Foreign Policy in Global Information Space: Actualising Soft Power

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ABSTRACT

The contemporary practice of the internal-external divide in foreign policy is being challenged by globalization's non-territorial logic. This challenge is reformulated as information globalization: a border-crossing trend of social exposure to alternative ideas jointly precipitated by the global reach of information and communication technologies, global capitalism, and post-Cold War geopolitical fluidity. The agents and processes associated with it confound any orderly delineation of 'the foreign'. This can be understood as an ideational threat to the nation-state in terms of generating a public 'global information space' that reopens all borders to political struggle. For the nation-state to survive in this space, a reformulation of foreign policy as discourse is needed.

This thesis argues that the ideational, in the form of information, is endowed with power relations in spite of its abstraction, hence creating a tangible enough 'target' for 'offence/defence' by foreign policy. In this regard, information is defined as the socially patterned relationship of events and symbols capable of politically inducing action, identity or community. Thus 'soft power', or the ability to produce outcomes through attraction instead of coercion, becomes a central focus of this examination of informational challenges to statist foreign policy. Two central research questions are posed. Firstly, how can foreign policy defend or project statist political communities using soft power within a global information space? Secondly, does soft power, when exercised in turn by non-state actors, affect foreign policy by undermining statist community within the same global information space? An answer to the first question is to actualise soft power through forms of Leadership, whether from 'Inside-Out' or 'Outside-In', which are derived from domestically proven communitarian discourses worthy of emulation abroad. Alternatively soft power can be
exercised by non-state actors to the detriment of state interests through processes I label the 'Intermestic Correlation of Forces', 'Socialisation' and the 'Demonstration of Ideas'. In this second hypothesis, foreign policy retains relevance by learning to accommodate itself to the demands of external parties with interests in the welfare of domestic political constituencies. Exercising soft power in this sense is a conflation of the international and the domestic (intermestic) spheres. The case studies of Singaporean and Chilean foreign policies respectively provide analytical illustrations of both hypotheses.
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It is an irony that, in spite of the existence of information and communication technologies that amplify transmission and reception, the following work was conceived in an artificial monastic environment. 11 McAuley Close (off Cosser Street, I might add) was my ‘academic monastery’ facilitating meditations on the mysteries of globalization for the better part of the four years I have spent in London. While nowhere comparable to the tranquillity of Hampstead Heath, McAuley Close was an oasis for observation, cocooned by the sound of children’s games and the banter of families in a triangular field, and separated from Big Ben and the rumble of Waterloo trains by two apartment blocks.

However, reality was such that global penetrations could not be prevented from filtering into my world through the Internet, the television, and the loud headlines of the broadsheets. Outside the tranquillity of seclusion, politics was being speeded up and liberated, while Political Man retained conservative notions of identity and power. Real battles of ideals and truths were being fought in global spaces by individuals and collectives inverting roles across boundaries. My task was to unravel the web-like crossings of the lines of power being exercised. While some may deny the role of power in globalized politics, I had my senses trained on this old fissure. The fruit of meditating the world has been this volume. My honours list of gratitude extends geographically as follows:

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ALAN CHONG
London, United Kingdom
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<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>AFDD</td>
<td>Association of the Relatives of the Detained and Disappeared (Chile)</td>
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<td>AFP</td>
<td>Agence France-Presse</td>
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<td>AI</td>
<td>Amnesty International</td>
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<td>AM</td>
<td>Amplitude Modulation</td>
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<td>AP</td>
<td>Associated Press</td>
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<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (Forum)</td>
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<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<td>ASEM</td>
<td>Asia-Europe Meeting</td>
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<td>BBC SWB</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation Summary of World Broadcasts</td>
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<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>CNN</td>
<td>Cable News Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMECON</td>
<td>Council for Mutual Economic Assistance</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EXIM (Bank)</td>
<td>Export-Import Bank</td>
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<td>FM</td>
<td>Frequency Modulation</td>
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<td>FPA</td>
<td>Foreign Policy Analysis</td>
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<td>G-8</td>
<td>Group of Eight Industrial Countries</td>
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<td>GATT</td>
<td>General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade</td>
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<td>IACHR</td>
<td>Interamerican Commission on Human Rights</td>
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<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<td>ICF</td>
<td>Intermestic Correlation of Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>ICTs</td>
<td>Information and Communication Technologies</td>
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<td>IS</td>
<td>Intermestic Socialisation</td>
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<td>IHT</td>
<td>International Herald Tribune</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>Information Technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>ITT</td>
<td>International Telephone and Telegraph Company</td>
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<td>LIO</td>
<td>Leadership Inside-Out</td>
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<td>LOI</td>
<td>Leadership Outside-In</td>
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<td>MDED</td>
<td>Multipolar Direct Emulation through Demonstration</td>
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<tr>
<td>MERCOSUR</td>
<td>Southern Cone Common Market (Latin America)</td>
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<td>MFN</td>
<td>Most Favoured Nation</td>
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<td>MNC</td>
<td>Multinational Corporation</td>
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<td>MORI</td>
<td>Media Opinion Research Institute</td>
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<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
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<td>MW</td>
<td>Medium Wave</td>
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<td>NAFTA</td>
<td>North American Free Trade Area</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>NEFOs</td>
<td>Newly Emerging Forces</td>
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<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organisations</td>
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<td>NIC</td>
<td>Newly Industrialising Country</td>
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<td>NIEO</td>
<td>New International Economic Order</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>NWICO</td>
<td>New World Information and Communication Order</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>PIDH</td>
<td>Proyecto Internacional de Derechos Humanos (Britain and Chile)</td>
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<td>SCP</td>
<td>Singapore Cooperation Programme</td>
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<td>SEZs</td>
<td>Special Economic Zones</td>
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<td>SMD</td>
<td>Singapore Model of Development</td>
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<td>ST</td>
<td>The Straits Times (Singapore)</td>
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<td>The Straits Times Interactive (Singapore)</td>
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<td>STWE</td>
<td>The Straits Times Weekly Edition (Singapore)</td>
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<td>SW</td>
<td>Short Wave</td>
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<td>TAC</td>
<td>Treaty of Amity and Cooperation</td>
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<td>TCTP</td>
<td>Third Country Training Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>TNC</td>
<td>Transnational Corporation (treated synonymously as Multinational Corporation)</td>
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<td>UK</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UPI</td>
<td>United Press International</td>
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<td>VSIP</td>
<td>Vietnam-Singapore Industrial Park</td>
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INTRODUCTION:
A NEW ENVIRONMENT FOR FOREIGN POLICY — THE NATION-STATE, GLOBALIZATION, AND INFORMATION

The Conceptual Confrontation Between Nation-State Foreign Policy and Globalization

To define any space as foreign is to demarcate the simultaneous categories of the inside and the outside. The state in world history evolved its existence through the consistent legitimisation of borders that facilitate the creation of identity, security and welfare for inhabitants within them. At the same time, this enclosure of a particular set of goods excludes the depredations and burdens of ‘excess’ amounts of people, territory and threats to security. This separation of the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ has never been static as leaders and populations within pre-existing historical states have tried to shift their boundaries according to real and perceived ideas of optimum need satisfaction.

Globalization as a concept and late-modern phenomenon threatens the relative autonomy of states’ agency in controlling their boundaries. This thesis proposes to treat globalization as a particular set of processes which are caused by autonomous, development-oriented and state-produced agents, such as non-state actors and regimes, as well as by state-instruments themselves, which result in spatial and temporal transformations of nation-state parameters of social power and action, in the course of which consciousness of the globe as a whole is intensifying.¹ Globalization is thus the becoming of the global due to processes set in motion by the development of the state towards the total envelopment of terrestrial space into a connected whole where the identity, security and welfare needs of mankind tend towards a common problématique inviting common solutions. There is a transformation of problem-solving space here: ‘the common’ is regarded less viable as the nation-state; it is instead a common

¹
space for outsiders, near and far, to legitimise their inputs on functional and ideological grounds. The re-territorialisation of the state towards the global began with European imperialism, and has been accelerated by developments in political, social, economic and scientific innovation.

It was only in the 1990s, particularly with the demise of the Cold War that the tension between the global and the jigsaw-like international diversity of nation-state units mounted cumulatively and visibly as issues of ‘humanitarian intervention’, ‘new nationalisms’, ‘secessionism’, ‘universalisation of human rights’, ‘migrant and child labour exploitation’, ‘illegal immigration’, ‘good governance’, ‘capital flows’ and ‘financial fraud’. These are signposts of the tensions wrought by globalization on existing centres of authority and power. Inevitably traditional etatiste foundations of foreign policy have become contested in the present and will be more so in the future so long as globalization proceeds unrelentingly. To survive, foreign policy needs to comprehend the challenge of globalization. At the core of globalization lies an ideational foundation, particularly amplified by late twentieth century information and communication technologies, in which the globe as a political and ideological space comes about when it is produced and reproduced, voluntarily or involuntarily, into social modes that privilege the intervention of outsiders in national spheres (Waters 1995, 8-10; Spybey 1996, 5-11). In this line of thinking, idea change produces policy and activity change; hence existing communitarian modes find their rationale challenged.

It will be argued in this thesis that the ideational is endowed with power relations in spite of its abstraction, hence creating a tangible challenge to foreign policy. The

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conceptualisation of ‘soft power’ as the ability to produce outcomes through attraction instead of coercion (Nye Jr. 1990a, 31; 1990b, 166; 1999b, 24-25) is integral to the central research question: how can foreign policy defend or project statist political communities using soft power to articulate their particular existence in the information space opened up by globalization? And as a corollary: how can soft power exercised in turn by non-state actors affect foreign policy within the same global information space?

This thesis sets itself apart from most other works in the rapidly mushrooming nexus of globalization and International Relations (Luard 1990; Camilleri and Falk 1992; McGrew et al. 1992; Scholte 1993; Rosenau 1997a; Clark 1997; Clark 1999; Youngs 2000) by addressing the ideational challenge of globalization to the nation-state in terms of ‘global information space’. It argues for a reformulation of foreign policy strategy, in terms of two soft power foreign policy hypotheses. The working assumption is that operative abstractions such as the global are likely to place individuals and their constructed modes of organisation under logical strain when they do not conform to centuries-old modes of territorial practice. Yet it is equally probable that these same human subjects of strain will be compelled to re-examine notions of community. Community, in this context, encompasses specifying identity, interests and normative existence. By acting to distort the foreign, globalization’s special effects may ironically provoke new ways of thinking through complex coalitions of identity and interests, or through ever-deepening forms of communitarian bonds against a recast image of the foreign. By deductive and interpretative methods, subsequent chapters will discuss how globalization-competent foreign policy processes may operate as ‘leadership inside-out and outside-in’, and as the ‘intermestic politics of foreign policy’. Leadership inside-out and outside-in means the translation of domestically-derived practices
into ideas for foreign policy usage. The intermestic politics of foreign policy refer to the making of foreign policy within a complex environment where political inputs can be made by other state and non-state actors due to permeable boundaries. These hypotheses take into account both the empowerment and weakening of political constituencies by information flow and will be illustrated by the cases of Singaporean foreign policy and the Asian Values Debate 1992-99, and Chilean foreign policy and the Pinochet Extradition Controversy 1998-2000.

**Approach and Method: Inquiring the New International Environment for Soft Power Foreign Policy**

The building blocks behind the foreign policy agency studied in this enterprise are 'people'—human subjects who possess will, imagination and biases. They seldom function as uni-dimensional elements with universally fixed properties. The 'people', as the 'social' in social science, possess a behavioural agency which they may impute to themselves, being totally unanticipated by the social scientist. This intrinsic affliction of social science is treated not by comparing its results against the falsifiability and universal law tests of the natural and physical sciences, but by the standard of elementary science. Social science stands upon its ability to identify its subject matter, to develop taxonomy out of phenomena, and to explain the occurrence of the latter (Lessnoff 1974, 32).

Consider the human elements behind the ingredients of the new international environment. The nation-state is built upon the 'hearts and minds' of the inhabitants who either decide their governance collectively, or in deference to authoritarian elites. Both
decision-making forms define, on behalf of an imputed general will or other noble sanction, the direction and pace of manipulating or closing boundaries of interaction with the foreign. Globalization, as defined earlier, is a set of processes that are directly produced by human agents, or are indirect consequences of actions by the same. Globalization’s effects in turn impact upon practices of the human agents who caused them in the first place. Causality is naturally imprecise because the trajectories of nation-states and globalizing processes are collective resultants of mass human behaviour. The ‘hearts and minds’ factor in decision-making is synonymous with the subjective production and interpretation of information for planning and acting.

In the light of these human factors, this thesis will employ qualitative analysis, an approach aimed at documenting ‘the richness and diversity of meanings people attribute to phenomena.’ (Holdaway 2000, 166) In sum, it is an exercise in deduction and interpretation to account for the agency of foreign policy vis-à-vis the structures of its environment. Deduction will be defined as firstly ‘the action or result of tracing out or setting forth in order; a detailed narration or account.’ Secondly, it is ‘the process of deducing or drawing a conclusion from a principle already known or assumed;...[and] inference by reasoning from generals to particulars.’ (OED 1989, 358) As a close methodological cousin, interpretation refers to the explanation of how social reality is constructed and perpetuated. Postmodern analysis à la Michel Foucault, Gianni Vattimo and Jean-Francois Lyotard, involving textual readings and deconstruction of discourse is included in interpretation (Gubrium and Holstein 2000).

The task of the next three chapters is to analyse how globalization and its theorising, along with information flow, jointly impact upon the statist foundations of foreign policy. Chapter 1 will deduce globalization’s ideational threat to the state and indicate the inadequacies of mainstream scholarship on globalization in treating its consequences for foreign policy. Structuration theory will be introduced to illuminate the relevance of foreign policy. Anthony Giddens’ structuration theory, as an underlying framework for the whole thesis, offers particular advantages in explaining globalization’s impact on statist foreign policy because it accounts for how ‘agents’ (i.e. states and other actors) can constitute reality while also being affected by the ‘structure’ (i.e. the promoters, processes and outcomes of globalization). With discussion of structure, it may seem that structural theories of international relations, namely neo-realism and neo-liberalism, may be more germane to this project than a foreign policy approach, but it will be suggested later that these miss the point in explaining agency. A more focussed deductive account of globalization will be given in terms of a three-sided process I call ‘information globalization’. This comprises the global reach of information and communication technologies, transnational capitalist surveillance, and post-Cold War geopolitical fluidity. This is an ideational process with transformational impact upon political space, and how the latter organises power. Information enters the picture because ideas for organising and deconstructing social reality according to widening and permeable frontiers are affecting states’ abilities to justify and exercise power over citizens and foreigners. Information globalization’s precise impact upon foreign policy can only be evaluated through the former’s spatial transformation of the latter’s borders of accountability, that is, the complicating of the confines of foreign policy. Hence, the need for a layered analysis of the spatial effects of information globalization in Chapter 3.
Chapter 2 will define information and treat it as power in terms of the components of a flow. This is linked to how globalizing agents and processes can transmit, amplify, or mutate meanings of security, identity and welfare within every component of a flow: source, transmitter, channel, reception, destination and noise. Using a combination of deduction and postmodern interpretation, the power possibilities of information proliferate in all components. These enable the widest geographical inclusion of actoriness in transnational politics based upon the generation, or representation, of information for implementing action.

Chapter 3 will then flesh out information globalization's transformation of geographical space, in terms of 'global information space', which is to be extrapolated directly from the three components of the former. Global information space will be argued to be a Hobbesian informational state of nature manifesting the subjectivities of world public opinion. In response to the uncertainty of existence within global information space, the political and communitarian bases, and the necessity of soft power will be deduced. This is the first step in extending Nye's formulation into specific foreign policy prescriptions.

Chapter 4 will carry deduction to the final stage by joining the discursive power implications of information, described in Chapter 2, to the normative international defence of identity and community, and to the characteristics of soft power posited in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 will present 'soft power in foreign policy' by hypothesising foreign policy as primarily strategy through adaptation of foreign policy models from a sub-field of International Relations called Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA). The adaptation of two FPA hypotheses will be based on the following criteria. Firstly, the model must be able to
accommodate and adapt to the contemporary porosity of policy-making and diplomacy in the context of multiple sources of information and opinion. Secondly, the model must be able to explain the ‘publicness’ of foreign policy-making in terms of the participation of increased numbers of players within and outside governments, whether as policy initiators or feedback agents. Thirdly, the nature of global information space places the key onus of defending security, identity and community on the intellectual foundations of policy-makers.

The Leadership in Foreign Policy model, which stresses the individual and personal-idiosyncratic factor (Cerny 1979, 59) in foreign policy decisions, is a natural candidate. The policy-maker who ‘conducts’ relations abroad represents a multitude of citizens, or in authoritarian regimes, a select elite, and must be able to comprehend their interests thoroughly. In doing so, he/she must understand the precise interface between domestic stability, and social welfare, with the interests that matter outside his borders. With global information space permeating borders, he must be able to process and focus incoming or outgoing voices of dissent, indifference, or approval over political issues into a coherent diplomacy. Within these general tasks, he has room to exercise visionary leadership and accentuate the leadership component of leader-follower relationships. If foreign policy can be personalised, it is more likely to be coexistent with a unitary conception of statehood. The purposefulness of his existence and that of stateness will be bound up in how he represents and defends raison d’état in terms of identity and community. Leadership strategies will also be elaborated as soft power extensions into the literatures of regime theory and ‘epistemic communities’. A regime is an implicit or explicit set of rules and norms that govern state behaviour internationally, while an epistemic community ‘is a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to
policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area.' (Haas 1992, 3) In short, both
the regime and epistemic community ply their respective utility according to the generic
leadership model where there is issue or policy uncertainty, specialised interpretation of
circumstances is required, and where foreign policy may be engaged in attempts at
institutionalising agendas where prescient expert forecasting and foreknowledge are
imperative. The leadership in foreign policy hypotheses will be translated as

**Leadership Inside-Out (LIO):** A nation-state can achieve its foreign policy objectives through Leadership Inside-Out by projecting a communitarian base, by its credibility as a source of information, and by targeting an omnidirectional audience.

**Leadership Outside-In (LOI):** A nation-state can achieve its foreign policy objectives through Leadership Outside-In by exercising political entrepreneurship through international regimes, and by forming epistemic communities.

As it is apparent, the hypotheses to be derived expose foreign policy-making in a complex environment. The second set, which I will label the 'Intermestic Politics of Foreign Policy', assumes that foreign policy is never made in a straightforward manner. It is inherently political rather than completely rational. It is firstly characterised by making decisions based on pre-emption and bargaining between a large number of alternately competing and collaborating constituencies of interest within and across borders. Secondly, these entities, which include non-state actors, possess varying degrees of policy convictions, which may be ideological. And thirdly, disparities in knowledge of relevant issues exist. Even well known phenomenon such as ‘bureaucratic politics’ have mutated in conditions of globalization. Decision-making occurs across national boundaries, above and below official channels, hence the general enmeshing of the ‘international’ and ‘domestic’ spheres of policy into the ‘intermestic’. This is political in every aspect of the struggle to preserve one’s agenda intact, if not completely. Lobbying through positive and negative publicity, 'leak'
campaigns, and national and international legal sanctions are common ways of ensuring information, and hence opinion favourable to one's cause, will be reflected in policy. Chapter 4 will hypothesise the intermestic foreign policy in terms of

(i) Intermestic Correlation of Forces (ICF):

The intermestic correlation of forces joining state and non-state parties can shape foreign policy change through direct mobilisation of ideas, sanctioning standards through global regimes, non-state self-constitution of expertise, and manufacturing subjective world public opinion.

(ii) Intermestic Socialisation (IS):

Intermestic socialisation occurs when non-state actors hold states to account through regimes they sign on to.

(iii) Multipolar Direct Emulation Through Demonstration (MDED):

Multipolar Direct Emulation through Demonstration occurs when states and non-state actors emulate ideas that have been proven elsewhere to be efficacious in attaining particular objectives.

Evidently, the range of foreign policy tools involved in all of these hypotheses involves the presentation of information for a political purpose. Nye coined the phrase 'soft power', or the ability to 'co-opt' others through the attractiveness of one's ideas. What is different about theorising soft power foreign policy is that it is being regarded here as a frontline instrument in a different kind of environment, global information space, where the coercive capability of 'hard power' instruments such as the military and economic take a backseat in influencing opinion. Nye himself notes that soft power becomes prominent only in a complex milieu where states are faced with managing economic interdependence, dispersal of technology, especially the impact of communications and military technology, transnational actors, and shifts in political issues between and among states (Nye 1990b, 160-165). Power indices and concentrations are widely diffused in this environment of globalization. Over the next few chapters, it will be seen that once power of discourse is appreciated, this soft power of ideas either supersedes completely, or at the least, precedes
the utility of hard power. Conversely in cases where hard power application has been a fait accompli, soft power might yet be employed to counteract the former’s degree of impact. Nye’s formulation of soft power was elaborated largely for an American audience, and he has only made limited references to Japan, China and Singapore. In this connection, the case studies are partly chosen on the basis that they are geographically diverse, non-American illustrations of soft power foreign policy engagements. One is based in Asia, the other in Latin America. This will be valuable in extending the analytical validity of the soft power concept beyond its largely American genesis.

The selection of the two case studies in Chapters 5 and 6 will then illustrate the two aforementioned sets of FPA hypotheses, modified with their soft power aspects, within the context of global information space. The same three criteria used to qualify the two sets of foreign policy hypotheses also qualify these two cases. The first is the Asian Values Debate (1992-99) featuring the critical role Singaporean foreign policy played in it. The second is the Pinochet Extradition Controversy (1998-2000), involving a trial of Chilean sovereignty under mixed state and non-state-actor pressures for a global standard of justice. Each of the two countries involved in their respective issues has been historically and progressively involved in the evolution of global information space from within their domestic politics. Both Singapore and Chile are also representative of weak states with unevenly distributed

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3 Nye first raised the concept in a review of American foreign policy in the post-Cold War era in Bound to Lead (1990a). His passing references to the political weakness of Japanese soft power and China’s susceptibility to US soft power are made in “Soft Power” (1990b, 169-170). On the occasion of a 1999 public lecture in Singapore, he noted briefly that Canada, the Vatican, the Netherlands, Sweden and Britain were candidates for exercising soft power. But he cautioned that proper mastery of soft power required proximity to American-shaped global norms of liberalism, access to communication channels for framing issues, and credibility based on the conformity between national practice and ideas. The first two aspects automatically favoured the US but the third remained situation-dependent. (Nye 1999a) On Singapore, he said that its aspiration towards being a regional educational hub, and a technologically advanced and innovative society, was altogether improving its soft power. However, he cautioned that social control and information restrictions needed to be factored into the future strengthening of soft power.(ST 1999a).
power assets (Handel 1981, 30-54) linked to and operating within political, economic and cultural globalizing processes. Secondly, both countries suffer from the historical condition of border porosity. Foreign policy is conducted in an environment of multiple linkages between home and abroad in the forms of NGOs, MNCs, academics, political leaders, interventions of several foreign governments, as well as intense media scrutiny. All of these interactions occur within and reinforce a common global information space. This immensely complicates nation-state strategies for ‘winning’ on each issue, and widens the need for foreign ministries to employ soft power to earn opinion points.

Thirdly, in their respective foreign policy issues, both countries are faced with the clash of ideas across borders. Each of these states is involved in ‘soft’ matters that erode or defend identity and welfare. Singapore articulates ‘Asian Values’ as a broad intellectual bulwark against a largely American-inspired global strategy of liberal democratisation and human rights promotion. Chile’s sovereignty and its fragile democracy are subject to the trials of scrutiny arising from the arrest overseas of its controversial ex-dictator and symbol of the Right, Senator Pinochet, on charges of violation of the universal human rights of Chilean citizens. The charges were jointly filed by an alliance between Chilean and global human rights NGOs and a Spanish judge, and at the place of arrest, involved clashes between national sovereignty and international law focussed upon the extradition of a person charged with crimes against humanity. Ultimately, the nation-state boundary is where this author locates the primary foundation of his inquiry, and Foucault discourse analysis will be helpful in explaining soft power in articulation of a case for defending foreign policy amidst globalizing modernity.
CHAPTER 1
THE THREE SIDES OF INFORMATION GLOBALIZATION

1.1 The Empirical and Epistemological Challenge of Globalization to the Nation-State and its Foreign Policy

The notion of 'community' is central to the creation of the nation-state and hence necessary to briefly revisit in this section in order to elucidate the erosion of foreign policy by globalization. Mainstream foreign policy theorists have always defended the importance of their focus on grounds that the nation-state's sine qua non is to guard the common interests of those living within its boundaries (Snyder, Bruck and Sapin 1963a; Frankel 1967; Clarke and White 1989). In this regard, foreign policy is a 'separate and special area of government linked to the security and the fundamental values of the state' which 'is intended to affect, and [ironically] is limited by, factors outside the national political system as well as within it.' (Wallace 1971, 9-10,17)\(^1\) Security is conventionally understood in material terms of the protection of territorial integrity, the right to limit foreign property or other influences deemed prejudicial to the overall safety and wealth of the nation-state. A less conventionally-labelled set of security concerns, but more popularly invoked in diverse communitarian terms by the nation-state, would be abstract bonds such as 'nation', 'society', 'national sovereignty', 'the people', 'the culture', 'the identity' or simply 'way of life' (Wittfogel 1957; Strausz-Hupe 1956; P. Anderson 1974; Mann 1986; Weber 1978; A. Smith 1990; Canovan 1996). This is the realm of the ostentatiously 'domestic' or 'national', and it accords 'value' to nation-states for their human inhabitants. The nation-state as community reinforces through definitional circularity an indissoluble link between the membrane of domestic well being and the wall of 'foreign/external security'.
As a challenge to the nation-state, globalization is analysable in terms of physical impact and ideational change. The former involves physical change and boundary-diminution and is an empirical account of globalization. The latter refers to how globalization modifies philosophical, ideological and policy conceptions of patterns of state units existing on the world political and socio-economic map.\(^2\) As will shortly be argued, most globalization scholars envisage the marginalisation of the state. Correspondingly, the future of foreign policy is thematically irrelevant to them. One should instead ponder national policies transiting towards global public policies since globalization threatens to dissolve ‘the international’ into ‘the global’. Such views are unsatisfactory for presuming that global governance is attainable in a linear fashion while ignoring the capacity of states to react creatively to globalization without sacrificing raison d’état.

As an empirical process of change towards porosity of boundaries or their total displacement, globalization is often explained in the literature through studies of multiple border-spanning technological improvements, interdependence, and the cultural spread of capitalism. Technology shrinks distances and borders, whether man-made or natural, and initiates a sense of proximity in interaction between individuals and groups of them, such groups as the nation-state. Furthermore, expanding forms of technological contact whether through trade, or war, compels civilisations and individuals to face up to broadening horizons of joint benefit, joint threats, or antagonistic encounters with encroaching foreigners. Most historical, transportation and communications derived accounts depict globalization in this

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\(^1\) See the comparable definitions in Rosenau’s chapter titled “Foreign Policy as an Issue-Area” in his autobiographical anthology The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy (Rosenau 1971, 401-440); and also Jones (1979, 74-75).
way (Luard 1990, 189; Robertson 1990, 15-30; Camilleri and Falk 1992, 1-11; McGrew et al.
1992, 2-14, 23-26; Scholte 1993, 68-99; Hobsbawm 1995a, 1995b; Foreman-Peck 1998, xiii-
xvi). In a related set of arguments, connectivity occurs through the consensual identification
of transborder problems and solutions requiring common standards of conduct. This is
transactionalism at its most elementary stage. The evidence adduced in support of this view
ranges from the emergence of the International Telegraphic Union, the transition from formal
and informal empires in the mid-twentieth century, to the voluntary and involuntary
induction of independent nation-states into neo-liberal supranational financial and trade
regimes. To this list, the whole series of environmental conferences, beginning in the 1980s
where both non-state actors and states played conflicting and complementary roles, are
included as transactionalism (Mattelart 1994, ch. 1; Carney 1996; Dunning 1997; Rosenau
1997a; Arts 1998). In the eyes of their proponents, these four examples seem to capture the
trends of rising collaboration across borders, as well as the concomitant integration of nation-
states into interdependence networks.

The coining of the terms 'interdependence', 'dependence' and 'transnational', while
useful, lead many to marginalise foreign policy. Interdependence, as Barry Jones clarifies it,
'exists for a grouping of two or more actors when each is dependent upon at least one other
member of [the] group for satisfactory outcomes on any issue(s) of concern' (Jones 1995, 6).
This has developed from the embedded sub-notion of 'dependence', which is a condition in
which an actor's preferred outcome relies in varying degrees on a preceding or co-
determining outcome in another location or others' actions. Symbiotic upon these two terms
is a third in the compositional lexicon of globalization: the 'transnational', which means

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2 Held et al (1999, 2-10) suggest the alternative triadic framework of 'hyperglobalizers,' 'skeptics' and
'crossing national boundaries'. It was both the multinational, and synonymously transnational, business corporation (i.e. MNC/TNC) and other non-state actors that popularised the term in the 1960s. These terms connote a blanket threat to the orthodox separation of both domestic and foreign policies conducted by states possessing impermeable borders and national resources, simply because problems and solutions can now become both structure (e.g. environmental pollution and market confidence/panic) and agency (e.g. MNC decisions, individual choices, and state-sponsored mercantilistic or competitive trade measures).

The political economy writers on globalization go further by positing that capitalism is no longer international, and not only cite evidence of transactional threats to the state, but also call for a paradigm shift in comprehending global political economy. Kenichi Ohmae is the most radical advocate of 'the cartographic illusion' and 'the end of the nation state' (Ohmae 1996; 1990; 1994). From a business studies perspective, the territorial nation-state is seen to have outlived its economic utility with the advent of a borderless economy run on the four 'Is' of investment, industry, IT and individual consumers. These operate globally and do business not with nation-state units but with entities of 'the right size and scale to be the true, natural business units in today's global economy.'(Ohmae 1996, 2-5) These may be sub- and supra-national in scope, or simply 'region states'. Ohmae's 'region states' are not strictly nation-states but production and market-efficient combinations of states and sub-national territories pandering to the needs of commerce. Examples of such combinations include the Hong Kong-Southern China nexus, Singapore-Johor-Batam 'growth triangle', the Osaka-
Kansai region, the Rhine region around Baden-Württemberg, and California's Silicon Valley/Bay area. Susan Strange and David Elkins take this argument to a more sophisticated level predicting, firstly, the unravelling of national jurisdictions in political economy, and secondly, the capitalist mobility dynamics of privileging investment-savvy MNCs, knowledge workers and individual financiers. The latter constitute a global capitalist market, developed on the back of the technological revolution in communications in the 1990s, along with the transnational division of labour in the post-Cold War era (Strange 1997, 365; Stopford, Strange and Henley 1991, 32-47; Strange 1996, 7-12, 82-87; Sassen 1991, 3-15; Elkins 1995, 79-87, 89-94). Additionally, through their study of MNC patterns, Richard Barnet and John Cavanagh have contributed the idea of 'imperial corporations' running a new world order, presumably of economy-centric politics (Barnet and Cavanagh 1994).

The World Trade Organization (WTO), World Bank and IMF reports of astronomical rises of the ratio of external trade to GDP worldwide, and the year-on-year increase in the volume of private capital transactions accentuated by the 1997-99 financial crisis, lend statistical credence to these claims of a global political economy with diminished borders. The ratio of trade to GDP as a measure of economic 'openness' for developing countries almost doubled from 22.8% to 38% between 1985 and 1997, while the corresponding figures for developed countries were 16.6% to 24.1% respectively (World Trade Organization 1998, 33). This compares favourably with the ratio of world trade to world GDP of 29% in 2000, a year for which the WTO noted the strongest overall production and trade growth since 1990 in spite of cyclical economic crises (World Trade Organization 2001, 1). Meanwhile, the net private capital flows for 1984-89 were US$15.2 billion compared to net official (i.e. inter-
flows of US$23.9 billion for the same period; by 1990-96, the pattern was reversed with net private flows increasing nearly ten-fold to US$148.1 billion while net official flows declined to US$15.3 billion (International Monetary Fund 1998, tab.2). These last set of statistics suggest that non-state actors, especially MNCs and individuals, were making a larger share of financial transactions. Overall, WTO calculations showed that the 1990-97 ratio of increases in world merchandise exports to increases in world GDP grew from about 1.5 to 3.3. Between 1998 and 1999, taking the 1997-99 financial crisis into account, the ratio declined from 2 to 1.5, but the pattern of economic expansion and openness is expected to continue over the long term, notwithstanding the economic impact of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the US (World Trade Organization 2000, 6, chart II.1; 2001,18).

The global political economy thesis is a theoretical displacement of the international, and like the previous empirical boundary-shrinkage arguments, suffers from its inattention to the detailed impact on foreign policy. The latter is conveniently swept under the umbrella prognosis of state decline in purely functionalist and instrumentalist terms. Cultural prefixes such as nationality and its association with ethnicity, identity and moral beliefs have so far been ignored. A third set of empirical globalization theorists, specifically exploring culture, field a range of views about whether culture can be maintained discretely in nation-state units, or it must be defined transnationally invoking the terminology of global integration and disintegration. For most analyses, a ‘third culture’ perspective may emerge beyond the homogeneity-heterogeneity dichotomy. In this vein, postmodernist critique can aid inquiry

micro-states in the name of economic efficiency and accountability.

into the diversity of local and popular discourses arising from domestic state-society struggles and how they become projected onto a global plane. (Featherstone 1990, 1-3) Contestation becomes the trend in striving for and resisting globalized homogeneous culture, as contributions by Roland Robertson (1990), Alain Touraine (1990), Zygmunt Bauman (1990), Ulf Hannerz (1990) and Arjun Appadurai (1990) indicate. Appadurai’s reading of the complexity of interpreting a unified globality is worth noting in passing as he attributes contestation to ‘disjunctures between economy, culture and politics’ in five social ‘scapes’ – ethnoscapes, technoscapes, finanscapes, mediascapes and ideoscapes. (Appadurai 1990, 296-301) Trends in economics, politics, ideas and identities exert pulls and counter-pulls of logic, straining the nation-state’s territorial legitimacy, producing progress, adaptation and critical reaction, and ultimately inducing fragmentation of the verities of national existence.

In a 1996 article, the critical theorist Robert Cox joined the global culture debate by introducing ‘civilisations’ as a counter-framework for discussing capitalism, political dominance, human rights, marginal communities, communication and knowledge in international politics (Cox 1996). Significantly, Cox defined civilisation as a ‘community of thought’ instead of territory (Cox 1996, 144). Ultimately, this leads to Huntington’s thesis of civilisations-in-rivalry as a defining characteristic of post-Cold War global politics. He argues that the politics of global culture are essentially struggles for individual and societal identity creation, and endeavours to assess how core civilisational states pursue geopolitical civilisational strategies (Huntington 1996, 21). In his grand explanation, there is little sustained theorising of specific foreign policy shifts. Nevertheless, this work contains the warning that in the ongoing global clash centred on several civilisational core states, values transmitted across borders may become social threats. Secessionist inducements to the
restiveness of social and political milieus of nation-state societies and sub-groups can, for example, precipitate cultural 'fault line wars' fought out militarily (Huntington 1996, ch. 6-11). While this tussle of ideational flows over the culture-territory bind possesses potential consequences for foreign policy, this is generally not developed by culture globalization scholars to predict foreign policy changes. Instead, they tend to revert to the 'decline of state' debate, with its indirect implication for foreign policy.

The next group, the grand theorists of globalization, hail from sociological backgrounds. Due to their disciplinary training, they do not directly address foreign policy debates about state transformation. The majority of these theorists approach the discourses of globalization from the point of advanced modernity (Featherstone, Lash and Robertson 1995; Beck, Giddens and Lash, 1994). Among them, the work of Giddens is most representative and relevant to the present research. He locates globalization as a consequence of modernity. Modernity is assumed to be a radical break from previous practices (Giddens 1990, 2-6). It can be analysed in terms of pace, scope and institutional change. Giddens proposes that modernity is a set of dynamics operating in three dimensions: the separation of time and space, the disembedding of social systems, and the 'reflexive ordering and reordering of social relations in the light of continual inputs of knowledge affecting the actions of individuals and groups.' (Giddens 1990, 17) The notable common emphasis in all three is on the power of ideas in transforming modes of life. 'Time-space distanciation' literally tears space away from time through modern systems of standardised time measurement enabling 'relations between “absent” others locationally distant from any given situation of face-to-face interaction.' (Giddens 1990, 18-19; 1991, 16; 1995, 26-48) This is abetted by the
'dislocation of space from place' brought about by the processes of ‘charting’ the globe into 'universal maps, in which perspective played little part in the representation of geographical position and form.' (Giddens 1990, 19) It follows that the disembedding of social systems is intertwined with time-space distanciation in its ‘“lifting out” of social relations from local contexts of interaction and their restructuring across indefinite spans of time-space.’ (Giddens 1990, 21-22; 1991, 18) Institutionally, disembedding makes possible the ‘rationalised organisation’ able to command and support activities locally and over great distances. ‘Symbolic tokens’, such as money and expert systems, are both modern manifestations of disembedding. The last dynamic, reflexivity of examination, effects constant modification and reform of social practices under the constitutive power of the scrutiny afforded by knowledge flows (Giddens 1990, 38-45; 1991, 20). Modernity is above all characterised by its inherently expansionary and flexible processes, defying attempts at stability. Globalization is the symptom of an expanding modernity.

Given modernity’s implicit privileging of the extension of human control over nature and destiny, these characteristics of globalization translate institutionally into the local deepening and horizontal stretching of capitalism, industrialism, surveillance and military power in the expansion of nation-state forms of governance. While Giddens does not oppose the thesis of the decline of the nation-state, he is ambivalent on the matter, and hence silent on the notion of ‘foreign policy’. Many others such as Robertson, Held et al and Jones are also ambivalent about the future of the nation-state, and hence of foreign policy, in their assessment of the diachronic nature of globalization, that is, globalizing agents and processes

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5 This tri-faceted ‘dynamism of modernity’ has also been elaborated in Giddens’ earlier and recently updated works, A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism (1995), and Modernity and Self-Identity (1991).
provoke national reactions resulting in synthetic consequences that do leave some structures of nation-states intact (Robertson 1992, ch. 4, conclusion; Held et al. 1999, 55-57, 444-452; Jones 2000). To some extent, Giddens, Robertson, Held et al and Jones conclude their theorising by leaving the door open for an extrapolation of postmodern consequences for nationhood and statehood. This has implications for foreign policy process and power, as this thesis will argue.

The other pole of the epistemological group is represented by those espousing discontinuist views towards the nation-state. Waters and Albrow predict that the present century will see the decline of nationality and stateness due to the long-term trends identified by the empiricists, which undermine national legitimacy in functional, materialist and identity matters. What is happening locally is the fragmentation of authority, identity and other social relationships with global agents and processes claiming individual and sub-national attention, material and spiritual support. Culture may be commodified along with fragmentation, but like all social fields, it is open to reflexive remaking in virtual and selective forms (Waters 1995, 159-161; Albrow 1996, 4, 140-162).

The preceding tour of the empirical and epistemological challenges of globalization theorists against the viability of the nation-state still falls short of answering the question of what happens to foreign policy under globalization. The existing literature is heavily obsessed with macro analyses of nation-state viability, even where ambivalence towards the nation-state exists. It is all too simple for many writers to forecast the dissolution of the

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6 In his neo-ideological work, *The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy*, Giddens summarises globalization-as-modernity primarily as being 'about the transformation of time and space in our lives. Distant events, whether economic or not, affect us more directly and immediately than ever before.' (1998, 31)
'international' into the 'global'. They subsume foreign policy under networks of 'multilayered governance' in an incompletely globalized international order comprising mixed actorness of states, non-state actors and international organisations. The same obsession with macro-analyses of the nation-state's fate within a nascent 'global governance' occurs with preliminary attempts to study globalization from an International Relations perspective (Luard 1990; Camilleri and Falk 1992; Scholte 1993; Rosenau 1990, 1997a; Clark 1999; Youngs 2000). To some extent, an IR approach to globalization is fatefully coloured by the multiplicity of international organisations and non-state actors as agents, or by the post-Cold War fluidity. The 'complex interdependence' of the 1970s did not witness a significant loss of boundary control, due to the Cold War. Today many forms of power, along with ideological differentiation, proliferate in a non-bipolar international order, allowing new sub- and transnational spaces for manoeuvre and political constituency within a global frame. In this regard, the culture, interdependence and transactional dimensions conveyed by the empirical globalization literature is useful in illuminating how and what foreign policy needs to adapt to. At the same time, the grand theorists' notions of stretching, variety, and the intensification possibilities for social relations across time and space can usefully contribute to analyses of one's community and its corresponding 'foreign' sphere. Borders can be treated as obsolescent if global governance means a domestically patterned world state, but not if a broad 'global society' of mixed state and non-state authorities still obtains, as is presently the case (Shaw 1994). In this regard, this thesis ought to render a satisfactory account of how the empirical transactional challenge to the nation-state occurs in terms of information flow shaping practices, and to relate this to a set of corresponding spatially based epistemological understandings of globalization. Media flows, capitalist information

7 This phrase is frequently used by Held et al (1999). Rosenau's (1997a) 'multicentric' and 'bifurcated'
practices and post-Cold War fluidity are elements for a reformulation. The preceding survey strongly suggests a structure and agency problématique as to what globalization is about and how states, international organisations and non-state actors relate to it. To further understand how globalization affects foreign policy, it is now useful to introduce structuration theory as the underpinning of this thesis.

1.2 Structuration Theory and Globalization

The critical problem facing social scientific research is the explanation of causality: does the actor act autonomously, or does its environment shape its actions? Conversely, does the actor transform its environment in order to produce its actions? These three extreme positions indicate the ‘agency-structure problem’ that had long exercised social theory, but it was only in the late 1980s that IR theorising began to examine it seriously (Wendt 1987; 1999, ch.4; Onuf 1989). Most of these scholars cite Anthony Giddens’ structuration theory as the main inspiration, hence the need to consider it here.

Giddens, in the book setting out his most detailed exposition of structuration, supplies a stronger reason relating more directly to my claim that globalization is a trial of representations: social science theories tend to be partly derived from pre-existing ideas held by agents which they analyse, and after ‘theory’ is cast, the ideas gain currency and tend to lose their original quality. Giddens suggests that

the notion of sovereignty and associated theories of the state were stunningly new when first formulated; today they have in some degree become a part of the very social reality which they helped to establish. (Giddens 1984, xxxiv)

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8 Associated structurationists include Luckmann (1967) and Bernstein (1978).
The enigma of locating causality lies somewhere between governing practices across time, and the agents of transmission or origination.

Structuration theory, according to Giddens posits that:

The constitution of agents and structures are not two independently given sets of phenomena, a dualism, but represent a duality. According to the notion of the duality of structure, the structural properties of social systems are both medium and outcome of the practices they recursively organise. Structure is not ‘external’ to individuals: as memory traces, and as instantiated in social practices, it is in a certain sense more ‘internal’ than exterior to their activities...Structure is not to be equated with constraint but is always both constraining and enabling...Structure has no existence independent of the knowledge that agents have about what they do in their day-to-day activity. Human agents always know what they are doing on the level of discursive consciousness under some description. However, what they do may be quite unfamiliar under other descriptions, and they may know little of the ramified consequences of the activities in which they engage. (Giddens 1984, 25-26)

Agents are assumed reasonably to be rational and conscious actors exercising power in pursuit of parochial or collective ends while also reflexively monitoring their actions during and after their commission. This reflexivity is produced by matching internal and prior expectations with the results of actions, whether intended or unintended, so as to constrain, or enable, amendments to ongoing or future actions (Giddens 1984, 7-10). Structure enters causality when one asks how far the actors’ rational pursuit of interests, and the existence of internal and prior expectations came about, although it may be possible that the relevant actors wholly originated their causalities. This understanding of structure plays centrally in Michel Foucault’s understanding of the power of discourse construction (Foucault 1997), which will be used later to extend soft power explanations.

As an illustration, consider how the total originality of causation imputed to the agent is put in doubt when one tries to explain the foreign policies of nation-states that initiate regional and international regimes. The founding of the EU, NAFTA, ASEAN, the Non-
aligned Movement and the UN could be traced chronologically to a handful of core states. However, the lineage of ideas inspiring the norms and procedures of cooperation are more complicated: the balance of Westphalian influences and liberal internationalism will have to be weighed against geographical and idiosyncratic factors. Furthermore, the actual behaviour of member states with respect to any regime’s formalities depends on leaders’ and citizens’ interpretations of universal permissibility and expedience. Examples of structuration within interstate cooperation include the selectivity of commitment by UN members to humanitarian interventions, the speed of EU enlargement, and mixed signals about the applicability of free trade arrangements within Southeast Asia.

Structure accordingly refers to organised sets of rules and resources allowing the ‘binding’ of time-space in social systems, the properties which make it possible for discernibly similar social practices to exist across varying spans of time and space and which lend them ‘systemic’ form. (Giddens 1984, 17)

Structure as sets of rules and resources need not be formalised in institutions. It could be like international regimes where both informal and formal rules and norms can coexist. And where agents act consciously or unconsciously upon these rules and resources, they reproduce, or even transform the ‘system’ of relations among them. This is structuration in operation, and it is only to this extent that this thesis shares a constructivist approach.9

Structuration theory offers a way of thinking about globalization as an environmental factor which has been driven along by state and non-state actors, and which subsequently impacts upon them by generating global spaces that challenge representations of community.

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9 Wendt (1999, 23-29) for example offers two sets of constructivist possibilities – material-ideational and individualism-holism – all of which are extrapolated from agency and structure, which ontologically complicates practical foreign policy research, and hence is beyond this thesis’ scope.
This thesis will attempt to theorise a revamped concept of agency for foreign policy and its non-state aspirants by first outlining the ideational threat of globalization at the end of the Cold War. Here, it is useful to bear in mind the agency-structure intermeshing of information capabilities, capitalist globalization, and post-Cold War ideological fluidity in the information globalization process.

1.3 Information Globalization as a Confluence of Technology, Economics and the Post-Cold War Disorder

Transnational information flow is both structure and agent of the rubric of transactionally evolved globalization, as well as a trend making its presence felt specifically in the 1990s. Information flow affects states through time-space distanciation and a compression of geography effected cumulatively in the form of technological progress, economic extension and changes in the political environment. No one set of factors acts autonomously. They overlap and pull each another towards a confluence of power of geopolitical change. In this sense, this thesis is premised upon a social understanding of technology. It is assumed that technology is the concrete application of abstract scientific solutions to socially-articulated problems and needs, and that an insatiable human ‘appetite for convenience, comfort and entertainment products and services, as well as for means to overcome natural barriers like geography and travel time, creates a constant pull on technology.’ (Mayo 1985, 7) This must however be qualified as a general truth simplifying the actual empirical complexities of change.

10 Adapted from Sussman (1997, 18-19).
The occurrence of 'information globalization' is explainable as the resultant of the tugging and heaving of both the 'pull' of society and the 'push' of technological capability. These pull and push dynamics are evident in the following three trends which may be identified from the general interpretation of globalization in Section 1.1, and supplemented by political trend analysis, to comprise information globalization: (1) media technology has cumulatively and significantly enhanced the reach of information flows over the past century-and-a-half according to social necessity; (2) the globalization of capitalism in tandem with the advances of media technology has driven the penetration of information flows worldwide and correspondingly increased the scrutiny and visibility of both existing and hitherto underexposed interlinkages of political, social and economic activity; and (3) the termination of the Cold War represents a culminating point in the development of the ideologically-diverse Westphalian international system.

1.3.1 Information and Communication Technologies as Global Connectors

In a structural sense, information and communication technology\(^\text{12}\) is the quintessence of bridging time and space (Kellerman 1993; Mattelart 1994; Mowlana 1997, xi-xvii, 7-8). The following narrative traces the technological trajectory of communicating social patterns towards a global frame. Communication sociologist Harold Innis has identified a critical link between the history and shape of political empires and their prevailing modes of

\(^{12}\) 'Information and communication technologies' (henceforth, ICTs) encompasses the full range of transmission and reception forms ranging from writing on stone and papyrus to the Internet and communications satellites. ICT thus overlaps with some authors' reference to 'media technology' which covers only conventional broadcast media such as radio, newspaper and television. The term 'ICTs' not only admits some scholars' differentiation of information technologies (IT) as computers and storage disks, but also acknowledges the intensified possibilities of computers merging with communication forms like the telephone, modem, radio, television, video and satellite. Consider for instance, the Internet-linked interactive television, and 'text messaging' on mobile phones.
communication. In his study of the premodern history of the West and Near East, Innis showed that there were two types of media at work: those emphasising time (parchment, clay, stone), and those emphasising space (papyrus and paper). The former were relevant to the construction of architecture and sculptural manifestations of control, while the papyrus and paper forms, being lighter and less durable, were suited to administration and trade. Although it is difficult to pin down the exact effects of a medium on its host civilisation, that is, separating precisely the push and pull factors, owing to the medium influencing scholarly appraisal by itself, Innis posits the working hypothesis that the concept of empire waxes and wanes according to the ‘efficiency of communication’ (Innis 1972, 7-9). What mattered to political control at any centre was the ability to consolidate the symbolic expression of individual human experience and hence, of allegiance, in its train. The media of time extended men’s minds beyond the ‘range of remembered things’ and the media of space increased the ‘range of known places’. Writing carried on both types of media ‘enhanced a capacity for abstract thinking’ and the language of oral tradition became physically interpreted into written word of authority (Innis 1972, 10). In this way, a recorded form of ‘extended social structure’ became a recognisable bond between ruler and ruled. The implications were that

[ ]he sword and pen worked together. Power was increased by concentration in a few hands, specialization of function was enforced, and scribes with leisure to keep and study records contributed to the advancement of knowledge and thought. The written record signed, sealed, and swiftly transmitted was essential to military power and the extension of government. Small communities were written into large states and states were consolidated into empire. (Innis 1972, 10)

At a later stage in the recovery of Europe from the dark Middle Ages, the Gutenberg printing press might well be appended to the sword-and-pen formula. In fact, Benedict Anderson has

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13 Innis’ ideas are relevant to the ensuing exposition not just for his treatment of parchment, paper and stone as early mass media, but also for his ‘ecological holist’ approach to enriching the study of international relations.
documented evidence of the origins of many nationalisms in print media (B. Anderson 1991, ch. 2-5).

The groundbreaking reach of stone, paper and printing was emulated, intensified and diversified with the advent of electronic and electronically reliant media. Media theorists Ithiel de Sola Pool, John Thompson, and Lofti Maherzi in the UNESCO World Communication Report, along with a US Department of Commerce Report, have variously coined this the ‘global flow of mass media’ (Pool 1990, 34-39, 71-72), the ‘globalization of communication’ (Headrick 1991, 6-9; Thompson 1995, 149-159; Maherzi 1997, 12-13, 77) and the ‘globalization of the mass media’ (US Department of Commerce 1993, 4). What is particularly striking about this stage of development is the striving for a means of accelerating information flow beyond the limitations of physical transportation. The key politico-economic and scientific challenge after the Renaissance was to surpass the runner, horse and sail in connectivity. Most media theorists have seen globalization as a trend towards flows defying boundaries and a technology-engendered consciousness of shared human existence on the globe (Pool 1990, 71; Mattelart 1994, vii-xi; Thompson 1995, 150; Maherzi 1997, 77), which overlaps with this thesis’ working definition of globalization. The properties of electricity are overwhelmingly responsible for driving the technological

by explaining historically, time and space biases in the evolution of empires and civilisations. (Deibert 1999)

14 Journalist Frances Cairncross (1997) has offered the alternative term the ‘communications revolution’ to describe the basic idea that location will no longer matter for business and society in an age of fibre-optic networks and digital compression in communications.

15 Other communication scholars have situated media technology within globalization by positing that media structures, processes and audiences are undergoing ‘transnational horizontal integration.’ (Sreberny-Mohammadi et al. 1997, xiii).
capabilities powering the next three broad phases in which media 'networked' a global frame of social and political action into being.\textsuperscript{16} 

The first phase began with the invention of the electric cable telegraph and the concurrent development of submarine and overland cable networks. The social demand operated in the two forms of railway safety and the needs of an emerging economic practice of stock exchanges, both beginning in the early 1800s (Ellis 1954, 90, 147-149; J.M. Scott 1972, 8-16; Headrick 1991, 11-12). Steam trains embodied speed but this also introduced the need for managing the operation of such vehicles on single-track systems, and in tandem with stopping safely and punctually at the stations they served. The numerous accidents involving trains inspired telegraph amateurs such as W.F. Cooke, Charles Wheatstone and Edward Davy to experiment with new methods of signalling along railway lines and between stations (Winston 1998, 23). From another direction, capitalism in the form of the stock exchange required timely information about commodities' and manufactures' demand and supply conditions abroad, and shipping movements at ports. In the 1830s, pigeons had been resorted to, to facilitate transactions and news traffic between Paris, Brussels and French provincial cities (Headrick 1991, 12). Not surprisingly, following the patented breakthroughs of electric telegraph lines by Cooke and Wheatstone in Britain and Samuel Morse in America in 1837, it was largely the business elites who bankrolled large scale ventures to deploy electric cable systems, followed belatedly by the British and American governments. The latter were keen to support strategic developments in commerce and communication (A.C. Clarke 1992, 35-96). Overland cable-laying spread easily having been presaged by the Cooke-Wheatstone railway trials and Morse's famous 1844 Baltimore-Washington line, but

\textsuperscript{16} This organisation of the history of ICTs is broadly adapted from Thompson (1995, 152) and Pool (1990, 71-
overseas networks took longer owing to the technical difficulties of coping with the electrical and physical properties of the sea and the initial sluggishness of government support (A.C. Clarke 1992, 91-94).

The prospects of circling the globe changed dramatically when military and political considerations entered the picture. The cumbersome use of fires and other line-of-sight signalling systems could now be superseded. By the 1850s, France seized upon the telegraph line as a tool for communicating with her administration and settlers in Algeria and consolidating her hold on North Africa. Conversely, cutting telegraph cables proved to be critical in defeating the enemy in the 1861-65 American Civil War. In the Crimean War of 1854-56, the British and French decided that the initial 20-day message transmission period from metropole to frontline using a combination of telegraph and physical despatch was unacceptable. It was decided to effect near-continuous telegraphic transmission from the Austrian terminus of Bucharest right up to the Crimea including a section of cable under the Black Sea (Headrick 1991, 16-17). Cable communications now reduced message transmissions from months, weeks and days to hours and minutes.

To Innis' formulation of communications expansion as 'sword and pen', one can add the electric telegraph network, and along with it, the explosion of demand and supply of news to be carried across vast distances. News is the grist to the mill of media technology and constitutes our second and concurrent phase of media globalization. 'News' by most accounts is a derivative of capitalist economics: it drew its own demand indirectly through financial and commercial speculative activities (J.M. Scott 1972, 30-63). It was reliant upon
the electric telegraph for speed, and in turn almost single-handedly financed the operation of
the telegraph networks after the railway became eclipsed overnight by electric non-alphabetic
signal systems (Winston 1998, 27-28). In the 1830s and 1840s three 'international news
agencies'\(^{17}\) were set up respectively in Paris, London and Berlin. Each initially attempted to
cover the world independently for their nationally and regionally located financial clients but
rivalry proved damaging and by 1870, an 'inter-agency division-of-labour' agreement was
reached. Britain's Reuters covered exclusively British-controlled territories and the 'Far
East' whilst retaining special access to the US through partnership with Associated Press.
The French Havas (subsequently Agence France-Presse) covered French colonies, Italy, and
the Iberian Peninsula, while South America was 'shared' with Reuters. The German Wolff
agency did Austria, Scandinavia and the Russian Empire. Towards the end of the nineteenth
century, smaller rivals emerged on the scene, and by the end of World War One, the
Americans entered the market in strength with both Associated Press and United Press
Association (subsequently United Press International).

The politics of oligopoly operated to manage competition and keep the profit pie
stable throughout this time, and the respective market dominance of each agency was tied
precariously to the tides and fortunes of the major imperial powers of the day (Boyd-Barrett
Four' — Reuters, Associated Press, United Press International and Agence France-Presse —
dominated the non-communist world while TASS and Xinhua serviced the Soviet and

\(^{17}\) This term is strongly associated with Oliver Boyd-Barrett (1980) who assigns it to primarily four western-
based news agencies that evolved from their national origins to 'not only collect news from most countries and
territories of the world, but also distribute news to most countries and territories.' (p.14). Subsequently Boyd-
Barrett has argued that in discussing the global media organisation and the globalization of news, 'the
connections between news agencies, national formation and globalization are more profound and have a more
substantial history than has been recognized up to this point in time.' (Boyd-Barrett and Rantanen 1998, 1)
Chinese Communist political orbits. Newsgathering around the world was naturally expensive and logistically demanding in terms of staffing bureaus and experience, and furthermore it was interlinked with the economic centres of demand, which often coincided with the political centres (Boyd-Barrett 1980, 31-52; 1998, 19-34). With decolonisation and the expansion of the nation-state membership after 1945, the Third World and non-aligned intergovernmental lobbies painted the 'Big Four' into the generic target of western neocolonialism and accused them of perpetrating a 'bad news syndrome' about national conditions in the developing world, 'cultural aggression', and sustaining an inequitable world economic order (Righter 1978, 12-48; A. Smith 1980, 68-110; Pavlic and Hamelink 1985; Alleyne 1995).

While newsmaking, or newsgathering, was continuously augmenting increased social demand for technology and driving towards globalization of reporting, corresponding capability revolutions were occurring rapidly in the wake of the telegraph and cable. The escalating science of electromagnetics now swung wide open the technological possibilities for a whole host of associated applications. This third phase of ICT globalization is ushered in by the telephone, radio, television, microchip, computer and the space satellite, spread slightly over a century from the invention of the electric telegraph. Alexander Bell's 1876 telephone patent, for instance, occurred a decade after the first transatlantic telegraph cable had been successfully laid and the electric telegraph had taken firm root in business practices. Yet, for years afterward, it encountered social resistance from sections of elite opinion which feared moral degeneration with mass access to voice communication, and there were only a few things the telephone could better the telegraph at, apart from reproducing less-than high-fidelity sound in place of Morse code (Winston 1998, 59-60).
Radio was exceptional by comparison at the beginning of the twentieth century. It 'sold' itself as 'wireless telegraphy' initially and answered a twin naval need for long-distance communications beyond line-of-sight in the era of the ironclad warship, along with general maritime safety (Herring and Gross 1936, 76-80; Baker 1970, 36-60; Headrick 1991, 116-117). Not long after, telephone and microphone technologies were enterprisingly hitched to radio to give meaning to the term 'broadcast' by 1922. Furthermore, radio operated within invisible airwaves and breached the point-to-point limitations of cable for reach and area coverage. Creating its social utility via mass home entertainment, and battlefield applications, was not difficult.

Television, not unlike radio, also worked on wireless multi-point transmission and reception principles. Between its trial broadcasts in the mid-1930s and its large-scale consumer adoption in the early 1950s beginning in America and Europe, the prime obstacle was largely the quality of its picture content and lack of colour (Winston 1998, 119-125). The parallel research undertaken after 1945 into signal conductors that culminated chronologically in the transistor and integrated circuit, enhanced telephone, radio and television quality immeasurably in terms of speed, clarity and range of spin-off utilities. Portable recording formats such as cassette tapes, vinyl records and digital discs further served to supplement existing electromagnetic communication on all individual, social, military, political and commercial bases. By the mid 1960s, rocket science married to the prevailing state of electronic communications, had produced the commercially viable geo-
stationary communication satellite which afforded limitless global roaming potential for electronic information flows for the first time in history.\textsuperscript{18}

Paralleling all these developments is the revolution in automated computational and information storage and retrieval systems beginning in the interwar years. Initial prototype computers were large and catered to scientists performing research-based complex calculations, or more widely to military uses in encryption, decipherment and ordnance trajectory calculations. Computers also aided the Hydrogen Bomb project. With the arrival of the transistor chip and its progenies, the computer was finally downsized and made available for business users and the home (Winston 1998, 166-240). The electronic chip (microchip), starting with the ‘transistor’, was effectively to complement and integrate itself into all forms of ICTs by the 1980s. The logic of miniaturised computing, represented through storage, calculation and dissemination functions via cable, portents centralisation and decentralisation possibilities in stages or in simultaneity. Software enables ‘work’ at home, office and between distanced points of production and consultation (Robins and Webster 1988, 49-57; OECD 1996, 10-11). The idea of networking computers subsequently imitated the telegraph in many ways, and first underwent military communications experiments by the US Defense Department’s Advanced Research Projects Agency from 1969 onwards before gaining sufficient technological momentum as a viable commercial spin-off. Networked computers as a civilian tool began with electronic bulletin boards in the universities in the 1970s. This experiment was then hitched to the mass utility of the personal computer, finally attracting

\textsuperscript{18} Incidentally, satellite technology visionary Arthur C. Clarke claims that the 1964 Tokyo Olympics was the first attempt at live global television transmission via space, occurring seven years after the USSR launched the world’s first experimental satellites – the Sputnik series. (1992, 197-198) INTELSAT corporation however claims that its satellites formed the first complete global satellite communication system in 1969 and which allowed the worldwide television coverage of the Apollo moon landing that year (INTELSAT 1999). In October
business attention in the early 1990s in the form of the Internet (Tapscott 1996, 17-23; Winston 1998, 323-336). The Internet, as its name suggests, is a network of networks (or 'webs') of computers organised spatially. If this third phase can be considered to be sharply distinct from the first two ICT globalizations, it is that ICTs were forging geographical reach from an already advanced base in the form of the principles of electric encoding of information, and that its overall amplified volume and quality of transmission, channel and reception resulted as much from inter-technological hybridisation and fusion, as from technological displacement and self-improvement. Socially demanded connectivity now became faster, carried more volume, and delivered improved sight and sound clarity.

Statistically, global ICT audience reach over the past decade and a half in all three basic forms of modern mass media — daily newspapers, radio receivers and television receivers — has increased. Judged against steady declines of illiteracy rates across the globe (UNESCO 1999a, fig. 2), UNESCO statistics for daily newspaper circulation rates among developing countries nearly doubled from 37 per 1,000 inhabitants to 60 between 1980 and 1996, while among the developed countries, there was a decrease from 363 to 226. The latter decrease must be viewed against the rise in penetration rates of electronic media. Using the same illiteracy decrease as a backdrop, radio receiver availability showed significant improvement for both developing and developed countries in the period 1980-96: among the former, 120 receivers per 1,000 inhabitants had more than doubled to 244; among the latter, 880 receivers per 1,000 inhabitants had increased to 1,056. Most dramatic however, was the rise in television receiver accessibility over the same period: for developing countries, it was almost a fivefold increase from 27 per 1,000 inhabitants to 154; among the developed

1998, according to one industry survey, 48% of the "Space Market" was occupied by telecommunications
countries, a relatively saturated ratio of 424 per 1,000 inhabitants increased to 545 (UNESCO 1999a, IV-3, IV-4, IV-8 – IV-10, tab. IV.S.1, IV.S.3). Assuming that television broadcast is the most preferred, easily-comprehended and sense-pervasive form of mass media in terms of its fusion of visual and audio symbols within transmission and reception capabilities, it is also significant that geographically, large parts of the Third World such as Mexico, Colombia, Peru, Algeria, Morocco, Libya, South Africa and Malaysia, have seen television receivers increase by some 223% between 1980 and 1996, while Egypt, Oman, India, Mongolia and Thailand have registered impressive increases of between 816% to 2,145% over the same period. China, the most populous country, showed a staggering 4,889% expansion! Although this was from a low base, the pace of change is still striking. Among other countries with fairly large populations, Russia, Indonesia and Zambia caught up with 145% to 184% increases.19 Meanwhile, large Latin American states such as Argentina, Chile and Brazil, along with Saudi Arabia, maintained a fairly high television density of 100-349 receivers per thousand inhabitants. By 1996, the US had also set a new ceiling of 751-1,050 receivers per thousand inhabitants.

These figures ought to be read in conjunction with the last major worldwide statistical survey of non-indigenous television programme content published in the mid-1980s. Assuming that the importation of television programmes constitutes a major index of global information flow, it is significant that such non-indigenous programmes constituted an average ‘one-third or more of total programming time’ in a survey of 69 countries, of which two-thirds were Second and Third World members. With the exception of America’s low of utilities (Futron Corporation, 1998).

19 All percentages calculated from UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1998. (UNESCO 1998a, Tables 9.2) The comparison year chosen is 1996 because it conforms to the latest and most consistent media statistics available.
2% of foreign content, the then-USSR and China’s 8%, and India’s 11%, all others generally ranged between 30-60% in terms of screening of imported programmes (Varis 1984, 146-147). All these percentages are likely to have increased throughout the 1990s given the worldwide trade expansion in intellectual property, entertainment and cultural products (US Department of Commerce 1993). As an interim indication, the UNESCO World Culture Report 1998 reported that in terms of percentage of imports in total films distributed, for both television and cinema, the national average was 79%, with the US importing more than in the 1980s, at 22%, while at the extreme, Chile registered 100% imports (UNESCO 1998b, 168, graph 9).

To further buttress the statistical argument for a global audience reach using television as a representative mass media, the capabilities of Cable News Network (CNN) can be sampled as the advent of global media agents. Starting out with an aspiration towards 24-hour cable-only news provision for a lucrative American audience, the company realised by the mid-1980s, that it was profitable to gamble on going global. Its corporate chief, Ted Turner, seized upon both the expansion of world trade linkages and its concomitant need for up-to-date information. Furthermore, inspired by the non-western world’s New World Information and Communication Order-New International Economic Order (NWICO-NIEO) arguments about biased and exclusionary practices by western media, his fledgling CNN adroitly exploited a commercial opportunity with its World Report newsgathering and broadcast format (Flournoy and Stewart 1997, 2-3, 16-20). CNN undertook to provide broadcasters resident anywhere in the world with an opportunity to present news of their societies from within their national contexts, or from their point of view. In return, CNN for the two country studies at the time of writing. This edition of the Yearbook provides two detailed coloured
would be committed to transmit these stories unedited and uncensored through its various channels or rebroadcast them on its other affiliated networks, while at the same time respecting the rights of the original local broadcaster to use or re-use their contributed CNN material, and actively encouraging them to do so. Subsequently, these contacts enabled the company to expand its pool of overseas 'on-the-spot' correspondents. CNN's partnerships with assorted local media enabled it to obtain the news-breaking edge over rivals in major crises in Libya (US retaliatory air strikes), China (Tiananmen), the former Soviet Union, Iraq-Kuwait and Operation Desert Storm, the civil strife in Somalia and Bosnia and so on. Simultaneously, it allowed broadcast agencies from some 141 countries, such as those of Venezuela, Belize, Cuba, Czech Republic, Croatia, Turkey, Cameroon, South Africa, India and China opportunities for transmission on its news channels (Flournoy 1992, 7-15; Flournoy and Stewart 1997, 33-52; CNN World Report 1999). CNN's relationship with authoritarian China deserves particular mention: the state-controlled China Central Television signed up to *World Report* when it learnt about CNN's non-censorship policy, and according to a CNN editor, 'takes two hours of *World Report* every week and turns it around and broadcasts it out on the local stations.' Increasingly, local stations in various Chinese regions are doing programme tie-ups with CNN to facilitate local English practice.

In 1999, *CNN International* claimed an audience of 138 million television households in more than 210 countries and territories through a network of 23 satellites providing regional coverage for all inhabited continents, while *CNN World Report* itself is estimated to reach an additional 260 million households via national broadcast affiliates (CNN International 1999; CNN World Report 1999). This, of course, does not even include the maps for comparisons between 1980 and 1996.
extent of visits to its Internet news-sites. The network also stakes its reputation on having pioneered the first global ‘interactive news show’ with live phone-in, fax and email questions entertained on air (CNN advertisement 1999). The multiplier factor in CNN’s viewership is probably more substantial than existing statistics suggest, considering its programming and marketing format, and that ‘households’ do not exclude neighbours, visitors and community-based viewing. CNN’s capabilities are a trailblazer for its competitors such as BBC-World, and potentially the Arab Al-Jazeera, and Asia’s Channel News Asia.

Aside from the CNN factor, statistical analyses of media reach have also yet to take into formal account the information proliferation capacities of the Internet. As a network of networks, according to the UNESCO *World Communication Report*, it

...has no owner...[and] is managed by a community of users and finances its operating costs via its members, who pay connection fees to hubs (or network nodes) entrusted with routing the data exchange, or to local providers who connect up to the hubs. (Maherzi 1997, 45-46)

The Internet represents ‘Hydra-headed’ communication prospects. Presently one might project its ‘growth’ through numbers of users by geographical region in which North America, Europe and the Asia/Pacific register a disproportionate numerical preponderance.\(^{21}\)

Assuming that the majority in these areas accesses the Internet through telephone lines, these statistics compare favourably with the equally high total number of telephone lines in the three regions.\(^ {22}\) The measures of personal computer ownership per thousand inhabitants in

\(^{20}\) CNN assignment editor Claudia Chang quoted in Flourney and Stewart. (1997, 52-53)

\(^{21}\) World total: 163.25million (m); Canada & USA: 90.63m; Europe: 38.55m; Asia/Pacific: 26.97m; South America: 5.26m; Africa: 1.14m; Middle East: 0.88m as of April 1999. (Nua.com 1999) The measure of Internet host distribution by geographical area and type of domain from Network Wizards (www.nw.com) cited by Maherzi (1997, 48) in his UNESCO-supported *World Communication Report* reflects a similar domination by Europe, North America and the Asia/Pacific.

\(^{22}\) The total number of lines for the Americas (252,032,700), Asia, including the Pacific rim, (254, 514, 600) and Europe (296, 528, 400) are significant in their apparent equality considering that more than two-thirds of world population live in these areas. Africa (16, 914, 600) and Oceania (11, 790, 500) rank low by contrast. (ITU 1999, A-7, tab.1)
1996 show that more can be done to bridge the digital infrastructure divide: the 'industrial countries' lead with 156.3; Eastern Europe and the CIS with 18.2; Latin America and the Caribbean with 17.5; Asia/Pacific with 5.3; the Middle East (Arab States) with 5.7; while Africa has no statistics available (UNESCO 1999b, 282, tab. A.1). Nevertheless, the percentage rise in the number of Internet host computers for 1993-98 in all inhabited regions hints at rapid progress towards an increasingly connected world inclusive of developing countries: Africa 74.7%, the Americas 78.5%, Asia 110.9%, Europe 80.1%, and Oceania 61.5%. (ITU 1999, A-11)

Technically, Internet audience reach is infinite through its embodiment of mass media-telecommunications convergence and its corresponding ability to interface with other forms of IT and traditional print formats such as books and newspapers. Ominously, one might conclude that ICTs which started off with mapping empires have culminated with the Internet connecting the globe into a cybernetic 24-hour information circuit.

1.3.2 Informational Practices Within Global Capitalism and the Spread of Market Liberalisation

Technology and economics are not exclusively intertwined in a bias towards the growth of the former in facilitating globalization. The contrasting fortunes of the telegraph and telephone in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries attest to the practices within capitalism that supply the carrier with its load of information and invest it with importance. It is widely recognised that economics is purposive in nature and the capitalist type, more than its rivals, relies on actors' awareness of 'objective conditions' and 'states of belief' which

[23] The 'Asia/Pacific' figure is a mean calculated by the author from the UNESCO table indicated. At the time of writing, both the ITU and UNESCO admit that personal computer statistics remain incomplete.
enable demand and supply, price setting and factor allocation decisions to progress towards equilibrium (C.B. Richardson 1997, 5). Information greases the wheels of the free market on both micro and macro-economic levels, and from a political economy perspective, forms the knowledge complement to production. In the writings of Susan Strange, while the production structure determines the ‘what, who and how’ of production decisions, knowledge confers equivalent ‘power and authority’ upon

...those who are acknowledged by society to be possessed of the ‘right’, desirable knowledge and engaged in the acquisition of more of it, and on those entrusted with its storage, and on those controlling in any way the channels by which knowledge, or information, is communicated. (Strange 1994,121)

The financial analyst, the risk and IT consultants, the accountant, the sub-national, national and intergovernmental economic monitors comprise the knowledge structure. Their output and preoccupation is the creation, updating and interpretation of financial and economy-related reports that assume an aura of quasi-authoritative ‘bills of health’ with respect to firms, national economies and global markets. The authority of such bills of health beg the question of whether ‘objective’ facts and ‘states of belief’ can be scientifically precise in swaying markets towards equilibrium, and the answer lies in the subjective realm of the power of convincing the theoretically rational actor in capitalism.

The role of surveillance in global political economy is a major aspect of control by information. The white-collared information workers mentioned above qualify as part of the practice along with ‘mobilisation of organisational resources’ in response to perceived market fluctuations and ‘reflexive governance’ in the form of national and global fiscal

24 In describing the ‘knowledge structure’, Strange made explicit reference to the work of the main proponent of ‘post-industrial society’, Daniel Bell. Since the 1960s, the rising profile of white-collar managerial, financial, scientific and computer knowledge-based occupations in national economies has also been subsumed under other labels such as ‘knowledge industries’ and the more popular ‘information society.’ These are synonymous
policies (Hewson 1994, 61-62, 77). Surveillance accurately describes the evolution and workings of the postwar Bretton Woods financial architecture, upon which the United Nations signatories in 1944 agreed a Keynesian consensus, by which disruptions in worldwide economic flows might be diagnosed and reconstruction facilitated (Scammell 1957, 6-8). The IMF was to stabilise relative currency values and prevent competitive devaluations by making loans to countries which suffered short to medium-term balance of payments difficulties. The World Bank was to aid the cause of development and reconstruction by channelling a mix of private and public financial resources into official loans for countries with limited access to capital markets or low on credit-worthiness. Indeed, disbursing funds meant monitoring conditions in member-states in line with the neo-liberal free market philosophies at their core, and employing policy levers to avoid the interwar scenario of extreme economic nationalism. Such a mandate necessitated the formulation of information adequate for ensuring economic liberalism in national trade, monetary and fiscal policies as well (Mason and Asher 1973, 420-456; Goddard and Birch 1996, 222-223; Pauly 1997, 98-130). In this sense, the IMF and World Bank’s reporting on countries under their tutelage, and their imposition of ‘conditionality’ goes beyond surveillance into political penetration into the modus operandi of national economic governance (Miller-Adams 1999, 100-133).

For their first 45 years of existence, both the IMF and the World Bank oversaw a primarily international, interdependent, and largely western-dominated world economy affected by Cold War divisions. By 1989-91, the world economic map had been redrawn with the Soviet collapse, the emergence of newly industrialising countries, the continuing
plight of the vast majority of the Third World, and the sudden incorporation in both total and partial degrees of East European and Chinese economies into capitalist economic arrangements in trade and finance. The IMF’s annual report for 1992 pronounced that the world had finally progressed towards a ‘global monetary system’ with the fall of the Iron Curtain (International Monetary Fund 1992, 1). The next year, the fortieth meeting of the Interim Committee of the Fund’s Board of Governors adopted a ‘Declaration on Cooperation for Sustained Global Expansion’ whose concluding paragraph called for ‘strengthening’ the Fund’s ‘effective surveillance’ over exchange rates and macro-economic policies of member states ‘with a view to identifying and addressing in a timely manner problems that may give rise to tensions in the world economy and undesirable volatility in exchange rates.’ (International Monetary Fund 1993, x) In April 1998, in the wake of the ‘Asian contagion’ and Russia’s rouble collapse, the IMF’s information prescription had become politically global to the point of lecturing Japan on its weaknesses in domestic economic stimulus, warning Argentina to cool economic growth in the run-up period to critical national elections, and signing a deal with Indonesia compelling liberalisation and bank closures in an essentially patrimonial economy. It was also making prognoses on labour markets, banking supervision and competition policy (Dale 1998; Kirk 1999).

Three developments in the 1980s had also prepared the ground for the intensification of market-based information flow that occurred after the events of 1989-91. The first was the decade-long Debt Crisis, which engendered more than usual IMF and World Bank scrutiny into the (mis)management of domestic political affairs of Latin America and Africa. The second was the demonstration effect of the newly industrialising countries. The third was the
example of Thatcherism and Reaganomics. The latter 'economic ideologies' acted as positive advertisements for capitalism and were scripted ostensibly into academic and official literature discussing alternative development models (J. Williamson 1990; Stallings 1992; Biersteker 1995).

Last but not least, the massive flows of trade and investment conducted by MNCs have generated the expansion of occupations related to the knowledge structure of global political economy and supported the growth of a worldwide information-intensive IT industry. Such MNC activities had two large implications for information flow. Firstly, beginning in the early 1980s, investments increasingly entailed political risk analysis in addition to the purely economic national credit assessments regularly performed by banks engaged in cross-border lending. Learning the lessons posed by Third World debt default in the early 1980s, and the serial political instabilities demonstrated by the Lebanese Civil War, coups and revolutions in Chile, Iran and Nicaragua in the 1970s, along with the unexpected nature of military invasions in Afghanistan (1979) and Kuwait (1990), lenders and investors have become conscious of assessing risk in non-economic dimensions such as civil order, stable authority, propensity to expropriate, legal transparency and war risk (Haendel 1979, 91-124; C.R. Kennedy Jr. 1987, 1-22; Solberg 1992; Herberg 1992). Secondly, the embrace of IT by MNCs has increased their infrastructural demands on investment-recipient countries in the form of assessing the educational quality of workforces and the technological adaptability of host countries' social and labour policies (Reidenberg 1997; Froomkin 1997; Gellman 1997). This requirement is often factored into country-risk analysis and is particularly onerous for developing countries that are compelled to account for deficiencies on the bargaining table with MNCs and other states within the framework of a global
information economy. Such deficiencies might include domestic elite-driven protectionism, political resistance to embracing national information infrastructure initiatives, and policies favouring censorship at the expense of business needs (Lenk 1997; Talero 1997). This form of exposure may weaken the host countries' positions by raising the political, social and economic costs of the latter's efforts to 'interface' with a global capitalist information order. On the other hand, MNC expansion correspondingly drew the attention of non-state actors seeking borderless checks and balances to the excesses of MNC involvement in perpetuating corruption and other underdevelopment ills in the Third World. With the aid of the Internet and other global media, organisations such as Transparency International have set out to crusade against what they regard as the unethical and dehumanising practice of corruption in national and global contexts through exposés, and to raise awareness through campaigns and publications.25

1.3.3 Post-Cold War Geopolitical Fluidity

To speak of globalization in the 1990s is to acknowledge the sea changes on the geopolitical map of the world in 1989-91. The Cold War had globalized the Soviet-American contest. The bipolar confrontation between the two blocs took the form of multidimensional grand strategies pursued by the superpowers with weapons of intercontinental range and mass destructive effects, accompanied with much public rhetoric. The multidimensional means employed had underscored the totality of the 'war' of ideas on which each side staked their prosperity and future (P.M. Taylor 1997, 27-52). For the whole world, the 1945-89 era was a unique window of history in which the ideological struggle became totalising in

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consequence: scores of colonial territories joining the ranks of independent nation-states for the first time needed to make choices in their form of domestic governance, and these 100-plus states had to do so within the context of the developing electronic media, and an international political economy dominated by the US and her allies which excluded the communist world by default. The 'war' of communism versus liberal democratic capitalism respected no boundaries and the total stakes made superpower intervention commonplace (Halliday 1983, 32-33, 39-42; Gaddis 1997, 82-83). Third World non-alignment became, in practice, a figleaf for reproduced ideological rivalry outside Europe and North America.

Although this is not the place to posit a theory of the end of the Cold War, it is reasonable to observe that the USSR met its demise in large part due to the weight of its ideological contradictions exacerbated by the demonstration effects of the western model and the physical containment pressures exerted by NATO and other US allies (Risse-Kappen 1994; Checkel 1997). One distinct post-Cold War effect was to eliminate the automaticity of superpower intervention worldwide in response to its rival's moves (Clad 1995, 117-121). Another equally important result was the environment of ideological flux immediately attending a contested unipolar moment, or conversely, arising from the decompression of bipolarity (Gaddis 1991, 1992; Jervis 1992; Kegley Jr. and Raymond 1994, 3-64; Huntington 1996; Rosenau 1997b). As some writers have pointed out, the American model had also exhausted itself economically and socially in its appeal under the pressures of mounting budget deficits and neglect of non-military spheres of social welfare (P. Kennedy 1989, 665-692; Fulbright 1989; Marullo 1993; Bromley 1999). Instead, in place of the USSR and communism as a geopolitical blanket counterpoised against the coalitional straightjacket of a Free World or the western camp, post-Cold War decompression today brings a jostling of
pan-Islamic civilisational values, Asian Values, an 'African Renaissance', Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, resurgent nationalisms, the 'Third Way', and the presumed victor of the cold war, liberal democratic capitalism. This is an assessment shared as much by political leaders as academics since the early 1990s. Leaders such as Nelson Mandela of South Africa, Fernando Cardoso of Brazil and Narasimha Rao of India have articulated their perception of new national directions in the form of acknowledging the 'right to differ', as well as its tragic correspondence with the 'fight to differ' so dangerously magnified in the Balkans. In surveying Africa, a Nigerian leader argued that much as Africa was liberated from rigidly following US and Soviet socio-economic models, it had now to synthesise or establish indigenous formulas for democratisation to progress realistically (Obasanjo 1997). In East Asia, the stalemate between the US and the EU on one side, and the Asia-Pacific rim states on the other, over a universal vision of human rights and security confidence-building is a recurring conflict of ideas and problem-identification.

These are only the more prominent contenders in a world ideological marketplace, for there are possibly variegated rainbow political colours shading themselves out from these. The non-existence of dominant ordering ideology emancipates competing territorial justifications of communitarian-statist organisation. In addition, non-state entities such as terrorists, cyber 'hacktivists', MNCs, NGOs, including Greenpeace-type outfits, anti-capitalist anarchists, illegal immigrants and global criminal networks, pursue their disparate agendas utilising the networking avenues afforded by ICTs. Through mediated visibility, these agendas frequently impinge upon national agendas. This has in turn prompted some

26 These two phrases were coined by then-President Nelson Mandela (1997, 7) of South Africa and his assessment is widely shared by the respective contributions of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso of Brazil, then-Prime Minister Narasimha Rao of India, Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazzi of Iran, and then-Foreign Minister Ali Alatas of Indonesia in the same volume by Lepor (1997).

The nature of post-Cold War effects is as much of a babble of informational diversity built around conflicting political, social and economic ideas of civilisations as it is of a neo-realist perspective of declining powers contending with virile challengers. While military and economic power have not lost their utility, they play second fiddle to diplomacy and information management because, unlike the Cold War, there is neither ‘common enemy’ for automatic targeting, nor permanent alliances for fixed goals. Issues of crisis tend to be shifting and complex due to the way consequences hurt imputed ‘friends’ and ‘foes’, and also because of the way cross-border social, economic and political links manage to create large degrees of collateral damage. The recent 2001-2002 campaigns against terrorism are a case in point: the US-led coalition has had to wage a propaganda campaign marginalising Osama bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda network while wooing the peaceful majority among Arab populations as allies of a righteous war (De Young and Sipress 2001). Additionally, the Bush Administration’s public labelling of an ‘axis of evil’ as the doctrinal extension of the ‘war on terror’ has provoked visible dissent among allies and enemies alike (Knowlton 2002). Indeed, the outcome of the struggle to shape a new world order, hierarchical, interdependent, global democratic or otherwise, is likely to depend more upon whether the informational challenges can be met and adapted, or refuted, in the post-bipolar gaze of individuals, NGOs and national populations with vastly improved access to ICTs (Norris 1997; Strobel 1997, 10).
1.4 Information Globalization and Structural Contestations

Information globalization, as a border-crossing trend of social exposure to local and alternative ideas, thus becomes reality at the confluence of factors of ICTs, the spread of capitalist informational practices, and global ideological and power diffusion with the end of the Cold War. It manifests itself as a multidimensional information flow on a global scale ignorant of time and space boundaries, thereby precipitating a global political information space, or climate of scrutiny. Substantively, this is 'structurational change' taking place in terms of Giddens' conception of the tri-faceted 'dynamism of modernity' surveyed in Section 1.1 (Giddens 1990, 16). Firstly, it represents a radical break from premodern practices of connecting time and space in social arrangements due to a lack of universal uniformity in time measurement. Information globalization accelerates the process begun by print capitalism (B. Anderson 1991, 43-45). It separates time and space by making possible relations 'between “absent” others, locationally distant from any given situation of [physical] face-to-face interaction' (Giddens 1990 18-19; 1995, 26-48; 1991, 16) through the mediation of ICTs and a global economy. Secondly, global information flow facilitates 'disembedding' processes within modernity. This means that social relations in local contexts can be extracted out, re-examined, or socialised across time and space (Giddens 1990, 21-22; 1991, 18). Information flow equips the two disembedding mechanisms of symbolic tokens (e.g. money) and expert systems (i.e. systems of technical, governing accomplishments or professions) identified by Giddens to effect change in economics and politics. CNN's live broadcasts of political events, together with surveillance and market penetration characteristics of global capitalism, bear out the disembedding nature of late twentieth century economics and politics. Thirdly, information globalization encourages constantly reflexive re-examination of existing social modes for both individuals and societies
regardless of location and stage of development. This is because information availability widens the latitude for choice of modes of living through awareness of alternatives. In other words, 'thought and action are constantly refracted back upon one another...in the light of incoming knowledge.' (Giddens 1990, 38; 1991, 20) Alternatively, reflexivity in thought could also mean justifying pragmatic and syncretic ideologies and coalitions on grounds of rational success, reinforcing reactionary notions of 'otherness', or rejecting 'foreignness' altogether. Post-Cold War geopolitical fluidity mirrors this as political and economic actors pursue variations that may stray significantly from previously hegemonic Cold War ideologies and associations against a 'common enemy'.

Incoming information thus becomes 'political' when its representational qualities provoke reflexivity of self-examination among direct and indirect decision-making audiences. Clearly, a discussion of the 'power' of information flow carried by information globalization needs accounting when information providers and channel controllers can potentially manufacture 'opinion' presaging action or approval at various levels and locations of social organisation. In Chapter 3, the availability of informational power as a climate of scrutiny across frontiers will be elaborated as a threat to national community, in tandem with a layered analysis of the spatial implications of the three facets of the information globalization process.

Not surprisingly there exists at the transition into the twenty-first century manifold sites where nation-states interrogate and challenge every possible advance of globo-logic over definitions of community. These contests are structural in the dual sense that they not only involve particular territories, but instead, they are about setting, or defying, standards of
acceptable and unacceptable conduct, both domestic and international. At this point, it may be objected that if globalization compresses political space, and a clash of interests arises from the proximity of actors sharing that space, structural theories such as neo-realism or neo-liberalism may be more appropriate in resolving national-global contests through 'system management' such as shifts in balance of power, problem-solving bandwagoning, or regime-building. As Kenneth Waltz put it, systems as patterned interactions rely on the regularity of actors' behaviour and their capabilities. This regularity of behaviour and capabilities is what Giddens has termed rules and resources binding social systems in time and space. Waltz, speaking primarily for the neo-realists, assigns to international structure a static quality in which they are ordered according to state units differentiated by function and capabilities (Waltz 1979, ch.5-6). The balance of power operates according to the leadership of one or more hegemonic states outranking the rest in an order of capabilities, especially military and economic. Other neo-realists, such as Stephen Krasner and Joseph Grieco, who have introduced explanations of international cooperation through regime creation, argue similarly that the fusion of power and self-seeking goals is the foundation behind hegemony-led cooperation (Krasner 1982; Grieco 1993).

Neo-liberals such as Ernst Haas, Robert Keohane and Robert Axelrod, and the earlier writings of Nye, differentiate themselves by arguing that states selfishly pursue their national interest up to a point, beyond which considerations such as the long-term pay-off structure and the calculations of loss and benefit arising from the number of state and non-state actors on any issue induce jointly-maximising collaboration (E. Haas 1964; Keohane and Nye Jr. 1989, ch. 1, 2, 8; Axelrod and Keohane 1993, 87-98). These literatures of the 'neo-neo' debate have the advantage of steering clear of the anti-international institution orientations of
the realists and the anti-state obsession of liberal, revolutionist or idealist international relations theorists. They also have the ready argument that globalization is no more than a phenomenon produced by an identifiable hegemonic centre, or centres. To that extent, they are right in pinpointing the fact that an unstable American leadership exists within a fluid post-Cold War international disorder connected by capitalism and ICT networks. The latter two features of information globalization, as clarified earlier, may well prolong the pattern of western geopolitical dominance for some time. But this control cannot be secure and static, because information globalization’s three facets also produce immense possibilities for contestation. These possibilities can be collectively summarised as the lack of an immutable and automatic single ideological narrative under the worldwide gaze of ICT-connected individuals and nation-states: whose actual pay-offs, and whose joint benefits inhere in existing structures are unclear, although these are conveniently attributable to the American superpower.

Due to the informational practices of capitalism, the extensions of ICTs in creating multiple networks of transmission and reception, and the end of the strategic verities of bipolarity, the focus for nation-states in responding to globalization depends on how fungible power has become in defending the security of identity. The latter is a soft issue playing in the arena of meaning creation, and in conditions of information globalization, it will precede any decision to apply economic and military power. Chapter 2 will treat this foundation of soft power as power within information flow. And while both neo-realists and neo-liberals have a point in privileging structure, they do not clearly address how the agents might revise or constitute those structures’ operations through their own efforts at generating the
foundations of meaning for those structures, whether they be the UN Security Council resolutions, the international law of human rights, good economic policy under IMF guidelines, or the defence of cultures. In fact, where appropriate, as in the development of hypotheses of soft power agency in Chapter 4, the positive elements of neo-realist and neo-liberal thought such as regime and epistemic community theory, will be built upon to develop an account of agency by states and non-state actors alike in using information as instruments.

Hence soft power foreign policy, following structuration theory, answers the following questions: whose ideas, design, and ultimately whose order globalizes? And what impact would this have on 'our community'? There is often a soft threat from ideas projected through traffic such as news, issue and international legal agendas. For foreign policy to be reoriented to tackle this threat, the latter must be analysed in terms of the power of information and subsequently, its spatial consequences.

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27 Baldwin (1993, 20-22) makes the lack of explanation of the fungibility of power a criticism of the 'neo-neo' debate. Both sides do not explain how hegemonic coercion can translate into power for achieving other objectives that defy self-evident cost-benefit analysis, e.g. identity.
2.1 Introduction: Information and Global Politics

The present research is confronted with a myriad of definitions of information derived from the wider business IT, science and mathematical literatures. According to the ‘information systems’ perspective there are three requirements for defining information. Firstly, information is contingent upon a recipient’s understanding of it and consequent action. Secondly, acting upon information means interpreting and analysing it. Thirdly, it follows that information is an improvement upon ‘data’, which is a raw condition of representational symbols without meaning, that is, non-organised objects (Liebenau and Backhouse 1990, 2-3; Boisot 1995, 161-164). This account is consistent with a 1962 study by Fritz Machlup who defined knowledge as a ‘state of knowing’, as a basis for detailing the measurement of knowledge in education, research, media and IT. He noted that semantically, both ‘knowledge’ and ‘information’ are anchored in the common concept of meaning, and so on a general level, the two are indistinguishable. The only difference lay only in their verbal roots: to ‘inform’ is to convey what is known; and to ‘know’, the outcome of being informed. Machlup observed that this was a minor and possibly negligible difference (Machlup 1962, 8, 14-15) with which this thesis can agree. Hereafter, ‘information’ as a sphere of meaning can be regarded as synonymous with ‘knowledge’.

Analysing the list above of definitional requirements further suggests that information is socially generated, ordered and possesses value. In this respect, the mathematical school of information and communication represented chiefly by Shannon, Weaver, Wiener, Brillouin
and Rapoport attach a consensually utilitarian meaning to information that resonates with the above-mentioned criteria. Weaver for instance explained information as

...a measure of your freedom of choice when you select a message...[assuming that,] you are confronted with a very elementary situation where you have to choose one of two alternative messages...(Weaver 1966, 17; Shannon and Weaver 1949)

Similarly motivated, Rapoport articulates information as making possible

...a precise language for talking about the structure of assemblies and the fundamental processes involving the emergence of order from chaos and chaos from order...[;] information is the carrier of order. (Rapoport 1966, 54)

Fundamentally, information theory in science aims at maximizing value to observers and users. Most mathematical derivations of information flow express themselves in terms of changing probabilities (Goldman 1953, 2; Brillouin 1956, x; Theil 1967, xxl) and alleviating 'difference[s] between two states of uncertainty.' (Krippendorff 1986, 13)

Approaching information studies from a third direction, the generic 'sociology of knowledge', a broad school of thinking on the socially utilitarian nature of information is further reinforced. Increasingly, there is growing recognition that social structure and knowledge do not exist in a relationship of one-way domination, that is, structure does not simply shape knowledge. Rather, the two are co-constitutive, or influence one another in complex ways (Law 1986, 3-4). Bruno Latour has taken such a line of argument in proposing a 'performative definition' of society whereby actors within it, 'whatever their size, define in practice what society is, what it is made up of, what is the whole and what are the parts...’ (Latour 1986, 273; Rouse 1987, 248-265) Society is informed into being by a pattern of representational practices, both willed and unwilled alike. John Searle argues similarly that social reality is the consequence of collective intentionality and 'the biological capacity to

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1 This is not a controversial treatment as an early work proposing the incorporation of a 'political economy of information' into International Relations attests. (O'Brien and Helleiner 1980)
make something symbolize – or mean, or express – something beyond itself.’ (Searle 1995, 227-228) These understandings strengthen the structuration approach adopted from Giddens for this thesis.

Having established the utilitarian attributes of information, the literature on the political economy of information suggests another set of distinctions: information may be either a resource or a commodity. Dan Schiller argues that information as resource ‘is something of actual or potential use’ while an ‘information commodity’ is, like all commodities, derived from the vocabulary of capitalism, something ‘produced increasingly by wage labour within and for a market.’ (D. Schiller 1988, 33) In the present argument, information is necessarily expansive in meaning encompassing both resource and commodity characteristics as information is being considered politically in the realm of international relations. Politics often involves decision-making and social change on an organised basis, and thus its action-generators would be constituted by ideas of any form so long as they fulfil the criteria of being social movers. Economic information such as reports of excessive debt and blatant systemic corruption, or cultural information such as separatist or revanchist propaganda from abroad, are as likely as political ideologies to cause social and political displacement once they are translated into social meaning. Hence this thesis can finally adopt the working definition of information as a socially patterned relationship of events and symbols capable of inducing action, identity or community. To reiterate a formulation declared earlier in this section, ‘information’ is assumed to be interchangeable with, and to encompass, both ‘ideas’ and ‘knowledge’.
The subject of politics is in this regard closely intertwined with the definition of information as a connector of meaning and action. Countless primary tracts and secondary literature in political science have been authored around the question of 'what is politics as an activity?'. Through these works, it has become possible to articulate an understanding of politics as an exercise of decision-making for the purpose of social organisation or other jointly-constituted ends, against a background of competing wants, limited resources, and a search for affirmative identity. This squares comfortably with Bernard Crick's defence of politics in a distributive sense

...as the activity by which differing interests within a given unit of rule are conciliated by giving them a share in power in proportion to their importance to the welfare and the survival of the whole community. (Crick 1964, 21)³

To make appropriate decisions according to criteria as diverse as the quantitatively fair, qualitatively just, order, prestige and cultural standards, or even to serve parochial interests, political actors need to be equipped with capacities for symbolic and conceptual interpretations of needs, resources and options for solution. It relates to Man's interpretational skills in pursuit of survival (Edelman 1964, 114-115; Mueller 1973, 13-17). Politics is inherently a search for, and sustenance of, patterns of order, and where informed and enlightened compromises do not work, force may be employed but this usually requires justification (Crick 1964, 30-31) to both fellow power exercisers, target populations, majorities and minorities alike. In short, information must be digested in the course of the operation of politics as it empowers action, resistance or acquiescence. Karl Deutsch makes a pertinent point in drawing parallels between information and the operation of a trigger:

Power, we might say, produces changes; information triggers them off in a suitable receiver. In the example [of the gun] ..., the most important thing was not the amount

³ This definition has the advantage of implicitly incorporating the ancient Greek notion of 'politics as the good life' as well as more realist understandings of politics as conflict and bargained resolution.
of pressure on the trigger, once it had reached the required threshold, but rather the fact that it was delivered at the trigger, that is, at one particular point of the gun. Similarly, the information required for turning the gun to a particular target need not be carried by any amount of energy proportionate to the energy delivered to the target by the gun. The important thing about information is...the pattern carried by the signal, and its relationship to the set of patterns stored in the receiver. (Deutsch 1966, 146)

In politics, as in information theory, action is carried out via communication of ideas from source, transmission, channel and reception, and above all, the source loads information with meaning in order to empower it as a trigger. In this vivid sense, politics can be discussed as 'political communication', and a system in terms of its language, transmission, and its medium (Meadow 1980; Nimmo and Sanders 1981).

Within a closed political arena, such as the nation-state, legislative assembly or corridors of a bureaucracy, political communication and information flow can be conveniently isolated for the study of decision-making processes, but when applied to the level of the international and globalization, complexity inflates research possibilities and defies neat analysis. In a tightly-ordered domestic context, government propaganda services, newspaper and broadcast media can be 'located' in terms of impact derived through quantitative measures of audience feedback. By contrast, global media agents such as CNN, BBC World Service and the Internet generate potentially multidirectional impacts across time zones and cultures. Under conditioning by global information forces, domestic politics, and the international politics of states, have very broad and multiplied 'fronts' opened up for dealing. The ontologies of action and reaction in foreign policies become varied and complicated by individual actions (terrorists), ideologies (religious/cultural fundamentalisms and human rights), non-state actors (e.g. Greenpeace and MNCs), and international organisations (e.g. UN, WTO, IMF) in addition to conventional state-initiated causes. The
controversy over prioritising agency and structure haunts both policy and academic analyst. Central to all this is the very basic task of interpreting the ‘problem’ and ‘solution’ for foreign policy.

In this Chapter, the innate power relations of ‘information’ will be examined, through which, it will become apparent that information offers wide possibilities for constructing political realities for the state official and non-state actor alike. First, the concept of information flow and its components will be introduced as a vehicle for examining the operation of power. The idea of flow is deducible from the cross-boundary logic of information globalization. Next to flow will be a short discussion of theories of power, which will clarify their analytical links to Foucaultian discursive power, and ultimately, soft power. The rest of this Chapter will examine components of information flow in detail, and these will be drawn together in the conclusion to present a coherent affirmation of Foucaultian discursive power at the heart of soft power.

### 2.2 Information Flow

As a preliminary step towards elaborating information as power, the elements of information flow need to be introduced, following Warren Weaver's proposition (Figure 1), which is widely adopted by both mathematical theorists of information and communication scholars (Weaver 1966, 17).
Figure 1: A System of Information Flow

The source and the creation of the message at the point of origin on the extreme left constitute information creation. It is then transferred via a ‘medium’, which may jointly and indistinguishably comprise transmitter, channel and receiver. These components of the medium are self-explanatory as technology. However, the medium as a collective concept opens up an intellectual and political controversy. Media philosopher McLuhan offers a helpful definition: the medium is more than a technological arm of efficacy; it is simultaneously a message by itself, and both a potential and actual shaper of representation, aesthetic, memory and other content carried upon it (McLuhan 1974, 51-66, 70-71). This understanding is evident when one considers how drama in the form of a coup d'état, a racial riot, or a torture allegation against a government, is portrayed differently in varying degrees across printed news and books, television, radio, film, tapes, discs and Internet sites. Each medium tends to affect the receptivity and taste of singular and varying combinations of senses. A particular medium, say television or Internet, may in one instance, require a specific encoding of information in the form of moving pictures and clipped shots with minimal text, and in another, require a multimedia capture of so-called ‘defining essences’ of a viewpoint or an event. Built into media is the concept of noise, which implies corruption of the clarity of the information transmitted. Noise can range from malfunction of equipment, to the naturally-occurring ‘static’ riding on electromagnetic wavelengths, to the incompetence of crafting and interpretation of the original message by the political leader, civic participant or spokesman. Noise can be both accidental and deliberate.
Lastly, at the receiving end is the recipient, who is as vulnerable or intelligent as the source and message creation process. He also possesses the capacity and discretion to decode the information conducted through the media. Here is where a ‘good’ spin on an event may be perceived as ‘bad’ deception and unadulterated superficiality. The recipient can then be self-motivated to provide feedback via the same route from which he received the original information. Alternatively, he might wish to become a transmission source himself and the flow occurs in a reciprocal direction from that shown in Figure 1. In any case, the caprice of representation can occur anywhere down the length of the flow as noise.

By the latter half of the twentieth century, technology had attained for mankind unprecedented capabilities for accuracy in transmission, channelling and reception, but at the same time, electronic inventions such as the microchip, television and Internet had also amplified and multiplied the terminals for information creation. The structure for reporting and making news has become wider and more accessible to other actors in addition to states and corporations. Unsurprisingly, ICTs beginning from the printing press have enabled man to be modern in the sense of vastly extending his ability to be inspired, to record, and maximise ideas for controlling his environment for existence. The modern is definable as a knowledge-based liberation from the traditional worldview where life and change is inherently circumscribed by uncritical faiths, inherited social experience and fatalistic reconciliation to strictly local circumstances of subjection (Black 1967, 11-13, 54-55; Rostow 1971, 26-30, 56-62). In the perspective of the modernisation theorists, ICTs are both modern and modernising in being able ‘to help survey a new environment, raise people’s
aspirations, guide and control a dynamic process, teach new skills, and socialize citizens to a new and different society that is still only in the process of becoming.' (Schramm 1967, 6-7)\textsuperscript{5}

The project of modernity stands for awareness of new possibilities, unities of achievement and of unparalleled identity association. Yet at the same time, 'modern' media with their 'real time' and geography-surmounting span enable postmodern theorists to announce the demise of grand narratives in the construction of society and hence of all political life. The postmodernist Gianni Vattimo has observed that

The mass media, which in theory offer information in 'real time' about everything happening in the world, could in effect be seen as a kind of concrete realization of Hegel's Absolute Spirit: the perfect self-consciousness of the whole of humanity, the coincidence between what happens, history and human knowledge...In actual fact [however], the increase in possible information on the myriad forms of reality makes it increasingly difficult to conceive of a single reality. It may be that in the world of the mass media a 'prophecy' of Nietzsche's is fulfilled: in the end the true world becomes a fable. (Vattimo 1992, 6-7)

Vattimo's observation is the result of what his contemporary Michel Foucault calls the operation of discourse power throughout modernity, constituted by the production of scientific and social scientific modes of managing society for the benefit of mankind. As his genealogical studies of prisons, clinics and asylums reveal, these supposedly progressive changes have reproduced power in the form of authorities of knowledge, or information. These in turn possess the utility of subjecting people to scrutiny, and the legitimacy to punish, and to correct scientifically defined 'errant ways.' (Foucault 1980; 1997) As will be explained in the following sections, Foucaultian ideas are probably an advance upon conventional understandings of relational and hidden power.

\textsuperscript{4} This is consistent with Giddens' more recent use of the term 'reflexivity in thought' to distinguish modern from pre-modern societies in regard to the impact and role of knowledge. See Giddens (1990, 38-39).

\textsuperscript{5} Giddens also devotes some attention to the globalization of the media as part and parcel of his modernity thesis: "The point here is not that people are contingently aware of many events, from all over the world, of which previously they would have remained ignorant. It is that the global extension of the institutions of modernity would be impossible were it not for the pooling of knowledge which is represented by the 'news'."
2.3 The Power Content of Information Flow within Information Globalization

As Section 2.1 has explained, information is intrinsically a political power resource as it carries meaning. Political theorists from Plato to Foucault have both implicitly and explicitly recognised that political debate, with the employment of rhetoric, empirical examples, communitarian assumptions, natural law claims and counter-claims, tends to produce outcomes not unlike battles for control and dominance fought by physical arms. Power, in its most general working definition, is (a) relational and purposeful in nature involving at least two parties; and (b) operates when A is forced to do X by B, a course of action which A would not voluntarily do. In addition, as theorising by Steven Lukes has shown, the definition of power remains elusive but may be qualified by the degrees of its visibility. Overt conflict can reveal to the naked eye how and where an opponent is floored. Yet on a second level, power may have operated through the premeditated exclusion of certain weapons, resources and issues that one's opponent may potentially avail himself of in decision-making. This is achieved subtly through a 'mobilization of bias', which Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz describe in terms of tangible forms of 'predominant values, beliefs, rituals and institutional procedures ("rules of the game") that operate systematically and consistently to the benefit of certain persons and groups at the expense of others.' Bachrach and Baratz labelled this 'face' of power 'nondecision-making' (1970, 18, 43, 3-51). On a third dimension, power can also be said to act when potential resources and issues are excluded or precluded from politics by a combination of nondecision-making and 'the operation of social forces and institutional practices.' (Lukes 1974, 24, 11-23) Power

(1990, 77-78) In one of his 1999 BBC Reith Lectures, Giddens claims that advances in communications technology are the defining force of globalization as a revolution, even against the state. See Giddens (1999).
assumes a skin of subtlety in Lukes' 'three-dimensional view' in the form of contenders' long-term socialised values, prejudices and patterns of a macro-structural nature beyond both the control of immediate power contestants and the decision-making framework. This third dimension may skew, eliminate, or render fictitious opponents' autonomy and sense of agency altogether. Understanding the complexity of the power of information flow must therefore be sensitive to these possibilities and hence the need for a component-by-component explanation (Figure 1) if the structural emplacements of power are to be illuminated.

In adopting Lukes' three-dimensional power model, the present analysis also aims to surmount the quantitative methodological trap identified by many mass media researchers as a handicap in the development of their discipline. Writing nearly 15 years after the advent of audience surveys gained popularity under the stimulation of newspaper and radio, Joseph Klapper noted that despite amassing 'cascading data' with the aim of establishing whether media directly produces delinquency, debases public tastes and becomes politically persuasive,

...we have not only failed to provide definitive answers, but we have done something worse: we have provided evidence in partial support of every hue of every view. We have on the one hand demonstrated that people's existing tastes govern the way they use media, and on the other hand reported instances in which changed media usage was associated with apparently altered tastes.7

This 'pessimism' was widely acknowledged in intra-disciplinary surveys of 'diffusion models' of information flow (Savage 1981), political advertising campaigns (Kaid 1981), general political communication (Blumler and Gurevitch 1995, 11), socialization (T. Burns

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6 Adapted from Merriam (1950, 15-46) and Dahl (1994, 288, 290). It is notable that Dahl conscientiously resisted fixing any permanent concept of power; only generalisations would be possible in a constant search for accurate operational definitions. (p.308)

Klapper's proposed new agenda called for 'situational', 'phenomenistic' or 'functional' approaches moving 'away from the tendency to regard mass communication as a necessary and sufficient cause of audience effects, toward a view of the media as influences working amid other influences, in a total situation.' (Klapper 1966, 537) This more inclusive, sociological agenda tended to focus mass media forms as contributory agents and critical bit part actors, short of being the only source of change in a social situation (McQuail 1994, 2-4). By the mid-1970s, Colin Seymour-Ure had clarified the idea of media effect as one used in 'a broad sense': the media could be a necessary and sufficient cause of events only in the 'strongest sense' where media needs no assistance in causality; but more frequently, media operates 'in a weaker sense' as 'the catalyst or occasion of an event which might have happened anyway but not otherwise at that time or in that form.' (Seymour-Ure 1974, 21)

At the same time, others have suggested the politics and mass media be studied in a holistic systems perspective encompassing institutions, audience orientations to politics and 'communication relevant aspects of political culture'. Further research fragmentation occurred across mass media studies where others have proposed a culturalist model of communication emphasising group and culture-bound contexts, and yet others have plumbed for radical humanistic and interpretative sociological directions in explaining media power (Rosengren 1994; Craig 1994; Krippendorff 1994). Critical theory and postmodernism à la Vattimo and Foucault have today found new relevance to media analysis, and they may eventually clarify and further illuminate Lukes' hidden power dimensions in components of information flow across all social boundaries (Curran 1990, 139-142; Moores 1993; Mattelart 1994; Ang 1996).
2.3.1 Power Within Information Source

As has been elaborated elsewhere, politics occurs within an environment in which Man finds and expresses his existence with symbols in language, art and other forms of visual and oral interpretation. The creation of information as patterns of symbolic meaning is unambiguously direct relational power in the sense that human beings conduct their activities according to reports, mediating and acting as stimuli, without which actions will not be purposefully performed. The development of information throughout history has invariably been need-driven: for instance, the 'political' for government, citizen and party functions; 'commercial' for economic activities; and 'entertainment', a loose category catering to individual physiological and psychological needs, and including lifestyle, health and culture.

Delivering fresh and regular information seems straightforward enough when it is construed in terms of the physical means of getting numbers of spokespersons, journalists, stringers and sub-editors to collect, sort and compile, along with the acquisition of reliable electronic lines, cameras and satellites. However, an equally illuminating question to pose is: how is news sourced, created or 'pieced together'? This is where two and three-dimensional models of power operate. Firstly, one might consider the widest possible range of information creators in the realm of politics, which in practice encompasses the category of foreign affairs as well: the government bureaucracy, corporate organisations, sub-national groups and individuals – private and official – are all players in utility-driven information-generation. Then, one needs to ponder what determines the 'what, which and how' of their ideas. Governmental and intergovernmental bureaucracies such as the national ministries, the IMF, NATO and the UN are likely to generate reports on 'security' and 'administration'
according to the biases and acculturated values, ideologies and rules derived from circumstance and personnel choice in their respective social, geographical and occupational contexts (Snyder, Bruck and Sapin 1963b, 106-128; Goldstein and Keohane 1993, 3-30; Pfetsch 1998). Sub-national and non-state actors will equally have disparate agendas, just as the chief executive officer of an MNC, a prisoner-of-conscience, the soldier on the ground, the 'nouveau riche' professional and the blue-collar worker will view welfare and governance differently at home and abroad. All politically-active entities will yearn for rights and benefits, but their prioritising, substance and phraseology will be unlikely to be uniform, hence the potential for conflicts between 'objectives' and 'truths'. In political decision-making, it is thus highly conceivable that when one 'truth' gains ascendancy through individual charisma or incremental compromise, rivals will lose by default (Gregory 1993, 225-226), unless that ascendancy is fully countered, or at the very least, contested prominently and persistently. In short, when political actors are information sources, information becomes necessarily partisan and mediates politics.

The general field of reporting information under the heading 'news' exhibits the power of caprice in information in even sharper relief. Consider for instance the following comment by a journalist on the news product, which reveals far more than it states:

[News] is put together by large and shifting groups of people, often in a hurry, out of an assemblage of circumstances that is never the same twice. Newspapers and news programmes could almost be called random reactions to random events.  

The terms 'put together' and an 'assemblage of circumstances' suggest the operation of a multiplicity of pre-existing mindsets attempting to depict reality based on past intelligence, and together with the notion of 'random reactions', imply a role for value-filters in news

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8 Journalist John Whalo quoted in Golding and Elliot (1979, 6).
selection. Additionally, the participation of people as individuals demands explanation in forming events.

Structure and agency have inextricably evolved with the historically need-driven demand for news: what, which and how does information as newsheets, papers and bulletins get produced? The history of news production, often indistinguishable from journalism and broadcasting, produces strong evidence of the socially conditioned specificity of news creation. This ranges from human messengers pandering to ancient Greco-Roman imperial authorities, to news services for monarchs, generals, reformers, revolutionaries and mercantile interests in the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries, through to the ‘public sphere – public opinion’ needs of twentieth century mass government. As Jürgen Habermas’ genealogical inquiry into the transformation of the public sphere articulated it, newsmaking, content and deployment assumed particular forms at each step of its co-evolution with economy and polity (Habermas 1991, ch. II and III; Olson 1966). Today the ‘modern’ news agency is organisationally structured around four general processes of planning, gathering, selection and production (Golding and Elliot 1979, 92-113; Tunstall 1971, 34-39; Boyd-Barrett 1980, 73-111, 152-154). Planning decides long-term events for coverage and determines resource allocation for reporting short and medium term events. Gathering comes from the reporter on the ground. Selection is material sorting, condensation and general editing for broadcast and print. Finally, production is the art and science of presenting news in format for its showing to the audience.

The ‘power’ of making the news happen boils down to the human factor in value-filtering all these structure and agency features. Peter Golding and Philip Elliot argue that
news values are a corpus of 'occupational lore' implicitly and explicitly guiding 'newsroom practice'. These qualifications determine how gathered information from the reporter on the ground makes the 'public' news: drama or story quality, entertainment, importance (e.g. historical, political, economic etc.), source credibility, size, proximity, negativity, political obstacles on the ground, immediacy, elites, personalities and in the medium of television, visual appeal as well (Golding and Elliot 1979, 114-123; Boyd-Barrett 1980, 74-79). There is no authoritative definition of what these mean in practice except for precedents offered by pioneering media models such as the BBC public broadcasting system, the laissez faire 'liberal-democratic' system, the Soviet socialist model, the authoritarian-developmental model, or the practices pursued by the global news agencies. It has been a well-researched fact that the latter actively shape their affiliates' and subordinate partners' reporting and discriminatory selection practices in the various countries they serve. Meanwhile, at the 'centres' where the newsfeeds are finally prepared for commercial despatch to regional and national news agencies, editorial control is exercised for value fit. One researcher, drawing upon empirical surveys of practising journalists in OECD countries, reinforced the prevailing sociological perception that journalistic 'objectivity' is a chameleon value, and what matters in judging journalism is the journalist's degree of 'active' interest in information-construction (Paterson 1998). Michael Schudson, drawing upon a biographical comparison of two reputable early twentieth century western journalists, describes reporting as 'an invention of the nineteenth century, a result of and a contributor to a democratic market society and an urban commercial consciousness.' (Schudson 1988, 228) Both his journalistic subjects

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10 Most countries tend to self-define their own models according to 'national characteristics', politics, ideology, demography, history etc. For reference see: Katz and Wedell (1977), Browne (1989), McDonnell (1991) and Fox (1997).
admitted being intellectuals, Wall Street sympathisers or news trend-buckers in reporting contra-realities and peculiarities. Schudson’s final definition of a reporter as ‘someone faithful to sources, attuned to the conventional wisdom, serving the political culture of media institutions, and committed to a narrow range of public, literary expression’ (1988, 239) is echoed indubitably in CNN’s Christiane Amanpour’s comment to the International Herald Tribune at the height of Operation Allied Force in Kosovo:

I have chosen to apply, to the best of my ability, contextual objectivity to all my reporting, especially during war and especially when confronted with the most serious crimes against humanity. I insist on putting my reports in context, and I am often strongly impassioned. I will not apply moral equivalents where none exist...Anyone indicted for the most grave of crimes against humanity is not a chat show guest. (Amanpour 1999)

In the light of the susceptible nature of news, the NWICO agenda’s overall charge of ideological bias against the prevailing global information flow remains valid in principle but lacks a plausible proposal for redress of political power in its call for institutional change and reallocation of resources. In a broader sense, assuming that propaganda ‘consists of the planned use of any form of public or mass-produced communication designed to affect the minds and emotions of a given group for a specific public purpose, whether military, economic or political’, newsmaking in its structural, agency and human characteristics may produce subtle propaganda power of unlimited potential. Lastly, within the context of globalization, the subjectivity of reporting also opens up questions of how far news as

11 Jeremy Tunstall writes that all news correspondents ‘operate within what they regard as some set of news values’ and ‘[u]ncertainty is inherent in both the news values and the degree of discretion in relation to news values’ even in specific work situations. (1971, 263) Similarly Boyd-Barrett’s study of international news agencies cautions that apart from the influence of the western market ‘feel’ of the ‘Big Four’ on news selection and editing, there was a ‘problem’ of both relying on non-English educated local journalists’ incompatible linguistic standards of reporting and the impossibility of eliminating formal and informal pressures imposed by his ‘home’ government and other local interests. (1980, 93) A new thread of news studies has thus emerged along these lines under the theme ‘sociology of news’. (Berkowitz 1997)

informational content is complicated by its medium and reach. Exacerbated by the end of bipolarity in world order, there are today significant increases in national, sub-national, transnational and individual sources of news driven variously by capitalism’s growth and the demands for political diversification after the Cold War. According to journalists and UN reports, ‘Iraq’, ‘Rwanda’, ‘Cambodia’, ‘the Balkans’, ‘Chechnya’, ‘East Timor’, ‘Afghanistan’, ‘insurgency’, ‘massive capital flight’ and ‘human rights violations’, for instance, have made inroads against the traditional domination of the domestic news of Europe and North America in global information circuits (Utley 1997; Marthoz 1999, 80-81).

A 1998 comparison between CNN and BBC-World television content indicated that combined European and North American items dominated at 63.4% and 53.6% for the respective stations. Relative airtime by region also showed that in the period surveyed, ‘Africa’ occupied second spot with ‘Asia’ at five and ‘Middle East’ at six, with ‘Australasia’ and ‘Latin America’ coming last at eight and nine (Roe 2001, 275-276, tab.3-4). While making allowance for periodic fluctuations of newsworthiness, this western dominance is less overwhelming than expected. Some analysts attribute this to post-Cold War fluidity where ‘facts’ of otherness impinge upon forums of national consciousness through varying scales of shock and violence (Roe 2001; Strobel 1997). Disembedding of issues across time and space poses difficult dilemmas for newsmakers in terms of framing information importance on both national and global levels, and oftentimes inverting one for the other where terrorism, economic and environmental disasters are concerned. Additionally, the causality of what is to be reported as front-page, national or global might also be linked to the pure media forms themselves in their transmission, channelling and reception.
2.3.2 Power Within the Medium

A medium, often construed as the conduit through which information passes, is effective only to the extent that the information is suitable for feeding into the transmitter, channel and receiver components. As described in Figure 1, the latter three can never in practice be regarded separately from the social forces husbanding their introduction and use. Utilising this model, it was shown in the ICT component of information globalization that technologies both 'push' social use, as well as being in turn, 'pulled' forward in evolution by social demand. This means that media has co-evolved the power to link source and destination simultaneously. Moreover, this twin dynamic created the one-dimensional power of technological reach towards far-flung corners of the globe connecting peoples and cultures whether they wish it or not.

To understand the specific power of the various media, the four mainstream examples of the newspaper, radio, television and the Internet will be examined in respective order in terms of their characteristics in presenting news. The newspaper was historically linked to news demand and a direct child of the Gutenberg revolution (Zaret 2000; Schmid 2000). Print on paper enjoyed the advantages referred to earlier in terms of lightness, portability and repeatability of information contained within both time and space. Not surprisingly, along with its sister form, the book, the newspaper evolved to serve politics, economics and lately, entertainment interests, as a recording medium and event-making register, and subsequently an organ of opinion on both the record and event. Its reliance on text demanded a certain literacy, intelligence and literary inclination on the part of readers. The need to read information naturally excluded sections of populations without basic education while at the
same time, in a nationalistic sense, it united those who read and responded to the language of print (Stamm 1985; B. Anderson 1991). All this worked to create, in Habermas' parlance, a public sphere of social communication and contestation, potentially shaping information catering to particular avenues of relevance. Not surprisingly, every contemporary newspaper presently contains an agenda, divided into sections with matching 'correspondents' and an editorial page commenting authoritatively on what it considers important issues. Furthermore, opposite the editorial page is usually a page for readers' letters. Thus, through the evolution of both its readers' services and formats, newspapers exercise editorial control over their readership in two and three-dimensional forms through framing (Keeble 1994, ch.12).

Radio in contrast to newspaper is 'purely auditory, consisting of speech, music, sounds and silence, and since...the ear is not the most "intelligent" of our sense organs, their deployment has to be relatively simple.' (Crisell 1994, 5) Indeed most scholars would agree that radio had been invented in a drive for communications simplicity, as one might recall, for naval and transoceanic uses without the costs and effort of cable laying. In radio programmes, everything had to be 'voiced' and listenable: it worked on the time dimension and relied on evocation of mental pictures in building rapport with the audience. The power of radio lay in four features. Firstly, speech, music, sounds and silence concentrated reception of information to only one sensorial entry point – the ear – and this enabled radio-communicated information to present an easy immediacy to the hearer (Cantril and Allport 1971, 9-10). Secondly, once this information reached the brain, it had to be interpreted and

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13 This is evident from sampling literature defining newspaper forms and journalistic creeds. See for reference: Bush (1929, 2-14), Rucker and Williams (1965, 3-7), Keeble (1994), and Lacey and Longman (1997).

14 Habermas' public sphere will be elaborated in Chapter 3.
'imagined' by the other senses of touch and sight. One scholar mentions the 'bacon and eggs' speech invocation (Crisell 1994, 8) as an example of the evocative power of listening, and so one might say the same when politicians use references to 'Nazi death camps', 'infidels' and 'new colonialisms' to draw castigative parallels to genocides, invaders and MNC encroachments. Thirdly, radio's premise of using a human voice as the dominant presentational form, or to supplement other sounds, generates a personal appeal that visual media such as television, film and newspaper cannot match (Crisell 1994, 120-125; Cantril and Allport 1971, 18). In political terms, addresses such as 'dear citizens', 'dear comrades' and 'my fellow...' prefacing a monologue or debate on air seldom fails to honour and privilege a physically absent, but nevertheless real, presence of the individual listener (Scannell 1996, 77-80, 89-92). Post-mortems on the causes of the 1994 Rwandan genocide have attributed the radio 'voice' as the psychological context-setter and ultimately the media trigger for the mass bloodbath between Hutus and Tutsis (Kellow and Steeves 1998). Fourthly, radio reception equipment has also arrived at the stage where it ranges in size from high fidelity boxes to pocket-and-earphone inserts allowing it to be diffused cheaply and personally in great numbers across vast distances. A similar miniaturisation has accompanied the progress of radio transmission equipment. Radio's power lies then in its voice transcription, blending of personability, and omnipresence. Hence its moulding of information content and impact is a manifestation of two and three-dimensional power of shaping opinions.

Television comes into its own as a medium fusing the characteristics of sound and sight, and within the latter, motion as well in the form of moving pictures. Both space and time dimensions are jointly involved in a broadcast in this medium, thereby inherently
amplifying the complexity of its power over content. Television’s power lies in its selection ability, framed by the possibilities of camera and sound capture in tandem. Unlike the newspaper, the television camera is recording more than still life. Events happen and personalities orate, but they are projected to television viewers as either live dramas, as stored time-delayed occurrences, filtrates of capricious editing, or narrative biases irrespective of whether the content covered is a riot, election campaign or war.15 Coupled with sound accompaniment at every stage of movement, television produces and reproduces degrees of experience for the viewer. Coverage of political arguments on radio and television thus differ significantly in terms of the latter revealing additional sensorial details in regard to countenance, posture, eye contact, dress sense, and crowd noises, mattering as part of a holistic picture. It is not surprising that television has been described by McLuhan and others as a sense-surrounding medium demanding more attention than most other mass media (McLuhan 1974, 31-32, 329-334).16 Television’s power involves the audience’s senses in an atmosphere of near-totality, and is more so today with the fusion of high fidelity and IT into its amplification capacities. On the other hand, others might argue that television’s representation of images appeals to the emotions of both the illiterate and gullible by presenting reality through simplified chains of causality (Condry 1989; Hartley 1999, ch.11). Here lies its power, or danger. Television’s basic power possibilities may be one, two or three-dimensional, or all at once, since the camera can ‘select’ and present ‘reality’.

15 This is apparently a wide consensus exemplified by the following works: Hofstetter (1976), Conrad (1982, 125-143), R. Williams (1990, 48-49), Scannell (1996, 7-21, 80-89) and Kern and Just (1997).
16 In his last and posthumously published collaborated work, McLuhan coins ‘robotism’ as a synonym for the ‘hot medium’. This is because television, like robot technology and ‘right-hemisphere thinking’ (right brain), ‘is a capacity to be a conscious presence in many places at once.’ It is a condition where the right brain is ‘stimulated by bright, sensuous images, music and random movement’ on the screen while the left hemisphere is lulled into a dormant state by pixellated, rapidly pulsing electric pictures. (McLuhan and Powers 1992, 83, 87-88)
Television, with its joint time and space characteristics, is particularly relevant to globalization's time-space distanciation element, and its furtherance. Since the late 1960s, when satellite facilities enabled extraterrestrial broadcasting across the globe, television has featured the occasional live sports and concert event. However it was not until the late 1980s, culminating in the first globally televised war in the Persian Gulf in 1990-91, that live, regular and direct global commercial television came of age in the form of CNN. This added a new layer of power relations in the form of reporting immediacy, and an acceleration of 'speed' in the globalization of politics.\textsuperscript{17} The events of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm have produced a bumper crop of literature surveying the effects of real-time television on military operations focussing on the elements of surprise and instant communicability, and needs no reiteration here (Dunsmore 1997; Kellner 1992; Mowlana, Gerbner and Schiller 1992). Pertinent to the present argument are the power implications of live global television. Firstly, reporting immediacy refers to roving, or pre-positioned, dispersed news teams' ability to project live moving pictures anywhere in the world and to narrate unfolding events almost instantaneously so long as they are equipped with portable satellite uplink facilities (MacGregor 1997, 2-18, 174-201). This increases the overall possibilities of creating news across the globe, eliminates the remoteness of a location, and 'forces' an artificial and immediate consciousness of proximity onto the viewer.

Secondly, as a corollary to news immediacy, the so-called 'CNN effects' are unleashed upon governmental policymakers. Giddensian notions of disembedding political realities and pressures of reflexivity are urgently thrust on foreign policy bureaucracies

\textsuperscript{17} Although mainstream globalization theorists (e.g. Giddens, Luard, Spybey) and proponents of media globalization (e.g. Thompson, Maherzi and Pool) credit the media for collapsing boundaries, the thesis of technological speed as an important political mover is specifically alluded to by James Der Derian (1990, 1998).
through the rapidity of event-creation by global news. It gives reporters the ability to reveal credibility gaps in official actions and reactions arising from the time lag between event and formal response, or in select cases, to compel policymakers to confront unthought-of issues (Flournoy and Stewart 1997, 59-69; Strobel 1997, 57-90). One author has summed up the military and political implications of the CNN effects in terms of accelerant (i.e. reduced decision-making time), impediment (repulsion against decisive action), and agenda-setting agencies (Livingston 1997). The last effect is most obvious in contexts such as the disastrous US-led UNOSOM II relief mission in Somalia in 1992-93. Lastly, global real-time television offers policymakers and other situational non-state actors a regular electronic commons for initiating and exchanging views and threats (MacGregor 1997, 13-16). It also adds potency to 'public diplomacy' where politicians and non-state entities can appeal directly over the heads of governments to their populations, potentially generating psychological 'fifth column' support for all belligerents alike in diplomatic and military rows. Power in broadcasts tends to assume a fluid aspect depending on the competence of message and image-making, and other public relations arts.

The fourth main medium, the Internet, can be said to take real-time television to its ultimate development into a multimedia and multipurpose tool with applications in economics, business, politics, entertainment and other social uses. As it was pointed out in Chapter 1’s discussion on the globalization of ICTs, IT’s potential fuses with and rides upon pre-existing technology especially that of cable and satellite systems connecting computer to television, film, telephone and facsimile in time and space-efficient terms. The Internet is more than its formal definition as a global network of computers: it can deliver flexible combinations of radio, television and interpersonal communications to and from one or
several terminals in common digital format, plus providing the full range of computing capabilities: calculation, databases, design, demonstration and simulation. Transmission, reception and channel components are almost indistinguishable and the decentralising feature of user-user and user-machine interactivity creates an unprecedented cybernetic space (hence 'cyberspace') for interpersonal linkages that transcend or extend geographical contiguity.\(^\text{18}\)

The digital elements of simulation and dispersible presence available in IT add a further, and postmodern possibility, of constructing presences that do not exist in 'real life'. In this sense, one can never be sure if information and 'activities' on the Internet can ever be pinned down as one, two or three-dimensional power structures in an age of 'trojan horse' virus attacks, official and mirror homepages, virtual combat, virtual cities, and virtual lives (Brown 1997, 211-226; Holmes 1997; Wilbur 1997, 5-22).

2.3.3 Power Within Media Ownership and Control

So far, the discussion of power within a medium has focussed exclusively on technological and operational form, but there is another 'meta-level' at which media power operates – the firms, their corporate owners, and market activities. With the end of the Cold War, the popularity of the 'Washington Consensus' on free enterprise economic strategies, and the WTO pattern of sustained market liberalisation trends in telecommunications, global capitalism naturally forms the backdrop for examining power. As Strange argues, in political economy, there are two forms of power: relational and structural.\(^\text{19}\) The 'relational' corresponds in meaning to both this thesis' working definition and to one-dimensional

\(^{18}\) This potential is outlined by a US government report titled *Global Information Infrastructure: Agenda for Cooperation*. It was produced by a telecommunications working group which included public testimonies from major IT industry players and private sector chambers of commerce. (Gore and Brown, 1995)

\(^{19}\) Strange defined structural power as 'the power to shape and determine the structures of the global political economy within which other states, their political institutions, their economic enterprises and (not least) their scientists and other professional people have to operate.' (1994, 24-25)
power, while the 'structural' corresponds to two and three-dimensional power, simultaneously. Once electricity began to transform communication, beginning with the telegraph, the tendency in Europe was to concentrate financial control in either state-approved private monopolies or outright state ownership. In the other major centre of innovation, the US, the profile was mixed, with certain media run wholly privately, while others, such as radio, were started off as approved commercial monopolies guided by US Navy and government priorities (Herring and Gross 1936; Luther 1988, 13-14, 22-23; Winston 1998, 27-29, 77-87). These early forms of ownership coincided with international rivalries, which tended to reinforce the power of the state in communications matters.

Yet in the US, where private interests had been instrumental in funding each new electrical ICT, they naturally wished to take their commercial profits. As such, the American market for telecommunications evolved a dynamic of competitive tension between monopoly and privatisation which in time allowed corporations such as General Electric, AT&T, ITT, Time-Warner, Cable and Wireless, Reuters, AP, UPI, and eventually CNN, to flourish both by developing new commercial uses for existing communications inventions, and by cross-acquisition and alliance with rival companies across the Atlantic. Since the 1900s, over a span of 70 years, the shifts in government control to market-driven mass media corporatisation trends resulted in what Mattelart has mapped as 'a locus of the new power' in mass media ownership (Mattelart 1994, 62-65). Not surprisingly, this trend coincided with the eclipse of European geopolitical and economic power in world politics, and the emergence of a visible American 'hegemony' of social, military and economic models in the western world in strategic competition with the Soviets (Schiller 1992, 45-61). It is at this point that structural power enters the picture of media control. Applying Gramscian analysis,
where hegemony is built up by creating a form of consensual standard of superiority (Gramsci 1971, 161, 349-350), it can reasonably be argued that US media corporations had grown dominant beyond their national boundaries through business economies of scale arising from cross-ownership of complementary and rival systems such as telegraph-and-newspaper, telephone-radio-and-cable — subsequently adding radio stations, news wire services, television, satellite, film-making, Internet services and so on. All this was abetted by the Cold War-driven ‘military-industrial complex’ (H.I. Schiller 1992, ch. 2-6). This enabled a US ‘hegemony’ in R & D, oriented towards both setting international communication standards and controlling the supplies of that most malleable product, global news. The critiques of Herbert Schiller, Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer linking mass communications and the American empire, along with the elements of deception inside mass culture industries (Adorno and Horkheimer 1986, 120-167) argue for the media as dependent variables of structural power in a global political economy.

Today, following the early American example, transnational conglomerates of the likes of News Corporation, AOL-Time-Warner, Bertelsmann Media Group, the Berlusconi Group, Sony, and CanWest Global Communications, just to name a few, operate in apparent global oligopoly with chameleon-like corporate identities. There are innumerable cross-media, transnational and cross-corporate takeovers in a frenzied global marketplace, made possible by the ideology of economic liberalisation, institutionalised in the WTO (Tunstall and Palmer 1991, 2-6; Economist 1998b). However, this is an unstable oligopoly as attested to by many visible counter-trends. An oligopolistic mode of structural power is secure insofar as the players are able totally to limit consumer choice, especially to non-price competition, create insurmountable barriers to market entry by newcomers, and wield political clout by
way of size and cartel bargaining. On all these counts, resistance or counter-power is being mounted from a number of fronts.

Firstly, economic globalization can be a contested development: national governments and regional organisations such as the EU are taking a regulatory interest in clamping down on global potential for monopolies. Witness for instance the Italian government’s proposal in early 1999 to legislate curbs against Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation’s plans to secure 100% broadcast rights for Italy’s Series A and B football matches by acquiring an 80% stake in Telecom Italia’s Stream pay-television arm (Ball 1999). Across the Atlantic, the US government persisted with an anti-trust suit against Microsoft Corporation over the latter’s imposition of Internet Browser conditionality in its popular computer WINDOWS operating system (IHT 1999c). At the time of writing, Microsoft was still negotiating a settlement with both the US federal and state governments over WINDOWS access for rival software companies (Buckman and Kulish 2002). And in October 2000, the EU approved the AOL-Time Warner merger only after the two partners agreed to forego any exclusive music distribution deals with the Bertelsmann Group, which had also agreed to sell stakes in AOL’s European subsidiaries (Andrews 2000). It is worthwhile noting that although the European approach to corporate scrutiny is to ensure fair competition within an industry, and for the US, to protect consumer choice, both governing approaches seek to prevent monopolies (Davis and Raghavan 2001).
Secondly, governments are still screening the political advances of media and telecommunications MNCs on national interest grounds.\(^{20}\) Witness the continuing enforcement of 'public interest' legislation against media companies in Britain, China, France, India, and in much of the developing world. CNN makes it a standard 'good business policy' not to offend national sensibilities in broadcasting and instead makes national broadcasters partners in the *World Report* series. Even Murdoch's News Corporation has amended subsidiary Star TV's satellite news content to please Beijing in order to facilitate further business opportunities (ST 1998; IHT 1999a). Conversely, authoritarian-style media monopolies within territorial states have become increasingly undermined by the advent of CNN-type global networks functioning as a diplomatic arena for political fencing, by the signal spill-overs of satellite television, and by the information liberating effects of the Internet. The pressures towards capitalist market liberalisation worldwide are another source of pressure on national regimes to relax state dominance in telecommunications and media. A tension thus obtains between market-oriented and *dirigiste* approaches towards controlling ICT companies at the present moment.

Thirdly, the ever lowering costs of ICTs, along with infinitely growing and segmenting telecommunications and entertainment markets have ushered in the entry of more small players, including some with national backing, serving niche markets. For example, NASA, INTELSAT, the European Space Agency and Hughes Corporation have been challenged by more than two dozen space industry newcomers in one or both categories of satellite construction and launching since the 1960s. Brazil, Chile, China, India, Indonesia,

\(^{20}\) Resisting, controlling, or at the least, filtering the capitalist-technology dynamic of the free flow of information across borders has historically been a latent interstate bone of contention, but the advent of commercial direct broadcast satellites since the 1960s has stoked overt national sovereignty defences over
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey and the United Kingdom, including new private operators such as PanAmSat, have all entered the market (SatNews.Com 1999). In 2001, an estimated 15,000 companies, including both nationally and privately-owned ones, comprise the satellite industry (Satfinder 2001). These clearly serve as exemplars of the multiple counter-hegemonic sites of resistance identified by one study of US satellite policy (Comor 1998, 209-210). In the international news provision market, counter-hegemonic efforts began in the late 1960s with South-South news sharing networks such as the Inter Press Service, the Pan African News Agency, and in the 1990s, the Asian News Network and Channel News Asia. These are limited, however, to serving regional and developing country news. In the Middle East, the Arabic satellite television station Al-Jazeera has since 1996 gained prominence as a regional news provider with Arab cultural lenses (Seib 2001). The same counter-oligopoly trends are equally observable in the mobile phone and Internet Service Provider markets.

Lastly, consumers are also being empowered by the proliferation of choice on cable, satellite and in Internet services. Market surveys have shown, for instance, that satellite and cabled digital services do not necessarily enjoy accelerating sales in spite of free decoder giveaways. Consumers may well be saturated with choice, prefer tailored, localised information provision, or resist overly rapid format changeover (Parker 1997, 38-41; Robins 1999, Pfanner 2002). The sluggish performance of BBC World’s foray into the global television news market in fiscal 1998-99 was, for instance, attributed to consumer indifference stemming from more attractive local alternatives and CNN’s successful attempts to ‘go native’ in marketing niche programmes (Economist 1999b).
The above instances of counter-hegemonic power appear as corrections within the 'marketization' of the transmitter, channel and receiver components of information flow. The ephemeral coincidence of the demand and supply of information provision is neither economically nor politically optimal in the eyes of governments and consumers. Governments, whether elected or non-elected, police standards, while news providers enter a profitable market with governmental connivance or self-seeking profit motives, hence restoring competition to the market. On a deeper level, all these moves to correct the market are an outcome of constructive power exercised against rival forms. Before 'anti-competition' or the 'preservation of national security' can be used as explanations for clampdown, states must define the 'undesirables'. Perhaps China and the EU have in common fears of untrammelled market power in information provision. Similarly, the creation of alternative service providers, both private and state-controlled, and regardless of their initial financial viability in a market of information, is designed to ensure choice stands as a check on monopolistic structural power. In this way, long-term accessibility to the transmitter, channel and receiver components will be kept open by finance or by fiat because information audiences and sources will always be vigilant on account of their need to keep information accessible. The audiences and sources have historically been the willing privatisers of the transmitters, channels and receivers, as we have seen in the development of the telegraph, television, satellite and Internet. In this analysis, the structural power of News Corporation or AOL-Time Warner will not significantly obstruct editorial freedom through achieving monopolistic market positions. When the counter-power of constructing their
practices as 'undesirable' remains present and demonstrable, media corporations will always be mindful of being self-appointed censors or seekers of pure profit.

2.3.4 Power Towards and Within Destination (Audience and Noise)

The destination of information flow is its audience, which is defined by media scholars as 'the unknown individuals and groups towards whom mass communications are addressed.' (O'Sullivan et al. 1994, 19) The process of communication and the media employed seem to be coterminous with the audience in an arbitrary relationship. This has to some extent been borne out by the initial optimism with which the promoters of the telegraph, telephone and radio projected in terms of usage. More often than not, the audience proved elusive and behaved in unexpected ways. The Internet, for instance, began life as a US military project and has since been appropriated as a space for hosting terrorist propaganda (e.g. Tupac Amaru, Zapatistas), social matchmaking, and business advertising alike, as well as a channel for 'virus bombing' retaliation by opponents of the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999. The instability of the term 'audience' has divided media scholarship in myriad ways and by briefly tracing the variety of attempts to measure an audience, the power relations linking information source, media, and media control will inevitably surface. In the midst of such soul-searching fragmentation, media research has been driven back towards relocating media theorising within its sociological roots. In studying the reception of information within society, the intangible concept of noise (Figure 1) becomes more visible in terms of factors intervening in the way people interpret and use information. The purpose of the following survey of 'audience reception' research is to interpret how the source or sender may or may not affect the destination or recipient in intended ways. This inconclusiveness will reveal that information reception whether
nationally, or individually, may subjectively enjoy a 'power of interpretation' which the source may not have prefigured.

Research into audience responses began almost coincidentally with the introduction of mass radio broadcasts in the interwar years. The BBC's public service monopoly faced competition from programmes beamed from continental Europe almost from the start, prompting the institution of listener surveys in retaining its listeners. Not long after, the Nazis' use of propaganda spurred 'effects analyses' further afield in America where local researchers using quantitative methods pinned down 'audiences' based on simple stimulus/response questionnaires (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet 1968, 120-136; Lazarsfeld and Field 1946). In 1938, the radio play of H.G. Wells' *War of the Worlds* triggered panic among thousands in parts of the US, spurring a major study into radio-induced psychology (Cantril 1940). Clearly, this was one and two-dimensional power persuasion at work. Adorno and Horkheimer, of course, took effects analysis to the extreme of criticising mass mediated culture in film, newspaper and radio as orchestrated deception for an industrial age (Adorno and Horkheimer 1986, 120-167). The key assumption in effects analysis was a docile audience. For almost 20 years, effects studies have emphasised media power in action in situations of political campaigns, advertising strategies, creation of social realities, norms, institutional change and cultural change (McQuail 1977, 73-90). If this had gone unchallenged, it would have skewed power origins exclusively towards the information source and media components, with noise treated as a pure technological bug.

The next shift emphasised audience and ideology in context. The 'uses and gratifications' (U & G) scholars focussed on the question 'ask not what media do to people,
but ask what people do with media.’ (Palmgreen, Wenner and Rosengren 1952, 11) This opened up vistas of, firstly, looking at the audience as actively goal-driven in using media when faced with rival choices of need-satisfaction through other socially available avenues of gratification. And secondly, media and information sources can, through their unique characteristics, exposure and socialisation effects, induce certain gratifications at key moments (Palmgreen, Wenner and Rosengren 1952, 33-37). Knotting both social psychology and sociology together, U & G began an analysis of the audience, with concepts such as identity, values and belief-acquisition, and transactions, that view man-the-actor as an integral component of the world he moves within (Blumler 1952; Palmgreen and Rayburn II 1952; Wenner 1952). It is only by adopting a U & G approach that one might assert that in some developed countries in the 1990s, a consumerist demand-driven shrinkage of intellectual and foreign news has taken shape, and mainstream news space dominated by pragmatic forecasting and the cultural aesthetics of social escapism (Economist 1998a; Feiler 1998). The possibility of manipulation was now less important than the nature of the audience itself. And in cases where media effects appear as unexpected from the view of the source, ‘noise’ can be attributed to audience beliefs that operate in the hidden second and third dimensions of power.

U & G is a short step from exploring the agenda-setting possibilities conditioning audience behaviour, particularly the role of ideology operating in text-reader relationships. This approach saw meaning becoming ‘encoded’ in messages for transmission and having to be ‘decoded’ by the audience. Here, a dominant ideology may operate uniformly at both source and destination, thus maintaining a circular hegemonic discourse in culture, economy or polity. However, this model allows for resistance and independence on the part of
audiences, for they may possess ethical, religious or other ideological systems which do not instantaneously match the encoded text. Possibilities for independence will exist where textual meanings are decoded in negotiated modes, where the dominant ideological discourse is accepted but in adaptation to specific local, individual conditions; or in opposition modes, where the ideological codes are deliberately misread or re-read according to audience-specific preferences (Hall 1980; Eco 1984; Morley 1980). This last mode can be exemplified by the respective responses in the late 1990s of Tibetans and Montenegrins to Chinese discourses of a ‘Chinese socialist state’ and Serbian adherence to a rigid Yugoslav Federation as legitimations of dictatorship. In many ways then, ideological readings suggest hegemonic and counter-hegemonic power relations of the Gramscian variety.

The final cluster of audience theories takes the scrutiny of audiences into the heterogeneity-privileged postmodern realm. Audiences are viewed through lenses of almost limitless subjectivity. One approach hails from French poststructuralist theory and Lacanian psychoanalysis: audiences are subjects unto the media they are receiving or using; and the meanings they derive are similarly reproductions of what the media depicts as real in discursive form. This approach dominated cinematic studies beginning in the mid-1970s (MacCabe 1974; Sobchack 1995; Friedberg 1995). Another strand stresses the ‘ethnographic approach’ where the audience’s individual, cultural, religious or geographical specificities are utilised as perspectives through which to apprehend their subjective modes of reception of mediated information flows. It takes off from the anthropological obsession with seeing the world from the native’s point of view (Moores 1993, 3-5, 32-69, 117-140). In this light, one researcher has argued that the apparent worldwide popularity of Dallas in the early 1980s had more to do with individual emotional appeal and gender-differentiated empathy
than any blanket exercise of hegemony by American culture (Ang 1985, 1990). This same author has even argued for the next-step conversion of all of audience studies into the postmodern realm on the grounds that

...variation — e.g. in audience readings and pleasures — is not the result of autonomy and independence, as the liberal pluralists would have it, but emerges out of the inescapably overdetermined nature of any particular instance of subjective meaning production. The latter is traversed by a multiplicity of power relations, the specifics of which cannot be known ahead of time precisely because their articulations are always irreducibly context-bound. (Ang 1996, 171)

This comment sums up the micro-agencies of power existing in the shift from media and source-dominant effects analyses to the focus on audiences’ uses-and-gratifications, ideological conditions, and postmodern film studies, and on to ethnographic studies. The audience appears to possess a subjective independence in interpreting information, but on the other hand, attention is drawn to how obscured power lurks in socialisation forces which require more than Lukes’ two and three-dimensional explanations if we are to relate audiences to the politics of information flow.

The preceding examinations of power repositories and relations within information flow now allow the following conclusions about power:

(1) Information sources, including information-creation in inexorably social contexts, are need-driven, embedded in structure and agency, and involve the human factor in newsgathering, inside or outside newsrooms and bureaucracies. Information thus contains biases reflecting the two and three-dimensional power of those persons and practices who comprise the source.

(2) The media, comprising transmitter, channel and receiver components do not act as neutral conductors; instead their formats bear evidence of their social creation, and this endows information transmission and reception with power in terms of specific, subtle impacts on the audience. Newspapers demand intellect and literacy in reading and impose recorded realities on information. Radio presents information personally and emotionally through auditory representation. Television as a multi-sensory medium, possesses two and three-dimensional
power to determine 'eventfulness', and this is supplemented with more potency by the time-acceleration factor and time-space distanciation effects of real-time satellite broadcasts, thereby connecting local politics into an electronic global arena. The Internet takes two and three-dimensional power to a new extreme in its fusion of high fidelity in picture and sound reproduction with simulation-capable IT in both real-time and delayed time.

(3) Media ownership's impact on information control shows mixed results: the ownership of fledgling media companies has evolved historically from relational power to structural power, through privatisation towards oligopolies combining various media formats. However, oligopolistic structural power in its two and three-dimensional senses is challenged by governmental regulation and outright clampdowns, consumer preferences, technological diffusion, and market expansion which emboldens new corporate entrants. Both media ownership, and the resistance against oligopoly, demonstrate the power to construct and counter-construct access.

(4) Analysis of the destinations of information flow reveals that audiences and their reactions are potentially co-constituted by the media and information sources. Hence, audiences are partly vulnerable to construction by power. And where noise appears to produce unexpected effects on the audiences' reception of information, it has been suggested by some studies that the human audiences possess their own individual or collective power in interpreting information received. Hidden power relations seem possible in both directions. The source and the media socialise the audience. The audience may yet demonstrate independence in response, which then compels change in the market-sensitive media.

Power emerges as omni-directional, non-hierarchical, fluid and lacking substantive centres. Although Lukes' one, two and three-dimensional power schema has been useful in interrogating power within each flow component, it is unable to account for the fragmented result of power relations within the whole process of information flow. No singular grand narrative of information power is ever likely to be possible (McQuail 1994, 379-382; Eldridge 1993, 348-349; Braman 1995; Alleyne 1995, 2-5; Couldry 2000, 39-61), given the nature of information as a carrier of meaning, as elaborated in the Introduction. Information is, at core, a construction and it can, in turn, structure reality in its very formation, and in the ways it is projected. Even media ownership is vulnerable to others' long run portrayal of it. Power in information and its flow does not reside permanently and visibly in physical coordinates, due to the ever-globalizing reach of each new ICT, the contemporary spread of
capitalist knowledge industries, market liberalisation and surveillance, as well as the geopolitical fluidity unleashed by the collapse of international bipolarity.

In this vein, the postmodernists rightly argue that knowledge is no longer unilinear, fixed, nor homogeneous as it was in modernity, and this is reflected in the new problématiques and inquiries into power. Jean-Francois Lyotard’s analysis of the postmodern condition has postulated that technological transformations alone, as in communications, are individuating the knower and knowledge, and increasingly rendering knowledge a product for consumption (Lyotard 1984, 3-5). Vattimo has made the parallel point that the world is today a society of communication in the sense that information flow depicts the world through ‘images’ and it is simultaneously a world ‘known and constructed’ and ‘distinguished’ by its self-expression through ‘the human sciences’ (Vattimo 1992, 16). Michel Foucault further extends the argument of information heterogeneity into the analysis of contemporary societies and ourselves as constituted by ‘regimes of truth’, which he also terms ‘general politics’ of truth (Foucault 1980, 131).

In his genealogical studies on asylums, prisons and sexuality, he has outlined a shift in the political economy of power from the crude relational form used in this Chapter’s initial working definition to structural forms including subtler procedures, mechanisms and disciplines, as through corrective penal systems, and subjectivizing the individual within disciplinary discourses such as the human sciences. All this evolution occurred in keeping with modernity’s premise of ‘extending’ control over circumstances, and aiming towards the perfection of human life. Truth then, as composed in disciplinary discourses, is ‘a thing of this world’. It is dressed firstly in scientific and institutional garments designed to sanction
jointly specific truthful objects and corresponding falsities, and secondly, in the derived status of the experts who authoritatively coin them, as well as all the techniques and activities directed towards truth seeking (Foucault 1980, 131-132; 1991, 24-31, 136-139; 1984, 386-388). In this vein, it is not difficult to comprehend the operation of late twentieth century capitalist knowledge practices and ideological rivalry within a framework of manufactured truth.

Similarly, with reference to information sources, the media as transmitters, channels and receivers, media ownership, and fractured notions of audiences, each component can be said to contain their own versions of regimes of truth in the forms of nuances in phrasing, justifications for choices of transmission/reception, exclusionary programming, and ideological motivations. Each of these is not absolute and unchallengeable on their own. Within each flow component, as we have seen, truth is often rivalled by counter-truths, for example, in the way that news production inevitably provokes charges of bias, or where newspapers, radio, television and Internet compete for representational ascendance, access and coverage amongst one another.

Power should then be analysed through intangible descriptive categories such as ‘system of differentiations’, ‘types of objectives’, ‘means of bringing power relations into being’, ‘forms of institutionalization’ and ‘degrees of rationalization’. The exercise of power operates when it is ‘elaborated, transformed, organized; it endows itself with processes which are more or less adjusted to the situation.’ (Foucault 1982, 223-224) Power can even be said to operate as situations of conflict where a pole of antagonism provokes its own confronting force, for conflict itself implies a power condition or relationship. The abstraction of power
relations leads one to construe it in the form of a discourse (or discipline): it is holistically a regime of truth, but in its specifics, it is

...made up of a limited number of statements for which a group of conditions of existence can be defined...; it is from beginning to end, historical — a fragment of history, a unity and discontinuity in history itself, posing the problem of its own limits, its divisions, its transformations, the specific modes of its temporality rather than its sudden irruption in the midst of the complicities of time. (Foucault 1997, 117)²¹

Foucault arrived at this definition through a deconstruction of the emergence of psychiatric discourse in the nineteenth century. The sexual, penal norms and pathological symptoms of individuals were initially dispersed and distant from the family, judicial systems and the search for clinical precedents in police methods until they were intentionally compared, delimited and specified in relationships of meaning with one another. Human agency acting under a cult of inventive methodology thus established the scientific bases for law and order (Foucault 1997, 42-46).²² In Foucaultian terms, power is never construed as a singular object but instead as an exercise, a relation, a specific set of conditions of existence defining itself, and therefore functioning as a discipline in both senses of systems of control behaviour and science. Power and information constitute one another, and being discourses, possess no specific hub but may manifest 'agents of liaison' who function to deploy these discourses in operationalising subjection of individuals, societies, states and institutionalising control (Foucault 1980, 51-52, 62).²³ The physical manifestations of these agents in information globalization would be in the form of government leaders, diplomats, financial analysts, journalists and non-state actors acting as initiators of information as 'news', 'reports', and 'studies' characterising situations in degrees of desirability or undesirability. An example of

²¹ Italics mine.
²² Foucault's understanding of discourse as a vocabulary loaded with a limited range of unique meanings, judgements and commitments is echoed by two of his postmodern contemporaries, Connolly (1983, 2-3) and Laclau (1990, 28-29).
the political implication of power as discourse is given by Foucault himself in a comment on geography:

Once knowledge can be analysed in terms of region, domain, implantation, displacement, transposition, one is able to capture the process by which knowledge functions as a form of power and disseminates the effects of power. There is an administration of knowledge, a politics of knowledge, relations of power which pass via knowledge and which, if one tries to transcribe them, lead one to consider forms of domination designated by such notions as field, region and territory. And the politico-strategic term is an indication of how the military and the administration actually come to inscribe themselves both on a material soil and within forms of discourse. (Foucault 1980, 69)

Likewise, when power is applied as discourse within information globalization, one can reasonably argue that information sources, media, media owners, and audiences possess their own discourses, rival and counter-discourses, which may or may not coincide, but are more likely to conflict. This conflict is seen in the NWICO debate on western imperialism in reporting developing countries, and the presumption of ‘Hollywood’s invasion’ of domestic media markets and social consciousness. The NWICO debate can then be deconstructed into Third World protest discourses against the global news agencies, the media technologies’ implications, media ownerships, and possibly a discursive reflection on their hegemonic construction of their docile home audiences as well. Alternatively, discourse analysis is equally applicable to the political information context contained in the following excerpt from a single International Herald Tribune editorial authored five days before NATO hostilities against Serbia in March 1999:

While Slobodan Milosevic wages his war against civilians in Kosovo, he is also cracking down on freedom of expression at home in Serbia. This is no coincidence. Every time the United States threatens Mr. Milosevic and does not follow through, he has an excuse to turn on those he regards as internal enemies. Repression of all independent media in turn allows the Serbian dictator to fill his airwaves with hateful nationalist and anti-American propaganda. Whipping up nationalist support for his

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23 This is acknowledged even by scholars of the bureaucratic power of information control. (Sadofsky 1990, 13-24)
brutal campaign against the ethnic Albanians of Kosovo then helps him solidify his grip on power despite the economic misery he has brought on....

Poison at home promotes instability throughout the neighborhood. Official media helped produce the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia in the first half of this decade. Now they are providing a cover for Mr. Milosevic's crimes in Kosovo. Europe and the United States once again are vacillating on whether to stand up to this evil. Until they do, it will continue to expand. (IHT 1999b)

Here is an implicit sampling of conflicting discourses which are symptomatic of the contrast and conflation of news and audience political perceptions within information globalization: Slobodan Milosevic's exercise of sovereign government in Serbia versus his deeds of misgovernment from a US and European viewpoint; normatively independent media versus the turpitude of repressing the media; righteous European and US concern for Kosovar Albanians versus officially-organised domestic criminality in Serbia and Kosovo with 'neighbourhood' consequences. These battles of discourses served as trials of scrutiny that clearly preceded the decision for the subsequent exercise of hard military power by the parties scripted into this discursive contest. Once the campaign got underway, UN Secretary-General Annan declared Kosovo a 'human rights tragedy' and a test for the international community: 'with the eyes of the world on us, it is imperative that we aid the uprooted and brutalized people of Kosovo now...' (Annan 1999). Whose eyes, whose world and whose imperative to aid is clearly an issue of discourse, here probably shaped by those who commenced the military bombardment.

2.4 Information Globalization Implies Space for Scrutiny

The preceding expositions in this Chapter have shown that information flow in its components comprise omni-directional and decentred power relations that are best analysed using the postmodern concept of power as discourse. Discourses in a Foucaultian definition are transversal formations of information which subjectify persons, societies and nation-
states in a selective constellation of meaning and which possess unlimited capabilities of legitimising the deployment of more traditional forms of hard power. Hard power such as military strikes, occupations, embargoes, severance of ties, and physical demonstrations are oriented towards achieving certain objectives structured intrinsically to the discourse itself. The interplay of diverse discourses within information globalization presupposes an existence of a space for discursive conflict, which may also serve at times as an arena for benign inter-discursive dialogue towards pacific ends in international relations. Chapter 3 follows on by elaborating the nature of this 'global information space' and accounts for the great likelihood of discourses acting as defences for nation-state communitarianism, in a globally cacophonous politics. Communitarian discourses then become the foundation for foreign policy, and hence of soft power itself.
3.1 Introduction: Politics within Global Information Space

The concept of space is integral to the structural effects of information globalization. The latter’s three components, that is, the reach of ICTs, globalizing capitalism, and post-Cold War fluidity, impact on nation-state arrangements by precipitating a new sense of scrutiny from both ‘outside-in’ and ‘inside-out’ in regard to the politics of identity, community and security. In this regard, information globalization’s impact upon foreign policy can only be evaluated through the former’s spatial transformation of the latter’s borders of accountability, that is, the uncoupling of a territorially bound power centre from its circumscribed enclosure of authority into a decentred wider sphere of alternative authorities around the globe.

This Chapter will elaborate on the polycentric and malleable notion of the ‘global information space’ in terms of its composition of overlapping layers of scrutiny and contestation enabled by ICTs, transnational capitalist practices and ideological efflorescence in post-Cold War politics. These overlaps produce an imperfect but operational global public space that is vulnerable to domination by discourses carried or initiated at every stage of the information flow. The idea of a ‘public’ space, which was originally derived from the context of a national democracy, is predicated on two consequentialist arguments made since the dawn of western civilisation. Firstly, it developed from the need to manage common consequences arising from particularistic interests affecting other particular parties within connectable proximity, with a view towards attaining a jointly optimal outcome for all. Secondly, ‘the public’ developed from a free-market driven need for the dissemination and consumption of information.
independent of absolutist government beginning in the seventeenth century. This historical argument led to the concept of a public sphere as one where intellectual critical and rational debate (Habermas 1991, 27, 52) occurred on matters of governance and any matters deemed of interest to the subjects of a collective authority.

It will be argued that global information space, as a global public sphere, resembles the features and faults of the national public sphere, except for the unrealised potential of world government. Each nation-state presently acts in the capacity of particularistic interest with respect to one another, and to any institutions loosely administering international, and transnational non-state issues. To the 1891 nation-states currently in existence, might be added numerous transnational, national and sub-national non-state actors, with their own particularistic interests. These interests pose a difficulty of central governance in global information space where they frequently conflict over their relative prioritisation. This in turn leads to the further challenge of constituting order between the extremes of anarchy and world democratic government. Being also characterised by surveillance and discursive activities, this space tends to resemble a Hobbesian state of nature in terms of the availability and trial of ideas from multiple sources. Its interpretation as either anarchy or world democracy would then depend on one's form of analysis.

Within this intra-space conflict of ideas, discourse becomes available as power as argued in Chapter 2, and in this light, the idea of 'world public opinion' may supervene over interest diversity. Especially amidst the fluidity of the post-Cold War era, discourses that attract or mould a politically sizeable coalition of interests can potentially exercise hegemony and deny human differences through international regimes and humanitarian
interactions. It becomes not only a question of democracy and the protection of particular interests within a struggle for world public opinion; it is also an arena of struggle over meanings of identity and community.

The nation-state will be defended as a necessary agent of national identity and a sense of particularistic community amidst a cacophonous global information disorder. Towards this end, a soft power foreign policy has to be employed to support community and identity, and at this point, discursive power becomes soft power. Soft power is the ability to achieve one's goals through the appeal of ideas, instead of coercion, and as it will be argued, is based on projecting a credible communitarian existence to public, omnidirectional political audiences. The detailed characteristics of soft power as a foreign policy instrument will thus be enumerated after outlining the nature of global information space, the ramifications of world public opinion, and the reactionary value of the nation-state, all as implications of information globalization.

3.2 Global Information Space as Polycentric Space: Media, Economic and Political

Global information space is the direct consequence of information globalization acting as a multidimensional information flow inducing a climate of scrutiny. To comprehend the former's polycentric characteristics, a layered analysis needs to be rendered of each of information globalization's three components: the global reach of ICTs, globalizing capitalistic practices, and post-Cold War world politics. These correspond to discussions of global media space, of economic space, and of political space. It will be argued that these overlap one another to form a political global information space.

1 According to official membership or permanent observer status at the UN, 17 January 2002.
Global Media Space

First, consider how ICTs have transformed space. Each of the communications technologies from stone through papyrus to the Internet has clearly established linear and bilinear connectivity between two points in physical geography. They shrink distance according to their differential rates of speed in transmission, channel and reception. Territorial space, as the examples of the British Empire and American superpowerdom historically indicate, is mastered from a metropolitan centre in so far as information of social, economic and political changes in the ‘periphery’ can be efficiently tackled with instructions and material force (Headrick 1991; Hugill 1999). Besides the control and response speed, the evolution of ICTs, beginning especially with electricity, opened up another non-state, non-territorial dimension: the space within networks of ICT terminals. Conversational space between two telecommunication points has always existed all along electric cables, and this potential is multiplied exponentially when the exchange enables a simultaneous teleconference. The same is achieved by radio and television, but with more features added to conversational space: quality sound and sight. The earth-orbiting satellite contributed simultaneity to this list, and overcame the disadvantages of cable laying. The microchip, working through computer and Internet not only enhanced two-way sight, sound and simultaneity, it also transformed electronic space into cyberspace. Cyberspace, inspired by the foundational concept of cybernetics, allows limitless information storage, retrieval, simulation and feedback.

In this regard, McLuhan’s concept of the electronic global village usefully informs the analysis of transnational media space. Internet and interactive radio and television formats ensure ‘that we live in an electric environment of information coded not just in

<http://www.un.org/Overview/growth.htm>
visual but in other sensory modes.’ (McLuhan and Fiore 1968, 7) These fused
communication media ensure that human senses relating to media are ‘outered’ and
‘innered’ in consciousness simultaneously: experiencing information via media becomes
a total experience by placing the viewer and actor into each other’s positions through
visual, sonic and feedback possibilities in almost real time. This is the action of time-
space distanciation and the disembedding of social experience from locality, causing the
participants involved to experience reflexivity of self-examination in reaction to
information received from elsewhere. McLuhan and Powers go on to elaborate this as
acoustic space where experience is had from all directions in the respective senses
(McLuhan and Powers 1992, ch. 3-5, 7-8; McLuhan and Fiore 1968, ch. 1). Cyberspace
has neither fixed centre nor margin; anywhere can be a centre so long as ICTs exist.
National borders are irrelevant to cyberspatial existence, only ‘centers of thought and
influence’ matter (McLuhan and Powers 1992, 89-91, 93-94, 113-118; McLuhan and
Fiore 1968, 180-186).² It is in this sense, using ‘cyberspace’ as a metaphor for the global
electronic newspaper, 24-hour satellite and cable television, radio and Internet, that one
can assert that a global media space has been in operation since the early 1990s. At the
same time, global print news in the form of Time, Newsweek, Economist, Wall Street
Journal, Financial Times and the International Herald Tribune, have also proved their
ability to coexist with and augment the more efficacious reach of round-the-clock
electronic media. Here audiences have been enticed and retained by most newspapers’
diversification into web editions, the offering of rapid and inclusive editorial forums
online, and in general, offering news features on both paper and Internet tailored to
individual tastes (Crampton 2001; Borzo 2001). In this media space, coextensive with
satellites and cables, national politics can be supported, queried and bombarded with

² McLuhan’s foresight in imagining the electronic global village is complimented by Michael Vlahos’
imitative concept of ‘infosphere’, which he describes as a fusion of the world’s communication networks,
databases and sources of information into a heterogeneous ‘electronic interchange’. (1998)
information from any political actor virtually anywhere and anytime with discursive power at omnipresent transmission terminals.

*Global Economic Space*

Economic spaces, previously defined and limited by ideology and technology nationally, and by geopolitics of formal empire, have increasingly grown in interconnection since 1945 into a pattern of global economic space. As Chapter 1 has pointed out, capitalism is by nature a practice based on information-seeking production and consumption in relation to the function of price movements and factor allocations. Relying on the efficient connectivity within media space, entrepreneurs will always seek out the best prices, and sellers supply according to profitability. A space dimension, encompassing even time, inherently exists in the search for market equilibrium in transactions. To illustrate the political choices behind all these spatial information practices, they must be traced firstly, as a recent historical victory of a neo-liberal political momentum and its embodiment in ideas; and secondly, as a catalysed result of ICT effects.

First, consider the globalizing trajectory of neo-liberalism. Markets in the pre-1945 periods have operated in closed mercantilist fashion whether they occur in the guise of 'continental systems', 'empire preferences', or in mixed feudal and market forms in pre-modern societies. It required the conjunction of World War Two and the rise to worldwide geopolitical pre-eminence of the US that allowed the widespread incorporation of a neo-liberal form of capitalism into national economies. American economic leadership, or benign hegemony according to certain accounts (Kindleberger 1974; Krasner 1976; Strange 1989), created the Bretton Woods financial system and a free trade
regime called the GATT. These were essentially systems of interlocking surveillance and multilateral cooperation dedicated to greasing the operation of capitalism by spotting traffic flow (i.e. goods, money, practices) problems and remedying them wherever they occur, nationally or transnationally. While these measures were boycotted and rivalled by the central planning model of the communist bloc for 45 years, the non-communist economies integrated themselves into cross-border flows of trade, capital and currency convertibility mechanisms. Although most economic historians would treat 1971 as a hiatus in the postwar economy when the US unilaterally ended the fixed dollar-gold conversion rate it maintained since 1945, external and multilateral flows continued to generate a widening transnational economic space (Van der Wee 1991, ch. I, VI; Agnew and Corbridge 1995, 164-207; Greider 1997).

This neo-liberal transnational economic space was upheld initially, but not completely, by American interests through the Marshall Plan, other unilateral, IMF and World Bank loans, and positive trade discrimination measures to aid the strengthening of her European, Asian and other non-communist allies. The majority of newly-decolonised developing countries, who were nominally neither members of the western nor Soviet camps, were inducted into this capitalist economic space by both their opportunism in development planning, and their need to retain post-colonial sources of wealth generation through access to the markets of the former colonial metropoles (Van der Wee 1991, 401-404; Worsley 1984, 297-328; Skidelsky 1996, 87-88). In this way, most Third World economic spaces, in spite of their domestic hybrid practices of Keynesianism, protectionism and central planning, were joined into a neo-liberal capitalist surveillance system.\(^4\) Dependency theorists have elaborated extensively on the camouflaged neo-

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\(^3\) This term refers in a general sense to the principles of elimination of trade barriers and limited governmental economic intervention at home and abroad.

\(^4\) Surveillance is written into the IMF and World Bank mandates. See Chapter 1, Section 1.3.2.
imperialist nature of these post-colonial trade and financial links (Frank 1971), but these ideological arguments of an unequal capitalist world system still do not negate the broader argument that a transnational economic space was evolving into a global one. Ultimately, even the counter-plan of a communist economic bloc in the form of COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance), proved futile by the late 1970s. The USSR and China saw benefits in selling natural resources and limited amounts of light industrial products to the non-communist world to earn the foreign exchange necessary for purchasing western and Japanese technology for their domestic development.

Although this is not the place to debate closed and open models of development, it is important to note, from the above description, that development in the postwar and postcolonial contexts placed many of the world's nation-states in a spatial quandary against the western vision of neo-liberal multilateralism, which was effectively the only viable 'engine' of recovery and growth (Skidelsky 1996, ch. 7-8). An autarkic indigenous path of development for the Third World meant depressing standards of living and getting limited mileage from scarcities of capital, technology and skill. For the non-communist combatants of World War Two, turning inward meant a possible financial collapse akin to the interwar precedents of post-Versailles Germany, mercantilism and the ferment of Marxist revolutionary conditions. Among the less-developed members of COMECON, Stalinism provided a limited boost for short-term growth. But over the long term, central planning revealed its sharp contradictions in demand and supply, as well as technological stagnation, which became the ironic price of maintaining an enforced economic stability. In contrast, and in spite of cyclical economic contractions, capitalist economic space created within it a flourishing trade in consumer and industrial goods, and effected transfers of skilled and unskilled labour. It encouraged individual investors and MNCs to
go beyond national territories to exploit imbalances in development needs according to the 'invisible hand' of demand and supply. Furthermore, the Bretton Woods financial architecture provided emergency credit facilities to states in the form of the IMF and World Bank. That a neo-liberal global economic space was, by demonstration effect, in the ascendance was reinforced by the events of 1989-91 when the 'Second World' collapsed politically and economically; or in the case of China and Vietnam, reinvented themselves as hybrid-capitalists to fit into the neo-liberal system of economic surveillance.

The other prime generator of global economic space is the specific linkage of the market to the global capabilities of ICTs. The latter have affected actors and activities in terms of time-space compression, speed and variety of economic information. Computerisation of stock exchanges and the introduction of live satellite news on television and Internet translate into rapid updating of prices and financial confidence, thereby catalysing the speed and volume of buying and selling reactions. On a larger scale, technology enables time and space to be compressed into simultaneous trading on exchanges in overlapping daylight time zones, and some stocks such as Unilever, are cross-listed in London and Amsterdam, or in the case of HSBC Holdings, cross-listed in London and Hong Kong. Trading can take place literally 24 hours. When one exchange closes for the day, another picks up at another site. Additionally, the Internet-enabled online trading networks are giving established physical bourses competition on price, speed and in virtual time (Henriques 1999; Treaster 1999). The easy accessibility of round-the-clock trading offers the individual investor broadened choices of trading hours and location while experts caution that 'after-hours' trading in light volumes can exaggerate price swings, trigger excessive volatility, and cause lapsed state protection for investors
Policing Internet transactions is also likely to be complicated by volume, speed and location.

ICTs have also transformed intra-MNC trade and corporate working styles. Within MNCs, new concentrations and further specialisation beyond a physical division of labour between production stages and units is now a reality. Cities such as New York, London, Tokyo, Hong Kong and Singapore, equipped with advanced ICT infrastructure become companies’ ‘command points’ in organising economic strategy, research and development, as well as marketplaces for financial and other data services for firms (Knox 1995, 232-247; Sassen 1998, 179-182). These services, which rely on cyber and fibre-optic networks, are then contracted out to pure information corporations such as British Telecom, AT&T and Compaq to manage as exclusive intranets operating via the infrastructure of the worldwide Internet (Sassen 1998, 185-194). Rival ‘Silicon Valleys’ in Bangalore, Hong Kong, Seattle, Singapore and Tel Aviv are new actors within a global Internet economy. On the micro-level of the work team and department within the firm, videoconferencing in high-technology collaboration across continents, remotely networked supplier-customer chains and ‘teleworking’ from home are now equipping even medium-sized firms with unprecedented market flexibility. Product development is speeded up using resources of several locations simultaneously and skilled recruitment can access labour markets beyond local environments (Economist 1999c; IHT Sponsored Section 1999a; Tedeschi 1999). This global essence of ‘e-business’ is accentuated by the time-space connectivity of satellite transponders. All these point to the discursive power of problem construction and solution being shifted sideways and downwards from the major industrial states and corporate headquarters.
Clearly, global economic space has evolved as the triumph of neo-liberal market ideology and efficient media technologies. The latter ensures that capitalist activity is coterminous with the physical expanse of the globe, and not just with the formal international links between countries; while states now serve as (de-) regulatory bases in freeing up resources and skills for economic efficiency across geography. This state of affairs does not mean that market imperfections disappear as the 1970s oil shock, the NIC 'miracles', Third World debt and currency volatility attest. The playing field of actors has nevertheless become vaster, more competitive, allows the dispersal of advantage and generates intensified demands for factor-of-production-hospitable development and governance strategies. This ideational aspect of organising for economic competition nationally, subnationally, or supranationally becomes political at global forums where nation-state representatives increasingly concede attention and bargaining space for corporate and individual non-state entities. This bargaining process is a political struggle in the sense of it being an attempt at authoritative allocation of values amidst conflicting spatially based welfare requirements, played out among and between states and non-state actors (Sinclair 1999). The importance international diplomacy attaches to state-sponsored business promotion missions, World Bank and IMF reports on political and economic stability, along with economic confidence ratings by Standard and Poor and the Morgan Stanley Capital Index, have collectively politicised information within global economic space.

Global Political Space

Global political space is also an arena of struggle for group survival, material distribution, and domination. Although this thesis has argued in Chapter 1,5 that terrestrial

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5 This section, like the previous two on media and economic spaces, is a deduction from the third component of information globalization (Chapter 1, Section 1.3.3), as well as from the general empirical-transactional accounts of globalization.
space can only be called global in the 1990s, its origins lay partly in the imperial ambitions of ancient empires such as the Babylonian, the Greco-Roman, and the Chinese. Global politics however began in earnest with the historical constitution of the nation-state. The latter was designed to safeguard a collectively defined good in an attempt at mastering space for specific benefit to the exclusion of ‘others’. In this way, the question of the largeness of the ‘the majority’, the commune, the city-state and the nation-state as a successful social venture, along with the identification of the excluded categories, are perennial ideational controversies of both politics and economics.

The present Westphalian pattern of sovereign nation-states that arose from the seventeenth century onwards had maintained throughout its evolution a rigid distinction between domestic and international spaces for politicking, honoured more in the breach than in observance. Yet the distinction remains enshrined in the UN Charter as a fundamental principle. This pattern of relations in international space has led some thinkers to organise the study of politics in this space under the categories of ‘international society’ or ‘anarchical society’. In this international space, there is no common authority akin to the enforcement capabilities of domestic government. Instead, this space had witnessed conflict-prone relations between groups of self-governed peoples. Yet this ‘anarchy’ in relations does not exclude a modicum of cooperation and peaceful coexistence based on common norms voluntarily adhered to under a modus vivendi of bilateral or multilaterally recognised ‘national interests’, or in the extreme case during the era of imperialism, under military subjugation (Bull 1977, 16-19; Wight 1977, ch. 1-6). While it may appear that these norms evolved across time through practical inheritance, they were equally shaped by changes in states’ relative economic, military, technological and ideological capacities to lead or resist imposition (Watson 1992, 299-325).
The military history of the world since the seventeenth century has both
demonstrated the relative failure to overturn the pattern of nation-state forms of political
organisation, and the dominance of the nation-state as the prime pursuer of conflict and
stability in inter-group relations. World Wars One and Two confirmed it and so did the
Cold War. The Cold War seemed to some observers to be an anomaly in both weakening
the territorial sanctity of the nation-state with the threat of air-speeded nuclear war whilst
simultaneously granting it de facto protection under the strategic imperatives of
maintaining ideological-territorial defence perimeters (Herz 1962; Halliday 1983, 42-44;
Clark 1997, 128-147). Communism, despite its class-based world view being opposed to
national constructs, thrived against its free world adversaries by employing both static
border defence and ‘wars of national liberation’ on a case-opportunistic basis from Korea
in 1950 to Afghanistan in the 1980s. Containment by the ‘free world’ mirrored this
strategy, precipitating a relative stasis in international space. And even though
decolonisation of former imperial territories and the growing wealth and influence of
western MNCs had threatened to return the post-1945 international society to its
fragmented medieval predecessor, such a trend was arrested by the security dynamics of
the Cold War. Tenuous new Third World regimes were propped up by Washington,
Moscow and their proxies against ethnic and political separatist fissures in places such as
Ethiopia, Somalia, Philippines and Indonesia. The USSR itself comprised 15 diverse
‘nationalities’ united under communist autocracy. Where nationalist exceptionalism and
alternative centres of ideological allegiance arose in Yugoslavia, China, India, Egypt,
Ghana, Iran, Afghanistan and among member-states of the Non-Aligned Movement, they
were mindful of, and weak relative to the concentrated ideological, military and economic
power of the key bipolar centres. No ‘third force’ could convincingly operate
internationally except for the consumption of domestic political constituencies; hard
(military) security as well as soft (economic) security could only be ensured by de facto adherence to one pole or the other. This was because no aspiring great power could, for much of the Cold War, match the overwhelming ideological and nuclear projection capabilities of the superpowers. In this way international security conflict matched dominant orderings of international space.

The growth of multipolar fluidity was, however, rendered inevitable by sustained trends in horizontal and vertical technological diffusion in the armaments, high technology and ICT categories, as well as by positive economic growth afforded by capitalist economic space, and the corresponding under-performance within the rival socialist economic space. These technological and economic trends shifted significant amounts of hard power from Moscow and Washington, and created rival power centres where weakness or none had existed before. Britain, France, Germany and the original European Community states rebounded from postwar frailty to become a major market and business core. Japanese power was economic, and potentially a renovated regional-military form. Chinese power was clearly economic and regional-military. Indian and Pakistani military power went nuclear. Additionally, economic power was further shared outwards amongst newly-industrialising countries, MNCs, regional trade groups and transnational investment funds. This diffusion of hard power effectively enabled a levelling up of national and non-governmental hard power across the globe, and created a strategic stalemate where ideas, as foreign policy instruments, had wider manoeuvrability in the spaces between hard power conflict.

The power of ideology, concentrated originally since 1945 in two statist centres, was also eroding from rigid legitimacy over time, and from challenges of socio-economic diversity in governance and development worldwide. It soon became clear, mediated by
ICTs, that neither pure ideological forms provided catch-all solutions. The decisive *coup de grâce* against bipolarity was the Soviet acknowledgement of the twin crises of ideological and performative legitimacy beginning around 1988 with Moscow's abrogation of the Brezhnev doctrine of socialist intervention vis-à-vis its East European satellites. Prior to that, beginning in the mid-1980s, Islamic fundamentalism was already an emerging contender, and the Chinese way of market socialism had reinterpreted Marxism pragmatically.

The diffusion of hard power, joined by the weakening of any dominant ordering of global ideology enabled the diversifying tendencies above and below nation-states, that is, decolonisation and transnational capitalism, to stake self-legitimating claims against the status quo. This has translated into a crisis of borders, causing the increasing decomposition of international political space into a 'global political space' where nation-states compete on a stage crowded by discrete MNCs, international organisations and transnational ethnic, terrorist and social protest groups, all with convenient access to global media space. The incoherent political aims of collective state intervention in the 1990s from Somalia to East Timor are symptomatic of the vagaries of a global political space. Peacekeepers, civilian administrators and combat forces with UN and World Bank monies are deployed to police human rights and build democracy in contexts where civil combatants discursively depict themselves as oppressed nationalisms opposed to one another, delegitimating 'old states' and inventing new ones. The results of interventions years later tend to prove ambiguous as the cases of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Haiti illustrate: a superficial civil order is achieved atop a fragile domestic authority split into obstinately partisan camps, with development, law and order dependent upon international aid and imposed peacekeeping, and further subject to local practices of patrimonialism and corruption (Kovaleski 1997; Hedges 1999; R.J. Smith 1999; Wheeler
and Morris 1996). Global political space appears to reopen all frontiers to politics as forms of multidimensional struggle for authority, identity and resource distribution.

In sum, the mapping of global information space as a composite of global media, economic and political spaces is an outcome of the generic set defined as information globalization in Chapter 1. Global information space is a product of late twentieth century technology, economics and politics, which cumulatively produce multi-level globe-extensive space for ideational political struggle. Since this space is constituted primarily of practices (rather than physical geography), and the exchange of symbolic designs (e.g. ideologies, reports, opinions) preceding action, discursive power matters in the way it is used by parties engaged in political struggle to react to and construct the parameters of definable social order favouring their particularistic existence. Furthermore, given the end of dominant ideological verities after the Cold War, polycentrism of symbolic power is a natural feature rendering this global space an informational contesting arena where opinion plays a critical role.

The sceptic might object to the description of global information space as a political arena, considering the fact that geopolitics has already treated the dominance of space by political and economic means, or that the pre-existing FPA literature suffices to engage globalization by looking at the environmental settings of policy-making. However, these objections fail to accept that ideas politically transform international relations and domestic governance in the era of boundary-defying ICT activity, informational capitalism and the diversity of ideological competition after the Cold War. Traditionally, geopolitics à la Mahan, Haushofer and Mackinder, tended to privilege
physical and material control of space and the resources within it. Its critical version has only begun to define geopolitics as a mapping of how it came about that one state’s prospects in relation to others’ were seen in relation to global conditions that were viewed as setting limits and defining possibilities for a state’s ‘success’ in the global arena. (Agnew 1998, 2)

In this sense, global information space is complementary to geopolitics by emphasising the constructive power of ideas in subjecting others without tangible controls. It is also an improvement upon Anthony Smith’s attempt at coining the ‘geopolitics of information’ (A. Smith 1980), which narrates the imputed western control of information as a threat to the rest of the world in political economy terms, without considering how continuing ideological multipolarity can be a bone of contention among foreign policies.

FPA too has generally not kept pace with the changes brought by globalization, especially in its aspect of reopening all frontiers to multi-level political struggles, which invite unorthodox non-state and supra-state interventions affecting foreign policy. Once again, information affects foreign and domestic politics without visible physical control due to conditions of porosity accounted for by global information space. This is insufficiently explained by conventional FPA, which primarily scrutinises processes within state boundaries (Light 1994). Foreign policy, by definition, operates in spaces constructed by states, and it behoves the analysis in the next section to show how notions of world public opinion in global information space carry implications of an informational Hobbesian state of nature for states’ foreign policies.

3.3 Global Information Space as Public Space: World Public Opinion and a ‘State of Nature’

Global information space as a world public space can be comprehended when one defines the former’s composites as an amplification of the characteristics of a ‘public’, or

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6 A current example of geopolitical study fixated upon physical and material control is Blouet (2001).
a 'public sphere/space'. Habermas' sociology of a domestic bourgeois public sphere usefully informs analysis at this point. He has attempted to trace the varied strands and evolution of notions of the public as 'open to all', promoting group welfare, conferring 'public recognition' on someone's reputation, the exercise of open critical judgement, and attracting all forms of attention, including expressing anti-government positions (Habermas 1991, 1-2). What emerges from his work is an untidy genealogy of contextual practices in European history that he ascribes to the consequences of struggle for public participation.

According to Habermas, the idea of the public was a Greco-Roman legacy, which by the twentieth century, bore little resemblance to its origins. Between Greece and the late medieval period, generic notions of the public and private were understood and practised only by the political elites comprising monarchs, lords, nobles and the Church clergy (Habermas 1991, 3-11). It was however, the rise of a class connected to finance and trade, or in short, incipient agents of economic globalization, which laid the foundations for bourgeois features of publicness (Habermas 1991, 15-23). Like the kings and nobles in earlier periods, this class brought themselves into political consequence through emerging and independent bases of power. Merchants needed to 'traffic in commodities and news' which enriched the embryonic absolutist state's treasury and material power. An economy arose which became intermeshed with politics and administration, requiring information of social, governing and trade news to be provided on a regular basis. Furthermore, after the invention of paper printing, newspapers arrived in the seventeenth century, and before long, the absolutist state saw fit to use them for the open promulgation of laws and official movements. There came a point where official domination of news production evolved into an irksome regime that ran counter to commercial interests, which had by then differentiated and consolidated into the
bourgeois-proletarian divide. The merchants, bankers, entrepreneurs and manufacturers, who comprised the bourgeoisie, were negatively affected by the narrow-minded authoritarian demands of mercantilist policy, which they saw as stifling private initiative and livelihood. A civil society, literate and critical of government strictures arose to claim property and professional rights. This manifested itself in the flourishing of not only newspapers but intellectual journals, coffee houses, salons and *Tischgesellschaften* (‘table societies’). (Habermas 1991, 30-55) The latter were the nascent self-proclaimed spaces for social interaction among equals, generating art, philosophy and literature, and which functioned as alternative centres of interpretation and discussion of ‘common concerns’, apart from Church and State. Before long, this bourgeois public sphere constituted a political threat to monarchic absolutism and pushed for inclusive parliamentary politics where none existed before in Europe (Habermas 1991, 36-37). Participants of the public were simultaneously property owners and ‘the role of human beings pure and simple.’ (Habermas 1991, 56) In this way, a bourgeois public could accommodate other classes and non-state groups eventually.

Habermas’ public sphere, despite being situated domestically, sees ‘rational-critical debate’ as a feature of publicness that is applicable to diplomatic debates and economic disputes in global space. Furthermore, public space was a product of fledgling elites’ struggles against status quo groups and hegemonic practices utilising critical thinking and symbolic demonstrations of independence to pursue their causes. Open clashes of arguments checked domination, and trials of ideas and exposure were endemic to ‘publicity’. Also, the anchoring of ‘common concern’ as a plank for creating a public deserves exploration. Seen in another way, through discursive lenses, once an issue is sufficiently agreed in numbers as a matter that affects all, it triggers a rivalry and conflict among possible solutions. Another major theorist of the ‘public’, Thomas Dewey, posited
that the 'public' existed whenever 'indirect consequences' followed from persons or
entities engaged directly in transactions. If there were no indirect consequences, the
transactions would be 'private'. The public therefore

...consists of all those who are affected by the indirect consequences of
transactions to such an extent that it is deemed necessary to have those
consequences systematically cared for. (Dewey 1954, 15-16)

Dewey's prescription for a systematic resolution was the democratic state.

Leaving aside the question of creating a world democratic state as a world public
authority for the moment, the characteristics of global information space compares rather
favourably with the combined Habermas-Dewey list of public attributes. Firstly, actions
in global space, whether economic or political, are mediated into heterogeneous debating
positions by technologies that connect states, MNCs, non-state actors and international
organisations. This debate is clearly critical, and rational in so far as each participant has
a clear interest to defend. The diversity of resources, needs and outlooks endowed upon
states and non-state actors by acts of history and nature will ensure that any worldwide
agenda of environmentalism, human rights, trade and so on, would require a certain
amount of argument and bargaining, even if unanimous cooperation is consequentially
achievable. Secondly, as it has been argued in the preceding section, global media,
economic and political spaces are products or residues of military, ideological or
economic struggles engaged in initially, but not exclusively, by nation-states. Indeed
contemporary world political and economic relations have witnessed hegemonic projects
countered by anti-hegemonic movements, and players adopting strategies to carve out,
however successfully or unsuccessfully, collective, non-conformist arrangements.
Communism had its internationalist projects, so do liberal internationalists and Islamic
fundamentalists.
Thirdly, the feature of indirect consequences is mirrored in how global information space locates its existence. Primarily because territorial nation-states existed cheek-by-jowl on a common international space, their relations came to be governed by diplomacy, war, trade, population movement and the spillover effects of climatic change and natural disasters. Technology, especially of electronic forms, in tandem with transportation advances, made international contact ever more inevitable along with other modernities such as capitalism and news production. Ultimately, these trends led towards globalization, which by rendering territorial and political boundaries porous, introduced more actors into a hitherto state-monopolised international space, thus rendering it 'global'. Media, such as satellite television and Internet, or issues such as economic contagion and air pollution, now ensure a *de facto* global commons needs addressing at all levels of human association.

A global public space, like national public spheres, logically coexists in a performative sense, with and for public opinion. Public opinion can be understood generally as 'an expression of dominant conviction backed by an intention to give effect to it,' and on a second linked level, is 'a manifestation of the evident wish of the majority for the taking by governments of a particular course.' (Dafoe 1933, 7-8) In its operational specifics, it is less clear. Habermas has shown that public opinion might act as a critical normative sounding board against official exercise of power and leadership in some instances, while in others, such as in the context of twentieth century capitalist advertising and mass social programmes, public opinion is moulded according to 'a staged display of, and manipulative propagation of, publicity in the service of persons and institutions, consumer goods, and programs.' (Habermas 1991, 236, 237-250) Walter Lippmann has also elaborated the formation of public opinion in terms of 'the triangular relationship between the scene of action, the human picture of that scene, and the human response to
that picture working itself out upon the scene of action,’ and it is the total or partial selection of these ‘pictures in our heads’, which become public opinion (Lippmann 1960, 16-17, 28-29). These doubts about public opinion’s autonomy and true moral value are further compounded when one ponders its composition in a mass political system (Bryce 1981, 3-9; Lowell 1981, 10-16). It may be a sum of individual wills, the outcome of a clash of individuals or groups, or between the two, or even a mirror of majoritarian rule in a democracy. According to other possibilities, public opinion may be manufactured by elites with near-exclusive access to prominent organs of expression such as parliament, mass media, and officially designated public channels. Non-elites can then be effectively marginalized from forming public opinion by informal and legal means alike. In non-democratic environments, populist leaders and dictators might claim general will or popular support on socio-cultural psychic grounds, devoid of proof of volition in opinion formation. Yet, despite the controversies of operation, public opinion has always mattered to the stability and efficacy of governments, as countless free elections, ‘staged’ elections, revolutions and mass street protests since the eighteenth century have shown.

The concept of world public opinion is only a little different, in that the scale of the difficulties in ascertaining public opinion are magnified several times. World public opinion’s fundamental normative and political weight lies in its ability to present moral condemnation or approval, sanction material actions such as punishment by diplomatic and economic withdrawal, or trigger military attack, not unlike the imputed effects of elections, mass protests and revolutions in the domestic. Rusciano and Fiske-Rusciano have argued that world public opinion has power in so far as it possesses

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7 Even in constitutional democracies, it is not clear that public opinion on domestic and foreign policies are democratically derived from unmediated individual choice (C.W. Smith 1939, ch. X-XIII, XXIV; Lippmann 1960, ch. XXI-XXVIII; Mueller 1973; Glynn et al. 1999). It is worth noting that in the argument of Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis the contradictions between the liberal and capitalist components of liberal democracy alone distort the formation of genuine public opinion (1986).
(a) a moral component where a minimal universal moral standard is shared internationally;
(b) a pragmatic component where evaluations are based on 'interests which relevant nations were supposed to share, where issues [are] discussed in terms of practical costs or benefits;' and
(c) a national fear of isolation with respect to an assumed 'world community', 'international community' or 'international public'. (Rusciano and Fiske-Rusciano 1998, 19-26)8

The two authors derived this notion from studying the common reference to 'world opinion' in the reports and editorials of two 'quality newspapers' – the International Herald Tribune and the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. This evidence-based formulation, while analytically useful, cannot obscure the controversies of opinion formation. Rusciano and Fiske-Rusciano have assumed the automaticity of nation-states existing within an international society, which exists by virtue of certain shared behavioural norms and interests, but do not account for its pattern of derivation. Nation-states are not consistently and operationally solid blocks of collective will and their relative variations in political systems, culture, geography, development and military profiles may complicate coherent opinion articulation and aggregation. To the extent that nation-states are unitary points of opinion, they must be strong and enlightened communities able to articulate domestic majorities of opinion, or possess the ability to impose uniformity on them. Between states, inequalities of power may well lead to clashes of interest being resolved through default of hegemony by one or several groups of nation-states amassing an insuperable combination, or modus vivendi, of relevant ideological power in the manner Hobbes envisaged on the level of individuals. This might explain 'Pax Britannica', 'Pax Americana', 'the West', 'the Soviet bloc', 'Latin American regionalism', 'the African voice', 'the Confucian challenge', and 'the Islamic world'9 as coalitions of world public opinion centred upon particular worldviews. As international spaces evolved into post-Cold War global spaces, the number of opinion centres
multiplied as NGOs and international organisations gained voice through globalizing economic, environmental and technological processes impacting upon national schemes of welfare.

A host of questions can be raised about world public opinion processes. How does one analyse the composition of world public opinion when unequal entities ranging from political dissidents, fundamentalist terrorists, investment companies, the UN, and NATO invoke emotion and evoke uneven political shifts within and among states through satellite television, Internet and newspaper issue coverage? Will reactions to such world public opinion follow the course of liberal democratic procedures with legal trappings of enforceability? On a world scale, is it desirable to ignore the relative silence of the minority, or majority, of the less powerful and less developed on specific issues concerning their livelihood? Any sample of issue-specific UN members’ opinions during crises such as the Balkans, terrorism, or the Arab-Israeli conflict will tend to witness the US, Britain and pro-western UN personnel invoking the ‘international community’s opinion’ as moral justification, while the Russian, Chinese and many non-permanent members refer only conditionally to the same phrase. Frequently, the non-western members refer to world public opinion to denigrate hegemonic aggression and unwanted external interference in sovereign matters.

For example, some months after the bombing of Serbia got underway in 1999, UN Secretary-General Annan echoed NATO-led moral justifications for facilitating a multinational humanitarian intervention in Kosovo, in the absence of a specifically worded UN mandate, by describing certain players’ dominant voices as follows:

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8 These authors have significantly derived their conclusions from statistical analyses. Earlier attempts at explaining world opinion qualitatively as political approval and disapproval can be found in Robinson (1954) and Bull (1958).

9 The last two categories are from Huntington (1996, 102-121).
The international community is united in its pursuit of a peace that allows the full and speedy return of the Kosovar Albanians to their homes in safety and dignity. How that peace is achieved is now the focus of intensive negotiations, involving the large Western governments and Russia, the United Nations and all who seek peace with justice for the people of Kosovo. (Annan 1999)

In September, the Chinese foreign minister dissented in a UN debate on Kosovo that

[s]uch arguments as ‘human rights taking precedence over sovereignty’ and ‘humanitarian intervention’ seem to be in vogue these days...The outbreak of war in Kosovo sounded an alarm for us all. A regional military organisation, in the name of humanitarianism and human rights, bypassed the United Nations and took military action against a sovereign state. It created an ominous precedent in international relations. (Crossette 1999)

This pattern of denigration of an implied consensual world public opinion, or its equivalent, continued in the prelude to the installation of a UN peacekeeping mission in East Timor in September 1999. Following widespread rioting by pro-Indonesian militias on the ground in the wake of a UN-supervised referendum on the territory’s independence, White House spokesman Joe Lockhart insisted

The point we made very clearly and forcefully is that they need to demonstrate that they are prepared to assert control in East Timor or we believe they should invite an international presence. (M. Richardson 1999a)

This sentiment was backed up by the UN Secretary-General’s ultimatum to Indonesia to quell the violence within 48 hours or face Security Council intervention. Statements supporting the ultimatum were also issued by Britain, and some member states of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation group, including Australia and Japan. Indonesia’s instant reaction was to reject the warning of the opinion of the ‘international community’:

Why should we be the subject of so much abuse, so much accusations, and so much pressuring? Don’t hector us. Don’t pressure us. Don’t give us ultimatums, like within 48 hours you shall do this or that. (M. Richardson 1999a)

Yet within seven days of this rejection, Indonesia acquiesced to a unanimously approved UN Security Council Resolution authorising a peacekeeping force for East Timor. Jakarta however called for the peacekeeping force to conduct itself in an ‘impartial and neutral manner’ so as to be ‘credible’. Jakarta also asked that the composition of the force ought to include ASEAN because the latter’s members would understand regional sensitivities
(IHT 1999d). This episode goes to show that world public opinion, whatever its expression, is neither straightforward, nor initially representative, in communication. In the Timor case, it involved threats from some quarters, and revulsion from the target state. This suggests that, like the Habermas-Dewey-Lippmann understandings of public opinion, world-scale opinion is not democratically perfect either.

In a third instance, involving the Arab-Israeli conflict, the potential target of world public opinion denied its validity altogether. In November 2000, following the latest spiral of Israeli-Palestinian violence in the West Bank and Gaza, the Palestinian Authority issued a proposal for an international observer force to act as a buffer between Israeli troops and Palestinians in time for a UN Security Council discussion. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak dismissed the idea in realist terms:

We do not believe in rewarding violence and any international presence will become eventually a reward to the Palestinian violence. (Richburg 2000)

An Israeli government spokesman was more blunt:

They [the Palestinians] are trying to impose upon Israel a Palestinian state which will be achieved in violence and struggle, and through negotiation...[W]e don't trust much the UN or any other international organizations. The Americans, yes. (Richburg 2000)

In this context, world public opinion is presented as somebody's trojan horse.

A study of public opinion and global ethics contained in the first ever UNESCO *World Culture Report 1998* reinforces the impossibility of consistency and representative justice within any imputed world public opinion. Combining Gallup research 1993-96 based upon 18 countries, and the World Values Survey 1990-93 covering 42 countries, its tentative 'world climate of public opinion' revealed that while a thin homogeneity of values were upheld across countries and by regions, they were highly qualified by diversity. 'Democracy' was broadly idealised but 'not accompanied by a truly universal
endorsement of human rights.' 'Tolerance' is also supported 'though only partially
applied to foreigners (not in the labour market) and though not encompassing all
minorities, such as homosexuals.' (Van der Staay 1998, 276) Statistically, the survey on
'political matters' showed

[a]bout half of the total population (of the countries covered) approve[d] of the
human rights movement (58%) or show[ed] a reasonably high level of political
interest (51%). (Van der Staay 1998, 266, 286, tab. 22A)

Among regional clusters approving the human rights movement, Africa (76%) and
Central and South America (70%) registered the highest ratings, with Eastern Europe
(59%), Western Europe (56%) and North America (53%) in the centre, while Asia (45%)
ranked lowest (Van der Staay 1998, 266, 286, tab. 22B). Incidentally, data for the 'Middle
East' was not available. In addition, the results for identification with geography revealed

[i]dentification with one's home town is the strongest (40%). Smaller[, but still
substantial,] numbers identify with a province (19%) or with their country as a
whole (29%). Identification with a continent (4%) or with the world (7%) is rare.
(Van der Staay 1998, 266, 286, tab. 22A)

This last set of statistics is most telling: a strong primary orientation to immediate town
localities, and a secondary but sizeable one to the country, which can be read as 'nation-
state'.

Social surveys are never totally free of sampling difficulties but the above
suggests that the bases of world public opinion are diversity and locality. These elements
have been characterised by Christopher Hill as the 'empire of circumstance' in the sense
'that circumstances, rather than hope and abstraction, have the final say in shaping our
lives, praxis and experience.' (C. Hill 1996, 112) Circumstances which affect how global
or local actors wish to articulate world public opinion will include ideas, emotions,
temporal and historical givens such as 'balances of power, correlations of forces,
geographical position, the means of production, social class, [and] levels of technology.'
The dynamics of circumstance can be seen in global forums on human rights where states such as China, Iran, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia and Singapore counter a largely Americanised ‘world consensus’ on universal liberal human rights with coalitions among themselves, regional partners, independent academics, and other de facto allies among the ‘silent majority’ of non-western states, as well as corporations with large physical investments in their territories.

To the extent that any one protagonist in a global contest ‘wins’ through deadlock, split world public opinion, or claims a mythical but powerful ‘proportion’ of world public opinion on their side, world public opinion becomes nothing more than a political expedient in the absence of a world democratic state. And to the extent that world public opinion is converted or divided towards one’s cause, it is also a particular vindication of successful discursive power expressed in diplomacy and other policy instruments. In this sense, global information space as public space for political trials of opinion is a discursive Hobbesian state of nature, of war of all against all, where only power matters in securing one’s ends. In Hobbes’ account of natural existence, mind and bodily strength are potent counterparts to one another although the ultimate purpose of using them singly or in tandem is in successfully overwhelming the opposition (Hobbes 1929, 94-98). Here lies the distinction between discursive power, as soft power of information, as a counter or preface to hard power such as military and economic sanctions. The capacity to galvanise world public opinion is soft power manifest. Yet this state of nature cannot be a liveable place unless, as Hobbes understood it, it upholds independent sovereign communities where men can pursue their immediate needs. Within global information space then, the group appears to provide a container of discursive meaning.

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10 The subject of Chapter 5 – the Asian Values Debate.
3.4 Nation-State within an Informational ‘State of Nature’: Order, Developmental Community and Ethical Identity

Global information space as a polycentric public forum theoretically connotes open-ended possibilities for freedom of choice and action that can be expressed between the two extremes of regulated competition in democracy, and anarchy. Anarchy can mean dissension over ideas of good governance, complete moral relativism of all information production and reception, and ultimately neither the possibility of mediation nor dialogue at all levels of information flow among individuals and groups. Anarchy is pre-nation-state disorder. This is the extreme negative pole of a global informational state of nature and an undesirable condition, especially when cooperation across all boundaries, at all levels, may be minimally necessary for goal attainment in a polycentric world, lest private solutions be resorted to, resulting in uneven results and net losses. It would seem logical to posit straightaway that the other polar extreme ought to be dictatorial uniformity, where diversity is resolved by a one-size-fits-all formula. However, this goes against the nature of the global information space: polycentrism and its public attributes, especially the common consequences of private actions, and the struggle to deal with them in utilitarian modes. The central problématique of the global informational state of nature would be how to manage a plurality of interests towards a semblance of order.

If anarchy represents the polar extreme of ‘non-solution’ in the face of diversity, then the opposite extreme ought to be one which privileges diversity, yet simultaneously possessing features for conflict adjudication where interests expressed in information flows collide, that is, general global democracy. Democracy is understood here as a political process invoking (a) the minimisation of conflict within society, (b) the common stakes in common solutions, while (c) acknowledging equality of participants’ identities in actualising them. This definition respects a balance of Habermas and Dewey’s public-private distinctions whilst acknowledging Locke, Mill, Tocqueville, Barker and Held’s
defence of the pursuit of a common good despite diversity and property ownership by individuals.¹¹

Assuming that democracy of information flow is the benign and desirable end of the spectrum of possibilities of existence in global information space, it is necessary to inquire what it is and how it is achievable. It is necessary to begin by unpacking the three key concepts intrinsic to the definition of democracy adopted above in order to break down the requirements of a strategy to achieve them. First, if democracy is to work as a common spatial system, interest conflict must be reduced to a least-disruptive level sufficient to enable democratic norms to work, be it elections, reasoned arguments, the law, or the exercise of time-mandated and popularly legitimated leadership. One needs to consider if every idea and report of interest articulation and problem representation must be heard at all levels of democratic participation before decision-making can be attempted. A directly related problem would be the accountable size of the participants: should they be listened to individually or by group, and if the latter, in what numbers, on what elocutionary standards, or standards of ‘expertness’? On a global scale, the magnified considerations of size and normativity of representation, the disposition of participants towards negotiation, and compromise, are especially relevant and pose a need for central arbitration and ordering if conflict is to be minimised. Hence it must be asked if the desirable representative category should be nation-states, regions, non-geographically-derived groups, or individuals.

The flip side of conflict of interests could just as easily be approached as the second aspect of operational democracy, namely, agreeing on a ‘common problem’

¹¹ See the extracted views of Locke, Barker, Lippmann and Mill on the advantages and pitfalls of liberal representative democracy in Utley and Maclure (1957); and in particular Mill (1904), especially Chapter VI "Of the Infirmities and Dangers to which Representative Government is Liable"(pp.103-124); and De
requiring the subordination of separate and individuated interests to certain overriding purposes. Aims, rational utility, and definitions of a public good, are all dependent to varying degrees on how participants perceive them according to location, socialisation, and ascriptive factors. Even the shaping of mindsets cannot be proportionately related to the diversity of socialising sources in terms of culture, prior identity, historical tendencies, climate, and physical geography. These psychological filters of problem comprehension will pose severe problems in terms of achieving a commonality of will and problem acknowledgement.

Approaching any consensus, whether on procedures for negotiation, or outlining the problem itself, will involve trials of constitutive identity and goals. The third aspect of democracy tries to satisfy this diversity of constitutive identities and goals of participants by recognising each as equal to begin with, but this in turn poses the perennial dilemma of choosing between procedural and substantive equality, since both meanings rarely coincide in constitutional and practical terms. John Rawls' theory of justice initially marginalised this question outside the confines of a nation-state. Subsequently, he tried accommodating his conception of a liberal democratic 'just state' to the rest of the world by constructing a minimalist scheme of coexistence he called the 'law of peoples'. This law defined the reciprocal acceptance of equality among 'well-ordered' peoples as a precursor to that between states. The main bases of this equality include mutual respect among free and independent peoples 'as organized by their governments'; the assumption of a 'duty of nonintervention' by them; as well as the

Tocqueville (1982, 55-77). David Held reiterates the same conditions in his proposition of 'cosmopolitan democracy'. (1995, 282-283)

12 A consistent caveat against internationalist projects since World War Two (Friedmann 1943, 163-191; Barnett 1997; Bellamy and Jones 2000, 207-214).

13 Mill, "Of True and False Democracy; Representation of All and Representation of the Majority Only." (1904, 125-154)

14 John Rawls initially regarded 'justice as fairness' within a liberal democracy as prior to and more important than that between states. Interstate matters can be sorted only according to a modified 'Original
observance of existing treaties and obligations, including basic human rights (Rawls 1993, 54-63). In this way, both liberal and non-liberal well-ordered states can coexist without a world democracy. The preservation of well-ordered peoples is a primary task of states. The secondary one is to bring all states to adhere to the law of peoples. In this regard,

[how to do this is a question of foreign policy; these things call for political wisdom, and success depends in part on luck. They are not matters to which political philosophy has much to add. (Rawls 1993, 73)

Attaining the operational conditions for the scale of workable global democracy is probably an insurmountable task, short of its imposition through a world empire. In sum, the key obstacles are: the difficulty of reaching consensus on size and form of representation; a minimal possibility of common problem recognition and choice of solution; and the difficulty of sustaining the equality of the participants through consensus-seeking.

Nevertheless, these criticisms of a global democratic solution for the complete elimination of a state of nature from global information space do provide my analysis with insights into what is required for managing conflicting discourses. The very notions of consensus and equality are themselves born of human conflict, and their resolution towards the democratic ideal, where possible, must lie in analysis of conflict within a structurally hostile environment (Davies 1980; Eckstein 1980). Towards this objective, the Hobbesian state of nature is a useful vehicle in the search for workable order, since the Hobbesian scheme also presupposes autonomous human agents generating a pre-social structure of conflict through antagonistic self-maximising behaviour. This behaviour leads to the search for security within community, and the articulation of a
scheme of multiple, sovereign groups of men.\textsuperscript{15} This will address the foundation of soft power as the protection and promotion of community. Additionally, in applying a Hobbesian analysis of human conflict, more caveats can reasonably be made about the futility of making a world democratic order an inflexible goal, if after all it cannot realistically be achieved. The next best solution might be found in organisational forms below the scale of a world state: a global information space where soft power is utilised in relations among sovereign states. After all, as was stated at the start of this section, the main problématique of global information space is to move interest plurality towards the condition of a liveable order, in whatever form.

To Hobbes, the fundamental goals of human existence would correspondingly be the issues over which men will fight over: ‘competition’, ‘diffidence’ and ‘glory’ (Hobbes 1929, 96, ch. XIII). ‘Competition’ is the aggressive striving for material gain, which in the informational state of nature would translate as the securing of orderly information flows as both a means for conditioning wealth-generating activities, and as an end in itself of desirable earthly existence. An ideology legitimating community and power is fundamental for man’s pursuit of a livelihood, and in post-1945 capitalism, positive socio-economic reports supporting or reinforcing a comfortable political and economic status quo would be equally beneficial. ‘Diffidence’ is a negative reason for fighting: in a state of nature, participants are blind to prospects of confidence and trust in daily tragedies of competitive violence to secure the first objective of acquisition. The perpetuity of power-based modus operandi and a vicious cycle of life-threatening violence are the outcome of this second reason. In informational terms, ideologies, or even rival expressions of news realities, often assert universal claims excluding and antagonising one another normatively. The third goal ‘glory’, refers to man’s need for

\textsuperscript{15} This justification for employing Hobbesian analysis is supplied by Navari (1978) and Forsyth (1979).
reputation or identity. It is a need for a sense of individual being and self-worth, and across time, an accumulated desire for friendship and popularity. Towards these ends, information flow becomes a resource for participants' competitive standing. World democracy would theoretically solve the war of all against all by ordering competition with norms and respect diversities of interests and strengths, whilst guaranteeing basic need fulfilment.

Hobbes of course never articulated explicit notions of democracy, but he argued for a government of laws through the erection of a sovereign as a focus of common authority through which all interest claims would be peacefully adjudicated. Hobbes also did allow for as many commonwealths to exist as necessary to allow man to escape the state of nature, and stopped short of advocating world government as a final solution to anarchy. Organising into commonwealths would be a first step towards goal fulfilment with minimal loss of life, material interests, reputation and so forth. Hostile diversities will have been reduced to tolerable jousts between a number of collective bodies of men, and this would be an inter-commonwealth (or interstate) state of nature. Measured against the democratic ideal postulated at the desirable end of the spectrum of global information space possibilities, organising social existence towards a world democracy would theoretically be a second more definite step towards eliminating any remnants of the state of nature between the collectives of men. But Hobbes argues that the interstate state of nature is sufficiently tolerable in its concurrent possibility for de facto peace through armed vigilance short of physical combat, and the ability of states to uphold industry and livelihood within frontiers (Hobbes 1929, 96, 98, 129, ch. XIII, XVII). At this point, the immediate desirability of a world democratic state weakens.
Organising for nationhood and statehood discursively could be seen as a primary securing of the relevant order, identity and community needs of mankind in global information space, and these correspond to the human preoccupation with competition for gain, glory and diffidence identified above. The arguments for nation-state discursive community can be waged two ways. Firstly, in the absence of a global democracy, national ideas defend highly differentiated local realities of order, identity and community against the potentially hegemonic manipulation of world public opinion. Secondly, national ideas sustain pre-existing or voluntarily chosen local modes of achieving the same three basic human needs. Building on these broad aims of creating a communal safe haven from an endless state of nature among individuals, three micro arguments follow: the nation-state is a security enclosure; it is a developmental (and materialist) community; and acts as an ethical community for individual fulfilment.

Taking the argument of a security enclosure first, discourse legitimates the use of monopolised force for the protection of a limited number of individuals. Here Hobbes and other contractarians articulated the ‘size principle’ of community: the joining together of numbers of individuals and small groups must be large enough in comparison with a commonly identified enemy as to allow security of the former to be obtained through deterrence (Hobbes 1929, 129, ch. XVII; 1978, 166-167, ch. V). Extrapolating this ideationally, discourse is strength in will when it appeals singularly to, or both, primordial loyalties and expedient historical logic to cement a necessary and sufficient unity for the goal of self-preservation. At the same time, discourse instils definitions of ‘us-versus-them’ and constitutes territorial and metaphysical inside/outside boundaries in politics, economics and culture. Defence of a local space within global information space’s vulnerability to power politics is necessarily an ideological and deliberate representation.

16 In the Hobbesian lexicon, a synonym for ‘states’, and possibly ‘nations’, according to the argument of
of ideas and events favouring one community over all others. Not surprisingly, in both peacetime socio-economic disturbances, and civil and international wars, nation-states resort to a clash of words and justifications in media forms prior to and during actual hostilities. The natural presumption made in this thesis and elsewhere is that politics operates first in the minds of humanity and hence in symbols (e.g. language, ideas and pictures). Ideas activate the defence or retreat from securing safety in human associations. Even in his time, Hobbes argued that transmissions and demonstration effects of proximate events, philosophies of politics, and past histories have had subversive impact against commonwealths:

(1) [On the demonstration effect of political betterment:]

[A]s False Doctrine, so also often-times the Example of different Government in a neighbouring Nation, disposeth men to alteration of the forme already setled...So also the lesser Cities of Greece, were continually disturbed, with seditions of the Aristocraticall, and Democraticall factions; one part of almost every Common­wealth, desiring to imitate the Lacedaemonians; the other the Athenians...For the constitution of man’s nature, is of it selfe subject to desire novelty; when therefore they are provoked to the same by the neighbourhood also of those that have been enriched by it, it is almost impossible for them not to be content with those that solicit them to change; and love the first beginnings though they be grieved with the continuance of disorder; like hot blouds, that having gotten the itch, tear themselves with their own nayles, till they can endure the smart no longer.

(2) [On subversion by media:]

[M]en have undertaken to kill their Kings, because Greek and Latine writers in their books and discourses of Policy, make it lawfull and laudable, for any man so to do; provided before he do it, he call him Tyrant...From the same books, they that live under a Monarch conceive an opinion, that the Subjects in a Popular Common-wealth enjoy Liberty; but that in a Monarchy they are all Slaves. I say, they that live under a Monarchy conceive such an opinion; not they that live under a Popular Government: for they find no such matter...I cannot imagine, how anything can be more prejudiciall to a Monarchy, than the allowing of such books to be publickely read, without present applying such correctives of discreet Masters, as are fit to take away their Venime.17

With these warnings, Hobbes suggests not merely censorship of information as a foreign and defence policy, but a reasoned defence of raison d’état in terms of the qualities of a

Canovan (1996).
united commonwealth delivering its self-protection through self-policing obedience. One might label Hobbes as a progenitor of the international power of information.

It is also noticeable that the argument for security did not distinguish nation and state for both concepts share common premises in discursively uniting individuals in common security, and this overlap applies all the more when the argument for a national developmental community is attended to. In this usage, 'developmental' refers to economic development associated with the process identified in Chapter 2 as 'modernization', of which the expansion of information is part. Especially after 1945, modernization became the dominant pattern of newly independent nation-states although its arrival in Europe and the Americas occurred earlier. Prior to modern industrial society, that is, in agrarian society, a semblance of statehood was already functioning in varying degrees of centralisation and decentralisation as monarchies and feudal networks. Agrarian society did not require the vast mobilisation and congruence of culture and polity: economy and life rituals could be subsistent, discrete and flexible according to individual, immediate family and tribal needs. Furthermore, elites had neither the incentive nor the will strictly to circumscribe or include the semi-literate and illiterate masses in power sharing, nor did the latter desire to (Gellner 1983, 8-18; Crone 1989, ch. 2-5). It was the onset of industrial methods and its attendant modes of living and occupation that generated new discursive community.

The nation arose out of the imperative to homogenise people culturally for employment in a new social milieu of purposive regular production in which worldviews of systematicity, the regimentation of advantage, and large scale differentiated skill education were commonplace (Gellner 1983, 35-57, 140-141). Mass education, and hence mass socialisation, of individuals were instituted to produce community-internalising
selves dependent on access to a high culture of production for material exchange, and a collective identity moulded to suit states administering the complex social infrastructure of need-provision (e.g. welfare, schools, hospitals, citizenship responsibilities). Progress towards the modern industrial community was accelerated by print capitalism, which as Habermas pointed out, was a necessary facilitator of market operations across geographical distance. Benedict Anderson has taken the impact of print capitalism further, arguing as Innis has done (Innis 1972), that on one level, printed language cheaply and rapidly disseminated a sense of associational cultural ontology and historical time to readers with the appropriate linguistic ability (B. Anderson 1991, ch. 2-3). On a secondary level, print languages created ‘unified fields of exchange and communication’ by fixing standardisation of language above regional and village-level vernaculars, and below the elite languages of the hitherto feudal rulers. The book and newspaper started this, only to be amplified by radio and television onwards.

With access to common literature in common language, new socio-economic elites were formed, uniting old and new, and enfranchising territorial inhabitants into the consciousness of nation-states as imagined, sovereign communities (B. Anderson 1991, 205-206). This argument for nation-states as units of development is accentuated and valued in global information space, where capitalist practices of MNC investment and trade depend on, and investigate, economic conditions through information instruments such as the IMF, private consultancy reports and other products of the political economy knowledge structure. In short, to paraphrase some business writers, the competitive advantage of workers in global capitalism requires ‘nation-states’ as economic guarantors, and corporatist structures of mediation between local welfare and mobile investments.
The third micro-argument, the ethical, flows partly from the first two: the nation-state delivers physical security and acts as a promoter and shelter for wealth-generation, thereby demanding reciprocal allegiance from its citizens. This is a conception of material ethical good satisfying the gain and assurance of possession concerns in a state of nature. This leaves the aspiration to ‘reputation’ or the search for identity to be addressed in the ethical notion of the nation-state as community. The source of the ethics of identity begins with the fundamental relationship between the individual and the community.

For the individual existing under natural law, freedom in both positive and negative senses, plus equality and justice, comprise his self-worth. Existing alone, in relation to similarly atomistic individuals, appears theoretically ideal in allowing unfettered pursuit of the goals of self-worth. In practice, freedom, equality and justice contradict one another to the extent that the individual cannot achieve any of them in any degree. This is because there is no arbiter and no framework for adjudicating conflicts arising from atomistic actions without regard for fellowship; natural law justifies every individual authoring every action maximally, allowing inequalities of power to be decisive. However, within a community, a willed association of individuals interested in joint guarantees of self-worth forms the normative basis of existence (Herder 1969, 304-311, bk. VIII, ch. IV-V). Freedom is secured through reciprocal respect, familiarity, priority of mutual assistance over outsiders, and the possibility of realising ambitions that cannot cause grievous harm to others. Equality is secured through implicit and explicit membership rights and duties, while justice is served through mutual agreement on rights, wrongs and procedures of pacific arbitration. Individual identity is thus anchored in a community because the latter is a discourse of privileges and corresponding duties marking itself out to be unique (Walzer 1983, ch. 2; 1994, ch. 4-5; Sandel 1992; C.

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18 A common assumption from Rousseau through Rawls.
Taylor 1992). This is a communitarian-cum-ethical particularistic claim that undergirds the principle of nationality by treating the ‘thick’ value of preferential treatment by a bounded group as moral existence. (D. Miller 1997, 49-80)

To sum up, the Hobbesian-derived micro-arguments for establishing an ideational safe haven from the state of nature support nation-state formation discursively in terms of defining security/order, fulfilling development needs, and enveloping individual identity within a communitarian one. Ironically, nation-state discourses mitigate the informational state of nature in so far as they defend a somewhat tolerable version of anarchical international relations. The discursive value of the nation-state in fact fulfils, in a minimalist way, the political definition of democracy set out at the start of this section. A nation-state reduces parochial interest conflict among individuals by uniting them in national collectives aimed at common problem solving. Additionally, the individual’s desire for equality is safeguarded by the contracting into community. This universal preference for an imperfect, minimalist and democratic plurality of sovereign, equal nation-states seems to have withstood two world wars and decolonisation without any credible alternative transnational lobby working towards a world democratic state.

When globalization became an acknowledged phenomenon by the 1990s, some scholars (L. H. Miller 1985; Albrow 1996; Ohmae 1996) argued that it was time to recognise that the nation-state had become technically and normatively incompetent in dealing with the distributive justice of functional interdependence arising out of globalization. Hence there existed a need to think seriously about global democratic governance. Such a call however assumes that political theory can apply internationally and globally without prefixes. But in reality, global democratic governance may be no
more substantial than a discourse of domination whitewashed as conscientious world
public opinion carried through global information space on an issue-specific basis.

And although the Hobbesian scheme has helped analysis by treating the ‘Other’ in
terms of rival nation-states mounting discourses of domination against fellow units, the
same pro-national community arguments (i.e. securing order, and fulfilling both
development and individual identity needs) can also be extended in part to non-state
communities within global information space. Whether an MNC, or the average human
rights NGO can claim communitarian allegiance on par with the nation-state is largely a
theoretical possibility, relatively under-examined by empirical studies. Nevertheless, in
cases where national allegiances exhibit indecision or suffer weak legitimacy, non-state
discourses do claim communitarian appeal. Such is the case with the perceived sheltering
and welfare provision capabilities of human rights NGOs in Chile in the 1970s and 1980s,
and in Afghanistan and East Timor in the 1990s. While NGOs do not have the military
power to create community, they possess the flexible skills of presenting mediatory
credentials, and appealing to victims and bystanders for humanitarian protection against
localised and global ‘states of nature’. Only after allegiances are realigned by non-state
discourses, the requisite hard power can be induced into play through the UN, the US,
or other sympathetic states, so as to make territorial community coexistent with discursive
community. This has happened in numerous UN peacekeeping operations in East Timor,
Bosnia, and in human rights scrutiny across borders, as in Chile (Chapter 6). These non-
state discourses matter to foreign policy because they challenge its primacy.

Global information space thus seems destined to be an unending arena of struggle
where ideas triumph when they have proved themselves performatively and persistently
in fulfilling basic human needs. World public opinion, as it has been argued previously, operates in the realm of circumstance tied to locality and diversity of social formations, yet is ironically clouded by its own subjective idealism. In this environment, the propaganda of the nation-state, or communitarian, discourse normatively entails the soft power instrument of foreign policy.

3.5 Soft Power as Long-Term Propaganda of Community Discourse

The communitarian discursive defence of a nation-state begins with foreign policy, which at its heart, is a common practice of delineating and managing the inside-outside territorial dichotomy. The inside manifests stable community, order and identity while the outside must either be fought, ameliorated or convinced into favouring the community's cause. Foreign policy has its many power instruments ranging from the diplomatic, military, economic, covert and propagandistic, which have been employed in varying combinations throughout the evolution of international relations with its Westphalian trappings. With the advent of information globalization precipitating a global information space by the 1990s, the Hobbesian dichotomy referred to earlier between hard and soft power has become accentuated with the latter gaining equal if not preceding presence in relation to events.

Soft power is that entire range of policy options covering government-linked academic statements, NGO declarations, official propaganda, idea-dominance in international regimes to 'cultural imperialism'. It is co-optive power, or the ability to attract support through idea appeal, to get others to 'want what you want'.\textsuperscript{20} Although Nye publicised the term in the 1990s, the range of complementary dimensions he cites —

\textsuperscript{19} This is consistent with the cautionary comment of globalization theorist Scholte (2000). Chapter 4 will explain that non-state actors impact foreign policies indirectly through discourses.
American democratic freedoms, popular culture, intellectual resources, technology, educational institutions, international institutions committed to certain principles of modus operandi, and military applications of information disclosure — have been practised whenever politics involved appeals to superior reason, or physical force mobilised for the sake of shared moral principles (Nye Jr. 1990a, 29-34; 1990b, 167-170; Nye Jr. and Owens 1996, 29-30; Axworthy 1997, 185-196). This was the case with Socratic Athens, and the actions during the Peloponnesian War as recorded by Thucydides. An ancient Chinese tract on military strategy listed as a foremost priority the psychological manoeuvring against enemy plans with the object of acquiring physical infrastructure intact and bloodlessly.21 As Habermas’ history of the public sphere shows, the public earned its existence through the demand for information and its circulation against the monarchic monopoly of authority. Not surprisingly, just as the café societies, merchants, artists and workers gravitated towards liberalism, democracy and other Enlightenment and twentieth century mass ideologies against royal absolutism, the fifteenth and sixteenth century monarchs, as forerunners of secular popular government, had previously struggled to invoke worldly supremacy as a moral standard on the bases of portraying excesses of papal overlordship in temporal matters (Ullman 1970, 136-158). In each struggle for spatial legitimacy, ideas and their transmission affected an audience or an enemy through changes to power meanings favouring their initiator.

Bearing in mind how foreign policy originated, the ideational appeal of soft power and the instances of deployment in contextual ‘common causes’, it is evident that soft power foreign policy inheres within social structure and community where the latter is


21 Sun Tzu’s Chapter I (Estimates) of The Art of War deals with the importance of moral synergy of a sovereign state in meeting conflict from outside. Chapter III (Offensive Strategy) calls for taking a target state ‘intact’ by deploying non-war strategies to fracture its plans and alliances. (1971)
indistinguishable from the former. Ideas become power when they form, or are demonstrated, in a community that appear to solve the basic order, identity and community problématiques stemming from a state of nature. This is directly related to the communitarian arguments of the last section: the operation of a need-satisfying nation-state as a repository of a successful idea of organising living together, resource utilisation and so on. Such a generic idea can spawn related ideas in the social sciences, politics, economics or ideologies which other aspiring communities-to-be (e.g. separatists, anti-colonialists, idealists), rival nation-states, or their individual constituents might find worthwhile emulating. This is the Weberian notion of prestige abroad arising naturally from the demonstrable cohesion and augmentation of state monopolies of power at home (Weber 1948, 159-160). The flow, or deliberate projection, of prestigious ideas externally could take the following forms: specific nationally-targeted propaganda missions; attempts to institutionalise modus operandi and values as implicit and explicit norms and rules in news patterns; IT interface and presentational formats (e.g. Internet protocols, and ‘sound byte’ reporting of wars etc.); or in the authoring of charters of international regimes. Hence soft power reveals two forms: national prestige, and the external institutional type, structural power. The latter may be understood as Strange (1994, 24-25) intended it to be, the power to predetermine outcomes of others and collective actions to the wielder’s benefit.

In its essence, soft power is the long-term propaganda of community discourse. The nation-state as a community unto itself escaping an ungovernable state of nature generates its own system of subjective collective meaning in the Foucaultian sense. This discourse is propaganda in two ways. Firstly, both propaganda and discourse assume ‘that the world is completely caused but that it is only partly predictable.’ Secondly, discursive community is realisable only through changes to social attitudes effected by adjusting the
symbols that orientate them (Lasswell 1995; Lippmann 1925, 40-74; Lumley 1933, 21-44). Propaganda, as defined in Chapter 2, is the short term and specific influencing of social action by affecting the thought and decision processes of men through information manipulation and presentation. Operationally, soft power defines itself as long-term propaganda, which becomes obvious through its three employment characteristics.

Firstly, the communitarian basis of soft power poses the question of how to ‘package’ a way of life in the best possible light whilst minimising its shortcomings. In Nye and Owens’ understanding, for example, American liberal democracy’s appeal has been increasingly endangered by the growing international perception of America as a society riven by crime, violence, drug abuse, racial tension, family breakdown, fiscal irresponsibility, political gridlock, and increasingly acrimonious political discourse in which extreme points of view make the biggest headlines. (Nye Jr. and Owens 1996, 36)

This cuts to the fundamental strategic choice: how can the virtues of individual freedoms, benign ‘check-and-balance’ government and artistic creativity from Leonard Bernstein to Stanley Kubrick be promoted as American normative visions to non-American and non-western societies? World public opinion on good governance theoretically cannot be orchestrated in American favour if there are too many discordant signals and indices, producing a fractured image of ‘American ideology’. Nye calls this the national credibility criterion (Nye Jr. 1999a). Yet recent Cold War history showed that this is relative: the Soviet bloc provoked American soft power strategies which emphasised a strongly contrasted western freedom, consumerism and ‘objective truth conditions’ against the Soviet bloc’s extremes of totalitarian myth-making and oppression.

Furthermore, the bipolar resilience of superpower rivalry ideologically coded the various

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22 Linebarger’s definition (1948) cited in Whitaker Jr. (1960, 5).
23 Refer to contributions by Benton, Ratcliffe, Berding, Truman and Eisenhower in Whitaker Jr. (1960). See also Tuch (1990, 15-34).
shades of then pseudo-liberal democratic South Korea, Taiwan, Philippines, Thailand, Singapore and other Latin American authoritarianisms into a single ‘Free World.’ The USSR ran for a while a systematic propaganda offensive drawing on the universality of Marxism-Leninism encompassing Albania to China until fissures appeared through official and unofficial statements and reports of nationalist dissidence from then-Yugoslavia, Romania, Poland, Hungary and Maoism in China. Events such as the 1956 Hungarian Revolt and 1968 ‘Prague Spring’ openly gave the lie to utopia under Soviet-style governance. Perhaps the superpowers can be faulted for trying to force communitarian diversity into straightjacketed global ideological dichotomy, but the schism between representing ideal images to investors, potentially friendly audiences and governmental detractors on the one hand, and the often less-controllable social currents on the ground, remains and is intensified by information globalization penetrating time and space boundaries.

Nevertheless, freed of Cold War strictures beginning in the 1990s, soft power is almost fully liberated in its range of diplomatic possibilities in conditions of ideological flux, globalized capitalism and global media space. The worldwide debate on defeating terrorism in the wake of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks also underscores the absence of a credible and progressive Islamic state model among Muslim populations. Some commentators suggest that discouraging would-be recruits from Osama bin Laden’s cause would be for an Arab-Islamic state to demonstrate that it can deliver an attractive combination of domestic capability for peaceful political change, along with the delivery of advancing standards of living (Friedman 2001). As the case studies of Singapore and Chile will show, each national image has to be convincing enough to resonate with audiences abroad for any chance of successful foreign policy steering. Theoretically, a
neat corporatist nation-state arrangement reducing large-scale social dissent for the sake of a higher common national branding might be the ideal base for propaganda strategy.

Secondly, a direct implication of organising for soft power is to acknowledge the public omnidirectionality of audiences. The propaganda of communitarian discourse in global information space has to assume that the contested but nevertheless emotionally-appealing notion of 'national interest' must resonate domestically and be harmonised globally if it is to have any credibility.\textsuperscript{24} Successful propaganda always aspires to the nobility of truth claims regardless of the morality of policymakers' motivations, and this is more so today than in the early stages of total war (1914-18) when domestic and world public opinion could easily be swayed through censoring limited print, telegraph and radio communication outlets. Global information space, as an implication of information globalization, emancipates more non-state and new state actors onto a global arena of politics today because of spatial control defying technology, economics and geopolitical fluidity. The onus is more on nation-states to attract or counter world public opinion vis-à-vis their causes with consistent and believable information streams.

Thirdly, the need for consistency and credibility in information supply (Nye Jr. 1999a) requires foreign policy practitioners to tap unorthodox strategies for getting their message across as a precondition of action, or inaction, as it may be the case when domestic troubles prompt intense scrutiny abroad. Once again the experience of Cold War political warfare prompts the way: foreign policy needs to be coordinated across economic, cultural, diplomatic and military departments so as to speak and act with 'one voice and one action'; world and domestic public opinion need to be converted through particular images and arguments; the man-in-the-street must be educated into pulling his
weight for a national effort; and finally particular media forms and ownerships must be adapted to communitarian purposes (Kintner and Kornfeder 1963, 281-294; Clews 1964, 11-30, 69-87; Tuch 1990, 4-5, 39-49; Lasswell 1933). Discourses of nationalism, liberalism and socialism have historically begun this way and have in some tragic cases become incompetently intertwined and vitiated by excessive physical force as imperialism, Nazism, communism and Serbian fascism have shown in the twentieth century. There is no guarantee that the latter will not recur in the era of global information space, as soft power can easily be diluted by hard power in the hands of insensitive leaders. Nevertheless, the costs of exercising hard power without the complementarity of soft power will be staggering when reactionary forms of hard power arise in response. Witness the frequency with which multilateral humanitarian interventions in the Balkans and the Middle East in the 1990s run into opposition from neighbouring states, resistance on the ground, and lack of great power support after a fait accompli.

What the foreign policy-maker needs to be able to do sensitively, is to wield a discursive power that legitimates and resonates with a perceivable subjective reality. There can be no definite quantitative indicator of success, except perhaps in international voting forums. Foreign policy goals are more tangibly accomplished when coalitions of the convinced and abstained are favourable in size to one’s cause, or large enough to frustrate large scale anti-national measures such as imposed international legal norms, diplomatic boycotts, economic sanctions, and military intervention. A caveat needs adding at this point, that non-state actors must be taken into account in any application of soft power because of their ability to use the same, except in the first characteristic of soft power — packaging national community — where they will need states’ collaboration if it is to be done. As will be elaborated in Chapter 4, NGOs and individuals (such as

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24 A contemporary manifestation of this is the rising obsession with public relations strategies in foreign
human rights victims) act on the conscience principle of shaming, or lobbying, for change to state practices that they regard as undesirable. It is rare that they seek explicit overthrow of governments. The activities of shaming and lobbying rely on circulating partial and impartial information as widely as possible. In this way, they function in the age of satellite television and Internet by reaching omnidirectional audiences with ideas that must be credible in opposition to the foreign or domestic policies they seek to change. In these latter aspects, non-state actors have equal standing with bureaucrats within soft power foreign policy.

Tentatively, a spectrum of soft power results can be posited. On the weaker end, academic and purely international elite debates result in stalemate with little policy impact. In the middle, global non-state-actor-inclusive regimes and networks are negotiated to accommodate non-uniform agendas and particularistic interest aggregation. At the other extreme, a national soft power becomes globalized to the extent that total political hegemony results through the complete conversion of opinion at all levels of social existence to a particular cause. This becomes the cultural imperialism of one community.25 This is represented in Figure 2 below.

Figure 2: Soft Power Spectrum

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weak</th>
<th>Strong</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elite and academic debates</td>
<td>Regimes and policy networks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.6 Survival in Global Information Space

In this Chapter, the implications of information globalization have been elaborated in terms of globally enlarged spatial accountability. Drawing upon ICT implications,
global capitalist dynamics, and post-Cold War geopolitical fluidity, analysis of spaces for political action have revealed that a global information space has existed from the 1990s onwards. This space is both polycentric and public in character, and a common site of struggles for definitions of order, community and identity. But unlike a national public sphere, there is no central reference point for governance. Global information space, as a public space, is connected with the operation of world public opinion, which, like its national parallel, is a product of unpredictable power politics. However, in a world context, opinion emanates from nation-states and non-state actors alike, focussed upon selectively defined common consequences. World public opinion has been argued to be potentially unrepresentative, being mostly the subjective creation of articulate actors operating without representative mechanisms.

Given its vulnerability to power discourses of world opinion, global information space is similar to a Hobbesian state of nature within which the nation and its co-referent, the state, necessarily assume roles as containers and guardians of the basic order, community and identity goals of mankind. The nation-state is a normative community by default in the absence of a world democratic state. Nation-states are also discursive communities as they define human well-being within them, and simultaneously keep at bay the threat of anarchy from outside. Discourse as power simultaneously legitimates the nation-state in the eyes of its citizens, rival nation-states and non-state actors. The latter however have the partial potential of discursively challenging national allegiances because they can also offer solutions to developmental and identity issues. In this way, discourse can either delineate or confuse domestic and foreign policy.

\[25\] Definition from Morgenthau (1950, 40). Similar understandings of cultural imperialism are shared by scholars such as Thornton (1980), Tomlinson (1991) and Said (1993).
Foreign policy traditionally has a wide range of hard and soft power instruments at its disposal to navigate the global state of nature, but given the political uncertainties of opinion presaging action in global information space, soft power as the long-term propaganda of community discourse, assumes equal importance to hard power. Soft power's three operational features – of promoting coherent attractiveness of national community, omnidirectionality of audiences, and the need for consistency and credibility of information supply – point to a spectrum of possibilities of foreign policy outcomes ranging from minimal impact elite stalemates of opinion to total conversion to one's cause through cultural imperialism. Rendering concrete the operation of soft power through foreign policy is the subject of the next chapter.
CHAPTER 4
SOFT POWER IN FOREIGN POLICY

4.1 Introduction: Foreign Policy as a Compass, Information as Magnetic Force

As has been widely argued, foreign policy is composed of processes of framing and pursuing the interests of a nation-state beyond its borders. In its scope, it links domestic and external spheres of politics, but the compass of action is always directed towards the 'foreign', which can be identified as a negative image of the value of national statehood. The magnetic needle of the compass is the national interest and points the direction and modality of instrument and strategy for the government. This compass metaphor is useful in illuminating the 'how' and 'why' of national interest directing foreign policy at any given moment in time.

Just as the magnetic needle on the compass can be deflected randomly according to the varying and permanent presences of metallic and other magnetic objects, foreign policy can just as easily be swayed by new forces of technology, changing military profiles, trade in commodities, neighbours' political attitudes, and ideas. The latter factors act on the social and spatial context in which the compass of foreign policy is located, thereby affecting the perceived direction of the national interest. Naturally, questions of foreign policy 'agency' arise against the 'structure' of the seemingly objective magnetic forces. This is the subject of this Chapter: how will foreign policy operate when information acts as a magnetic force across the domestic-external boundary? This is a salient question under the conditions of nation-states operating in a global information space. It is proposed to expedite this task by arguing that the three characteristics of soft power elaborated in Chapter 3 operate in two representative sets of foreign policy processes adapted from the FPA literature. They are: the
idea of leadership in foreign policy, which will develop the theoretical suffixes ‘inside-out’ and ‘outside-in’; and the politics of policy-making, which will be amended as the ‘intermestic politics of foreign policy’ to incorporate the intrusiveness of other transnational non-state political actors due to globalization. As stated in Chapter 1, these two sets are chosen on three assumptions linked to the larger issue setting of global information space, namely:

(1) The hypothesis must accommodate and adapt to the contemporary porosity of policy-making and diplomacy in the context of multidimensional information flow.

(2) The hypothesis must be able to elaborate the ‘publicness’ of foreign policy-making in terms of the participation of increased numbers of players within and outside governments, whether as policy initiators or feedback agents.

(3) The hypothesis must accept that the onus of defending identity and community lies intellectually with policy-making and policy-makers.

These will be contextually reiterated at the relevant sections of this Chapter.

4.2 Leadership in Foreign Policy

In the context of boundary fluidity, porosity and information flow, the leadership component in foreign policy is pertinent for study as a conduit for soft power projection in terms of representing holistic causes in the midst of the global discursive cacophony. Defining a political leader is to define a clear focal point: someone elected or appointed to head a party, government organ, or the entire nation-state itself. He or she is simultaneously the symbolic head of a number of people contracting to form the body politic. The leader (or decision-maker) in foreign policy is no less involved in politics. George Modelski’s ‘theory of foreign policy’ ascribes an important role to the foreign policy leader in terms of his or her

...ability to act and their responsibility for acting ‘on behalf’ of their community. One community, and the state into which it is organized, cannot have more than one set of policy-makers who speak and act on its behalf; the availability of policy-makers is the
distinguishing mark of a community organized for foreign policy purposes, a community organized into a state. (Modelski 1962, 4)

International relations since Thucydides has essentially been a game played among represented groups, although from the mid-twentieth century onwards, non-state actors have crowded onto the same arena. Each representative must therefore be a leader in performative terms of aggregating, articulating and pursuing agendas for the well being of the community of followers. The term ‘foreign policy leader’ refers generically to the policy-making elite: the Head of State (where applicable), the Head of Government, the foreign minister and his immediate deputies, as well as persons intimately connected to all of the preceding by bureaucratic, political or nationalistic ties. These general observations on foreign policy leadership supply a setting that is clearly compatible with the three characteristics of soft power enumerated in Chapter 3: the reliance upon communitarian credibility at home, omnidirectional audiences for foreign policy, and the demands for presentational competence in information concerning foreign affairs and national stability.

The foreign policy leader’s forte lies in his representational power and authority derived jointly, democratically or otherwise, from his community (Burns 1979; George 1980; Caldwell and McKeown 1993). Representation involves discursive power in the sense of defining the short and long-term national interest, meeting the demands, and corresponding strategies of a crisis situation, and above all, in the abstract but nevertheless identity-relevant sense of national dignity. By some accounts, all these are collectively classed as ‘raison d'état’ but this term is inadequate in elaborating personal leadership as a critical point of soft power emission. Operating in global information space means that the foreign policy leader is permanently a world public actor, a natural defender of discursive community, and a processor of inflows of information. He decides whether these inflows constitute a threat to
the symbolic enclosures of nationhood. Due to the tendency for contemporary foreign affairs to be a conflation of multiple and indivisible issue-areas, unlike most domestic policy debates (Rosenau 1967, 39-50; Waltz 1967, 283-293), the leader is apt to employ all the intellectual resources he can muster to frame the interests, self-worth, the necessity of sacrifice, and bold initiative required of his national audience. As far as possible, he has to lead according to his own vision of a future. Furthermore, given the omnidirectionality of discursive power in a globally-mediated world, the leader has also got to consider moderating or incorporating messages for hostile and neutral world audiences.

To adapt Robert Jervis, the leader is a significant point for issuing the signals and indices of foreign policy activity. Signals are 'statements or actions the meanings of which are established by tacit or explicit understandings among the actors'; hence they are information transmissions. Indices, in contrast, 'are statements or actions that carry some inherent evidence that the image projected is correct because they are believed to be inextricably linked to the actor's capability or intentions.' (Jervis 1989, 4-32) According to the information flow concept in Figure 1 (Chapter 2), signals and indices are most likely issued at source. Hence the leader is also partly responsible for any accurate perception or misperception of adversaries' and allies' foreign policy situations along components of the flow, leading up to nationally-desirable or undesirable outcomes for the short and long term. Although the study of foreign policy leadership employs a wide range of angles in explaining causality and expression of decisions, the purpose here is to cull selectively from pre-existing literature the operational aspects of running a soft power foreign policy. Being concerned

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1 On the privileging of the leader as issuer of signals and indices, see Jervis' Chapter 4 'Signals and Lies'. The same assumption of the leader as issuer of signals and indices is made by Hermann (1993).
2 This view is shared by Henry Kissinger. See Stephen Grabaud's intellectual biography of him. (1974, 10-12)
with frontier management, leadership in foreign policy can be dichotomised into 'inside-out' strategies based on domestic sources, and 'outside-in' strategies based on the globalized sources of soft power.

4.2.1 Leadership Inside-Out

Just as 'foreign policy' exists on the assumption that the components of a nation-state are united in certain kinds of allegiance, the leader who wishes to wield soft power effectively needs a coherent polity backing him. Foreign policy is, of course, dependent on the interchangeability of hard strengths and constraints ranging from territorial size to material resources. However, when soft power is involved, a coherent polity can be built or weakened by the degree of availability of leadership intelligence, foresight, the cultures of both elite and public opinion, and congenial leader-follower relations, along with its social, economic, political and bureaucratic performance at any given moment in time. In short, the latter are the unquantifiable humano-philosophical factors that constitute the basis of diplomacy as attraction to one's ideas (Nye Jr. 1990b, 166). Due to its communitarian foundations as elaborated in Chapter 3, soft power is charged and re-charged from a leadership's domestic arena prior to outward projection. It is the task of this section to elaborate how these humano-philosophical factors contribute to the generation of ideational strengths domestically, for use abroad.

Firstly, leadership as a social practice draws its sustenance from culture and socialisation factors (Burns 1979, 49-137; George 1980, 4-12). Culture can simply be understood as a particular set of beliefs, habits and traditions informing modes of life persisting through time. Socialisation comprises agents (e.g. teachers, bureaucrats,
counsellors, politicians, parents) and processes (education, punitive learning, rule-following, parental influences etc.) of transmitting culture from the old to the young within the population. While it is doubtful that the strains of culture can be scientifically analysed, it is widely acknowledged that the cultural beliefs and practices of a people can be deliberately formed through nationalism foisted downwards through an elite consensus, or spontaneously moulded, and reinforced through common historical experiences of social tumult and triumph (Steiner 1983, 373-412; Walker 1990, 11-13). Studies of political leadership and diplomacy have drawn on the psychic and philosophical repository of communities for creating causality in leader-follower relationships of attraction. In this way, cultural symbols, not excluding myths, recurrent themes, values, even fantasies and other popular imaginations, serve as a ready repository of resources for leaders to work up a following (Mazlish 1990, 253-266).³

Using cultural explanations, one might argue that American leaders draw on the heritage of their War of Independence and the Lincolnian ideals to push for neo-liberal national regimes globally, or that there is a French sense of great power grandeur driven by the echoes of 1789, Napoleon, and de Gaulle. Similarly, in dealings with newly emergent nation-states and powers such as China, Egypt, India, and Indonesia, a certain amount of shared anti-western, and anti-capitalist, radicalism is to be expected at some point in their dealings with other state representatives and non-state actors at diplomatic forums. It is the personnel driving foreign policy who would project their psychological experience of history. Variations of historical-national traits manifest in foreign policies according to other equally dependent variables such as innate leadership personalities, their adolescent experiences, extent of education, the openness and accountability of their governmental systems and so

³ See also Burns on 'transformational' and 'transactional' leadership (1979, ch. 6-14).
on. Some leaders may latch on to a messianic philosophy in order to propagate soft power first at home, then abroad (e.g. communism). Others such as Castro, Kim Il Sung, Sukarno, Ho Chi Minh and Zhou Enlai may simply have been ‘schooled’ in the university of revolutionary and economic upheaval into a transnational cohort who are susceptible to sharing one of their own’s anti-imperialist ideas. Witness the radical themes of sections of the Non-aligned Movement in the 1960s for redistributing international economic and information flows. Other contemporary examples of soft power leaders reveal that regional, passive, or less-ideological characteristics can also serve foreign policy goals: Presidents Mandela (South Africa) and Havel (Czech Republic) offer themselves as international ‘voices’ of suppressed human rights and peace mediators on the basis that they have once been leaders of the oppressed in their countries; alternatively, the joint leadership of US, Japanese, Canadian, and increasingly, Singaporean diplomats in promoting rapid trade liberalisation in the Asia-Pacific region stems from their countries’ common recent experiences as pro-regime free-traders.

Secondly, if leadership is to be exercised in terms of a convincing projection of a model society and organisational showcase abroad for economic and security ends, then the burden of responsibility must weigh upon the unity of elites and masses alike, however ordered. Since antiquity, kings and elite rulers of empires and nation-states have asserted tributary claims, moral, cultural and military superiority on the basis of physical displays and assertions of grandeur. Examples include the Socratic assertion that principles of virtuosity and right living were limited only to Hellenes guided by philosopher kings (Plato 1987, 198-199, pt. VI, bk V), the Roman imperium’s presumption of natural colonial administration of inferior peoples from a self-regarding centre, or the Chinese ‘celestial’ empire’s political
cosmology of claiming the ‘mandate of heaven’ for its Emperor. In each case, the metropolitan civilisation used a combination of coercion, through display of superior military power, and holistic cultural appeal transmitted through law, art and writing to develop a suzerain system of relations between superior and subordinate proto-state communities. In other words, each metropolitan civilisation incorporated satellite entities into a distinct worldview of hierarchical relations. In Europe, this pattern of thinking persisted into the Middle Ages despite the decline of Rome. In fact the ‘Barbarian’ Goths, Vandals and Franks copied Roman laws and government practices while encamped within and around the militarily moribund empire and pressuring it politically (Moss 1935, 64-71). In their time, the medieval forerunners of contemporary political theory generally regarded the Church as the repository of soft power sanctioned by God, but they disagreed over whether it covered both temporal and spiritual matters spatially. The medievals also derived ‘corporation theory’, or the idea that the temporal ideal of government was one of a functionally-complemented, consent-based, and collectively self-governing body politic (Marsilius 1980, 15-18, 51-55, dis. I, ch. V, XIII). A majority of these philosophers did so for the purpose of secularising monarchic authority as the upholder of territorial organisations of ‘the good life’. This paved the way politically for the principle of equal procedural sovereignty marked by the Peace of Westphalia 1648.

In the contemporary world, one finds echoes of a cohesive framework of government-society relations serving as a source of extra-national power of attraction in the ‘mission civilisatrice’ of late European imperialism, the Marxist-Leninist ideology, and in the promotion of American-style liberal democracy and modernization in the Third World especially between the 1950s and the 1970s. Unlike the post-Cold War period, these attempts
at soft power were all heavily interfered with, although some might argue 'complemented', by the use of force from gunboat diplomacy, military advisors and bases, to transnational domestic subversion networks (e.g. communist underground cells and CIA 'black operations'). Liberated and active soft power today is unique in that there is vastly less backing for it by hard power. The transnational attraction of the 'Third Way' around the turn of the last century, expressed as modernised, globalization-acclimatised social democracy is, for example, not borne by gunboats but by images of President Clinton, Prime Minister Blair and Chancellor Schroeder delivering the socio-economic goals of the good life at home in terms of pruned social welfare, investment-friendly taxation, and an emphasis on centre-left community (Dionne Jr. 1998). Presidents Vicente Fox and Ricardo Lagos of Mexico and Chile\(^4\) respectively, are reported to be recent adherents to the 'Third Way' as well. Similarly, under the worldwide expansion of investment activities, scrutinising practices by international and non-state financial authorities are compelling nation-states to package themselves as coherent industrial or capital investment havens. Some states have resorted to the art of 'branding' their images to attract investors (Kunczik 1997). In a way, all these developments re-embed leadership theory in considerations of the project of the corporatist state\(^5\) in modern political economy, and the stress on philosophical and social unity for the sake of attracting transnational business-driven development. Leaders who wield such corporatist soft power are likely to fuse academic and public relations qualities in their

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\(^4\) See references to Lagos in Chapter 6.

\(^5\) Although my usage of this term is not meant to recommend dictatorial modes of governance in pursuit of forging a cohesive base for foreign policy, theorists of the bureaucratic-authoritarian form of corporatism describe such a reality from Latin American cases (e.g. Argentina and Brazil) from the 1960s. Political regimes, captured by elites dependent upon foreign trade and investment, restructure domestic politics in such a way that democratic competition is 'disciplined' into regime-approved hierarchical channels of political communication. Potentially destabilising groups such as trade unions are all incorporated as part of the bureaucratic apparatus (O'Donnell 1979, 85-105).
diplomacy, or hire new kinds of professionals to perform information promotion tasks in the place of orthodox diplomats.

In one sense, the cultural and cohesive society elements of the humano-philosophical factors can be construed as the 'structure' from which leadership inside-out springs, hence the nominally independent 'agency' of leaders is another set of factors for consideration. Whilst distinguishing structure and agency is inherently difficult in sociological theory, as explained in Chapter 1, it can be asserted that leaders enjoy an independent source of power in so far as they exercise intrinsic talents and traits to secure a role conception matched to the political situation at hand (Kissinger 1969, 20-26; Walker 1983, 86-107). Leadership is fundamentally a leader-follower relationship. Henry Kissinger argues that it is 'the decisions...made by individuals who will be above all conscious of the seeming multiplicity of options,' (Kissinger 1969, 27) and this can be elaborated through three 'contemporary' types. First, a 'bureaucratic-pragmatic leadership' exists in the sense that the West exemplifies modernity in form: most recognised problems can be solved on a rational-technical basis and professions such as law and business are highly valued for their problem-solving expertise; furthermore, decisions are made and viewed administratively as bargaining and compromise between two positions of disagreement. There is a low appreciation of historical and national particularities. The pragmatism of this leadership type

...is based on the conviction that the context of events produces a solution[,] there is a tendency to await developments. The belief is prevalent that every problem will yield if attacked with sufficient energy...Problems are segmented into constituent elements, each of which is dealt with by experts in the special difficulty it involves. (Kissinger 1969, 29)

The second type, the ideological, depends on the worldview and doctrinal properties of an ideology for guidance in foreign policy. For Kissinger, communism typified this model.
Marxism-Leninism filtered truth for communist statesmen through fixed interpretations of 'objective' factors such as social class, correlation of economic and political forces, and conditions of historical revolution. Unless one is the progenitor of that very ideology, there is less room for 'subjective' initiative except to interpret the scientific laws of history and apply correct strategies for attaining utopian futures. Ideological leadership tends to be dogmatic and holds relatively rigid postures of hostility to non-conforming leaders and their countries (Kissinger 1969, 34-38). In many ways, religious fundamentalist and nationalistic governments are classified as ideological leaderships in the way they stake out entrenched positions on human rights, development, information policy and military security for reasons of domestic and regional consolidation (Cerny 1979, 59-85).

Thirdly, there is the charismatic-revolutionary type of leadership exemplified by Castro, Hitler, Sukarno and Khomeini, and perhaps more recently Mugabe in Zimbabwe, and Chávez in Venezuela. This is characterised by leading a struggle for independence or national revival, and being 'sustained in the risks and suffering of such a course primarily by a commitment to a vision which enabled him to override conditions which had seemed overwhelmingly hostile.' (Kissinger 1969, 39; Cerny 1979, 76-79) The source of 'charismatic revolution' lies in the subtle motivation of visions of a utopian future. This definition has been supplemented by a more detailed study of charismatic political leadership that concluded that it is a leader-follower relationship with four specific properties:

1. The leader is perceived by the followers as somehow superhuman.
2. The followers blindly believe the leader's statements.
3. The followers unconditionally comply with the leader's directions for action.
4. The followers give the leader unqualified commitment. (Willner 1984, 8)
The qualities of charismatic leadership are useful reference points for this examination of 'inside-out' leadership as soft power. Firstly, how is a leader able to demonstrate the strength of his personality as writ large upon his following? It lies in perception, particularly in the cultural socialisation and information which the leadership is schooled in and which it draws on for legitimacy. Weber has described the state as a relation of 'men dominating men' based on three inner justifications of legitimacy: the authority of tradition or behaviour patterns sanctified through 'ancient recognition and habitual orientation'; the authority of charisma as 'absolutely personal devotion and personal confidence in revelation, [and] heroism'; and authority based on legal and statute rule-governed function (Weber 1948, 78-79). These are the cementing links of leader-follower mutual recognition and very clearly correspond to Kissinger's three types of foreign policy leaders. One might be doubtful in an age of public opinion and global media as to whether charisma holds ground in foreign policy anymore. The answer will have to be partly refracted through the previously cited aspects (2) and (3) of charismatic followership: why do followers believe in the representational capacity of leadership and follow a lead?

Alternatively, bearing in mind the numerical disparity between leader and community, one must ponder if public opinion can lead decisively and consistently. The Almond-Lippmann theories of public opinion in foreign policy argue 'no' on the basis that spontaneous 'general willed' decision-making is a fiction. Bearing in mind the observations about the nature of global information space and issue-area complexity in foreign affairs, the reality is likely to be opinion-formation engendered by elite-interests and political structures acting as opinion leaders and mediating variables in giving voice to, harmonising, or
mobilising public support for foreign policy (Risse-Kappen 1991; Holsti 1992; Hermann and Hagan 1998). Lastly, international relations, as it has been argued in earlier chapters, is normatively a game of grouped entities, hence a leader of his group has to draw power from his national constituency in so many ways reminiscent of political corporatist arrangements. It is to represent coherence against external adversity, a beacon of self-righteous good governance to potential friends and foes, as well as to invite global investment to 'reside' in an attractive territorial-economic climate. This is easier said than applied: it is ultimately up to the individual agency, affected by cultural and socialisation structures, to mix and match leadership types (read 'styles') to foreign policy situations and goals. One half of soft power leadership is thus constructing a problem discourse matched to a desired solution discourse.

4.2.2 Leadership Outside-In

The soft power of foreign policy leadership is however less commonly derived from the exclusive interplay of factors located outside the leader's national territory. The model of American structural power associated with Strange, Kindleberger and more recently, Nye and Owens (Nye Jr. and Owens 1996, 29-33), is a fresh exploration of the possibility of 'outside-in' leadership. In consonance with the thesis that structural power is the power to determine the structures setting parameters for the working of political institutions and non-state actors within the world political economy (Strange 1994, 24-25), soft power leadership aims to promote, circulate and if possible, institutionalise ideas favourable to a national cause. Although it is unlikely, in the foreseeable future, that a single nation-state can duplicate the postwar moment, purpose and overriding power which enabled the US, and to some extent Britain, to draft the nascent 'constitutions' (GATT, IMF and World Bank) of

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6 A sceptical school of thought on the decisiveness of public opinion on foreign policy centred upon the various
global economy, the amorphous political potential of global information space offers opportunities for any soft power-capable nation-state to shape agendas of existing institutions to their benefit and to influence the conversion of other actors to these agendas. This is where the soft power leadership of external origin can globalize and penetrate the domestic agendas of nation-states. This can be explained through regime theory and epistemic communities.

International regimes are ‘implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given area of international relations.’ (Krasner 1982, 186) These may be institutionalised in formal terms with a full secretariat, compliance monitoring body, regular conferencing, or an informal declaration of principles for conduct on specific issues with no international legal sanction. In many cases, such as arms control treaties, human rights and trade conventions, national legislative ratification is required for regimes to take effect. This represents domestic enforcement of external ideas. Soft power then becomes ‘binding’ as structural power. The stakes of getting ideas written into regimes are thus high, and the informational nature of regimes enables leadership to mount campaigns for a global audience. Regimes are common problem solving pacts, a public good, or a means to supply it. The motivation is generally statist and involves the arbitraging of national interests towards joint action. The means of arbitraging are ideas that serve as critical roadmaps of policies where deadlock exists, or suggestions for coordinating shared principles of agreement (Goldstein and Keohane 1993, 13-20). Occasionally, visionary leadership may produce the institutionalisation of an idea before a
problem actually arises, such as the nuclear-free zones in the South Pacific, South America, and Southeast Asia.

Regime-formation however rarely occurs through multilateral spontaneity, rather as Robert Keohane pointed out in a rational-market theory of demand for regimes, a 'political entrepreneur' is necessary in reducing the 'transaction costs' of initiating cooperation. According to this logic, entrepreneurial leaders arise only when potential profit is perceived to be sufficiently large and consequent upon joint cooperation (Keohane 1982, 338-339). This 'profit' is not necessarily monetary, although trade and anti-pollution regimes certainly deliver such results. It could simply be the reduction of long-term political risk and uncertainty involved with certain issues. The nuclear non-proliferation regime, which took effect in 1970, and was renewed through 1995, represented a centrepiece of efforts by the erstwhile USSR, the US, Britain, France and more recently, China, to preserve the global nuclear status quo since the 1960s. Obviously, the soft power of non-proliferation ideas was set back in 1998 where India and Pakistan were concerned. This illustrates a perennial problématique within regime leadership: how is this sense of 'profit' to be extended equitably to all participants, and does regime learning occur in response to changed circumstances as the Indian and Pakistani tests show? Ultimately, the entrepreneurial leader must know when to don the hats of the intellectual and structural power-bargainer to sustain common foci in collaboration. In some accounts, for instance, both US presidents Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt have had to swap the intellectual hat for the realist one, just to gain their allies' acquiescence to their respective new world order designs with varying degrees of success in 1919 and 1945 (A. Williams 1998, ch.1-5). Briefly speaking, the entrepreneurial element is in the 'start-up' initiative, while 'structural power bargaining' is
the translation of material state interests into bargainable items; and the ‘intellectual’ consists in the generation of fresh ideas by the entrepreneurial visionary, with overlaps of these roles becoming increasingly common.

At this point in the evolution of international society, these permutations of leadership as diplomacy are reflective of the cumulative scientific, social and economic complexities of progress, often necessitating the creative transformations of knowledge expertise beyond state-bound forms. One additional innovation is the epistemic community. This is ‘a network of professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area.’ (P.M. Haas 1992, 3) The epistemic community of individuals plies its trade in coordinating national, international and now, global non-state networks towards ascendancy in solving problems where uncertainties of issue-salience across time and space prevent coordinated policy-making and regime maintenance. The epistemic community may or may not solve problems by itself, being dependent on the accommodating spirit of national political wills in transnational forums. Nevertheless, it is leadership potential on its own if it sheds light on cause-effect relationships in problems and consequently shapes states’ responses to them. Not unexpectedly, epistemic communities have arisen in military technology, environmental, developmental, and security confidence building arenas in international relations. They may come in the form of think-tanks, formalised transnational NGOs, eminent persons working groups supported by intergovernmental organisations, or academic institutes with national links. The leadership bases of an epistemic community can broadly encompass the pragmatism of problem-specific regime formation, or may be the independent initiative of a

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8 These distinctions are adopted from Young (1991, 288-299).
group of citizens, scientists and interest groups concerned about environmental, human rights or peace causes (P.M. Haas 1992, 12-20; Stone 2001). Above all, their territorial scope is not a limiting factor, with participation of international organisations and non-state actors as a standard feature. Due to its amorphous self-definition of being merely policy-relevant, the leadership of an epistemic community may owe allegiance to national interests to the extent that their mission is a sub-set of an idea strongly associated with one or more states.

In a way, one might say that in the struggle between international and global frames of action, the epistemic community is a nascent civil society body mediating the two but always exhibiting uneven degrees of partiality. The economists John Maynard Keynes and Harry Dexter White have, for example, been jointly regarded as the epistemic authors of the Bretton Woods financial regimes, bridging the official policy positions of London and Washington in the postwar era (Ikenberry 1993, 68-75). Much in the same vein, Third World state protests against debt burdens and unequal economic globalization at the World Economic Forum (Davos) and WTO have been taken up by epistemic communities-cum-aid organisations such as Third World Network, Action Aid, and the Grameen Bank (Runyan 1999; Khor 1999). While these tend to assert that neo-liberal prescriptions by the World Bank-IMF-WTO epistemic communities are indifferent to realities on the ground, through being associated with western governments and MNCs, many development NGOs continue to act as funnels for official aid monies to developing countries (Stiles 2000). In fact, European states such as Britain, Norway, the Netherlands and Germany have issued a joint declaration to constitute an anti-poverty epistemic community based on civil society collaboration, academic inputs, and empowerment of the recipients (Herfkens et al. 1999).
4.2.3 Summary: Contours of Soft Power Leadership

Leadership in foreign policy thus emerges as a vast field of information contestation intrinsic to the discursive defence of community within global information space. Global information space has given the informational strengths of diplomacy special prominence. In this milieu, leadership is a weighty vessel of soft power provided that it can be anchored to ideas, and floated on circumstances. Two hypotheses, respectively, Leadership Inside-Out and Outside-In, are derived from the preceding discussions:

\[\begin{align*}
\text{Leadership Inside-Out (LIO):} & & \text{A nation-state can achieve its foreign policy objectives through Leadership Inside-Out by projecting a communitarian base, by its credibility as a source of information, and by targeting an omnidirectional audience.} \\
\text{Leadership Outside-In (LOI):} & & \text{A nation-state can achieve its foreign policy objectives through Leadership Outside-In by exercising political entrepreneurship through international regimes, and by forming epistemic communities.}
\end{align*}\]

Given its brevity, this section could not have done more than provide a taxonomy of sources of ideas in social structures and individual agencies. Ultimately, the sets of meanings constituting power-community can only be articulated by leaders able to draw on domestic repositories of knowledge and legitimacy, tap epistemic communities, or operationalise joint regimes of nationally favourable knowledge-based practices for constructing benign global environments. In this context, the ideational threats may arise not just from structural power of the American form, but also from global non-state networks which assert policy-relevant knowledge.

4.3 Intermestic Politics of Foreign Policy

The issue of the possession of policy-relevant knowledge within global information space leads directly to the consideration of the second set of soft power-relevant foreign policy processes: the politics of foreign policy-making. This is a collective label
encompassing associated sub-fields of FPA known as the 'governmental/bureaucratic politics model', the 'politics of policy making', 'foreign policy as a political process', 'new diplomacy' and 'democratic foreign policy' (Allison 1971, 144-184; Hilsman 1971; Wallace 1971; Halperin 1974; Butterfield 1966; N.L. Hill 1970; Skidmore and Hudson 1993). Despite their subtle differences, all of these have in common the assumption that the practice and making of foreign policy is a political activity in the symbolic sense defined in Chapter 2, and in the form of competing agendas of institutional and non-institutional groups inside and outside government. Their 'weapons' and 'resources' of politicking lie primarily in values, and in mobilising ideology, expertise, prestige, status and other forms of information. In cases where these groups include assertive militaries and police forces, the potential threat of physical force may also constitute an asset in affecting policy (Hilsman 1971, 49-50). In the main, however, foreign policy is an exercise of unity and the employment of information is more applicable and efficacious in gaining position, allies and neutrals, rather than risking communitarian unity in a prospect of outright civil war when arms are employed for coercion to secure objectives.

Since these groups operate on the basis of claiming policy-relevant knowledge, the advent of information globalization ensures that foreign policy-making becomes exposed to interested parties that transcend national borders, perhaps located within another state's civil society, or even outside the governing framework within one's national territory. Foreign policy is thus being made in a context of porosity: sources of information pervade decision-making from unexpected directions. A porosity of information boundaries for policy-making

9 The precedent for this has been that groups within a government have been mobilising and exchanging support with those outside government within a national territory. See Halperin (1974, 230-232) and Newsom (1996).
will tend to sharpen conflicts of interests among groups claiming legitimate inputs into policy-making, thereby encouraging groups to adopt modes of discursive leadership to get their way. They use modified versions of soft power leadership ‘inside-out’ or ‘outside-in’ according to situational experience. Lastly, because of both the condition of porosity and the competitive nature of political processes, foreign policy-making within global information space compels nation-states to take account of multiple actor inputs into their policies.\(^{10}\) Thus the ‘politics of foreign policy-making’ enables an examination of the exposed cross-boundary nature of pursuing a foreign policy today, and the operation of soft power by non-state actors upon states. This model should henceforth carry the prefix ‘intermestic’ (international and domestic) to reflect this reality. Although this term was introduced by scholars to analyse US foreign policy-making during the Cold War (Manning 1977),\(^{11}\) it is even more pertinent today as a shorthand for boundary penetration and complexity for all states within global information space.

This section next elaborates the characteristics of the intermestic foreign policy process with a view to drawing out its detailed soft power operation. First of all, foreign policy as governmental action is a ‘political resultant’ in the sense that ‘what happens is not chosen as a solution to a problem but rather results from compromise, conflict, and confusion of [interested parties] with diverse interests and unequal influence.’ (Allison 1971, 162; Hilsman 1971, 117) Secondly, bargaining is involved vertically and horizontally as a decision-making mode. Taken together, these first two characteristics require drawing

\(^{10}\) Keohane’s proposition of ‘international multiple advocacy’ for the conscientious interdependence-sensitive formulation of US foreign policy through consulting ‘foreign-interested parties’ is a useful starting point for the foregoing analysis. (1993)

\(^{11}\) There are also implicit allusions to a concept of ‘intermesticity’ in Bloomfield (1982).
discursive lines of issue-relevance with the power of information at the disposal of interested parties. This means that the communitarian bases of soft power foreign policy must be cohesively mapped out among the policy-shaping parties, otherwise cacophony results and the attraction in soft power is dissipated.

Thirdly, the bargaining among interested parties on foreign policy issues is determined by their non-physical and non-coercive resources on the grounds that if the political resultant is to be stable, it should be backed by the conviction of voluntary choice among initial objectors. The outcome will then be manifested as a unified policy position (Hilsman 1971, 188-191). This means the release or control of information are the prime tools of policy-making participants. This is linked to the fourth and final characteristic of the way in which various participants’ might wield information power; they do so through tactical negotiating positions, ideologies, philosophies, photographic evidence, and prestige based on office, prior performance, or precedent (Allison 1971, 168-169, 175-179). Once again, soft power evidently has to be used to congeal and shape a coalition of common interest, and the way to do it is to employ discursive practices. The field of public administration studies further informs this analysis by arguing that the essence of bureaucratic power is sourced from organisations’ self-constituted, or governmentally constituted, authority to prescribe or espouse expertise (Michels 1960; Neumann 1960). This is no different from the Foucaultian explanation of discipline as power, or truth regimes conferring power upon their expounders, particularly within the widely accepted modern milieu of both theory and practice of international relations.
To further investigate soft power operation in the intermestic politics of foreign policy, we can develop two operational formulations from the discussion above:

(a) multiple actors, multiple inputs: the intermestic correlation of forces; and 
(b) competition of ideas and their resolution: ‘intermestic socialisation’ and ‘multipolar direct emulation through demonstration’.

These two sets reflect the dynamics of multi-actor play and will facilitate the explanation of how information, as various forms of ideas, affect foreign policy globally.

4.3.1 Multiple Actors, Multiple Inputs: The Intermestic Correlation of Forces

The notion of the intermestic determinants of foreign policy is contiguous with the cumulative impact of globalization on political practices within and between states. During the twentieth century, assorted developments in the western hemisphere arising from the complexity of modern science, health, industrial conditions, the increasing scale of war casualties and inter-cultural contact, stimulated the formation of groups of ordinary citizens to organise first nationally, then internationally, to further their mutual philanthropic and intellectual interests. The epistemic communities of social scientific area studies (e.g. African, Asiatic and Orientalist), the International Red Cross and the International Women’s Association are examples of what some authors have termed movements motivated by individualism and rationalism aimed at advancing mankind’s future well-being (Boli and Thomas 1999a; Field Jr. 1972; Halliday 2001). The non-state actor can be said to have been born from the domestic fragmentation of national interest and centralised state power.

By the time of the Versailles Peace Conference of 1919, the term ‘democratic foreign policy’ had grown to signify a more complex and fractious domestic process of making policy. Politicians came to believe they had to heed the ‘peoples’ voice’ in addition to the
voice of commerce at home and abroad. Furthermore, technical and philanthropic non-state actors had begun making their small-scale presence felt on the sidelines of intergovernmental meetings of the League of Nations. Yet it was not until the late 1950s and early 1960s that the activities of agents of interdependence came to be contextualised theoretically in a serious way within the study of international relations. By the 1970s, against the background of stymied socio-economic development of the newly decolonised nation-states, and the proliferation of MNCs operating in neo-liberal transnational spaces, Keohane and Nye’s conceptualisation of ‘complex interdependence’ crystallised the prominent role played by international organisations and non-state actors in the world politics of nation-states (Keohane and Nye Jr. 1989, 1972). In the interwar years, Marxism-Leninism had also contributed another strong transnational non-state element: the revolutionary parties representing a purported world proletariat (A.M. Scott 1982, 3-68). Nevertheless, whether it was the interwar years or the Cold War, nation-states were still politically primus inter pares and the intermestic could all be subordinated or subsumed into a composite ‘national interest’.

What has changed since the early 1990s is the liberation of soft power for political action through the arrival of global information space. Non-state actors are quickly proving as adept as nation-states in exercising several forms of soft power across the spatial and time boundaries of national interests within the context of satellite communications, the Internet, global capitalism and post-Cold War geopolitical uncertainty. In a significant way, national interests are rapidly confronted by the transnational complications of issues such as

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12 David Mittrany made a start with A Working Peace System in 1943, but it took more than a decade longer for works such as Ernst Haas’ Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization (1964) to launch serious debates about non-state and intergovernmental actors in International Relations.
environmental pollution, energy shortages, arms proliferation, immigration, the poverty-effects of global capitalism, cross-border inter-ethnic wars, refugee flows, and the conundrum of applying human rights law transnationally. These issues invite new perspectives, and this is where non-state-actors attempt to span national boundaries in prescribing solutions.

At this point, the term 'non-state actors' needs further clarification. It covers actoriness that is not formally controlled by nation-states (Keohane and Nye Jr. 1972; Josselin and Wallace 2001, 2-4): individual citizens, social activists, cyber-hackers, politicians, terrorists, separatist movements, the International Federation of Airline Pilots' Associations, Amnesty International, Greenpeace, even MNCs. However, not all of these exercise soft power as their main instruments, an obvious case being terrorists. The rest of this discussion is concerned with the majority of non-state actors which regard themselves as non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and with NGO-associated individuals who operate both domestically and globally.

The NGO is defined here as a formal or informal organisation that actively promotes causes of conscience and welfare which nation-states are reluctant or unable to provide.14 For example groups like Greenpeace articulate 'global-level' environmental visions on nuclear waste disposal and maritime pollution which many nation-states cannot or will not pursue because of their concern for 'national interests'. Similarly, Amnesty International, and human rights groups such as the Proyecto International de Derechos Humanos, dare to push for

13 The ideas of spatial and time dimensions of national interest come from Frankel (1970, 76-93).
14 This is adapted from the de facto NGO directory, the Yearbook of International Organizations (UIA 2000, 2404-2405, app. 2), Fisher (1997), and Aall, Miltenberger and Weiss (2000, 95-103).
human rights adjudication according to universalist conceptions of human rights law regardless of international sensitivities and politicians' constraints. NGOs such as the Grameen Bank, Catholic Relief Services and Oxfam also demonstrate freedom in sponsoring community-based alternative development in South Asia, Central America and East Africa because they are able to communicate and join efforts with local participation. NGOs and associated individuals are also the type of organisational actors that states are not: they are 'unburdened with large bureaucracies, relatively flexible and open to innovation, more effective and faster at implementing development efforts, and able to identify and respond to grass-roots needs.' (Fisher 1997, 444) Although some NGOs may depend largely on funding from states and international organisations, in addition to private donors, their implementational and ideological flexibility remains substantial because they are not directly responsible to an electorate. Furthermore, their operating milieu is in the soft realm of spreading ideas for improvement, exposing and defining social 'wrongs'. This broad mission allows them to claim a membership appeal across many cultural and geographical boundaries, although at the time of writing most NGOs that operate transnationally are headquartered in the Scandinavian countries, the Benelux countries, Britain, Switzerland and Austria. Nevertheless by 2000, the breakdown of NGO membership by geographical region showed that 14% came from '[Eastern] Europe and Central Asia', 13% from 'Latin America and the Caribbean', and 13% from 'Sub-Saharan Africa', compared to 33% from 'Western Europe'. The broadness of membership and the specific ranges of their agendas allow NGOs to compete almost equally with nation-states in the information flow processes within global information space. NGOs can manoeuvre in the interstices of post-Cold War ideological uncertainties, utilise capitalism's information networks for publicity, and attract

15 See Chapter 6.
attention via protests on Internet sites. Their visual and psychological impact is amplified through global television reporting on physical protests against the EU, the US, the IMF or the World Bank. If the numbers of the transnational NGO ‘population’ indicate their political importance vis-à-vis nation states, then the statistics indicate a blooming in the 1990s; from 51 in 1910, the total reached 110 in 1958, 5,000 in 1989 and by 1999, more than 26,000.\textsuperscript{17}

In providing a holistic expertise on mapping and tackling problems on a global basis at the expense of states, the objectives, allegiances and resources of NGOs are likely to be drawn into an existential transnational civil society by issue (Lynch 1998; Anheier, Glasius and Kaldor 2001). These actors assert a watchdog role vis-à-vis states’ domestic and foreign policies by providing an exposé of abuses in global information space and invoking the collaborative sanctioning power and authority of other state, non- and sub-state groups (Keck and Sikkink 1998, ch. 1-2; Stanley Foundation 1999, 16-19). The network is the post-Cold War modus operandi of NGOs. It is a horizontal and reciprocal pattern of communication allowing, where necessary, intimate asymmetrical support among all parties in the network (Burt 1982, ch. 2). This intimacy is created through shared values, and in many cases bound by an idealism of altering the norms of human society towards greater humaneness as development and human rights NGOs attest. However, there are also others who share the commonality of revising the social status quo in the direction of fascism. Examples include right-wing associations of landowners and ex-military officers in Latin America or neo-fascist groups in Europe. Due to their propensities towards physical violence, these groups stretch their NGO status to the limits of terrorism (Payne 2000).

\textsuperscript{16} Figures from Anheier, Glasius and Kaldor (2001, 6-7, tab. 1.2).
For NGOs, the discovery of this intimacy is itself the product of communications exposure. An individual or isolated group making little political headway in one location learns of another pursuing identical or parallel goals, and they make contact to combine efforts for their respective ends. Some NGOs may, from their inception, actively seek solidarity across professional, social, economic and political frontiers (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 12-15). Or it could be a matter of accidental legitimacy, engendered by increased contact through the global reach of ICTs, and the ever closer social communion produced by the expansion of capitalism into the Second and Third Worlds. This is the solidarity of soft power towards a common target. And in terms of welfare provision, NGOs can in some cases facilitate communication and relief for oppressed and neglected groups within state borders, as relief organisations such as Oxfam, Catholic Relief Services and Christian Aid demonstrate in Bangladesh, Costa Rica and Ethiopia. At the extreme, as recent private NGO attempts reveal, a nation-state can face retaliation through a panoply of ‘cyber-weapons’ (e.g. negative publicity and monitoring updates) in global information space depending on the issue, as with the controversy over proposals for a global Multilateral Agreement on Investment, or maintaining a regularly updated website publicising the anti-corruption and human rights practices of nation-states.18

All these forms of direct mobilisation can collectively be called the intermestic soft power of the multi-actor correlation of forces. To correlate is to relate two strands of ideas or actions. A correlation of forces is basically a coordination of two or more actions either in simultaneity or in reciprocity to achieve a common goal. This usage is partly borrowed from

17 Figures have been obtained from Figure 1.1 in Boli and Thomas (1999b, 23) and Economist (1999d).
18 Consult Kobrin (1998); also the websites of Transparency International and Human Rights Watch listed in the bibliography, as well as Amnesty International’s <http://www.amnesty.org.uk>.
Marxist-Leninist and Soviet explanations. Karl Marx did not specifically use the term but he intimated it on the basis that national working classes could only liberate themselves by liberating each other in a coordinated international strategy. Reflecting on European politics in 1864, Marx wrote

> It was not the wisdom of the ruling classes but the heroic resistance to their criminality by the working classes of England, that saved the west of Europe from plunging headlong into an infamous crusade for the perpetuation and propagation of slavery on the other side of the Atlantic. The shameless approval, mock sympathy, or idiotic indifference, with which the upper classes of Europe have witnessed the mountain fortress of the Caucasus falling a prey to, and heroic Poland being assassinated by, Russia...have taught the working classes the duty to master themselves the mysteries of international politics; to watch the diplomatic acts of their respective governments; to counteract them, if necessary, by all means in their power; when unable to prevent, to combine in simultaneous denunciations, and to vindicate the simple laws of morals and justice, which ought to govern the relations of private individuals, as the rules paramount of the intercourse of nations. (Marx 1983, 364-365)

When the last three lines are taken out of historical context, they describe the contemporary NGO's mission. It was the erstwhile USSR, beginning from the Khrushchev era, which coined the ‘correlation of forces’ as the Marxist-Leninist reading of the status of class warfare at any given moment (Light 1988, 267-269). On a theoretical level, the correlation would be interpreted in terms of how various groups within society adhered to the respective antagonisms of bourgeoisie and proletariat. A study of the correlation would assess how these alignments affect the relative degrees of success of either class in any political, social or economic conflict at any moment in history. This applies both domestically and internationally (Lider 1986, 70-71).

In translating the reading of the correlation of forces into plans for subverting world capitalism through fomenting violent revolution, armed intervention, or electoral alliances, Marxist-Leninists would have to judge whether the correlation of domestic or international
forces favoured any action at that particular moment using socialist states as instruments and bases. If the correlation was perceived to be ripe for action, the proletarian leaderships of all socialist states would make an alliance among themselves to reinforce this favourable correlation either worldwide, or in a specific region. In the event that the correlation was unfavourable, propaganda could be assiduously employed to convince world and national public opinion otherwise (Lider 1986, 69-70). The USSR would put out the line that socialism was catching up economically with the West, that it was the natural ally against exploitation, and that Marxism-Leninism was an inevitability in the world and more imminent in a particular region. This may be buttressed by public gestures such as visits by revolutionary leaders to Moscow and Soviet-Cuban military deployments to the Third World. The US would be expected to counter this propaganda by warning of Soviet hegemony and poor record in economic delivery. Soviet propaganda would counter that the US was playing at deception to support corrupt bourgeois reactionaries and so on. A reading of a favourable correlation in the aftermath of propaganda would then serve as a basis for intervening in ‘the domestic affairs of individual countries where the class struggle takes an acute form’ with the aim of furthering the Marxist-Leninist cause (Lider 1986, 130; Halliday 1999, 72-90). If a complete revolutionary change in the targeted state is achieved, it would further strengthen the correlation of forces favouring the victorious class, writ international. If the intervention was unsuccessful, it would set back the loser’s respective correlation of forces.

Under globalization, the intermestic correlation of forces would differ from Marxism-Leninism by replacing narrow class warfare considerations with diverse and modular agendas of environmentalism, human rights, good governance, and developmental idealism. The idea of intervening across boundaries to make alliances for political causes is retained
(Burbach, Núñez and Kagarlitsky 1997, ch. 9). Of course there are NGOs today that are remakes of Cold War era left wing movements, but they indict capitalism for both impoverishment of the Third World and environmental neglect. Also, unlike the class-state alliances fostered by the Soviet bloc, NGOs operating under conditions of globalization are predisposed towards bandwagoning with all global actors wherever they can make common cause with, including states and non-organised protesters. The intermestic correlations of the 1990s rarely advocate armed revolution to subvert a state although they might condemn political systems wholesale on the basis of subjectively described unjust practices. Intermestic correlations maintain a second thread of continuity with their Marxist-Leninist forebears in engendering action through the power of information, acting upon subjective world public opinion.

Monitoring and campaigning by mixed NGO and state coalitions for sanctions against deviant state behaviour frequently operate through pre-existing global regimes such as the UN, IMF and WTO, which in turn, claim authority from state membership to police states whose domestic measures and international behaviour are seen to undermine economic stability, global welfare, or global military security. At the WTO summit in Seattle in 1999, the physical and cyberspace-assisted NGO protests were bitterly divided along multiple issue fault-lines over trade-labour, trade-environment, and liberalisation-versus-protectionism linkages. This affected national bargaining positions among state representatives already split into regional and North-South coalitions by not only extending the fronts of confrontation outside the forum, but also amplifying dissent against the US. President Clinton drew the ire of Third World delegates when he agreed with those sections of NGO protests encouraging him to push for clauses imposing trade sanctions against states without developed world
standards of labour welfare. Clinton also argued that globalization issues were of such complexity that it would now require the active admission of NGO inputs in policy formulation (Knowlton 1999; Sanger 1999; Stevenson 1999). There are numerous admissions from World Bank and WTO officials that NGO inputs are increasingly included in drawing up national funding plans, where NGOs do not hesitate to point out where these regimes may have flouted their own rules (O’Brien et al. 2000, ch.2; Kahn 2000). Today, NGO impact through international forums thus constitutes a second form of intermestic soft power input into national foreign policy.

A third form could be attributable to NGO and MNC decisions, whether exercised independently or collectively over an investment climate within a nation-state. Initially developmental, environmental and human rights NGOs launched publicity campaigns to shame MNCs into taking up social responsibilities where they operate. Witness for instance, Greenpeace’s 1995 campaign forcing oil producer Shell to retract its planned dismantling of the Brent Spar oil platform in the Atlantic. In 2000, coordinated pressures were applied by the Nicaraguan Union of Chentex Workers and the American National Labor Committee on Taiwanese clothing manufacturer Chentex Corporation for anti-union attitudes and underpaying workers at a Nicaraguan jeans factory (Gonzalez 2000). Today, a more cooperative approach exists where MNCs could utilise joint expertise such as Pricewaterhouse Coopers, the Greenpeace-World Wildlife Fund originated Forest Stewardship Council, and Transparency International, to survey state-suitability for investment or form an NGO lobby for socially responsible investment plans (Gereffi, Garcia-Johnson and Sasser 2001). This soft power will have an effect through determining capital and trade flows towards a state.
A fourth form of intermestic soft power exercised indirectly through correlating forces is that discussed in Chapter 3 as the contested notion of world public opinion comprising states, non-state actors and populations. Like the other three described in this section, this amorphous political body of opinion overlaps into assisting the discursive construction of whether a state is aberrant in military, human rights and economic activities. When such a discourse is repeated consistently among NGOs and at forums such as the UN and IMF for example, ‘global power’ might be orchestrated against the aberrant state through measures ranging from boycotts to legal intervention. In the 1990s, Myanmar was sanctioned by individual UN member states, who were also its key export markets, due in part to joint publicity over human rights abuses coordinated among western states, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and Aung San Suu Kyi of Myanmar’s National League for Democracy through the UN (BBC The World Today 1997; Wain 1998). While the overall effectiveness of sanctions remains in doubt, Myanmar’s economy has stagnated as one of the world’s poorest, and the military regime’s illegitimacy continues to inhibit its presence in international forums where both the US and EU hold seats. The Yangon regime has incrementally conceded to pressure by allowing in, most recently in 2001, a UN-appointed Brazilian human rights expert, Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, who certified some progress but warned that NGO humanitarian assistance was necessary to alleviate poverty (Jendrzejczyk 2001). In East Timor, Human Rights Watch, together with a local women’s aid group, the Forum Komunikasi Untuk Perempuan Loro Sae, continue to monitor Indonesian and UN peacekeepers’ compliance with the terms of the UN agreement for withdrawal brokered in 1999. Their reports have the effect of keeping open the agenda of prosecuting ‘crimes against humanity’ committed by Indonesian troops on the island prior to the UN intervention (Jones
Conversely, to avoid incurring the penalties imposed by anti-national global power, national interests in foreign policy-making must today harmonise discursively with a favourable intermestic correlation of political forces, or divide a hostile alliance by adopting some parts of externally-sponsored agendas and rejecting the rest.

4.3.2 The Competition of Ideas and Their Resolution: Intermestic Socialisation and Multipolar Direct Emulation through Demonstration Effects

Intermestic politics are inseparable from the competition of ideas between interested parties aiming for change in a state’s foreign policy. Within a global information space interpenetrating the domestic, decision-makers must assume that all information inputs are given for a partisan purpose (Halperin 1974, 135-136), whether other-national, NGO-specific, or arising from some global mixed coalition. When Amnesty International, Morgan Stanley Capital Index, or the IMF, puts out a report on issue-specific conditions within a country, the information is meant to present ‘road maps’ for policies, to provide ideational ‘focal points and glue’ for reform and dissent within the state, or even to trigger the ‘institutionalisation’ of certain ideas in the absence of innovation (Goldstein and Keohane 1993, 11-26). These are uses that can be made of the ideas entering the foreign policy calculations of those who make the final decision and implementation. Yet this merely suggests how ideas compete, while explaining little of why some ideas triumph over others.

For a start, Rosenau’s early study of cross-national linkages classifies three general ways in which ‘external’ political processes impact on the ‘internal’ (Rosenau 1971, 319-...
First, a ‘penetrative process occurs when members of one polity serve as participants in the political processes of another.’ The participants in such a process range from military invaders, MNCs to members of foreign political parties. Second, the ‘reactive process’ is one where domestic responses unexpectedly occur due to the gravity of external developments. Examples are nationalist backlashes against the construction of foreign military installations in a neighbouring country, or in reaction to perceived humiliations from accepting external aid. Third, an ‘emulative process’ takes place when an external action produces a reaction of similar pattern domestically. This is also known as the demonstration effect. Clearly, Rosenau does not distinguish hard power from soft power, which is of more concern here. While global information space privileges soft power, it does not admit clear distinctions between penetration and reaction across borders. Borrowing partly from Rosenau, it is proposed to treat the methods by which certain ideas triumph transnationally in two categories: intermestic socialisation (IS), and multipolar direct emulation through demonstration (MDED).

IS is consistent with soft power as attraction rather than coercion, and takes into account the benign elements of international regimes, their transnational reach, and their commonly-expressed mandates for socialising states and non-state actors into normative communities. It is one way in which ideas in international relations, when administered, operate to change the actions of states and the lives of citizens. It is socialisation in the sense that ideas are institutionally and geographically agreed and sustained upon the principle of state signatories promising to effect legal adherence to regime norms and rules in relevant domestic and external matters. Although implementation as either domestic or international law depends on a state’s domestic political will, once a sizeable majority of states ratify the
regime, it can be invoked over time by non-state actors and signatory states alike to psychologically compel compliance through generating critical reports and creating a discourse for change involving domestic lobbies, transnational groups, other states and international organisations. This is the normative-political, and in some cases legal, effect of regimes such as the UN Declaration of Human Rights, the International Convention Against Torture, and the recent treaty establishing the International Criminal Court. In Chapter 6’s study of the Chilean case, it will be seen that the information arising from such regimes crosses boundaries and may modify national jurisdiction.

MDED is a more passive concept and retains the emulative process of ideas carried throughout global information space. It accounts for the adoption of ideas through demonstrations of superior performance by information-carrying agents, within groups of states and non-state actors, or through bilaterally-agreed exchanges. The prefix ‘multipolar’ is added to acknowledge the omnidirectional attraction of soft power in a fluid post-Cold War ideological context. A general comparison can be made with the demonstration of two or more new models of television sets in an electrical store before incidental and prospective customers who already own television sets at home. The customer may buy on the impression that the new set is better than his existing one on either subjective or objective criteria.

MDED is thus focussed on the proven success of ideas and its near-universal ‘exploitability’ as soft power. It is clearly a result of post-Cold War ideological multipolarity. Post-communist and developing countries in search of political economy models of good governance and export-oriented industrialisation, constitute the audience and ‘global market’
for the diverse ideas of countries and NGOs that are subjectively promoted as successful in certain spheres of politics. For example, the US-Soviet propaganda form of trade fairs has been copied and improved upon by Japan, European and many newly industrialising states. Similarly, developing countries from the Middle East and Africa are also deploying international public relations campaigns through global media and business diplomacy to attract MNCs to their countries.\(^2\) NGOs like Greenpeace and Amnesty International have in fact preceded states in organising fairs promoting their causes; most have done so by holding exhibitions and selling charity products. The Internet has greatly amplified their reach. In situations where there is a lack of Great Power consensus and will, such as in preventive peacekeeping and the treaty banning Anti-Personnel Landmines, NGO-state collaborations with creative leaderships make a difference. In these two issues, Human Rights Watch, Handicap International, Landmine Survivors Network, Australia and Canada, armed with decent records in the field to match, take advantage of the vacuum of ideas by propounding initiatives in speeding up treaty approval, improving peacekeeping training for future missions, or volunteering to lead peacekeeping tasks in new troublespots (Keating 1993, 231-234; Hampson and Molot 1998; Cameron, Lawson and Tomlin 1998; M. Richardson 1999b; Moore 1999). These windows for exercising soft power are dependent on circumstances, and the ability to exploit them consistently depends very much on maintaining as spotlessly clean a record as possible over time. In this regard, Canadian soft power over peacekeeping matters was diminished in 1998 by retrospective reports of its contingent’s excesses in Somalia (Oliver 1998). MDED as soft power is generally state-reliant, but it does not preclude the possibility that NGOs alone can enlarge upon, associate with, or criticise such forms of

\(^2\) In the late 1990s, Bahrain for example touted itself as a pro-business ‘friend of the West’ while the memberstates of the Southern African Development Community were selling their economies anew as ‘an African Renaissance’. (IHT Sponsored Section 1999b, 1999c)
model governance to augment their own soft power inputs into states’ foreign policy calculations. In Chapter 6, it will be shown that anti-Pinochet NGOs cited Britain’s demonstration of fair play in judicial procedures as a discourse for shaming the Chilean state into making amendments to its domestic legal system.

4.3.3 Summary: Contours of the Intermestic Politics of Foreign Policy

The operational context of foreign policy-making historically has never been neat, and the existence of global information space has only exacerbated the competitive politics of making a coherent foreign policy. Due to issue-complexity ranging freely across national boundaries and the global flow of information, other actors, in addition to states themselves, can claim national policy relevance on the basis of knowledge and global interdependence. Economies, human rights, and good governance are current examples where inputs to decision-making are no longer pure intra-national bureaucratic politics. Transnational and domestic non-state actors performatively create an ‘intermestic’ field of ideas which are expressed politically in national foreign policy formulation through either (a) an intermestic correlation of forces competing on a particular issue; or (b) a global competition of ideas resulting in the triumph of some through IS and MDED. These can be expressed in the following hypotheses:

*Intermestic Correlation of Forces (ICF):* The intermestic correlation of forces joining state and non-state parties can shape foreign policy change through direct mobilisation of ideas, sanctioning standards through global regimes, non-state self-constitution of expertise, and manufacturing subjective world public opinion.

*Intermestic Socialisation (IS):* Intermestic socialisation occurs when non-state actors hold states to account through regimes they sign on to.
These are entirely public discursive rivalries in the global information space. Nation-state foreign policies have normatively to engage with them through soft power. And although soft power can also be employed by non-state actors, the latter are deficient with regard to the communitarian aspect. Non-state actors evoke a sense of community among their audiences only in modular forms, and unlike nation-states, they cannot deliver on the majority of basic human needs, especially since they do not possess military force and territory.

The constituent concepts of intermestic politics of foreign policy now remain to be illuminated in a case study. In keeping with this Chapter’s layout, Chapter 5 will next illustrate the LIO and LOI hypotheses through the case study of Singaporean foreign policy in the Asian Values Debate. Chapter 6 will likewise illuminate the ICF, IS and MDED hypotheses using the case of Chilean foreign policy in the Pinochet Extradition Controversy. In each study, the components of global information space both justify the choice of cases and explain them empirically.
CHAPTER 5

5.1 Introduction

The objectives of this Chapter are to illustrate the validity and limits of the interlinked foreign policy leadership, from the inside-out (LIO) and the outside-in (LOI), hypotheses. Singaporean foreign policy and its active input into the Asian Values Debate in 1992-99 are put forward in this regard as a suitable case study. The LIO strategy represents coherence against external adversity, a beacon of self-righteous good governance to potential friends and foes, as well as an invitation to investors to endorse an attractive economic territory. This is easier said than applied: it is ultimately up to the individual agency, affected by cultural and socialisation structures, to mix and match leadership styles to foreign policy situations and goals. One half of soft power leadership is thus constructing a problem discourse matched to a desired solution discourse. The other hypothesis, LOI, is almost synonymous with structural power as the power to determine the structures setting parameters for the working of political institutions and non-state actors within the world political economy. It also emphasises leadership promoting and if possible, institutionalising, ideas favourable to a national cause.

This Chapter will proceed by first justifying Singapore and its foreign affairs in relation to the Asian Values Debate 1992-99 as a case situated in global information space, and will concurrently provide the historical and contemporary contexts for Singapore's ideational conflict with the external world. Singapore's history and continuity as a trading state sensitive to external information currents, will be highlighted as the groundwork for the
country’s engagement with the Asian Values Debate. Thereafter, an introduction to the
Asian Values Debate will be given, and a scheme of the debate as a foreign policy issue
summarised for further reference. This issue will next be examined in terms of how the
Singapore state could be construed as participating in the debate using the LIO hypothesis
which can be stated as:

\[\text{LIO: A nation-state can achieve its foreign policy objectives through Leadership Inside-Out by projecting a communitarian base, by its credibility as a source of information, and by targeting an omnidirectional audience.}\]

The limitations of LIO will be highlighted where they occur in the testing. Thereafter the
same approach will be adopted for illustrating the LOI hypothesis, which can be expressed
as:

\[\text{LOI: A nation-state can achieve its foreign policy objectives through Leadership Outside-In by exercising political entrepreneurship through international regimes, and by forming epistemic communities.}\]

The conclusion will describe how the Singaporean case study has illuminated the validity and
weaknesses of both hypotheses about leadership in foreign policy.

5.2 Singapore and Global Information Space

The choice of Singapore and the Asian Values Debate is made for three sets of
reasons: the country’s long-term involvement in global information space, its contested
border porosity in relation to foreign policy decisions, and the consequential clash of ideas
across borders. These reasons have been stated in the thesis’ Introduction. To preface
analysis and assist clarity, a short chronology of Singapore’s history is appended below:
Table 1: Chronology of Singapore’s Political Milestones

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1819</td>
<td>The British East India Company establishes the colony of ‘Singapore’ by recognising a local Malay potentate and purchasing from him the island of ‘Temasek’. The Company planned to transform the island into the ‘emporium’ of the East.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1820s-1920s</td>
<td>Liberal colonial policies towards immigration from China and India.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942-45</td>
<td>Japan occupies Singapore during World War Two.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>The first local government is formed by the Labour Front, under a self-governing constitution that provided a partially-elected legislature. Several series of negotiations between local nationalists and the British in 1956-58 yielded the constitution of 1959 allowing complete internal self-government. The British retain control of defence and foreign affairs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>Following elections for a fully-elected parliament in which it won a landslide, the Peoples’ Action Party forms the country’s government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963-65</td>
<td>Federation with Malaysia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965 (August)</td>
<td>Independence is thrust upon Singapore, following irreconcilable racial, economic and political differences with Kuala Lumpur. Foreign policy is tuned towards themes of survival and external interdependence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970s—1980s</td>
<td>Constant battles with the foreign media over interference in domestic politics. Singapore emerges as a newly-industrialising country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew resigns to allow Goh Chok Tong to succeed. Lee remains in Cabinet as Senior Minister.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>The UN World Human Rights Conference in Vienna.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>The Michael Fay caning affair.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997-99</td>
<td>The Asian Financial Crisis.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since its founding, the Singaporean nation-state has been consistently enmeshed within the three intrinsic spheres of global information space: the global media space, global economic space and global political space. Singapore’s involvement in the global media space originated with its founding by the incipient arm of British imperialism, the trade-
based East India Company. This company tolerated the proliferation of newspapers reporting purely commercial news for the benefit of foreign merchants in Singapore, but imposed ‘gagging’ orders on newspapers for publishing outside mercantile matters. One order required newspapers to be licensed, and to submit material to the local government for vetting. Two concerns were behind this: firstly, the company disliked criticism of its operations; and secondly, preventing the vernacular press from stirring up racial strife in India and other profitable colonies was equally important (Turnbull 1995, 5). This began a historical pattern whereby the Singapore-based media was either struggling against or subordinated to the overriding interests of the government of the day. The history of Singapore’s pre-eminent English language newspaper *The Straits Times* is testimony to a long-running tension between the local media acting as a check against political excesses, and a conscientious supporter of a dominant political order. At its inception, the *Straits Times* was founded by Singapore-based foreign mercantile interests not only to report commercial intelligence, but also to transplant the press atmosphere created by ‘the laws and customs of England’ by affording protection to the colony from the abuse of power by the governing elite.1 The vernacular press was, by contrast, split into the three Asian Languages of Malay, Chinese and Tamil, serving respectively the interests of the three main Asian communities living under colonial rule. Of the three, the Chinese and the Tamils (or nominally ‘Indians’) were numerically dominant and had immigrant roots that tended to focus their media concerns upon culture-specific matters and events in the ‘mother countries’ of China and India respectively. The Malay press likewise followed a parochial media focus upon their community (Tan and Soh 1994, 8-23). In these divergent ways, the pre-independence Singaporean presses could not have reflected nor constructed a singular understanding of a

1 According to the editorial of the first issue of the *Straits Times* (*ST*) 15 July 1845 quoted in Turnbull (1995,
Singaporean identity. The readership of the *Straits Times* was an exception for reflecting the loyalties of a thin, English-educated, Asian and European-descended elite. And during the Japanese Occupation, their temporary overlordship complicated this diversity by superimposing Japanese language media on this cultural mosaic.

Wielding these diverse information flows into a viable Singaporean nation was a formidable task facing the Peoples' Action Party (PAP) government upon achieving self-government. This task was not made easier by the wider Cold War and decolonisation politics afflicting Southeast Asia, China and India. Malays could be swayed by the media narratives of Malayan and Indonesian independence from neighbouring Malaya and Indonesia. The Chinese were vulnerable to cultural and ideological propaganda from Maoist China, while the Indians were susceptible to Indian nationalism. The centrifugal pull on Singaporean loyalties beyond its borders had in fact been experienced by both the Labour Front administrations, which preceded the PAP, and the PAP administration itself under the two self-governing constitutions negotiated from the British in the 1950s. The *Straits Times* advocated stability based on the preservation of the status quo and was perceived to articulate European commercial interests. Unsurprisingly, it was attacked by nationalists for its neocolonialism (Turnbull 1995,198-219). Meanwhile, the respective Asian language presses favoured self-government or independence along racial lines. Communist propaganda also resonated among large sections of the Chinese community about colonialism's threat to Chinese identity if 'socialist' independence was not achieved. During Singapore's brief federation with Malaysia (1963-65), vernacular newspapers exacerbated tensions between the PAP in Singapore and the Malay-Chinese-Indian Alliance government in Kuala Lumpur.
Vernacular newspapers were both used by politicians to stir up readers' passions across the border, as well as placing politicians in difficult positions of defending communal interests once partisan lines had been sustained by editorials against 'others'. Several serious racial riots in Singapore during and after the federation experience were publicly blamed on the incitement of racially biased media (K.Y. Lee 1998c, 551-569, 605-607).

Due to these precedents, the PAP government has consciously maintained a 'national' media policy emphasising the nation-building role of media channels, whether newspaper, radio or television, in avoiding the incitement of racial and religious hatreds within Singapore, or in neighbouring Malaysia and Indonesia. Furthermore, Singaporean media could not become agents of foreign interests, especially in the light of anti-colonialism, communism and the federation experience. They instead ought to inform objectively within the limits set out above, to educate, and to build a national consensus on desirable values. Debate and dissent would be tolerated so long as it did not diminish nation-building efforts.²

Radio was not significantly politicised because its introduction in the 1920s was government-controlled, and it remains regulated today despite privatisation in the 1990s (Kuo and Chen 1983, 65-69; Tan and Soh 1994, 63-66). It has served as a mouthpiece of the government of the day, whether they were the Japanese, the British, or the PAP, in countering the respective propaganda of external radio broadcasts during the Japanese Occupation, or communist radio from Peking and the Malayan jungles during the 1960s. Following the launch of digital radio in Singapore in 1999, the Deputy Prime Minister explained:

Each listener feels that he or she is the only person being addressed by the radio presenter.

That is why radio remains a valuable link between the Government and Singaporeans...Even in our present peaceful times, radio can go beyond entertaining Singaporeans, to educate, motivate and help us form the national consensus. (Chang 1999)

And this fact of government-regulated domestic radio coexists with the wide availability of the BBC World Service and other FM, MW and SW broadcasts from the outside.

The history of television in Singapore closely followed radio's. The government in 1963 introduced it with the same aims as radio and the press: to inform, entertain and to cultivate a national identity. On the other hand, the government was aware of the educational and economic contributions of television from the outside to the wider goal of material development. Although live and delayed satellite television broadcasts were packaged into national television programming since the 1970s, along with the fact that imports of foreign programmes reached 55-70% of airtime in 1983 (Varis 1984, 146, tab. 1), it was CNN's demonstration effect which accelerated developments in 1990-91. CNN’s worldwide real-time reporting of the Gulf War brought not only a rise in local audience numbers for news television, but also demand from the business community for more sources of market-sensitive news from the Gulf (Tan and Soh 1994, 73-75). In the 1990s, the government also saw advantage in encouraging the global media firms to locate headquarters, re-broadcasting and post-production facilities in Singapore in the way that high-technology MNCs were being enticed into the Singaporean economy. This was complemented by the advanced satellite broadcast infrastructure on the island, and the liberalisation of the domestic telecommunications market following the WTO agreements in 1996 (STS 1996; Satnews Asia Online 2000). At the end of 1997, the country hosted 208 accredited correspondents and
camera crew, representing 69 foreign media companies performing national terrestrial, as well as regional and global satellite programming functions. These range from Associated Press and Reuters to the BBC, CNN, CNBC Asia Business News, Disney and HBO (Home Box Office). (Ministry of Information and the Arts 1998, 276) Although there are no available global comparisons with hubs such as New York, London and Hong Kong, these statistics show that foreign media have a large in situ presence to scrutinise the host country.

In another instance, in terms of daily newspapers, Singapore had 12 in 1970, but only 8 in 1996 (UNESCO 1999a, IV-124, tab. IV.8). This ranked Singapore in 1996 above the world median of 4 newspapers per country, and thirteenth among Asia-Pacific and South Asian countries. These statistics by themselves do not reflect the diversity of media availability in relation to the country's size of 659.9 square kilometres and a small population of almost 4 million. For instance, although the government-linked Singapore Press Holdings Group controlled 100% of the eight local dailies from 1996 to the end of the period of this study (Ministry of Information and the Arts 1998, 275-276; Country Profile Singapore 2000:Mass Media), foreign daily newspapers, such as the Asian Wall Street Journal and International Herald Tribune, as well as weekly journals such as Time and Asiaweek, have been available at news stands and through both private and public subscriptions. By 1999, these external print media outnumbered the local dailies by 14 to 8. In terms of radio receivers per 1,000 inhabitants, the number rose from 241 in 1970 to 741 in 1996, making Singapore the third highest in Asia-Pacific and South Asia that year, and putting her way

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3 It is noteworthy that most of the 26 foreign television (satellite and cable) broadcasters set up shop in Singapore at the height of the Asian Values Debate, between 1992 and 1998. (R. Lim 1998)

4 The world median for daily newspapers, as well as the regional ranking of 25 Asian countries, were calculated by the author from Table IV.8 of UNESCO (1999a, IV-106 – IV-133). Comparisons of this type were otherwise unavailable.

5 Ownership has since increased to 13 newspapers and four magazines in 2000.
above the 1996 world average of 417 (UNESCO 1999a, IV-228, IV-8, tabs. IV.14, IV.S.3). Meanwhile, measures for television receivers per 1,000 inhabitants showed a fourfold increase from 96 in 1970 to 385 in 1996, making Singapore second highest in Asia-Pacific and South Asia, and exceeding the world average of 238 for 1996 (UNESCO 1999a, IV-228, IV-8, tabs. IV.14, IV.S.3). Furthermore, under the Singapore One communications infrastructure masterplan, all Singaporean homes have been equipped for access to commercial cable television and Internet-based multimedia applications at the end of 1999. These wired outlets provide complementarity and competition to the Government-linked and privatised 'Singapore TV12', Television Corporation of Singapore channels in English, Mandarin, Malay and Tamil, as well as the local radio stations run by the Radio Corporation of Singapore, the Armed Forces and the National Trades Union Congress. By this time, Singapore was rated as having achieved a 45.84% personal computer-to-home ratio, which is the world's third highest after the USA and Luxembourg (Tee 1997; Tanzer 1999; ITU 1999, A-23, tab. 6). In 1998, the number of Internet users (per 100 persons) in the country ranked one of the highest in Asia and the world at 17.39, which compared favourably with Japan's 13.26, Denmark's 18.87, USA's 22.19 and Sweden's high of 39.53 (ITU 1999, A-18, tab. 4). Singapore's Internet policy emphasises light touch regulation, and blocks objectionable pornographic and ethnically sensitive sites where feasible, but treats web vandalism and hacking as conventional crimes punishable in a court (D.T.E. Lim 2001).

These statistics indicate a high level of media exposure for a small population. Admittedly, ordinary Singaporeans' access to direct-to-home satellite television is still...
prohibited at the time of writing, but most foreign channels such as CNN, BBC and CNBC Asia Business News are widely available and uncensored via Cable and Internet. The country is thus exposed to many global webs of information discourses. The potential for value conflict with the external had already been proved in the press arena beginning in the late 1950s. During the 1959 election campaign that facilitated the PAP's entry into government, the party's candidates accused the Straits Times' expatriate staff of neglecting the interests of a self-governing Singaporean nation-in-waiting. Furthermore, the paper failed to foster a climate favourable to federating with Malaya. The newspaper not only countered with editorials of its own, but took the issue to the International Press Institute's General Assembly, complaining that the PAP had threatened press freedom. The Institute sent an inspector to Singapore who found that both the party and the newspaper had over-reacted in the heat of electioneering (Turnbull 1995, 214-219). In 1971, the PAP government's frictions with the press soured over national security issues when the Internal Security Act was used to detain three senior executives of the Chinese language paper, Nanyang Siang Pau, on charges of stirring Chinese racial emotions against the government's language policies. Meanwhile, an English paper, the Singapore Herald, had its license withdrawn because of foreign funding and its participation in 'black operations' run by communists. A third paper, the Eastern Sun, closed voluntarily when allegations were made public about Hong Kong-based communist funding for its operations (Turnbull 1995, 287-293). Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew faced criticism for these actions at the International Press Institute conference in Helsinki later that year. He defended his actions on the grounds that the integrity of the nation-building effort by an elected government was a priority over the freedom of the press, and that the latter should contribute to nation-building instead (Turnbull 1995, 293).
In the late 1980s, the Singaporean government took *Time*, the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, and *Asiaweek* to court for inaccuracies in reporting government policies, and refusing to publish the Government's replies. They were accused of misrepresenting local political events, court proceedings against opposition politicians, and the detention without trial under the Internal Security Act of persons involved in a 1987 'Marxist conspiracy' to topple the government. In each case, the Government either sued for libel or gazetted the journal concerned for restricted local circulation, instead of enforcing an outright ban allowed under existing legislation (Tan and Soh 1994, 38-42, 55-56). This had the effect of compelling some of the publications concerned to temporarily terminate distribution, and involved the country's foreign relations with discursive conflicts over freedom of the press abroad, particularly with the US. This pattern continued well into the 1990s. The Singaporean government maintained the position that domestic politics ought to be only the business of Singaporeans, and that the offending papers had interfered in Singaporean politics through biased reporting and in refusing to publish the government's letters of reply.

To date, the Singaporean government's jousts with the domestic and foreign media have primarily been with the newspapers. One reason for this is historical, as the earlier account of the press showed; the other is suggested by Prime Minister Lee himself when he elaborated in a speech the difference between television and newspaper:

Television depends on pictures rather than words. The press uses language to make its points. Readers respond rationally to words whereas viewers respond emotionally to images. So the press can make up for deficits of television pictures because the press communicates ideas whilst television transmits images or impressions. Nevertheless, the press are not merely passive reporters of events. (K.Y. Lee 1990)

The analysis points to a clear appreciation of the media's power of construction. This is why Singapore's official media posture, as restated by Prime Minister Lee to the Commonwealth
Press Union in 1990, literally on the eve of the Asian Values furore, placed a premium on communitarian discourse as the best defence:

It (the Singaporean government) will not allow interference by foreigners in its domestic debate. Singapore's voters are English-educated unlike voters in other countries in Asia. Singapore is a totally urban society with state-of-the-art telecommunications and no government can effectively censor what the people read. But the government can and will insist on no foreign interference in the domestic politics of Singapore. We do this by insisting on our right to reply.

...[I]t brings home to Singaporeans that regardless of the pontifications of foreign correspondents and commentators, it is the values of the elected government of Singapore that must and will prevail. Ministers in Singapore are rational and logical people. They do understand the Western world and the changes which Western technology has brought about. They welcome, indeed they embrace, these changes. Singapore has found its niche in the world as a centre for trade, finance, banking, transportation and telecommunications because its ministers have recognised and embraced these innovations. But the Singapore Government cannot change its stand that the political process of Singapore is reserved only for Singaporeans. (K. Y. Lee 1990)

The embrace of the external is reinforced by the Singaporean economy's thorough and deliberate interconnectedness with global economic space even prior to Independence in 1965. Retrospectively, it can be seen in equal measure as a colonial legacy and a result of Singapore's government policies. The British empire had supported free immigration, and developed the administration, harbour and light industrial processing facilities for the purpose of servicing both regional trade, and trade with the rest of the far eastern possessions. Malayan rubber and tin, in particular, were processed in intermediate stages and shipped from there to fulfil the needs of the metropolitan industrial revolution in the nineteenth century. Post-Independence, the PAP government pragmatically toned down its democratic socialist rhetoric and continued to engage closely with a primarily western-driven

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9 Much of this trading function was set out broadly, and in the case of rubber and tin exports, with foresight, by colonial founder and Lieutenant-Governor of Singapore, Thomas Stamford Raffles. See his official correspondence excerpted in Moore and Moore (1969, 44-107), and on Singapore as a strategic conduit for primary products (pp.476-483). Refer also to Turnbull (1989, ch. 2-4).
international political economy. Through a combination of realistic resource appraisals, and Cold War exigencies, the new government paid lip service to anti-colonial ideals while intensifying efforts to invite western and Japanese MNCs to underwrite dependent capitalist development. In the geography of dependency, Singapore aspired to being the semi-peripheral economy servicing the consumer-driven and capital-rich core. Statistical figures from the mid-1980s to 2000 reveal the ratio of external trade to GDP at a consistent 3-to-1, indicating the extent to which the country is integrated into post-1945 neo-liberal regimes. This engagement is manifested in Singapore’s foreign economic diplomacy with the world at large: the relentless initiatives and refrains of open and complementary collaboration in industrial parks and ‘growth triangles’, as well as GATT- and WTO-consistency of its bilateral and multilateral trade, have all endeared the country to global economic networks of financial services, transport and communications, computer software research, manufacturing and engineering, and increasingly, Internet-based electronic commerce. The Republic is in turn an active campaigner for structures such as free trade agreements and inter-regional economic forums between Asia and Europe, Asia and North America and, more recently, with Latin America (Henson 1994; Goh 1996; Tan and Gan 1999).

Singapore’s profile in capitalist economic globalization is also intertwined with its positioning in the political component of global information space. As a weak state created at the height of the Cold War, its foreign policy leadership had to align international political loyalties to regime survival. Circumstances were such that it was economically tethered to both pro-western and radical anti-colonial states, and faced simultaneously with transnational

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communist and racial subversion. Regime survival has become nearly indistinguishable from national economic survival. This is reflected in a somewhat elitist or soft authoritarian system of foreign policy-making. The (economic) survivalist ideology was easily translated into an omnidirectional pragmatism by the late 1960s. This pragmatism manifested itself in a curious series of postures between 1965 and 1990 which initially included delaying the withdrawal of British military bases for security and economic reasons; actively courting Indian, Egyptian, Israeli, and Burmese support for recognition and defence assistance; signing up to regionalism under ASEAN; keeping the US at arms length; and opening trade links to both the USSR and China. Around 1967, against the backdrop of Britain's 'East of Suez' military withdrawal, Singapore took the initiative to improve ties with the US. Staunch support for Washington's war in Vietnam began, and in 1978-80, Singapore stood with the US in condemning both Vietnam and the USSR for territorial violations in Cambodia and Afghanistan. However in 1983, Washington's invasion of Grenada was attacked on the same grounds of the infringement of sovereignty. Singapore was also initially reluctant to endorse the Indonesian invasion of East Timor in 1975, and only did so under pressure from its ASEAN neighbours (Soh 1965; ST 1965; Chan 1969; Buszynski 1985; Rajaratnam 1987a, 493-494). This sort of selective and delicate non-alignment required the maintenance of an independent domestic and ideological identity so as to maximise the country's manoeuvrability vis-à-vis the rest of international society.

12 Interviews with [ex-foreign minister and] Senior Minister S. Rajaratnam (1987a, 491-492; 1987b, 524-526, 533-535, 539). In reflecting on the foundations of foreign policy in terms of his experience as the first foreign minister, Rajaratnam described the survival of the country as being dependent on Ibn Khaldun's 'asabiyya' qualities (unity and resilience through adversity) and the proper ordering of the roles of captain and passengers
The preceding elaboration of Singapore's deep involvement with the three components of global information space — media, economic and political — provides the background for the next justification for this case study: the country's consistent border porosity in relation to foreign policy decisions. The acknowledgement of porosity was made, for instance, in Lee Kuan Yew's 1966 speech on 'being Singaporeans':

The foreign policy of Singapore must ensure, regardless of the nature of the government it has from time to time, that this migrant community that brought in life, vitality, and enterprise from many parts of the world should always find an oasis here whatever happens in the surrounding environment...

The foreign policy for Singapore must be one as to encourage first, the major powers in this world to find it — if not in their interests to help us — at best in their interests not to have us go worse: "If you do not like me as I am, then just think of what a nasty business it could be if I am not what I am."

The second point is that we must always offer to the rest of the world a continuing interest in the type of society we project. (K. Y. Lee 1968, 87-88)

The concept of an open oasis rendered materially and socially inviting to individual talent and the rest of international society is understandable due to the country's geopolitical realities. Its Asian population composition — Chinese, Malays and Indians — will always be vulnerable to transnational ethnic appeals originating from their respective ancestral homelands. Singapore's geographic location as a maritime, air and lately, ICT junction, will ensure that it will be a nodal point of global capitalist flows. In the face of continuous economic competition in the 1990s from London, New York, Tokyo, and regionally, from Hong Kong, Kuala Lumpur, Bangkok, Shanghai and Sydney, the Singaporean nation-state is also likely to aspire to retain its coveted investment-friendly status of being the world's first or second most competitive locale. It has achieved this by embracing the opinions and

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preferences of certain global capitalist elites whether they are economics professors, Chief Executive Officers or risk analysts. The Singaporean state is engaged in foreign policy whenever it conducts foreign and domestic economic policies (Acharya and Ramesh 1993, 134-152; Rodan 1997, 148-178), and with an influx of foreign media agents drawn in by technology, trade and investment, the external scrutiny of domestic processes is intensive to the degree that the country's leaders and citizens draw both criticism and plaudits for their excessive fiscal and social discipline (STWE 2000).

This porosity gives rise to the third justification for this case study: Singapore's vulnerability to a consequential clash of ideas across open borders. In 2001, consultants A.T. Kearney and the journal *Foreign Policy* quantitatively measured globalization by the degree of openness exhibited by each state. They ranked Singapore first because

The country far outdistances its nearest rivals in terms of cross-border contact between people, with per capita international outgoing telephone traffic totalling nearly 390 minutes per year. Singapore also boasts a steady stream of international travellers, equal to three times its total population. ("Measuring Globalization" 2001, 59)

But it issued a caveat:

Yet in recent years, Singapore has struggled to maintain high levels of trade, foreign investment and portfolio investment which help support its globalization lead. The Asian [economic] flu is partly to blame...But Singapore's slow progress in privatizing state industries, its failure to win endorsement for a regional free trade agreement, and its tight controls over Internet development have also slowed its integration with other countries...But if Singaporean officials are somewhat authoritarian, at least they are honest. ("Measuring Globalization" 2001, 59, 61)

This potential for value and identity conflict in a globalizing milieu leads to the salient role of the Singaporean foreign policy establishment, which has taken offence at foreign ideas and wishes to defend local political identity in the 'soft' battleground of the Asian Values Debate. This has had discursive consequences for 'hard' political practice
worldwide, and in particular, for post-Cold War US-European human rights foreign policy agendas. This debate involved no troops, missiles, mineral resources or direct casualties, but has been about defending and projecting political community amidst post-Cold War political fluidity. Singapore's Minister for Information and the Arts interestingly described Singapore's 'defence' against external influences as a national immunisation against unwanted ideas with demonstration effects:

[W]e need a kind of semi-permeable membrane to preserve our own bubble in Singapore. It cannot be an impermeable skin because we need constant interaction with the world outside. It cannot be completely porous either because the internal and external environments will quickly equalise. It has to be semi-permeable like the wall of a cell so that an osmotic pressure difference can be maintained.

There are two aspects to maintaining the bubble. One is preventive; the other is immunological. Preventive actions include immigration controls, police action and censorship of materials which come in. Preventive actions have to be selective and intelligent. We cannot be comprehensive because there are too many movements in and out of Singapore...

In addition to preventive measures, we need an immune system which fights infection within the bubble. While we can minimise contamination, we cannot expect our environment to ever be germ-free....Central to our immune system is the value system we internalise. We must therefore pay particular attention to the way our values are preserved and transmitted. In any society, the main temples [that] preserve and transmit values are homes, schools, religious organisations, clan and cultural organisations, and national institutions like the SAF [Singapore Armed Forces]. If our values are strong, we will remain Singaporean, however our economy is internationalised and wherever our people travel. (Yeo 1994)

In the light of this statement, the Asian Values Debate is, as its label implies, a clash of ideas versus ideas in global information space with portents for transforming populations' attitudes and governing arrangements behind borders. That this discursive conflict reproduced itself through real consequences for governance can not only be seen in this Chapter's list of events involving Singapore and other Asian countries in the imposition of legal and fiscal standards by 'others', but also in how the US ambassador to Indonesia in 1993 reported the aggravated policy challenge of defending US interests in a region inflamed by the publication
of Huntington’s initial thesis on ‘clash of civilisations’ in Foreign Affairs. He noted that many senior Asian officials assumed the new tone of US foreign policy was civilisational warfare.\textsuperscript{14}

### 5.3 Introducing the Asian Values Debate

The Asian Values Debate is centred upon an exceptional set of ideas with utility, or implications, for the way nation-states are governed, with a view to achieving prosperity and moral livelihood for their citizens. At face value, the debate appears merely academic, but on the plane of policy implications and a discursive interpretation of past, present and projected realities, it is political in its effects on relations between states. Hence the appending of the element of ‘good governance’ to the Asian Values Debate.

The political impact is channelled across borders according to the characteristics of information flow. ‘Asian Values’ derives its referent from one part of the world and once transmitted in the vicinity, resonates among like-minded or ideologically-stalemated political constituencies in control of domestic and foreign policies in an imputed and self-referent region of origin. This discourse is then projected across the Pacific and other global channels where ‘global standards’ are being worked out.\textsuperscript{15} As it will be shown through the following summary of the Debate, it is a political struggle marrying theory and praxis within global information space, where ideas for global society, order or segregation contest with power backing from assorted local centres.

\textsuperscript{14} Reported in Harries (1994, 109). This view of tangible effects is backed up by Singaporean diplomat Bilahari Kausikan (1993, 25-41).

\textsuperscript{15} Refer to the 1993 UN World Human Rights Conference in Section 5.4.1.
The Asian Values Debate had existed at some level since the era of nineteenth century European imperialism in Asia. European demonstration of superior technology, especially of firepower, had induced questioning of Asian civilisation in the pan-Asian region from China to India. Nationalism, in the region tended to be anti-colonial, anti-western, and syncretic in their attempts to fashion a semblance of indigenous ideologies with elements from the West. Witness post-independence Indonesia’s attempt at moulding nationalism, socialism and communism together in ‘Nasakom’, Gandhi’s satyagraha concept and righteous non-violence, as well as Mao Zedong’s sinicised reading of Marxism-Leninism. Due to the coincidence between the decolonisation process and the Cold War, the proper differentiation between indigenous ideologies could not be made. The latter were collapsed politically into ‘pro-communism’ and communism, or ‘pro-democratic capitalism’ and the ‘Free World’.

The ideological variety began to surface however with the waning of the Cold War. Rising Asian economic prosperity centred on the first four newly-industrialising countries of the Asia-Pacific – South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore – in the shadow of Japan’s success, followed by the second tier comprising Malaysia, Thailand, China and Indonesia, accentuated Asian uniqueness. China was also starting to face increased western censure over the human rights atrocities committed during the June 1989 Tiananmen Incident and her attitudes towards Hong Kong’s handover. This pattern of a ‘western crusade’ over human rights was repeated over the rest of non-communist Asia. Indonesia, for example, was abrasive towards the West following the latter’s criticism of its suppression of dissent in East

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16 As early as the 1960s, studies of Asian political systems have suggested that a geocultural reckoning, be it balance, or confrontation, would be in the offing as soon as the decolonised Southeast Asian political region
Timor in 1991. Singapore itself, through the speeches of Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew, attempted to disabuse the West of imposing change upon China. Lee said the West was foisting values on ‘a Chinese civilisation of 4,000 years by an act of Congress, or [by] cancelling Most Favoured Nation status.’ (ST 1993a) US foreign policy, during the final months of the administration of George Bush Senior, had slowly begun to turn towards a human rights emphasis reminiscent of the Carter Administration. In 1993, President-elect Bill Clinton made human rights promotion a priority of US foreign policy, having castigated his predecessor for ‘coddling tyrants’ around the world (McNulty 1992; Clinton 1993). By this time, ethno-religious genocide in the Balkans had begun to feed debate on cultural exceptionalism in the ‘new world order’. The lines of the respective foreign policies were aligned for a confrontation that was to follow.

In the years 1992-93, the Asian Values Debate was sparked simultaneously in the realm of newspapers, television and international relations journals. This had two sources. Firstly, Harvard academic Samuel Huntington published his ‘clash of civilisations’ reading of the post-Cold War agenda for western foreign policies (Huntington 1993a). Secondly, Singaporean diplomats such as Kishore Mahbubani and Bilahari Kausikan were astounded by the post-Cold War western mood of triumphalism they experienced abroad in both diplomatic and academic encounters (Kausikan 1995-96, 279-280; Mahbubani 1998a, 9-10). The latter motivated them to vent their reactions in the journals Foreign Affairs, The National Interest and Foreign Policy. Another Singaporean diplomat and distinguished ex-UN official, Tommy Koh, started debate in the pages of the International Herald Tribune by replying to attempted to synthesise exceptionalist paths of development which delivered tangible material and social progress (Sih 1959; D. Wilson 1972; Pye 1974).
an article in late 1993 that criticised the publication of Mahbubani’s initial ‘West and the Rest’ article in The National Interest (Mahbubani 1998b, 37-56) and other Asian ruminations on value difference. No single person coined ‘Asian Values’, it was a convenient shorthand for everything purported to be distinct about Asian political culture. Much of the Singaporean role in the Asian Values Debate explained elsewhere will cover the entire trajectory of the debate, since the Singaporeans re-ignited it in the 1990s after 50 years of dormancy.

A list of 10 [East] Asian Values was presented by Tommy Koh, in his reply in the International Herald Tribune:

1. An East Asian does not practise ‘the extreme form of individualism’ but instead reconciles his/her existence with the community at local and national levels.
2. ‘East Asians believe in strong families’, which explains lower divorce rates in Asia vis-à-vis the West.
3. East Asians revere education at all strata of society.
4. ‘East Asians believe in the virtues of saving and frugality.’
5. ‘East Asians consider hard work a virtue.’
6. ‘East Asians practise national teamwork.’
7. The Asian version of a social contract between citizen and state operates. The government maintains law and order and provides for citizens’ basic needs: jobs, housing, health care and education, and treats them with ‘fairness and humanity’. In return, the citizens become law-abiding, respectful of authority, diligent, promote their children’s education, and practise self-reliance.
8. In some parts of Asia, governments build ‘stakeholder’ societies by granting a large percentage of shares in public corporations to citizens.
9. East Asians want their governments to police a morally wholesome environment.
10. ‘Good governments in East Asia want a free press but, unlike the West, they do not believe that such freedom is an absolute right.’

Koh went on to conclude that ‘these ten values form a framework that has enabled societies in East Asia to achieve economic prosperity, progress, harmonious relations between citizens, and law and order (Singapore and Tokyo are the two safest cities in the world).’

17 Especially Lee Kuan Yew’s interviews with CNN and other television networks cited throughout this Chapter.
18 Tommy Koh, “Does East Asia Stand for Any Positive Values?” IHT 11-12 December 1993 reproduced in T. Koh (1998, 349-351). Koh’s general list has seen very slight variations on the same communitarian theme when compared to other comparable writings from Singapore and elsewhere in Asia. See Mahbubani (1998c, 57-80)
To this list, Vietnamese and Chinese (i.e. PRC) politicians have amplified the priority of economic and social human rights over the civil and political human rights (Zhu 1997). Moreover, Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamed and then-Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim of Malaysia emphasised the socio-economic ascent of East Asia from the miseries of decolonisation and development, whilst retaining traditional values, into an Asian ‘Renaissance’ (Mahathir and Ishihara 1995; Mahathir 1998, ch. 4–5).19 Some Japanese scholars and politicians have also maintained their continuity with this recent bandwagon by insisting that Japan’s success is also a signal that the West ought to learn something from Asia’s ‘Pacific Century’ (Funabashi 1993; Mahathir and Ishihara 1995). Much of this debate reached its zenith in the 1992-99 period, for it was not merely coincidental but impelled by the end of the Cold War, the globalization momentum in communications, culture and economics, and significantly by the human rights and democracy platform of the Clinton Administration’s foreign policy. This much is admitted by proponents of Asian Values and its corresponding implication for twenty-first century good governance (Kausikan 1993; Mahathir and Ishihara 1995; Wain 1997; Mahbubani 1998a, 9-10; 1998b, 37-56). At the core, there is a search for ideological equality perhaps best expressed by Lee Kuan Yew’s closing statement in his Foreign Affairs interview:

Let me be frank; if we did not have the good points of the West to guide us, we wouldn’t have got out of our backwardness. We would have been a backward economy with a backward society. But we do not want all of the West. (Quoted in Zakaria 1994, 125)

Lee Kuan Yew’s lists of values and comments on them can be read from a speech he gave in Tokyo (K.Y. Lee 1992a) and Lee’s interview in Zakaria (1994). The Singaporean list can be read ideologically as resonating with Confucian and neo-Confucian philosophy and this gives it a certain amount of credibility depending on the interpretation one sides with. In other words, Confucian precepts can justify extensive paternalistic government through its emphasis on orderly relationships and sacrifice for fellow men. At the same time, the emphasis on cultivation of the self can equally be used to align it with liberal individualism, while its embrace of virtuous nepotism can legitimise corruption - two points Asian Values critics seize on. The following Confucianist studies underline this duality: Chen (1986) and de Bary and Tu (1998).

19 See also excerpts of interviews with Mahathir in Sheridan (1999, 104-105). Anwar Ibrahim’s (1996) version is noticeably qualified by a much less combative stance than Mahathir’s or the Singaporeans’.
Ranged against the proponents of Asian exceptionalism are a more varied coalition. The ‘extremists’ broadly include the Clinton Administration and the so-called ‘US/Western liberals’, ex-Hong Kong Governor Christopher Patten and an Anglo-Hong Kong School, the Filipino, the Taiwanese and the South Korean schools (Clinton 1993, 1995; Huntington 1993b; Neier 1993; Jones 1994; Lingle 1998, ch. 3; 1996; Hernandez 1998; T. H. Lee 1995, 1996; Kim 1994). Although this is not the place for pondering the subtle distinctions between each, these can be said collectively to reject Asian exceptionalism on four general grounds:

1. Asian values are also universal values as recorded in the original 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, both 1966 UN-endorsed International Covenants on Economic, Social, Cultural and Civil Rights and those on Civil and Political Rights, as well as possessing similarities to Max Weber’s thesis of Protestant ethics (Neier 1993, 49-50; Jones 1994, 27-28; Patten 1996, 8; De Bary 1998, 17-29).
2. Asian advocates are turning Confucianism on its head and straightjacketing the complexity of Asian developmental paths. Confucianism used to be seen as a bane of development, but is now justified as a means to prosperity. ‘Asian’ heritage is also wider than the Sinic-Confucian and Buddhist roots of East Asia; its Hindu, Malay and Muslim strands have been ignored.
3. Asian democratic showcases such as Taiwan and South Korea reveal that Confucian thought is equally supportive and amenable to liberal democratic routes to good governance (De Bary 1998, 134-157; T. H. Lee 1996, 6-8; Huntington 1993b, 39-40; Jones 1994, 24; Kim 1994).
4. Asian material prosperity is based upon the learning of western values such as the belief in progress, free trade, economic and individual liberties. Central to this is the argument that knowledge and technology-applications cannot work for prosperity in an oppressive polity (Patten 1996, 9-10; Huntington 1993b, 42).

These ‘extreme’ positions largely represent a perspective centred upon Francis Fukuyama’s initial 1989 ‘end of history’ liberal democratic triumphalism.

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20 This group is characterised by a denial of Asian-Western value incompatibilities, particularly prominent before the Hong Kong handover of July 1997. (Armentrout 1995; Patten 1996; 1998a, 146-172; Ng 1997)
21 Made most pointedly by Patten (1998a, 157-166; 1996, 7-8). These opinions however ignore the fact that Lee Kuan Yew and others in the ‘Singapore School’ argue that East Asia is a discursive entity of Confucian and neo-Confucian cultures, and which excludes some Hindu-Islamic versions, while Mahathir’s line technically includes all Asia.
Ironically, Fukuyama has located himself among a ‘moderate opposition’ within the Asian Values Debate. It is a location shared equally by an umbrella coalition of NGOs identified with the alternative NGO Bangkok Declaration (Asian Cultural Forum on Development 1993) in the prelude to the 1993 UN World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna. This moderate opposition argues that whilst differences in developmental stages and historical contingencies occur between Asian states and the rest of the world, existing Asian governments have not delivered justice with economic growth, but instead cloaked their shortcomings behind selective Asian Value-legitimised authoritarianism. Confucianism, as Fukuyama, Emmerson and Glazer argue, has many facets, some of which support the authoritarian characteristics of family cohesion and stoic work ethics, while others reject political authoritarianism by justifying rebellion against power abuses and neglect of popular welfare (Fukuyama 1995, 1997; Emmerson 1995; Scalapino 1997; Glazer 1999). Liberal democracy is still valid for Asian adoption if it can graft itself onto traditional family-oriented ethics, and offers the same, if not better material and ethical goods than authoritarian versions.

The Asian Values Debate is clearly conflated at several levels of theory and praxis, and which can be more usefully analysed as a global contest of political information if it is conceived of at three levels:

Figure 3: Scheme of the Asian Values Debate

1. Philosophical Value and Systemic Difference Argument

(a) Primacy of communitarianism versus primacy of individualism

(b) Primacy of order and harmony versus primacy of competitive idealism
2. Normative Governing Differences

(a) Which type of government: democratic or authoritarian?

(b) Which type of democracy: liberal or illiberal?

(c) Which is the superior economic development formula: mixed state-guided capitalism or classical economic liberalism?

(d) How large should the role of social discipline be in all-round development: more or less? Communitarianism versus individualism/polyarchy.

3. Policy – Political Consequences

(a) Human rights as conditionality or marginality in foreign (and economic) policies?

(b) Should foreign policy question domestic and regional political legitimacy: ideational incitement to change or maintain inter-state consensus?

(c) Should value advocacy be a way of putting down geoeconomic competitors?

Evidently, the polarised arguments of systemic difference lead to the prescriptive level of advocating normative governing types, which in turn translates into road maps, to use Goldstein and Keohane’s term (1993, 12-13), for policy-political implementation. LIO and LOI thrive on translating empirical and ideational content into foreign policies. In this sense, the Asian Values Debate involves advocating and defending, à la ideological conflict, rival versions of global future(s) in social organisation. The stakes involve not merely foreign policy elites, although foreign policies are still dominated by them, but also the populations they claim to represent. Like ideology, the Asian Values Debate is fuelled by institutionalisation via outside-in strategies in regimes articulating certain governance philosophies for new, weak, transitional, and reforming states. In short, following Foucaultian discourse, power operates according to which side one adheres to within the Debate. This section has given a flavour of the latter, prior to its possible analysis on the
basis of LIO and LOI. The following study of the ‘Singapore School’ demonstrates how LIO foreign policy can operate by translating ideas into policy.

5.4 Singapore’s Leadership Inside-Out Strategy

As established in Chapters 3 and 4, soft power is based on ‘communitarian attractiveness’ and its demonstration, and hence possesses three characteristics. Firstly, it uses a communitarian base as an ideological showcase. Secondly, it presupposes an omnidirectional audience in the interaction among nation-states within an anarchic global information space. Thirdly, it places a premium on projecting consistency and credibility of information about a country. LIO encapsulates all of these as a soft power foreign policy strategy. It works on the assumption that the foreign policy leadership enjoys a reasonably stable following as its resource base in two senses. First, they must draw upon a set of cultural symbols and other socialisation factors derived as uniquely as possible from their nation-state of chosen citizenship. Secondly, in order that these symbols and factors can be projected as a model for emulation and respect by other actors in international relations, the coherence of the ‘model’ must depend on the degree of unity of elites and masses alike within the particular nation-state. Hence the importance of domestic political cooperation for foreign policy ends. This model to be used as soft power must assume the free attractiveness and transmittable form of an idea that can be sold in toto, or adapted with minimal modifications to other actors bilaterally, or multilaterally. The object of LIO is to get others to empathise and to support one’s way of life, thereby securing it from physical and non-physical harm. Potentially, LIO also shapes global futures by supplying a map of future governance. LIO is discourse as power abroad.
The seeds of the LIO in Singapore’s foreign policy vis-à-vis the Asian Values Debate are found in both the post-Cold War context and the historical factors arising from the 1959-65 period when the country passed from self-government under British supervision, to formal independence as a republic. The historical factors will be explored first. Like many newly-decolonised and newly-developing states confronted upon achieving statehood by Cold War geopolitics, Singapore’s foreign policy was consciously steered according to the strength of domestic assets and vulnerabilities in regard to situational (geography), material and ideological factors. As her first Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew noted, unlike many of the neighbouring states, the Republic could not refer to an idyllic territorial past when planning its future (K. Y. Lee 1968, 86-87). If anything, the distant past was one of existence as ‘war booty’ at the peripheries of the Malay, Javanese, Sumatran and Japanese empires (Wolters 1970, ch. 6-7; Thio 1991), while the more recent was that of the economic and migrant plural society of British colonial creation.22

It was the last that most enhanced the importance of the situational factors. As stated earlier in the introduction, the integrated regional and world economic role of Singapore was introduced consciously by British policy over a period of 146 years. The overwhelming importance of trade and communications hubbing services were one set of colonial legacies, the other was the microcosmic pattern of economically-induced Asian migration into the country. The result of this was a mix of predominantly Chinese, and substantial Indian (Tamil and Ceylonese), Malay (relatively indigenous) and Eurasian cultural strands managing a strategic emporium. The physical geography amplified the inter-Asian and global

22 The concept of plural society is elaborated by J.S. Fumivall as a ‘medley of peoples’ who ‘mix but do not combine...Each group holds by its own religion, its own culture and language, its own ideas and ways. As
importance of the territory continuously too: the island lay astride the sealanes connecting the South China Sea and Pacific Oceans to the East, and the Straits of Malacca and Indian Oceans to the West. This fact, and the maritime proximity of the major centres of mineral, agricultural, and subsequently manufactured goods in Southeast Asia, made the island a natural crossroads of material exchange. With the free movement and transit of goods and people, the interactions of culture, technology and other information flows occurred naturally on the island. At the same time, geography had also dictated that the island possessed no natural resources.

These situational factors contributed directly to the gelling of material and ideological factors in a pro-active foreign policy in 1959-65 and continuing thereafter. Materially, the country could only be wedded to support a neo-liberal posture on international economic flows. In 1966, an official instructional tract on foreign policy propounded ambitious priorities in spite of sizeable pockets of poverty, the lack of natural resources and recent communist and communalist disruptions:

...[A]s our standard of living is the highest in Asia, outside of Tokyo, we have a high standard of living to maintain for a population which is predominantly young and is growing at a rate which will bring it to 4,000,000 by the turn of the century...Our commercial organisation – in banking, insurance and brokerage firms, the dock facilities, the storage space, the agency houses – is unique in its intricacy and responsiveness, and the more who make use of it, the more assured our prosperity, and the more people who have a realistic vested interest in our survival, as friendship is underpinned by finance.\(^{23}\)

This drive to involve as many external parties as possible in the stakes of a global city thriving on intermediary roles located in Asia continued unabated after the end of the Cold War. Moreover, pronouncements on foreign policy now more boldly underlined the need to

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\(^{23}\) A survey of the colonial origins of Singapore's plural society is given in H.E. Wilson (1972, ch. 1).
exploit opportunities to sustain the country's accommodation as the thirteenth largest trading nation, and a position among the world's top 10 in terms of per capita GDP (H.K. Lim 1996). All this amounts to a new expansiveness in not only supporting, but actively shaping by words and deeds, multilateral political contexts (Chong 1998).

The ideological factors follow a similar trajectory. Ideologically, the Cold War loomed large in the domestic struggle for independence in 1954-65 (Bellows 1970; Chan 1985). With the support of Beijing, Moscow and then-Indonesian President Sukarno, the Malayan Communist Party pursued domestic 'anti-imperialist' subversion against the local British representatives, the Malaysian government and the ruling PAP in Singapore. In both open front and underground activities, the Communists attempted to frustrate the non-communist socialistic nationalists' plans to crystallise a self-governing polity acquiescent in the economy's western-oriented trade and financial links. At this time, the most successful socialistic nationalist faction led by Lee Kuan Yew had temporarily allied with the communist open front under the umbrella of the PAP from its founding in 1954 till 1961. They realised that their counter-propaganda against the communist hold on the civic cultural and economic associations of the Chinese majority had to be conducted abroad on the diplomatic front as well. This was an early attempt at soft power linking non-communist Singapore-style socialism to the dominant Third World currents of the 1960s. During the years in the Malaysian Federation (1963-65), Prime Minister Lee exercised what Peter Boyce has termed 'power without authority' in foreign affairs (Boyce 1965). Under formal British and Malaysian auspices, Lee had embarked on Afro-Asian, Australian and New Zealand

tours to drum up support for the normative vision of a non-communist Malaysian and Singaporean society. Lee's diplomacy also aimed to debunk communist charges of British neocolonialism in conniving in the formation of the Federation, its territorial retention of military bases, and its non-revolutionary character of independence. In fact the viability of genuine independence for a small state was an obsession with the country's foreign policy up till the 1980s.

Meanwhile in domestic society, the economy and political arrangements were being 'reengineered' by the governing party for long-term competition in the regional and world economy. Politically, it helped that the PAP was a disciplined umbrella party, cross-cutting race, class and professional cleavages. Its electorally-mandated dominance since 1959 enabled it to use its uninterrupted time in office to implement long-term infrastructure building projects and to assure investors that investment regimes would not suffer from the gyrations of political change, and ultimately to deliver a comfortable standard of living (Chan 1976; B.H. Lee 1986). The PAP itself learned corporatism from its erstwhile partners and enemies, the Chinese chauvinists and communists (K.Y. Lee 1998c, 172-173, 321-324). Using a combination of associating citizen groups, trade unions and civic associations with a parapolitical grassroots network both to provide transmission channels and feedback for government policies, public political culture became nationalised into a 'survival ideology' (Chan 1971, 1976). The latter signified a combined sense of unity of purpose, voluntary sacrifice and paternalistic cohesion in making the 'Singapore Inc.' vision work in spite of

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24 Judging by the consistent ranking of Singapore within the top 10 in the leading political economy and business indices such as the Global Competitiveness Report, these aspirations have been met throughout the 1990s (World Economic Forum 1990-99).
communist threats and ejection from a stillborn Malaysian common market. The PAP's effective political communication through the commercially consolidated pro-government local media reinforced this sense of 'survivalism'. The social and economic spheres of public life took the cues from the political prioritization of material modernization. As noted by academics studying Singapore's public policies in the 1970s and 1980s, the imputed generic communitarian roots of all Asian cultures, and primarily the Chinese Confucian version, were re-articulated and tapped to support official policies of corporatism (Tamney 1996, 25-50; B.H. Chua 1997). Political opposition and social behaviour were, by turns, exhorted and compelled by the threat of anti-crime and disorder legislation to be 'loyal' in avoiding activities such as strikes, riots, mass protest, street crime, and excessive individualism which could undermine diligence, trade and foreign investment. If deterrence failed, the government would police social and industrial harmony using its legislated powers.

Society was fostered towards macroeconomic goals through extensive educational opportunities and an informal contract, legitimised by the ruling party's regularly large electoral mandates, to deliver First World standards of living in approximately two generations. Economic hospitality to external links was ensured by the visible delivery of air, sea, road and power utility facilities that have been widely acclaimed by international and regional economic monitors (Ho 1996, 23-52; UNCTAD 1998, 76). This was supplemented by the Industrial Relations Act (Amendment) 1968, the consolidation of the pro-government

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25 A study has labelled the 'Singapore Inc.' state shaped by the combination of political and economic adversity a 'developmental' one in the sense that all, social, political and economic arrangements are singularly oriented towards achieving high economic growth (Perry, Kong and Yeoh 1997, 6-12). It helped that the PAP leadership consistently stressed cohesiveness within itself (Lam 1999). This vision of Singapore as a corporatist state is made explicit on the official government website <http://www.singapore-inc.com/writeup.html>.

26 The World Bank's The East Asian Miracle (1993, 178) draws attention to Confucian thought as an underpinning of successful development bureaucracies in Singapore, Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, China and Taiwan.
National Trades Union Congress and the practice of 'tripartism' in industrial relations. Tripartism meant that labour grievances and pay demands were negotiated behind closed doors in a collegial setting with key employers' representatives, trade unions and government seated around a common table. To accommodate wage adjustments regularly, the government created a National Wages Council where all three tripartist partners consensually set the tone for changes according to real and projected productivity and GDP growth and so on (Deyo 1981, 2-15, 41-51; Drysdale 1984, 404-412). The management of political feedback was also structured in like manner, via an extensive network of Peoples’ Association Community Clubs, Citizens’ Consultative Committees, Residents’ Committees, Town Councils and Community Development Councils, all alongside the Westminster-style inspired Parliament.

If this formula was authoritarianism disguised as pragmatic corporatism, it has been described as soft, being more the result of effective leadership-follower communication, and of a realistic appraisal of situational and material factors. Despite nearly unbroken economic growth except for recessions in 1973, 1985-6, 1998-9 and 2001, opposition parties came close to undermining PAP dominance in the 1984, 1988, 1991 and 1997 elections, but their combined share of total votes peaked at barely 40%. This figure did not translate into anything more than 2-4% of parliamentary seats under the first-past-the-post electoral system. In the last election in 2001, the PAP reprised their 1970s majorities by garnering 75.3% of total votes. Furthermore dissenting sections of nascent civil society remain confined to a handful of issue-based, English-educated intelligentsia over matters such as the threat of golfing ranges to wildlife, or national identity negotiations. The majority of these

\[27\] This particular aspect of corporatism has been singled out for praise by the World Bank's *East Asian Miracle*
have lobbied the government on their causes in a neo-Confucian manner through private member bills in the PAP-dominated Parliament; through letters to the press, Members of Parliament, Ministers and government agencies; or have called for consultative forums with the government (Z. Ibrahim 1998b; B.S. Koh 1998). The outcome of the pioneering civil society conference in 1998 showed a split between the English-educated ‘quality of life advocates’ and those representing ethnic socio-economic self-help groups over the role of these groups in bettering state-society synergies. The latter were generally more communitarian in calling for reinforcing corporatist arrangements in the future of the Singaporean nation-state.28

Although there are various summaries of the ‘Singapore Model of Development’ (SMD), it may be represented in shorthand by the three ‘Cs’.29 Firstly, the ‘Credibility’ of political promises, programmes and personnel, including talent promotion and uncompromising anti-corruption vigilance. Secondly, the ‘Cohesion’ of the nation-state, expressed in the qualities of teamwork, diligence and harmony of purpose in the face of common threats. And thirdly, ‘Confidence’ in paternalistic leadership, its virtues in implementing strict law and order, and its planning for a long-term communitarian good. Ostensibly these link to the dominant discourse of culturally and historically-derived political and social order. The Singaporean political leadership has consistently defended and promoted these as its basic governing philosophy since 1959. That the SMD became politicised in the Asian Values Debate following the end of the Cold War was due to the

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28 See the conference contributions in Koh and Ooi (2000). Interestingly, the major government representative, Minister of Information and the Arts George Yeo, preferred to interpret ‘civil society’ as the non-political action of ‘civic organisations’ in welfare and nationalism issues. (Yeo 2000)

change in threat perceptions towards one focussed upon the flow of ideas undermining domestic and global security. A list of specific post-Cold War reasons that prompted Singapore’s initiation of and engagement with the Asian Values Debate follows.

First, with the collapse of communism, ‘western triumphalism’ rapidly converted into a global crusade of scrutiny against countries that did not measure up to the yardstick of liberal democracy. Aside from Lee Kuan Yew, three senior outspoken Singaporean diplomats, Koh, Mahbubani and Kausikan, have spoken and written of their intellectual umbrage at largely western-dominated forums where the new Asia, of both the NICs and market socialism (i.e. China and Vietnam), was becoming pigeon-holed as candidates for assisted liberal change.\(^\text{30}\) In policy terms, the advent of the Clinton Presidency in 1993 introduced the primacy of democratization and human rights proselytising (enlargement of democracy) as a centrepiece of a New World Order, with European states not lagging far behind, over issues such as China and the Tiananmen Incident, Hong Kong’s handover, East Timor, North Korea, the Middle East, and Cuba et cetera (Clinton 1993, 1995, 1998; Wain 1995). Already in the late 1980s, the Singaporean government fought a series of long-running libel battles with prominent western-owned publications such as *Time*, *Asian Wall Street Journal*, *Far Eastern Economic Review* and *Asiaweek* over the misrepresentation of domestic politics and official sanctions against opposition politicians. Criticism of Singapore’s press laws, judiciary and human rights record mounted throughout the 1990s, stoked in part by Singaporean salvoes rebutting western criticisms of illiberalism and

\(^{29}\) This schema is inferred from the consistency of official speeches on the subject (K. Y. Lee 1993b; ST 1996b; ST 2000a), and which has been reflected in most academic scholarship. (Huff 1995; Perry, Kong and Yeoh 1997; Quah 1998)

\(^{30}\) Both Kausikan (2000, interview, 19 May) and Tommy Koh (2000, interview, 24 April) confirmed this point to me in their interviews in April-May 2000. See also Kausikan (1995-96); Mahbubani (1998a, 9-10); and Zakaria (1994, 110-113).
dictatorial impropriety (K.Y. Lee 1990). In policy terms, the first Clinton Administration was noticeably cooler in ties with Singapore, a fresh sore being the 1994 Michael Fay caning affair\(^3\) where Singaporean-Asian style order was castigated by the White House and sanctions were threatened.

Secondly, the bigger target of democratic enlargement was China’s transition, which would affect Singapore’s fortunes indirectly but adversely if unchecked. Having a thoroughly external orientation in economy and politics, Singapore’s fears for a rapidly democratising China should be read as a conjunction of the following. First, a failed Soviet-style *perestroika* path privileging political over economic reform might destabilise China. This might prompt a reactionary and militant elite into taking the helm, provoking military crises with not just Taiwan and Japan, but also all of China’s neighbours over territorial disputes in the Himalayas, the South China Sea and over missile proliferation in the Middle East (ST 1993a; K.Y. Lee 1996, 1997, 1999). Next, sudden democratisation might splinter the country, reprising the post-Vietnam War refugee influx into Northeast and Southeast Asia on a vaster scale, further straining still-delicate inter-racial political balances in many of these countries, leading possibly to civil and external nationalistic wars. Singapore has in fact been unofficially dubbed the ‘third China’ by Southeast Asian governments since 1965. A third factor would be Singapore’s massive economic stakes in mainland China. Since the Deng Xiaoping reforms, Beijing has officially endorsed Singapore as a political and economic model\(^3\) and has specially invited Singaporean public and private corporations to set up city-

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\(^3\) A diplomatic row over values was ignited when Singapore caned an American teenager for vandalism. See Section 5.4.2.

\(^3\) See Section 5.5.2.1.
scale experiments in several industrial parks in the coastal provinces, all except one of which are performing well.

The reaction against western hubris and concern over the stability of China are fused in the wider, third reason: the search for political equality with the West, especially with American unipolar tendencies in the more fluid post-Cold War context. Singaporean diplomats weave this theme without exception into their inputs into the Asian Values Debate (K.Y. Lee 1993a; T. Koh 1998b). In a way, it is not surprising that a ‘Singapore School’ came to represent an ‘othering’ for America’s foreign policy elite33 during the Clinton Administration, which aimed, during both the 1992 and 1996 election campaigns, to focus on fixing domestic ills and promoting a new idealism in foreign policy. Singapore’s discourse on Asian Values is a form of discursive power premised upon the ability of an SMD, culturally-derived and uniquely synthesised, to deliver material and spiritual goods from an exceptionalist standpoint. The SMD is labelled as a ‘shock’34 in its selective non-conformity towards the predominantly western norms of post-1945 international order. For Singapore, equality was to be achieved without disturbing the economic and military ties with the US and EU which had developed since the 1980s.

Singapore’s LIO strategy can be summarised according to the components of the Asian Values Debate expressed in Figure 3 earlier. Although there is no single document spelling out the LIO in detail, its objectives, as gleaned from the preceding analysis, are (a) to put up a credible wall against perceived western sermonising on political liberalism in

33 See Huntington (1993b); Neier (1993); Jones (1994); Lingle (1998, ch. 3; 1996) and the discursive conflict in the western media over the Michael Fay caning in Section 5.4.2.
development prognoses, (b) to galvanise an Asian or non-western political front in support of China's self-determined political and economic transition, and (c) to assert normatively Asian countries' political equality with the West after the divisions of the Cold War. The danger the strategy is designed to counter straddles intellect and coercion, and the response is designed to be both subtle and forceful. In terms of spelling out 'value and systemic differences', Singaporean foreign policy leaders have chosen to stress cultural exceptionalism centred around order, family, community, diligence and respect for authority, as opposed to a stark set of contemporary 'western values' overindulging individualism and freedom. The latter are considered unhelpful for many developing countries' quest for modernization. At the same time, given its own experience, the Singapore School has paid tribute to good (conservative) western values such as public accountability, fair play and faith in scientific solutions where possible, as well as admitting to a few negative Asian Values such as corruption. The position on 'normative governing differences' proceeds from here: the SMD represents one workable non-western vision of good government. Ratified by neo-liberal and western economic intelligence agencies, such as the World Bank, the World Economic Forum and the International Institute of Management and Development, the SMD is empirical evidence of the credibility of Asian Values. It is an indigenous synthesis of non-liberal methods joined to circumstance and a largely East Asian psychic repository favouring progress. Singapore offers itself as a global idea for emulation without imposition. Finally, on the plane of 'policy-political consequences', Singapore will use discursive political communication to affirm the SMD and its connection with an Asian and non-western exceptionalist argument in bilateral, regional and global forums to outflank or stalemate

34 The credibility of the SMD's threat to political liberalism's global hegemony is highlighted in large sections of Huntington's book *Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order* (1996), and is the target of the western liberals highlighted in ibid.
western political value impositions. The clearest statement comes from Lee Kuan Yew’s *Foreign Affairs* interview:

It is not my business to tell people what’s wrong with their system. It is my business to tell people not to foist their system indiscriminately on societies in which it will not work. (Quoted in Zakaria 1994, 110)

This statement is intended to be read not as a closure of interstate discourse but a closure on the forceful implementation of ideology through indiscriminate coercion. The same points above will also be interpreted as the LIO’s flip side, that is, the LOI strategy, later. The analysis now turns to an assessment of how far the LIO has succeeded in three significant chronological events at the height of the Asian Values Debate: the UN Human Rights Conference at Vienna 1993, the Michael Fay caning affair 1994 and the 1997-99 Asian Financial Crisis.

5.4.1 Singapore and the 1993 UN World Conference on Human Rights at Vienna

Singapore’s Asian Values LIO strategy became part of the context leading up to the 1993 UN World Conference on Human Rights at Vienna. In 1992, a pivotal year between the effective collapse of the USSR and the Conference, two events which were intertwined with larger trends, figured prominently in Singapore’s perception of over-the-horizon threats. The first was the arrival of new Hong Kong governor Chris Patten and his proposals to democratise the colony in preparation for its handover to China in 1997. The second was the prominence of US President-elect Clinton’s hardline stance on advancing human rights as a plank of American foreign policy. The larger trends were the restiveness of the Third World against a perceived unipolar arbitration of a New World Order, and increasing acrimony along regional and ‘civilisational’ lines over issues of armed, ‘humanitarian’ interventions by the UN and the West in ethnic conflicts around the world. Whether Huntington’s thesis of intercivilisational conflict was prescient or realistic in 1993, the rhetoric of confrontation was
nevertheless fleshed out at the 1992 Non-Aligned Movement Summit in Jakarta and the ASEAN-EC Dialogue in September and October 1992 respectively when the West, including both the US and European Community were mentioned by name as instigating a new imperial order of rights against the rest of the non-western world (Wallace 1992; Kikuta 1992; Xinhua 1992b). China, Iran, Syria, Iraq (sic), Indonesia, Myanmar and Vietnam were outspoken in denouncing specific pressures against their economic and foreign policies on liberal human rights grounds. The imbroglio over ethnic cleansing in then-Yugoslavia lined up Arab and Asian Muslim states against 'western hypocrisy' over Iraq and Bosnia. China was still undergoing western sanctions over the 1989 Tiananmen Incident, alienated by the outgoing Bush Administration’s sale of fighter aircraft to Taiwan, and the Clinton manifesto threatened to add the withdrawal of MFN trading status to the list of bilateral disputes.

Against this background, Singapore was most concerned with defending China’s integrity, for the longer term strategic reasons enumerated earlier, and to influence and stabilise a realist thread of continuity in the transition of the US’ Asia policy from Bush to Clinton (George 1992). A soft threat was to be met by soft power. Senior Minister Lee was a natural instrument, the country’s first prime minister and widely perceived to be consummate in the art of domestic government. He was a person held in high, albeit controversial, regard throughout Asia, especially in Beijing. On the one hand, Lee warned of dire consequences for Asia-Pacific stability should London and Washington force China to democratise immediately. He alluded to Patten’s Hong Kong proposals as a democratic trojan horse in a battle to mould China to western liking (K.Y. Lee 1992b; M. Richardson 1992). On a second level, Lee argued that since Chinese society, along with much of East Asia was culturally unlike the West, their political systems were unsuitable for direct grafts of liberal democracy.
in the quest for political and economic development. Stark choices between democracy and authoritarianism were less relevant than opting for a hybrid system delivering social discipline to seed and sustain economic development (Branegan 1991; ST 1993a). The 'failure' of the Soviet formula was highlighted and the path of the newly industrialising countries, along with the SMD, were cited as more viable for developing and transitional countries, such as China. Mahbubani, in turn, lambasted western human rights double standards over Yugoslavia, Myanmar, Algeria, Peru, China and ASEAN. While all countries in Asia should adhere to 'certain basic standards of human rights', a comprehensive approach to rights would have to give way to dialogical nuances in prioritising rights. He called openly for ASEAN states 'to encourage the West to be honest in discussing the complex issues of democracy and human rights.' (Mahbubani 1992) In a March 1993 interview with CNN Moneyline, Lee outlined the fundamental difference between the American and Asian viewpoints:

You have had it so good for so long, you have taken food, medicine, clothing, the comforts of everyday life so much for granted, and you have concentrated on the intangibles – free speech, freedom of publication, freedom from arrest, privacy of the individual, and so on. And the result has been less than ideal, and you go marauding around the world pretending to be Democrats, and we are in a very democratic way, because we cannot afford to be otherwise, minding our own business, sorting out our business within ourselves. (Dobbs 1993)

Lee explained in a separate article that he was not encouraging the US to disengage from trade and military commitments in Asia, as these were necessary ingredients in the Asia-Pacific societies' rise to prosperity and stability, but that any Asia policy must respect the coterminous increase in Asian states' economic (market and productive) 'power'. Hence US relations with both Japan and China must reflect equitability. 'Economics, politics and security – they must be considered as a whole when formulating a China policy' not human rights alone (K.Y. Lee 1993a).
Using the analytical scheme set out in Figure 3, it is clear that the collective Singaporean position had adopted a ‘strategic fuzzy logic’ in drawing up a median position between Asian value exceptionalism and accommodation to the ‘West’ on the intellectual level of value and systemic differences. Moreover it then leaned towards a hardline exceptionalism on the level of normative governing differences, and returned to flexibility on specific policy-political consequences. This complex modulation was an attempt to avoid total alienation of western stakes in the Asia-Pacific while asserting an independence based on value difference. In terms of media effects, Lee Kuan Yew in particular, and the ‘Singapore School’ in general, had gained attention as articulators of a general Asian exceptionalism in human rights, development and governance attitudes; it became the benchmark against which opinion for and against exceptionalism inside and outside Asia is expressed.\(^{35}\) In terms of real policy results, China, Indonesia, Vietnam and ASEAN (the organisational collective) had to varying degrees of overtness, substantially supported and cited the Singapore School and the SMD as justifications for their upcoming positions at both the Asian preparatory meeting at Bangkok in March and the Vienna UN Human Rights Conference in June 1993 (Wanandi 1992, 7,8,19; Economist 1993; Lu 1992; Makabenta 1993; Patten 1998a, 150). In the reported positions at Bangkok and Vienna, those espousing exceptionalist lines (China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Bangladesh and Pakistan) had actually hardened their cultural exclusivity arguments on all three levels (i.e. value and systemic difference, normative governing difference, and policy-political consequences) of the Asian Values Debate. Opposition to the latter and to the Singapore School came from not

only the countries comprising the West, but also from the Philippines' pro-western tilt, Japan's and Thailand's ambivalence (Dixit 1993b), as well as the extra-conference voices of the majority of Asia-Pacific NGOs, all of whom argued that human rights protections marched lock-in-step with development (Dixit 1993a; Loh 1993; Asian Cultural Forum on Development 1993). Nevertheless, the hardline position on Asian Values was supported by an 'Arab-Islamic bloc' of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Syria, Yemen and even the Palestine Liberation Organisation, plus Cuba. This Asian-Islamic opposition coalition was however drawn up against a sizeable number of ex-Soviet bloc, African and Latin American states supporting universalist and western positions (Kaufman 1993; Traynor 1993).36

Singapore's strategic fuzzy logic benefited its diplomatic image and goals at Vienna. As its foreign minister, Wong Kan Seng put it, while murder is always murder and 'no one claims torture as part of their cultural heritage', the Singaporean experience 'is that economic growth is the necessary foundation of any system that claims to advance human dignity, and that order and stability are essential for development', hence 'a pragmatic approach to human rights is one that tries to consolidate what common ground we can agree on, while agreeing to disagree if we must.' (ST 1993b) The Singaporean delegation was perceived by key players of both polarised camps to be simultaneously intellectually partisan but diplomatically realistic (D'Ancona 1993a; Bone 1993; D'Ancona 1993b).37 On this basis, it was asked to be a mediator behind the scenes in the final drafting sessions at Vienna (Chai 1993). The leader of the delegation claimed that

36 The parallel campaigning by a majority of NGOs favouring human rights universalism was ignored when China successfully pressured the UN convenors to exclude them.
37 Singaporean Foreign Minister Wong's speech was widely cited as a thermometer of divisions at the conference, and a marker of the path toward a thin universalism.
...we have a pragmatic approach, not an ideological approach as both groups do on their edges. I think we did something right because both groups came to ask us for help in reaching some compromise text...It's accepted that we are not a human rights violator. So when we put forward an alternative viewpoint, rationally argued, we cannot be accused of using this as a shield for abuse. (Chai 1993; Kausikan 2000, interview, 19 May)

The final text of the Vienna Declaration acknowledged human rights universality while allowing significant exceptions on national, regional, historical, cultural and religious particularities, while the agreed post of UN High Commissioner for Human Rights suffered curtailed powers (United Nations 1995, 25-71, paras. I.5, I.8, I.36, II.B.22). In short this was a 'win-all' result for Singaporean soft power, albeit intertwined invisibly with a broad use of Asian soft power on the Asian Values Debate.

In a postscript, a report authored in 2001 by a UN-appointed resource person at the Vienna Conference commented that following the Declaration, most signatories had failed to fully implement 'good practices' in national human rights regimes by the time of the prearranged 1998 review conducted by the UN General Assembly (Dias 2001). The monitoring of states’ implementation was inadequate with both states and international legal bodies not coordinating reports, hence inhibiting rapid responses to human rights violations. The UN Human Rights High Commissioner Mary Robinson criticised all member states for not giving practical meaning to the Declaration. The Singapore delegation countered that rights and responsibilities must be treated contextually:

No time and no society has found all the right answers for mankind for all time. It would be arrogant and unwise for us to pretend that both in the UDHR (Universal Declaration of Human Rights) and VDPA (Vienna Declaration and Programme for

38 The pyrrhic victory of human rights at Vienna is echoed by most newsreports. (Mills and Amsterman 1993; Awanohara 1993)
Action), we have found the perfect answers. History tells us we have not. Let us together temper our celebrations today.\textsuperscript{39}

That this 2001 report chose to single out the Singaporean comment for an indication of dissent against the Vienna Declaration signified the resonance of Singaporean discourse since 1993.

5.4.2 The Michael Fay Caning Affair 1994

Less than 12 months after the Vienna Conference, a law enforcement action on Singaporean soil served as another lightning rod for the Asian Values Debate. Despite the relative amity of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit at Seattle involving East Asian and American heads of state in November 1993, American-East Asian tensions had produced rows over the human-rights-MFN trade link with China, Japanese trade protectionism, and continuing irritations with Indonesia and Myanmar over the treatment of dissidents and separatists. Huntington’s ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis remained interpreted by both Asian and western policy-makers as a strategic hint of Washington’s post-Cold War strategy: ‘the West’ was now increasingly confronting a Confucian-Islamic connection of ideology, economics and military strength. Against this background, one commentator has dubbed Michael Fay the first American casualty of the clash (Emmerson 1994).

Michael Fay was an 18-year old American student at an expatriate school in Singapore indicted by a Singaporean court for vandalising public and private property.\textsuperscript{40} He

\textsuperscript{39} Excerpt from the Statement by the Permanent Representative of Singapore to the UN, 3 November 1998, reproduced in Dias (2001, 59).

\textsuperscript{40} Fay’s crime was spray-painting more than a dozen cars without permission and retaining the public street signs he and his group of friends from the Singapore American School had pilfered.
was initially sentenced to six strokes of the cane, four months imprisonment and a S$3,500 fine under the law. Fay was not the first foreign national to be convicted by local courts for crimes on Singaporean soil to cause controversy. Yet the conjunction of the simmering Asian Values Debate with the above events provoked both the social conscience and the commercial opportunism of large sections of American media and society (Latif 1994, 7-37, 91-101). Singapore's exercise of soft power in the run-up to the Vienna Conference probably made it more of a target for liberal and democratic foreign policies in 'the West'. In the Fay case, the three-pronged western critique attacked the SMD simultaneously on the levels of value and systemic differences and normative governing differences. Firstly, caning was a barbaric and outmoded form of torture and inhumane punishment. Secondly, since the SMD believed in privileging communitarian order through strict observance of law, the 'Singaporean-Asian Confucian state' was a reprehensible authoritarian example contrary to everything western, American, liberal and democratic. Thirdly, Fay was a young inexperienced individual deserving of leniency. These reasons were cited in President Clinton's intercessionary letter to the President of Singapore, and in his public statements prior to, during and after the implementation of the sentence first read out on 3 March 1994. This critique resonated in the US media for months afterward (Branigin 1994; Wallace 1994; Pringle 1994).

Reported opinion polls and letters written by non-Singaporeans received by assorted US, UK and Singaporean newspapers showed that individual and non-governmental overseas opinion was divided on the issue (Kenny 1994; Austin 1994; Johnson 1994). A Newsweek poll for instance showed that 38% of the 'US public' approved and 52% disapproved of the Singaporean action. A separate phone-in poll taken in Fay's hometown of Dayton, Ohio —
one of American pollsters' favourite political barometers for national sentiment — showed that out of 2,270 people who called the Dayton Daily News, 1,442 supported the caning while 828 objected (Branigin 1994; Elliott et al. 1994; Latif 1994, 10,17). Singapore Press Holdings Group carried out a nationwide poll in Singapore across race, educational and class categories and found that upwards of 87% supported their government's decision at the time of the caning.\footnote{Assorted telephone polling and statistical counting of letters to the Straits Times Forum Page reported in Latif (1994, 15-17).} This solid national majority was backed by assorted Singaporean and non-Singaporean news interviews with people in the street in Singapore. This strong impression of a sizeable moral majority coalescing behind the Singaporean nation-state remained consistent\footnote{That is, without alternative polls, changes in polls, or dissenting controversies and opinions expressed by significant Singaporean public personalities in the media at home and abroad.} throughout the four months of the affair and gave critical ballast to the credibility of partisan international conflict on the policy-political level of the Asian Values Debate, against which some chronological observations can be made.

Between the 3 March sentencing and the actual caning on 5 May, amidst US State Department propaganda pressure and the media war over the merits of the SMD as applied to Fay, the Singaporean government basically stood firm on its brand of law and order. In an indirect insight into the normative effect the case was having on Clinton's decision-making dilemma, on 19 April, the latter said the following on America's MTV in response to a 20-year old student's query about Fay and America's inability to keep crime down:

...[O]n the one hand, I don't approve of this punishment, particularly in this case. Now having said that, a lot of the Asian societies that are doing very well now have low crime rates and high economic growth rates, partly because they have very coherent societies with strong units where the unit is more important than the individual, whether it's the family unit or the work unit or the community unit....What's happened in America today is, too many people live in areas where there's no family structure, no community structure and no work structure. And so
there’s a lot of irresponsibility. And so a lot of people say there’s too much personal freedom. When personal freedom’s being abused, you have to move to limit it. (Clinton 1994)

This argument was to prove prescient. Nevertheless, in response to Clinton’s private letter for clemency in early May, as allowed under the Singaporean Constitution, the President of Singapore, acting under the advice of the Cabinet reduced the six strokes to four. The official explanation for doing so was that

[t]o reject his appeal totally would show an unhelpful disregard for the President and the domestic pressures on him on this issue. Therefore even though the Cabinet found no merit in Fay’s petition, it sought a way to accommodate President Clinton’s appeal without compromising the principle that persons convicted of vandalism must be caned. (ST 1994a; M. Richardson 1994)

The statement also said that account was also taken of Singapore’s good relations with the US and its special role in the Asia-Pacific in making the reduction. It also qualified that while similar reductions of sentences would be considered upon appeal for Fay’s fellow offenders, ‘this is an exceptional decision which will not be a precedent for future cases’, nor would sentences be commuted outright. The Clinton Administration’s official response continued to be hostile. In Singapore, public reaction was momentarily split into a slightly dominant moderate section and a minority hardline section, both of which were pro-caning and pro-Asian Values, except that the latter were less supportive of the government for making concessions to the US (Nathan et al. 1994). Yet this was a propaganda bonus for the Singaporean government, which could, and did, reasonably claim that diplomatic quarter had to be given to a friendly state without compromising socio-legal principles at home, and in so doing, it had acted with the best intentions between extremes (Fernandez 1994). This was a reprise of the strategic fuzzy logic of Singapore’s Asian Values Debate input. That the discourse of Asian Values was not permanently damaged was underlined by the consistency of media reports acknowledging that Singapore went ahead with caning without showing any
sign of unease over the information war preceding the action (M. Richardson 1994; PA Newsfile 1994).

The coalitions of international support for Singapore as an Asian state and the SMD were already in position for what followed in terms of policy-political consequences. On 5 May itself, Clinton called the caning a mistake and questioned the proportionality of the crime and its punishment (Walker 1994). On the same day, US Vice-President Albert Gore and Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific Winston Lord expressed regret over Singapore’s action but stressed it was time to move on and take account of the larger bilateral relationship with Singapore (Pringle 1994). At the same time, Winston Lord wrote to Secretary of State Warren Christopher, in a memo leaked to the press, warning in reference to Fay’s caning and other recent quarrels with Asia that the Pacific spirit of comity forged at the 1993 APEC Summit was potentially giving way to charges that ‘we are an international nanny, if not bully’ and that ‘without proper course adjustments, we could subvert our influence and interests.’ (P. Wilson 1994) Yet on 10 May, US Trade Representative Mickey Kantor publicly opposed Singapore’s bid to host the WTO’s first ministerial meeting in 1996 without stating any reasons (Stewart 1994). Unidentified US sources speculated that this was in retaliation for the Fay caning. The next day, the State Department argued that the Kantor threat was merely a personal opinion and that no firm decision had been made (Nathan and Ngoo 1994). This duality of threat and accommodation in the US reaction continued well into mid-June. The Singaporean government replied that WTO decisions were collectively made according to proper procedures and that the country was prepared to underwrite the cost of the entire meeting. On 24 May, Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong reiterated his country’s official belief in severely deterring crime and argued that
[t]he important point is that the US and Singapore have substantive relations...And if it cannot survive this episode, then the relations are not worth having...You believe in the freedom of the press. And so the noises appear. (Chuang 1994)

Subsequently, within days, Singapore’s bid for the WTO hosting was publicly supported in Asian quarters: Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand supported Singapore in the spirit of ASEAN solidarity; Hong Kong felt that Singapore’s bid should be regarded ‘positively’; while Japan claimed ‘because of the dynamic growth of Asia, we think it is very meaningful to host the WTO ministerial meeting in an Asian country, whether in Singapore or otherwise.’ (ST 1994b, 1994c) In reaction to Kantor’s reiteration on 6 June that major economic powers had aligned against Singapore’s bid, Japan’s foreign ministry was culturally more explicit on 8 June:

As far as our position on Singapore’s proposal is concerned, although we have not decided on the issue, we are sympathetic as an Asian nation to the proposal to hold the first ministerial conference somewhere in Asia. (Kwan 1994)

The sum of the diplomatic skirmishes again clearly showed how the value and systemic differences of the Asian Values Debate translated into direct action on political governance.

Admittedly, the international support for Singapore could have masked other hard bilateral interests for cooperation, but the non-governmental mêlée, particularly in Canadian, American and British newspapers showed that Fay had pegged the SMD as a potentially difficult, yet enviable target, of much intellectual fencing over value and systemic differences in political organisation. The SMD as a vehicle for efficacious Asian values had worked well enough to ‘defend’ Singapore. Support for the SMD was varied but vociferous. Newsweek scrutinised the SMD and highlighted the fact that while sexual promiscuity was frowned upon in Singapore, Singaporean tourists flocked to Thailand’s sex parlours and that the authoritarian culture was being challenged by the rising Asian middle class; meanwhile, it
acknowledged that the city-state's 58 murders and 80 rapes in 1993 showed up Los Angeles' 1,058 murders and 1,781 rapes for the same year (Elliott et al. 1994). Other surveys of Singapore in the Daily Telegraph, The Independent (London), The Sun (Baltimore), Time, The Ottawa Citizen and the Vancouver Sun, as well as articles by ex-western diplomats and 'Asia-hands' such as Richard Armitage and Robert Manning, have admired an implicit element of moral and performative superiority in the SMD which frustrated contemporary American attempts to mould Asia in its liberal democratic image. Armitage empathised with Singaporean-Asian cultural differences but insisted that the US heritage included an explicit moral scrutiny arising from its foundational 'city on a hill' vision (Armitage 1994). Manning wrote that Fay was not a political affair until the US publicly questioned 'the legitimacy of the Singapore system' giving it no way to back down. Paying a backhanded compliment to Singapore's soft power on Asian Values, he said

I think it is a bogus issue because the Singaporeans have developed a very elaborate critique that looks at the United States’ murder rate, incarceration rate, education system, and breakdown of the family, even challenging [Secretary of State] Warren Christopher to walk the streets of Anacostia after 8.00[pm] at night, and so on. By pursuing this missionary approach, we have encouraged an Asian notion of a different approach to human rights. (Feulner et al. 1994)

The Sun (Baltimore)'s Roger Simon reflected the western rights lobby's frustration in noting that while 'even a limited cruise missile attack would lay waste to much of the city-state and allow US pride to be avenged[,]...you do have to wonder at just what we are angry about.' Simon concluded that playing in someone else's ballpark logically means following different rules (Simon 1994). Other western commentators, wearied by public crime, took a leaf from the Singapore book, and shifted the burden of creating a civilised community onto the perpetrator, instead of the victim: neighbourhood vandals out of control, indisciplined children and lax parenting, unsafe gun-and-drug-toting gangs and so on ought to be made to pay. Long-time Singapore critic Ian Buruma’s comment on the frustration of disabusing
divided western and liberal opinion on Fay, summed up the discursive attraction of the SMD at both the normative and the policy levels on this occasion:

Singapore's streets are indeed safer than London's, let alone those of New York, but not because of corporal punishment. The low crime rate has more to do with general prosperity, and the intrusion of the state in every aspect of its citizens' lives. Singapore is not so much a country as a large small town or, perhaps more accurately, a huge tropical boarding school. It is easy to control, and easy to make feel richer, through massive government spending on housing, education and public surveillance.... The difference is this: most free and open societies suffer from crime as private enterprise - vandalism, larceny, mugging, drug abuse. In closed societies, on the other hand, robbery, rape and even murder are institutionalised - crime as a state enterprise. To stress the importance of individual rights, even at the price of those rights being regularly abused by individuals, is not to indulge in political correctness; it is to prevent worse crimes from being possible. The protection of individual liberty is not simply a 'Western value'. After all, countless Chinese, Koreans, Thais, Burmese and others have risked and often lost their lives to acquire it. For without such protection there can be no freedom to think. And without that freedom, civilisation would remain as barren as Singapore. Science, the arts, economic prosperity for an ever larger number of people; all these depend on the defence of individual freedom and the limitation of state control. It is not for nothing that many gifted Asians continue to go to France, the United States and Britain to use their talents. Few gifted Westerners, or other Asians flock to Singapore or Kuala Lumpur to do the same. Singapore is relatively rich, its streets are clean, and few people get mugged. These are notable achievements. And we must find ways of curbing crime in our own cities, but not by following the Singaporean example. (Buruma 1994)

5.4.3 The 1997-99 Asian Financial Crisis

In retrospect the Asian financial crisis of 1997-99 was a test of communitarian value discourses against rampant economic globalization, provoking not only intellectual ring-fencing but also prescriptions for reform. The crisis had rebounded upon the Asian Values Debate through the governance component threading through all three levels of discourse (Figure 3). The critique of Asian Values went as follows. Firstly, if Asian Values were different and presumptuously superior to western and universal values, they had ultimately failed in economic governance in the face of global capital movements. Secondly, the normative governing differences showed that an Asian neo-authoritarian practice of political
economy could not stand up to the scrutiny of the market forces. Hence thirdly, Asian-style good governance is a misnomer perpetuated by unrepresentative and inept elites as a defence against an inevitable embrace of a western liberal democratic model along with the teleology of modernization. Although many voices in western and Asian liberal circles took this line, it was the IMF and World Bank, encouraged by the US, EU, MNCs, transnational investment funds and individual financiers, who fronted the prescriptions for Thai, Indonesian, South Korean and Philippine economic overhaul.43

Although the IMF, the World Bank and their supporters placed only four Asian countries on their ‘patient list’, Singapore was indirectly involved through the fact of its participation in global economic space and its large input into the Asian Values Debate. Capitalist economic interdependence explained how the crisis came into being as a local ‘flu’ or ‘contagion’. Panic selling of the Thai Baht was triggered by information, both real and interpreted, that both state-run and private Thai property and investment projects were overvalued or on the brink of insolvency. Bad news spread via ICT networks, and the interlinked stock exchanges of the region involved with similarly profiled projects and companies were put under scrutiny by fund managers and investors. When these showed parallel symptoms, both real and imagined, the respective national currencies involved correspondingly suffered devaluation through panic selling and bearishness. This was how Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan felt the ‘shockwaves’ of investor withdrawals. Aside from China, which had a non-convertible currency, the last three economies in that list endured the speculative attacks relatively well, shedding 15-20% of pre-crisis currency values compared to the rest which ran into the region

43 In this section, the spillover effects on Russia, Brazil, Argentina and Ecuador will be left out as these did not
of 40% upwards. The difference according to most analysts, was how foreign investors perceived the rigour and standing of domestic probity and confidence in the management of economic governance. Singapore, which had ‘led’ and abetted the more articulate Asian Value arguments at the beginning of the 1990s was now weighed with the baggage of ‘Asian Value failures’ (McRae 1997; Business Week 1997; Brittan 1997; Lingle 1998, ch. 4, 6; Clifford and Engardio 2000, ch. 7; Riès 2000, ch. 12) around the region — although her economy was hardly ravaged, avoided negative annual growth rates in 1997-99 and recovered fastest. The fate of Singapore’s LIO strategy amidst the financial crisis could be summarised in two dimensions: the inconvenient sample and the indirect target of ‘Asian misgovernance’ charges, and its opposite, the good governance consultant.

The direct intervention of the IMF and World Bank in four national economies showed the dominance of discourses diagnosing Asian misgovernance as the key problem. Prescriptions were for accountability, transparency and fair competition in government and banking regulations and tenders, and against corruption, cronyism and nepotism. The communitarian and family commitments of Asian Values were directly blamed for fostering the Suharto family’s web of corruption in Indonesia, the *Chaebol*-government nexus’ misallocation of resources in South Korea, corporate cronyism among ruling parties and national companies in Malaysia, and the entrenched public sector culture of corruption in the Philippines. Singapore’s espousal of communitarian ethics ignored all these, charged the critics (Brittan 1997; Lingle 1998, ch. 4, 6; Clifford and Engardio 2000, ch. 7; Riès 2000, ch. 12). Ironically, the city-state was also acknowledged to be the most corruption-free country

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44 Interestingly, this was also Asian Values critic Chris Patten’s prediction (1998b). See also Bowring (1998) and Porter (1999).
in Asia and ranked regularly among the world’s top 10 cleanest by private consultants (Economist 1998c; Luther 1998). Singapore’s political economy too drew trend-defying attention for its flexible and consensual ‘tripartist approach’ to adjusting wages downwards, and rationally coaxing labour and management groups to acquiesce in emergency economic rebate measures jointly drawn up with the government. Meanwhile, unemployment (3.2-3.5% for 1998-99) resulting from the crisis did not reach proportions comparable to the rest of the region; and economic growth in 1997 ended comfortably at 7.6%, levelled off at 0.4% in 1998 and recovered to 10.7% by 2000 (Arasu 1998; Ministry of Information and the Arts 2000, 114-115). This large pocket of stability and confidence enabled Lee Kuan Yew to claim on the one hand that Asian Values, especially as applied to the SMD, were not a wholly convincing explanation for economic downfall, while he conceded that they had to be finessed and re-applied for the rest of the region’s recovery (K.Y. Lee 1998a; Kassim 1998b; Plate 1999; L.H. Chua 2001). This was in contrast to Malaysia’s emphasis on the xenophobic aspects of Asian Values, that is, blaming neocolonial ‘outsiders’ for exploiting a community’s hard-earned prosperity — witness Malaysian premier Mahathir’s spat with financier George Soros over Malaysia’s difficulties.

Instead the SMD’s corporatist and prudential characteristics were a renewed attraction to countries such as South Korea, Thailand and Indonesia, as well as the IMF and World Bank. Lee lost no time in defending the Singapore School. On the occasion of the 2,550th birthday of Confucius celebrated by the Congress of the International Confucius Association in Hong Kong in early October 1999, Lee pointed to South Korean recovery within the past year as a vindication of Confucian traditions of placing community before

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self. He said the symbolism of South Korean citizens lining up to donate gold jewellery and other personal treasures to aid official efforts at staving off national bankruptcy was critical. While this symbolic effort did not on its own contribute to economic salvation, it was 'an intangible which would encourage foreign investors to augment their long-term prognosis of the country.' However, Lee also cautioned that Confucian concepts of putting family and society before self

...must not be misconstrued to mean abusing one’s position to benefit family and friends at public expense.

That is the recourse of the ‘little man’ or xiaoren, who places self above society in direct contradiction to the basic tenet of Confucianist thought. (ST 1999b)

Later that month, in a moment of irony, when his erstwhile Asian Values detractor Kim Dae Jung was South Korean President, Lee was invited to brainstorm reform at a forum organised by the Federation of Korean Industries, at which he exhorted his audience of business conglomerate representatives to build recovery through corporatism with the government:

If I were you, I wouldn’t argue with the President’s advisers whether you should or should not do it. You should say, ‘Yes, of course, but tell me how. If you want to break my company, hundreds of thousands of workers will be put out of jobs.’

It’s not you versus President Kim Dae Jung.

It’s the President’s advisers working with you to get outside help to try and reshape your corporations into more competitive units. (L.H. Chua 1999)

Earlier Thailand also invited Lee to consult on implementing IMF reforms, and this came on the back of Singapore’s contribution of US$1 billion to the US$17.2 billion IMF-brokered rescue package for Bangkok. Lee told Thai Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai to foster a cooperative spirit among all sectors of Thai society and economy. While warning against cronyism between business and civil servants, he argued that ‘we have not become weak. We

have got into trouble by carelessness and stupidity. We will rise again.' (Tang 1998b) On the same occasion, Premier Chuan also revealed he was thankful that Singapore’s Prime Minister Goh had earlier in the week ‘interceded’ for Thailand during a teleconversation with US President Bill Clinton on the Southeast Asian scenario, upon which the Clinton Administration supported Thailand by subsequently declaring that Thailand was going in ‘the right direction’.

Apparently, in that same Singapore-US telephone consultation during January 1998, Clinton also sought Goh’s feedback on Suharto and Indonesia (STWE 1998).

Indonesia was a more complex case for Singaporean soft power. While consultations with Singapore were visible, tangible signals of reform from the upper echelons in the Suharto government were equivocal. Singapore nevertheless pledged US$5 billion to the IMF-arranged rescue package for Indonesia, and supported the Rupiah by intervening in forex markets through the Monetary Authority of Singapore. The Singaporean government further proposed a US$20 billion multilateral export credit guarantee scheme to enable Indonesian firms to sustain imports of raw materials but this was only partially successful as Indonesia’s damaged credit reputation could not spark sufficient multilateral interest to sign up to Singapore’s ideas. Nevertheless, Singapore went ahead with it, unilaterally adjusting to a lower credit level of US$3 billion (Z. Ibrahim 1998a). Indonesia’s recurrent civil disturbances and weaknesses in leadership transition from Suharto to Habibie to Wahid did not help a corporatist effort to reform, and instead demonstrated the limits of Singaporean soft power in social contractual formulas (Spencer 2001).

Right in the midst of all this bilateral rescue diplomacy, the IMF recognised the validity of the SMD in spite of its Asian

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46 This Asian Value sentiment in forging recovery was echoed by Thai foreign minister Surin Pitsuwan in an interview in Kassim (1998a).
Values association by jointly setting up with Singapore a ‘regional training institute for financial managers’ in May 1998. In his speech at the institute’s inauguration, Singapore’s Finance Minister Richard Hu noted:

If public institutions in East Asia were found wanting, it is not because they pursued inappropriate macroeconomic demand management policies, but because they failed to safeguard the stability of the financial system. Countries in the region had rushed to liberalize their financial systems and capital accounts before adequate safeguards were in place.\(^49\)

Asian Values, in other words, also require the correct application of diligence and integrity to make communitarian policies work.

Finally it should be noted that a key lesson which Singaporean LIO drew from global information space’s first high-speed regional, and mediatised, financial panic was to ensure that Asian leaders needed to communicate values distinctly. As Lee Kuan Yew put it

The availability of [media] bandwidth and the inexorable shift from broadcasting to narrowcasting will have an enormous impact on all human societies, both west and east. This will make it difficult for governments to communicate their positions to the people. Without a clear enunciation of government positions and policies and the reasons for them, it is not possible to rally a people around common goals. Instead of a clear and consistent message, we will have a cacophony of media voices sending a plethora of messages, many contradictory. Because of the different interests and objectives of journalists and media owners, the government’s position may not get through at all. This will be bad for any society, democratic or otherwise.

Asian societies strike a different balance between the rights of the individuals and those of the larger community. There is a need to have an established official position known to its people. Asian governments will use whatever is the latest media technology for this purpose. This is not to say that the official position is exclusive. Indeed, information technology is rapidly undermining whatever monopoly control of the media governments might have had. Thus, along with the official view, many other views are available and known. It is important for a man to know what the official position is, whether or not he accepts it. (K.Y. Lee 1998b)

\(^{48}\) It remains to be seen if President Sukarnoputri, Indonesia’s third after Suharto’s downfall, can enlist social cohesion to aid economic recovery.

This is a slight variation on Singapore’s media position articulated by Lee himself in 1990 but it is a statement that Asian Values can be propagated in the face of globalization if discourse is used.

By way of an interim summary of the results of the LIO policy considered in the Asian Values Debate, three observations can be made. Firstly, as the Vienna Human Rights Conference and the Fay Affair indicate, Singapore’s LIO operated effectively as a setting for China’s defence and a platform for exceptionalism where international trends favour policy combativeness in a fluid ideological milieu. Concomitantly, world public opinion was also fairly malleable and open to partisan mobilisation by coherent ideas in both contexts. Singapore’s SMD presented itself as a corporatist and communitarian whole and a veritable showcase for discourse, although on a strategic level, fuzzy logic in putting across Asian Values had been employed in finessing goal achievement routes. Secondly, LIO requires consistent spokesmen able and willing to effect information formation, and ensure favourable transmission and reception. The Singapore School’s voice in the Asian Values Debate was put across by Lee, Koh, Kausikan and Mahbubani forcefully, and was amplified by the discursive support of favourably disposed national and subnational opinion sections. Thirdly, the LIO’s requirements for credibility in leadership projection sometimes requires a ‘dogmatic consistency’ even when geopolitical or geoeconomic circumstances defy it generally, as the effect of the 1997-99 financial crisis showed. That Singapore did not crumble under macroeconomic adversity granted it a continued degree of moral high ground, which perhaps attracted to itself much indirect blame for the failures of others following the same values in general. A generalised discourse on Asian Values had proved real in economic backlash. On the positive ledger, the consistent credibility of the SMD saw
Singapore's consultancy sought after by crisis victims and rescuers alike, and this sustained a sense of equality in western perceptions as the Clinton Administration's belated high regard for Singapore and the global political economy indices show.

5.5 Singapore's Leadership Outside-In Strategies

Singapore's LOI strategies in regard to the Asian Values Debate follow closely upon the LIO. As elaborated in Chapter 4, the gravity of foreign policy now shifts more emphatically into giving certain nationally-favoured ideas a semi-autonomous or autonomous life of their own outside their country-of-origin: soft power assumes structural form in regimes and epistemic communities in its ability to set parameters and performance standards in cooperative international relations, and in some cases, through institutional prescriptions for good governance. International regimes are 'implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given area of international relations.' (Krasner 1982, 186) As a public good a regime requires a political entrepreneur to broach the concept. According to Robert Keohane, such an entrepreneur reduces the 'transaction cost' of initiating cooperation: perceiving profit, monetary or otherwise, deriving from joint action, a leader puts forward or innovates upon existing ideas to present a plan attracting partnerships (Keohane, 1982, 338-339).

The other manifestation of LOI, epistemic communities, often work parallel or directly with the logic of regimes. An epistemic community is 'a network of professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area.' (P.M. Haas 1992, 3) It is a transnational policy shaping and advisory body which coordinates global networks and takes
action where uncertainties of issue-salience across time and space prevent coordinated policy-making and regime maintenance. The epistemic community claims its information-expert function on the basis that global and domestic politics are thoroughly penetrated by modern techniques and neo-liberal economics, and hence face common and interdependent security problems. International organisations, think-tanks and NGOs joining in training and aid partnerships with states and individual scientific-technical consultants, are examples of epistemic actorness in international relations, whether they are monitoring human rights adherence or advising on governance.

The efficacy of Singapore’s LOI in regard to the Asian Values Debate can be viewed in two areas: firstly, its role in norm formation and innovation in regional and multilateral organisations such as ASEAN, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), and APEC. These are regimes in which political entrepreneurial roles can be examined. Secondly, the epistemic community component is illustrated by the country’s attempt to establish a global constituency of ‘good governance’ advocates through a nascent foreign aid programme based on partnering, teaching or coaching expertise. With reference to the scheme in Figure 3, the LOI operates only at the third level of policy-political consequences as the first two levels of abstract ideas are collapsed into attraction and behaviour according to norms of actual state conduct and policy adoption.

5.5.1 Singapore as Norm-Setter in Multilateral Contexts

The Republic’s politically entrepreneurial roles, particularly in ASEAN, have been justified post hoc and in the present by the Asian Values Debate (T. Koh 2000, interview, 24 April). Asian Values, though dealing primarily with domestic governance, has been
abstracted into two principles of international process: the transformation of fissiparous nationalism through regional harmony, and an emphasis on consensus and teamwork in reaching national goals through regional cooperation. Hence in regional and multilateral terms, the Asian Values Debate impacted upon the evolution and struggle of norm shaping in ASEAN, ARF and the APEC. The standard of performance as well as the tangible results of regionalism have been attributed to an imputed 'Asian way' – a diplomatic modus operandi encompassing the above two principles (M. Haas 1989, 5-10).50

The discursive justifications began with the ‘ASEAN Spirit’ or ‘ASEAN Way’. Singapore, as one of its original founders, desperately wanted its neighbours to guarantee in word and deed its territorial integrity and national sovereignty, and leading on from this to create a pacific intra-regional climate for national development. This seemingly modest Westphalian condition was a revolutionary achievement considering the stillborn attempts at regional norm-creation in the 1950s and early 1960s based on extra-regional imperatives (the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation and the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East), anti-communism (Association of Southeast Asia), racial solidarity (MAPHILINDO51), or pan-Asian radicalism (NEFOS52). Although these involved state signatures, they did not strictly sanctify territorial demarcations according to geographic contiguity. Deeds in this period were even more worrying. Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, North Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, China, USSR and the US, all either supported or connived in separatist movements in the border regions of Thailand-Malaysia, Philippines-Malaysia-Indonesia, or

50 Haas asserts that the ‘Asian Way’ evolved from the conceptual foundations of fledgling Pan-Asian interstate conferencing in the late 1940s and 1950s, predating ASEAN in utilising Confucius, Buddha and Mohammed in rationalising conflict mitigation without ‘external power’ intervention. Michael Antolik has however dubbed this the ‘diplomacy of accommodation’ (1990).
51 Literally Malaysia, Philippines and Indonesia amalgamated.
52 Newly Emerging Forces – a pipedream of then-Sukarnoist Indonesia.
insurgencies in virtually every Southeast Asian country (Jorgensen-Dahl 1982, ch. 2, 8; Antolik 1990, 12-17). A nearly coincidental change of leaderships and policies in 1965-67 which included critically, the coup which removed Sukarno in Indonesia, the tension-fraught ejection of Singapore from Malaysia, and the ending of military confrontation between Suharto’s ‘New Order’ Indonesia and the former two states, opened a window of opportunity for drawing anew a code of conduct for the region. An ‘ASEAN Way’ came to be embodied in the wording of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) which was formalised within nine years of ASEAN’s founding (1976). The terms of the TAC were somewhat unremarkable in their call to respect Westphalian non-interference principles, refrain from the use of force, and to strengthen intra-regional relations on the basis of ‘traditional, cultural and historical ties of friendship, good neighbourliness and cooperation which bind them together.’ (ASEAN National Secretariat 1979, 17, ch. II art. 3) Its operationalisation was however the unique point.

While Singapore cannot claim to be the sole originator of the TAC, its joint enunciation with Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand represented a de facto triumph for the Republic’s LOI on ‘protective sovereignty’. From here on, the use of the ASEAN way in Singapore’s role within ASEAN shows up more clearly. Its diplomats have spelt out the ASEAN Way as:

1. ‘[A] habit or a culture of cooperation and consensus-building, or musyawarah, among leaders of Southeast Asia....Even when relations among some members have been at a low ebb, they put their differences on the backburner and have not allowed these to impede ASEAN cooperation.’ (Jayakumar 1997b, para. 29) In this speech, the Singaporean foreign minister went on to cite both the referral of territorial disputes within ASEAN to the International Court of Justice, and the constant annual meetings of ASEAN leaders as examples of this. An official Indonesian commentator dubbed this the ‘7-x’ (after 1998, 10-x) principle of reaching consensus, allowing ‘x’ to demur without actively objecting or openly jeopardising the image of a consensual community. (Anwar 1997, 28-29)
2. Non-interference as a sacred principle of sustaining, peaceful coexistence of ideological and governmental diversity. ‘The surest and quickest way to ruin is for ASEAN countries to begin commenting on how each of us deals with these sensitive issues. Each of us deals with them in our own way, in our common effort to achieve harmony and stability in our societies.’ (Jayakumar 1997a) This is the ‘national’ and ‘regional resilience’ connection in ASEAN.53

This operational code has ensured that no standing member of ASEAN has taken up arms against another since its founding in 1967, and it has allowed Singapore to use this jointly derived code to marshal ASEAN’s sustained crusade of delegitimisation against then non-member Vietnam’s illegal occupation of Cambodia in 1978-91 (Leifer 1989, 98-120; Lau 1991, 372-383). It is widely observed that by leading the propaganda charge at the UN against Vietnam over her aggrandisement of Cambodian sovereignty, Singapore was explicitly getting all the ASEAN States to reaffirm publicly the TAC and to manoeuvre themselves into maintaining a corporate solidarity which has been termed a ‘diplomatic community’ (Leifer 1989, 140-148; 1999; 2000, 84-88).54 More importantly, by conciliating rival intra-ASEAN threat perceptions of Vietnam and China during the various points of the Cambodian conflict, Singapore’s political entrepreneurship demonstrated obvious utility to its partners.

The religious adherence by ASEAN States to the ASEAN Way forged in word and deed over Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia was to be even more severely tested after the Cold War. With Vietnam voluntarily reconciled with and admitted to ASEAN through the non-ideological cover of the TAC, the long-term vision of admitting the rest of Southeast Asia began to pose threats to the ASEAN Way. Leaving aside uncontroversial Laos, the

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53 These parts of the lexicon of the ASEAN Way were first coined by President Suharto (1975, 8) of Indonesia in the late 1960s. Suharto is cited in Leifer (1989, 4).
admission of Myanmar, then Cambodia, began to pose case-specific problems with pronounced disapproval from non-aligned, interested and great power parties, adding a layer of complication to the ASEAN Way. Both features of the ASEAN Way came under attack from within (Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, versus Thailand in disagreement) and without (US, EU, Japan versus China) on moral grounds. Singapore initially adopted a neutral position over admission, but ultimately the ASEAN Way won by default, partly against the background need to ‘close ranks’ in Southeast Asia against the perceived western liberal crusade. In a sense, this was a first test of ASEAN’s survival in global information space; the jointly originated and Singaporean-demonstrated ASEAN Way became a local norm of defensive communitarian response.55

The other trial of ASEAN by globalization in this period occurred simultaneously in the form of the 1997-99 financial crisis. This occasion saw the ASEAN Way flagging for 12 months as Malaysia adopted economic nationalism, Thailand and Philippines followed IMF advice, while Indonesia dithered over IMF prescriptions, backtracked frequently, and became embroiled in domestic turmoil. Under duress from creditor states, investors and the politics of bilateral central bank interventions, ASEAN members rather hesitatingly adopted a ‘peer surveillance’ mechanism for jointly acting to forestall future financial crises, over Thai and Filipino suggestions for overt constructive interference. This was produced under Singapore’s moderating influence jointly exercised with Malaysia and Indonesia (Fuller

54 Leifer observed that the activity of a diplomatic community depends as much on norm-setting as peer group pressure.
55 Most observers concur on the diplomatic moral obligations of the ASEAN Way upon its members, but some such as Tobias Ingo Nischalke argue it is more the result of reluctance to veto than volition, especially amidst post-Cold War uncertainties, minus a Vietnam bogey. (Nischalke 2000, 101-107)
Yet this was insufficient to boost recovery. Singapore then initiated a call to adopt a series of bold measures to signal a spirit of regional resolve. The 1998 ASEAN summit in Hanoi heeded the call and agreed to forward existing ASEAN Free Trade Area plans towards 2002, implement an immediate raft of investment liberalisation incentives, an ASEAN investment area, and negotiate for freer trade in services. Exceptions were however made for Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam on grounds of national reform adjustments. A year later, with the exception of Indonesia, the worst casualties of the crisis had largely turned the corner of recovery, but without completely vindicating the region-wide initiatives as IMF prescriptions continued along with weak investor confidence. In March 1999, ASEAN returned to the orthodoxy of the ASEAN Way by reiterating the importance of national discretion in managing exchange rates (CNN.com 1999).

Singapore also tried to clone this ASEAN Way into the expanded security forum known as the ARF, the inter-regional dialogue ASEM, and the transpacific economic forum APEC through the discursive and tactical device of an ASEAN core as the 'driver' of gradualist initiatives.\(^5\)\(^7\) In the ARF, this has had mixed results since its inception in 1994. It was an attempt to regularise security discussions with the US, Canada, EU, Russia, China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and subsequently India. China supported the ASEAN Way in so far as it preserved her tactical room for political manoeuvre over the contested and purportedly oil-and-gas-rich Spratly islands (Wain 1996; Jacob 1999b). The US, EU, Canada and subsequently Thailand and Philippines wished to quicken the ARF’s transition into OSCE-style confidence-building measures, conflict prevention and domestic

\(^{56}\) The adoption of ‘peer surveillance’ as a watered down intervention norm is the result of the operation of the ASEAN Way in treating cross-border assistance. (Ramchandran 2000, 78-83)
democratisation measures (K.C. Lee 1995; Economist 1997; Jacob 1999a). All these strained the ASEAN Way as interests were divided and segmented on the sidelines of the forum, and the non-ASEAN states tended to introduce wider Asian and global security issues onto the agenda, complicating consensus (Jeshurun 2000). Nevertheless Singapore was regularly responsible for mediating the differences by reiterating to all that building dialogue and 'comfort levels' were more important than lightning progress. Indeed she can claim a partial success for having comfortably engaged the critical Asia-Pacific heavyweights of China, Japan and the US in embryonic confidence-building.

ASEM, which was also a Singapore-mooted idea, proved to be another trial between two different diplomatic cultures: the EU representatives' wish to discuss human rights conditions over initially East Timor, and subsequently Myanmar, became a recurrent controversy with ASEAN states, while the ASEAN Way would not admit such distinctions on grounds of domestic interference. The sheer number of the EU and Asian states, as well as their varying levels of development also made it difficult to coordinate joint projects on a consensual basis (Shmiegelow 1998; Machetzki 1998; Dijiwandono 1998; Maull 1998; Westerlund 1999). In the third arena considered here, APEC, which Singapore championed at its genesis in 1989, replicated the faultlines within ASEAN, and between ASEAN members, China, Japan, Canada and the US, on the desirability of maximum trade liberalisation.58 During the financial crisis of 1997-99, the US opposed a Japanese proposal for an Asian Monetary Fund which enjoyed widespread Asian support within APEC, but excluded its Chilean and Mexican members. The US insisted upon the primacy of the IMF

57 A clear sample of this 'ASEAN Way-centrism' is the emphasis on consensus and evolution in The ASEAN Regional Forum – A Concept Paper (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1994). See also Mahbubani (1998d, 135-136).
bailout facilities vis-à-vis APEC's cooperative financial surveillance (Cheng 1998, 27-29). Conversely, APEC might still be said to have followed the ASEAN Way of saving national face by allowing members to implement grand visions according to their national timetables (Ueno 2000). However, at the November 1998 APEC Summit, the US representative, Vice-President Albert Gore, uncharacteristically confronted Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir to register his country's displeasure over the arrest of former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, in a speech which appealed to the 'brave people' of Malaysia to delegitimise the link between authoritarian regimes and economic growth (M. Richardson 1998). Understandably, such behaviour was seen as violating the aspiration of making the ASEAN Way of diplomacy the hallmark of APEC.

5.5.2 Singapore's Foreign Aid

For obvious reasons of geographical size, and despite building up one of Asia's largest financial reserves over 30 years, Singapore's foreign aid policy did not substantially manifest itself as block grants, physical gifts, loans or conditional assistance. Its foreign aid principle is that of a grateful globalist reciprocity in the transfer of development ideas. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs rationalised this posture historically: since the 1960s, the country had benefited enormously from 'soft' aid such as Colombo Plan training grants, scholarships, and the advice of United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) consultants, notably Dr Albert Winsemius, as well as numerous formal and informal socialisation through nationally-sponsored undergraduate and postgraduate students overseas. Although the latter were exposed, like Lee Kuan Yew himself, to mainly Anglo-Saxon and

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then-Malayan universities, the political and corporate learning attitudes were self-consciously emphasised in the direction of selective copying. The filters for idea experimentation and application in Singapore were the earlier-mentioned situational, material and ideological factors determining foreign policy boundaries. It is in this sense that the SMD was branded diplomatically as 'Singaporean', and at the same time domiciled within geographic and cultural 'Asianness'.

Ironically, the Asian Values Debate allows the dichotomisation of the SMD into a holistic informal version, and a segmented formal version run in partnership with more than 20 states and international organisations. The former is the large-scale emulation of the SMD's operating principles and specifics without comprehensive interstate agreements involved, and hence is largely coterminous with the case for Asian Values set forth in Section 5.3. In Lee Kuan Yew's consultative parlance, this holistic Asian formula is abstracted as: 'The more dissension, the more contention and the less consensus, the less you get on with the job.' Part of East Asia's success lies in this 'high tolerance' for subordinating the self to the needs of the nation and society, and this according to Lee, is exportable and being applied by China (Branegan 1991).

The segmented formal version is however more restrained in its claims. Formalised in 1992, as the Singapore Cooperation Programme (SCP), it 'offers training in areas where Singapore possesses expertise such as airport management, port management, banking and public administration' and other modular aspects of technical development. The emphasis is on the 'sharing' and adaptation of aspects of development across time and space contexts.
The Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Technical Cooperation Directorate explained the implementation of the SCP in terms of Singapore:

... sharing its governance standards or 'best practices'. We have to be sensitive to cross-national differences and variations. We believe that 'our' practices have worked for us and which we hope will work for others according to their local circumstances. At all times, it is important for us to highlight the smallness and uniqueness of the Singapore context, geographical, political and social and so on.... The basic philosophy remains that Singapore's past development path is broadly similar to the experience of others in the present. Therefore through technical assistance, the learning course can be shortened. (Chng 2000, interview, 5 May)

As of May 2000, Singapore has signed 22 bilateral and third-country training programmes (TCTPs) under the SCP, either to directly share development experiences, or to share experience transfers in partnership with 'advanced' countries such as Britain, Germany, Japan, South Korea, Canada, Australia and Norway. In the late 1990s, TCTPs had broadened to include the Asian Development Bank, UNDP, IMF and the World Bank, in addition to the ongoing courses for the Commonwealth Secretariat. Considering the diversity and technicality of the SCP partnerships and idea transfers, the Director claimed that the Asian Values debate, that is, at the level of philosophical and value differences (Figure 3) had little impact on the other levels of normative governance and actual policy implications. 'The aim [of the SCP] is to help others to see and to realise their own potential.' (Chng 2000, interview, 5 May)

The next two subsections will scrutinise the holistic informal aid and segmented formal aid in terms of idea transfer and policy implementation in reference to some Asian states and general others. The latter surveys depend heavily on feedback salience of news reports as the programme administrators who were interviewed by the author have not

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60 A sample is the publication of the Commonwealth Secretariat, *Current Good Practices and New Developments in Public Service Management: A Profile of the Public Service of Singapore* (1998).
actively followed up upon the results of experiential learning outcomes in the trainees’ countries (Tan 2002b, email, 25 Mar.). This is partly because this consciously epistemic aid policy is still in its infancy. Available data for courses handled by one of the SCP’s main local training agencies, the Civil Service Consulting Group, indicate a steady increase in demand for idea transfer from Singapore in 1997-2000:

Table 2: Demand for the Singapore Cooperation Programme
By Numbers of Courses Conducted by the Civil Service Consulting Group, Singapore, for Foreign Officials

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>NO. OF PROGRAMMES</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
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<td>1999</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>15</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

5.5.2.1 Holistic Informal Aid

The application of holistic informal aid has been most visible in the cases of China and Vietnam, and to a lesser extent, attempts with Indonesia, Philippines, Kazakhstan, and Britain. In the cases of China and Vietnam, the SMD’s appeal was visibly articulated only when reformist leaderships sensed ideological bankruptcy in pre-existing national Marxisms. For China, the death of orthodox Marxist economics occurred five years before Soviet perestroika and glasnost, and 10 years before the USSR’s collapse. In 1981, the Chinese government mouthpiece Peoples’ Daily announced that among the NICs, the conditions for Singapore’s foreign trade policies, technology use and business management were similar to those existing in coastal Special Economic Zones (SEZs) being set up, and deserved learning
from. However, the commentary drew distinctions with Singapore’s ‘social system’ and circumstances (ST 1981). Meanwhile bilateral trade was taking off, the Soviet experiment had come to grief, and the tussle between reformers and conservatives within the Chinese Communist Party came to a head over the Tiananmen Incident. This gave impetus to ‘paramount leader’ Deng Xiaoping’s symbolic tour of the Southern (SEZ-located) provinces in 1992, where he personally issued a call to learn from Singapore how to maintain social order and discipline (Deng 1994, 366). Since that announcement, senior officials ranging from Ministers of Propaganda Departments, Mayors and Chairmen of provincial parliaments have made regular study visits to the Republic to examine its legal system, anti-corruption policing, social security, public housing and industrial estates. A Hong Kong-based China watcher observed that the Chinese knew that capital, technology and other heavy and light industrial investments could be had from the West, Japan and other NICs, but the SMD exemplified a model for combining factors for development (Asiaweek 1993). Senior Minister Lee, Prime Minister Goh and others had consistently cautioned that while the SMD was a model for emulation, its transferability was qualified by differences in territorial scales, development stages and mentalities in courting private investors (Chuang 1993; Yong 1993).

One mutually preferred vehicle for transferring the SMD is the ‘industrial park’: it is a territorial site combining housing, storage, power, communications and transport infrastructure, the coordination of which created an ideal production and business environment for all sizes of investments (Kwang 1993). One of several Sino-Singaporean industrial parks, at Suzhou in Jiangsu province, was to serve as ‘flagship’ of

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61 Provided by the Civil Service Consulting Group in Singapore during the author’s visit on 4 May 2000, and re-verified by Tan (2002a, email, 22 Mar.).
intergovernmental development transfer and collaboration. It began life in 1994 with much promise as a carbon copy of Singapore’s first nationally successful Jurong Industrial Estate, with heavy capital outlays from government-linked and other private investors. However, by 1997 it was widely acknowledged to be making a loss and suffering from conflicts over corporate and legal culture with its local Chinese municipal partners. It had turned out that municipal leadership changes in Suzhou had revived centre-periphery grievances with Beijing, and led to local officials setting up a rival industrial park in the vicinity, and directing interested investors away from the original (L.H. Chua 1997). Even after Lee Kuan Yew elicited a public reiteration of priority for the original Suzhou project from an embarrassed President Jiang, political rectification suffered from bureaucratic politics on the Chinese side. By July 1999, an exasperated Singaporean government renegotiated its commitment to 35%, down from the initial 65%, and arranged for a handover to Chinese majority control in early 2001 (M. Richardson 1999c). Singapore’s other private sector and minimal government-partnered industrial parks have, however, mitigated the Suzhou fiasco. The Wuxi-Singapore Industrial Park was in 1997 one of China’s better performers in terms of earnings per square kilometre (L.H. Chua 1997), while the Port of Singapore Authority-managed Dalian port contributed heftily to the government-linked company’s profits and global branding. Meanwhile, Sino-Singaporean ardour for industrial park collaboration has not cooled as China’s interior provinces have begun to request for Suzhou models, and in 1998 total Singaporean investments abroad in China overtook those in Southeast Asia, the US and Europe (L.H. Chua 2000; Aggarwal 2000).

Ironically in 1997, ex-US diplomat Jeanne Kirkpatrick (1997) called similarly for China to follow the model of ‘another Singapore, or even Taiwan’ in political economy and gradual democratisation.
Vietnam too looked to the SMD as a source of regeneration following the UN-mediating Cambodian Peace Treaty in 1991 and the collapse of the Soviet bloc as an economic prop. Much like Beijing, Hanoi wished to preserve one-party government through economic reform. During Lee Kuan Yew’s 1992 visit to Vietnam, Vietnamese Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet announced an interest in learning from the SMD, and in particular, Lee’s personal experience in forging development, and if possible to engage him as advisor (AFP 1992). In October 1993, Vietnamese Communist Party General Secretary Do Muoi visited Singapore and remarked that most political and developmental perceptions of both countries were ‘similar or close to each other’; he also visited industrial estates, public housing, port and airport authorities on this occasion (Xinhua 1993). At the end of this visit, the Vietnamese delegation announced that Singapore had promised assistance on the scale of a ‘Vietnam master plan’ which would provide manpower training in finance, urban planning and infrastructure management, as well as assist in establishing export processing zones and construction of transport and communications networks. As in China, the groundwork for soft aid was being laid. A year later Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet called for the creation of a Vietnam-Singapore industrial park (VSIP) to facilitate expertise transfers. That same year, Hanoi’s official publishing house translated a 40-year selection of Lee’s speeches on democracy, development and human rights on the grounds that his thoughts deserved an audience in Vietnam (ST 1994d).

In May 1996, the VSIP was inaugurated at Song Be province near Ho Chi Minh City on the basis of public-private partnership and intergovernmental agreement. In his speech for the occasion, Prime Minister Goh reminded his Vietnamese partners that aside from political

63 See UNCTAD (1998, 76). The Dalian Port collaboration project enjoyed double-digit cargo growth between
stability and a good workforce, high standards in park development and maintenance, along with transparent and consistent regulations, were vital for success (S. Tan 1996). In August 1997, a Vietnam-Singapore Technical Training Centre was also launched to upgrade Vietnam’s workforce and to offer similar training for other Indochinese countries. Thus far, both governments have expressed a general satisfaction with the VSIP and other projects. However, in 1999 Lee Kuan Yew remarked in an interview that Vietnam’s economic miracle would have to await a generational change in leadership. He said that the present leaders were still operating with a guerrilla mentality in a networked global economy (D. Lamb 1999). By May 2000, it was reported that although Singapore was Vietnam’s number one foreign investor, the power struggle between reformers and conservatives in the ruling Communist Party was impeding further pro-business measures such as clarifying contract law, reducing red tape and taxation (ST 2000b).

China and Vietnam have been the most visible candidates and qualified successes for holistic model transfer although some significant clashes of culture still occur over managing business. The SMD also attracted interest in the Philippines and Kazakhstan in 1991-92, but little resulted politically following Lee Kuan Yew’s lectures on communitarian discipline before democracy (Lu 1992; R. Chua 1993). Indonesia, after the removal of Suharto’s corrupted Asian Value governance, initially appeared ready to imbibe elements of the SMD following the continued profitability of the Singapore-Indonesia industrial park in Batam (T. Tan 1999), and President Abdurrahman Wahid’s request for Lee Kuan Yew’s participation in 1996 and 2000 (Kwang 2000).

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64 The Singaporean Ministry of Foreign Affairs concurs with the Vietnamese government’s view that the Technical Training College was paying off in skill training. (Chng 2000, interview, 5 May) The Song Be industrial park was doing much better financially than Suzhou (T. Tan 1999).

65 This profitable industrial park operating since 1990 was relatively unaffected by the 1997-99 turmoil in Indonesia, partly because of its economic, managerial and geographic proximity to Singapore.
in his eminent persons advisory panel on reforms in 1999. However, pending resolution of Indonesia’s post-financial crisis civil disturbances, the prospects of implementing aspects of the SMD currently look dim for Jakarta.

In a western context, the British New Labour government’s attempt informally and selectively to duplicate the SMD in ‘modernising’ Britain has run into perceived incompatibility with Asian Values. In 1996, then-British-Prime-Minister-in-waiting Tony Blair visited Singapore for ideas on reforming Britain’s social welfare and trade unions to meet the challenge of economic globalization. While acknowledging Singapore’s corporatist labour relations and the social investor role of the National Trades Union Congress as an inspiration for New Labour’s all-inclusive ‘stakeholder economy’, he drew a line at imbibing Asian communitarianism, preferring the term ‘unified society’ instead as a universal basis of progress (Wong 1996; ST 1996a). Most academic and media opinions supportive of the stakeholder concept’s borrowing from the SMD identified it with how ‘Singapore’s policies for state-administered pensions that are owned as personal property [can] demonstrate that government can have a decisive role.’ (Gray 1997) In Blair’s first administration (1997-2001) welfare reforms contemplated retaining basic state pensions but that

...people earning more than 100 Pounds a week would also have to contribute to a second pension. A new ‘mutual fund’, not unlike Singapore’s CPF (Central Provident Fund) would manage the investment of the second pension.

The then deputy social security minister Frank Field was impressed with the possibility of a combination of the SMD with New Zealand and Australian programmes (Behrmann 1997). There was also a suggestion that New Labour should consider copying Singapore’s restrictive car ownership quota, known as the Certificate of Entitlement, as a solution to traffic gridlock and urban pollution. The underlying idea was stakeholding: make motorists
pay for their eligibility to drive, discourage retention of energy-inefficient old cars, and increase public funds for environmental projects (Green 1997). Whether Prime Minister Blair’s first term of office has produced visible adaptations of the SMD’s aspects in Britain remains in doubt even as New Labour won an electoral landslide for a second term on the promise of completing unfinished reforms. It is also doubtful if the SMD remains an inspiration at all for New Labour considering the fact that many opinions have criticised the Blair-Giddens Third Way as a disguised attempt to holistically transfer Lee Kuan Yew’s ‘nanny state’ into British public policies. Ralf Dahrendorf, a predecessor of Giddens as Director of the London School of Economics, has slammed Blair’s admiration for the SMD as an ‘authoritarian temptation...in a free society.’ (1999) By mid-2000, one observer concluded that Blair had dropped stakeholding and references to the SMD from his public vocabulary (Richards 2000). In this sense of applying the SMD to a western society, the SMD’s transmission to the recipient appears obfuscated by the ‘noise’ in the channel components of soft power.

5.5.2.2 Segmented Formal Aid

Officially Singapore’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not distinguish between holistic and segmented aid. The catch-all offer to all interested states to take home relevant aspects of the SMD under the SCP appears to temper the harsher fundamentals of Asian Values. Virtually all of the courses and seminars offered either bilaterally by Singapore, or in partnership with third countries and organisations, are basic or technical: civil aviation management, port management, environmental management, public administration, telecommunications, community policing, productivity, IT, banking and finance, and the English language. The Memorandum of Understanding signed with the World Bank in
October 1999 to support the Bank’s development mandate in the region, especially in the wake of the 1997-99 financial crisis, aims to draw merely on Singapore’s knowledge base in corporate and financial sector governance, civil service and public management (S.H. Lee 1999). This poses the issue of efficacy in idea transfer by a motley ‘Singapore-IMF-World Bank-UNDP-Developed country’ epistemic community: a heavy onus is placed upon the learner’s ability to discriminate over applicability to his own developmental environment. In an interview with this author, Paula Donovan, the Head of the World Bank Liaison Office in Singapore identified ‘Open Economic Policies’, ‘Governance’ and ‘Social Protection’ as the SMD’s points of excellence (Donovan 2001, email, 16 Jan.). In so far as the Asian Value trait of the SMD is acknowledged, Donovan elaborated on ‘Social Protection’ as follows:

[W]e know that globalization entails ‘winners and losers’. Singapore has amassed considerable national savings, such that necessary enlightened adjustments could be made if volatility due to globalization inflicts unacceptable costs on some groups of its citizens. National cohesion and leadership is such that public as well as citizen sacrifices would be expected in the event of a serious national setback (and one already sees small examples of this e.g. topping up of the Central Provident Funds [CPF] of the poorest; cutting the CPF contributions by employers during the crisis etc.) (Donovan 2001, email, 16 Jan.)

But this World Bank discourse also urges that countries must have [the] wisdom to make sensible adaptations from available global experience. We see many countries interested in Singapore’s experience – especially in those areas which are relatively invariate to country size e.g.: judicial reform, public sector management, knowledge economy/continuous learning, fighting corruption, financial sector deregulation. Looking ahead, we would expect some of the emerging ‘public private partnerships’ – their transparency and regulatory framework [–] to be other areas in which Singapore’s experience will be one of the many that other countries will want to look at. (Donovan 2001, email, 16 Jan.)

With qualifications, one might claim this epistemic SMD discourse via the World Bank represents disembodied Asian Values grafted onto aspects of modernization.

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66 The evidence of this is the way Singapore is positively presented as a model in official World Bank and IMF publications: the World Bank (1993); and Bercuson (1995).
This author managed to sit in on a one-day study visit conducted bilaterally for three directors of the Indonesian civil service in May 2000 (Civil Service Consulting Group: Programme for the Study Visit from Indonesia 2000). The following gaps in the visitors' understanding of streamlining public administration were observable. Following an explanation about Singapore's shift to the training philosophy of 'individual learning roadmaps' tailored to marry organisational and individual interests as the more efficient contrast to quota-derived training targets, one visitor commented that he would have difficulty reconciling the politics of horizontal geographical diversity, vertical seniority and positional differences up and down his organisation. Additionally, while Singapore’s ‘Public Service 21’ vision thrived on anticipating continuous changes in public service delivery standards, the Indonesians were consistently wondering aloud how employees could be persuaded to accept change with negative consequences for their well-being. Frequently, the presenter suggested implementing consultative processes in reply. The 'normative prescription' of supportive social values as an underpinning of bureaucratic values is probably a missing dimension – a.k.a. the Asian Values of communitarianism, self-discipline, rule-obedience, and the like.

On the other hand, English language training, productivity, telecommunications and IT may not require the bolstering of Asian Values as the success of Botswana in duplicating Singapore’s productivity movement showed. Being aware of Botswana’s vulnerability as a landlocked, export dependent country dwarfed by the larger neighbouring South African economy, and possessing only half of Singapore’s population, the political and economic

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67 This should be read in conjunction with the World Bank’s The East Asian Miracle (1993) as well as with Lee
elites of that country viewed the improvement of productivity in existing industries as the only guarantee for its long-term survival (Xinhua 1990). Not surprisingly, with the UNDP’s encouragement, the Botswanan government looked to Singapore to transfer the ‘software’ of human resource enhancement (Xinhua 1992a). The Botswana National Productivity Centre was the first of its kind launched in 1995. Its director in 1997, Lepetu Setshwaelo, who had been stationed, courtesy of the SCP, in Singapore for three weeks in 1994-95, claimed that it made a difference to his country as it gave him ideas. The staff at Singapore’s National Productivity Centre kept up a helpful liaison by email. In Botswana, the productivity concept, like its Singapore version, mushroomed into Work Improvement Teams in the public and private sectors. According to Setshwaelo, his centre trained 300 to 400 people annually and planned to expand to service requests from Lesotho and South Africa. Botswanan President Masire has lauded the transplantation of the productivity movement as a critical component of his country’s standing in economic competition (Menon 1995; M.H. Chua 1997), which according to many reports is a ‘miracle’ in Southern Africa.

If Botswana is a strong advertisement for the SCP, it remains to be seen if the Pacific Ocean state of Palau can make good on its admiration for Singapore’s ‘small island success’ techniques in the long term (ST 1997). If demand and supply is anything to go by, selective technique learning via the SCP remains potent evolutionary soft power for Singapore. The number of courses conducted for foreign officials in Singapore by the Civil Service Consulting Group have expanded 67% between 1997 and 2000, while course participants

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Kuan Yew’s comments on South Korea in Section 5.4.3.

68 In its endorsement of Singapore as a model of small country public service management, the Commonwealth Secretariat drew attention in its report to the country’s ‘social discipline’ and a publicly-proclaimed communitarian ethos as a critical part of its material success. This is possibly Asian Values endorsed in clinical guise. (Commonwealth Secretariat 1998, 2-3, 11-13)

69 Calculated from Table 2.
are now drawn from all continents, and training partners sharing the SMD include the
dominant neo-liberal global institutions such as the IMF and World Bank. In forging
partnerships with Singapore, these organisations have kept silent on Asian Values while
openly embracing the segmented expertise of 'best practices' in public administration and
central banking.

By way of an interim assessment of Singapore's LOI strategies, five points can be
observed. The first three derive from the country's role as international norm-setter. Firstly,
Singaporean soft power, in externalising its strong preference for 'protective sovereignty' as
a regional behavioural norm, became accepted in the form of a treaty adhered to in spirit and
letter. However, the country's political entrepreneurial role was subsumed under the
procedures of consensual decision-making, due ironically to the ASEAN Way, and hence
cannot always be openly attributed. Secondly, once externalised as information in the
channel, the TAC was consciously applied by Singapore as an ideational adhesive under the
name of the ASEAN Way in forging an ASEAN common front against Vietnam's
occupation of Cambodia. The ASEAN Way was used to justify political opposition to Hanoi,
and unity within ASEAN. Thirdly, after the Cold War, the ASEAN Way's adhesiveness
frayed somewhat over the issues of admitting Myanmar and Cambodia, and over joint efforts
to recover from the financial crisis. Attempts by Singapore to encourage ASEAN to stand
together and steer the wider regional processes of the ARF, APEC and ASEM along the path
of the ASEAN Way also produced bickering and mixed results as larger and more culturally
differentiated diplomatic actors such as the US, China, Japan and the EU states were
included. The ASEAN Way could not attract all after the Cold War, because the ‘noise’ of diverging interests and security perceptions obscured the channels for reception.

In examining Singapore’s foreign aid policies, the LOI also revealed mixed results. The fourth observation would regard the holistic informal transplantation of the SMD as only partially successful in coopting China and Vietnam into a common currency of governance. Size, cultural outlooks, and history complicated the SMD’s transfer in these two countries and elsewhere. Fifthly, the segmented formal aid represented by the SCP attempted to build and coopt an epistemic community without accentuating the Asian Value trait of the SMD. Whereas countries ranging from China, Botswana, Britain, Palau and Vietnam tried emulating SMD components, it could not be said that all unreservedly subscribed to Singapore-style Asian Values. Perhaps, as the neo-liberal collaborations with the World Bank and IMF show, the SMD is a chameleon discourse. Therein lies the paradox of LOI as soft power: one can package ‘a model’ freely and omnidirectionally, it is however up to the recipients to interpret the ‘power’ of transferred ideas through local filters.

5.6 Conclusion

In this Chapter, Singaporean foreign policy and its participation in the Asian Values Debate in 1992-99 as a clash of discourses with policy implications for national governance and moral livelihood have served to support the twin hypotheses of Foreign Policy Leadership from Inside-Out (LIO), and from Outside-In (LOI). Singapore, in spite of limitations of physical assets, played a substantial role in wielding Asian Values as an informational instrument derived from the globally-acknowledged success of its model of development (the SMD) measured in terms of GDP, relative public safety and other material
development indicators. In Figure 3, it has been pointed out that the Asian Values Debate had three levels. In the first (value difference) and second (normative governing difference) levels, the Singapore School has been philosophically stalemated by counter-ideological and academic arguments that Confucian, Buddhist, and Hindu traditions do not overwhelmingly favour pre-existing forms of neo-authoritarian to totalitarian forms of government (Tatsuo 1999; Donelly 1999; Sen 1999). It is on the third level that the incontrovertible core of the Singapore School's discursive strength lay: the SMD has delivered according to material indices of modernization, and hence this demonstrable 'success' lends post hoc justification to 'Asian Values as a foundation of Good Governance' as a discourse. In Foucaultian terms, the Singapore School is thus constructed as a system of meaning for a purpose – the soft power to engage and rival a hegemonic-aspiring and western-originated discourse of liberal democracy.

In LIO, where the Singapore School sought to use the Asian Values argument based almost exclusively on the SMD, it can be said to have achieved its objectives of defending China, exceptionalism in global political dialogue, and also the defence of its national particularism in the face of a legal and human rights row with the US. The LIO also required that Singaporean society maintain cohesion to underpin a rational unitary actor model of foreign policy implementation. This was achieved through the corporatist and communitarian aspects of the SMD, in spite of a wide range of external engagements, economic, geographic

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70 The critics of Singaporean Asian Values are however not unanimous. Joseph Tamney argues that although Asian Values were drawn from tradition for legitimisation and cultivating progress ethics, the exposure to other civilisational influences through trade and communications will ensure Singapore will be neither 'a typical Chinese country' nor 'a copy of the West.' It will be a unique testing ground for modernisation in Asia. (1996, 173-201)

71 Labelled by some as a 'Singapore Puzzle'. (M. Haas 1999)
and political. In this sense, LIO dealt more with the concrete achievements of level 3 of the Asian Values Debate, as opposed to the intellectual vagaries of levels 1 and 2.

For its part, when applied to Singapore, the LOI revealed a mixed result. Asian Values were propounded post-hoc as a norm-setter among Southeast Asian states. Singapore's role as the 'political entrepreneur' in initiating and maintaining regime norms intact was subtle, even obscured within a communitarian context of regional processes. However, its role was clear in consequence when the 'ASEAN Way' as an ideational set of practices was manifested in the TAC and in the campaign against Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia, where the Republic led the 'ASEAN voice' in regional and international forums. By contrast, the ASEAN Way proved weak in attracting wider regional and culturally differentiated players in post-Cold War forums such as ARF, APEC and ASEM. Even within ASEAN, the ASEAN Way held strongly only if one regarded it as a defence of conservative regionalism amidst post-Cold War identity and financial crises. When the LOI was used to explain Singapore's aid policies, Asian Values were seen to be partly decoupled from its good governance dimensions in the SCP, which segmented and promoted parts of the SMD selectively. This made a rainbow epistemic community of good governance possible, but it decomposed the exceptionalist rhetoric of Asian Values. Even in the rare cases where the SMD was copied with near totality (China and Vietnam), the results were uneven and could not be said to generate any solid epistemic community with the 'Singapore School'. The LOI thus both showed up the incomplete efficacy of the SMD abroad, and hence its limitations as externalised information, interfered with by 'noise' in the channel and the reception of the idea.
In sum, Foreign Policy Leadership from Inside-Out and Outside-In both depend heavily on the visible demonstration of reasonably established models around which strong self-evident discourses can be constructed to appeal to other foreign policy actors. The reception and endorsement of a national brand of ideas is another different matter. Responses by recipients to ideas in the global information space depend on how those original ideas are sluiced and filtered in the channels and reception components of information flow. In the perspective of the LIO, Singapore's ripostes and arguments were based heavily upon the corporatist nature of the SMD which held up in transmission and reception globally despite the 'noise' of philosophical counter-arguments. An LOI application has shown up many significant qualifications: a national set of ideas, once externalised or transferred in operational political channels such as regimes and epistemic communities, is subject to much distortion from the multiple power applications of additional actors and their preferences.
CHAPTER 6

6.1 Introduction

This Chapter illustrates soft power through the permeable margins of the intermestic. As explained in Chapter 4, the intermestic condition entwines the international and domestic dimensions of politics, and is a manifestation of globalizing effects. The ‘intermesticity’ of any issue occurs when ICTs connect the emotions and implications of a physically remote event to audiences across time and space. As elaborated in Chapters 1 and 2, these connections are an infrastructure enabling assorted and dispersed parties, willing and able to involve themselves in information flow, to affect political outcomes around the original event, duplicate or even amend the original through representation. This intermesticity will be illustrated in this case study of Chilean foreign policy and the Pinochet Extradition Controversy 1998-2000.

This Chapter will proceed in a format similar to Chapter 5 and according to the three intermestic hypotheses set out in Chapter 4. The next two sections will justify Chile and its foreign affairs in relation to the Extradition Controversy as a case study of soft power in global information space, and will concurrently provide the historical and contemporary contexts for non-state activities in competition with Chilean foreign policy. The prime historical context is the 1973 military coup d’état and the ensuing praetorian regime that endured till 1990, as well as its human rights legacy till 2000. Thereafter, a brief summary of the 503 days of the Extradition Controversy will be sketched using a four phase chronology to assist subsequent illustration of the hypotheses of the intermestic politics of foreign policy.
Intermestic Correlation of Forces (ICF)

The intermestic correlation of forces joining state and non-state parties can shape foreign policy change through direct mobilisation of ideas, sanctioning standards through global regimes, non-state self-constitution of expertise, and manufacturing subjective world public opinion.

Intermestic Socialisation (IS)

Intermestic socialisation occurs when non-state actors hold states to account through regimes they sign on to.

Multipolar Direct Emulation through Demonstration (MDED)

Multipolar Direct Emulation through Demonstration occurs when states and non-state actors emulate ideas that have been proven elsewhere to be efficacious in attaining particular objectives.

Clearly, ICF concerns illustrating the direct means of wielding non-state soft power through networked sanctions; while IS and MDED concern the complementary, but more indirect means, by which non-state soft power takes effect through making comparisons and listings of state behaviour. The conclusion will consequently identify the extent to which the three hypotheses have been supported, and where it needs further explanatory capacity.

6.2 Chile, Global Information Space and Intermestic Penetration

The choice of Chile and the arrest of ex-dictator and Senator Augusto Pinochet in London is made, as was the case for Singapore and the Asian Values Debate, for three sets of reasons: the country’s long-term involvement in global information space, its consistent border porosity in relation to foreign policy decisions, and the consequential clash of ideas across borders. A short chronology of Chilean political history is provided below to aid the subsequent explanations of Chilean involvement with the global.
Table 3: Chronology of Chile's Political Milestones

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year(s)</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1540 – 1800</td>
<td>The Spanish <em>conquistador</em> Pedro de Valdivia founds a European colony in the Central Valley after marching southward from Peru. Immigration primarily from Spain, Ireland (mainly Catholics), France and Italy continued till the end of the 1700s. Settlement boundaries were temporarily checked by warfare between Spaniards and the Araucanian indigenous peoples in the South. The colonial economy was organised around the ranch: horses and mules bred for transport, cattle for food supplies to neighbouring Spanish colonies. Subsequently, crops were grown for export, along with limited mining of metals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1808 – 1813</td>
<td>The conquest of Spain by Napoleon, as well as Napoleon’s installation of a puppet emperor in Madrid, created an opportunity for reevaluation by local elites of the metropolitan-colonial relationship. Liberal and nationalist ideas were publicised. After Spain recovered following Napoleon’s defeat, military confrontation with the fledgling nationalism ensued.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1818 (February)</td>
<td>Following Spanish military defeats on several occasions, General Bernardo O’Higgins declares the Independence of Chile with the assistance of fellow Argentine rebel General José de San Martín.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1800s-1900s</td>
<td>An export economy based on agricultural and mining products for overseas markets is pursued, leading to periodic economic booms, but uneven wealth creation. Limited industrialisation helped produce a working class by the late 1800s. The War of the Pacific between Chile, Peru and Bolivia in 1879-1883 resulted in Chile gaining the nitrate and copper-rich Atacama desert. The system of government alternates between authoritarianism and liberal democracy. Civil wars break out frequently between political rivals. Two military coups occurred in 1924-5.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929-30</td>
<td>Great Depression hits Chile. Economic woes inspire experiments with socialism by governments between 1932 and 1941.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939-45</td>
<td>Second World War produces shifts in Chilean governing coalitions, mirroring the Allied-Axis contest abroad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964-70</td>
<td>Against the backdrop of the Cold War, non-communist reform-minded Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei Montalva is elected to the Presidency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-73</td>
<td>Despite losing to Frei in 1964, Marxist Salvador Allende wins the elections in 1970, heading the first elected Marxist government in Latin America. Within three years, the economy is in crisis following nationalisation and resistance from business elites and the US.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973 (11 September)</td>
<td>With considerable support from business elites, Army Commander in Chief General Augusto Pinochet implements a coup plan jointly coordinated with the Navy and Air Force chiefs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The coup is justified as a mission of national salvation from communism. Military dictatorship lasts till 1990.

1973 (October) – 1988 (June)
Various human rights NGOs and deputations from the UN and regional organisations investigate humanitarian conditions under Pinochet.

1974-8
Pinochet's intelligence agents execute opponents abroad in Operation Condor, including the assassination of ex-Allende minister Letelier in Washington D.C. Pinochet's regime enacts an Amnesty Law for all abuses committed prior to 1978.

1988-90
Pinochet loses plebiscite on his dictatorship and proceeds to allow presidential elections in 1989. Christian Democrat Patricio Aylwin of the Concertación for Democracy is elected President, and assumed office on 11 March 1990. Pinochet continued as Army Commander in Chief till early 1998, when he is given a seat in the Senate under the terms of the 1980 Constitution drawn up by his regime.

16 October 1998
While recovering from a back operation in a London clinic, Pinochet is detained for human rights abuses on a Spanish-originated warrant. (See section 6.4 for detailed chronology.) Ironically, the President at this time, the Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle, was the son of Allende's presidential predecessor.

2000 (2 March)
Senator Pinochet flies home hours after British Home Secretary Jack Straw announces his final decision against extradition.

Despite its relative geographical isolation, Chile is thoroughly enmeshed in each of the three components of global information space: the global media space, global economic space and global political space. Chilean involvement in the global media space began in earnest with the drawing of inspiration for Independence in the early 1800s from the ideals of both the American and French Revolutions. More will be said about this under the discussion of global political space. However, within the historical context of the development of media pluralism in Chile, the point made here is that the importation of ideas and models from abroad through local media showed consistency. The rise of printed newspapers in Chile, like its liberal bourgeois counterparts in Europe, originated from the intellectual and economic needs of the creole political and economic elites. The nature of the founding of Chile through
Spanish empire, and the corresponding economic encouragement of migration from Spain, Ireland (Catholics primarily), France and Italy till the end of the 1700s, ensured that as these settlers composed themselves into a wealthy landowning elite, they would retain links of travel, education, politics and culture with Europe (Collier 1967; Collier and Sater 1996, 18-20, 29-35). Just as the printing revolution abetted the spread of anti-monarchic ideas in Enlightenment Europe and provoked reactionary controls, the first newspaper in Chile, entitled La Aurora de Chile, started life in 1812 as a mouthpiece of those sections of the local elite who had taken advantage of the Napoleonic occupation of Spain since 1808 to push for political autonomy (Buckman 1996, 156-157). The incitements to rebellion, derived philosophically from the 'voice of reason and of truth' and the inspiration of Socrates, Plato and 'the most celebrated writers of England, of France, of Germany', provoked the inevitable backlash when Spain's King Ferdinand VII attempted a military reestablishment of colonial control following the end of the Napoleonic Wars in Europe.

This pattern of media agents serving as indigenised proxies for imported ideologies and political realignments continued right up to the military coup of 1973 that compelled the mainstream media to dance exclusively to the tune of political and economic neo-liberalism. The proliferation of media ownership and opinions since Independence depended almost entirely on how the political elites fragmented themselves over the ideological direction of the country, and the emergence of counter-elites produced by social and economic change. Pre-coup studies showed it was not uncommon for political parties to own or purchase newspapers, radio stations, and subsequently television stations, to propagate their preferences, and to invoke selected national security and public decency legislation against media rivals (Burnett 1970, 23-41; Fagen 1974, 59-70). The initial split among the landed
and industrial bourgeoisie's worldviews into conservative news (e.g. *El Diario Ilustrado* and provincial dailies), moderate middle class reformism (e.g. the newspapers *El Mercurio*, *La Segunda* and *Las Ultimas Noticias*) and radical middle class reformism (*La Tercera de la Hora, Flecha Roja, Boletin PDC, La Epoca, Radio Cooperativa, TV Channels 4 and 13*), was supplemented by the socialist agenda (*Las Noticias de Ultima Hora*, and a couple of radio stations), the communist agenda (*El Siglo, El Rebelde, Vanguardia Proletaria, Vistazo, Punto Final*), and the mouthpiece of the government-of-the-day (*La Nación* and TV Channel 7).\(^2\) These are a sample of the more nationally and commercially prominent newspapers, radio and television channels which broadly represent, then and now, the three main political cultures of Chile of the Right ( conservatism), Centre (middle class reformism) and the Left (socialism and communism). This is sustained regardless of the volatility in party name changes and the periodic closures of a few newspapers such as during the 1973-90 military regime. Most media tend to retain their traditional names.\(^3\) This diversity of opinion was accentuated by the penetration of the Cold War into Latin America. For example, the US military and the CIA respectively attempted to steer Chilean opinion by recommending an information management project to the University of Chile in 1965 for the purposes of mitigating civil war, and blatantly funded *El Mercurio* in 1971-72 to destabilise the elected Marxist government of President Salvador Allende (Davies 1999, 66-67, 84-85). A high point of global media space dynamics in Chile was reached in the 1970-73 period when the Allende government, given its distinction as the first freely-elected Marxist government in Latin America, if not the world, attracted the vitriol of the entire non-Left spectrum of media

\(^1\) From the maiden front page commentary in *La Aurora*, quoted in Buckman (1996, 158).
\(^3\) Most media names demonstrate continuity in the 1990s, although most consensually accept or tolerate the dominance of economic neo-liberalism, much in the way the right wing and the governing coalition parties coexist. (Heuvel and Dennis 1995, 119-121, 126-127)
in Chile. The latter were supported by western MNCs whose interests were being threatened by Allende’s nationalisation plans. Ironically, Allende’s government was determined to make a propaganda point to both Chileans and the world by adhering to the principle of ‘media freedom’. This was manifested through reluctance and brevity in clamping down on the opposition-run media, as part of the constitutional Chilean road to socialism (Fagen 1974, 63). It is likely that this tolerance contributed to the opposition’s success in provoking a coup.

The subsequent autocratic military regime of General Augusto Pinochet was more pragmatic, but also cruder, in dealing with its media profile. The initial junta, and Pinochet in particular, perceived their mission in terms of war analogies. All hostile media were either destroyed or censored (Buckman 1996, 169-173). This compelled voices opposed to a dictatorship espousing neo-liberal economics to either go underground or enlist external channels for transmission. Between 1970 and 1986, the number of daily newspapers had declined marginally from over 40 to 37 (Wilkie, Aleman and Guadalupe 2000, 59, tab. 401), but the legal remnants were forced to toe a single editorial line (Buckman 1996, 169). Television ownership doubled from 53 to 145 per thousand inhabitants in 1970-85, but easily remained controlled in the absence of cable and satellite penetration. But it was radio, which more than doubled from 147 to 332 per thousand inhabitants between 1970 and 1985 (Wilkie, Aleman and Guadalupe 2000, 66-67, tab. 408, 409), and along with the organising of oppositional information networks involving human rights NGOs, exile groups, the UN and international news agencies, that increasingly facilitated from outside the domestic contestation of the military regime. This author’s interviews, along with published journalistic accounts, confirmed the fact that radio, especially given its multiple frequencies
on FM and AM, was much harder to suppress and easier to access both within Chile’s rugged terrain and worldwide. Radio became a popular means of receiving and broadcasting the alternative realities of material deprivation and human rights violations outside the urban centres, which were more tightly under military control (Valle and Hoya 2001, interview, 22 May; Carter Jr. and Sepulveda 1964; Burnett 1970, 29-30). While pirate radios ('radios piratas') within Chile connected Chileans with the harsher realities of Pinochet’s neo-liberal agenda, global radio broadcasts enabled Chilean exiles abroad to reach home audiences (Constable and Valenzuela 1993, 149). In 2001, Chile had 179 AM and 614 FM stations (Industry Analysis: the Media, News, Broadcasting and Publishing Industry in Chile 2001). Additionally, along with radio news, music was also a means of keeping the spirit of resistance alive. The music of Victor Jara, Inti-Illimani and others of the New Chilean Song movement born of the 1960s, were then regarded as subversive by the military authorities (Jara 1983). However, such music retained a clandestine popularity, both at home and abroad, that survived the dictatorship.

The effects of the negative human rights attention the Pinochet regime was getting abroad as a result of networked reporting of abuses by NGOs, the UN and others had equally important effects. UN hearings on torture and disappearances generated adverse media comment, while the images of abuse caused Chile’s political alienation from much of the Non-aligned Movement and Europe. Even the US Congress and Administrations, especially Jimmy Carter’s and Ronald Reagan’s second term, criticised Pinochet, intensified contacts with the opposition, and occasionally threatened sanctions on arms sales (Constable and Valenzuela 1993, 289-291; Fernandois 1991, 443-444). These diplomatic pressures, along with widespread external reporting of regime blunders such as the 1976 assassination of ex-
Allende Minister Orlando Letelier in Washington D.C., and the military's flagrant petrol torching of two protestors in Santiago in 1987, intensified widespread revulsion against Pinochet's Chile. Global media exposure hurt Pinochet further in 1987 when Pope John Paul II, on an official state visit, personally visited the only survivor of the torching (Buckman 1996, 170-171). The 1976 assassination was captured in a journalist's book and sparked an official inquiry in the US which triggered the removal of Pinochet's security chief, General Manuel Contreras, and a successful, albeit limited, prosecution of a Chilean-American secret agent who surrendered himself in the late 1980s. The Pope's gesture and the torching incident reinforced the negativity of exposure when the domestic Chilean press was observed to have been momentarily emboldened in adopting a more sceptical line towards the official version of events. In both cases, the causes and culpabilities were reported with significant variations between external media and official statements, which perhaps fuelled all-round media criticism (Buckman 1996, 170-171). The Pinochet regime faced additional, if belated, adverse publicity arising from the 1973 disappearance of an American student with left-wing sympathies when a Hollywood film based on the incident, titled Missing, was released in 1982 starring Jack Lemmon (Ryle 1998; Weiner 1998).

All these incidents have since returned in the Pinochet Extradition Controversy as a mediatised 'memorial sword of Damocles' in affecting the atmosphere of fair play in transnational dispute settlement, and have rebounded in favour of the soft power of human rights NGOs. This diversion into how Chile has consistently been playing its domestic politics within global media space is necessary as it shows that even before the Internet era, the preservation of particular images and practices of ideologically polarised politics can challenge foreign policy. This is because paths have been long open for 'outsiders' to involve
‘insiders’ and vice versa through information linkages. This is a significant magnification of Chile’s middle ranking as a communications-penetrated country, which in 1996 was numbered sixth (52 newspapers) out of 20 Latin American states for numbers of daily newspapers in circulation. It was ninth in the number of radio receivers (354) per thousand inhabitants. In terms of television ownership per thousand inhabitants, it was ranked seventh with 216.\(^4\) Available global comparisons also indicate Chile’s political media exposure is out of all proportion to its rankings. Chile is above the 1996 developing world average of 154 and just under the world average of 238 for television receiver access. As for radio, it is above the 1996 developing world average of 244 receivers, and under the world average of 417 (UNESCO 1999a, IV-8 - IV-9, tab. IV.S.3). For daily newspapers, it exceeds the world median of 4.\(^5\) In terms of Internet hosts per ten thousand persons, Chile ranked only 58 in 1998 with 22.77 hosts (ITU 1999, A-25 – A-26, tab. 8).

In terms of global economic space, the Chilean case demonstrates even more intense world linkages. It is possible to analyse the evolution of the Chilean political economy as a pendulum swinging between full and limited engagement with global capitalism. This can be seen in three phases: colonial foundations through Independence to the Great Depression of the 1930s; the Great Depression to the Allende government’s Popular Unity Marxist programme of 1970-73; and the Pinochet-era neo-liberalism to the present. The first period witnessed three modes of dependence: mercantilism, foreign expertise, and foreign loans. The mercantilist modus operandi of the Spanish Empire ensured that newly settled possessions such as Chile were organised with landowners and tenant farmers, mine-owners

\(^4\) Ranked by author from Wilkie, Aleman and Guadalupe (2000, 59, 66-67, tab. 401, 408, 409). Note that 1996 is the latest year for which consistent comparative statistics were available.

\(^5\) The world median for daily newspapers was calculated by the author from Table IV.8 of UNESCO (1999a, IV-106 – IV-133). Measures of this type were otherwise unavailable.
and extraction labourers, producing agricultural and metal supplies exclusively for the welfare and enrichment of the metropole. All local development was secondary and incidental (Vitale 1969; Frank 1971, 44-79; Loveman 2001, ch. 2-3). This ensured that after the country gained its Independence by 1818, the local political and economic elites had little alternative but to rely on raw material exports for revenue generation, but with diversified markets. Independence also opened the doors to foreign expertise and capital where mineral deposits such as copper and nitrates were discovered in abundance. And where the local economic elites desired to transform themselves into an industrial bourgeoisie by producing consumer goods for home markets, or investing in copper and nitrate extraction, loans from the US, Britain and elsewhere in industrialised Europe were resorted to and liberally obtained. Export taxes were the prime revenue generator for the government. While nitrate exports propelled growth during the 1880s, and declined due to war and the rise of synthetic substitutes by 1920, copper remained stalwart, accounting for 28% of exports in 1928 and rising to 76% by 1970.6

This structural imbalance ensured that when the Great Depression struck in 1929-30, Chile was hurt significantly. Meanwhile, traditional exports of agriculture, nitrates, and most critically copper, continued, and so did reliance on foreign loans, increasingly from the US government and private sector. Recovery was slow and painful most of all for the working classes, where along with some intellectuals, soldiers and disaffected bourgeoisie, socialist and Marxist ideas took root (Silva 1996, 30-40). The brief attempts at socialist economics in 1932 and 1938-41, when socialist military coup leaders and popular fronts comprising competing socialist and communist parties took power, all presaged the more serious
attempts to reform dependent capitalism under the non-communist Christian Democrats in 1964-70. Reform was further intensified under the Marxist Popular Unity regime of Allende in 1970-73. By 1966, despite the dirigiste backlash, 57% of the assets of the largest 50 firms in Chile were held by foreign-owned corporations, the US firms Kennecott, Anaconda and ITT being some of the most prominent and politically controversial (Zeitlin and Ratcliff 1976, 304-305). Even after Allende was elected in 1970, his anti-dependency programme proceeded with a mixed priority: nationalising outright strategic industries and allowing for mixed public-private ownerships (Oppenheim 1999, 40-41, 56-62). The severance of dependency by Allende ran into the difficulties of negotiating compensation with foreign corporations and the repayment terms of existing overseas loans. Some of these loans had come from the IMF, World Bank and the US EXIM Bank, all of which had influence on foreign investors through their official surveillance reports on the investment ratings of Chile (Farnsworth, Feinberg and Leenson 1976). While American interests were most aggrieved by Allende’s measures especially in copper, hence triggering the Nixon-Kissinger plan to foster a coup against Allende, both the real and imagined implications of Allende’s programme for a country long-sustained on world capitalism logically escalated the crisis of confidence with other aspects of economic linkages. This triggered reductions in both demand for and supply of Chilean products and raw materials by both domestic and external private interests (Farnsworth, Feinberg, and Leenson 1976, 361-365; Silva 1996, 41-57), exacerbating a domestic crisis that lent initial enthusiasm for a military coup.

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7 This tone of tactical accommodation with some reformist sectors of capitalism is characteristic of Allende’s programme. Allende advisor Joan E. Garces has explained this attitude. (1972, 31)
8 In 1972, the Chilean Minister of Finance admitted that 78.4% of total short-term credit available to Chile came from US sources (Farnsworth, Feinberg and Leenson 1976, 349, fn 35).
The military coup ushering in the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet on 11 September 1973 swung the economic pendulum towards unfettered engagement with global economic space (Bosworth, Dornbusch and Laban 1994; Velasco 1994). The regime suppressed labour activism, drastically lowered barriers to trade and capital, and welcomed the return of foreign investments. As a sign of a more complete immersion in dependent capitalism, it was more than symbolic that Kennecott, Anaconda and ITT had become in this episode the co-conspirators of the ‘correction’ of Chilean politics. It was no less significant that the Pinochet government engaged Chilean graduates and sympathisers of the ‘Chicago School’ of economics personified by the ideas of Milton Friedman and Arnold Harberger to normalise the economy. Friedman himself legitimised the plan by visiting Chile in 1977 at the invitation of pro-Pinochet elites (Silva 1996, 101). The loans continued but in 1982-83, the next major world recession nearly replayed the damage of the 1930s. However, Pinochet’s team instituted drastic bank closures and consolidations for a limited period, and essentially preserved the necessary stability for capitalism. The confidence of global capital was relatively undamaged and Chile was among the first to rebound through export-oriented growth in the rest of the 1980s while much of Latin America was weighed down by the debt crisis, stemming from 1982.9 In the 1990s, heavy dependence on copper – 37-46% of exports – was supplemented by exports of fruit and marine products (ECLAC 2000, 122-123, tab. 92). The size of Chile’s participation in global economic space is seen in the rise of trade (imports and exports) as a percentage of GDP from 37% in 1974 to 65% by 1994, and stabilising between 43 to 46% for 1997-98 (IADB 1994-95, 79; ECLAC 2000, 193, tab. 132; Boletín Mensual 2000, 346). This material measure has to be supplemented by the Pinochet regime’s legacy of uncompromising economic neo-liberalism, safeguarded by the military’s

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9 The comparative recovery of the Chilean economy can be seen from the measures of Latin American GDP between 1980 and the 1990s in Table 132 of ECLAC (2000, 192-193).
pacific withdrawal in 1990 from direct politics in favour of a guided democratic process (Meller and Romaguera 1992, 49-50). In the light of this imposed neo-liberalism, it is notable that the presidential candidates of the Left and Right in the 1999-2000 elections only distinguished themselves by respectively citing British New Labour’s ‘Third Way’ and US Republican Newt Gingrich’s ‘Contract with America’ (Gallardo 2000; A. Elliott 2000).

From the perspective of 2000, this guided democracy was substantially a pact signed between hitherto domestic civil war combatants with global neo-liberal economic space considerations in mind. This is a direct manifestation of how the economic and political components of global information space intertwine. Historically, Chilean politics is interrelated with the external in terms of demands for external legitimisation, ideas and economic sustenance, and also demands by the external upon national politics for economic probity and competence, as well as strategic conformity to world political order. As has been argued in Chapters 2 and 3, order in global political space depends on how conflicting normative designs are discursively resolved by compromise or upheaval in the domestic realm.

Chile’s involvement in global political space is patterned according to a two-part elite perspective on foreign policy. It is a direct legacy of Spanish imperialism that a landowning upper class was fostered to dominate the majority who worked the land; and the system of extraction of agricultural, and subsequently mineral, products ensured that profits accrued to the upper class whilst the manual workers had their wages kept low and depoliticised as far as possible. In this hierarchy, it was the upper class comprised largely of mixed European descent, and wedded to the land and its people for their prosperity, who would have any
grievance against colonial authority, or who would conceive of alternatives for governance without upsetting pre-existing hierarchical and horizontal linkages of wealth and power (Gil 1966, 35-36; Loveman 2001, 100-103). This is the first part of elite logic. Given the destruction of Spanish prestige and control by the Napoleonic Wars, and the simultaneous appeal of the ideals of equality, liberty and nationalism evoked by the French and American Revolutions to those well-exposed members of the nascent Chilean elite, the stage was prepared to legitimise independence at home with ideas from abroad. Unsurprisingly, Chilean constitutions since 1822 have invoked expedient combinations of western communitarian\(^\text{10}\) and liberal\(^\text{11}\) ideals combined with elements of nationalism and modernization (Collier 1967, ch. 4). These seldom applied in practice to the majority below the elite unless sections of the former deliberately empowered themselves through new wealth, ballot or force. The second part of elite logic, conjoined to the first, was a pattern of calling for external intervention in intra-elite political disputes. These disputes frequently progressed towards irreconcilable positions, leading one side to force exile upon the other. Prior to the arrival of socialism and Christian democracy in Chile in the twentieth century, the issues which polarised the Conservative, Liberal and Radical Parties were nearly those which mirrored the bourgeois revolutions in nineteenth century Europe: secularism versus the socio-political role of the Church, legislative supremacy versus executive supremacy, and prioritising national unity over individual freedom. Nonetheless, there was consensus on capitalism. In civil wars in 1836, 1851, 1858, and 1891, the combatants’ foreign policies involved Peru, Britain, Argentina, Germany and the US in varying capacities of hosting exiles, ferrying troops, training troops, supplying arms, or blockading and dispersing rival leaders. These multinational accomplices were simultaneously traders and investors in

\(^{10}\) Especially Rousseau.

\(^{11}\) Especially the French Declaration of the Rights of Man.

With limited industrialisation coinciding with the discovery of copper and nitrates, along with continued expansion of agricultural export production in the 1850s, a sizeable working class emerged over the next 50 years as a base for socialist and communist propaganda. This new left-wing elite, like its pre-existing capitalist rivals, sought to consolidate at home by interacting abroad as part of a proto-global, anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist front (Muñoz 1984, 12-17). This reached its first governing manifestation in a brief 100-day coup-installed socialist republic in the wake of the 1929-30 Depression. A second manifestation came in 1938-41, when in direct response to the Communist International, Chilean communists joined forces with socialists and the moderate landowner and middle-class-dominated Radical Party to form an elected Popular Front government. However, the Nazi-Soviet pact of 1939 weakened the communists' enthusiasm for the Front, and it was not until the Nazi invasion of the USSR in 1941 that the communists changed their tune and got included in the next government (1942-46). This administration again took in an unstable Left-Right combination, thus reflecting the uneasy Anglo-American-French-Soviet anti-Axis coalition in World War Two (Gil 1966, 70-71). By this time, the US had begun marshalling Latin America as a bulwark against world fascism, and subsequently against anything left wing (Gil 1975, 169-170, 175-204).

Unsurprisingly, the respective alignments in the 1964-70 Christian Democratic and 1970-73 Marxist governments faithfully reproduced Cold War divisions. The 1964-70 Christian Democratic government had been heavily supported by both Chilean conservatives
and the US as a non-communist, modernising and land-reforming alternative to the socialists and communists. The 1970 presidential elections however gave the socialists and communists a small numerical margin in a largely two-way ideological competition with three candidates, with the ‘losing’ two being Christian Democrat and Conservative. Given the intensity of international and domestic polarisation at the time, and the new Marxist President’s popular programme of aggressive nationalisation of local and foreign private corporations, not least of which involving the copper industry, the US and much of the West were naturally allied to every non-Leftist political party. President Allende’s Marxist inclinations led him to react by inviting Cuban, Soviet and Chinese assistance, and friendship of the Non-aligned (Muñoz 1984, 40-47). Subsequent events in 1973 followed the pattern of many earlier Chilean political confrontations: the polarisation of social conditions, the incitement and assistance from outsiders, and the absolute pursuit of one agenda by force if necessary.

The Pinochet military dictatorship, although favoured by much of the anti-communist world order, could not escape external scrutiny and intervention through the media and economic spaces. The ability of non-state groups and individuals to publicise human rights abuses in world media circuits inhibited the regime’s foreign policy legitimacy with long-running confrontations with the UN, the US and European states (Spooner 1999, 93-99, 135-138). The unfettered return to Chicago School capitalism brought a debt crisis in the wake of the 1982-83 recession that roused an intense degree of domestic protests against military authoritarianism, and speeded up a democratic transition. With the winding down of the Cold War beginning in 1988, and the retreat of hardline authoritarianism elsewhere in Latin America and Asia, even the vacillations of US foreign policy tended to favour Pinochet’s
exit. This Chapter begins with Pinochet's engineered democratic transition with its authoritarian features of prioritising military courts over civilian ones, a partially appointed Senate, and the disproportionate military veto in the National Security Council. By the end of the century, global information space, with its structural features of external media, economic and political penetration within Chilean politics, invited intermestic coalitions of interests to induce Chilean foreign policy into reactionary postures over Pinochet's legacy.

The explanation for Chilean border porosity as a second criterion for this case study is easier to make after outlining how the country is involved within global information space. The patterns of embracing foreign ideas and courting legitimisation sources abroad continue into the post-Cold War and post-dictatorship era. In much of the foreign policy analyses produced in the 1990s by serving foreign ministers, bureaucrats in the foreign ministry, or workers in research institutes, the history of foreign relations under Pinochet had been consistently written off as a 'long isolation' tied to the 'praetorian ideology' of dictatorship despite Pinochet's international economic neo-liberalism (Fernandois 1991, 441-447; Muñoz 1983, 229-249). In contrast, the foreign policy of democratic transition is characterised as 'foreign policy for democracy', 'international reinsertion' into the community of nations, and engaging in multilateral cooperation on security confidence building, good governance, environmental protection, trade and combating drugs (Muñoz 1989; Matus 1993; Muñoz 1996, 66-68, 73-78; Rojas 1997). The search for new approval meant not only the extension of capitalist integration into the Andean Pact and MERCOSUR (Southern Cone Common Market), but also the endorsement of international human rights and democratic norms. In 1993, Mario Matus, the Secretary of External Services of the Subsecretariat of the Chilean Ministry of External Relations wrote that
as a result of the process of reinsertion of our country in the international system, certain regularities in the external actions of Chile can be appreciated and can be identified (or resumed) in the following: the fostering of human rights, independently of the political system; it manifests openly, as an aspiration, the generalisation of democracy as a system of government; in recognising and accepting the power and real capacity of Chile in the global context, the operational pragmatism will be privileged over the classical leadership norms of formality or protocol. Because of being a small (sic) country, we maintain a clear vocation in this respect, which does not mean rejecting bilateralism or plurilateralism in as much as it does not contradict [established] multilateral principles...

This vocal assertion of comity with global libertarian and cooperation norms appears in retrospect as an externally harmonised foreign policy. However by March 2000, following the conclusion of the Pinochet Extradition Controversy and a change in foreign minister, the official ministry website adopted a more cautious note about harmonising foreign policy with global trends:

Her [i.e. the Minister's] principal mission is to respond to the phenomenon of worldwide globalization with a foreign policy of a sense of [national] citizenship, in a manner in which Chileans are able to appreciate the benefits that result from such a policy. (Ministry of External Relations, Chile 2001)

This is an admission of the ideational challenge to Chilean foreign policy in the globalization context. Identities of the nation-state and its individual inhabitants are strained by the permeability of frontiers to agents and influences that can construct and reconstruct community. This is also the third justification for selecting Chile and the Pinochet Extradition Controversy as a case study. The historic pattern of Chilean society imbibing ideas from abroad and testing them politically at home, amounting to proxy ideological war with domestic casualties, was evidently exacerbated between 1970 and 1990. Allende's reified Chilean road to socialism clashed with the non-communist conservative opposition between 1970 and 1973. During the dictatorship, remnants of the socialist and communist parties continued upholding a socialist alternative centred around Allende's image as a

symbol of hope, even while being forced underground. The wellsprings of the Extradition Controversy of 1998-2000 partly originate here, with foreign policy being made into a battleground by both sides. In his first annual message to the Chilean Congress as president, Salvador Allende said

Our struggle against underdevelopment and dependence on foreign hegemony places Chile in a community of interests shared by other countries in Asia and Africa. Because of this, it is the decision of the Unidad Popular (Popular Unity) government to play an active role in that group of nations known as 'non-aligned'...Our universalist view of the United Nations leads us to vote in favour of the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Peoples' Republic of China. Our respect for the independence of nations requires us to condemn the war in Vietnam, and its extension to Laos and Cambodia. (S. Allende 1973, 168)

Conversely, on the third anniversary of his coup-installed presidency, General Augusto Pinochet placed his imprint on the foreign projection of 'anti-communist Chile':

Without pretending to interfere in the internal affairs of other nations, or of exporting what represents our own and original answer to the challenge in front of us, I proclaim this morning that, just as other sister nations that have suffered a similar experience [do], Chile stands today as a word of warning to other countries in the hemisphere and the world, as history will some day admit to the pride of all those who knew how to fight in defense of the freedom [of] our land, and to the shame of those who, yesterday and today, have chosen the road of weakness or of treason.

While a totalitarian imperialism sheds the blood of millions of human beings in an endeavour to enslave the world, Chile had a September 11 [1973 coup] in which many patriots surrendered their lives to guarantee the freedom of our country and of our children. (Government of Chile 1976, 23, 53-54)

These are the respective statements of 'two Chiles' presenting themselves as rivals for future international order with diametric claims of righteous community. Of course, this was also Cold War rhetoric dressed in local colours, but post-1990, this civil war of Chilean ideals transmuted into global-versus-national justice debates with the trial of Pinochet as a lightning rod. The domestic human rights movement that had evolved in reaction to the persecutions of the Pinochet regime was now augmenting its long-time external partners' calls for realising a humane new world order and prosecuting late twentieth century genocides and other crimes
against humanity. The mixed state-NGO campaign for the adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) is symptomatic of this. Meanwhile, the 'Pinochet line' has witnessed reformulation by the governments of the Chilean democratic transition into a defence of national sovereignty as a legitimate basis for a more equitable world order. Both the Chilean government and Chilean human rights alliances claimed the moral high ground of advocating desirable boundaries of rights adjudication. Incidentally, the Chilean defence of national sovereignty harmonised with one aspect of the global justice claim: the ICC is a common good for a just world order. The principal clash between the rival soft power campaigns turned on the timing and location of global justice.

The contours of Chilean participation in global information space, the historical porosity of its borders, the consequent and consistent clash of internalised ideas from abroad, and the rearticulation of this conflict externally implies an intermestic condition to Chilean politics. These behove the foreign policy actor to (i) adapt to the intermestic nature of making foreign policy in global information space by forging expedient coalitions of common interests, or discourses, with policy-relevant groups of expertise inside and outside national boundaries (ICF); (ii) attempt to socialise these policy-relevant transnational interest groups through regimes (IS); and (iii) convince others by getting them to emulate directly one's ideas from demonstration of model projects (MDED). These hypotheses, ICF to MDED, will shortly be demonstrated following a contextualisation of the extradition controversy.

6.3 Contextualising the Pinochet Extradition Controversy in London as a Globalized Foreign Policy Issue Beginning in 1973

While the preceding section sketched out the evolution of structural patterns in Chilean interactions with the global, this section will situate the extradition controversy
1998-2000 within these patterns in two complementary ways. First, the battle to indict Pinochet for human rights violations committed during his 1973-90 regime will be explained as a divided nation's deliberate attempts to project its divisions externally beyond 1990 in informational forms. The rise of the non-state sector as a protagonist will be traced against a background of an incomplete transition from authoritarianism to democracy in institutions and political climate. Second, the global non-state activity that ignited the event of Pinochet's arrest in London will be explained as a recent historical pattern, which inevitably complicated official foreign policy attempts to manage it.

The concept of an informational civil war waged by aggrieved sectors of the Chilean nation in partnership with internal and external non-state actors must be understood as an evolution beyond, whilst still encompassing, the 1970-73 Cold War antagonisms of the political Left and Centre-Right. As many writers have noted, the military junta led by General Pinochet had only militarily defeated the combined moderate socialist and hard core communist political groups in the country, and temporarily delegitimised in constitutional terms the role of all political parties (Constable and Valenzuela 1993, 272-276). The military's actions of mass and selective arrests, tortures, executions, and the relatively new bureaucratic weapon of 'disappearing persons' without trace, decapitated most organised armed resistance along with pre-existing local government personnel. The anti-political utopian scheme of formally de-recognising existing political parties, at least till Pinochet's voluntary plebiscite of 1988, left functional, moderate, and political grassroots concerns in both urban areas and countryside virtually unrepresented. If any legitimate (read non-antagonistic) demands were to be articulated to the military government, they could only be channelled via the mayoral system of pro-Pinochet civilian appointees, military bureaucracy,
or the paralysed remnants of local civilian government. Public service provision, welfare and personal safety, once guaranteed by a system of reliable bureaucracy were no longer maintained at reasonable levels of efficiency. It is against this background that civil society emerged in the form of non-state individuals and groups replacing and duplicating former state and party functions in directing local production, alleviating unemployment, housing and estate maintenance, relief for the destitute, health care, neighbourhood recreation, food supplies and defending human rights (Oxhorn 1995; Loveman 1995, 123-136). Non-state displacement of state protections in regard to human rights will be the main concern of this analysis of a civil war of human rights priorities between the winners and losers of the 1973 coup.

Initially, defending human rights in the face of the intense repressive phase of 1973-78 fell upon the conscience of the Churches, especially the Catholic one. Historically, the Catholic Church had evolved into a key representative of the non-state sector immediately after Independence, and constituted a bulwark of humanist and religious principles against a modernising post-Independence political milieu oriented primarily towards secularisation. During the period of the short-lived Allende reforms, the Catholic Church had expressed annoyance at some Marxist changes. But it was only with the provocation of the scale of human rights abuses under Pinochet that it acted as an umbrella, voice and progenitor of an intermestic human rights network in Chile (Economist 1999a). This is a fact acknowledged by one of the most vocal human rights NGOs in Chile since 1973, the Association of Relatives of the Detained and Disappeared (AFDD). (AFDD 1997, 15-19) At the initiative of Cardinal Raúl Silva, a Committee for Peace was set up in 1974 which sheltered the nascent AFDD and other victims of the military coup, and their families, and provided legal and
employment relief where possible. Under pressure from the military government, the Committee was disbanded in name but reconstituted as the Vicariate of Solidarity in 1976. The Vicariate claims its mission from both the Christian Gospel and the UN Universal Declaration on Human Rights: the general defence of human rights, especially the right to life, 'expressed by deeds, which arise from having felt as one's own the suffering of one's neighbour...as did Jesus.' (Archdiocese of Santiago 1984, 1) The deeds encompassed a full range of symbolic measures ranging from witnessing, and legal intervention for victims, to education for justice, and public denunciations of crimes against humanity. For instance, the Vicariate’s Legal Department takes up the legal cudgels against official brutality. The Department of Zones actively collaborates with local individuals and NGOs in all dimensions of relief and community self-help initiatives, while the Support Department meticulously documents individual violations of Chileans’ human rights. These are deliberately facilitative of domestic and external collaborations in presenting a discourse of victimhood to Chileans and the world (Archdiocese of Santiago 1984, 10-14, 15-18, 23).

The Vicariate’s aforementioned collaborator, the AFDD, stemming in part from its existence as an association of families of victims of the Pinochet regime, established an even stronger informational raison d’être captured in its permanent slogan ‘donde están?’ (‘where are they?’). This question simultaneously extrapolates into one campaign to seek legal and symbolic redress for those still classified as detained and disappeared by the military regime, and another of philosophical warning against the persistence of the practice of genocide at the close of the twentieth century (Díaz-Caro 2001, interview, 24 May; AFDD 1997, 7). Chief among the AFDD’s activities since its formation as an NGO in 1977 has been annual participation in marches, demonstrations, folk culture events and solemn on-site
commemorations of the deaths of Salvador Allende, and other outstanding individuals and groups around the country. From the 1980s onwards, it began associating with human rights groups of similar backgrounds in the rest of Latin America, forming a pan-regional NGO forum called the Latin American Federation of Associations of Relatives of the Detained and Disappeared (FEDEFAM)\(^{13}\) to mobilise against unresolved human rights issues in the region. Similar in motive, but equipped more for legal activism, is the Corporation for the Promotion and Defence of the Rights of the People (CODEPU)\(^{14}\) which stressed action to preserve future domestic, and indirectly, world peace by both educating awareness and adjudicating human rights violations in national, foreign national and international courts wherever possible, so as to create precedents against future violations. In the interview with the author, CODEPU’s executive secretary emphasised that if it proved necessary, advancing human rights causes must mean embracing the ‘imperialism of international law’ irrespective of geography, ‘whether it be Chile, Colombia or China.’ (Espinoza 2001, interview, 23 May)

Another party to the informational civil war is the former and existing political left associated with Salvador Allende’s then governing Popular Unity coalition. The Chilean Communist Party, with its long history of advocating anti-fascist fronts culminating in the armed overthrow of capitalist regimes, was an implacable foe of Pinochet. Although driven underground in 1973-90, it kept its structure intact and was re-legalised in time for the regime-organised 1989 presidential and legislative elections which facilitated Pinochet’s peaceful departure (Constable and Valenzuela 1993, 313-314). This party neither recaptured the level of electoral support, nor the position, to be kingmaker to the governing coalition,

\(^{13}\) Federación Latinoamericana de Asociaciones de Familiares de Detenidos Desaparecidos (AFDD 1997, 50-51).

\(^{14}\) Corporación de Promoción y Defensa de los Derechos del Pueblo. Refer also to their website <http://www.codepu.cl>.
but through its uncompromising opposition to Pinochet’s record, allied its political critique to the NGOs’ human rights cause. In January 1998, Communist Party president Gladys Marín signalled her party’s human rights solidarity by launching the first lawsuits against General Pinochet after he stepped down as army commander-in-chief. The Socialist Party (PS)\textsuperscript{15} of Salvador Allende was equally persecuted during the 17 years of dictatorship, but the experience divided the party into factions in dealing with the Pinochet era. As would be apparent in the 1998-2000 controversy, party members such as Isabel Allende and Juan Pablo Letelier, direct descendants of Pinochet’s more prominent victims, openly allied themselves to the intermestic campaign to extradite him against their governing Concertación\textsuperscript{16} coalition’s official foreign policy stand. José Miguel Insulza, the first Chilean foreign minister in the 1998-2000 period and himself a PS member, had a difficult time defending the ‘sovereignty discourse’ amidst divergent sentiments in both the PS and his coalition. Similarly, the PS presidential candidate Ricardo Lagos, who was selected as the Concertación’s joint candidate in 1999 was placed in a delicate position of supporting the return of Pinochet as a sovereign action abroad, while also upholding the principle of human rights accountability at home.

A third aspect of the informational civil war arising from the 1973-90 dictatorship is the institutional and political legacies of Pinochet’s departure as president (March 1990), up till and including the extradition controversy itself (1998-2000). Pinochet’s boast upon stepping down as President was his slogan ‘mission accomplished’. By this, he meant that the 17 years of military rule had produced an improved national culture and concomitant institutions according to Pinochet’s vision of praetorian, anti-political, yet nationalistic

\textsuperscript{15} Partido Socialista.
\textsuperscript{16} See fn 21 for an explanation of this label.
modernisation (Loveman 1991, 42-48). Firstly, the institutional legacy was centred upon the military-designed 1980 constitution. It created a permanent, and potentially infinite, slate of non-elected senators that automatically included all ex-presidents who served full terms. There was also a national security council in which the military members could convene at will and veto civilian decisions; a scheme of appointed mayors; and a gerrymandered electoral system. Annexed to these were the expanded interior security law of the state which granted the governing executive wide latitude for censoring the media and sanctioning journalists for reasons of national security. Furthermore, an Amnesty Law decreed in 1978, applied retroactively to murders and executions committed within the severest period of the dictatorship, 1973-78. There was also a submissive judiciary staffed with a large number of Pinochet-era appointees up till 1999, and which in practice was subordinate to military courts which could declare jurisdiction on matters regarded as military or national security in nature (Loveman 1991, 48-52; Human Rights Watch 1991; M.A. Garreton 1995; Oppenheim 1999, 198-199). This last feature, together with the Amnesty Law, were to be politicised in the extradition controversy for between 1990 and 1998, multiple attempts to pursue human rights and political malfeasance claims through civilian courts were hampered by existing laws. One prominent case, involving the irregular sale to the army of a defence company by one of Pinochet’s sons, was eventually closed by its transfer to military courts. Even the few limited successes of human rights prosecutions, such as the imprisoning of Pinochet’s first intelligence chief, General Contreras, and his adjutant Brigadier-General Pedro Espinoza, over the 1976 assassination of ex-Allende minister Letelier, showed that the military could obstruct implementation of sentences. They initially shielded Contreras, temporising over his medical attention at a naval hospital, before allowing him to be imprisoned in a special complex built for ex-military and public officials. Contreras’ conviction came in 1993, but it
was not until 1995 that he started his sentence (Correa 1997, 142-144). This partial success was a result of a game of political opportunism and daring played by the first two democratically-elected presidents after Pinochet’s departure against the military and political right.

All this time, Pinochet had continued as army commander-in-chief and issued his share of warning shots against overturning the permanent gains of the 1973 coup. This is the second Pinochet-era legacy: the consummate maintenance of political stalemate over the atrocities and impositions of the military government’s institutional preferences. This stalemate is derived from the general failures and limited successes of the first two democratically-elected civilian governments after 1990 in ameliorating authoritarian aspects of the 1980 constitution, curbing the autonomy of the military, and the unresolved human rights violations of 1973-90. It is also a stalemate because the social forces aligned to the erstwhile Pinochet regime continued to oppose any political initiative remotely intended to undo the military’s special guardianship of the polity. In any case, apart from the 1980 constitution, interior security and Amnesty Laws, the political Right has staked out its electoral ground through the formation of the Independent Democratic Union (UDI)\textsuperscript{17} and National Renovation (RN)\textsuperscript{18} political parties which, between them, have since 1990 maintained 30-40\% of seats in the lower chamber (Chamber of Deputies) of the Chilean Congress. In the upper chamber (the Senate), the combination of UDI-RN elected senators in tandem with the small number of appointed senators with Pinochet-era connections, has

\textsuperscript{17} Unión Democrático Independiente.  
\textsuperscript{18} Renovación Nacional.
ensured a sizeable right-wing obstruction bloc. This power of the political Right in Congress is amplified by the constitutional provision that a two-thirds majority of both chambers is required for any constitutional amendment, or any changes to legislation concerning the Armed Forces ("CHILE" 2001, 214). Thrice in 1991, 1992 and 1995, the civilian administrations' proposals to Congress to modify aspects related to asserting executive oversight on promotion and removal of officers were rejected (Loveman 2001, 331-334, tab. 11-4). On the other hand, the first civilian administration of President Patricio Aylwin managed to veto several attempts by the Army to promote officers known to be involved in human rights abuses. Even during Pinochet's detention in London in 1998, a Chilean military officer with such a reputation was recalled by President Eduardo Frei from his participation in a UN mission (BBC SWB 1998d; Atlanta Journal and Constitution 1998). These symbolic gestures of civilian supremacy, while annoying the military, did little to alter the status quo. The military budget was also a source of military autonomy, being legally guaranteed of a share of national budgets, and supplemented directly by 10% of the state copper company CODELCO's revenues (Rojas 1994, 254-255).

Adjudicating human rights abuses constitutionally also proved impossible under political circumstances of stalemating strategies by the military and the political Right. Shortly after assuming office in March 1990, the Aylwin government created a National Commission of Truth and Reconciliation chaired by a civilian judge, Raul Rettig, whose mandate was to investigate all human rights abuses which resulted in death from the day of the coup (11 September 1973) till President Pinochet's last day in office (11 March 1990). Relying on testimonies from survivors of imprisonment, relatives of the disappeared, the
Vicariate, AFDD, CODEPU and other NGOs, a list of victims' names and the crimes suffered by them was collated (Rettig Commission 1991, 3). Even the military was asked to supply information. As the inquiry got underway, it became clear that information about torture would require a special section in the final report, plus there was the difficulty of accounting for those disappeared by the military government without confirmation of their fates. This outpouring of evidence, allegations and official recording of a list of crimes disturbed the military at the same time that a congressional commission had begun to investigate the earlier-mentioned corruption case involving Pinochet's son. General Pinochet's response in December 1990 was to order a sudden 'exercise of security and coordination' in which troops staged symbolic movements throughout the country. Although President Aylwin called in General Pinochet to explain the army action, the point had been made, and negotiations over the corruption case attempted to close the possibility of damaging Pinochet and the military (Loveman 1991, 41; Oppenheim 1999, 211). Meanwhile the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's findings proceeded apace and it released its report by March 1991, announcing 2,115 human rights victims (of maladministration of justice, torture, disappearances, and deaths through executions and excessive force in protest suppression), 164 victims of political violence, enclosing a sub-report on torture in 1973-90, and listing the fate of 641 persons unaccounted for in terms of offence (Rettig Commission 1991, 196). In this way, an open-ended living discourse was created in simultaneously confirming and speculating the incidence and magnitude of human rights abuses under Pinochet's rule. President Aylwin publicly condemned the practices of torture, executions and disappearances, asked for forgiveness from the families in the name of the Chilean nation, and asked the military to make gestures of reconciliation towards the victims (Aylwin 1991, 196).

19 View the results of the last Congressional elections before Pinochet's arrest in Britain in the report "CHILE" (2001, 215). For election results from 1989, see Oppenheim (1999, 225-226) and the Chilean Ministry of.
In 1991. In an information ploy to distance himself from the Report, now commonly known as the ‘Rettig Report’, Pinochet, together with the navy commander-in-chief, the head of the Carabineros (National Police) and some Right-wing support, called it a campaign to discredit the military. While the Air Force commander-in-chief accepted the Report, it was noted by observers that he and his service had not been implicated in the gravest violations (Human Rights Watch 1991, 32). Perhaps also in deference to Pinochet’s pressure, the Rettig Report had merely quasi-legal standing and did not name the perpetrators, although reparations were recommended and implemented by Aylwin’s government. Most of the deaths were also protected from litigation by the 1978 Amnesty Law. The ongoing suits launched by victims’ families were also either stalled by the civilian courts or languished in military ones (Human Rights Watch 1991, 39-63; Ensalaco 2000, 213-216).

In 1993, the military’s displeasure climaxed in another show of force when both the corruption case involving Pinochet’s son, and human rights prosecutions against military officers, continued with the prospect of damage to the military. This time, on 28 May 1993, a state of alert was declared lasting five days in which 42 army generals attended a ‘crisis’ meeting in combat uniform in the armed forces building across from the presidential palace. This incident was even more ominous in the absence of President Aylwin who was on an official visit to Scandinavian countries at the time. Immediate talks between Aylwin’s cabinet ministers, General Pinochet and his advisors resolved the tensions but led to concessions to some additional military demands over the signing of administrative decrees concerning the defence ministry, the diminution of the corruption investigation, and the defusing of other civilian-military conflicts over human rights. The exceptions to political stalemate were the earlier-mentioned prosecution of Generals Contreras and Espinoza over

the assassination of Orlando Letelier in the US in 1976, the jailing of 15 former Carabineros in 1994 over the 1985 murders of three communists, and three other prosecutions of police captains and ex-army majors for tortures and deaths of students. As indicated, the military had procrastinated in surrendering Contreras and even then, the government had agreed that the guilty serve time in a special military prison. It was probably only the fact that the Letelier case was also the subject of widespread publicity and specific US pressure from 1976 that it produced a prosecution, while the cases of the three murdered communists and students involved prosecuting only low-ranking officers. The atmosphere of obstruction continued during the extradition controversy in London, when a journalist published The Black Book of Chilean Justice. This triggered not even an investigation of its allegations of corruption and cronyism in the judiciary dating back to the Pinochet government, but instead, a ban on its sale and distribution engineered by one of the ex-judges named in the book (LAWR 1999).

To some extent, the political stalemate manifested in the restricted independence of the Chilean government is attributable to the civilian coalition that has continuously controlled the government through three presidential elections since 1989. The Concertación de los Partidos por la Democracia (CPD) was born initially as a protest umbrella in 1983, grouping virtually all centrist and socialist parties united only in opposition to continued military government, while excluding the Chilean Communist Party (Constable and Valenzuela 1993, 285-286, 313-314). Between 1983, when the first wave of mass public protest occurred against Pinochet, and the 1988 plebiscite on Pinochet’s continuation, the

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21 ‘Concertation’ of Parties for Democracy, or simply the ‘Concertación’. The latter has no direct English translation but it approximates ‘coalition’, which the CPD is electorally, and ‘coordination’ or ‘broad coordination’ (Boeninger 1997, ch. VII).
embryonic opposition umbrella acted cautiously. It steered a middle course between campaigning for total removal of the institutional legacies of 1973-90, a reversion to Allende-style socio-economic programmes, and the taint of communist armed struggle which might have re-enacted Cuban and Nicaraguan-type political upheavals in Chile. In many ways, up till Pinochet’s detention in 1998, it was inevitably a transition agreed among elites. It bound historical rivals such as the Christian Democrats, Socialists and Social Democrats to a controlled level of political competition and collaborative agendas. More importantly, they avoided antagonising a substantively undefeated military and political Right who had voluntarily transferred power to a ‘protected democracy’ of the former’s own design and rules (Boeninger 1997, ch. VII-VIII; Oppenheim 1999, 230-233). Pinochet, who had stood in the 1988 plebiscite expecting to win, and lost, still claimed some 40% of the popular vote. This measure was retained for the political Right’s candidate in the 1989 elections. In the last presidential elections in January 2000, the vote difference between the Concertación’s victorious Ricardo Lagos and the political Right’s Joaquin Lavin was 2.6% (Global News Wire: CHIPS 2000). In short, every Concertación government has had to avoid rocking the boat by drastically amending or redressing the legacies of 1973-90, and this meant neutralising human rights adjudication if politically necessary. Pinochet’s pre-departure warning to the Concertación in 1989 remained ominous: ‘The day they touch any of my men will be the end of the state of law.’ (Quoted in Spooner 1999, 255)

At this point, it becomes clear that given the legacies of the Pinochet regime and the political stalemate of the mainstream politics among political parties and the military, under a constitution and judiciary constrained by authoritarian pockets, the largest manoeuvrable space for redressing human rights issues belongs to non-state entities. The human rights
NGOs such as the Vicariate, AFDD and CODEPU need to be located within a Chilean understanding of civil society. Civil society is not just a check and a rival, but on occasion a supplement, to the formal authority and welfare-delivery of the government. It is also a form of community grouping the unemployed, underemployed, manual and semi-skilled workers, self-help neighbourhood associations, communal kitchen operators, victims of human rights violations, informal vigilante groups protecting women and children of poor neighbourhoods against police brutality, and all other charitable NGOs. This amorphous category is called 'lo popular', or the popular culture (Aman 1991; Oxhorn 1995, ch. 4). By its very nature, this non-state sector offered a social buffer against the public welfare cutbacks and physical repression of Pinochet's neo-liberal authoritarian regime. This sector easily found roles for ex-socialist and pro-communist activists in broad alliance with all categories of the disposessed, displaced and altruistic. It is easy to understand why human rights NGOs within Chile were able to articulate their discourse of justice against Pinochet as an affirmation of fundamental human self-respect and dignity of right to life, as a contrast to the mainstream political stalemate that tended to dominate Chilean foreign policy.

On the eve of Pinochet's departure, the Concertación had publicly conceded some legitimacy to NGOs in an ironic parallel to their admission of authoritarian legacies within a democratic transition:

In [the] past years, the majority of NGOs have been working on the improvement of conditions and quality of life of the poorer sectors, as well as being dynamizers ('dinamizadores') of the redemocratization of national life. In realisation of these actions, the NGOs have counted themselves [in] along with the generous collaboration of entities of international cooperation...

The grassroots-derived programmes of the Concertación affirm that the new government will not aim to increase in disproportionate form the state apparatus, but on the contrary, will give incentive to socially organised participation in the search for solutions to diverse problems, as well as in the implementation of diverse socio-
political [programmes]. In accordance with this, a vast field of cooperation between NGOs and the future government is open within the defined frame of the grassroots programmes.\textsuperscript{22}

In this way, Chilean NGOs, whose numbers increased in 1985-86 at a rate equivalent to the whole period 1974-80 (Agurto 1990, 1), were ensured a special political standing in Chilean public life. This simultaneously constituted them as potential state-replacing interlocutors in welfare arenas, including human rights, with both internal and external NGOs. This effectively legitimised a creeping trend of intermestic linkages.

The virtue and political asset of the NGO lies in its non-governmental flexibility in combining means and ends with less-stringent accountability than that which governments are bound up with (Fisher 1997). Chilean human rights NGOs such as the Vicariate, AFDD and CODEPU established 'just causes' in common with entities which had claimed a nascent global mandate during the Cold War such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch's precursor Americas Watch, the International Council of Jurists, the UN Commission for Human Rights and the Interamerican Commission on Human Rights (IACHR). The last two are not NGOs but appendages of intergovernmental organisations that have been significantly influenced by NGOs. The shared just causes are broadly: the defence of the right to life, the prevention and the punishment of violations of the human rights listed primarily in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This intermestic correlation of aims of NGOs have two documented origins: the domestic interests of Chilean NGOs aligned towards creating a voice for the oppressed under the Pinochet regime; and the international attempts by NGOs during the Cold War to amplify the results of the postwar Nuremberg trials into a global standard of conduct covering states and individuals (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 85-88; Tolley Jr. 1987, 3-9). This remaining section will specifically explain how this
intermestic correlation of non-state just causes over human rights emerged under the dictatorship and culminated in the events of 1998-2000.

Domestically, the NGO drive for external engagements began with the fact of repression. The Pinochet regime either destroyed or censored any independent media channels. Domestic audiences could only be reached through clandestine radios and unofficial journals put out by NGOs and daring individuals, or through news rebroadcast into the country by external radio and foreign newspapers. For the Vicariate, AFDD, CODEPU and Chilean exiles, it was considered a priority that internationally connected journalists, NGOs and foreign governments become aware of the unrelenting harshness of military rule and hence apply pressure for amelioration of human rights violations. All three Chilean NGOs clearly confirmed that they have been suppliers of human rights assessments and case histories to Amnesty International, Americas Watch, the UN, and the International Federation of Human Rights, just to name a few.22 Even during the Concertación governments of 1990-98, Chilean human rights NGOs, while enjoying a large concessionary public space for remembrance and remonstration for justice, could not rely completely on domestic political and legal processes.23 Allying with Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the progress of international human rights law in the aftermath of the Cold War proved fruitful by 1998 in obtaining a measure of justice against Pinochet.

Global NGO efforts on behalf of human rights in Chile began within a purely international arena, that is, formal state-to-state arrangements with NGO persuasion involved

22 Concertación Working Group on NGOs (1990, paras. 3-4). Author’s translation.
at the margins. The Nuremberg war crimes trials, the drawing up of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the creation of various conventions (regimes) prohibiting genocide, racial discrimination and torture trace their roots to individual, NGO and governmental revulsion towards the mass atrocities conducted in World War Two. Working through the American national polity, NGOs such as the Commission to Study the Organisation of the Peace, Council on Foreign Relations, the Foreign Policy Association, and the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ, all lobbied in the final months of the war for making human rights promotion a main purpose of the UN, and specifically of its Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). (Tolley Jr. 1987, 3-9) By 1947, a UN Commission on Human Rights had been established with rotating state memberships under the auspices of the ECOSOC along with a supporting secretariat. It had the 'authority' to 'call in ad hoc working groups of non-governmental experts in specialised fields.'25 Significantly, NGOs, depending on size categorisation by the secretariat, could propose agenda items, make oral presentations, and submit short statements to the Commission through the secretariat. Through such preliminary lobbying and channels of international decision-making access, NGO capacity to use information power26 to denounce and shape human rights conduct across borders were extended under the shadow of the Cold War. Also, by influencing the genesis of ideas for international human rights law from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights onwards, to the Conventions against specific violations, through to the immanent International Criminal Court, NGOs can claim a pioneering specialisation in protecting individuals and sub-national groups against state abuses. Both Amnesty International (hereafter, AI) and Human Rights Watch, who came to play key roles in keeping Pinochet

24 Interviews ibid. Invariably, all the interviewees encountered by the author, including those exiles based in London, argued that because justice was frustrated by elite compromises made by the democratic transition at home, inviting external solutions was a necessity.
under detention in Britain in 1998-2000, claim themselves to be voluntary monitors of the application of international human rights law. Moreover, their mission statements against torture, genocide and right to fair trials resonate with humanitarian standards of the spirit of most national constitutions. The record of both organisations in frequently submitting independent reports and briefings to the UN Commission on Human Rights on Chile suggest an attempt to hold states accountable to embryonic global standards, as well as existing international standards already ratified among states. This complex point about NGOs policing what seems exclusively state-to-state agreements is all about shaping global humanitarianism into a discourse transcending sovereignty, as it is attested to in AI’s statement on its raison d’être:

[M]ost of the member states of the United Nations — countries that affirm the Universal Declaration of Human Rights — regularly violate some of those rights.

Furthermore, governments frequently make laws that themselves ignore human rights standards — this is why AI sometimes works on behalf of people who have broken their country’s own laws.

If the protection of the forgotten victims was left entirely to the state, in many cases the victims would have no protection at all.

Organisations like AI are necessary because often there is no one else to speak up against human rights violations.

Often it is only mass international pressure — the pressure of large numbers of ordinary people — that can rescue those who suffer at the hands of state power. (Amnesty International 1991, 13)

In short, human rights globalization is about the use of information on abuses in one or more countries to hold particular states to account to standards they have signed up to, and which technically privilege the individual’s rights and responsibilities as equal to the concerned states’. International agreements lend a ready value-mandate, though not

26 As elaborated in Chapter 4.
necessarily a legal one, for action that had been frequently obstructed by the capricious balance of power manoeuvres of Cold War politics at the UN. Nevertheless, it is crucial to note that the informational civil war between Chilean human rights NGOs and Pinochet had provoked a trail\(^\text{28}\) of intermestic interventions since 1973 that preceded and contributed to the events of 1998-2000:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October 1973</td>
<td>At the urgent prompting of AI and the International Commission of Jurists, the IACHR Secretary General Luis Reque negotiated a visit to determine respect for human rights in the wake of the coup.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1973</td>
<td>An AI delegation visits Chile to report on conditions there, to stop killings and protect those in detention. The delegation meets with Chilean Ministers of Justice and Interior, judges and lawyers. Outcome is the first of Amnesty’s special reports on Chile. A delegation member also testifies to the US Congress.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1974</td>
<td>International Commission of Jurists visits Chile at the suggestion of the World Council of Churches. A delegation member also testifies to the US Congress.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July-August 1974</td>
<td>IACHR follows up on earlier visit, citing Chile's membership obligations to it, and obtains visits to jails and torture sites, while also meeting up with NGOs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1977 – July 1978</td>
<td>Following NGO testimonies to the UN Commission on Human Rights, the convocation of an Ad-Hoc Working Group on Chile, and UN General Assembly resolutions condemning human rights violations in Chile, a prolonged propaganda exchange between Chile and the UN ensues, leading to a UN Ad-Hoc Working Group visit by July 1978.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981 - 1983</td>
<td>Americas Watch representatives visit Chile to document human rights conditions ten years after the coup. The resulting report criticises the persistent partiality of the judicial system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April – May 1982</td>
<td>AI conducts another mission focussing specifically on torture, and includes doctors in the delegation to verify allegations and cases supplied by local NGOs and to</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

examine and interview victims directly. Special report on torture in Chile is published.

March 1987 –
June 1988 Americas Watch conducts a series of fact-finding missions to Chile, interviewing victims and consulting local NGOs. A comprehensive report is published on Chilean human rights up to almost the eve of Pinochet’s final plebiscite in 1988.

This sample does not include numerous intermestic verifications, joint issues and transfers of reports through low-level fact-finding visits, local sections, regional action networks and volunteers of AI and Americas Watch/Human Rights Watch. Throughout the dictatorship, the Pinochet government either dismissed these criticisms as falsehoods, or downplayed their significance against the overriding needs of Cold War fighting. The latter justification worked to Pinochet’s advantage in stymieing serious sanctions from the US, Western Europe, or the UN. Also, the combative mood of the superpowers blocked any possibility of national or multilateral jurisdictions applying the still-embryonic international human rights law against Chilean violations (Tolley Jr. 1987, 199-202). Nevertheless these intermestic investigations succeeded in developing an information pool for future political reckoning and confirming Pinochet’s public odium.

Finally, before embarking on the chronology of the 1998-2000 events, one semi-distinct group needs to be treated under the category of ‘global NGO’: the one million Chileans exiled by the Pinochet regime primarily to Europe, the US and Australia. These people are quintessentially intermestic since they have either set up Chilean-only organisations for the recovery of democracy in Chile, or become members and intermediaries with AI and Human Rights Watch. Jose Zalaquett, a victim of the Pinochet regime, was one-

29 These are all part of the standard information collecting infrastructure of global human rights NGOs. See Amnesty International (1991).
time executive director with AI, and a regular consultant for Human Rights Watch reports on Chile (Human Rights Watch 1998). Carlos Reyes of Chile Democrático, Silvia Velasquez (a Chilean working for the Colombian Refugee Association, CORAS), Sara De Witt, Jimmy Bell and Nicole Drouilly of the Chile Committee Against Impunity (subsequently, the Proyecto Internacional de Derechos Humanos, PIDH\textsuperscript{31}), most of whom have been interviewed for this thesis, are examples of intermestic role merger in pursuit of human rights in Chile. Chile Democrático, formed in 1974, dedicates itself to publicising and informing the world about social and political conditions in Chile as part of an ongoing campaign to further democracy and human rights there. The global campaigning potential of ex-victims and exiles-turned-activists is explained by Reyes who was president of Chile Democrático during 1998-2000:

Human rights abuses were verified through the families, eyewitnesses at the moment of detention, eyewitnesses at the detention centres, and international organisations which had information about the whereabouts of those who were arrested. The secret police were using detainees as traps to arrest their friends and colleagues...Tens of thousands were detained at the time and those who were interrogated and released were able to inform the outside world. (Reyes-Manzo 2001, interview, 3 Jul.)

Silvia Velasquez of CORAS, who is also an ex-member of the Left-wing Movimiento Accion Popular Unitaria, suggested that their power lay in the multiplicity of individual narratives hounding Pinochet:

We had to constantly maintain a physical and symbolic presence inside and outside the court to remind Pinochet that his ‘nightmare’ of past abuses would not go away. It is not surprising that he had to be shielded everywhere he went, both at court appearances and on the Wentworth estate. We now keep the memories of the victims alive through the website memoriaviva.com. (Velasquez 2001, interview, 1 May)

\textsuperscript{30} A 1986 NGO-supported study named Chile as the third most frequently visited country for violations (Thoolen and Verstappen 1986, 122).

\textsuperscript{31} This NGO operated during the Controversy under the first name, as well as under an umbrella group called Piquete de Londres (London Picket). From April 2000, after Pinochet’s departure, it renamed itself as Proyecto Internacional de Derechos Humanos (International Human Rights Project) which formally appears on its website <http://www.memoriaviva.com>. Reference will hereafter be made only to PIDH as most of the material cited from it and its members, were procured under this name.
Sara De Witt, a former student activist and current member of the PIDH, also made the following comment to a British newspaper about a personal stake in persisting against Pinochet:

For over 20 years I had to try and suppress and forget the memories of my dreadful experiences (of rape). When he was arrested all the psychological wounds resurfaced. It was very tough. I have had to re-live all my pain, but [UK Home Secretary] Jack Straw refuses to reveal the medical evidence about Pinochet. (Quoted in Kelly 2000)

This informational device identified by all three as eyewitness accounts, reminders of ‘nightmares’, memories and psychological wounds are what human rights scholarship has termed the personal narrative, which lends authenticity, emotion and counter-hegemonic aura to any campaign for justice based on basic humanitarian solidarity (Slaughter 1997).

Reyes’ also elaborated on the internecine necessity for justice saying that ‘any external judgement cannot be an imposition on Chile because we asked for it in pursuit of justice against a criminal regime at home.’ Chile Democrático had been supplying documentation on abuses in Chile to AI for 25 years prior to Pinochet’s British arrest. ‘Chile Democrático’s role was more a matter of supporting the prosecution by sustaining the public opinion’s positive disposition towards extraditing and prosecuting Pinochet.’ (Reyes-Manzo 2001, interview, 3 Jul.) One immediate boost to their strategy lay in aligning themselves to the discourse of international human rights law and humane conscience in the wake of genocidal events in Africa and former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Another was, of course, the availability of their personal narratives of past and present sufferings for media projection, and to support solidarity networks. All these would help create premeditated images of Pinochet’s culpability across global information space.
In sum, the context of the Pinochet Extradition Controversy has been sketched: an informational civil war of human rights truths and falsehoods lined up non-state actors inside and outside Chile against a praetorian elite bent on preserving its version of the results of the 1973 coup. Furthermore, due to the institutional and political stalemate caused by the mutual constraints imposed by incoming and outgoing elites under democratic transition, domestic political conflict was ready to become externalised for resolution within global information space. Chilean foreign policy, being historically elite-oriented and attuned to external support on an international basis, thus faced events where the ‘foreign’ could not be demarcated easily. ‘Pinochet’ represented a problématique of at once domestic and intermestic injustice/justice.

6.4 A Chronology of the Controversy: Chilean Foreign Policy’s Rivalry with Non-State Actors in Four Phases

This short chronology will demonstrate how the intermestic environment shaped the ‘foreign’ in foreign policy terms. The four phases will be categorised according to the major legal judgements by the House of Lords’ Appellate Committees and British Home Secretary Jack Straw’s rulings since they serve as outcomes in the various stages of soft power trials of strength between foreign policy and non-state actors. Each set of legal outcomes triggers changes for and by the various actors. Also, this chronology will not provide a mere list of dates, but clusters events into three sectors of action – the non-state sector, the Chilean foreign policy sector, and the international sector relating inter-foreign policy action – and in four phases. These phases will be the reference points for illustrating the hypotheses of the Intermestic Correlation of Forces (ICF), Intermestic Socialisation (IS), and Multipolar Direct Emulation through Demonstration (MDED) in the last four sections of this Chapter. With the

\[\text{Note this feature of externalised discourses in the discussion of global media space in Chapter 3 Section 3.2.}\]
exception of Chile, it will be evident from the chronology that the international sector was
generally marginal to the controversy because of a lack of strong ideological polarisations
compared to the Cold War, and the relative passivity with which states react when an issue
appears quasi-legal and constitutionally consistent.

First House of Lords’ Judgement

This phase technically began between 14 and 16 October 1998 when Spanish judge
Baltasar Garzón launched his interrogation and arrest warrants respectively through Interpol
and the London Metropolitan Police, but its legal origins predated these actions to 1996. It
started with the non-state initiative of a group of Spanish victims of both the Chilean and
Argentinian military regimes, who sought the legal advice of ex-President Allende’s advisor,
Juan Garcés, who had been spending his exile in Spain. He took up their cases and filed for
investigation under Spanish civil law, setting in motion an inquiry to be handled ultimately
by Baltasar Garzón. This was an investigation into the complicity of high-ranking junta
leaders in Operation Condor, a multilateral plan to assassinate opponents of the respective
Latin American military regimes during the 1970s within and outside their sovereign
territories. The gathering of evidence naturally attracted human rights NGOs in Chile,
Argentina, as well as the support of AI and Human Rights Watch. When the by-now
Senator-for-Life Augusto Pinochet made a well-publicised visit to Britain, officially to
inspect possible arms acquisitions from Royal Ordnance, and privately for a back operation,
there were many non-state ‘whistle-blowers’ notifying Garzón to make an arrest. These

33 Also spelt ‘Joan Garcés’ in some accounts.
34 The early trail of Pinochet’s prosecution is extensively detailed in R.J. Wilson (1999).
35 According to AI’s Richard Bunting, AI attempted to have British police arrest Pinochet on his previous visits
in 1994 and 1995, which failed. On the first occasion, the UK Attorney General gave a ‘guarded’ response and
disputed his prosecutorial powers. On the second, no action was taken by police either. (Bunting 2001b, email,
23 Apr.) This may have been due to the fact that NGO efforts were not as transnationally coordinated as in
NGOs and individuals mounted a public media campaign to indict him well before, and throughout the extradition appeal process. Parallel lawsuits filed by non-state actors in Belgian, French, Swiss and German courts followed.

Chilean foreign policy started making orthodox defences of state and diplomatic immunity to delegitimise both the arrest of Pinochet in Britain and the prospect of an extradition to Spain. These formal defences were undercut immediately by the disaggregation of the unified voice of the Chilean state, and the defections of sections of the Chilean ruling Concertación to the anti-Pinochet camp of the non-state sector (BBC SWB 1998c). These defections weakened the discursive credibility of the government’s foreign policy in confining the issue to diplomatic channels.

The international sector was also deadlocked by the speed and scale of the non-state initiative. Intermestic alliances were working ostensibly through domestic law parameters, but expanding their implications globally through soft power devices in the media, and in citing state-ratified regimes on torture, genocide and terrorism. The British and Spanish governments wished to be seen to be adhering to the democratic rule of law, however much they disliked the political matter being adjudicated through it (Padgett et al. 1998). The US was diffident about putting pressure on freeing Pinochet, an ex-Cold War ally with a negative reputation for human rights, partly because of the post-Cold War sensitivity of unveiling the CIA’s past complicity in Latin America, and partly because the US wished to avoid jeopardising the Chilean democratic transition and the lucrative economic links with it (M. Matthews 1998). On the other hand, the Clinton Administration did not want to sully its

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1998. The Spanish judiciary and Chilean NGOs were not directly involved then. Furthermore, a Conservative government was still in charge during the transition between Cold War to post-Cold War.
human rights positions on atrocities in the 1990s in ex-Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The UN could not at this stage be counted on either to institute a trial or to free Pinochet given Russian and Chinese sensitivities towards the post-Cold War US hegemony and possible US-UK vetoes.

**Phase II: 26 November 1998 – 17 December 1998 – From the Effects of the First Lords’ Judgement to the ‘Hoffmann Bias’ Affair**

For the non-state sector, the first House of Lords’ judgement of 25 November 1998 affirming the validity of Pinochet’s extradition on charges of torture, hostage-taking and murder was hailed as a global victory of human rights, and a simultaneous signal that the cover of political office and status was no bar to criminal liability under international law. On 9 December 1998, British Home Secretary Straw issued an ‘authority to proceed’ with extradition hearings. A MORI (Mass Opinion Research Institute) poll in Chile showed that Chileans were severely divided over whether Pinochet should be tried abroad or returned home.36 AI had boldly attempted before Straw’s ruling to file for a pre-emptive injunction against any possible decision by Straw to free Pinochet at his discretion. Even while the vindication of human rights NGOs was being celebrated, the exposé by Pinochet’s lawyers following a pro-Pinochet individual’s tip-off, about a member (Lord Hoffmann) of the Lords’ Committee’s possible bias through his and his wife’s charity links with AI, had begun to build the case for a hearing on the overturning of the 25 November verdict.

Chilean foreign policy, alerted to the strength of non-state intermestic alliances against Pinochet, tried a plethora of strategies ranging from calling for compassionate release on health grounds to floating the possibility of a home trial for Pinochet, if he were to be
released. Foreign Minister José Miguel Insulza openly admitted his diplomacy was frustrated by government members and groups in Chile arguing for ‘global human rights’ prosecutions abroad. Santiago garnered some international support for judicial sovereignty from MERCOSUR members, Argentina, Peru, Bolivia, even Cuba. Special missions by Foreign Minister Insulza and Chilean Senate president Andres Zaldivar to London, Madrid and Brussels asserting the importance of sovereignty yielded no immediate results (Drago 1998). Straw’s ruling on 9 December is explained on the grounds that ‘justice’ outweighed Chilean arguments thus far, and that Britain’s obligations under the European Convention on Extradition were paramount.

The international sector generally proved indifferent to Chilean foreign policy actions apart from some Latin American states. Britain and Spain adhered to the position that it was an entirely juridical, and not a political matter. In another sign of post-Cold War fluidity, there was Anglo-American dissension over freeing Pinochet. Still, Washington backed off from pressuring London and said there was no right answer to balancing justice and peace in post-authoritarian transitions worldwide (AFP 1998c; M2 Presswire 1998). The Clinton Administration remained uneasy about revealing CIA complicity with Pinochet and feared that prosecuting Pinochet could set a precedent for prosecuting former US leaders abroad.

Phase III: 18 December 1998 – 14 April 1999 — From the Outcome of the ‘Hoffmann Bias’ Verdict to the Third Lords’ Judgement and Straw’s Second Authority to Proceed

The Law Lords’ ruling of 17 December 1998, overturning the judgement of 25 November 1998, and the disqualification of Lord Hoffmann from subsequent hearings on Pinochet, was a partial setback for the non-state sector’s anti-Pinochet campaign. AI, Chile

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36 A poll taken on 2 December 1998 showed 45% of Chileans opposed his arrest in Britain, while 44% favoured
Democrático and members of the UK Parliamentary Human Rights Group expressed disappointment, but Judge Baltasar Garzón and Chilean human rights lawyers drew comfort from the British judicial system’s fair procedure. Indeed, the Lords’ second judgement acknowledged the scrutiny of three sections of world public opinion as a factor. A continuing press campaign by anti-Pinochet groups appealed to the conscience of world public opinion and political leaders using personal testimonies. There were spontaneous non-state efforts to undermine the Chilean government’s claim of competence to conduct a credible home trial of Pinochet: for example, Chilean judge Juan Guzman’s indirect admission of pessimism about a home trial, and the International Federation for Human Rights’ visit to Chile and its subsequent negative certification of the Chilean justice system (Egan 1999; BBC SWB 1999g). The other key thrust of the anti-Pinochet groups lay in their consistent alignment with arguments advancing international human rights law in the January-February re-hearing of appeals through the House of Lords. The Lords’ 24 March 1999 ruling re-confirmed Pinochet’s non-immunity from prosecution even on time-limited charges, hence vindicating the anti-Pinochet intermestic campaign. The list of criminal charges against Pinochet was nevertheless expanded again by Judge Garzón through a generous supply of 85 cases sent by CODEPU to him on 25 March (C. Lamb 1999). At the same time, the non-state sector also became less predominantly anti-Pinochet as the Chile-based Pinochet Foundation, together with prominent Chilean right-wingers and British Conservatives, mounted a counter-campaign ‘blackwashing’ Pinochet’s 1973 nemesis, Salvador Allende (Lamb, Bamber and Webster 1999). The military in Chile showed restiveness too through various gestures of independence from the Concertación’s foreign policy.

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it (Chicago Tribune 1998).
Chilean foreign policy was increasingly awake to the need to engage the discursive strategy of justice used by the NGOs. Foreign Minister Insulza and Senate president Zaldivar began to argue in statements to the UN, Organisation of American States, and the IACHR, that the real issue was finding the right court for a trial, while maintaining sovereign equality among states. Insulza also slammed the aforementioned International Federation of Human Rights certification as shallow and inappropriate. There was an open acknowledgement of a historically negative ‘Pinochet-Chile’ image association. Chile, for the first time, participated directly as an intervener in the appeal process, pleading for the protection of the principle of sovereignty and not the person of Pinochet. While Chilean foreign policy emphasised possibilities of a domestic trial of Pinochet, the vagaries of Chilean justice were highlighted by the contrasts between the successful prosecution of the case of an assassinated trade union leader by Pinochet’s secret police, and the invocation of state security legislation to prevent the circulation of a book alleging pro-military bias among judges. The latter forced the book’s Chilean author to seek asylum abroad.

Chilean actions had aimed to muster internationally a defence of Westphalian principles concurrent with manoeuvring upon the legal terrain so far dominated by NGOs using the humanitarian regimes of international law. Chile enjoyed some success in getting Vatican, Polish and Czech support. The US reaction to the 24 March ruling was ambivalent between supporting Chilean democracy and humanitarian accountability. The British and Spanish governments remained consistently silent, stressing that the juridical process must operate autonomously.
Phase IV: 15 April 1999 – 2 March 2000 – From the Effects of Straw’s Second Authority to Proceed to Pinochet’s Release on Medical Grounds

Having consistently allied themselves to themes of ‘justice through prosecution’ and observance of the international law of human rights, the non-state anti-Pinochet sectors found their satisfaction at the 25 November 1998 and 24 March 1999 rulings re-vindicated when Jack Straw’s statement of 14 April 1999 sided with their arguments. There was even more satisfaction in the fact that Straw marginalised warnings by the Chilean government and Pinochet supporters about democratic conditions within Chile being disturbed by approval of extradition. Straw’s observation that the Chilean state had not requested Pinochet’s extradition homewards enlarged the importance of the anti-Pinochet intermestic alliance’s arguments that Chile was not prepared to try Pinochet. This strategy of holding Chilean domestic governance and other legal processes up to scrutiny against largely Anglo-American democratic standards continued till the end, even to the point of compelling Jack Straw to release Pinochet’s confidential Home Office-authorised medical report on grounds of transparency. Sensing the anti-Pinochet intermestic alliance having the upper hand, pro-Pinochet individuals, groups, the Chilean military, and even Pinochet himself, went so far as to give critical interviews upbraiding the Concertación’s foreign policy bungling, and making strong gestures of irritation to prod more aggressive diplomatic efforts from Santiago.

Chilean foreign policy appeared even more sharply focussed on showing off the probity and efficacy of domestic accountability. The Concertación government’s free rein to the judiciary to shift the boundary-markers against prosecuting the military accomplices of Pinochet’s regime – a total of six high-ranking (Colonel and above) officers were prosecuted in 1999 alone in contrast to 2 the preceding 9 years – emphasised how the intermesticity of
the Pinochet affair had widened considerably the domain of 'foreign policy.' Foreign ministry officials repeatedly emphasised that Chile could convince world public opinion that trying human rights violations were possible in Chile. A human rights roundtable dialogue began with military collaboration for the first time in August 1999. Nevertheless, these measures contrasted with the government's weak claim that its foreign policy had successfully 'delayed' Straw's 14 April 1999 ruling for reasons relating to Chilean sovereignty (AFP 1999b). Both outgoing foreign minister Insulza, and his successor Juan Gabriel Valdes, claimed they would strive for 'sovereignty and justice' (UPI 1999; Echeverria 1999). This was translated into proving what the anti-Pinochet non-state sector desired – a trial – while at the same time, probably in response to the pro-Pinochet lobby's pressure of gestures, making bilateral and trilateral approaches to the British and Spanish governments to release Pinochet.

The international sector saw the Spanish foreign ministry trying to be receptive to Chilean proposals for bilateral arbitration, first under the terms of the International Convention Against Torture, and secondly, through the International Court of Justice. However, Spanish foreign policy too was paralysed by domestic political opposition stirred up by Baltasar Garzón, NGOs and political parties sympathetic to victims' groups in Chile, as well as by questions of constitutional legality (BBC SWB 1999i). There was also limited success for Chile in sending diplomatic signals by boycotting the Ibero-American summit in Cuba. The most effective tactic was the resort to an appeal for Pinochet's release on humanitarian grounds, addressed both to Prime Minister Blair and the British Home Office. Although this ultimately led to Pinochet's release on 2 March 2000, it was not before the

37 Such as Army Commander-in-Chief Ricardo Izurieta's personal visit to Pinochet two days after Straw's 14 April ruling.
anti-Pinochet intermestic alliance and Belgian prosecutors had attempted to force disclosure
and reinterpretation of Pinochet’s medical certification through the Home Office, and once
again, the British courts.

6.5 The Intermestic Correlation of Forces (ICF): Chilean Foreign Policy Encounters
Non-State Initiative – Phases I Through IV

As was explained in Chapter 4, the intermestic correlation of forces (ICF) operates
within a context of soft power targeted at achieving foreign policy change through forming
interest alliances across national frontiers, grouping states, non-state actors and institutions of
global and international governance in a common cause. The ICF affects foreign policy by
making information for policy-making choices available or unavailable, or by simultaneously
broadening and puncturing policy boundaries. Information creation and recreation through
discourse construction and alteration is the primary instrument by which both states and non-
state actors form alliances of opinion. ICF has four parts that the preceding chronology
supports: the direct mobilisation of ideas, the sanctioning of states through regimes, the non-
state self-constitution of expertise, and the manufacturing of public opinion.

6.5.1 Direct Mobilisation of Ideas

In Phase I, the initiation of Pinochet’s arrest by a motley cast of an independent
Spanish judge, AI, other Chilean exiles, and human rights NGOs fleshed out the charges of
‘crimes against humanity’ into reality. AI’s stance on enforcing the international human
rights law was clear from its mission statement, and with specific reference to Pinochet

Amnesty International wants Pinochet brought to justice by the international
community – for the sake of the thousands of victims in Chile and their loved ones
and because it will send a clear message to other dictators that they cannot torture and
kill with impunity. (Bunting 2001a, “AI: Internal Working Notes”, 19 Apr.)
On 10 October 1998, six days before Garzón’s formal request for detention, AI had openly called for Pinochet’s arrest on torture charges (Novedades 1998), reprising similar but unsuccessful attempts in 1994 and 1995 during Pinochet’s earlier London visits (Bunting 2001b, email, 23 Apr.). On 16 October, following testimonies by AFDD and Spain’s Izquierda Unida (a left-wing political party) before Judge Garzón’s inquiry into Pinochet’s role in Operation Condor, a criminal suit before the Spanish National Court read

In this court formal charge has been presented against Augusto Pinochet Ugarte [and other named military officials of the Chilean junta...], and other persons to be identified for alleged crimes of genocide, terrorism and torture, lodged by the solicitor Sr. Sanchez Masa in representation of the Association of Relatives of the Detained and Disappeared of Chile ...; as well as the enlargement of the charge by the Izquierda Unida against Augusto Pinochet for the seizure and disappearance of multiple persons who are identified in the annexes which accompany the mentioned “Rettig Report”.

These same themes were carried into Garzón’s request through Interpol to Britain on 14 October, which sought British police reports on whether Pinochet was available

...to provide a statement regarding his alleged involvement in the criminal activities under investigation in this Court, within the so-called Condor operation between the years 1975 and 1983 which are imputed to the authorities which governed at the time in Chile as well as in Argentina and which could constitute crimes of Genocide, Terrorism and Torture. (Spain 2000, 55)

Two days later, an order of arrest was faxed direct to London by Garzón for those crimes substantiated by the jurisdiction of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch of Spain. This law incorporated provisions of the respective International Conventions Against Genocide and of Torture, as well as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. On that same night of 16 October 1998, a British magistrate signed the arrest warrant against Pinochet that was immediately implemented as a procedure of national law. This chain of action in Phase I from discourse to action operated when ‘crimes’ were categorised, ‘targets’ identified and

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existing ‘law’ with cross-border implications invoked in a domestic and extra-territorial context.

6.5.2 The Sanctioning of Ideas through Regimes

The idea of ‘crimes against humanity’, defined broadly in international law as murder, extermination and torture against individuals or groups, harks back to the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials after World War Two, and its legal teeth had been sharpened in the largely customary basis of international law. However, its sanctioning power could only be applied in the post-Cold War context of global information space. Kenneth Roth, executive and advocacy director of Human Rights Watch, AI’s co-intervener in the legal hearings, explained in Phase I that the ‘temper’ of the world ‘public mood’ had created political will and legal momentum for implementing international law. In Britain, New Labour’s ethical foreign policy had made it difficult to object to Pinochet’s arrest. The ‘twin genocides’ of Bosnia and Rwanda in the 1990s ‘seem to have given the rest of the world a guilty conscience, and the United Nations Security Council has created war crimes tribunals for judging the perpetrators of these ghastly events’, while the indictments of these tribunals have politically marginalised troublemakers from the peace accords (Roth 1998; Human Rights Watch 1998, xv-xvi). These events also spurred the idea that an International Criminal Court (ICC) be established ‘to try the gravest crimes’, reaching a culmination in July 1998 when the Rome Statute of the ICC was open to states for signature and ratification. In the written judgements for the 25 November 1998 ruling allowing extradition, and concurrently the irrelevance of immunity to charges of torture, murder and hostage-taking, this ‘public mood’ of punitive international law was taken into account by all five Lords as favouring prosecution in one way or another. But where they differed lay in whether Pinochet could
enjoy immunity as Head of State. The three-strong majority tended to side with Lord Steyn’s view, and hence AI and Human Rights Watch as well, in that

...the development of international law since the Second World War justifies the conclusion that by the time of the 1973 coup d’état, and certainly ever since, international law condemned genocide, torture, hostage-taking and crimes against humanity (during an armed conflict or in peace time) as international crimes deserving of punishment. Given this state of international law, it seems to me difficult to maintain that the commission of such high crimes may amount to acts performed in the exercise of the functions of a head of state.\(^39\)

The extraterritoriality of international law as an ally of human rights NGOs is exemplified in AI’s solicitor Patrick Duffy’s citation in the Lords’ hearings (House of Lords Proceedings 25 February 1999, 19) in Phase III of Articles 4 and 5.2 of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984) which Spain, Britain and Chile had all ratified or incorporated into national law by 1998:

Article 4.1: Each State Party shall ensure that all acts of torture are offences under its criminal law. The same shall apply to an attempt to commit torture and to an act by any person which constitutes complicity or participation in torture.

Article 5.2: Each State Party shall likewise take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over such offences in cases where the alleged offender is present in any territory under its jurisdiction and it does not extradite him...\(^40\)

Concurring with this interpretation, Lord Hutton, in his written contribution supporting the ruling of 24 March 1999 pronounced:

The alleged acts of torture by Senator Pinochet were carried out under the colour of his position as head of state, but they cannot be regarded as functions of a head of state under international law when international law expressly prohibits torture as a measure which a state can employ in any circumstances whatsoever and has made it an international crime. (Reg. v. Bow Street Ex Parte Pinochet 1999b, 899)

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\(^40\) Reproduced from Evans (1999, 338). Italics mine. Note that this regime is also known as the International Convention Against Torture.
In Phase IV, at the end of the extradition hearings of 27-30 September 1999 following Straw’s second ‘authority-to-proceed’, AI issued a statement exhorting Britain to follow through other international regime obligations:

Amnesty International, which recently called on New Scotland Yard to make public if it is investigating Augusto Pinochet over the torturing to death of people in Chile during his rule – has repeatedly stressed that under the European Convention on Extradition, rejecting Spain’s extradition request and failing to prosecute in the UK is simply not an option. (Amnesty International 1999)

Acknowledging solidarity with this pro-regime trend, the Global South Coordinator for the NGO Coalition for an ICC commented that while this campaign had no mandate to opine on the Pinochet case, ‘our member organizations, such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and others have actively participated in the case mentioned.’ (González 2001, email, 19 Feb.)

6.5.3 The Self-Constitution of Expertise

The non-state actors’ claim to expertise through all four phases must be understood in terms of firstly, the evidence they possessed in regard to all crimes against humanity alleged against Pinochet’s government; secondly, the promotion of extraterritorial punishment of human rights violations via international law; and thirdly, their denigration of the possibilities of fair trials in Chile over human rights violations on the grounds that authoritarian domestic laws would obstruct them, or that they would trigger a recalcitrant response from the military and political Right.41 By contrast, the claim to expertise of official Chilean foreign policy would be derived from the Concertación’s political legitimacy arising from the circumstances of the Pinochet-era designed constitution, the elections won under it, and their accompanying constraints. The Concertación’s foreign policy could assert competence on behalf of the Chilean judiciary and democracy in so far as its external
sovereignty was not questioned through its incomplete internal sovereignty. The asymmetry in expertise was a direct manifestation of the informational civil war traced out in Section 6.3.

The pattern of the democratic transition afforded a limited form of justice for human rights abuses in the Rettig Report, which categorised and documented violations without automatic legal effect upon the perpetrators. A salient contribution to its compilation by the Vicariate, the AFDD and CODEPU had, as mentioned earlier, been officially acknowledged (Rettig Commission 1991, 3). In this way, the Rettig Report was one manifestation of Chilean NGOs' evidentiary expertise that was wielded to legal effect in Garzón's initial and subsequent charge sheets against Pinochet, some of which have been quoted earlier. The fact that both the AFDD and CODEPU chose actively to participate in Garzón's inquiries signalled that up till 1998, legal justice could not be obtained within Chile against Pinochet and his close aides. This was to be the line of interpretation put out in the world media beginning in Phase I, and which would be carried through to the end as a combined Chilean and nascent global civil society reading of Chile's domestic governing incapability. In Phase I, this occurred not only through web-based calls to human rights action networks to 'Help Extradite Pinochet' (Equipo Nizkor 1998) by writing letters to persuade prominent decision-makers in Britain and Spain, but also through interviews with AI, Chile Democratico's Carlos Reyes, and with assorted Chilean exiles who publicly volunteered additional personal testimonies to violations.42 This non-state cause was swelled by individual and group dissenting opinions voiced from within the Concertación government, notably socialist MP Isabel Allende's approval of British and Spanish actions, and her comparing of Pinochet's

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41 These were recurrent themes in interviews with the AFDD, CODEPU, Chile Democratico, AI and the PIDH.
42 Details in Section 6.5.4.
guilt to Hitler’s (Delano 1998). Another socialist MP, Juan Pablo Letelier, also a descendant of one of Pinochet’s more famous victims, called for a foreign ‘detergent’:

We would love to be able to wash our dirty clothes at home. But we need detergent. The opposition parties, given our particular transition, are blocking that possibility. The possibility of the administration of justice of human rights violation cases in Chile until now has been basically closed - negated. (The Times 1998)

Throughout Phase I, Chilean foreign policy adhered to a standard Westphalian defence of juridical and political sovereignty among states, and from there extrapolated the principle of Pinochet’s immunity from all foreign legal proceedings. This statist argument was intensely supported by the formal members of President Frei’s government, the right-wing political parties, and the military. However, the trading of charges of sedition and treason between parties of the Left, Right and Centre hampered the unitary image of sovereignty which arguments in foreign policy required.43 This factionalism was aggravated by street protests for and against Pinochet’s return, and the thematic conflation of Pinochet’s return and his immunity. Incidentally, Chilean foreign minister Insulza admitted twice on 29 October and 18 November 1998 that global antipathy towards Pinochet was a given and that, despite Chilean democratic transition and prosperity, ‘legitimizing a military dictatorship that never had international legitimacy cannot be measured as an effect of reintegration [of Chile into global community.]’ (BBC SWB 1998e)44 Noticeably, Pinochet’s legal defence was left to private lawyers, none of whom had been sanctioned by the Chilean state. However, in court, they did not hesitate to invoke Chilean foreign ministry arguments, and cited the danger of democratic regression in Chile should Pinochet be extradited, thereby triggering further political upheaval.45

44 See also ibid.
In their written judgements on 25 November 1998, the majority of the three Lords tended to favour the 'expertise' claimed by the anti-Pinochet intermestic alliance. Lord Nicholls wrote

It cannot be stated too plainly that the acts of torture and hostage-taking with which Senator Pinochet is charged are offences under United Kingdom statute law. This country has taken extraterritorial jurisdiction for these crimes...Arguments about the effect on this country's diplomatic relations with Chile if extradition were allowed to proceed, or with Spain if refused, are not matters for the court. These are, par excellence, political matters for the Secretary of State... (Reg. v. Bow Street Ex Parte Pinochet 1998, 1502)

Lord Steyn also wrote

Relying on the information contained in the request for extradition, it is necessary to expand the cryptic account of the facts in the warrant. The request alleges a systematic campaign of repression against various groups in Chile after the military coup on 11 September 1973...[Details supplied]...The case is that he [Pinochet] ordered and procured the criminal acts which the warrant and request for extradition specify...The House is not required to examine the correctness of the allegations. The House must assume the correctness of the allegations as the backcloth of the questions of law arising on this appeal.46

Lord Hoffmann concurred completely with Lords Nicholls and Steyn without elaboration, thus putting a seal on non-state expertise as the more persuasive. Jack Straw's authority to proceed issuing from this ruling similarly downplayed its impact on Britain's bilateral relations with Chile and on Chilean democracy, concluding that the extradition request was made 'in good faith in the interests of justice.' (Straw 2000, 186, para.23)

From this triumphal point, non-state expertise endured a trial of impartiality itself in Phase II when a tip-off alerted the Pinochet defence team to Lord Hoffmann's links with AI. While the financial, charitable and administrative proximity of Hoffmann to the human rights NGO need not be examined in detail here, it was sufficient in the perception of both the Pinochet team and his fellow jurists to reach the unanimous conclusion 'that public

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45 Case for the Respondent (Pinochet), para.70 (House of Lords 2000, 123).
confidence in the integrity of the administration of justice would be shaken if his decision were allowed to stand.’ (Reg. v. Bow Street Ex Parte Pinochet 1999a, 294) Lord Hope commented that it

...is inescapable that Amnesty International has associated itself in these proceedings with the position of the prosecutor. The prosecution is not being brought in its name, but its interest in the case is to achieve the same result because it also seeks to bring Senator Pinochet to justice...It has for many years conducted an international campaign against those individuals whom it has identified as having been responsible for torture, extra-judicial executions and disappearances...[Hoffmann’s] relationship with Amnesty International was such that he was, in effect, acting as a judge in his own cause. (Reg. v. Bow Street Ex Parte Pinochet 1999a, 290-291)

Two points arising from the ‘Hoffmann affair’ can be analysed. Firstly, it showed that ICF politics do considerably transcend borders and pervade structures purporting to handle international-to-global justice. Secondly, the heed paid to ‘public confidence’ openly acknowledged the existence of global information space. Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s prefacing comments on world public opinion in reference to Hoffmann’s bias heightened scrutiny of both non-state and state expertise in the next phases:

The hearing of this case, both before the Divisional Court and in your Lordships’ House, produced an unprecedented degree of public interest not only in this country but worldwide. The case raises fundamental issues of public international law and their interaction with the domestic law of this country... There are many Chileans and supporters of human rights who have no doubt as to his guilt and are anxious to bring him to trial somewhere in the world. There are many others who are his supporters and believe that he was the saviour of Chile. Yet a third believe that, whatever the truth of the matter, it is a matter for Chile to sort out internally and not for third parties to interfere in the delicate balance of contemporary Chilean politics by seeking to try him outside Chile. (Reg. v. Bow Street Ex Parte Pinochet 1999a, 276)

Although the Hoffmann affair did not assist Chilean foreign policy goals significantly, it reinforced its awareness of the ideological mass of the intermestic correlation of forces ranged against a raison d’état-style defence of Pinochet. The Hoffmann affair also catalysed a consensus within the Chilean foreign policy system (by which is meant the

members of the cabinet, president and the foreign minister) that a foreign policy of delivering Pinochet home had to be mounted through articulating a community of principles among states and non-state actors, or in short, a semblance of both inside-out and outside-in leadership. This came into play in Phase III, when Santiago defended principles of 'international community, national justice' on both diplomatic and legal fronts, with the latter translating into direct participation in the House of Lords appeals. On 24 December 1998, only seven days following the Hoffmann verdict, foreign minister Insulza linked the assertion of Chilean sovereignty to an exercise of national responsibility, a critique of Spanish colonialism, and in an inclusive reference to non-state agendas said 'I want justice to be done in Chile, but I do not feel obliged to go and prove it to anyone.' (BBC SWB 1998g)

The new discursive diplomatic strategy for Phase III began quickly with President Frei addressing foreign ambassadors in Chile on the need to respect diplomatic immunity and territoriality of justice in support of the 'international community'. Foreign minister Insulza wrote to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan for help, citing the impropriety of judges without international mandate trying a state's domestic affairs. He also emphasised the consequentialist argument about trying Pinochet abroad, saying it could shatter domestic democratic tranquillity (BBC SWB 1999a; Insulza 2001). Insulza adopted the same argument in a separate letter to the Secretary-General of the Organisation of American States, but warned that the Chilean courts could sue British authorities for 'obstructing justice' by holding Pinochet (Xinhua 1999). The Chilean Deputy Foreign Minister Mariano Fernandez backed up his superior by starkly outlining the legal choice facing Britain:

[The] English will have to decide what is more important: to extradite Pinochet because a foreign judge has requested that with arguments that are politically important but legally weak or to respect principles of international law [among states.] (Quoted in Gallardo 1999)
Ostensibly to support the ‘national justice’ argument, reinforcing statements about a home trial for Pinochet had increasingly been made by various Chilean ministers, even from the Pinochet-era appointed Supreme Court President Roberto Davila. To buttress the overall defence of ‘international community, national justice’, Chile solicited the intervention of the Vatican whose subsequent letter to Britain requested respect for Chile’s sovereign equality among states and its national reconciliation process. When the Vatican letter was revealed in late February after the third House of Lords hearings had concluded, it drew intense criticism from the AFDD, Chile Democraticó and other anti-Pinochet intermestic allies (Deane and Hamilton 1999).

Both inside and outside the Court, the anti-Pinochet non-state groups were already reasserting their expertise in disabusing world public opinion by undercutting Santiago’s claims of a possible home trial for Pinochet through public counter-statements by Chilean human rights lawyers Roberto Garretón, Nelson Caucoto, Hector Salazar, Carmen Hertz and Juan Bustos (Global News Wire: CHIPS 1999b; BBC SWB 1999c). All of them had been prominently involved in attempting prosecutions against Pinochet’s aides before 1998. On 17 January 1999, amidst the Lords’ hearings, Isabel Allende published an open letter – ‘Pinochet without Hatred’ – in the New York Times deriding Pinochet’s democratic legacy as having been built on ironies, described Chile as ‘traumatized, like an abused child’, and approved foreign intervention in getting public ‘moral censure’ of Pinochet, thereby helping to shatter fear within Chile (I. Allende 1999). The credibility of these claims were dramatically justified the next day when a former intelligence chief under Pinochet, General

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47 This is explained in Chapter 3 as a tendentious expression of a dominant collective conviction by various actors backed by a desire to give effect to it within global information space. World public opinion need not be
Mena, threatened to charge Allende, other socialist party members and human rights activists with assorted crimes such as ‘illegal association’ and sedition under state security laws (London Observer Service 1999). In another direct challenge, Human Rights Watch submitted a statement to the Lords’ hearings on the inefficacy of Chilean justice authored by the earlier-mentioned Roberto Garretón, a former judicial director of the Vicariate, a Chilean ambassador to the UN Commission on Human Rights 1990-94, and a practising lawyer in Chile. Part of his submission read:

The foremost obstacle to Chile’s prosecution of Pinochet is the April 1978 amnesty from prosecution that the Chilean military granted itself for the crimes committed from the September 1973 coup through March 1978 – the period in which the bulk of [the] Pinochet regime’s crimes were committed. The Chilean Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld the constitutionality of this self-amnesty. Any theoretical possibility of declaring the amnesty ‘null and void’ would be blocked by Pinochet’s supporters in the Senate, including some Senators not democratically elected. (R. Garretón 2000, 211)

In court, the discursive alliance between the Crown Prosecution Service, AI and Human Rights Watch produced a steady reinforcement of a genealogical reading of post-1945 international law as culminating in the elimination of automatic immunity for both present and former Heads of State. Professor Christopher Greenwood, an international law scholar arguing for the prosecution, said

the state itself cannot authorise or order except through the medium of an individual and eventually one comes up against the proposition which is at the heart of the Respondent’s [Pinochet’s] case, which is that these were official acts because the Respondent said so, because the Respondent decided that this was what he was going to do, and that becomes a self-justifying principle in relation to immunity which, in our submission, cannot be part of the modern international law. It goes wholly against the trend of the way in which international law has developed. (House of Lords Proceedings 19 January 1999, 62)
Speaking more directly for AI, AFDD and the Medical Foundation for Care of the Victims of Torture, Peter Duffy QC interpreted the extraterritoriality of Section 134 (covering torture) in Britain’s Criminal Justice Act 1988 as implying

[F]irstly in it [Britain’s] Parliament has decided that a criminal wrong answerable before our courts occurs regardless of the nationality of the alleged torturer or where the alleged act of torture has occurred; secondly, that public officials or persons acting in an official capacity are responsible for the crime; and thirdly, that the crime occurs...in the performance or purported performance of official duties. (House of Lords Proceedings 25 January 1999, 13)

That the Lords in their third hearing were partial to this line of expert reasoning was evident in their disapproval of immunity in extradition proceedings and in expunging Garzon’s list of charges only according to the date of implementation of the international torture convention in Britain. That left two charges – of torture and conspiracy to torture – available for the use of the anti-Pinochet alliance. Chilean foreign policy expertise had no substantive counter to non-state claims of self-constituted expertise allied to international law in Phase IV, except to shift the Westphalian community argument towards the invocation of ‘humanitarian justice’, connected to Pinochet’s physical health. Even then, the anti-Pinochet intermestic alliance held up Pinochet’s release by questioning the credibility of Pinochet’s secret medical assessments, citing rival medical expertise.

6.5.4 Manufacturing Subjective Public Opinion

Due to the intermestic nature of the extradition controversy, references here to public opinion should be understood interchangeably as ‘world public opinion’. Moreover, the notion of publicness discussed in Chapter 3 is spatially infinite in global information space. The author’s interviews with the CODEPU, AFDD, AI and the exile groups Chile Democrático and PIDH confirmed that publicness was constituted in overlaps of the ‘legal’ and the ‘political’ spheres, the British and Chilean conservative-right-wing campaign for
Pinochet, in the fight for substantive globalization of international human rights law against its realist opponents, as well as within the three House of Lords' Hearings.\textsuperscript{48} In short, the causes tend to construct intermestic correlations of partisan forces because of their open-ended nature and their inherent demonstration effects across time and space. Lord Browne-Wilkinson had confirmed this in his assessment of three world public opinion constituencies in the judgement of 17 December 1998 over the Hoffman affair (Reg. v. Bow Street Ex Parte Pinochet 1999a, 276). The global demonstration effects have also been strongly alluded to in the way the intermestic correlations mobilised ideas, sanctioned states through regimes, and self-constituted expertise on the normative options surrounding the symbolism of Pinochet.

In the words of one activist, 'campaigning cannot be restricted to one medium.... [And a]lthough we cannot control the media, we can control the information we put out to them i.e. control over sources of Internet, TV, newspapers et cetera.' (Drouilly 2001, interview, 13 Aug.) Another activist from the PIDH, which contributed significantly to the NGO media campaign against Pinochet, stressed the advantages of being an NGO-cum-network with little or no fixed infrastructure, hierarchy and assets. Firstly, there was freedom of action within broad guidelines, and secondly, it had the ability to avoid state and pro-Pinochet corporate retaliation against immobile assets (Bell 2001, interview, 16 Jul.). This

\textsuperscript{48} These understandings of world publicness in campaigning can be seen in AI (Southern Andean Regional Action Network) coordinator David Pearson's statement on the difficulty in separating legal and political processes: 'There were two agendas, one legal the other political and it was important that Amnesty was seen to be following and influencing the first and not being embroiled in the second. In court the distinction was readily made but on the streets and in the media it was difficult to avoid at least a perception that there was an overlap. Amnesty was always at pains to emphasise its pursuit of justice and to refute any suggestion that it had a political agenda... Fortunately, the Home Secretary responded positively to Amnesty's plea that Pinochet's crimes were no more Chile's business than they were the business of Britain or Spain. The principle that certain crimes are so heinous that they override sovereignty, first propounded by Robert Jackson at Nuremberg, was urged and received.' (Pearson 2001, email, 31 Mar.) Carlos Reyes of \textit{Chile Democrático} also took the view that battles of opinion cut across legal and political boundaries and 'when Pinochet was stripped of his immunity as head of state[,] a historical precedent was set.' (Reyes-Manzo 2001, interview, 3 Jul.) Nicole Drouilly of PIDH was also of the view that the Pinochet prosecution occurred in a context where '[h]umane standards have been
fluid ensemble run by the overwhelmingly anti-Pinochet Chilean exiles\textsuperscript{49} enabled Chile-based human rights NGOs to wage the informational civil war against Pinochet with diligent partners, and with a certain impunity from the authoritarian strictures within Chile. To him, the end of the Cold War helped enormously due to the change in perception it brought among right-wing politicians throughout Latin America, North America and Europe: the latter could no longer plausibly justify human rights abuses when trends were favouring openness and democracy worldwide. Soviet \textit{glasnost} was cited as an example (Bell 2001, interview, 16 Jul.). This activist acknowledged there were tensions between ‘hardliner’ and ‘idealistic’ factions in deciding how to manage a common theme into the media strategy. The former wanted to emphasise the victimisation of socialists, the ‘fascist dictatorship’ and ‘the structuring of oppression’ while the ‘idealists’ stressed ‘truth and justice’ versus ‘silence and impunity.’ This ideological division was resolved, network-style, by creating lateral working groups which carried out a division of labour on organising public demonstrations, ‘thinking strategy’, ‘thinking out all possible themes for articulation’ and so on. However, a consensus was maintained on a covering media theme of ‘truth and justice’, a kind of lowest common denominator to be woven into all interviews by victims of the dictatorship, a category which covered ‘just about everybody in the exile community.’ There was also to be ‘no labelling of Salvador Allende as a “socialist victim”; he was, like many other Chileans, a “victim of injustice”.’ Operationally,

There was to be flexibility through the self-exercised autonomy in giving interviews, and releasing images and other sound-bites to capture the public imagination, with the

\textsuperscript{49} Reflecting a Chilean cultural obsession with creating organisations to handle all socio-political activities, most exiles, according to Dr Bell (2001, interview, 16 Jul.), operated initially under the umbrella of \textit{Chile Democrático}. However, due to schisms in political perspective between management and membership arising from the 1990 transition to the \textit{Concertación} government in Chile, the decision was taken to create independent groups to campaign for human rights, separate from those catering to non-political activities such as sports and education. Hence the plethora of Chilean exile organisations (e.g. the PIDH, the Chile Committee for Justice and \textit{Chile Democrático}) working in loose formation towards extraditing Pinochet in 1998-2000.
condition that all abided by the common theme. We learned this from observing the media and what they reported in the TV and the press. The concept of ‘one voice through many voices’ was our operational guide – this meant saying the same thing in many different forms and using different mediums. For example, the idea of white balloons, the multiple crosses on Parliament Square, the red-painted hands and so on – all were intended to associate in the public mind the issue of extradition with truth and justice. To ensure coherence, we kept discussion of our cause to a narrow cluster of themes. (Bell 2001, interview, 16 Jul.)

Although most activists did not single out the Internet as the primary medium for speed and connectivity, emphasis was commonly put on solidarity among human rights groups as the enabler of joint campaigning through ‘Action Alerts’ and information coordination by fax, telephones and email. Both Bell and Drouilly of the PIDH recalled for instance that when Home Secretary Straw refused to reveal Pinochet’s medical records in early January 2000,

a bombardment of his office by 70,000 emails and faxes from various human rights and Chilean exile groups in the Europe, the Americas, Canada and Australia produced a clear response. It should also be pointed out that the sustained protests between 1998-2000 for the extradition of Pinochet to Spain[,] in the UK and the world[,] were] coordinated almost completely through the Internet.50

‘Action Alerts’, which were utilised at critical junctures by AI and the leftwing Spanish NGO *Equipo Nizkor*, which associated with the Garzón prosecution, consisted of letters with a standardised content (listing Pinochet’s crimes and exhortations for due legal process) to be sent out by networks in tandem,51 or in parallel with the PIDH. In sum, the anti-Pinochet intermestic alliance’s world public opinion strategy comprised the use of fluid horizontal networks to publicise common themes based on solidarity of human rights principles. Ostensibly, this contrasted with the pro-Pinochet lobby in the UK attempting to ‘blackwash’

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50 Bell (2001, interview, 16 Jul.). This account is echoed by the interview with Drouilly (2001, interview, 13 Aug.).
51 A sample of this is the “Help Extradite Pinochet” document (Equipo Nizkor 1998).
Salvador Allende and downplaying atrocities under Pinochet, or the Chilean military’s public hints of disaffection with Chilean foreign policy in Phases III and IV.52

As an interim summary, we can say that the idea of ICF elucidates four points. Firstly, intermestic correlations of agendas and sympathies can distort foreign policy by initiating actions that combine domestic grievances with external humanitarian ideals. The informational civil war engaged global non-state support against Pinochet as a symbol of humanitarian injustice since 1973. This mixture only acted to sanction Pinochet in a proto-global court in the post-Cold War era due to the ‘decompression’ of the effectiveness of international law coinciding with the passing of bipolar geopolitical competition. Secondly, the intermestic correlations of human rights advocates seriously confronted statist realpolitik with the soft power of global humane standards, because intermesticity undermined the unitary actor basis of foreign policy. Chilean foreign policy and its theoretical commonalities with Pinochet’s legal defence could not consistently claim to speak for a united Chile, given the publicity of pro-global dissenting discourses of Chilean NGOs and party members of the ruling Concertación government. Thirdly, the ICF threatens to amplify and invert notions of community. Pinochet’s legal defence had hung on customary legal ideas of nationally-derived ‘Head of State immunity’ from prosecution abroad, and Chilean foreign policy likewise asserted sovereign equality of national communities as a recognised pillar of a Westphalian international community. The intermestic correlations created a community of interests which denied both of the former claims, creating a crisis of rival discursive communities in global information space.
6.6 The Competition of Ideas and their Resolution (I): Attempted Intermestic Socialisation (IS) by Non-State Actors

This section and the next further explains how the intermestic correlation of forces are considered to have enjoyed qualified success in inducing reactions in Chilean foreign policy instead of the latter acting as the initiator of events. Intermestic socialisation (IS) occurs where non-state actors hold states to account through regimes they sign or ratify. It is one way in which ideas in international relations, when administered, operate to change the actions of states and the lives of citizens. It is socialisation in the sense that ideas are institutionally and geographically agreed and sustained upon the principle of state signatories promising to effect legal adherence to regime norms and rules in relevant domestic and external matters. Although implementation as either domestic or international law depends on a state's domestic political will, once a sizeable majority of states ratify the regime, it can be invoked over time by non-state actors and signatory states alike to psychologically compel compliance through generating critical reports and creating a discourse for change involving domestic lobbies, transnational groups, other states and international organisations. While ICF mobilises information for sanctioning and confrontation, IS specifically coaxes adherence to existing norms. Thus elaborating IS does not cover fresh ground, instead it is one complementary effect of intermestic action by non-state-state coalitions against Chilean foreign policy objectives.

Two main intermestic actions during the extradition controversy qualify as IS: the non-state intermestic alliance with the principles and implementation of international law, especially on human rights; and the alliance between Chilean NGOs and their global partners. The alliance with international law manifested itself firstly in the direct legal

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52 See the respective chronological phases in Section 6.4.
intervention by AFDD, AI, Human Rights Watch and the Medical Foundation for Care of the Victims of Torture.53 This was meant, firstly, to associate with Garzón’s initiative in launching the extradition bid. It was also to reinforce the Crown Prosecution Service’s efforts in arguing that international law obligations denied both Pinochet’s main legal defence, that of Head of State immunity or such-like from 1973-90, and diplomatic immunity for his September 1998 visit to Britain. Discourse is integral to the widely acknowledged reliance of international legal interpretation on customary law: that is, the recognition of ‘good precedents’ in bilateral and multilateral treaties, national legislation on diplomatic privileges, as well as national court judgements on third party disputes between various combinations of foreign policies and between foreign and national parties (Henkin 1979, 23; Harris 1998, 23-45). Professor Greenwood argued for the prosecution in the third Lords' hearings in Phase III that:

[S]peaking generally, in embarking on international law, their Lordships are to a great extent in the realm of opinion, and in estimating the value of opinion it is permissible not only to seek a consensus of views, but to select what appear to be the better views upon the question. (House of Lords Proceedings 20 January 1999, 13)

In another instance, Professor Ian Brownlie, another international law scholar speaking directly on AI’s behalf argued that

we are here concerned with important areas of international law which have been domesticated; they are not, so to speak, out there somewhere, but they are incorporated in English statutes...[A]t the end of the day, the court has to consider the proper relationship of a set of English statutes dealing with torture and other international crimes together with the Act covering state immunity. (House of Lords Proceedings 25 January 1999, 12)

This is clearly discourse that simplifies and constructs Pinochet’s culpability in the considerations of the judges. The entire section treating non-state self-constitution of

53 This is the cumulative list of NGO interveners in the First and Third Lords hearings. The second involved largely AI over the Hoffmann bias allegation.
expertise in human rights, Chilean political conditions and international law buttresses non-state actors' socialisation capabilities in this regard.

Just as importantly, their alliance with international legal principles and implementation enables non-state actors to expose previously hidden or distorted historical truths about past and present human rights violations in legal and open media forums. Such exposure also engenders awareness of individuals' rights and legal protections. The NGO CODEPU for example, stressed that trying Pinochet was a symbolic attempt to outflank the Chilean political Right's whitewashing of their degree of historical responsibility for rupturing democracy and supporting military violence (Espinoza 2001, interview, 23 May). The AFDD was pledged to be an eternal witness for victims who are 'detained and disappeared' under Pinochet, and their legal actions reflect their motto: 'If I am in your memory, I am part of history.' (AFDD 2000). AI and Human Rights Watch wished an international law prosecution of Pinochet to send a signal to torturers and dictators worldwide that they are not immune from punishment for crimes against humanity. So for all these non-state objectives, agglomerated under the umbrella of victims' justice, international law, once implemented even in small degrees, such as the listing of victims' names on charge sheets, enables the arraignment of unjust states or portions of their political institutions.

The second main intermestic action classifiable as IS is the alliance between Chilean NGOs and global partners for a dual purpose of continuing an informational civil war arising out of Pinochet's 1973 coup, and in globalizing the struggle for a humane world order. As has been elaborated in Sections 6.3 and 6.5, having allies and proxies among ex-Salvador Allende advisor and lawyer Juan Garcés, Spanish judge Baltasar Garzón, AI, Human Rights
Watch, Medical Foundation for Care of the Victims of Torture, and the services of international law scholars such as Christopher Greenwood and Ian Brownlie, facilitated the application against Pinochet of international conventions against torture, genocide and hostage-taking in Phases I and III. The judgements in these phases in turn compelled British Home Secretary Straw twice to authorise extradition proceedings over Chilean foreign policy objections. Extraterritoriality of law was driven through the national jurisdictions of Britain and Spain against Chile, and this was achieved through a discursive non-state strategy that fettered British and Spanish foreign policies in the sense that the international laws invoked were operating along established lines of domestic legal processes.

In ensuring that both British and Spanish states did not brake the operation of normal legal processes in extraditing Pinochet, the anti-Pinochet intermestic alliance campaigned for probity in all judicial investigations and procedures. This soft power operation could be seen in Phase II when AI and the Chilean NGOs peacefully respected the ruling over the Hoffmann bias and the overturning of the first Lords’ ruling approving extradition proceedings. From this high ground, many intermestic parties castigated the partial nature of the Chilean judiciary (Press Association Newsfile 1998; Global News Wire: CHIPS 1998). In Phase IV, when Secretary Straw was ‘minded’ to release Pinochet on confidentially examined health grounds, the anti-Pinochet intermestic alliance was able to convince a British court to force Straw to disclose Pinochet’s medical examination using the same transparency of law argument (Sengupta 2000). Also, the nature of intermestic alliances ensured that the British, Spanish, even Chilean and American foreign policies, could not aggressively end the Pinochet affair through pure raison d’état. This was because sizeable domestic constituencies dissented: the radical Left within Britain’s ‘New Labour’ Party, the

54 Author’s translation.
socialist opposition parties and sections of the judiciary in Spain, the high profile of the NGO protests and intra-\textit{Concertación} fissures in Chile, as well as the ambivalence between the Clinton Administration and Attorney General Janet Reno in the US. These fractured official positions on their sympathies for and against the anti-Pinochet human rights campaign (Weiner 1998; Parker 1998; Gooch and Hopkins 1999). Moreover, they forestalled a unitary front for foreign policy coordination among Washington, London, Madrid and Santiago. IS by the anti-Pinochet alliance was further assisted by its alignment with the global intermestic campaign for the implementation of the Rome Statute of the ICC signed by 120 states (Britain, Spain and Chile included) three months before Pinochet’s arrest.

IS displaced Chilean foreign policy in two key directions away from its initial defence of state immunity for Pinochet. Firstly, it shifted its case for returning Pinochet from one pitched at diplomatic immunity to one defending principles of justice at different levels. Secondly, it was merged increasingly into pronouncements on micro-processes of domestic politics such as whether the Chilean judiciary met Anglo-American standards of independence, whether the nascent democracy would unravel if the transition ‘deal’ of 1988-90 was disturbed, or if human rights were being protected constitutionally. During Phases II to III, after the anti-Pinochet intermestic alliance successfully provoked the first Lords’ ruling invalidating Pinochet’s immunity from international human rights conventions, Chilean foreign affairs spokespersons began articulating a defence of Pinochet on grounds of ‘principles and not the person’. They claimed that achieving both sovereign and personal justice required a legitimate venue of either Chile or a properly functioning international court such as the ICJ, or the impending ICC (BBC SWB 1999b; Bellaby 1999; BBC SWB 1999f). Additionally, the \textit{Concertación} government seemed willing to guarantee a trial of
Pinochet in Chile in spite of the risk of manipulation by authoritarian enclaves in its political institutions. When on human rights grounds, in Phases III and IV, President Frei conducted his first meeting with the AFDD since entering office in 1994, he called on the military to be forthcoming on information on the disappeared. He then initiated a pioneering roundtable dialogue between the military, the Catholic Church and human rights lawyers on accounting for violations during 1973-90 (Global News Wire: CHIPS 1999a; BBC SWB 1999k; Bellos 1999).

By Phase IV, Chilean foreign policy had also begun floating proposals to Spain and Britain, albeit unsuccessfully, for releasing Pinochet through bilateral arbitration under Article 30 of the much-cited International Convention Against Torture. This article allowed arbitration in the event that disputes between two or more states over interpretation of the convention could not be settled through negotiation. If the organisation of arbitration among states fails, then the ICJ may be resorted to.\(^5\)\(^5\) This was part two of Chile's Phase IV strategies, which Spain also rejected. The main stumbling blocks for Madrid were the anti-Pinochet intermestic linkages within the Spanish political opposition and sections of the judiciary, which inhibited a raison d'etat solution, heightened by a looming election in 2000 (Gooch and Hopkins 1999). In these ways, IS employed by non-state intermestic alliances overrode Chilean foreign policy initiatives. It was finally by appealing to the public acceptability, however contested, on the humanitarian grounds of Pinochet’s failing health that enabled Britain and Spain to reassert the prerogatives of foreign policy in acquiescing to Pinochet's release. The soft power circle of a human rights discourse contra-Pinochet was closed when the discourse of human rights pro-Pinochet was ultimately activated by Chilean foreign policy.
The Chilean transition from military dictatorship to protected democracy, as elaborated in Section 6.3, was a uniquely brokered phenomenon which could not satisfy the individuals and NGOs unwilling to surrender in the informational civil war over the truth about human rights violations in 1973-90. This formed one source of the popular Chilean yearning for a better model of a democratic polity. Another motivation for emulation developed indirectly from the effects of the anti-Pinochet intermestic alliance pronouncing

upon the unsatisfactory conditions for legal justice within Chile before the first and third Lords’ hearings in Phases I and III respectively. In the judgement from the first hearings on 25 November 1998, of the three-strong majority who voted for Pinochet’s extradition, only one Lord referred to the need to take into account the Chilean judiciary and politics by way of declaring them within the competence of the Home Secretary, while all three Lords argued Pinochet’s culpability on overwhelming grounds of international legal jurisdiction. Notably, the two dissenting Lords also explained their decisions on points of international law, but both voted for Pinochet’s release by sidestepping issues of integrity concerning Chilean politics and law (Reg. v. Bow Street Ex Parte Pinochet 1998, 1460-1508). It was Secretary Straw’s subsequent explanation following his authorisation of extradition proceedings on 9 December 1998 that cast aspersions on Chile’s domestic institutions

The Chilean Government argued that Senator Pinochet should be returned to Chile where he could stand trial. However there is no extradition request from the Chilean Government, which the Secretary of State could consider...Moreover, there is no provision of international law which excludes Spain’s jurisdiction in this matter. The Secretary of State does not consider the possibility of a trial in Chile to be a factor which outweighs the UK’s obligations under the ECE (European Convention on Extradition) to extradite Senator Pinochet to Spain. (Straw 2000, 186-187)

Based on the context sketched out in Section 6.3, and from Phases I through II of the controversy, there was thus a palpable demonstration by external events to the Chilean state that its foreign policy had to deal with the discourse of aspersions cast upon the integrity and efficacy of its national political and judicial institutions: first, could Chile prove itself capable of rendering due legal process for the ‘combatants’ in the informational civil war over human rights violations? And second, could its post-dictatorship foreign policy of pro-democratic and pro-multilateral reinsertion into the international community live up to the expectations of the international community and interested parties? These questions were themselves

56 See Chapter 3’s discussion on post-Cold War ideological multiplicity.
confirmed by Foreign Minister Insulza on Chilean television two weeks after Pinochet’s arrest:

I believe it is too evident that we have had an unfinished transition. I am not happy or content and we have done what we had to do. But I save my happiness for the day when Chile has more justice in human rights matters. (BBC SWB 1998b)

Substantive signs of the echo of Anglo-American standards of legal and political justice in Chilean foreign policy positions came upon the heels of reactions to the 25 November 1998 Lords’ ruling. Viviana Díaz, then vice-president of the AFDD commented:

At last Pinochet will face the trial he deserves. It is nothing but right that he should be submitted to a due judicial process where a judge and jury can decide whether he is guilty of the crimes that he is accused of committing.

We have for so many years been scared to speak up about our dark past for fear of reprisals from the right-wing military in Chile. The ruling by the Lords has given the human rights campaign international approval. (Quoted in Gamini 1998)

Isabel Allende of the Socialist Party, part of the ruling Concertación, echoed this sentiment on behalf of all of Pinochet’s victims saying that a foreign judiciary ‘demonstrate[d] that there are principles in the world and that dictators cannot travel around the world with immunity, believing they are above the law.’ (BBC Worldwide Monitoring 1998) Chilean foreign policy, reacting ostensibly to the import of the Lords’ decision and the ascendance of intermestic arguments about the lack of proper justice in Chile, adjusted its original sovereignty and diplomatic immunity arguments during Foreign Minister Insulza’s 29 November -1 December 1998 mission to London and Madrid. Insulza now supported trying Pinochet at home, denying that his former Head of State status barred prosecution. At the same time, he claimed the ‘political atmosphere in Spain is not favourable to General Pinochet’ regardless of the Spanish judiciary’s wish to be impartial. Insulza also said respect for sovereign justice between Spain and Chile ought to be mutual (BBC Monitoring Europe 1998). These positions were diluted within Chile by calls by the Christian Democrat and
Socialist Party presidential candidates for learning lessons from abroad on reforming Chilean justice. Members of the anti-Pinochet intermestic alliance were quick to hold Insulza to account. The Chilean Socialist Party president countered that conditions for ‘a just and rigorous trial’ of Pinochet were not in place (AFP 1998a). Chilean lawyer Eduardo Contreras, involved in several lawsuits against Pinochet and his aides, retorted that if the *Concertación* wanted to try Pinochet, ‘we ask the minister why the Chilean government has not filed [a] suit against him.’ (AFP 1998b) On 3 December 1998, as though synchronised as a reply, the Chilean Supreme Court President Roberto Davila told the press that Pinochet could be guaranteed a trial in Chile if he were freed from Britain. Subsequently, Chilean exiles in London and other members of the anti-Pinochet intermestic alliance, including politicians from the Chilean Socialist Party, Christian Democratic Party, and even Supreme Court President Davila, cited the Lords’ Ruling on Hoffmann’s bias as a lesson for Chilean justice in fairness (Global News Wire: CHIPS 1998; BBC SWB 1998f).

By Phase III, Santiago’s first substantial emulation initiative was to float the idea of requesting the CDE (Council of State Defence) 77 to participate in domestic cases against Pinochet. The opposition right wing parties said the government was catering to the claims of overseas doubters against Chile while the military questioned the *Concertación*’s partiality towards Pinochet in doing so (BBC SWB 1999d, 1999e). For the *Concertación*, invoking the CDE as a plaintiff or intervener against Pinochet thus meant soft pedalling the option until military and right wing opposition relented. By the time of the third Lords’ ruling which reiterated the stripping of Pinochet’s immunity to extradition, albeit on time-limited charges, it was apparent that the Chilean foreign policy position had again failed to convince the Lords either through its British solicitor’s first-ever direct intervention in the appellate
hearings, or through its public statements insisting on sovereign justice. Secretary Straw’s
second ‘authority to proceed’ for extradition hearings reaffirmed the weakness of Chilean
judicial efficacy previously declared on 9 December 1998 using the same wording:

The Secretary of State does not consider the possibility of a trial in Chile to be a
factor that outweighs the United Kingdom’s obligations under the ECE (European
Convention on Extradition) to extradite Senator Pinochet to Spain.58

A significant emulation of British and Spanish judicial patterns in regard to
Pinochet’s alleged ‘crimes against humanity’ began about this time with Foreign Minister
Insulza’s letter to Jack Straw in late March 1999 arguing that Chilean democracy could be
‘greatly strengthened’ if the trial of Pinochet and his aides could be carried out at home (BBC
SWB 1999h). On the day of this announcement, a Chilean appeals court reopened an
unfinished case concerning the Pinochet-era assassination of a trade union leader and
detained 12 ex-intelligence agents pending trial (AFP 1999a). Carlos Montes, speaker of the
lower house of the Chilean Congress, the Chamber of Deputies, called on all Chileans and
their institutions to solve the human rights conundrum ‘because to the extent that we fail to
do so, there will continue to be an ethical demand worldwide [for justice]...’ (BBC SWB
1999i) In late May 1999, human rights prosecutions in Chile saw Judge Juan Guzman’s
ongoing investigations making significant headway by indicting five Pinochet adjutants
involved in the ‘Caravan of Death’ massacres of September 1973, some of whom ranked
Colonel and General. These officers appealed against their arrest for trial but in July the
Chilean Supreme Court turned down their appeals. This was serious enough for the Army
Commander-in-Chief to issue a statement calling for human rights dialogue with Chilean
NGOs, and the convening of emergency meetings with top serving and retired officers to plot
countermeasures (BBC SWB 1999j). On 21 August, not long after Chilean foreign policy

57 Chile’s equivalent of Attorney-General, or Crown Prosecution Service.
floated bilateral arbitration proposals to Spain, a roundtable on human rights began between the military and human rights lawyers. However, the AFDD was significantly absent, preferring open trials instead of exchanges of information for impunity (Bellos 1999). By the last quarter of 1999, the Chilean judiciary had allowed Judge Guzman’s excavations of alleged mass graves in Chile’s Atacama Desert to proceed, and charged two more Generals linked to Pinochet’s intelligence services for political murders (AFP 1999c). By late February 2000, some 59 lawsuits had been filed against Pinochet directly in Chilean courts.

In a final consummation of the MDED effect upon Chilean foreign policy aimed at deflecting further foreign prosecution, particularly from a joint Belgium-NGO eleventh hour appeal for stay of Pinochet’s release on 25 January 2000, foreign ministry spokesman Carlos Mladinic said he hoped ‘people will realize the best solution is to try him in Chile.’ He added that in recent months, a large number of cases, some pre-dating 1988,59 have flourished in Chilean courts. He also said that due to a ‘changing attitude’ within the courts, along with a complete renovation of the Supreme Court, ‘there is a judicial basis’ for the Supreme Court to strip Pinochet of his immunity as a Senator-for-Life (Global News Wire: EFE News Service 2000). All this came to pass over the next 16 months following Pinochet’s release on humanitarian grounds on 2 March 2000. But on 9 July 2001, in a mirror of Straw’s March 2000 decision, Pinochet was ruled unfit for trial on the same humanitarian grounds by the Chilean Supreme Court.60 Although this form of MDED rebounded in Pinochet’s favour, litigation against his accomplices has continued, indicating that the legacies of 1973-90 were now less untouchable.

58 From the full text of Straw’s statement reproduced in Graves (1999).
59 The third Lords’ judgement on Pinochet’s vulnerability for prosecution limited it to cases after 8 December 1988 (Reg. v. Bow Street Ex Parte Pinochet 1999b, 927).
In summary, IS and MDED are complementary forms of soft power. Both envision the adoption of visible standards of normative behaviour. Both also enable non-state actors to assert a disproportionate form of rival foreign policy power in the form of publicity and ideas that can alter a state's foreign policy. A third observation would be that intermestic alliances are discursive communities acting as both cause and effect of foreign policy change by splitting the unitary basis of foreign policy projection. Where IS and MDED differ is in their reference standard: the former invokes regimes signed by states, the latter relies on circumstantial, or free-ranging standards. This case study has perhaps been exceptional because of the stark cases of human rights and wrongs stemming from the Pinochet military dictatorship 1973-90. If issues had more complex causes and effects, such as nuclear pollution in a border zone, or financial ruin wrought by financial speculation, the intermestic lines of discursive community might be more difficult to draw for political socialisation or demonstration.

6.8 Conclusion

As a case study of foreign policy in global information space, Chile exhibited long-term patterns of engagement with external media flows, economic flows, and ideological trends, and has served as a test-bed for competing social ideas from abroad. The military dictatorship of General Pinochet and its foreign policy of defensive isolation, while harmonising the domestic economy with world capitalism, was as much a product of the Cold War as it was of elite initiative from within its borders. This was the backdrop and foundation for the Pinochet Extradition Controversy and its testing of Chilean foreign policy.

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60 Pinochet's medical report in Chile listed grounds of 'mild to moderate dementia,' paralleling the British medical report of January 2000 (Faiola 2001; Simons 2000).
The Pinochet regime’s human rights violations throughout its 17-year existence had triggered an embryonic intermestic alliance of largely non-state opponents, which not only survived the end of the military regime, but gained added momentum with the emergence of global information space in the 1990s. The prosecution of Pinochet over human rights atrocities was an example of the employment of information to enlist allies and divide opposition. This was soft power. Chilean foreign policy faced a prospect of entangling itself in discursive communities of opinion, when trying to defend principles of sovereignty without also trying to defend the Pinochet regime’s excesses.

The intermestic correlation of forces (ICF) was clearly illustrated by the solidarity of non-state actors in pursuit of trying Pinochet wherever possible, in this case, via extradition to Spain, or trial in Britain. This solidarity operated in network formations. It mobilised information, utilised national legal avenues, amassed evidence for prosecution, constituted its own expertise, and manufactured a favourable world public opinion. Such a network meant that when and where one set of non-state actions proved unable for political, legal or geographical reasons to deliver action upon a common cause of prosecuting a violator, their comrades could be entrusted and coordinated to do so on their behalf. The elaboration of the non-state anti-Pinochet networked media strategies under ICF revealed in great detail the flexibility and competence with which a human rights campaign marshalled a moral and expert community of opinion against not only Pinochet’s personal legal defence, but also in forcing significant changes to Chilean foreign policy.

Intermestic Socialisation (IS) and Multipolar Direct Emulation through Demonstration (MDED) have shown themselves as complementary explanations of the
results of the employment of soft power by the intermestic correlation of forces. IS as a producer of change in Chilean foreign policy was made possible by non-state reference to available international standards, and extrapolating from them national legal avenues to socialise others towards their human rights objectives. By articulating ideas with an extraterritorial legal status, a dominant discourse is achieved. Foreign policy will accommodate to IS especially if the intermestic alliance includes domestic political constituencies in the target state which are opposed to its foreign policy. Similarly MDED accounts for a demonstration effect upon foreign policy through non-state reference and recommendation of free-ranging and proven ideas – a greater flexibility than IS’ reference to international regimes. MDED works where the non-state intermestic alliance can articulate normative comparison with a working model elsewhere in the world. The foreign policy of the target state will accommodate to the demonstration effect, again if the intermestic alliance campaigning for it includes sizeable political constituencies within the target state that are opposed to its foreign policy.

Scrutinising Chilean foreign policy throughout this episode might lead to the conclusion that it was reacting all along to the political initiatives of the anti-Pinochet ICF. Yet in their patterns of reaction, Chilean foreign policy officials have also revealed a capacity to learn and adapt to the informational milieu of the issues surrounding Pinochet. The willingness to resort to invoking humanitarian reasons for getting Pinochet released showed an awareness of catering to the sensitivities of world public opinion aroused by the ICF. The willingness of other parts of the Chilean polity to make gestures in consonance with foreign policy change had also given substance to the Chilean credentials, in terms of a new foreign policy of post-dictatorship reinsertion into responsible global community.

61 See Chapter 4, Section 4.3.1 on 'network'.
CONCLUSION:
SOFT POWER AS INSTRUMENTAL IN GLOBAL INFORMATION SPACE

The thesis of soft power has been argued through all the preceding chapters as an instrument borne of the necessities of maintaining foreign policy in an unfamiliar environment characterised by globalization, intensified information flow and the existence of the nation-state. These three notions have been explained as part of a three-sided process called information globalization, comprising the implications of advances in ICTs, global capitalist dynamics and post-Cold War geopolitical fluidity. Using information globalization as a vehicle for explaining the new environment in policy terms, it has been argued that a globally enlarged space of accountability irrespective of political and geographical boundaries has come about. This is global information space. This space is both polycentric and public in character, and a common site for struggles of definitions of order, community and identity. However, unlike a national public sphere, there is no central reference point for governance. Global information space, as a public space, is connected with the operation of world public opinion which, like its national counterpart, is partly a product of unpredictable power politics. World public opinion is defined, like its national counterpart, as an expression of dominant conviction backed by the intention of its originating sectors to give effect to it. Notably, the operative word is dominant conviction, not democratic justice. In a world context, opinion emanates from nation-states and non-state actors alike, focussed upon selectively defined common consequences. The evolving of commonality of order, community and identity is analysable in terms of the power of information, which in a strict sense is the creation of meaning in symbols. This power is also a Foucaultian formation of a 'regime of truth' whereby power is synonymous with the subjective geneses of ideas and with the linkages between them.
Interestingly, this information power does not kill, maim or disenfranchise directly. It effects 'hard' consequences indirectly, by acting 'softly' to convert or subvert opinions and designs for the initiatives and responses of nation-states and non-state actors. Within global information space, following Nye's formulation, it creates a soft power of attraction that makes others want what the exerciser wants. Soft power makes sense when one understands globalization through structuration theory as set out in Chapter 1. That agents and structures can constitute one another, or co-constitute one another simultaneously, implies that power is highly transferable in form. This is where hard power retains its traditional utility to coerce and punish up to a point, beyond which its gains run into diminishing returns. Witness for instance the consequential ambiguities of post-Cold War humanitarian interventions after the deployment phases. Soft power, in contrast, takes the explanation and projection of power into the analytically subtle terrain of structures, be they forums, regimes, mediatised agoras, or national courtrooms. This power residing in structures acts on the assumption, fleshed out in Chapter 2, that politics operates as mental symbols in the minds of friends, foes and neutrals to solidify acceptance, rejection, or at least benign indifference towards others' gains. In short, where hard power cannot consolidate a gain through time and space by fear of punishment, soft power does it through the conversion of minds and persuading them into a principled adherence to 'rules of the game'. Soft power does what most realists have yet to do, extend two-and-three dimensional power into a Foucaultian discursive mode within International Relations. More of this will be considered in the next few sections in terms of the relevance of soft power in foreign policy vis-à-vis realism and its neo-liberal and neo-realist critics.
Translating soft power directly into foreign policy analysis, as was shown in Chapter 4, is to map out the theoretical possibilities of a soft power foreign policy in contrast to the hard power of economic sanctions and military coercion. In fact, in an era of globalization wrought by technology, mass destruction potential and neo-liberal economics, the complementing and prefacing of hard policy instruments with soft power is essential in navigating the interests of nation-states. With this in mind, it was the deliberate choice of this author to select two non-western weak-state-derived case studies to illustrate the possibilities of soft power beyond its largely North Atlantic milieu as theorised by Nye.1 A soft power foreign policy was deducible from the Hobbesian nature of global information space, within which the nation and its co-referent, the state, necessarily assume roles as containers and guardians of the basic order, community and identity goals of mankind. This pure form of soft power foreign policy is manifested in the propositions illustrated by the case study of Singapore and the Asian Values Debate:

**Soft Power Foreign Policy I (LIO)**

*A nation-state can achieve its foreign policy objectives through Leadership Inside-Out by projecting a communitarian base, by its credibility as a source of information, and by targeting an omnidirectional audience.*

**Soft Power Foreign Policy II (LOI)**

*A nation-state can achieve its foreign policy objectives through Leadership Outside-In by exercising political entrepreneurship through international regimes, and by forming epistemic communities.*

On the other hand, nation-states are not the only ones with the ability to utilise soft power to constitute communities of allegiance for policy effect. Non-state actors are equally adept at manoeuvring domestic and world public opinion in intermestic combinations to rival

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1 See fn 3 of the thesis' Introduction. Nye 'qualified' Japan and Singapore for soft power in passing mention, while criticising China's unsuitability.
and induce shifts in foreign policy positions of states through monitoring, exposure and demonstration. The case study of Chilean foreign policy and the Pinochet Extradition Controversy demonstrates that the intermestic politics of foreign policy is a real prospect where non-state actors are determined to employ soft power. Hence, three other possibilities of using soft power to challenge foreign policy exist:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-state Soft Power I (ICF)</th>
<th>The intermestic correlation of forces joining state and non-state parties can shape foreign policy change through direct mobilisation of ideas, sanctioning standards through global regimes, non-state self-constitution of expertise, and manufacturing subjective world public opinion.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-state Soft Power II (IS)</td>
<td>Intermestic socialisation occurs when non-state actors hold states to account through regimes they sign on to.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-state Soft Power III (MDED)</td>
<td>Multipolar Direct Emulation through Demonstration occurs when states and non-state actors emulate ideas that have been proven elsewhere to be efficacious in attaining particular objectives.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The rest of this conclusion will proceed to assess the implications of these soft power applications by first comparing the respective sets of Soft Power Foreign Policy and Non-state Soft Power to explain on the one hand, how far foreign policy reveals the nation-state as being reliant on structural power, and on the other, how far soft power may operate through non-state actors without the international legal status of states. Additionally, the comparison shows that soft power can act passively. Secondly, some lessons will be drawn from the experiences of soft power as seen in the two case studies, for their implications for these countries’ future foreign policies, as well as for the autonomy of non-state policies. Finally, the pertinence of the exercise of soft power for the roles of policy-makers and academics will be considered.
Soft Power and the Permeability of Foreign Policy: Comparing the Two Sets of Soft Power Models

The concept of permeability best describes the transformations foreign policy has undergone in global information space. Decisions are still made by formal organs of states but they are no longer *primus inter pares* on every issue. The wideness of space for initiation and reaction extends as far and as persistently as the components of information flow, accessed and utilised by other states and non-state actors, will make of it. The Foucaultian possibilities of creating discourse are enormously democratised by the nature of global information space, and because the media, economic and political stakes are intertwined, as elaborated in Chapter 3, actorness itself becomes an issue for foreign policy.

However, looking at the nature of the two sets of soft power usage deduced and illustrated in this thesis, the nation-state still remains central in global issue framing and resolution. The first set of Soft Power Foreign Policy establishes 'leadership' through bounded examples of material, political and even cultural success. For leadership to operate inside-out or outside-in, a communitarian base must be a prerequisite, and the indices of success must stand up to scrutiny. The best assurance of credibility as seen in the Asian Values Debate is to have an empirical model to point to. Yet for leadership to appeal across boundaries, it must operate on the assumption that a global audience is a given. This means a promotional relationship between 'seller' and 'client' must be believed in by those who run a soft power foreign policy. It is in the nature of soft power that attraction must be voluntary and as widely exercised as possible among states and non-state actors.
These same soft power considerations for pure foreign policy apply equally, but with reverse motivations, to non-state actors that intend to effect what they perceive as desirable change in foreign policy. Following the three versions of Non-state Soft Power, the non-state actors evidently need to target the state with discourse with the intent of uncoupling or realigning the sense of community embodied by the double boundary of nation and state. Hence non-state actors project information in such a way that forces favourable to their causes are aligned against the straightjacket of foreign policy in the way that ICF operates. Alternatively, non-state actors can act as witnesses and policemen of the conscience of nation-state obligations (IS) to either the international community of states, or the global community of humankind, as it has been shown in the Chilean case. A third possibility of non-state soft power operating through or against the nation-state is discursively to point to examples of betterment through the demonstration effects of MDED. MDED works where good communitarian examples can offer their inspiration for improvement elsewhere. Ultimately, whether it is Soft Power Foreign Policy or Non-state Soft Power, the nation-state is the status quo claimant on communitarian allegiance, and it is only by deconstructing this prior claim on loyalty that information can demonstrate its power.

Secondly, both models of soft power are premised to varying degrees on the reliance upon structures to carry information to audiences worldwide. This observation approximates to what Robert Cox has termed ‘new realism’, whereby power resides more in structures such as market, corporate, cultural and media networks of countries, groups, and individuals, rather than in states per se (Cox 1997, xv-xxx). Soft power foreign policy, as elaborated in the Singapore study, clearly depends upon linking Asian cultural and political networks on both state and non-state discursive levels to generate an effect. It is no surprise that debates
and engagements with advocates of a ‘western way’ occurred at a World Conference on Human Rights, through media representations of a ‘Singapore Model of Development’ in the case of the ethics of caning as a law and order formula, and through organisations such as ASEAN, the World Bank, and the Commonwealth Secretariat. In keeping with the possibility of weaker forms of soft power, some of these conflicts on Asian Values were also played out in academic debates on paths for Third World development. Non-state Soft Power relied even more on information flow conducted through structures of open access to carry messages. As is also evident from the Chilean case, foreign policy has to reckon with such unlikely rivals as a human rights action network coordinated via email and intermestic personnel appointments, personal exchanges of solidarity and information of abuses, and the imaginative employment of international legal discourse in tandem with national legislation on protections of human life. In short, if global information space did not exist, soft power cannot be an instrument. This is especially so for the non-state actor since unlike the state, the former cannot level the playing field of power on its own.

A third comparative observation can be made as to the possibility of exercising soft power in passive modes. Soft Power Foreign Policy has shown itself to be passive in the Singaporean case in so far as the latter provided aid in the form of sharing, coaching and partnering expertise through an epistemic community. The Singapore Model of Development is a passive tool in part because of Singapore’s size, and in part because it is more likely to be effective as a gainer of friendships in contrast to the ‘strong arm’ precedents of Cold War aid patterns. Non-state Soft Power however is only reliant on passive soft power in so far as academic and public opinion points can affect official mindsets through reference to demonstration effects (MDED). Non-state actors are nevertheless predisposed to act on the
stronger end of the spectrum of soft power possibilities where they can (Figure 2, Chapter 3). The anti-Pinochet internestic alliance's employment of ICF and IS in 1998-2000 to alter the course of Chilean foreign policy catalysed more tangible results than years of patient protest through mere publicity.

Ultimately this comparison has shown that the use of soft power by both states and non-state actors for goal attainment is the result of foreign policy being made permeable by the structures of global information space. The degree of state vulnerability to discursive power of the Foucaultian form corresponds directly to the degree to which it is linked in multiple networks, both formal and informal. At this juncture, it is clear that this entire study has attempted to adapt realism constructively to the permanence of structures penetrating and linking the unitary actor to schemes of cross-border cooperation in economics, politics and information. Realism holds that states are primary actors in international relations and that they seek to maximise their relative power to achieve goals vis-à-vis others. This self-seeking behaviour is duplicated by all states, culminating in an anarchical pattern of competitive relations. The conception of a Hobbesian global information space owes much to this tradition, along with the explanation of the communitarian bases of soft power. Yet traditional realism stops short of developing an account of state agency for and against the discursive power inherent in information flows carried over economic knowledge structures and political regimes such as the UN World Human Rights Conference or the International Convention Against Torture. Martin Wight wrote that 'a power is a modern sovereign state in its external aspect, and it might almost be defined as the ultimate loyalty for which men today will fight.' (1979, 25) The global information space problématique will query: how does realism describe state responses to the power of censure by portrayal through global
media? Furthermore, how do states respond to non-state actors who use such 'censure by portrayal' to generate coalitions for immobilising hard power? This thesis advocates the instrumentality of a Foucaultian discourse reifying one's national community as a defensible moral entity to connected audiences both within and without the state concerned, hence its identification with Coxian new realism. Communitarian defence and goal maximisation must occur through creating acquiescence among other actors, so as to solidify gains made. And if creating acquiescence among others necessitates amending existing structures of interdependence, or creating new ones, foreign policy as a discourse of attraction is the way to go about it.

In Chapter 1, it has also been suggested that given globalization's structurational possibilities, à la Giddens, the neo-realist and neo-liberal theorists initially have a case in arguing that studying state agency, and hence foreign policy, may be superseded. The 'neo-neo debate' would focus explanations on managing the international system through balances of power or looking at long-term pay-off structures in international cooperation as a resolution of purported anarchy in information flows. However, they ignore the fungibility of power where nation-states need to respond to globalization by justifying their very existence against the challenges posed by the informational practices of capitalism, the extensions of ICTs in creating multiple networks of transmission and reception, and the end of bipolar strategic verities. The strategic question for nation-states in global information space remains: how can foreign policy secure identity when information flows originated by others can construct and deconstruct community? Alternatively how does the 'neo-neo debate' reply to the power possibilities behind expressions of world public opinion? The latter may be a
soft issue playing in the abstract arena of meaning creation. But within global information space, opinion will also precede any decision to apply economic and military power.

In the final analysis, soft power foreign policy is a partner in the new skein of FPA commonly known as ‘foreign policy as discourse’ (Larsen 1997; Campbell 1998) since it is analyses how foreign policy defends identity in words and meanings when globalization threatens the ideological space the state inscribes itself upon. Following Campbell, it is not unreasonable to argue that within global information space,

Foreign policy shifts from a concern of relations between states that take place across ahistorical, frozen, and pregiven boundaries, to a concern with the establishment of the boundaries that constitute, at one and the same time, the 'state' and 'the international system.' (Campbell 1998, 61)

Singapore, Chile and Non-State Actors: Scrutiny, Inequalities and Learning as Challenges for Foreign Policy

Having made theoretical observations about the actualisation of soft power in the preceding section, it is also useful to briefly revisit the foreign policy experiences of the three actors examined for the case studies, so as to indicate how the ‘theory’ set forth may find further practical application. Rather than present a full epilogue on Asian Values or the fate of Pinochet, this section will be arranged in three themes: the inevitability of cross-border scrutiny; creative manoeuvres around power resource inequalities; and learning. A central characteristic of these themes is their interrogation of the coherence of foreign policy: who forms the community that defines ‘foreign’ through exclusion? And if foreign policy is to retain utility and legitimacy, must the boundaries of community widen or constrict?

The nature of global information space has made political scrutiny inevitable across all sorts of borders. The global reach of ICTs ensures that no terrestrial space is remote from
politicisation, even though the degrees of doing so will remain uneven, being tied to the 'empire of circumstance' as one writer put it (C. Hill 1996, 112). The relentless expansion of neo-liberal capitalism has joined every national economy into a global one interlinked by a knowledge structure which relies upon ICTs to create price comparisons, facilitate interaction between demand and supply, and labels territories according to investment stability criteria. This links into the global political component which, as a result of the end of the Cold War, amplifies possibilities for fluid ideological contestations and the widening of local antagonisms into matters for multiple protagonists. Above all, global information space is political in the sense that it involves a distribution of values, priorities and material goods according to the dominant voices that construct the design for distribution at any moment.

The Singapore case exhibits all of these challenges. Despite having opted to prosper by fitting into a neo-liberal global capitalism, its foreign policy has had to defend community on a national, regional, and global level in the immediate post-Cold War context through the Asian Values Debate. The target of Singaporean discourse was the prescription of western liberal democracy as the ideal imprint of a new world order. This defence of Asian Values, as pointed out in Chapter 5, stands as long as there is a Singapore Model of Development to act as the foundations on which cultural exceptionalism may be built. Increasingly, as the country continues to weather recessions and progresses towards First World income standards on the basis of being the 'most globalized' nation-state ("Measuring Globalization" 2001, 59), scrutiny of its formula for governance will increase regardless of whether leadership inside-out, and outside-in, remains conscious policy or not. The response by two senior civil servants to a query posed by the author on whether Singapore's policy on Internet governance amounts to a surrender to external standards is revealing:
A global consensus on many critical issues, such as security, privacy, consumer welfare and protection, taxation, cybercrime etc, has yet to be forged. Furthermore, there exists social stratification issues among the Internet-savvy and the not-so-savvy all around the world. We have to evolve a 'Singapore Way' built up over the past few years through our very own national attitudes on Internet management, legal precedents and legislation. This could serve as a reference to other countries considering ways of safeguarding their citizens and global economic interests amidst an unfettered information superhighway....For external audiences to fully understand such seemingly strict measures, they must be willing to appreciate the country’s governing philosophy and very real social constraints, such as our geopolitical environment and multiracial population. (Chan and Choong 2000, interview, 12 May)

The thrust of Singaporean information policy, operating as foreign policy, will be to convince external audiences to live with, and maybe adapt, a Singapore Way if it appears practical for them.

For Chile, external audiences also matter greatly. The whole spirit of a foreign policy of reinsertion into the global community is hinged on regaining the reputation for stable democracy and respect for human rights squandered during the Pinochet years. Reinsertion into a, largely western, international community of democracies is desirable because it enhances a weak state’s international power, both hard and soft, in an era of globalization. Moreover, it alleviates the pre-existing regional isolation the post-authoritarian civilian governments inherited. The trend of Chilean foreign policy initiatives in the 1990s spell this out. Firstly, there was rapprochement with neighbouring Argentina and Peru, with whom Chile has had political and armed conflicts over the past century, and which were exacerbated under Pinochet. And secondly, Chile showed enthusiasm for associating with the MERCOSUR common market and NAFTA, as well as signing free trade agreements with Central American states (Veronica 2000, 325-330). This is, ironically, an advantageous undergirding of the continuing success of the neo-liberal economy of Pinochet-era design. Although national income standards are nowhere comparable to Singapore’s, Chile’s is still
outstanding in Latin America, and the Chilean 'jaguar' economic model has been held up by individual economists and the International Institute of Economics as an example for its neighbours, and even Russia (Piñera 1994; 2000). The Pinochet Extradition Controversy however undermined this neo-liberal soft power by externalising the unfinished business of democratic transition, and allowing an intermestic human rights alliance to define the terms of reinsertion. Reflecting on the shock of the 'globalization of new actors' such as Amnesty International and the application of 'universal jurisdiction' on human rights against Chile, the Chilean foreign ministry's director of planning during the controversy commented:

[T]he Pinochet case demonstrates the necessity of solid regimes of regional and global human rights, designed carefully and without discrimination, which establish clear jurisdictional priorities, and which do not allow space for discretionary and arbitrary interpretations. (Van Klaveren 2001, 48)²

In other words, global scrutiny is a given for Chilean foreign policy, even if corrections for impartiality are needed from a Chilean perspective.

Non-state actors, characterised by their profile as information creators, monitors and disseminators for idealistic purposes, benefit naturally from the linkages between the media, and the economic and political components of global information space. The non-state actors are able to use scrutiny against foreign policies because of two things. Capitalist economic prosperity depends on a wide degree of ICT penetration and information circulation across borders; and politically, nation-states have grown increasingly reliant on media to inform, argue and promote geographical community through newspaper, telegraph, radio, television and even Internet sites. Whether singly, as individuals, or in groups, as NGOs pooling greater resources, non-state narratives threaten the positive communitarian identity foreign policies seek to promote. In this sense, non-state actors do not pursue 'foreign policies' but 'non-state

² Author's translation.
policies' that are partially territorially based, and often not democratically-legitimised in an electoral sense. Therein lies their flexibility in championing causes that advance through the shame of exposure and criticism, or an offering of counter-reality. This is the demonstration of the Foucaultian logic of discursive power generating its own counter-construction (Foucault 1980, 141-143). The PIDH in the Pinochet Controversy, for example, transformed itself from being the 503-day London Picket against one ex-dictator into a permanent collective organisation based in London to 'fight against impunity and defend human rights in Chile, the rest of Latin America and worldwide.' One of its initiatives is the website www.memoriaviva.com ('living memory.com') which is a site of remembrance for the victims of the 1973-90 period. Additionally, it publicises documentation on Pinochet's detention centres, the perpetrators of violations, as well as eyewitness accounts of those violations. The site also offers a free email bulletin on human rights issues in Chile and Latin America drawn from Chilean, American and European news sites (Human Rights International Project, London 2001; http://www.memoriaviva.com).

A second foreign policy experience common to all three actors, but to varying degrees, is their use and leverage of relative inequalities in power and status. On measures of hard power in economic, military and political areas, Singapore, Chile and the non-state actors are barely within the shadow of the Permanent Members of the UN Security Council, or the G-8 industrial states. It is global information space that mitigates their relative inequalities by empowering their actorness in the realm of 'soft resources' such as economic arbitraging within networks of IT and commerce, intellectual traffic between core, semi-periphery and periphery, and possibilities of developing niche specialisations in shaping the

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3 For example, market size, foreign reserves, and numbers of home-grown entrepreneurs.
any future transitions towards global governance. Singaporean foreign policy derives its post-Cold War resources largely from its cumulative and acknowledged proficiency in financial and communications hubbing, as well as in high technology manufacturing, research and development. The geocultural and geopolitical position of Singapore, while not being comprehensive assets, have contributed to its developing a model of governance that blends imported technological modernity with imputed cultural proclivities towards authoritarianism. These strands have been drawn upon in the articulation of the Singapore School in the Asian Values Debate with the main intention of adding variety to western-led designs for a new world order. As analysed in Chapter 5, the Singapore School gained positive resonance among East Asian foreign policies largely because its exponents spoke from a reasonably cognate cultural repository, and linked it to the performative success of the Singapore Model of Development. The Singapore School also gained some mileage as a holistic aid programme because it offered an alternative to a western package of neo-liberal capitalism and liberal democracy. ‘Singapore’ represented a fusion between techno-capitalist modernity and an Asian way, that does not exclude authoritarianism. This was a niche creation amidst post-Cold War ideological fluidity.

Chile also imbibed neo-liberal capitalism comprehensively under the Pinochet regime, which enhanced the country’s already highly integrated economic links with the rest of the world, as well as its economic growth. But this did not correspondingly augment its foreign policy resources. The military authoritarian form of political governance vitiated the soft power comprehensiveness of Chile’s economic model because of its systematic and widespread human rights violations. While Pinochet-era foreign policy justified

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4 For example, positions in elite decision-making councils of international organisations and numbers of diplomatic missions etc.
authoritarianism in terms of Cold War fighting at home and abroad, it could no longer maintain its plausibility over time, especially since the ideological threat of communism was waning in its international centres in Beijing and Moscow in the late 1980s. Furthermore, the nature of the informational civil war between human rights advocates and the military government led the former actively to support external attempts to monitor and pressure Chile, creating a conflict pattern enduring past 1990.

The non-state actors were well placed to exploit post-Cold War ideological fluidity in part because they could prosecute the informational civil war more fully without entangling Cold War discourses. They were also nimble in part because global information space facilitated information penetration across borders and raised issues of normative governance in a boundary-eroded world. The prime asset of the non-state actors was their ability to deploy information at important junctures in time and space using ICTs such as the Internet, fax, newspaper and television. Due to their innate characteristics, these media facilitated a de facto global public sphere susceptible to those with loud voices, real and simulated majority opinions, evocative narratives, and pictures. In this realm, Singapore, Chile, non-state actors and the G-8 might enjoy equality of access to soft power. The equalisers, inherent in soft power, being the availability of holistic visions and the credibility to advocate them (Keohane and Nye Jr. 1998, 89-92). The non-state actors pitched their campaign to try Pinochet on the ground of democratising and humanising the new world order in tandem with huge polarised debates on redressing genocides in ex-Yugoslavia, Rwanda and the ICC’s role. And to enlarge worldwide constituencies of agreement on principles, the intermestic alliance based in London coordinated a basic media theme of ‘truth and justice’ to their narratives and pictures. This global scope of discourse contrasted starkly with Chilean
foreign policy attempts to reduce discourse to that of ‘international community, but national justice’ through diplomatic channels.

The third common foreign policy experience is the learning aspect. Using soft power necessitates ensuring that the information transmitted is timely, focussed and adaptable to targeted levels of decision-making. Both the Singaporean and Chilean foreign policies in the cases surveyed have encountered this. The first, in trying to avoid total diplomatic breakdown despite bilateral and multilateral discursive competition, and the second, in trying to stay relevant in arguing Pinochet’s release over time. The Singapore School had its ‘strategic fuzzy logic’ in diagnosing the American predicament over the Fay Incident by reducing the caning sentence in deference to President Clinton’s intercession without eliminating the principle of punishment to deter crime. It was also strategic fuzzy logic operating in advising Thailand and South Korea to restore discipline and communitarian purpose without jettisoning IMF-World Bank conditions following the Asian financial crisis. The ‘fuzziness’ comes in the chameleon logic of asserting consistent values that can entertain supple positions for fencing purposes.\(^5\) Interestingly too, the Singapore School had the humility to admit that in applying Asian Values through aid regimes, strategic fuzzy logic meant in effect not highlighting them as necessary features of method transfer, in order to broaden the Singapore Model’s appeal across cultures. In diplomatic regimes, such as ASEAN, APEC and the ARF, the Singapore School also had to ‘retreat’ where diverse national interests operated against strict consensus.

In the Chilean case, foreign policy response clearly evolved over time by learning to play in the field of discourse dictated by the anti-Pinochet intermestic alliance. In every
phase of the Pinochet Controversy, the intermestic seemed to have largely determined the initiation of events from legal courtroom to courtroom of opinion. This pattern clearly showed to Chilean foreign policy-makers that the discourse of globalization of human rights was in the ascendant, and that it had to outflank the prosecution camp by ironically demonstrating that there was a visible domestic capability in administering impartial justice. The fact that humanitarian reasons and Pinochet's medical report had to be invoked and revealed symbolised how far the non-state soft power had gone in affecting Chilean foreign policy through invoking international regimes, mobilising humanitarian ideals and manufacturing world public opinion. The Pinochet case also demonstrates the agility of non-state-driven intermestic alliances as an organisational form adept at soft power. Horizontal networks based on solidarity for a generic common cause enabled co-ordinated legal submissions, publicity and developing precedents in spite of foreign policies' ambivalence or outright obstruction. Although Pinochet escaped extradition, the symbolic and legal demonstration effect of putting a major human rights violator, who was also an ex-Head of State, in the dock, through a predominantly non-state and intermestic initiative, had significantly eroded Pinochet's invulnerability in Chile. It also set a precedent for global governance via international human rights law, and undercutting sovereignty.

What all these foreign policy experiences suggest is that in global information space, foreign policy will have to be permanently vigilant in articulating community. It is also less inhibited by power and status inequalities in asserting actorness. These experiences also challenge the foreign policy-maker to learn adaptability from permeable frontiers and the increasing ability of non-state actors in declaiming their voice through global networks of connectedness. In the light of the 2001-2002 global 'war on terrorism', non-state and state

\(^5\) See Chapter 5.
uses of soft power are more relevant than ever if vicious cycles of violence are to be avoided. The fundamental causes of terrorism in the Middle East and elsewhere need to be confronted: the lack of tangible material and political development in many developing states that exhibit the uneven wealth of a rentier elite. At the same time, the generic targets of terrorism must also be recognised for what they need to promote more: western modernity’s hospitality to non-western variations of modernity. Terrorism is potentially rooted in domestic frustrations, expressed in internestic strategies of violence. The multinational composition of the Al-Qaeda network is suggestive of this. Developing states need to demonstrate their ability to match their peoples’ material and political expectations, and hence inspire others through leadership examples from ‘inside-out’ and ‘outside-in’. The western states need to employ soft power to diminish misperceptions of their socio-economic insensitivities towards a globalizing world which is constantly uncovering diversities of mindsets. This goes back to the problématique of pursuing foreign policy amidst globalization: how can the diversities of statist political communities be projected without suffocation by blanket ideologies? A modest start would be to socialise ‘others’ into pacific coexistence through narratives of accommodative diversity. This is a task for both states and non-state actors.

**Actualising Soft Power, Joining Practitioners and Academics**

A final reflection on soft power revolves around the communitarian justifications of foreign policy in global information space. All national communities, as interpreted by scholars as diverse as Renan, Weber, Smith and Anderson, invariably contain strong linguistic-cultural components that compose a discourse of togetherness and simultaneously inscribe an otherness. Judging from the deductive account of global information space as Hobbesian in Chapter 3, it would follow that nation-state articulators are as relevant in the
era of globalization as they have been historically. If foreign policy practitioners are to justify their portfolios in governments and their budgets, intellectual competencies in explaining community in its media, economic and political dimensions are a necessity not a luxury.

The question can now be posed: can a bureaucrat be an intellectual leader as well? Existing literature on the practitioner versus academic role debate in international relations suggests that a practical gulf between the two remains to be decisively and organisationally bridged – over pragmatic issue management in matters of government, the role of the normative visionary in organisational hierarchies, and the relative utilities of emergency fixes versus long term strategizing (Hill and Beshoff 1994; Webb 1994; Eberwein and Hörsch 1994). Actualising soft power may be a significant bridger of the two in the way that it draws upon skills of congenial persuasion, salesmanship, oral and visual presentation for the mass media, charismatic leadership, ideology-making, creative legal interpretations, conversing constructively with non-state constituencies, and working in a logic of learning and adaptation. All this is useful in addition to the standard diplomatic skills of arbitration, mediation, bargaining and summitry. This broadening of skills takes foreign policy into the realm of the man-in-the-street, the arts of commerce, the intangibles of leadership mystique, and the inchoate world of academic reflection. Emulating the intellect of a Huntington, a Lee Kuan Yew, a Mahbubani, a Clinton-Blair-Giddens ideological nexus, an Allende, a Garzón, or a human rights activist may be a requirement for launching soft power. Leadership inside-out and outside-in rely as much on personification, vision, model presentation and inclusive partisanship as intermestic political correlations for socialisation and demonstration do. These are the hybrid skills expected of a globalization-competent policy-maker. In this
mixture the academic, writ large to include thinkers among the non-governmental, has much to offer the organisational operator.

Although Foucaultian thinking about power is unlikely to make policy-friendly reading to the conventional foreign policy bureaucrat, the following rhetorical point is worth reflecting on in the light of soft power:

What political status can you give to discourse if you see in it merely a thin transparency that shines for an instant at the limit of things and thoughts? Has not the practice of revolutionary discourse and scientific discourse in Europe over the past two hundred years freed you from this idea that words are wind, an external whisper, a beating of wings that one has difficulty in hearing in the serious matter of history? (Foucault 1997, 209)

Global information space rapidly mediates policy into particular political history if the discourse initiator values the subjective role of world public opinion and tries manufacturing it. The second last word may then go to Morgenthau whose realist meditation on the relative positions of hard and soft power is often underestimated:

What we suggest calling cultural imperialism is the most subtle and, if it were ever to succeed by itself alone, the most successful of imperialistic policies. It aims not at the conquest of territory or at the control of economic life, but at the conquest and control of the minds of men as an instrument for changing the power relations between two nations. (Morgenthau 1950, 40)

To Foucault and Morgenthau, this thesis adds that in global information space foreign policy, as well as non-state policy, actualises soft power by both creating it, and having its creation re-create others.
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