Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs under its interior ministry. In May 1914, following the Manchu Qing example, the Department of Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs was elevated as Mongolian-Tibetan Yuan, directly responsible to the president.

The "divide and rule" policy carved up Inner Mongolia. The leagues of Hulun-buir and Jerim were separated out and put under the administrations of Heilongjiang Province and Jilin Province. In January 1914, the Suiyuan special administrative region was set up which included 12 counties, Guihua city (Huhhot), two special banners of Tumed, two leagues of Ulaanchab and Ikh Zuu. In February, the Chakhar Special Region was set up which included the Jehol region, Josotu and Juu-uda two Leagues. In March, the Chakhar Special Administrative Region was set up to include the Xinggan Region and the Shilinggol League, the 8 banners of Chakhar tribe. Governor-generals were the top officials in charge of the three regions.

Two years after Yuan Shikai came to power, he was in even more control in terms of dealing with nationalist revolutionaries in the south and the Mongol ruling class in the north. In 1914 large-scale cultivation of Mongolian lands began, which were much larger in scale than the cultivation that had been carried out at the end of Manchu Qing dynasty. In February 1914, the ministries of the Interior, Agriculture-Commerce, and Finance together with Mongolian-Tibetan Yuan made the Ban on Unauthorized Opening Mongolian Lands for Cultivation, Award Measures to Cultivating Mongolian

79 On 9 Feb. 1912, the Nanking Provisional Government passed three documents on the Republic government's attitude toward Mongolian princes. The main content of the documents was that the private property of Mongolian aristocracy and their hereditary titles were to remain as before, and their faith in the Tibetan religion was to remain the same. The documents are: Favorable Conditions in the Post-abdication of Qing Emperor, Favorable Treatment Conditions about Royal Family, Treatments toward Manchus, Chinese, Moslems and Tibetans. Tian Zhihe, Feng Xuezhong, Minguo Chu Mengqi Duli Shijian Yanjiu (Study on "Independence" Incidents in Mongolian Banners in the Early Years of Chinese Republic) (Inner Mongolian People's Press, 1991) p.190.
Lands. In 1915 the Regulations of Frontier Wild Land was published. The new policy forbade Mongolian banners to open lands for Chinese cultivation without the central government’s authorization. Yet, the more land that Mongolian banners provided for cultivation, the more rewards the ruling princes could get from the central government, such as medals, official titles, etc.. Half of the profit involved in the land lease and sale was surrendered to the state, the remaining half was kept by the Mongolian banners. The best grazing were being taken away from Mongol herdsmen, and as a result their livelihood suffered.

The death of Yuan Shikai in 1915 was followed by the period of turmoil known as warlordism. Chinese warlords in neighboring Chinese provinces separately controlled large part of Inner Mongolia. Warlords' control of of Inner Mongolia did not completely end until 1947. The cultivation of Mongolian lands became the major means for the Chinese warlords to make profits and retain and enlarge their power.

The Chinese warlord Zhang Zuolin in Manchuria use his military power to force Mongolian princes in the area to open Mongolian grazing land for Chinese cultivation. In 1916, he forcibly opened 180,000 hectares of rich river valley in the Darkhan Prince Banner. In 1922 Zhang Zuolin again forcibly seized 126,000 hectares to the west of Tongliao.

Warlords Zhang Yuting, Wu Junsheng, both Zhang Zuolin's henchmen, followed Zhang’s example in seizing Mongolian lands. In 1924 Wu Junsheng forced a 99-year “lease” of 2,000 hectares of land in the Rear Banner of Khorchin Right Wing. At the same time Wu Junsheng together with Yang Tingyu seized 2,200 hectare of cultivated land in the same banner. Wu Junan, Wu Junsheng’s brother, occupied a large parcels of land in the Jelim League as both farmland and grazing land and made a profit over 70 million silver dollars (Yin Yuan).

In the same year, Zhang Zuolin drew up the Program of Opening and Cultivation of Mongolian Lands, the purpose of which was not only to tender offer of Mongolian lands to Chinese immigrants but also to send his troops out for military cultivation of the land. Zhang Zuolin was the first person to begin the large-scale planned cultivation of Mongolian lands in the east of Inner Mongolia and from among all the warlords in Manchuria, he obtained and consolidated more cultivated Mongolian land than all the others.

In the west of Inner Mongolia, warlords seized and cultivate Mongolian lands as the major means to pay their soldiers and make profit. In the 8-year period from October 1912 to December 1920, the four consecutive Suiyuan Governor-generals seized 552,970 hectare of land, and 132,700 taels of silver and 14,560,000 silver dollars (Yin Yuan) by way of seizing land. In 1914 in Tuned Banner a Six County Measuring Bureau was set up. The bureau demanded that Mongol farmers pay for the price of their land in land certificates; if they could not afford the price, the land ownership would be transferred to Chinese farmers who could afford the price.

In 1926 after the Shanxi warlord Yan Xishan occupied Mongolia, he confiscated the land from the
peasants who lagged behind their mortgages while at the same time he continued to open Mongolian
grassland. When Li Zhongming, Fu Yuxiang’s henchman, was Suiyuan governor-general, he opened
36,045 hectares of land and made a profit of 1.62 million silver dollars (Yin Yuan).80

From end of the Manchu Qing dynasty to 1928, 198,492 hectares of land were opened for cultivation
in the Suiyuan region alone. The land opened at the end of Qing dynasty accounted for 40% of the
total number of 198,492 hectares, the land opened from 1912 to 1913 accounted for 0.6%, from 1914
to 1928 59.4%.

According to an investigation made in the republic period, since 1915 the price of the “wild” land in
the Chakhar Special Region was so cheap that the rich Chinese merchants, landlords, officials and
politicians from all over the country were enthusiastically bidding on the newly opened land. The new
land made many of them extremely rich and many of them became landlords with thousands and ten
thousands hectares of land. “Those who got several hectares are as many as the stars in the sky, those
who got under one hundred and several hundred hectares are not extraordinary, and those who got
several hundred to several thousand hectares are many.”81

In Linhe County, where there were 60,000 hectares of cultivated land, there were two big Chinese
landlords who had farmlands with holdings of over 20,000 hectares, 4 landlords with land over 667
hectares, 9 landlords with land over 67 hectares. And the Catholic church owned nearly 10,000
hectares farm land. These big landowners now held nearly 90% of the farmland of the whole county.
As a result of warlord cultivation of Mongolian lands, in Inner Mongolia “farmland became
increasingly larger, grazing land increasingly smaller and Mongolian herdsmen’s livelihood harder” .82

While the officially organized colonization represented the Chinese ruling class’ colonialist policy
toward Mongols, the vigilante groups and secret societies organized by the Chinese settlers
represented common popular antagonism toward Mongols. In eastern Inner Mongolia, the most
famous of the gangs of Chinese settlers was the Jin Dan Dao Society (Golden Pill Society), in the west
of Inner Mongolia, the most famous example was the rag-to-riches landlord Wang Tongchun.

By the latter part of the Manchu Qing dynasty, the southern region of both the Jiu-uda League and
Josotu League were heavily settled by the Chinese, many of whom were deeply influenced by the
historically rebellious White Lotus Society (Bai Lian Jiao), a militant Buddhist Sect. In 1891, a group
of Chinese in the Ch’anyang and Aukhan Banner areas organized the Jin Dan Dao society (the way of
golden pills), to fight for the restoration of the Chinese, the extermination of the Manchus and
Mongols, and to fight against the foreign Christians. They killed the prince of Aukhan, disrupted the
three Kharachin banners of Josotu League, and killed [massacred?] men, women, and children in these
areas. This Chinese peasant revolt was crushed by the Manchu-Chinese forces and by Mongolian

80 Hao Weimin, ed. (op. cit.) p.94.
81 Hao Weimin, Ibid.
82 Hao Weimin, Ibid.
Wang Tongchun came from neighboring Zhili province as a landless peasant, and he took tremendous amount of farmland from Mongols by violence and chicanery. Wang Tongchun in the Hetao area (the rich irrigation areas in the Ordos bend of the Yellow River) had superb farmland of over ten thousand hectares, with an annual grain harvest of 20,000 hectoliters. He built up his own fortresses and maintained a private bandit army of over 100 soldiers. After the harvests like many other big border landlords, he often sent out his retainers on freebooting forays that ranged for hundreds of miles in a great curve sweeping from the Hetao region up into northwestern Manchuria.

3.2. Mongolian Anti-Colonial Uprisings And Responses To The 1911 Mongolian Independence

Ordinary Mongols were more concerned about Chinese colonization, they were not interested in monarchist or republic politics of China. Whether republic or monarchist made little difference to them in terms of Chinese colonization. In the republic period in the newly established Chinese administrative territories in Inner Mongolia such as Chakhar, Suiyuan, the military and civilian officials were hangovers from the Ching. But in Manchuria, the new governors of the three new provinces were formerly Chinese bandits who had a history of early confrontation between local Mongolian peoples and Chinese settlers. Among the warlords in Manchuria, Zhang Zuolin had the most aggressive policy in terms of occupying Mongolian lands as noted above. After Zhang Zuolin, his son Zhang Xuelang dominated eastern Inner Mongolia until the Manchurian Incident of 1931. In eastern Inner Mongolia, there were locally organized uprisings against the Chinese colonizers, many of which were branded as being formed of Mongolian bandits. In western Inner Mongolia, the most famous rebellion was Dughuilang, a form of a secret society in which participants signed their names in a circle so that no ringleader could be recognized.

The Mongolian uprisings in the latter part of the 19th century took place after a period of two centuries of peace which had begun after the the Chakhar uprisings in 1657 had been quelled by the Manchu dynasty. This indicates that Mongol-Chinese ethnic tensions reached a breaking point mainly due to the drastically increased Chinese colonization. Though some of the uprisings were directed at the unscrupulous Mongolian ruling class, the social tensions within Mongolian society were directly or indirectly related to Chinese colonization.

“Mongolian Bandits” in Eastern Inner Mongolia

The Mongolian areas within the three Northeast provinces were under more severe cultivation pressure than other areas in Inner Mongolia. It was under such circumstances that out of all the

83 Jagchid Sechin, “An Interpretation of Mongolian Bandits (Mengfei)”, Essays In Mongolian Studies, Volume 3 in Monograph Series of the David M. Kennedy Center for International Studies (Brigham Young University, 1988) p193
85 The part is mainly drawn from Jagchid Sechin, “An Interpretation of Mongolian Bandits (Mengfei)”, Essays In Mongolian Studies, Volume 3 in Monograph Series of the David M. Kennedy Center for
Mongolian anti-Chinese colonization uprisings, most took place in eastern Inner Mongolia. The most famous were Toghtogh Taiji’s anti-Chinese Revolt (1908-11) and Babujab’s revolt (1913-16). The Mongolians who participated in these uprisings were usually labeled by the Chinese as “Mongolian bandits”. The phenomenon drew the attention of Owen Lattimore in his book on the Mongols of Manchuria. According to Jagchid Sechen, those so-called Mongolian bandits were mainly involved in uprisings against the Chinese colonization. These rebellions contained members from both the upper and lower classes. And many of them were sympathetic and supportive toward the Independence movement in Khalkha Mongolia.

In the Mongol-Chinese conflicts in the Chinese-settled areas, there were both Chinese and Mongol bandits and vigilantes. The Chinese groups were much more powerful and aggressive. The Liu-Lama Band of the Tumed Right Flank Banner (Chaoyang District), and the Josotu League from 1851 to 1852 were early examples. There were also so-called Ma Ze (Bandits on horseback”), of which the Manchurian Warlord Zhang Zuolin was a prominent example. Jilanggha Taiji of Keshigten Banner, Juu-uda League, 1890, was typical of many groups on horseback.

The Bilinggha-Milsengge Band of Josotu League from 1862 to 1868 was a large group which looted Chinese towns near Mukden, Chaoyang, Chiencchang Chinghomen, and along the Great Wall. They were protected by Mongols in Mongol territory until their capture by Manchu forces.

Many Mongolian revolts were against the tyrannical Mongol overlords. A typical example was Prince Sewangnorbusangbu, Jasagh of Tushiyetu (Khorchin Right Middle) Banner and Chief of the Jerim league, who put a heavy tax upon the Mongols within his banner to fund his luxurious life-style. In 1901, banner officials and the ordinary people rebelled spontaneously, forcing him to hang himself. As a result the leaders of the banner, such as Khuwaliyasun, Toghtogh, Namkhainingbu, Khuwaliyan, and more than thirty others were executed by the Manchu Qing court. There were other cases wherein the ruling princes were assassinated by Mongol rebels.

One popular uprising of the common people was the Lao Tou Hui movement. It took place in the Tumet Left Banner, Josotu League from 1860 to 1867. The fertile grazing fields of this banner were increasingly being cultivated by the Chinese settlers, and the Mongols’ livelihood was steadily deteriorating. The elders (lao tou) of this banner organized an association and led the people in armed resistance against the exploitative and corrupt banner administration. After an investigation, many commoner leaders including Chojintai, Namsarai, Chaghanbator, and Enkebatur were executed. The rebellion of the Eight Sumun, Tumend Right Banner, Josotu league from 1861 to 1870 was influenced by the Lao Tou Hui movement mentioned above. Popular leaders, i.e., Changming, Danjur, Derchinjab, and others, stirred up the people in eight sumun (local units) of the banner to refuse military service and the payment of taxes. This was a mass movement against both Manchu and Mongolian authorities. The leaders of the rebellion were either killed or exiled.

International Studies (Brigham Young University, 1988) p193
The Revolt at Tokum in Jasaghtu Banner, Jerim League from 1899 to 1901 was a larger popular movement. This armed revolt was a co-operative movement among the Mongols of Jasaghtu and its neighboring banners whose livelihood was depressed because of poor administration and high taxes. Leaders of the uprising, Ghombosangbu and Wang Lao Hu, were outsiders who came in to help foment the popular uprising. Russian forces were also involved in the incident.

More recent and more fresh in the Mongols' memory are the anti-cultivation revolts. Ghadaa Meiren (Meiren: title of banner administrator), a leader in these revolts, has become the best-known national hero for Mongols today and a famous folk song about his heroic deeds is sung on almost every occasion when national sentiments are expressed.

In the Jerim League, the Choghdalai Rebellion in Jalaid Banner in 1907 was an early example of anti-cultivation revolts. After the Boxer Rebellion (1900), the Manchu Qing government accelerated its policy of land development and Chinese settlement north of the Great Wall. Eastern Inner Mongolia was the focus of the policy, and Jalaid banner was one of the main areas. As a backlash, in 1907, Choghadalai, the meiren of the banner, led a group of Mongols and killed Khafenggha, a Mongol collaborating with the Chinese. Then the group rose in armed rebellion and destroyed the Chinese administrative offices and settlements. This movement continued for almost one year.

A decade later between 1929 and 1930 again in the Jerim League, the Ghadaa Meiren in Darkhan (Khorchin Left Middle) Banner led another revolt. It was then a few years before the Manchurian Incident (1931)\(^\text{87}\), and Chinese development of Mongolian lands in the Jerim League was being forcibly carried out by General Zhang Zuolin. The Manchu wife of Namjilsereng, the prince of the Darkhan Banner, collaborated with the Chinese for personal gain and was the main promoter of Chinese settlement and cultivation. Ghadaa, a meiren of the same banner, strongly opposed her policy. He struggled in vain to stop the Chinese colonization and finally gathered his followers in an armed rebellion against her, her husband, Prince Namjilsereng and the Chinese.

In Turned Left Banner of Josotu League in 1908, an uprising led by Bayandalai arose purely from the common Mongols without any leadership from the upper class. The armed struggle destroyed Chinese settlements in the districts of Changwu, Taoan, Huaide, and Tuquan, all of which were Chinese districts (or counties) that had been established within the Jerim League. This revolt was finally crushed by Chinese forces.

In Jarud Left Banner, Juu-uda League in 1913, Ghombojab' a rebellion led by Ghombojab was directed against the Prince Dobjai, Jasag (banner administrative head) of the banner, because he was a corrupt official who collaborated with Chinese officials to sell banner land to Chinese settlers. Ghombojab, Tusalghchi (vice-head) of the same banner opposed the prince's policies. He gathered the people, killed the prince, raided the Chinese city of Kailu, and destroyed the Chinese settlements

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\(^{86}\) Jagchid Sechen, (Ibid.)

\(^{87}\) In the incident, Zhang Zuolin was assassinated by the Japanese when his train exploded by means of a bomb fixed on a bridge in a place called Huang Gu Tun.
within the three banners of Left Jarud, Right Jarud, and Aru-Khorchin of the Juu-uda League. Finally, being outnumbered by Chinese forces, the rebels escaped to Outer Mongolia.

Mongolian Uprisings in Western Inner Mongolia

In Western Inner Mongolia, it was the same as in the Eastern region, with Mongols' uprisings against Chinese settling being as old as the Chinese colonization. One early uprising was led by Bayanoljei in Urad Front Banner, Ulanchab League in 1856. Bayanoljei was a high official of the Urad Front Banner and he led a group in burning Chinese settlements and in killing the settlers.

Baghadorji and Shobghor led a rebellion group near Hohhot, Tumed banner and Ulanchab League in 1870. This group robbed the Chinese in the vicinity of Hohhot and the north of the Mongnai Mountains (Da Qing Shan). They had support from Mongol officials of the Muu-Mingghan banner, Ulanchab league.

In western Inner Mongolia, Mongols' resistance to the Christian churches was also related to Chinese cultivation. By the time of the Boxer Rebellion in North China in 1900, western Inner Mongolia was offended by missionary activity, especially in the Dalad Banner, Ikh Zuu League, the Doren-keud Banner of Ulanchab league, and the Alashan Banner. However, Mongolian opposition to the Christian churches was quite different from the Chinese Boxers. The Mongols were against the churches not only because they propagated a faith contrary to Buddhism, but because the churches supported Chinese occupation of Mongol lands. In the settlement of the Boxer Rebellion, the churches received even more land from the Mongolian banners, thus increasing the hatred. Therefore, until the end of the Qing Dynasty there were always problems between the pastoral Mongols and those Chinese settlers who were under church protection.

The Dughuilang movements first happened in Jeunghar (Ordos left Front) Banner, Ikh Zuu League (Ordos) between 1906 and 1908. In 1902 Yigu, the Manchu Governor-General of Suiyuan, forced the banners of both Ikh Zuu Leagues and Ulanchab Leagues to open their land to Chinese settlers for cultivation. In 1906, a Dughuilang-type, popular and secretly planned movement broke out in the Jeunghar Banner but its leaders were killed by Yigu. Later, Mongols under the leadership of Dampil Taiji organized another Dughuilang and situation became more serious. Finally, Dampil and six other persons were executed by Yigu in 1908 and the movement was crushed.

In the republic period, Dughuilang movements revived in Ikh Zuu League on a much larger scale in the republic period in the form of armed struggle. Dughuilang movements broke out in the banners of

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88 The part is mainly drawn from Jagchid Sechen (op. cit.) and Hao Weimin, ed. Nei Monggu Lishi (Inner Mongolian Recent History) (Inner Mongolian University Press, 1990) p. 28.
89 Dughuilang means "in a circle", it was a form of rebel organization that originated in the Ordos areas and then became widespread to all Mongolian areas. The members of a Dughuilang are all supposed to be equal. They write their names down in a circle so that no one can be singled out as the leader. See Owen Lattimore, Nationalism and Revolution in Mongolia, p.23, Oxford University Press, 1955.
90 Jagchid Sechen, (op. cit.) p.193.
Uushin, Hangjin, Dalad and Otog. The targets of these movements were Chinese warlords and Mongolian princes who sold Mongolian interests to Chinese. The most prominent Dughuilangs were the two in the Uushin Banner and Dalad Banner.

The Dughuilang of Uushin Banner was led by the famous Shine Lama. He organized 11 Dughuilang organizations in the banner. The Dughuilang movement controlled the whole banner and put forward the following demands: a ban on the sale of the banner’s land and punishment to those who did the selling; and the banner’s public land was forbidden to be used for the payment of debt. The movement lasted from 1912 to 1919 when the Shine Lama was arrested by the head of Ikhe Zuu league.

The Dughuilang movement in Dalad Banner broke out in 1914. The movement was against the banner Jasagh Sunbarbaatu who sold banner land and put heavy taxes on Mongols. There were five dughuilangs involving several thousand Mongols. The movement set up its own armed force and controlled the whole banner. Because of its persistent armed struggle, the Dughuilang forced the banner administration to give in. The banner authority had to stop selling the banner land, close the already cultivated farmland, reassert the banner’s public ownership of the land and land rent, and so forth.

Efforts Towards Independence in Inner Mongolia
Faced with the dying Manchu dynasty and the change from the Manchu imperial authority to the Chinese republican authority, the Mongols’ sense of crisis increased abruptly. Apart from sporadic uprisings, there were more conscious efforts of self-strengthening made by the Mongols, as well as the active response of the Mongolian ruling class in Inner Mongolia toward the 1911 declaration of independence in Khalkha (Outer) Mongolia. Nationalist sentiments and efforts made by the Mongols in Inner Mongolia were no less than those shown by those who established Mongolian Independence in 1911 in the north. But the different fates of Inner Mongolia and Outer Mongolia were the consequence of mainly outside forces.

According to Joseph Fletcher, the earliest recorded modernization reform took place in Khalkha Mongolia and was led by Toghtakhu Toro, the grandson of Sechen Khan Sangjayidorji. He was well-versed in many languages such as Manchurian, Tibetan and Chinese in addition to Mongolian. Beginning in 1821, he began to modernize the systems of administration and religion within his banner. In 1837, however, when he tried to unify all the dispersed monasteries, he came into direct confrontation with the monasteries. In the end, he lost the ensuing armed conflicts because he had failed to garner enough sympathy and support from his more conservative contemporaries. From a larger perspective, his failure was also caused by the Manchu Mongolian policy which thwarted the development of a unified Mongolia.

At the turn of the century when the Manchu Qing dynasty was deep in crisis, the Japanese Meiji
Reform provided a measure of inspiration not only to the Manchu-Chinese officials, but also to Prince Gungsangnorbu (Prince Gung), the most prominent Mongolian leader in Beijing and also the leader of the three leagues in eastern Inner Mongolia. He knew that modernization was essential to national survival, so he carried out modernization reforms in education, in the local military force and for individual rights in Kharchin Mongolia, his homeland. His most important achievement was setting up the Mongolian-Tibetan Academy in Beijing. The academy played an important role in modern Mongolian nationalism since the academy produced many figures who later emerged in the nationalist movements such as the Inner Mongolian Revolutionary Party, the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement led by De Wang and the pro-Communist Inner Mongolian Allied Autonomous movement.

After the Wu Chang Mutiny, Prince Gung declared that if the Manchu dynasty gave in to the Chinese nationalist revolutionaries, he would declare the independence of Eastern Mongolia. After the abdication of the Manchu emperor in 1912, Prince Gung went to Kharachin Mongolia, his homeland, and convened all the leaders of East Mongolia at Ulan Khada. At the meeting, all the Mongolian leaders advocated independence from China and the establishment of a Great Mongolia. They intended Prince Gung to be the Mongolian Khan and hoped for assistance from Japan or Russia.

At the time, the Bogda Khan of independent Mongolia responded very quickly by appointing Prince Gung as the governor of south Mongolia, of all 6 leagues and 49 banners. But in the end, the Japanese failed to meet their promises to the Mongolians because their needs regarding the Mongolian areas were satisfied by the famous 21 Agreements made with Yuan Shikai on May 25, 1915. The treaty gave Japan prerogatives on the economy, transportation, land and mining developments in South Manchuria and East Mongolia, and in return Yuan received Japanese support in the restoration of the Chinese monarchy.

Yuan Shikai’s secured position and his now strengthened power made Prince Gung’s attempt difficult and Prince Gung was forced by the situation to compromise with Peking. That same year (1915), the Khiahtta Tripartite Treaty was signed by Russia, China and Mongolia, and under the terms of the agreement, [Outer] Mongolia was forced to abandon its independence but was to remain autonomous under Chinese suzerainty.

An additional heavy blow to Mongolian independence and unification efforts was General Xu Shuzheng’s expedition into Outer Mongolia. Under the pretext of defending China’s territorial integrity, General Xu Shuzheng, a pro-Japanese warlord whose courage and strategic shrewdness are still admired by the Chinese today, occupied Mongolia in 1919. He canceled the Mongolian autonomy that had been worked out by the Treaty, and demanded all taxes due going back to 1911, which pauperized most of the Mongolian population. One year later he was driven out by the “Mad Baron” Ungern-Sternberg, and the republic was formed with the support from the new Soviet Union in

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92 Shi Bo, *The Inside Story Of Outer Mongolia Independence* (Press of People’s China, 1993) p176. The book was banned shortly after it was published because the book's ultra-nationalist content caused protests from the Mongolian State and the Japanese Embassy in Beijing, interview with Mr. Donga,
However, in 1911, the new Mongolian independence was an inspiration for nationalist revolts in Inner Mongolia. The anti-Chinese Revolt led by Togtogh Taiji broke out in Eastern Inner Mongolia in 1908 and lasted until 1911. Toghtogh was a taiji (noble) of the Ghorlos Front Banner, Jerim League. Toghtogh launched his armed attacks on the Chinese settlements and government offices in 1908. Soon this revolt against the Manchus and Chinese was supported by the people of the four banners of Jailaid, and Suke-Gung (Khochin Right Front) in the Jerim league. Toghtogh, a talented leader of guerrilla warfare, led his force to attack Chinese settlements in the districts of Changchun, Talai, and Taoan. He was able to dominate the northern half of the Jerim league for several years from a stronghold in the Great Xinggan Mountains. His men continued their heroic fight against the Qing regime and the Chinese settlers until 1911, when Toghtogh and his group went to Outer Mongolia to join the Mongolian Independence Movement. This was the greatest “meng fei” incident of the late Qing dynasty.93

In 1912, the independence efforts of Inner Mongolia were joined by the efforts of Prince Utai of Khochin Right Banner, Jerim League. Utai allowed Mongolian farmers from the Josotu League to cultivate the banner lands instead of the Chinese, and he attempted to play the Russians against the Manchu-Chinese power. For so doing, he was attacked by the Manchu Qing court. In 1912, seeing the inevitable fall of the Manchu Qing dynasty, Utai cooperated with Rashiminjur, Prince of the Suke Gung (Khochin Right Rear) Banner, in a rebellion against Peking. At one point they even occupiedTaonan and Kailu, the newly established Chinese prefectures, but they were eventually defeated by Chinese forces and fled to Outer Mongolia.94

In the Silinggol league, there were two Khauchid banners who responded to the 1911 Mongolian independence. Princes of East Khauchid Banner, successfully rallied more than half of their banner, and along with the livestock, they migrated to North Mongolia. Yangsanjab, Chief of Abagha Right Banner, also declared his loyalty to the newly-founded Mongolia State. Countless individual Mongolian lamas, princes and common people, also migrated to the Mongolian state to show their political loyalty.

In 1913, the year of the black cow in Mongolian calendar, the Mongolian state began its military expedition of unification. Positive response in Inner Mongolia extended from the east to the west. The expedition army commanded by Damdinsuren enrolled most of his 1,000-strong army from the eager volunteers of Inner Mongolia. The army won battles all the way to Doloon Nor, the base for Chinese traveling merchants. The unification campaign won favorable response from the four leagues in the West of Inner Mongolia, and was later joined by Babujab in Eastern Turned in the siege of Doloon Nor. Finally the military unification failed mainly due to the shortage of supplies in winter of that

Ulaanbaator, 1993.

93 Jagchid Sechen, (op.cit.) p.193.
94 Ibid.
Babujab's Revolt in Easter Inner Mongolia from 1913 to 1916 reflected the competing outside forces which tried to influence and dominate Mongols. Babujab was an ambitious man from Surug (or Tuned Left Banner) with a deep hatred of the Chinese colonization. He had once been involved in the Japanese-supported Manchu restoration movement. After the failure of Prince Gungsangnorbu's Inner Mongolian independence movement, Babujab obtained Japanese arms and supplies and rebelled against the Chinese Republic. He fought in the Jerim and Juu-uda leagues, and even attacked the Chinese centers of Mukden, Jilin (Kirin), and Heilongjiang Provinces, and to the south and west in the Jehol and Chakhar areas. All along, he had maintained contact with the Urga Government of Outer Mongolia. He was killed in 1916 while attacking the city of Linxi, northern Jehol, and his troops scattered. Some of them joined the Outer Mongolian forces and some returned to their homes.

Among these Mongolian rebellions, most were fighting against Chinese colonization and against the Mongolian upper-classes who had collaborated with the Chinese. But Chinese Communist historians focus on the supposed revolutionary nature of the struggle and refer to these movements against Chinese Colonization as the "Inner Mongolian Peasant Revolution". Yet, the real nature of these nationalistic movements reveals most prominently very strong anti-Chinese colonization and anti-Mongolian ruling class sentiments, which indicates the complexity and depth of Mongolian nationalism in China. Actually the later development of Mongolian nationalism in Inner Mongolia mainly wavered between two themes: revolutionary nationalism and ethnic-nationalism.

Even after the Khiakhta Tripartite Treaty wherein Outer Mongolia's independence was canceled, there were still independence activities going on [in Outer Mongolia or in Inner Mongolia?], though more as isolated incidents. In 1917, Mugdenbo, a young and learned official of Ukerchin (later Mingghan Banner) of Chakhar, gathered several thousand young Mongols and carried out a military rebellion against the Chinese Republic in a struggle for independence. Without support from any outside powers, his group was soon crushed by Chinese forces before the rebellion had gained sufficient momentum.

The reaction of the ruling Mongolian princes toward the new Chinese rule established after the Wu Chang Mutiny in 1912, was that they preferred the traditional monarchy to a Chinese republic or a nationalist government; they preferred a monarch, even a Chinese monarch, as a ruling authority rather than an authority based on the concept of a Chinese nation. For Mongolian leaders to accept Chinese nationalist authority, they would have had to admit that they were part of the Chinese nation as conceived by early Chinese nationalists.

The Mongols' negative response toward the Chinese republic showed that an all-including Chinese nation equal to the Manchu empire was too alien an idea for Mongolian princes and nobles to accept.

95 Ibid.
96 Ibid.
97 Hao Weimin, (op. cit.)
98 Jagchid Sechen, (op. cit.) p. 142.
It was relatively easier for a Mongolian lordship to be transferred to or succeeded by a Manchu lord as long as the latter functioned in the same way. But in an age of nationalism, it was more difficult to convince Mongols to accept a nationalist authority from another people; it was difficult because the Chinese nationalist authority, as opposed to the concept of feudal allegiances, is an individualist notion and individual Mongols had to be convinced that they were not what they always thought they were, that they were suddenly a part of a new nation after the Manchu empire.

In spite of the ferocity and widespread nature of the uprisings and resistance, these efforts did not form a general Inner Mongolian nationalist movement with a unified leadership. According to Owen Lattimore, the Mongols rose in rebellion against Chinese colonization in different places at different times because each Chinese warlord pressed his encroachment on the Mongols at his own pace. Upper class Mongolian society after the Chinese revolution in 1911 remained relatively unchanged. The hereditary princes and monastic power were the ruling class, there was no middle class, and trade was in the hands of Chinese. Therefore Owen Lattimore, correctly, observed that there was not even enough manpower to make possible the rise of Mongol warlords to compete with Chinese warlords.

3.3. Mongolian Nationalism and KMT: Collaboration And Disillusion

The KMT was different from all previous Chinese political powers in the sense that it had a whole set of political ideology, the principles of three peoples. The nationalist principle of KMT regime was an assimilationist policy toward non-Chinese minorities. During the period of the KMT regime, Mongolian resistance against Chinese pressure evolved from sporadic and non-unified uprisings into a form of ideological politics. The Inner Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party founded in 1925 was the Mongols' first modern political party in Inner Mongolia. The motivation behind the party was nationalistic though it had different ideological colors under the influence of different outside forces: Russians, Independent Mongolia, Chinese communists and Chinese nationalists. Although De Wang's autonomous movement was a coalition of the radical Mongols with both modern educated and conservative nobles, De Wang's personal leadership represented a more independent and genuine nationalist effort with less influence from other ideologies. There was also the pro-Chinese autonomous movement led by Ulanhu. Though Ulanhu represented the Chinese communist party, in the early period the party's Mongolian characteristics were emphasized to appeal to Mongolian nationalists.

Inner Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party
To envisage a modern Chinese state, Sun Yatsen had to deal with the problem of how to incorporate non-Chinese peoples, inherited as part of Manchu dynastic legacy, into the new Chinese state. That was one of the considerations of Sun Yatsen when he departed from his early view of “expelling northern barbarians” and progressed to the view of setting up a commonwealth of five nations. In

100 Owen Lattimore, (op. cit.) p.22.
contrast to local Chinese warlords who had huge interests at stake in colonizing Mongolian lands, Sun Yatsen’s nationalist party in the far south appeared to be a friend. The KMT’s slogan of “down with Warlords” in their unification campaign certainly made them appear a potential ally for the Mongols against local Chinese warlords and this appealed to many Mongolian nationalists.

As early as 1917 when Sun established the nationalist government in Guang Zhou, Bai Yu-ti (Serengdungrub), a Mongol teacher at the Mongolian Tibetan Academy, joined Sun’s nationalist party thus becoming Sun’s earliest Mongolian disciple. He was appointed by the KMT as the Special Commissioner of Party’s Affairs in Mongolia and three special districts of Johel, Chakhar and Suiyuan. Since he was a former teacher of the Mongolian and Tibetan Academy and had many contacts, the KMT exerted influence through his Mongolian followers.

From the very beginning, the Chinese Communists began to pay attention to its work among the Mongols. The CCP’s organization in the north began to exert its influence among Mongol students in the Mongolian and Tibetan Academy. Among the early CCP leaders, Li Dazhao in particular paid a lot of attention to Mongolian affairs. In his articles of Doctrine of the People and Mongolian National Liberation Struggle, he regarded the issue of Mongolian national liberation as part of the Chinese revolution. Ulanhu, leader of the later Inner Mongolian autonomous movement, was one of the active students who had contact with Li Dazhao. The Mongolian Revolutionary Party sent Buyan Nemeku, a famous writer, to Beijing to influence Mongolian students.

Later when the Chinese Communist Party and the Nationalist Party (KMT) formed an anti-imperialist and revolutionary united front with support from the Third Communist International (Comintern), it was possible for a Mongolian political party associated with both the KMT and the CCP to be established. At the time of the KMT-CCP cooperation, there was a representative from the Mongolian Revolutionary Party, B. Dantzen, who was sent to Guang Zhou where he was warmly welcomed by Sun Yatsen. The Mongolian People’s Republic also sent party representatives to Peking to influence the students of the Mongolian-Tibetan Academy.101

On March 1, 1925, in Kalgan the IMPRP was formally founded under the aegis of the Pro-Russian warlord Fe Yuxiang and the Comintern. Among those attending the meeting were Dambadorji, the first secretary of the Mongolian Revolutionary Party in Mongolian People’s Republic; and Orchirov, a Buryat Mongol, as representative of the Comintern. Bai Yunti, who represented the forces believing that Mongolian national liberation was to be achieved with the help of the KMT, was elected as Chairman. Merse (Guo Dao-fu), elected general secretary of the party, spoke for an independent nationalist force. When Bai Yunti went to Guang Zhou to join the KMT, Merse went to the north to become a member of Mongolian Revolutionary Party. During 1923 to 1924, Merse, together with Fu Ming-tai, another nationalist, founded the Mongolian Youth Party in Hulun-buir area. Many Mongols with a CPC background were also elected to the central committee; among these were Jiyatai, Li Yu-

zhi and Ulanhu. Soon after the IMPRP was founded, it began to set up its own cadre school, a military academy.

The background of the KMT-CCP co-operation was reflected in the IMPRP's guidelines. In Chinese, the party was called "nei meng gu renmin geming dang" (Inner Mongolian Nationalist Party) which indicates it was like an extension of the KMT in Inner Mongolia. In Mongolian, the party was called "totughadu monghol un arad un khubisghaltu nam" ("nei meng gu renmin geming dang" in Chinese; Inner Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party) which means it was a sister party of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party in the Mongolian People's Republic. Since the Chinese Communists were incorporated by the KMT at the time, the IMPRP was also heavily influenced by the CCP and the leftist wing of the KMT.

The primary goal of the party was to realize Mongolian national self-determination. The party asserted its goals of protecting Mongolian public land and forbidding dishonest trade. The revolutionary goals of anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism were also prescribed in the party constitution. The Mongols' goal of national liberation was opposed to Chinese patronage whether it emanated from the KMT or from the warlords. At the time, Chinese warlords were the major advocates and executors of Chinese cultivation on Mongolian lands. However, the KMT later proved to be no more willing to stop Chinese migration and cultivation than were the warlords. In 1928, a KMT force controlled Beijing and renamed it Beiping, a name meaning "pacifying the north" which had once been used in the Ming dynasty. Mongolian national liberation was also emphasized differently by radicals and conservatives. The left wing tended to emphasize liberating Mongols from the oppression of the Mongolian feudal ruling class, but others emphasized national independence from outside forces, i.e. Chinese domination.

The mixed representation of the goals of the IMPRP reflected the disagreements and confusions in Mongolian nationalism in those years. The goal of national self-determination was diluted by various competing ideologies. In the Eastern areas, the newly founded army led by the IMPRP took some action against the Chinese colonization forces under the warlords such as executing Chinese officials who were in charge of cultivating Mongolian lands. But these actions were possible only because the Mongolian army joined warlord Feng Yuxiang's campaign against the Manchurian warlord Zhang Zuolin.

Being closely associated with external political forces, inevitably the IMPRP experienced up and downs together with the general situation in China in 1920s. In the autumn of 1926, Feng Yuexiang was defeated at Nankou by Zhang Zuolin, and the IMPRP together with Feng Yuexiang retreated from Kalgan to Baotou, and then to Ningxia. At this time, the IMPRP began to exert more influence in western Inner Mongolia.

In the west of Inner Mongolia, the IMPRP's force, the Inner Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army,
was more influenced by traditional radical forces (Dughuilang) and by the Chinese Communists. The army based itself in the Uushin Banner and engaged in armed struggle against the Chinese warlord Jing Yuexiu for two years. In 1926 radical forces created the Ikhe Zuu League Incident\textsuperscript{103} and Alashan Incident\textsuperscript{104} which shocked the whole of Inner Mongolia.

In July 1928, the Mongolian nationalists, Merse and Fu Ming-tai, took the opportunity to declare independence in the Hulun-buir League, with the help from the Soviet Russian and Mongolian army. The independence was short-lived, Mongolian army was defeated by Zhang Xueliang, the chief commander of the three provinces of Manchuria. However, Merse made peace with Zhang in return for more autonomy in Hulun-buir region.\textsuperscript{105} but the retreat of the Soviet army put an end to the short-lived independence. Ulanthu, Kuibi and other Mongols had originally been sent by the IMPRP to the Soviet Union to receive training. After the split between the KMT and the CPC, they were instructed by the Comintern to return to Inner Mongolia.

The military successes achieved by the IMPRP were short-lived because they had been decided by the general political situations in the time. The factional struggle within the party reached a breaking point as the KMT began its showdown with the CCP. In 1927, the IMPRP moved to Ulaan Baator following instructions from the Comintern. Under the direction of the Comintern, the pro-KMT elements in the party were purged. When Bai Yunti escaped from the Mongolian People's Republic, he completely sided with KMT and changed his faction of the IMPRP to the KMT's Inner Mongolian section. That was the effectively end of the Ulaan Baator pro-KMT IMPRP.

The faction of the IMPRP associated with the Comintern and Ulaan Baator continued to work among the radical groups such as the Dughuilangs. After the “September 18 Incident” in 1931 when the Japanese army completed its occupation of Manchuria and eastern Inner Mongolia within the short timeframe of 4 months and 18 days, the IMPRP's activities went underground in Inner Mongolia. It has been said that the IMPRP ended in 1933 when the Mongolian People's Republic put an end to the IMPRP's Ulaan Baator Office. But the IMPRP's links with the Comintern and with the Mongolian People's Republic and its continuing underground activities after 1931\textsuperscript{106} were later used by the Chinese as a pretext for the fabrication of charges and the subsequent purge of the so-called New

\textsuperscript{103} The IMPRP revolutionary army led by Wangdanima and Communist Li Yu-zhi once drove the Prince of Uushin Banner Tehusamughulang out to Yu Ling County in Shaan Xi. The radical action caused internal conflicts between Bai’s pro-KMT force and the pro-CCP force. As a result, Li Yu-zhi was killed by the pro-KMT force. Ibid., p271.

\textsuperscript{104} In 1926, Merse and Orchirov went to the Alashan areas and engaged in activities which led to a small-scale revolution. In April 1927, Dechinyinshinorbu, a relative of the ruling prince of Alashan, got arms from Feng Yu-xiang, occupied the capital of Alashan, and killed officials and the jasagh. The rebels set up a revolutionary political office in place of the former administration which was also the headquarters of the IMPRP second rout army. In just 12 days, the rebellion was suppressed and Dechinyinshinorbu was executed. Jagchid Sechen, (op.cit.) p. 270.


Inner Mongolian Revolutionary Party during the Cultural Revolution.

As the KMT came to power, Chiang Kaishek abandoned Sun Yatsen's pretension that "all peoples in China are equal" and "all peoples in China have the right of national self-determination". The KMT began a straightforward assimilationist policy toward non-Chinese minorities. By collaborating with the KMT and now compromising nationalist goals, the pro-KMT IMPRP members led by Bai Yunti were put in charge of the Ministry of Mongolia and Tibet which was the successor to the Manchu's Ministry of Dependencies, which had also been known as the Mongolia and Tibet Yuan in Yuan Shikai's reign. The legitimacy of the pro-KMT radical Mongols' representatives were questioned by Mongols in the later wave of the nationalist movement led by De Wang.

De Wang's Mongolian Autonomous Movement
Prince Demchukdongrub (1902-1966) of West Sunid (De Wang) became a prominent Mongolian leader on the eve of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, when he succeeded for the first time in organizing a general movement of the whole of Inner Mongolia, from Manchuria to the Ordos, and set up a regime with a state nature. The major point he made was that Inner Mongolia should no longer be divided into different parts and annexed into to various Chinese provinces, and this was also a major demand that he made to Chiang Kaishek. His goal was a unified Inner Mongolia and a unity of Mongol action. Faced with the Japanese invasion, he maintained that Inner Mongolia, not just as the Chinese frontier, had its own interests to defend, and that these were different from Chinese interests, and further, that Mongols could not expected to fight against the Japanese for China's security. He therefore demanded autonomy for Inner Mongolia, under a government chosen by the Mongols, not appointed by the Chinese.

As soon as the KMT unified the whole country and its power reached north China and into west Inner Mongolia region, the KMT government began to reform Mongolian traditional administrative system which had remained unchanged from the Manchu Qing dynasty to the warlord governments. The purpose of the reform was to further institutionalize the separation of Inner Mongolia into different territorial divisions and to speed up the assimilation process.

The first important measures undertaken by the KMT in Inner Mongolia were to establish Chinese provinces and their concomitant administrative structures in Inner Mongolia. In August 1928, the KMT central Political committee passed a resolution to set up Chinese provinces out of the six special districts: Jehol, Chakhar, Suiyuan, Ningxia, Chinghai (Kokonor), Xikang (Kham). In addition to Jehol, the banners of Chakhar and Suiyuan became Chinese provinces, and the two banners of Alashan and Ejina were also thrown in to the newly established Ningxia Province.

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107 Jagchid Sechen, (op.cit.) p.270.
108 Lin Xiuche, "Two Key Figures in Modern Mongolian History", Collection of Papers on Important Figures in Modern Chinese History p.953 and Tovshin, ed., Demchugdungrub's Autobiography (Historical Archive Committee, IMAR Political Consultancy Conference. 1984)
109 Tovshin, ed., Demchugdungrub's Autobiography (Historical Archive Committee, IMAR Political
In September 1928 the order of setting up new provinces was published. In the beginning of 1929 the
three Chinese provinces were set up on Mongolian land. By then the 6 leagues, 24 tribes and 4 special
banners had already been incorporated into the Chinese provinces of Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning,
and the newly established provinces of Jehol, Chakhar, Suiyuan and Ningxia. Provincialization,
which had never been realized under Manchu and Chinese warlord administrations because of
Mongolian opposition, was completed. Inner Mongolia was now under the control of the new KMT
warlords (old warlords who had received appointments from the KMT government), and under
Manchurian warlords in the east and Shanxi warlords in the west. The Chinese cultivation of
Mongolian lands was accelerated by both these new warlords and by the new Chinese provincial
administrations.

Bai Yunti, as a member of the KMT central committee, in the eyes of many Mongols, did not make
much of an effort to stop the resolution. Mongolian representation in the KMT as headed by Bai Yunti
was discredited at this point and this situation was then exploited by the Chinese. As a result, Yan
Xishan, a Shanxi warlord who had had a long history of maintaining his troops by colonizing
Mongolian land, was appointed Chairman of the Mongolia and Tibet Ministry in 1928.

This shows that by then the pro-KMT IMPRP as led by Bai Yunti had become a convenient tool for
the KMT’s Mongolian policy and no longer represented Mongol demands. Disillusioned with this
policy, Mongols demanded autonomy from the KMT regime and started a new autonomous movement.
The campaign against the establishment of Chinese provinces on Mongolian territories was the
starting point for the new autonomous movement.

The setting up of Chinese provinces in Inner Mongolia caused major opposition from all Inner
Mongolian leagues and banners. When the Mongols realized that there was no way to gain ground on
the issue of the newly established provinces, they turned their attention to the issue of how to define
the system and status of Inner Mongolian leagues and banners, and to the issue of their relations with
the Chinese provinces and counties. Mongolian representatives made petitions to Chiang Kaishek
asking him to honor Sun Yatsen’s promise of self-determination for non-Chinese minorities. In June
1929, the KMT held a Meeting of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs bureau. In the meeting, the
Mongolian representatives asked for the establishment of a unified Mongolian autonomous
administration of all leagues and banners, but their wishes were ignored.

In the end, the meeting passed “Organization Law of the Mongolian Leagues, Tribes and Banners”.
Though the organization law indicated that the status of leagues and banners were the same as that of
provinces and counties, it confirmed the separation policy that all leagues and banners of Inner

Consultancy Conference. 1984) p. 15.
110 Jagchid Sechen, “The Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement of the 1930s”, Essays in
Mongolian Studies, (op. cit.) p.282.
111 Ibid. p.282.
112 Tovshin, ed., Demchugdungrub’s Autobiography (Historical Archive Committee, IMAR Political
Consultancy Conference. 1984) p. 32.
Mongolia now belonged to the different new provinces. According to the law, although the traditional units of the league and banners remained, power was transferred from the ruling class to councils of elected people. Though this would appear on the surface to be more democratic, in actuality, it further divided and dispersed Mongolian political power. For the Mongolian ruling class, the law was obviously worse than the Beijing Government’s (1912-1919) “Regulations for the Treatment of Mongolia”.

During Mongolian opposition against the organization law, Prince Demchugdungrub emerged as a nationalist leader. He had assumed the post of Jasagh at the age of 18. In his banner, he conducted modernization reforms such as the setting up of modern schools, hospitals and factories. He made lamas who could not read the sutras return to lay life. He also organized a Mongolian armed force. He maintained that national survival was the most urgent goal for Mongols in Inner Mongolia, and that internal reform or social revolution was the second task. He advocated working hard in the grasslands to build up Mongolian strength rather than going to Peking to ask for titles.

The autonomous movement was initiated by the Bat-Khaalagh Sume conference in the summer of 1933. The movement demanded the formation of a pan-Mongolian autonomous area governed by an autonomous government; Mongols were to hold full autonomy except for diplomacy and defense; and it argued for the cessation of Chinese cultivation of Mongolian lands at the very least, if not also the return of previously taken lands now cultivated by the Chinese. Chiang Kai-shek regarded the Mongols’ demand for autonomy as a “conspiracy” and decided to deal with De Wang using a carrot and stick policy. He would tolerate only the separate local autonomies excluding the vast areas inhabited by Mongolian herdsmen. According to his view, the Mongolian nomadic economy should be changed and incorporated into part of Chinese agriculture for security purposes.

The KMT Party’s Central Political Committee that same year reluctantly passed “Principles for the Implementation of Mongolian Autonomy”. In 1934, the Mongolian Local Autonomous Political Council was set up in Bat-Khaalagh Sume under the sovereignty and supervision of the KMT central government. With an administrative fee from the KMT central government of only 20,000 yuan, the autonomous political council setup office in three Mongolian yurts and recruited its own armed force. The motivation behind the KMT’s approval of this council was the fear that the Mongols as led by De Wang might be enticed into collaborating with the encroaching Japanese.

The autonomous council at Bat-Khaalagh Sume was actually in a very hostile situation: De Wang’s Bat-Khaalagh Sume Mongolian Political Council was surrounded by numerous antagonist Chinese

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113 Jagchid Sechen, (op. cit.)
114 Tovshin, ed., Demchudungrub’s Autobiography (Historical Archive Committee, IMAR Political Consultancy Conference. 1984) p. 5.
forces: Fu Zuoyi at Guisui (present Huhhot), Wang Jingguo at Baotou, and Song Zheyuan at Kalgan. Further opposition against De Wang's autonomous movement came from local warlords like Yan Xishan and Fu Zuoyi\(^{117}\) rather than from KMT central government. Yan Xishan and Fu Zuoyi had had to depend on ever increasing cultivation in Inner Mongolia to maintain the large numbers of their armies and to provide cultivated land for their retired peasant soldiers. Yan Xishan appointed a commander (Wang Jing-guo) stationed at Baotou exclusively for military cultivation. Apart from administrating Chinese migration into Inner Mongolia, the Chinese warlords also interfered with local Mongolian affairs at the league and banner level. Chinese counties and prefectures were set up to administer the influx of Chinese. According to the principle self-rule under the Manchu dynasty, Mongolian local authorities had power not only to administrate their internal affairs, but they also exercised judicial power over those Chinese who committed crimes against Mongols.

In order to sabotage De Wang's autonomous movement, Fu Zuoyi suggested to the KMT central government that De Wang's autonomous political council be divided into two, with one in the east (Chakhar), the other in the west (Suiyuan). The suggestion was accepted by the KMT in January 1936, and the Shanxi warlord Yan Xishan was appointed as the head of the Mongolian Political Council in the west. During the time of Fu Zuoyi's opposition regarding the autonomous council\(^\) even the rights prescribed in "Principles for Implementation of Mongolian Autonomy" that were passed by the KMT could not be carried out. An example of this is that the law provided for the Mongols to have a share of the tariff on Commodities transported through Mongolian land, yet all of the tariff revenue was monopolized by Fu Zuoyi. Armed conflict between De Wang's autonomous government and Fu Zuoyi's army broke out because of disagreements on the opium tariff, which was then also known as "Opium War". Fu Zuoyi's economic restrictions and embargo made the situation extremely severe for De Wang's government and for the Mongols particularly during the times of natural disasters on pastoral lands.

With concrete examples of the ill-intentions of Fu Zuoyi on one side and the friendly gestures of the Japanese on the other, De Wang decided to collaborate with the Japanese to realize his goal of Mongolian autonomy\(^{118}\). In contrast to the actions of the KMT and the local warlords, the Japanese made efforts to win over Mongols. In Japanese-sponsored Manchoukuo which was formed on 1 March 1932, the Japanese allowed Mongols to establish the Mongolian Xinggan Special District and a Mongolian army\(^{119}\), and later, the Japanese canceled the Chinese Chakhar Province and restored

\(^{117}\) The Shanxi warlord who then had the control of Suiyuan and the surrounding areas. Most immigrant farmers in Inner Mongolia came from Shanxi. In 1949, Fu surrendered Beijing to Nie Rongzhen.

\(^{118}\) On 1 March 1932, the Japanese-sponsored Manchoukuo was established, and in Manchoukuo the Mongolian Xinggan province and the Mongolian army were set up with the approval of the Japanese. Dr. Lin Xiuche, "Two Key Figures in Modern Mongolian History", *Collection of Papers on Important Figures in Modern Chinese History* p.953.

Chakhar's League status.\textsuperscript{120} In the 1935 "white disaster" in Shilinggol, Japanese provided timely food aid. In Manchuria, the Japanese actually stopped further Chinese colonization of Mongolian land, they set up 1000 primary schools, and many hospitals and experimental farms in East Mongolia.

In 1935 after the Ho-Ying-Chin-Umezu Agreement was signed by the KMT and Japan, the Japanese extended their influence in North China. Song Zheyuan, a local warlord, maintained neutral independence in the north China. The KMT government was thus blocked and its influence could not reach Inner Mongolia. So, it was under desperate circumstances that De Wang began to collaborate with the Japanese to counter the Chinese warlords.

De Wang viewed collaboration with the Japanese as a necessary means to achieve his nationalist goal: after a period of Mongolian autonomy, to set up an independent, constitutional monarchy for the Mongolian state. After July 7, 1937, when Japan took control of north China, De Wang, with Japanese support, set up a Mongolian autonomous government. But soon the collaboration proved inharmonious with Mongolian nationalist goals. The Japanese refused to let autonomous Mongolia incorporate the Xinggan Mongolian district from the puppet state of Manchouguo. To facilitate its control of north China, Japan forced Mongolian autonomous government to take in two Japanese-sponsored Chinese local regimes, South Chakhar and North Shanxi, and to form the Mengjiang government.

De Wang's autonomous movement and the autonomous government in Inner Mongolia in the 1930-40s was a genuine nationalist attempt, and the balance of power between Chinese, Russians and Japanese made it possible for De Wang's autonomy to exist as a kind of semi-state nature for nearly 10 years. The autonomous movement was more genuine because it aimed to set up an independent and unified Mongolian state based on a strong sense of history. Secondly the movement was an alliance of both the traditional ruling class and liberal-minded young Mongols. Thirdly, in spite of his anti-Communist stance, De Wang enthusiastically encouraged the recognition of the Mongolian People's Republic by the Chinese nationalist government in 1945; this showed his nationalist vision transcended the boundaries of both localism and political ideology.

Although Japanese support was the prerequisite of the autonomous Mongolia, it still enjoyed considerable features of an independent state: a political council (government), a Mongolian army, and a consultative council (legislature). De Wang also envisioned a unified Mongolian territory which included all Mongolian leagues and banners, and also an outlet to the sea (as provided for by international maritime law for landlocked states). The autonomous regime was also founded with a historical ambition: it regarded itself as the modern successor to the historical Mongolian empire. The regime adopted Chinggis Khan's chronicle.\textsuperscript{121}

\textsuperscript{120} Chakhar as an administrative unite and tribe was cancelled by the Manchu dynasty after it had defeated Chakhar's rebellion against the Manchu in 1675.

\textsuperscript{121} Tovshin, ed., \textit{Demchugdangrub's Autobiography} (Historical Archive Committee, IMAR Political Consultancy Conference. 1984)
De Wang’s autonomous movement may be the first and also the last movement dedicated exclusively to nationalism in the modern history of Inner Mongolia. Before pondering its uniqueness, let’s first look at some of the negative elements inherent to the movement from its very beginning.

According to Owen Lattimore, its failure can be attributed to three factors. First, Chiang Kaishek’s central government was not powerful enough to control the warlords of the border provinces, and the new warlords would not agree to any Mongolian autonomy at the expense of their interests. Second, De Wang’s movement was a coalition of young idealistic Mongols who were radical enough to speak against the hereditary nobles, princes and high lamas, and the traditional ruling classes some of whom collaborated with the most outrageous Chinese policies for immediate personal profit, so this coalition had its own internal contradictions. Third, Japanese aggression overwhelmed almost all of Inner Mongolia. Beginning in Manchuria in 1931, the Japanese moved into Jehol in 1934, and into western Inner Mongolia in 1936-37. They made enough moves favourable to the Mongols to prevent unity of action between anti-Japanese Mongols and Chinese, and at the same time they successfully prevented unity among the Mongols by subdividing Inner Mongolia.

China’s Mongolian Policy since the end of the Manchu Qing dynasty, maintained its old “divide and rule” strategy. This was also an important characteristic of both the warlord and the KMT periods. Even when China became a republic, it still dealt with the Mongols almost exclusively through the traditional ruling class, the princes, nobles and high lamas. The Chinese state never addressed demands made by the Mongols as a people. When China used intimidation and force to carry out its colonisation policy, it was usually the Mongol princes and nobles who were ordered to move common Mongols out of land wanted for colonisation. Their authority to do so was augmented by Chinese troops when necessary. When a deal was made, princes and important lamas were let in on the deal. In this way, the powers of princes and lamas were enhanced within the structure of the old society at the same time that the power of the Mongols as a people was being steadily and surely eroded.

As a result of this, social tensions within Mongolian society were so serious that Mongolian nationalism was easily influenced by radicalism and revolutionaries. The reason was that it had become quite clear to the commoners and intellectuals that Mongolian interests could not be defended as long as the old social order was both preserved and exploited by the Chinese, and secondly that the Mongols could not resist colonisation unless they resisted the orders transmitted to them through their own authorities. The social tensions worsened by the Chinese “divide and rule” policy presented a formidable dilemma for both the IMPRP’s nationalist efforts and De Wang’s autonomous movement. But De Wang’s radical-conservative coalition survived the dilemma since he adopted a reformist and modernist stance by trying to find common ground for both traditional political order and modern politics. His personal leadership and nationalist vision were an inspiration for the united front of nationalists.

Traditional Mongolian identity, the ideal of political unity, common nomadic culture and a common language was not automatically transformed into a modern national identity, which is mainly concerned with a common citizenship, a common territory, and a common national economy. The modern Mongolian national consciousness, like that of the Chinese, was born out of a sense of a crisis of survival. For Mongols in both Outer Mongolia and Inner Mongolia, the Chinese encroachment was the primary outside contrast to their modern identity. For Mongols in Inner Mongolia, the independent Mongolia in the north remained an reminder of their non-Chinese identity and a beacon for their political aspirations. Besides an outside contrast, modern Mongolian identity in Inner Mongolia was reinforced by the common experience of unified struggles. The traditional ideal of a unified Mongolia survived as a part of the Mongolian sense of identity. Modern unification efforts and a unified Mongolian authority would renew and strengthen the political ideal based on a strong historical and cultural heritage. That was another part of the modern Mongolian identity. It should be noted that although there were some modernisation efforts implemented by the Mongolian ruling class, the lack of a nation-scale modernisation rendered the Modern Mongolian nation as only a political ideal without the base of a nation-wide industrialisation and a national economy. In this sense, De Wang's autonomous movement, albeit short-lived, was significant in the development of a modern sense of identity by the Mongols in Inner Mongolia.

Due to its ill-fated association with the Japanese, De Wang's autonomous movement failed soon after Japanese defeat in 1945. However, Mongolian nationalism adapted to post-war changes in China's politics and survived in a different form by associating with the CC.

4. Conclusion

Chinese view on historical ethnic relations often presents a sino-centric history, according to which Mongolian history is simply part of Chinese history. Mongolian nationalism, which developed in the same way as Chinese nationalism, was ideas and movement by Mongolian intellectuals and political elites at the end of dynastic era, facing the imports of Western national ideas and the external differentiation of modern international world. Chinese republic after Manchu dynasty is an important external differentiation for Mongolian nationalism, esp. in the case of Mongolian independence with backing from Russians and in De Wang's autonomous movement associated with Japanese. Outside assistance and other geopolitical factors prove crucial in the different result of Mongolian nationalism in the case of Outer Mongolia and Inner Mongolia.
CHAPTER IV. THE CCP AND INNER MONGOLIAN NATIONALISM - THE SOVIET MODEL OF NATIONALITY ISSUES

1. The Soviet Model Adapted by CCP

The founding of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region can be seen as resulting from competition between pro-CCP Mongolian forces led by Ulanhu and other nationalist forces that pressed for independence, but it was also a result of large-scale power politics played out between the Soviet Russians, the Mongolian state, the KMT regime and the CCP. At the same time the Soviet model of nationality policy appealed to many facets of Mongolian society.

1.1. Mongolian Social Crisis

The society and economy of the Mongolian people in Inner Mongolia had experienced drastic changes by the 1920s as a result of the massive Chinese migrations of the previous decades both before and after the KMT had come to power. In southern and eastern Inner Mongolia the Chinese cultivation of agricultural areas continued to increase, and between the agricultural areas and the grassland, the semi-agricultural and semi-pastoral areas were also continuously transformed into Chinese land for agriculture. The results were disastrous for the majority of Mongols whose livelihood depended upon animal husbandry.

The dramatic expansion of the agricultural areas under Chinese cultivation was paralleled by the changes in the balance between the ethnic groups. On the one hand, the population of Chinese peasants increased dramatically. On the other hand, large numbers of pastoral Mongols were forced to leave their homeland which was now cultivated. Only a small number remained. Since the best of the traditional grazing land had enjoyed abundant rainfall, the presence of underground water and the richness of the soil were ideal for farming, most of the best grassland in Inner Mongolia was taken over for Chinese cultivation, leaving most pastoral Mongols without their best grassland. For those who chose to remain in the agricultural areas, switching from nomadism to farming was extremely difficult as they usually lacked the necessary farming skills. Mongolian aristocrats who had made large profits and had become big landowners out of the sale or lease of land in the agricultural areas were a minority even among their class group. The majority of aristocrats of low rank without holding office were reduced to the status of peasants or tenants.

The increased social gap in Mongolian society and the concomitant social tensions were due to the traditional Chinese policy towards the Mongols. The traditional Mongolian ruling class - the princes, nobles and high lamas - collaborated with the Chinese in opening Mongolian lands because they were greedy for profit and also because they had no other choice when faced with the intimidation and superior power of the Chinese warlords and heads of local provinces. The power of the Mongolian ruling class was artificially enhanced so that they could legally sell the public land of the banner,
which formerly could not have been sold. The result was that Mongolian public ownership of grassland (which included all natural resources such as underground aquifers, minerals, and the forestry, rivers, lakes) was completely sabotaged. Much of the Mongolian hatred was directed to their own ruling class. Two things had become quite clear to the commoners and intellectuals: First, that Mongol interests could not be defended as long as the old social order was both preserved and exploited by the Chinese; and second, that the Mongols could not resist colonization unless they resisted the orders transmitted to them through their own authorities.

These social tensions in Mongolian societies provided a fertile ground for the breeding of radical politics and the growth of influence of the CCP, Soviet Russia, and the socialist republic of Mongolia. As seen by Mongolian revolutionaries, communism would provide a short cut for Mongols from what they considered to be a slave society to a communist society on the same level as Soviet Russia, now seen as the most advanced society on earth. And the Mongolian People’s Republic remained visible on the psychological horizon as a vivid reminder to Mongols in Inner Mongolia of what they could achieve.

Since anti-Chinese colonization sentiments together with anti-traditional ruling-class sentiments were the most powerful themes for Mongolian nationalism, the CCP had to appear different from the previous oppressive Chinese powers in order to appeal to Mongolian nationalism. The CCP’s anti-traditionalism and revolutionary stance from the 1920s through to the 1940s provided a potent ideological basis for the new Mongol-Chinese co-operation.

1.2. CCP and its Nationalist Character

The ideological stance of the CCP has changed much since its early days of the 1920s. Then, nationalism and Communism or a combination of the two could all be found in the development of the CCP. Of course, Communism, as a universalistic ideology, was opposed in principle to nationalism except for temporary, tactical purposes. Since nationalism was a formula for denying that class struggle ever existed, the communists could always say that international class solidarity was more important than national identity and national interests. Yet, the Chinese nationalists then could say that the Chinese must all have solidarity as Chinese, and that the Chinese culture or Chinese nation should have a universal claim on Chinese loyalty.

It is an ideological paradox for the CCP that either nationalism can be viewed as means to achieve a

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2 The Program of the Works in Inner Mongolia issued by the CCP Central Committee on November 5, 1930. One point in the program was to cancel the slavery system in Inner Mongolia. It should be noted according the program, Inner Mongolian society was more backward in social development stage than the Chinese semi-feudal and semi-colonial society. See Hao Weimin, ed., The Recent History of Inner Mongolia (Inner Mongolian University, 1990) p.150.
communist goal or that communism is just an effective means to a nationalist goal, yet the CCP exploited this paradox to its advantage. The CCP under Mao’s influence tried to add the Chinese character to the universalistic ideology to make Communism more Chinese. But the issue went deeper. As Joseph Levenson argued, a complete disavowal of old China was psychologically impossible even for the Communists. Some Chinese communists said that the May Fourth movement went too far in destroying the images of the past and searched for evidence of dialectical materialism in traditional Chinese philosophy. Liu Shaoqi wrote that the thought of Mao Zedong was the best expression of Marxism applied to a given nation, and “It is as Chinese as it is thoroughly Marxist.” In terms of nationality policies, from the starting point of Lenin and Stalin’s rhetoric on nationality issues, Chinese communists have added more and more ‘Chinese spirit’ into the matter.

A different ideological emphasis was adopted in the different periods of the development of the CCP which can be roughly approximated as the period of KMT-CCP co-operation; the period of armed CCP struggle against the KMT; the anti-Japanese war period; and the period after 1949 when the CCP took over state power. But in the early period it was the CCP’s anti-traditional stance that appealed to its Mongolian collaborators and followers. The CCP decided that its ideology advocated revolt, against not only foreign imperialists, but also against previous Chinese “reactionary” regimes.

The CCP’s legitimacy, apart from the ideological justifications, rested mainly upon the negation of the old political regime. Yet, anti-traditionalism was more complete in a political sense than in a cultural sense. Since history was able to be interpreted by the CCP in terms of class struggle, so were the historical Mongol-Chinese conflicts. The CCP held that the oppressive Manchu-Chinese policies, Chinese warlord’s actions, and the KMT’s oppressive policies toward the Mongols did not promote the interests of the Chinese as a whole, but the interests of the Chinese ruling-class. So, class-analysis as utilised by the CCP provided a new way of solidifying and justifying a common fate and a common identity between the Chinese and Mongols, as they were seen to be all of the proletariat, of the oppressed class, or of the people.

In the beginning of this period from mid-1920s to 1949, it may be argued that the Communist ideas from the Soviet Union and the Mongolian People’s Republic had an appeal at least as equal, if not greater, to young Mongolian radicals as those from the CCP. Most early Mongolian revolutionaries in Inner Mongolia such as Ulanhu, Kuibi and Jiyatai who had joined the CCP had first received their revolutionary training in Moscow and Ulaan Baator. The Soviet party and even the Mongolian party, had more authority and influence upon them than the CCP. To many of the Mongol revolutionaries, the three communist forces were not all that differentiated in their minds because of their

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internationalist beliefs and because actual leadership of the worldwide Communist movement was provided by the Soviet Russians at the time. But the Mongolian communists had to make a choice regarding which group they should side with sooner or later. The reason was that Chinese memories of the humiliations suffered at the hands of Tzarist Russia were still fresh and the suspicion of Russian imperialist intentions did not die even though Lenin and Stalin reiterated many times their negation of Tzar Russia's imperialism. Moreover Chinese suspicions increased as the Soviets began to assert a more domineering approach in coordinating relations with their country. The suspicion, interestingly, was rested in Chinese nationalist sentiments, and as a result this affected communist Chinese attitudes towards Mongolian revolutionaries and it had a profound effect on the fate of Mongolia nationalism.

The nationalist side of the CCP did not like to see Mongolian revolutionaries following the Russians too closely. Their position could be justified on ideological grounds that stemmed from the 'Chinese spirit' that informed their approach to communism. Precisely because China did not fit in neatly within the grand Marxist design of historical social development (i.e., it had a long history of feudalism, without much capitalist preparation before the advent of communist revolution, etc.) it was carrying out a revolution with Chinese characteristics. This differed from the Soviet Russian experience, and the CCP believed that its experience provided a model for other non-western peoples to follow in their self-emancipation. Accordingly, Chinese communists held that it would be better for the national liberation of Mongols in Inner Mongolia if they were to follow the Chinese example and accept the leadership of the CCP. This was clearly a Chinese Communist justification of a Chinese nationalist intention.

1.3. The Soviet Model

The Soviet promise of the right of secession and independence to non-Russian peoples within the Soviet Union has been called by Walker Connor as an official myth. It was at a time when the Bolsheviks were weak and in opposition, they sought to exploit the divisions among their opponents as well as seeking to get the support of non-Russian nationalists by giving the promise of national self-determination to non-Russians. It can be regarded as an exercise of astute tactics, but it was also a display of confidence in the superiority of the Soviet system and the Union.

Before the Bolsheviks came to power, the demoralizing war, the end of Tzarism and the weak provisional government all made non-Russian peoples contemplate severing their ties with Russia. The Bolsheviks condemned the imperialist policy of the Tzarist government and the semi-imperialist policy of the Mensheviks and of the Socialist-Revolutionaries toward non-Russians and promised

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them the right of secession. After November 7, the Bolshevik government reiterated its policy and the policy won vital support from non-Russians in the Bolsheviks' campaigns against the Whites.6

By 1922 the Soviet government succeeded in establishing control over most of the non-Russian minority areas both because of the military successes of the Red Army and also due to the work by local Communist elements. By the end of the Second World War, the Soviet Union regained control over all the remaining peoples of the old Russian Empire, with the exception of the Finns.

By then it was asserted, however, that a nation's right to self-determination should not be put ahead of Marxist and socialist principles. The national self-determination principle was diluted when Stalin specified that only the people, or the toiling class should decide the matter of secession or independence for the nation concerned. And Lenin's statement made in March 1919 best illustrates the official party policy:

"The All-Russian Communist Party regards the question as to which class expresses the desire of a nation for separation from a historical point of view, taking into consideration the level of historical development of the nation, i.e., whether that nation is passing from medievalism toward bourgeois democracy or from bourgeois democracy toward Soviet or proletarian democracy, etc."7

In taking this position, Lenin reserved for the party the power to decide who is entitled to speak for the nation and thus kept the policy, in practical terms, flexible.

However the right of secession was a written part of the constitution of the Soviet Union throughout its existence. It was written into each of the 1924, 1936 and 1977 Constitutions of the Soviet Union that all member peoples (the union republics) are sovereign and possessed of the right to secede at will from the Soviet Union.8 That the promise was kept in the constitution certainly had its propaganda value, which also gave the USSR of extra seats in the UN, i.e., the Ukraine and Bylorussia. It was also

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6 Walker Connor, (op. cit.) p.46. "At its Twelfth Congress (April 1923), the party also went on record as recognizing the absolute essentiality of the support provided by the non-Russian peoples during the Red-White struggle. Referring to "the confidence of its brothers of other nationalities," the party resolution added that "it need hardly be shown that if it had not enjoyed this confidence the Russian proletariat could not have defeated Kolchak and Denikin, Yudenich and Wrangel."


meant to set the Soviets’ nationality policy up as a model to both the colonial areas and fellow communist countries. The Bolshevik revolution was seen by its leaders as an international revolution and the USSR saw itself as the leader of the international communist movement right to the end. While Chinese revolution was at heart a national revolution and it always had difficulty in accommodating the national aspirations of others. Therefore the clearly written secession right for non-Russian peoples within the Union, especially when compared with the PRC, showed more confidence in the Union and the Communist ideology. One of the major assumptions behind the promise was that even were those non-Russians given the chance to secede from the Union, they would not take it because it was in the best interest of each nation to stay within the Union rather than to be outside of the Union. The fact that after 70 years of the union some non-Russian peoples could finally break loose from the collapsed Soviet Union, in itself indicates that within the union many non-Russian peoples’ identity survived to such an extent that they could assert their separate identity after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Ironically, some of non-Russians, especially those in central Asia, created a sense of national identity from above with the arbitrary borders they inherited.
The right of secession was never agreed to by Chinese nationalist revolutionaries such as Sun Yatsen and his successor Chiang Kai-shek. Although the KMT recognized that all racial-groups in China had the right to self-determination, to the KMT the right to self-determination was not equal to the right of secession. In the Joint Manifesto of Sun Yatsen and A. Joffe (January 26, 1923), Sun Yatsen even managed to get a guarantee from the Soviets that it was not “the intention or the objective of the present Russian government to work for Outer Mongolia’s independence from China” although Outer Mongolia had already gained its independence with the help of the Soviet Union in 1921. The KMT’s position on the Mongol national self-determination issue was best summarized by the remarks of Mr. Dai Jitao, the head of the Examination Yuan: “The power of any people is derived from their culture. Chinese culture is superior to that of the Mongols and is the foundation upon which the Chinese state had been erected. Hence, from now on, the Chinese should exert every effort to confer their culture on the Mongols, who should strive to receive it.”

It was the Chinese Communist Party that first made a break with the KMT’s assimilationist policy towards non-Chinese minorities. The CCP during the 1930s promised the right of secession for ethnic non-Chinese minorities. In the 1940s, the CCP began to retreat from this position and put forward the idea of nationality autonomy. For a period of 40 years, roughly from the 1930s to the late 1960s, the CCP’s nationality policy was largely based on the Soviet model which openly advocated nationality equality and self-determination. Yet, as part the CCP’s official ideology, in its nationality policy of the period, the Soviet model and ‘Chinese spirit’ were two competing factors. As ‘Chinese spirit’ grew to influence nationality theory and policy, nationality self-determination was mentioned less and less. The Soviet model of nationality theory and practice were put to an end by the Cultural Revolution in 1966.

2. Allied Autonomous Movement and CCP

De Wang's autonomous government failed due to the change of international and domestic Chinese political situations. At the end of World War II, the issue of Mongolian unification was simply out of the question because it was not the part of the deals the three big powers made at Yalta. Instead, the Soviet Union signed a treaty with the Chinese to secure the status of Outer Mongolia. Trumen administration, before and after the defeat of Japan, increasingly regarded that FDR had given in too much to Stalin in East Asia at Yalta. Probably to Americans, the merger of the two Mongolia was a much bigger concession than the Soviet control of Dalian and Lusun. The United State did not accept the total control of the above two ports by the Soviet Union, they certainly would not accept the merger of the two Mongolias. Stalin was careful not to exceed the limit of Americans' tolerance.11

After the end of the war, the CCP gained sufficient strength to change the military balance in the north. De Wang's autonomous government which was associated first with the Japanese and then with the KMT government was now seen as the enemy of the revolution and was doomed. Mongolian nationalism could not possibly escape influence of the Soviet Union and China between whom Mongolia was trapped. In this sense, Ulanhu's autonomous movement as patronized by the CCP seemed naturally the most feasible way for Mongolian nationalism to find an outlet in Inner Mongolia.

CCP's Interpretations of National Self-Determination.

In Inner Mongolia, the CCP tried to win Mongols' support by striking a balance between their ideological beliefs and Mongolian nationalism. During its long campaign to achieve state power, the CCP denounced the KMT and all the previous Chinese regimes' oppressive policies toward Mongols specifically in order to win the support of the Mongolian people.

As early as 1922, in the second Congress of the CCP, the declaration of the CCP condemned "warlords and KMT's oppression of Mongolian autonomy under the name of unification" and advocated that "Mongolia, Tibet and Moslem Frontier could establish Republics within a Chinese Confederation."12 But the CCP did not mention the right of secession for non-Chinese until the 1930s. The delay could be explained by geographic factor that the early CCP were active mainly in south China and the CCP's preoccupation with urban centers at the time. Besides these two possible factors, another reason stemmed from nature of the CCP's relations with the CPSU through the Comintern in 1922 and before 1924 when the united front was negotiated by Joffe. It was not until then KMT broke with the CCP in 1927 that the CCP had to formulate a different line. By this stage the Trosky-Stalin divide was in full swing. When the CCP finally established a new center in Ruijin in Jiangxi it was anxious to show its Comintern credentials. Hence the documents of the party named Soviet in 1931-33

copied Soviet type documents when possible. This changed again at the end of the Long March.

The official Soviet model was certainly a contributing factor in the evolution of the CCP's position from advocating self-determination (not equal to secession) to advocating secession for non-Chinese minorities. The leaders of the Soviet Union, through the agency of the Comintern, were pressuring all other Communist parties during the 1920s to endorse publicly the self-determination for their respective minorities.

In November 1931, "The resolutions on Minority peoples within China" were passed by the 1st Chinese Soviet National Congress of workers, peasants and soldiers. It admitted that the non-Chinese peoples' right of self-determination as "in the Chinese soviet republic's constitution, minority's right of self-determination even that of independence from China should be made clear. The independence of Mongolian People's Republic should be recognized unconditionally." According to Dreyer, the Soviets supported or even designed these developments. In 1930 the Executive Committee of the Comintern passed a resolution calling for the creation of a central Soviet government with headquarters in the hinterlands, and with its own "real Red Army." With regard to non-Chinese minorities, the resolution wrote that "the party should also reinforce its work among the national minorities. It should establish strong links with and take the lead in the Moslem movement in North China, in the national-revolutionary struggle in Inner Mongolia, in the struggle of the Korean workers and the Manchurian peasants, and of the tribes in South China...Further more, given the immense importance of the growing revolutionary struggle in Indo-China, the party should extend its influence toward the Annamite masses particularly in Yunnan, Hong Kong, and Canton." By the end of 1935 when the CCP's Red Army reached Yanan and set up its base, it became more and more important for the CCP to appeal to Mongols in Inner Mongolia, just to the north of the revolutionary base. To win the Mongolian peoples' sympathy and loyalty became part of the Party's political agenda. At the time, Mao Zedong considered Mongolia as a convenient route through which the CCP could establish supply links with the Soviet Union. From October 1936 to March 1937, the west expedition force of the Red Army tried to cross the Yellow River but was almost totally defeated by Muslim warlords in the northwest region of the Qi Lian Mountains. Blame for the spectacular defeat was placed on rightist opportunism by the CCP Central Committee. But according to recently available materials, it was the CCP's Central Military Commission headed by Mao Zedong that decided on the west expedition. The intention was to enter Xinjiang and Outer Mongolia, in order to link up a supply line with the Soviet Union for necessary international aid. When Edgar Snow met

13 "Declaration Of 2nd National Congress Of CCP", July, 1922, (op. cit.)
15 Chen Jing, Shi Yan Shi (History in Poems), See Zheng Yi, 'Uncover the Truth of the Long March'
Mr. Shao Lizi, the governor of Shaaxi province, he was told by Shao that there had been little fighting between the KMT army and the Red Army in north Shaanxi, because “the Reds are moving into Ningxia and Gansu. They seem to want to connect with Outer Mongolia.”

Just as Stalin held that the right to national self-determination right was available only to the toiling class, the CCP could always explain the self-determination and secession in the same way: they could always nullify non-Chinese people’s nationalist demands by saying that it was not what the toiling people of the particular nationality really wanted. National self-determination was also emphasized differently on different occasions and different times. It should also be noted that the CCP’s and Mao Zedong’s public and official statements did not always reflect their real intentions. While sometimes they did go as far as to interpret self-determination as secession for the non-Chinese, more often they envisaged a federation of China including all non-Chinese peoples even including the already independent Outer Mongolia. On one occasion Mao Zedong made the following statement concerning Outer Mongolia: “The relationship between Outer Mongolia and the Soviet Union, now and in the past, has always been based on the principle of completely equality. When the people’s revolution has been victorious in China, the Outer Mongolian Republic will automatically become part of the China Confederation, at their own will. The Mohammadian and Tibetan peoples, likewise, will form autonomy republics attached to the China federation.” Mao even said that Burma, Indochina, Korea and Mongolia are illegally annexed parts of China which must be restored to it.

Among the numerous statements made by the CCP on nationality issues, the one that was directly related to the Mongols and also the most famous was “The Chinese Soviet Central Government’s Declaration to The People of Inner Mongolia” made on 10 December, 1935, widely known as the ‘1935 Declaration’. In this declaration Mao Zedong promised to help Mongols to “preserve the glory of the epoch of Genghis Khan, prevent the extermination of their nation and embark on the path of national revival and obtain their independence enjoyed by such people as those of Turkey, Poland, the Ukraine and the Caucasus.”

The declaration further stated that “all the original 6 leagues of 24 tribes and 49 banners, together with Chakhar, Tuned and two banners in Ningxia, regardless of their present county status, are all Mongolian national territory; the provinces and administrations of Jehol, Chakhar and Suiyuan should

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17 “It is the immediate task of China to regain all our lost territories, not merely to defend our sovereignty below the Great Wall. This means that Manchuria must be regained. We do not, however, include Korea, formerly a Chinese colony, but when we have reestablished the independence of the lost territories of China, and if the Koreans wish to break away from the chains of Japanese imperialism, we will extend them our enthusiastic help in the struggle for independence. The same things applies to Formosa. As for Inner Mongolia which is populated by both Chinese and Mongols, we will struggle to drive Japanese from there and help Inner Mongolians to establish an autonomous state.”, See Edgar Snow, *Red Star Over China* (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1937) p.102.
be cancelled. Inner Mongolian nation's land should never be taken away by any nation under any name...Mongolian nation in Inner Mongolia can organize themselves at their own will. They have the right to organize their own life according to their own principle and establish their own government. They also have the right to form a federation with other nations or to be completely independent.19

2.1. Ulanhu: CCP's Proxy Among Mongols

It is difficult to tell when exactly the CCP shifted from the position of advocating nationality secession to that of autonomy since in the late 1930s-40s the CCP mentioned both policies on different occasions. The time that the CCP still mentioned the right of self-determination and secession must be later than it is indicated in CCP history textbooks today. Mongolian communists in Inner Mongolia must have still used the slogan of national self-determination even later than the CCP. Mongolian nationalists, however, always regarded the Soviet Union and the Mongolian People's Republic as their models. Because of their close ties with the Soviets and Outer Mongolia, the CCP's Mongolian collaborators and followers were different from the CCP's other local branches for the following two reasons:

At first, the CCP's influence among the Mongols was relatively insignificant compared to its work in the Chinese-populated regions such as Jehol, Chakhar and Suiyuan.20 The CCP's activities in those regions were directed by CCP branches operating out of the neighboring Chinese provinces such as Hebei. Most of the cadres were Chinese and most of the work was conducted among the Chinese population. It was later in CCP history that these activities began to be regarded as part of the CCP's effort to help the Mongols' cause of national liberation.

Secondly, Ulanhu and other Mongolian communists had closer links with the Soviet Union and the Mongolian People's Republic than with the CCP in Yanan. In 1929 Ulanhu and other Soviet-trained Mongolian cadres were sent back to Inner Mongolia by the Comintern. Before he went to Yanan in 1941, his work in Inner Mongolia had been directly instructed by the Comintern and all his Mongol fellow comrades were Russian-trained and IMPRP members. According to material made available by the Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution and the KMT in Taiwan, Ulanhu in his early

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20 The CCP's earliest influence on the Mongols started in the Mongolian-Tibetan Academy in Beijing in 1920s, which, as a matter of fact, had more to do with the earliest CCP and the Comintern and relatively little to do with Mao Zedong's group who later came to the leadership of the CCP. Ulanhu was among the Mongolian students at the academy, and later he was sent by the CCP to receive training in Moscow. As early as 1925, CCP began its underground activities in Inner Mongolia.
activities in Inner Mongolia was not a staunch member of the Chinese communist party. The time
that he decided to go to Yanan was rather late in the game.

Ulanhu's name was made known in a national newspaper because of his role in the Bai Ling Miao
Mutiny in 1936. His agitation was partly responsible for the mutiny by the Mongolian autonomous
army at Bai Ling Miao. It was a heavy blow to De Wang's autonomous movement since the army was
the only armed force he had at the time. The mutiny was an important fillip for Fu Zuoyi, the Shanxi
warlord who controlled western Inner Mongolia, who was then engaged in a confrontation with De
Wang, the leader of Inner Mongolian autonomous movement.

Later on, in part because of on his role in the rebellion force, Ulanhu became the political commissar
of New 3rd Division, the designation of the New 3rd Division was permitted by the Generalissimo
Chiang Kaishek as a Mongolian force within the KMT army. Ulanhu never managed to establish
control over the New 3rd Division and he failed to convert it into a Communist armed force. It has
been said Ulanhu made up his mind to go to Yanan to join up with the CCP because he had become
disappointed after he saw his advancement had been blocked in the KMT's army.

In 1938 Mao Zedong instructed He Long's 120th Division to expand its activities to the north and set
up a guerrilla base in Inner Mongolia so as to enlarge the CCP's base of armed struggle at the time of
the united front with the KMT against the Japanese. It was at this time that Inner Mongolia became
more important for the CCP's build-up of its military strength. This was when the CCP retreated from
its former position on national self-determination for minorities and put forward the idea of nationality
autonomy because then the CCP began to give more serious consideration to Inner Mongolia's future
as a part of a communist China rather than using the former appealing slogan. In 1940, an
international transportation link (Yanan - Inner Mongolia - Ulaan Baator) was set up with the
assistance of the guerrilla force.

In 1941 Ulanhu went to Yanan. The same year, the CCP set up the Yanan Nationality Academy to
train cadres for non-Chinese areas, and Ulanhu was appointed the deputy director of the academy. In
1944 Ulanhu returned to Inner Mongolia and organized a resistance group against Japanese, and that

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21 Cultural Revolution Materials and Feiqing Yanjiu (Studies of Chinese Communism) (the Institute
286.
23 Feiqing Yanjiu (Studies of Chinese Communism) (op. cit.)
24 1938 was the year when the CCP in Yanan set up the Northwest Working Committee and began to
systematically study nationality problem and made the policy of nationality autonomy instead of
advocating national self-determination and secession for ethnic minorities. The CCP Northwest
Working Committee in 1941 passed the Program of Mongolian Issues in the Anti-Japanese War which
was another comprehensive policy document concerning Mongols after 'the 1935 Declaration'. See
Hao Weimin, ed., Concise History Of Inner Mongolia Modern History, (Inner Mongolian University
25 Hao Wei-min, ed., Concise History Of Inner Mongolia Modern History (Inner Mongolian
same year, the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Committee was set up under Ulanhu’s leadership. In 1945 after the Japanese surrendered, Ulanhu set up the Suiyuan Mongolian Government.

Ulanhu advanced rapidly within the party especially after 1945. There are three basic reasons for this. The first was that the work in Inner Mongolia and the work among Mongols had become one of the priorities for CCP. The second was Ulanhu’s personal quality in that he was able to side with the right faction at the right time.26 The third was that his links with the Soviet Union and the independent Mongolia might also be regarded as political assets since at this time, the CCP still sought suggestion from the Soviet Union. In 1945 he attended the CCP’s 7th National Congress27, and was elected as an alternate member of CCP’s central committee, deputy secretary of the committee in charge of nationality affairs.

2.2. Ulanhu’s Allied Autonomous Movement

The end of the war gave Mongols short-lived hopes of a possible independent and unified Mongolia. Ulanhu, as the CCP’s representative, using a soft approach incorporated and neutralised the various independence efforts mounted by pro-Soviet Mongols. Just as the CCP had done in China, Ulanhu linked the goals of Mongolian national liberation with class liberation. To unite Mongolians under his flag, he showed the Mongols that CCP, in contrast to KMT and Japanese, was a genuine friend of the Mongolian people; the CCP advocated Mongolian autonomy in a united Inner Mongolia and against setting up Chinese provinces on Mongolian land.

Ulanhu had shown that he was more a realist than an idealist in his political career so far. At the point when he tried to unite and suppress pro-independent Mongolian nationalists, he showed again his realistic side either in request of his own political advancement or out of his belief in what was possible to achieve for the Mongolian people. Maybe it can be said he was an realist in both senses.

In August 1945, the Soviet Red Army and Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Army entered eastern and middle Inner Mongolia. According to the Soviet practice on nationality policy, the Soviet and Mongolian allied force were both supportive and sympathetic toward the local independence declared

26 Gao Gang was the head of Mongolian Work Committee of Shan-Gan-Ning (Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia) Border District. Gao Gang was in 1941 the director of Nationality Institute and Ulanhu was the deputy. In Yanan’s Rectification, he was saved by Gao Gang. In the later year when Ulanhu became the head of the IMAR, while Gao Gang was the head of Manchuria, he pursued the same pro-Soviet policy as Gao. He was then under the leadership of the CCP’s Northwest Bureau, which also had close ties with Soviet trained leaders. From the period of difficulties (1959 to 1961) created by Mao’s Great Leap Forward to Cultural Revolution, he was a devoted follower of Liu Shaoqi. See Hao Yufeng, Biography of Ulanhu (Inner Mongolian People’s Press, 1989) p.338, and the Cultural Revolution Materials.

27 Ulanhu attended the CCP’s 6th Party Congress in Moscow, June 1928. As a student in Moscow’s Zhong Shan (Sun Yatsen) University, he was entrusted by the Russian hosts with the highly confidential work in the secretariat of the meeting. See Hao Yufeng, Biography of Ulanhu, (Inner Mongolian People’s Press, 1989) p.113.
by the Mongols. Due to the fact that Inner Mongolia was controlled variously by large numbers of
troops from the Soviet Union, the CCP and the KMT, the issue of national determination in Inner
Mongolia was determined by geopolitics rather than by the Mongols' national aspirations. Besides,
the co-ordination between the Soviet Union and CCP left little choice for Mongols but to side with the
CCP.

The Yalta secret agreement on February 11, 1945 guaranteed the independent status of Outer
Mongolia. The KMT government reluctantly agreed with the Soviet Union on the status of
independent Mongolia, hoping that in return the Soviet Union would not let the CCP control
Manchuria and Xinjiang - the areas under the Soviet Union’s influence and control. What was more
important for the KMT government was that by agreeing with Stalin on the issue, in return they,
instead of the CCP, would be recognized by the Soviet Union as the legitimate government of post-
war China. From the point of view of Russian's western allies and the KMT government, it was hard
to accept Inner Mongolia, a region now controlled by Chinese, to be merged with Outer Mongolia and
put into the sphere of the Soviet Union.

The KMT government later recognized the independence of Mongolia after the referendum held in
Mongolia between October 10-20, 1945, in accordance with the Sino-Soviet Friendship Allied Treaty
signed on August 14, 1945. The CCP had not expressed any grudge to the Soviet leader for his
support of the independence of Outer Mongolia, because apart from the party's ideological affinity
with the Soviet Union, it needed Soviet support much more than did the KMT if it were to win the
civil war. In Inner Mongolia, the CCP promised the Mongols more autonomous rights than had the
KMT so as to win Mongols over. During the negotiations on the Sino-Soviet treaty in July, 1945,
Jiang Jingguo said to Stalin: “The CCP’s army is fighting against the government army in Inner
Mongolia. And CCP propagated that since Outer Mongolia has declared independence, they will help
to make Inner Mongolia independent as well”.28 The remarks indicate that the CCP and Ulanhu’s
Inner Mongolian forces at least for propaganda purposes had promoted the idea of an independent
Mongolia. According to the CCP’s instruction on the Inner Mongolian issue, the CCP began to
support the idea of a unified Inner Mongolian autonomous government because Mongolian delegates
in KMT’s National Congress had made the demand to the KMT government that Inner Mongolian
autonomy be solved.29

In the same year, Lin Biao’s 100,000-strong army with 20,000 CCP cadres entered Manchuria and
East Mongolia.30 In Western Inner Mongolia there had been CCP guerrilla bases in Chinese cultivated

28 ‘Memorandum of the meeting between Stalin and Jiang Jingguo, Jiang Jieshi’s private
representative’, recorded by Baprov, translated by Chen Chunhua, Ming Pao Monthly, Feb. 1997,
p.47.
29 “CCP’s Telegram on the Issue of Inner Mongolian Autonomy”, Nei Menggu Lianhe Zizhi Yundong
Dangan Xianbian (Archive Collection Of The Joint Committee Of Inner Mongolian Autonomous
30 Hao Weimin, (op. cit.) p.217.
agricultural areas as early as 1938. By 10 October of 1945 when the KMT-CCP truce was signed in Chongqing, the CCP’s Jin-Cha-Ji (Shanxi, Chakhar and Hebei three provinces) Military Zone already occupied the southern part of southern Inner Mongolia.

In September, Boindalai, a former supreme Judge of the Mengjiang government, declared independence at De Wang’s Sunit Banner (Bei Zi Miao) and set up the Provisional Government of Inner Mongolian People’s Republic. The chief commander of the Soviet Russian army in the area, out of his belief in the Lenin-Stalin doctrine on the nationality issue, supported their independence, but their request to merge with the Mongolian People’s Republic was refused by the MPR because by then the Soviet Union and the MPR had clarified their Inner Mongolian policy as an issue that was China’s domestic problem and should be solved in association with CCP. The inconsistency between the field commander of the Red Army and the Soviet leadership at top level is also noted by Westad. According to Westad, the Soviet occupation policy in Manchuria during the first few weeks seemed contradictory and aimless, compared to the great efficiency with which the military offensive had been carried out. The Red Army in some places such as in Shanghaiguan co-operated with the CCP’s army, in some other place they even refused to see the CCP leaders.

Ulanhu, with the backing of the CCP and the co-operation of the Soviet Russians and the MPR, single-handedly cancelled the independent government and incorporated many of its followers into his own Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement.

On 25 November 1945, the Joint Committee of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement was founded in Kalgan. In order to reduce Mongolian suspicions, the joint committee pretended to be an organization of the masses rather than an official organization of the CCP. In his speech at the founding ceremony, Ulanhu said that the joint autonomous movement was the latest effort in the long line of attempts to realize Mongolian national unification, independence and liberation. They began with Genghis Khan’s unification of the clans and were continued by Chakhar Ligdan Khan’s and Junghar Gerdan Khan’s defiance against the Manchu conquest. In modern times, they were continued with the Inner Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party founded 20 years earlier by Sukhbaator, national hero for the independent Mongolian state. He also said clearly that the goal of the

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31 In August, 1945 the Inner Mongolian People’s Committee, the independence organization in Shilinggol, sent a delegation to Ulaan Baator asking for the merger of the two Mongolias, but their request was refused. In September, the newly-setup provisional government sent a delegation to Ulaan Baator asking to use Ulaan Baator’s radio station to broadcast to the world their independence. They also asked for the recognition of their independence and for military and economic aid from the Soviet Union and the MPR. Again their requests were denied. See Hao Weimin, ed., Concise History Of Inner Mongolia Modern History (Inner Mongolian University Press, 1990) p.219.
34 Ulanhu’s speech at the founding ceremony of the Joint Committee of Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement.
movement was the complete liberation of the whole Mongolian nation, and that the CCP was a sincere help to the Mongolian cause.

If the CCP and Ulanhu could still justify their cancellation of the independence in Shinggol by denying that it represented the toiling masses and the proletarian class, it was difficult for them to justify their cancellation of the independence in eastern Inner Mongolia on the same pretext. It seemed that to Ulanhu, whether the demand for national self-determination came from toiling masses was not as important as to whether the movement was under his control.

After the Japanese surrendered and before the Soviet-Mongolian army entered eastern Inner Mongolia, some pro-Soviet Mongol communists and revolutionaries, young intellectuals and officials began another autonomous movement. On 18 August 1945 they issued the Inner Mongolian Emancipation Declaration advocating the merger of Inner Mongolia and the MPR. In March 1945, in eastern Inner Mongolia the Inner Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party was revived as the New Inner Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (NIMPRP) with a revised party program and constitution. NIMPRP was an anti-feudalist revolutionary party. Hafenga, Penstag and Temurbaagen and other Mongolian nationalists were the founders of NIMPRP whose aim was Inner Mongolian national liberation and merger with independent Mongolian state. The party also set up a Mongolian youth organization called People's Revolutionary Youth League and it also established its own army.

On January 16, 1946, the NIMPRP and other Mongolian nationalist groups gathered at Gegen Monastery in Xingan League for the Convention of Eastern Mongolian Delegates and set up the Eastern Mongolian Autonomous Government, and passed The Administrative Programme of the Eastern Mongolian Government. The government was formally established at Wangyemiao (Ulaan Hot) and Boinmandu was elected as Chairman. Quickly the autonomous government acquired all necessary features of a sovereign state: a constitution, government, parliament and an army. Within a short time, the government carried out a series of progressive measures. The East Mongolian People's Co-operative and the East Mongolian People's Bank were established.

For its goals of first, merger, and later, independence, the autonomous government sought the support of the MPR and KMT government and was turned down by the both. The CCP Bureau and Military Zone of western Manchuria did a lot work to influence the autonomous government in Wangyemiao and to persuade the Mongols to abandon their independence demands, but no agreement was ever reached. Again Ulanhu played a key role in incorporating the independent entity into his united autonomous movement. After a series of long and hard negotiations between Ulanhu and the Eastern

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35 Li Fuchun, the secretary of western Manchuria CCP Bureau, spent some time at Wang Yie Miao, but achieved nothing, which was in sharp contrast to the success of Ulanhu's appeal to those nationalists. At that time Lin Biao, Huang Kecheng and Li Fuchun were the top CCP leaders in Manchuria. Xi Zhongxun, "Ulanhu Forever Live in the Hearts of the Peoples of All Nationalities", "Preface", Hao Yufeng, Biography of Ulanhu (Inner Mongolian People's Press, 1989) p.3.
Inner Mongolian Government, the NIMPRP and the Eastern Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government were disbanded in January 1946. The Eastern Inner Mongolian independence movement was incorporated into Ulanhu’s Joint Committee of Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement.\(^{36}\)

On 3 April 1946, at the Chengde Conference (also known as the ‘April 3 Conference’), the Joint Committee of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement and Eastern Mongolian Government were merged into Ulanhu’s joint autonomous movement. On 1 May 1947, the Joint Government of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement was established. In June 1946, the CCP and KMT again engaged in civil war, and by July 1947 the CCP began its strategic offensive. In the period from 1945 to 1947, Ulanhu, using a policy of carrot and stick, controlled and assimilated various Mongolian independence movements and efforts. Backed by the weight of the CCP’s military triumphs, Ulanhu executed those Mongol nationalists who refused to surrender and united with those who accepted his leadership.

3. The Compromise of Autonomy and Revolution

3.1. The Situations for the Compromise

The success of Ulanhu’s joint autonomous movement in becoming associated with the CCP and the establishment of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region was the result of compromise between the Mongolian nationalist demands and the CCP’s hegemonic communist ideology. Those sections of the Mongolian nationalist movement that were associated with both the Japanese and the KMT were clearly doomed. The movements which advocated the merger of the two Mongolias were also discouraged by the Soviet Union and by the Mongolian People’s Republic because it seems at the time the Inner Mongolian issue was considered as a Chinese domestic issue by the Soviet Union, and the merger of Outer and Inner Mongolia was not envisaged and agreed to as part of the regional post-war order.\(^{37}\)

Ulanhu tried to present Mongolian nationalists the view that to reach an understanding and compromise with CCP was the only way to secure any position in the new political regime being established in Inner Mongolia, the CCP could also be perceived in many positive ways by the Mongols to justify the compromise. By doing so, Ulanhu enhanced his role in Inner Mongolian politics while promoting the CCP interests.


\(^{37}\) Because the commander of the Soviet-Mongolian Joint Army in Shilinggol supported pro-independent Mongolian nationalists, he was replaced by Nicklayev, the deputy Soviet advisor in the Mongolian people’s Republic. Nicklayev told Ulanhu that Chinese affairs should be handled by Chinese Communist Party. See, Hao Yufeng, Biography of Ulanhu (Inner Mongolian People’s Press, 1989) pp. 366-8.
The CCP then regarded Inner Mongolia as an inseparable part of the future communist China, but they still needed as much support as possible to win the civil war against the KMT regime, hence it was important for them to win Mongol support to consolidate their hinterland bases. Therefore there was more room for Ulanhu to take more control in Inner Mongolia by meeting some of the Mongolian nationalist demands such as recognition of Mongolian land rights. CCP's tolerant gesture on autonomy in Inner Mongolia, China's first nationality autonomous region, was also a gesture to the Soviets and the MPR to win their trust and support.

The CCP made a lot of gestures to Mongols in Inner Mongolia, therefore it was possible for Mongols to understand the China-Inner Mongolia relationship as similar to that between the Soviet Russians and the Mongolian State. Since 1921, the Soviet-styled social revolution and modernization program was regarded by pro-Soviet Mongols as having completely transformed the backward theocratic Mongolian society from extreme poverty into a socialist society with modern industries, education and health care. But the Soviet Russians, in contrast to the Chinese colonizers, did not have much stake in colonizing Mongolian lands. Obviously the Soviet Union was never short of farmland and never had the same population pressures as China.

Among the Mongolian revolutionaries there were always pro-Chinese views. On the question of with whom the Mongolian nation should form an alliance, some believed it was safer to ally with those nations of relatively similar and less modernized culture like the Chinese people, since Mongolia would be more likely to be simply assimilated by a more modernized nation like Russia." In that period there was a tendency to view Chinese people as being dominated by western powers so that they were regarded by Mongols as fellow sufferers. This pro-Chinese view was later certainly augmented substantially by the CCP's Mongolian followers. The pro-Chinese views from Merse and later from Ulanhu idealized the new Chinese regimes of either Sun Yatsen or the CCP, and put much emphasis on the threats from western imperialists.

The nature of the future state as conceived by the CCP was different from the previous Chinese republic which pretended to be a Chinese nation-state. The new Chinese state was to be a multinational state of nationality equality, that would enjoy common progress. In the future multi-national state, Mongols were to be recognized as an equal and separate nation by the CCP and they were promised the integrity of Mongolian territory and right of national self-determination. Of course the incorporation of Inner Mongolia into the Chinese state was interpreted by the CCP as a product of a voluntary act by Mongols rather than the negation of their self-determination right. The CCP, by

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39 In 1945 when the Sino-USSR treaty was signed at Moscow, Stalin told one of the KMT officials: "To be honest with you, we want Outer Mongolia for no other reason than military strategic considerations". Wang Qichong, "The Strategic Position of Outer Mongolia in Sino-USSR Confrontation", *Feiqing Yanjiu (Study of Communist China)* (op. cit.) 5/72.
40 Guo Daofu (Merse), *The Speech on Mongolian Issues* (1929) (Inner Mongolia Dauer History and...
exploiting all its foreign and domestic enemies' oppressive policies towards Mongolian people, presented itself as a genuine friend and ally of the Mongols. After the Mongolian nationalists had swallowed their bitter experiences with the KMT and the Japanese, the CCP appeared more attraction.

3.2. A Revolution with Inner Mongolian Characteristics

If Ulanhu's autonomous movement was only understood as no more than the sum of CCP activities in Inner Mongolia, its nationalistic side would be neglected. Although it was under the leadership of the CCP and was regarded as a part of the Chinese revolution, the joint autonomous movement was in nature a united front movement. In terms of its goals, roots and the logic of its development, it had its own character. Although it was understood as a communist movement, it was a movement with distinct Inner Mongolian characteristics.

Within the movement it was always clear to Mongols that the cooperation with the CCP was basically a political alliance rather than one based on a sense of a common national identity. Accordingly the possibility of merging with the independent Mongolian state was not excluded, which, according to Stalin's view on the international proletariat revolution, depended on the requirements of economic and political development. In the documents of the autonomous movement, Mongols and Chinese, descendants of Genghis Khan and descendants of the Emperors Yan, were always used as two separate notions respectively, as Inner Mongolians and Chinese people. Since the Joint Autonomous Movement in theory was a mass movement and an united front movement led by the Communist party, its ultimate goal was Mongolian national liberation. After the Japanese were defeated in 1945, Ulanhu envisaged three stages for the Inner Mongolian revolution: an autonomous movement prior to the establishment of an autonomous government; then an autonomous government; and finally a state in a free confederation. According to the 1947 Program of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government, the goal of autonomy was “to unite Mongolian people of all levels in Inner Mongolia, unite Chinese Communist party and Chinese democratic forces, ... finally set up for the Inner Mongolian people a self-determined government”, "to realize complete Mongolian national liberation", and to "form a free confederation".

In the beginning of the IMAR, the CCP's role and leadership was not emphasized as much as today.


41 Ulanhu said: “the heroes of the Inner Mongolian defense army fight abreast of the 8th route army against the common enemy. They are suffering and refuse to give up and the blood of descendants of Genghis Khan and descendants of Huang Emperor are shed together”, Ulanhu, “The First Year of Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement”, (27 April, 1949), Archive Collection Of Inner Mongolian United And Autonomous Movement (Archive Press, 1989) p.230.


44 “Program of Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government”, Ibid.
Regarding Inner Mongolia’s autonomy and its relations with the CCP, Ulanhu sometimes spoke of the CCP as a genuine friend and ally and he tried to convince people that the paramount leader of the autonomous movement was the Inner Mongolian Communist Party rather than the Chinese Communist Party. When outside help for the Inner Mongolian national liberation was mentioned, the Soviet Union as the powerful victor in the war and the independent MPR were usually listed before the CCP and other Chinese democratic forces.

Ulanhu’s power in Inner Mongolia was built up less through military means than by co-opting various Mongolian nationalist groups and this was also one of the reasons that he was highly valued by CCP. Contrary to Mao’s view that “national struggle, in the final analysis, is a matter of class struggle”, Ulanhu believed “the Nationality problem was an internal problem”. Rather than engendering a social revolution as the CCP did, Ulanhu used an approach softer than the social revolution carried out in Chinese areas; he did not group Mongolian people into antagonist classes. The autonomous movement was described later by Ulanhu as a “Successful chapter of unity and struggle”. Just as the CCP had put forward a three-part secret formula as the reason for the success of its revolution, Ulanhu summarized his own three during this period: to win over Mongolian youth; to establish Mongolian national liberation and unity; to unite the Mongolian traditional classes.

The Inner Mongolian revolution was regarded as having its own developmental logic. Mao Zedong sometimes liked to see himself as a modern successor to the historical peasant revolutions, and in the same way, Ulanhu saw the Inner Mongolian autonomous movement under his leadership as developed in the line of historical Mongolian heroism, starting from Genghis Khan, Ligden Khan (the last Mongolian great khan to fight against the Manchu conquest), Gerdan Boshigt (Junghar Mongolian Khan who tried to unify Mongolia but was defeated by the Manchu emperor Kang Xi), to Sukhe Baator and Chalpasang, the modern revolutionary Mongolian heroes. In the history of Mongolian communism, the Mongolia-Tibetan Academy in Beijing was seen as the cradle of Inner Mongolian revolution just as the Jing Gang Mountains or Yanan are regarded as the cradles of the CCP’s revolution. And Ulanhu said that the Mongolian revolution developed independently of the CCP before the Sino-Japanese war and during civil war period.

47 Cultural Revolution Materials
50 In the 1930s Mongolian communist activities in Inner Mongolia were under the leadership of the
4. The Autonomy Effort and leftist policies from 1947 to the End of the Cultural Revolution

The CCP's leadership of the Inner Mongolian autonomous movement was established by compromise. One element was the CCP's promise to keep the integrity of Mongolian land and the traditional rights of Mongols. The other was the promise to all the people in common that they would enjoy equal rights and prosperity. Ulanhu, through his leading role in the autonomous movement, made himself a champion of both the cause of Mongolian autonomy and of the socialist cause.

At the beginning of the IMAR, Ulanhu and his followers tried to set up a basis for a genuine nationality autonomy in Inner Mongolia. But during the entire process, the Mongols and Chinese were in constant conflict. In spite of the haggles and struggles, some achievements were made during this period. Yet, ironically, in the same period, the very reason for Mongolian autonomy -the right of Mongolian people to Mongolian land - was canceled by China's socialist reform in the 1950s. Though it was only ten years since the IMAR was founded, it was clear that the CCP would not tolerate any real autonomy in Inner Mongolia, and Ulanhu's downfall in 1966 in the beginning of the Cultural Revolution indicated the final end to an era of compromise. The CCP in the end abandoned completely the Soviet model of nationality policy.

After the CCP defeat of the KMT, it proclaimed the founding of the new China, and the PRC became an internationally recognized sovereign state which included all non-Chinese frontiers, such as Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang and Tibet, where the KMT regime had never exercised full control. [ Even the Manchus had exercised only various means of indirect administration and only rarely did they enjoy outright control]. It was then that the guarantee of the CCP's promises regarding Mongolian autonomy came to mean nothing more than an ideological slogan. Yet, this slogan could guarantee little since the character of Chinese communism had always flickered between the two influences of orthodox Marxist-Leninist doctrines and Chinese deep-seated characteristics. Mongols who argued in favor of genuine nationality autonomy, could only base their arguments against the CCP in the 1950s with quotes from Lenin and from Stalin's remarks on nationality issues, or from what the CCP leaders had previously promised to Mongols.

Nationality assimilation was usually carried out under the name of nationality integration. Nationality integration or assimilation was justified by the Chinese arguments based on the logic of historical materialism. Since Marx and Engels wrote in the Communist Manifesto that class, state, and nation would vanish in the end, and the Chinese usually argued that since China was a socialist state, different nationalities together with their cultural and language differences would gradually be integrated into one. And since the Chinese were the largest nationality and at a more advanced stage of development stage than other ethnic minorities, ethnic minorities should therefore be assimilated into the Chinese. But Mongols argued that since Marx and Engels said that nation would vanish instead of being assimilated by a dominant nationality, the Chinese nationality was as unimportant as the

Comintern. "Speech on Lindong Cadre's Meeting" (February 1947) Cultural Revolution Materials

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Mongolian nationality in the future common communist identity. According to Lenin, after socialism succeeded in one state, those nations previously under oppression would experience an unprecedented stage of developmental prosperity, as would their languages and intellectual development.51

In the Maoist era, the CCP’s official perception of nation or nationality did not venture beyond Stalin’s definition which provided a mixture of objective and subjective standards for a nation: common territory, common economic life, common language, common culture and common psychological make-up of the common cultural community52. Stalin’s criteria of nationality was often quoted in reverse by those who argued for Mongolian autonomy. The reverse logic was that a people being recognized as a nation or nationality are entitled to their own common territory, common economy, common language and culture. That was Ulanhu’s main theoretical basis for nationality autonomy. Ulanhu, in his own way, listed three foundations for nationality autonomy: political, economic and cultural foundations.

The extent to which Mongols could manage their own affairs in Inner Mongolia was related to two issues: the first was whether Mongols’ right to Inner Mongolia as a whole was recognized; the second was the extent to which political authority in the IMAR represented Mongolian nationality. The first issue of Mongolian land rights was complicated by the changes in the IMAR administrative regions which involved changes of ethnic population. The change of Mongolian rights was indicated not only in legal categories, but it was also determined by ideologically-motivated social changes. The second issue of representation was a matter of compromise between two different principles. On one hand the Chinese Communist party decided that it did not need to derive its mandate from the people’s votes, but from the vanguard party theory; on the other hand there was also the pretension of democratic formalities. The democratic formalities in IMAR were the ethnic content or proportion of the officialdom.

4.1. Ethnic Cadres and Mongolian Language

In the first 10 years of the IMAR after 1947, Ulanhu's political position was significantly elevated. He was a member of Constitution Draft Committee (1953). He was the person who in both theory and practice contributed most to the 1954 constitution on nationality issues. In 1954 he was the deputy chief of the Korea War Visiting Group in his capacity as vice-premier of state council, director of the State Nationality Commission and vice-president of the Sino-USSR Friendship Association. Before 1967, Ulanhu enjoyed as many as twelve titles: alternate member of the politburo of the CCP central committee, vice-premier, director of the State Nationality Commission, the Second Secretary of the CCP's North China Bureau, the First Secretary of the CCP Inner Mongolia Committee, the Chairman of the Inner Mongolian Government, the Chief commander and commissar of the Inner Mongolian military zone and the President of the Inner Mongolian University. In the 20-year period just prior to the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, the administrative status of the IMAR was higher than any of the other Chinese provinces. The Inner Mongolian Military zone then enjoyed an equal status with other large military zones directly under the command of the Chinese central military authority.

Ulanhu put a lot emphasis on the ethnicization of cadres in Inner Mongolia, which naturally met considerable resistance from the local Chinese cadres who were in a majority at all levels of the IMAR's party and government organization. Therefore it was important for Ulanhu to put his Mongolian followers in significant positions of the IMAR government and party organs. Many of these Mongolian cadres had not been trained by the CCP, they had been formerly associated with the former IMPRP, the Comintern and even De Wang's autonomous movement. The cadres most trusted by Ulanhu were the Tumed Mongols that he had co-opted and who had been under his leadership before 1947. There were also Mongolian cadres from eastern Inner Mongolia who had accepted Ulanhu's leadership when he incorporated the eastern autonomous movement. Most of those from the east were formerly associated either with the Comintern or the Japanese, and thus were less trusted by the CCP. It may be that those most trusted by CCP were the Mongols who had joined the Chinese revolution in a manner which had nothing to do with Inner Mongolian autonomous movement. For example, there were those Mongols who had joined the CCP and its army in Manchuria after 1945 and there were those who had joined the CCP in north China, and many of them were sent to Inner Mongolia.

Ulanhu considered it vital for the autonomy to train more Mongols and other non-Chinese cadres and bring them into the autonomous government and the party organizations. In 1956, the IMAR and other autonomous regions launched a drive to "ethnicize" the party and government organs. In a speech before the 3rd plenary of the National People's Congress on June 20, 1956, Ulanhu explained that in order to enable the national minorities to truly become "masters in their own house", it was necessary to train a large number of national minority cadres to take over the primary roles of government administration and party affairs in their respective autonomous regions. The achievement was made a year later. According to Wang Duo, deputy party secretary of the IMAR at the time, one fifth of all cadres in Inner Mongolia were Mongols while Mongols by then accounted for only 1/8 of the whole population. But in the ensuing period from 1957 to 1962, cadre ethnicization was affected by Mao's radicalism.54

Another issue related to the ethnicization of the government and the party organs was widening the use of Mongolian language. Before the Sino-Russian split when the Soviet model of socialist construction was still highly regarded and copied by China, the MPR, the second socialist state in the world, was regarded by some Mongols in the IMAR as a better example to follow than China. Mongolian culture and language were regarded by the IMAR as better and more direct means than Chinese culture and language to learn the more advanced socialism of the Soviet Union.55 The common Socialist culture between the Mongolian state and Inner Mongolia was emphasized. Efforts towards unifying Mongolian culture was even once emphasized by the IMAR government.

The pro-Mongolian cultural policy was possible because of the Sino-Russian alliance. Besides, it might also have had something to do with the long-standing Chinese reluctance to recognize the independent Mongolian state. Senior Chinese leaders repeatedly spoke of their hopes of bringing back into China the Mongolian state56. Perhaps Ulanhu also took advantage of these Chinese expectations to justify his pro-MPR policy. He once said that the standardization of the Mongolian language in the MPR and the IMAR could better promote Mao Zedong thoughts in the MPR.57

54 Wang Duo, *My Fifty Years*,
56 In the summer of 1949, Mao said "why don't we let Inner Mongolia and Outer Mongolia unite under the name of autonomy and become a part of PRC" when he mentioned nationality problem to Russians. Actually Mao in many other occasions in 1945, 1954, 1956 and 1964 mentioned "losing Mongolia". *Ming Pao* 2/93 p55.
57 *The Cultural Revolution Materials*. 127
In 1953 at a special conference on Mongolian language, the IMAR government decided to popularize Mongolian. On July 10, 1955, the IMAR validated the use of the Cyrillic alphabet for writing and spelling Mongolian in the same way as operated in the Mongolian state. The goals set were to follow the Mongolian state's use of Cyrillic as the standard written form; to standardize local dialects following the standard of the Khalkha dialect which was the official language in Mongolian state; to standardize vocabulary and technical terms with those of the Mongolian State; unite Mongolian textbooks under a single system with the Mongolian state. These were designed to bridge the traditional cultural cleavage and bias between east and west Inner Mongolia using the then-believed higher culture of the Mongolian state.

The decision was followed by a wide-scale speak-Mongolian drive. The ability to speak Mongolian became then an important component of the nationalization of autonomous organs and also as an important criterion in determining a cadre's promotion in Inner Mongolia regardless of whether they were Mongols or Chinese. During this period, Inner Mongolia was categorized in four different areas, from advanced areas to backward areas according to their different level of popularizing the Mongolian language. The most advanced areas were those border areas along the Mongolian state, the worst areas were municipalities where the majority of the population was Chinese.

Due to pressure from Beijing, the effort to popularize Mongolian was held back in the leftist years from 1957 to 1962. During that time, Mongolian cadres were not allowed to speak Mongolian at work and conferences in spite of the official legal status of Mongolian. In April 1958, the IMAR was forced to declare that Cyrillic spelling was not suitable for Inner Mongolia. Yet, after the Great Leap Forward, the term for “people's commune” borrowed from the Chinese in Mongolian vocabulary was replaced by “nigdel”, the same term that was used in Ulaan Baator.

The goal of Mongolian education was defined by the Inner Mongolia government as to serve national culture. The Chinese authorities were so worried by this trend that during 1957 to 1962, they punished several people in highly publicized anti-rightest cases to warn against Mongols' fervor in learning from Ulaan Baator. In the IMAR primary school Mongolian textbooks of 1956, all mountains and rivers were listed as belonging to the Mongolian state in the textbook “Our Homeland”. In 1960, in the officially published Mongolian-Chinese dictionary, the item “Ulaan Baator” was explained in Chinese as the capital of our Mongolian motherland; “Nanking” as China's capital; “Beijing” as Beiping. Whether or not they were mindless mistakes, the incident showed the depth of the cultural influence from Mongolian State. Later in Cultural Revolution, the IMAR Nationality press and the IMAR People's Press were accused by Red Guards as being “the branch press of Ulaan Baator”.

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Nanking was KMT China's capital before 1949, after 1949 Beijing has been Communist China's capital. Beiping is the old name for Beijing used by KMT and Ming dynasty. Beiping in Chinese means “pacify the north”.

58 The Cultural Revolution Materials.
During the first 10-year period after 1947, considerable progress was made in nationality education. According to official statistics, in 1947, there were only two middle schools and 100 primary schools in Inner Mongolia, 100 Mongolian teachers and 95% of all Mongols were illiterates. By 1957, there were 25 middle schools, there were 20 times more teachers of Mongolian, and 37% of Mongols could read. In the second ten years from 1957 to 1967, there was some progress and there were some setbacks.

Before 1958, a lot of work was carried out by Inner Mongolia to preserve the Mongolian folk art and cultural tradition. Some major Mongolian literary classics were put together and published. To celebrate the 10-year anniversary of the IMAR, The Historical Romance of the Yuan Dynasty, Gada Melin, Erdni Tovch, Danabal were published. An important monument to the period is Genghis Khan’s Mausoleum which was rebuilt in 1955. The huge mausoleum was built in Mongolian style on the Ordos plateau where originally there were three simple yurts for the keeping of some relics from Genghis Khan.

4.2. Inner Mongolian Territory and Mongolian Land Right

From 1946 to 1956 it took ten years for the IMAR to reclaim those areas which had been either incorporated into bordering Chinese provinces or established as new Chinese provinces. According to IMAR propaganda, the Mongolian territory promised by the CCP in the 1935 Declaration was restored in the new China.

In 1947 when Ulanhu united and secured the support of the eastern Mongolian nationalists, the capital of the Joint Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement was moved from Ulaan Hot in east Mongolia to Kalgan [“zhang jia kou” in Chinese]. In 1952 the capital was finally moved to Gui Sui [meaning return and pacified in Chinese, today’s Hohhot, the capital of IMAR] which was immediately restored to its original Mongolian name, Hohhot [ “Hoh hot” in Mongolia means blue city] beginning from the time of Altan Khan.

Suiyuan Province was abolished in June 1954; in July 1955 the six banners and counties of Jehol province such as Onut Banner and Chi Feng county were incorporated into Inner Mongolia. (The other part of Jehol were put into Hebei provinces). In April 1956, Bain Hot Mongolian prefecture and Egina Banner of Gansu Province were incorporated into Inner Mongolia and in the same year Bayan

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61 Genghis Khan’s tomb has never been found. It is generally believed that the real burial site is within the MPR. The Ordos Plateau in Inner Mongolia where Genghis Khan’s relics were kept is only a shrine to him. “Cheng Lin” (Genghis Khan’s Mausoleum), the Chinese name for the Ordos site is misleading. But the misnomer does have the political implication which supports the Chinese claim that the Mongolian empire was ancient China and Genghis Khan was a Chinese emperor whose burying ground is still on the territory of P.R.C.
Nor League was set up in Inner Mongolia. The unified IMAR was regarded by Mongols as the end of 300 years of separating Inner Mongolia. Five hundred thousand Mongols outside the IMAR (in Xinjiang region, Qinghai province and IMAR's neighbouring provinces, Gansu, Ningxia, Hebei, Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang) were welcomed to return to Inner Mongolia. Ulanhu said that the unification would benefit the development of nationality culture.

The enlargement of IMAR no doubt increased the IMAR government and Ulanhu's power. One principle used to restore the original size of Inner Mongolia was to include as little Chinese as possible to provide Mongolian autonomy with Mongolian population bases. But the IMAR enlargement also brought in more Chinese cadres into the IMAR government, and also added substantially to Chinese population in the IMAR which was then already in a majority, particularly in those incorporated parts which were mostly agricultural areas.

But the enlargement of the IMAR administrative areas was not the same as unifying the territory of Mongolia. Since the people in China were not allowed to change their permanent residence freely in the PRC's household registration system, the provincial border was another barrier to the freedom of movement. Therefore in the longer term, the enlarging administrative scope of the IMAR, thus incorporating more Chinese peasants than Mongolian herdsmen, undermined the population basis for Mongolian autonomy.

During the Cultural Revolution, in the ten-month period from January to October in 1970, the size of the IMAR was reduced by half with only with three of the original leagues left: Shilinggol, Ulaan Chab and Ikhe Zuü. The other three leagues were annexed by the neighboring provinces of Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning, Ningxia and Gansu.

Within the 10-year period from 1947 to 1958, the state had became the landowner of the grassland of Inner Mongolia and Mongols lost their land ownership step by step.

Land reform was conducted between 1947 and 1952 in Inner Mongolia. In the pastoral areas, the reform was called "democratic reform" since the ownership of grassland was not changed. Before 1947, the grassland in Inner Mongolia belonged to the Mongolian public and the aristocracy was not the landowner, they had only privileges in using grazing lands. During the democratic reform, it was
recognized by the IMAR CCP Committee that all the land in Inner Mongolia belonged to the Mongolian people. In the pastoral areas, the Mongolian public ownership of grassland and the equal right of grazing were reiterated by the IMAR government, and the policy was called "free grazing" (zi you fang mu).

During the democratic reform period, Mongolian ownership of all the land in Inner Mongolia was redefined to mean that the land right extended only to the limited pastoral areas. A document issued by the Nationality Commission of the State Council in 1953 confirmed that the grasslands in Inner Mongolia belonged to the Mongolian public in common. It pointed out: "at present all grasslands and grazing lands in all pastoral areas, which might formerly have belonged to the whole nationality or a tribe, an individual or a monastery, or might have been leased land between the different nationalities or tribes, are now owned by the Mongolian public in common, in the whole IMAR, the policy is free grazing on grassland and readjustment of grassland."

In the Inner Mongolian agriculture areas, the Mongolian ownership of land was annulled by the land reform. The land which had formerly belonged to the Mongolian public in common was now allocated to individual peasants. For centuries before the land reform, Chinese peasants in Inner Mongolia had no land ownership rights and the land belonged to the Mongolian banners. When Mongolian nobles illegally let or sold public land to Chinese landlords, some other land was then also allocated to the Mongolian commoners. Chinese tenant farmers paid rent to Mongolian landlords: either Mongolian nobles or commoners. The rent was called Mongolian Rent (meng zu) by the Chinese which clearly indicates Mongolian land ownership. One important measure of the land reform was to invalidate the Mongolian Rent. And when those Mongols who owned more land were categorized as landlords, their land was allocated to the landless tenants, most of whom were Chinese.

From 1947 to 1957, a "no class-struggle" policy was pursued in the democratic reform in the pastoral areas in Inner Mongolia. Since there was no private ownership of grassland, therefore there was no exploiting class which could be said to control the means of production in the pastoral areas. The democratic reform on the pastoral land was not to change the land ownership, but only to abolish the Mongolian nobles' privileges in the use of public grazing land. The guideline of the IMAR

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70 The policy was called "3 no's, 2 beneficials": no class struggle, no confiscation, no class classification/categorization; to be beneficial to both livestock owner and herders. See Hao Weimin, *IMAR History*, (Inner Mongolian University Press, 1991) p.38.
government was that there should be "public ownership of pastures, freedom of grazing, without class categorization and class struggle, and with mutual benefit for both herd owners and herdsmen." The land reform in the cultivated parts, of the lands taken over from Mongolian landlords, 80% was given to Mongols and 20% to Chinese peasants. After the land reform, Mongolian peasants usually had more land than Chinese, therefore they were allowed to employ Chinese peasants or let farmland to Chinese peasants for rent.

The different policies of the democratic reform in the agricultural areas and the pastoral areas, and the different treatment toward Mongolian peasants and Chinese peasants in the agricultural areas reflected the compromise of two principles: both recognition of Mongolian rights and the more radical policies based on class differentiation. The split in policy differences often showed up between the Chinese central government guidelines and those of the IMAR government, and between the Mongolian cadres and Chinese cadres of the IMAR government. In spite of the policy of no class differentiation and struggle, in practice, class distinction was still adopted as an internal guideline by some cadres, and in some pastoral areas the policy of class distinction was copied from the agricultural areas.

Cooperatives (he zuo she) were set up in the agricultural areas in Inner Mongolia from 1953 to 1956 and in the pastoral areas from 1953 to 1958. By January of 1956, the first stage cooperatives had been established in the agricultural areas. The farm land and other basic production materials were collectivized into the cooperatives as shares of the means of production previously owned by households, and the peasants became the shareholder. Since the distribution was conducted according to the share, the first stage cooperatives were regarded as semi-socialist in nature. By the end of 1956, the first stage cooperatives were upgraded into advanced collectives in which the distribution was no longer conducted as a dividend, but according to work. And, the individual peasant's land rights were totally abolished.

During the cooperative movement, the so-called "combined cooperatives" ("lian he she": cooperatives consisted of many nationalities, most combined cooperatives were Chinese-Mongol cooperatives) were encouraged by Chinese cadres and welcomed by Chinese peasants. Since Mongolian peasants normally owned more land than Chinese peasants before the collectivization, Mongolian peasants lost more than Chinese peasants. During the collectivization in the pastoral areas, herdsmen's livestock were taken by the preliminary cooperatives as shares first and later became the collective property of the advanced cooperatives. Many monasteries - large livestock owners in the pastoral areas - were forced to join the state farms together with their livestock and grazing land, while others were collectivized into cooperatives. In the cases of those "combined cooperatives", more land which had formerly been owned by Mongols was transferred to the cooperatives and was shared by Chinese peasants. In the collectivization of monastery properties, the livestock formerly belonging to the monasteries and the Mongolian public grazing land both became state property.

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71 Ulanhu, "Speech on Sub-branch of North China Bureau Meeting on 11 May", 1952. The Cultural
The communization of agricultural cooperatives in Inner Mongolia was completed in October 1958. By July of 1958 cooperatives had been set up in all the pastoral areas. Although the IMAR CCP Committee suggested postponing communization in the pastoral areas, in practice more radical policies were pursued and communization started after September and October of 1958. The guidelines of the CCP on the people's communes emphasized that there was to be a transitional period from the socialist collective ownership to the socialist people's ownership (quan min suo you zhi), and from socialism to communism. The guidelines also emphasized that the people's commune was a three-level collective ownership, the ownership of the production team was the base. But in practice, the collective ownership was replaced by the state ownership (quan min suo you).

The period after the "Great Leap Forward" and before the Cultural Revolution was the period when land ownership experienced a transition from the collective ownership to the state ownership (it was known in Chinese as “public” or "the people's ownership" (quan min suo you zhi). The so-called "Combined Communes" (lian he she: communes with many nationalities) were encouraged in Inner Mongolia. During the communization Mongolian land rights were finally abolished and the Chinese state became the owner of Inner Mongolian grassland.

Though Mongols may argue that the transition of the grassland ownership was contradictory to the Chinese policies on people's commune and the 1954 Chinese constitution, Chinese can always argue the opposite. Since the 1954 Constitution stipulated that "wild land" belonged to the state, the different interpretations of the definition of wild land became crucial to the issue of grassland ownership. The Chinese tend to regard all the land which is not cultivated for farming as wild land. The cultivation of grassland has always been called by Chinese as "opening wildness/wild land" (kai huang). Mongols argue that no law was ever written that says that the grasslands in the IMAR, except those occupied by the state and PLA, are owned by the state.

The ownership of the grassland in Inner Mongolia was clarified later. In 1963 the Nationality Commission and the Agricultural Ministry of the State Council issued a 40-article regulation on the works in pastoral areas. It wrote: "the production teams have fixed rights to use the grassland within their sphere according to the particular conditions and historical customs." Grassland ownership was

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Revolution Materials, also See Hao Weimin (op. cit.) p.92.


74 In the constitution of 1954, it was made clear that "each nationality autonomous region is an inseparable part of the PRC." It also stipulates: "mines, rivers, the forest, wild land and other resources which, according to particular laws, belong to the state, belong to the whole people (quanmin suoyou)". Sun Xianfang, The Laws of Nationality Regional Autonomy (Inner Mongolian
not mentioned. Yet, in 1965, ownership was mentioned in the IMAR Grassland Management Provisional Regulations. It wrote that "the grassland of IMAR is owned by the state (quan min suo you)". State ownership of the IMAR grassland was reiterated in the Grassland Management Regulations stipulated in 1973.75 The two regulations were opposed by Mongols because they were not made through the particular legal procedures required by the state constitution. According to the constitution at the time, the two regulations could only have become law after they were approved by the standing committee of the people's congress. As a matter of fact, the two regulations never went through the standing committee. The legal argument is not really to the point because it was never a problem for the regulations to be approved by the people's congress which was simply a rubber-stamp anyway.

With regard to the communization, Ulanhu again displayed certain policy differences with the radical policies emanating from Beijing and the Chinese cadres. He advocated that the cooperatives on the grassland should remain the same except for putting up the sign of people's commune. In spite of his moderate position, in the later period of the socialist reform after the collectivization of the Mongolian herdsmen economy in 1958, many newly-established cooperatives began to be upgraded to people's communes by copying the communisation in the agricultural areas. The radical guideline was to "rely on the poor and lower-middle herdsmen, unite all eligible forces, resolutely strive for socialist transformation in the pastoral area".76 When communization was carried out in Inner Mongolia in 1958, "Gong She", Chinese term for "Agricultural Commune", was introduced into the Mongolian language. In the spring of 1959 when the central government readjusted the radical policy on people's communes, Ulanhu quickly reversed many radical policies on the communisation of the grassland.77

Land ownership went through three changes from the land reform to socialist reform. With regard to Chinese peasants, the new Communist state deprived landlords of their land and gave it to the landless peasants; the state first changed individual ownership of land into the collective ownership by collectivization, and then the collective land ownership was changed into the state ownership. Chinese landless peasants first became individual farmers with land, and then became landless again. As far as Mongolian herdsmen were concerned, the Chinese state was less justified in doing the same. In the process of collectivization the Mongolian public ownership of grassland was separated into many smaller collective ownerships, and then the collective ownership was transferred to the state. As a result of communization, Mongolian herdsmen for the first time in their long and ancient history became landless.

4.3. Chinese Migration, Cultivation and Environment Deterioration

Once the Mongolian grassland was no longer owned by Mongols either as individuals or collectively, it lost any remaining legal protection against Chinese cultivation and migration. After 1958 when the "agriculture first" policy replaced the former policy of "animal husbandry first" the new policy speeded up Chinese migration into the IMAR. Moreover, it also eroded Mongolian's political identity still further. By 1960 66% of nomads had permanently settled for a sedentary life and during the period of the Great Leap Forward (1958-61) many Mongolian cadres were arrested and purged because they did not agree with the "putting grain first" policy.

In 1955 Mao said "in the third 5-year plan, 400 to 500 million mu (Chinese acre) wild land should be opened up". According to this spirit, the CCP North China bureau, with the support of the Agriculture Cultivation Ministry, launched the opening-up campaign during the Great Leap Forward. From 1958 to 1976, 31 million acres of grassland were turned over to cultivation as farmland. In Ulaanchab League, 8 million acres grassland have been opened since 1949. In Hulun Buir League alone, from 1960 to 1961, 4 million acres of pastoral land were cultivated and 24 State farms were set up. In Hulun Buir League in the year of 1960 2.97 million acres of grassland were opened. By 1972 in Ilhe Zuu League there had been four large-scale cultivations, wherein 10 million acres of grassland had been changed into farmland, 6 million of which ended up as desert.78

After the failure of the Great Leap Forward, the CCP government readjusted its national economic policy. The adjustment enabled Ulanhu to reverse many radical policies carried out during the Great Leap Forward. He even restored some of the cultivated land back to grazing land. In 1962 he went to Hulun Buir and canceled all the newly set up state farms and sent back all the soldier farmers to where they had come from. At a 1963 meeting on nationality work, Ulanhu reasserted the "livestock first" development strategy in place of "agriculture first" strategy.

Yet within 20 years after 1958, there were 3 large-scale movements to expand cultivations in the IMAR, wherein 31 million acres of grassland were cultivated.79 During the period of the Cultural Revolution, 14 million acres of grassland were opened up. All of them brought serious environmental problems to grasslands, and caused animal husbandry to stagnate. The total number of the livestock in pastoral areas in 1976 had fallen by 7.4% as compared with 1966.80

Mongols, already a minority in IMAR, were further dwarfed as large numbers of Chinese migrated into Inner Mongolia as both industrial and agricultural labors. Fully one-third of the IMAR population migrated there during the period between 1947 and 1976. The proportion of the Mongolian population

(including Daur and other related indigenous nationalities) decreased from 25% to 4.7%. In 1947 the number of Chinese was four times that of Mongols, by 1960, the Chinese population had increased to 9 times that of the Mongols, and 8 years later, the Chinese outnumbered the Mongols by a factor of 12. In 1962 Mongols were majority in 22 banners, but by 1982, in only one banner were Mongols a majority. From 1952 to 1982, a total of 25 to 30 million Chinese migrated to frontier non-Chinese areas, 30% of which migrated into the IMAR. During the period from 1952 to 1982, China's overall population increase rate was 50%, but in frontier areas the rate was 200%.81

During the process of socialist industrialization, Mongols in Inner Mongolia were exposed to even more Chinese pressure to assimilate. The slogan of social progress and socialism was a powerful ideological weapon against Mongols' resistance to the assimilation and to their demands for autonomy. Since the 1st 5-year plan began in 1953, the IMAR has been more and more incorporated into the whole country's economy and in the process forcibly changed into just another Chinese province. In the period of the 1st 5-year plan, Baotou Steel Base and other major industries such as forestry, wool, textile were set up as a priority in state development schemes to support China's industrialization. As a result, large numbers of Chinese workers flooded in from outside. Together with the implanted heavy industries in Inner Mongolia, Baotou, Hohhot and other small townships began to emerge as big Chinese metropolises.

In 1969-70, the May 7 Cadre School system was set up according to Mao's 5.7 Instruction (May 7 1966) that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) should be a big school. At the same time the PLA more and more interfered with administration. In 1969, the IMAR military district became a subordinate of Beijing Military District after the border conflict with Soviet Union at Zhen Bao Dao Islands. On May 7, 1969, the third anniversary of Mao's 5.7 Instruction, the Production and Construction Corps of the Beijing Military Zone, which had been planned as early as 1966, was finally founded in Inner Mongolia. It started large-scale military farming in Inner Mongolia. According to the official view of its significance, first, the corps was an effective way to facilitate the migration of Chinese and utilize the land and resources in Inner Mongolia, and to crackdown on the Mongolian nationalist conspiracy of stopping the opening up frontier areas. Second there were security reasons, as had applied to military colonization in the historical past. The defense against the Soviet Union in accordance with Mao's decision of people's war could be better carried out by peasant soldiers or soldier peasants. There was also the issue of internal security: to suppress local nationalism, the PLA was regarded as the best propaganda team to educate and mobilize the local masses.

In 1989 in Inner Mongolia there were still 229 PLA landowners which belong to the 3 big military zones (Shenyang, Beijing, Lanzhou), 6 provincial military zones, the PLA's infantry, air force, navy and the strategic armed force. These PLA organizations occupy 446 sites across 63 banners and

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counties of 11 Leagues and cities of IMAR and they occupy 8.9 million acres grassland in Inner Mongolia, 1.35 million acres of which have been cultivated for farming.\(^2\)

\(^2\) Ni Dongfa, (op. cit.) p.336.
4.4. The Anti-Rightist Campaign

Ulanhu argued in 1951 that the scope of the United Front policy in minority areas should be wider than in Chinese areas. Accordingly each of the major political movements were carried out in a more moderate way in Inner Mongolia – that is until the Cultural Revolution. This was true of the major campaign carried out in China during the 1950s and early 1960s including land reform, the suppression of counterrevolutionaries, the three anti-movement, the anti-rightist movement and the movement for socialist education. During the purge of counterrevolutionaries in 1955, the IMAR issued document “Materials on Inner Mongolia Parties, Political Organizations, and Japanese, illegal organizations and KMT Secret Agents”. The IMPRP, together with other nationalist organizations were recognized as progressive or revolutionary.

In the Socialist Education movement initiated by Mao Zedong in 1965 that was intended to purge “alien elements” in Chinese means those who are not one of us) within the proletariat class, Ulanhu emphasized that the class struggle issue in Inner Mongolia was mainly an issue of anti-Han Chauvinism. In 1966 Ulanhu ordered the 1935 Declaration to be reprinted and issued to all cadres as their study material in socialist education. The 1935 Declaration, with its promise of national self-determination and secession right for Mongols, reminded Mongols how much the CCP had retreated from its former position.

From the point of view of Beijing, for the first ten years of the IMAR, Ulanhu had paid much more attention to the IMAR and much less attention to the CCP central authorities. That did not in itself cause Ulanhu to be categorized as a Mongolian nationalist, but to the CCP leaders in Beijing, Ulanhu’s policies were sufficient to show that he had been more interested in promoting regional autonomy and consolidating his own personal power than in promoting common class interests. The perceived nationalist tendency in the IMAR, together with changes in the Mongolian socialist camp, were regarded by Mao as major threats to China’s domestic socialist construction and international communism. After Khrushchev made his severe criticism of Stalin in his secret report in 1956, and after the Polish and Hungarian Incidents later that year (political liberalization movements took place in Poland and Hungary the wake of Stalin’s death and were suppressed down by hardliners in each country and Russians from the outside), Mao Zedong became suspicious of Khrushchev, Stalin’s successor, and he also began to worry about possible antagonistic forces within the CCP.

83 Ulanhu, “Summery Report on Sub-Bureau of CCP North Bureau Meeting”, 24 January, 1951. The Cultural Revolution Materials. Here wider United Front policy means many people who were otherwise regarded as class enemy were treated as friends or potential friends worth being won over or united. In the early period of IMAR, the policy of no class distinction, no class struggle is an example of the wider united front policy.


85 In the Qing Dao Conference when the local nationalism was criticized and national unity was emphasized as the precondition of the nationality autonomy, Ulanhu was recorded as having said that “Some Mongols wondered why I can keep good terms with Chinese, I say this is the natural
In 1957 just before anti-rightist campaign began, the ‘Qingdao Nationality Conference’ was convened. At the meeting, Zhou Enlai said that both Chinese Chauvinism and local (minority) nationalism should be opposed. He warned that a nationality autonomous state was not suitable in China. He made the comment that “the nationalities in China should not be separated but integrated.” On 15 October, the CCP Central Committee issued the Instructions on the Rectification and Socialist Education Among Minority Nationalities, which began to direct attacks against so-called “local nationalism”. The document was designed to target mainly the IMAR since all the criteria of local nationalism were listed in a tailored manner and suited the situation in the IMAR perfectly. At the Chengdu Conference in 1958, Ulanthu’s enthusiasm about Inner Mongolian autonomy was criticized by Mao Zedong. Mao Zedong emphasized that communism - instead of nationalism - should be the article of faith for nationality cadres. The IMAR was later mentioned by Mao as “waterproof independent kingdom”.

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development and historical inheritance from Genghis Khan. If he (Genghis Khan) had not maintained a good relationship with Chinese, how could the Yuan Dynasty have lasted for nearly 90 years? Without good nationality relationship, how could the Manchu dynasty have last for almost 300 years?”


86 From 20 July to 6 August 1957, the Nationality Work Committee of the People’s Congress convened a meeting on nationality works in Qing Dao, which came to be known as the “Qing Dao Conference”. Hao Weimin, IMAR History (Inner Mongolian University Press, 1990) p.161.

87 Zhou Enlai’s speech was made on 4 August, 1957, the title was “Several Issues on Our Country’s Nationality Policy”. Hao Weiming, (op. cit.) p.161.

88 The Instructions on the Rectification and Socialist Education Among Minority Nationalities analyzed the nationality issues in China, especially the increasing tendency of local nationalism among many minority nationalities. It listed the manifestations of local nationalism: “conservatism and exclusionism in terms of nationality relations, being passive and negative to nationality unity and cooperation; with no regard to the conditions of historical development and reality, enlarging nationality autonomous region and improving the administrative status of the autonomous region in the aspect of nationality regional autonomy, in some regions the integral leadership of the state is not respected and there is even a serious separatist tendency with the purpose of disintegrating the family of the motherland; there are serious tendencies opposing the integrity and unity principle of communism in terms of the party construction”. The document instructed that the rectification should be carried out within the party in minority areas, and local nationalism should be the main target. See Hao Weimin, (op. cit.) p.163.

89 Mao Zedong: “Mongols and Chinese should co-operate closely, should believe in Marxism. All nationality should trust each other. It does not matter which nationality it is but whether you side with truth or not. Marx was a Jew, Stalin was also an ethnic minority. Ch’iang Kai-shek is a Chinese, but is a very bad man whom we should oppose. A provincial official is not necessarily a person from the same province. No matter where the person is from, South or North, this nationality or that, the first thing to ask is whether he is a communist or not, how much communism he believes. The point should be made clear to minority nationalities.

Chinese in the beginning were not a big nationality, but they were formed by many different peoples. In history Chinese conquered minority peoples, drove them in mountains. The nationality issue should not judged by history. Which should be our profession, nationalism or communism? Our profession at first should be communism. Locality is important but not localism.” Mao Zedong, “Instruction on Nationality Issue”, made in March, 1958. Ding Wang, Mao Zedong Anthology Addendum, Vol. 3 (1949-1959) (Mingpao Monthly Press, 1971)

90 The Cultural Revolution materials.
Ulanhu somehow survived the anti-rightist movement intact, but most of his Mongolian colleagues and followers were replaced by Chinese cadres. In the movement, a huge number of Mongolian and other ethnic minority cadres, intellectuals and party members were labeled as bourgeoisie local nationalists and treated as the enemies of the people. Normal discussions on nationality theories and policies were suppressed.

By the end of 1950s it had already become clear that there was no room for true IMAR autonomy. It is possible that Ulanhu remained unwavering in his belief in the prospect for IMAR autonomy all the way to the end, but Chinese encroachment in Inner Mongolia under the name of social justice and progress was achieved to such an unprecedented degree that Inner Mongolia became a place where Mongols were marginalized in terms of population, economy, culture and political power. The name of Ulanhu, no matter how genuine his insistence on Mongolian rights, will forever be linked to the period when Inner Mongolia experienced fundamental changes and irreversibly became another Chinese province.

4.5. Ulanhu's Downfall: the Beginning of the Cultural Revolution

The Cultural Revolution in the IMAR not only purged all those who were regarded as capitalist roaders within the party and the government as had happened throughout all of China, but it also purged almost all the Mongolian cadres. More than half of the IMAR was incorporated into neighboring Chinese provinces. And Chinese assimilation was stepped up even further, reaching unprecedented proportions.

As early as in 1957, it was already obvious that genuine attempts of autonomy in the IMAR would not be tolerated by the CCP. The fervor of class struggle in the Cultural Revolution finally made it no longer possible for Mongols to argue for autonomy by quoting Lenin and Stalin on nationality issues. Any reference to the Soviet Model of nationality policy after the Sino-Russian split in 1960 was regarded by the CCP either as rightism or revisionism, and therefore was punished harshly. After 10 years of the existence of the IMAR, the delicate but seemingly workable compromise between Mongolian nationalism and CCP socialist unity had collapsed, and by the beginning of the Cultural

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91 In 1966 before his downfall, Ulanhu summarized his past experiences: “I struggled against Chinese Chauvinism for several decades. I am now in my 60s, I will struggle for another two decades until Chinese Chauvinism ends.” Ulanhu at the Hohhot Meeting in January 1966 expressing his defiance in the face of the on-coming Cultural Revolution, *the Cultural Revolution Materials.*

92 According to Yahuda, the breakdown of Sino-Russia alliance was a protracted affair lasting about 10 years from 1956. Among many disagreement and quarrels, a major turning point in the two countries relationship was in 1959 when the Soviet Union refused to supply China with a sample atomic bomb as requested. In 1959 Sino-Indian border conflict, the Soviet Union adopted an neutral position, which showed publicly the division between the two socialist countries. In 1960, the Soviet Union withdrew all its several thousands experts who took with them all the blueprints away, it was a heavy blow to China’s economy. The withdrawal of Russian experts in 1960 are remembered by Chinese as the most important example of Russian’s Betrayal. Michael Yahuda, *The International Politics of the Asian-Pacific, 1945-1995* (London: Routledge, 1996), p.58
Revolution, any traces of the compromise and the Soviet model of nationality solution were simply wiped out.

Ulanhu's autonomous policy had been regarded as rightist since Mao Zedong started his anti-rightist campaign. In the course of China's durable political struggles up until the Cultural Revolution, Ulanhu had clearly sided with the moderates who turned out later to be on the losing side, particular those factions in charge of north China before 1949, e.g. Gao Gang, Xi Zhongxun, and so forth. And also Ulanhu's policy in the IMAR after 1947 was more in line with Liu Shaoqi's moderate policy. While Liu was accused of being the Chinese Khrushchev, Ulanhu was accused of being Liu's protégé and the No. 1 revisionist in Inner Mongolia.

From 4 to 26 of May, 1966, the CCP Political Bureau convened an expanded meeting in accordance with Mao Zedong's instructions. The meeting voted to pass the Notice of the CCP Central Committee, drafted by Kang Sheng and Chen Boda and revised several times by Mao Zedong himself (i.e., "May 16 Notice"), which set out the theoretical basis and program for the Cultural Revolution. At the end of the meeting of the politburo, the CCP North China Bureau also held a working meeting at Qiangmen Hotel from 21 May to 25 July. It was at this meeting, that the attack on Ulanhu was finalized and, after a 65-day struggle session, he was purged as an enemy. According to the CCP Central Committee's North China Bureau's Report on Ulanhu's Problems that was passed on 27 July, 1966, Ulanhu had committed five major crimes, "Ulanhu's mistake in nature is anti-CCP, anti-socialism and anti-Mao Zedong thoughts; he sabotaged the unity of the motherland, carried out nationalist separatism aiming at an independent kingdom, and revisionism, Ulanhu is the No. 1 capitalist roader in the IMAR CCP. To uncover Ulanhu's mistakes and to repudiate him is to unearth a time bomb within the party." Among all the first secretaries at the provincial level, Ulanhu was the first to fall victim to the Cultural Revolution.

In September 1966 Ulanhu and his followers, mainly Tumed Mongols and Chinese cadres who had worked in Inner Mongolia for many years, were repudiated by the big character posters put up by the rebels (Zao Fan Pai) in both Beijing and Hohhot. The rebels met a counter-attack from those in power in Inner Mongolia. In the Inner Mongolian People's Daily on 24 September 1966, the IMAR authority urged the Inner Mongolian Cultural Revolution to be suspended and people to concentrate on Autumn Harvest. The Red Guards were ordered to go to countryside to help with the harvest. In the meantime, with the support of those in power ("dang quan pai"), anti-Red Guard mass organizations were organized to defend Inner Mongolian leaders against pro-Mao Red Guards.

Encouraged by Red Guards' exploits in Beijing and Shanghai, local anti-Ulanhu rebels took action to seize power from Ulanhu and the Chinese cadres. In January 1967, they occupied the buildings of the Hohhot municipal government, Post and telegram station, broadcasting station and railway station. When the PLA cracked down on the rebellion in Inner Mongolia, the anti-Red Guard mass  

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Hao Weimin, ed.(op. cit.) p.297.
organizations took the buildings back from the Red Guards. Reflecting divisions in Beijing, the most powerful resistance to the rebels were mainly from the Chinese cadres rather than from Ulanhu's Mongolian followers. The senior PLA men in the IMAR Military Zone were mainly from the former North China Field Army (Huabei Yezhanjun), some of which had participated in the Long March.

Zhou Enlai, together with other key members of the Cultural Revolution Group of the CCP Central Committee, lent their support to the rebels and replaced the cadres in control of the Inner Mongolian party, the government and the military zone. In April 1967, General Teng Haiqing, the deputy commander of the Beijing Military Zone, was assigned by Zhou Enlai as the head of the new authority of the IMAR, the IMAR Revolutionary Committee. At the same time, the CCP Central Military Commission issued an order that the IMAR Military Zone was demoted to a provincial military zone and was subordinated to the Beijing Military Zone. On April 7th, Teng Haiqing commanded a division of the 21st Field Army, stationed in the neighboring Shanxi province, to go to Hohhot to suppress the antagonistic mass organizations.

On April 17, the CCP central committee declared that it was stripping Ulanhu of all the offices and that it had set up a Revolutionary Committee in place of the Inner Mongolian autonomous government. A month later, as a coincidence or a reaction to the change, Ulaan Baator expelled the CCP's diplomats and teachers from Mongolia.94

4.6. The Miseries of Common Mongols: the Purge of NIMPRP

The need to use the army to handle the IMAR situation had little to do with Mongolian ethnic resistance but with the powerful local Chinese cadres. It was ironic that in the 20-year history of the IMAR nothing had been done to improve the Mongols' collective power and the Mongols as a whole were even more vulnerable and powerless than before. What made the Cultural Revolution in the IMAR a peculiar case was that, apart from being both an ideological and power struggle, it also brought a large-scale purge based on ethnic boundaries - the purge of the so-called New Inner Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party. (xin nei ren dang). Ulanhu together with his followers and other Chinese cadres in charge in Inner Mongolia had already been purged at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, but the large-scale purge of the NIMPRP lasted one year from April 1968 and affected almost all the Mongolian families in Inner Mongolia. The most prominent case of injustice concerning an individual during the Cultural Revolution was related to Liu Shoal, the most prominent collective case of injustice during the period was that of the NIMPRP.95

After the Soviet Red Army and the Mongolian army entered Inner Mongolia in 1945, some Mongols in Eastern Mongolia founded the Inner Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party in September. This party is also known as the New Inner Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (NIMPRP) to distinguish it from the Inner Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party that operated between 1925 and 1927 (this party was also known as the Inner Mongolian KMT). The new party’s objective was Inner Mongolian independence and a merger with the Mongolian state. The main founders and leaders of the party were Hafenga, Pentsag and Temurbaagan. In January 1946 under the influence of Ulanhu, NIMPRP was disbanded and absorbed into Ulanhu's Joint Committee of Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement. The leaders of the NIMPRP such as Hafenga and Temurbaagan joined the CCP and worked for the party for many years. In 1967, a conspiracy theory was invented by Chinese that held that the NIMPRP was still active within the Inner Mongolian party and government as the Soviet Union revisionist arm and as a Mongolian nationalist force.96

96 Tumen, (op. cit.) pp.53-57.
According to the People's Daily (Nov. 21, 1980), 346,000 people were arrested in Inner Mongolia during the Cultural Revolution and 16,222 were tortured to death. But Mongols in the IMAR have privately estimated that as many as 800,000 Mongols were arrested, and that 23,000 - 50,000 were killed, while some 120,000 were permanently maimed during the NIMPRP purge. Mongolian intellectuals believe that the total number of Mongolian dead numbers 100,000, although this may include all those died during the entire Cultural Revolution 97. According to a survey conducted by a Western anthropologist 98, in Inner Mongolia among 186 pastoral and urban Mongolian households, 56 households (30%) had at least one person arrested; 11 households (17%) lost at least one immediate relative. The survey indicated that one quarter of all Mongols were arrested during the purge of the NIMPRP, which suggests the death of 100,000 Mongols' death, slightly less than 1/10 of the then total Mongolian population. The anthropologist concluded that “there was not a single Mongol who did not lose a close relative or friend during the Cultural Revolution.”

The case has never been properly redressed, and few people have been found responsible for the wrongdoing. According to the later Chinese official view, Kang Sheng was the major person responsible for inventing the conspiracy theory regarding the NIMPRP. And Kang Sheng along with the Gang of Four, particularly Jiang Qing, were blamed for the deaths in the purge 99. Clarifying the real causes of the purge still remains a taboo subject. It was alleged by Chinese authority that the top CCP leaders such as Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai had no knowledge of the purge of NIMPRP 100. But the CCP Central Committee never lost control of the IMAR situations during the Cultural Revolution, and Zhou Enlai and Kang Sheng could have decided which mass organization in the conflicts should win over others. All the friction and struggles (e.g., friction and conflicts between eastern Mongols and western Mongols, between Inner Mongolian cadres and outside cadres, between PLA and civilians, between Mongols and Chinese) seemed to be planned and controlled 101 by a higher authority.

Those Chinese who inflicted torture, causing maiming and deaths, were never allowed to be brought to court. According to the official position towards the Cultural Revolution, almost everybody was a victim, and all the blame was put upon a handful of individuals such as Lin Biao, Kang Sheng, and the Gang of Four.

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97 Interview in 1993 in Hohhot.
99 Hao Weimin, (op.cit.) p.317.
100 Ibid.
101 According to Tumen, 1995, Zhou Enlai paid detailed attention to the Inner Mongolian situation during the Cultural Revolution, such as to the death of a particular student rebel caused by the PLA, and to the protection of the confessions and evidence collected during the purge of the NIMPRP from the angered victims. See, Tumen and Zhu Dongli (op. cit.) pp. 23-35.
This is the characteristic of the mass struggle, also the difference between the purge in Stalinist Soviet Russia in the 1930s. The perpetrators of the purge were mainly mobilized masses rather than state organs. This put the party state in a position above the conflicting mass groups and thus it evaded blame when the struggle bought expected damage.

The purge of the NIMPRP was carried out by PLA cadres and soldiers, local cadres and organized masses. During the Cultural Revolution in 1967, PLA sent numerous cadres and soldiers to the IMAR - as it had in the rest of the country - to support leftists, workers and peasants, and to exercise military control and military training. It was known as “Three Supports and Two Militaries” (san zhi liang jun). All the revolutionary committees and power organs in the IMAR during the period, consisted of mainly military cadres, then the rest were local leftist cadres and the representatives of mass organizations.102

During the CCP 9th Party Congress (April, 1969), Mao Zedong said “the scope of the purge of class team in Inner Mongolia has been broadened”. On 22 May Mao Zedong approved suggestions from the IMAR leadership to correct the leftist errors in the purge of the NIMPRP. Mao’s approval, known as the “May 22 Instructions”, put a brake on the further purge of the NIMPRP. Most of the victims in the purge were rehabilitated. After most of the victims had been rehabilitated, the PLA in Inner Mongolia were reassigned, many mass organizations retreated to their original working units or simply disbanded, therefore most of the perpetrators quickly disappeared back into normal life thus evading all charges. On 19 December 1969 the CCP Central Committee decided to establish direct rule of Inner Mongolia and exercise martial law. The IMAR was taken over by the Beijing Military Command in the name of preparing for possible attack from the Soviet Union. Teng Haiqing and the whole IMAR leadership were disbanded and sent to training schools (May 7 Cadre Training Schools) outside the IMAR. Martial law was implemented out of the consideration for both external defense and internal stability.

Because those directly responsible for the persecution did not need to face the aftermath of the purge and there was nobody there to bear the blame, and also under the martial law, any demand for rehabilitation was easily overruled by the excuse of national security, during the Cultural Revolution, the Mongols never had the chance to express their anger about their sufferings. The purge of the NIMPRP, with the tremendous sufferings it brought to the Mongols and the many unanswered questions remain alive in the memories of the Mongols. The purge of the NIMPRP, as the most recent physical and inner emotional experience commonly shared by Mongols, has become an element content of modern Mongolian identity.

102 Tumen, (op. cit.) p.5.
4.7. Decline of Mongolian Identity

The Mongolian collective status experienced a decline during the period from 1947 to 1976, and the decline was manifested in many ways. From the political aspect, the Mongolian ruling class was replaced by the Chinese state. The new Mongolian political elite was less powerful than the traditional ruling class had been before 1947. The Mongolian political elite a generation after Ulanhu are even weaker than Ulanhu. Ulanhu got certain respect from the CCP because he represented some aspects of Mongolian nationalism and he articulated the Mongols' demands for social reform or revolution. But the present generation of political elite, without any resources to bargain with the central authority, have to totally rely on the Chinese state to keep their privileged position.

In a socio-economic sense, the modernization process did not break down the internal borders between traditional Mongolian communities, and it did not demand a free-flowing population within Mongolian territories. Therefore Mongolian ethnicity was not strengthened by any industrialization process that occurred during the period, and no new Mongolian culture was formed based on modernization. What did occur was the massive and irreversible migration of landless Chinese peasants from the poverty-stricken and overpopulated bordering provinces of Hebei, Shanxi and Shaanxi. After 1947 many parts of the IMAR experienced industrialization and large scale urbanization, but these did not build upon existing Mongolian cultural boundaries, but were implanted by the Chinese along with massive Chinese migration into Inner Mongolia. Mongolian people by and large were either confined to their pastoral land outside of the industrialization process, or they were assimilated into the Chinese to be included in the modernization process. The new contrast of industrialization versus the herdsman economy; municipalities versus the pastoral lands created a division of labor along purely ethnic lines.

Despite the continuing increase of Chinese pressures to assimilate, the Mongols' sense of a common identity has not diminished. The experiences of the 30-year IMAR, especially the drastic purge of the NIMPRP, have added new content to the Inner Mongolians' sense of identity. The sufferings have added a deeper psychological dimension to their sense of self-identity and to their differentiation from the Chinese. It is this sense of victimization and humiliation in common which began to reemerge and intensified in the new situation during the period of reform.
CHAPTER V. REFORM PERIOD: RE-EMERGENCE OF MONGOLIAN NATIONALISM AND THE PROBLEMS OF SURVIVAL

The Mongolian nationalism that emerged during the reform period is consistent with that which developed in earlier periods in terms of the goals to which it aspired and in its senses of external differentiation. The external differentiation is both the very real pressure by the Chinese to assimilate and the new conceptual way in which the Chinese nation is defined. External differentiation referring to the Chinese has been reinforced by historical experiences throughout different periods. These include: openly seizing Mongolian land and imposing political oppression in the KMT period before 1949; leftist policies and the large scale purges of Mongols after 1949, especially in the anti-rightist movement in 1957 and the Cultural Revolution(1966-76). In the reform period, the external differentiation was generated by socio-economic and ideological changes. All these changes have deepened the sense of external differentiation between Mongolians and Chinese corresponding to the way in which China’s newly acquired sense of external differentiation has been accentuated between Chinese and outsiders, especially the West. In this chapter the intellectual dimension of Mongolian nationalism will be the main focus: i.e. Mongols’ interpretation of historical and current situations and the nationalist conclusions that have been drawn from the interpretations.

Mongolian nationalism should be understood as being more a revival of a remote ethnicity in modern conditions rather than having been derived from economic development per se. Hence intellectuals have played an important role. It is the Mongolian intellectuals and academics who reflect and place the changes Mongols experienced in a historical perspective. It is they who also provide meaning to the changes brought by the reform to Mongolian people. Intellectual and historical analysis play an important role in current Mongolian nationalism.

The political, ideological and socio-economic changes during this period have intensified the sense of crisis among Mongols. It has become more obvious than before that the development of political, economic and cultural autonomy for Mongols is impossible without first establishing territorial autonomy. It has become a fully fledged nationalism in principle because the goal of territorial autonomy has been combined with the claim to cultural and ethnic distinctiveness. This nationalism is articulated in the process of discussing history, economics, political and cultural affairs. In nature it partly accords with classic descriptions of nationalism; e.g. nationalism as an ethnic revival in a time of change, nationalism generated by modern economic development, and also nationalist ideas born out of intellectual discussions. But most of all, all the discussions provide a new sense of external differentiation, in this case it is the Chinese nation and state which is the important cause of Mongolian nationalism.

As Dr. Jirimutu suggested in his demography of Mongolian population, Mongols have become largely
an urban people now and it is mainly those urban Mongols who face the pressure of assimilation\footnote{Jirimutu, \textit{A Sociodemographic Profile of Mongolia in China, 1990}, Paper presented at the 1996 Annual Meeting of Association for Asian Studies, Honolulu, Hawaii, April 11-14, 1996.}. During the reform period, Mongols experienced proportionately a greater degree of urbanization than other ethnic minorities or even Chinese. From 1982 to 1990, as the table shows, Mongols witnessed substantial changes in many urban occupations, an increase of about 30\% in the categories of state/party officials, administrative staff and service related occupations, an increase of 50\% in the category of production/transportation, and an increase of 122\% in the category of commerce and sales. As expected, the percent of Mongols in the category of agriculture, forestry and animal husbandry decreased by 16\% from 1982 to 1990.\footnote{Jirimutu, (op. cit.) p.15.} Although Mongols were traditionally known in the outside world as a nomadic people and a significant proportion of them still live on the grassland and are engaged in animal husbandry, they, as a group, are more urban than most ethnic groups in China, including the Han Chinese majority. According to the 1990 census, nearly 36\% of Mongols resided in urban areas while the remaining 66\% of them were in rural areas. In contrast, only 25\% for the Han and 24\% for the ethnic minorities as a whole were urban residents.\footnote{Jirimutu, (op. cit.) p.16.} The following account of the IMAR industry and economy focuses mainly on the frustrations felt by urban Mongols.

The IMAR pastureland almost equates to the core of Mongolian-ness because it has always been regarded as the source of Mongolian traditions and ethnicity. Although the percentage of Mongols in agriculture, forestry and animal husbandry and fishery was lower than that of other minorities and Han Chinese (for instance, 59.5\% of Mongols were in this category, as opposed to 82.4\% of all minorities and 62.8\% of the Han Chinese.\footnote{Jirimutu, (op. cit.) p.15.}), the discussion of pastureland economy is also an important part of the chapter.

1. \textit{Two Contradictory Principles in the Nationality Autonomy and the Four Dimensions of Nationalism Perception}

The practice of national autonomy in China can be regarded as a compromise between two contradictory principles, communism and nationalism. The former is used to justify integration and the latter to justify the separate interests of the different nationalities. The reform period after 1978 created a situation in which more attention has been drawn to the nationalist principle. Chinese nationalism and non-Chinese nationalism are all on the rise. National autonomy both in theory and practice has become less and less adequate to contain the contradictory principles and the different nationalisms.

Supposedly, the Communist goal based on the common proletarian interests of integrating all nationalities can nullify the need of national self-determination (though in the socialist period, different
interests and identities of different nationalities were permitted and protected at least in rhetoric\(^5\)). While according to the nationalist principle, national interests and identity are regarded as being of the utmost importance, the institution of nationality regional autonomy set up in the P.R.C. is based on the recognition of different nationalities within the unified socialist state.

In the reform period economic pragmatism and national interests have come to prevail over the former political ideology, Chinese nationalism prevails over the former socialist beliefs. Non-Chinese nationalism has also risen as a response, to challenge the rising Chinese nationalism and the ideas of China as a nation state. The ideological changes of the reform period indicate the end of the compromise between the socialist principle and the nationalism principle, and hence the end of the national autonomy system.

In practice the CPC shifted its position on nationality affairs from a position similar to that of the Soviet model (the self-determination of each nationality (including independence or secession which is allowed at least in rhetoric) to a less tolerant position. The CPC’s deviation from Soviet Marx-Leninist orthodoxy has been justified by reference to the claimed different circumstances of China and its revolution. To the CPC, Marx-Leninism can not be genuine without being modified by Chinese practice. Chinese practice and characteristics always came before abstract theories and doctrines. The CPC official view on regional autonomy is that the Chinese Socialist system brought an end to imperialist oppression of Chinese peoples and the KMT reactionaries’ oppression of minority peoples. It also ended all the social causes for national oppression. National regional autonomy has been enforced within the integral territory of the country, under the leadership of the highest state authority. Democratic centralism is the administrative principle.\(^6\) This emphasis on Chinese characteristics only explains one aspect of the application of national autonomy, namely, why the principle of national self-determination is not applicable in China. But it neglects the other side of the question of national autonomy, namely, why is it needed at all.

Chinese nationalist views of the identity of the Chinese nation prior to the articulation of the views of the CPC were inconsistent and ambiguous on whether the Chinese nation included non-Chinese minorities. However, despite its claims, so is the CPC’s standing on the matter.

The CPC, for the purpose of political struggle, regards all peoples within China as a unity, but on the other hand, during a certain period in the 1930s it also advocated the right of national self-

\(^5\) According to Lenin, "by transforming capitalism into Socialism, the proletariat creates the possibility of abolishing national oppression; the possibility became a reality only - only- with the establishment of the full democracy in all spheres, including the definition of state frontiers in accordance with the "sympathies" of population, including complete freedom of secede(Lenin "Socialism and the Self-Determination of Nationality", in Walker F. Conner, *Minorities In Marxist Theories And Practices* (Princeton University Press, 1984) p.49.

\(^6\) Ulanhu,"Minzu Zizhi De Guanghui Licheng (The Glorious History of Nationality Autonomy)"
determination for non-Chinese minorities. But, strangely, Mao has said that all nationalities formed a big family. It is difficult to pinpoint the time when the CPC began to envisage a family of many nationalities. Mao also said that “ethnic minorities gave Han Chinese great political help, their joining the big family of the Chinese nation (zhong hua min zu) is a political help to Han Chinese”. The integrity of the Chinese nation or the family of many nationalities, according to the official interpretations, were justified by the following reasons.

Firstly, autonomy with Chinese characteristics is provided with a historical basis. According to the Chinese-centric view of Chinese history, the continuous history of centralist Chinese states has been the main trend in Chinese history. And those Chinese centralist states in history were multi-ethnic and unitary. In modern times, the international environment and the nature of society since the Opium War have again provided all the reasons for all nationalities to unite to realize their national liberation.

Secondly, the Chinese claim that a common socio-economic basis has existed for the family of the different nationalities or the Chinese nation (zhong hua min zu). Gradually over a long period of history and in wide areas, various nationalities have mixed with each other and only on a smaller localized scale have they lived separately. The co-existence of different nationalities is the social basis which makes non-Chinese self-determination unfeasible. Uneven economic development and unevenly distributed natural resources provide the economic rationality for staying together. The 55 non-Chinese peoples account for 6% of the whole country’s population and occupy 50-60% of the whole country’s territory where there are rich grasslands, forestry and underground resources.9

The third is the political and ideological basis. The changed nature of Chinese modern history and the modern international environment demanded a joint revolutionary struggle by the different nationalities so that the CPC’s long-time revolutionary struggle has set the framework for the practice of national autonomy within a unitary state. The doctrines favoring big states organized along the democratic centralist line are selectively picked out from works by Marx, Engels and Lenin to justify the following points: 1) Nationality integration is the general trend in human historical development; 2) the unitary state is beneficial to socio-economic development; 3) the unitary state is helpful to the revolutionary struggle of the proletarians.10 Of course there is much truth in the proposition that large,
industrialized and unitary states tend to incorporate smaller rural communities, but it is only so in terms of a rational observation, not as a normative standard.

Apart from the above, the first of the two principles in the compromise which justifies the unity of the socialist nation state, there is the other principle of national self-determination which the Chinese authorities try to avoid and ignore, but which had been emphasized by the CPC’s Mongolian collaborators in different periods. The CPC argues that the autonomy system is the best embodiment of political will and socio-economic interests of the non-Chinese minorities. According to the CPC, the nationalist principle itself is not an ultimate value, it will be phased out, and class liberation and communism will be the endpoint. Meanwhile during the socialist stage, there will still continue to exist the separate ethnic identity and particular interests of the Mongol people, for instance which provide the reasons for national autonomy. But the separate national identity, interests and national tradition were emphasized more by the CPC’s Mongolian collaborators. Ulanhu’s autonomous movement under the leadership of CPC even used nationalist slogans to attract Mongols.

The compromise of the two principles embodied in national regional autonomy has changed over time. The revolutionary Mongolians of the first generation like Ulanhu, often emphasised the nationalist principle, separate ethnic identity and interests as the basis of autonomy and national equality. But since the beginning of the reforms, the balance between the two principles began to be further changed especially after the communist ideology diminished as the legitimating ideology and Chinese nationalism was more emphasized than before. Chinese political authority began to be justified more and more by a state-defined Chinese nation rather than by an overriding universalistic Socialist ideology.

1978 is a turning point in the sense that the reform initiated by Deng Xiaoping has had a decisive and comprehensive impact on Chinese society. There have been fundamental changes in the CPC’s economic policies in its views of the international environment and in its self-perception of the Chinese nation. All these changes, indicate, in terms of state legitimacy, the absolute decline of Communist ideology and the rise of Chinese nationalism – a nationalism that has put the emphasis more on the historic traditional Chinese nation rather than on a community based upon political ideology and modern citizenship.

Communists: "in a state like Germany, so many feudal remains from middle ages need to get rid of, many narrow localities and provincialities need to be destroyed", "not only it is needed to set up a unitary, inseparable German republic, but also insist on all power be monopolized under the state." In 1891 Engels in the Criticism of the Constitution of Social Democratic Party commented on German state system: "What should be used to replace current German state system? In my opinion, proletarians can only use the single inseparable form of republic." Like Marx and Engels, Lenin also mentioned the principle of big state of democratic centralism, "Proletariat party should build as big state as possible." "Our social democrats are the enemy of all kinds of nationalism and supporters of democratic centralism." see Buhe, On Nationality Works (People’s Press, 1992) pp. 152-3.
Nationalism as a sentiment and a political principle expressed by the people involved can be explained by how and why people's views were affected by their particular historical situations. Mongolian nationalism during the reform period can be explained by reference to how Mongols perceived the changing situation during the period and developed a heightened sense of national crisis. The intellectual explanations of the national idea can be examined in the following four dimensions upon which national identity or nationalist ideas are usually expressed. The first is how to perceive a common past, the second is how to conceive a common future, the third is to justify the national identity on the basis of a distinctive socio-economic development and finally to construct an external differentiation to reinforce the national identity.

During the reform period, ideological changes brought changes in the way history was discussed. The crisis of the Communist faith may have brought more uncertainty in people's view of future, but it also allowed more room for historical discussion. The revival of historical memory at the time of change and uncertainty is important both for Chinese and Mongolian nationalism. The loss of credibility of the Communist ideology reduced the validity of the logic of the development of modern Chinese history according to which socialism and communism was portrayed as the inevitable result of the unfolding of modern Chinese history.

As the justification of the new socialist state and nation weakened, the Chinese tried to replace the Marxist interpretation of historical inevitability with new explanations, either culturalist or functionalist. At the same time it also made it possible for Mongols to look back in history with a more nationalistic perspective of their own.

Mongolian and Chinese nationalists, depend heavily upon their different interpretations of history, but neither provide the same forward-looking vision as the former Communist ideology. Many Chinese share the view that China in the coming century will become a prosperous and dominant power in the world, and Chinese nationalism may be said to be forward-looking in that respect. But Mongolian nationalism, partly as a reaction to Chinese nationalism, does not share the same faith in a common future.

During this period, the Chinese have used socio-economic arguments as a justification for emphasizing unity. The socio-economic reasons can also give Mongols a sense of national decline and they can be used by Mongols in support of their claim for economic autonomy. Economic pressure and the growth of the market system do not always act as an integrating force in developing a national consciousness. On the one hand, economic pressure could be an integrating force in nation building as in Gellner's model of nationalism, on the other hand, it can also be regarded as a fragmenting force as well. The Marginalization of IMAR economy and the vulnerable herdsmen economy in the new market system could be regarded by Mongols as examples of internal colonialism. In this way, because of the perceived disparity and injustice of economic development, nationalists realize that
some political guarantee of a real autonomy or an independent state is necessary if Mongols are to enjoy equal economic opportunities.

Regarding external differentiation, during this period, the mutual perception between Mongols and Chinese is changing, their perception of the international world is also changing. The changing external differentiation has an important impact upon both Chinese and Mongolian nationalism.

2. Ideological and Historical Issues

The articulation of a national history is an essential component of nationalism, and it has become vital for the emergent nationalism of the Chinese and the Mongolians during the current period of reform. Since there is more freedom for academic discussions during this period, we can follow the contending interpretations of national history between Chinese and Mongols. The significance of these historical discussions are rich in nationalist implications because they present different views on the Manchu dynasty, the last imperial precedent of the PRC and the MPR. They also offer different interpretations of the roles played by foreign countries in their own national histories, and they provide divergent views on the national heroes of the Mongols and Chinese.

2.1. From a Political Nation to a Cultural Nation

When the Chinese nation is emphasized more in a traditional sense, i.e., in terms of Chinese culture and history, rather than as a socialist commonwealth of many peoples, Chinese writers tend to invent a common history for the different peoples in China. The new approach negates the previous presentation of China as a multi-national state. And the single history is largely identified with that of ethnic Chinese people. In support of the new idea of the Chinese nation, Chinese history has been reviewed and a new version of history has be created. The concept of a cultural Chinese nation brings more contention in historical discussions between Mongols and Chinese than the concept of a political Chinese nation.

Inevitably different views have appeared on how to view the history of the relationship between Chinese and other non-Chinese peoples. In the former version of China as a political nation, the modern Chinese nation was based more on the assumption of a common political fate and a shared communist faith rather than on the vision of a common cultural and ethnic past. It is only in modern Chinese history beginning with the Opium War that the common political tasks of anti-imperialism and survival forged a political bond between the Chinese and the non-Chinese peoples within the Manchu empire. Modern history is vital to the conception of the political Chinese nation (zhong hua min zu).

For the same reason, the interpretation of modern history of Inner Mongolia is crucial for the Chinese
communists' claim that Mongols form a part of the larger Chinese nation.

The new political Chinese nation as envisaged by Chinese communists was mainly politically-based and contradicted the idea of a Chinese nation in the traditional sense with its emphasis on culture and ethnicity. The political nation is revolutionary because of its negation of the old and traditional Chinese nation. To envisage the political nation is also an attempt to apply modern concepts to define and explain pre-modern associations often in an anachronistic way.

During the reform period, the Chinese government has put more emphasis on the networking of Chinese in Hong Kong and Taiwan and the overseas Chinese for the sake of economic development. The development of economic cooperation on the basis of a claimed common Chinese culture that spans across state borders has generated the idea of a so-called "greater China". This shows that the view of the Chinese nation as based on culture has gained in importance while the concept of the political nation is in decline. The political Chinese nation which is associated with the declining Communist ideology has lost its former importance.

The historical view of the cultural nation places more emphasis on the pre-modern past in cultural and ethnic meanings rather than on modern history in political meanings. Therefore pre-modern China has been deliberately depicted as a multi-ethnic state, and pre-modern ethnic relations depicted as almost as harmonious as those in the idealized socialist family of many nationalities. The conceptual shift from a political nation to a cultural nation, in historical discussions, means that there has been less freedom for Mongols in historical discussions than before, since the idea of a cultural nation which includes Chinese and non-Chinese needs more than a modern political bond between Chinese and non-Chinese, it also needs to demonstrate that some ethnic and cultural similarities linked them in pre-modern history. Apart from the modern Chinese history, the pre-modern history has not become increasingly important and relevant to the present interpretation of the Chinese nation.

The following discussions of history mainly cover three aspects: the nature of the historical relationship between agricultural Chinese and non-Chinese nomadic peoples; the Manchu dynasty before the modern Chinese state and the relationship between the two; and the nature of modern history related to the CPC's role in Inner Mongolia.
2.2. Historical Inevitability and Direction

The conflicts and confrontations between Chinese and non-Chinese peoples in history, especially between the agricultural Chinese and the northern nomadic peoples, have been deliberately ignored as a more harmonious and idealized history has been invented to meet present needs. Both unification and confrontation are all regarded as part of the historical scheme by which Han Chinese nation was founded and developed. In this view of Chinese history, history has a course and a main trend. It is the task for Chinese historians to distinguish the main trend of history.

The emergence of the ancient Hua and Xia groups 4000 years ago was the beginning of the scheme, the second stage was the expansion of the Hua and Xia into Han people 2000 years ago. Unification in the Qin and the Han dynasties, usually depicted as the foundation of historical Chinese people, is now regarded as only one of the many stages in the whole process of the formation of the Chinese nation. The unification of nomadic peoples to the north of the Great Wall, according to the new theory, is considered as the next important stage of the Chinese nation’s historical formation. In the logic of the development of the Chinese nation, the unification of the northern non-Chinese peoples was the necessary preparation for the next unification between Chinese people and non-Chinese peoples.

The assertion that ethnic harmony was the main historical trend is based more on belief and imagination rather than on historical evidence. This attitude toward historical study is indicated by the following sentence: the co-existence of “the two big regions’, Central China and the North, was not really one of confrontation, even though there were no shortage of recorded so-called wars, invasions or looting. These are historical facts, but what is more important are the interactions which have not been recorded: more frequent communications and trade.”

2.3. Historical Figures and the Manchu Dynasty

When history is regarded as a grand scheme culminating in the development of a great Chinese nation, all actors in history are judged by the roles they played in relation to the realization of the scheme, and therefore all historical figures can be categorized as positive and negative. In this frame of mind, Chinese historians have set up some stereotypical standards for the assessment of historical figures.

The first standard is whether they are positive to the “defense of the integrity of territory and sovereignty.” Given the complexity of the relationships between Chinese, Manchu and Mongols, consensus is a long way from being agreed on this. According to Mongolian scholars, before the establishment of the Mongolian Empire in 13th century, Tibetan and Dali kingdoms were fully

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12 Ibid. p.11.
13 Interview in Inner Mongolian University, July 26, 1993.
independent with complete sovereignty and territorial integrity. Only after the establishment of the Mongolian empire, they were integrated as part of the territory of the empire that included China. During the Ming dynasty, the Mongolian people always enjoyed territorial and sovereign integrity and they continuously confronted the Chinese Ming Dynasty. In the course of the wars between Mongols and the Manchu Dynasty, both Mongols and Manchus could claim political legitimacy and territory and regard themselves as the defenders of their territory and sovereign integrity.

Gerdan Boshigt, the head of once powerful Zungharia Mongols, challenged and posed a serious threat to Manchu rule in China. His military campaigns against the Manchu dynasty could be regarded as splitism since he was trying to separate China. But by the same standard, he could be regarded as a hero whose unification effort just unfortunately failed. When Chinese say, that the Kangxi emperor conquered and oppressed rebels of the Zungharia Mongols led by Gerdan Boshigt in order to defend motherland’s territorial and sovereign integrity, Mongols also can say that Gerdan’s war against the Manchu was for the restoration and defense of Mongolian territorial and sovereign integrity.

It is interesting to note with regard to claims made by Chinese historians that in terms of their relation and contribution to maintaining the integrity of Chinese territory or sovereignty, Gerdan never ceded any land to the Russian Tsar except for some unrealized promises. On the other hand, in asking for the Tsar’s help to destroy Gerdan, the Kangxi emperor signed with the Tsar the Treaty of Nerchinsk, ceding vast territory west of River Orguna to the Tsar.

Gerdan Khan was once extolled as national hero in the Yanan National Institute as early as in 1930-40s, in the Yanan period, before the end of Sino-Japanese war. Gerdan Khan was then recognized as a Mongolian national hero and Genghis Khan’s status was also confirmed before the Cultural Revolution. At the time there were no objections from Chinese scholars. But in the late 1970s and whole 1980s, articles appeared continuously to negate Gerdan Khan. Although at Chinese national conferences on Mongolian studies in recent years, after many discussions and debates, Gerdan Khan was once again recognized as a national hero for Mongols, the problem has never been settled. The politically utilitarianist standard is still very popular among Chinese scholars. They use the same standard to judge a Mongolian historical figure such as Togtkhu, who took part in Mongolian nationalist movements at the end of the Manchu Qing period and the beginning of the republic period.

The second criterion is whether the role of historical figures is seen as positive with regard to the unity of the state and nation. This actually has been the Chinese Communist party’s principal guideline on handling national relations after 1949. But many Mongolian scholars said openly and privately that it

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14 Ibid.  
15 Ibid.  
16 Manaohai, "Mongolian People Are Striding Forward", People's Daily, 1953; also Xinhua Digest of the same year.
is obviously absurd to apply the criterion in historical study. There was no such thing as national equality in most parts of Chinese history, therefore there is no sense in talking about state unity through national unity. Both Gerdan Khan and the Kangxi emperor believed “the victors assume the titles of kings and dukes, the defeated are bandits” (the legitimacy is only conferred upon victors). They both regarded China as a trophy to be conquered rather than a motherland to defend. For them wars were launched for the expansion of territory and dynastic interests other than for national interests.

While the same standard is normally used to negate the historical figures who are regarded as national heroes by many non-Chinese peoples, the standard is seldom applied by Chinese scholars to judge Chinese historical figures. Quyuan, an ancient poet during the period of warring states, some 2,000 years ago, defended his native Chu state against the Qinshihuang Emperor’s unification, but he is commonly recognized by the Chinese as a patriotic hero. If judged by the above standard in the same way as any other non-Chinese figures, Quyuan was a negative and reactionary figure because he resisted the main trend of the development of Chinese history, the Qin Unification, and his resistance was futile.

Yuefei, a Chinese general in the Song Dynasty (1127-1279), defended against the Jin State (1115-1234) in the north when Nuzhen Jin State was in the process of conquering southern China. The Nuzhen Jin State was a stronger power in offensive than the Chinese Song Dynasty in defensive, therefore Yuefei, again, stood out against the general historical trend of unification, however he is still considered as a national hero throughout history by the Chinese. Another example is Wen Tianxiang, a Chinese civilian official and a poet in the Song dynasty, who chose to die rather than to surrender to the Mongolian conqueror. He is also regarded as an example of a great national hero.

Zheng Chenggong, also known as Koxinga, a Chinese general of the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644), fled to Taiwan and refused to surrender to the victorious Manchu Dynasty after the Chinese Ming Dynasty was completely wiped out by Manchus. Zheng drove out the Portuguese colonizers from the island of Taiwan when he got there. Still he is regarded as a national hero because he was Chinese although he fought for a lost cause. Another reason why he is highly regarded today is the fact that he drove away the Portuguese from Taiwan. The Portuguese colonizers and the Manchu invaders to Zheng at the time were both foreign invaders, but by today’s standard, the Portuguese in Chinese eyes, of course, are much more foreign than the Manchus. Therefore Zheng is today extolled more as a national hero against the Portuguese than a national hero resisting the Manchus.

The third standard is “whether the person has contributed positively to the socio-economic development of the nationality concerned”. If it is understood that for a smaller nationality to be absorbed by a bigger and more developed nation is equal to socio-economic progress, it is a standard very close to colonialist logic. It can be used to justify the earlier western imperialist’s expansion in China and Japanese occupation in China during the second world war. Of course Chinese historians
are partial as they only use this standard with regard to non-Chinese peoples, when they are regarded as being in lower socio-economic grade than the Chinese.

By this criterion, Chinese historians regard Gerdan Khan as a reactionary figure because he resisted the socio-economic development of Mongolian nationality by resisting the Manchu's conquest. But it can be always argued in the opposite way. By the same standard, Gerdan had more than enough reason to launch war against the Manchus considering the Manchus' oppression and obscurantist policy toward Mongols (even Mao Zedong mentioned Manchu's reactionary policy toward Mongols in his 1935 Declaration). Some Mongols argued that by the same standard, the rapid economic development under British rule would justify the British colonial rule in Hong Kong.

The fourth is "whether the person played a positive role in the struggles and rebellions against invading foreign forces". "Foreign" is a relative term as it varies over time, yet the standard actually applied by Chinese writers uses today's notion of "foreign" to judge the past when "foreign" had a totally different connotation. Even in using the same standard, Mongolian historians can also make a different argument from their Chinese counterparts. Monohai, a well-known Mongolian historian in Inner Mongolia, argues along the lines of the Chinese nationalists' anti-Manchu argument. Since Chinese nationalists agreed that the Manchu dynasty was the worst and weakest dynasty in defending China's interests, he suggests that if Gerdan Khan had not been defeated by the Manchu dynasty, if he had conquered the Manchu dynasty and ruled China, judged by Mongolian people's inherent bravery, it is for sure Gerdan Khan and his successors would not have sold sovereign rights and territories like the Manchus did to foreign powers.17

In the discussions of modern history, foreign links have become a much more sensitive issue since the idea of which nationalities were foreign and which were within China is closely related to the idea of modern China either as a multi-national state or a nation state.

In discussions about Mongolian leaders in modern history, Mongol and Chinese scholars differ in their assessments of those historical figures who had foreign support. Chinese scholars usually use a political utilitarianist standard whether or not the issue concerned is beneficial to the present Chinese state. The Chinese view is that Mongolian princes and dukes in leadership should be divided into two groups: those with foreign connections and those without foreign connections; the former are reactionaries and traitors, and the latter are progressive. In the same way, the average Mongols' rebellions are also put into two categories: those who rose themselves and those who were led by feudal princes. That is the line to be drawn.18 Generally Chinese scholars assessed negatively all those Mongolian nationalist leaders or movements who had any foreign connections and who wanted

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17 Conference discussion, Inner Mongolian University, 28 July 1993.
18 Aug., 1993, interview with Mr. Cai Zhichun, deputy secretary general, Chinese Association for Mongolian History Studies, Associate Research fellow, Institute of Nationality Studies.
to merge with the Mongolian State or who sought independence.

Because of the political utilitarianism in the discussions of history, Chinese historical figures and Mongolian historical figures are not usually judged by the same standards. If the standard of foreign links were equally applied to Chinese historical figures, Sun Yatsen, who had been backed by imperialist forces like Japan, must have been a traitor to the Chinese nation, since he promised to cede to imperialist powers all sorts of concessions and rights in return for their support. And actually a Taiwanese writer suggests Sun was more or less a national traitor instead of the father of the modern Chinese nation as he has been always regarded by the KMT government19.

When a nation is in a weaker position, it is natural for it to seek for an external ally. It is not unusual that both Chinese nationalists and non-Chinese nationalists in modern history maintained certain foreign links.

Zevtsondanba, who founded the independent Mongolian state in 1911, is generally depicted today in Chinese literature as a traitor, conspirator and the puppet of Russia20. He is despised mainly because he was a non-Chinese. If judged without a Sino-centric bias, the Mongolian independence in 1911 was no different from the independence declared by Chinese nationalists in various Chinese provinces following the collapse of Manchu Qing dynasty.

Togtkhu was a Mongolian nationalist who rebelled against the Manchu dynasty and local warlords. What he did was not different from Sun Yatsen except that he did it for the Mongols and Sun did it for the Chinese. They both had foreign connections, but according to the Chinese view, Togtkhu is a villain and Sun Yatsen was a hero. One Mongolian historian writes that the only fault of Toktohu is that he did not set up a Xing Zong Hui(Strengthening Chinese Society) and KMT party as Sun Yat-san did21. The irony is obvious, Chinese historians apply today's national ideas and standards to the past when Mongols were still regarded by most Chinese as an alien people.

De Wang(Prince Demchigdungrub), the Mongolian leader of the Inner Mongolian autonomous movement 1930-40, is regarded by both KMT and CPC as a Japanese collaborator and a traitor to the Chinese nation. It is a verdict on which Inner Mongolian scholars cannot openly disagree. But some Mongolian historians openly argued that De Wang's autonomous movement, especially De Wang & Wu he-ling's anti-provincialization and autonomous movement in the 1930s, represented the popular sentiments of Mongols at the time22. They argue that in spite of De Wang's personal motive, the

20 Shi Bo, Wai Menggu Duli Neimu (Secret History of Outer Mongolia's Independence) (Huaxia Press, 1993)
21 Zhu Feng, former director of Institute of Historical Studies, Inner Mongolia Academy, July 28, 1993 on the conference.
22 Interview with Prof. Bala, director of the Institute of Inner Mongolian Contemporary History, June
movement itself was domestic in nature as it focused on conflict with the KMT government rather than seeking separation.

By today's standards, the independent Mongolian state is a foreign country for Mongols in Inner Mongolia. Therefore sometimes the Mongolian nationalists in the past who advocated merging with the Mongolian State are now regarded as negative figures because of the so-called foreign links. Most of them as the IMPRP members, in the same way as the CPC in 1930s, just followed the instructions from Comintern. For them to demand the merger with the MPR or to side with the CPC was only a matter of different prioritization: national liberation first or class liberation first. Many Mongolian nationalists later accepted the CPC's leadership with the understanding that Mongols need not only national liberation, but also class liberation. Foreign links or separatism is such that once it was touched, it became a permanent mark for the Mongolian historical figures concerned. But Chinese historical figure are treated differently. Sun Yatsen's view of the Chinese nation was subject to change. He started with an Anti-Manchu racist stance and then moved on to a republican one. Nevertheless it was his latter view that is taken into account.

To Mongolian scholars it is obvious that the Chinese tend to overemphasize the Mongolian leaders' foreign connections and their demands to merge with the MPR. The Chinese view is not only biased, but it is also harmful to the present situation in IMAR. Even the demand of merging with Mongolia by the Mongolian nationalists in the beginning of the century should be understood according to the situation at the time: that involved Chinese merciless colonization, Yuan Shikai's chauvinist anti-Mongolian policies and maneuvers, and also Sun Yatsen's racist doctrines. Therefore those demands for a merger by the Mongols expressed their anti-colonial and anti-oppression sentiments.

No standard, whether Marxist or not, cant satisfy the political utilitarianism with regard to the Chinese treatment of history. The lack of standards can often put the Chinese in a disadvantageous position in the discussion of history related to ethnic relations. As a Chinese historian argued, the discussion of the issue of national liberation need not only be guided by Marxism and Leninism, but it also requires the guidance of the Party's nationality policy. The Party's nationality policy is of course based on political utilitarian considerations instead of academic analysis or pure ideological justifications.

History is given different meanings by the CPC to meet the different political needs of different times. This was true before 1978, and it has become especially so after 1978 when Chinese nationalism is on the rise and Marxist ideology in a decline. Gerdan Khan is denigrated by Chinese historians not only because he challenged the political authority of the Manchu empire over Mongols, but also because he

1993, July 26, 1993, and his presentation on the conference.
23 Mr. Zhang Zhi-hua, professor at the Institute of Mongolian Studies, Inner Mongolian University, at
received assistance from the Russian Tzar. Because of this, he was criticized especially during the Sino-Soviet disputes in the 1960s. During the Cultural Revolution, Qinshihuang Emperor and the Kangxi emperor were greatly extolled because the Qinshihuang Emperor was the first unifying emperor in Chinese history and the Manchu emperor Kangxi fought against Russian encroachment.

The changes in the Chinese attitude toward the Manchu dynasty reflect their present views on Chinese nation. The Manchu dynasty laid the foundation in many ways for the modern Chinese state. Mongolian education in The Qing dynasty is described by contemporary Chinese historians as: "... (Manchu dynasty) paid great attention to Mongolian education, positively advocated the study and use of Mongolian language, and further promoted the development of Mongolian education." 24

This is a totally different view from the CPC's earlier position on the Manchu dynasty. Mao Zedong himself criticized the Manchu dynasty for its oppression of the Mongols, "KMT reactionary group negated the existence of many nations in China, called those non-Chinese people as "clans". Their nationality policy, inherited from the Manchu Qing dynasty and warlord government, exploited and oppressed non-Chinese peoples to an extreme degree. The massacre of Mongolian peoples of the Ikhe Zuu League 1943, armed crackdowns of non-Chinese peoples in Xinjiang since 1944 and massacre of Moslems of Gansu during recent years all prove this. These are the results of wrong Chinese Chauvinist mentality and policy." 25 However during the reform period when there is more and more freedom for academic discussions to be conducted in a non-Marxist fashion, the Manchu's ethnic policy has been evaluated more in a nationalist view rather than from the former class line 26.

Popular interests in the Manchu dynasty were led to a new height partly by the Hollywood movie on Puyi, the last emperor of the Manchu dynasty. The Chinese seem to accept Puyi as the last Chinese emperor, but strictly speaking, the last Chinese emperor should be Chongzhen, the last Ming emperor who hanged himself when the peasant army led by Li Zicheng sieged Beijing in 1644. Or it could be Yuan Shikai who tried to restore the Chinese monarchy in 1915). The remaining members of the Manchu royal family suddenly became social celebrities. The scholars and writers of Manchu origin also used the chance to exotol the glories of the Qing dynasty by producing a large array of literature on a few of the earlier Manchu emperors of the dynasty 27. Popular literature added much to the imaginary history of the Chinese nation and the Manchu dynasty has come to be treated with nearly the same respect as the golden Chinese dynasties of Han and Tang 28.

Mongolian scholars do not share the same enthusiasm about the new evaluation of the Manchu
dynasty, they still argue from the point of view of the Mongols that the Manchu dynasty’s Mongolian policy was reactionary and oppressive. The Manchu Qing dynasty’s Mongolian policies are summarized by Mongolian historians as follows: 1) Obscurantist in approach to both to the Chinese people and especially to the Mongols. 2) massacre policy. 3) genocide policy: Qing’s restriction on Mongolian culture’s development and national consciousness; segregation of Mongols and Hans before the 17th century. In the 20th year of Jiaqing’s reign (1816), the Qing dynasty forbade Mongols from constructing Han style houses, using the Chinese language, Chinese names and marrying Han Chinese. The ban lasted until as late as Xuantong’s reign (1909-11). In the 7th year of Qianlong’s reign (1743), all Mongolian books and archives were moved to Beijing from Mongolian areas, which is no different from the Qinshihuan emperor’s barbarian practice of “burning books and burying scholars”. The Qing’s Mongolian school in Beijing was restricted only to preparing translators.

Manchu’s segregation policy here is one reason used by Mongolian writers to disagree with Chinese writers in criticizing the Manchu Qing dynasty. On some other occasions, they also argue that the ending of the segregation policy was also harmful because it was replaced by a deliberate policy of assimilation. The truth is not so important as the way history is used as a justification for national heroes. It is possible to counter the Chinese argument by demonizing rather than extolling the Manchu Dynasty. Thus Mongolian scholars could argue that according to Lenin’s advocacy of the right for minorities to self-determination, it is justifiable to resist the ruler in Beijing as long as the struggle is directed against the Manchu Qing.

If the Chinese were real Marxist materialists as they claim, they would follow the Marxist logic of historical development and their treatment of history would be supra-national. They should advocate or extol not only one nation’s interests, but also those of others and even the unification of all nations, whether by force or by peaceful means, as long as the result can be justified as historical and socio-economic in progress. As far as Mongols are concerned, the Chinese political utilitarianism in historical study is worse than the Marxist view, because national questions are simply out of focus in the Marxist tradition while Chinese political utilitarianism is a Chinese-centric bias. Political ideologies involved in historical discussions between Mongols and Chinese are not so much about faith as theoretical weapons in the battleground of nationalist arguments.

29 See “Changed Manchu-Mongol Relations and Manchus’ New Policy” in Chapter Three.
3. Economic Situations of the Urban and Rural Mongols

Market principles negate the principle of socialist egalitarianism formerly carried out by central planning. The differences between the national autonomous regions and Chinese provinces which were formerly preserved on the grounds of nationality equality will be erased by market forces. Putting minorities in the market of China as a whole and immersing them into the overwhelming majority of the Chinese market, is a further denial of minority rights to their lands and resources, and thus constitutes a denial of the reasons for the nationality autonomy. Reform to the Chinese means opening to the outside world, and to Mongols it means more opening to the Chinese.

3.1. Peripheralization Of Regional Economy

The IMAR has been treated more and more like any other Chinese province by the state with less and less characteristics to distinguish it as a nationality autonomous region.

The Increased Regional Development Gap

National autonomous regions, especially those in the north-west, contain most of the country’s natural resources. In the 1980s when Chinese economic reform gained momentum, these regions have become increasingly important for China’s economic growth. But the economic gap between the eastern coastal China and China’s interior region and north-western region(nationality autonomous regions) has become wider. The autonomous region is becoming rapidly peripheralized in China’s economy.

It should be pointed out that in recent years, the industrial growth rate of national autonomous regions is not only lower than the country’s average, but also lower than their pre-1978 speed. From 1978 to 1987, the total national industrial output increased by 226%, but the output of national autonomous regions only increased by 146.3%.\(^{31}\) In Inner Mongolia, during the eight years since the reform began(1979-1986), GDP, the production of the industry and agriculture and GNP increased annually at 6.6%, 5.8% and 5.7%, the growth is faster than that during the 26 years from 1953 to 1978 which were 6.6%, 5.8% and 5.7%. But the IMAR growth is lower than the country’s average, the GDP and the production of the industry and agriculture of the whole country during the 8 year period are 10.3% and 10.1%, and even lower than Xinjiang. The growth of GDP and of industry and agriculture production in Xinjiang during the period are 11% and 10.9%.\(^{32}\) The production efficiency of the IMAR calculated by the national income created by each employee in the IMAR was 1230 yuan in 1986, lower than the whole country’s average by 20.1%, lower than Xinjiang by 30.7%. The production efficiency of the state owned enterprises in the IMAR was only 57.3% of the whole country’s average, slightly higher than Tibet. Agricultural production per agricultural population was


only 79% of the country’s average, lower than Xinjiang by 31%.

The average income of the state enterprise employees in the IMAR, 116.3% of the country’s average in 1979, decreased to 97.8% of the country’s average, the lowest among all five nationality autonomous regions. Average income per agricultural population decreased from 97.3% to 80.1% of the country’s average. In 1981 and 1982 the income of the agricultural population was twice that of the country’s average, since 1983, it has been on a decline and the distance that it has been lagging behind the country’s average has been growing ever since.33

The table 1 shows the advantages of Inner Mongolia in terms of natural resources per head. Table 2 shows the decrease of the nationality region’s share in the country’s economy through some major economic indicators. Table 3 shows the case of Inner Mongolia.34

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>Percentage in the whole country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td></td>
<td>19,274,279*</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>arable land</td>
<td>10,000 mu**</td>
<td>7449 x unit</td>
<td>5.19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest</td>
<td>100 million mu</td>
<td>2.50 x unit</td>
<td>13.38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>forest covering ratio</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>timber reserve</td>
<td>100 million cubic metres</td>
<td>9.7 x unit</td>
<td>10.61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grassland</td>
<td>100 million mu</td>
<td>13 x unit</td>
<td>21.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fresh water surface</td>
<td>10,000 mu</td>
<td>1286 x unit</td>
<td>5.14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coal reserve</td>
<td>100 million tons</td>
<td>2009 x unit</td>
<td>22.29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iron ore</td>
<td>100 million tons</td>
<td>15.6 x unit</td>
<td>3.13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

33 Lin Weiran, (op. cit.) p.99.
34 Most of statistics data in the following tables are taken from Buhe's "Work Hard To Develop The Economy In Minority Regions", Buhe's Speeches On Nationality Works (Inner Mongolia People's Press, 1993, Huhhot) pp. 272-85.

* The population figure taken from The 3rd Nation-Wide Census (State Council Census Office and State Statistic Bureau, 1982) The population of Inner Mongolia to that of the whole country is 19,274,279/1031,000,000.

** Chinese measure of area, 1 mu = 1/15 hectare.

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Table 2. Nationality Autonomous Regional Economy’s Proportion in the Country’s Economy as a Whole

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Industrial output</th>
<th>Agricultural output</th>
<th>Industry &amp; Agricultural output</th>
<th>Total output of all industries</th>
<th>Total retailing sales volume</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>5.00%</td>
<td>11.14%</td>
<td>6.53%</td>
<td>9.68%</td>
<td>9.68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>4.24%</td>
<td>8.22%</td>
<td>5.25%</td>
<td>9.15%</td>
<td>9.15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Inner Mongolia Economy’s Proportion in the Country’s Economy as a Whole

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Industrial output</th>
<th>Agricultural output</th>
<th>Industry and Agricultural output</th>
<th>Total output of all industries</th>
<th>Total retailing sales volume</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are both subjective and objective explanations for the increased regional development gap. The subjective reason is the so-called frontier psychology. Economic determinism does not function as much in Inner Mongolia as in the Chinese provinces where the localization of economic interests has usually led to political regionalism. In Inner Mongolia, and other non-Chinese regions such as Tibet and Xinjiang as well, there is more resistance among the locals to the regionalization of economic interests and political power. The resistance is related to the refusal by local Chinese to identify with the regions that they regard as foreign. Chinese in Inner Mongolia tend to consider the adjacent Chinese provinces, where most of them are from, such as Shanxi and Hebei as their homeland. It can be described as the frontier psychology observed by Owen Lattimore more than half a century ago.35

The difficulty in Inner Mongolia’s regionalization of economic interests can be illustrated by the frontier psychology. In 1993, some big power plants were under construction in Inner Mongolia for the purpose of supplying power exclusively to the Beijing and Tianjin areas while the electricity supply in Inner Mongolia was still rationed.36 When asked about this, the number of ethnic Chinese who felt angry about this was amazingly smaller than that of Mongols even though their daily lives were both equally affected by the power shortage. Mongols tend to say that the shortage of power supply in Inner Mongolia is due to the free power export to Beijing. But ethnic Chinese as well as

35Lattimore, Owen, Mongols of Manchuria (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1935)
36According to the Power Supply Agreement between Inner Mongolia, Beijing Municipal and State Energy Ministry, starting from 1990, Inner Mongolia region supply power to Beijing. In 1993 the supply will be increased to 450 MW, 1/6 of Beijing’s electricity consumption. In 1995 the power supplied will further increase to 1000 MW, 1/4 of the total power consumption in Beijing. Liaowang (Outlook) magazine, October 31, 1994.
IMAR leaders would, through TV media, persuade people that IMAR's shortage of power has nothing to do with power export.\textsuperscript{37}

Ethnic Chinese officials in IMAR party and government organs are more eager than their provincial counterparts to show they support the center at the expense of regional interests. The following example maybe shows both the official corruption and the so-called frontier psychology. Perhaps the frontier psychology may relieve the guilt of those corrupted Chinese officials to some extent.

The Fengzhen power plant in Inner Mongolia, with a designed capacity of 800 MW(mega-watt), bought the 1st generator unit of the 4 from Wuhan. The generator has been proved in testing to be lower in quality than the approved Inner Mongolian standards. But because of the pressure from No 1 official, the party secretary of IMAR\textsuperscript{38}, the power plant was not only forced to purchase the generator, but it also had to buy the 2nd, 3rd, and the 4th from Wuhan. According to an engineer in the Inner Mongolian Energy Design Institute, Wuhan is not amongst the country's five leading energy designing forces; even Inner Mongolia's own power design institute can do better than Wuhan's in terms of designing and manufacturing capacities. Wuhan's generator units should not have been purchased at all. But favoritism and official corruption in Inner Mongolia made all the difference because the region's Chinese party boss' former power base was Wuhan before he was assigned to Inner Mongolia as the party chief\textsuperscript{39}. Officials of the Inner Mongolian power sector dared not do anything against their party boss (the head of the power sector is an ethnic Mongol). The purchase was finally concluded, and those officials involved secured their officialdom and lined their purses as well.

There are other objective reasons for the increased gap of regional development: the IMAR's relatively isolated geo-political locations for economic involvement, trade, technology transfer and investment from prosperous outside economies; the structure of industries left over from the pre-reform period; unfavorable state current policies during the reform period.

\textsuperscript{37} In several formal interviews in Hohhot, Aug. 1993, about 10 people were asked of their opinion on the issue. They included several students and one faculty member at Inner Mongolian Teacher's University and 1 couple operating a bookstore near the university.

\textsuperscript{38} Wang Qun was formerly the party secretary of Wuhan municipal, the big city with heavy industries in central China. He was one of ethnic Chinese bosses of the IMAR since Ulanhu's downfall in 1967. Ethnic Chinese officials have taken charge of Inner Mongolia after Ulanhu are Teng Hai-qing, You Taizhong, Zhou Hui, Zhang Shuguang and Wang Qun. The first two were PLA generals with meritorious military service to CPC, they are all assigned from outside.

\textsuperscript{39} Interview with an engineer involved in Fengzhen project in Huhhot in August 1993.
The Problem of the IMAR Industrial Structure

The industrial structural problem of the IMAR is that large basic industry and heavy industry (raw material and mining, metallurgy) is much more extensive than light and processing industry. Heavy industries, the largest part of the (Inner Mongolian) regional economy, accounted for 55% (light industry is 45%) in 1988. Industries of mining and raw materials constituted 64.45% of heavy industries. In 1988, the annual growth rate of heavy industry production is 11.20%, mining by 6.15%, raw material industry by 11.02, but processing by 17.65%.40

Guangxi autonomous region is the only one among the five national autonomous regions in which the ratio of light industry is above the country’s average by 5.8%, and the production of its light industry is higher than that of its heavy industry by 4%, therefore the economic performance of the province is higher than the country’s average.41

Many enterprises in heavy industries are directly controlled by the state which are exempted of local taxation and do not submit any of their revenue to the local government. The heaviest of the heavy industries are mostly those directly under the control of various Central ministries. They do not contribute profit and tax revenues to Inner Mongolia. Many of them are nuclear and military industries of heavy weaponry which cause environmental damage. One example is the Hexi Company near Hohhot, a large rocket-fuel manufacturer directly controlled by the Chinese military.

Take the coal industry for example, the coal mines in the IMAR, Xinjiang and Ningxia are famous for their huge reserves, deep/thick stratification, rich varieties, good quality and easy accessibility. There are also rich oil reserves in the IMAR and Ningxia. When the state decided to open those natural resources and to use coal for power generation, the enterprises tended to be monopolized by the state, so that the autonomous region normally had no share in the revenue and taxation generated by the enterprise.

The industrial structure problem in Inner Mongolia is severe because of the long-standing state policy whereby the prices of primary industrial products have been kept artificially low. The state generates huge profit and tax income by transporting coal and supplying locally generated power to other provinces. But Inner Mongolia gets no share from these transactions.

41 Lin Weiran (op. cit.) p.13.
The following table shows the low economic efficiency of the five nationality autonomous regions in relation to the country's average. Guangxi is the only autonomous region with an above-average economic efficiency because light industry in Guangxi accounts for 54.0% of its total industrial production value realized.\textsuperscript{42} Other autonomous regions have much larger proportion of heavy industries than the country's average. But heavy industries are usually a headache for Chinese economic reforms in terms of technical and structural changes, market competitiveness and ownership reform. Compared with other provinces and autonomous regions, the problem of Inner Mongolia is that "heavy industries are too heavy, light industries are too light".\textsuperscript{43}

Table 4. Main Indicators of Economic Efficiency: National Autonomous Regions and the Country's Average in 1987\textsuperscript{44}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Product value realized per RMB 100 fixed capital</th>
<th>Profit &amp; tax realized RMB per 100 fixed capital</th>
<th>Profit &amp; tax realized per RMB 100 capital</th>
<th>Profit &amp; tax realized per RMB 100 industrial output</th>
<th>Production per capita of state-owned enterprises</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Xingjiang</td>
<td>64.78</td>
<td>9.36</td>
<td>11.15</td>
<td>14.45</td>
<td>13165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inner Mongolia</td>
<td>61.82</td>
<td>9.21</td>
<td>9.69</td>
<td>14.90</td>
<td>9941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ningxia</td>
<td>54.82</td>
<td>8.19</td>
<td>8.83</td>
<td>14.94.11391</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tibet</td>
<td>34.06</td>
<td>3.32</td>
<td>3.81</td>
<td>10.35</td>
<td>6184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guangxi</td>
<td>11.34</td>
<td>24.14</td>
<td>23.32</td>
<td>21.12</td>
<td>14934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country's Average</td>
<td>1.4.15</td>
<td>19.72</td>
<td>20.03</td>
<td>18.93</td>
<td>16671</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{42} Lin Weiran (op. cit.) p.14.

\textsuperscript{43} A common observation in Inner Mongolia, interview in Huhhot, August, 1993.

\textsuperscript{44} Lin Weiran (op. cit.) p.14.
Unbalanced Industry Policy in 1980s

For many years it was because of neglect by the central state authorities that the natural resources were not opened and utilized in a planned and efficient manner, with the result that the base industries lag behind and the processing industries are over developed. That is part of the reason for the development gap between national autonomous regions and the rest of the country. It was especially so during the early 1980s (the sixth five-year plan period) when a policy that “light industries are given 6 priorities” was pursued.4 The situation was made worse by other factors such as unreasonable/unfair price systems, low prices and low profit for raw materials, higher prices and profits of processing products, and the processing industries kept a high growth rate. Coal, crude oil, power generation, steel industries, road and railways stagnated and lagged behind.

In March of 1989 the state council issued “The Decision on the Present Industry Policy”, pointing out the problems existing in the industrial structure. It was an effort to try to readdress the problems.

The state’s long-term industrial policy made the IMAR region have much more of a share of base and heavy industries (raw materials, mining and metallurgical industries). The situation of the IMAR has been made worse by a price system which does not reflect market changes. In the price system, the planned prices of those base products are kept artificially low, 80% of which are allocated to the more developed areas. This inevitably brings huge profit together with the base products to those developed areas since those more developed areas can make profit from buying cheaply and selling dearly. The state, while keeping the prices of base products low, fixed the consumer goods' price at an artificially high level. Even in the later double-pricing system, Inner Mongolia did not benefit from the adjustment of base products prices. In 1987, at planned prices, the state commissioned from Inner Mongolia 950,000 tons of steel, 3300,000 cubic metres of timbers, 24,000 tons of aluminium, 9,100,000 tons of coal and 1.4 billion kwh of electric power, the total volume of which was 2.6 billion yuan at planned/fixed prices. But the market price then was almost the twice of the planned price. Therefore with these few items alone Inner Mongolia suffered the loss of 2.5 billion yuan, which far exceeded the financial subsidies Inner Mongolia received from the central government.46

46 Lin Weiran (op. cit.) p.12.
In the 1980s the changed fiscal policy had virtually ended the previous favorable treatment of the IMAR. In 1980, in determining the base of the budgets for provincial governments as they began to be responsible for their own finance, the Ministry of Finance cut the budget base of all provinces, municipals and autonomous regions by 10%. 148.89 million yuan, 10% of the IMAR annual budget, was cut. Since 1981 the central government began to borrow from provincial governments, in 1981-82, the total borrowing from Inner Mongolia was 330 million yuan. In 1983, 99 million of the loan was offset against the reduction of the base of IMAR budget. In 1987 the Ministry of Finance, in a nationwide borrowing from the local government, borrowed from IMAR 345 million yuan. In the same year the Ministry of Finance also cut the increased rate of financial assistance to national autonomous regions by half. Formerly there was a policy regarding the autonomous region's budget that made allowances for the economic development and cultural and educational needs in the national autonomous regions, the central government increased its allowance to the autonomous regions by an annual rate of 10% of the normal budget of the previous year(excluding the allocated fund to infrastructure construction and the fund added to circulating capital). Therefore in the same year, the borrowing and the cut of allowance reduced the IMAR budget by 444.08 million yuan. Starting from 1988, 316 million yuans worth of borrowing was again offset as the reduced amount of the budget base. In the same time, the 10% annual increase in the allowance to the national autonomous areas was cancelled. The two cuts in 1988 alone reduced IMAR financial capability by 500.19 million yuan. Then the favorable treatment of the nationality regions in state fiscal policy, which has best embodied the state nationality policy since 1963 according to some people, was brought to an end. The result was that the financial capability of the nationality regions has been weakened, leading to a slowdown of the normal development of the economy, culture and education in the regions.

The state also has different economic policies toward different regions. Development priority has been given to the coastal and the more economically developed Chinese provinces, while inland areas were encouraged to concentrate on energy and raw materials processing industries to serve the rapid growth in the favorable areas.

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47 Lin Weiran (op. cit.) p.18.
48 The state made some specific fiscal arrangements for the nationality autonomy regions as early as 1954. In 1958, the state council issued "The Temporary Fiscal Measures of the Nationality Autonomy Regions(Draft)", the policy was described as "revenue and spending to be calculated in total; the surplus to be submitted and the shortfall to be compensated by the central government; the policy to be renewed annually." There were also four special arrangements: 1. The preparatory fund of the nationality autonomy regions is higher than other provinces; 2. The normal annual budget(excluding the fund allocated to infrastructure and those as flowing capital) is added by 5% emergency fund; 3. The compensation fund to the nationality autonomy regions is increased to meet some special needs of the regions; 4. The surplus budget revenue is totally controlled by the nationality autonomy regions. All the above measures increased the financial ability and fiscal power of the local governments in the regions. See Lin Weiran, (op. cit.) p.26.
From 1979 to 1988, a number of so-called special economic zones were set up in the coastal Chinese provinces and cities. The favorable policies granted to the special economic zones were numerous: local right to approve joint ventures; import and export right for raw materials and products for processing; exemptions from tariff, VAT and export tax; rights to authorize a presence abroad and quota of foreign currency, etc..

All these solid economic rights were in sharp contrast to the rights on paper for national autonomous regions. While the rich coastal areas were given favorable policies by the state, the former policies made by the state toward minority areas to help the economic development of the minority areas have been tightened, and even cancelled.

Some argued in the IMAR that the IMAR also should be given the same favorable policy. They listed the advantages of the IMAR in support of the argument for granting it SEZ status: rich natural resources, it has become a sizable economic and technological base after its 40-year development; a special economic pattern of agriculture; animal farming; forestry combined together with good transportation links to eight neighboring provinces and national autonomous regions; and railway links with Mongolia and Russia.

### 3.2. Pastureland Economy and the Traditional Way of Life

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49 As early as 1979, Guangdong and Fujian provinces were given favorable policies and were allowed to open to Hong Kong and Taiwan. In 1980 four SEZ(special economic zone) were set up there. In 1984 further 14 port cities were granted favorable policy and the status as opening city for attracting foreign investment to the economic development zones of each city. From 1986 to 1988, other larger areas were treated as specialized areas for economic development: delta areas of Zhujiang and Yangtze river, a large triangle in Fujian province, East-Liaoning peninsula, Shandong peninsula, and cities like Qinghuangdao, Tang Shan and Chang Chou, etc. In 1988 Hainan Island was again designated as SEZ.

50 Lin Weiran (op. cit.) p.15.

51 Interviews in Hohhot in 1993.
As a socio-demographic research shows, from 1982 to 1990, the Mongols in Inner Mongolia experienced a decrease in its population involved with agriculture and an increase in its urban population. The scale of decrease and increase are both more drastic than the average of other ethnic minorities and Han Chinese during the same time. The Mongolian population in the agricultural sector decreased from 1982 to 1990 by 16%, while the average decrease rate during the same time for the other non-Chinese minorities was only 2% and for the Chinese only 12%. More Mongols left their traditional way of life and entered into an urban Chinese environment. In terms of changing the balance between the rural and urban population of Mongols in Inner Mongolia, it can be said that the source for the traditional Mongolian life and artistic inspiration of Mongolian ethnicity and culture.

The IMAR pastureland economy has a bleak future for two reasons: First some negative signs concerning the pastureland economy appeared during the reform period; and second is the expansion of arable farming that competes more than before with the pastureland economy for land for further cultivation, for increased migration and for state funds.

Since the IMAR pastureland economy is still largely within the Mongolian ethnic and cultural boundary, the pastureland economy continues to represent the traditional Mongolian way of life. Both the pastureland economy and the traditional Mongolian way of life face the dilemma of either being absorbed into a vast Chinese-ness or of being isolated and lagging behind. Moreover, as to the Mongolian identity in Inner Mongolia, to be modern and to be Mongols are a pair of contradictions and mutually exclusive choices for Mongols.

State policies in the pastureland, copy rural reform

Under the influence of leftist policies during the Great Leap Forward in 1958 and the Cultural Revolution period of 1966-76, a pro-agricultural policy which gave priority to grain production over animal farming was pursued in Inner Mongolia, and vast areas of pastureland were cultivated for growing grains. The policy had a negative effect on the pastureland, turning vast swathes of pastureland into cultivated farming land. The newly cultivated land on grassland facilitated Chinese immigration and brought environmental problems. The pastureland economy stagnated during 1960 and 1962. But after a 3 year restoration period, the total livestock number on the IMAR pastureland reached an unprecedented 41.76 million in 1965. The past fifty years have shown that the agriculture of grain first policy has been associated with leftism and it is related to a Chinese style-cultivation and a pro-immigration policy; while the animal husbandry first policy has been associated with a moderate policy which is more amenable to Mongolian herdsmen and the Mongol way of life.

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Although the IMAR government reiterated that in the course the reform period since 1978 the policy forestry and animal husbandry should be the priority, in practice in the IMAR, the importance of grain agriculture has been increasing in the IMAR, especially since the later period of the 7th five-year plan from 1985 to 1990.

The reforms carried out on the IMAR pastureland were just duplicates of the experience that had been gained from the Chinese agricultural reform. The former commune system has been replaced by a dual contract (responsibility) system. The pastureland is still state-owned but it is managed by individual herdsman through contract; livestock is bought by herdsmen from the collective ownership and raised by individuals. The ownership of the IMAR pastureland has not returned to the collective ownership in the pre-commune period. The ownership of the pastureland is discussed later.

The system of family responsibility has been applied to grazing land and livestock and it has brought incentives into pastureland production resulting in a huge increase in production corresponding to the results of the rural reform in the cultivated agricultural areas. Since 1978, and especially during the 7th 5-year plan from 1985-90, the total number of livestock on pastureland increased substantially. By June, 1990, the livestock of fine/improved breed reached 21.948 million, 14.018 million more than the number in 1985. In 1990, the year of the unprecedented agricultural harvest in the IMAR history, the livestock number in the IMAR also increased. The total meat production of the IMAR increased to 53610 tons in 1990 an increase of 49.3% compared to meat production in 1985. Wool and cashmere reached 64400 tons in 1990, an increase rate since 1985 of 53%. The pastureland production value increased by 31.4% to 1.948 billion yuan from 1985 to 1990. The average income of herdsmen increased to 905 yuan in 1990, increase since 1985 of 39.2%.

The Inner Mongolian pastureland economy, like China's general economic situation, has been idealized with official statistics in such a way to show that the Deng Xiaoping period since 1978 has been the best ever in the history of the People's Republic of China. The way this is usually done is to compare the period after 1978 with the whole period from 1949 to 1978 without distinguishing the disastrous periods such as Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution and the more economically sound periods such as the first-five year plan period (1953 - 1958) and the three-year economic convalescent period (1963 - 1965).

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55 Zhang Dinghua, (op. cit.) p.62.
As to the achievements of the pastoral economy in the past, the IMAR government does not separate the pre-Cultural Revolution period, especially the first 10 years of IMAR, from the Cultural Revolution period. In many reports from the IMAR government to the central government in 1985, it was stated that during the 26-year period from 1953 to 1972, the total livestock number of the IMAR had been fluctuating the whole time around 30 million heads. This is not a scientific summary because in 1965, a year before the Cultural Revolution (CR), the number of the livestock already surpassed 40 million\textsuperscript{56}. But during the Cultural Revolution, in addition to political suppression, Mongols also suffered economic miseries, and the number of their livestock declined drastically. In 1978, the total livestock in Inner Mongolia was 36 million. The pastureland production in 1988 was mentioned as the highest since 1978 which was around 40 million\textsuperscript{57}, the same as that in 1965. After the Cultural Revolution, although many reform policies and measures have been carried out, the pastureland production in IMAR has recovered to a certain degree, but it has not reached the unprecedented levels suggested by government propaganda. The livestock number in 1990 (the year of unprecedented agricultural harvest in IMAR history) reached 55 millions, but that number included pigs and other agricultural animals, so it is hard to tell whether the number of the livestock on the pastureland surpasses the number in 1965.\textsuperscript{58}

Less specialization in production

Some new problems appeared in the pastureland economy as a result of the introduction of the family responsibility model. The soundness of this imitative policy is also questioned by Mongolian intellectuals. Some even argued that according to Marxist theory, whether or not a productive relationship is advanced depends on whether it is good for production\textsuperscript{59}. Private ownership and family-based management have greatly reduced the producer's ability to absorb large equipment and new technology. While the family responsibility reform may have increased the economic incentives for herdsmen, the family-based production has reduced the level of the internal labor division and production specialization in the pastureland economy. The structure of pastoral labors has changed as a result. In Inner Mongolia in 1979, the number of labors directly related to animal herding were 398,000 units, other auxiliary labors of various kinds were 17,000 units. In 1984 the former was increased to 548,000, meanwhile the auxiliary labors decreased to only 6,113\textsuperscript{60}. The statistics indicate a tendency that more and more labors have concentrated on single trade of herding animals, labors on other lines are decreasing.

\textsuperscript{56} Orchelan, \textit{Research On Inner Mongolian Nationality Issues} (Inner Mongolian Education Press, 1993) p.45.
\textsuperscript{59} Orchelan, (op. cit.) p. 76
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid.
Formerly there were the so-called four stations on the IMAR pastureland: the grassland stations; the breed improvement stations; the vet stations; and the management stations. In the reform period this specialization was reduced and the four stations were merged into one. The current number of these technical stations operating in the pastureland is only 118 in the whole IMAR employing 3500 people, amongst whom 64% are technical personnel.\(^1\)

Lack of specialization of production also leads to degradation of livestock breeding. A common scene on pastoral land since the reform is that almost all households have five kinds of animals (camel, cattle, horse, sheep and goats), none of which are large enough to form a herd of its own. It is common knowledge that various herds should be strictly separated, but the labor needed to do it is just too much for a family. Inevitably the mixed herding on a small household farm would lead to a degradation of livestock.

Low level labor division and specialization also leads to a massive waste of labor. The labor production rate on pastoral land is in decline. From 1979 to 1984, the number of laborers on the pastoral land of the IMAR increased by 37.8%, in the meantime the value of production increased by only 18.6%. Comparing 1984 with 1979, production efficiency decreased by 16%.\(^2\) In contrast, in agricultural areas production value increased at a much higher speed than the increase of labor.

In theory, the lack of specialization in production could be solved by forming cooperatives amongst several families. The production experience in the past proved that co-operatives of 5 to 10 households are more productive and efficient than family-based production, but so far this more suitable way of organizing production seems not to be favored by the government since the authority is now committing itself to the new economic thinking of family-based production. The real problem which makes cooperatives unfeasible is the problem of pastureland ownership. Under the current system, each of the families on the pastureland are tenants to the state, the sole land owner. Collective ownership of the grassland, or the old public ownership of the grassland in the pre-Communist period would certainly have been better.

Many other statistics given by Mongolian researchers show that there have been some signs of absolute decline in the pastoral production of each League (prefecture). The lack of the division of labour and production specialization is becoming an unprecedented barrier in the commercialization of the pastoral economy. Mongols are becoming a people who are bounded more and more closely to a single means of production, and are thus placed in a vulnerable position in the increasingly more market-oriented Chinese economy.

**Price policy**

The pastoral economy is also affected by an unstable state pricing system. Frequent fluctuation of state prices brings a lot of damage to Mongolian animal husbandry and it does not give herdsmen the stability necessary for their production and sense of security. Take Shilinggol League as an example, from 1979 to 1986, the state cattle purchasing price kept changing every year which made cattle raising herdsmen frustrated in their production decision-making. In 1979, the state price was 1.77 yuan per kg. In 1983 the price was raised by 19.7% and reached 2.12 yuan per kg. In 1985 the price was further raised by 32% and reached 2.80 yuan per kg. But in 1986 the price declined by 17.1% to 2.60 yuan per kg. Usually it needs 4 years to raise cattle before they are ready for sale, but state price policy changes almost every year. The price fluctuation is certainly not determined by day-to-day market conditions, but it is determined by the central government. The purchase prices were not governed by the markets but more controlled by fiscal policy and the availability of funds for the particular purchases.

In the first three price rises, the Mongols in Shilinggol League gave priority to raising cattle and also made extra efforts and incurred additional expenditure to ensure the cattle's survival through the terrible winter. When the price was lowered, the herdsmen's income was affected. The productivity of the pastoral economy in IMAR is largely influenced by natural conditions, so it is extremely vulnerable to the present unstable purchasing policy. The current practice on pricing by the government is certainly not designed to benefit the animal husbandry in the longer term and it also had an adverse impact upon Mongolian herdsmen's normal life.

Another example is the government's poor record as the regulator of the cashmere market which had adverse effects on the cashmere industry on the pastureland. In 1981 the price of 1 kg white cashmere was 15.12 yuan and the price in the following years was raised by 20-30% annually. By 1986 the price had reached as high as 48 yuan per kg, and by 1988 it even reached 100-140 yuan per kg. The then market price was even higher than 200 yuan per kg. Raising white goats became such a profitable business that not only most Mongolian herders but also a lot Chinese peasants rushed to raise goats. But in the following years as the market crashed and the price dropped drastically and the "cashmere rush" started by speculators was over, long-term damage was done to the cashmere production industry on the pastureland and to the Mongolian herdsmen rather than the speculators and peasants.

Different funding policy

^Orchelan, "On IMAR Pastoral Economy Pattern", Nei Meng Gu She Lian, 5th issue of 1987
^Ibid.
^Interview in Ikhe Zuu League, 1993
Another aspect of the price system is related to the state funding policy, i.e. the state purchasing price is fixed far below the market value. Several decades of such practice in the pastureland means that state investment on the pastureland infrastructure is offset by the huge amount of invisible wealth taken away by the state. In 1986, the state purchasing price on cashmere was 40 yuan per kg, but the local market price was 70 yuan per kg. In the same year, the state purchasing price on improved wool was 3.48 yuan per kg, but local market price was 9 yuan per kg. The West Ujimqin Banner of Shilinggol League annually sells at the state price more than 1 million kg of wool and fur, and 600 thousands pieces of hides. The quantity of the sale to the state means that the banner loses more than 7 million yuan annually to its state purchasing quota. But the state fiscal allocation plus investment to the banner is far less than 7 million yuan per annum. Of course the 7 million yuan annual loss is burdened by Mongolian herdsmen in the banner.

The state funding situation in the reform period was even worse than in previous periods. After 1947 and even during the Cultural Revolution, although the state exercised planned control of pastoral production including management, production planning and purchasing, yet the state was nevertheless responsible for adding the necessary funding for production in pastoral areas and also for supplying consumer goods and production materials such as animal fodder, medicines, building materials, farming mechanics, etc. at a low fixed price. In the reform period, the state abolished the subsidies for goods supplied to pastoral areas. The price became subject to bargaining (a compromise between the state planned price and the market price). Chinese peasants are ensured to be able to sell their agriculture products because the state provides loans especially for purchase of agricultural products, but since 1993 the state has stopped providing loans for purchase of animal products in Inner Mongolia. As a result Mongolian herdsmen have no guarantee either for selling their products at a reasonable price or for selling them at all. Animal fodder is another example. In 1985 the price of corn was 0.252 yuan per kg which was 0.1 yuan more than the previous year’s planned price. During 1985 West Ujimqin Banner's anti-disaster efforts, a total of 3.25 million kg of corn was consumed. Because of the changing prices, herdsmen in the banner had to pay an extra 1850,000 yuan on the bargaining price.

Generally speaking, the pastoral economy in Inner Mongolia provides the state with products ten times more valuable than the funding received from state. During the last forty years since the founding of IMAR, the state has been provided with animal products valued at 13.8 billion yuan by Inner Mongolia, but the budget for both infrastructure and administration allocated to the pastoral areas is only 117 million yuan. State investment in the pastureland infrastructure in 1986 decreased by more than half that of 1980. Livestock pedigree improvement, animal epidemic prevention and research

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65 After 1984, the State Agricultural Bank put limits on its low-interests loans, category I and II agricultural products are still entitled for low-interests loan, but not the category III products which include mainly animal products. Lin Weiran, *Economic Study Of Minority Areas*, 1990, Inner Mongolian People’s Press.
were also adversely affected by the reduction of funds.\footnote{Boin, "On Inner Mongolian Animal Husbandry", \textit{Collection Of Works On Pastoral Economy} (Inner Mongolian People's Press, 1989)}

After 1979, Chinese peasants were allowed to take a considerable part of their agricultural produce to the free market, but Mongolian herdsmen were not granted the same freedom to sell their animal products. Furthermore, Mongolian herdsmen have not been able to enjoy the same favorable state subsidies that Chinese peasants do for their products. The situation has been made worse for Mongolian herdsmen by poorer transportation and by less developed commercial channels. As Chinese agriculture and its commercial animal husbandry sector have developed, the increasing supply of animal products has led to a price decline in recent years, and that has weakened the situation for the Mongolian pastureland economy.
Conclusion: Bleak Future for the Pastureland Economy

In 1990 the IMAR agriculture had an unprecedented bumper harvest as grain production reached 9.73 billion kg. Comparative figures for previous years include: 4.5 billion kg. in 1959, near 5 billion kg. in 1974, around 5-6 billion kg. from 1985 to 1987, 7.35 billion kg in 1988 and 6.8 billion kg in 1989. The harvest can be mainly explained by increased enthusiasm and by good weather.

According to official statistics, there are 80 million acres of cultivated land in the IMAR, but according to a satellite survey, there are 100 million acres, 20 million extra acres of cultivated land are not on the books. Although the IMAR authority attributed the bumper harvest to an increase in the yield per acre, increased cultivation also contributed to the harvest. If general agricultural growth may be said to be mainly the result of increased production efficiency, the growth of the pastureland economy, however, is caused by overgrazing of the grassland and that cannot be sustained because it leads to environmental degradation.

The grain harvest, however was also gained at a huge cost. The expansion of cultivated farmland resulted in deforestation. Now only 13.6% of the whole IMAR area is covered by forest and the locations of the forests are not necessarily best placed. More than 50 million acres land were already degraded into desert and huge areas of additional grassland continue to become desert. Land affected by soil erosion by water and wind now accounts for 1/3 of all the cultivated farmland in the IMAR. About 45 million acres of the farmland have become affected by salinization to various degrees. 10% of all cultivated land has already been too salinized for any production value.

Formerly the IMAR had to rely on the rest of the country for food. Every year 1 billion kg grains were allocated to the IMAR by the state. After the 1990 harvest, the IMAR for the first time in history achieved food self-sufficiency. Because of the requirements from the state, and pressures from the growing Chinese population, the IMAR leader aimed to achieve the goal of 15 billion kg in grain production to relieve the whole country's pressure by the year 2000, the end of the 9th 5-year plan. The way to realize the goal, apart from further increasing the production per acre, is to increase the farmland.

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The emphasis on the importance of cultivation will put additional pressure on the pastureland to provide new farmland. Considering that overgrazing animal husbandry on the grassland has already caused a deterioration and a desertification of the grassland, the pastureland available for animal husbandry will shrink still further. The pastureland economy now faces a bleak future.

3.3. Inner Mongolian Territory and Mongolian Land Rights

From 1946 to 1956 it took ten years for the IMAR to reclaim those areas which had either been incorporated into bordering Chinese provinces or had been set up as new Chinese provinces. According to the IMAR’s propaganda, the Mongolian territory promised by CPC in its 1935 Declaration was restored by the New China. However the territorial restoration was only an enlargement of the IMAR administrative size, and it had nothing to do with the Mongolian rights to the land.

In 1947 when Ulanhu united and secured the support of the eastern Mongolian nationalists, the capital of the Joint Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement was moved from Ulaan Hot in east Mongolia to Kalgan. In 1952 the capital was finally moved to Gui Sui (“return and pacify” in Chinese) and the city was renamed as Hohhot, the original Mongolian name for the city when it was first founded in 1554 by Altan Khan (1507-83).

Suiyuan Province was abolished in June 1954, In July 1955 the six banners and counties of Jehol province such as Onut Banner and Chi Feng county were incorporated into Inner Mongolia. (the other parts of Jehol were assigned to He Bei province). In April 1956, Bainhot Mongolian prefecture and Ejina Banner of Gansu Province were incorporated into Inner Mongolia and in the same year Bayan Nor League was set up in Inner Mongolia. The unified IMAR was appraised by Ulanhu as the end of 300-year separation of Inner Mongolia. 500,000 Mongols outside the IMAR were welcomed to return to Inner Mongolia. Ulanhu said that the unification would benefit the development of its national culture.

The enlargement of IMAR increased the geographical scope and power of the IMAR government and more particularly of Ulanhu himself. One principle used to restore the original size of Inner Mongolia was to include as few Chinese as possible so as to provide Mongolian autonomy with a stronger indigenous population base. But nevertheless, the IMAR enlargement also brought in more Chinese

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73 Although Ligden Khan only controlled Chakhar, he was by lineage the orthodox khan of all Mongolia. He it was defeated by Manchu Emperor Tiancong (Hung Taiji, or Arvkhai 300 years ago (1634), and then South Mongolia was annexed to Manchu Qing dynasty.
cadres into the IMAR government, and it also added substantially to the Chinese population in the IMAR which was by then already the majority. The incorporated areas were mostly agricultural areas where Chinese peasants usually outnumbered Mongolian peasants.

But the expansion of the IMAR administrative border was irrelevant to the unification of Mongolian territory. The people in China were not allowed to change their permanent residence freely because of the PRC's household registration system, and the provincial border was another barrier for free movement. That had given a degree of protection against the migration by Han Chinese. But after the more populated agricultural areas were incorporated into Inner Mongolia, the door was opened for population in the agriculture areas to move to the more sparsely populated areas within Inner Mongolia. Accordingly the enlargement of the IMAR administrative area further changed reducing the Mongol-Chinese population ratio and reducing the population basis for the development of any meaningful national autonomy.

During the Cultural Revolution as Sino-Soviet relations further deteriorated, the Soviet Union signed in 1966 a security treaty with the Mongolian People's Republic and stationed armed forces in Mongolia along the Mongolia-China border. In 1967 China began to counter deploy force along the border. In April 1967, General Teng Haiqing, the deputy commander of the Beijing Military Zone, was assigned by Zhou Enlai to be the head of the IMAR Revolutionary Committee, the new authority of the IMAR. At the same time, the CPC Central Military Commission issued an order that the IMAR Military Zone was to be demoted to a provincial military zone and was subordinate to the Beijing Military Zone. Between January and October in 1970, the size of IMAR was reduced to ⅔ of its original size mainly for strategic considerations. Only three leagues were left: Shilinggol, Ulaan Chab and Ikhe Zuu. The other three leagues were incorporated by neighboring provinces. The early period of the Cultural Revolution was the time of the massive purge of Ulanhu and Mongols in general. The partition of the IMAR obviously enabled Beijing to control the situation in Inner Mongolia more easily.

On May 30, 1979 after the Cultural Revolution ended, the CPC Central Committee and the State Council decided to restore the original IMAR administrative areas to the pre the Cultural Revolution dimensions. The IMAR took back the three leagues of Hulun Beir, Jerim, Jo-oda which were formerly lost to Heilongjiang, Jilin and Liaoning provinces, and the three banners of Alashan Left, Alashan Right and Ejina from Gansu and Ningxia provinces respectively. But the fact that IMAR was so

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76 The CPC Central Committee on December 19, 1969 made the "Decision on the Partition and Martial Law of IMAR", according to which the Beijing Military Zone exercised general martial law in Inner Mongolia after the partition. The Commander, together with his deputies and commissars of the Beijing Military Zone formed the Inner Mongolian Front Line Command which controlled all the works in Inner Mongolia. Hao Weimin, ed. (op. cit.) p.320.
easily partitioned shows that the so-called national autonomy was just something at the central government's disposal.

The Administrative territorial scope of the IMAR has very little bearing on the extent of the Mongolians' right to land. The process in which Mongols lost their land rights happened much earlier and had little to do with the changes of the IMAR administrative area. Within the 10-year period from 1947 to 1958, the state became the land owner of the grassland of Inner Mongolia and Mongols gradually lost their land ownership.

Land reform was conducted between 1947 and 1952 in Inner Mongolia. In pastoral areas, the reform was called democratic reform since the ownership of grassland was not changed. Before 1947, the grassland in Inner Mongolia belonged to the Mongolian public in common and the aristocracy was not the landowner, its privileges were confined to the use of grazing lands. During the democratic reform, it was recognized by the IMAR CPC Committee that all the land in Inner Mongolia belonged to the Mongolian people in common. In pastoral areas, Mongolian public ownership of grassland and equal rights of grazing were reiterated by the IMAR government, and the policy was called "free grazing" (zi you fang mu).

During the democratic reform period, Mongolian ownership of all the land in Inner Mongolia was redefined as the land rights were limited to only pastoral areas. A document made by the National Commission of the State Council in 1953 confirmed that the grasslands in Inner Mongolia belonged to the Mongolian public. It pointed out: “at present all grasslands and grazing lands in all pastoral areas, which might have formerly belonged to a whole nationality or tribe, an individual or a monastery, or might have been leased land between different nationalities or tribes, are now owned by the Mongolian public, in the whole IMAR, the policy is free grazing on grassland and readjustment of grassland.”

In the Inner Mongolian agricultural areas, the Mongolian ownership of land was annulled by the land reform. The lands which formerly belonged to the Mongolian public in common were allocated to individual peasants. For centuries before the land reform, Chinese peasants in Inner Mongolia had no right to land ownership and the land belonged to Mongolian banners (public land for all Mongols within the banners). When Mongolian nobles illegally let or sold public land to Chinese landlords, some land was also allocated to the Mongolian commoners. Chinese tenant farmers paid rent to Mongolian landlords: either Mongolian nobles or commoners. The rent was called Mongolian Rent (meng zu) by the Chinese, which indicated Mongolian land ownership. One important measure of the

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78 Liu Jingping, (op. cit.) p.106.
79 Liu Jingping, (op. cit.) p.111.
land reform was to invalidate the Mongolian Rent. When those Mongols who owned more land were
categorized as landlords, their land was allocated to the landless tenants, most of whom were Chinese.

From 1947 to 1957, a “no class struggle” policy was pursued as part of the democratic reform in the
pastoral areas in Inner Mongolia. Since there was no private ownership of grassland, therefore there
was no exploiting class which controlled the means of production in the pastoral areas. The policy
during the period of democratic reform regarding the pastoral land was not to change land ownership,
but only to abolish the Mongolian nobles’ privileges in the use of public grazing land. The guideline
of the IMAR government was: “public ownership of pastures, freedom of grazing, no class
categorization and no class struggle, mutual benefit for both herd owners and herders.” The land
reform that was applied in agricultural areas ensured that regarding the lands taken over from
Mongolian landlords, 80% was given to Mongols and 20% to Chinese peasants. After the land reform,
Mongolian peasants usually had more land than Chinese, therefore they were allowed to employ
Chinese peasants or to let farmland to Chinese peasants for rent.

The different policies of democratic reform that were applied to the agricultural and pastoral areas,
that accorded different treatment toward Mongolian and Chinese peasants in the agricultural areas
reflected a compromise of the two principles: recognition of Mongolian rights and more radical
policies based on class distinction. Often the difference of the Chinese central government guidelines
and the IMAR government policies was reflected in the different opinions of the ethnic Chinese cadres
and Mongolian cadres and in the IMAR government. In spite of the declared policy of forswearing
class differentiation and class struggle, in practice, class distinction was still adopted as an internal
guideline by some cadres, and in some pastoral areas the policy of class distinction was copied from
the agricultural areas.

The cooperatives were set up in the agricultural areas in Inner Mongolia from 1953 to 1956 and in the
pastoral areas from 1953 to 1958. By the end of January 1956, preliminary cooperatives had been set
up in the agricultural areas. The farm land and other basic production materials were collectivized into
the cooperatives as shares and the peasants became the shareholders. Since the distribution was
conducted according to shares, the preliminary co-ops were regarded as semi-socialist in nature. By
the end of 1956, the preliminary cooperatives were upgraded into the advanced cooperatives in which
the distribution was no longer conducted as a dividend, but according to work. Individual peasant’s
land rights were totally abolished.

During the cooperative movement, the so-called “combined” (lian he she: cooperatives consisted of
many nationalities, most combined cooperatives were Chinese-Mongol cooperatives) cooperatives
were encouraged by Chinese cadres and welcomed by Chinese peasants. Since Mongolian peasants

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81 Liu Jingping (op. cit.) p.106.
82 The policy was called “3 nos, 2 beneficials”: no class struggle, no confiscation, no class
classification/categorization; to be beneficial to both livestock owner and herders. See Hao Weimin
(op. cit.) p.38.
83 Ulanhu, “Speech on Sub-branch of North China Bureau Meeting on 11 May, 1952”. The Cultural
normally owned more land than Chinese peasants before the collectivization, Mongolian peasants lost more than Chinese peasants. During the collectivization in the pastoral areas, herdsmen's livestock were taken by the preliminary cooperatives as shares first and later became the collective property of the advanced cooperatives. Many monasteries and large livestock owners in the pastoral areas, were made to join state farms together with their livestock and grazing land, the others were collectivized into cooperatives. Because Mongols contributed more livestock and land than the Chinese to those “combined cooperatives”, and Mongols and Chinese equally shared the coops, Mongols actually lost and the Chinese gained land and livestock in the collectivization process. In the collectivization of monastery properties, the livestock that formerly belonged to the monasteries and Mongolian public grazing land became state property.

The leftist Great Leap Forward policies no longer accepted the principle of distinguishing between minority and Han Chinese as had been applied previously. The communization of agricultural cooperatives in Inner Mongolia was completed in October 1958. By July 1958 cooperatives were set up in pastoral areas. Although the IMAR CPC Committee suggested that the communization in the pastoral areas be postponed, in practice more radical policies were pursued and communization started after September and October of 1958. The guidelines of the CPC on the people's communes emphasized that there was a transitional period from the socialist collective ownership to the socialist people's ownership (quan min suo you zhi), and from socialism to communism. The guidelines also emphasized the people’s commune was a 3-level collective ownership, the ownership of the production team was the base. But in practice, the distinction between the collective ownership was replaced by the state ownership (quan min suo you).

In the period after the “Great Leap Forward” and before the Cultural Revolution was the period when land ownership experienced a transition from collective ownership to state ownership (it was known in Chinese as “public” or “the people’s ownership” (quan min suo you zhi). The so-called “Combined Communes” (lian he she: communes with many nationalities) were encouraged in Inner Mongolia. During the communization Mongolian land rights were finally abolished and the Chinese state became the owner of Inner Mongolian grassland.

Though Mongols may argue that the transition of the grassland ownership was contradictory to the Chinese policies on the people’s commune and the 1954 Chinese constitution, the Chinese can always argue the opposite. Since the 1954 Constitution stipulated that the wild land belonged to the state, the question of how to interpret what was wild land become crucial to the issue of grassland

Revolution materials. Also See Hao Weimin (op. cit.) p.92.

84 “The Resolutions On The Several Issues Of The People’s Commune”, passed by the 6th Meeting of the 8th CPC Central Committee. “The Regulations Of The Work Concerning The People’s Communes In The Countryside(draft)” (commonly known as the “60 Articles”), Liu Jingping (op. cit.) pp.227, 446.


86 In the constitution of 1954, it was made clear that “each nationality autonomous region is an inseparable part of the PRC.” It also stipulates: “mines, rivers, the forest, wild land and other
ownership. The Chinese tend to regard all land which is not cultivated for farming as wild land. The cultivation of grassland has always been called by the Chinese as "cultivating unused or useless land" (kai huang). Mongols argue that no such law was ever written stipulating that the grassland in the IMAR, except those occupied by the state and PLA, is owned by the state.

Ownership of the grassland in Inner Mongolia was clarified later. In 1963 the National Commission and the Agricultural Ministry of the State Council issued a 40-article regulation on work in pastoral areas. It wrote: "the production teams have fixed rights to use the grassland within its sphere according to the particular conditions and historical customs." It did not mentioned grassland ownership. The ownership was mentioned in the IMAR Grassland Management Provisional Regulations made in 1965. It wrote that "the grassland of the IMAR is owned by the state (quanmin suoyou)". The state ownership of the IMAR grassland was reiterated in the Grassland Management Regulations stipulated in 1973. Mongols objected to the two regulations on the grounds they were not made in accordance with the legal procedures stipulated by the state constitution. According to the constitution at the time, the two regulations could only become law after they were approved by the standing committee of the people's congress. As a matter of fact, the two regulations never went through the standing committee. However, the legal argument is not really the key issue because there never was a problem in having the regulations approved by the people's congress.

Land ownership underwent three changes from the beginnings of land reform to the completion of socialist reform. From the perspective of the Chinese peasantry, the new Communist state deprived landlords of their land and gave them to the landless peasants (predominantly Chinese); the state first changed individual ownership of land into collective ownership during the collectivization process, and then the collective land ownership was changed into state ownership. During the rural reform period, the collective ownership of farmland was re-emphasized. Chinese landless peasants first became individual landowners after the liberation, and then became landless peasants in the agricultural communes. In the reform period, Chinese peasants came collectively to own their farm land. But as seen by Mongolian herdsmen, the treatment by the state was less just. During collectivization the Mongolian public ownership of grassland was separated into many smaller collective ownerships, and then the collective ownerships were transferred to the state. Since the communization, Mongolian herdsmen for the first time in history have become landless. Since the reform began in 1978, Chinese peasants have come to enjoy collective ownership and management of their farmland, where Mongolian herdsmen have still remained tenants the state.

resources which, according to particular laws, belong to the state, belong to the whole people (quanmin suoyou)". Sun Xianfang, *The Laws of Nationality Regional Autonomy* (Inner Mongolian University Press, 1990) p.53.


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4. National Language, Education and Culture: view and discussions

Among both cultural and economic changes, there are both positive and negative changes, it is hard to qualify or quantify that the negative side is more than positive side or the otherwise. Therefore a reductionist/materialist method is not feasible. A simple causal relation between the cultural changes and economic changes could not be set up, nor has there been found a causal relationship between cultural change and rise of ethnic nationalism. If we consider the issue within the broader context of the overall ideological, policy and socio-economic changes that took place in the course of the Chinese reform, one point that could be discerned is that changes in the issues of national language and culture that have worsened from the perspective of Mongolian nationalism are due more to the economic and socio-cultural environment than to an assimilationist orientation of the state. In other words, the deepening predicament of Mongolians was the result of practice more than from deliberate policy.

4.1. Mongols More Assimilated into Chinese society

China's reform since 1978 brought changes and improvements in education and cultural development. In Inner Mongolia, from the Mongols' perspective, those improvements are mainly restoring Mongolian Language departments in colleges, setting up college-preparing classes for ethnic minorities in colleges and universities, and ensuring a target number (or certain proportion) of Mongolian students graduating from secondary schools; increasing Mongolian teaching staff and improving teaching materials.

During this period, some professional research institutions and societies for Mongolian literature and study were set up. The China Society of Mongolian Literature was created in November 1989. In the same year, the Inner Mongolian Literature Society was also set up. There have been other non-governmental societies established in recent years. These include the Research Institute of Mongolian Literature, the Society of Injanash⁸⁸, Societies of Janger, the Society of Gesar and the Society of Secret History. There were also some international academic activities about Mongolian literature and studies. From 1987 to 1988 the Inner Mongolian University sponsored the 1st International Conference on Mongolian Studies; Inner Mongolian Normal University hosted the International Conference on the Secret History of Mongolia. From 1985 to 1989 in Huhhot the 1st National Academic Conference on Janger and the 1st International Conference on Gesar took place. According to Mongolian scholars, one motivation behind the Chinese government's permission and even sponsorship of those Mongolian cultural activities is partly politically-motivated, or at least the motivation was not purely academic. The Chinese authorities have tried to prove that the centre for

⁸⁸ A Mongolian literary figure in Manchu Qing period.
Mongolian studies is not in Ulaan Baatar but in China. 

Colleges and schools with Mongolian Language Departments have been increased from 5 in 1978 to 10 in 1988. Teaching institutions using Mongolian as a teaching language increased from 21 in 1978 to 30 in 1988. College Students learning in the Mongolian language have increased from 1698 in 1978 to 3489 in 1988. Since 1947, 17,000 graduates from higher education have been taught in Mongolian. By 1985, there were 9 national colleges and schools in higher education with 7831 students; there were 27 national middle schools and specialized schools with 8270 non-Chinese students; the number of national middle schools was 378 with 204,100 non-Chinese students; their number had increased by 188 and 389 respectively. There were 3207 national primary schools with 426,100 non-Chinese students, and their respective increases were 8 and 18.

Actually during the reform period the statistics show that the overall educational levels of all ethnic groups increased. According to Dr. Jirimutu, the rate of increase in the educational levels of Mongols was much higher than it was for the ethnic minorities as a whole and even for the Han Chinese. For example, the percent of Mongols who were illiterate/semi-illiterate dropped by 44% to 15.9 in 1990 from 28.5 in 1982 and the percent of Mongols with elementary school education decreased by 24% to 31.6 in 1990 from 41.5 in 1982. Nevertheless, the increase in the percent of Mongols with above high school education was the most dramatic, an increase of 577% from 0.96 in 1982 to 6.5 in 1990. During the same period, the illiteracy rate of all ethnic minorities decreased by 30% and the percentage of minorities with elementary school education increased by merely 4%. Meanwhile, the percent of minorities with junior high school education and above high school education jumped by 56% and 350%, respectively, and the percent minorities with senior high school education increased moderately by 11%. Surprisingly, the illiteracy rate of the Han jumped by 26% and the percentage of Han with elementary school education and senior high school education dropped by 27% and 6%, respectively. On the other hand, the percentage of Han with junior high school education and above high school education increased by 32% and 260% respectively.

The higher proportion of urban population of the ethnic minorities including Mongols as opposed to the Han Chinese partly explains their higher educational level of attainment. This is because there is a huge gap in terms of income and education between the rural and urban population in China. In higher education there is a guaranteed quota allocated to ethnic minorities, which may partly explain the larger proportion of the Mongolian population in receipt of higher education as compared to the Chinese. From the chart, we can see Mongols, proportionately speaking, are a better-educated people than Chinese. The higher education in the Mongolian language was more developed than in many other ethnic minority regions, maybe with the exception of Xinjiang, even before the reform period.

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89 Interview with Mr. Saihan, research fellow in the Research Institute of Mongolian history, Inner Mongolian University.

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The Educational Level of Mongols, Ethnic Minorities as a Whole and Han Aged 12 and above in China, 1982 and 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Educational Level</th>
<th>Mongols 1982</th>
<th>Mongols 1990</th>
<th>Change</th>
<th>All Minorities 1982</th>
<th>All Minorities 1990</th>
<th>Change</th>
<th>Han 1982</th>
<th>Han 1990</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Illiterate</td>
<td>28.5 %</td>
<td>15.9 %</td>
<td>-44 %</td>
<td>42.5 %</td>
<td>29.9 %</td>
<td>-30 %</td>
<td>16.4 %</td>
<td>20.6 %</td>
<td>+26 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-Illiterate</td>
<td>41.5 %</td>
<td>31.6 %</td>
<td>-24 %</td>
<td>37.2 %</td>
<td>38.8 %</td>
<td>+4 %</td>
<td>50.0 %</td>
<td>36.6 %</td>
<td>-27 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary School</td>
<td>19.8 %</td>
<td>32.8 %</td>
<td>+66 %</td>
<td>14.5 %</td>
<td>22.6 %</td>
<td>+56 %</td>
<td>23.9 %</td>
<td>31.6 %</td>
<td>+32 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior High</td>
<td>9.3 %</td>
<td>13.1 %</td>
<td>+41 %</td>
<td>5.3 %</td>
<td>5.9 %</td>
<td>+11 %</td>
<td>8.9 %</td>
<td>8.4 %</td>
<td>-6 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior High</td>
<td>1.0 %</td>
<td>6.5 %</td>
<td>+577 %</td>
<td>0.4 %</td>
<td>2.8 %</td>
<td>+350 %</td>
<td>0.8 %</td>
<td>2.9 %</td>
<td>+260 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100 %</td>
<td>100 %</td>
<td></td>
<td>100 %</td>
<td>100 %</td>
<td></td>
<td>100 %</td>
<td>100 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Educational Levels above High School:

1982 Census
- Attending College: 0.31 -- 0.12 -- 0.22 --
- Graduation from College: 0.65 -- 0.32 -- 0.59 --

1990 Census
- Technical School: -- 3.4 -- 1.6 -- 1.6
- Junior College: -- 2.2 -- 0.7 -- 0.9
- University: -- 0.9 -- 0.5 -- 0.4

Source: The 1982 Chinese Census and the one percent sample of the 1990 Chinese Census

Although the statistics show that the ratio of illiterate/semi-illiterate Mongols has decreased since 1978, the statistics do not distinguish the language to which the literacy refers. Sinicization of Mongols is not reflected by the above statistics. Looking at the Illiteracy level with reference to the Mongolian language alone, the illiteracy rate among the youth of Mongolian peasants and herdsmen has increased drastically, several times more than that before 1947.

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92 Jirimutu, Ibid.
Not all the changes in IMAR national education and culture during the reform period may be said to be good and some have caused worries among Mongols. While statistics show a general improvement in education among Mongols during the reform period, distinctions should be drawn between the urban and rural areas, between higher education and primary education, and between education in Chinese and education in the Mongolian language.

In the pasturelands, where the Mongolian population is more concentrated, the basis of primary education is weaker and the conditions poorer. Even according to official figures, in pastoral areas, the admission of children in primary school only accounts for 87% of those eligible, lower by 7% than the IMAR's average level. The annual drop out rate is 9%, higher by 5% than the IMAR average level. In some remote areas, the admission rate is lower than 50% of all school-age children. IMAR national primary schools have 300,000 students, but the number of boarding students is less than 50,000 because of the shortage of student accommodation.⁹⁴

Special professional and technical education serving the pastureland has also weakened. There are only 6,000 non-Chinese students studying in agriculture and animal farming specialized schools, the number is far from enough to meet the needs in the pastoral areas. There is only 1 vet for every 11,000 livestock; only 1 technical administrator for 20,000 livestock, and even fewer administrators for livestock production and management. According to some experts, the educational level of teaching staff is lower and the school management is poorer in those national schools than it was in the period before 1957.⁹⁵

There is a severe shortage of technical personnel even at elementary level on pastureland, for example, nobody can repair the more technical items such as wind-powered generators, recorders, tractors and vans. The 500,000 Mongols in the pastureland with primary level schooling in the Mongolian language have no chance to receive technical training in Mongolian. But there are much more training facilities in Chinese for Chinese speaking peasants⁹⁶ in cities and agricultural areas.

From a Mongolian point of view, the improvements in education explain how Mongols being increasingly assimilated into Chinese society.

⁹³Interview with Mr. Arya, researcher at IMAR Nationality Language Committee, July 1993, Huhhot.
⁹⁵Shenamjil, Ibid.
⁹⁶Interview with Mr. Enkhe, Cadre in Nationality Committee of Ike Zuu League, Aug. 1993.

4.2. Negligence of Government Policy

During this period there have been many instances of neglect and many setbacks in government administration of the national language issue. In 1983 when the League & City Organization Reform was carried out by the IMAR government to streamline government administration, most Mongolian Language Commissions at league and banner level were either cut or merged with other governmental
departments. IMAR's Mongolian Language Commission has become seriously understaffed. Compared with other government departments, Mongolian language commissions are more like homes for destitute old people. The general practice concerning the Mongolian language commissions is that when a cadre becomes senile or is proved to be incapable of other work, he is most probably assigned to a Mongolian language commission. On the other hand, such Mongolian cadres who may have a genuine interest in national language work are accorded no such privilege. Even in the work of Mongolian language, the cadres are promoted mainly by the merit of their command of the Chinese language rather than of Mongolian.

The IMAR Mongolian Language commission's work was for a long time directed by Wang Duo who had been a party secretary of IMAR before he was retired to the IMAR Mongolian Language Commission. Ironically, Wang Duo was an ethnic Chinese who had graduated from the former Manchuria University where he studied frontier affairs and administration in the 1930s. As seen by some Mongols, the appointment shows a centric consistency between the CPC's national policies and that of the colonialist policies of the previous warlord Chinese regime.

After 1979, the IMAR government did some work to restore dual language (Mongolian and Chinese) in the government and party administrations of all levels. But the practice lags far behind the policy. In 1982, the IMAR government issued "The IMAR Administrations Translation Work Regulations" and "The Notice on Gate Signs in Both Mongolian and Chinese Languages". The purpose of the first document is to implement dual language system in the party organs, government and people's congress and to urge those organs to issue documents in both the Mongolian and Chinese languages. The latter document was aimed at urging all governmental and non-governmental organs, businesses and institutions to use Mongolian language on their gate signs, and official seals abreast with Chinese language. The document also covered the use of Mongolian on railway timetables, trade marks, advertisements, ID cards, road signs, and tables of ticket prices, etc.

The IMAR government set up some goals in national education in its 8th 5-year plan: By 1995, IMAR's education quality and management level should have achieved an advanced level among all non-Chinese regions; IMAR was going to extend national primary education; admission rates in middle school and high school were set to reach 30% and 50% respectively; and "bilingual" and "trilingual" education would be encouraged. All these vague promises, however lacked the support of concrete plans and policies, and as a result they could not give Mongols any sense of relief. The newly resumed Mongolian translation work that was begun again in 1979 in the IMAR government and party administrations was cancelled after 1983. The documents being issued have ceased to be translated into the Mongolian language and Mongolian interpreting was no longer being provided during work. The procuratorial organs and courts were no longer being provided with

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97 Interview with Mr. Arya
98 Interview with Mr. Arya. Also see Wang Duo, My Fifty Years in Inner Mongolia (Inner Mongolian People's Press, 1994) p.4.
99 Shenamjil, "To Improvce Mongolian Language Work Under the Guidance of the Party's Basic Line", 190
Mongolian interpreters. The situation was highlighted by the case of Ulanshovoo. Ulanshovoo, a Mongolian researcher in the Inner Mongolian University, was jailed for his nationalist belief in 1991. After two years in prison without a trial, he finally got a chance to receive a trial in 1993. Because he insisted on the right to have the trial conducted in the Mongolian language, a right prescribed by the state constitution and the laws of national autonomy, the planned trial was postponed again and again. This was because in the whole IMAR judiciary system it was very hard to find enough people who were both legally qualified and proficient in the Mongolian language to function in the court.

Another example to show the difficulty of implementing the existing policy is the name spelling on passports. It is very difficult for non-Chinese people to spell their names in their own language. The usual practice is that their names have to be spelt in hanyu pin yin, Latinized Chinese, i.e. the non-Chinese name is to be transliterated into Chinese first and then spelt in hanyu pin yin. By this system, a name such as Genghis Khan and Mohammod could be spelt as Cheng Ji Si Han and Mo Ha Mo De, well known place names such as Inner Mongolia and Ordos could be written as Nei Menggu and Er Duo Si. The Chinese authorities must have noticed the frustrations expressed by non-Chinese about this practice. As early as 1990, the Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a proposed regulation confirming that non-Chinese passport applicants have the right to have their name spelt according to the pronunciations in their own language. In 1992 the document was issued as a formal directive, Document No.12. But the situation has not improved much. Due to ignorance or prejudice, Chinese personnel handling passport applications seldom spell non-Chinese names according to their own languages. They only do it as favors for graft and guangxi(connections).

4.3. Bilingual Policy

The decline of the use of the Mongolian language is caused by the socio-economic environment in the reforms as well as by government policy. The bilingual policy is the most prominent among the numerous language and cultural policies carried out by the IMAR government and the policy to be "bilingual in both Mongolian and Chinese" is now being reiterated by the IMAR government. Originally the policy of being bilingual in both Mongolian and Chinese was intended to emphasize the importance of the Mongolian language and it was designed mainly for Chinese cadres to learn Mongolian in Inner Mongolia and to ensure the equal treatment of the two languages. Now the slogan has been used by the government to encourage Mongols to learn Chinese. The same slogan has

100 Ulanshovoo was accused of providing an internal document of the IMAR party to Andrew Higgins, a journalist working for Independent, a British broadsheet newspaper. The charge has never been substantiated with solid evidence and denied by Ulanshovoo. See Asian Watch, 1991.
101 Interview, Mr. Baojin, Inner Mongolian Intermediary People's Court, July 1993.
102 Interview with Mr. Anwar, an Uighur official in State Council, Dec. 1994 in London.
been interpreted differently by Mongols and Chinese. Usually Mongolian cadres emphasized it
differently from Chinese. To Chinese, the bilingual policy is simply an excuse so that Mongols who
can only speak Mongolian should learn Chinese. To Mongolian cadres, the bilingual policy means not
only that those Mongolian cadres who cannot speak Chinese should learn Chinese, but also that
Chinese cadres should learn to speak Mongolian.

In a situation in which Mongols have become greatly outnumbered many times by the Chinese in Inner
Mongolia, the result of this bilingual policy is simply that Mongols learn Chinese, but never the
opposite. The Mongol people have learnt a lesson from reality that the “bilingual Mongolian and
Chinese” policy is disastrous for the Mongolian language. Mongols find it hard to believe that all
nationalities are equal when in Inner Mongolia, Chinese do not need to learn Mongolian, but
Mongolians have to learn Chinese.

The arguments made by Mongolian intellectuals against the bilingual policy are both theoretical and
factual. For Mongols, the safe way to made the point without being accused of being a nationalist or a
separatist is to make their point in the Marxist and Leninist tradition. Another way to provide counter
argument against the bilingual policy is to quote Chinese leaders in the early period of the PRC when
the early policy prevailed. Mongols’ harking back to Marxist argument, rather than a matter of
ideological faith, can be regarded as a reaction to the popular thinking among Chinese intellectuals
which negates Marxism and favors Chinese nationalism.

Some Mongolian scholars trace the root of the bilingual policy to the theory or slogan once overtly
advocated by the Chinese, i.e., “Unifying the languages of the motherland”. The assumption
underlying the slogan is that the proletariat class needs a common proletariat language and the
socialist state needs a common socialist language. Another assumption of “unifying the languages of
the motherland” is that the language of each nationality or ethnic group is categorized into advanced
or backward levels of different degrees according to the perceived socio-economic development stage
of the nationality or ethnic group in question. The presumption that the Chinese language is the most
advanced among all the different ethnic languages in China also echoes the old Chinese-centric view
held by the pre-Communist Chinese regimes before 1949.

104 Shenamjila, "Mongolian Language and IMAR's Modernization", IMAR Nationality Study Society
First Annual Conference Paper Collection (1981) p.120.

105 Lenin, “Those who refuse to recognize the nationality and nationality language equality, those who
do not fight against nationality oppression and inequality, are not Marxists, not even democrat.”,
Lenin, “Critical Opinions on Nationality Issues”, Complete Works by Lenin, Chinese version, Vol.20,
p.11, Shenamjil, "Marxist Theory on Nationality Language and the Party’s Nationality Language

106 The so-called neo-conservatism among Chinese intellectuals in 1990s emphasizes on state power
and capacity rather than ideological principle, traditional confucian values rather than communism.
The representative figures of the neo-conservatism are Xiao Gongqin, Wang Huning, He Xin, etc. See
The Department of Ideology and Theory, China Youth Daily(Zhongguo Qingnian Bao), “China’s
Realist Response and Choice of Strategy after the Drastic Change of the Soviet Union”(Sulian Jubian
Zhibou Zhongguo de Xianshi Yingdui yu Zhanlue Xuanze), internal publication, September 1991.
Xiao Gongqin, “Nationalism and the Ideology of China in Transition”(Minzu Zhibu yu Zhongguo
Zhuangxingshiqi de Yishi Xingtai), Zhanlue yu Guanli (Strategy and Management) No.4, 1994.

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They argue that a language can only belong to a nation or cultural group rather than the proletariat class or a political group. The Common language is not a prerequisite for the proletariat class and there is no way for the Chinese to prove that Chinese is a proletariat language. There can be an unitary language for a nation, but there should not be a unitary language for a multi-ethnic state like China. They argue that the Chinese centered view on language is both anti-Marxist and anti-ethnic minority.

A favorite quote of Chinese leaders on national languages by those arguing for language equality is what Zhou Enlai once said at a Qingdao conference, "In national autonomous regions, the major nationality’s language should be the first language." The Organization Articles of the IMAR People's Congress and Government of All Levels (Article 20 and 48) read that "IMAR people's congress at all levels should conduct conferences in common Mongolian and Chinese languages, and necessary translators should be ready for other nationalities. ""All committees and administrative levels of government should carry out their office both in Mongolian and Chinese language".

Argument Against Bilingual Teaching

The factual evidence used by Mongols to argue against the bilingual policy is that as applied to education the Mongolian students' performance at secondary schools has been affected and their chance of going into higher education reduced.

During the Cultural Revolution, Mongolian children in some regions who did not know Chinese were nevertheless compelled to listen to lectures in Chinese as soon as they entered primary schools. And it was precisely in those regions, that in 1977 when the state restored the national college entrance examinations, examinees had comparatively lower marks and the college enrollment ratio was much lower than that of other regions. Conversely, in those areas where the teaching in Mongolian language was restored earlier, the college enrollment ratio was higher for Mongolian students. One example is Kulun Banner in Jerim League, where among the 30 students in a specialized school, only 1 or 2 student were from the classes taught in Chinese.

Another example is in a secondary school, among the 43 students in a class, 38 entered college simply because teaching in Mongolian had been restored comparatively earlier. By contrast, it should be noted that for Mongolian students taught in Chinese in the pasture land or countryside, the entrance rate was drastically lower. One disastrous result of the “direct transformation into Chinese language” policy was that in the countryside and especially in the pastureland, the illiteracy rate amongst youth increased drastically. In some places the illiteracy rate amongst youths between the ages of 15 to 30, accounted for 50-60% of the local Mongolian population. In Shinebargud Banner of Hulun Beir League, in some sumu(Mongolian for the administrative unite below the banner/county level) it is

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108 Chulunbagan (op. cit.)
difficult to find an accountant who can read a Mongolian newspaper.  

4.4. Worsened Social Economic Environment for the Mongolian Language

Although the right to use and learn the Mongolian language is written in the state Constitution, it cannot be guaranteed in practice. The practice and the implementation of policies has lagged far behind what is prescribed in government policies and laws, which reflects the harsh socio-economic realities facing the Mongolian language, education and culture. Everywhere in the IMAR Chinese people account for the majority of the population, even in Shilingol League, which is normally believed the best preserved Mongolian land, the government documents are issued in Chinese without the parallel in Mongolian. This negligence happens at all levels of the Inner Mongolian government: Directives issued by the IMAR government are in Chinese to all levels, leagues, banners and further below. In most places, there are no translators and interpreters. As to those documents issued to the levels lower than banners, few of them have Mongolian parallels. It is also a serious problem in Judiciary departments. The Mongolian right to sue and defend in their own language has never gone beyond something written on paper.

In a largely Chinese society in which Mongols constitute a small minority in the IMAR, command of the Chinese language is a prerequisite for Mongols to make a living outside their traditional profession - animal husbandry. Because there are no interpreters and there is a shortage of bilingual cadres in most of the unites in cities, Inner Mongolian metropolises are as inconvenient as foreign cities to Mongols from pasture lands. Mongols from the countryside who move to and settle in cities and towns have to speak Chinese. The depth of the problem may be seen from what actually happened in Hohhot, the capital of the IMAR, when Mongolian playwrights wrote plays in the Mongolian language and the Mongolian plays were finally put on after many rehearsals by Mongolian actors and actresses. The plays were closed down after only one or two shows, as the plays could no longer attract audiences because few people could understand their language.

It has become more difficult for the next generation to pick up the Mongolian language and more difficult for them to cope with the two languages. It is extremely difficult for them to be proficient in both Mongolian and Chinese. The situation has been made worse by the fact that Chinese is an extremely difficult language to command. Even for those Chinese who spend half of their life learning their language, it is hard for them to say that they have truly mastered the Chinese language. So it is easy to imagine the difficulties with which Mongols have to cope.

In Inner Mongolia, most of those Mongolian professionals, who have a good command of the Mongolian language and one or more foreign languages like Russian and Japanese, are very competent in their profession. But they have to spend a great deal of extra time learning the Chinese language. They are usually treated unfairly because of their relatively lower command of the Chinese

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109Shenamjil (op. cit.)
Those professionals with a lower command of Chinese are often discriminated against in their career development, for example, the chance of further study and on-job training. The negative effect of the bilingual practice for Mongolian children is that the absence of a linguistic environment of their own made it extremely difficult for them to grasp their own language whilst struggling to learn difficult Chinese. Therefore in becoming bilingual they usually end up having grasped neither language well enough. In the middle schools in Hohhot, Mongolian students who learn Chinese and Mongolian at the same time are usually noted for their poor marks.

The decline of Mongolian literacy together with other factors in the reform period, such as profit orientation in Mongolian press houses, has led to the drastic decline in Mongolian publications. In terms of content, Mongolian publications have become more and more like simple copies of Chinese publications.

In the past there was a government subsidy for national publications in the Mongolian language. Although formally the policy has remained in the reform period, in practice the subsidy has ceased. The demand for publications in Mongolian is small and therefore they are not as profitable as Chinese publications.

On the grassland, Mongolian herdsmen do not have access to the newspapers, radio and television broadcasts they like to read, listen to and watch even though there are Mongolian-language newspapers, radio broadcasting and lately television programs in Mongolian language which started since May 1st, 1987. The truth is that Mongolian language media is mostly translated versions of Chinese originals. Moreover there are no technical books of a popular kind available on the grasslands.

4.5. Attitudinal causes

The causes of the decline of the Mongolian language are both attitudinal and socioeconomic. At first, the painful memory of the long-lasting leftist policies and practices by the Chinese government have made many Mongols pessimistic about the status of the Mongolian language. Secondly, the current socioeconomic situation in many ways has reinforced their pessimism on the matter of a national language.

As a result, there is a wide-spread belief among Chinese as well as among Mongols that Mongolian is a useless and dying language. The negative perception of the prospects for the Mongolian language is supported by the following facts. The first is that in the IMAR, the Mongolian language environment has been shrinking all the time. The second is that higher education in the Mongolian language is both limited in its scope and future. The third reason is that because Mongols are terrorized by their past sufferings, they are afraid of being accused of being Mongolian nationalists and being prosecuted again in the next political movement, therefore they more often than not take the same stance as the

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110 Interview in Davhart Sumo, Shilingol, Sept. 1993
111 Interviews, summer of 1993, Inner Mongolian Medical College.
Chinese, believing that the sooner the Mongolian language is assimilated, the better because it is going to be assimilated anyway.

4.6. Mixture of Optimism and Pessimism

Not all Mongols are pessimistic about the unfavorable socio-economic environment for the Mongolian language. Many Mongolian scholars argue that the demand for equal status of the Mongolian language in the IMAR is not as unrealistic and unfeasible as some say. It is only a misconception that the sinicization of the Mongolian people is so severe that the Mongolian language is no longer useful. The fact is, although there has been a drastic decline in the number of Mongolian speakers after 1957, especially during the Cultural Revolution, there nevertheless still remains an overwhelming majority who speak Mongolian among the Mongols. There are 2.3 million Mongolian speakers among the 2.74 million Mongols in Inner Mongolia, 83.9% of all Mongols can still speak Mongolian.\(^{112}\)

According to optimistic statistics given by Shenamjila, amongst 2.8 million Mongols who are located in the IMAR, Xinjiang autonomous region, Liaoning, Heilongjiang, jilin, Qinghai and Gansu provinces, 2.5 million, the majority, are in the IMAR, Xinjiang autonomous region and Liaoning province. Mongols who live among or with Chinese(share a village) only account for 15% of the whole population, 85% of Mongols live together in their own villages and hots(Mongolian for “residential areas” in grassland). A living environment is a prerequisite for the survival of the Mongolian language. Among 2.02 million Mongols in the IMAR, only 150,000 Mongols lost their mother tongue. Those Mongols who only speak Chinese account for only 7.4% of all Mongols and they mainly inhabit Huhhot and Baotou and the surrounding suburban areas, Dalat Banner and Zungar Banner of Ikh Zuu League, Chahar Front-right Banner and Zhuozi County of Ulaan Chab League, Tuquan county of Xingan League, Auhan Banner, Harqin Banner and Chifeng Municiple of Jo-oda League. 92% of Mongols live in the vast expanses of countryside and pasture land, where Mongolian is the only language of communication.\(^{113}\)

But such optimism may be weakened by the character of the Mongolian speaking populations as they are mostly rural with the occupations of farming and animal husbandry. Generally speaking, the population in the rural areas has a much lower level of education and higher illiteracy rates. Urban Mongolian speakers who use Mongolian in their professions are mostly language workers in government organs, academic institutions, cultural and media organizations. Mongolian language newspapers, radio and TV broadcasting are in fact merely functioning as translating machines, 80% of their Mongolian employees’ work has nothing to do with Mongolian language research or study and


\(^{113}\) Shenamjila, Ibid.
continues to be more weighted towards general administrative work. Therefore Mongolian language culture is more rural than urban with a lower level of education. On the other hand there is the scholastic study of the Mongolian language and culture in city academic institutions which has little to do with Mongols' daily life.

The gap between the rudimentary and higher education in Mongolian language and the high rates of illiteracy in Mongolian language have reduced the readership for Mongolian publications and there is a severe shortage of writers from the younger generation. There is even a shortage of Mongolian writers including those who write in Chinese. Many of the so-called literary achievements in Mongolian literature are actually the works written in Chinese language on Mongol-related subjects or works in Mongolian that in content reflect Chinese rather than Mongolian concerns.\textsuperscript{114} Many of those Mongolian literary achievements mentioned by the Chinese authorities were mostly literary criticism and studies rather than literary works.

The gap between rudimentary education and higher education of research, and the problems resulting from that gap illustrates a potentially fatal problem that exists in Mongolian national education, i.e., a lack of independence and too much incoherence. There is an urgent need to set up a Mongolian designed and run system of education from pre-school level to higher education.\textsuperscript{115} In national education, common education is the foundation of all other areas of education. Mongols argue that native/Mongolian language teaching should be guaranteed in Mongolian primary Schools. In colleges and universities, specialized schools, Mongolian should be set up as majors and minors available for all students. Only once the Mongols have grasped the basics of their own language, should a second language be possible. And for Mongols, the second language should not necessarily be Chinese, it could be English, Japanese, Russian, German or French, since the trilingual emphasis, which requires Mongolian students to learn Chinese and one foreign language(English, Russian or Japanese) besides the Mongolian language, is more impractical than the bilingual policy.

Out of nationalist sentiments, many Mongols expressed the view that if they have to lose their national language, they would lose it for a foreign language rather than the Chinese language. Some quote Deng Xiaoping to justify the view. Deng Xiaoping once said that China was lagging behind the most developed countries of the world by almost three centuries or at least one century.\textsuperscript{116} And it is a known fact that the Mongols' development lagged behind the Han Chinese considerably, therefore it is justifiable according to Deng's logic that Mongols should do everything to catch up. Naturally to learn the language of more advanced foreign countries such as English and Japanese instead of Chinese

\textsuperscript{114}Interview with Mr. Ge San-tong, young Mongolian poet in Shilingol League, Sept. 1993.
\textsuperscript{115}Interview with Mr. Chibaabar, senior lecturer in Inner Mongolian Normal University and Mr. Tavan delev, former lecturer in Inner Mongolian University, Mongolian student leader in 1981 nationalist demonstrations, now an individual entrepreneur. Also see Shenamujila, Ibid.
would be a more direct way for Mongols to be exposed to modernization and to catch up more quickly. Accordingly it is not necessarily a splittist view to argue that foreign languages should be treated equally, if not more importantly, than Chinese. The CPC has described itself as great, glorious and always correct. Many Mongols argue that the CPC should prove its “correctness” by allowing more space for Mongolian development, which might then allow hope for mending the unity between the Chinese and the Mongols.117

As private schools appear in Chinese areas, Mongolian intellectuals and entrepreneurs who are concerned about national education have begun to combine their forces to set up their own schools. The motivation for setting up those private schools is to find alternatives to a modernized education other than in the Chinese language. In those schools, it is intended that, Mongolian and English teaching should come before Chinese.118 Many Mongolian entrepreneurs have showed enthusiasm for Mongolian education by giving financial assistance. The Mongolian donors often demand to have a say in school or academic institution’s policies. Accordingly, some state-run Mongolian middle schools at banner level have begun to receive financial support from Mongolian entrepreneurs.119 At a higher level, Mongolian studies in the Inner Mongolian University have also been financially supported by Mongolian entrepreneurs.

Conclusion

The above account as related through both statistics and some anecdotal evidence has revealed that the situation in Inner Mongolia related to Mongolian education, language and culture is indeed complicated. Both sets of evidence could be interpreted in different and even opposite ways. Nevertheless the Mongolian-speaking environment is shrinking, and education in the Mongolian language is unbalanced as there is a huge gap/vacuum between the pastureland culture and the urban academic culture.

As seen from a wider perspective, the Mongolian language is becoming little more than an affiliation or even a decoration of the Chinese language. Neither the efforts of individuals nor that of even most of the Mongolian speaking population seem able to change the tide.

What accounts most for the Mongolian language’s continuing decline is the socio-economic reality of the whole of Inner Mongolia rather than direct government policy. Mongolian language and cultural development formerly suffered from Chinese leftist policies, but now they suffer even more deeply from the effect of market forces.

Due to their lower level of literacy and the limited availability of training and publications, it has

117 Interview with Chibaatar, Aug. 1993 Huhhot
118 Interview with Mr. Chebaatar in Aug. 1993, who resigned his lectureship and set up a Mongolian boarding school.
119 Interview with Mr. Tavan Delev, Aug. 1993 in Ike Zuu League.
become more difficult for Mongols to use some basic technologies to process their animal products and to improve their management. Therefore national education can directly influence their incomes and the development of the economy. Under such circumstances, most Mongols have little choice but to learn Chinese.

The shrinking language environment for Mongolian also reinforces the cultural division of labor between Mongols and Chinese. It further facilitates the sinicization of the Mongols by creating the impression that Mongolian-ness is equal to backwardness.

Zhou Enlai once said: "in the national autonomous regions, the language of the major/main nationality should be the first language". (Qing Dao Conference, August 4, 1957) The main nationality in the national autonomous regions is an unspecified term, especially in Inner Mongolia. It is obviously unrealistic to assume that Mongols who account for only 14% of the whole population or even less, can be the major nationality. Nor can it be assumed that Mongolian is the first language.

Although the Chinese have always been the major nationality and Chinese has been the major language in Inner Mongolia, because of nationality policies or propaganda, that has never been publicly acknowledged because of the regime's declared policy and propaganda on nationality affairs. The IMAR has long become an misnomer as far as the IMAR population is concerned. Perhaps it is only a matter of time before some clarification will be made by the Chinese that the Chinese instead of the Mongols constitute the major nationality in the IMAR and that Chinese instead of Mongolian is the major language in the IMAR. The Chinese could always use the argument of the democratic principle against the so-called national autonomy in Inner Mongolia though China would unlikely do it before unification with Taiwan.

5. Intellectual Content of Mongolian Nationalism

For Mongols, the negative changes in socio-economic, political, ideological and cultural aspects during the reforming decades is only a small part of a much longer historical decline of the Mongols' territorially-based identity. The rise of Mongolian nationalism during the reform period must be understood as more of an intellectual phenomenon rather than an openly avowed political program or a wide spread political movement. To be sure there are more and more instances of openly expressed dissatisfaction such as student demonstrations against Chinese migration and the highhanded treatment of Mongolian intellectuals. Moreover there is even a nationalist party in existence outside the PRC with the independence of Inner Mongolia as its ultimate goal. Nevertheless the articulation of Mongolian national sentiments within the IMAR is sharply limited and is confined to a few intellectual concerns as outlined above.


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Mongols in the reform period face a dilemma, i.e., to be modernized and become assimilated, or to remain Mongolian and become marginalized. As the reform continues and the national economy becomes more marketwise, the economy will bring greater pressure on the capacity of ethnic cultures to maintain that diversity. Normally, according to the economic theories of nationalism, the pressures of development will reduce cultural diversity and create a new cultural identity. However, Mongolian nationalist sentiments have risen during the period partly as a reaction to the increased pressure to conform to Chinese culture. Therefore Mongolian nationalism is a case outside the model of economic integration nationalism, a materialist explanation is not enough to account for the rise of Mongolian nationalism.

This chapter has explored the inter-linking between economic and cultural environments and the development of a Mongolian self-identity including the perception of national autonomy. Firstly it outlined the perception of the interrelation between national economy and national culture. The emergence of a modern cultural identity of the Mongolian people depends on the development of their own economic center and metropolis. In theory a Mongolian cultural development would facilitate economic development and the modernization of a Mongolian nationality. Secondly the chapter sketched out the links between national culture, identity and autonomous rights, i.e. territorially-based rights. Territorial integrity is a condition for national culture and identity, but the Mongolian territorial integrity was sabotaged by the Chinese, be it intentional or not, by economic means. The perception of the situation is bound up with different aspects of economic, cultural and political factors and the interrelations between them. To change the unfavorable economic and cultural situations would require political power. But the political representation of Mongols in government is too small to be of substantial help. Once Mongols should reach such an understanding that the guarantee of the territorial, economic and cultural rights boils down to a matter of political power (or lack of power), there is an intellectual consensus/basis for nationalism.

Nationalism, according to the theory that emphasizes the significance of economics argues that industrialization or economic development demands a political shell to protect the community based economy and in turn the political shell, the state, in order to strengthen the common culture and provide a standard education for the sake of economic development of the community. The case in Inner Mongolia makes the same point in a negative sense: i.e., the lack of economic development, lack of common culture and standardized education highlights the lack/absence of protection from a political shell.

121 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Basil Blackwell, 1983)
122 Ibid.
5.1. National Economy And Modern National Identity

Historical Lesson: The Lack Of Cities As Economic Centres

Nomadism has been the sole economic system for Mongols throughout history and it is the main reason for the absence of an economic center or a metropolis in Mongolia. For most of the time that has worked to the disadvantage for the political integration of Mongolia. The above is a century old argument which has been used by many modern Mongolian leaders in history, such as Prince Gung123, Te Wang and even Ulanhu.

The independent State of Mongolia since 1911 has developed a metropolitan Mongolian culture which is in sharp contrast to Inner Mongolian cities where the culture can only be said Chinese.

In the present period of China’s economic reform, the concern for the desire of a Mongolian economic center and metropolis has been voiced again by Mongolian intellectuals. Clearly the establishment of a Mongolian city that could serve as that kind of economic center would require ethnic segregation and that would stand in sharp contradiction with the notion of national unity and a single Chinese nation as advanced by China’s leaders and intellectuals.

The lesson that Mongolian people may now draw from their history is that, even at their peak, the power and prosperity of Mongolian ancient states lacked a solid foundation for the establishment of a stable community. The absence of a solid community in itself is a characteristic of the Mongolian nation, but it is also its weak point.124

The problem, the absence of the nation’s own economic center and own metropolis, has always been there and it has become even worse. The reason, from an economic perspective, is the practice of a single economic form that of Mongolian nomadism. The Mongolian traditional nomadic economy demanded little division of labor and forms of internal economic co-operation. Historically, the self-sufficient herdsmen economy without specialization of labor needed no trade and commerce amongst Mongols, and therefore it did not generate an economic demand for a national market or for an economic center, therefore in the end no national metropolis has been set up.

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It seems that Genghis Khan and Owgodai Khan had in fact realized the importance of the metropolis, and there were at their times the cities like Khara Khorum, the so-called Upper Capital, and the Middle Capital. However those cities were built out of the ruler’s will and to serve strategic concerns rather than due to the needs of Mongolian economic activities. The Chinese Ming Dynasty that followed the Mongolian Yuan Dynasty, in a negative way, proved the importance of a metropolis for Mongolian people. The Ming’s northern military expeditions that were launched by the Ming Emperor Hongwu deep into Mongolia constituted several strategically-fatal attacks that destroyed the few existing Mongolian cities to such a degree that the ruined cities could never be rebuilt. That has proved to be disastrous for the Mongolian nation.

The single economic mode of Mongols made it necessary for them to maintain trade links with the Chinese since the nomadic economy has to rely on agriculture and the handicraft industry. When Chinese dynasties placed trade embargoes on Mongols, the trade itself served as a cause for Mongols to take military action against China. An example is that of Altan Khan (1507 - 1582), who tried to mend relations with the Ming Dynasty for the sake of trade, but he was refused repeatedly. The Ming dynasty even put a price on his head and killed his envoys twice. As a result of these rebuffs, he had to resort to war, but even when he surrounded Beijing, he still decided to make peace with the Ming. The Chinese Ming dynasty engaged in trade with Mongols only as a result of force.125

The historic of lack of an economic center is a counter-example of the economic thesis on nationalism as it shows that the lack of a common economic basis is directly related to the absence of an economic motivation for political unification in Mongolian history.

Lack of Development in Education

Because of the age old antagonism between Mongolian herdsmen and settled Chinese farmers, Mongolian people traditionally had a very strong bias against agriculture and handicraft which continues to exist even to this day. The attitude is reflected in the vocabulary of Mongolian herdsmen. In the 4 banners of Hulun Beir League and northern Shilinggol League, “peasant”, “layman” and “merchant” in herdsmen’s vocabulary still have a derogatory meaning. In the Mongolian State, the derogatory meanings of certain words is even more directly related to the Chinese.126 The traditional bias against trade and commerce is a psychological barrier to the commercialization of the pastureland economy.

125 Here again Mongols and Chinese have different view on the same historical events. According to Chinese historians, the wars launched by Altan Khan against Ming was unjustified because of looting and Altan Khan was simply an invader. See, Bai Shouli, History of Nationality Relations in Northern China (Chinese Academy of Social Science Press, 1987)
126 the meaning of Mongolian word for “merchant”...
The nature of the pastureland economy tends to discourage people to gather together and to form a metropolis. In the Shilinggol League, where the Mongolian traditional economic form is best preserved, the places with a relatively larger concentration of population such as League, Banners and even sumu, tend to be made up of Chinese immigrants who constitute 80% of the population. As the population of Chinese increases in particular places, Mongolian herdsmen tend to move away taking their livestock with them. That is determined by the character of the nomadic economy. For the same reason, two Mongolian families both herding sheep cannot live together, they should locate separately at least more than 10 miles away from each other, lest the flocks of the 2 families should be easily mixed together, which would be a disaster.

Education is a much more difficult task in the sparsely populated pastureland than in cities and towns. There were once so-called “Horseback Schools” which were advocated by the Chinese government in the 1970s. The “horseback school is one in which teachers rode horses over long distances from one family to another in the sparsely-populated grassland to teach. Usually a family was visited by a teacher once a week. However, when the teacher came the following week, the pupils had already forgotten what they had learnt in the previous week. It showed that effective national education could not be properly developed on the grassland. Now things have become even worse for Mongolian children’s education in remote areas because even the teachers on horseback are no longer there. Mongolian herdsmen face the dilemma: to pay much more for their children to be sent to far away boarding schools to receive Chinese style education or to keep them at home to be uneducated Mongols. In the Mongolian Republic, there are enough boarding schools in cities and townships to accommodate the children from the pastureland.

The difficulties concerning Mongolian education relates to the particular economic mode which in return limits Mongols' participation in the modern economy. Some Mongols have said that the state has only paid attention as to how to exploit the natural resources of the IMAR. It has not shown any concern about how to develop Mongolian human resources and how to improve the Mongolian people's level of science and technologies.

127 Interview with Mr. Honchin in Davhart Sumo near Shilin Hot, Sept. 1993
128 Interview with Mr. Honchin, Sept. 1993, Davhart Sumo.
129 The point was told in the interviews with some Mongolian intellectuals and cadres in Inner Mongolia.
The relationship between the Mongolian nationality’s education and its economic development is obvious: when a people’s education and culture are highly developed, they could more easily promote the utilization of natural resources and the development of their economic potential to the fullest extent. According to many Mongols, if a state neglects this, as it has already done, it violates the objective law and it also deviates from the principles of Marx-Leninist theories on nationality issues. Without the proper development of Mongolian language and education, the Mongolian people in the future at best face sinicization rather than national modernization. They further argue that other nationalities with their own languages in China are in the same boat as the Mongolian people in having to rely on their own language as a means of grasping modern science and technology.\textsuperscript{130}

\textbf{National language is about Political Rights}

Mongols see the right to use their own language as a matter of political right. The real right of autonomy in the Mongolian view is the right to decide their nationality’s internal affairs which should mainly include the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region’s fiscal and economic matters, territories in which Mongols can live; the respect for their living customs and the right to use their own language. Those autonomous rights are closely linked to the Mongol-Chinese relationship. Among the violations made to Mongolian autonomous rights during the Cultural Revolution, those to national language came first. Among those so-called nationality rightists who were persecuted, a considerable number were linguists.\textsuperscript{131}

And still, the most convenient way to counter the bias from the Chinese and the malpractice in Inner Mongolia is to cite Marxist and Leninist doctrines, especially those on national rights. Lenin once pointed out: "those who do not admit national equality, equal status of national languages, do not defend against national oppression, inequality, are not Marxists, and also not even nationalists."\textsuperscript{132}

After the Soviet government was set up, Stalin spoke on strengthening the significance of the principle by which each republic using its own language should “speak and work in their own language,(referring to organization of non-Russian republics), the Soviet government must not only become a Russian power, but it must also incorporate the power of other nationalities and the powers with which the oppressed peasants of other nationalities have close links."\textsuperscript{133}

\textbf{5.2. Nationality’s Territorial Basis And Political Equality}

\textsuperscript{130}Shenamjila, (op. cit.) p.77.
\textsuperscript{131}Interview with Mr. Arya July. 1993 in Hohhot.
A common territory is regarded by Mongols as a necessary condition for the development of a national economy. Stalin’s definition of nationality is well known in China and it seems to be a favorite quote of Mongols. One of the four criteria prescribed for a nationality is a common territory, but Mongols argue in the opposite way that since Mongols are a nationality, they are ipso facto entitled to a common territory. The argument is aimed to address both the long-existing problem and the continuous deterioration in Mongolian territorial integrity.

Mongolian common territory began to be disintegrated in the late Qing dynasty. The situation deteriorated to an unprecedented degree during the Republican period, when Mongolian dukes and princes in neighbouring Chinese territories were either forced or lured to sell the public land of Mongolian banners to Chinese warlords for military cultivation. As a result Mongols constantly had to retreat further to the northern frontier of more arid land and the Gobi desert. What brought still greater damage was the large number of Chinese migrants invited in the late Qing period into the Mongolian interior to farm and to set up Chinese counties. That was fatal to the preservation of a Mongolian common territory, which was the very condition for the survival of the Mongolian people. For example, the newly Chinese populated Linxi, Lindong and Jingpeng(Dolonor) areas functioned as barriers separating eastern Mongolia from western Mongolia. Wuchuan county separates the Tuned Banner from Damao Banner and the Four Prince Banner. The rear irrigation area near the bend of the Yellow River(“huo tao”) again separates the Ikhe Zuu League from the Ulaan Chab League. Chinese counties have been set up everywhere, which has led to the reality of a co-existence of Mongolian banners and Chinese counties. Those counties are like “sharp daggers thrashing deep into Inner Mongolia” and more over, they “take roots and blossom”.

As a result, the degree of Mongol-Chinese co-inhabitation has been increasing all the time whilst the characterization of a Mongolian common territory exists only by name. The situation of internal separation in Inner Mongolia, in the Mongolian view, has reinforced a long-existing fractionism and localism amongst Mongols.

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135 Qindamuni, "On Mongolian Nation's Modernization".
Some Mongolian intellectuals have said that a common territory for the Mongolian people is a prerequisite for an equal national relationship between Chinese and Mongols. There is never a shortage of criticism and attacks by the CPC on previous Chinese regimes for their oppression of the Mongolian people. The argument of the CPC itself is available for Mongols to use that the ethnic co-inhabitation is indisputably the result of national oppression, in Zhou Enlai's own words, it is the "result of Chinese nudging minority people."\(^{136}\)

The process of losing common territory, argue Mongolian scholars, will continuously deprive a nation with a common territory of its national characteristics i.e., the nation's political virility and of its means to preserve itself. The result is that "Mongolian people easily fall prey to any domestic and foreign reactionary rulers."\(^{137}\)

Mongols now account for only a marginal minority in the IMAR, and economically they are affiliated to the Chinese. The question now is whether the two decade reform process can provide a solution in any way to the above predicaments in the Mongolian people's modernization. The answer is negative.

In the early 1980s many Mongols still placed much hope on the Chinese reforms. They suggested that Mongols let bygones be bygones, and they expected Mongolian people to be given some real autonomy and freedom to develop in the future. In this scenario, Mongols would be willing to let others[e.g., the Gang of Four, or whatever] bear the blame of the fact that all advanced industries and profitable natural resources have been occupied by the Chinese, even the fertile pastureland has been farmed by Chinese. All the blame could be put on the Fascist, feudalist national oppressive policy before the CPC or during the Cultural Revolution. When Mongolians speak out about their dissatisfaction and anger towards the past Communist rule, the safest way is to blame the Gang of Four and Lin Biao.

The suggestion from Mongols is to ethnicize/nationalize the metropolis and so help to form a stable Mongolian community. In accordance with the new spirit of forgetting bygones and looking forward as advocated by Deng Xiaoping, many Mongols voiced that Mongolian people should not blame the past and should not compare Chinese Mongolian policies to that of Zhu Yuanzhang, the first emperor of the Chinese Ming dynasty, who massacred and assimilated Mongols by force in the Ming dynasty. Mongolian people should look to the bright future promised by Chinese reform and pay attention to setting up new cities with Mongolian characteristics. One example then was an open cut coal mine in Holingol, a place which would be set up as a city with a population of 5-600,000. Holingol is located between Xingan, Jerim and Shilingol Leagues and is surrounded by a Mongolian population. It was well placed to be Mongolianized and there were sufficient reasons to do so. In Jerim League, there is


\(^{137}\)Chindamni, "On Mongolian People's Modernization", *IMAR Nationality Study Society First Annual*
a Mongolian population of 650,000 among which 300,000 inhabit semi-desert and desert areas. The
desertification was the result of over-farming. The life of the Mongols there is miserable. The welfare
of the 300,000 Mongols may be seen as a test of the CPC’s nationality policy and its capacity to solve
the problem in a right way that can also alleviate environmental problems. Holingol’s development
would have needed an immigrant work force and it should have considered those 300,000 Mongols in
the desert. This was the least that the Chinese authorities should have been able to do for the Mongols
to be “the master of their own house”. In the end, it turned out to be another disappointment for the
Mongols.

5.3. Development at the cost of national identity.

It is ironic that the only seemingly effective guard of Mongolian identity is some undesirability related
to being Mongols. For example the harsh natural environment and the simple and poor living
conditions in the pastureland discourages the Chinese from going there and it is that which has
reduced the Chinese influence.

In 1962, Mongols constituted a majority in 22 out of the 49 banners of Inner Mongolia. But by 1982,
only one banner in Inner Mongolia has a Mongolian majority.138 It can be concluded that in almost all
townships at banner level Mongols are in a minority. During the past four decades since 1947,
Mongols have witnessed a massive Chinese population influx along with many new industries set up
in the IMAR. Mongols’ suspicion towards those modern industries persists, although there is an
obvious need to establish their own processing industries of fur and leather, etc.. In this sense, a
cultural division of labour is reinforced, industries in cities and townships are mainly for ethnic
Chinese, while animal husbandry on pastoral land are a Mongolian's domain. It seems that the only
guarantee for Mongols to keep their traditional occupation is the disadvantageous character of that
occupation, such as, a return of low profit.

When certain circumstances arose which made animal farming more profitable, Mongolian herdsmen
soon faced the danger of losing their traditional jobs to the Chinese. The point can be seen from the
so-called “cashmere rush” from 1988 to 1989 when cashmere prices soared unreasonably high
because of speculation. In that period, many Chinese peasants in Ikhe Zuu league began raising
cashmere producing goats and became dealers between the Mongol and Chinese textile industries,
especially those outside the IMAR. The later collapse of cashmere prices was partly due to the
dishonest dealings by Chinese merchants in the area. They mixed white cashmere they bought from
Mongols with sand or some kind of very heavy white powder which was called by Chinese peasants
“heavy metal powder”).139 As a result, the much reduced profitability of cashmere trading
discouraged Chinese peasants from going into the same trade as Mongolian herdsmen.

138Orchelan, “Inner Mongolian Population Issues”, The Research On Inner Mongolian Nationality
5.4. Inadequate Political Representation

Mongols and Chinese have a different attitude as to Mongol representation in government and whether Mongols should enjoy a higher quota of cadres. By regarding the IMAR just as another Chinese province, the Chinese attitude to the issue of national autonomy has become ahistorical. Chinese are much less concerned than Mongols about history before 1947 which showed that in principle the founding of the IMAR resulted from a compromise of the two principles. The Mongolian demand for national self-determination and the Chinese for territorial integration. The criterion of choosing Mongolian cadres is also related to the issue of national cultural identity. The assignment of ethnic cadres inevitably reflected the nationality's economic position in general, therefore the issue of the Mongolian political representation is related to cultural and economic issues. The difference of opinion on the proportion of ethnic cadres between Chinese and Mongols also reflects the two different principles: An ahistorical democratic principle; and an historical principle on Mongolian rights. The Chinese favor a democratic principle based on proportionate representation according to which Mongolian cadres in government should not exceed 1/8 of the total since Mongols only account for 1/8 of the whole the IMAR's population.

As seen by Mongols, Mongolian rights are part of the historical package upon which the IMAR was founded, and the Mongolian rights have been written in the state constitution and laws which should not be affected by the population changes. According to the Program Of People's Republic Of China's National Autonomy and the Laws of Nationality Regional Autonomy, the nationality in whose name national autonomy is granted, appoints mainly their own cadres, use their own language, and at the same time to some degree run their internal affairs according to their national form. The three key elements in national autonomy are ethnic(minority nationality) cadres, national language and national form. The scope of ethnicization of cadres should include all the power organs in autonomous regions: administrative organs, executive organs, juridical organs, procurators' offices, political consultative organs, business organizations, schools and colleges, public security, party organs and other non-governmental organizations such as the trade unions, the Youth Leagues and Woman's Associations. Among so many organizations, the leading role is played by the state power organs. The degree of the ethnicization in these power organs represents the degree of nationality autonomy.

Since the Mongolian population is not concentrated in one area but is located in many areas and is inter-mingled with the Chinese population, it seems that the only feasible way to ensure the Mongolian people's autonomous right is to ethnicize the cadres in the IMAR, i.e., to increase the proportion of Mongolian cadres in the People's Congress and the government councils. Mongols could not be convinced that they have any say in the government and national autonomy in any sense if their cadres accounted for less than 50%. The Communist party organs in the IMAR are of course the key part of cadres' ethnicization. Mongolian members of the party committees and directors of those committees should be more than 50% of the total so that it is possible for Mongolian cadres at the party's top organizations to hold vital office and to exercise power so as to play the due role. A Mongolian scholar has suggested in a published article that the proper proportion of Mongolian cadres should be 208
Mongols see majority representation in government as the key embodiment of national autonomy. It is very clear, however, that the Mongolian cadres or the current ethnicization of cadres in Inner Mongolia serve only decorous roles rather than governing functions. Ulanhu once said that the IMAR autonomy should not be merely a badge and Mongolian cadres should be more than decorations. In the 8th Party's Congress, he also reiterated the importance of the ethnicization of the autonomous region's party: "Merely to nationalize the government of autonomous regions but not to staff party's organizations with minority cadres is to fail to completely adhere to the principle of national regional autonomy making it difficult to carry out the Party's leadership among minority nationalities. Therefore the fundamental task is to carry out gradual ethnicization of the party's leadership." In the Mongol view, the core and essence of nationality autonomy and the only way for Mongols to be the master of their own house is the ethnicization of the IMAR cadres and that is also the only way in which Mongols could develop some emotional ties with the Chinese government.

Chinese cadres in the IMAR like to say nationalization should be carried out according to the ethnic population proportions. Usually they oppose the idea that Mongols should account for more than 50% of IMAR cadres on the grounds of the inequality between Chinese and Mongols. One particular point usually cited by Chinese is that the IMAR is different from Xinjiang and Tibet, Mongols cannot copy the above two regions to ask for majority representation in leadership of all organizations. Facing the situation that in Inner Mongolia Mongols only account for 12% of the IMAR population, Chinese have tried to emphasize that it is a regional autonomy rather than Mongolian people's autonomy. The official position that the autonomy is a national regional autonomy instead of a national autonomy denies Mongols of their historical right to Inner Mongolia and nullifies the exact reason for setting up the IMAR's national autonomy. Autonomy with emphasis on the region where the Chinese are 8 times more than the Mongols is autonomy which has little to do with Mongolian nationality, and it negates the reasons why the IMAR was set up.

Another important matter besides the question of the ethnic proportion of IMAR cadres is the criteria for choosing ethnic cadres. Without any exception in the IMAR cadres are chosen, first of all on the grounds that they should be good party members (more in the sense of loyalty to the party and central government than in the sense of the ideological beliefs). Most Chinese and even some Mongolian cadres, when asked about the autonomy issue, usually respond that "I am a Communist, I do not care about those nationality issues", or "nationality issues are too complicated, the farther from it, the better".

The above view is not widely shared by Mongolian cadres. Some Mongols argued in published

140 Orchelan, (op. cit.) p.32.
142 Interview with Mr. Batu, secretary to the president of IMAR People's Congress, July 1994.
articles that for an ethnic cadre, the first obligation is to reflect his own people's opinions and needs, to work and breathe together with the people of his own nationality and to share the same fate with them. Should they fail to do this, they are nihilists in terms of nationality issues, and they cannot meet the standards set not only by the Mongolian people, but also by the Communist party according to the Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy. Therefore the most important standard for judging nationality cadres should be whether they are active and courageous enough to reflect and represent their own nationality's opinion and needs, and not their command of the Chinese language, their level of sinicization or the degree of their total political identification with the Chinese.

It is a fact that proportionate to their numbers in the population as a whole Mongols constitute a larger proportion of cadres than Chinese. But other non-Chinese enjoy an even higher representation rate than Mongols. Including Mongolian professionals in translation organizations, in the whole of the IMAR Mongolian cadres account for only 20-25% of all the IMAR cadres. The situation is different between regions. Shilingol League is the place with the highest rate of Mongolian cadres because in that league Mongols account for 77% of population. There Mongolian cadres number 795 (1981), equivalent to 82% of all cadres. 23 out of 25 government councilors are Mongols and Party secretaries and heads of the League and banners are all Mongols.

Over 10 years after 1971, 20,000 Mongolian cadres were promoted, accounting for 15.4% of the whole. Now Mongolian cadres at bureau level account for 24.3%. Significantly, there are relatively fewer Mongolian cadres with an economic and technological background. This has led to an unbalanced location in different governmental offices. The economically important departments are mainly occupied by Chinese cadres.

143 Interview in July 1993 in Hohhot.
144 Chindamni, (op. cit.) p. 87.
145 Chindamni, (op. Cit.)p. 88.
147 Chindamni, (op. cit.) p. 87.
5.5. Conclusion: external differentiation

If nationalism is explained as a matter of collective opinion and of a sense of external differentiation, Mongolian nationalism has exhibited different external differentiations at different periods. The external differentiation came from the Chinese mainly because of Chinese warlords and their brazen seizure of Mongolian land before 1949. In the communist period after 1949, the external differentiation was obscured by the rhetoric of socialist internationalism and the fact that Mongols suffered from leftist policies together with other ethnic minorities and Chinese as well. In the Chinese reform period after 1978 the external differentiation for Mongolian nationalism was heightened as result of a shift in ideology and the socio-economic changes that took place in the IMAR.

Formerly both Chinese nationalism and non-Chinese nationalism could be repudiated by universalist Communist ideology which supported the idea that the stage of the nation-state was an interim one. The integrationist view that applied to all nations and states, non-Chinese as well as Chinese, until their submergence in the historical stage of Communism was more easily accepted by non-Chinese peoples than the present assimilationist view in which Chinese nationalism constructs an external differentiation of the Chinese nation versus the rest of the world, especially the West. When development and progress was no longer explained in terms of class struggle but according to China's national destiny when the official view of the outside world was no longer depicted in terms of imperialism versus socialism and the Chinese nation suddenly became an enthusiastic participant in globalization that had formerly been regarded as the hostile capitalist world, the former class-based bond between different peoples in China ceased to be valid any longer. To non-Chinese peoples, the meaning of state as a protecting shell to non-Chinese peoples against the perceived hostile capitalist world was no longer as convincing as before. When international relations are no longer interpreted in terms of class struggles, Chinese statehood become a barrier to the equal participation in the global economic system by non-Chinese peoples.
CHAPTER VI. EXTERNAL DIFFERENTIATION AND NATIONALISM

Nationalism, though summarized as one political principle, differ from case to case. There are different ways to explain national identity and nationalism, such as economic, intellectual or historical explanations, but all none of these ways of explaining the evolution and character of nationalism in specific cases is comparable with others. For example, the economic causes for Chinese nationalism and Japanese nationalism are different, China and Japan each has different traditions of thought and their histories differ. However, among different factors contributing to nationalism, the only cause which is common for all nationalism in different cases is the sense of external differentiation, i.e., the exclusiveness from other or, put differently, the self-realization of being merely one among many other nations and states.

The self-identity of a nation, according to the different explanations of nationalism, is possible because of socio-economic, intellectual or cultural basis, etc.. However a national identity and nationalism are unthinkable without a shared sense of external differentiation, i.e., perception of many other groups in contrast to the we-group and the understanding that we-group is just one of many groups.

Imagine a people on an island which provides a geographical whole for the people. Even if the islanders were to speak the same language, but had no knowledge of any other people except for those on the island, they would likely be conscious of their different group identities rather than of a shared common island identity. That would be true even if they could form a single government. It is like human kind on earth today being divided into different nations and cultural groups, can earth people have a common(international) society like the societies within national boundaries, and have a sense of solidarity superseding the different national consciousnesses? Separate nations need an external differentiation to form a sense of solidarity of mankind, earth people would need an extraterritorial differentiation to make national difference unimportant. That is why a world government only appears in the science-fictions in which human being are busy combating hostile aliens.

Chinese views of the outside world provide an important sense of external differentiation to contribute to Chinese self-identity and modern Chinese nationalism. Perceptions of the world and of the international system affect Chinese nationalism as well as non-Chinese sub-state nationalism. Corresponding to the different external differentiation, the way in which Chinese define their self-identity can be analyzed in different time scales: a 5000-year Chinese nation; a 100-year Chinese nation and a Chinese nation with an ideological basis after 1949. The external differentiation is crucial to modern Chinese national identity and nationalism, it is also important for non-Chinese sub-state nationalism for which the Chinese nation is usually the external differentiation.

National identity is a matter of a self-consciousness of belonging. In the version of the 5000-year
nation, there is no appeal to self-consciousness, nor a sense of external differentiation. This is because it is expressive of a Sino-centric view in both geographical, cultural and moral terms. The "5000-year China" is associated with a Sino-centric view of the world. The ancient Sino-centric view, strictly speaking, was not an external differentiation as that provided by a modern state system because it could not give Chinese a sense that they were just one of the many cultural groups. Their view of the world was universalist rather than nationalist, therefore the so-called 5000-year nation is not a nation in modern sense (territoriality, citizenship and sovereignty). Therefore the contemporary assertion of myth, the "5000-year nation", is more a fiction than reality.

The 100-year Chinese nation is more valid in terms of external differentiation, i.e., the modern state system. The modern state system characterized by political saturation in the territorial sense, is a world of states in which every individual or group has to choose its national and political identity. In this sense, national self-consciousness is generated by this external differentiation. The 100-year Chinese nation began from mid 19 century when the Western intrusion made Chinese realize they were just one of the many states and nations in the world system. The Sino-centric universalistic view of the world was replaced by a pluralist view of the world. It was the beginning of modern Chinese nationalism.

However according to that Chinese official view a Chinese nation has existed for thousands years even though it lacked self-consciousness. The Chinese nation only became a self-conscious entity in the last one hundred years since China faced western intrusions. Fei Xiaotong, the P.R.C.'s top theorist on nationality issues, calls the former stage without self-consciousness as the existence without realization (zi zai), the latter as existence with self-realization (zi jue). The 50-year nation after 1949 for the most of the time was based on political ideology and a socialist system. In principle, national identity was regarded as a transitional rather than permanent, and the view of the world was again universalist and internationalist. The way in which external differentiation was determined in the course of the 50-year nation varied in accordance with the different periods of Chinese foreign policy, i.e., China in the socialist camp in 50s, Sino-Soviet schism and egoist isolation in 60s, tripolarity in 70s and 80s, pragmatic nationalism in 80s and 90s. The various forms of external differentiation affected Chinese self-identity and indirectly affected the domestic ethnic relations. There is a link between the external differentiation and the nationalism of Chinese and the non-Chinese at sub-state level.

During the reform period since 1978, when the international relations was no longer viewed in terms of class struggle, the course of international relations and its various conflicts were no longer regarded as leading to the final success of a world communism. China was no longer regarded as a leading force of this historical progression and China's leaders began to develop a pragmatic and non-ideological view of the world. This pragmatic view of the world no longer encompassed the old Sino-centric

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1. Fei Xiaotong, Zhonghua Mingzu Duoyuan Yitihua Geju (The Pattern of Chinese Nation: Unity With
universalist paradigm; nor did it share the Communist ideological view of the international system; but it assumed that international relations consisted of a basic competition for survival and development. If we can call it a 19th century realist view of the world, then the idea of Chinese nation also regresses from the ideological and political nation to the historical and cultural nation. The reunification issues of Hong Kong and Taiwan are often addressed within the framework of this cultural and historical Chinese nation. In the 1980s and 1990s, the 50-year political nation was replaced by the ideas of 5,000-year and 100-year nation are in ascendance.

1. Different Chinese nation and different external differentiation

1.1. Sino-Centric View and the Idea of the 5,000-Year Chinese Nation

For a long time after 1949 in the PRC, Chinese conceptions of nationality were dominated by Stalin’s definition according to which a “nation is a historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic life and psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture”\(^2\). According to this view, a nation could exist free of statehood and free of a goal to achieve a statehood, therefore the nation in question is not necessarily a modern phenomenon.

Chinese also categorized nations as pre-capitalist nations (ancient nations), capitalist nations and socialist nations.\(^3\) Chinese scholars maintained that the Chinese nation had existed throughout the stages of historical progress and that the Chinese nation is as old as Chinese civilization. Because of earlier history recorded in Shang Shu (by Confucius) about Wu Di (five Kings), the legendary period from 2600 BC to 2200 BC, Chinese like to say China is a civilization, a state and a nation of 5,000-year history.

The view draws no distinction between civilization, state and nation. Nation is regarded as a perennial phenomenon. Fei Xiaotong calls it as a nation without self-consciousness (“zi zai” in contrast to “zi jue”). National identity is a matter of self-consciousness, therefore the 5000-year nation is a nation without self-identity and a nation without nationalist principle.

The 5,000-year Chinese nation is an aprioristic notion. Since the concept of 5,000-year Chinese nation in cultural sense is not congruent with all the peoples within the PRC and in historical sense it stretched back and include all the previous Chinese dynasties, it is incompatible with the modern national ideas that a nation is a community of equal individuals.

When the idea of the 5,000-year Chinese nation is applied to modern state politics the modern China

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\(^3\) Sun Xianfang, Sun Zhonglin, ed., *Study On Nationality Regional Autonomy Law* (Inner Mongolian
as a nation state, it adds historical and cultural dimension to Chinese state nationalism (ai guo zhu yi) in its normal meaning which is love of state and devotion to the welfare of one's state. With the historical and cultural nation as the basis of the state sovereignty and the object of people's loyalty, Chinese patriotism, or rather nationalism, has well exceeded the normal sense of nationalism (congruence of state and nation). Because in theory, this 5,000-year Chinese nation is both a notion permeating throughout the history and including all different peoples within the state, accordingly Chinese can always invoke the name of the whole Chinese nation to nullify a local secessionist demand. In this view, the opinion of the nation has to include the nation both at present tense and at past tense, which means not only all those currently included in the perceived nation should be consulted, but also the dead in history should be consulted. Therefore how to interpret the opinion of the cultural nation is an anti-empirical matter since a national plebiscite in the normal sense is irrelevant as it is impossible to include a nation both at present and in the past.

The aprioristic view of the cultural Chinese nation is often used by the Chinese government to stress the sovereignty and reunification issues. One example is the justification of Taiwan as an unalienable part of China. According to this view of 5000-year Chinese nation, whether Taiwan could be independent has to be decided by all Chinese rather than the population on Taiwan island.

Qian Qichen once said that the future of Taiwan cannot be settled by the 21 million people there it can only be determined by all the 1.2 billion peoples of China of which it is a part.

If the historical dimension of the Chinese nation is considered, even the 1.2 billion Chinese could not represent the entire Chinese nation because they are only the Chinese nation at present tense. There is also the Chinese nation in the past tense.

By the same reason, anthropological and archeological evidence is used by Chinese government to reach a political conclusion. When some genealogical evidence produced in a piece of academic work suggested that the ancestors of Taiwanese most probably came from Chinese mainland, the work together with its author were paid great attention by the Department of United Front. With this view


Mayall mentioned this unfeasibility of plebiscite in national self-determination, "As a method for establishing that the right of national self-determination has been exercised that plebiscite has two obvious weaknesses. First, it assumes that a collective identity already exists - otherwise, who or what would decide which people to poll; secondly, it discounts the agenda problem - that is the problem which arises because of the fact that whoever controls the questions on which a particular population is to be asked to vote, is in a very strong position also to control the outcome". Mayall, James, Nationalism And International Society (Cambridge University Press, 1990) p.52.

It is a Ph.D. Thesis produced in the University of Tokyo. The title of the Ph.D. thesis is “A Genealogical Study Of Earlier Inhabitants At Taiwan” and the thesis drew a conclusion that “there is a close link between Taiwan inhabitant group and those on mainland China, the ancestors of Taiwanese
of a timeless Chinese nation, Chinese leaders sometimes said if they gave in on the matter of unification and claiming back lost territory, they would be too shamed to face their ancestors.

For the thousands of years, the Sino-centric view could not provide an external differentiation as provided by the modern state system. The saturated modern state system has included all territories and peoples on earth, therefore all peoples have to made a decision about their national identity, i.e., they either identify with one of the UN member states they happen to live in or deny it and assert their own identity. In the pre-modern and pre-sovereign state world, the relationship between various territorialities was not well defined as today's state relationship and there were more political vacuums and ambiguities between states. With the territory loosely defined, there was always room in between big powers which made it possible for peoples in between to be at ease with their cultural and political identity. There might have been more room for the peoples in the past not to make either-this-or-that choice. It was especially true with nomadic peoples such as Mongols. In the past they could migrate, detached from any of their neighboring powers. In the modern state system in which borders are accurately defined between sovereign states, communities either declare their own nation state, or choose one of the states they happen to be in, since there is no man’s land left in the saturated modern state system.

The idea of a 5,000-year Chinese nation is equivalent to defining China as a civilization or a culture. The world outside this 5,000-year nation would consist of non-Chinese civilizations, or of uncivilized non-Chinese because for the most part of the pre-modern history, Chinese regarded themselves as the only civilization in the world. For some period the distinction between the "civilized" Chinese and the "uncivilized" non-Chinese was blurred by an assimilationist attitude according to which the non-Chinese who adopted Chinese culture were accepted as Chinese or the semi-civilized (shou fan). The periodic conquests by the non-Chinese did not destroy the Chinese sense of centricity. The external differentiation provided by nomadic powers was unstable and temporary which did not produce an international consciousness among Chinese that China was only one of many in the state system. Therefore the centric view is different from that of a modern nation in any sense (sovereignty, territoriality, citizenship, etc.). The Chinese didn't have this modern sense of external differentiation until 19CC when western power posed an over-whelming challenge to the Sino-centric view and to the Chinese sense of cultural superiority.

The historically and culturally based Chinese nation is an exclusive conception of ethnic Chinese (Han), but not non-Chinese peoples. For the ancestors of those non-Chinese were despised as alien barbarians by Chinese until even late Qing period, it needed a drastic re-interpretation of Chinese-centric history to convince non-Chinese peoples that they too shared a common origin with Chinese up mostly came from Chinese mainland", “there were ethnic Miao in the mainland, close brothers with Miao”. Both the author and his work are highly valued by the Department of United Front. Wang Xiaohui, “Blood Origin”, Minzu Tuanjie (Nationality Unity Magazine), April, 1996.
to 5,000 years ago. Apart from the difficulty in historical explanation, the present nationality reality is also contradictory to the conception of the 5,000-year nation. The 5,000-year nation is incapable of explaining those territories and peoples which have been artificially separated out by political force and many of those cross-border minorities, especially those who have a sovereign state across the border such as Mongols, Koreans, Kazakhs, Kyrgyzs, Uzbeks and Tajiks.

The Chinese nation in the perennialist view is a historical cultural-community but it lacks the legal-political dimensions of modern nationhood. According to A.D. Smith, the modern nation at least in theory incorporates all strata of the perceived nation, whom as citizens enjoy certain rights and duties with regard to their fellow citizens and the modern nation is conceived as a part of a larger international system.7

1.2. State System as an External Differentiation and Modern Chinese Nation

During the roughly 100 years from mid-19 century to the founding of the PRC in 1949, a modern sense of Chinese nationhood and modern Chinese nationalism developed mainly as a response to the external differentiation of the modern state system.8 The new national identity together with the modern external differentiation can be called the “100-year Chinese nation”, different from the perennialist view of the “5000-year Chinese nation”.

Chinese communists regarded the period starting 1840 until the May Fourth Movement in 1919 as the period of “old democratic revolution”, i.e. anti-imperialist movement without communist leadership.9 According to Fei Xiaotong, Chinese since mid-19 century has become a self-conscious nation (zi jue in contrast to zi zai)10.

The external differentiation of modern state system made Chinese national ideas change to adapt to the modern international environment, Chinese anti-Manchu nationalists began to see China as one of the many nations in the world (shi jie min zu zhi lin), and to conceive a Chinese nation (zhong hua min zu) with the imported notions of sovereignty, territoriality and citizenship which are originally European.

The gap between an identity based on Chinese culture and a modern identity based on the territorial

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8 It is 109 years from 1840 when the first Anglo-China war (Opium War) broke out to 1949 the People’s Republic was founded. According to Chinese official view of modern history, during the 109-year period, imperialist powers invaded China and China remained a colony, semi-colony and semi-feudal state; Chinese feudal ruling class gradually colluded with comprador bourgeoisie, and they became the walking dog of imperialist powers; Chinese people, including working class, peasants, petite bourgeoisie, national bourgeoisie and other patriots, began to unite; during the period the latter engaged in nationalistic and democratic struggle against the former. See Li Weihan, “Nationality Issues in Chinese Democratic Revolution”, Several Issues On Nationality Theory and Policy (People’s Press, 1980) p.22.
9 Li Weihan, Ibid.
10 Fei Xiaotong, (op. cit.)
state is huge. Accordingly the conceptual transformation from the cultural nation into new modern
national identity is problematic. Because Chinese culture was emphasized more than ethnicity as the
basis of dynastic successions in the past, Chinese ethnic identity was not emphasized by the ancient
Chinese states as much as a Chinese cultural identity. Along with the dynastic changes, the names of
Chinese people also changed. In Han dynasty, Chinese were called “Han people”, in Tang Dynasty,
“Tang people”, etc. For the early Chinese nationalists at the end of Manchu dynasty, there was not
even a proper name for China as an ethnic entity. Liang Qichao said that “Indeed, there was not even
a serviceable word for the historical and ethical community of “China”. Among the many faults which
Liang Qichao attributed to the “Chinese people” was the inability to put a name to their own country
in the world for several thousand years.” The word “‘China’(zhong hua) is what people of other races
call us. It is not a name the people of this country have selected for themselves”.

“zhong hua”(as in zhong hua min zu) appeared as early as in Wei Jin period(AD 220-420). Zhong
hua was first used in political mobilization by Zhu Yuanzhang, the Chinese founder of the Ming
Dynasty, who was the first to rebel against the Mongolian Yuan Dynasty. In 1367 he ordered Xu Da,
his general to “ expel barbarians and restore zhong hua”. He said that “those who surrender can live in
zhong hua, those who are defiant live in the north of the Wall”. “zhong hua” was here used as a
geographical term same as “zhong yuan”(middle plain, China).

In 19th CC “zhong hua” again was used by Chinese nationalists. “zhong hua” and “minzu” (nation)
used together in the beginning of the century. “Min zu” was borrowed from Japanese at the turn of the
century. Zhang Taiyan in his article “zhong hua min zu” explained:” Zhong guo (China) is a
geographical terms to distinguish China and foreign territories, near and far; zhong hua(Chinese) to
distinguish hua and yi(barbarians), the higher and lower culture.”

Still, “zhong hua min zu” then mainly referred to Chinese in a cultural sense, i.e., Han Chinese. Liang
Qichao tried to give “zhong hua” a more inclusive meaning beyond Han Chinese by a standard of
subjective identification. In 1922, Liang Qichao in his “Study Of Chinese Nation In History” pointed
out that “zhong hua min zu usually refers to Han Chinese, at the same time, it also included each
people which identified themselves as Chinese. He also said, “ when you meet other peoples, when he
thinks he is a Chinese, he is a member of zhong hua min zu”. and also "Manchu is a member of zhong
hua min zu”.

Sun Yat-sen emphasized that the state and nation should be one. He used race and nation

11 Liang Qichao, “Zhongguo Jinruo zhi Yuanyin” (On the Origin of China’s Weakness), Yin Bing Shi
12 Chen Lian-kai, zhongguo huayi fanhan zhonghua zhonghuaminzu -- a inherent development of
cognition. Fei Xiao-tong, Unitary Chinese Nation of Pluralistic Origins, the Central Institute of
13 Zhang Tai-yan, Zhang Tai-yan Xuanji (Zhong Tai-yan collections) (Shanghai People’s Press, 1985)
14 Ibid. p.252.
interchangeably and said that assimilation would make a homogeneous Chinese nation within the state. He believed that through assimilating non-Chinese into Chinese, China could be transformed into a nation congruent with the state. According to Fitzgerald, Sun Yatsen’s view of Chinese nation, different from Liang Qichao’s, is more based on race than individual citizenship. He rather viewed Chinese people as a distinctive race, “China, since the Qin and Han dynasties, has been developing a single state out of a single race, while foreign countries have developed many states from one race and have included many nationalities within one state.”  

According to Sun Yatsen, the Chinese nation is strictly based on the state, ethnic Chinese within the state constitute the so-called state nation (guo zu) and other non-Chinese peoples will be eventually absorbed into Chinese. Chiang Kaishek, Sun’s successor, in his “China’s Destiny” also put forward the same assimilationist view, believing all non-Chinese are merely sub-branches of Chinese nation.

Because Chinese nationalists conceived of a modern Chinese nation which was congruent with the preceding Manchu dynasty in terms of territory and ethnic constituents, the Chinese nation is regarded not so much as a nation in its original meaning, i.e. nation as a self-conscious community. Lucian Pye regards China as a civilization pretending to be a nation-state, and “China today is what Europe would have been if the unity of the Roman Empire had lasted until now and there had not been the emergence of the separate entities of England, France, Germany, and the like.” However, the external differentiation of modern state system is crucial to modern Chinese nationalism and Chinese self-identity of a nation rather than a culture.

The idea of 5000-year Chinese nation is associated with culturalism and the 100-year nation with modern Chinese nationalism. Joseph Levenson termed pre-modern Chinese sense of centricity and identity as culturalism. He observed that the high culture, ideology and identification of the mandarin, were principally forms of cultural consciousness, an identification with the moral goals and values of a universalizing civilization.

The transformation from culturalism to modern nationalism involved changes in political legitimation, territoriality and a new external differentiation. The former dynastic prescriptive sovereignty was changed into a popular sovereignty, at least theoretically. The nation-building process also territorialized the imperial rule. One important part of the territorialization of imperial rule was to

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16 Jiang’s close colleagues, Chen Guofu, Chen Lifu brothers in the language reform in 1930-40s, elaborated the same view. Chen Guofu believed “China’s ability to achieve unity is entirely dependent on having a unified written language”, Chen Lifu even had a plan for compulsory instruction in Chinese script for all minority peoples on the frontiers. See John De Francis Nationalism and Language Reform in China (Princeton University Press, Princeton 1950).
internalize the former distinction of Chinese and barbarians\(^9\). When the former uncivilized aliens under the Manchu imperial rule together with their territories became part of the modern Chinese state, the external differentiation for modern Chinese was no longer non-Chinese such as Mongols and Manchus but the western imperialist powers.

With the modern external differentiation, the former Sino-centric view gave way to a modern international outlook, i.e., China is fitted in the world state system. The former universalist view of Chinese centricity changed into a pluralist view of the world, i.e., nations and states in the world coexist and compete with each other. One lesson Chinese drew from Chinese international experiences in 19CC and early 20CC was “luo hou ai da” (to be backward is to be beaten) which reflected the relations between China and the European powers during the period.\(^{20}\)

It is a realist lesson about international outlook that Chinese drew from the 19CC international relations. The realist understanding of “luo hou ai da” is also understood by Chinese in reverse order as “ai da luo hou” which means “being beaten leads to lagging behind”. Therefore the lesson of modern history also generate a redemptionist attitude toward the West.

As to the reason why China lagged behind, liberals and anti-traditionalists blamed Chinese tradition, but the anti-imperialist nationalists tried to find causes from outside. Scientism and populism in May Fourth Movement was associated with the former attitude. It is the anti-imperialist view that caters the belief that China only lagged behind the West in modern time and it is the redemptionist view that adds substantially to the modern external differentiation of modern Chinese identity. Chinese communists’ interpretation of modern Chinese history depicts imperialism as a major enemy for Chinese people and also constructs a myth that China’s progress did not lag behind European countries, nor lost its superiority status until modern time.\(^{21}\)

One Chinese Communist view embraced by Mao claimed that capitalist shoots emerged in China before the Opium War independent of western influence, and it was crushed and disrupted by the western intrusion. In other word, the independent development and progress of Chinese history was interrupted by the west.

This Chinese Marxist historical view was regarded as contradictory by Joseph Levenson\(^{22}\). Chinese

\(^9\) The internalization of Chinese-barbarian distinction is not very complete, many old symbols associated with the distinction are still being used by average Chinese mass, but also by Chinese authority. Maybe the most prominent example is the Great Wall, often used to symbolize Chinese national spirit and defense. Whether by mistake or deliberate intention, it at least shows the difficulty in obscuring and compromising the ethnic distinction in the internalization process.

\(^{20}\) “luo hou ai da” is a household phrase, widely used by Chinese leaders from Mao Zedong to Deng Xiao-ping, and is easily found in the People’s Daily’s editorials on China’s reunification issues and reflection on historical humiliations imposed by Western powers.


Communists, following Marxist historical materialism, equate Chinese history with the West's by periodization, e.g., slave, feudal, capitalist, communist societies, and thus deny to China any highly individual character. By periodization, Chinese history is put into a liberal and Marxist universal history, a Western system. But on the other hand, Chinese insist Chinese historical changes have their own internal causes and developed independently, e.g., the view of Chinese indigenous capitalism developed independently before the Western intrusion.

In contrast to the view that China's backwardness arose in modern times as a result of external causation, there is an argument that China's backwardness or weakness have its roots far back to 10th Century. Before 10CC Chinese dynasties were more open and more confident. In Tang Dynasty (618-906), foreign merchants, preachers, trade were encouraged. Zoroastrians, Nestorians, Manichaens, Jews and Muslims (Persians, Arabs and Turks) came and live in China. Even if China still claimed as centric view, it at least did not come to conflicts with dealing with outside world.

After 10CC China became weak and defensive. Until 13CC and after Chinese sense of superiority was greatly weakened because of the weakening political and military strength. And Neo-Confucianism with its introspection functioned to restrict China's adaptability.

In 1276 the Mongols conquered China and for the first time the whole China was under an alien rule. Later the Ming Dynasty took Neo-Confucianism and the Han and Tang as model of orthodoxy. After an early interest in the external maritime world, the Ming focused on defense in Inner Asia and closed the doors to the outside. For the first time, foreign trade was forbidden. China's decline took place long before the advent of the Manchu Qing Dynasty (1644-1911).

Starting from the Opium War in 1840, Chinese nationalist efforts led to the founding of the Chinese Republic and to China becoming a permanent member of UN security council in 1945. And if the communist revolution leading to the PRC founded in 1949 is regarded as a part of the nationalist revolution and the modernization drive, the People's Republic since 1949 together with its rapid industrialization and its effort to be a big power, can be understood as a part of continuous nation-building process reaching back to the 1840s.

The modern nation-building process from 1840 to 1949 which lasted about 100 years, stands in contrast to the version of the 5,000-year Chinese nation, and should be seen as an 100-year Chinese nation.

In terms of external differentiation, the 100-year Chinese nation has a pluralist view of the state system different from the Sino-centric universalism in the concept of 5,000-year Chinese nation. But domestically, it is still an assimilationist view in the concept of 100-year Chinese nation.

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Since the 100-year Chinese nation is a concept born out of the 5000-year national idea and imperial heritage of Manchu dynasty, accordingly it is believed that the peoples formerly ruled by the Manchu dynasty should be assimilated into the 100-year Chinese nation. For example Mongols, Tibetans and the Moslems in Xinjiang were regarded as part of this national concept. Therefore the independent Mongolian state in 1911 and after the revolution was not recognized by the 100-year Chinese nation.

The following are two points made on the 100-year nation. Firstly, the 100-year nation contains the contradictory ideas of the 5000-year nation as well the legal character of modern nationhood. Secondly, modern Chinese nationalism has a redemptionist character because of the external differentiation provided by aggressive western powers.

1.3. The Political Nation after 1949 and its External Differentiation

The response of Chinese intellectuals towards the external differentiation of outside powers varied. The main responses were to emphasize a need to engage in self-strengthening and to focus on national salvation. There also developed a belief in democracy and scientism. Self-strengthening and national salvation became the main theme of modern Chinese nationalism, which democracy and scientism became central to what is called Chinese Enlightenment starting from the May fourth Movement in 1919. Chinese Communism in some way addressed the two different ideas because it claimed to be scientific with its origin in European enlightenment tradition and it claimed to be the only way to save the country. In the development of Chinese communism both before and after 1949, the theme of self-strengthening and national salvation was never replaced by communist internationalism. Nationalism and Communism became two interwoven themes, one as the means, the other as the end.

The new China that was proclaimed in 1949 could be called another phase of Chinese nation which was based on the state and political ideology more than on common history and culture. But through the half century after 1949, the position of the political ideology and nationalism have changed. By the reform period, nationalism become the dominant theme as communist ideology lost its appeal. The identity of the Chinese nation began to be justified more with reference to claims to a common history and to a cultural rather than a political ideology. The different modes of self-perception of the Chinese nation have corresponded to the changes in the form of external differentiation.

In the different periods after 1949, the Chinese international outlook may be characterized as limited internationalism during the period of Sino-Soviet alliance in 1950s, egotist radicalism during the Sino-Soviet schism in 1960s and the so-called tripolarity period in 1970-80s, and more pragmatic nationalism in 1980-90s. But the quest for a strong and powerful Chinese state has been a persistent theme throughout.

Ideological radicalism never excluded considerations of realpolitik and the promotion of national interests from the Chinese international outlook of China’s leaders. Leaning to one side with the
Soviet Union was not totally motivated by proletarian internationalism\(^2\), the outlook of the three world was not merely an analysis of international pattern in terms of class struggle and capitalism versus socialism, it also served as a theoretical basis for China's international united front strategy.

The 50-year political Chinese nation characterized by the changing external differentiation at different times is an important period of the development of modern Chinese nationalism. The revolutionary radicalism and the egotism, apart from the meaning of negating tradition and national culture, nevertheless has expressed confidence and belief which in the same way as the traditional Sino-centric view put China in an unique and central position again. This is why the period of radicalism is cherished by many Chinese in spite of the suffering it caused to Chinese people.

The revolutionary state founded in 1949 changed the former concepts of Chinese nation drastically in terms of state legitimacy, the basis of nationhood and international outlook. Mao Zedong proclaimed the emergence of a new Chinese nation which differed from those envisioned by Sun Yatsen and Chiang Kaishek. The powerful combination of ideology and nationalist claims set up a new orthodoxy in place of battered Confucianist culture\(^2\). The revolutionary state after 1949 may be regarded as an important part of modern Chinese nation building, and for the purpose of analysis I have called the new post 1949 national ideas as constituting a 50-year Chinese nation which, as far as non-Chinese is concerned, is based more on political ideology rather than a common history and culture. During the period the term Chinese people(zhong guo ren min) was more frequently used than the term Chinese nation(zhong hua min zu).

Although “zhong guo ren min”(Chinese people) and “zhong hua min zu”(Chinese nation) are often used interchangeably. “Chinese people”(ren min)\(^2\) has class connotations. As used by the CPC the concept of people was an important element in the blueprint of the united front strategy. The term of “people”(ren min), apart from proletariat class of industrial workers and socialist peasants, also included sympathetic bourgeoisie and intellectuals who had supported the CCP at various critical stages. The rank of intellectuals were upgraded as part of proletariat working class in the post Cultural Revolution period. The outside contrast of the people is the people's enemy, i.e., the KMT counterrevolutionaries, big bourgeoisie, the reactionaries who tried to resist the historical progress represented by the CCP, certain class of unrepent landlords, compradors and common criminals\(^2\).


\(^2\) Joseph R. Levenson, *Confucian China and Its Modern Fate: The Problem of Intellectual Continuity*, (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958) p.97. One of his argument is CPC set up a new orthodox, a sense of mission in the place of Confucianism

\(^2\) It is important to note that some non-Chinese officials prefer to say “Zhonghua ge minzu”(Chinese peoples/nationalities), while ethnic Chinese like to say “Zhonghua minzu”(Chinese nation).

In terms of its class basis, the 50-year Chinese nation has a supranational pretense. The relation between supranational and nationalist nature of the new regime since 1949 is paradoxical. In appearance they contradict to each other, but the 50 years since 1949 proves that Chinese nationalism or nation-building process could not have been fulfilled without the supranational political ideology. The supranational political ideology, in theory, helps to legitimize Chinese incorporating non-Chinese people into the new socialist nation in the sense that the integration and disappearance of different nationalities, including Chinese, in the future communist society is more easily justified than the straightforward assimilation and Chinese chauvinism.

Chinese nationalist revolution in 1911 aimed at converting imperial subjects ("scattered like sands" in Sun Yatsen's phrase) in China into politically conscious citizenry and set up republic. But the KMT regime founded by Sun Yatsen never succeeded in establishing the control of the whole country and never made non-Chinese peoples within the state conscious nationals before 1949.

At the time, non-Chinese frontier areas such as Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang and Manchuria were under the control of local Chinese warlords, Chinese modern nation-building did not affect those areas in the same way as in Chinese provinces. Some areas, notably Tibet and Manchuria for some time were not influenced at all.

During the Sino-Japanese war when Chinese people were mobilized on an unprecedented scale and anti-Japanese warfare as mainly conducted by Chinese in inland China. The Japanese in Inner Mongolia and Manchuria tried to appear as liberators or allies to Mongol and Manchu peoples. Japanese met less challenge in setting up local government in those areas than in Chinese areas.

In Inner Mongolia in 1940s, even in KMT controlled Mongolian forces, Mongol soldiers did not know the meaning of Chinese flag and anthem, they preferred to salute the portrait of Genghis Khan than the Chinese flag and to sing Mongolian folk songs than the Chinese anthem.

De Wang, the head of Inner Mongolian autonomous movement and government (1936-46), described vividly how he still felt a bond of loyalty between him and Puyi, the Manchu emperor, when he met him in 1935.

Since Mongolia, as compared with Tibet and Xinjiang, was then more tightly controlled by Chinese,

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Pu Jie, recorded by Ye Zufi, Autobiograph of Pu Jie (Fanrong Press, 1994) In 1945 Te Wang visited the brothers and said to Pu Yi:“We Mongols only have autonomy on appearance, no real power at all. You are descendant of the Great Qing Dynasty, how can you be so weak? We Mongols always respect the Emperor Pu Yi as our own lord. Because you are the direct descendent of Manchu royal family. But you invite Japanese tian zhao da shen and treat it as your own ancestor, which confuse us. Now Manchuria become Japan’s colony, you the emperor do nothing but watching, don’t you become Japan’s puppet, do you? What are you going to do about it?”

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it can be said that Tibetans and Uighurs must have felt even less attached to Chinese state than Mongols.

In those non-Chinese frontiers controlled by local Chinese warlords or Japanese, there were strong local non-Chinese nationalism which were mainly reactions towards local Chinese warlords’ oppression and KMT regime’s assimilationist policy. The CCP’s supranational ideology helped to reduce the suspicions of the non-Chinese and to win them over.

The 1949 revolution had different meanings for Han Chinese and for non-Chinese nationalities. For Chinese, the 1949 revolution was the successor of the 1911 revolution in salvation for China as a state and a nation. Therefore the nature of the 1949 revolution was primarily nationalist. This was especially so as all the non-Chinese peoples were incorporated into the nation at an unprecedented degree.

To non-Chinese peoples, especially those who regarded CCP as an ally or liberator, the new socialist state was perceived as a revolutionary state rather than a nation-state, the political mission of socialism and communism rather than a Chinese culture was regarded as the basis of the state.

To Chinese nationalists, the communist revolution was just a means for a Chinese nationalist end; to CCP’s non-Chinese followers, the end is nothing other than the goal of the revolution, an ideal society free of national oppression.

In this new phase of nation-building, Chinese nationalism, together with the Communist ideological fervor, made Chinese regard their individual sufferings as a sacrifice which could be tolerated.

Within several decades after 1949, China was transformed from a semi-colonial country, a mere geographical expression, into a unified, independent, modern civilization-state: products and services increased at a steady rate for more than four decades; the infrastructure of the country (e.g. irrigation, sanitation, transportation, and communication) improved significantly; the equality and spread of public health virtually doubled average peasant life expectancy; the Chinese workers, farmers, and soldiers have maintained a respectable living standard among developing nations.\(^\text{32}\)

Those achievements have generated so much nationalist pride among Chinese that to some extent they have tolerated the CCP regime for most of their wrongdoing, e.g., prosecution of intellectuals in anti-rightist campaign, the 3 hardships years, and later massive deaths\(^\text{33}\) in the later Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution.

But the non-Chinese peoples, who do not necessarily share Chinese nationalistic sentiments and do not identify with the 5,000-year and 100-year Chinese nation as do the Chinese, therefore may have a

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\(^{33}\) According to Tu Weiming, Ibid., 43 million Chinese were starved to death. The source is an internal CPC report of 1961, based on Chen Yizi’s analysis, yet to be verified, *Shanghai University Journal*, Society in 1993, the number quoted was 40 millions, the issues were immediately confiscated.
lesser degree of tolerance towards the miseries resulted from the CCP leftist policies after 1949. Among different peoples, such as Tibetans, Uighurs and Mongols, their sense of identity and involvement in the 50-year Chinese nation are different, not only because they were incorporated into the political nation at different times (Mongols in 1947 and Tibetans in 1951), but also because they were incorporated into the PRC in different manners.

The Mongols had a longer history of being involved in the politics of Chinese nationalism and revolution than Tibetans; the IMAR was set up in the name of Mongolian people by CCP’s Mongolian collaborators; and Tibet was taken over by the PLA from the outside.

2. 50-year political nation and external differentiation

2.1. Ideological Radicalism: Two Camp, the Great Schism and Ideological Radicalism

_Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1950-1958_

The external differentiation of the 100-year Chinese nation entails the pluralist view of the outside world in which nations compete for survival. From 1949 until the beginning of the 1980s the outside world was perceived by the “new” China in ideological terms. The Chinese international outlook in terms of imperialism versus socialism was strengthened by the United State’s cold war rhetoric and its containment policy in the Asian-Pacific.

To Chinese, the Sino-Soviet alliance was justified by proletarian internationalism as well as by strategic needs; and the alliance together with its internationalist emphasis temporarily blurred the traditional national ideas of common culture and history. In that period, the Chinese authority even tolerated the Inner Mongolian leader talking about the possible merger of Inner Mongolia with the MPR, because publicly proletarian internationalism and the socialist camp were more important than the traditional national idea.

One year after Chinese communists gained power in 1949, anti-Communist propaganda ran rampant in the United States when McCarthism relentlessly hunted the so-called domestic traitors. In July, 1949, Mao Zedong publicly encouraged hostility towards the United States, proclaimed his adherence to the Soviet Union and Liu Shaoqi was secretly sent to Moscow. In December 1949 Mao went himself to Moscow to negotiate an alliance that was eventually signed in February 1950.35

“The Korean War put an end for a long time the possibilities or an accommodation between Beijing

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34 Inner Mongolia was declared as part of PRC as its first nationality autonomous region by CCP’s Inner Mongolian protégé in 1947; Xinjiang was controlled by CCP in 1949 after some negotiations involving PRC, local non-Chinese nationalists and the Soviet Union; Tibet was under the control of PRC in 1951 when PLA marched into Tibet.

35 Yahuda, (op. cit.) p.25.
and Washington". By the time the Korean War broke out in June 1950, China was already in a position of siding completely with the Soviet Union and in an irreconcilable position with the United States.

During the Korean War, at least one million Chinese soldiers died.

To contain the perceived Communist threats in the Asian-Pacific, the United States made a series of security arrangements in the region. In early 1951, John Foster Dulles as the special envoy, who visited Japan in early 1951 was unable to persuade the Japanese to rearm and settled instead for a policy of economic cooperation by which Japanese productive capacity would be used in support of the war effort.

American ideas of establishing a regional Pacific Pact also included a Mutual Defence Treaty with the Philippines signed on 30 August 1951, the United States, Australia and New Zealand Security Treaty signed on 1 September. The Japanese Peace Treaty was also signed in September in San Francisco. Japan and the US signed a Mutual Defence Treaty.

As part of its containment policy, the United States also promoted the order of a multilateral security arrangement in the region. On 8 September, 1954 the Manila Pact, the Collective Defence Treaty for Southeast Asia, was signed, and in the following year the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) was established in Bangkok. On 2 December, 1954 the U.S. signed with KMT government in Taiwan a Mutual Defence Treaty. On 24 February, 1955 Baghdad treaty was signed between Iraqi and Turkey. NATO, SEATO and the bilateral treaties signed by the United States in the Asia-Pacific formed a ring of containment against the Communist threat from the Soviet Union and China, and local communist insurgencies. As seen by the Chinese leaders, the new China was encircled by this political and military strategic alliance arranged by the United States.

However during the period of siding with the Soviet Union, China's traditional national idea was not completely replaced by communist internationalism. The Soviet Union during the period never dominated China as it controlled the East European countries, since "the PRC was too big, independent and proud to be dominated in that way especially as it proved itself to be a major power on the battlefields of Korea where for the first time in modern history Chinese forces had fought a

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36 Yahuda, (op. cit.) p.28.
37 According to Jon Halliday and Bruce Commings, 2 million North Korean civilians and 500,000 soldiers, and at least 1 million Chinese soldiers died on the communist side. They estimated that 1 million South Korean civilians died. See Yahuda, (op. cit.) p.41.
38 Yahuda, (op. cit.) p.29
39 Yahuda, (op. cit.) p.50
modern Western army to a standstill. The nationalist side of the PRC of the period might have been underestimated by the United States which failed to take advantage of the traditional Sino-Russian antagonism.

"John Lewis Gaddis, the principal historian of containment, has faulted the Eisenhower Administration particularly for lacking confidence in its own supposed reliance upon the independence and nationalism of Third World countries especially". As early as in 1954, General Ridgeway, who had succeeded MacArthur in Korea, had pointed out that that would require bringing "Red China to a realisation that its long range benefits derive from friendliness with America". That was ruled out by Eisenhower himself on the grounds that the requisite diplomatic contracts were unacceptable as they would pose problems with allies, destroy Chiang Kaishek and be resisted by an American people still 'emotional' about China.

The Chinese ideologically based international view was strengthened by the containment policy and the cold war rhetoric of the west, and Chinese nationalist thinking with the emphasis on independence and Sino-centricity had to take the second place to the international view of ideological struggle which then seemed to be closer to the international situation. From the 1950s to the 1960s, China changed from a close ally of the Soviet Union to its adversary which showed that Chinese considerations of their national interests always competed with their ideological belief. It was indicated in many ways that Chinese nationalism was an important cause of the Sino-Russian schism.

'The Great Schism and Opposition to Both Superpowers 1959-69' Behind the ideological debates between the Soviet Union and China from 1959s to 1960s, there was the conflict of different national interests and ego of the two big states with different cultural and historical traditions.

Ideaogy was at the heart of the legitimacy of Communist Party rule in both the Soviet Union and China and the Sino-Russian disagreement were mainly expressed in ideological terms. Therefore, according to Yahuda, in the early 1960s both Chinese and the Soviet Union leaders were condemning the other as traitors to the communist cause. For China and Russian leaders, there was only one genuine Marxism-Leninism.

Besides claiming to be the genuine heir of Marxism and Leninism, China by repudiating the Soviet Union as revisionist and social imperialist put itself again in a central position in an ideological and moral sense. During the Sino-Soviet alliance, especially early on when Stalin was still alive, the Soviet communist party had the authority over all the brother communist parties including Chinese

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42 Yahuda(op. cit.), p.29
43 Yahuda, (op. cit.) p.49
44 Yahuda, (op. cit.) p.58
communist party. Since China did not occupy a central position in the socialist camp, the new orthodox of Marxism did not put the CCP at a central position as Confucianism did to the old China.  

After Stalin died, the CCP began to challenge the Soviet party’s leadership position. The CCP first showed disagreement on the ideas of “peaceful co-existence” and “peaceful competition” in Khrushchev’s report in the 20th Party Congress held in February, 1956. The CCP’s disagreement with the Soviet communist party and Khrushchev’s secret report caused confusion among Eastern European countries and damaged the prestige of the Soviet party in the international communist movement. In the First Congress of the World Communist Parties convened in November, 1957, Mao disputed with the Soviet party on the issue of war and peace, guidelines of the relationship between the brother parties. The CCP emphasized “the principle of unity on the basis of Marxist-Leninist and proletarian internationalism and the principle of consensus through consultation”, and repudiated the distinction of the so-called “superior party” and “subordinate party”.  

After the CCP denounced the CPSU as revisionist (of Marxism and Leninism) and splittist (of the international communism), it regarded itself as the true champion of communist cause in a leadership position of the international communist movement. “the Soviet Communist Party’s Leaders are Contemporary Biggest Splittists”, the seventh article of the Sino-Soviet open debate published in the People’s Daily on 2 February 1964, quoted Lenin as having said in 1919, ‘the leadership of the revolutionary proletarian international was temporarily in the hands of Russians(naturally it is within a short period of time)’. The article argued “if a party in the forefront position is on the road of revisionism, it will inevitably lose its forefront position even though it is the biggest and the most influential party”.  

The confidence showed by the CCP in its leading role in international communism was not only based upon its revolutionary experience (the CCP’s revolutionary success was achieved independently), but also based upon its long pre-modern history of Chinese centricity. The breakdown of the alliance and differences about international politics and strategy decided more by national interests than ideological difference. “As the senior ally, the Soviet Union could not allow China to place its global strategic interests in jeopardy. For its part, an independent China could not  

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45 Joseph Levenson’s regarded Marxism as the state ideology replaced Confucianism as the new orthodox. But with the Soviet Union as the senior party, the new orthodox of Marxism did not give the new China the same confidence of being the center as Confucianism gave to the old China the sense of sino-centricity. Joseph R. Levenson, The Past And Future Of Nationalism: China. One of his argument is CPC set up a new orthodox, a sense of mission in the place of Confucianism  


expect to subordinate itself to the degree of compliance demanded by its Soviet ally.\(^{48}\)

From a Chinese point of view, Khrushchev thwarted China's endeavor to become an independent big power and maintained Soviet-US détente at the cost of Chinese sovereignty. In 1957, the United States deployed nuclear tipped missiles in Taiwan which evoked a strong protest from the PRC. Although in 1957 there were already disagreements between China and the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union nevertheless agreed to assist the PRC in developing nuclear weapons.\(^{49}\) In April 1958 Khrushchev proposed to the United State to sign a treaty for a nuclear test ban, and this was seen by Chinese as aimed at constraining their nuclear bomb program. In the summer of 1958 Khrushchev suggested to China the establishment of an allied naval force with joint naval and air communications in China and Mao refused. The Sino-Soviet relationship further deteriorated. On August 23, PRC began the bombing campaign targeting Quemoy, the off-shore island in the Taiwan Strait occupied by KMT force, which openly showed a Chinese independent approach to war and the United States. According to an Chinese official view, the bombing showed Taiwan was a domestic issue of China in which interference by foreign forces was not allowed. It also showed that the United States armed with nuclear weapons was just a "paper tiger".\(^{50}\) But Khrushchev accused Mao's reckless campaign as "to test the international stability by force".\(^{51}\) In 1959 the Soviet Union refused to supply China with a sample nuclear bomb to assist China's nuclear bomb program. In September Khrushchev visited the United States and talked with Eisenhower at David Camp. The talk which was labeled the "Camp David Spirit" pointed up the contrast between the Soviet Union' peaceful approach to the United States and the belligerent stance taken by the P.R.C.

The quarrel on international strategy and ideology also freshened Chinese memory of national humiliations imposed by imperial Russia. The most nationalistic view expressed during the quarrels between China and the Soviet Union was about the historical relationship between the two countries. China's leaders regarded the Soviet Union not only a revisionist of Marxism and traitor to the Communist cause, but also an imperialist successor of the former Czarist Russia. And automatically, when it regarded China as a victim of the imperial Russia and the Soviet Union, the P.R.C. automatically took a position of being the successor of the imperial China. The quarrel revived memories of the past when imperial China was a victim to imperial Russia's encroachment, it also revived the unpleasant memories about what the Soviet Union did to China and the lack of wholehearted support to the Chinese communists during their struggles before 1949.

From mid-nineteenth century. Czarist Russia exploited China's involvement in war with Britain and France to seize the land between the Amur, the Ussuri, and the Pacific, and to set up a naval base Vladivostok ('Star of the East'). The Aihui Treaty signed on May 28, 1858 ceded the land east of Ussuri to the coast to Russia. Since the treaty was signed by Heilongjiang General Yishan, a local

\(^{48}\) Yahuda, (op. cit.) pp.57-58.

\(^{49}\) Yahuda, (op. cit.) p.197.

\(^{50}\) Zhang Jiliang, The History of Contemporary International Relations, 1982)
official, therefore it was an illegal treaty. Two years later Tianjin Treaty was signed between China and Russia basically to confirm Aihui Treaty. Later Beijing Treaty signed ceded land in China’s western frontier to Russia.52

According to the Chinese, Russia through illegal and unequal treaties occupied Chinese territory in the northeast to the extent of 1.5 million square kilometers, an area equivalent to the size of the nineteenth century Germany and France combined together plus the size of China’s Zhejiang province.

Russia tried to seize Korea, a tributary state of the Manchu dynasty, and its plans were defeated, not by China, but by Japan. In Manchuria, through a treaty signed with Shengjing General Zeqi, Russia tried to take over the whole Manchuria but failed because it was not accepted by Manchu dynasty as well as other powers.53 But nevertheless Russians still gained privileges and influence in Manchuria, even after their defeat by the Japanese in 1905, they kept their Chinese Eastern Railway, a fortress of political and military as well as economic value. When the Bolsheviks took the place of the Czar, Lenin first talked of handing the railway back to China, but the Soviets did not repeat the promise when they were in a position to implement it. (They kept the railway until 1935, and then sold it to the Japanese.) 54

On the occasion of Mongolian independence in 1911, Russia appeared as protectors of the Mongols against the Chinese. In 1919 the Bolsheviks repudiated the privileges held by the Imperial Government in Mongolia, but in 1921 they sent the Red Army to guarantee Mongolia’s independence against Chinese and the subsequent political revolution led by Mongolian revolutionaries. Xinjiang (Chinese Turkestan) was also an object of contention between Imperial Russia and China. Here, too, in the 1930’s, Soviet Influence was strong, at the expense of the Chinese government55.

The story of relations between the Communist parties of the Soviet Union and China is not one of happy comradeship. In 1920s the Soviet Union advised the Chinese Communists to form the anti-imperialist united front with the Kuomintang even after Chiang Kai-shek had shown himself to be an enemy. Insistence by the Comintern (which meant Stalin) that the Chinese Communists should take no action against Chiang led to the massacre of Communist workers in Shanghai in April 1927, and to further humiliations and repression by the Kuomintang later in the year. Mao never forgot those disasters and Stalin’s preference for his rivals within the party56. There is no evidence of any significant Soviet material support for the CCP during the Chinese war against Japan. One Chinese historian describes the total amount of assistance as three to five planeloads of blankets and

51 Yahuda, (op. cit.) p.59.
55 Hugh Seton-Watson, (op. cit.) p.223.
56 Hugh Seton-Watson, (op. cit.) p.224.
medicine. In 1945 Stalin had secured the interests of the Soviet Union by a treaty with the KMT government which had given him control of the Manchurian railways, Port Arther (Lushunkou) and Dairen. These were not given back to the Communist until well after their victory - the railways in 1952 and Port Arther in 1955. By the treaty Stalin recognized Chiang Kaishek’s KMT government as the only legitimate government in China, hardly giving the CCP any help they need. The Soviet Red Army in Manchuria did not recognize the CCP army’s right to control Manchuria. Stalin admitted to the Yugoslavs in 1948 that he had ‘underestimated their chances’. In 1945 the industrial equipment of the factories built in Manchuria by the Japanese since 1931 was removed to Russia, which regarded today by Chinese almost as looting.

2.2. International United Front, Three World International View, Tripolarity and the External Differentiation

China broke with the Soviet Union between 1958-63, in the following period up to 1966 Chinese regarded the Soviet Union as revisionist but still recognized its socialist nature. After 1966 China regarded itself as a bastion of socialism and the leader of an International United Front against American imperialism, hence once again, China had the Sino-centric view of the world revolution. The period from 1969 to 1979 can be called tripolarity, within that period China developed their international outlook of “three world”.

Although CCP’s ideological division of the “three worlds” theory was often blurred by power politics of the tripolarity and the later realism of Chinese nationalism, the “three worlds” theory is the most systematic model of the UF policy which has the major influence on Chinese foreign policy.

The “intermediate zone” view of international politics in 1960s was the precedent for “three world” theory. Mao Zedong believed that the struggles of the “intermediate zone” could counter the worldwide offensive of imperialism.

The three world theory is an application of CCP’s international united front policy. The united front

58 Hugh Seton-Watson, (op. cit.) p.224.
60 Hugh Seton-Watson, (op. cit.) p.224.
61 About periodization of the CCP’s international policy, see Michael B.Yahuda, China’s Role in World Affairs (Croom Helm Ltd., 1978)
62 In 1960s, China’s diplomacy operated at a variety of levels. In the “first” intermediate zone – the third world- while it supported some revolutionary movements the main weight of its efforts went into developing relations with existing nationalist governments(often in open rivalry with the Soviet Union). In the “second” intermediate zone, as it began to be defined, of most of the capitalist world except for the United States, China’s trade expanded rapidly as it shifted the burden of this economic relations away from the Soviet bloc. See John Gittings, The World and China 1922-1972, (London: Eyre Methuen, 1974) p.261.

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thinking behind the three world theory, as strategy and tactics to realise the ideological goal, is also in nature a compromise on the ideological principle. According to Lenin, for communists to take over state power, they must abandon their sectarianism and use united front strategy. He said that “to reject compromise on principle is childish.”  

The intellectual root of the united front strategy can be found in the Manifesto of the Communist Party. Section two of the manifesto, “Proletarians and Communists”, sets out the relations of the Communists to the existing working-class parties. Section four, “Position of the Communists in Relations to the Various Existing Opposition Parties”, suggests “the Communists fight for the attainment of the immediate aim, for the enforcement of the momentary interests of the working class; but in the movement of the present they also represent and take care of the future of the movement”. Then it suggest in different countries such as France, Switzerland, Poland and Germany, proletarians should ally with different political forces, social-democrats, radicals, etc., against different immediate enemies.

The united front strategy is one of the contributions Lenin made to Marx/Communist theory. What is known as the “Oriental Strategy” put forward by Lenin in 1916 Lenin to support anti-colonial nationalism against imperialism is a more recent source of the CCP’s united front policy. In March 1919 Lenin set up the Comintern (the Third Communist International), the purpose of which was to organise world revolution. Later in the 3rd Comintern congress of 1921 “united front” tactics were formally introduced. The united front required the communists to establish contact with the masses either by collaborating with the leaders of non-communist organisations (“united from above”), or by appealing to the rank-and-file members of such organisations over the heads of their leaders (“united front from the below”). The united front strategy was a strategy for world revolution.

The “Intermediate Zone” view in 1960s was the origin of the later “three world view which formed the analytical basis of the CCP’s international united front policy. As early as 1946 “middle area” was mentioned by Mao Zedong in his meeting with Anna Louis Strong, Mao said “in the vast middle areas in between the United States and the Soviet Union, there are many capitalist countries’ colonies and semi-colonial countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Before the American reactionaries subdue those countries, they are in no way to invade the Soviet Union, } , we believe that very soon those countries will realise who is the real oppressor, the Soviet Union or the United States.”

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meeting with Anna Louis Strong. In 1965 Mao said to Edgar Snow, "‘the third world’ is a term used by French to refer to the underdeveloped countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, former colonies and present colonies of capitalist countries. France is a developed industrialised country, it does not belong to the ‘third world’".

China formally proclaimed the theory of “three World” in 1974. In February Mao said to Kenneth David Kaunda, the visiting Zambian president that the United States and the Soviet Union are the first world, the force in the middle such as Japan, Europe and Canada belong to the second world; “we(China) and you belong to the third world”.

CCP’s view of three worlds was first expounded to the world by Deng Xiaoping on the 6th Special Session of the United Nation General Assembly in 1974.

In the practice of their third world united front, the Chinese employed both united front from the above and the united front from the below. Whether the united front was implemented from above or from below mainly depended on Chinese global strategic considerations, i.e. anti-superpowers and big triangle power politics.

In Africa in the early 1960s, China spent huge amount of money and supplied large quantities of arms to support the overthrowing of US-backed leaders such as Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire. But later when China regarded the USSR as a much more serious threat to China, China began to make friends with Mobutu. China’s involvement in Angola is another example of how its untied front policy was swayed by its position in global power politics. In the 1960s Chinese had switched their support away from the Soviet-backed MPLA to the weaker National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola(UNITA). In 1974, when China was improving its relation with the US, Chinese delivered a large consignment of weapons to the National Front for the Liberation of Angola(FNLA), which had its headquarters in Zaire. In 1975 civil war broke out between the Soviet-backed MPLA and the Chinese-backed FNLA in Angola. The FNLA’s light weapons were no match for the MPLA, so the Chinese once again turned their attention to UNITA.

Before the Bandung conference in 1955, China’s policy towards Asian neighbours was an united front from below, advocating that the masses rebel against their bourgeoisie governments. After the Bandung Conference, China began to cultivate ties with the nationalist governments of the newly independent Asian countries(undited front from above), and the attitude of China’s leaders toward their communist comrades in those countries was not no longer as supportive as required by their internationalist ideology. China regarded itself more as a big power player than the champion of world communism.

1090, People’s Press. See Jun Qingyao, (op. cit.) p.45.
69 Jun Qingyao, (op. cit.) p.130.
70 Jun Qingyao, (op. cit.) p.130.
71 Peter Van Ness, “China As A Third World State: Foreign Policy And Official National Identity”, p.197 See also Jun Qingyao, (op. cit.) pp.133-134.
72 Dick Wilson, Mathew Grenier, Chinese Communism (Paladin, 1992) p.98.
According to Alexander Haig, Secretary of State of Carter administration, when he met Zhou Enlai in Beijing in 1972, he was told by Zhou Enlai that (US) “don’t lose in Vietnam; don’t withdraw from South East Asia.” China’s third world united front was stretched so far that an anti-Communist government could ask China for advice on how to crush the communist rebellions in its country. In 1975 the visiting Thai Premier Kukrit Pramoj asked Mao Zedong how to crush the Thai Communist Party, Mao replied: ‘you don’t have to worry about the Communist Party of Thailand. It has existed for more than ten years but not a single Thai Communist has come to see me here.’

China’s border war with India in 1962 and Vietnam in 1979 shows that the third world united front and communist comradeship meant very little as against the solid national interests concerning territory. Sino-India relations deteriorated drastically after China’s repression in Tibet in 1959, Mao began to distrust Nehru, the former third world ally. In 1962 border war broke out over the controversial McMahon Line, which was regarded as a legitimate border by India, but illegitimate by the Chinese because they regarded the McMahon Line as the result of an unequal treaty forced upon imperial China by British imperialists. China’s quick military success served as a warning to India not to interfere in China’s internal affairs in Tibet. The war also showed when national interests was involved, the good will between the fellow third world countries was simply not enough for forming a third world united front.

The shared communist ideology did not prevent China from going to war with Vietnam in the excuse of border issue, although the real issue was wider, involving Vietnam’s alliance with the USSR and its invasion of Cambodia. The Vietnamese argument that the Sino-Vietnam border should be realigned according to the treaties drawn up between the French and the Manchu dynasty and the demand to settle the border on the old French terms were simply an insult to Chinese nationalist feelings since China regarded those as unequal treaties and national humiliations in modern history.

During the border war, the Chinese nationalist attitude toward Vietnam, the former tribute state of imperial China, echoed the old Sino-centric view. Deng Xiaoping said the war against Vietnam was to “teach Vietnam a lesson”.

The CCP’s international united front policy in the 1960s was intended to make alliance with the third

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73 John Pilger, Heroes(London: Jonathan Cape, 1989), p.183. Pilger criticizes Zhou’s role in the Indochina conference at Geneva in 1954, saying that he preferred a divided Vietnam. According to Anthony Barrett, Zhou secretly told the French that ‘he recognized the reality of the South Vietnamese government they were trying to create’ (ibid., p183), see Dick Wilson, Mathew Grenier, (op. cit.) pp.107,179.

74 Dick Wilson, (op. cit.) p.108.

75 Chang Paomin, The Sino-Vietnamese Territorial Dispute (The Washington Papers, 1986), p.52. The fighting lasted for seventeen days, with only troops being set into battle. According to Chang, “unlike any nation engaged in a military operation of such a scale, Beijing made it clear from the beginning that the Chinese action would be limited in both scope and duration, that China did not want “a single inch” of Vietnamese territory, and that Chinese troops would be withdrawn as soon as they had administered the punishment Vietnam deserved and accomplished their mission’(Chang, p.55)
world and the second world against the two imperialist super powers. In the tripolarity period in the 1970s when the United States, still the No. one imperialist power according to China’s leaders, was regarded as a temporary ally against the Soviet Union, the united front was stretched further, the element of power politics further compromised the ideological principle. In the 1980s and 90s political ideology was completely replaced by pragmatism and nationalism in China’s international policy.

In the history of the CCP’s united front, during the Sino-Japanese war, CCP began the policy of united front from the above and made peace with KMT, nationalism then was a card that was used in tactics played by CCP against KMT regime. In the 1980s Chinese nationalism, which formerly seemed only a tactical purpose in the CCP’s united front, finally became an end in itself.

The new period of pragmatism and nationalism during the reform period put an end to the ‘three world’ outlook and also put an end to the united front policy in its original meaning, i.e., united front as tactics to ideological goal. From 1960s to 80s, the external differentiation for China changed from that of the ideological enemies and of imperialism to that of powers hostile to China’s national interests in which no ideological consideration is involved.

**New External Differentiation, New Self-Identity And State Legitimation**

Deng Xiaoping put an end to the tumultuous ideological politics of the Maoist era in favor of the mundane tasks of economic development. Deng Xiaoping made fundamental changes in foreign policy according to the changed domestic and international circumstances and reasserted the independent foreign policy of China as a big country. Chinese foreign policy had the following three adjustments.

The first adjustment was the reassertion of China’s independent position in the world. Deng said:“(China) with big size and heavy weight has become an important force independent of the United States and the Soviet Union”. There has been a détente in the Soviet-US competition/confrontations, there are both confrontations and dialogues between the two. If China shall form an alliance with either of them, it would tilt the global strategic balance, detrimental to the world stability. He said Chinese foreign policy should be independence and self-reliance, genuine non-alliance, Chinese do not play American card, nor the Soviet card, and also “do not allow others to

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play China card".79

At the Twelfth Party Congress in September 1982, Hu Yaobang, CCP party secretary, made it clear that China had changed the “one line” strategy of anti-Soviet Union hegemonism.80

The second change was to revise the view that war is inevitable. Deng Xiaoping said, “Although the threat of war still exists, the factors constraining/preventing war have increased considerably”, “It is possible that during a long period of time there will be no large-scale world war, there is hope in maintaining the world peace.”81 Deng said that in a considerable period of time, at least within this century, there is unlikely a world war. He listed reasons for the possible world peace. The first, those capable of engaging/launching world war, i.e., the US and the USSR, are deeply engaged in arms race and “deterrence balance”. Secondly, the global deployment of US and USSR is in stalemate and it is difficult for both to complete their strategic deployment. Thirdly, peace elements, i.e., the third world with ¾ world population(China has 1.1 billion population), is increasing; the second world too does not like war. Therefore the idea that “the war is inevitable” can be abandoned and the idea that the peace is the main trend can be promoted. He pointed out that “the genuine problem facing the world today, the problem of the global strategic importance, one is about peace, the other is about development.” 82

The third change was to abandon the standard of social system and ideology in international affairs. To speed up modernization and catch up Western developed countries. China began to open to outside, especially to the West. The willingness to learn from the West and to be integrated into the world economic system, formerly regarded as capitalist system, diminished the role of ideology. The diminishment ideology can also be seen from the so-called “one country two system” as reunification formula. The idea was put forwarded by Deng Xiaoping in September 1982 as a means of extending PRC sovereignty over HK, Macao and Taiwan, allowing different economic and political system, and the idea was passed by the National People’s Congress in December and added as Article 31 to the new constitution: "special administrative regions" may have different economic systems”. 83

The changes of Chinese foreign policy during the period reflected the conceptual changes of external differentiation and Chinese state and nation, i.e., the change from ideological to more pragmatic and national. Even after China was exposed to international condemnation over the Tiananmen massacre and after the collapse of the Soviet Union, China did not go back to take up the old ideological view. After the changes in the Soviet Union and the Eastern Europe, Deng pointed out in the post-cold war

80 Yahuda, (op. cit.) p.207. Also see, Su Ge, “Holding High the Banner of Deng Xiaoping’s Theory to Promote China’s Diplomacy into the Next Century”, The Contemporary International Relations(No.11, 1997), p.40
82 Deng Xiaoping, (op. cit.) p.105
era: “no matter what the world pattern will be, tri-polar, quodru-polar, penta-polar, whatever, “, “many of our judgment about the world affairs in the past are still sound and well-advised.” The view of “peace and development” made on the general trend of the new international situation is not outdated.84

The goals of Chinese foreign policy have departed from ideological ones to more pragmatic and realistic priorities, i.e., to create peaceful international environment for China’s development; to be Independent and self-reliant. The emphasis that state capacity and economic development are above everything else echoes the themes of modern Chinese nationalism over the hundred years, i.e., self-strengthening and national salvation.

As another aspect of modern nationalism, foremost importance is put on independence and sovereignty. Deng Xiaoping said that the “sovereignty issue is not an issue to be discussed”85; “State sovereignty and security should be always the first priority.” “some countries in the west use human rights, unreasonable and illegitimate social system as excuse, they actually damage our sovereignty”.86 He also said, ”independence and self-reliance, in past, present and future, was, is and will be our standing point. Chinese people cherish their right of independence and self-reliance which gain after long term struggle”.87

To champion the cause for the South and against hegemonism and the cause for the new world order88 put China back to a centric position in moral sense. Mentioning goal of Chinese foreign policy, Deng said, “there are two points in our foreign policy, the first is anti-hegemonism and power politics, to guard world peace. The second is to set up new international system and new economic pattern”.89

Facing the new international pattern in the post-cold war era, which in the Chinese view is largely dominated by the US and the west, China’s leaders claimed they have a moral responsibility to contribute to a just world order which is different from the present one. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European communism, Deng Xiaoping said “probably one cold war has ended, another two has started. One is against the whole south, the third world; the other is against socialism. Western countries are waging another smokeless the third world war. Smokeless refers to the socialist countries are made to have peaceful evolution.”90

84 Deng Xiaoping, (op. cit.) p.353.
85 Deng Xiaoping, (op. cit.) p.12.
86 Deng Xiaoping, (op. cit.) p.348.
87 Deng Xiaoping (op. cit.) p.3.
88 Since September 1988, Deng Xiaoping in many occasions porposed to the visiting foreign politicians, “(we) now need to set up a new international economic order, and also need to consider setting up new international political order.”, “...the general international situation is changing, every country is considering proper new policy and setting up new international order”, ...... the new international order in the post-cold war period envisioned by Chinese scholars in the book is an alternative to “the peace dominated by the US”. , See Shen Qurong, ed., The Issues on the New International Political Order (Current Affairs Press, 1991) pp.2, 4.
89 Deng Xiaoping, (op. cit.) p.353.
90 Deng Xiaoping, (op. cit.) p.344.
Therefore the nationalist ideas in Chinese foreign policies can be summarized as the following points. The first is the nationalist pride derived from history and culture; China as a great nation with long history and glorious culture. The second is the redemptionist attitude derived from modern Chinese nationalism and modern Chinese history: i.e., China should be accorded compensatory treatment from those powers which insulted or injured it in the past. The third point is that China, as a great nation of historical, cultural, economic and political importance, must be treated as a great power. China's national sovereignty must be respected absolutely, and such respect precludes and forcing criticism of China's internal politics. The fourth point is the claim to moral superiority. China's special virtue in international affairs consists in the fact that its foreign policy is based not on expediency but on immutable principles that express universal values such as justice and equity.

*New National Identity, New state Legitimation and Contradictions*

Chinese foreign policy changes correspond to the changed perception of the international world, i.e., changed external differentiation in terms of national identity. The international view of two camps, three world are both class-based analysis, the tripolarity strategic balance added more realist politics into the class politics, but after Chinese leaders publicly abandoned the role of political ideology in their foreign policy, the external differentiation was constructed on a cultural and an historical basis. Therefore it is not surprising that the thesis of cultural confrontation such as Huntington's thesis has been taken seriously by Chinese scholars in the circle of international studies. In particular the following points can be made: post-Cold War politics emphasize ethnic nationalism over ideology; modernization does not mean westernization. Those who are usually labeled as neo-authoritarianist and neo-conservativist scholars advocate Confucianism to restore moral values in the post-Communist China and cultural nationalism against the anti-Chinese intention of the west. Without ideology in Chinese foreign policies, the Chinese international united front strategy simply degenerated into an unprincipled realpolitik tool.

The new external differentiation for the cultural Chinese nation is the international hostility which is not just anti-Communist, but anti-Chinese in general. Cultural differentiation between the west and China is emphasized over the ideological difference. Chinese national ideas are at the same time

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associated with 5000-year, 100-year and 50-year nation, but the change is discernable that basis of Chinese nation changed from the political to cultural, from the basis of political state and political system to historical and cultural, with more emphasis on the past than the communist future. Chinese nation is more backward looking in the sense that Chinese identity depends more on the past than the future envisaged by the former political ideology.

With the external differentiation changed from ideological to cultural, Chinese self-identity also changes, from the nation bound by social system and ideology to the nation defined by common culture and history. The idea of one country two system, besides showing the lack of confidence in communist ideology, shows that the nationalist principle is more important than those of the political system and ideology. The implication lessens the credibility of the former political nation. The national idea based on common history and culture is reactionary in the sense that it in many ways reverses to the pre-communist Chinese national ideas, the idea of 5000-year nation in which Chinese is in the central position and non-Chinese in peripherals. According to the new culturally-based national idea, the future of non-Chinese peoples is no longer the disappearance into some supranational future identity but rather assimilation and becoming incorporated into the Chinese people. The Chinese state is no longer regarded as merely a vehicle for revolution, but an end itself and the Chinese nation is no longer regarded as an interim but as a permanent phenomenon with a historical destiny. The state with its nationalist legitimation become the external differentiation for the more alienated non-Chinese.

The legitimacy of China as a nation state also changes as the emphasis shifts from political basis to cultural basis, but the state legitimation shift is not completed yet, therefore Chinese state is still led by the CPC which cannot divorce itself from its ideological roots. In terms of the political nation, in theory, China as a socialist state was not an end itself but only a vehicle of interim nature for the ultimate end of Communism. The revolutionary state as revolutionary agent is justified by historical materialism. When Marxism-Leninism lost its appeal to Chinese, a more conventional approach has been used to justify Chinese state as a nation state. A state justified by other than communist ideology is meant to preserve physical peace and security for its citizens and their property against external or domestic disorder. A state is also meant to foster economic prosperity and security. Apart from the economic-political function, state has also spiritual functions. "State is supposed to provide its citizens with a source of pride, awe and idealism - or at least emotional and psychological satisfaction - a function that grows in importance when traditional religions are in relative decline". Therefore by becoming the most important source to provide emotional and psychological satisfaction for Chinese, Chinese nationalism replaces Communism and becomes an important part of Chinese state legitimation. And the new external differentiation related to Chinese nationalism is the part of state legitimation.

In Marxist-Leninist theory, national issue is not of ultimate importance, but of interim and tactical importance. Theoretically speaking, national culture, either Chinese or non-Chinese, does not have a place in the ideal society Chinese strove for. Therefore in the years of ideological fervor, there was comparatively more freedom for various interpretations of non-Chinese nationality’s past. They could somehow extol their own national heroes which were not necessarily Chinese national heroes. Chinese authority did not mind so much some non-Chinese dynasties to be called “alien dynasties” or “conquest dynasties” as it does now. The political nation is more inclusive a notion in terms of internal ethnic nationalities than the present nation in cultural and historical sense. In terms of handling domestic ethnic relations, Socialist nation appeared more confident and forward-looking the backward-looking cultural nation.

Assimilation or integration of non-Chinese was carried out in a supranational name - Marxist theory of social progress. When the cultural and ethnic side are emphasized, the traditional justification is not supranational, but straightforward assimilationist, without the intellectual content of the political ideology. Historical and cultural Chinese nation is more challenging and antagonistic to internal ethnic nationalism. There is more room for non-Chinese identities in the Chinese nation based on political ideology than in the nation bounded by history and culture. Some Chinese scholars already expressed the view that non-Chinese nationalities form an inconvenient factor for present Chinese nationalism which in their view is vital for the state stability and future in the post-Communist China.95

Chinese nationalism is indeed restricted by the tensions between the different national ideas, i.e., the one associated mainly with the political state after 1949, and the one in traditional sense, mainly associated with history and culture. By emphasizing the historical and cultural Chinese nation, China can claim Hong Kong and Taiwan as part of Chinese nation and thus as part of Chinese nation state. Any attempt of Hong Kong to claim separate international identity and attempt of Taiwan nationalists to claim separate nation is contradictory to this idea of historical and cultural nation held by Chinese, i.e., the national idea linked with 5000-year Chinese nation and 100-year Chinese nation.

The Chinese communist government’s appealing to the Chinese in Hong Kong, Taiwan and overseas who were formerly regarded as being outside, or at least in the periphery of, the Chinese people(ren min), was part of the so-called united front policy, which was a revolutionary tactics, a means rather than an end. As the identity of the Chinese nation has shifted from its class basis to a cultural and historical basis, the appeal to those outside(or in the periphery of) the class nation can no longer be regarded as a part of the united front policy as the CCP still pretends. This is because it is no longer a means to a revolutionary goal. The goal Chinese government envisioned beyond all the present united

front work is no longer a communist society, or the eventual success of communist system in Hong Kong or Taiwan when it is some day reunited with the mainland China.

Deng Xiaoping and Chinese government made it clear that one country two systems would remain a long-term basic state policy. When the CCP no longer emphasized the communist society as its goal but instead a stronger and prosperous Chinese nation state disregarding its social system, it was more than a "compromise of principle", as what Lenin said on united front policy. By doing so, Deng Xiaoping postphoned the realization of Communism into the very distant future. Though Communism was not abandoned by Deng Xiaoping as a goal altogether, it is no longer a practical goal to be reached in the foreseeable future. Chinese business tycoons from Hong Kong, formerly regarded as big bourgeoisie or compradore, now are welcomed by the CCP as great patriots and some of them are even appointed to leading positions in the National People's Congress.

The tension between the cultural nation and political nation in increasing and it is a problem for Chinese state to accommodate the different national ideas, i.e., 5000-year, 100-year and 50-year Chinese nation, esp. when China is regarded as a nation state.

After 1949, rhetorically Chinese nationalism against non-Chinese peoples was condemned as Han Chauvinism by the CCP and the legitimacy of the political state including non-Chinese was built on the negation of the pre-Communist nationalism. The CCP regarded itself as the eliminator of the previous Chinese oppression and the liberator of all nationalities in China. In the post-Communist period when Chinese nationalism is increasingly relied upon as a means of state legitimation, new external differentiation of the international world is constructed as in non-ideological terms, e.g., conflicts between national interests, cultural confrontation, the west versus China.

The cultural Chinese nation and its new external differentiation alienate non-Chinese peoples. In 100-year national idea, non-Chinese as an outside contrast of Chinese identity was already internalized in front of the western imperialism and colonialism as the new external differentiation. In the idea of 50-year political nation, non-Chinese difference from Chinese is blurred by the ideology of common future and class interests. Now with the cultural and historical emphasis in Chinese national ideas and the new external differentiation for Chinese nationalism, it is a tendency that non-Chinese nationalism is again externalized since China as a nation state can not accommodate the two contradictory national ideas, political nation and cultural nation at the same time.

97 For systematic description of this China versus with views expressed by Chinese scholars, see, Suisheng Zhao, "Chinese Intellectuals' Quest for National Greatness and Nationalistic Writing in 1990s", The China Quarterly (Winter 1997)
At first, the resurgence of non-Chinese nationalism is usually identified as a historically consistent hostility against Chinese because Chinese authority tends to regard the present non-Chinese nationalism in a historical view rather than to understand it by the current changes, i.e. discrepancies in the regional development between Chinese inland and non-Chinese areas, resurgence of traditional Chinese nationalism, etc.. Secondly, in a horizontal way, non-Chinese nationalism has always been regarded by Chinese as being linked with the wider international hostile forces and international conspiracies against Chinese nation. Chinese authority is always ready to believe there are foreign links in the major non-Chinese nationalism such as Tibetan, Uighur or Inner Mongolian.

Formerly the nationality problem was regarded as the contradictions within people(ren min nei bu mao dun) and only class struggle was regarded as a contradiction with the enemy(di wo mao dun), Chinese nationalism has two different dimensions in terms of the two contradictions. The former is inward nationalism, the superior attitude towards non-Chinese peoples; the latter is the outward nationalism which shows an redemptionist attitude toward the capitalist and imperialist west. Now with the two contradictions blurred, the two dimensions of Chinese nationalism tend to merge into one. This Chinese nationalism based on historical and cultural belief is less tolerant to non-Chinese nationalism, and as the external differentiation for non-Chinese nationalism, it is the main cause behind the resurgence of non-Chinese nationalism.
CONCLUSION

Central Question

Since China's reform began in 1979, socio-political changes initiated by the reform have led to a revival of modern Chinese nationalism that now draws on traditional attributes. At the same time there has been a resurgence of Mongolian nationalism. The rising Mongolian nationalism poses challenges to Chinese state legitimacy as Chinese state legitimacy more and more relies upon nationalist justifications.

Historical Method

Modern Mongolian nationalism in China and Mongol-Chinese relations cannot be fully understood without exploring the complex inter-relationship between the Mongols and the Chinese state in history. Mongolian self-rule, the struggle for autonomy, and the titular regional autonomy in history have been reviewed to show that the resurgence of Mongolian nationalism has been partly caused by the deterioration of the political and economic situation of Mongols in China.

1. CONTRIBUTIONS

The thesis aims to provide an insight into how ethnic nationalism of Mongols in China challenges the legitimacy of a multi-ethnic Chinese State, and how the ethnic nationalism at sub-state level can have international implications.

To understand those issues, I use the concept of external differentiation. Together with other major explanations of nationalism, my approach is to analyze nationalism in 4 dimensions, i.e., how nationalism is understood by its historical roots, ideologies about a common future, internal mechanisms of social and economic rationalism, a sense of external differentiation.

Problems in the Reform Period

China's transition towards a market economy since 1979 has created many problems: an increased development gap and inequality between different regions and within regions. Economic change has sabotaged the previous structures of community without replacing them with new ones. Another problem is that the transition of a communist economy to a market economy exposes a vacuum in state sectors which has led to both extensive and epidemic official corruption, social unemployment, and dislocations. Against this background there continues to be a deepening deterioration of the Mongolian economic and political situation.
Ideological and Legitimacy Shift

During the period of reform, the political ideal of a socialist nation that had provided a framework for promoting the integration of ethnic and non-ethnic Chinese in the early years of the People’s Republic was weakened. The decline of Marxist ideology has reduced the supranational nature of Chinese statehood with the result that the formal identity of the Chinese state has become more nationalistic. In this sense China has changed from being a supra-national empire to a nationalist state.

In opposition to the ideal of socialist unity, the old traditional view has re-emerged. According to this, the identity of the Chinese nation is defined principally by the cultural, ethnic, and historical ties that bind the Chinese people together in the state.

During the period of reform since 1979, an important shift occurred in the basis of state legitimacy of the Chinese State is claimed. This shift paralleled the decline in significance of Communist ideology both in China and the world as a whole and the corresponding rise of Chinese nationalism officially designated as “patriotism”.

“Ai guo zhu yi”, patriotism, is Chinese state nationalism used as a state legitimization principle with emphasis upon the state rather than upon the nation: Since all peoples live in one state, therefore they are of one nation, and by the nationalist principle, they should be loyal to state.

Since this view is dominated by the perspectives and interests of the Han Chinese, the developments since the beginning of the reforms have combined to weaken the authority that the Chinese government has exercised over what the Chinese call “national minorities” (shao shu min zu). This weakening of authority has resulted in the more overt use of force, which shows power of coercion replacing political authority.

These developments have shaped the re-emergence of Mongolian nationalism in China, which in turn has challenged aspects of the basis of statehood as asserted by China’s Communist party rulers.

Changes in Chinese State Legitimization

The question of Chinese state legitimacy involves the changing relationship between Chinese nationalism and Chinese statehood, and how the changes in the justification of Chinese state authority
affect Mongolian nationalism.

The autonomy of Inner Mongolia in the 1950s was relatively more acceptable to Mongols since it was based on the Soviet influenced doctrine of the CCP, with Ulanhu as a Mongolian leader who was acceptable to Beijing. In the beginning there was a possibility of establishing some meaningful national autonomy in Inner Mongolia, i.e., recognition of Mongolian rights in local government, the economy and cultural affairs in Inner Mongolia, but the leftist policy and the Cultural Revolution destroyed that chance.

The leftist policies from late 50s obliterated Mongolian rights emphasized in earlier periods and emphasized a supra-national ideology.

The Chinese government of the reform period after the cultural revolution continued to ignore the interests and the demands of minorities in Inner Mongolia. With the former ideology declining, the Chinese government failed to introduce a new supra-nationality and all encompassing ideology. The legitimacy of the Chinese state, apart from Marxist justifications, relies more and more on national ideas with more historical and cultural meaning. At the same time, occasionally during the reform period, Mongols and other non-Chinese peoples have had more opportunities to express their grievances and dissatisfactions.

More active non-Chinese nationalism during the period, highlights the legitimacy problems of China arising from its character as a multi-ethnic state. Chinese state legitimacy relies more and more on national and cultural standards rather than the former political ideology. The legitimacy problems and rising non-Chinese nationalism illustrates the problems and dilemma facing many post-communist countries searching for new political legitimacy. With all of its flaws the Soviet example provided a model for integration, the nationalist and market driven approach of the reform period is assimilationist. The former allowed a degree of space for non Chinese nationalities, the latter allows little or none.

Dual Principles in State Legitimacy

Because legitimacy and illegitimacy are not matters to be quantified, it is difficult to find a point beyond which legitimacy becomes illegitimacy. Like a sinking boat, there may be some crucial moment before and after, when people on the boat would make totally different decisions on whether to abandon ship or not. The same can also be said of people’s judgement of state legitimacy. Nevertheless, it is possible to list certain conditions to qualify the matter of legitimacy or illegitimacy. Mongolian nationalism, among other non-Chinese nationalism, highlights some conceptual weaknesses of Chinese state legitimacy.

Chinese state legitimacy has many origins: the imperial legacy, the nationalist past and Marxist ideological influences. For example, Chinese state nationalism partly originates from the sino-centric
past and culturalism\(^1\), assimilation before 1949 and it also finds justification in historical materialism.

The Chinese reform period witnesses a transition from the ideological politics of state to nationalist politics. China as a multi-ethnic state is increasingly pretending to be a nation state by reinforcing a common Chinese national identity. Of course there are still theoretical ambiguities which become confused in nationality policies and theories, hence the Chinese state is regarded as both a multi-ethnic state, and a nation state on different occasions. Positive nationalism is helpful to the legitimacy of a nation state, but detrimental to the legitimacy of a multi-ethnic state as far as minorities are concerned.

As both a nation state and a multi-ethnic state, China's state legitimacy relies on nationalist principles and democratic principles at the same time. The nationalist principle is about a single Chinese nation encompassing all different peoples in the PRC, and the democratic principle is about all the different ethnic groups being equal citizens. But the idea of a single Chinese nation meets the challenge from negative non-Chinese nationalism, and the claim to provide equal representation to all ethnic groups is also contested on democratic and liberal grounds.

National principles are cultural and historical, while democratic and liberal principles neither historical nor cultural. Yet they are interrelated. For example, strong Chinese nationalism makes the Chinese more tolerant of a lack of political representation and personal freedom when Chinese authorities try to champion a nationalist cause. Positive nationalism supporting state legitimacy really fends off democratic and liberal principles. On the other hand, the lack of political representation also alienates not only non-Chinese, but some Chinese as well. As the Chinese economy is more integrated into the world market, Chinese nationalism will meet more pressure.

Negative nationalism as an opposition, has allied itself with democratic and liberal principles to challenge positive nationalism, for example in IM, and other areas of non-Chinese nationalism, the Dalai Lama is more associated with democratic and liberal principles than supposedly more progressive Chinese communism.

Two Types Of Nationalism In State Legitimization

However, nationalism as a legitimization principle is a two-pronged sword. While nationalism can be used to justify state legitimacy, it can be also used to defy a state and justify a separatist movement.

The imposed national identity can evoke both positive(supporting) and negative(defying) responses

from different ethnic groups. Chinese nationalism is positive in the sense that it supports a Chinese national identity and justifies statehood. Non-Chinese nationalism, usually intensified by the attempted imposition of a Chinese identity, is negative in the sense that it denies Chinese identity.

While Chinese nationalism and Mongolian nationalism are in constant conflict, the former upholds a unitary concept of Chinese statehood, and the Mongolians reject Chinese view of them and their history and therefore by implication their concept of statehood. While Chinese nationalism, since its beginning in modern history, is associated with various political ideologies that share in common the striving to establish a powerful and modern Chinese state, a unified and powerful Chinese nation including all non-Chinese peoples has always been the basis of statehood. Hence Chinese nationalism is assimilationist.

Both ancient Chinese political thinking about statehood and modern nationalist ideas (even including Chinese communism with its nationalist bent) emphasize strong state authority. Throughout history, Confucianism has been utilized by ruling dynasties to extol the virtue of their subjects’ obedience and loyalty towards the monarchy. Modern nationalist thinking, initially motivated by self-strengthening ideals and competitiveness between western imperialist powers, also emphasizes a strong and powerful state, which sometimes worships state power so much that it resembles European fascism.²

The National ideals of Mongols rely heavily on the history of independent Mongolian powers, especially the empire started by Genghis Khan, which historically was in conflict and confrontation with the Chinese dynasties. In pre-nationalist times, Mongolian self-consciousness as a cultural and ethnic group was strengthened by external differentiation provided by Chinese Ming and Manchu Qing. Examples: Modern Mongolian nationalism in Mongolian independence in 1911 was also related to the external differentiation provided by either Manchu Qing or Czarist Russia.

Throughout history, the Mongolian group identity was often a negative or reactive identity in the sense that it was opposed to the identity of an imposing alien group. Mongolian nationalism in China is especially related to, and can be regarded as, a reaction to Chinese influence and assimilation. The rising Mongolian nationalism in the period of Chinese reform is a reaction towards the increasingly manifested Chinese nationalism and towards a China that increasingly relies on Chinese nationalist ideas to justify itself. Mongolian nationalism promotes a view of pluralism in nature and differs from Chinese assimilationist view, thus Chinese leaders regard it as a threat.

International Outlook

The relationship between Nationalism and state legitimacy arguably has been an important source of tension in international relations since the 19th Century. But it has acquired even greater saliency in the 1990s following the end of the cold war. Most international conflicts have stemmed from intra-state rather than inter-state wars. And these conflicts have hinged on which national groups has the right to exercise state power or what should be the territorial basis for new states upon the break-up of multi-national states.

These issues have acquired greater significance. Firstly, because the end of bipolarity has removed the constraints exercised by great powers involvement in local conflicts. Secondly, the collapse of Communism as an alternative economic system and as radical ideology has removed a system that once ever-rove national divisions for many of the Eurasian peoples.

China too has not been exempt from these changing currents. The increasing nationalistic basis on which the identity of the Chinese people is based, together with the problems this raises in regard to Hong Kong and Taiwan, have profound implications for the international identity of the Chinese state. Consequently, the way in which Chinese “national minorities” have emerged as a problem within China also has clear international implications.

In the international environment, Mongolian nationalism fits into the general trend in post-communist states agenda, i.e., raising nationalism following the abandonment of communist ideology. Moreover, Mongolian nationalism has implications for China’s foreign relations with other countries of Northeast Asia, especially in the post-cold war era.

Having witnessed the collapse of the Soviet Union and East European communist bloc, an inevitable question is whether China will follow the example of the former Soviet Union; Whether Mongolian nationalism, together with other non-Chinese nationalism, can pose a feasible challenge to Chinese state.

Nationality issues in China are different in many ways. As far as Mongols are concerned, they now account for only 3.56 million among 23 million people in Inner Mongolia (The population of the Mongolian People’s Republic is 2,096,5003). Considering the fact that many Chinese are registered as

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Mongols to enjoy some “benefits” allowed to minorities, the avoidance of the one-child policy in particular, the real number of Mongols is actually smaller. Therefore prospects of secessionism for Mongolian nationalism are small, and because of their small population, even a meaningful autonomy for the Mongols is doubtful.

But considering the existing problems of Chinese statehood, if Mongolian nationalism persists, it then contributes to the weakening of the Chinese state, because the leaders of the Chinese state cannot construct a legitimate public philosophy which can accommodate peoples such as Mongols. In this sense, the Chinese state remains an empire rather than a nation-state or a true multi-national state.

Moreover, Mongolian nationalism, like other non-Chinese nationalism such as Tibetan and Uyghur, questions state policy and asks for diversity. All these contribute to the diversification and disintegration tendency in the statehood and nationhood of China.

It is also possible that Chinese economic development could provide further chances for Mongolian nationalism. As China joins the WTO, and Chinese society is more subject to a legal framework and international conventions, Mongols and other non-Chinese minorities would have more chances to realize some of their demands in education, liberal rights and more autonomy.

This gives China’s leaders a sense of vulnerability and makes them fear the implications of the Kosovo crisis, i.e. international intervention in the ethnic affairs of a sovereign state in name of human rights. Non-Chinese nationalism, such as Tibetan, Uighur and Mongolian, in a sense would become a contributory factor in undermining the Chinese state. China’s leaders’ sense of vulnerability was added to by non-Chinese nationalism in peripheral areas such as Tibet, Xinjiang and even Inner Mongolia. This suggests that the problems of Chinese statehood come from within, not from without.

2. SUMMARY

Method: 4 Dimensions

Various theories on nationalism range from the intellectual and ideological origins, historical conditions and socio-economic mechanism. These different theories can be categorized as studying 3 dimensions of nationalism, i.e., a sense of a common past provided by historical explanations, sometimes a sense of common future and fate by intellectual and ideological approaches, and some inner mechanism of a nation provided by socio-economic models, especially a functionalist approach. I found it is extremely useful to add another dimension to those 3 dimensions, i.e., external differentiation which is vital to national consciousness and national identity.

The sense of external differentiation is vital for both Mongolian nationalism and Chinese nationalism.
Chinese perception of the international world provides a vital external differentiation for Chinese nationalism, and modern Chinese nationalism gives Mongolian nationalism a sense of external differentiation. By the same approach we can better understand the international implications of sub-state ethnic nationalism.

Chapter Summary
The chapters are arranged to show the four dimensions of both Chinese and Mongolian nationalism.

The 2nd chapter looks at the two dimensions (past and external) of Chinese nation and the transformation from historical nation to modern nation. I have disputed the common Chinese view that the continued existence of a Chinese nation since ancient times is an objective fact.

Chinese and Mongols view both their own and others' history very differently and hence, their respective accounts of a historical relationship also differ. Nationalism needs an "invented tradition"\(^5\), and a common past is invented to justify modern nationalism. The modern Chinese nation can be regarded as a constructed entity based on certain historical and cultural roots. The invented and regenerated Chinese culture and tradition involve particular interpretations of history, national heroes, ethnic relations in history, etc..

In the same way, modern Mongolian nationalism also links itself with the pre-modern history of independent Mongolian powers. In the 3rd chapter, Mongolian views of history and historical ethnic relations are presented which differ from the standard Chinese view. 1911 Mongolian independence traced its origin to Mongolian independence in the pre-Manchu period.\(^6\) Even in Communist China, the enlargement of IMAR was related by Ulanhu to Mongolian unification in history.\(^7\)

Apart from their association with the past, both Chinese and Mongolian nationalism in the 1940s and 1950s were strengthened by a strong sense of a shared future, especially by their close association with Communism. Communism added ideological politics into nationalism to convince people of a common future and destiny. The 4th chapter shows how Mongolian nationalism and Chinese Communism accommodated each other and autonomy as a result of the compromise of the two different political principles.

Elie Kedourie used the term "ideological politics" in contrast to constitutional politics. He defined

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\(^7\) Ulanhu's speech at the founding ceremony of the Joint Committee of Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement, Archive Collection Of The Joint Committee Of Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement (Archive Press, 1989) p.19.
ideological politics as "concerned with establishing a state of affairs in society and state such that everyone, as they say in old-fashioned novels, will live happily ever after".8

In the past a human commonwealth was envisaged in Confucian classics⁹, in modern times a communist society free of all human evils was envisaged by the Chinese communists, according to which Chinese and non-Chinese relations in a future society would be so harmonious that the ethnic and national borders were no longer necessary.

Mongolian communists, under either Russian or Chinese influence, envisaged a picture in which their powerful neighbors, either Chinese or Russians, were transformed not only into harmless neighbors, but also into unselfish friends by supra-national class solidarity.

The 5th chapter explains why Mongolian nationalism experienced a rise in the period of reform from 1978 when some fundamental ideological changes took place in China, i.e., the rise of Chinese nationalism and decline of Communist ideology in Chinese politics. Chinese nationalism and communist ideology both play important parts in modern Chinese nation building. In terms of incorporating a multi-ethnic state, communist ideology is vital to providing some common political ground for the construction of the new Chinese nation in a political sense. The decline of communism is also diminishing the already weak common ground shared by Chinese nationalism and Mongolian nationalism. The rise of Chinese nationalism incites more antagonism amongst Mongols by reminding them of the more ostensibly oppressive Chinese nationalism in pre-1949 period.

The alleged Chinese nation also needs to be supported by some inherent mechanism which is invented on the basis of some historical and cultural evidence to justify the togetherness and uniqueness of the nation.

Apart from finding a common past and "invented tradition", the Marxist view on social development and the liberal view on social progress were used to support the concept of the Chinese nation. Despite their different views concerning the social agent that will lead to the emergence of a universal identity, Marxists and liberals agree on the prospect of a final international identity beyond nation and state. Hence both the above views regard the Chinese national identity in nature is at an interim stage of social and historical development.

The functionalist view by contrast, that has predominated since 1978, finds an inherent mechanism behind the Chinese nation in the historical, territorial and social dimensions of China. According to

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9 Confucius, "Chapter Hongfan", Shangshu Jiyi (Shu King), ed. by Qu Wanli (Lianjing Publishing Co(Lian Jing Shiye Chuban Gongsi), 1983) p.120.
the functionalist view, all different ethnic peoples both in history and in the present PRC are all bound together by a rational mechanism such as the need for development and economic necessities. Accordingly, the Chinese nation is regarded as a perennial phenomenon that has survived from a very remote and distant past to an infinite future, hence obviously there is no room in this view for social progress and revolution which would finally erase ethnic and national differences.

The 6th chapter in a larger time scale and an international scope provides different external differentiation's for different concepts of the Chinese nation, i.e., 5000-year Chinese nation, 100-year Chinese nation and the 50-year political nation.

To envisage an external differentiation is also vital for both Chinese nationalism and Mongolian nationalism. Again, the above elements, both historical and political ideologies as well as the claim to an inherent uniqueness can be used to justify an outside contrast. The external differentiation for nationalism, which varies at different times, can be a foreign nation, culture and civilization consisting of a group of countries. For most of modern history, the Chinese nation and state have served as an important external differentiation for Mongolian nationalism. The modern state system, especially industrialized western powers, were the external differentiation for modern Chinese nationalism.
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