EXPLORING THE ONTOLOGICAL BASIS OF COEXISTENCE IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: SUBJECTIVISM, HEIDEGGER,
AND THE HETERONOMY OF ETHICS AND POLITICS

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Abstract

In the literature of International Relations the notion of coexistence is not understood as a question for world politics, despite the frequent irruption of issues of coexistence that constantly preoccupy international praxis. Rather, in theoretic terms coexistence is considered self-evidently as the composition of units, identified with co-presence in some spatial sense. This is evident, not from the explicit theorisation of coexistence as such, but from the ontological commitments of the discipline. The enquiry points toward the ontological centrality of the modern subject, whose key attributes are reason, self-mastery and control over others and itself, and which determines coexistence through 'a logic of composition.' The logic of composition reduces the multifarious relations of self and other to mere co-presence of already constituted subjects, that is, it occludes the constitutive role of the other in coexistence and for the 'subject' itself. Illustrating the interplay of subjectivity, composition and heteronomy in Thomas Hobbes's *Leviathan* and the work of David Campbell, the thesis turns to the phenomenology of Martin Heidegger in order to gain access to the heteronomy of entities. In his account of Being-in-the-world, it is argued, can be found an 'optics of coexistence' which enables a factically adequate understanding of coexistence. Such an optics reveals the self, not as autonomous and masterful, but as other-determined in its everydayness, and as uniquely appropriating this heteronomy in its process of becoming-proper. Existential heteronomy 'unworks modern subjectivity'. In this way, it forms the basis for the self's ethical comportment, a self which is an opening to otherness, and enables the articulation of a 'politics of non-self-sufficiency,' as a point of departure away from the subjective politics of self-sufficiency. Moreover, the disclosure of heteronomy disturbs the determination of coexistence as composition and points to community constitution through critique. Through what is called 'critical mimesis' community comes into being through the deconstructive retrieve of past possibilities inherited from past generations in process which is inclusive and critical. This is an account of communal constitution which is productive also in an era of global transformations, concerned with the destabilising effects of 'globalisation.'
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Chapter 1

Introduction: Subjectivity, Coexistence, and the Question of Heteronomy

1. The issue of coexistence and International Relations

Coexistence could be said to be paramount for international politics in the post-Cold War world. Exploring what coexistence might mean and what it might entail, however, has not been directly addressed by the discipline of International Relations (IR). That is not to say that IR scholars have not turned their attention to specific and diverse issues of cohabitation or living-in-common but, rather, to suggest that what is considered to be 'coexistence' has yet to receive proper questioning. Coexistence, in other words, is not presently regarded as a question for world politics; it is, instead, a term whose meaning is considered to be self-evident. Endowed with the literal meaning of co-presence, its study is bounded within a set of assumptions and parameters that serve to revoke its status as a question, restricting reflection on coexistence as an aporia of international politics.

The seeming self-evidence of 'coexistence,' however, is rendered unstable by world events, which often unsettle and disrupt the everyday activities of world-political actors, what one might call, in its collective form, 'international praxis.' States, governments, international organisations and other non-governmental bodies alike are, in awareness of it or not, continuously preoccupied by specific concerns that arise from the question of coexistence. International praxis, thus, is constantly required to address itself to coexistence as a question.1 Such preoccupation centres on issues within state borders, such as civil war, secession disputes, resource conflicts, civic debate within multiethnic or other diverse communities about issues of cultural diversity, etc. Additionally, it is an issue at the level of international interaction for
intergovernmental bodies that become increasingly concerned with the
regional or global repercussions of states' internal disputes. Since 1989, such
interaction has often resulted in military interventions, in the form of assisting
in the cessation of hostilities and violence. These are, usually, undertaken in
the name of certain values often considered 'humanitarian,' whose protection
is regarded as imperative to the current human rights regime. Interventionist
measures, moreover, are intended to promulgate these values in the aftermath
of conflict in the wider cause of international peace and order, although their
critics often consider these a disguise for power politics.

It can be claimed, therefore, that while coexistence has not been question-
worthy for international thought, it is constantly surfacing as a problem for
international praxis. In this regard, international thought could be said to have
failed to keep up apace with international praxis in its consideration of the
general meaning of 'coexistence.' In the context of this project 'coexistence'
is taken to be a concept whose aporetic nature is obscured in international
thought, and yet one that constantly preoccupies international praxis, but is
usually dealt with under other, more specific, guises. This thesis illustrates
how, in the absence of direct questioning about coexistence, its more general
meaning can only be discerned from an examination of the ontological
premises of international relations. Amongst these premises the modern subject
stands out in its ontological centrality, IR theory being embedded in the larger
context of modern philosophical and social inquiry.

1 Roland Paris, "Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism," *International
2 This neglect can be noted, even if, were we to look at them specifically, the nature and
intentions of political praxis at the international level would come under severe critique.
3 Robert C. Solomon has suggested that the rise of the subject to prominence has been the
single most defining trend in continental thinking. See his *Continental Philosophy since 1750:
4 Fred Halliday notes that IR academic work is embedded within the social science context,
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Within this larger theoretical context, the modern subject is generally understood as a completed self, already fully constituted when it 'enters' into relations with others, relations that are considered ontologically secondary to the subject itself. Its main attributes are, in sum, self-consciousness, non-relationality and autonomy; these become instrumental in determining coexistence as the presence of multiple units, as a composition of otherwise non-relational subjects, in other words. The thesis contends that based on the ground of modern subjectivity coexistence can only be articulated through what might be called the 'logic of composition.' When being-with-others is understood solely as a composition of entities, the constitutive role of otherness in coexistence, but also for selfhood itself, is obscured. In particular, the other's participation in the constitution of the self, what might be called the 'heteronomous constitution of selfhood,' remains concealed. The other is grasped, instead, as a similar non-relational subject; its otherness reduced to what is knowable about the self.5

Unless this heteronomous constitution of selfhood is allowed to show itself,6 then coexistence appears only as the mere composition of units, as is often assumed in IR, instead of being the prior and constitutive condition of their being. Before providing a fuller articulation of the juncture of subjectivity, coexistence and heteronomy, however, it is important to review the historical trajectory of IR discourses about 'coexistence,' in order to bring to the fore the reduction of coexistence to the co-presence of entities in both the Cold War and post-Cold War conceptual constellations. This brief survey highlights that, despite the assumption that these are radically different historical configurations, there is an inherent unanimity in their prevalent determinations of coexistence as co-presence or composition. It suggests, therefore, that any reconsideration of coexistence requires, in the first instance, that closer attention be paid to the pervasive centrality of modern subjectivity.

2. The Cold War, ideological conflict and coexistence

In the post-1945 world, various forces practically and conceptually affected the meaning and study of coexistence. In the years following the end of World War II, societal and political concerns revolved primarily around the imminent nuclear confrontation between the two superpowers. The very presence of nuclear arms meant that conflict resounded with the possibility of worldwide destruction. Thus, the conflictual workings of the state system, without any higher authority to guarantee peace, called for concerned academics, politicians, and international activists alike to bring about 'a conception of coexistence which matches the needs of the nuclear age.' During the Cold War, then, the presence of nuclear weapons ensured that thinking about coexistence revolved exclusively around the nexus of survival. Amongst politicians in the so-called 'first' and 'second' worlds, the co-presence of divergent political systems was the centrepiece of a strategy aimed towards the accommodation of the ideological differences of the superpowers. It was widely regarded that such 'coexistence' of contradictory, yet totalising, ideological positions was required for the very survival both of their incompatible political systems, but also of the human species as a whole, considering the nuclear context within which the struggle among their competing ideologies took place. Related to the potentially holocaustal repercussions of nuclear conflict, 'coexistence' also became the sole means of survival when one reflected on the various paths to development and modernity available to post-colonial, developing countries that were inevitably caught up in the international politics of the Cold War. Moreover, 'coexistence' became a central concern for peace movements that attempted to diffuse the nuclear tension by calling for an end to the superpowers's ideological struggle.

Amongst the anti-nuclear activist movement, it was felt that the entanglement brought about by the nuclear age rested with the politicians' inability to extract

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themselves from an old age of strife. ‘Pride, arrogance, fear of loss of face, and ideological intolerance have obscured their power of judgement,’ insisted one of its most vocal members, British philosopher Bertrand Russell. In his extensive writings against nuclear armament, Russell clarified further the association between survival and coexistence. ‘Coexistence,’ he wrote in the early 1960s, ‘must be accepted genuinely and not superficially as a necessary condition of human survival.’ That coexistence was the hoped-for antidote to the possibility of nuclear annihilation served to affirm and highlight the assumed opposition of coexistence and conflict. It has remained, to this day, a certainty that ‘coexistence’ is the condition or state that surpasses conflict, but not the primary condition in which entities find themselves. Rather, it is considered to be a state that must be actively, and secondarily, brought about.

Despite the calls for a notion of coexistence to accommodate the particularities of the nuclear age, it was a primarily conflictual configuration of the concept that prevailed in the international political world. In the 1950s Nikita Khrushchev revived the Leninist term ‘peaceful coexistence’ to signal that nuclear confrontation was not only undesirable but also unnecessary. V.I. Lenin had indicated that in the international climate of the 1920s coexistence was possible, and also preferable for the Soviet Union, in order to provide the peace which the newly founded USSR needed to survive in its first years of existence. While for many political commentators in the West military and political coexistence was considered inconceivable, coexistence of the diverging systems was a fact of international political life. As Y. Frantsev noted once, ‘[socialism and capitalism exist on the same planet and their coexistence is historically inevitable.’ Ironically, Lenin had argued that it is the ‘general economic world relations, which compel them [capitalists] to establish intercourse with us.’ Situated as Lenin was in the ‘revolutionary

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9 Russell, *Has Man a Future?,* 90.
10 With the Bolshevik Revolution under threat after its initial success, Lenin had reminded the revolutionaries of the fact of the majority of capitalist states surrounding the newly created socialist Soviet Union in a seminal speech at Brest Litovsk in 1918.
struggle,' he was aware of the requirement for peace to allow for the progression of socialism.

Khrushchev's revival of the term 'peaceful coexistence' reasserted the political necessity of promoting the co-presence of conflicting ideologies and political systems in order to avoid war with capitalist states. He agreed in this regard with Lenin's earlier argument that, at the inter-state level, coexistence between capitalist states and communist countries was possible and the struggle against capitalism could be carried out at the level of ideas. 'Peaceful coexistence' in the post-1945 world entailed, therefore, the desire to avoid interstate warfare in the name of ideological opposition, but revived the pledge to maintain and encourage confrontation in the realm of ideology to bring about the collapse of the capitalist system. As Khrushchev himself proposed in an article in *Foreign Affairs*, peaceful coexistence intended 'to keep the positions of the ideological struggle, without resorting to arms in order to prove that one is right.'

It could be argued, then, that in the 1960s 'peaceful coexistence between countries regardless of their social system' came to form 'the bedrock of international affairs.'

Despite some political opposition, the West prudently embraced the chance to challenge the Soviet articulation of the concept of 'peaceful coexistence' in order to reshape it for its own ends. The Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, a member of the American Association for the United Nations, defined 'peaceful coexistence' as 'primarily a state of affairs in which the so-called sovereign states seek to protect and promote their conflicting national interests by means other than war, or organized and systematic intimidation based upon the threat of war.' In its report on this issue the Commission reiterated that peaceful coexistence should be considered as a

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13 This summary obscures, of course, the extensive role played by proxy wars, where military confrontation was afforded between the superpowers through conventional warfare. See Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey, "The Imperial Peace: Democracy, Force and Globalization," *European Journal of International Relations* 5, no. 4 (1999): 403-434.
compromise because this concept lay ‘between war in the literal sense and peace in the ideal sense.’ As a compromise necessitated by the nuclear context, ‘peaceful coexistence’ accepted that ideological struggle was the means of confrontation and a mechanism of ‘diffusion’ of the nuclear situation. With its re-articulation of peaceful coexistence the Association sought to counter the Soviet hegemony over the term and to reiterate it in ways that accorded a much greater role to international law in the workings of international politics, in recognition of the fact that, in a time of nuclear proliferation, ‘national security is unobtainable by military force alone.’

‘Peaceful coexistence,’ therefore, mitigated nuclear war by allowing ideological competition amongst the superpowers, a contention which resulted in many a proxy war fought with conventional weapons in the periphery, as well as in the often violent intervention into the political systems of developing and post-colonial countries. Opponents of ‘peaceful coexistence’ in other countries and social movements resisted this initial acceptance of the notion of ‘peaceful coexistence’ by emphasising that Krushchev’s proposal for ‘peaceful coexistence’ contained within it the notion of ideological struggle as the site of contestation of the capitalist world system and that, as a result, ‘coexistence’ became a paradoxical term: ‘[b]itter ideological struggle is central to their idea of coexistence’ denounced Christopher Paget Mayhew, a British politician in the 1960s. Where ‘peaceful coexistence’ is the condition where state interaction allows for a sustained ideological struggle, then one can be said to be ‘waging peaceful coexistence,’ no matter how counter-intuitive or oxymoronic this may seem. This resistance to the ideologically contentious configuration of ‘coexistence’ once again highlights the assumption that

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18 Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, *Peaceful Coexistence*, 5. Towards further condification of this notion, Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia succeeded in convincing the Non-aligned movement to accept 18 principles of peaceful coexistence law as the Cairo Declaration of 1964, see John Newbold Hazard, *Coexistence Law Reconsidered* (Copenhagen: Juristforbundets Forlag, 1969), 196 and n.13. Yet, events such as the Prague Spring and its quashing by Soviet troops in 1968, led to a reconsideration of the nominal acceptance and hopes for ‘peaceful coexistence’ among the super-powers. At the very least such events, led to the speculation whether a new Soviet position with respect to coexistence with capitalism was in the making, see also, 191.
19 Again see Barkawi and Laffey, “The Imperial Peace”, 403-434.
'coexistence' was regarded as that state which transcends conflict and enables survival.

Furthermore, many in the West noted the danger that such an ideological competition still entailed despite the widely held admission that ‘peaceful coexistence’ would be the ideational tool through which interstate violence, so potentially precipitous in the era of nuclear weapons, could be avoided, or at the very least, mitigated. The acceptance, and even encouragement, of ideological propaganda on both sides of the world-political spectrum, argued opponents of ‘peaceful coexistence,’ could lead to the reduction of ideological variety and complexity arising from the multifarious social systems in the international political world. Intense ideological struggle as the means of engagement between the two superpowers discouraged world-wide multi-vocality and reduced the possibility of multiple interpretations of the world system. More importantly, it captured the terms of international discourse and limited the alternatives available to political thought, at a time when they were most needed. Such a reduction of variety to two monolithic ideologies was tantamount to the creation of ideological myths, which were ‘a prime cause of international tension and a major barrier to disarmament and peace.’

Amongst those who attempted to think outside the parameters of ‘peaceful coexistence,’ a different type of concern as to the future of peace arose precisely from the presence of too many voices. In the late 1950s, Sir Kenneth Grubb equated ‘coexistence’ with the existing international system of sovereign states and their political interactions. Understood in this way coexistence meant taking ‘for granted an unlimited compatibility of national aspirations,’ whose acknowledgement did not, however, provide the requisite conditions or guidelines for the prevention of nuclear conflict. The fact of coexistence alone, in other words, did not suggest how one may ‘coexist.’ Taken literally coexistence is nothing more than co-presence. As Grubb noted in 1957, ‘[p]resumably coexistence simply means side by side: it does not

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21 Mayhew, Coexistence Plus, 22.
22 Mayhew, Coexistence Plus, 2.
require that we live together in any meaningful way; it merely records that we live in the same limited space, the inhabited world,\textsuperscript{24} astutely observing the spatial determination of coexistence, where it is understood as co-presence or the composition of units. In this way, international thought and praxis about ‘coexistence’ in the post-1945 era reduced the term to a primary concern with the organisation of a multitude of units, and the sustenance of the international state system and its principle of state-centricity, whose survival was far from assured in the nuclear context. Grubb called for a more meaningful and instructive definition of what kinds of interaction coexistence might entail, and highlighted the need to move beyond ‘mere coexistence’ ‘into a closer partnership or community,’ among states and peoples.\textsuperscript{25} Coexistence, understood as the cohabitation of sovereign states, harboured ‘a terrible lie,’ containing within it a principle that belied what ‘coexistence’ ought to mean, suggested Grubb. This was, of course, the norm of state sovereignty, which accorded the state absolute control within its territorial boundaries. Such sovereign cohabitation ‘almost seems to sanctify evil and condone the effects of tyranny,’\textsuperscript{26} he noted, advancing an opposition to the kinds of actions that were subsumed under the heading of ‘coexistence,’ such as war, violent incitement to struggle, proxy wars in the periphery and, finally, sustained ideological propaganda.

During the Cold War era an understanding of coexistence evolved to accommodate the nuclear threat by proposing that ‘coexistence’ be thought as the co-presence of opposed entities, in which ideological competition ought to be tolerated. This led to the equation of coexistence with survival and the absence or transcendence of conflict, despite the fact that the mitigation of nuclear war in this way entailed the toleration of intense ideological struggle. The commitment to the avoidance of war in the centre, transposed confrontation to the periphery, where proxy wars were fought throughout the post-World War II years. This brief exposition suggests that international

\textsuperscript{24} Grubb, \textit{Coexistence}, 5.
\textsuperscript{25} Grubb, \textit{Coexistence}, 3.
\textsuperscript{26} Grubb, \textit{Coexistence}, 9.
relations literature and institutional or political practice were largely preoccupied and sought to address the continued danger brought about by the production and deployment of nuclear arms on the one hand, and the perceived ideological incompatibility of capitalism and really existing communism.

While there was a general acceptance of the progress that the concept of 'peaceful coexistence' brought to Cold War political life, largely seen as the immediate avoidance of nuclear warfare, concerns remained about the dangers of the ideological struggle entailed within 'peaceful coexistence.' Therefore, despite this general acceptance of the usefulness of the term, many opponents saw it as a restrictive concept and attempted to think beyond 'mere coexistence.' Given the disconcerting nuclear context, scholarly focus reflected the connection between coexistence and survival, which concerned world politics and the general public of the West. This served to highlight and, moreover, sustain the conceptual opposition between coexistence and conflict, despite the conflictual element inherent within the term 'peaceful coexistence.'

The ideological struggle, in which such reflection took place, led to the ossification of the meaning of coexistence as the tentative and dangerous co-presence of ideologically incompatible units. Coexistence also came to connote an ephemeral state, as it contained within it the acceptance that conflict was inevitable, albeit momentarily restricting it to the realm of ideology.

3. Coexistence in the post-Cold War era

Since the collapse of communism, the parameters of thought that had guided international coexistence between opposing ideological camps during the post-

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27 Several movies which noted the anxiety caused by the nuclear threat and depicted the horror of nuclear holocaust were released in the 1950s and 1960s, such as On the Beach, Dr. Strangelove and The War Game, as discussed in Geoffrey Stern, The Structure of International Society: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations (London: Pinter, 1995), 265. As Günter Figal suggests literary works and films are 'represented experience, and a literary work is the representation of its experiential context' in Günter Figal, "Stereoscopic Experience: Ernst Jünger's Poetics of The Adventurous Heart," trans. Wayne Klein, in Günter Figal, For a Philosophy of Freedom and Strife (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), 91.
1945 era have undergone major changes. Contrary to the political preoccupation with the possibility of nuclear annihilation during the Cold War, since 1989 concerns with potentially precipitous ideological competition have dissipated, leaving concerns about issues of 'coexistence' to evolve along three main trajectories.

In the context of the first path, a certain uncertainty and source of concern was visible, arising from the perception that,

the West [was left] without markers to identify potential threats to its way of life or reasons to be prepared. With the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe, followed by the dissolution of the Soviet Union itself, the global ideological confrontation that had served so well to identify friend and foe vanished.28

Cold War thinking about ideological struggle has transformed its content by discursively shifting away from superpower conflict towards 'civilizational tension or struggle.' The most widely known example of this strand of thinking is Samuel Huntington's 'Clash of Civilizations,'29 although his theorisation of the post-1989 international political scene has come under severe criticism, not only from mainstream authors but also from critical theorists.30 Embedded within an alarmist ontology of decline, IR thinking about civilisations sought to replace the formulaic role of Cold War ideological and military oppositions with mapped cultural differences.31 As Marc Lynch argues in this vein, 'Huntington's "clash of civilisations" initially defined the terms of debate within a realist conceptual universe which simply replaced "states" with

30 See for example, Stephen Chan, "Too Neat and Under-thought a World Order: Huntington and Civilisations," Millennium 26, no. 1 (1997): 137-140 and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, "'Civilisation' on Trial," Millennium 28, no. 1 (1999): 141-153. Unfortunately, IR has yet to benefit from sociological thinking on civilisation such as that of Johann Arnason which aims to understand 'civilizational structures as configurations of culture and power' as the editors of a special issue on his work note. For the contributions to this see Thesis Eleven no. 61 (2000): 1-113. However, efforts to rescue civilisational thinking from its realist premises appear to be increasing, see Marc Lynch, "The Dialogue of Civilisations and International Public Spheres," Millennium 29, no. 2 (2000): 307-330.
"civilisations". As such, it remains wedded to an understanding of civilisation, not as diverse and polymorphic, but as unitary.

The second trajectory reveals that the discipline of International Relations has been increasingly called upon to theorise coexistence, not amongst sovereign states where its traditional expertise lies but, rather, of sub-state groups and individuals. The emerging concern with the coexistence of people as an issue which requires attention in IR is evident when one considers the rise in civil wars, ethnic conflicts and other such 'internal' matters that have preoccupied the international community in the post-1989 world. Similarly, there is an increased scholarly focus towards individual or group conflict at a more localised level, usually in the form of specific case studies. The concerns of conflict resolution scholarship evolve around 'peace-making' and, additionally, in terms of peace maintenance and post-conflict reconstruction, include 'peace-keeping' and 'peace-building.' This strand of thinking about 'coexistence' inevitably responds to the considerations of the international community about localised conflicts, either couched in humanitarian language or considered with regards to their international repercussions, or both.

As Eva Bertram argues, a certain extension of the scope of multilateral (usually United Nations) peace operations can be noted since 1990, when there occurred a move from the prevention of hostilities to the active building of 'the political conditions for a sustainable peace,' a task which amounts to 'remak[ing] a state's political institutions, security forces, and economic arrangements,' in short, 'nation-building.' Such 'on the ground' widening in the scope of operations within international praxis, as has occurred since 1989,

Northwestern University Press, 1988), 63-75, although admittedly this would assume a different sense in post-Cold War realist ontology.
35 Bertram, "Reinventing Governments," 388.
has thus far not been accompanied by a deepening of scholarly focus, punctuated with the return to reflection about the more general, yet foundational, terms which bound that scope. Deepening of that sense would serve to better clarify what it is that these operations are trying to achieve, namely, 'coexistence' and would, moreover, enable the consideration of this concept beyond specific issues of technical management of transitions and cessation of hostilities.

It must be noted that the confrontational politics of the Cold War, compounded as it was by its location in a nuclear context, afforded the tragic opportunity of reflecting on the meaning of coexistence as such, despite the fixing of dichotomies between coexistence and conflict which that location had imposed on thinking. The post-1989 focus on peace-making, peace-keeping, and peace-building, has thus far restricted itself largely to the technical issues of conflict prevention or management within the generalised context of the 'up-keeping' of the world system. Despite its difference from the civilisational path of post-Cold War thinking it, too, has the tendency to consider coexistence in the post-Cold War context as co-presence in a new political geography. It can be argued, therefore, that 'a new political geography of the world' has began to dominate political understanding, where new kinds of wars are associated with 'violence-prone areas,' which necessarily require the mobilisation of world-political resources for the management of international peace and security.37

This reflective restriction and self-imposed limitation of scholarly scope and debate, however, are not understood by the discipline of International Relations as limitations, but, on the contrary, as prudent responses to what is now perceived the mere maintenance of the international system.38 This level

36 Bertram, "Reinventing Governments," 389.
38 Saskia Sassen has argued that the world economic system is not, as often claimed, a spontaneous order, but, rather, is designed and maintained in Saskia Sassen, Globalization and its Discontents (New York: New Press, 1998) and Saskia Sassen, Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). Similarly, the increased engagement of the UN 'as an agent of democratic transitions' as noted by Bertram,
of comfort only makes sense if located within the 'end of history' so
optimistically heralded by Francis Fukuyama, which leaves but one historical
alternative: liberalism. In this regard, Roland Paris has argued that the guiding
paradigm of post-1989 peace operations is liberal internationalism with its
premises of free-market oriented economy and liberal democratic polity, which
he collectively unites in the phrase 'market democracy.' Fukuyama’s
proposition about the 'end of history,' and the prevalence of liberalism more
generally, illustrate the acceptance of the modern subject at the centre of the
political ontology of IR, despite widely held pessimism in philosophical and
social scientific circles about the assumptions of modern subjectivity.

Furthermore, the widespread orientation towards technicity and minute
specialisation occludes the status of coexistence as a question. Specifically, it
presents research as multiple and varied, whereas, upon closer examination the
apparent multiplicity in the study of coexistence takes place within the bounds
of a greater unanimity about the subject of coexistence. Moreover, there are no
attempts to think about the meaning of 'coexistence' and its conditions of
possibility. Finally, and most definitely, there are no discernible attempts to
explore the possibility of grasping coexistence as anything other than
composition or co-presence of already constituted units.

The third and final post-Cold War strand of thinking about 'coexistence'
comprises international attempts to encourage the 'extension of moral
inclusion in world politics.' Just as within the structures of national societies,
it is suggested that in international society, too, inclusion 'depends crucially on

41 In this sense, one might disagree with Slavoj Žižek who finds the centre of political ontology
to be vacant, since the modern (Cartesian) subject has been 'chased away,' so to speak, by
concerted critique mounted on multiple fronts. See Slavoj Žižek, The Ticklish Subject: The
Absent Centre of Political Ontology (London: Verso, 1999). Naturally, Žižek is referring
primarily to philosophical circles; upon closer attention to the concerns of the international
community, with its newly found focus on human rights, the modern subject is definitely
securely holding court.

42 Molly Cochran, Normative Theory in International Relations: a Pragmatic Approach
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 14. See also, Andrew Linklater, The
Transformation of Political Community: Ethical Foundations of the Post-Westphalian Era
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), 14-45 and 60, as well as Gerard Delanty, Citizenship in a
finding ways of bringing disadvantaged groups, women or men into the political process. They mandate of greater inclusivity has arisen more recently from the destabilising effects brought about by the globalisation of world politics and the intensification of social relations across a number of spheres of interaction. The more influential of these discourses tend to suggest that something akin to a post-Westphalian era is now approaching, which, in turn, might signal a more inclusive approach to 'community.' Their analysis of the impact of processes of globalisation upon territorially sovereign nation-states, as well as their evaluation of the possibilities arising from novel political arrangements for the future of 'community,' as in the context of the European Union for example, offer the most promising outlook of the three trajectories.

The great majority of those working within this third path are 'proponents of a liberalism hospitable to particularities' and exhibit a concern with otherness that aims to bestow upon it 'equality in the sense of legal egalitarianism.' Most influential amongst these, are the writings of David Campbell and Andrew Linklater. The latter's recent monograph *The Transformation of Political Community* sets out to sociologically appraise recent attempts to move beyond the statist Westphalian 'blind alley,' for the express purpose of making the notion of 'community' less exclusionary. The larger project, in Linklater's words, is twofold: the first aspect of this drive for more inclusion is to reconstruct 'the modern state and the international state system to permit the development of higher levels of universality.' The second aspect concerns the cultivation of a sensitivity and respect towards otherness. This entails 'transforming exclusionary political communities so that higher levels of

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respect for cultural difference can evolve.'48 The transition towards a post-Westphalian international environment, whether this is due to the impact that globalisation is said to have on the state-form as such, or whether it is attributable to the successes of political innovations such as the European political project, is seen as productive for bringing about a universality sensitive to difference, where 'universalistic loyalties have to be reconciled with strong emotional ties to specific communities.'49

This trajectory, therefore, questions current modes of exclusion of the other, a task that appears to cohere with this thesis's interest in why and how coexistence understood as co-presence occludes the role of otherness. Their inquiry into otherness, however, is limited to how community might be expanded, as if greater inclusivity in terms of numbers alone might be the decisive issue. Rather, the issue is how does one allow existence to show itself as other-determined, as 'heteronomous' and coexistential from the start, so that issues of addition become of no consequence. As Werner Hamacher writes in response to the debate on multiculturalism and the question of inclusion, thinking must seek to go beyond addition, beyond mere counting.50 Diana Coole concurs, noting that 'where the prevailing liberalism is grounded in a philosophy of the subject,' as the majority of these perspectives are, 'the radical challenge is to rethink the political' and coexistence in a more fundamental way.

This must entail something more fundamental than placing rational individuals within a communicative situation: what is needed is an ontology of this interworld, in order to grasp the way rational forms are engendered within the thick, adverse space between subjects. The analysis of politics no longer begins with the juridico-theoretical model (as Foucault will call it),

48 Both in Linklater, The Transformation of Political Community, 16.
49 Linklater, The Transformation of Political Community, 2. It would appear that Linklater's work is expressive of a desire to transcend the sharp divide between cosmopolitans and communitarian thinkers, which was seen to lead to an 'impasse.' See Cochran, Normative Theory in International Relations. As Gerard Delanty has recently suggested, however, the greater majority of 'communitarians can be seen as liberals disenchanted by liberal individualism' but who anchor their positions on 'the liberal principle of equality.' Gerard Delanty, Citizenship in a Global Age: Society, Culture, Politics (Philadelphia: Open University Press, 2000), 25 and 27 respectively. As to the credence given to particularist ties and sentiment see also Alan Finlayson, "Psychology, Psychoanalysis and Theories of Nationalism," Nations and Nationalism 4, no. 2 (1998): 145-162 who argues that there is a reductive psychological account on which most theories of nationalism and nationalists sentiment rest.
with the state at its zenith and juridical subjects beneath, but with struggles for coexistence.51

The reliance of the majority of these literatures on predominant variants of the modern subject, therefore, suggests that such attempts for greater inclusion are limited in their ability to rethink coexistence, unwittingly reducing its consideration to composition. This reduction is what the thesis calls ‘the logic of composition.’ Prior to its fuller articulation, however, it is advisable to outline in brief the prevalent assumptions of the modern subject operating within this logic in order to highlight its inadequacy for thinking about coexistence. This can be seen as an extension of Paris’s initial insights regarding the prevalence of liberal internationalism, ‘that cynicism called liberalism’ as the French philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy has called it,52 by way of providing a curtailed analysis of the subjectivism which is the condition of possibility of the ‘liberal paradigm.’

4. International ontological commitments

A paradoxical situation comes into view, as was already noted above, when one reflects upon the status of coexistence in International Relations in the post-Cold War world. While the issue of coexistence ought to be paramount for world-political understanding, its meaning is taken as self-evident; in other words, coexistence is not addressed as a question. Since coexistence is not regarded as an aporia, there is no scholarly debate about what it is, how difficult it is to define and grasp, or, moreover, what other theoretical issues it might both reveal and conceal. Therefore, this thesis argues that statements about coexistence in the theoretical literature of International Relations (IR) are to be found solely within the discipline’s ontological statements, where ontology is understood as ‘what is the world of international relations and what are its units of analysis.’

51 Both quotes in Diana Coole, “Thinking Politically with Merleau-Ponty,” Radical Philosophy, no. 108 (July/August 2001), 25.
According to the prominent stories that IR tells about an anarchical society or system of sovereign nation-states, and more recently, stories about individuals or sub-state groups, the term coexistence is implicitly understood as a condition of entities coming together to cohabit a particular geographical, social, and political space. It does not necessarily require a physical joining, but it does appear to require the explicit act of ‘staying together.’ The definition of coexistence as a state of staying together presumes coexistence to be a secondary condition requiring a predating event of coming together. As such, the term connotes an a posteriori state; the event of coming together, in other words, renders coexistence a state that must be yielded from purposive action. The thesis argues that, for IR, coexistence is post-ontological; if such a term may be useful, it denotes a condition not investigated at the level of the existential structures of these entities, but rather one that rests on other ontological assumptions.

What are those assumptions, and can they be traced to a single basis or guiding principle? Despite the substantially differentiated contexts within which attempts to think about ‘coexistence’ have arisen, it can be claimed that, in modernity, their grounding has been centred on the individual subject, the historical development of which is examined in greater detail in chapter two. IR theory presents the state as subject in much the same way as social theory takes the self or individual as subject, in the sense of a unitary observable and purposive agent. Where IR turns to issues of individuals, such as recent preoccupations with human rights or post-conflict transitions, it joins more explicitly related social sciences in its grounding on the modern subject.

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53 See, for example, Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979), and amongst constructivists the more recent work of Wendt reinstates the state as subject. See Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Of course, sub-fields such as Foreign Policy Analysis have sought to problematise both the agency of the state and its unitary outlook.
What does one refer to when one speaks of the modern subject? Following Christoph Menke’s recent articulation, it could be argued that

[i]n “modern” use, the term “subject” is no longer taken just in its grammatical meaning where a subject is that of which something can be predicated, but refers to anything that (and, thus, anyone who) can say ‘I’.56

David Carr, similarly, elaborates this definition of the modern subject as being ‘centered in such notions as the cogito, the “I think”, consciousness, self-consciousness, self-transparency, self-determination.’57 But does this actually suggest that the ability to say ‘I’ is the condition of subjectivity? In and of itself, I-saying does not elucidate the characteristics of subjectivity, unless it is considered that I-saying has been traditionally seen as the evocation of self-consciousness and self-control. Stephen K. White notes in this respect that the modern subject can be identified as the assertive, disengaged self who generates distance from its background (tradition, embodiment) and foreground (external nature, other subjects) in the name of accelerating mastery of them. This teflon [non-stick] subject has the leading role in the modern stage.58

In chapter two the characteristics of modern subjectivity are outlined in some detail, but suffice it to say presently that its main features are non-relationality and self-control, features which are often discussed as the values of autonomy and sovereignty. Non-relationality, does not suggest that modern subjects do not engage in relations, but that these relations are not considered constitutive of the subject; rather, they tend to be viewed as non-constitutive for selfhood.

As White rightly observes, however, discussions of the modern subject are not customarily conducted in such critical terms, but more neutrally and without explicit exploration as to how its main features affect the subject’s relationality towards others. Upon closer examination, moreover, it appears that the modern subject is under-thematised, a historical outcome which ought to be taken as ‘at

55 ‘Subject translates hypokeimenon and refers to anything which can have predicates’ in Christoph Menke, “Modernity and Subjectivity: From an Aesthetic Point of View,” Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 21, no. 2 (1999), 221.
least a measure of modernity's self-confidence. It is perhaps a rising insecurity about the modern subject, a dissipation of the once prevalent modernist confidence about its foundational capacities, which has recently led to ontological investigation in search of different thinking about 'ourselves, and being in general' among multifarious lines of inquiry. Slavoj Žižek, for example, notes that philosophy, along with social and political theory, have expended considerable energy criticising the hold which modern subjectivity has over inquiry in the modern era, often seeking alternatives or reformulations to it. He notes that,

[a] spectre is haunting Western academia, the spectre of the Cartesian subject. All academic powers have entered into a holy alliance to exorcize this spectre: the New Age Obscurantist...the postmodern deconstructionist...the Habermasian theorist of communication...the Heideggerian proponent of the thought of Being...the cognitive scientist...the Deep Ecologist...the critical (post-) Marxist...and the feminist...61

This recent attempt to evaluate stories about human existence, to gain access to the kind of entity 'which we ourselves are'62 is what is normally suggested by the type of inquiry called 'ontology.' As Tracy Strong has argued, narratives about political order (and coexistence) are grounded in the stories people tell about themselves.63 As regards International Relations, ontology has been neglected in IR, as Alexander Wendt has argued, because the so-called 'third debate' between the advocates of positivist methodology, on the one hand, and post- or anti-positivists, on the other, has focused on methodological and epistemological issues. Wendt encourages a shift to a more ontological emphasis in order to reevaluate what 'the international world is made of,’64 in

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59 White, "Weak Ontology and Political Reflection," 503.
60 White, "Weak Ontology and Political Reflection," 503.
61 Žižek, The Ticklish Subject, 1.
64 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 90. While such a call is in itself laudable, it is, unfortunately handicapped by Wendt's own location and theoretical commitments. Wendt regards that epistemology should give way to ontology in IR because of 'both sides [of the third debate] are tacit realists' (p. 90) revealing with this statement his embeddedness in the United States academic context where alternatives to the realist paradigm display strong similarities in their premises with the realists. More importantly, however, Wendt's ontological investigations are taken entirely within this location, serving to legitimate and broaden it, but by no means challenge it. In a way, his project wishes to correct the answers to the right questions of international politics asked in 1979 by Kenneth Waltz. See Michael
other words, 'what actors there are, how they relate to one another, and what methods are appropriate for the type of research we want to do.' While Wendt hopes that this sort of ontological exercise should enable debate to recommence after a substantial period of ceased communication between the two sides of the epistemological spectrum, he does not appear to advocate a serious reconsideration of the ontological premises of international politics as a modern social science, as the one described by White for political thought more generally. On the contrary, Wendt is eager to complete an investigation of IR’s ontology, because, as a modern social science, it lacks knowledge of its ground.

While this thesis endorses Wendt’s call for ontological thinking, it also wishes to distinguish itself from the agreement with IR’s existing ontological premises, which is implicit in his constructivist writings. This is because such a tacit agreement encloses international thought within a subjectivist ground (see chapter two), on the basis of which coexistence can only be articulated through a ‘logic of composition.’ Below, this logic is outlined along with the implications of the mutual reinforcement of ‘composition’ and ‘subject,’ which, it is argued, obscures the constitutive role of otherness, what one might call at this stage ‘the question of heteronomy.’ This concealed heteronomy of selfhood itself is taken here as a ‘mandate of otherness’ and points to the need to elucidate an account of heteronomous coexistence by engaging with the concept of heteronomy itself, and suggest the way forward and structure of the project as a whole.


65 Cox, Booth, and Dunne, “Editors’ Introduction to the Forum on Social Theory of International Politics,” 123.

66 White, “Weak Ontology and Political Reflection.”

67 It is quite interesting that in addition to the restricted nature of Wendt’s inquiry, some of the commentators on his project have sought to curtail even further the ontological explorations of IR, seeking to limit the discipline’s output to ‘analysis of international relations’ and to discourage the onset of ‘ontological debates,’ achieving in this way a closure of questions about what is it that IR examines, that is states, their interactions and affiliated issues, Robert O. Keohane, “Ideas Part-way Down,” Review of International Studies 26, no. 1 (2000): 125-130, 126.
5. The logic of composition: subjectivity and coexistence

It has been claimed above that the ground of modern subjectivity restricts the possibility of understanding coexistence as anything but a collection of composite subjects of already constituted individuals. Grounding inquiry on the modern subject limits theoretical articulations of coexistence through what the thesis calls 'the logic of composition.'68 What being-together or coexistence might mean post-1989, is largely determined by one of 'Europe’s' greatest achievements. Nancy, for example, considers that the construction of the modern subject, the individual, is widely heralded as 'Europe’s incontrovertible merit of having shown the world the sole path to emancipation from tyranny, and the norm by which to measure all our collective or communitarian undertakings.'69 How can this construct, he asks, be considered a triumph, an achievement of European thought, when it is at the centre of the dissolution of coexistence more generally and of community more specifically.

By its nature – as the name indicates, it is the atom, the indivisible – the individual reveals that it is the abstract result of a decomposition. It is another, and symmetrical, figure of immanence: the absolutely detached for-itself, taken as origin and as certainty.70

Within the metaphysics of the detached subject, the ‘with’ may only be grasped as composition.71 Prescribing to what can be called the ‘logic of composition’ means that the predicate ‘together’

is in fact only a qualification extrinsic to subjects, not belonging to the appearing of each as such, designating a pure and indifferent juxta-position; or, on the other hand, it adds a particular quality, endowed with a literal sense, which must realise itself for all subjects “together” and as an “ensemble”.72

The understanding of coexistence as extrinsic to the subject that coexists illustrates the power of the ontological commitment to determine coexistence as little more than a situation of subjects being simultaneously present, the reduction of coexistence to co-presence.

68 Inspired by the analysis provided by French philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy. See Nancy, "Being-With," 5.
70 Nancy, The Inoperative Community, 3.

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Such a ‘logic of composition’ might be thought as a mode of articulation, because it iterates ‘a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice.’ Based on modern subjectivity, with its key features of self-sufficiency and mastery prescribing a relation of mere co-presence, the logic of composition suggests that units or entities are non-relational in their constitution until ‘composed.’ The articulatory practice itself does not arise from the phenomena, the facticity of entities, but as an interpretation it is ‘grounded in something we already have in advance – a fore-having,’ or interpretative pre-conception. The ‘fore-having,’ which is part of the structure of understanding, and which is brought into the thinking of coexistence affecting its articulation, is the non-relational subject. The interpretation of coexistence that this articulatory practice establishes renders it as a secondary and fragile condition; an act of composing previously unrelated subjects. The decisive effect of such an articulatory practice is the restriction of relationality to mere co-presence, among the elements modified, determined and inscribed by the practice.

One might object, asking whether the logic of composition can be reduced to its reliance on the human subject. What about the system of states which provides the parameters for the discipline of world politics? Surely, one might argue, the system of states defies this logic by concentrating on state as the type of unit involved in coexistence. However, this logic not only assumes that collectivities are made up of multiple ‘I’s but also that as collectivities they behave as a larger ‘I,’ which works by a reduction of the ‘we’ to an ‘I’. The ‘logic of composition’ involves the understanding of collectivity according to the principle of subject. The logic of composition is not problematic because of composition as such, but because it fails to recognise the priority of coexistence and the constitutive role that otherness has in the construction of selfhood, a role which one might call ‘heteronomy.’ It is blind to the fact of the

72 Nancy, “Being-With,” 17, emphasis added.
74 Heidegger, Being and Time, 191.
other's primacy or 'equi-primordiality' with the self. It cannot recognise, Furthermore, that the self is already thrown into a world of otherness.

The logic of composition is not some aberration of the philosophy of some thinkers, of liberalism, etc, easily exorcised or denounced. Rather, it becomes the sole means of grasping togetherness once the metaphysics of the subject has become prominent. Coexistence becomes a technical problem, instead of an irreducible *aporia*, when sovereign subjectivity is the underlying assumption. The tension between 'self' and 'society,' the 'I' and the 'we,' arises only with the arrival of the modern subject as the ground of inquiry:

[...]only because insofar as man actually and essentially has become subject is it necessary for him, as a consequence, to confront the explicit question: Is it as an "I" confined to its own preferences and freed into its own arbitrary choosing or as the "we" of society; is it as an individual or as a community; is it as a personality within the community or as a mere group member in the corporate body; is it as a state and nation and as a people or as the common humanity of modern man, that man will and ought to be the subject that in his modern essence he already is?  

In other words, the question of self and collectivity cannot be asked from any other position; it is only a comprehensible concern from the perspective of subjectivism.

Since the question of being-in-common becomes settled through the logic of composition, the question of the status of coexistence is never properly raised: '[a]n inconsequential atomism, individualism tends to forget that the atom is also a world.' The atom, the indivisible unit that the modern human subject is assumed to be, is a world, that is, it is enclosed within itself in its certainty and mastery. It relations are relations of grasping, of presenting that which is (beings) to itself as its object. Thus, thinking about coexistence falls within a larger 'metaphysics of the subject,' understood as part of, or equal to,

the metaphysics of the absolute for-itself – be it in the form of the individual or the total state – which means also the metaphysics of the absolute in

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76 Nancy, *The Inoperative Community*, 4.
general, of being-absolute, as perfectly detached, distinct, and closed: being without relation.  

'Being without relation' does not mean that there are no actual relations of the subject to that which is (world and other beings). Rather, it suggests that the subject, having established itself as complete and absolute, can only strive to preside over its relations: it is unencumbered, it is solitary, it is unaffected in its self-constitution by the 'objects' of its representation and reflection.

Within this metaphysics of subjectivity the question of coexistence can only be asked as that of composition, of a technical arrangement of units, its success always fragile, its descent to conflict never surprising, always expected. Expectation of incompatibility and surprise at any achievement of coexistence betrays that the logic of composition determines it as an afterthought, as a secondary condition. This also helps to clarify why in IR coexistence is primarily considered as the tentative state which might always 'slip-back' into conflict: it is because the 'with' is seen as that which must be constructed from the starting point of subjectivism that is becomes a precarious achievement. There is, in other words, a subterranean theoretical linkage between 'coexistence' and 'conflict' which is sustained even by the people who wish to imbue coexistence with a different meaning, and those who wish to emphasise that coexistence is a matter crucial to human survival. Coexistence, especially in the absence of ideological contestation, appears as a technical issue of how to arrange units in a certain manner to bring about this condition of togetherness crucial to 'survival.'

This thesis argues, therefore, that if coexistence is to be theorised otherwise in IR, the reliance on the premises of modern subjectivity must itself be questioned. A certain awareness of the 'late modern' times, in which IR takes

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place as a social science, is presently evident in the abundance and unabated increase in studies of globalisation, the retreat of the state, as well the appearance of phenomena not easily viewed through IR's conceptual lenses. For example, as was noted above, IR has increasingly become involved in the study and policy advocacy of concerns previously not considered within its parameters of study, such as civil wars, ethnic conflicts, internal disruption of communities, internal political transitions, etc. This juncture, as a result, might present an opportunity to 'unwork modern subjectivity,' to problematise subjectivity and suggest a recovery of selfhood that is able to coexist in its heteronomy. But why should such resistance and problematisation be considered so crucial? The remaining pages examine, finally, the effacement of heteronomy, which comes about when coexistence is determined through the logic of composition.

The effacement of heteronomy

It is the contention of this enquiry that understanding human existence under the sign of modern subjectivity produces a set of assumptions about the entity 'we all are, in each case,' and about the other, based on a mindset of valuation, disposal, management, and objectification in our care for our lives, a mindset whose overpowering force hems us in throughout our everyday world, confuses freedom with the condition of possibility for certain types of subjectivity, and gives priority to correctness and measurement in matters of truth. It is by the production of certain assumptions about ourselves, Charles Scott argues in this regard, that 'we make ourselves present to each other by reference to values that commonly identify us and have proven trustworthy for our survival and well-being.' Yet, the values which are customarily considered as 'trustworthy' guides for life, are located within 'a history of

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80 Scott, The Question of Ethics, 138.
thought and practice in which engagement in the disclosure of beings is thoroughly overlooked and excluded from thought.\textsuperscript{81} Human existence, and coexistence, are understood in ways which distort the disclosiveness of beings and which lead, moreover, to their reduction to 'their identifiability, their use, or, in the case of other people, their ability to be answerable to standards, to themselves, or to God.'\textsuperscript{82} Within the ground of modern subjectivity, disclosure becomes detached from facticity, from the fact that an entity is and how it is in the 'world.' In this way, '[t]he disclosiveness of beings is thus distorted into their presence and their quality of will regarding other beings.'\textsuperscript{83} To be is to be present and the question of coexistence becomes one of management of tentative co-presence, of bringing together units through composition and creating a discourse of primary solipsism. When self-sufficient subjectivity is the ground on which the 'with' is thought, 'coexistence' cannot be revealed in its heteronomy.

To attempt to shed light on heteronomy is to refuse the effacement by modern subjectivity of its own constitution by otherness, and to allow otherness and 'selfhood' to be disclosed outside of a subjectivist grasping. Rethinking the relationship between selfhood and alterity does not merely seek to 'reverse an oppositional dissymmetry while leaving the opposition and its terms intact'; rather, the consideration of heteronomy

seeks to articulate a relation other than that of opposition itself, a relation of differential intrication in which the involvement of terms with each other constitutes their only identity or quidity.\textsuperscript{84}

The first step towards the grasping of heteronomy and the enabling of coexistence beyond composition must begin with a challenge to the assumptions of non-relationality and self-sufficiency, usually bound up in the notion of 'autonomy.' Autonomy has to do with freedom and 'absolute autoactivity, a spontaneity and a power of man to determine himself on his

\textsuperscript{81} Scott, The Question of Ethics, 138-139.
\textsuperscript{82} Scott, The Question of Ethics, 139.
\textsuperscript{83} Scott, The Question of Ethics, 139.
own.\textsuperscript{85} But why, asks Paul Standish 'should we have anything to say against autonomy, why feel any reservations about this sort of ideal'\textsuperscript{86} intricately related as this is 'in a fundamental way with many aspects of our freedom and with the related notion of our individuality.'\textsuperscript{87} Yet, what the thesis seeks to challenge is the fallout from this kind of autonomy as an attribute. As Ute Guzzoni suggests autonomy has, in many a configuration of the modern subject, been related to mastery over otherness: '[t]he subject is posited as \textit{autonomously determining} in relation to an object which is determined by it; its autonomy is revealed in a relation of domination over everything which is not itself.'\textsuperscript{88}

Asking the question of heteronomy, however, does not only understand the mandate of otherness to refer only to really-existing others; rather, it is equally interested in the suppression of the otherness, the strangeness, of human existence, which autonomy similarly-effaces. There are, then, two concerns about 'otherness' in the thesis. The first is how the logic of composition reduces the phenomena of sociality to co-presence of already constituted subjects. The second relates to how the subject's otherness, its heteronomy, how it is other to itself is grasped as subject. It will be argued in the course of the thesis that it is only when selfhood is grasped beyond the subject, that coexistence itself will be thought beyond addition or composition.

Prior to further exploration of the ontological basis of coexistence 'heteronomy' as a term should defy a fixed definition, because any definition, which might be given presently, has to come from within a subjectivist ground. Yet, awareness of the futility of accessing heteronomy within the language of the subject does not obviate the need for something like a 'working definition' of the term. The term heteronomy ought to be taken at this stage as nothing but a \textit{formal indication}, in the sense that it indicates a potential meaning without

\textsuperscript{87} Standish, \textit{Beyond the Self}, 210.
\textsuperscript{88} Ute Guzzoni, "Do We Still Want to Be Subjects?," in Simon Critchley and Peter Dews (eds.), \textit{Deconstructive Subjectivities} (Albany: State University of New York, 1996), 201-216, 203.
strict determination, leaving open the definition of heteronomy to be illuminated through the discussion. Thus, the term heteronomy should be considered as a 'formal indicator' for a phenomenon still obscured by subjectivist thinking. As such, it only serves as a placeholder for unfixed meanings, which indicate something as yet to be properly discussed.

The usage of 'heteronomy,' therefore, warns of a phenomenal awareness of something like 'heteronomy' but its determination (which may very well require a reformulation in the assumptions of formally indicated 'heteronomy') will be momentary and gradual. In some sense, heteronomy means 'constitutive otherness,' but also entails within it another meaning, that of being-other-directed. Furthermore, and this is the meaning that challenges the predominant feature of non-relational subjectivity, heteronomy could be seen to indicate being-radically-in-relation. Yet another possible sense of the term arise when one asks what it is that compels thinking towards the questioning of modern subjectivity. How is an aporia created in something as complete and self-actualising as the constellation of modern subjectivity? As Foucault noted, the achievement of subjectivity is a continuous process, a 'ceaseless task' within which is contained the possibility of the failure of totalisation and closure. To think of this failure, is to think of the space in which subjectivity (putting this term under erasure awaiting its rearticulation) can be rethought. 'The subject is thus indeed already, between the lines (and thanks to a retrospective reading), what threatens...But why is the subject threatening? And what is it, in the subject, that threatens?' What is it 'which, in the subject, deserts (has always already deserted) the subject itself' and leads to 'the dissolution, the defeat of the subject or as the subject: the (de)construction of the subject or the “loss” of the subject—if indeed one can think the loss of what one has never had, a kind of “originary” and “constitutive” loss (of “self”).' It will be argued that, not only something in the subject ‘threatens’ its own construction but that, in its making itself secure it fails to adequately

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92 Lacoue-Labarthe, *The Subject of Philosophy*, 82.
efface its own heteronomous constitution. Heteronomy, then, is the remainder that subjectivity could not erase.

Finally, heteronomy denies the premise of individuality understood as self-constitution, but considers the fact of singularity, because 'behind the theme of the individual, but beyond it, lurks the question of singularity.'\textsuperscript{93} As Nancy argues, 'singularity never has the nature of individuality. Singularity never takes place at the level of atoms, those identifiable, if not identical identities'; rather singularity has to do with the inclination or disposition to otherness.\textsuperscript{94} In addition to the violent erasure of otherness with subjectivity, the self-understanding of self as subject is phenomenologically inadequate.

6. The structure of the project

The project is divided into two substantive parts. Chapter two is illustrative of manifestations of composition in both traditional and critical international political thought. It provides a brief historical trajectory of the modern subject and examines the interplay of subjectivity, otherness, and coexistence in Thomas Hobbes's account of the social contract arising in the state of nature, which is one of the most lasting and powerful manifestations of the logic of composition, especially for International Relations. The logic of composition, however, surfaces in accounts that seek to provide an account of subjectivity that go beyond the subject, or, stated otherwise, that problematise the reliance of modern subjectivity. The investigation of David Campbell's influential critical perspective shows that the logic of composition is inadvertently operating despite his concerted efforts to ground his work on Levinas' account of subjective constitution through the face-to-face encounter, efforts which have received great attention amongst scholars interested in rearticulating world-political interaction. Campbell's theory still harbours and is impeded in an unstated, residual 'contractarianism.' The discussions of Hobbes and Campbell remain brief illustrations of the logic of composition, however,

\textsuperscript{93} Nancy, \textit{The Inoperative Community}, 6.
\textsuperscript{94} Nancy, \textit{The Inoperative Community}, 6-7.
because the thesis seeks to investigate the possibility of an ontological account which can arrest the articulation of coexistence as co-presence or composition.

The second part of the thesis then, falls loosely within what Stephen K. White has called 'the recent ontological drift.' In order to think of coexistence as a question and to gesture towards a possibility of theorising it otherwise than composition, an ontological examination of the entity normally conceived as subject is called for. The conditions of possibility for an alternative framing of coexistence lie in the initiation of a process of 'unworking subjectivity.' This process has as its starting point the search for a method through which to access and express the 'facticity' of entities. This is found in the early thought of German philosopher Martin Heidegger and his rearticulation of interpretative phenomenology, which is examined in chapter three.

Chapter four, then, undertakes the phenomenological examination of Dasein (Being-there) in the project of fundamental ontology, largely contained within his seminal work Being and Time. Within the phenomenology of everyday existence can be found 'an optics of coexistence,' a host of elements that 'unwork' the presuppositions of the subjectivist ontology of IR. Through these elements, coexistence is shown phenomenally to be the primary fact of Dasein's existence. Theoretically, such an account of primary sociality renders unstable the terms of subjectivist discourse through which ethical and political issues of coexistence are conceptualised. The disclosure of Dasein as coexistential and heteronomously embedded in the world. Such an optics is what can be called a heterology or a discourse where the other is primary, but also an other discourse, one which attempts to defy the dominance of subjectivity and which shows that selfhood is coexistentially heteronomous.


96 Robert Bernasconi rightly points out two phases in the attempt to go beyond the domination of modern subjectivity in Heidegger's thought. Summarily stated, Heidegger in his earlier period was concerned with 'destroying' or 'de-constructing' the history of ontology and providing a phenomenological account of the structures of Dasein. In the 1930s, however, this project became reconfigured into a history of Being (Seynsgeschichte), which attempts not to provide ontologically informed alternatives to modern subjectivity. Rather, Heidegger realised that what he initially had assumed was a decline associated with the subjectivism of the modern age marked 'the sending of that which brings the completion of Western metaphysics:'
Heidegger's 'optics of coexistence' and his 'calls for the overcoming of subjectivity as the constitutive feature of man,' engages in a process of 'unworking of subjectivity,' which lets heteronomy show itself. Chapter five, moreover, continues this task by discussing how Dasein becomes aware of its own heteronomy through a process of becoming-proper.

The task of thesis does not stop here, however. It essential to emphasise that the account given by Heidegger in Being and Time amounts to an existential heteronomy, which forces us to relinquish the determination of coexistence as composition. The unworking that chapter four undertakes does not seek to replace the 'subject' with another account of ontological certainty. It is, on the contrary, the problematising of assumptions that aims at creating the possibility for thinking of coexistence beyond composition. Thus, chapters six and seven ask how might a new understanding of coexistence be articulated, if it can no longer be conceived as mere co-presence. To think of coexistence on the basis of the heteronomous facticity of selfhood involves two steps, both of which involve the interrogation of ethical and political terms towards which coexistence might turn after the disruption of its determination as co-presence. As chapter six shows, calling ethics into question recovers 'an ethical' self that sees itself as an openness to alterity. Chapter seven, brings this recovery of the 'ethical' self to bear on political self-sufficiency. Chapter seven, moreover, examines the possibility of conceptualising the constitution of coexistence beyond composition, through what it calls 'critical mimesis' and considers how

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representation, subjectivity, certainty, and Historie itself.' Robert Bernasconi, Heidegger in Question: The Art of Existing (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1993), 167. See also pp. 150-169 and also Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche, trans. Krell, David Farrell., Vol. IV: Nihilism (New York: Harper and Row, 1991), 86-120. This became known as 'Die Kehre' or the 'turn' in Heidegger's thinking Martin Heidegger, "The Turning," trans. William Lovitt, in Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), 36-49. The question to this project becomes, then, why pursue the phenomenological-ontological project at such length, since Heidegger himself turned away from it towards the history of Being. I think that this is best to cite David Wood, who cautions that engagements with the early work are still productive, arguing that the turn to the history of Being 'is surely too much of a reaction to a predominantly subjectcentered tradition, and as a reaction, flawed.' David Wood, "Reiterating the Temporal: Toward a Rethinking of Heidegger on Time," in John Sallis (ed.), Reading Heidegger: Commemorations (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1993), 153.

this account might become the basis of future research for thinking about 'community' in an era of globalisation.
We think restlessly within familiar frameworks to avoid thought about how our thinking is framed.
William E. Connolly

Chapter 2

Manifestations of Composition: Discourses Traditional and Critical

How does coexistence come to be articulated through the ‘logic of composition,’ as a condition of joining distinct, previously unrelated ‘units’? The equating of coexistence to composition, it is argued here, becomes possible in a political thinking based on modern subjectivity. Presently, it is necessary to examine in greater detail the historical development of ‘the subject,’ so that the ontological commitment of International Relations (IR) to modern subjectivity can be illustrated. Such a discussion enables, it is hoped, the illustration of how coexistence is manifested as composition once the grounding in the modern subject has occurred. On the ground of modern subjectivity, as described briefly in the introduction, a number of accounts of political coexistence (and more specifically, of ‘communal constitution’) have arisen in the modern age, which take different perspectives on government and the creation of political order. Martin Wight’s reflections on the traditions of international political thought suggest, in this regard, a number of political philosophic accounts which have grounded the theoretical perspectives of International Relations (IR). Wight has, in this regard, distinguished between Realist, Rationalist, and Revolutionist legacies, loosely associated with Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Immanuel Kant, respectively. Despite their diversity, they do determine coexistence on the basis of composition to a greater or lesser extent.

2 I delineate ‘the modern age’ not necessarily as a historical spectrum, but an era where certain philosophic concerns become prevalent, see section 1 below, Jürgen Habermas, Theory and Practice, trans. John Viertel, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988), and Connolly, Political Theory and Modernity.
Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis to exemplify in detail how the logic of composition operates in all the traditions and the breadth of thinkers included in Wight's typology, this chapter seeks to illustrate how the assumptions of subjectivity affect the understanding of coexistence in both 'traditional' and 'critical' discourses prominent in IR. As an example, then, of this effect the present chapter focuses on certain aspects of the political philosophy of seventeenth century English philosopher Thomas Hobbes for the following three reasons. First, Hobbes reconfigures the emerging attributes of early modern subjectivity for the purposes of his political theory, by specifically reformulating reason and mastery into a self-interested subject concerned with survival and self-preservation. The Hobbesian infusion of danger into the ontological basis of the modern subject inserts the notion of self-preservation as part of the mastery of the subject. Hobbes' reconfiguration is an example of how different distinct modern philosophies re-articulate the main features of modern subjectivity. Although re-articulations of modern subjectivity can vary widely, there exists a basic question, revolving around the very concern about subjectivity, which is distinctive of modern philosophy. As Dieter Sturma and Karl Ameriks argue, modern philosophy 'has combined perspectives that construct and criticize the standpoint of subjectivity...but without thereby giving up the notion of the self.'

Second, his account of the creation of a civil and orderly commonwealth out of a 'state of nature,' through the establishment of a social contract, has been one of the more lasting and powerful manifestations of the 'logic of composition,' a composition that is, in his case, permeated by danger. Third, Hobbes's political philosophy clearly illustrates the interconnectedness of subjectivity, composition, and otherness. Hobbes's *Leviathan* contains an extensive *heterology*, a logos of/about the other, which sustains his political theoretic construction. Specifically, his reconfiguration of modern subjectivity leads to the specific understanding of the other-as-enemy, where the other is

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encountered through an 'ethos of survival' as an enemy which must be survived. The effect of the interplay between subjectivity and composition is a political theory of coexistence, which exhibits all the characteristics of the 'logic of composition' as outlined in chapter one, namely, tentativeness, tendency to failure and non-constitutive, controlled, relationality.

In addition to this 'traditional' discourse, the chapter examines how coexistence as composition is an implicit assumption in discourses that aim towards a greater 'moral inclusivity' and that seek to offer ethical alternatives to modern subjectivity. Specifically, David Campbell’s reflections on responsibility and just governance are exemplary of a critical perspective of IR that results in the logic of composition, despite trying to remain faithful to its grounding in the philosophy of French philosopher Emmanuel Levinas. Campbell rightly attempts to surpass the ethical parameters of the modern subject, and his work merits acknowledgement for highlighting the need to move beyond territorial notions of ethical responsibility in IR. It might still be argued, however, that even within such a critical account anchored on the phenomenology of subjective constitution found in Levinas, there is a residual contractarianism at play at the level of inter-state action, at the specific point of transference of responsibility to international action. This contractual mechanism required for the dissemination of this notion of responsibility allows the implicit assumption of composition to make itself evident and detracts from the otherwise innovative effort to consider alternatives to modern subjectivity. It becomes, therefore, increasingly difficult to adopt or use this perspective for a reconsideration of coexistence.

5 A certain ethos of survival has been acutely influential for the perspective of political realism in International Relations and more generally for discourses which invoke the notion of anarchy. See Louiza Odysseos, “Dangerous Ontologies: The Ethos of Survival and Ethical Theorising in International Relations,” Review of International Studies forthcoming (2002).
1. The modern subject in historical context

_The modern subject has been at the centre of social and political inquiry even if by negation._
Simon Critchley and Peter Dews

As Simon Critchley and Peter Dews note in the preceding epigraph, the modern subject has been holding court over the philosophic endeavours of the modern era. In this century it has become the focus of numerous divergent philosophies, with often contradictory aims and ends. To talk about 'the modern subject' is not to claim that a unifying conception of it holds for all modern philosophy. Rather, its importance suggests that modern philosophy might be seen as 'a set of variations on a theme' of the subject, which originated in Continental philosophy, and where it received extensive attention, but also substantive critique.

Jane Flax notes that after the seventeenth century two related but distinct views about the subject dominated philosophic debate:

[,o]ne is the Cartesian idea of the self as an ahistoric, solid indwelling entity that grounds the possibility of rational thought. In turn the self is accessible and transparent to such thought. The defining characteristic of this self is to engage in abstract rational thought, including thought about its own thought... The second idea is the Humean-empirical one. This self and its knowledge are derived from sense experience.

Paul Standish notes, however, that what is known as 'analytical' philosophy has been similarly preoccupied with modern subjectivity. He suggests that

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while '[a]mongst European philosophers the tendency has been to take [the cogito] as an immediate datum of conscious experience; in the Anglo-American tradition it is the self-generating character of the utterance which is regarded as key.'

From its philosophic origins, the modern subject has become the cornerstone, the underlying premise, of much theoretic inquiry and has provided the unit of analysis for the majority of the 'social' sciences. In order to elucidate the problematic of coexistence as one which obeys a certain 'logic of composition,' it is necessary to provide an account of that which is operative in this logic and, moreover, of that which makes this logic possible. This is to ask the question: 'what is meant by subject?' The answer that this chapter offers can only sketch, in summary form, a historical trajectory of the institution of the subject, while bearing in mind that any 'narration of its story' in such a setting can never be fully inclusive of the resistances and critiques rendered against 'the subject,' nor of the forms of its many reassertions.

**Subject as hypokeimenon**

'Subject,' at first glance, appears to translate the term hypokeimenon, which in Greek philosophy meant that which lies under, that which predicates something else. This apparent relation or identity between 'subject' and hypokeimenon, however, requires careful consideration because the concept of the subject has undergone a reformulation in the modern era which prohibits such an immediate equivalence. In Greek philosophy hypokeimenon was generally understood together with the term 'substance' (ousia) because '[s]ubstance is the underlying, persisting foundation which supports everything else.' For something to be, therefore, it had to be 'a substance or to be a

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12 Hassan Melehy, *Writing Cogito: Montaigne, Descartes and Institution of the Modern Subject* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 3 denies the possibility of writing about 'one beginning of the subject in modernity.' But Meleny also suggests that the story of the reassertions of the Cartesian subject, recounted through the debate between Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault about the 'Cartesian moment for the twentieth century' in *The Order of Things*, illustrate that there are threads of subjectivity which point to a certain institutionalisation of the subject through the modern academy which is indicative, if not of a 'beginning' but of a diverse continuity, 27-35.
property or predicate of a substance. Substance exists in the primary sense, everything else exists “in” substance and thus has a merely secondary and dependent way of existing.\textsuperscript{14} In Aristotle’s \textit{Physics} and \textit{Metaphysics}, \textit{hypokeimenon} refers to ‘that of which all other entities are predicated but which is itself not predicated of anything else,’ that which does not require further foundation.\textsuperscript{15} For the Greeks, then, subject indicated a predicate which acted as a foundation ‘which persists through change, the sub-stratum, and which has a function analogous to matter (\textit{hule}). It is matter which persists through the changes that form (\textit{morphe}) imposes on it.’\textsuperscript{16} These brief references to a pre-modern meaning of ‘subject’ as \textit{hypokeimenon}, make clear that the term ‘names that-which-lies-before, which, as ground, gathers everything onto itself.’\textsuperscript{17}

What is missing from this description of what ‘subject’ meant in a pre-modern context for the ancient Greek philosophy is any relation or equation of \textit{hypokeimenon} to ‘man’ or human being. As the 20\textsuperscript{th} century German philosopher Martin Heidegger argued, ‘[t]his metaphysical meaning of the concept of subject has first of all no special relationship to man and none at all to the I.’\textsuperscript{18} In his own work on modern metaphysics he opposed a subjectivist re-reading of Greek philosophy.\textsuperscript{19} He also emphasised the sea-change which came about in modernity, and particularly with the principle \textit{ego cogito, ergo sum} put forward as the essential feature of selfhood by French philosopher Rene Descartes in the 17\textsuperscript{th} century.\textsuperscript{20} Heidegger understood ‘all metaphysics’ to

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{14} Carr, “The Question of the Subject,” 404.
\bibitem{16} Critchley, “Prolegomena to Any Post-Deconstructive Subjectivity,” 13.
\bibitem{18} Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture,” 128.
\end{thebibliography}
be 'characterized by "subjectity", but in modern philosophy this is transformed into "subjectivity."'\(^{21}\) Whereas *subjectum* or *hypokeimenon* had meant the underlying, unchanging predicate which itself required no further foundation but denoted no relation to man or the 'I,' with the advent of modern metaphysics 'man' asserts himself as this final ground.

**Man as subjectum**

The inception of subjectivity is closely related to the increasing concern with the individual in the 17th century. As Paul Barry Clarke notes, '[t]his is no mere accident'; such an interest in the individual as subject is 'a clear consequence of the breakdown of the medieval order'\(^{22}\) and is evident in several thinkers of that time. The creation of a relationship between man, seen as the ultimate predicate (*hypokeimenon*), and constancy, in the sense of continuous presence and certainty, must be grasped within the context of 17th century metaphysics and the space created by the loss of certainty associated with pre-modern cosmology. The collapse of divine ultimate foundations, however, required the formulation of a new ground. Man as final foundation had not only to be itself one that was certain, but since every standard of measure from any other sphere was forbidden, it had at the same time to be of such a kind that through it the essence of the freedom claimed would be posited as self certainty.\(^{23}\)

Thus, the disavowal of medieval metaphysics seeks a modernist kind of grounding which, in effect, works as 'man's making himself secure as *subjectum*.'\(^{24}\) As Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe have argued,

the seventeenth century [brought about] the collapse of the view of the cosmos as a meaningful order within which man occupied a precise and determined place – and the replacement of this view by a self-defining conception of the subject, as an entity maintaining relations of exteriority with the rest of the universe.\(^{25}\)

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According to Heidegger, the philosophy of Rene Descartes, specifically, played a grounding role in the establishment of man as subject.\textsuperscript{26} Cartesian thought enabled the philosophical development of modern subjectivity as the primary ground by emphatically placing the subject as the final foundation of rigorous science. As Robert C. Solomon and Kathleen M. Higgins note in their overview of the history of philosophy 'Descartes was the philosopher who most dramatically insisted on the simultaneous turn to subjectivity and the use of logic...to argue his way to objectivity.'\textsuperscript{27} David Carr goes as far to suggest, that in fact,

[b]eneath the surface of a language that metaphysically valorizes the "objective" over the "subjective" ...lies an ontology that precisely the reverse. For in spite of all orientation towards the objective, in modern philosophy and especially science, it is the subject...which exists in the primary sense, while the objective is reduced to something secondary.\textsuperscript{28}

The modern articulation of reflection as constitutive for subjectivity, in the form of the Cartesian \textit{cogito}, played a grounding role for subsequent philosophising and theorising. Heidegger regarded that,

[a]t the beginning of modern philosophy stands Descartes' statement \textit{Ego cogito, ergo sum}, "I think, therefore I am". All consciousness of things and of beings as a whole is referred back to the self-consciousness of the human subject as the unshakable ground of all certainty.\textsuperscript{29}

The liberation of man from the medieval schematic of salvation required the creation of its replacement in the form of a different, human-based, self-sufficient kind of certainty\textsuperscript{30} and Descartes's position is this transition 'was to \textit{ground the metaphysical ground of man's liberation in the new freedom of

\begin{itemize}
\item Melehy suggests that Montaigne's thought had unsettled 'much of the old philosophy' that had served to 'clear the way for Descartes.' Whereas Montaigne's skepticism had assailed the systems of thought of the collapsing medieval period Descartes 'was the one who assumes his skepticism in order to subordinate it, in order to find the ground of certainty required by the notion of modernity.' See Melehy, \textit{Writing Cogito}, 94.
\item Carr, \textit{The Paradox of Subjectivity}, 18.
\item Heidegger, \textit{Nietzsche}, 86.
\item Heidegger, \textit{Nietzsche}, 99.
\end{itemize}
self-assured self-legislation\textsuperscript{31} to fashion, in other words, a ‘foundation for the freeing of man to freedom as the self-determination that is certain of itself.’\textsuperscript{32}

The distinguishing feature of metaphysics in the modern age, therefore, ‘is that the metaphysical foundation is no longer claimed to reside in a form, substance, or deity outside of the human intellect but is rather found in the human being understood as subject.’\textsuperscript{33} The assignment of man as subject came about, Heidegger argued, because Cartesian inquiry relied on the existing idea of substance with which to grasp the ‘essence’ of man. He disregarded an analysis of man that would adequately account for his embeddedness \textit{within} the world, relying instead on the idea of substance to describe the world and innerworldly entities. Human being became, then, the entity who is defined by \textit{distinction} to substance, as the entity defined by its reflective capacity, the ‘I think.’ According to Heidegger, Descartes ‘prescribes for the world its “real” Being, as it were, on the basis of an idea of Being whose source has not been unveiled and which has not been demonstrated of its own right’\textsuperscript{34} but is, rather, equated with substantiality.\textsuperscript{35} The \textit{res corporea}, from which the \textit{ego cogito} is distinguished, is understood as \textit{res extensa}, as ‘extended substance.’\textsuperscript{36}

What about the human subject, however? Heidegger argues that Descartes neglected serious investigation of the latter part of his now famous maxim, of the ‘I am,’ the \textit{sum}, examining solely the \textit{ego cogito}. In this way, the ‘I am’ in the \textit{cogito ergo sum} is rendered equivalent to presence and to ‘remaining constant.’\textsuperscript{37} In other words, in focusing on the ‘I think’ Descartes created an opposition between what makes me certain that I am this entity, the reflective ‘I think,’ and the fact that I am this entity, the ‘I am.’ In this respect, the embodiment of the ‘I think’ is neglected, and this oversight results in its equivalence with that against which the ‘I think’ is distinguished, namely,
'extended substance.' Descartes, therefore, understood human being 'in the very same way as he takes the Being of the res extensa – namely, as substance.' 38 Heidegger questioned whether it was phenomenally adequate to equate the 'I am' with the res extensa and substantiality in general. 39

In sum, what distinguished the modern age from the prior medieval era, but also from Greek philosophy, is that in modernity 'man, independently and by his own effort, contrives to become certain and sure of his human being the midst of beings as a whole.' 40 Michel Foucault concurs years later, not only that certainty is self-instituted but that 'the modern cogito...is not so much the discovery of an evident truth as a ceaseless task constantly to be undertaken afresh...’41 This echoes Friedrich Nietzsche's insight that '[t]he subject is multiplicity that built an imaginary unity for itself.' 42 The process of securing man as the ground of certainty is, in other words, continuous and reiterative and has to be asserted through the subject's relations with others within its world.

The emplacement of man as foundation, moreover, had to 'make secure as certain that being [man] for which such certain knowing must be certain and through which everything knowable must be made secure.' 43 This transition was far from effortless and involved two related steps. The first is the pivotal role of thinking-as-representing and the second is the representing-as-securing, which, taken together, render 'man' as ground. 'The freeing of the subject to freedom,' liberated man from the medieval schema in which he had been thus far incorporated. Man as subject, however, inversely 'assume[d] a definitive relationship of domination with regard to the world in which it represent[ed]

38 Heidegger, Being and Time, 131.
40 Heidegger, Nietzsche, 89.
43 Heidegger, "The Age of the World Picture," 149, brackets added.
itself as living.'\textsuperscript{44} The relation of man-as-subject to existing entities was a relation of mastery: the subject relates to the world, and entities within the world, as object. As Dalia Judovitz suggests, 'the subject signifies a new way of being human, one that has to do with the rationalization of human capabilities through their delimitation and economization in order to master the world through representation.'\textsuperscript{45}

The representing subject

The 'ceaseless task' of subjectivity is intricately connected to representation not only of entities as objects but also of the subject to itself as the subject of re-presentation, the subject which presents itself to itself as subject. Lacoue-Labarthe contends that the modern subject is 'the subject that writes itself [s'écrit]: that writes about the subject, that is written about, that is written—in short, the subject that is "one," only insofar as it is in some way or other inscribed.'\textsuperscript{46} Having already noted that to exist for a subject is 'to be an object or representation of it,' it has been argued that the relationship of human being to the world, to other entities and other human beings within the world, becomes one of subject and object.\textsuperscript{47} As Richard Polt suggests, '[s]ubjectivism pictures the human situation in terms of the subject, object, and a representational connection between the two.'\textsuperscript{48}

There results a limitation in relationality, a reduction to representation. As Bernard Flynn notes, '[w]hat can appear is determined in advance as what can be represented to a subject, a subject whose self-representation is the ground of all that it represents to itself.'\textsuperscript{49} But what does that mean for alterity? In the first instance, it reduces the spectrum of relationality to self and other, leaving no space for an understanding of the self as permeated by alterity, constituted

\textsuperscript{44} Melehy, \textit{Writing Cogito}, 3.
\textsuperscript{45} Judovitz, \textit{Subjectivity and Representation in Descartes}, 181. This mastery over the world is also 'its major failure' she argues further.
\textsuperscript{47} Carr, "The Question of the Subject," 404-405.
through and through by otherness. 'Instead of a medieval hierarchy of relations between the Creator and his creatures, Descartes elaborates a new set of relations, those of subjectivity and representation.'50 Far from further elucidating the self's constitution, the subject of representation 'is supposed to be in complete command of its own consciousness, perfectly self-present or at least potentially so.'51 The very character of this subject is representation, understood as 'a gesture of proposal and of proposition by the subject to itself. In so doing, Descartes gives representation its character as a command or will.52 Otherness, as the object, 'is supposed to be a thing that occurs as present within a neutral space.'53 It becomes something knowable and intelligible because 'by representing it, that is, by following some procedure that will yield the correct picture or account of the object' it is determined as an object distinct and non-related to the subject that presents it to itself.54 Representation, thus, 'make[s] the object available for manipulation,'55 whereas 'the human subject—as self, ego, or conscious, thinking thing—becomes the ultimate foundation upon which entities are rendered intelligible, that in virtue of which entities are understandable in their Being.'56 The representing subject reduces relationships with otherness and with the world to a process of representation and knowledge, although this knowledge is not of entities as they are, but rather, a conflation of otherness to sameness. Subjectivity 'takes over all being by objectifying it and reducing it to calculable representations, framing it within a world-picture which is a product of subjective (human) activity.'57 Through this will and activity 'in the philosophical era extending from Descartes to Hegel, subjectivity ultimately negates its own negation, sublates the other as or into itself.'58

49 Flynn, "Descartes and the Ontology of Subjectivity," 14.
50 Judovitz, Subjectivity and Representation in Descartes, 126.
52 Judovitz, Subjectivity and Representation in Descartes, 126.
56 Critchley, "Prolegomena to Any Post-Deconstructive Subjectivity," 15.
57 Carr, "The Question of the Subject," 405.
As well as revealing the relations of domination woven by the concept of the subject, the relationship between subjectivity, intelligibility, and representation is of great ontological significance for the very institution of subjectivity itself. Through the grasping and determination of otherness as object the subject secures itself: in representing the ‘object’ the subject is supposed to be capable of representing itself with the object. Thinking-as-representing, therefore, does not affect only otherness. The invocation of the dichotomy of subject and object recalls the very interval constitutive of the modern metaphysics of subjectivity, in which a subject entirely present to itself confronts an object present or opposed to that subject. The emphasis placed on representation and intelligibility, in other words, puts into focus the ego cogito: man as subject becomes himself reduced to his reflective capacity and his mind. Richard Williams and Edwin Gantt suggest that ‘[t]he intellectual spirit of modernism is captured and preserved in its finest creation, the individual mind as subject, standing over against the world conceived as object.’ As Carr further argues ‘primary being or subjectivity...is conceived as the activity, striving or will’ reified as a mind distinct from its embodiment and in control over it. With mind in the ascent the material world and otherness becomes purveyed and thought of as non-constitutive, the result of which is the consideration of world and people as ‘resources.’ The opposition of subject/object, most prevalently taken as the pursuit of knowledge of inner-worldly entities in the name of manipulating them or putting them to use, is best exemplified in the domain of scientific inquiry where science is transformed into ‘human science.’

60 Trezise, 'Foreword: Persistence,' xiii-xiv.

51
Science as human science

The human sciences, argued Foucault, cannot be traced to the problem, obstacle or requirement of a theoretical or practical order to which their genesis and subsequent institutionalisation is normally attributed. Rather, their intrinsic possibility, the simple fact that man, whether in isolation or as a group, and for the first time since human beings have existed and have lived together in societies, should have become the object of science— that cannot be considered or treated as a phenomenon of opinion: it is an event in the order of knowledge.64

Political knowledge is, naturally, of special interest to us and its epistemic transformation from the classical age to modernity illustrates three evident changes. First, 'the claim of scientifically grounded social philosophy aims at establishing once and for all the conditions for the correct order of the state and society as such. Its assertions are to be valid independently of place, time, and circumstances, and are to permit an enduring foundation for communal life, regardless of the historical situation.'65 Second, the transition from knowledge into praxis is now considered a merely technical problem. General conditions for order are considered knowable and narrowing the task of politics to 'the correctly calculated generation of rules, relationships, and institutions.'66 The third change, most importantly, involves the subject of politics, whose behaviour now becomes 'the material for science,' itself transformed into the deduction and ‘construction of conditions under which human beings, just like objects within nature, will necessarily behave in a calculable manner.’67

The assertion of man as subject and its characteristic self-certainty ‘leads to a conception of knowledge as information gathering and processing, which can then be exploited to serve the interests of the subject.’68 Thus, all science becomes, in some sense, ‘anthropology’: in other words, science is now understood from man’s perspective. ‘Anthropology,’ in this instance, ‘designates that philosophical interpretation of man which explains and

64 Foucault, The Order of Things, 345.
65 Habermas, Theory and Practice, 43.
66 Habermas, Theory and Practice, 43.
67 Habermas, Theory and Practice, 43.
evaluates what is, in its entirety, from the standpoint of man and in relation to man." As Foucault argued, 'the anthropological configuration of modern philosophy' suggests that 'the pre-critical analysis of what man is in his essence becomes the analytic of everything that can, in general, be presented to man's experience.' It is not, however, just that this scientific configuration evinces technicity and calculability and that these two modes of relating to the social and physical world have become predominant. The transformation of science into 'human' science or 'anthropology' is not without its overtly political determinations because 'the modern enterprise is thus also inextricably tied to a kind of "metaphysical politics" ... striving for a complete universal self-authorization.' In other words, the subject's positing of itself as the object of science and the reduction of science to what is representable to the subject as part of its experience involves the desire towards self-knowledge and the ability to make total claims about the world. In this way, 'we come to know the world "outside" by looking "inside".' This paradoxical 'arrogance of knowledge coupled with the seeming humility of critical self-examination,' however, means that a largely situated perspective can make global claims about the objectivity of its knowledge amassed subjectively. Thus, the rise of the subject is not merely synonymous with the 'apotheosis of reason, and the successful pursuit of knowledge.' Rather, the story of science as the institutionalisation of thinking-as-representing and representing-as-securing is 'also a story of power and politics.' Heidegger admits that

man assumes a special role in metaphysics inasmuch as he seeks, develops, grounds, defends, and passes on metaphysical knowledge — and distorts it. But that still does not give us the right to consider him the measure of all things as well, to characterize him as the center of all beings, and establish him as master of all things.

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69 Heidegger, "The Age of the World Picture," 133.
70 Foucault, The Order of Things, 340. In this way, 'the end of man, for its part, is the return of the beginning of philosophy,' p. 342.
72 Solomon and Higgins, A Short History of Philosophy, 178.
73 Solomon and Higgins, A Short History of Philosophy, 178.
74 Solomon and Higgins, A Short History of Philosophy, 178.
75 Solomon and Higgins, A Short History of Philosophy, 178.
76 Heidegger, Nietzsche, 86.
The subject of international politics

While philosophy has been preoccupied with notions of subjectivity for the better part of this century and has involved a process of self-critique since the very advent of the enlightenment, it appears that in the more applied fields of the human sciences, the modern subject has taken hold and is still generally accepted as the basis of inquiry. C. Fred Alford has observed that, in political theory and political science, as well as social science in general, theorisations of the ‘self’ always involve trade-offs. Often authors will ‘weaken, split, and shatter the integrity of the self, in order to render it more tractable, or more ideal.’ The purpose of these manipulations of the self is, of course, to write social or political theory which fulfills certain functions and allows certain normative concerns to be realised theoretically. The self, thus, is considered to be little more than ‘a dependent variable in this or that social theory.’ If Alford is correct in his opinion, this might also explain why ontology is not a major concern in social and political theory, although in some respects this may be changing. Alford contends, not without irony, that for most social scientists ‘more subtle and complex models [of the self] may be interesting, but they are not necessary to do real social science.’ It is interesting to ask as to the extent to which his comment, ironic as it may be, could not also be appropriate for IR as a social science, and significantly as a social science not really concerned with ‘people’ at all, although again exceptions can be found. Furthermore, ‘subtle and complex models’ of the self might be what is required

81 Alford, The Self in Social Theory, 3, brackets added.
82 IR scholars interested in ethics have questioned subjectivity, see Vivienne Jabri, “Restyling the Subject of Responsibility in International Relations,” Millennium 27, no. 3 (1998): 591-611. Also critical international relations names subjectivity as a neglected area in IR, see R. B. J. Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
for a reconsideration of coexistence as an issue of primary importance for international politics.

It might be contentious to suggest that the ontological assumptions on which IR grounds coexistence are centred on the individual subject. However, the disciplinary position of IR can be ascertained to lie within the modernist tradition and to share its fundamental metaphysical positions about human beings as sovereign and self-sufficient. Martin Wight classified IR theories into three schools made up of realists, rationalists, and revolutionists, because these perspectives take their assumptions from philosophical movements or schools which bear those names, although, as he rightly notes not without 'debasement.' Can one really claim that these rest on a common understanding of subjectivity? Yet, is this really the claim put forward here, namely, that post-Cartesian philosophy is identical to the Cartesian articulation? Not at all. The claim put forward here, rather, suggests not identity among philosophies of the modern era about their consideration of subjectivity, but an inherent centrality within them of the notion of the subject. The suggestion is that with modernity philosophy becomes grounded in the human being as subject, although there are a number of differentiated features of that subject proposed by various thinkers. Cartesian philosophy has effected a change in the terms of discourse, so that post-Cartesian philosophy takes its problématique from the cogito. Whereas in Descartes, one finds no explicit mention of 'subject,' the discursive parameters change after his contribution.

Let us consider briefly the first two 'schools of thought' noted explicitly by Wight, which trace their lineage to Hobbes and Locke, as examples of the ontological centrality of the subject with its modern features but also as illustrations of the different political theories which can arise from the basis of such centrality. It is crucial to discuss Hobbes within this enquiry because his

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work can illustrate how, although, harshly differing from some generalised modern understanding of the subject, the features of modern subjectivity become reformulated in a unique and politically useful way to ground his political philosophy of the creation of a civil commonwealth. Hobbes, is a contemporary of Descartes and displays a parallel move which one might call ‘modernist’ with his reliance on certain features of subjectivity.\textsuperscript{85} Hobbesian subjectivity is amongst the earliest modern reconfigurations of human being out of a medieval schema, although his articulation retains some archaic characteristics.\textsuperscript{86} The Hobbesian subject utilises its natural right towards modernist concerns. The self is endowed with autonomous will and mastery over material nature. His equality with other such subjects amounts to a self-induced vulnerability, compounded by ‘the state of nature’ where the lack of a sovereign authority provides the structural parameters of anarchy. Hobbes re-articulates the features of the modern subject, reason and mastery, in a differentiated way, to achieve the self-interested subject of survival. The modernist infusion comes with the elucidation of the ‘flash of reason,’ which refers to man’s capacity to use this endowment in order to calculate his self-interest and to mitigate against his vulnerability. It is this capacity for self-interest and rationality which succeeds in extracting man out of the ‘warre of all against all’ in the state of nature and which enables man to give up his free will and to acquiesce willingly to the civil commonwealth. Reason, then, is instrumental in activating and facilitating the realisation of desires; it assists, in other words, intentionality in the pursuit of purposive action. Hobbes is amongst the first thinkers to endow the state with selfhood, to consider it an

\textsuperscript{85} There are, of course, a number of differences between the Cartesian and Hobbesian formulations of subjectivity. Descartes was a dualist and an advocate of ‘free will’ while Hobbes is a monist, a materialist and a determinist. However, ‘[w]hatever the differences between Hobbes and his successors and Descartes and his successors might be, what they tend to share is an initial concern with the individual...What they and their successors held in common was the phenomenon of individualism and consciously or unconsciously (probably the latter) a need to explain what Maine was later to call the shift from “status to contract”.’ Clarke, \textit{Autonomy Unbound}, 15.

\textsuperscript{86} Alford, \textit{The Self in Social Theory}, chapter 5. Which is why, of course, Hobbes is not included in Michel Foucault’s understanding of the modern episteme. See Foucault, \textit{The Order of Things}, xxii.
'Artificial Man,' which has been as constitutive of IR discourse as the sum of his construction of the state of nature has formed the basis for political realism.

The Lockean account is even more embedded within, and serves to extend, the subjectivist project. For Locke, consciousness helps to form a distinct personal identity of individual units through the act of 'holding ambivalent and contradictory passions together' and the ability to 'claim and exert ownership' over man's actions, which are concerned with labour and property. The reign of consciousness is paramount in the Second Treatise which intended 'not to quell the desire for unlimited mastery, domination and acquisition but to rechannel it (sublimation) into the acquisition of property' because this was regarded by Locke as the weakest and gentlest form of mastery. In this vein, Locke reified the notion of acquisition, through which, he contended, we produce and increase value for others but, furthermore, by increasing our accumulations 'we make ourselves vulnerable to the social.' His theory of governance reflects this primacy of proprietary consciousness because 'the authority of government derives from the consent of the governed' whose foremost identity is linked to ownership. Not only does the existence of government arise from the consent of the governed, 'but its structures and limits' are also determined in this way. Locke considers that 'any Community, being only the consent of the individuals of it, and it being necessary to that which is one body to move one way; it is necessary that the Body should move that way whither that greater force carries it, which is the consent of the majority...' As John McCumber argues, community and society are conceived as 'a body composed...of independently moving individuals' which voluntarily consent to constitute themselves as a 'body.'

87 Alford, The Self in Social Theory, 114 and 115.
88 Alford, The Self in Social Theory, 117.
89 Alford, The Self in Social Theory, 120.
90 McCumber, Metaphysics and Oppression, 152.
91 McCumber, Metaphysics and Oppression, 152.
93 McCumber, Metaphysics and Oppression, 155.
This brief illustration suggests that despite their renowned and sharp difference regarding the characteristics they attribute to subjectivity, and the political theoretic result of these differences, modern subjectivity is what allows both Hobbes and Locke to articulate their political thought in the way in which they do. Far from agreeing on the particulars they put the attributes of modern subjectivity to work in radically differentiated political theories. These theories, however, are united by their grounding on modern subjectivity even if their reformulations of it are varied. But it is not only traditional accounts of international politics which avail a view of the ontological centrality of the modern subject. The discipline of IR takes its subject to be the modern subject and this can be seen in at least three ways. First, IR as the study of the interactions of states seen through their statesmen and diplomats, engages with the modern subject in its utmost interpretation, namely, the secular, self-interested subject of modern politics. Second, the entities of IR undergo a process of anthropomorphisation, so that non-human or pluralistic actors, the most prevalent being the state, assume a number of the characteristics attributed to human being as subject, such as purposive behaviour, self-sufficiency, and rationality. This is not only an occurrence in IR but is the case with social theory in general, which takes its object of inquiry, society or community, as the ‘absolutization of subjectivity.’

Third, the resurgence of critically-disposed theorising in IR has returned disciplinary attention to, and effected an acceptance of, the study of ‘individuals.’ This had been customarily neglected by political realists, who took their unit to be the sovereign state (as subject), especially following the pervasive turn to structuralism in the late 1970s. Of course, liberal political theory assumes ‘individual human beings as the primary international actors’ and states as pluralistic actors whose interests and functions are determined by

96 John W. Burton, most notably, had been at the forefront of emphasising the need to focus on individuals. See, John W. Burton, Conflict: Human Needs Theory (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990).
97 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979).
bargaining, elections and contestations amongst groups of individuals. Until the early 1990s realism was harshly distinct from its opposing paradigm, liberal internationalism but a most interesting development of the 1990s is what Ole Weaver and others have called the 'neo-neo synthesis,' between neo-realist and neo-liberalist approaches to IR after the discipline's 'third debate.' In this synthetic move, methodology and key assumptions of the two perspectives appear to have converged particularly regarding 'anarchy' and 'rationality.' The 'neo-neo synthesis' offers a unique opportunity for ontological examination because it reveals for the first time the unanimity between these two alternative worldviews on international politics, whose assumptions about the subject can hardly be prohibitive to such a convergence.

As an epiphenomenon of this neo-neo synthesis, Alexander Wendt's constructivist international theory, whose latest statement is Social Theory of International Politics, takes as its premise the state as a 'purposive actor' and regards that in its social interactions, the state is equivalent to a Self. Despite his commitment to a 'synthetic view' on structure/agency questions, Wendt suggests that 'states really are agents,' that is they are endowed with reason and a form of rationality conducive to purposive action. He invests the units of analysis in customary IR with subjectivity, directly related to the action-directed and masterful subject of modernity. Relations with other such subjects are at least partly determined, he argues, from the type of self these units are (and partly structurally). Wendtian social theory, then, seeks to reinforce the view that, 'states are also purposive actors with a sense of Self – "states are people too" – and that this affects the nature of the international system.' This is not to reject the value of the effort to provide a synthetic view of unit between holism and individualism, as Wendt purports to do. But it must be

100 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 10.
101 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 194.
102 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 165-184.
borne in mind that strategically Wendt’s account depends on the revival of subjectivism, of the state as the subject of intentionality and agency understood in ways which resound with the echo of modern subjectivity. This is because his explicit concern is to counter the hegemony of a neo-realist structuralist account, which reduces the workings of the international system to the effects of structure. Thus, despite his awareness of the pitfalls of pure individualism, his much sought ‘balance’ weighs heavily on the side of subjectivism for the strategic purpose of returning to the proper consideration of state ‘agency.’ Thus, Wendtian constructivism harbours an implicit, if not explicit, call for selfhood or subjectivity as the bedrock of international politics. It is not unusual, Williams and Gantt argue, for critical work to display such ‘perverse’ faith to sovereign subjectivity. The denunciation of Cartesian subjectivity on the basis of empirical or psychological evidence does not usually amount to a fundamental questioning of the ‘self.’ Rather, even empirically minded sceptics ‘retain the individual self as locus, or bearer, of all a person is or knows. This privatizes knowledge and makes the individual the principal focus of the (perhaps misnamed) “social” sciences.’ The remainder of this chapter turns more closely to the interplay of subjectivity, composition and otherness and examines two particular manifestations of coexistence as composition, in ‘traditional’ and ‘critical’ discourse respectively.

2. Thomas Hobbes and the social contract

As Jürgen Habermas has argued, modern social philosophy largely arose out of the pragmatic political concern with the maintenance of human life. The primary concern of modern philosophers ‘is how human beings could technically master the threatening evils of nature.’ While it cannot be denied that early modern philosophy was ‘also concerned with the betterment, the easing, and the raising of life to a higher level’ this was a preoccupation wholly distinct ‘from the moral perfection of life’ through the cultivation of virtue.

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103 Wendt distinguishes between individuality and what he calls ‘the social terms of individuality.’ See, Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 181.
104 Williams and Gantt, “Intimacy and Heteronomy,” 253.
105 Habermas, Theory and Practice, 51.
which had concerned the ancients. Rather, for modern philosophers, like Hobbes, '[t]he pragmatic forms of heightening the agreeableness and strength of life retain their reference to the positive, to the mere maintenance of life.'

This section examines Hobbes's formulation of subjectivity and attempts to bring to the fore some of the implications this has for coexistence. Coexistence, in this context, is regarded as co-presence prior to the social contractarian solution to the problem of dangerous anarchy and, subsequent to it, it is reduced to a fragile composition of units sustainable solely by the mechanism of its institution and by the exercise of absolute power of the sovereign. Coexistence is not the primary state of being for the Hobbesian subject but must be politically effected. The contract, therefore, is constitutive of the sociality (coexistence) of the already constituted, completed selves of the Hobbesian schema. The contract, moreover, serves to reinforce the particular type of non-relational subjectivity required for it to work as a political mechanism, maintaining the ontological assumption of the tendency to failure and general fragility of a composition of non-relational subjects. It frames and articulates 'civil and orderly' coexistence through the 'logic of composition.'

**Configuring subjectivity: danger and reason**

The Hobbesian enframing of the subject must be contextualised as the locus of a social philosophy responding to the revolutionary climate and chaotic political and social situation of England in the 1650s, wherein Hobbes's seminal philosophical text, *Leviathan*, was conceived. Heavily influenced by this context, Hobbes provided an imaginary description of social existence prior to the creation of, or in the absence of, the 'state' as an anarchical 'state of nature,' wherein people are enmeshed in a 'war of all against all' and in which all persons were enemies to others. The Hobbesian account of what is

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widely known as 'anarchy'\textsuperscript{108} elucidates 'self/other' constructs as 'self/enemy,' whence the other is always already encountered through what might be called 'an ethos of survival.'\textsuperscript{109} 'Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of Warre, where every man is Enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live without other security than what their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish them withall.'\textsuperscript{110} The pre-social world, in other words, is understood as 'dangerous,' where danger is inevitable out of two related principles, the first of which is a materialist understanding of man's nature and the second is the lack of a natural harmony of interests, which necessitate the presence and efficacy of a sovereign authority to maintain peace and order. However, the locus of danger is Hobbes's conception of the other-as-enemy: pervasive enmity makes the notion of an-archy 'dangerous' and establishes survival as the predominant preoccupation of the subject in the state of nature.

The causes of war, strife and lawlessness are to be found in every man's nature. Hobbes writes in this respect, 'that in the nature of man, we find three principall causes of quarrell. First, Competition; Secondly, Diffidence; Thirdly, Glory.' It is important to elaborate that Hobbes does not identify the state of nature in actual fighting and enmity. Rather, he explains that, '...the nature of War, consisteth not in actuall fighting; but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary.'\textsuperscript{111} The universal disposition to quarrel arises from the equality among men:

\begin{quote}
Nature hath made men so equall, in the faculties of body, and mind; as that though there bee found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or quicker of mind then [sic] another; yet when all is reckoned together, the difference between man, and man, is not so considerable, as that one man can claim to himselfe any benefit, to which another may not pretend, as well as he.\textsuperscript{112}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{108} For an exposition of the political theoretic significance of this concept, see Robert Nozick, \textit{Anarchy, State and Utopia} (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974), although Nozick's account suggests that the 'minimal state' is a necessity. For a different opinion see, Noel O'Sullivan, "Postmodernism, Difference and the Concept of the Political," unpublished paper, 27.

\textsuperscript{109} Odysseos, "Dangerous Ontologies." See also, Vilho Harle, \textit{The Enemy With a Thousand Faces: The Tradition of the Other in Western Political Thought and History} (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000).


\textsuperscript{111} Hobbes, \textit{Leviathan}, 88-89.
Equality, in this regard, leads to a universal desire for material possessions or glory "which neverthelesse they cannot both enjoy." For this being impossible, men who desire the same thing "become enemies; and in the way to their End....endeavour to destroy, or subdue one an other."\textsuperscript{113} Yet, in addition to the drive for material goods, the Hobbesian subject comes to desire power in itself. John McCumber argues that the materialist desire for specific objects, which distinguishes the Hobbesian subject, is supplemented "with the general desire for power."\textsuperscript{114} When Hobbes suggests that there is in mankind "a generall inclination...a perpetuall, and restlesse desire for Power after power, that ceaseth onely in Death,"\textsuperscript{115} he thereby transforms power from being "the universal means to satisfying desires into a universal object of desire on its own account."\textsuperscript{116} It is this transformation which delivers us to the state of nature and to an understanding of the enemy as the other person in competition for power, as well as material goods.

Moreover, man’s ability to transcend his ‘inclination to quarrel’ becomes possible by another feature of Hobbesian subjectivity, namely, Hobbes’s distinction between ‘danger’ and ‘sin.’ When man is described as evil, this refers to ‘dangerous’ and should be understood not as theological evil, but as ‘the innocent evil of the beasts.’\textsuperscript{117} Man’s troublesome nature is, furthermore, compounded by the structure of the state of nature, namely, the absence of a sovereign authority. Prior to the laying down his rights by agreeing to the covenant, man is at liberty to do as he pleases. There are no limits to his rights and liberties. He is dangerous because of his quest for power, yet this endless quest for power is largely the result of lacking security to ensure his own survival. The evil of man is not theological but, rather, is grounded in materialist competition, itself pursued due to the lack of other means to security. Hobbes does not have a notion of sin, other than one tied to the

\textsuperscript{112} Hobbes, \textit{Leviathan}, 86-87.  
\textsuperscript{113} Hobbes, \textit{Leviathan}, 87.  
\textsuperscript{114} McCumber, \textit{Metaphysics and Oppression}, 138.  
\textsuperscript{115} Hobbes, \textit{Leviathan}, 70.  
\textsuperscript{116} McCumber, \textit{Metaphysics and Oppression}, 138.  
\textsuperscript{117} Leo Strauss, "Notes to 'The Concept of the Political'," trans. George Schwab, \textit{The Concept of the Political} (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1932), 99.
disobedience to the covenant, and the laws stated by the covenant.\textsuperscript{118} He denies a theological conception of evil while, at the same time, attributes danger to man's dispositions. Similarly, the other-as-enemy is not evil, but, rather, dangerous. This distinction between danger and evil is crucial as it explains, William E. Connolly argues, that the Hobbesian self has the reason to recognise the need for society but does not have the nature for it. The subject of the state of nature is in need of education and control, but cannot be said to be 'evil.'\textsuperscript{119}

The conditions in the state of nature leads man to seek self-preservation through survival, and in order to ensure it he may lay down all his rights but the right to his own life. The only 'inalienable' right, which may not be given up to the Leviathan, is the right to life: 'man cannot lay down the right of resisting them, that assault him by force, to take away his life; because he cannot be understood to ayme thereby, at any Good to himself.'\textsuperscript{120} Survival is, in this way, connected to man's natural right, which exists in the state of nature and becomes the aetiology for the creation of the Leviathan. Since man has an inalienable right to life, it is his responsibility to himself to ensure that he does survive: to transcend the state of nature fulfils one's responsibility to oneself, that is, the responsibility to survive. Thus, transcendence of the state of nature becomes the foremost responsibility of the self and, as such, should not be seen merely as a pragmatic response to danger. Leo Strauss explains that Hobbes's 'contention that the State originates only in mutual fear and can only so originate had thus moral, not merely technical, significance.'\textsuperscript{121} 'Survival' serves as the constellation of the attributes of mastery and control, and the modernist concern with the maintenance of human life over against the world and entities within the world.

That survival of the other and self-mastery is intimately connected to Hobbesian subjectivity becomes apparent when, as Connolly argues, the state

\textsuperscript{118} Hobbes, \textit{Leviathan}, 201.
\textsuperscript{119} Connolly, \textit{Political Theory and Modernity}, 27.
\textsuperscript{120} Hobbes, \textit{Leviathan}, 93.
of nature is seen as a construct aiming to express Hobbes's political preoccupations at the time and place of writing.

When Hobbes discusses the state of nature he is talking to people already in civil society. He is not trying to convince them to move from a stateless condition to a state, from a condition in which the passions are wild to one in which they are domesticated. Rather he is persuading imperfectly domesticated subjects that they, in their present state, should consent to remain there and should commit themselves more fully to the habits and principles that ensure the stability of their condition, even though that condition does and must carry many "inconveniences." Thus, Connolly argues, the purpose of the state of nature is to simulate 'what it would be like to live amongst others in a condition where civil power has been removed.' In this respect, he explains, it is advisable to realise that, for Hobbes, the description of the state of nature has an instrumental and disciplinary intent: 'the state of nature is shock therapy. It helps subjects to get their priorities straight by teaching them what life would be like without sovereignty. It domesticates by eliciting the vicarious fear of violent death in those who have not had to confront it directly.' Hobbesian subjectivity is thus shaped by the confrontation with the possibility of violent death. Fear of death becomes the means by which the subject, although having no limits to his natural right, cultivates a disposition towards survival. In this manner, with the possibility of death, the right to self-determination is relinquished, giving way to sovereign government: 'when one confronts the fear of early and violent death, one becomes willing to regulate oneself and to accept external regulations that will secure life against its dangers. The fear of death pulls the self together.' As John Dunn suggests, for Hobbes, 'human political authority is a rational response to the overwhelming motivation of human fearfulness. It rests practically upon a systematization of the passion of fear.'

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Hobbes's configuration of subjectivity is, therefore, well served by the accentuation of man's immature and quarrelsome sociability and his disposition to strife. According to Connolly's analysis, this 'is a useful passion, useful to an ordering of the self and to peace and quiet in the social order.' The quarrelsome disposition of man is at once a cause for concern for man's own life and, at the same time, the means that leads man to choose an orderly society, that is, to ensure that his survival is safeguarded by a state apparatus. Transcendence of the danger that man posed to one's self and to others was possible because, as was noted above, the Hobbesian self is a curious entity.

The Hobbesian individual is, first, not a given but a formation out of material that is only partly susceptible to this form [social life] and, second, not merely an end in itself but more significantly a means to the end of a stable society. The Hobbesian individual is thus in part a product of the civil society which is to regulate it, and the Hobbesian problem is how to form it so that it will be able and willing to abide by the natural laws and contracts appropriate to civil society.128

To shape such a subject is to bring to bear another feature of modern subjectivity to the artifice that is the Hobbesian self: reason. Transcendence of the state of nature is only possible due to man's 'flash of reason,' by which Hobbes meant man's ability to 'recognize as the real enemy not the rival, but "that terrible enemy of nature, death."' Eager to advocate against the collapse of civil order, Hobbes theorised the transcendence of the state of nature towards orderly coexistence through man's calculation of his interest to avoid violent death and his ability to agree to a Covenant. Hence, man self-interestedly chooses to transcend the dangerous state of nature by abandoning the multiplicity of wills present among the people at large and relegating responsibility for survival to the Leviathan as the only means of temporally and spatially transcending anarchy. The Hobbesian solution to the dangerous ontology of 'the state of nature' created a fragile peace within a 'commonwealth.' Maintenance of this peace required the vigilance of a state apparatus, the Leviathan. This man-made covenant, by which order is brought about, is a product of man's rationality and self-knowledge and, as such, resisted any continuity with the medieval age where covenants were contracted

127 Connolly, Political Theory and Modernity, 29
128 Connolly, Political Theory and Modernity, 27, brackets added.
between the people and a godly or princely sovereign. In Hobbes, the social contract is brought into being solely through man’s action and, therefore, is radically individualist in its conception. It can be seen, therefore, that this configuration of subjectivity, through the attributes of danger but not sin, reason but non-relationality, and omnipresent enmity, conceptually enables transcendence of the state of nature through the subject’s decision to agree to the radical reformation of the *structural* conditions. As Connolly writes, ‘[t]he self-interested self is an artifice, an artifice celebrated by Hobbes as the one most conducive to a well-ordered society.’ At the same time, the implication of retaining the non-relational subject after transcendence is that there occurs a framing of coexistence as fragile co-presence, directly implicated in the need for sovereign civil authority.

**Heterology in the state of nature**

The Hobbesian account, it was noted above, frames the relation to the other as one of ‘self/enemy’ and regards enmity as omnipresent (‘all against all’) by definition. Such a framing of ‘the other’ as ‘an enemy’ occurs largely because coexistence in the state of nature is potentially a war of all against all because it is grounded on a subjectivity whose modernist aspects are configured through a systematisation of innate mastery, fear, and danger. It is important to note that, the dangerous ontology of the state of nature, where proximity to others is theorised as a “warre of all against all,” determines sociality through an overriding imperative: survival. The essence of man, according to Hobbes, is utilised to connect danger and subjectivity and reduces, in this way, proximity to a relation of enmity. When the mode of relating to those residing in proximity to the self is examined at length, survival is revealed to be the predominant relational schema of the Hobbesian account. ‘Survival,’ then, can be seen as a *particular* kind of relationality, whose focus is the protection of the self and the surviving of the other. The relation to the other becomes a relation of danger, one to be transcended in concordance with the subjective and ethical imperative of self-preservation. As Strauss noted in this regard,

"[s]elf-preservation and the striving after peace for the sake of self-preservation are 'necessary,' because man fears death with inescapable necessity."  

The extensive and pessimistic heterology of *Leviathan* reduces otherness to the same (self) since it is grasped and represented to the subject according to the attributes of the very same Hobbesian selfhood. In this way, by encountering the other as a competitor for material goods and power against the background of structural insecurity, as well as an enemy against whom one must preserve oneself, his terrifying otherness is assimilated to the self's knowable nature. The other is tamed and his enmity transformed to an enmity of otherness in the subject, that is, of those attributes which are at once accentuated and lamented, so that they can build the edifice of the Leviathan. The other's very alterity is expunged and subordinated to the well-structured construct designed to effect a workable political philosophy. Through the 'ethos of survival' the other is 'othered,' as well as enclosed within a certain schema indicative of the mastery and control exerted over otherness, yet made possible through the manipulation of subjectivity. The self-interested and rational subject holds mastery over the other as well as itself by politically determining the fate of otherness in a solution whose very rationality leaves no choice of dissent.

**Composing social life through the contract**

The social contract has undoubtedly provided political thought with a powerful and lasting imaginary that inseparably links state, coexistence with others and subjectivity. The imaginary of the 'state of nature' or more generally, the notion of 'anarchy' has become a staple of political theorising and analysis. Stuart Umphrey argues, in this regard, that '[Hobbes's] teaching...remains to be overcome in fact. Our way of regarding things political is still predominantly Hobbesian.'  

Mary Dietz, a prominent Hobbes scholar, concurs when she writes that, '[Hobbes’s] political theory...is at least partly

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constitutive of the ways in which we continue to understand and describe our own political practices."\textsuperscript{133} The Hobbesian description of the world as pre-socially dangerous has assumed immense significance in International Relations by providing the ground for the perspective of political realism, and this importance has long been recognised within the discipline.\textsuperscript{134}

Brian C. Schmidt writes in his study \textit{The Political Discourse of Anarchy} that

[from an early point in the history of academic international relations, scholars embraced the view that the topics of central concern to the field — topics that included the study of the factors leading to war and peace, international law, international organization, colonial administration, and the means of achieving world order reform — were grounded in an ontology of anarchy. The idea that international relations was characterized both by the presence and absence of sovereignty has provided the intellectual paradigm within which the academic discourse of international relations has taken place.\textsuperscript{135}

Once order is brought about by the covenant and safeguarded by the Leviathan, danger is relegated to the outside of state boundaries in the form of others-as-enemies. As Leo Strauss once noted in this regard, 'the state of nature continues at least in the relationship between the nations.'\textsuperscript{136} James Der Derian concurs, noting that 'Hobbes's solution for civil war displaces the disposition for a "warre of every man against every man" to the international arena.'\textsuperscript{137} A parallel can be discerned where the state behaves in the international (the outside) in the same fashion as man behaved in the state of nature. The state acts to promote its own survival and mastery over the system, creating what Der Derian calls 'an ethico-political imperative embedded in the nature of things.'\textsuperscript{138}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{136} Leo Strauss, "Notes to 'The Concept of the Political',' trans. George Schwab,\textit{The Concept of the Political} (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1932), 90.
\bibitem{138} Der Derian, "The Value of Security," 99.
\end{thebibliography}
The link between anarchy and danger in the international sphere relates to the absence of principles which have brought about order inside the Leviathan. Arche, meaning both principle and order, enables us to look at anarchy as that condition which lacks the principled order brought about by a sovereign power. Thus, danger imposes on us an an-archic, or unprincipled, environment reminiscent of the pre-commonwealth state of nature, where the other-as-enemy is defined as a like-entity, that is, as another Leviathan among many. The outside of the Leviathan remains in the state of nature and offers no security. Beate Jahn has claimed, moreover, that understanding of 'the international' as a state of nature 'is the defining claim of IR, its very raison d'être.'

With regards to the coexistence of individuals, the linkage of subjectivity and danger is resolved though the creation of a commonwealth through an agreed-upon contract whereby men give up the multiplicity of their wills because they have a responsibility to survive. The covenant, however, does little to dispel or deconstruct the Hobbesian subject. On the contrary, the need for contract establishes the subject as unsociable, that is, having no capacity to be with others without the regulation of rules and principles. Hobbes's institution of an ontology of danger through the elaboration of the notion of an anarchical state of nature, in which the other is encountered as an enemy serves to emphasise the features of the logic of composition, that is, the notion that coexistence is but fragile co-presence.

Highlighting the non-relational aspect of the subject even after the occurrence of transcendence sustains the anarchical assumption that coexistence is fragile, if not dangerous, and will still require watchful authority and general vigilance against its proneness to collapse, since the condition of 'staying-together' following the act of 'joining-together' is in some ways 'unnatural' to the subject determined in large by the assumption of non-relationality. The already constituted subjects which compose coexistence must have autonomy and
rationality in order to choose the contract but also to retain that right which underlies the whole edifice: the right to self-preservation. Furthermore, the mechanical construction of coexistence or sociability amounts to 'a physics of sociation.' The contract, in other words, composes non-relationality into the controlled sociability of the Leviathan. It, additionally, imbues sociability with the need for domination and control by merely modifying the structural conditions of the state of nature, but leaving unchanged and unchangeable the ground on which the political solution is based.

To conclude this section, Hobbesian political philosophy has enabled an illustration of how the reconfiguration of subjectivity determines coexistence through a 'logic of composition' and highlights the interconnection between subjectivity, otherness and coexistence is quite clearly evidenced. The social contract, taken here as an example of compositional logic, becomes a necessity for a thought which is grounded in the subject because of the non-relational nature of this subjectivity. Georges Van den Abbeele argues that 'the notion of social contract assumes the prior constitution of self-determining subjects who “freely” aggregate to form a community.’ Not only does the notion of contract occlude the whence of its subjects’ constitution (usually through the delegation of it to human nature), but it ‘forgets the differences between subjects that may obtain in such a way as to obviate, or at least complicate, the presumption of their absolute equality.”

3. Residual contractarianism: David Campbell’s critical thought

The discussion of Hobbes’s Leviathan has demonstrated the manifestation of the interplay between subjectivity and composition in ‘traditional discourses’ of international politics. It is imperative to show, moreover, that residual elements of composition are present implicitly in work which claims to forego

140 Habermas, Theory and Practice, 72.
a grounding in modern subjectivity and which forms part of discourses of IR which intend to offer an alternative account of subjectivity. For this purpose, the remainder of this chapter concentrates on the critical writings of David Campbell on the refashioning of international responsibility. Campbell’s work might be classified as ‘constitutive theory,’ it shares, in other words, its concern about issues of self-reflection, alterity and the general transformation of international relations theory with other critical discourses of IR. Campbell’s work is distinct, however, in that it has turned to the phenomenological writings of French philosopher Emmanuel Levinas on the constitution of the ethical subject, which fundamentally transforms the concepts of ‘subjectivity’ and ‘responsibility.’ His writings have mostly viewed Levinasian ‘ethics’ as a means of reformulating more traditional understandings of ‘responsibility’, and expanding ethical regard to people beyond the borders of the state; arriving, in other words at a different nexus in debates on self and other.

From the basis of Levinasian phenomenology Campbell has articulated an ethos of political criticism aimed at the articulation of just governance. It can be argued, however, that as regards its theoretic application to the inter-state and international level, Campbell’s extraction of Levinas’s subjectivity from its phenomenological framework requires, and makes use of, elements of composition, in the form of contractarianism, for its coherence. This reliance on residual elements of contractarianism as the necessary mechanism of diffusion of his interpersonal model for responsibility, renders Campbell’s work unsuitable for theorising coexistence. After a brief description of the

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143 Campbell, National Deconstruction.
model suggested by Levinas and Campbell, the residual elements of the logic of composition are highlighted.

**Grounding Campbell: subjectivity and responsibility in Levinas**

It is not surprising that Campbell has turned to Levinas for an alternative to modern subjectivity, since his philosophy of 'the face' has attracted great attention amongst critical discourses in IR. He is regarded as one of the philosophers of otherness, whose wider concerns were aimed both at a contestation of the Western philosophical tradition, which he calls Hellenic, in its drive towards systematic totalisation and also at a supplementation of this tradition with a Hebraic openness to 'the infinite.' For Levinas, and for Campbell, Hellenic philosophy frames engagements with alterity through 'ontological totalitarianism,' where a tendency to equate truth to presence is seen to reduce the other to the same. The other becomes an object of comprehension engulfed within the framework of the 'knowing self' as described in section one above. Levinas considered his own philosophy to be informed by a 'phenomenology of nearness,' and he was concerned to articulate a framework of subjectivity and responsibility that avoids the ontological totalitarianism of the Western philosophical tradition and describes a relationality to the other beyond knowledge and instrumentality.

Consciousness as posited by the continued trajectory of Hellenic philosophy, Levinas contented, was a process where being 'loses and rediscovers' itself, so as to possess itself by showing itself, proposing itself as a theme, exposing itself in truth,' so that consciousness amounts to 'the rediscovery of being on

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144 Iver B. Neumann, "Self and Other in International Relations," *European Journal of International Relations* 2, no. 2 (1996), 150.


the basis of an ideal principle or *arche* in its thematic exposition.\textsuperscript{148} Consciousness, according to Hellenic philosophy, is a process of loss and rediscovery based on *thematisation*, on ordering according to a principle or theme. The ideal principle is Being itself, and it is through this ego-centric theme that being comes to consciousness, when ‘consciousness is therefore always the grasping (*Fassen*) of a being through an ideality,’ an ideal principle.\textsuperscript{149} For Levinas, the Western philosophical tradition is tantamount to an *egology*, compounded by a self-folding of being into being. In Levinas’s words the drive to consciousness can be thought as ‘the gathering of the being [Being/essence] of a being [existent] into being [as a subject].’\textsuperscript{150}

Levinas used phenomenology to describe relations differently and to extract a model of subjectivity arising out of a ‘face to face relationship’ to the other. The face to face encounter with the other differs from the dominant Hellenic conception of approaching otherness as an object to be known by an I, where the other is appropriated by knowledge. In his own reformulation, ‘subjectivity is structured as *the other in the same*, but in a way different from that of consciousness. Consciousness is always correlative with a theme,’ whereas ‘*the other in the same* determinative of subjectivity is the restlessness of the same disturbed by the other.’\textsuperscript{151} Levinas argues that the face to face encounter with the other is *constitutive* of the self, that it is where subjectivity is exposed and uncovered to itself, not as a possession of the autonomous I, but as heteronomy. This understanding of subjectivity does not assume an already constituted *I* who is in relationship with the other. Rather, the other’s face summons the self into consciousness and constitutes it as subject.

The face to face relationship, therefore, is not one of knowledge, of encountering the other as an object to be known based on a theme (*arche*) of an


\textsuperscript{149} Levinas, “Substitution (1968),” 80.


already-constituted self. The face to face relation disrupts the commonplace 'understanding' of alterity derived from the thematisation of otherness on the basis of the theme of an independently constituted self. When an I discovers the other and approaches the other as an object of knowledge, an object of comprehension, the other is not ethically implicated in the I's constitution. '[B]eing in direct relation with the Other is not to thematize the Other and consider him in the manner one considers a known object, nor to communicate a knowledge to him.' Knowledge (of the other) is not social, nor ethical, because 'knowledge is re-presentation, a return to presence, and nothing may remain other to it...'; the other has been freed, through the I's knowing it, of its otherness. Contrary to the Western philosophical tradition, Levinas does not consider 'knowing' and 'knowledge of others' as equivalent or constitutive of the social. 'The most audacious and remote knowledge does not put us in communion with the truly other; it does not take the place of sociality; it is always a solitude.' Levinas attempted to go against the grain of ontological inquiry and particularly Heideggerian fundamental ontology, which he claimed relayed subjectivity as the locus engendered by the inner movement of Being for its own exhibition. On the contrary, for him, subjectivity is the focal point where 'alterity makes contact,' a locus which is generated by the very movement of the other. Showing how Being moves to constitute itself as an entity does not ontologically elucidate subjectivity. Nor is subjectivity constituted by ek-statically flying from Being. The other's alterity is irreducible to a theme of my consciousness, it is, in other words, an-archical, it is ordered according to a theme, an arche; rather, an-archy disrupts thematisation according to a principle or arche. The other does not confirm the identity of the self; rather, it places it and its 'limitless' freedom into question.

Moreover, the face to face relationship is not one of presence, but one of proximity. For Levinas, proximity is irreducible to consciousness and thematisation, it cannot be reduced to images, it is incommensurable with a

154 Levinas, *Ethics and Infinity*, 60.
theme, it frustrates any schematism. It is a relationship with a singularity, a
'summoning of myself by the other,' yet it is not a summoning related, or
determined, by distance or geometrical contiguity. 'The subject, "me," is
affected without the source of the affection becoming a theme of re-
presentation.'\textsuperscript{156} Proximity, according to Levinas is radically different from
other kinds of relationships and must be understood as responsibility for the
other, 'it might be called humanity, or subjectivity, or self.'\textsuperscript{157} Levinas calls this
kind of relation \textit{obsession} and \textit{persecution} to illustrate its non-voluntarist
nature. The relationship with the other is an ethically constitutive one but it is
not by definition reciprocal or symmetrical. It is a relationship inasmuch as it is
a responsibility invoked in me by the other's \textit{face}. The other's face demands a
response, and therein arises my \textit{responsibility} for the other. The face invokes
me to respond to it. 'Responsibility is the response to the imperative addressed
in the concrete act of facing.'\textsuperscript{158} The act of facing is the way in which the face
enters the sphere of the phenomena. The encounter with alterity entails
making-contact prior to, and supportive of, making signs.

In his later writings Levinas sought to rethink the face to face encounter as a
linguistic one. He distinguished between the saying (the act) and the said (what
is said). Levinas became more concerned with the act of saying than with the
informational content of it (the said). The face compels me to speak, this is the
signification of the saying. 'The Other becomes my neighbour precisely
through the way the face summons me, calls for me, begs for me, and in so
doing recalls my responsibility, and calls me into question.'\textsuperscript{159} Therefore, the
other is not first an object of comprehension that, once comprehended,
becomes an interlocutor; my understanding of the other is 'inseparable' from
his invocation of me. To respond to the invocation is to 'have neglected the
universal being that he incarnates in order to remain with the particular being

\begin{itemize}
  \item Levinas, \textit{Otherwise than Being}, part I.
  \item Levinas, "Substitution (1968)," 81.
  \item Levinas, \textit{Otherwise than Being}, 46.
  \item Alphonso Lingis, "Translator's Introduction" in Emmanuel Levinas, \textit{Otherwise than Being},
xiii.
  \item Levinas, "Ethics as First Philosophy," 83.
\end{itemize}
he is." The saying is a way of greeting the other, "but to greet the other is to already answer for him." In this way, Levinas seeks to link response and responsibility and make it part of the encounter which constitutes the subject.

Bernhard Waldenfels noted that there are three instances of responsibility in traditional ethical thought. First, something is said or done for which one is responsible; in other words, one is responsible for the result of one's actions. Second, one is responsible to somebody, which is more or less anonymous. This is the 'neutral third'; the transsubjective standpoint of the neutral third that transforms what is said and done into an objective state of affairs that is subject to objective standards. Finally, somebody has to justify himself, has to assume responsibility and responsibility becomes the criterion of becoming a subject of carrying duties and rights. In Levinas however, the response to the other does not refer to 'something which has been said or done but rather to something which has to be said and done.' The other's demand cannot fall under the usual distinctions of 'is' or 'ought' because the demand cannot be reduced to an empirical fact, or to a general law. Levinas objects to notions of reciprocity because 'it implies that humans are interchangeable, that one may substitute one person for another..." The face to face encounter is an articulation of another kind of relationship, which he terms 'substitution,' where taking an ethical stance vis-à-vis the other is 'to put oneself in another's place...taking responsibility for the other as if one were the other.' This is not responsibility to the other but for the other. This account of responsibility 'grounds both the Other and oneself without reducing or absorbing either to the other.'

161 Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, 88.
163 Waldenfels, "Response and Responsibility in Levinas," 42.
164 Patricia H. Werhane, "Levinas's Ethics: A Normative Perspective without Metaethical Constraints," in Peperzak (ed.), Ethics As First Philosophy, 64.
165 Werhane, "Levinas's Ethics," 64.
The Levinasian approach de-centres subjectivity by giving an account of how it arises through the face to face relation, which is constitutive of the very ‘subjectivity’ of the self. This inter-face relationship however, is based on a phenomenology of subjective constitution, situated within the larger project concerned with the constitution of the transcendental Ego in the heritage of Edmund Husserl. It cannot be understood as political theory and, although it is a rich and powerful account of selfhood, it frames selfhood within the face to face relationship. The ‘phenomenological reduction’ is disrupted and cannot account for what Levinas has called ‘the third party,’ which refers to the others beyond the face to face relationship. More accurately, it accounts for the multiplicity of others in a secondary, derivative way, by claiming that the third party is reflected in the face of the other. In so doing, Levinas’s framework has trouble moving from the particularism of the other’s face to the wider social sphere made up of multiple others. Therefore, the theorisation of the social, which can be thought of as a transition from the face-to-face relation to a relation encompassing the third party (or multiplicity of third parties) is problematic in Levinasian thought. The third party is precisely the locus where coexistence could have been articulated, and yet it is the moment when the phenomenon of multiplicity becomes disruptive of the very framework of the face to face, on the basis of which coexistence would have to be based.

Campbell’s concerns are both theoretical and practical: he is interested in examining how notions of responsibility are brought to bear on the ‘reterritorialisation of states’ which cannot be conceptualised without an exploration of new forms of deterritorialised responsibility. He begins from the premise that the requirements of the contemporary political world cannot be fulfilled with the current notions of state-based responsibility. Campbell’s initial interest in Levinasian phenomenology, therefore, sprung from his concern of how to foster responsibility beyond state boundaries. Concerned with the apparent inability to respond internationally to crises, he rightly traced this to ‘the normal foundations for ethical considerations in International

167 See for example Levinas, “Peace and Proximity (1984).”
Relations – sovereign states in an anarchic realm. Campbell claims that Levinasian ethics provides a philosophic ground from which to theorise responsibility beyond the frontiers of the territorial state. After Levinas, responsibility is no longer the responsibility of ‘autonomous agents’ and it cannot be seen as contained within territorial states. By invoking the ethical constitution of the self by the other in the Levinasian ethics of heteronomy, Campbell sees potential for responding to others that would not be included in conventional, territorially bounded, space. The face to face encounter, which is the event of responsibility, knows no boundaries. There is responsibility in the moment of encounter with no regard to the spatial/territorial constrains that political theories of responsibility posit. Campbell sees the heteronomic ‘ethics’ as an antidote to the ethical and moral blueprints or codes that typify, for him, traditional notions of responsibility where ‘ethics is most often understood in terms of the moral codes and commands pertaining to autonomous agents (whether be they individuals or states).

Campbell’s attempt to utilise Levinas’s model of subjective constitution in the task of reformulating notions of responsibility at the inter-state and international level is laudable. This effort, however, is largely restricted by the parameters of the Levinasian framework itself because the phenomenological description of the face to face encounter is not intended, in the first instance, to be applicable to non-human, or pluralistic/collective entities. Its description is concerned with reformulating the transcendental ego beyond the phenomenological project of Edmund Husserl; furthermore, the phenomena it addresses, for example, the mother-child relationship or the erotic relationship in *Totality and Infinity*, are restricted to that reformulation. Levinas’s problematic handling of the phenomena of multiplicity and coexistence illustrates that beyond the inter-face relationship the framework becomes

difficult to attain but rather must be posited as an ideal goal, always deferred, and towards which ethical thought must strive.

The de-territorialised responsibility which Campbell hopes to advance requires the capacity to describe a ‘world,’ a totality of relations in which selfhood is constituted in multiple ways and within multifarious relations of otherness. This would make possible not only interpersonal responsibility but could advance novel deliberations of politics as well as societal or ‘public’ responsibility. It appears that Campbell fails to see the need for precisely what Levinas rejects as the ‘side by side,’ namely a framework of being-in-the-world-with-others which places self and other in a referential totality of relations amongst co-constituted and heteronomous entities.  

In the absence of a workable framework of multiplicity within the limited Levinasian framework, Campbell’s concern’s with just international governance must seek a process or mechanism which can infuse the interpersonal into the international-political. Since Levinas’s phenomenology of the face offers an account of responsibility contained within the framework of subjective constitution, something that Zygmunt Bauman has called the ‘moral party of two,’ the mode of dissemination of the face to face must be deliberated explicitly. This has not yet occurred in the extant writings of Campbell, who turns to Jacques Derrida’s reflections on justice and the radical undecidability of politics to address another aspect of the problematic entry of the third party into the face to face relationship. To overcome the restriction presented to it by this ‘moral party of two,’ Campbell’s attempt implicitly falls

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175 This is a reference to Levinas’s response to the 1982 Sabra and Chatila massacres. Phalangist forces introduced in the Palestinian camps by the Israel Defence Forces murdered Palestinian civilians, causing hundreds of thousands of Israelis to take to the streets in protest. When asked whether for the Israeli, the other is no one but the Palestinian, Levinas responded: ‘...the other is the neighbour, who is not necessarily kin, but who can be. And in that sense, if you’re for the other, you’re for the neighbour. But if your neighbour attacks another neighbour or treats him unjustly, what can you do? Then alterity takes on another character, in alterity we can find an enemy, or at least then we are faced with the problem of knowing who is wrong, who is just and who is unjust. There are people who are wrong.’ Emmanuel Levinas, “Ethics and Politics,” in Sean Hand (ed.), The Levinas Reader (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
back on some mechanism of the social contract in order to be able to move from interpersonal to international responsibility. The notion of the contract offers the means by which the responsibility that the self ‘develops’ for the other can be reflected to the subject’s state and be made its responsibility. Thus, Campbell’s extraction of Levinas’s subjectivity from its phenomenological framework requires, and makes use of, elements of contractarianism for its coherence, and thus is caught up in workings of the logic of composition, despite his desire to move beyond the subject.

In the absence of a contractarian mechanism through which to disseminate responsibility, Campbell’s claim that heteronomic responsibility enables us to acknowledge our responsibility to the other beyond our borders confounds two sets of ‘we.’ One is the group of concerned citizens who may very well feel that the events beyond the boundaries of the state, which grant them citizenship, ought to invoke a response. The second set of ‘we’ is the state and its attendant institutions (domestic and affiliated international). To move unreflectively from one set to the other is to ignore the very framework of heteronomic ethics. To claim, in other words, that the state is responsible for the other outside of its territory is to claim that the face to face is a metaphor for the relations of politics in the international domain, reading thus Levinas violently and against the grain.176 How can the moral motivation of states come about when the underlying philosophical framework is one which resides in the interpersonal relation, the original encounter of the face to face? This problem is exacerbated when one considers that this particular philosophical framework is regarded by Campbell himself as problematic when there exists, as it inevitably does, a multiplicity of others. This is not, however, what Campbell’s informed discussion intends to do, leaving unanswered questions about the need for a mechanism of disseminating the interpersonal model of responsibility to the level of inter-state interaction. By unwittingly deploying the mechanism of the social contract, in order to fill the gap between the


176 To suggest that states are responsible and encounter others in the way in which Levinas describes is to suggest a Wendtian type of ‘state subjectivity’ for the state that Campbell cannot but shy away from.
subject constituted by the other and the actions of the state of which the subject is a citizen, Campbell's theory cannot but detract from its purported challenge to the 'autonomous agents' entailed within the parameters of modern subjectivity.

More importantly, however, this reliance on residual elements of contractarianism as the necessary mechanism of diffusion of his interpersonal model for responsibility, renders Campbell's work problematic for theorising coexistence. It conceptualises coexistence as requiring a mode of articulation, a mechanism of keeping it into place, such as the social contract. By collapsing at the point of the disruptive introduction of the phenomenon of multiple entities into the face to face relationship it conforms to one of the characteristics of the 'logic of composition' which we outlined in chapter one, namely, that coexistence is a secondary, post-ontological condition, a state which must be effected from non-relational subjects and which will remain tentative.

4. Conclusion

As the discussion above has illustrated, the ontological centrality of the modern subject is evident in traditional discourses of international politics. The examination of Thomas Hobbes's manifestation of social contractarianism, conveys the specific schema formed by the interplay of his own 'dangerous' configuration of subjectivity and a heterology of enmity. This relational schema, or 'ethos of survival,' has been extremely influential and is still at play in political realism and generally discourses which invoke the notion of anarchy. The chapter also provided an example of the slippery slope into the mechanisms of modern subjectivity in, what has perhaps been one of the most successful critical theories in IR, namely Campbell's writings about the need for international responsiveness and responsibility beyond territorial boundaries. Despite his laudable efforts to work with an alternative to the modern subject, the particular choice of ground in the Levinasian phenomenology of the face to face relationship arguably restricts the
possibilities for a successful articulation of politics. In order for the theory to disseminate its interpersonal foundation to the pluralistic level, be this the interstate or the 'interhuman' level, it requires a theory of diffusion, such as a form of contractarianism.

In order to be able to articulate an understanding of coexistence beyond composition and to mitigate against the effacement of the constitutive function of otherness in the articulation of selfhood, two conditions must be addressed. First, an account of the self is required which does not start from the presuppositions and assumptions of the modern subject, since it is those non-relational attributes of modern subjectivity, such as autonomy, non-relationality and mastery, which reduce coexistence to mere co-presence or composition of already constituted units. Second, and in order to avoid the ossification of theoretic assumptions about the self, there is a need for a different mode of access to the facticity of entities, that is an access to the way they are manifested in their location in the world with others. The remainder of this enquiry, therefore, sets out to fulfil this task through the philosophy of German philosopher Martin Heidegger and, particularly, his phenomenology of average everydayness. Specifically, the next chapter turns to his search for a method with which to access and express the facticity of the entity too easily designated as subject in a modern configuration. His path towards a radicalised phenomenology is instructive of the methodological issues at hand in challenging modern subjectivity, and forms the first step in a process that might be called 'unworking subjectivity.'
Towards a ‘Hermeneutics of Facticity’: Martin Heidegger’s Philosophical Project

The subject of modern politics, it was argued in the previous chapter, is the subject of certainty and mastery. This subject voluntarily curtails its natural right and chooses to enter into arrangements of regulated sociability, usually via the mechanism of the contract, of which residual elements can still be found in recent contributions to critical thought in IR. Since, however, coexistence can only be rethought beyond the logic of composition if the subjectivist understanding of existence is challenged, it is advisable to turn to the phenomenological insights of German philosopher Martin Heidegger, where an ‘optics of coexistence’ can be discerned. Heidegger’s existential analytic in Being and Time does not presuppose the I-saying subject for its enquiry; it seeks, instead, to analyse this entity with respect to how it is, in the fact that it is in its world. Indeed, Heidegger wanted to know

[how does man come to play the role of the one and only subject proper? Why is the human subject transposed into the “I”, so that subjectivity here becomes coterminous with I-ness? Is subjectivity defined through I-ness, or the reverse, I-ness through subjectivity?]

His analysis, in turn, offers an account of existence where coexistence is not reduced to the mere addition of co-present subjects. Rather, the ‘optics of coexistence’ discernible in Being and Time reveals that the being ‘each of us is in each case’ is constituted as a heteronomous and coexistential entity.

It is not only the substantive content of the ‘optics of coexistence’ which is of interest to this thesis as a whole, however. Equally important to the attempt to articulate an understanding of coexistence beyond co-presence is the method through which existence is accessed, and it is with this task that the present chapter is concerned. This method is phenomenology, which Heidegger

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radicalised to pursue his project regarding the question of Being. The historical
development of this method arose, furthermore, through Heidegger's own
attempts to avoid presuppositions about subjectivity when assessing lived
experience. In this methodological search Heidegger challenged the implicit
assumption that the modern subject, which had grounded philosophy since
Descartes, could be used in philosophy and the sciences on the basis of prior
presuppositions and without an attempt to gain access to its existence as it is.
He, therefore, sought to gain access to the facticity of existence. His critical
engagement with phenomenology resulted in an account of coexistential
heteronomy through the analysis of Da-sein (Being-there), or the facticity of
this entity which each of us is. This search for a method further highlights the
fact that coexistence cannot be analysed through the uncritical acceptance of
theoretical assumptions regarding the modern subject but must, rather, be
sought in its facticity. It is necessary, therefore, to explicate this method
through the historical trajectory of Heidegger's search for a method
appropriate for thinking about existence.

Prior to any consideration of the substantive content of his analysis, a
discussion of the philosophical context in which Heidegger's project developed
is also necessary in order to understand the status of its coexistential
heteronomy as an optics. The exposition of the philosophical context presented
here is by necessity brief; it aims, however, to advance the reader's general
understanding of Heidegger's project in order to situate the discussion
undertaken in chapter four. It also highlights that the 'optics of coexistence'
arises within a project that seeks to restate the question of Being as the
question of philosophy, and is not, in and of itself, Heidegger's focus.

3 This focus on facticity is not to be equated with the primacy on 'sense data'. It does not wish
to 'privilege ontology and assume that the world discloses itself by affecting our senses, and
that, therefore, we have come to some primitive or basic observational statements which "tell it
1. Heidegger's project

Heidegger's project revolved around restating the question of Being as the question of philosophy. In order to channel philosophical inquiry towards the question of Being, Heidegger began with the question asked by traditional ontology, namely, 'what is the being of entities?' Heidegger thought that this question had to be preceded by a question into the meaning of Being, in other words, into the 'conditions for the possibility of having any understanding whatsoever.' Contrary to the assumptions of mainstream Heidegger scholarship, Heidegger's own concern was with 'what gives or produces being as an effect,' what 'lets things be what they are, what “determines entities as entities” in their various ways of being.' As early as 1922, when Heidegger wrote the essay 'Phenomenological Interpretations with Respect to Aristotle,' his program was two-fold: first, to inquire into the meaning of Being, what he called fundamental ontology, inseparably accompanied by the second part, namely, the 'destruction' of the history of ontology, where destruction does not imply the rejection of the ontological tradition but rather a critical stance towards it and a re-appropriation of its positive aspects (BT, §6). It is helpful, however, to first outline Heidegger’s philosophical concerns and how these led him to his early engagement with the ontological tradition, prior to turning to the radicalisation of phenomenology beyond subjectivity and towards human facticity.

4 The term 'entities' is interchangeable with 'beings' but is used to avoid confusion.
Heidegger and the ontological tradition

The genesis of ontology in ancient Greece can be seen as a development facilitated in part by the peculiarities of the Greek language. The existence of distinct terms for 'beings' (ta onta), 'to be' (einai) and 'the nature of beings' expressed in the abstract noun 'being' (ousia) led to the question whether there is a unified meaning of being that accrues to all beings (in contradistinction to "what is not") or whether being has irreducibly many different meanings that fall into different categories, depending on the kind of entity that is under investigation.0

Could there be, in other words, a 'unitary concept that demarcates the realm of being as such'?11 The Greeks, John van Buren argues, variously 'experienced being as a stable noeton topon, an intelligible place (Republic 508c),12 an open area of truth in the sense of unconcealment (aletheia), light (phos) or radiant appearing (phainesthai), and emergence (physis).' Despite the apparent variety, however, Being was understood 'to be the aition of beings (the cause of beings in the pre-modern generic sense of what is responsible for something), as well as the arche, which...has the double sense of beginning and governance (Herrschaft), dominion, kingdom.'13 In Greek thinking the formulation of the question of ontology around a unitary concept resulted in an understanding of 'being (Sein) or beingness (Seiendheit) of beings in the sense of a causal ground for beings.'14 As a unitary concept,

Being as ground was also taken to be itself a being, the most beingly being (to on ontos), that is, the highest and most honored being in the hierarchical-teleological order of the cosmos. Thus Greeks ultimately saw in being the divine (to theion).15

The Greeks themselves related to being through logos 'in the inclusive sense of theory, thought, and assertion' – they 'stood in an ocular relation of seeing (idein), contemplative gazing (theorein), and in wondering (thaumazein) to

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11 Frede, "The Question of Being," 44.
14 van Buren, The Young Heidegger, 30.
being. However, despite the phenomenological possibilities which Heidegger saw in the Greeks – ‘letting appear (phainesthai), making manifest (deloun) and un concealing (aletheuein)’ – their seeing relation was modelled on theory and thought, where thinking is understood as assertoric speech.\(^{16}\)

Their understanding of being as ground or as substance, in turn, created the space in which these ontological enquiries were to take place. At the same time, however, it restricted the possible answers that the Greeks were capable of providing. The fundamental metaphysical positions which established themselves in Greek thinking appeared as ‘competing answers: for example, being (Parmenides), logos (Heraclitus), idea (Plato), category, being-in-work (Aristotle)’; this competition, however, took place within a ‘deeper unanimity [which remained] concealed in the very unquestioned question about being as ground.’\(^{17}\) Against the background of this underlying unanimity about Being as substance, these metaphysical positions did not attempt to articulate the question differently or direct it towards a different path.

While Plato had offered a distinction between being and not-being as ‘what has the power to act or be acted on,’ it was Aristotle’s doctrine on the manifold meanings of Being, however, that prevailed in the history of Western metaphysics.\(^{18}\) Frede argues that ‘Aristotle distinguished as many meanings of “being” as there are categories of entities.’ He divided Being into ‘a primary category of substance, designating natural “things” that exist in their own right,’ while regarding other beings as ‘attributes of substances either inhering in them or standing in some other relation to them (quality, quantity, relation, place, time, action, affection, possession, position).’\(^{19}\) Thus, with Aristotle, Being received manifold meanings with physical entities being accorded the dominant meaning of substance and the rest becoming reduced to qualitative attributes of it. Yet, what is important to note is that ‘Aristotle regarded the categories as distinctions contained in the nature of things; they are read off

\(^{16}\) van Buren, The Young Heidegger, 33.
\(^{17}\) van Buren, The Young Heidegger, 31.
\(^{18}\) Plato posed the question of Being in his dialogue The Sophist, calling it a gigantomachia peri tis ousias (a battle of giants about being).
\(^{19}\) Frede, “The Question of Being,” 44.
nature and are not schemas read into or imposed on nature by us.'

Aristotle's categories, then, must be understood as merely describing the natural structure of reality. 'Such a structure is based on the primacy of substances, naturally existing independent entities that form the building blocks of Aristotle's universe. Substances are the only entities that can exist in their own right, while all other entities are attributes that need substances as the substrate for their existence.' As Charles Guignon points out, this is the belief that 'what is ultimately real is what underlies properties—what “stands under” (sub-stantia) and remains continuously present throughout all change.'

The implication of this ontology of substance is that “to be” then means either to be a substance or to be (one of the nine other kinds of) attributes of a substance'; by implication, it meant that there was 'no unified sense of “being” that could be predicated in all categories because, as Frede explains, 'the being of a substance and any of the attributes are irreducibly different.'

Heidegger considered that a false clarity about Being had come about in traditional ontology since, '[on the basis of the Greeks’ initial contributions towards an Interpretation of Being, a dogma has been developed which not only declares the question about the meaning of Being to be superfluous, but sanctions its complete neglect' (BT, 21). It is the widely held acceptance of the manifold meanings divided into categories of Being that Heidegger invoked when he wrote that 'this question has today been forgotten' (BT, 21) implying that the question of the meaning of being, of a ‘unitary concept that demarcates the realm of being as such,' had ceased to be a question, that what ‘the ancient philosophers found continually disturbing as something obscure and hidden has taken on a clarity and self-evidence such that if anyone continues to ask about it he is charged with an error of method' (BT, 21). In elucidating the urgency of going beyond the reliance on categories, and restating the question as ‘continually disturbing,’ Heidegger argued that ontology would remain blind to the question which supposedly animated it ‘if it has not first

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20 Frede, “The Question of Being,” 45, emphasis added.
24 Frede, “The Question of Being,” 44.
adequately clarified the meaning of Being, and conceived this clarification as its fundamental task' (BT, 31).

Heidegger’s goal with respect to the ontological tradition, therefore, was to problematise ‘the idea that reality must be thought of in terms of the idea of substance at all.’ Heidegger considered the reliance on substance or ground as the enduring principle of reality as a ‘metaphysics of presence’ because substance is what ‘remains continuously present throughout all change.’ It is this reliance on substance that has facilitated dichotomous ways of philosophising such as, for example, ‘either there is mind or everything is just matter; either our ideas do represent objects or nothing exists outside the mind…’. These, Heidegger claimed, ‘are derivative, regional ways of being for things,’ which are ‘remote from concrete lived existence.’ This problem of theorising about reality preoccupied Heidegger throughout his student years, to which the discussion turns next.

The early works

Heidegger’s doctoral thesis and qualifying dissertation, or Habilitationsschrift, examined the problem of reality and pointed him towards Husserlian phenomenology. Specifically, both of the early works led Heidegger to challenge the acceptance of Aristotle’s theory of categories within the ontological tradition and attempt to overcome the difficulties with the ‘substance ontology’ that permeated it. The thesis, entitled “The Doctrine of Judgement in Psychologism” (1913), was a critique of psychologism, a strand associated with Franz Brentano and the early Edmund Husserl. Heidegger’s critique of this doctrine showed that ‘that the key to meaning cannot lie in the empirical observation of the actual psychological processes that constitute our thoughts’; indeed, Heidegger argued, the act of judging ‘[i]f we want to know what our thoughts are about…we must analyze the content of thought itself, as distinct from the psychic events that are at work.’ With regards to the

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question of being, the young Heidegger thus became interested in 'how meaning as a whole is embedded in the actual life of the person who entertains a thought...' It is such insights that moved him towards a sustained engagement with Husserlian phenomenology.

The *Habilitationsschrift*, published as *Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus* (The Theory of Categories and Meaning of Duns Scotus), can be seen as a refinement of the question of being. Heidegger expressed an interest in Duns Scotus because the latter considered the Aristotelian system of categories, as briefly described above, to be 'only one of several such systems, a subclass that fits one special part or specific realm of being but does not exhaust reality as such.' Duns Scotus's concerns largely arose from the need to expand the ontological categories for theological reasons: for Scotus, 'the most fundamental concepts apply to God...only in analogous sense.' Scotus did not merely seek to expand or diversify the categories of the Aristotelian tradition. Neither did he only 'assign different realms of reality to the different subject matter of different disciplines'; rather, the scholastic philosopher 'saw the need for a new conception of reality as such':

[i]f different disciplines import different (senses of the) categories, then the categories of reality cannot simply be read off nature, as they were for Aristotle, but they are obviously also read into nature by us, or rather into reality as a whole.

Thus, for Heidegger, '[t]he “question of being” becomes then the question of the givenness of the object to the subject.' Heidegger showed that in Scotus the conditions and means by which the subject takes hold of or interprets its objects, which Scotus had called the 'conditions of subjectivity,' attain paramount importance: 'all objects depend on the meaning that is bestowed on them by the subject, and... they are always part of a wider network of referential totality.' It would be philosophy's purpose to understand 'in what sense there is a structure of meaning that stands in relation to or conditions what one might call the structure of reality.'

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28 Both in Frede, "The Question of Being," 47, second emphasis added.
29 Frede, "The Question of Being," 47.
Scotus considered language as the tool with which to access the structure of meanings, given that ‘all meanings find their expression in linguistic signs.’ Scotus explored how language, and particularly its grammatical structure, imposes a discernible form on our thinking. According to Heidegger’s examination of Scotus, ‘the categories of “all that is” become the categories of our understanding of being: the categories become the “elements and means of the interpretation of the meaning of what is experienced”’. The idea that categories of ‘what is’ are categories of the interpreter’s understanding of being, crucially, urged Heidegger to question the consequences of reflection and theorising on reality and so to challenge Aristotelian metaphysical realism. Heidegger concluded, then, that reality was framed by the subject’s understanding, and this led to his concern with accessing a pre-theoretical attitude arose in Heidegger’s thinking. Thus, Heidegger set out to access a sense of beings outside theorising and reflection by studying ‘the way [entities] show up in the flux of our everyday, prereflective activities.’

Heidegger’s engagement with Duns Scotus also led him to argue that the objectifying outlook originated not so much in the natural sciences (as Husserlian phenomenology and neo-Kantianism, the two prominent philosophical ‘movements’ of the early twentieth century, had claimed) but ‘from the theoretical attitude itself.’ Scotus’s insights provided the impetus for the search for a method for ontology to avoid the imposition of categories onto everyday experience by modes of theoretical thinking, which served to ‘un-live’ human experience and objectify existence. Importantly, however, it

is not necessarily the case that Heidegger was against theory; rather, Heidegger aimed to interrogate anew what it is to be a human being and for this purpose he needed a new approach towards pre-reflective activity, 'a phenomenology of “mindless” everyday coping skills as the basis of all intelligibility.' 37 In this vein, Heidegger subsequently 'made it his task to show that there is a meaningful concept of the being of all beings, a conception that underlies all our understanding of reality.' 38 This task found expression in a holistic conception of human existence as “Dasein,” that is, as being-in-a-world, or of “care” as the meaning of our existence, which comprises and unifies in its understanding all the different conceptions of what there is, let alone of temporality as the transcendent horizon of the overall meaning of being as such.39

This is perhaps an opportune juncture at which to focus more specifically on Heidegger’s search for a method for ontology, which he found through a critical engagement with phenomenology.

2. Radical phenomenology as the method of ontology

Although providing a generally valid definition of phenomenology is a difficult task, there are certain things that are accepted as the means and tasks of inquiry.40 According to John Sallis, for example, phenomenology is, in the first instance, the methodological demand, that one attend constantly and faithfully to the things themselves. It is the demand that philosophical thought proceed by attending to things as they themselves show themselves rather than in terms of presupposed opinions, theories, or concepts.41

The ‘things themselves’ refer to objects of perception because phenomenology involves ‘attending to the perceptual object as it shows itself,’ accepting that

37 Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World, 3. P. Keller and D. Weberman, “Heidegger and the Source(s) of Intelligibility (Dasein, Care, Temporality),” Continental Philosophy Review 31, no. 4 (1998): 369-386 contest Dreyfus's understanding the mindless ongoing coping is the ground of intelligibility and rightly suggest “care.”
38 Frede, “The Question of Being.” 43.
'perception of such objects is always one-sided.'

Performed again under different conditions, the phenomenological method may yield different results. At the same time, however, phenomenology saw itself as able to provide 'the scientific ideal of knowledge with a rigorous foundation'; Husserl, in particular, was 'deeply suspicious of attempts to apply the model of the natural or positive sciences to the understanding of human consciousness.'

Phenomenology aimed, in this regard, to eliminate the presuppositions amassed by the natural sciences about the world and objects of study, so that the phenomenologist could access experience as pure phenomena. In this way, Husserl distinguished between man's involvement with things and the world, which he called the natural attitude, and the phenomenological attitude, which denotes 'the reflective point of view from which we carry out philosophical analysis of the intentions exercised in the natural attitude and the objective correlates of these intentions.'

The natural attitude 'only credits that which is physically given,' and in so doing, it 'either denies the life of consciousness altogether or else "naturalises" it as a "fact" of physical reality.' If encountered as objects through the natural attitude, therefore, 'the phenomena of consciousness are thereby deprived of their essential status as living intentional experience.' In order to avoid this misunderstanding, Husserl proposed the suspension of the intentions and convictions that operate in the natural attitude by something he called 'the phenomenological epoche.'

The epoche is not a doubt or negation of these intentions, as it was for Descartes, but rather a distancing which is required in order to allow the phenomenologist to contemplate their structure. The method by which one achieves the epoche or suspension, and by which one moves from the natural attitude to the phenomenological attitude, is called the phenomenological reduction, and it is, perhaps, the most salient feature of Husserlian and subsequent phenomenologies. The reduction is to be understood as 'a "leading back" from natural beliefs to the reflective consideration of intentions and their

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objects.46 In the words of Mary Warnock, the reduction 'consists in putting on one side (in brackets) all that is known, normally assumed, about the objects of perception or thought in order to describe and, later, analyse them as pure phenomena.47 Bracketing-out and description are crucial for un-objectified access to experience, which theories of the natural sciences could not obtain. What, though, remains behind once the reduction has been carried out and the *epoche* or suspension has occurred? John Caputo suggests that 'by the reduction the phenomenological investigator is, according to Husserl, carried back from the hitherto naively accepted world of objects, values and other men, to the trascendental subjectivity which “constitutes” them.'48 Bracketing the world thus shows 'how the ordinary objective world is dependent upon the perceiving and thinking subject,' such that what has been thus-far taken for granted as existing independent of any act of perception is 'shown to be given both existence and intelligibility or sense by my transcendentnal Ego,' which is the self left over after common assumptions previously held have been reduced or suspended.49 As Warnock claims, the goal of the phenomenological *epoche* 'may be said to be transcendental subjectivity' or 'consciousness.'50 It must be remembered that there are, in fact, two separate points that must be retained from this summary statement about phenomenology as a 'method.' The first is the return to pure phenomena and, the second, is that the reduction 'enables us to return to the generating axis of our intentional experiences before they are overlaid by objectifying constructs,' the generating axis being transcendentnal subjectivity. Husserl was striving towards restating the relation between knowing and the world: 'the world is an *experience which we live* before it becomes an *object which we know* in some impersonal or detached fashion.'51 This statement contests at a fundamental level the subject-object dichotomy, reminiscent of Heidegger’s comments about either/ors, and

45 Both in Kearney, *Modern Movements in European Philosophy*, 16.
50 Warnock, *Existentialism*, 35. See also Solomon, *From Rationalism to Existentialism*, 166.
replaces the notion of ‘substance’ as the enduring quality of things or entities with the category of relation: ‘[m]an and world are first and foremost in relation; it is only subsequently, at the reflective level of logic, that we divide them into separate entities.” Phenomenology, then, seeks a pre-theoretical attitude through which to gain access to life or lived experience by bracketing out the imposition of theoretical frameworks and schemata which prevent things from showing themselves in themselves.

Returning to Heidegger’s search for a method for the question of Being, it should be clarified that Heidegger did not follow ‘unerringly’ in the methodological path of Husserl. For Heidegger, phenomenology was the method which conceived of itself as the attempt to investigate originary lived experience, and was, as such, Heidegger’s chosen method for his project of fundamental ontology. He believed, however, that up to this stage phenomenologists had
defined the human being as a coherence of experience, a centre of acts unified in an ego: they never raised the question of the sense [meaning] of Being of this, our own Dasein [existence]. Instead, they fell back on traditional definitions dividing man into reason and sense, soul and body, inner and outer, without a sense of what holds these realities together as a whole.

Hence, Heidegger’s need to restate the question of Being (i.e. what produces being as an effect or what determined beings as beings) as a question led him to a radicalisation of phenomenology, away from its Husserlian assumptions. It is telling that Heidegger was aware that there were numerous limitations to phenomenology. He wrote in his discussion on method in *Being and Time*, ‘what is essential in it does not lie in its actuality as a philosophical “movement” [“Richtung”]. Higher than actuality stands possibility. We can understand phenomenology only by seizing upon it as a possibility’ (BT, 62).

Radical phenomenology

After World War I, Heidegger collaborated with Husserl to implement radical phenomenology, 'which he now regarded as [philosophy’s] highest and deepest possibility.'\(^{55}\) Such a radicalisation centred on 'explicating life as it presents itself to us in concrete, individual, historical existence.'\(^{56}\) Heidegger's attempts departed from Husserlian phenomenology, despite their close working relationship throughout the early post-war years. It was, in fact, Heidegger's response to Husserl's critics that led to his departure towards accessing lived experience.

The post-war years witnessed the interactions and debates between neo-Kantianism, proponents of which included figures such as Paul Natorp, Heinrich Rickert (Heidegger's doctoral supervisor), and Wilhelm Windelband, and phenomenology, as advocated by Husserl.\(^{57}\) Neo-Kantianism was the reigning philosophical movement at the time and Heidegger made it his task to 'expose the primacy of the theoretical attitude' in its methodology and in the philosophy of values in general.\(^{58}\) The critical exchanges between neo-Kantianism and phenomenology revolved around Husserl’s call 'for a radical break with any philosophy which is even remotely oriented toward a worldview.'\(^{59}\) In 1919 Heidegger criticised neo-Kantianism, arguing that it understood itself as 'the critical science of values which, “based as it is on the basic acts of consciousness and their norms, has in its system an ultimate and necessary tendency toward a worldview,”'\(^{60}\) despite the fact that neo-Kantianism regarded wordviews to be the personal affair of the individual and not the focus of philosophy as such. Heidegger supported the Husserlian


perspective arguing that worldview and philosophy are incompatible. This notion of philosophy as radically separated from worldview led Heidegger to suggest that philosophy ought to remain ‘outside any connection with the ultimate human questions,’\(^6\) which was meant to recover philosophy’s vocation which did not ‘consist in building and developing a worldview.’\(^6\)

George Kovacs explains that for Heidegger ‘the true essence of philosophy is something quite unique beyond any connection with ideology, worldview, and teachings about the ultimate destiny and meaning of human living.’\(^6\)

Heidegger considered that the kind of thinking that can be called philosophical should be ‘more rigorous, more primordial than scientific knowing; it is more radical, more essential than the exploration of nature and life by the theorizing attitude of the sciences.’\(^6\)

He intended to establish that ‘philosophy is not a theoretical, speculative science at all; it is a way of disclosing (living) experience.’\(^6\)

The harsh opposition between neo-Kantianism and phenomenology was, in fact, rooted in the very proximity of the two ‘movements.’ Both were in search of ‘establishing philosophy as the “primal” or “original” science (Urwissenschaft)...to determine origins and ultimates, the first and last things, the underived from which all else is derived, which can only be “shown” or “pointed out” but not “proven”.’\(^6\)

In the early 1920s Heidegger sought the way that would make phenomenology into a ‘primordial science.’\(^6\)

Heidegger took phenomenology into a new direction by focusing on the need to look at the origin, the Ur-sprung or “primal leap” into the factic,\(^6\) as opposed to life itself that had been the concern of the totality of human and natural sciences, which investigated factic life by dividing it into separate disciplines.

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\(^{63}\) Kovacs, “Philosophy as Primordial Science (Urwissenschaft) in the Early Heidegger,” 124.

\(^{64}\) Kovacs, “Philosophy as Primordial Science (Urwissenschaft) in the Early Heidegger,” 124-125

\(^{65}\) Kovacs, “Philosophy as Primordial Science (Urwissenschaft) in the Early Heidegger,” 125.


Phenomenology, therefore, aimed to locate and access 'the origin of the factic life.'\(^6\) This is not, however, entirely unproblematic; as Kisiel argues, it is rather 'the most basic problem of phenomenology is itself, understood as a science of origin.'\(^7\) If that is indeed the self-proclaimed mission of phenomenology then what would be the method and the matter of such a science of origins? 'The problem of a pretheoretical science thus ultimately becomes a problem of language: how to approach and articulate the dynamic, and thus elusive, facticity of life?'\(^8\) This was the programmatic call of Husserl himself that phenomenology be able to grasp and also 'articulate the pretheoretical realm of life in a pretheoretical way, and so to achieve the unique status of a pretheoretical science.'\(^9\) It is while searching for his own way towards accessing life philosophically that Heidegger engaged with the two simple, yet fundamental, objections rendered against phenomenology by Paul Natorp, the neo-Kantian philosopher associated with the Marburg School; specifically, it is his reaction to these criticisms that led him away from Husserl's phenomenology.

Natorp's critique argued that 'the “stream” of living experience is brought to a halt by reflection: “there is no immediate grasp (hold) of living experience”.'\(^10\) This argument challenged both Husserlian phenomenology and Heidegger's own attempts to use phenomenology as the method for accessing lived experience for his question of Being. There were two specific objections raised by Natorp, the first of which suggests the inability of phenomenology to have 'intuitive access to its chosen subject-matter.'\(^11\) This objection amounts to asking the question: '[h]ow is the nonobjectifiable subject matter of phenomenology to be even approached without already theoretically inflicting an objectification upon it? How are we to go along with life reflectively without de-living it?'\(^12\) The second objection, furthermore, doubted that

\(^{71}\) Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time*, 47.
\(^{72}\) Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time*, 47.
phenomenology was able to *express* its purported access to its subject matter. As Kisiel explains,

> [p]henomenology claims to merely describe what it sees. But description is circumscription into general concepts, a "subsumption" under abstractions. The concrete immediacy to be described is thereby mediated into abstract contexts. There is no such thing as immediate description, since all expression, any attempt to put something into words, generalizes and so objectifies.  

Natorp had argued that reflective analysis always already unwittingly transformed, or even deformed, the living experiences upon which it reflected. This ‘devastation’ brought on to experience could be undone, he claimed, by the method of reconstruction, according to which ‘analysis and interpretation can “regain” (reconstruct) the “wholeness of the subjective” (the immediately given prior to the analysis) from the primordial life of consciousness “theoretically”’. Heidegger, however, challenged this proposed method of reconstruction, arguing that it could not successfully disclose the sphere of lived experience because, despite Natorp’s arguments to the contrary, ‘[e]ven reconstruction is objectification; it consists in construction, in theorizing.’ For Heidegger, Natorp’s method brought about the ‘absolutization of the logical’ and the ‘most radical absolutization of the theoretical.’ With respect to Natorp’s objections as such, Heidegger responded by turning away from the transcendental or pure phenomenology of Husserl towards *Verstehen*, or understanding, a school of thought largely influenced by Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834) and Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911).  

Heidegger’s reply to the first objection about accessing life without objectifying it ‘pointed to a non-intuitive form of access...a certain familiarity which life already has of itself and which phenomenology needs only to repeat. This spontaneous experience of experience, this streaming return of

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77 Both in Kovacs, “Philosophy as Primordial Science (*Urwissenschaft*) in the Early Heidegger,” 129.  
79 For Schleiermacher and Dilthey see, Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time*, 89-93 and 100-105 respectively.
experiencing life upon already experienced life, is the immanent historicity of life.'

Heidegger suggested that instead of relying on 'objectifying concepts which seize life and so still its stream,' one ought to turn to the kind of access that life has to itself, which 'provides the possibility of finding less intrusive pre-cepts ot pre-concepts which at once reach back into life's motivation and forward into its tendency.' This understanding that life already has of itself 'at once repeats and foreruns life's course accordingly stretches itself unitively and indifferently along the whole of the life stream without disrupting it.'

Heidegger’s response advocated against extracting experience and subsuming it to the universal, which he had likened to the situation of 'form subsuming matter.' Instead, Heidegger called for a 'nonobjective option of a more indicative and intentional universal stemming directly from the very temporal intentional movement of finding oneself experiencing experience.'

What is crucial to note is that in responding to the first objection, Heidegger also provided the answer to the second critique, which had contested the ability to express immediate experience. 'The problems of intuition and expression are therefore transposed into the possibility of a 1) nonreflective understanding and 2) the nonobjectifying conceptualization that it [non-reflective understanding] itself provides, that allusive universal called the formal indication.' Formal indication formulates the understanding of life that life has of itself into concepts which merely designate certain terms to denote in a formal manner the phenomena under scrutiny, leaving their determination to the phenomenological bracketing-out and description. As Kisiel explains '[w]ords like “life,” “lived experience,” “I myself” drawn from daily life pose a danger of objectification in our descriptions; they cannot be taken univocally, but rather must be understood in their formal character as indicative of certain phenomena of the concrete domain.' Formal indication, thus, was Heidegger's attempt to avoid the reduction of phenomena to their

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80 Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time, 48, emphasis added.
85 Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time, 49, emphasis and brackets added.
86 Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time, 121.
representative concepts and the subsequent neglect of these phenomena of lived experience in which such an ossification resulted.

Heidegger’s reactions and responses to these neo-Kantian objections opened up the way to the pre-theoretical solution to the problem of intuition and expression. Whereas Husserlian phenomenology lost the ‘the immediacy of intuition’ in the ‘mediacy of expression,’ a disruption which led Husserl to seek a theoretical solution to the methodological problem of access and expression, just as Natorp did, Heidegger attempted to ‘find less intrusive, more natural ways to get a grip of its subject matter, which remain in accord with the “immanent historicity of life in itself”’. This non-disruptive entry into the historicity of life is an implicit understanding called ‘hermeneutic intuition,’ which was brought to serve phenomenology methodologically. The hermeneutic intuition could understand ‘the articulations of life itself, which accrue to the self-experience that occurs in the “dialectical” return of experiencing life to already experienced life.’

The departure from Husserl ultimately rested on the need to conduct philosophical questioning which ‘is not added on and attached to the questioned object, factual life, externally; rather it is to be understood as the explicit grasping of a basic movement of factual life,’ by that life itself. In other words, the structure of understanding is such that ‘[a]ll of our experiences, beginning with our most direct perceptions, are from the start already expressed, indeed interpreted.’ This turn away from Husserlian phenomenology amounted, as Kisiel argues, to a ‘hermeneutic breakthrough,’ the point at which the method and the subject matter are revealed as united, where ‘a formally indicating hermeneutics and a dynamically understood facticity belong essentially together in a close-knit unity.’ Heidegger’s answer to Natorp’s objections of accessibility and expression is akin to a desire

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87 Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time, 49.
88 Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time, 55, also citing Martin Heidegger, Zur Bestimmung der Philosophy, 117. He is citing from student transcripts of the lecture and the comment on the immanent historicity of life did not make it into the GA Vol. 56/57.
90 Heidegger, “Phenomenological Interpretations With Respect to Aristotle,” 359.
91 Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time, 49; see also (BT, §31 and §32).
'to let the facts speak for themselves; and at the same time to claim that there are nor such things as uninterpreted facts.'

But his answer was also much more than that: it is the grasping of the presupposed 'subject' in non-subjectivist terms. Warnock has argued that Heidegger's reformulation of phenomenology amounted to a rejection of the attempt by transcendental phenomenology 'to isolate the "transcendental Ego", the undifferentiated, pure "I," who perceives and constructs the world, but is not involved in it.'

Heidegger radicalised phenomenology 'by adhering even more radically than Husserl to the phenomenological demand to attend to the things themselves' by asking 'what remains unthought in the appeal to the things themselves.'

What had remained unthought in Husserl's phenomenology was thinking of Being-thus, of how it is that being appears as something. Thinking the unthought led to the search 'for an entity both with regard to the fact that it is and with regard to its Being as it is' (BT, 24, emphasis added).

3. Challenging subjectivity: the priority of facticity

As has been already argued in the introduction of the thesis, International Relations relies on an ontology centred around the notion of the modern subject. Philosophically, there have been many manifestations of modern subjectivity. However, in most of these manifestations the modern subject, Stephen K. White has noted, is the 'assertive, disengaged self who generates distance from its background (tradition, embodiment) and foreground (external nature, other subjects) in the name of accelerating mastery of them.' This, moreover, is precisely the subject which refers to itself as 'I.' As was shown

94 Warnock, Existentialism, 49.
98 See the discussion in William J. Richardson, Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought (The Hague, NL: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963), 321-330.
above, Greek thought maintained that Being was substance, that which lay under or grounded, entities. Even in the attempt to use the subject, knowledge, life, history, or society as 'as the universal horizon of inquiry' Heidegger suggested that 'in these modern concepts the ancient sense of being is actually implicitly retained.'

In Heidegger's view, the modern conception of the subject was infiltrated by the notion of substance (BT, 123-131). According to Heidegger, Descartes 'takes the Being of "Dasein" (to whose basic constitution Being-in-the-world belongs) in the very same way as he takes the Being of the res extensa — namely, as substance' (BT, 131). For Heidegger, the main problem with the modern subject understood as substance, or bearing an essence, is that it is 'phenomenally inadequate.' As John McCumber suggests, 'ousia [substance]...is inadequate as a descriptive framework for the fabric of our lives'; rather than accepting the modern subject as given, Heidegger proposed instead to undertake an examination of this entity, abandoning the 'I' of post-Cartesian philosophy, which had obscured the structures of existence of this entity whose Being is in each case mine, structures which cannot be grasped in terms of substance: 'If we posit an "I" or subject as that which is proximally given we shall completely miss the phenomenal content [Bestand] of Dasein' because 'every idea of a "subject"...still posits posits the subjectum (hypoikeimenon) along with it' (BT, 72).

Heidegger's early years at Freiburg were spent, as was suggested above, seeking a way to challenge modern subjectivity in its manifestation as Husserlian transcendental consciousness, which resounded with Cartesianism. This challenge also manifests itself into an evolution in the terms specifying the matter of Heidegger's project. In the War Emergency Semester of 1919 the

101 See also John McCumber, Metaphysics and Oppression: Heidegger's Challenge to Western Philosophy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), 219.
102 McCumber, Metaphysics and Oppression, 206.
topic is still 'amorphously' described as 'life in and for itself.' This later changes to 'factic life experience' with Heidegger adopting the term 'facticity' from neo-Kantianism to describe what Kisiel has called his 'own “distressing” topic,' that of philosophically accessing life. By the Summer Semester of 1920 the matter of his thinking becomes 'concrete actual Dasein,' reminiscent of the vocabulary of Being and Time. The term 'Dasein' is used in order to avoid the preconceptions that accompany 'subject' and to tentatively describe an entity which we ourselves are. As Jean-Luc Nancy notes,

Dasein—that ordinary German noun for existence, which Heidegger gives as a “title” to humanity and beneath which, for him, humanity and only humanity ex-ists—is the being-the-there of being itself...the there of being, its taking place, insofar as it is a ravishment and a distancing (a coming and going of sense), takes place neither anywhere other not toward anywhere other than the here of this world here.

The term 'Dasein,' this 'intentionally vague, non-descriptive, almost vacuous designation,' both avoids presuppositions about what kind of entity this is (conscious, having mind and body) and also unites the search for method with the matter to be analysed. A look at Heidegger's 1923 course 'Ontology' illustrates that his notion that 'life' has the ability to access its own experience, had by then been connected to the entity which has this ability: Dasein, in each case our own. In the eleven years between the Habilitationsschrift and Being and Time, Heidegger pursued an interaction between matter and method to arrive at a convergence, 'a point where they are one and the same: a hermeneutics of facticity.' The genitive 'of' is a double genitive. At once it means that understanding, Verstehen, belongs to facticity; and at the same time it means that understanding takes facticity as its object. The hermeneutics of facticity 'is simply the operation of philosophy itself that catches hold of life in

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104 All quotes in Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time, 117.
107 Heidegger, Ontology, 13.
109 van Buren, The Young Heidegger, 94.

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its activity...[it] is factical life caught in the act of interpreting itself.'

As Heidegger himself notes,

"Facticity" is the designation we will use for the character of the being of "our" "own" Dasein. More precisely, this expression means: in each case "this" Dasein in its being-there for a while at the particular time...insofar as it is, in the character of its being, "there" in the manner of be-ing."

For Heidegger, then, 'Dasein,' serves as a formal indicator for this entity whose primary characteristics have yet to be properly delineated by means of existential analysis, a type of inquiry explained below. Importantly, in avoiding the term 'subject' and choosing 'Dasein' over the 'I' of Cartesian philosophy, Heidegger leaves open the question of the 'who' of this entity, while at the same time claiming that in each case 'I' am this entity. However, Heidegger is not simply proposing any type of inquiry for examining Dasein. He states quite clearly that such an inquiry must take the form of what he calls existential analysis. '[F]undamental ontology, from which almost all ontologies can take their rise, must be sought in the existential analytic of Dasein' (in German, Daseinanalytik) (BT, 34).

What, then, is the existential analytic through which Heidegger interrogates Dasein? It is the type of inquiry that enables access to 'lived experience' and an investigation of the entities within the world by means other than theoretical construction. Existential analysis concerns itself with the structures of existence of Dasein in order to find out how Dasein is without assuming in advance, and on the assumptions of traditional ontology, what it is. The how and what are related since, as Heidegger has shown in his rejoinder to Natorp, there is an 'intimate relationship between method and subject matter in ontology' which enables to letting-be-seen of Dasein's constitution as Being-in-the-world.

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111 Heidegger, Ontology, 5.

Matter and method: phenomenology as the method for ontology

Heidegger’s own engagement with phenomenology was configured to his specific intention to redirect philosophical thought to the Question of Being, which now may be restated. Heidegger has brought phenomenology to bear on the facticity of entities, rejecting the phenomenological reduction of isolating the pure I from the perceptual objects. Phenomenology and ontology become explicitly intertwined because in interpretative phenomenology the ‘perceiving subject’ turns to inquire about itself as the perceptual object. The analysis that being which each of us is and which Heidegger referred to as ‘Dasein’ showed Dasein to be the investigator, as well as das Befragte, or that which is interrogated (BT, 24). Hence, Heidegger’s phenomenological concern becomes the manner in which Dasein shows ‘itself to itself.’ From Greek ontology Heidegger’s thought received its fundamental issue, and from Husserlian phenomenological beginnings Heideggerian thought reformulated its own radicalised access to existence.¹¹³

Radicalised phenomenology had to become ontology in order to become the method for ‘that which makes possible this showing [of Dasein to itself]’; yet, what remains unthought is ‘the ground of the possibility of such showings as those to which phenomenology demands we attend,’ where the ‘grounds must themselves be such as can be brought to show themselves.’¹¹⁴ John D. Caputo also agrees that ‘Dasein’s understanding of Being is the sole condition under which both ontology and phenomenology are possible.’¹¹⁵ Not only is phenomenology possible solely as ontology, but in the words of Heidegger himself, ‘only as phenomenology, is ontology possible’ (BT, 60). Furthermore, Caputo argues that ‘[i]t is only under the condition that Dasein understands Being that beings can be experienced as beings (phenomenology) and that they can be understood to be (ontology).’¹¹⁶

¹¹⁶ Caputo, “The Question of Being and Transcendental Phenomenology,” 103, emphasis added.
This interconnected matter-method of a 'more hermeneutically oriented phenomenology'\textsuperscript{117} was intended by Heidegger as the 'way to return to origins through an analysis of preconceptions'\textsuperscript{118} about ontology which permeated the tradition after Aristotle, as discussed in section one. What has become, since Heidegger's initial attempts to dismantle the guiding question of ontology, the celebrated method of deconstruction (\textit{Destruktion} or destruction meaning deconstruction, critique) was, in this way, rendered inseparable from phenomenology. 'Destruction is first regarded as a counter to the pervasive tendency of objectification...and then in its more comprehensive role as an antidote to any and every tendency to lapse or "fall" from originality into the "surface existence" of everydayness.'\textsuperscript{119} In thinking about the meaning of Being, the thinker has to have a ground from which to undertake the thought. At the same time, the thought has to be aware of the philosophical tradition in which it occurs and which makes its articulation possible. The notion of destruction or 'destructive retrieve' as Kockelmans has formulates it, provides both of those requirements. It destroys 'in the tradition what is philosophically unjustifiable and maintain[s] those primordial experiences from which genuine philosophical insights ultimately flow.'\textsuperscript{120} The task of fundamental ontology, is thus, made possible by destruction: 'the destructive retrieve and the phenomenological method cannot be taken to be independent and unrelated procedures; rather both procedures belong intimately together and the one (hermeneutic phenomenology) cannot possibly achieve its goal without the other (destructive retrieve).'\textsuperscript{121} Thus the destructive retrieve does not overcome a tradition, but rather, searches for and retains its positive possibilities, which are subsequently used to transform the tradition's \textit{problematique} and preserve it as a possible question.

Having transformed phenomenology as the method for ontology, in \textit{Being and Time}, it no longer 'characterise[s] the what of the objects of philosophical

\textsuperscript{117} Kisiel, \textit{The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time}, 49.
\textsuperscript{118} Kisiel, \textit{The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time}, 117.
\textsuperscript{119} Kisiel, \textit{The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time}, 117.
\textsuperscript{120} Kockelmans, "Destructive Retrieve and Hermeneutic Phenomenology in \textit{Being and Time}," 118.
\textsuperscript{121} Kockelmans, "Destructive Retrieve and Hermeneutic Phenomenology in \textit{Being and Time}," 108.
research as subject matter,’ and comes to designate ‘the how of that research’ (BT, 50). Phenomenology is made up of two components, those of phenomenon and logos. The first term, phenomenon, is derivative of the verb ‘phainesthai’ which means ‘to show itself.’ Phenomenon is ‘that which shows itself, the manifest’ yet the word’s relation to the verb ‘phaino’ which means ‘to bring to the light of day, to put in the light’ exemplifies that a phenomenon ‘signifies that which shows itself in itself, the manifest’ (BT, 51). However, ‘an entity can show itself from itself in many ways, depending in each case on the kind of access we have to it’ (BT, 51). It is possible, therefore, that entities ‘show themselves in many different ways: they may appear as something they are not (semblance), or as an indication of the presence of something else that does not show itself directly (symptoms), or as the manifestation of something that is essentially incapable of ever manifesting itself directly.’

For Heidegger, then, a phenomenon is

something that proximally and for the most part does not show itself at all: it is something that lies hidden, in contrast to that which proximally and for the most part does show itself; but at the same time it is something that belongs to what thus shows itself, and it belongs to it so essentially as to constitute its meaning and its ground (BT, 59).

The second term, ‘logos,’ in turn, is deprived of its usual rendering as Reason and, in Being and Time, refers instead to ‘discourse.’ As such, it denotes ‘making manifest what one is “talking about” in one’s discourse’ (BT, 56). Logos, then, ‘lets something be seen (phainesthai), namely, what the discourse is about’ (BT, 56). It brings about this letting-be-seen “apo”...that is, its lets us see something from the very thing which the discourse is about’ (BT, 56). Logos ought to be understood as referring precisely to ‘this fundamental uncovering or unconcealing of entities in their Being.’ It is because logos ‘is a letting-something-be-seen’ that ‘it can therefore be true or false’ as aletheuein (unconceal) and pseusthai (cover up) respectively.

Phenomenology, moreover, also ‘informs us of the how with which the what is to be treated in this science,’ recalling that Heidegger’s etymological reflections on phenomenology are rooted in ontology’s connection to

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phenomenology, i.e., to the implicit, non-intuitive understanding which existence has of itself (BT, 59). It is with delineating this priority of Dasein that this chapter concludes.

The Paradoxical priority of Dasein?

Heidegger at that time agrees with modern philosophy, from Descartes to Husserl, that philosophical investigation has for its ground the being that we ourselves are. What he disagrees with is not the priority of our own being, but the ontological definition of our being.124 In his account of the analysis of Dasein, Heidegger set out to challenge the predominance of subjectivity that has provided the basis for human inquiry in the modern era. Yet, it may appear as a paradox that the very being to which Being and Time accords priority is an entity which appears to be suspiciously akin to the subject. Is not the proposed existential analysis of Dasein another exercise in the same tradition? At this juncture, it must be emphasised that Dasein is not equivalent to the modern subject, for at least three reasons. First, Heidegger ‘contests the view that the being of every entity is merely its capacity for being apprehended as an immanent or transcendent object by a present consciousness.’125 Second, ‘the subject of intentionality, far from constituting “a region of being that is enclosed in itself” and absolute as it does for Husserl, is in fact an entity the being of which is openness, transcendence.’126 Third, Heidegger, as noted briefly above, proposes that ‘a phenomenological approach to the being of the intentional ought to begin by paying attention to the intentional behaviour of man in his concrete and daily life, to the ways in which man actually comports himself to the things of the world’ and cannot be ‘be revealed by turning away from the facticity of human experience.’127 Since experience of the world is paramount for phenomenology ‘a phenomenological interpretation of subjectivity must radically disassociate itself from what is often referred to as a worldless Cartesian subject, a res

123 Mulhall, Heidegger and Being and Time, 24.
125 Rudolf Bernet, “Husserl and Heidegger on Intentionality and Being,” Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 21, no. 2 (1990), 146.
126 Bernet, “Husserl and Heidegger on Intentionality and Being,” 146.
cogitans...it must avoid a notion of subjectivity in which it becomes a problem to account for how a subject can ever hook up with the world.128

Therefore, Heidegger was concerned to avoid positing a theoretical account of existence, which isolates it from its world; on the contrary, he wished to show that Dasein's dealings in the world are always already infused with meaning, and take place within already existing intelligibility; such availability of meaning, in turn, leads to wonderment: to the question of Being itself. In the words of Robert B. Pippin,

to deal with objects, other persons, social practices, and so forth, all the "beings" or "entities," is to be engaged in an always disclosed world, familiar and saturated with significance. Any sort of dealing, whether practical or cognitive, goes on "in the light of" such already present intelligibility, and ought to force on us the question of the possibility of such significance itself, or the meaning of Being in general.129

The possibility of things making sense to Dasein, and more importantly, the possibility that Dasein makes sense to itself rests on certain conditions: "what are the conditions for the possibility that Dasein could make sense to itself, could, in other words, be "at issue" for itself?"130 An initial answer to this question is that the 'meaning of Being must already be available to us [Dasein] in some way,' otherwise Dasein could not ask the question in the first instance (BT, 25, brackets added). Yet this initial understanding of Being is "so infiltrated with traditional theories and opinions about Being that these remain hidden as sources of the way in which it is prevalently understood."(BT, 25) Dasein, then, is the entity which has some understanding of Being, although this understanding is saturated with pre-existing theories which occlude proper understanding. Thus, in order to gain a better understanding as to 'Being', the existential structures of this entity, to which some understanding of Being belongs, must be investigated. Dasein, moreover, is the entity that poses the question of the meaning of Being, and, in order to

127 Bernet, "Husserl and Heidegger on Intentionality and Being," 146.
to work out the question of Being adequately, we must make an entity – the inquirer – transparent in his own Being. The very asking of the question is an entity’s mode of Being; and as such it gets its essential character from what is inquired about – namely, Being (BT, 26-27).

In other words, the choice of Dasein is not accidental; at the very least, by posing the question of Being, Dasein launches the inquiry, so to speak. Dasein is the being under analysis, as opposed to the modern subject, and this choice is the reasons for the suggested priority of this entity. In his consideration of the question of Being, Heidegger discerns three closely related ways in which Dasein has priority. First, ‘Dasein is an entity whose Being has the determinate character of existence’ and thus exhibits ontic priority. Second, Dasein has an ontological priority because its ‘existence is thus determinative for it’; yet, ‘Dasein also possesses—as constitutive for its understanding of existence—an understanding of Being of all entities of a character other than its own’ (BT, 34). This understanding indicates Dasein’s third priority, which constitutes ‘the ontico-ontological condition for the possibility of all ontologies.’(BT, 34, emphasis added). These priorities are revealed to be related, therefore, to Dasein’s factical being as existence, a fact which is determines the kind of Being that it is – and the Being that it is constitutes the possibility of understanding itself and entities other than itself.

4. Conclusion

The chapter has provided the context within which an ‘optics of coexistence,’ which will be the focus of the following chapter, can be understood. Heidegger’s philosophical project sought to challenge the predominance of the subject in modern philosophy, in his search for the appropriate method for the question of Being. Discussing the search for method also highlighted that Heidegger’s thought was not animated by the specific issue of coexistence, but was concerned with reinstating the question of the meaning of Being as a valid philosophical undertaking. The method Heidegger used for philosophically accessing existence aimed to go beyond the reflective or theoretical attitude. Its

111 Ontic refers to features which have to do with actual life, with beings as opposed to Being.
radicalisation by Heidegger wedded phenomenology to ontology, in order to make possible the showing of Dasein to itself. Such a 'hermeneutics of facticity' indicates that facticity has an understanding of itself and that understanding has to take facticity as its object. It is out of this confluence that existence lets itself be seen as coexistential and heteronomous. The coming chapter, therefore, will discuss the elements that comprise the 'optics of coexistence' arising out of the existential analysis of Dasein and reflect specifically on the question of otherness in coexistence.
Chapter 4

An Optics of Coexistence: Dasein’s Radical Embeddedness in its World

The previous chapter outlined Heidegger’s critical engagement with phenomenology and traditional ontology in search of a method that would access lived experience while, at the same time, avoiding the prevalent assumptions related to the modern subject. The present chapter, in turn, examines the substantive existential analysis of Being-in-the-world found in Heidegger’s *Being and Time*, out of which, it is argued below, emerges an account of the primary sociality of existence (*Da-sein*).\(^1\) Whereas a ‘subject’ is traditionally understood as an ‘assertive, disengaged self who generates distance from its background (tradition, embodiment) and foreground (external nature, other subjects) in the name of accelerating mastery of them,’\(^2\) the interrogation of Dasein’s existential structures offers an account of existence beyond autonomy.

Specifically, Heidegger’s account of Being-in-the-world diverges substantially from previous Cartesian and post-Cartesian articulations of subjectivity. Whereas they tend to understand the subject as an isolated and self-sufficient being, Heidegger’s existential analytic refuses to proceed on the basis of such presuppositions.\(^3\) *Being and Time* begins from the premise that it is misleading to presuppose the answer to the question ‘who is Dasein?’ and to use the subject as the guide to inquiry. This cautionary avoidance of the assumptions of modern subjectivity enables Heidegger’s phenomenological analyses to


subsequently suggest that the theoretical positing of Dasein as subject is phenomenally inadequate at the ontological level.⁴

What is particularly important for this project, however, is that the account of primary sociality amounts to an ‘optics of coexistence,’ a host of elements that attest, not to subjectivity in its autonomous and non-relational sense, but rather, to a ‘coexistential heteronomy.’ These elements are best referred to as an optics because they enable a different seeing of the phenomena of existence. This chapter, therefore, seeks to illuminate and gather these elements into a heterology, a discourse about to heteron, the other. There are four distinct, but related, elements, which contest the premises of modern subjectivity. First, Dasein initially and primarily finds itself immersed in its world. Understanding Dasein as existing primarily in the mode of ‘engaged immersion’ helps to shift emphasis away from reflection and ‘knowing’ as the definitive modes of human relationality. Challenging the reflective relationship of comprehension and of objectification that the modern subject is assumed to have towards entities and the world, allows the disclosive character of existence to be brought to the fore.

Second, Dasein’s comportments while immersed in activity disclose a different conception of the world as such. Thinking of existence as engaged immersion brings to the fore a notion of the world as a web of involvements with other entities, as a background of meanings against which existence makes sense of itself pre-reflectively. The world is revealed as a referential web of meanings and relations, but it is a web which is not authored by Dasein alone. Rather, Dasein’s way of life, the norms and rules, which help it go about its business in the world are structured by otherness and are only shared by Dasein. This dependence that Dasein has on other-created meanings and understandings signifies that Dasein has an ontological relationship to the world. Third, Dasein

⁴ Ontological inquiry, as used by Heidegger, is distinguished from ontic inquiry, in a distinction known as the ‘ontological difference.’ Ontic inquiry has to do with beings and entities, as the type of research undertaken by the natural and human sciences, while ontological inquiry has to do with Being, see Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), 318-330. In an ontic sense, it can be argued that Dasein regards itself as subject and its human sciences are predicated on such an understanding.
is Being-in-the-world with others. For Dasein, existence is already coexistence, Being-there is always Being-with. Selfhood is coexistential in its constitution, where such an understanding of 'coexistence' is not tantamount to the uniting, composition, or co-presence, of completed and autonomous subjects. Fourth, Dasein is fundamentally attuned to the world in which it exists and its understanding of itself and other entities is affected by this attunement. Its attunement shows it to be an entity thrown into its world; at the same time, its understanding of itself as 'possibility' indicates that it also projects itself towards the future. Taken together, the aspects of Dasein's fundamental attunement indicate that its world matters to it; in other words, Dasein is an entity better understood as care.

When viewed in connection, therefore, these four elements of the optics of coexistence elucidate Dasein's coexistential heteronomy, which can be found in Heidegger's phenomenology of average everydayness and which the following four sections seek to explicate in greater detail.

1. Dasein's engaged immersion in its world

Writing at a time when the prominence of neo-Kantianism, on the one hand, and Edmund Husserl's concern with the transcendental subject, on the other, signalled the dominance of the modern subject, Heidegger attempted to 'advance an anti-individualist and anti-mentalist account of the general possibility of any sort of meaning, of anything being intelligible at all.' The centrality of the reflective subject in Western philosophy since Descartes, and the attendant emergence of the theoretical attitude, had resulted in the creation of rigid dichotomies between subject and object. It led to the perception that 'as individual humans we are individual subjects and egos, and what we

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5 Co-presence has two senses, the first referring to being-present as substance (ousia) and the second to being-present in time, that is 'now-ness' (parousia). For an exposition, see Jacques Derrida, "Ousia and Gramme: Note on a Note from Being and Time," trans. Alan Bass, in Jacques Derrida, Margins of Philosophy (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1982), 29-68.

represent and mean are only subjective pictures which we carry around in us.' Holding onto this understanding of the subject meant that ‘we never reach the things themselves.’7 The account of the world in idealist terms could not be surpassed by a mere shift to the consideration of collective ‘things,’ ‘by talking about “we” instead of “I” and by taking into account the community rather than the individual.’8

Heidegger's thinking about the question of the general intelligibility of our world, the question of ‘Being’ as he called it, sought to divert attention from the detached subject of post-Cartesian philosophy. In fact, as the previous chapter has argued, he wished to call into question the primacy of relating to beings as mere objects of reflection and representation, whose very existence could be doubted by a ‘subject.’9 The Western philosophical tradition, he claimed, had been concerned either with ‘explaining deliberate action (Aristotle) or with assigning moral responsibility (Kant).’10 Refusing to restrict human comportment to these two modes, Heidegger focused attention on the more primary, but neglected, perspective of everydayness, in order to elucidate a pre-reflective and non-deliberative type of comportment in the world, which forms the first element of the optics of coexistence. Hubert Dreyfus usefully refers to this mode of everyday relating to beings as ‘ongoing coping,’ in order to emphasise its non-deliberative aspect, while Slavoj Žižek suggests the term ‘engaged immersion’ to highlight the character of being within the world of activity.11 Both terms, however, highlight that Dasein initially and primarily finds itself immersed in the world and relates to others and the world in the mode of average everydayness. Everydayness is ‘a positive phenomenal characteristic’ of Dasein that enables the examination of Dasein's pre-reflective relations by offering a perspective quite distinct from the privileged position of disinterested gazing at objects of comprehension (BT, 69).

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8 Heidegger, *What is a Thing?*, 11-12.
The discussion of engaged immersion as the first element of the optics of coexistence, calls into question not only the supremacy of disinterested knowledge towards objects and the world, but also the reduction of Being-in-the-world to 'a single exemplar—knowing the world' (BT, 86). Whereas the 'relation of subject to object is initially conceived as a knowing relation' this is due to the prior determination of both terms as 'knower and known.' The suggestion that Dasein exists in its world as 'ongoing coping' contests this prior determination as phenomenologically distortive. Moreover, the focus on immersion rids intentionality of its mentalistic connotations and allows Dasein to show itself as 'directed-toward' the world and other entities. The examination of such a type of comportment towards entities reveals 'that all relations of mental states to their objects presuppose a more basic form of being-with-things which does not involve mental activity.' Prior to reflection, '[o]ur dealings with the world typically absorb or fascinate us; our tasks, and so the various entities we employ in carrying them out, preoccupy us.' Theoretical reflection, then, is not primary for Dasein's dealings with entities in the world; rather, 'Being-in-the-world, as concern, is fascinated by the world with which it is concerned' (BT, 88). Even when Dasein refrains from non-deliberative, non-reflective activity such as 'producing, manipulating, and the like,' it is still not reflective as such. Rather, 'it puts itself into what is now the sole remaining mode of Being-in, the mode of just tarrying alongside (amidst) [das Nur-noch-verweilen bei]...' (BT, 88, brackets added). The mode of going along in the midst of other entities is the very condition of possibility of deliberate reflection about entities, but is not the primary and initial way in which Dasein comports itself in its world.

Suggesting that Dasein's everyday mode of being is engaged immersion does not intend to denigrate reflection or knowing, however. Heidegger's focus on ongoing coping does not simply wish 'to make practical activity primary';

12 David Carr, The Paradox of Subjectivity: The Self in the Transcendental Tradition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 19. 'It is in this sense,' Carr suggests, 'that ontology or metaphysics is always prior to epistemology.'
13 Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 58.
rather, it suggests 'that neither practical activity nor contemplative knowing can be understood as a relation between a self-sufficient mind and an independent world.' Engaged immersion and ongoing coping in the world was 'meant to show that the traditional epistemic situation of a mind distinct from objects, whether observing or acting upon them, is a deficient mode of being-in-the-world.' The theoretical attitude tends to obscure the phenomenon of 'world' by considering it as 'nature' and as the container of other entities. For Heidegger, 'knowing,' in the sense of disinterested knowledge, can only be regarded as a 'founded mode' of Being-in-the-world, 'a mode which can subsist only when connected with something else' which is, in this case, the mode of engaged immersion (BT, 86, note 1).

The first element of the optics of coexistence, furthermore, enables one '[t]o get the phenomenon of the world properly into view,' by 'locat[ing] a type of human interaction with entities that casts light on its own environment.' The focus on Dasein's engaged immersion in everyday, directed activity also sheds light on the specific context of the work-world, as well as refuting the Cartesian claim that reflection is the primary mode of comportment in towards entities. As the following discussion suggests, when a non-deliberative mode of Being-in-the-world is shown as both initial and primary for Dasein, the world and other entities cease to be objects for a reflective subject and come into relief as themselves constitutive of Dasein. Ongoing coping in the world of work usually takes the form of usage of available things and clearly illustrates that Dasein does not encounter entities as objects of 'theorein' (see, gaze or observe) but, rather, as 'equipment' or 'gear' available in its world of activity. But more importantly, in going about its concerns in everyday life, Dasein discloses the Being of other entities, and of the world itself, while at the

18 Mulhall, *Heidegger and Being and Time*, 47.
19 In order to understand the practical activity through which Heidegger wants to access 'world' we must remember that '[t]here are two basic ways of being. Being-human, which Heidegger calls Dasein and nonhuman being. The latter divides into two categories: Zuhandenheit and Vorhandenheit.' These are normally translated respectively as 'readiness-to-hand' and 'presence-at-hand' but the meaning of these terms can be best rendered by 'availableness' and 'occurrentness.' Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World*, xi.
same time, revealing the role of otherness in the ‘layer of everyday experience.’

**Engaged immersion and Dasein’s disclosive character**

In what way can Dasein be said to disclose the Being of other entities? Engaged immersion, in the form of manipulating a simple tool, like a hammer for example, makes manifest the kind of Being which equipment has. The act of ‘[h]ammering does not simply have knowledge about the hammer’s character as equipment, but it has appropriated this equipment in a way that could not possibly be more suitable’ (BT, 98). It is the handling of equipment in the most appropriate way that reveals its Being: ‘the less we stare at the hammer-Thing, and the more we seize hold of it and use it, the more primordial does our relationship to it become, and the more unveiledly is it encountered as that which it is—as equipment’ (BT, 98). It is by using the hammer for what it is intended, for hammering, that ‘uncovers the specific ‘manipulability’ of the hammer’ and manifests its Being as readiness-to-hand (availableness) (BT, 98). As John Haugeland suggests, ‘[a]vailability is the way of equipmental being.’ Dasein’s directed activity to get something done in its work-world, then, affirms that gear is not merely occurrent in the world (present-at-hand) but is available (ready-to-hand) for Dasein to use in its everyday activities.

Furthermore, equipment does not occur singularly in this world of work. Rather, it functions as part of an equipmental totality; it belongs within this equipmental whole, which endows it with meaning. A hammer is only a hammer in relation to nails, wooden boards, etc. ‘Equipment – in accordance with its equipmentality – always is in terms of its belonging to other equipment’ and this equipmental totality invokes the concrete circumstances or

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In addition to disclosing the concrete context of use, however, Dasein’s engaged immersion with available equipment in the world of work highlights its proper function, which, in turn, ‘presupposes something for which it is usable, an end-product.’ In other words, the Being of an available thing becomes accessible when one considers its role. Thus, the role of the hammer might be to drive nails into wooden boards: disclosing the function of equipment enables the relationship of a specific piece of equipment to the equipmental totality to be understood as a role-relationship. The highlighting of the referential ‘assignment’ of a piece of gear indicates that, with each available entity, ‘there always belongs an equipmental whole, in which it can be this equipment that it is.’ The ‘specific functionality,’ the assignment, of a piece of equipment within a whole set of references ‘makes the thing what it is.’

It should be noted, moreover, that Dasein’s initial involvement is not with the things (equipment or gear) themselves. ‘On the contrary, that with which we concern ourselves primarily is the work – that which is to be produced’ (BT, 99). The work, for which the equipment is assigned a specific function also presupposes that raw material is available. Furthermore, the final product or service is intended for people to make use of. Their requirements and interests, then, have an impact on the work being done. Thus, the work is assigned a ‘towards-which’ reference that refers to the ‘end-points we use in making sense of a flow of directed activity.’ The final end of the chain of ‘towards-which’ assignments is Dasein itself, because ‘Dasein exists in the manner of being-in-the-world and as such it is for the sake of its own self. It is not the case that this being just simply is; instead, so far that it is, it is occupied with its own capacity to be.’ This assignment of work and gear ‘for-the-sake-of’ Dasein is not conspicuous in everyday work, however (BT, 116). Yet it is this

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22 Haugeland, “Dasein’s Disclosedness,” 56.
23 Mulhall, Heidegger and Being and Time, 48.
26 Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World, 94.
latent ‘self-interpretation’ of directed activity that ‘informs and orders all [of Dasein’s] activities.’

Dasein’s worldly Being is ‘always already outside of itself, dwelling amidst objects in all their variety;’ entities show up for Dasein ‘in the full specificity of their nature’ and this ability to disclose entities as they are ‘in their what-being and that-being’ makes Dasein the ‘clearing.’ It is because Dasein has the ability to disclose other entities by the fact of its being-in the world, that Dasein’s Being is constituted by its disclosedness. Dasein’s involvement with equipment in the work-world discloses that existence operates according to a totality of references and assignments. The work itself ‘bears with it that referential totality within which the equipment is encountered’ (BT, 99). The referential assignments that map how, and for what reason, activity occurs make the work-world meaningful and comprehensible for Dasein. As such, the work-world is a micro example of the surrounding world (Umwelt) which Dasein’s disclosive character brings to the fore. This understanding of the world, as a totality of involvements, references, and meanings must be examined in greater detail, in order to show its essentially co-existential and heteronomous character. Prior to this discussion, however, the role of reflective deliberation deserves some more analysis in order to dispel its assumed primacy and to suggest its proper place in human existence.

The role of reflection

As was briefly noted above, the equipmental totality is not noticeable while Dasein is immersed in its everyday comportments. This is because, in the example of the work world, the user of equipment is focussing on the particular task at hand and on the end-result, such that the equipment itself, and the totality of which it is a part, are subsumed in the task and become transparent and ‘in invisible.’ The user is not explicitly aware of any specific traits that a particular piece of equipment may have while manipulating it, or

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29 Mulhall, *Heidegger and Being and Time*, 75. See also (BT, 171).
how it specifically functions within the equipmental whole. The inconspicuousness of equipment continues throughout the normal, unproblematic functioning of everyday directed activity. Deliberate reflection towards available entities is only called for when a breakdown in the referential totality occurs. When non-deliberative ongoing coping is no longer possible, the user turns to deliberation in order to restore the referential totality to its normal state. Knowing is required as a mode of relating to entities when there is 'a deficiency in our having-to-do with the world concernfully' (BT, 88). The specific situation of breakdown in Dasein's ordinary immersion in the world of work, therefore, calls for new modes of encountering entities and of being-encountered, that are not, as it was shown above, part of Dasein's initial involvement with entities in the world. Such disturbances in the flow of comportment, reveal Dasein as a being capable of reflection and deliberation.

Using disturbance as the instance when reflection is required, however, establishes that disinterested reflection (theorein) is not the primary or initial mode of relating to the world and other entities. Rather, the world and available equipment are related to primarily through 'the circumspection of the dealings in which we use it'; it is Dasein's constant and extensive involvement in practical activity which lends itself as a novel starting point for existential analysis (BT, 102). As the situation of breakdown illustrates, Dasein is both capable and inclined to engage in theoretical reflection when it is called for by a deficiency in everyday comportment. To focus from the start on the reflective subject, however, is to obscure how reflection comes about and to occlude Dasein's proximal relationship to its world as one of immersed involvement.

30 According to Heidegger there are 'three modes of disturbance—conspicuousness, obstinacy, and obtrusiveness.' Conspicuousness reveals that equipment is no longer available and in being so 'it shows itself as an equipmental Thing which looks so and so, and which, in its readiness-to-hand as looking that way, has constantly been present-at-hand too' (BT, 103). However, usual and ordinary breakdowns perhaps do not necessarily lead the user to deliberate reflection. Based on habit and experience, the user might switch to another mode of repairing the equipment or asking for help. In a situation where things are missing, rather than broken, the non-availability of equipment renders it obtrusive. In other words, its momentary unavailability, its un readiness-to-hand, in other words, clarifies its usual availability. So much so Heidegger argues, that it seems to lose its readiness-to-hand in the very urgency with which it is needed, and therefore, reveals itself as present-at-hand. In the case of equipment being neither unusable nor missing, something may 'stand in the way of our concern' when it does not, for example, belong in this context, or has not been taken care of. 'Anything which is
The knowing subject which ‘encounters present-at-hand objects on to which he then projects his aims, and exploits them accordingly,’ Žižek clarifies in this regard, ‘falsifies the proper state of things: the fact that engaged immersion in the world is primordial, and that all other modes of the presence of objects are derived from it.’

The phenomenological observation, therefore, that Dasein’s engaged immersion is the primary mode of relating to entities within the world forms the first element of the optics of coexistence. Understanding human existence to be immersed in its world in an engaged manner, counters the proposition that the subject is first and foremost involved in a relation of reflection and objectification with things and the world. Furthermore, everyday comportments, in the form of ongoing coping, help to disclose the Being of entities, as either available or present, and the world as a referential totality of meaning and relations. Dasein’s disclosive character suggests that, as an entity, Dasein has an ontological relationship to the world. In fact, it can be argued that ‘solipsism is an ontological impossibility for Dasein since Dasein occurs only in disclosive relations.’ This understanding of the world as a referential totality in which Dasein makes sense of itself, as well as the ontological relationship that this indicates, is examined in the following section as the second element of the optics of coexistence.

2. The world as a shared web of meanings and relations

Two equally important insights emerge from the above discussion of engaged immersion to form the second element of an optics of coexistence. First, that engaged immersion is indicative of a more basic state of immersion, one that Heidegger calls ‘Being-in-the-world.’ This state of radical embeddedness reveals, as is analysed below, that Dasein has an ontological relationship to the

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unready-to-hand in this way is disturbing to us, and enables us to see the obstinacy of that which we must concern ourselves in the first instance before we do anything else’ (BT, 103).

31 Žižek, The Ticklish Subject, 15.

world and, as such, it is not merely contained in the world spatially as a dis-embedded 'subject.' Second, the conception of the world that arises from the discussion of engaged immersion as the initial and primary mode of Dasein's comportment is not 'nature,' or even a container of other entities; rather, the world appears as a totality of references and assignments, a set of relations and sense according to which Dasein orients itself. Both aspects, Being-in-the-world and the world as a referential totality, related as they are, serve to establish a context of inner-worldly belonging that gives Dasein a worldly character and becomes, together with the primacy of engaged immersion, the bedrock of the optics of coexistence.

The disclosive character of Dasein's engaged immersion in the work-world has crucially illuminated that Dasein can be understood as Being-in-the-world, and that this denotes a range of inner-worldly involvements, such as, primarily 'dealing with the world; tarrying alongside it in the manner of performing, effecting and completing, but also contemplating, interrogating, and determining by way of contemplation and comparison'; taken as a whole, it can be argued that 'Being-in-the-world is characterized as concern.' Yet, Dasein's everyday praxis does not only indicate that Dasein is Being-in-the-world. It also simultaneously discloses the 'world' as a totality of meanings, in which Dasein makes sense of itself (as existence).

Thus, the insight that Dasein is a being that 'has a world' leads to an understanding of 'world' as the referential background that enables Dasein to make sense of its environment. Referred to in this manner, 'world' designates something other than a spatial container of all other entities, an object, or, even, nature. For Dasein, whose Being is Being-in-the-world, this 'world' can

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34 Although the understanding of 'world' as a referential totality is most clearly brought into perspective by the accidental interruption of Dasein's engaged immersion, the disclosure of the referential totality can occur in the absence of a disturbance by entities 'whose function it is to show their practical context.' Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World,* 100. Such entities are 'signs' which help Dasein achieve orientation in its own environment by 'explicitly rais[ing] an equipmental whole into our circumspection' (BT, 110). Signs, then are 'indicative of the ontological structure of readiness-to-hand, of referential totalities, and of worldhood' (BT, 114).
only be understood as ‘an “environment” within which man dwells with the things he uses in a circumspective manner. The worldliness of this world is defined...as a meaningful totality of references.’ The references by which Dasein locates itself in the world, and according to which existence becomes both possible and meaningful, are all connected in such a way that the totality is also a ‘web of assignment relations.’ One assignment is related to another, and to the referential whole, in a chain or, rather, a web, such that the referential totality is also a ‘relational totality,’ which Heidegger calls ‘significance’ (BT, 120). It is this connectedness of signifying assignments that makes the whole meaningful. Because it is meaningful, the world is ‘a web of socially or culturally constituted assignments within which entities can appear as the particular types of object that they are.’ Furthermore, it is Dasein’s familiarity with the totality of assignment relations which ‘is the ontical condition for the possibility of discovering entities which are encountered in a world with involvement (readiness-to-hand) as their kind of Being, and which can thus make themselves known as they are in themselves’ (BT, 120).

Making assignments, completing the chain, enlarging or altering the web of references is part of Dasein’s Being as Being-in-the-world. Therefore, the totality of involvements helps to substantiate that within it ‘lurks an ontological relationship to the world’ (BT, 118). Dasein’s general absorption in its everyday dealings reveals ‘the world as familiar in such a way that there is no separation between Dasein’s disclosing comportment and the world disclosed.’ Dasein’s familiarity with the referential totality and its readiness to do what is appropriate, to cope in other words in each concrete context, is constantly active. This relationship to the world is so familiar that Heidegger ‘simply calls it being-in-the-world.’ ‘On the face of it,’ John Haugeland

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36 Mulhall, *Heidegger and Being and Time*, 51.
37 Mulhall, *Heidegger and Being and Time*, 51.
notes, 'this structure looks like a relation: being-amidst as a relation between self (agent, who) and world'; yet, Being-in-the-world is more properly understood 'as a single entity with two interdependent structural aspects: self and world.' In other words, Dasein is worldly from the start and as part of the kind of being that it is. 'In clarifying Being-in-the-world' Heidegger notes, 'we have shown that a bare subject without a world never "is" proximally, nor is it ever given' (BT, 152). 'Dasein in so far as it is, has always submitted itself already to a "world" which it encounters, and this submission belongs essentially to its Being' (BT, 120-121). It is, Heidegger argues, the most basic instantiation of the understanding of Being, which belongs to Dasein's Being (BT, 118).

What is the nature of this 'world' in which Dasein is always already absorbed? As was noted above, within the referential totality assignments are relational. This primarily includes references assigned and altered by other Daseins, as shall be discussed in greater detail in the following section. The multitude of Dasein's activities 'presuppose the disclosure of one shared world.' Without this shared 'web,' this 'common institutional framework,' behaviour would not be intelligible; the web works tacitly and holistically and against this background, Dasein's roles, norms, and praxis 'make sense in relation to one another and as a whole.'

Furthermore, the web of other-created, shared references 'must therefore always be laid out...in advance of any particular encounter with an object.' As it can be recalled from the discussion of engaged immersion above, Dasein's initial and primary comportment towards things and other Daseins is in the mode of average everydayness. In this mode of averageness, Dasein operates according to already existing meanings, rules, and norms within the equipmental whole. In fact, it is important to note that without the mode of averageness there could be no equipmental totality, because its functioning requires a certain average or undifferentiated way of acting and behaving into

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40 Haugeland, "Dasein's Disclosedness," 61.
41 Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World, 142.
42 Haugeland, "Dasein's Disclosedness," 58.
which Dasein has always already socialised. This understanding of the world as an other-created totality of meaning brings to the fore the *heteronomous* aspect of the phenomenon of the world.

Averageness, however, does not suggest that ways of behaving and acting are identical among Daseins. On the contrary, Dasein goes about its concerns by uniquely appropriating these shared meanings, norms and practices that add up to the referential totality. This appropriating relationship that Dasein has with respect to the shared web of meanings and relations is what Heidegger calls *mineness*. Mineness enables Heidegger to say about Dasein that, in each case, I am this entity. Dasein is Being-in-the-world, a basic state of being that indicates an ontological familiarity and submission to the world. The world is understood as a shared, already given, web of references. In this constellation, Dasein is ‘shared social activity’ uniquely appropriated, in each case, through mineness. This unique appropriation that Dasein *is* does not result, however, in the return of the autonomous self of Cartesian thought. Confusion can arise by the two apparently divergent claims, namely, that Dasein is not equivalent with an ‘individual’ (the answer to the question ‘who’ is Dasein, is phenomenologically not ‘I,’ it will be argued below) but, at the same time, it is ‘essentially distinctive of people; and in each case, we are it.’ It can be avoided, however, if Dasein is conceived of as ‘a “living” way of life,’ that is, a way of life currently being lived out. This allows mineness (in each case I am myself this entity) to be reconciled with averageness (‘Dasein is shared practices’) in order to arrive at Dasein being a uniquely appropriated way of life.

The relationship between averageness and mineness is quite distinct from the subjectivist ‘conception of Dasein as an occurrent (present-at-hand) subject,’

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43 Mulhall, *Heidegger and Being and Time*, 51.
which 'isolates Dasein' and which requires a conception of coexistence as the composition and co-presence of self-sufficient entities. Since Dasein's absorption in the world has 'the quality of "mineness"' then, Dasein's immersion and participation in averageness can 'have its unique appropriations' without the two being opposed to each other. Only then can averageness appear as 'the ontological source of the familiarity and readiness that makes the ontical discovery of entities, of others, and even of myself possible' and that lends meaning to Dasein's comportment towards things and others.

The second element of the optics of coexistence, then, provides an understanding of the world as a relational totality of meaning and involvement, to which Dasein has an ontological relationship. This element rescinds completely the relationship of disinterested distance which the modern subject is purported to have to the world, taken as its object of reflection. On the contrary, not only is Dasein Being-in-the-world, but also the world is accessed by Dasein as a web of relations and references already formed by otherness and, as such, it is only ever shared (and, occasionally, appropriated in a distinct way) by Dasein. The way assignments of meaning are connected show that Dasein's world is fundamentally relational; it is shared with other Daseins, and therefore, coexistential; but it is also already created by others in an average way and, as such, it is heteronomous. This relationship that Dasein has with others is the third element of the optics of coexistence and is the focus of the next section.

3. Being-there is Being-with

The third element of the optics of coexistence sets out the precise relationship that Dasein has with others, as well as the ontological significance of this relationship, following the discussion of the worldly context in which Dasein's comportments with other entities unfold. Robert Pippin has argued that the

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50 Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World, 144.
account of engaged immersion, as given above, is ‘immediately suggestive of some theory of sociality, rather than subjectivity in the Cartesian sense.’ This third element refutes most directly the phenomenological adequacy of the modern non-relational subject, of the ‘I’ as the answer to the question ‘who is Dasein,’ and suggests, instead, that Dasein is essentially Being-with. The analysis of engaged immersion has already suggested that conceptualising Dasein as a knowing subject would not be ‘phenomenally adequate,’ while the conception of the world as a totality of meaning has indicated that Dasein is not an isolated subject but, rather, has an ontological relationship with the world. The exposition of Dasein as fundamentally constituted by its capacity to be with others within the world, in turn, dispels the understanding of coexistence as mere co-presence, which the ground of subjectivism imposes upon ontology.

**Withness as a prior capacity of Dasein**

Following the discussion of engaged immersion in the world, it can be recalled that ‘Dasein finds itself proximally in what it does, uses, expects, avoids — in those things environmentally ready-to-hand with which it is proximally concerned’ (BT, 155). Others, therefore, ‘are encountered from out of the world, in which concernfully circumspective Dasein essentially dwells’ (BT, 155). While the other has been traditionally viewed as either an object of comprehension or a co-present subject, existential analysis shows that in the mode of average everydayness Dasein encounters Others ‘environmentally’ in its surrounding work-world in the course of its everyday dealings. For example, the available equipment that a particular Dasein uses are not designated specifically for it; rather, it is available for all others who are disclosed by their usage of equipment. More specifically, the equipmental totality highlights the importance of the other because equipment bear not only ‘in-order-to’ (e.g. perform a task) assignments, but also ‘towards-which’ ones

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51 Pippin, “On Being Anti-Cartesian,” 377, emphasis added. Despite the potential which exists in the Mitsein analytic it was itself underdeveloped by Heidegger as is claimed by Frederick A. Olafson, *Heidegger and the Ground of Ethics: A Study of Mitsein* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) and Michael Theunissen, *The Other: Studies in the Social Ontology of*
(e.g. for this end) and ‘whereof’ (e.g. the origin of the ready-to-hand). These ‘whereof’ and ‘towards-which’ references ‘of equipmental totalities relate the work-world to other people.’

When Dasein is at work producing something or performing a task, this is always oriented with reference to the others for whom the task is performed or thing is produced, to its future users or consumers, in other words. When Dasein is using material, its suppliers or producers are encountered as to whether they do their supplying or producing well. Even on the mode of ‘tarrying amidst,’ various entities show themselves as belonging to others, being serviced, maintained, or sold by them. In the surrounding world of praxis, then, ‘along with the equipment to be found when one is at work [in Arbeit], those Others for whom the “work” [Werk] is destined are “encountered too”’ (BT, 153). It is, then, in this world of activity where Others are disclosed by Dasein’s everyday praxis.

Mulhall notes that there are three distinct ways in which other Daseins ‘show up’ in the world. First, they are one additional type of entity which is encountered by Dasein in the course of its disclosing engagement in the world. Second, the work Dasein produces and the tasks it performs are generally intended for others, either as consumers or as further producers in the process of completing the work. Third, the available things which Dasein uses or encounters are not ready-to-hand for that Dasein alone. An available thing is available for every Dasein capable of using it; in this way readiness-to-hand is ‘inherently intersubjective.’

The emphasis placed on Dasein’s engaged immersion means that the ‘Dasein-with of others is often encountered in terms of what is ready-to-hand within-the-world’; they are encountered in their own work environment, and not as entities which Dasein studies reflectively: ‘[w]e meet them “at work,”’ that is,
primarily in their Being-in-the-world' notes Heidegger (BT, 156). Although it is within this environmental context of equipment and in the mode of ongoing coping that their Being is disclosed, this is neither readiness-to-hand nor presence-at-hand. Heidegger employs the term "Dasein-with"

to designate that Being for which the Others who are [die seienden Anderen] are freed [disclosed] within-the-world. This Dasein-with of the Others is disclosed within-the-world for a Dasein, and so too for those who are Daseins with us [die Mitdaseienden], only because Dasein in itself is essentially Being-with (BT, 156, second brackets added).

The others are encountered ‘in’ the work-world in the basic mode of Being-in-the-world, that is, ‘they are like the very Dasein which frees [discloses] them, in that they are there too, and there with it’ (BT, 154, brackets added). Although the relationship to the other is mediated through the work-world, this does not mean that it is not originary, that there is in other words, a distinction between the with-world and the work-world, as if these were separate and distinct. As Michael Theunissen has argued, ‘the environmental kind of encounter of Dasein-with does not suspend the circumstance that the surrounding world is itself already a with-world and that thereby all equipment carries “with-like” traits from the outset.’

What is more important to note is that others are not encountered in the world ‘as a “plurality” of subjects that, thanks to their incarnation, arise as “person-things-present-at-hand” among other things.’ The logic of composition is directly refuted by Heidegger both in its conception of others as subjects and of their coexistence as a plurality of distinct units being together as a composition of self-sufficient subjects. The reformulation of the ‘with’ beyond composition ‘unworks’ the non-relational character assumed of the modern subject. ‘The world of Dasein is a with-world [Mitwelt]. Being-in is Being-with Others. Their Being-in-themselves within-the-world is Dasein-with [Mitdasein]’ (BT, 155). ‘With,’ then, shapes the very Being of Dasein as a worldly entity.

Being-there-too [Auch-da-sein] with them does not have the ontological character of a Being-present-at-hand-along-‘with’ them within a world. This ‘with’ is something of the character of Dasein; the ‘too’ means a sameness of Being as circumspectively concerned Being-in-the-world. ‘With’ and ‘too’

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54 Theunissen, The Other, 182.
55 Theunissen, The Other, 176.
are to be understood *existentially*, not categorically. By reason of this with-like [mithaften] Being-in-the-world, the world is always the one I share with Others (BT, 154-155).

The claim that 'Dasein is essentially Being-with' is not merely a description that 'I am not present-at-hand alone, and that Others of my kind occur' nor that 'I am currently with others' (BT, 156). Rather, Being-with is an attribute of Dasein's Being; as Heidegger explains, 'Being-with is an existential characteristic of Dasein even when factically no Other is present-at-hand or perceived' (BT, 156). Even when no Others are present Dasein is Being-with. Being-alone is possible only for an entity who has Being-with as its Being and as such being-alone can be understood as 'a deficient mode of Being-with' (BT, 157). To say that Dasein is Being-with, then, has little to do with the actual presence of multiple others, because 'with' is not about composition or spatial proximity. Rather, the 'with' is an existential attribute of Dasein. Georgopoulos articulates this quite effectively when he argues that the term 'with' cannot be seen as designating a relationship that can be noted once there are more than two terms. Rather we have to think of *Mit-sein*, of Being-with, or more exactly of the very Being of with, of withness. There can be two terms that can encounter one another only if first there is withness. That is, only if first there is a primordial structure of commonness, of a with relationship, can a specific type of relationship be instituted.56

'Withness,' Heidegger suggests, is the existential commonness that makes all actual interactions with and experiences of others possible. This 'sharing' of the world is a 'prior capacity,' which Dasein possesses; it is the capacity to-be-with (mit-sein) that makes any consideration of others possible. Coexistence and its multifaceted dimensions rest on this existential structure of Being-with. As Michael Gelven notes '[t]o say that Being-with (or to-be-with) is an a priori existential of Dasein means that one cannot be a self unless it is within one's possibilities to relate in a unique way to other Daseins. Hence, to be Dasein at all means to-be-with.'57

What is this way in which Dasein relates to others, given that its Being is Being-with? 'If the world is revealed in concerned dealings, what Heidegger called besorgen, so Mitdasein (Dasein-with) is originally revealed in what he calls Fürsorge' where this 'refers to those dealings by virtue of which the Other appears as another Dasein.' Dasein comports itself towards other Daseins with solicitude (Fürsorge, commonly meaning 'welfare'). Referring to the range of comportment to other Daseins, solicitude cannot be understood to be synonymous with 'respect.' As an ontological claim, comportment in terms of solicitude can take many forms, from being inattentive, indifferent or hostile towards others to being attentive and caring. While it may be attractive to view solicitude in an a priori positive way, it may be worth remembering that 'in average everydayness, however, solicitude, is...an absorption in worldly matters of common concern' and that such a concern often finds expression in keeping one’s distance and interacting with others with distrust and reserve (BT, 219). However, despite the forms in which solicitude is manifested in average everydayness, 'in clarifying Being-in-the-world we have shown that a bare subject without a world never 'is' proximally, nor is it ever given. And so in the end an isolated 'I' without Others is just as far from being proximally given' (BT, 152).

The phenomenology of average everydayness enables an account of the priority of relationality and, hence, coexistence in its ontological sense. The analysis of Dasein as Being-with goes beyond notions of intersubjectivity, with their basis on empathetic relations with Others, because, 'only those who cut the I off from the Other must latch onto “empathy” as that act that is supposed to instate the initially absent bond between I and the Other.' Being-there is Being-with, Heidegger claims, to the extent that others are rather those from whom, for the most part, one does not distinguish oneself – those among whom one is too' (BT, 154). Walter A. Davis concurs when he writes of the fundamental relationship with the other: '[w]hen the other comes before us it is not to meet an already formed subject which may or may not choose to enter

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58 Georgopoulos, The Structures of Existence, 93.
60 Theunissen, The Other, 175. See also (BT, 160).
into relationships from which it can always subsequently detach itself. Relationships have "always already" begun.' Dasein's constitution is structured by the other: 'Being with and like the others, we are one with the comforts of the commonplace, the already thought, which is not outside us but within, already at work producing an "identity" which is prior to all subjectivity.'

The manifestation of Being-with as the 'they'

It is not only important to examine 'withness' as an attribute of human existence, however. It is equally significant to ask how this existential structure of Being-with manifests itself. According to Heidegger, in average everydayness Being-with manifests itself in the phenomenon of 'Das Man,' which has been rather misleadingly translated as the 'they,' although one cannot not assume that Dasein is distinct from the 'they' on the basis of this translation. The 'they,' or the 'one' as it also sometimes referred to, is part of Dasein's constitution. Dasein belongs to others 'who proximally and for the most part "are there" in everyday Being-with-one-another' (BT, 164). 'The "they,"....which we all are, though not as the sum, prescribes the kind of Being of everydayness,' notes Heidegger; as the 'they,' others are not distinct in average everydayness; rather, 'any Other can represent them' (BT, 164).

The answer to the question 'who is Dasein?' finally has its response: the who of Dasein is not the 'I' but the 'they.' This answer asserts the priority and primacy of the others for Dasein in its constitution as Being-in-the-world. As Davis explains, '[t]he "they" is primary. We don't fall into it from a prior self-presence, but are in it and delivered over to it long before any question of independence arises.' What does this response to the question of 'who' in the form of the 'they' signify however? The 'they,' it can be argued, rescinds any

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62 Davis, Inwardness and Existence, 118.
priority of the self and affirms the primacy of sociality and relationality found in the first three elements of the optics of coexistence:

[w]e live in the midst of others with their beliefs and values, fears and conflicts already so deeply embedded in us that the initial experience of reflection is the shock of discovering how utterly the voice of the other comes pouring forth whenever I, the sovereign individual, speak, feel, think, or act.63

There are two related arguments contained within Heidegger’s examination of Dasein’s indistinguishability from others in the form of the ‘they.’ First, the suggestion that the ‘they,’ rather than the ‘I,’ may be the ‘who’ of everyday Dasein, attests to Dasein’s immersion in the world with others. Averageness, it was noted in section two, has a norm-creating function. When the ‘they’ is understood to establish and maintain ‘averageness’ and to contain the whole of shared practices, it can be seen to constitute ‘one shared world rather than a plurality of individual worlds’; to point, moreover, to the norm-creating role of ‘withness,’ which might be called ‘constitutive conformity.’64 As Herman Philipse notes, the ‘they’ ‘is a fundamental structure of everyday life that is constitutive of the cultural public world’ and it is moreover, ‘the mode of Being in which we live “proximally and most of the time”.’65 The notion of ‘constitutive conformity’ illuminates that Dasein ‘requires for its Being-in-the-world an expected and normal way of referring to and dealing with others. In this sense the “I-myself” exists, in significant part, in its conformity to the “one” or “anybody” or “they,” and it shares...a commonality of significance,’ suggests Howard Tuttle.66 The problematisation of the subject’s purported autonomy through the designation of the ‘they’ as Dasein’s everyday self, therefore, appears to be ‘the last nail in the coffin of the Cartesian tradition.’67

Second, Heidegger’s discussion of the ‘they’ also contains what appear to be ‘negative connotations,’ in order to establish that ‘our habitual and social self,

63 Davis, Inwardness and Existence, 115.
64 Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World, 154. He claims that this constitutive conformity is not fully developed by Heidegger who obscures the constitutive role of the with-world by not distinguishing between it, on the one hand, and the impropriety of conformism for Dasein’s Being, on the other.
67 Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World, 144.
which is structured by public rules, norms, and roles...is not our real or authentic self." It is important to note at this point that the reference to Dasein’s ‘habitual self’ gestures towards the ease with which Dasein understands and comports itself as subject. What must be problematised, therefore, is the publicly conveyed self-understanding of Dasein as ‘subject’ that flourishes within the discourses of the ‘they.’ When Heidegger claims that average everydayness is an ‘inauthentic’ mode of being, he is referring to the ways in which Dasein understands itself as a sovereign, self-sufficient subject. He, thus, views the shared world as the place of self-dispersal, where one compares himself to others and where ‘there is constant care as to the way one differs from them’ (BT, 163). Whether Dasein feels that it is lagging behind, whether it wants to maintain a certain superiority, Dasein’s ‘Being-with-one-another has the character of distantiaility [Abständigkeit]’ (BT 164). Yet distantiaility is only possible because ‘Dasein, as everyday Being-with-one-another, stands in subjection to Others. It itself is not; its Being has been taken away by the Others’ (BT, 164). This happens precisely because Dasein belongs to the Others, to the ‘the one’ and ‘enhances their power’ so that Dasein is ‘the one’ initially and primarily (BT, 164). Yet, in designating them as ‘the Others’, we hide this fact of belonging to them. We belong to ‘the One’ to such an extent that:

Being-with-one-another dissolves one’s own Dasein completely into the kind of Being of ‘the Others’, in such a way, indeed, that the others, as distinguishable and explicit, vanish more and more. In this inconspicuousness and unascertainability, the real dictatorship of the ‘they’ is unfolded (BT, 164).

In the safe fold of ‘the one’ Dasein takes its pleasures as one would, and considers certain things sad, as one would, and so comport itself in the world with entities and other Daseins as the ‘they’ would. Heidegger argues, that

the “they” maintains itself factically in the averageness of that which belongs to it, of that which it regards as valid and that which it does not, and of that to which it grants success and to that which it denies it...Publicness proximally controls every way in which the world and Dasein get interpreted (BT, 165).

Although constitutive of the shared world, the general acceptance of averageness has a serious repercussion in that it tends towards a ‘levelling

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down' of Dasein's possibilities of Being. In the constant process of 'adjustment' it 'seek[s] in its everyday sense to approximate the public, positive sense of the "anybody,"' and this renders it too hesitant 'to roam too far from public use and expectation.' Publicness affects interpretations of the world and makes it appear familiar to all. In this way '[e]veryone is the other, and no one is himself. The "they," which supplies the answer to the question of the 'who' of Dasein, is the nobody to whom every Dasein has already surrendered itself in Being-among-one-another' (BT, 166). This surrender can be thought of as dispersal into the 'they-self' such that 'Dasein is the "they"' (BT, 167). Similarly, the particularity of the other is diffused: the other is the anonymous nobody, an unnamed no-one. Such a dispersed Dasein must be distinguished from the proper self, although this dispersed self is 'who' Dasein is primarily in its inauthentic everydayness.

The negative connotations that Heidegger bestows on the discussion of the 'they' might prompt the question: why does he shed light on the heteronomous constitution of Dasein, only to immediately call for something translators have called 'authenticity'? Dreyfus claims that Heidegger confuses the two aspects of the 'they,' namely, 'constitutive conformity' (the norm-creating and socialising function of the 'they') and unwanted social conformism. Heidegger's analysis, this chapter suggests instead, endeavoured to prevent the reification of the 'they' as the antidote to the 'I.' Heidegger's description of the 'they' aims to problematise of this everyday mode of being, not towards a recovery of the 'I' but, on the contrary, to illuminate that it is within the 'they' that notions of sovereign subjectivity have arisen. Dasein's self can neither be the they-self nor the subject, but must be proper for Dasein's Being. Being-in-the-world is constituted as radically embedded within the referential totality and as Being-with. Dasein's Being-with is ontologically manifested in the 'they,' from whom Dasein does not distinguish itself. Being-lost in the 'they'

69 Tuttle, The Crowd is Untruth, 67-68.
70 However, self-dispersal does not mean that Dasein does not have its world: '[t]he lack of reflexivity, the complete self-identification as well as the total identification with the environment, in other words, narcissism and conformity, do not prevent any Joh from conjuring up a world “according to Joh”,' writes Agnes Heller. See her “Death of the Subject?” in George Levine (ed.), Constructions of the Self (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1992), 280.
results in Dasein regarding itself as an autonomous and self-sufficient subject, unaware of its possibilities as a heteronomous entity. The negative connotations one might sense in the discussion of the ‘they’ arise, therefore, from the desire to unsettle Dasein’s acceptance of public discourses about its selfhood which are improper for Dasein and its ability to be itself.

This third element of the optics of coexistence, then, illustrates that Dasein’s ‘factual’ coexistence is heteronomous: ‘the ways in which the other inhabits our being as the subtext that is constantly at work in a vast array of activities that make up the busy business of the day.’ The ‘they’ is constitutive of both the significance of the world and of Dasein as submitted to the world. It also emphasises, however, that such heteronomy, such ‘withness’ is not part of Dasein’s everyday self-understanding. Becoming-proper, as we shall see in chapter five, is a movement towards genuine understanding and awareness of Dasein’s ability to be itself. Below, however, is an examination of the final element of the optics of coexistence, which is the most illuminating of Dasein’s radical embeddedness in the world and its Being as ‘care.’

4. Dasein is Care: Thrownness, Projectiveness, Fallenness

Dasein, it was outlined in the previous sections, is immersed in an engaged manner into its everyday world of praxis. It has an ontological relationship to the web of meanings that is its world, in which it is essentially Being-with others, such that it cannot, ontologically, be distinguished from others. The first three elements of the optics of coexistence have challenged the understanding of human existence as ‘subject’ in three ways: as a primarily reflective subject that encounters other entities as merely co-present; as a subject that is autonomous and dis-embedded from its world; and, finally, as an isolated and self-sufficient being. A certain ‘coexistential heteronomy’ has emerged thus far; Dasein’s attunement and understanding, this section shows, provide a more detailed account of Dasein’s radical embeddedness in the world.

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of otherness and form the last element of the optics of coexistence. Their consideration illustrates that Dasein is already attuned to the world, and that this fundamental attunement structures its understanding. These inter-related aspects of embeddedness, of Being-in, show Dasein to be thrown entity, yet one which projects itself outwards into the world.

Heidegger’s term *Befindlichkeit*, which Michel Haar rightly translates as ‘attunement,’\(^{72}\) refers, Mulhall suggests, to ‘the capacity to be affected by the world, to find that the entities and situations it [Dasein] faces matter.’ Dasein’s attunement is most easily disclosed by the phenomenon of moods, which are sometimes falsely understood as mental states, but are more appropriately considered to be ‘affective inflections of Dasein’s temperament that are typically experienced as “given,” as states into which one has been thrown.’\(^{73}\) These dispositions are indications that what goes on around Dasein affects it. Dasein’s moods disclose that it is fundamentally attuned to the ‘world’ (both as surrounding world, *Umwelt*, and as with-world, *Mitwelt*). Such attunement reveals that it is an entity thrown in the world of activity and of others and that it is in such a state of thrownness without being explicitly aware of it. Rejecting the notion that moods are solely related to mental states, Heidegger argues that, since moods affect Being-in-the-world, they ‘must be as revelatory of the world and of Being-in as they are of Dasein.’\(^{74}\) The affect of fear, for example, illustrates that ‘that in the face of which we fear, the fearsome, is in every case something which we encounter within-the-world and which may have readiness-to-hand, presence-at-hand, or Dasein-with as its kind of Being’ (BT, 179). At the same time, fear *fears about* Dasein, it discloses Dasein as afraid, as the kind of entity for which its own Being is an issue (BT, 180). Moods, therefore, signify ‘a disclosive submission to the world, out of which we can encounter something that matters to us’ (BT, 177).

Moods, Heidegger claims, disclose Dasein to itself ‘prior to all cognition and volition, and beyond their range of disclosure’ (BT, 175). Specifically, they


\(^{73}\) Both quotes in Mulhall, *Heidegger and Being and Time*, 76.
show it to be that entity which is ‘Being-delivered-over to the “there”’: that Dasein is, means that it is ‘thrown in such a way that, as Being-in-the-world, it is its “there”’ (BT, 174). The ease with which bad moods, in particular, are recognised by Dasein is related to its being a thrown entity. Moods ‘disclose Dasein in its thrownness, and — proximally and for the most part — in the manner of an evasive turning-away’ (BT, 175). Yet, the disclosure of such fundamental attunement to the world and to others can also be seen as the ‘existential kind of Being in which Dasein constantly surrenders itself to the “world” and lets the “world” “matter” to it in a way that somehow Dasein evades its very self’ (BT, 178). In the ‘they’ Dasein’s ‘lostness’ in everydayness is sustained by this publicness of moods. ‘Publicness, as the kind of Being which belongs to the ‘they,’ not only has in general its own ways of having a mood, but needs moods and “makes” them for itself’ (BT, 178). Moods are public and their ‘socialness...also implies that an individual’s social world fixes the range of moods into which she can be thrown.’

Moods, therefore, disclose Dasein as a thrown being and, simultaneously, affect how Dasein comports itself to its world, whether in relation to objects or to the possibilities about its life.

Being-in the world in a radically embedded manner also affects Dasein’s understanding. As Heidegger suggests, ‘understanding something’ usually refers ‘to being able to manage something, being a match for it, being competent to do something’ (BT, 183). When understanding is constitutive of how Dasein is ‘in’ the world, how it is ‘the there’ (Da), this competence ‘is not a “what,” but Being as existing’: Dasein is not merely competent for this or that task, but rather ‘it is primarily Being-possible. Dasein is in every case what it can be, and in the way in which it is its possibility’ (BT, 183). But what is the meaning of ‘possibility’ here? It does not mean merely something that has yet to take place. Understood as an existential attribute, possibility is the most proximate and appropriate characterisation of Dasein and its ability to be

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74 Mulhall, *Heidegger and Being and Time*, 77.
75 Mulhall, *Heidegger and Being and Time*, 79.
**Seinskönnen** (BT, 183). In other words, ‘Dasein’s true existential medium is not actuality but possibility.’

Where attunement ‘reveals’ Dasein as thrown Being-in-the-world, understanding reveals it as carrying forward that momentum; it corresponds to the active side of Dasein’s confrontation with its own existentiell possibilities.’ Tuttle suggests that this means that ‘human existence is open to the future in such a way that it casts a tendential structure ahead of itself as part of its Being. This structure is Dasein’s apprehension of its own possibilities.’

This forward pressing structure of Dasein’s self-understanding shows that ‘as thrown, Dasein is thrown into the kind of Being which we call “projecting”’ (BT, 185). The invocation of thrownness suggests that, as already thrown, Dasein has ‘already projected itself; and as long as it is, it is projecting’ (BT, 185). ‘Dasein must project itself onto one or other existentiell possibility,’ and how it decides upon these definite possibilities, as well as their success depends on its authenticity. As Being-in-the-world Dasein is faced with concrete possibilities, that are defined and ‘limited’ by the factual situation in which it finds itself as thrown. ‘Just as thrownness is projective (disclosing the world as a space of possibilities that matter to us in specific ways), so projection is thrown (to be exercised in a field of possibilities whose structure it did not itself project).’ Thrownness and projection, then, form one ontological structure which signifies Dasein’s radical embeddeness as both taking place within the bounds of the world and also taking up concrete possibilities within it. Hence, Dasein’s Being must be understood ‘as ahead-of-itself-in-already-being-in-the-world’ (BT, 236).

Attunement and understanding are co-originary (Heidegger calls this ‘equiprimordial’): attunement accompanies and affects understanding, while *vice versa*, attunement is meaningless without the understanding of how Dasein finds itself in the world. A ‘pure beholding’ of the world could never,

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76 Mulhall, *Heidegger and Being and Time*, 83.
77 Mulhall, *Heidegger and Being and Time*, 81.
78 Tuttle, *The Crowd is Untruth*, 58.
79 Mulhall, *Heidegger and Being and Time*, 82.
80 Mulhall, *Heidegger and Being and Time*, 84.
without mood, encounter something present-at-hand, as ‘threatening’, for example (BT, 177) because Dasein’s ‘anxious attunement to...[its own existence] is the ultimate basis of any act of interpretation.’ Tuttle concurs with Davis in this regard, noting that ‘understanding and inquiry are “circular” in the sense that the interpreter always brings to the interpretant or world-at-hand the pre-existing frames of meaning and reference which constitute the significance of such a world-at-hand’; the circularity of interpretation, therefore, can only mean that ‘[t]he world does not exist neutrally, or as a clear and distinct object. Instead the world must always remain an object of possible interpretation, and all interpretation is circular in its presuppositions of what something has been and what it has been projected for.’ This does not create a sort of a ‘vicious circle’; on the contrary, ‘[c]ircularity implies that Dasein comes to objects in the world by casting upon them the past possibilities that were present in the previous constructions of Dasein’ and that ‘the manner in which we have been in time and the manner in which we conceive the future are always preconditions for the way that we come to understand something in the present.’

Dasein’s ‘attunement’ and ‘understanding,’ therefore, are constitutive of how it is ‘the there.’ Their examination reveals, for the purposes of explicating the fourth element of the optics of coexistence, a radical embeddedness in the world, which can be best understood as ‘thrown projection.’ In its average everydayness, when Dasein is manifested as the ‘they,’ its radical embeddedness is guided by idle talk, ambiguity, and curiosity. These ways in which Dasein exists in public discourse comprise the Being of the ‘they’ as fallenness. Together with thrownness and projectiveness, ‘falling’ makes up the Being of Dasein as ‘care.’

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81 Davis, Inwardness and Existence, 5.
82 Tuttle, The Crowd is Untruth, 59.
83 Tuttle, The Crowd is Untruth, 60.
Falling prey to the 'world'

Idle talk refers to the type of everyday understanding and interpreting, which lies in everyday 'ready' significance present in casual, customary expressions that make claims about this thing or that, but primarily focus on the claim and not on the thing itself. As such, idle talk 'does not communicate in such a way as to let this entity be appropriated in a primordial manner, but communicates rather by following the route of gossiping and passing the word along' (BT, 212). Expressions of idle talk 'are a way of preventing an honest search for what is real, while at the same time asserting some definiteness,' because '[w]hat is said-in-the-talk as such, spreads in wider circles and takes on an authoritative character' (BT, 212). Average understanding, however, does not wish to draw a distinction between what might be gossip and what might be an appropriate way of disclosing this or that thing. On the contrary, saying something in idle talk 'gets passed along in further retelling,' and 'amount[s] to a perverting of the act of closing off' (BT, 213). When Dasein 'closes off,' it distorts its proper relationship to 'its primary and primordially genuine relationships-of-Being towards the world, towards Being-with, and towards its very Being-in' (BT, 214).

Curiosity, moreover, 'expresses the tendency towards a peculiar way of letting the world be encountered by us in perception' (BT, 214). This tendency shows Dasein to be floating away 'from what is ready-to-hand and towards the exotic, the alien and the distant,' by searching for new and unknown 'objects not in order to grasp them in their reality but to stimulate itself with their newness, so that novelty is sought with increasing velocity.' Dasein acquires a spectatorial attitude towards the world but this is concerned less with marvelling at things but with 'abandoning itself to the world' (BT, 216). Comporting itself curiously to the world, Dasein 'remains in a state of concealed indifference; it seems observational yet is neutral in its relation to the world. In its search for distraction and novelty, it is blind to the actuality in front of it.' The effects of

84 Tuttle, *The Crowd is Untruth*, 72.
85 Mulhall, *Heidegger and Being and Time*, 106.
86 Tuttle, *The Crowd is Untruth*, 72.
both idle talk and curiosity make it 'impossible to decide what is disclosed in a
genuine understanding and what is not' (BT, 217).

In addition to idle talk and curiosity, ambiguity affects not only Dasein's
understanding of the world but also its relations to 'Being-with-one another as
such, and even to Dasein's Being towards itself' (BT, 217). 'Dasein here sees
the world as theory and abstraction, while remaining neutral and passive,'
explains Tuttle regarding ambiguity.7 This, however, is 'manufactured
indifference or theoreticality,' which nonetheless 'has already established itself
in the understanding as a potentiality-for-Being, and in the way Dasein projects
itself and presents itself with possibilities' (BT, 217). It is important to note
that in the ambiguity of how things are interpreted in publicness, Dasein
relates to the Other on the basis of 'what "they" have heard about him, what
"they" say in their talk about him, and "they" know about him' (BT, 219).
There is no effort to comport oneself to the other in ways that might be
genuine. Rather, there occurs an 'intent watching of one another, a secret and
reciprocal listening-in. Under the mask of "for-one-another," an "against-one-
another" is in play' (BT, 219).

Idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity are the ways in which the 'they,' Dasein's
ontological manifestation in everydayness, is 'the there.' They make up the
Being of everydayness, which Heidegger calls fallenness, best understood as
'falling prey' (BT, 219). 'Falling prey to the "world" means being absorbed in
being-with-another as it is guided by idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity.'8 This
absorption, although initial and primary, accounts for Dasein being-lost, being
something other than its proper self, a self which is its proper ability-to-be
(potentiality-for-Being). Dasein has 'fallen prey to the "world,"' away from its
Being, its genuine self-understanding, as was also noted in the everyday
manifestation of Being-with, the third element of the optics of coexistence. As
Mulhall notes, the prominent characteristic of everydayness is that Dasein has

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7 Tuttle, The Crowd is Untruth, 72-73.
8 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time: A Translation of Sein und Zeit, trans. Joan Stambaugh
no conception of itself as lost. Dasein believes in the fiction of separateness and views its relationality as voluntary.

This characterisation of ‘fallenness’ does not mean to imply, however, that in falling Dasein becomes mere facticity; quite the contrary ‘in falling, Dasein itself as factical Being-in-the-world, is something from which it has already fallen away’ (BT, 220). If Dasein is an entity thrown into a world, dominated by ways of being-in which are given to it, rather than adapted to it as that particular Dasein that it is, then the aforementioned dispersal of its self into the ‘they,’ is what occurs ‘proximally and for the most part’ for Dasein. Similarly, fallenness ought not to be portrayed negatively, as though it indicated a less than optimal situation, because this is not the status of the discussion of falling:

a set of limits, can only be thought of as limitations if there exists a possible mode of existence to which those limits do not apply. Since that is not the case, the inherent worldliness of human existence must be thought of as an aspect of the human condition. It is a condition of human life, not a constraint upon it.

Dasein is an entity thrown into the world, whose norms and practices are not of its own making and ‘which it did not itself fully choose or determine.’ It acts, thinks, and feels as anyone would; it is, in other words, other-directed and self-dispersed. One of the consequences of self-dispersal is that it has no awareness of its fallenness. It begins to become aware of itself as a thrown and fallen entity through anxiety, which is a particular kind of affect. Unlike fear, with which it is often misleadingly confused, anxiety does not arise from the perception of an external object. Rather, it ‘plunges Dasein into an anxiety about itself in the face of itself’ and reveals Dasein’s ‘existence as essentially thrown projection’ into the world ‘but its everyday mode of existence as fallen.’ What Dasein is anxious about is no one but itself: ‘[i]n anxiety, Dasein is anxious about itself: not about some concrete existentiell possibility, but about the fact that its Being is Being-possible, that its existence necessarily

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89 Mulhall, Heidegger and Being and Time, 133.
90 Mulhall, Heidegger and Being and Time, 61-62.
91 Mulhall, Heidegger and Being and Time, 110.
92 Mulhall, Heidegger and Being and Time, 110-111.
involves projecting itself upon one or other possibility. Georgepoulos also
indicates that through anxiety, 'attention for the first time...is focused on
Dasein as Dasein' (Being-the-there), thrown, projected and fallen. As such,
Dasein's Being has a threefold structure, which Heidegger called 'care'
(Sorge).

In sum, the final element of the optics of coexistence is the disclosure of
Dasein as 'care.' The three elements of the care-structure are thrownness, as
seen in Dasein's attunement, which reveals that the world matters to it;
projectiveness, as seen through its capacity for understanding itself as futural
and possible; and finally, fallenness, seen in its being-guided by idle talk,
curiosity, and ambiguity, which shows it to have fallen prey to the everyday
world. The phenomenological description of the three aspects of 'care' grasp
Dasein's comportment more effectively 'than do the categories of “rational
animal”', contests J. Glenn Gray. These three aspects are not so much a
‘unity’ but a configuration of Dasein's Being. They 'belong together,' John
McCumber suggests, and cannot ‘be reduced to the others either, and there is
no yet more basic unity to bring them together.' Care, used here to illuminate
the radically embedded way in which Dasein is heteronomous in the world, is
above all 'the unifying origin of the various limits that characterize Dasein's
distinctive mode of existence.' As the fourth element of coexistence 'care'
serves to reinforce the other three elements, of engaged immersion, of having
an ontological relationship to the world and of Being-with, by providing the
unifying context of embeddeness in the form of thrownness, projectiviness and
fallenness.

93 Mulhall, Heidegger and Being and Time, 110.
95 Mulhall, Heidegger and Being and Time, 111.
96 J. Glenn Gray, "Martin Heidegger: On Anticipating My Own Death," The Personalist 46
(1965), 439.
97 John McCumber, Metaphysics and Oppression: Heidegger's Challenge to Western
Philosophy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), 208.
98 Mulhall, Heidegger and Being and Time, 112.
5. Coexistential heteronomy, or otherwise than composition

Recalling the analyses in the first and second chapters of the thesis, post-Cartesian subjectivity allows the conceptualisation of entities as indivisible units. This assumed indivisibility has historically enabled modern political theory to reduce coexistence to the condition of staying-together, requiring an event of union, described astutely by Jürgen Habermas as a 'physics of sociation.' The inquiry of coexistence within International Relations, too, can be said to be predicated on these subjectivist ontological premises. Coexistence, then, is a state, which involves the assembling of a composition of units with characteristics not amenable to composition; the non-relational and self-sufficient nature of these units renders coexistence a tentative and uncertain, though sought-after, condition.

Thus far, the investigation of the optics of coexistence has shown Dasein to be heteronomously constituted. The coexistential heteronomy to which the four elements attest renders unstable the location of this entity within the 'metaphysics of subjectivity.' The optics of coexistence found within the existential analysis of Dasein serve to 'unwork' the reflective, non-relational and self-sufficient features of modern subjectivity. Specifically, they perform this task of unworking in four distinct but connected ways: first, Dasein initially and primarily finds itself immersed in its dealings with the world. Understanding the primary mode of Dasein to be 'engaged immersion,' challenges the assumption that reflection and 'knowing' are the definitive modes of human relationality towards entities and the world.

Second, Dasein's disclosive character reveals a different conception of the world as such. The mode of engaged immersion allows the web of relations with available things and other beings to become conspicuous as a background of meanings against which existence makes sense of itself pre-reflectively. The

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world is revealed as a referential totality of meanings and relations which is not solely authored by Dasein. Rather, the practices, norms, and rules which help Dasein cope with its involvements in the world are structured by otherness and already given to it in advance of its involvement. Dasein shares into this totality but it is not its author. Generally, any access that Dasein has to ‘itself’ is ontologically mediated through otherness.

Third, Dasein is Being-in-the-world with others in this totality of meanings. For Dasein, existence is already coexistence, Being-there is always Being-with. Selfhood is coexistential but this is far from identical to the uniting, composition, or co-presence, assumed of the completed and autonomous subjects of modernity. Rather, Dasein can be said to be essentially Being-with — withness is an attribute of the kind of entity that it is. Withness, furthermore, manifests itself in such a way that, for the most part, Dasein cannot be distinguished from others.

Finally, Dasein is fundamentally attuned to the world in which it exists and its understanding of itself and the surrounding world is affected by this attunement. Its attunement illuminates a radical embeddedness which is best described as being-thrown into the world, but at the same time its understanding of itself as ‘possibility’ indicates that it also projects itself towards the future. Dasein’s embeddedness has the structure of thrown projection. The world, and others, matter for Dasein: Dasein’s attunement is evident in its disposition for moods, from the structure of its understanding, and its use of language or discourse. In everydayness, the world matters to such an overwhelming extent that Dasein can be said to have fallen prey to the world. Fallenness, thrownness, and projectiveness together suggest that, rather than self-presence and self-sufficiency, Dasein’s Being is better understood as care. In average everydayness Dasein can be said to be inauthentic, but this is the primary and initial mode in which it is found, and expresses the primacy of otherness in Dasein’s life. Dasein is inauthentic when it is not aware of its heteronomous constitution and its immersion into the ‘they’; it behaves as subject, as autonomous and sovereign, as the subject of control.
Through these elements, coexistence can be revealed as the proximal fact of Dasein's existence. A number of theoretical implications arise from this observation: the optics of coexistence offer an account of primary sociality, which begins to unwork the subjectivist ground through which ethical, and political issues of being-with-others are traditionally thought. The disclosure of Dasein as coexistential and heteronomously embedded in the world, renders unstable the terms of subjectivist discourse. It also problematises those critical discourses which try to articulate 'respect for difference or otherness' or a sensitivity to the exclusion of the other.\textsuperscript{101} The articulation of such respect, or sensitivity, in the language of the subject results in the effacement of heteronomy just as profoundly as the defence of modern subjectivity.\textsuperscript{102} This is not heteronomy, but alterity-sensitive homology, a \textit{logos} which tries to escape its own limits but finds itself trapped in its masterful discursive creation. Coexistence beyond the logic of composition is that condition which disrupts the domination of the non-relational subject and reveals, instead, the constitutive role of the other (\textit{heteron}).

In the course of its everyday comportments, Dasein's \textit{heteronomy} is manifested in its being other-directed, although Dasein itself is unaware of this and, rather, considers itself as both self-sufficient and autonomous. This flight from its heteronomy is understood as inauthentic for the kind of entity that it is. Therefore, although the optics of coexistence illustrate the ways in which human existence is coexistentially heteronomous, they do not illustrate how it becomes aware of this heteronomy. The ontological submission to the world that the four elements of the optics of coexistence bring to the fore is manifested in Dasein losing sight of its own ability to be and projecting itself onto possibilities which are not proper for it. When Dasein 'falls' into the world, it comports itself in public terms. Relating to itself in average terms


\textsuperscript{102} See, for example, in the essays in Joan Copjec (ed.),\textit{Supposing the Subject} (London: Verso, 1994).
means that it has a self-understanding, which is not proper for a coexistentially heteronomous, fundamentally worldly entity. It is lost in the public discourses of 'sovereign subjectivity' and regards itself as self-sufficient.

Becoming its proper self, then, could be thought as a process of recognising itself as 'already' being-radically-in-relation. Becoming-proper, then, would require that Dasein begin to grasp its heteronomy as the primacy of relation. Seeking to critique the discourses of autonomy to which it conforms while living its life according to average understandings and in unawareness of its possibilities, Dasein would open itself up to its self as a heteronomous entity characterised by anxiety and care for its Being. The process of becoming-proper, which is the focus of the following chapter, is reinterpreted therein, not as the discovery of some true 'inner self' but, rather, as the process of relinquishing notions of self-sufficiency and of being resolute towards its coexistential heteronomy. Becoming-proper involves an awareness of its own ability to be as a primarily heteronomous entity, whose very Being-there is Being-with and whose world matters to it.

Furthermore, the optics do not immediately suggest how this awareness might help reformulate ontic inquiry such as ethical and political coexistence. This is the task, respectively, of the next three chapters.
Chapter 5

Becoming-proper

The previous chapter surveyed Heidegger's analysis of the existential structures of Dasein in *Being and Time*,¹ and suggested that its existential analytic contains a number of elements, which reveal that coexistence is the initial and primary fact of Dasein's existence. One might call these four elements, which challenge the prominent features of the modern subject, 'the optics of coexistence.' Dasein's existential structures exemplify a coexistential heteronomy first, in the mode of 'engaged immersion,' in which it copes with its dealings in the world. Second, it exhibits this heteronomy in its ontological relationship to the totality of references, which is its 'world' and by which it makes sense of itself and its activities. Dasein, in other words, is immersed in a web of meanings, assignments and signs, of which it has not been the author; in its everyday world of praxis Dasein copes with its everyday going-about-its-business 'plugged into' this relational totality, which forms the background of its life. Third, Dasein's heteronomy is evident in its prior capacity for 'withness.' Dasein is Being-with to the extent that in its everydayness it cannot be distinguished from others. This Being-with, moreover, can hardly be understood as the 'with' which unites distinct and self-sufficient entities. And finally, Dasein's heteronomy can be seen in the way in which it is an entity thrown into the world, and which understands its existence as possibility. Dasein's modes of being-in the world, namely its attunement and understanding, reveal that Dasein's 'factual life is disturbed by everyday concerns,' that its world, in other words, matters to it.² It is attuned to the world and its self-understanding is already affected by this attunement. When Dasein is indistinguishable from others, its 'there' is manifested in language in terms

of idle talk, curiosity and ambiguity, such that the Being of this everyday self is 'falling.'

Heidegger regarded the fallenness of Dasein as the proximal way in which it is found in the world. As an everyday public self indistinguishable from the 'they,' however, Dasein is not able to have a proper understanding of itself. Without a genuine understanding of its Being as coexistentially heteronomous, Dasein cannot project itself onto possibilities which make most of its ability to be, something that Heidegger called its *Seinskönnen*. The ontological submission to the world that the four elements of the optics of coexistence have brought to the fore also indicate that Dasein has no awareness of its own ability to be and projects itself onto possibilities which publicly decided for it by the 'they-self.' Its self-understanding is determined by the public discourses of 'sovereign subjectivity,' which lead it to regard itself as self-sufficient. When Dasein 'falls prey' to the world, it comports itself in average terms that are not proper for its Being as a co-existential heteronomous, and fundamentally worldly entity.

Therefore, the optics of coexistence illustrate the ways in which human existence is coexistentially heteronomous, but do not delineate the process by which Dasein becomes aware of its heteronomy or how it takes it up in the unfolding of its existence. The present chapter, thus, provides an exposition of what has been, somewhat misleadingly, called 'authenticity,' which refers to the process of 'becoming-proper,' as Dasein's traversing towards a proper intelligibility of itself might be more appropriately called. As a process, becoming-proper involves a recovery of its dispersed being as a 'self.' Importantly, it is argued here that 'authenticity' is only a modification of the inauthentic way in which Dasein relates to its coexistential heteronomy in its everydayness. This reinterpretation of 'authenticity' turns away from its understanding as the discovery of some true 'inner self,' and advances a conception of it as the process of relinquishing notions of self-sufficiency and

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3 As was noted in chapter four, there is a distinction between 'others' and the 'they.' In the 'they' the others have already 'lost' their distinctiveness, just as Dasein has. Others have
of becoming resolute towards its coexistential heteronomy. This process of modification, it will be argued below, enables Dasein to improve its self-intelligibility by gaining an awareness of its own ability to be as a primarily heteronomous entity, whose very Being-there is Being-with and whose world matters to it.

Inauthenticity, the last chapter noted, meant that Dasein has no conception of itself as lost, it is oblivious, in other words, both to its heteronomy and its 'lostness' in the they-self. In denying its other-mediated existence, it comports itself in the world as a sovereign subject, believing in the fiction of separateteness and viewing its relationality as voluntary. How can Dasein reach a genuine understanding of itself, and of its possibilities, not as subject, but rather on the basis of its Being as 'care'? How can it reach an understanding of itself as 'already' being-radically-in-relation and recognise the primacy of relation for its Being? Anxiety, it was noted in chapter four, brings Dasein back from its falling and 'makes manifest to it that authenticity and inauthenticity are possibilities of its Being' (BT, 235). In this way, anxiety can be said to 'individualise' Dasein by signalling that its Being is an issue for it. Anxiety in itself, however, does not provide the means through which Dasein can break through its dispersal and view its existence as a whole self, as care. Ontologically, this recovery occurs through Dasein's understanding of itself as being-towards-finitude, an exposition of which is given in section one below. Section two addresses some of the concerns regarding the effect of 'authenticity' on Dasein's radical embeddedness, bringing about, as a result, a rethinking of becoming-proper itself. Finally, the chapter concludes with an examination of the 'dialogic' relation between authenticity and inauthenticity.

\*blended* in this public domain of discourse, in which no one comports herself as a uniquely distinct being.

1. Becoming-whole: Being-towards-death

Lost in the ‘they,’ Dasein does not regard itself as whole; it is self-dispersed and ‘insofar as it exists, it is oriented towards the next moment of its existence.’ In order to be able to recover an understanding of its potentiality for Being as a radically thrown entity, Dasein must grasp itself in all its elements of its care-structure. How, though, can Dasein see itself as a whole self however when, at the end of its life, Dasein is no longer able to look at itself as a whole, just as its life has reached its end and can be fully grasped?

According to Heidegger, death brings Dasein to its end and makes it complete, but this completion cannot be grasped, since Dasein does not experience its death. Although it can witness the other’s death, this is not tantamount to grasping someone else’s life as a whole. The other’s death is an event that Dasein may find sad or frightening but, as an occurrence, it does not afford the outlook of totality which might redress Dasein’s understanding of itself beyond self-dispersion. As Jacques Derrida notes, ‘nothing is more substitutable and yet nothing is less so than the syntagm “my death.”’ That is because ‘[e]veryone’s death, the death of all those who can say “death,” is irreplaceable.’ The inability of Dasein to examine itself as a whole, just when it is ‘completed,’ points to the concealment of death as an issue for Dasein. In everydayness Dasein’s being-towards-death is never given proper consideration despite it being constantly referred to in ‘idle talk.’ As Heidegger explains, ‘death is “known” as a mishap which is constantly occurring’ (BT, 296). The everyday reference to death and its designation as a well-known occurrence renders it inconspicuous. Covered up by its everyday interpretation as something that will eventually occur to everyone, an examination of death as something worth pondering is always postponed: in the present ‘it has nothing to do with us’ (BT, 297). ‘They say, “Death is certain”; and in saying so, they implant in Dasein the illusion that it is itself certain of its death’ (BT,

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5 Mulhall, Heidegger and Being and Time, 114.
In this way, "[t]he 'they' provides a constant tranquilization about death" (BT, 298).

By revoking the everyday understanding of death as a biological act, Heidegger showed that finitude is not merely the physical end or limit of Dasein. It 'impends at every moment of Dasein's life' and this has nothing to do with the progression of age. Death is a possibility which cannot be surpassed, no matter how young or old Dasein might be presently. When Dasein is forced to consider what its own death means for it, it realises that death is nothing but the possibility of its impossibility (BT, 294). Since the other's death cannot afford Dasein this perspective, nor can it unburden Dasein of its own death, it can be said that death is Dasein's ownmost possibility. Once Dasein anticipates its own death, its finitude ceases to hold it in morbid fascination, or condemn it to melancholy. Anticipation of its death, readiness for finitude, makes Dasein ready for anxiety; it is in this anticipatory sense that Dasein can be said to be 'Being-towards-death.' Finitude is, therefore, also Dasein's ownmost possibility and, as such, it is unsurpassable no matter how the 'they' try to mitigate against the proper anticipation of death through comforting idle talk. Moreover, facing the possibility of one's death leads Dasein to realise that, despite its fundamental relationality and its embeddedness in its world, death is 'a non-relational possibility.' Dasein cannot, in other words, share it with others as one would a burden. To this extent, Heidegger argues that 'death lays claim to it as an individual Dasein. The non-relational character of death, as understood in anticipation, individualizes Dasein down to itself' (BT, 308). Thus, taking the three defining characteristics of finitude: it is 'that possibility which is one's ownmost, which is non-relational, and which is not to be outstripped' (BT, 294).

There are several significant implications of such an understanding of Being-towards-death for Dasein's existence. When death is grasped as Dasein's ownmost possibility, Stephen Mulhall argues, it is accompanied by the realisation that its Being is an issue for it. Dasein's existence matters to it, not

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7 Mulhall, Heidegger and Being and Time, 117.
in its disparate moments, but as a whole; it is as a whole that Dasein must question how it wants to live its life and it is for the whole of its life that it must take responsibility. Taking responsibility for one’s life as a whole, furthermore, involves an acceptance that, for the greater part of its existence, Dasein has relinquished such responsibility to others and has allowed itself to be drawn into customary practices and ways of living that it had not critically appraised. When Dasein conceives of its death as a non-relational possibility, moreover, it realises that the publicly held opinions by which it had ordered its life, the discourses of idle talk in which it drowned its anxiety, and the curious and ambiguous involvement with available things, ‘are ultimately inessential to the task of being authentically itself.’ Finally, the impossibility of surpassing or avoiding death shows Dasein that its existence is ‘ultimately to be given up or annihilated, and is utterly contingent, and in no way necessary; from which it follows that every existentiell possibility which makes up that utterly contingent life is itself contingent.’ Mortality enhances the fact that Dasein has to chose one life to live and, at the same time, forego other possibilities; hence, it elucidates that only Dasein can be responsible for the projection it chooses. The radical contingency of Dasein’s existence reveals it to be finite and not grounded in certainty. Becoming-proper can begin to be understood, then, as ‘a projection upon an existentiell possibility in the light of itself as mortal.’

It would be ontologically possible, then, to grasp Dasein’s existence as a whole by invoking a confrontation with one’s own finitude. How, though, could such a confrontation come about in the course of everyday life, however? Since the roots of the existential analytic are found in the lived experiences of Dasein (BT, 34), what sort of experience can actually lead Dasein to recover its dispersed self and to view itself in its totality? Heidegger suggests that the phenomenon of ‘the call of conscience’ performs precisely this task of rousing Dasein out of its ‘lostness’ in the ‘they,’ and bringing about a consideration of itself as a contingent, yet whole entity. The phenomenon of the voice of

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8 Mulhall, *Heidegger and Being and Time*, 119.
9 All quotes in Mulhall, *Heidegger and Being and Time*, 119.
10 Mulhall, *Heidegger and Being and Time*, 120.
conscience, speaking to human beings from within, had been previously discussed in spiritual, mystical, religious, and moral terms. Heidegger, however, wished to see whether the voice of conscience could be seen as a call to Dasein’s ownmost ability-to-be, without becoming reduced to an aspect of spirituality or morality. In order for the call of conscience to be effective in this sense, it must not be similar to the kind of discourse in which Dasein participates in the folds of the ‘they.’ It must not voice the things Dasein wants to hear, as with idle talk, nor should it fuel Dasein’s curiosity about everyday events. Heidegger maintains that the call of conscience cannot, furthermore, contain a specific directive towards particular possibilities or encouragement for Dasein to follow this or that way of life. Rather the call of conscience ‘has the character of an appeal to Dasein by calling it to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being-its-Self’ (BT, 314). ‘[N]othing’ gets called to this Self,’ Heidegger writes, pointing to the call’s lack of positive content; the call appeals to Dasein’s self which is lost in the ‘they-self’ (BT, 318).

It is important to ask, moreover, whose voice might call Dasein to itself. Heidegger suggests that the call comes from within Dasein and yet from beyond it; the voice of conscience itself does the calling. It would appear that the call of conscience is ontologically possible for Dasein only because the Being of Dasein is care. Yet, this apparent indeterminacy of the identity of the caller ‘does not justify seeking the caller in some entity with a character other than that of Dasein’ (BT, 321). The caller could not be a being which does not have Dasein’s coexistential heteronomy because, as Mulhall argues, the passive aspect of the voice of conscience suggests that it relates to Dasein’s thrownness – that the voice of conscience is somehow expressive of the fact that Dasein is always already delivered over to the task of existing, placed in a particular situation it did not choose to occupy, but from which it must nevertheless choose how to go on with his life.11

The primary reason for the prevalent understanding of the call of conscience in religious or moral terms lies with the nature of the call, which often appears to accuse Dasein, to address it as guilty, and to call it to accept responsibility. Dasein’s everyday comportment in the world, however, does not make it guilty

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11 Mulhall, *Heidegger and Being and Time*, 127.
according to a body of law or a certain moral code. The discussion of guilt and conscience, therefore, should not be taken in a moral but, rather, in an ontological sense. In fact, Heidegger notes, "'Being-guilty'...is a kind of Being which belongs to Dasein" (BT, 328). Dasein can be seen as Being-guilty because it is responsible for a lack, not as something present-at-hand which ought to be there but is not, but nevertheless as something which has the 'not' as its basis. 'This “not” belongs to the existential meaning of thrownness' (BT, 330). Conscience, for Heidegger, 'calls Dasein forth to the possibility of taking over, in existing, even that thrown entity which it is; it calls Dasein back to its thrownness so as to understand this thrownness as the null basis which it has to take up into existence' (BT, 333).

It is important to note that the discussion of finitude and guilt in some way can be seen as a return to the discussion of 'who' is Dasein. The process of recovering its dispersed self discovers something even more destabilising for modern subjectivity: it reveals 'authentic' Dasein as an entity whose basis is the 'not,' whose existence is utterly contingent. Therefore, the attempt to understand its being-there as a whole for which Dasein is responsible requires that Dasein take 'on one's finitude, if...finitude is characterized by groundlessness (Grund-losigkeit) or by the concealment of the ground (Grund-verborgenheit)." Becoming-proper, therefore, is not about the adoption of particular lifestyles or attitudes, which can be confirmed by the lack of specific content in the call of conscience. On the contrary, 'the response it seeks is responsiveness, the desire to have a conscience,' which can be understood as the desire to be a self; in this vein, 'the particular form of self-disclosedness that the voice of conscience elicits in Dasein is a reticent self-projection upon one's ownmost Being-guilty in which one is ready for anxiety.' This self-projection encouraged by Dasein's responsiveness to the call of conscience is what Heidegger calls 'resoluteness' (in the sense of having 'resolve'). Taking over death as Dasein's ownmost possibility, can only mean, Francois Raffoul argues, 'taking over and making oneself responsible for or making oneself the

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13 Mulhall, *Heidegger and Being and Time*, 129.
basis of this "not" or absence of basis."\textsuperscript{14} Jean-Luc Nancy makes the connection between nothingness as the ground of Dasein and the deconstruction of 'certainty' as the ground of modern subjectivity quite explicit when he notes that '[a]ll of Heidegger's research into "being-for (or toward)-death" was nothing other than an attempt to state this: \textit{I} is not—am not—a subject.'\textsuperscript{15}

For historical reasons – whether they are as specific as the frequent reading of Heidegger through the work of Jean-Paul Sartre, or whether they are as general as the attempt to grasp a text which unsettles modern subjectivity through subjectivist terms, translations and understandings, or even whether are fuelled by the difficulties of Heidegger's neologisms – authentic Dasein and its resolute response to the call of conscience has been interpreted as a return to an individualist, decisionist and isolated subject, which rejects the 'inauthentic' world for authentic solitude. If the optics of coexistence is to be useful in rethinking coexistence in international relations beyond the composition of individualist subjects, however, this conception of becoming-proper must be refuted, a task to which the next section turns.

\textit{2. Becoming-proper and individualisation}

Authenticity is often condemned as harbouring the radical individualisation of Dasein, which leaves it isolated from its world and others, negating the phenomenal descriptions both of Dasein's worldly immersion and its Being-with. Simon Critchley and Peter Dews, for example, write:

\begin{quote}
Although, in its authentic existence – through the experience of angst, death, and conscience – \textit{Dasein} becomes individualized and resolute, that is, it becomes a Self, this conception of authentic selfhood cannot be confused with metaphysical conceptions of subjectivity. \textit{Or can it}?\textsuperscript{16}
\end{quote}

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\textsuperscript{14} Raffoul, \textit{Heidegger and the Subject}, 234.
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Their question exemplifies the, at best ambivalent, and at worst subjectivist, reception of becoming-proper. Some of the more prevalent critiques of authenticity are thus concerned with the possibility that authentic Dasein becomes a decisionist subject in its comportments and also, individualised and isolated from the world following the transcendence of its inauthenticity. Although Dasein becomes ‘individualised’ through its understanding of itself as Being-towards-death, it will be suggested below, this is not the kind of individualisation that revokes, the radical embeddedness of Dasein, or its capacity for ‘withness.’ The process of becoming-proper only seeks to unsettle the ontological manifestation of Being-with in the form of the ‘they,’ and to suggest that Dasein’s coexistential heteronomy can be taken up ‘properly.’ This somewhat confusing claim can be placed into perspective by recalling that, while indistinguishable from the ‘they,’ Dasein does not understand itself as heteronomous. Rather it has an understanding of itself given to it through the public discourses of the self as subject, as self-sufficient and largely non-relational.

Resoluteness: Countering the charge of decisionism

Prominent amongst the suspicions about authenticity is the charge of decisionism which, has been most eloquently put forward by Karl Löwith. Decisionism amounts to a serious challenge for the optics of coexistence because it suggests that the authentic self is akin to masterful, wilful subject of decision. He draws parallels between what he calls the ‘ontological decisionism’ of Heidegger and the political decisionism of his contemporary Carl Schmitt. Löwith discerns affinities between the ‘readiness for death and for killing’ that distinguishes Schmitt’s concept of the political and Heidegger’s ontological analysis of Being-towards-death and resoluteness. Löwith argues that the concern with finitude, ‘rather than any kind of ordering of the social life as is proper to the primordial meaning of the polis, becomes

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the "highest court of appeal" for Schmitt. In this vein, he also draws a parallel between the 'threat to existence,' as it serves a justifying role for Schmitt's distinction between friend and enemy, and Heidegger's analysis of finitude. Dasein's resolute ""capacity-for-being-a-whole," corresponds in political decisionism to the sacrifice of one's life for the total state in the exigency of war,' Löwith suggests, because 'the principle is the same: the radical return to something ultimate, namely the naked that-ness of facticity.'

What is of concern presently, however, is whether the charge of 'decisionism' reverses the 'unworking' of modern subjectivity that the optics of coexistence have extensively outlined in the previous chapter. When the notion of resoluteness is understood as to have the essence of a decision, it would require a sovereign and masterful subject. The linkage of decisionism and resoluteness superficially appears to be an easy one to make. It must, however, itself be seen not only as a political reading, but as an interpretation which remains firmly embedded within subjectivist philosophy. In this vein, Richard Polt rightly points out that 'any discussion of Heidegger as a "decisionist" should note that he does not view decisions as springing from the will of the subject as understood in modern philosophy.' Joanna Hodge concurs by noting that

[t]he critique that the enquiries in Being and Time are decisionist, voluntarist and fatalist presupposes a humanist, subjectivist reading...They all fail to take into account Heidegger's questioning of the Cartesian break, through which Heidegger displaces the modern assumption that the starting point of enquiry is the thinking of an individual human being, a res cogitans.

In addition to the subjectivist presuppositions about the subject of resoluteness, readings of resoluteness as 'mastery of self' fail to recognise that 'resoluteness has little to do with a determined seizing of our freedom to act; it is closer to a steadfastness in the face of the vicissitudes of circumstance.' For Miguel de Beistegui, too, resoluteness 'is the way in which Dasein comes

19 Löwith, Martin Heidegger and European Nihilism, 160.
20 Löwith, Martin Heidegger and European Nihilism, 160-161.
back to itself, back to its original site, from the dispersion in everydayness into which it is for the most part Dasein thrown.24 Finally, the equation of resoluteness with a decisionist disposition is also unsustainable because, for Heidegger, resoluteness cannot be understood as ‘an unqualified call to action.’ Since there is no encouragement to any one particular option, political, social, or otherwise, ‘Dasein’s resoluteness remains empty’25 of content and cannot be seen to represent any one social or moral perspective. Rather, resoluteness can only embody ‘a reticence which makes us ready for anxiety. Our acceptance of anxiety does not lead to a frenzied state but is the basis of our composure and calm openness (Gelassenheit).’26

**Speaking the middle voice**

Even if scholarly pronouncements in favour of alternative readings of authentic Dasein help counter the charge of decisionism, there is still another way to illustrate that the charge of decisionism cannot be sustained with respect to the process of becoming resolute. For, the examination of a linguistic form known as the middle voice promotes an understanding of Dasein’s becoming-proper beyond the self-appropriation of a hyper-individualist and decisionist subjectivity. The middle voice is the form that is linguistically situated between the active and passive voices, but is no longer prevalent in modern Western languages. As Charles Scott suggests, ‘[i]n the active voice the verb is for another. In the passive voice the verb acts on the subject. The middle voice is used when the subject is in some way specifically implicated in the result of the action but is neither active subject nor the passive object of the action.’27

Heidegger employs the middle voice when writing on authenticity and the call of conscience and this usage dissuades charges of decisionism. Although it is difficult to relate the precise loss of meaning in the translation/rendering of the

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middle voice into active voice (which frequently happens in English renderings of it), it is worth bearing in mind that the middle voice 'suggests something that goes beyond subject-object formations...it is the voice of something taking place through its own enactment.'

Furthermore, the middle voice interjects a certain ambiguity and destabilization of presence while, simultaneously, offering a more immediate access to presence. It is important to note, therefore, that usage of the middle voice signifies an attempt to 'think outside of the domain of subjectivity' because it aims at 'undermining the syntactical distinction between the subject and the predicate' in order to bring to the fore a certain 'hermeneutics of nearness' that becomes apparent in 'phrases like “world worlds,” “language languages,” or, most explicitly, “nearness nears”.' Nearness attempts to be 'mindful of the otherness of other beings' while avoiding the opposition of self (same) and other. Instead of invoking an opposition between subject and object, the middle voice shows that 'the way in which the world transpires...is by each being or thing opening itself, in its self-concealment, to the other,' resulting in a 'powerful reconfiguration of otherness.' A pertinent example of this usage if the verb 'to end,' which means both to limit and to terminate. It suggests arrival at a telos (the end of this project is at hand) or incompleteness (the project came to an untimely end) or the continuing presence of a telos (the end of the project guided its process) or delimitation (the project’s possibility ends here).

If 'to end' is removed from the active voice and is thought, instead, in its middle voice form, 'both the conclusiveness of termination and the nonconclusiveness of delimitation become apparent, both the overtone of death and the overtone of self-realization, the presence of both limited identity and possibility at the limit' are brought out without the prior subject-act-object form imposed by the active voice.

28 Scott, The Question of Ethics, 24.
29 Scott, The Question of Ethics, 19.
31 Ziarek, Inflected Language, 55.
32 Ziarek, Inflected Language, 56.
33 Scott, The Question of Ethics, 21.
34 Scott, The Question of Ethics, 21.
the middle voice, enabling the unique appropriation of everydayness in terms of mineness to be understood as an enactment which enacts itself in each case without the assumption of the willing and sovereign modern subject.

From 'inwardness' to transcendence towards the world

The second concern that arises from the supposed reassertion of sovereign subjectivity in the process of becoming-proper, purports that Dasein's transcendence of its inauthenticity leads to a form of isolating 'inwardness.' Understood in this way, authenticity is regarded as an isolation or removal of Dasein from its world, as a return to some inner self, which is more proper for it than its worldly immersion. Is it appropriate, however, to equate authenticity to Polonius's call ‘to thine own self be true'?\(^*\) Does the call of conscience draw Dasein away from its lostness in the 'they' in order to return it to a fixed self that is there to be discovered? The answer to the urging to be true to one’s self ('I am who I am' was Yahweh’s answer) is ‘an answer of self-sufficiecy.’\(^*\) Thinking of authenticity in this manner, it would seem, transforms becoming-proper into pure introspection, and misleadingly confuses Dasein’s search for propriety with inwardness.

On the contrary, becoming-proper requires the realisation that one’s self is Being-in-the-world, disclosed and constituted by its innerworldly relations. Any inwardness or introspection brought about by the call of conscience has the intention of precisely highlighting the constitutive importance of the world. Becoming-proper turns Dasein towards the world, therefore, and cannot be interpreted as an isolating individuation. The resoluteness of propriety is, indeed, a return from self-dispersal, yet 'such a coming back, such gathering is not an inward movement whereby Dasein would cut itself off from the world so as to enjoy the peace and depth of some precious inner life,’ Beistegui argues; '[r]ather it is a movement of disclosure, of clearing, where Dasein authentically ek-sists its own essence, and this means confronts its own


facticity. In coming back to itself, Dasein comes back to its own ecstatic yet finite essence.\textsuperscript{37}

According to Dasein’s constitution it is, contrary to the charge of inwardness, inauthentic to flee in the face of its worldly character. The call of conscience, therefore, aims to awaken Dasein to the realisation that ‘in its fall it seeks tranquilization and distraction through the concealments of worldliness.’\textsuperscript{38} Worldiness is inescapable, however, because Dasein’s Being is thrown projection. No transcendence can ever rescind thrownness, since Dasein cannot exist without a world: ‘[w]orld belongs to a \textit{relational} structure distinctive of Dasein as such, a structure that we called being-in-the-world.’\textsuperscript{39} Authenticity seeks to bring out the propriety of Dasein’s worldly anxious existence, so that becoming-proper is a finite transcendence, ‘a surpassing in the direction of world,’ where the world is understood neither as belonging to Dasein as something ‘subjective’ nor as something ‘objective’ related to natural entities or their totality.\textsuperscript{40} Dasein’s transcendence and its thrownness in the world are linked: ‘[t]o transcendence belongs world as that toward which surpassing occurs.’\textsuperscript{41} Transcendence belongs to the very fact of Dasein’s being-the-there.\textsuperscript{42} ‘Inwardness,’ then, does not negate the heteronomously co-existential character of Dasein. On the contrary, the struggle for authenticity cannot be reduced to radical individualisation because ‘the only inwardness that the existential subject has is that which plunges it into the world; an inwardness thrown and initially lost and ever only as good as its labor’; if this understanding of transcendence as an anxious movement of Dasein towards the

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{37} Beistegui, \textit{Heidegger and the Political}, 15.
\bibitem{38} Howard N. Tuttle, \textit{The Crowd is Untruth: the Existential Critique of Mass Society in the Thought of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Ortega y Gasset} (New York: Peter Lang, 1996), 73.
\bibitem{40} Heidegger, “On the Essence of Ground (1929),” 121. Agnes Heller attests to such a view from a different perspective: to be one’s self, is to have a map to the self with which to orient; ‘the center of the map of the self (be it reason, passion or something else) is not the center of the self: for the center of the self (around which the self is centered) is outside the self. It is “in” the world.’ Agnes Heller, “Death of the Subject?” in George Levine (ed.), \textit{Constructions of the Self} (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1992), 282.
\bibitem{41} Heidegger, “On the Essence of Ground (1929),” 111.
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world is obscured, then, 'the reification of the subject is a foregone conclusion.'43

The proposition that Dasein transcends its everydayness in the direction of the world suggests that becoming-proper is predicated on a distinction between, on the one hand, a 'naive everyday, understood as unproblematic and not in need of clarification, an everyday in which the uncanny experienced as anxiety takes place' and 'an everyday rendered strange by being subjected to analysis' on the other.44 Dasein attempts to transcend its inauthentic self by moving from a flighty (curious, ambiguous, gossipy) immersion in its publicly comprehended everyday towards a resolute engagement with a world which can be subject to critique. Its everyday world becomes luminous and its ontological relationship to it is taken up in a steadfast readiness for anxiety. However, if becoming-proper is interpreted as an achievement which is complete, which can be fully actualised, this distorts the understanding of everydayness as that which 'both is and is not a simple structure; that the everyday both is and is not aporetic and paradoxical.'45 The everyday world is that which is most familiar for Dasein and yet that which simultaneously harbours uncanniness. Dasein discovers in the midst of familiarity something that shatters its self-perception as a distinct and autonomous subject. It discovers that what distinguishes it from "the they" is not innate autonomy but, in each case, an internalisation of the shared practices and norms of its world, formulated in way unique for its factical situation.46

If Dasein does not become a 'subject' once it strives to become-proper, then what is the result of its transcendence towards the world? According to Michael Gelven becoming-proper discloses Dasein as thrown projection, projecting itself on its possibilities. In his view, 'authentic existence is

44 Hodge, *Heidegger and Ethics*, 182. Such a distinction, however, is unstable and can never become concrete, it is heuristically used to create a space for thinking.
45 Hodge, *Heidegger and Ethics*, 182.
awareness of possibilities. However, it was argued earlier in this chapter that Dasein’s *ownmost* possibility is its finitude: how, then, can propriety and death be thought together? Scott argues that, ‘[w]hen dasein’s *eigenste Möglichkeit* (most proper possibility) is named death, the meaning of *most proper* or *ownmost* or *most essential* is thus interrupted.’ Becoming-proper cannot be determined as a specific way of being according to an essence of Dasein, because ‘[a]uthenticity for Heidegger is not a matter of self’s actualizing itself.’ Rather, it only be thought as a proper readiness for the ‘improper’ being that Dasein is. Seizing Dasein’s ownmost possibility, means then that Dasein ‘exposes itself as Being-guilty, to its Being-toward-Death, to its thrownness, in short, it exposes itself to its own finitude and to its “own” inappropriable.’ When Dasein is ‘lost’ in the ‘they’ it is unaware of its constitution as Being-in-the-world and understands itself as self-completing and unencumbered, voluntarily participating in relations with others. In becoming-proper, an interruption of the myth of the ‘I’ reveals Dasein to itself as Being-in-the-world. Thus, becoming-proper tears Dasein away from its passive immersion in the ‘they’ only to return Dasein back to a recognition of its fundamental worldly embeddedness. In the process of becoming-proper, it ‘is torn from its inherited interpretation of itself as self-founding’ and self-sufficient, and brings about a recognition of otherness as constitutive for it.

Dasein, as an intrinsically social, worldly being, is a being marked by difference in its being from the totality of its relations and values. In its relations and values dasein is the opening [erschliessen] of its ownmost incapacity to own its being by affirming who in fact it is. It comes into its own by disowning its selfhood in the way it is a self.

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**The impossibility of isolation: Dasein’s bounded ‘historising’**

There is, furthermore, a third reason why authentic Dasein cannot be seen to signify a return to an isolated ‘disengaged self who generates distance from its

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52 Scott, *The Question of Ethics*, 100.
background (tradition, embodiment) and foreground (external nature, other subjects). The previous discussion maintained that Dasein's process of becoming-proper does not isolate it from its world as a masterful subject while, on the contrary, it achieves the proper comportment to Dasein's 'foreground'. Authentic Dasein, moreover, cannot signify a return to a Cartesian kind of subjectivity because Dasein's coexistent heteronomy is also manifested in its relationship with its 'historical background.' Dasein is historical in the sense that it exists 'between' birth and death. Its existence unfolds between the two, and this unfolding Heidegger calls 'historising.' Since Dasein is Being-with, its historising, is co-historising, as will be discussed in greater detail in chapter seven. Its possibilities are not self-made but, rather, have been inherited from its tradition. In this manner, '[t]he resoluteness which comes back to itself and hands itself down, then becomes a repetition of a possibility of existence that has come down to us' (BT, 347).

When Dasein is resolutely considering its possibilities, it does so with respect to those possibilities handed down to it by its tradition. Awareness of possibilities, thus, signifies an engagement and adaptation of 'past possibilities.' 'Repeating' past possibilities, however, does not mean that Dasein uncritically accepts the outlook of its tradition. This kind of repetition is, on the contrary, related to the unique appropriation of the world into which Dasein is thrown. Thus, Dasein brings its resoluteness to bear on those 'past possibilities,' which are found to be worth repeating after critically evaluation within Dasein's factual situation. Repetition, therefore, refers to the critical appropriation of the shared past. In becoming-proper, one's understanding of the separation from others as a sign of selfhood gets disrupted by being-towards-death. Dasein's recognition of its contingency and finitude, as well as its openness to its factual possibilities, tear Dasein 'from the meanings and values by which it makes its way in its society.' This includes both one's familiar surrounding world (Umwelt) and those past possibilities that have

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54 'What we have been, what we call our past, exists nowhere else than as an idea in our minds,' writes Philip Allott. Philip Allott, "Globalization from Above: Actualizing the Ideal through Law," *Review of International Studies* 26, Special Issue (December 2000), 61.
been handed down by one’s ‘historical community and identity,’ which are not proper for it.

Therefore, Dasein’s historising supplements the discussion on resoluteness, the middle voice and finite transcendence. Taken together these related arguments counter the charges of decisionism and isolating individuation. They gesture, moreover, towards an understanding of propriety as a modification, and not a negation, of the coexistential heteronomy that the optics of coexistence outlined in the previous chapter. The relationship between authentic and inauthentic modes of being concludes the exploration of becoming-proper, in preparation for the unworking of ethical and political subjectivity in the following chapters.

3. Authenticity and inauthenticity – a dialogic relationship?

Both authenticity and inauthenticity are modes of Dasein’s existence which are ‘grounded upon that state of Being which we have called “Being-in-the-world” (BT, 78). It is important to illustrate that the two modes of being are not separate but rather constitute one another dialogically. Dasein comports itself towards its Being even in the mode of average everydayness, ‘even if it is only in the mode of fleeing in the face of it and forgetfulness thereof’ (BT, 69). Since Dasein flees from a confrontation with the fact that its Being is an issue for it, Heidegger designates everydayness as inauthentic. However, there can be no transcendence of everydayness as such. The proper comportment to one’s Being and to entities within the world occurs when Dasein appropriates its average practices, norms, and values in a unique way and has an awareness of its ability-to-be. Thus, it is not everydayness which is transcended, but the inauthentic relation to one’s Being in which Dasein finds itself initially and primarily (zunächst und zumeist). This is the meaning of the statement

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55 Scott, The Question of Ethics, 99.
56 Scott, The Question of Ethics, 100.
'[i]nauthenticity belongs to the essential nature of factual Dasein. Authenticity is only a modification but not a total obliteration of inauthenticity.'\textsuperscript{57}

Moreover, transcendence does not mean 'to overcome' or 'to go beyond' in the context of the optics of coexistence, as was noted above. Rather, it is more appropriately reformulated for an entity whose basic constitution is Being-in-the-world, as a going towards the world, towards facticity, a movement through which the shared world is uniquely appropriated \textit{in each case}. 'Mineness belongs to any existent Dasein, and belongs to it as the condition which makes authenticity and inauthenticity possible' (BT, 78). Dasein's appropriation of its factic coexistence launches a process of becoming-proper as a being who is a radically contingent, foundation-less, death-bound possibility. Authenticity demands recognition of one's entity as 'Being the basis of a nullity,' not in a morbid attempt to urge Dasein towards a taking-leave of the factual world, but to urge an appropriation of its worldly existence in a unique way. The recognition of finitude and its appropriation as one's ownmost possibility do not rid Dasein’s impropriety. On the contrary, 'by resolutely projecting my Being-guilty, I appropriate the inappropriable as inappropriable. \textit{I must be the improper (inauthenticity) properly (authentically).}’\textsuperscript{58} When authenticity is understood in connection with Dasein’s relation to its self as contingent and groundless, 'Dasein comes to dwell in familiarity with its mortal temporality.'\textsuperscript{59} This is the primordial sense of mineness, namely, ‘giving oneself to what is other and being this givenness (which is at once a reception, a hearing, a corresponding, a hearkening, a belonging) authentically.’\textsuperscript{60} Although Dasein is 'in each case mine' (BT, 67), 'mineness,' is not a property but a reiteration. The singularity of Dasein is taken anew in each case. As Nancy insists, 

\textit{there is no} being apart from singularity: each time just this once, and there would be nothing general or common except the "each time just this once". This is how we must understand Heidegger’s \textit{Jemeinigkeit}, Dasein’s "each time as my own," which does not define the subjectivity of a substantial

\textsuperscript{57} Heidegger, \textit{The Basic Problems of Phenomenology}, 171.
\textsuperscript{58} Raffoul, \textit{Heidegger and the Subject}, 235.
\textsuperscript{59} Scott, "Nonbelonging/Authenticity," 67.
\textsuperscript{60} Raffoul, \textit{Heidegger and the Subject}, 235.
presence of the ego to itself...but which on the contrary defines “mineness” on the basis of the “each time.”

This kind of ‘mineness’ restates singularity and uniqueness in a temporal sense:

Each time there is the singularity of a “time,”...there is “mineness,” which does not imply the substantial permanence, identity, or autonomy of the “ego,” but rather implies the withdrawal of all substance, in which is hollowed out the infinity of the relation according to which “mineness” identically means the nonidentity of “yourness” and “his/her/its-ness.”

Relation is primary, since mineness cannot be understood as Dasein’s property, substance or even its possession of itself. Rather, ‘existence always exists in the plural...that being one can be understood on the basis of plurality within being, the singularity of being is plural.’

The ambivalent content, tone and language in which inauthenticity is approached has often led Heidegger scholars either to denigrate such an ‘inauthentic mode’ or who rush towards a defence of inauthenticity. Yet both ‘camps’ of the inauthenticity/authenticity debate rest on a distinction that was not intended to establish and maintain a rigid dichotomy between inauthentic and authentic modes of being. Rather, Heidegger invoked this distinction to call for a rendering-strange of the average manifestation of Dasein. A dichotomy is not ontologically possible, moreover, because the mode of ‘averageness’ cannot be transcended, as it constitutes the shared world of significance. If by transcendence is meant the overcoming of averageness, then this is a phenomenal impossibility, because the structures of shared existence are constituted by it. Lawrence Vogel notes in this regard that, ‘[t]here is no pure authenticity but at best an authentic appropriation of the inauthentic.’

But this is not merely an indication of the limitations of the process towards

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propriety. Rather, it is meant to highlight that, 'authenticity is nothing but inauthenticity seized as such.'\textsuperscript{66}

Furthermore, transcendence in a conventional meaning of going beyond is not only \textit{impossible} but also \textit{unnecessary} because of the dialogic relation between these two modes. As Joan Stambaugh argues, '[w]e are both at once, usually without realizing it.'\textsuperscript{67} In this vein, setting up a dichotomy between inauthenticity and authenticity can be said to obscure the fact that there is never a complete severance of the dialogic relation between the two modes of being. 'Inauthenticity characterizes a kind of Being into which Dasein can divert itself and has for the most part always diverted itself; but Dasein does not necessarily and constantly have to divert itself into this kind of Being' (BT, 303). In this way, Heidegger's paradoxical statement 'inauthenticity is based on the possibility of authenticity' can be better understood as a dialogical interaction between the two modes (BT, 303). Within inauthenticity can be found the very possibility of its modification, authenticity; but, at the same time, inauthenticity is only possible for a being who has the capacity to be authentic (proper) within its everyday possibilities. Their interconnection reveals that 'if authenticity is always manifested by inauthenticity, authenticity is itself in some sense inauthentic,' belonging, that is, in some way to the everyday and its possibilities.\textsuperscript{68}

Thinking of authenticity as a 'modification of inauthenticity' also transforms Dasein's relation to otherness. Dasein's submission to the world and the 'they' is modified so that it becomes Dasein's understanding of the primacy of \textit{relation} for its Being-in-the-world (BT, §27). Dasein is both singular (unique) \textit{and} fundamentally related, its 'singularity of the self which knows itself as opening to alterity.'\textsuperscript{69} Authenticity modifies Dasein's self-understanding so that it comes to consider its heteronomy as being-radically-in relation. Becoming-proper, therefore, involves a transformation of Being-with from fallenness in

\textsuperscript{66} Raffoul, \textit{Heidegger and the Subject}, 251.
\textsuperscript{68} Raffoul, \textit{Heidegger and the Subject}, 250.
the ‘they,’ to the critical appropriation of one’s shared way of life and an understanding of oneself as determined by the critical repetition of possibilities which are historically inherited. Propriety is an awareness of the heteronomy of the concrete situation, as well as a response to it that is unique. It is the recognition, in other words, that ‘[e]xistence exists in the plural, in the singularly plural.’

Thus, discussions of authenticity/inauthenticity must ‘be understood at the philosophical-hermeneutic level of whether an implicit self-interpretation appropriately articulates and discloses the being proper to Dasein or not.’

This enhanced intelligibility involves, ultimately, relinquishing perceptions of selfhood as ‘merely self-consciousness, self-possession, or self-control’ and no longer comporting oneself towards beings as a self-sufficient subject; higher intelligibility enables Dasein to ‘appreciate the meaningfulness of all beings’ and to be ‘the maintenance of creative openness to the significance of what is, to the difference it makes that there are beings rather than nothing.’

Becoming-proper involves, therefore, a disclosive enhancement to relations with others and available things. The dialogic relationship between inauthenticity and authenticity serves to highlight, also, Dasein’s relation to itself. It aids the questioning of the assumptions of the modern subject and signifies the unstable process of ‘the deconstruction of Dasein, Dasein’s making itself tremble’ by which ‘Dasein is its own deconstruction.’

To recapitulate, then, the ‘optics of coexistence,’ discussed at great length in chapter four and modified in chapter five, has sought to ‘unwork’ the characteristics attributed to modern subjectivity. Acting both as a means of

69 Christopher Fynsk, ‘Foreword: Experiences of Finitude,’ xiii.

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accessing the facticity of existence and as an analysis of the structures of Dasein (being-there), the ‘optics of coexistence’ reveals that, far from being an innately autonomous and sovereign subject, Dasein is coexistentially heteronomous. This means that its existence is coexistence: in the proximal and average way in which it finds itself in the world, Dasein is radically embedded Being-with, although it flees in the face of this worldiness. Its efforts to become proper for its Being, moreover, take up this radical embeddedness and allow it to define Dasein’s ability-to-be. By bringing to the fore the ways in which heteronomy permeates and constitutes Dasein, the various elements of the ‘optics of coexistence’ have rendered untenable the conception of coexistence as the co-presence of already constituted, and self-sufficient subjects. What is needed at this stage, therefore, is an elaboration of coexistence in which the heteronomous constitution of the self can be adequately reflected.

The dialogic relationship between Dasein’s proper and improper manifestations ‘unworks’ subjectivity as the ground of international political inquiry. This unworking is neither a closure, nor the replacement of ‘subject’ by another ontological certainty; rather, it is the unravelling of ossified assumptions, which creates the possibility for thinking of coexistence beyond composition. How might a new understanding of coexistence be articulated if it can no longer be conceived as mere co-presence? To think of coexistence on the basis of this facticity of coexistential heteronomy is to seek its articulation in ethical and political terms. To think of coexistence after the insights of the heteronomous facticity of selfhood involve the interrogation of ethical and political terms towards which coexistence might turn after the logic of composition. Reflecting on the insights of the optics of coexistence in terms of ethics and politics is required, furthermore, because many of the issues of

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74 Though such an exercise might appear as a grounding one, i.e. one that provides ultimate foundations, it is important to note that it can only occur on the basis of a groundless entity, a Being-towards-Death. In this regard, the transcendental “condition of possibility” of our experience...is revealed as also the historical finite “condition” of Dasein,” who is a thrown project and as such cannot constitute an ultimate ground as did God, Spirit and human subjectivity, Gianni Vattimo, “Toward an Ontology of Decline,” trans. Barbara Spackman, in Giovanna Borradori (ed.), Recoding Metaphysics: The New Italian Philosophy (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1988), 69.
coexistence in world politics are addressed as ethical and political issues. In the remaining chapters of the thesis it will be suggested that heteronomous Being-with-others must be articulated, not in an additive way, but in terms of ethical and political selfhood.
Chapter 6

Recovering the ‘Ethical’ Self as an Opening to Otherness

_Thinking takes place, as the universal validity of what is thought falls more and more into question._
Charles E. Scott¹

The ‘optics of coexistence,’ discussed at great length in chapter four and modified in chapter five, has sought to ‘unwork’ the characteristics attributed to modern subjectivity. Acting both as a means of accessing the facticity of existence and as an analysis of the structures of Dasein (being-there), the ‘optics of coexistence’ reveals that, far from being an innately autonomous and sovereign subject, Dasein is coexistentially heteronomous. This means that its existence is coexistence: in the proximal and average way in which it finds itself in the world, Dasein is radically embedded Being-with, although it flees in the face of its worldliness. Its efforts to become proper for its Being, moreover, take up this radical embeddedness and allow it to define Dasein’s ability-to-be. By bringing to the fore the ways in which heteronomy permeates and constitutes Dasein, the various elements of the ‘optics of coexistence’ have rendered untenable the conception of coexistence as the co-presence of already constituted, and self-sufficient subjects. The previous chapter, therefore, ended with the question of how a new understanding of coexistence might be articulated, in which the heteronomous constitution of the self can be adequately reflected. It suggested that heteronomous Being-with-others must be articulated, not in an additive way, but in terms of ethical and political selfhood. Reflecting on the insights of the optics of coexistence in terms of ethics and politics is required, furthermore, because many of the issues of coexistence in world politics are addressed as ethical and political issues.

Allowing the optics of coexistence to bear on ethical selfhood has two effects. First, it expands and subverts what is normally designated as ethics. For, it requires a movement beyond the supposition that ethics is solely ethical construction, i.e. the elaboration of rules which are intended to moderate relations between subjects who are only voluntarily associated. This kind of reduction, characteristic of modernity, takes ethics as 'obligatory principles of conduct, rules that tell you what you must do to be blameless.' Conventionally, then, the term ethics refers to 'the body of values by which a culture understands and interprets itself with regard to what is good and bad...a group of principles for both conduct and value judgement.' These specific definitions of ethics, moreover, resonate throughout ethical theorising in some Continental and most Anglo-American moral philosophy but, more importantly, also represent the articulation of the great majority of normative theorising within the discipline of International Relations. In fact, the literature on normative theories within International Relations is dominated by the traditional conception of ethics as ethical construction. The majority of ethical international approaches, which call for an inclusion of normative questions amongst the concerns of the discipline, are, to date, formulated largely in the manner of universalisable theorising or the application of existing ethical theories to specific issues, such as refugees, societal exclusion, inter-cultural critique, universal human rights and their political success in non-western parts of the world, etc. Even for those international ethical discourses that strive for a 'thoroughgoing anti-foundationalist ethics,' such as that of Molly Cochran, 'by definition, an ethic is understood to be


3 Scott, The Question of Ethics, 4. This citation might be taken to resonate with the cultural relativist position. It is moderated, however, by the clarification made by Kai Nielsen as early as 1966 that, anthropologically, similar types of obligations or prohibitions are evident in all cultures signifying a cross-cultural overlap. However, the content of the rules 'varies considerably from culture to culture.' See Kai Nielsen, 'Ethical Relativism and the Facts of Cultural Relativity,' Social Research 33 (1966): 531-551.

4 See James P. Sterba (ed.), Ethics: the Big Questions (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998); Mervyn Frost, Ethics in International Relations: A Constitutive Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) but also the related literature on human rights which is predicated on this understanding of ethics such as R.J. Vincent and Fred Halliday.
universalizable' in the sense that it is 'interested in seeking convergence on ethical principles.'

Second, the optics of coexistence leads to a 'recovery of the ethical self,' understood as a stance of heteronomous selfhood 'which knows itself as opening to alterity.' The present re-conceptualisation of coexistence in terms of ethical selfhood participates in a number of critical discourses that have emerged within ethical international theorising and which are concerned with the shortcomings of traditional conceptions of ethics. In particular, their animating spirit arises from attestations of otherness and suffering that traditional ethics is said to unwittingly occlude. These discourses are troubled by the possibility that the reduction of ethics to ethical construction and rule-making might not be sufficiently open to otherness. It is in this way that the reconceptualising of coexistence in terms of ethical selfhood simultaneously contributes to a rethinking of ethics itself.

What occurs, then, is a 'de-construction,' or a 'destructive retrieve,' of ethics in the sense of a double movement of 'destruction' and 'retrieve,' which calls into question the assumptions that hinder its full potential, while bringing about a recovery of the 'ethical' self as a possibility within ethics that is worth reclaiming and enhancing, and which has positive implications for ethical theorising in IR. Importantly, then, this chapter does more than to just reflect on an understanding of coexistence beyond composition. Rather, it contributes to the critical re-evaluation of the very possibility of ethics in the traditional sense and considers whether a more fruitful direction for ethical theorising

6 Cochran, *Normative Theory in International Relations*, 249.
might not be found, instead, in an exploration of ethical selfhood informed by the optics of coexistence.

Specifically, the present chapter examines the linguistic trajectory of the word *ethos* and wedds it to the extensive Heideggerian discussion of Dasein's socialisation in the 'they.' This combined perspective *questions* ethics by enabling the understanding of the discursive creation of moral norms as crucial to, and inseparable from, processes of socialisation and normalisation. It is through this connection between normalcy, normalisation and *ethos* within conventional conceptions of ethics as moral rules that the occlusion of suffering and of alterity occurs. The veiling of otherness and suffering points to the urgent need to turn away from a restricted notion of ethics as ethical construction and to seek other means of access to the ethical, which adequately reflect the heteronomy disclosed by the 'optics of coexistence.' Hence, ethics itself becomes radically re-determined, beyond rules, until it reaches an 'unrestricted conception of ethics concerned not just with human beings, but with human beings in relation to difference and to otherness.'

1. **Questioning ethics**

*questioning was the piety of thought...piety should from the start have been understood as the docility of listening, thus making the question...into a modality of reception, a trusting attention to what gives itself to be understood rather than – or prior to – the enterprising, inquisitional activity of a request or inquest.*

Jacque Derrida

The lack of explicit theorisation of ethics by Heidegger had discouraged many Heidegger scholars and moral philosophers from exploring the possibilities of

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9 This suspension of traditional meaning of ethics, or the desire to utilise the term and yet postpone its definition, is indicated in the text by the use of quotation marks (while in all other instances a traditional definition can be assumed).


Heideggerian thinking for normative concerns. It can be argued, however, that the discussion of everydayness found in *Being and Time* and, specifically, the analysis of everyday social practices, rules, roles, and norms, under the heading of the 'they' (*das Man*) amounts to a forceful critique of modern conceptions of morality and ethical construction, and indicates that Heidegger *did* indeed have a lot to say about ethics. Charles E. Scott, for example, states that the *question* of ethics is 'functioning with exceptional force' within Heidegger’s thinking. Joanna Hodge similarly regards that ‘the question of ethics is the definitive, if unstated problem of his thinking.’ The ‘optics of coexistence,’ it is here suggested, offers a forceful critique of ethics as ethical construction and enables a recovery of the ethical self which aids the re-conceptualisation of ‘ethics’ itself.

The constitutive function that conformity and mimesis have for Dasein’s worldly existence is evident in everyday ontological manifestation of the ‘who’ of Dasein as the ‘they.’ As can be recalled from chapter four, Heidegger acknowledges conformity as positively constitutive for Dasein but also offers a critique of ‘conformism’ which suggests that shared social practices must be evaluated and uniquely appropriated. The critique challenges public morality insofar as it is an important mode through which Dasein is socialised into the mentality of the ‘they.’ Slavoj Žižek calls this ‘the inauthentic ontic morality of

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14 Hodge, *Heidegger and Ethics*, 1. This new type of work, has succeeded earlier ethical thought that had, in part, assumed that Heidegger’s contribution to ethics lay primarily in questioning the fact-value dichotomy, a distinction which had largely contributed to the academic ‘neglect of human conduct,’ Fred R. Dallmayr, *The Other Heidegger* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 109. Surpassed is also the assumed equivalence between ontological concepts, such as ‘authenticity,’ ‘resoluteness,’ or ‘solicitude’ and ethics. See, for example, Charles M. Sherover, “Founding an Existential Ethic,” *Human Studies* 4 (1981): 223-236 and Marjorie Grene, “Authenticity: An Existential Virtue,” *Ethics* 62, no. 4 (1952): 266-274.

“this is how it is done, how one does it.” Scott similarly recognises that what is meant by ethics as rules of conduct can only arise in the context of the ‘they.’ If by ethics we understand the emergence of a code or of a set of norms expressive of locally acceptable and expected behaviour, then ‘the possibility of ethical thought and action is found in traditional “normalcy” and its history.’ The reference to normalcy indicates that the construction of norms usually arises within habitual behaviour, which tends to have a normalisation effect. People are socialised by adjusting their dealings in the world towards what becomes average practice through infinite and minute adjustments. It is through such normalisation that ‘norms’ develop, in the sense that historical and local habitual practice tends to coalesce into customary ways of doing things. Norms, then, are representative of current average practice which is attained through processes of normalisation of behaviour and the power of habituation. As such, they are undeniably public.

Some of these ‘ways’ also ascend to the level of moral rules, by which we normally refer to locally desirable ways to regulate action towards others and the collectivity in general. Moral rules have been accorded value within a historically determined and locally specific public group and some of them might have been gradually and/or officially codified. That such a body of rules exists, however, need not involve the explicit individual choice of those specific rules as such, neither does it signify each individual’s conscious agreement to obey them. On the contrary, the everyday value judgements and moral acts of members of society involves recourse to such rules without reflexive choice (BT, 164-165).

17 Scott, The Question of Ethics, 106.
18 Additionally, in a Foucauldian argument, the process of habituation can be supplemented with the exercise of power beyond its traditional understanding as coercion, since ‘[i]n modern societies, power operates in a much more complex manner: through normalisation rather than prohibition,’ Andrew Schaap, “Power and Responsibility: Should we Spare the King’s Head?,” Politics: Surveys and Debates for Students of Politics 20, no. 3 (2000), 129.
A linguistic excursion might help to illustrate the relationship between the customary and the moral, as well as the transition from one to the other. Charles Chamberlain's research in this area shows how in the 5th century BC, the word 'ethos' can usually be understood and translated as "character" but that this was not true in the case of earlier writers; on the contrary, the term had the prior signification of 'animal haunts' or 'dwellings' and was usually used in its plural form, ethea. Gradually the term became commonly used regarding humans and came to mean 'the arena in which people or animals move; further, this essence, whether in an animal or a human being, resists the imposition of outside influences.' Similarly for Scott, ethos has to do with customary dwelling and the behaviour or manners which one exhibits in such a homestead. In ethos one finds a particularist drive which encompasses its own 'ordering, identity-giving, and nurturing force.' Ethea, then, were places of belonging, but the term connoted a certain disposition to recalcitrance and resistance to 'civilising' influence. Furthermore, it can be established that the term, where it referred to humans, initially did so to barbarians (such as Persians), indicating that these 'are subject to a principle of order, a logos all their own, off the scale of "normal" — that is, Greek — expectations.'

In the 4th century BC, the term's meaning as a place of belonging was reconfigured and ethos became located in the soul, and was occasionally used in conjunction with tropos (way or manner). It is from this configuration that the connection to 'character' develops as that which evidences one's manners. The 'spatial' sense of the term persists, however, and 'now refers to the peculiar characteristics which citizens of a polis acquire as part of their civic heritage...ta ethe in particular are often mentioned in connection with trepho and paideuo, that is, with the socialization of children.' Customary habits become gradually codified into rules and laws, that is, nòmos. Nòmos, which means 'both law and melody,' can be seen as the movement to codify into

22 Chamberlain, "From 'Haunts' to 'Character,' " 99.
23 Scott, The Question of Ethics, 145.
24 Scott, The Question of Ethics, 144.
25 Chamberlain, "From 'Haunts' to 'Character,' " 100.
26 Chamberlain, "From 'Haunts' to 'Character,' " 101.
standardised rules and, perhaps promulgate, that which belongs to a particular habitual order.27 Nómos, then, raises particular manners to the level of principles, by which also the recalcitrant ethea are 'civilised.' The movement towards codification and ordering, in this regard, necessarily involves struggle between free and differentiated habituation on the one hand, and the desire to impose an external but principled order, on the other. Ethos, then, derived from the Indo-European Swedh, meaning 'one's own' character and also the 'way we are of our own' as a distinct group: ethos nurtures, socialises, and provides the identificatory processes by which one is one's own self.28

The connection between customary ways of life and ethics is, moreover, constant and ever-evolving through infinitesimal changes, a process which is historically bounded and undeniably local. One cannot but perceive 'of laws and principles for thought and action as regional, as a group of claims characteristic of one cultural and historical segment.'29 The derivation of the term ethics from ethos, from customary ways of life, does not refer only to mores of small secluded communities, tribes of anthropological interest or imagined 'closed' cultural groups. It could similarly refer to 'Western culture,' 'Western civilisation,' or 'European ethos' as a historically enlarged group with its specific ways of being. In this light, the norms, rules and ethical practices, such as human rights, normally associated with 'the West' are shown to be situated in processes of habituation and socialisation of this public group or culture, despite their universalist aspirations. When the insights of the historico-linguistic development of the term ethics are allowed to inform ethical inquiry, the universality of such norms is called into question.

The particular location and basis of ethical codification and construction in customary ways of behaving brings to the fore the relation between ethics and habituation, and recalls Heidegger's discussion of average everydayness as the initial and primary way in which Dasein finds itself as Being-in-the-world. The historical development of the term ethos as a habitual dwelling place underlies

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27 Scott, The Question of Ethics, 143.
28 Scott, The Question of Ethics, 144.
29 Scott, The Question of Ethics, 145.
the analysis of how Dasein is embedded in the with-world. It informs the phenomenological investigation of Being-there amidst others in the form of the ‘they,’ in a specific cultural tradition that is constitutive for Dasein, because it is constitutive of sense and all norms by which Dasein lives. Dasein, manifested in the ‘they,’ ‘is shared practices’ and, as such, finds itself in a world already infused with sense. Hence, Dasein is thrown into a world through its dealings with available entities (the ready-to-hand) and its solicitude towards other Daseins.

The intelligibility which Dasein has within the ‘they’ is, however, average and, through it, Dasein relates to other entities, be they available in its work world or other Daseins, as merely occurring (present-at-hand). The average solicitude towards other Daseins as present-at-hand is particularly problematic for a discussion of ethics because this ‘misperception’ does not disclose entities in their Being but rather as assumed presence. Inasmuch as something or someone is accorded moral significance, it requires the assignment of ‘value’ as the expression of positivity. As regards itself, moreover, Dasein entertains conceptions of autonomous selfhood and action free from constrain bestowed upon it by an assumed innate autonomy. This average kind of comportment and intelligibility leads to a ‘levelling-down’ of Dasein’s possibilities for Being, but also involves a lack of recognition of this levelling-down and a flight from Dasein’s own anxious ability-to-be. Insofar as morality enables this flight away from one’s becoming-proper by socialising Dasein within its group, and keeping it within this average and constricting level of interaction, it is a product of the ‘they.’ The narrow significance of Heidegger’s critique of morality, then, is that ‘ethics’ commonly understood enclose Dasein in commonplace and average comportment. The moral subject

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is, despite its purported autonomy, the subject of averageness, publicness and conformism, unquestioningly remaining within 'traditional' and customary bounds of behaviour. Morality, therefore, is part of the 'average' intelligibility through which the world and beings within the world are disclosed, and what is more, forms part of the process by which Dasein is constituted within its group. Yet, if ethics arises within the folds of the 'they,' and sustains the average intelligibility and inauthentic comportment towards the world, then becoming-proper, as discussed in chapter five, itself involves a critical examination of ethics.

This questioning of ethics has a number of implications for universalist ethical construction in International Relations, even at this early stage in the overall discussion. The questioning of ethics as contained within a prevalent communal ethos contextualises scholarly ethical work within its particularist location, which in the case of International Relations scholarship is mostly Western. This ‘locating’ contests its universal claims and reveals its situated roots. Seen in this light, the aspirations of universalist ethics are disclosed as particularist drives of socialisation which seek to spread beyond their particularity. This questioning also attempts to create a distance from the specific issues which might preoccupy international ethics at a time and ‘lead[s] towards the construction of a larger picture of the whole’ in the effort to theorise or construct an ethic calling into question its aspiration. Moreover, no matter how valuable such universalism is considered to be for the inter-

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Of course, as Ken Booth writes, '[t]o say that human rights comes from somewhere — and the West is not the only geographical expression claiming to be a parent — should never be allowed to be the end of the story: it is only a discussion of how we should live, as humans, on a global scale.' Ken Booth, “Three Tyrannies,” in Timothy Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler (eds.), Human Rights in Global Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 53.

Even Andrew Linklater’s universalist approach acknowledges this: ‘A new universality may yet bring an end to the West’s use of universalist moral concepts to celebrate the achievements of Western modernity and to enlarge its control of other peoples.’ Andrew Linklater, The Transformation of Political Community: Ethical Foundations of the Post-Westphalian Era (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), 24.

national and global concerns that International Relations wishes to address, this
'locating' suggests that universalised customary norms might not be the ideal
response to these concerns and that ethical theorising in IR might greatly
benefit from heeding the call for a relinquishment of ethics understood as
ethical construction.

Turning away from ethics

If ethics arises within the folds of the 'they,' the call to becoming-proper or
'authenticity' amounts to a 'turning away from ethics as we know it.'36 To find
out what is questionable in one's own ethics, based on the group *ethos* as these
are, Dasein must confront its customary practices and their assigned values, no
matter how nurturing and comforting the former may be, or how much value
has been previously accorded to them. In this way, becoming-proper,
understood as the process of increasing awareness of Dasein's thrownness in
the world and its mortal possibility (Being-towards-death), entails a
fundamental reconsideration of the commitment to socially constructed ethical
norms. Such a critical re-evaluation of ethics, however, is hard to pursue
because it disrupts the everyday safety that Dasein seeks in the 'they.'
Specifically, four difficulties can be discerned that might hinder a re-
examination of customary normativity.

First, the turn away from ethics is checked by the power of habituation. Since
it challenges that which has been most revered by a particular culture or
society, 'we cannot believe that our recognition of wrong, our commitment to
right, our worship of God, our love of just laws, and our respect for human
beings have as part of their fabric the inevitability of what we most abhor.'37
Leaving 'what we most abhor' for later consideration, let it be noted that what
is required in such a turning away from ethics is not to proclaim that this or
that rule is faulty, or that another maybe better suited to the moral judgement at
hand. Rather, the notion of 'value' must itself be brought under scrutiny since

36 Scott, The Question of Ethics, 106. For one account of the customary and the ethical see
Gernot Böhme, "Ethical Life or 'The Customary'," trans. John Farrell, Thesis Eleven, no. 60
it contributes, through its assignment, to the concealment of average comportment. The habitual practice of moral norms misleads Dasein into believing that it is morally dutiful, a belief that is reinforced by the approval that Dasein receives within the ‘they.’ Therefore, Dasein remains closed off to the question of ‘ethics,’ to the question of how it might be ‘ethical’ beyond ethical rules.

A second difficulty with critically questioning ethics is that such a process disputes the normativity of phenomena which are widely accepted as signifying ethical activity. A re-evaluation of ethics would render suspect, for example, the notion of ‘moral conscience,’ which refers to the inner voice that alerts one to do the right thing or brings on feelings of guilt when one has acted wrongfully. For Heidegger, however, moral conscience is a tally, a keeping of scores, through which Dasein is alerted to his moral debt, guilt and, sometimes, innocence. The moral individual is ‘a moral accountant who treats life as a business, forever worrying about whether he has covered the moral costs.’

Seen in this way, moral conscience is a subjectivist remnant, another way of making-secure a particular kind of subjectivity. Even, the transgression prevailing morality in order to follow one’s own conscience still falls under the subjectivist will to security. Dasein seeks to ensure that its life is dictated by no one but himself, instantiating the autonomy assumed by modern subjectivity. Both kinds of behaviour are connected, in that they both reflect the schema of the moral conscience that involves ‘a turning away from having to choose one’s own possibilities and a turning toward possibilities that “have already been decided-upon”.’ It is, then, both a manifestation of the ‘falling’ into the ‘they’ but also a tool of sovereign subjectivity in its desire to take moral action autonomously.

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40 An interweaving of autonomy and morality, of sovereignty and willed-subservience to morality has characterised the modern subject. See Robert C. Solomon and Kathleen M. Higgins, *A Short History of Philosophy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 211. See also Jane Flax, *Disputed Subjects: Essays on Psychoanalysis, Politics, and Philosophy* (London: Routledge, 1993), 95. Etienne Balibar also comments that the ethical self is presupposed as autonomous. The ‘autonomous subject,’ therefore, is a redundant statement,
The third difficulty is related to the assumption of sovereign subjectivity mentioned above. The rupture involved in the calling of ethics into question, brings Dasein face to face with its impropriety or inauthenticity: turning away from ethics 'is nothing less than a twisting free of a body of selfhood that is given in its investment in not knowing its being or its propriety vis-à-vis its being.'\(^4\) The interruption of ethics arrests Dasein's self-conception as subject and throws it back into anxiety by reminding it that it is the entity whose Being is an issue for it. Dasein, having no definite and determinate substance or nature, is called to itself by 'being called to a being whose meaning is mortal temporality and thus has no intrinsic, determinate meaning at all.'\(^4\) Questioning ethics, then, is inseparable from reflecting on the subjectivity that Dasein posits for itself and the relation that ethics has in sustaining it. The indeterminacy and contingency of Dasein's Being reveals ethics to be the ossification and occasionally-willed construction of a web of rules for a being it wills itself to be in its flight from its ownmost possibility.\(^4\) The critique leads, therefore, Dasein to question itself and, in so doing, to challenge its ethical constructions in a cyclical and reinforcing manner.

Finally, and most importantly, turning away from 'ethics' brings with it the realisation that, for all our rules and, what is worse, because of them, we have permitted and covered up that against which we purport to construct all moral rules: suffering.\(^4\) Enclosed within the 'they' Dasein comports itself

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4\(^1\) Scott, *The Question of Ethics*, 106.


4\(^4\) On suffering see Philip Allott, "Globalization from Above: Actualising the Ideal through Law," *Review of International Studies* 26, Special Issue (December 2000): 76-77. The focus on suffering necessarily refers to a Western conception of ethics and morality because the unworking of modern subjectivity for the purpose of exploring the ontological basis of coexistence is itself targeted towards the Western conception of the subject. To call the modern subject 'Western' might be redundant. See Etienne Balibar, "Subjection and Subjectivation," 14, n. 12 and his "Citizen Subject," in Eduardo Cadava, Peter Connor, and Jean-Luc Nancy (eds.), *Who Comes After the Subject?* (New York: Routledge, 1991), 33-57.
ambiguously towards the world and, prompted by curiosity, it moves from one topic of interest to another without relating to entities in a way that would let them be in their Being. Moreover, average solicitude reduces communicating to 'idle talk' and treats other Daseins as merely present along Dasein in the world, occluding in this way the paramount role of others and otherness for Dasein's constitution. Morally secure within communal norms and sets of rules set out according to the being it believes it is, Dasein drowns out its anxiety in the volume of idle talk and the speed of its curiosity. Avoiding anxiety makes Dasein's own suffering invisible: the truly other to Dasein, then, is that which is most familiar, that is, itself. Dasein's existence is rendered commonplace by the subjectivist assumptions held by the 'they.' The invisibility of anxiety reduces suffering to the occurrent, the recognisable, 'real violence,' as it were. Other Dasein are also reduced to occurrence or presence, and rendered voiceless in the endless transmission of things of interest. Additionally, the non-communal other, and his suffering, remains voiceless.

Questioning ethics, then, reveals a tension between the affirmative nurturing and socialisation provided by one's own ethos on the one hand, and that which the ethos makes inaudible, namely, the suffering and the very voice of the other. Ethics, located within normal and habitual behaviour, is deaf to the suffering and voice both of alterity and of Dasein's Being. In this way, '[t]he interruption of ethics provides an opening to hear what is inaudible in our ethos.' Is there a way to hear from within the ethos, a way to render the ethos open to the voice of the other? Can suffering be made audible without an isolation from one's own group and customs? How, moreover, can Dasein's own anxious self be acknowledged? Finally, how can the ethical self be recovered without a severance of Dasein from its identity-giving ethos?

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45 Scott, The Question of Ethics, 178.
2. Hearing and silence

Calling ethics into question, it was suggested above, might create an opening for Dasein to hear the other’s voice and confront its own suffering. How might conventional morality be questioned, however? ‘[D]o we create the opening by wilfully moving beyond our situation and even beyond ourselves? Or do we, from the beginning and unknowingly, stand in the opening which is granted?’

The discussion of the call of conscience, outlined in the previous chapter, and particularly, a recent modification to it suggested by Stephen Mulhall, might offer a way to make the other’s and Dasein’s own suffering audible and enable Dasein to be called to its mortal possibility. Mulhall proposes that the call of conscience, which is the way in which Dasein confronts its radical contingency, ought to be voiced by a third party, quite plausibly, a friend. For Heidegger, the call comes within Dasein and yet from beyond it, signifying in this way that the voice of conscience ‘does the calling.’ This apparent indeterminacy ‘does not justify seeking the caller in some entity with a character other than that of Dasein,’ since the call of conscience is only ontologically possible because the Being of Dasein is ‘care’ (BT, 321).

Mulhall proposes that the call has to come from an authentic friend, one who by his example shows Dasein that its everyday way of being is not proper to it. The authentic friend has already differentiated herself from the they-self and Dasein witnesses this. The authentic friend does not mirror Dasein in its actions and, thus, withholds the affirmation which the ‘they’ usually grants Dasein for its perpetuated absorption in average comportment. Furthermore, the friend does not accept any inauthentic relation with Dasein. Thus, the ‘undifferentiated mass of the they’ is disrupted: ‘[f]or Dasein could mirror another who exists as separate and self-determining, and who relates to others

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46 Henry G. Golz, Plato and Heidegger: In Search of Selfhood (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1981), 301. Is authenticity, in other words, predicated on a notion of ‘grace’? 47 ‘If that capacity [to become-proper] is genuinely repressed, how can it possibly speak out? If it can, its repression must have already been lifted; but it is just that lifting, that transition from inauthenticity to authenticity, which the call of conscience is supposedly invoked to explain.’ For Mulhall, the external source of the call is a requirement of coherence of the account provided by Heidegger. See Stephen Mulhall, Heidegger and Being and Time (London: Routledge, 1996), 130, brackets added.
as genuinely other, only by relating to her as other and to itself as other to that other.\textsuperscript{48} The mode of existence that the friend exhibits helps Dasein appropriate its own life properly. Rather than vocalising the call, the friend disrupts Dasein's lostness in the 'they' by example. Her very mode of existence awakens 'otherness in Dasein itself; Dasein's relation to that other instantiates a mode of its possible self-relation (a relation to itself as other, not as self-identical).\textsuperscript{49} The mimetic processes by which Dasein is socialised in the 'they' lend some support to Mulhall's contention: the proposal concurs with the phenomenal attribute of the call of conscience is 'silent' and recalls, moreover, that the notion of 'catching-up' with other Daseins is part of Being-with (BT, 164). This type of 'mimetic competition' involves Dasein in catching-up with the friend. Once an opening is made by this type of inauthentic catching-up, then Dasein's own capacity to hear might be enhanced.\textsuperscript{50} Furthermore, this kind of mimetic competition unwittingly shows Dasein that its everyday existence is not proper to it and inaugurates the struggle of becoming-proper within Dasein. Catching-up is embedded within the 'they' and, thus, illustrates that the turning away from ethics suggested above can indeed be made an integral part of the identity and nurturing processes that Dasein's ethos entails.

This still does not address the question of how Dasein can hear the call, even if voiced by a friend? The problem might not be the source of the call as such but, rather, the inability of Dasein to recognise itself as inauthentic while immersed in the 'they': 'lacking any conception of being other than it is, Dasein conflates its existential potential (Seinskönnten) and its existentiell actuality, and represses its uncanniness.'\textsuperscript{51} If, as Mulhall concedes, the lostness in the 'they' arises primarily from Dasein's inability to recognise itself as lost,

\textsuperscript{48} Mulhall, \textit{Heidegger and Being and Time}, 133.
\textsuperscript{49} Mulhall, \textit{Heidegger and Being and Time}, 133. The notion of mimesis involved in Mulhal's modification, is attuned to the 'problematic of attestation' required by Heidegger in which 'a proper existential possibility of Dasein is shown in an existentiell manner' (BT, 34).
\textsuperscript{50} Does this 'catching-up' comply with the need for the call to be perceived by Dasein 'not in some external and superficial way' but as the means of revealing that becoming-proper is a necessity grounded in Dasein's existence? See Francois Raffoul, \textit{Heidegger and the Subject}, trans. David Pettigrew and Gregory Recco (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1998), 226.
\textsuperscript{51} Mulhall, \textit{Heidegger and Being and Time}, 133. Uncanniness translates \textit{Unheimlichkeit} which might be better understood as homelessness see (BT, 233, n. 3).
then the chances of hearing the call, *irrespective of its source*, are limited. Thus, the voicing of the call by a friend is not *in itself* sufficient to rouse Dasein from its absorption, nor does it offer any guarantee that the call will penetrate through Dasein’s immersion in the ‘they.’ The friend would have to, as it were, ‘create the conditions for her own audibility.’ The ability to hear, then, has to be understood as a stepping away from ‘idle talk’ into silence, to which we turn next.

The ‘conditions of audibility’

*I could not speak,
and my eyes failed, I was neither
Living nor dead, and I knew nothing,
Looking into the heart of light, the silence.*

T.S. Eliot

In what way, then, can the ‘conditions of audibility’ be improved and how could the transformative process begin by which one’s own ethos might open up to otherness and suffering? Is all that is required, ‘a simple ontological [or otological?] operation, a small puncture through Dasein’s ears so that it could for a moment at least escape the deafening sounds of “they” drowning out the question of (its) Being’? Yet, Dasein’s absorption and fascination with others and publicness is rooted in its ontological structure as Being-with others.

Heidegger traces such a possibility to the existential structure of discourse. ‘Hearing is constitutive for discourse,’ he notes, because the ability to listen discloses authentically that Dasein is Being-with others (BT, 206). Having more than a disclosive function, moreover, ‘[l]istening to...is Dasein’s existential way of Being-open as Being-with for Others’ (BT, 206, emphasis added). ‘Da-sein hears because it understands. As being-in-the-world that understands, with the others, it “listens to” itself and to *Mitda-sein*, and in this

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52 Mulhall, *Heidegger and Being and Time*, 133.
listening it belongs to these.\textsuperscript{55} Hearing is an aspect of Dasein's attuned understanding that highlights its thrownness: Dasein is born into discursive relations, so to speak, but it is specifically 'listening to' which enhances the coexistential character of existence. As Heidegger notes, 'Being-with develops in listening to another' (BT, 206). Dasein's heteronomous constitution is made concrete through hearing; Dasein lives according to its heteronomy when it listens to the other. When 'Dasein is, or rather exists, *hearingly* it is brought into communion with itself as Being-with.\textsuperscript{56}

Yet, what could make Dasein hear out of its lostness? The possibility for hearing is related to keeping silent, because silence 'is another essential possibility for discourse' (BT, 208). Indeed, Bestegui argues, silence 'seems to occupy a...privileged position' in Heidegger's thought, and is regarded as a pivotal link in the relationship between discourse and otherness.\textsuperscript{57} 'In talking with one another, the person who keeps silent can “make one understand” (that is he can develop an understanding) and he can do so more authentically than the person who is never short of words' (BT, 208). In this regard, '[k]eeping silent authentically is possible only in genuine discoursing' because '[t]o be able to keep silent, Dasein must have something to say – that is, it must have at its disposal an authentic and rich disclosure of itself' (BT, 208). In this way, silence cannot be associated with an inability to speak, or be considered 'a negation nor a privation'; on the contrary, silence should be thought of as 'a positive possibility, indeed speech in its most proper sense.'\textsuperscript{58} As with hearing, with which silence is aligned, 'silence is essentially *Mitteilung*, communicating and sharing' because '[i]n silence, Dasein has an ear for the Other, it is “all ears,” as it were.'\textsuperscript{59}

As a constitutive part of discourse (*logos*), hearing belongs to everyday comportment in the world; yet, through hearing 'Dasein is open, disclosed to

\textsuperscript{56} Miguel de Bestegui, *Heidegger and the Political: Dystopias* (London: Routledge, 1997), 149.
\textsuperscript{57} Beistegui, *Heidegger and the Political*, 148.
\textsuperscript{58} Beistegui, *Heidegger and the Political*, 148.
\textsuperscript{59} Beistegui, *Heidegger and the Political*, 148-149.
itself, to the world and to others in the most authentic way.’ Hearing, then, ‘constitutes the primary and authentic way in which Dasein is open for its ownmost potentiality-for-Being – as in hearing the voice of the friend whom every Dasein carries with-it’ (BT 206, emphasis added). This is an extremely important passage, as it is the only one in Being and Time that makes this explicit reference to the other-as-friend, carried within, carried as otherness ‘in the mode of a voice, a purely phonic presence.’ Such a ‘phonic presence’ is not uncanny or ghost-like but ought to be understood as constitutive for Dasein as a speaking being. As Jacques Derrida remarks, ‘[t]his voice is an essentially understandable voice, the possibility of speech or discourse.’

The sort of presence invoked in Heidegger’s quote is not representational in the pure sense of the word. ‘Through its voice that I hear, I hear the friend itself, beyond its voice but in that voice; it is almost an echo of Dasein’s withness, where ‘I hear and carry the friend with me in hearing its voice... Dasein carries it, one might say, in the figure of its voice, its metonymic (figure) part of the whole.’ It is a reminder that otherness is not external, as that from which Dasein distinguishes itself. Dasein has no choice with regards to its relation to otherness because, as Being-with, Dasein carries its otherness within it. Relations can be only thought of as voluntary on the basis of an ontological account of subjectivity which denies and obliterates Dasein’s heteronomy and refutes the other’s constitutive role in Dasein’s world. The other-as-friend whose voice Dasein carries within it, is the specificity of this otherness, while at the same time it is Dasein being made aware of the internalisation of otherness. ‘What defines “the voice of the friend,” then, is not a quality, the friendly characteristic, but a belonging.’ In this regard, the belonging also says more about the constitution of Dasein, its internal relation to otherness that is part and parcel of its thrownness, than about the friend, who is there as a voice to be heard without choice within Dasein:

60 Beistegui, Heidegger and the Political, 149.
61 Beistegui, Heidegger and the Political, 149.
Through its voice, Dasein carries the friend with it, whether it wishes to or not, whether it knows it or not, and whatever its resolution. In any case, what matters here is not what the friend’s voice says, not its said, not even the saying of its said. Hardly its voice. Rather what matters is the hearing (das Hören) of its voice.\[^{65}\]

The ear to which the hearing refers, however, does not point to the organ ‘ear’ but alludes instead to ‘the ear of and for one’s self,’ attuned not to some inner life but the disclosedness of Dasein as projected outward and ahead of itself, ‘its very ek-sistence.’\[^{66}\] It is what renders the familiarity of one’s own ‘self’ strange. It is significant for becoming-proper that the voice, which Dasein carries within it, is the voice of the other-as-friend: ‘this hearing could not open Dasein “to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being,” if hearing were not first the hearing of this voice, the exemplary metonymy of the friend that each Dasein bears close to itself (bei sich trägt).’\[^{67}\] Beistegui too insists that propriety and silence are related, because ‘silencing reveals existence to itself, a call that can only be heard in the withdrawal of language.’\[^{68}\]

Listening to the other, however, need not only have positive connotations. As Heidegger explains, it ‘can be done in several possible ways: following, going along with, and the privative modes of not-hearing, resisting, defying, and turning away’ (BT, 206-207). Similarly, there can be assumed no a priori positivity about the voice of the other, as Derrida confirms, ‘[t]he voice is not friendly, first because it is the voice of a friend, of someone, of another Dasein responding to the question “who?”’\[^{69}\] And yet, this is embedded in a different kind of positivity, which pertains to all modes of hearing. The incessant relation between discourse, hearing, and otherness encompasses opposition, resistance and the possibility of turning away: as Derrida suggests ‘there is no essential opposition between philein and Kampf.’\[^{70}\]

The negative modes could still determine the hearing of the voice of the friend. To be opposed to the friend, to turn away from it, to defy it, to not hear

\[^{65}\] Derrida, “Heidegger’s Ear,” 164.
\[^{66}\] Beistegui, *Heidegger and the Political*, 149.
\[^{68}\] Beistegui, *Heidegger and the Political*, 150.
\[^{70}\] Derrida, “Heidegger’s Ear,” 176.
it, that is still to hear and keep it, to carry with self, *sich bei tragen*, the voice of the friend.\textsuperscript{71}

The crucial question, however, is whether the friend is used in those passages as any other interchangeable example ["why not sister, brother, father," asks Derrida] or whether the concept of the friend is in itself crucial to audibility and propriety. Could it possible that

exemplarity functions here in another sense, not in the sense of an example among other possible examples but of the exemplarity that gives to be read and carries in itself all the figures of *Mitdasein* as *Aufeinander-hören*? All the figures of *Mitsein* would be figures of the friend, even if they were secondarily unfriendly or indifferent.\textsuperscript{72}

In the space created by silence and hearing there is a possibility of reformulating the *ethos* so that it is open to otherness, to the internal and permanent recollection of the voice of the friend, which Dasein carries with it. [B]y developing what one would call an ontology of friendship or an ontophilology, Heidegger seems to provide the space for a rethinking of ethics.\textsuperscript{73} Silence "makes dangerous the values by which we give ourselves common lives and establish the rules within which we are constituted," and

\textsuperscript{71} Derrida, "Heidegger's Ear," 176.
\textsuperscript{72} Derrida, "Heidegger's Ear," 176.
\textsuperscript{73} Beistegui, *Heidegger and the Political*, 151. It can be argued that the connection between silence, hearing the other in Dasein, and 'ethics' is not sustained in the later thought of Heidegger, where the emphasis on Dasein is relinquished and substituted with an emphasis on epochality (history of Being). This neo-Hegelian insight asserts that 'each historical epoch is based upon a fundamental metaphysical stance the determines how things shows up for human beings in that epoch,' writes Herman Philipse, "Heidegger and Ethics," *Inquiry* 42 (1999), 440. See also Robert Bernasconi, *Heidegger in Question: The Art of Existing* (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1993), chapter 9. The withdrawal and oblivion of Being, which the later Heidegger thought described the present epoch 'is deaf to the appeal of suffering,' because, 'nowhere in the call of Being is the cry of the *victim* to be heard, nowhere the plea for mercy, the summons for help,' writes John D. Caputo, "Heidegger's Scandal: Thinking and the Essence of the Victim," in Tom Rockmore and Joseph Margolis (eds.), *The Heidegger Case: On Philosophy and Politics* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992), 277. Heidegger's abandonment of worldly Dasein and its projective thrown 'resoluteness' found in his early work is partly responsible for Heidegger's own silence about the holocaust. Within the later approach of the history of being, 'there is no call of conscience, no response that says "guilty," and so there are no victims. There is/is it gives (*es gibt*) only the epochal shifts which have fallen into an escalating history of oblivion from *eidos to Technik.*' Caputo, "Heidegger's Scandal," 278. So, for the early Heidegger, silence is a positive possibility, the only way Dasein can be be-with others in a proper way, while, years later silence is an escape for Heidegger from the Holocaust and the 'greatest blunder,' as he called his rectorship of the University of Freiburg during 1933. Beistegui writes in this regard, '[o]ne might wish, then, to hear the silent voice of Heidegger sympathetically, as if echoing the almost imperceptible moan of his victims. One would like to understand this silence as memory and mourning, as if language, wounded and bruised, had found refuge only in the inner ear of thinking. Yet the meaning of Heidegger's silence lies elsewhere: not in memory, not in mourning, but in a lack and failure of thinking
instigates the questioning of morality. In the wider silence of Being/time Dasein's 'reticence [Verschwiegenheit] makes something manifest, and does away with “idle talk” (BT, 208). Thus, '[h]earing in this silence [of Being/time] is finding oneself in the question of ethics.'

3. Recovering the ethical self

The above exploration suggested that the voice of the friend, exemplary of otherness, is carried within Dasein. However, Dasein's flight from the most fundamental otherness, its own, renders it deaf to the cry of the other. The conditions of audibility might be enhanced when 'idle talk' (Gerede) is interrupted, perhaps by the example of a friend and, in the space of this suspension, there is silence, in which the voice calls Dasein into question and is heard. Heard in silence, the voice is a genuine communication and enables a 'wrenching motion,' by which Dasein recoils from its inauthentic practices and 'puts itself in question by the values it holds.'

Heidegger's critique of morality as a product of the 'they' reveals that becoming-proper involves a 'twisting free,' not only from traditional ways of life but also from conceptions of selfhood which are not proper to it. What becomes interrupted in the radical recoiling movement is not the worldly relations Dasein has with others, but rather, the understanding of its existence in terms of subjectivity and self-sufficiency. The recoiling movement enables an understanding of propriety as the placing of oneself in question, of questioning the adequacy of thinking of oneself as a subject:

Heidegger thinks in the interruption of the meaning of our lives by the mortal possibility of living and finds in owning the being's interruption of our lives we may disown the theoretical and existential sufficiency of our selves for defining our being or ability to be.
Therefore, becoming-proper is tantamount to becoming-other or strange to oneself.\(^7\)\(^8\) This estrangement leads to a self-relationship where otherness is not only ‘accounted for’ (in the philosophical sense of other minds) but it is what Dasein becomes and how it relates to itself. Once this process is set into motion, Dasein’s heteronomy is made apparent to it, enhancing in this way the possibility of listening to ‘the voice of the friend whom every Dasein carries with-it’ (BT, 206).

Thus, the turn away from ethics is entailed in Dasein’s own ‘destructive retrieve,’ where its selfhood is placed into question. Moreover, through sustained critical engagement with the shared past of its tradition, Dasein is able to discern its own ‘factual’ and ‘repeatable possibilities,’\(^7\)\(^9\) which are worthy of reconfiguration, but also to distance itself from possibilities that obscure its ability-to-be (Seinskönnen). Seen in this light, the movement away from ethics brings Dasein to face itself as being-guilty-as-the-basis-of-a-nullity, and effects an act of disclosure of the difference between Dasein and its tradition: ‘the call itself discloses not the power of an ethos but the difference of human being, in its being, from traditional ways of life.’\(^8\)\(^0\)

To find oneself in the ‘question of ethics,’ to use Scott’s phrase, is to attempt a recovery of the ‘ethical’ self, which is open to itself as strange and to the voice of the other as always within it. There is no choice to hear otherness once Dasein embarks on this process of self-estrangement.\(^8\)\(^1\) The process of attaining this ‘ethical’ kind of selfhood is not universal but unique to each struggle, its

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\(^8\) Scott, *The Question of Ethics*, 106.

\(^8\) ‘Choice is at the heart of ethics, but our choices are never entirely free.’ Ken Booth, Tim Dunne, and Michael Cox, “How Might We Live? Global Ethics in a New Century,” *Review of International Studies* 26, Special Issue (December 2000), 1. The difference with the presupposition that choice always informs ethical decisions is that the recovery of the ethical self is not about this or that choice because these issues would be determined within the specific factual context. The recovery of the ethical self involves a ‘turn away from ethics’ in which customary moral practices are deconstructed: recovering ethnicity is about opening up and remaining within the ‘question of ethics’ aware that any factual momentary choice is contingent.
achievement is never assured nor static; we cannot phenomenally speak of ‘completion’ because what is defining of authenticity is the effort to achieve it. The struggle, the ceaseless movement towards propriety can be thought, Walter Davis argues, as ‘the “ethical” relationship one is living toward oneself.’ Such a recovery is inextricable from the struggle with one’s self towards a modification of one’s impropriety. Thus ‘the ethical’ is not determinate or universal; on the contrary, it is particularist because it refers to ‘the primary relationship which underlies all the positions and attitudes one adopts toward the world.’ How one relates to others on the basis of this self-relationship is not given in advance nor can it be collectively dictated since this would mean a fall into the ‘they.’ In the absence of the relationship one resolutely assumes towards one’s own existence, it is impossible to have any appropriate relationship towards others.

Of course, it can be argued that this self-relationship is not ethical in any common sense of the word but ontological. In the ‘Letter on Humanism,’ Heidegger refers to ethics as the dwelling in the nearness of Being. The term ethos is modified with propriety in mind so that it now ‘means abode, dwelling place. The word names the open region in which the human being dwells. The open region of his abode allows what pertains to the essence of the human being, and what in thus arriving resides in nearness to him, to appear.’

There might be an intimate relationship, therefore, between ‘propriety’ and something like ‘ethicity,’ which is, according to Derrida, that which makes ethics ‘ethical.’ The movement to authenticity is ‘ethical’ then in the sense

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83 Davis, Inwardness and Existence, 113.
84 Davis, Inwardness and Existence, 113.
that it indicates a struggle expressive of a self-relationship which brings Dasein to reside closer to its Being. In this way, Dasein's genuine appropriation of its heteronomous existence, the relationship it sustains with itself, might be compared to Michel Foucault's Heidegger-inspired ethics as 'a practice; ethos is a manner of being.' The ethical self, then, would embody its propriety towards its finite being as a techne tou biou, or a technology of the self. Only on the ground of such a self-relationship can an 'ethical' attitude arise towards other beings. It is only on the ground of itself as finite transcendence and unique appropriation of historical possibilities that the authentic Dasein can ask the ethical question 'who am I; what shall I do?' and find an answer in its concrete situation. This is also the view of Scott, that 'Dasein's temporal and mortal movement, its Vorlauf, would then be the basis for the way we design our lives.'

4. Rethinking the need for rules of proper conduct

The recovery of the 'ethical' self, it was mentioned above, refers to the 'ethicity of propriety,' where propriety is the self-relationship which enables Dasein to be take up its heteronomy properly, and to hear the voice of otherness that it carries within it. Does this necessitate the relinquishment of ethical construction as inauthentic, as a remnant of a subjectivist ontology? Could not the 'ethicity of propriety' form the basis for minimalist ethical construction? This possibility of utilising the recovery of the 'ethical' self as a ground for ethical construction is examined below.

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91 Scott, The Question of Ethics, 98.
92 'Ground means: possibility, basis, account' writes Heidegger adding that ground is inseparable from transcendence: See Heidegger, "On the Essence of Ground (1929)", 131.
On the impossibility of a renewed ethical foundationalism

There is a tension between the affirmative nurturing associated with the socialisation processes of a communal ethos and impropriety of the average intelligibility, which these processes result in, so that the voice of the outsider and of Dasein’s own anxiety in the face of its own Being, become inaudible. One cannot ‘do away’ with ethos, since the averageness it generates is constitutive for Dasein’s totality of meaning; socialisation is intimately connected to ‘belonging,’ as Jean-Luc Nancy notes, and ‘there is nothing sentimental, domestic, or “community-oriented” about wanting to say we. It is existence reclaiming its due or its condition: co-existence.’93 Acknowledging that ethics is embedded in ethos, Scott wonders whether it would be possible to maintain ‘a limited field of nurturance...a structure that shows itself differently, that shows itself to be outside time and outside ethnic suspicions and conservative provinciality’ and, at the same time, delineate on the basis of it ‘a field of laws and principles, that brings with it, into time, indications, more than hints, but patterns that point to a transtemporal circumscription of the writhing, belligerent interplay of ethea.’94 Such a field of nurturing would effectively maintain the identity-giving and norm-creating characteristics of the local while, at the same time, attempt to provide a minimalist set of principles that would restrain its resistance to otherness and render it open to the influence of alterity.

What is at stake in Scott’s suggestion, then, is the possibility of universalising the recovery of the ethical self out of a specific ethos. Below, four related arguments are examined as to the impossibility of renewing a universalism ‘grounded’ on the recovery of the ethical self. A first argument would be to recall the conditions under which universalism is possible, and specifically, its connection to foundationalism. For Hermann Philipse, Scott’s suggestion for minimal ‘indications’ for ethical conduct can be taken as merely another ‘stage in the historical development of ethical foundationalism.’95 If this is indeed so,

94 Scott, The Question of Ethics, 145.
what is the ultimate ground on which these principles would be based, and does not such a search for foundation, in and of itself, ‘lead to an infinite regress unless there are first principles of ethics that are so secure that further justification is not needed’? If one contests ‘the idea that there is supreme moral truth from which rules of conduct could be deduced,’ then a renewed foundationalism becomes untenable. Andrew Linklater has recently suggested from a self-styled universalist position, that ‘the possibility of occupying an Archimedean standpoint which permits objective knowledge of permanent moral truths which bind the whole of humanity is a claim’ that not only has been repeatedly contested but that contemporary theorists ‘are correct to deny.’

Second, could Dasein’s ‘ethical’ openness to otherness, seen in its ‘self-relationship,’ serve as this foundation for the universal construction of rules? Could one rely, in other words, on the recovery of the ‘ethical’ self as ‘some kind of ontological commitment’ to act as a basis for construction? The answer is most likely negative, since it would require that Dasein be ascribed a substantive essence. In chapter five, the impossibility of Dasein having an essence was discussed extensively in the discussion of Being-toward-death and Dasein as Being-the-basis-of-a-nullity. The essence of Dasein’s propriety is not permanence, but an abyssal structure which can never act as ground: ‘in such a structure, which is a non-fundamental one, at once superficial and bottomless, still and always “flat,” the proper-ty (propre) is sunk.’ Dasein’s groundlessness arrests the foundationalist drive from instantiating itself in an ultimate ground: this could only be Dasein’s self-relationship, the content of which is that Dasein has no ground, and in becoming proper, it comes to terms with this groundlessness and into communion with itself as strange. What Dasein has, rather, is a disposition towards itself (it is ready for anxiety) and

96 Philipse, “Heidegger and Ethics,” 456. This question is asked in IR in Brown, “‘Turtles all the way down’.”
99 Cochran asks the same question with respect to international ethics in Cochran, Normative Theory in International Relations, 204.
solicitude towards others. As such, it cannot form the foundation that this kind of ethical construction requires. 'Nothing would be more violent or naive,' writes Derrida, 'than to call for more frontality, more thesis or more thematization, to suppose that one can find a standard here.'\(^1\) Authentic Dasein is not an answer in the form of a ground, but a struggle towards propriety, which is but an awareness that its Being is a question for it, that it is itself *questionable*.

Third, universalising the insights gained in the recovery of the ethical self, moreover, is rendered particularly untenable when one considers that ontology can provide ethics...only with formal indications of the general characteristics of human existence. In turn, the practical disciplines can be of help to human action only indirectly by providing a rough outline of the practical sphere in question that has to be interpretively concretized in the historical situation of one's own existence.\(^2\)

The role of fundamental ontology is not to dictate explicitly how one ought to act by constructing ethical rules, rather it 'frees the individual for his self-reflection.'\(^3\) When, just after the Second World War, Jean Beaufret asked Heidegger why he had hesitated in constructing an ethics, Heidegger's reply could only be that 'the question was essentially unanswerable.'\(^4\) The responsibility of philosophy was to induce thinking, but not to impose restrictions or conditions of an *ontic* nature, as if these were generalisable to each and every factual situation. As Hans-Georg Gadamer notes

> [h]ow can it be the task of a philosopher to construe an ethical system that proposes or prescribes a social order or recommends a new way of molding morals or general public convictions about concrete matters?\(^5\)

Ethical judgements can only be taken on the basis of the factual situation and its specificity. Moreover, as was noted above with the examination of *ethos*,


ethical norms 'involve processes of human learning and socialization that are already under way, forming an ethos, long before people confront the radical questions associated with philosophy. “Ethics” presupposes a lived system of values.'106 Whatever assistance on how to live one's life ethics might desire to provide, it can never replace reflection about and in the factical situation by which already existing rules of conduct are interpreted. To answer the question of ethics with, even a minimalist, codified morality is to ignore that codification can only be understood as embedded and socialised into a group ethos which resists the ‘imposition of outside influences’ or at best interprets them on the ground of its ethos. To claim that rule-making could lie outside one's own ethos, outside of a historical and factical situation, would be to assert that morality requires a kind of reasoning based on logic which everyone is capable of.107 It is to suggest that reasoning is not embedded within local practices but is universal, but this might indicate an ethnocentric outlook disguised as universalism.108

Fourthly, it is worth noting that both foundationalism and universalism are called into question by the general philosophical crisis in which ethical theorising finds itself. As Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe notes, ‘[t]o speak of doing wrong presupposes that there exists an ethics, or at least that an ethics is possible. Now it is probably the case today that neither of these conditions is fulfilled.'109 In this regard, ethical contraction also suffers from the general exhaustion of philosophical possibilities and manifestly cannot claim to stand outside that exhaustion except at the cost of a certain blindness towards it and its origin: how and from where could one philosophically get back beyond Heidegger's delimitation of ethics and humanism?110

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110 Lacoue-Labarthe, Heidegger, Art and Politics, 31. His argument is targeted against Emmanuel Levinas’s insistence that ethics escapes ‘the end of philosophy’ and ought to be ‘first philosophy.'
The ascription of a substantive content to the ethical self and the attempt to universalise it is a return to philosophical humanism whose possibility is limited by the exhaustion of philosophy's own possibilities. What has been called the 'end of philosophy'\(^{111}\) refers not only to 'end' as having reached exhaustion or culmination, or even to its goal, but also to the understanding of philosophy as a finite undertaking.\(^{112}\) It is not possible to encompass universal ethical construction in a philosophy of the limit, such as Heidegger's phenomenology of Dasein, which recognises not only the facts of cultural relativity but that an ahistorical and foundational approach towards proper conduct cannot but fail to do what it is intended to achieve: make the other's voice audible and act in ways which do not occlude the heteronomous facticity of existence.

The impossibility of a renewed universalism, however, brings into relief that what currently exists is but 'an urgent plea for a universal morality.'\(^{113}\) Yet, it is questionable whether a set of universal principles could, indeed, bring about a transformation of local ethos and provide a design for inter-ethical interaction. There is no assurance that what has been inaudible in one's ethos will not be equally or more starkly so if voiced in ways not able to be captured or accommodated by codified norms. The preceding discussion considered that the 'ethical' self cannot provide the new foundation nor can its comportment within the factical situation be universalised. Such a refusal directs the present inquiry towards the possibility of disposition or sensibility towards the other, coming full circle to revisit coexistence as an 'ethics' radically re-determined. This, moreover, has wide ranging implications not only for the ontological basis of coexistence in IR but also for ethical discourses of IR in their efforts to confront and respond to the limitations of universalist and foundationalist


\(^{113}\) Nielsen, "Ethical Relativism and the Facts of Cultural Relativity," 545. This notion of a plea is slowly also being heeded in International ethical theorising. See Ken Booth, for example, who articulates, it seems, a similar plea for universality: 'not because we are human, but to make us human.' Booth, "Three Tyrannies," 52, and also Molly Cochran, who writes in a similar vein "There may be a hope for a principle to have a range of applicability, a degree of
thought, called into question in the current crisis of Enlightenment thinking. As Linklater has noted in this regard, the conversation that IR ethical theories sustain with their critics open up the very possibility of 'a radically improved universalism.' The turn to disposition examined below, forms an affirmative path within the Enlightenment ethos, in which most IR ethical theorising is located, in that it is a measured response to the unworking of the modern subject by the phenomenological attentiveness to the facticity of existence; it is a response which heeds, more than ever, the desire to hear the voice of the other that does not pursue an ethical project which unwittingly obscures its very object of concern.

5. The 'ethical' self's disposition: liberating solicitude

What is proper to Dasein, then, has little to do with the moral norms and rules of the community in which Dasein is thrown or, more importantly, rules grounded on a universalised understanding of propriety. There is no standard of what an 'authentic' human being ought to be, but rather a conception of propriety that is linked to the struggle to render audible the voice of otherness, which Dasein already carries with it. Nonetheless, a mediation amongst 'belligerent ethea,' which ethical construction wishes to restrain, is still desirable in a world of value plurality and inter-communal conflict. As was noted above, the notion of the 'ethical' self proposed above can be understood as an opening to alterity which constitutes the very 'ethicity' of any ethics. Dasein's awareness comes from seeing that its ground is nothingness, that it is the basis-of-a-nullity, having no ground but thrownness and no other transcendence but a plunge towards the world. Becoming-proper is a constant recovery of its world as relational totality, within which relationships with others become re-evaluated in their own facticity and thrownness. The recovery of silence and hearing, resulting from the questioning of ethics, brings

universality beyond the context of the situation from which it arises...’ Cochran, Normative Theory in International Relations, 206.


115 See the essays in Maria Lensus and Jan-Stefan Fritz (eds.), Value Pluralism, Normative Theory and International Relations (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999).
Dasein to face itself as ‘singularity of the self that knows itself as opening to alterity,’\textsuperscript{116} a knowledge which arises from an awareness of itself as other. As Jean-Luc Nancy insists that ‘[s]ingularity...installs relation as the withdrawal of identity, and communication as the withdrawal of communion.’\textsuperscript{117} The ontological disposition associated with the ‘ethical’ self suggests ‘that human being can be thought in terms of the clearing or space that it makes for Being, for world, for the realms and regimes of “truth” or manifestness, for the plurality of cultures.’\textsuperscript{118} This disposition is none other than what Heidegger had called ‘liberating solicitude.’

Liberating solicitude is, according to Heidegger, one of the two radical manifestations of solicitude, discussed in chapter four. On the one hand lies the situation when Dasein’s solicitude ‘take[s] away “care” from the Other and puts itself in his position in concern: it can \textit{leap in} for him’ (BT, 158). But this kind of solicitude does not facilitate the process by which the other uniquely appropriates its shared world and confronts it own mortal facticity. \textit{Liberating} solicitude, on the other hand, ‘pertains essentially to authentic care – that is to the existence of the other...it helps the other to become transparent to himself \textit{in} his care and to become \textit{free for it}’ (BT, 159). Only the solicitude which ‘leaps forth and liberates’ allows the other to embark on her own struggle and become-proper. Through this proper kind of comportment ‘I call the other to face his own anxious self-responsibility.’\textsuperscript{119} It is important to note, however, that liberating solicitude does not only assist the other to face her own Being as care but, furthermore, it is the precondition for the other to become transparent to me as ‘for who he is’ as a whole.\textsuperscript{120} John Caputo has argued that in this conception of interaction with alterity can be found ‘an ethics of otherness’

\textsuperscript{116} Christopher Fynsk, ‘Foreword: Experiences of Finitude,’ xiii.
\textsuperscript{119} Vogel, \textit{The Fragile “We”}, 75.
\textsuperscript{120} Vogel, \textit{The Fragile “We”}, 82.
based on humility and compassion. It is through such a liberating and
disclosive solicitude, that Dasein may recognise others in their own
groundlessness. Liberating solicitude, far from being a paternalistic attitude
towards the other, is the comportment by which Dasein shares the other’s
basis-of-a-nullity and comports to the other Being-with.

As the ‘ethical’ self’s disposition, liberating solicitude is able to penetrate a
particular factical situation, even if this crosses the boundaries of another
community. Similarly, it allows for the other to do the same because it involves
the ‘recognition of the claim of others who, from beyond “our” horizon, call
into question the parochialism of our tradition insofar as it does not speak for
them and who demand that we include their perspectives in the effort to
understand ourselves.’ Such a disposition
does not involve a subordination of self and others to a common standard that
would provide a decision-procedure telling anyone what he ought to do in a
particular situation; rather, it involves an attunement to the particularity of
others, to others as truly other, stemming from an awareness of the singularity
of one’s own existence.

This is not an impersonal and anonymous perspective but an ‘interpersonal
orientation motivated by one’s desire not to incorporate others into “the
universal” but, rather, to “let others be” in their freedom for their own
possibilities and to allow one’s self-understanding to be informed by theirs.’
The ‘ethical’ self implies the withdrawal of identity based solely on the
nurturing ethos in which Dasein is primarily and initially socialised and thus
can sustain ‘a form of coexistence in which one remains attentive to others as
centers of transcendence and possibility who are never subsumed by the public
projects in which they happen to be absorbed.’

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121 John D. Caputo, *Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconstruction, and the Hermeneutic
122 Vogel, *The Fragile “We”*, 70. Vogel’s account places this disposition in a deconstructed
notion of the moral conscience which transforms the ontological insight into a moral
mechanism. This, however, should be treated with caution. I retained only the useful
examination of solicitude as a disposition, which can be employed without Vogel’s account of
the moral conscience.
123 Vogel, *The Fragile “We”*, 70.
124 Vogel, *The Fragile “We”*, 71. See also David Campbell and Michael Dillon, “The Political
and the Ethical,” in David Campbell and Michael Dillon (eds.), *The Political Subject of
Violence*, 167-168.
Beyond its reduction to the composition of otherwise unrelated subjects, coexistence can be sustained and renewed by the disposition of liberating solicitude, which does not subsume the other into its sameness but calls him out to her own Being. The 'ethical' self liberates the other, not by awarding him personhood and accompanying rights, but by calling him to face his own heteronomy and groundlessness as Being-the-basis-of-a-nullity. The liberation comes precisely from the unworking of modern subjectivity and the 'releasement' from a kind of selfhood which is predicated on the denial of heteronomy. This is an active letting-be, a releasement to one's own Being, in which genuine coexistence might be found.126

6. Conclusion

Following the exposition of the optics of coexistence, this chapter brought it to bear on ethical selfhood, engaging in a 'destructive retrieve': ethics, understood as ethical construction was called into question and its meaning was both subverted and expanded. The linguistic trajectory of the word ethos, from which ethics is derived, showed it to arise through processes of habituation within distinct, customary ways of life and to be embedded within habitual and average behaviour. Analysed through Heidegger's discussion of the 'they,' ethics is revealed as implicated in the processes of socialisation and conformity which are nurturing and even constitutive for Dasein as an entity whose Being is Being-with. However, these average processes are inauthentic. The intelligibility which arises from these processes of socialisation is not appropriate to Dasein as Being-in-the-world: they comfort it into considering itself as subject, and relating to things in the world as objects and to the other as merely occurrent. More importantly, however, they help Dasein flee its own anxiety in the face of its Being, which is an indication that its Being is an issue for it. As an integral part of the socialisation of Dasein into the 'they,' ethics is implicated in the lostness of Dasein and fails to hear the otherness which

125 Vogel, The Fragile "We", 71.
permeates Dasein’s heteronomy. Therefore, the call to self-propriety entails within it a turning away from ethics as we know it.

As a ‘retrieve,’ however, the optics of coexistence also led to a ‘recovery of the ethical self,’ understood as a stance of heteronomous selfhood ‘which knows itself as opening to alterity.’ This ‘ethical’ self cannot be utilised as the foundation for instantiating the will to universalising morality. It cannot serve as a ‘deconstructed’ but reasserted ground for ethical construction; rather, it is a kind of selfhood, which is the at the very heart of the ‘ethicity’ of ethics.

There are a number of wide ranging implications for ethical theorising brought to the fore by the questioning of ethics and the recovery of the ‘ethical’ self. Shown to be contained within an ethos, to be a community’s own, ethics is disclosed as the codification and promulgation of particular practices and norms. It becomes clear, in this sense, that any claim to the universal must travel through the particular. Universal aspirations for specific codes remains, then, little more than a plea. For the normative literature of International Relations, whose initial and primary attempts at ethical theorising are dominated by universal theories aimed at global issues, this contextualisation places such attempts within their particularist, almost exclusively Western, locations. Although, universalism (seen most prevalently in the articulation of human rights) is regarded as suitable for a discipline with global concerns, it is argued that universalisation of the customary may indeed prove to be a crippling and harmful response to those global issues. Calling ethics into question – making it, in other words, questionable is more likely to benefit IR ethical theorising. For, far from limiting their resonance with global concerns, the recovery of the ‘ethical’ self is but a different, more attuned, response to the plea of audibility from the other.

The recovered ‘ethical’ self can neither provide a renewed foundation to fill the space left by the unworking of modern subjectivity, nor can its comportment within any concrete situation be universalised. Yet this double

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127 Fynsk, ‘Foreword: Experiences of Finitude,’ xiii.
prohibition directed the present inquiry towards the articulation of disposition or sensibility towards the other whose possibility might as yet exceed the 'ethicity' of ethics. For the ethical discourses of IR, this could become a path in their efforts to work within the limits (not limitations) of Enlightenment thought, at its margins. The turn to disposition is, then, a response befitting an awareness of the limit, which abides by the 'destruction' of the modern subject by the phenomenological attentiveness to the facticity of existence; it is a response which heeds, more than ever, the desire to hear the voice of the other and witness its suffering, and pursue no ethical project which unwittingly obscures its very 'object' of concern. The recovery of the 'ethical' self as a disposition has, thus, also come full circle to think coexistence as an existential sensibility of a heteronomous being who is aware of its disclosive role for itself and the other. In this regard, liberating solicitude is more than an empathy for the other; it is a caring-for (in the sense of Fürsorge) which calls the other to his own anxious Being-in-the-world and lets her assume her fundamental mortal possibility.

For coexistence in IR, furthermore, this has destabilising repercussions because the unworking of the modern subject is taken a step further with the elaboration of the 'ethical' self, not as a replacement of the modern subject, but precisely not as its replacement: a decentring occurs with the ontological consideration of a groundless self whose Being-with, manifested in its solicitude to others, places heteronomy at the centre of coexistence. The solicitude of the 'ethical' self constitutes the very ethicity of what is 'ethical' such that coexistence becomes the manifestation of the 'ethical.' Furthermore, the recovery of an 'ethical' selfhood participates in and is equi-primordial with a de-centring the self-sufficient subject of politics, as will be shown in the next chapter, and opens up the space for considering the notion of a politics of non-self-sufficiency.
Chapter 7

Worldly Realms: Political Selfhood and Communal Constitution Beyond Composition

nothing guarantees that the very concept of politics should retain any validity in this context whatsoever.
Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe

The exposition of ‘ethical’ selfhood explored in the previous chapter argued that the ‘ethical’ self becomes open to, and ‘embodies,’ its innate otherness by cultivating silence and hearing. This ‘openness to alterity’ is crucial for the task of this final chapter of the thesis, which examines the impact of the recovery of ‘ethical’ selfhood on political coexistence and communal constitution as such. The ‘ethical’ self’s acknowledged coexistential heteronomy informs, it was suggested, a disposition of *liberating solicitude* towards others and this can be said to facilitate coexistence with others, where their own alterity is at the forefront: liberating solicitude assists other Dasein to embark on their own process of propriety.

Returning to the claim that subjectivist ontological presuppositions restricted coexistence to a ‘logic of composition,’ it can now be suggested that the recovery of the ‘ethical’ self renders untenable political theoretic accounts about coexistence available to us within the discursive horizon of modern subjectivity. It effects a shift away from the determination of certain categories of modernist *political* discourse, which parallels the ‘turn away from ethics’ undertaken in the previous chapter. This concluding chapter suggests, therefore, that the consideration of the optics of coexistence and the recovery of an ‘ethical’ selfhood brings about a *hermeneutic* shift away from modern political subjectivity that, at the same time, calls for a rethinking of the ways in which coexistence might be theorised beyond co-presence. Since the ‘logic of composition’ becomes untenable through the unworking of modern

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subjectivity, coexistence is rethought through three trajectories, which are representative of the levels of the argument. The first path, refers to Thomas Hobbes's account in order to demonstrate how Hobbesian political subjectivity is unworked (abbauen) by the rethinking the phenomena of fear, violent death, and self-interest that are constitutive of the contractarian imaginary, an imaginary which is an exceedingly pertinent example of the logic of composition. The second trajectory considers how the constitution of 'community' or collectivity might be rethought, if it is no longer to be reduced to the composition of non-relational units. Finally, the third trajectory indicates how this conception of communal constitution and belonging contributes to the discipline of International Relations as it finds itself in an era of 'global transformations.'

1. Unworking Political Subjectivity: toward non-self-sufficiency

Can one think through a politics of nonselfsufficiency? That is, as one will want to say, a politics of dependence or interdependence, of heteronomy or heterology?

Jean-Luc Nancy

Thomas Hobbes's Leviathan has shaped the political imagination for a substantial period in political inquiry and, more specifically, international relations. Since Hobbesian political theory had served as an example of the 'logic of composition' in chapter two, his account of the subject is again utilised here as an extreme exemplar of the modern configuration of subjectivity.4 Juxtaposing selected insights of the 'optics of coexistence' with the Hobbesian construction both illuminates the ways in which phenomenological investigation can 'unwork' political subjectivity and also reconstructs an account of political non-self-sufficiency that is informed by the recovery of 'ethical' selfhood and, therefore, that is attuned to the heteronomous constitution of existence. The analysis is limited to the

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phenomena of fear/anxiety, death/finitude and interest for the sake of brevity, but even in such a limited way, it illustrates the hermeneutic shift away from the categories and terms of modernist political discourse, and allows for the possibility of rethinking coexistence concomitant to a non-self-sufficient political selfhood.

The ethos of survival and the will to security

The claim that Hobbes founded an intellectual tradition of modern liberalism known as ‘possessive individualism,’ or that he is ‘one of the ancestors of technological rationalism’ is by now well argued in social and political philosophy. The theoretical articulation of early modern subjectivity in terms of danger, fear and survival was illustrated in detail in chapter two but it is worth recalling some of these earlier discussions to demonstrate the unsettling effects that the recovery of the ‘ethical’ self has on it. The Hobbesian configuration of subjectivity links anxiety and death (in the form of the ‘anxious anticipation of death’) to an external source, the other-as-enemy. Enmity becomes omnipresent and ‘structural,’ in the context of the state of nature. The other-as-enemy is not truly other, it is not in other words considered as alterity because he is gathered into the fold of the same by Hobbes’s account of human nature, where otherness mirrors sameness. Both reflect the quarrelsome disposition of man, his search for glory, and material security. Otherness is as knowable to the modern subject as itself: the Hobbesian theoretic construction achieves the equivalence of the Other with the Same.

The ontological premises of the Hobbesian account are hinged upon the occurrentness (substance or, in Heidegger’s idiom, presence-at-hand) of entities, which enables Hobbes ‘to structure his accounts of the human mind

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and of society.'\(^7\) While the account of the primacy of conflict in the state of nature might be understood to signify some sort of initial relationality with world and other, upon reflection it becomes apparent that the political-theoretic intention of this primacy is precisely the opposite. It suggests the impossibility of 'civil' relationality prior to regulatory government, reducing, in this way, coexistence to the sum of merely present, non-relational entities. In the pre-social state of nature of \textit{Leviathan}, the other serves to generate a suspicious and pessimistic \textit{heterology}, where the fearful anticipation of death renders survival as the primary responsibility of the self, which chapter two called 'the ethos of survival.' Death is to be avoided at all costs: in order to prevent violent death, understood as the self's \textit{demise}, the subject rationally (that is, in recognition of its interest) agrees to a Covenant by which he gives up all his rights (except the right of self-preservation) for the safety provided by the Leviathan. There is a reiterative process of self-control and self-mastery at work here and its theoretic result is an account of socio-political interaction where 'civil society...[is considered] the result less of natural inclination than of design and planning.'\(^8\) Therefore, the configuration of the Hobbesian subject around security and self-control usefully results in a theory of controlled interaction.\(^9\)

The agreement of the self-instantiating, self-present and self-sufficient subject to collectively relinquish its rights through a social contract indicates a desire to secure itself against want and need. The subject 'wants to be untroubled, safe, and settled,' expressing a will to making-secure. The other is encountered as co-present by a self imbued with natural right and reason, yet who is, paradoxically, furnished with an unsociable nature. Onto otherness is transferred part of this problematic and an othering process assigns the other (and every other) as enemy, as dangerous and fearsome, until man's natural reason breaks through and brings about the creation of a civil commonwealth.


\(^8\) Dallmayr, "Hobbes and Existentialism," 123, brackets added.

The displacement of fear with disclosive anxiety

If this brief reminder of Hobbes's reflections on the subject is juxtaposed with Heidegger's account of Being-toward-death, there occurs a disruption of the constellation of anxiety, death and self-interest. Viewed from the perspective of the coexistential 'ethical' self, who becomes proper through an increasing awareness that otherness is not only constitutive for its everyday self, but it is always already carried within it, the subject's desire to secure itself against want indicates that the modern subject 'wants to cover over its very being as needy, as Darbung.'¹⁰ In this vein, John Caputo suggests that 'it is because factual life is disturbed by everyday concerns,' because its Being is an issue for it, 'that it seeks to “secure” itself against want'; the Hobbesian subject's will to making-secure arises from the need to 'look whole not privatio...as if it were without care, sine cura, secure – even though that very desire for security is itself a (deficient) mode of care [Sorge].'¹¹ Hobbesian subjectivity, it has already been suggested, has a right to the world: man's natural right results in the creation of a perspective on the world as possessed and authored by the subject. This perspective denies an understanding of Dasein's Being as care and its ground as nothingness (in the sense of Being-the-basis-of-a-nullity). The subject conceals the anxiety induced by its thrownness and lack of ground by conceiving of the world as a state of nature, whose structural conditions and the presence of widespread enmity lead to the externalisation of anxiety about its own Being. This making-secure serves to illustrate the suppression of anxiety in the Hobbesian subject's 'warre of all against all.'

When Heidegger's analysis of anxiety is brought to bear on the Hobbesian schema, it becomes evident that it is confused, or better still conflated, with the phenomenon of fear. Anxiety, Heidegger insists, cannot be confused with the phenomenon of fear as, arguably, occurs in Leviathan. Heidegger agrees that 'obviously these are kindred phenomena' and their confusion or conflation is further complicated 'by the fact that for the most part they have not been

distinguished from one another: that which is fear, gets designated as "anxiety," while that which has the character of the anxiety, gets called "fear." While fear is an affect which corresponds to something in the world which is fearsome, and becomes more so as it approaches Dasein, what Heidegger designates as 'anxiety' has no concrete worldly referent. 'Anxiousness as a state-of-mind [attunement] is a way of Being-in-the-world; that in the face of which we have anxiety is thrown Being-in-the-world; that which we have anxiety about is our potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world. Thus the entire phenomenon of anxiety shows Dasein as factically existing Being-in-the-world' (BT, 235). Anxiety is generated from the general constitution of Dasein as care and as being-thrown, which causes Dasein to flee from itself constituted as such. 'In falling, Dasein turns away from itself. That in the face of which it thus shrinks back must, in any case, be an entity with the character of threatening; yet this entity has the same kind of Being as the one that shrinks back: it is Dasein itself' (BT, 230). It cannot, then, be fear that guides Dasein's falling, for fear is that affect which 'comes from entities within-the-world.' (BT, 230)

The conflation of anxiety and fear in Hobbes, results in the causal attribution of anxiety, which is related to Dasein's constitution as 'care' (Sorge), to otherness. In seeking an external referent, fear is displaced towards the other. The encounter of the other-as-enemy and the assignment of fear to the other can be understood, then, within the framework of Dasein's inability to accept itself as the basis of a nullity, as Being-toward-Death. Othering is disclosed as an inauthentic response to Dasein's own Being in an attempt to externalise the anxiety that emerges from Dasein's finitude and groundlessness and direct it to otherness. The heterophobia found in Hobbes's reworking of early modern subjectivity is shown to be displaced from anxiety about Dasein's thrownness and care for its Being to the other. The assumption that fear/anxiety is the result of the omnipresent other-as-enemy, moreover, leads to a political theory where such fear/anxiety can be avoided through the right sort of regulation and

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governance. 'In the last instance,' writes John Dunn, 'humans’ political authority is a rational response to the overwhelming motivational power of human fearfulness. It rests practically upon the systematization of the passion of fear.'  

Heidegger's distinction between fear and anxiety, reveals that in *Leviathan* anxiety is transformed, from an affect disclosive of Dasein's Being as 'care,' to fear of another. In the Hobbesian construction, the conflated fear/anxiety is always related to danger, and is thought to be induced by the other within the state of nature. Fear is displaced to an external other because there is no understanding of Dasein as 'care.' Anxiety is not traced to Dasein fleeing from itself, because in its inauthenticity, Dasein avoids a confrontation with itself as thrown and finite. Rather, fear/anxiety can only be seen by the Hobbesian subject as linked to its encounter with the other. The assumption of a completed self, which encounters the 'world' and the other, distorts the disclosure of thrownness and care that anxiety can effect. In flight from its Being, the Hobbesian subject attributes its anxiety to fear of others. Leo Strauss argues that the institution of the commonwealth is possible because the subject realises that, not the other, but death is man's common enemy; if this proposition is accepted, then it becomes apparent that what the subject 'fears' in the state of nature is its own mortality. It 'fears,' in other words, its own finite constitution within the world.

Contrary to such a fearful heterology, for Heidegger, being with others in the world is the initial and primary way Dasein finds itself. Anxiety serves a positive function because it brings to the fore the thrownness and falling of Dasein, and acts as a reminder that Dasein's Being is an issue for it. For Heidegger, the other is neither the source of fear, nor an impetus to regulatory government as it is for Hobbes. On the contrary, the other is to be welcomed: rather than fearing the other as an enemy and distancing one's self from him, personally or institutionally, Dasein seeks the safety of the other in the flight of its anxious Being: 'what this turning-away does is precisely to turn thither

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towards entities within-the-world by absorbing itself in them. The turning-away of falling is grounded in anxiety, which in turn is what makes fear possible' (BT, 230). The other delivers us from the unsettling experience of anxiety, and this 'makes the other an inordinately sought source of comfort and support.' At the same time, however, the 'they' is the foremost manifestation of thrownness in the face of which Dasein flees, because, as Davis notes, '[t]he “they” is the most immediate issue of anxiety because anxiety and inauthenticity are virtually indistinguishable at the “origin” of experience.'

Therefore, the recovery of the ‘ethical’ self who disaggregates the reiterative processes of establishing certainty for a contingent self from fear for the other, can be seen as a political act of resistance enunciated in two movements. First, it denies political theory the justification of the othering process through fear and the preservation of life. Second, it disrupts the will to security by unravelling the constellation of anxiety and death which is part and parcel of the Hobbesian configuration of modern subjectivity.

The hermeneutics of finitude

As noted above, the consideration of finitude in terms of possibility and groundlessness also helps to rethink the role of death in Hobbesian philosophical anthropology. For Hobbes, it can be recalled from chapter two, death is equated with the body's demise and is thought of as the end of life. Violent death is to be avoided at all costs, even if this entails the relinquishment of the subject's natural will and right. Finitude, in this regard, is considered as the deprivation of life, as being-finished. Fear of violent death is, for Hobbes, the condition for the creation of the Commonwealth because it brings about the acquiesce of man to regulatory government. Heidegger, however, insists on a distinction between finitude, on the one hand, and the

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death of Dasein as its biological end, on the other.\(^{17}\) For Heidegger, and as noted in chapter five, death is Dasein’s ownmost possibility. This interpretation denies that the phenomenon of finitude can only be understood as physical demise. ‘Finitude is not the being-finished-off of an existent deprived within itself of the property of completion, butting up against and stumbling over its own limit.’\(^{18}\) The distinction drawn between the biological end and the ontological understanding of finitude enables the utterance, perhaps contrary to a more commonplace understanding of death, ‘[f]initude is not privation.’\(^{19}\) In denying death as privative, the existential analytic reveals the phenomenal content of finitude as a possibility which is one’s ownmost, non-relational and unsurpassable. In this way, it relates finitude not to the ‘end’ but to a radical contingency, a lack of certainty, which is Dasein’s ground. Thus, regulatory government cannot mitigate against finitude understood in this way. It is merely a spectral postponement, a concealment of the lack of ground through action.

The phenomenological investigation of finitude brings about an understanding of finitude as possibility, which disrupts fear of violent death and, moreover, also dispels thinking in terms of essence. Jean-Luc Nancy suggests in this regard that ‘“death” = the nullity of essence,’\(^{20}\) the invalidation of which lets existence be seen in all its contingency. By arresting the unfolding of essence this conception of finitude allows existence to come forth undetermined. ‘In other words, toward death would mean toward life, if “life” did not refer too simply to the contrary of death.’\(^{21}\) Since death is Dasein’s possibility it allows Dasein to be understood as the Being which is determined by its relationship with its end, and which always and from the start carries its death, as its unsurpassable possibility, with it. In this vein, ‘finitude’ should therefore be attributed to what carries its end as its own, that is what is affected by its end (limit, cessation, beyond-essence) as its end (goal, finishing, completion) – and is affected by it not as a limit imposed from

\(^{19}\) Nancy, *The Sense of the World*, 29.  
elsewhere...but as a trance, transcendence, or passing away so originary that
the origin has already come apart there.22

Unlike the Hobbesian problematic which theorises the regulation of relations
aimed at the avoidance of violent death, it can be argued that Heidegger shows
precisely that, 'privation annuls itself, essentially' while, '...finitude affirms
itself.'23 The thought of finitude as possibility highlights, moreover, the
contribution that a philosophy of the limit might make to a reconsideration of
international political theory: it disrupts an understanding of death and its
avoidance as the justification for contractarian theories, but also reverts the
reduction of the political to the decision in the face of an 'existential threat.'24
Where the Hobbesian subject, as an inauthentic Dasein, suppresses its anxiety
(by displacing it onto the other in terms of fear) in order to maintain its self-
certainty in the face of its radical contingency and embeddedness in the world,
the 'ethical' self appropriates its anxiety and becomes ready for it, and for
death as its ownmost possibility.

While for political theory '[Hobbes's] teaching...remains to be overcome in
fact' because '[o]ur way of regarding things political is still predominantly
Hobbesian,'25 the recovery of the 'ethical' self provides a challenge to the
determination of worldly phenomena in a Hobbesian manner. In addition to the
unworking of political subjectivity, such a recovery primarily questions the
pertinence, and encourages the relinquishment, of the inside/outside
dichotomy, which is but a manifestation of the distinction between self and
other. The recovery of the 'ethical' self shows the same to itself as other, and
the inside does not need to guard itself against the outside: otherness is not
only internal but pervasive. In this way, the predication of strands of
international theory on a logic of composition sustained by a pessimistic

24 See, for example, Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, trans. George Schwab
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996). It also provides a context where the 'right
to self-preservation' might itself be rethought On this issue see Peg Birmingham, "Ever
Respectfully Mine: Heidegger on Agency and Responsibility," in Arleen B. Dallery, Charles
E. Scott, and P. Holley Roberts (eds.), Ethics and Danger: Essays on Heidegger and
25 Stuart Umphrey, "Why Politike Philosophia?," in J. N. Mohanty (ed.), Phenomenology and
ontology and heterology can be challenged. This cannot be regarded as an outdated task because, as Mary Dietz, argues, Hobbesian political theory 'is at least partly constitutive of the ways in which we continue to understand and describe our own political practices,'\textsuperscript{26} particularly as regards the framing of the non-relational subject of politics, the other-as-enemy, and the theoretic right of self-preservation. In the following section 'interest' is examined as a central term of political subjectivity related to both fear and death in the Hobbesian configuration of the self-sufficient subject of politics.

\textbf{From self-interest to care}

How do subjects of modern politics interact with each other, how are their relationships manifested? In a contractarian conception of politics, such as the Hobbesian one, instituting and regulating 'relation' comes from the notion of 'interest.' For a subjectivist understanding of politics, the notion of interest 'imposes intellectual discipline upon the observer, infuses rational order into the subject matter of politics, and thus makes the theoretical understanding of politics possible.'\textsuperscript{27} In addition to its being a lens through which the phenomena of politics become intelligible, the concept of interest and understandings of 'political association' are intertwined because the modern subject, which is ontologically non-relational, \textit{requires} a connection through which sociability is expressed. In a non-relational conception of the 'world' of politics, the phenomenon of political relationality must be explicated with the aid of that which both institutes and regulates relation. As a requirement for the existence of relation, the notion of interest reconciles the subject to its sociability by bringing together the disparate phenomena of 'sociation.' The notion of 'interest' serves, therefore, not only to regulate relation or interaction but to also effect the relation of subject to subject, and subject to 'political association.' By relating and (inter)acting according to its own knowable interest, the subject receives both its regulative political connection to

\textsuperscript{26}Mary G. Dietz, "Introduction," in Mary G. Dietz (ed.), \textit{Thomas Hobbes and Political Theory} (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1990), 4.

otherness and also relationality as such. The distinct characteristic of the notion of 'interest' is, therefore, that it provides both a reason for and a blueprint to regulate association in politics, in the 'absence' of prior constitutive relationality, the concealment of which is brought about by the modernist understanding of subjectivity.

In this vein, Jürgen Habermas's discussion of this distinctly modern conception of politics elucidated by modern social and political thought highlights that, with the advent of the modern subject, politics relinquishes its role in instructive socialisation, through which one learned how to cultivate not only the ways of customary participation in the communal space, but also how to properly conduct and improve oneself, in the sense of techne tou biou or technologies of the self.28 Politics, suggests Habermas, inevitably becomes the mere 'regulation of social intercourse' based on diverse interests.29 As a consequence, the self-interested decision to agree to a covenant can be seen as necessary in order to articulate the framework which constitutes and, at the same time, institutionalises relationships between subjects, as well as between government and subjects.

A shift from 'interest' to 'care' (meaning concern and radical embeddedness in the world) brings to the fore Dasein's relationality, which is not reducible to, or dependent on, a calculus of interest. On the basis of its being as care, Dasein can admit its anxiety for its potentiality-for-Being (its Being-free for its possibilities) and for its thrownness as Being-in-the-world; Dasein can fully inhabit itself as 'thrown projection' (BT, 243). The notion of 'care' transforms the rational reflection of the modern subject and its subsequent calculations of interest: '[t]he “sum” [the I am] is then asserted first, and indeed in the sense that “I am in a world’” (BT, 254, brackets added). The ability to relate the ‘am’ as thrown in a world serves to condition the “I,” such that it understands itself, not in terms of interest but rather in terms of possibilities, of 'various ways of

comporting myself – namely, *cogitationes* – as ways of Being alongside entities within the world’ (BT, 254). ‘[N]either does “care” stand primarily and exclusively for an isolated attitude of the “I” towards itself...“Care” cannot stand for some special attitude towards the Self’ (BT, 237).

Dasein’s ‘reticent self-projection upon one’s ownmost Being-guilty, in which one is ready for anxiety,’ known as resoluteness, *cannot* be understood as the ascertaining of one’s interest and acting according to it, as also argued in chapter five (BT, 343). Rather, resoluteness is a mode of Dasein’s disclosedness, ‘the disclosive projection of what is factically possible at the time’ (BT, 345). Resoluteness, then, can be thought of as the discovery of the *factical* situation, as distinct from the *general* situation known by the ‘they,’ a discovery which ‘brings the Being of the “there” into the existence of its Situation’ (BT, 347). Interest can be said to have a similar function for the Hobbesian subject, but unlike interest, resoluteness is not isolating or oppositional. It does not detach Dasein from its world, nor does it isolate it so that it becomes a free-floating “I”. And how should it, when resoluteness as authentic disclosedness, is authentically nothing else than *Being-in-the-world*? Resoluteness brings the Self right into its current concernful Being-alongside what is ready-to-hand, and pushes it into solicitous Being with Others (BT, 344).

**Toward non-self-sufficiency**

The politics of self-sufficiency is intimately linked to the logic of composition, since both rely on the modern subject’s posteriority of relation. One can go as far as to say that the politics of self-sufficiency is the discursive promulgation of the logic of composition, in other words, its political manifestation.\(^{29}\) Therefore, the attempt to unwork a politics of self-sufficiency has at its core the achievement of Dasein’s recognition of its relationality to its world and others. It takes place through the concerted disruption of the characteristics of

\[^{29}\text{Habermas, *Theory and Practice*, 43.}\]

\[^{30}\text{This does not hold in the case of David Campbell, whose work intends to transcend ‘self-sufficiency’ but retains, however, contractual elements which lend it coherence.}\]
modern subjectivity that permeate political discourse, prominent amongst whom are the notions of ‘fear,’ ‘death,’ and ‘interest.’

The ‘unworking’ of political subjectivity creates an opening or path toward non-self-sufficiency, which can now be defined as the desire or end which not only ‘accommodates’ heteronomy, but makes its disclosure possible. It allows heteronomy to be revealed as that configuration whose possibility is the shattering – foundering and failure – of the modern subject of self-sufficiency.

The notion of shattering has both a symbolic and an interpretative function, in that it links Dasein’s propriety to the dissolution of the subject’s mastery. Proper understanding of Dasein ‘bends to the task at hand and risks “genuine failure”.’

Dasein’s radical embeddedness in its world and its constitutive relationality, projecting its thrownness on possibilities proper for its heteronomous constitution, brings about ‘genuine failure’: it relates Dasein’s ‘improper’ propriety to the shattering of the sovereign self and shows that where subjectivity was effortlessly posited, phenomenological examination finds heteronomy. Becoming-ready for anxiety shatters the becoming-secure of the subject. As David Farrell Krell explains, becoming-proper can be likened to foundering or to disintegrating. But upon such ‘failure’ of the will to security Dasein can take itself up as anxious and ready for its possibilities. ‘Failure or foundering. Scheitern. Failure as a trembling or agitation to the point of disintegration. Erchütterung. In a word, shattering.’ Failure to be a subject is the outcome of Dasein’s search for propriety, ‘[w]hose very genuineness, the genuineness of its understanding, guaranteed precisely insofar as it genuinely shatters.’

How does this incessant unworking of political subjectivity, which aims to bring about its very shattering, affect thinking about coexistence as such? In the first instance, there occurs the dissolution of the legalist conception of

32 Krell, “Shattering: Toward a Politics of Daimonic Life,” 155. Krell notes that ‘Scheitern – foundering, failing, shattering – appears regularly in Being and Time when it is a question of the methodological conduct of Heidegger’s own existential hermeneutic of Dasein,’ that is it brings to the reader’s attention the precarious nature of claims about Dasein.
communal constitution, of belonging and relationship, as well as the mechanistic conception of social regulation, which Jürgen Habermas has rightly termed a 'physics of sociation.'

Moreover, the reduction of coexistence to an additive calculus of subjects, as occurs through the 'logic of composition' is arrested. Coexistence beyond composition requires that the self ceases to be determined in unitary terms. To reverse the commonly held notion that interest-based decisions and agreements institute political relationality, explaining in this way the emergence of civil society and government, radical embeddedness in the world (Being-in-the-world) must be seen as primary, or at least as co-appearing with formal 'political association.' When sociability itself and the heteronomous self are shown to jointly appear, there can be thought a 'comparation' of the phenomena of coexistence:

Comparation must therefore mean...that "appearing", that is, coming into the world and being in the world, existence as such, is strictly inseparable, indissociable from the cum, from the with, wherein it finds not only its place and its taking-place, but also – and it is the same thing – its fundamental ontological structure.

With comparation, otherness also is allowed to show itself standing at the outset of selfhood, no longer requiring mechanistic concepts, such as interest, in order to be related to. In this sense, comparation might be thought as 'the appearing to and with an other.' The disavowal of a politics of self-sufficiency, therefore, also aims to account for the simultaneous appearance of both relation and singularity. Reflecting on a politics of non-self-sufficiency Nancy notes that '[s]uch a politics consists, first of all, in testifying that there is singularity only where a singularity ties itself up with other singularities.'

This co-disclosed inherent plurality, or multiplicity, of singularity hopes to arrest a return to a subject-driven politics where, 'politics considered as a real practice has always been taken to subserve (i.e. to originate and culminate in) a

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34 Habermas, *Theory and Practice,* 72.
self-identical, self-sufficient, self-determining entity. Non-self-sufficiency, then, is ‘an end that can serve double duty as ethical imperative commanding respect for others and existential condition securing the open endedness (of a-teleology) of political life.’

In sum, the above discussion has illustrated the unworking of fundamental terms of the Hobbesian configuration of political subjectivity through a juxtaposition of Heidegger’s discussions of related or identical phenomena. It has been shown that anxiety, which is often confused with fear, has a disclosive function for Dasein’s own existence as thrown, whereas the fear of the other initiates an othering process which misdirects anxiety in the face of Dasein’s Being to the other. Finitude, moreover, is shown to be the self’s ownmost possibility, an indication not only of mortality but of groundlessness and radical contingency. Comportment on the basis of care, finally, reveals the particularities of the factual situation into which Dasein is thrown but avoids the reduction of sociability and relationality to calculations of interest. Being-resolute, furthermore, on the basis of one’s Being as care, leads to a mode of comportment towards beings in the world which avoids the isolating and regulative effects of interest. The broader contribution of the recovery of the ‘ethical’ self and the consideration of the optics of coexistence lies in illustrating the possibility of a hermeneutic shift away from the political manifestation of the modern subject as self-sufficient and towards the recovery of a politically non-self-sufficient self who takes up its radical relationality. The theoretic construct of the self-sufficient subject, and its relations of mastery over world and others, remains one of the main obstacles hindering the disclosure of the ‘irreducibly plural worlds’ in which the ‘ethical’ self finds itself.

Hermeneutic phenomenology, as understood by Heidegger, brings to the fore the subjectivist features of politics and makes their usage problematic. At the same time, it reveals possibilities, which had been hitherto obscured. This is

the self-stated task of the deconstructive enterprise of political philosophy, which has called into question its own reliance on traditional categories of politics. What remains to be examined, however, is how this shift from the subjectivist discursive domain affect the ways in which coexistence is theorised? The 'unworking' of the modern subject and the recovery of the 'ethical' self render the understanding of coexistence as co-presence untenable, and the challenge to the modern subject opens up the question how coexistence might be rethought. This question is posed explicitly during the second trajectory: on the basis of the reconsideration of these concepts, how a 'community' or collectivity might be rethought if it is no longer to be reduced to the composition of non-relational units?

2. Coexistence and communal constitution through critique

The act of bringing about a hermeneutic shift in the terms of discourse is a political act that seeks to effect a change in the ways the world and entities within the world are to be understood: 'every hermeneutical program,' argues Stanley Rosen, 'is at the same time itself a political manifesto or the corollary of a political manifesto.' Seen in this vein, the recovery of the 'ethical' self is political in the sense that it has weighty repercussions on the unproblematic usage of the modern subject in international political theory. Politically, then, '[w]hat becomes of being-with when the with no longer appears as composition, but rather as dis-position?'; in what way is the primacy of relation to be theorised politically without the additive logic of composition of self-present and self-sufficient subjects? Furthermore, how can political

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40. Stanley Rosen, "Political Philosophy and Ontology," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 18, no. 4 (1958), 537. Of course, the persistence with delineating a politics entails a danger that these insights are appropriated by dominant subjectivist conceptions of politics, such that their heteronomous aspects are dissolved. Slavoj Žižek argues, therefore, that rushed rearticulations on the basis of deconstructed notions ought to be resisted since they are likely to be determined by liberal ideology; 'thesis eleven' ought to be resisted. See Slavoj Žižek, Did Somebody Say Totalitarianism? Five Interventions in the (Mis)use of a Notion (London: Verso, 2001).
41. It must be added that Rosen means this in a disparaging way. See Stanley Rosen, Hermeneutics as Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 141.
praxis arise within fundamental ontology in a way that would bring to the fore Dasein’s thrownness and relationality? The recovery of the ‘ethical’ self is political, however, in another, more direct sense: it gestures towards a different understanding of coexistence and communal constitution, one which becomes available to political discourse following the unworking of the modern subject. Addressing itself to the ‘with,’ or the ‘together,’ beyond the ensemble, it suggests that collectivity can be understood to be constituted through the practice of ‘critical belonging,’ which attempts to escape the logic of composition. This suggestion is contentious on a number of grounds, however, which deserve some attention before the articulation of communal constitution below.

**Deconstructed sociality: apolitical, pre-political, ‘too’ political?**

There are three prominent contentions to the suggestion that one might usefully utilise the recovery of the ‘ethical’ self in order to articulate a means of communal constitution arising from it. The first argues that the unworking of the modern subject of politics leaves a ‘gap,’ a ‘ceasura,’ in political thinking which is not addressed in the hermeneutics of facticity one finds in Heidegger’s *Being and Time*. In the midst of a cottage industry about Heidegger’s Nazism, fuelled by historians and philosophers alike, it is sometimes easy to forget that the early reception of *Being and Time* held the view that it was largely an apolitical work. More recently, this reiterated concern arises not only from the lack of explicit discussions about politics in that work but it is grounded in the absence of a positive account of sociality to replace Heidegger’s ‘critique’ of the ‘they.’ The everyday comportment of Dasein with others in public takes, as was discussed in chapter four, the form of the ‘they.’ While adhering to conceptions of itself as autonomous and sovereign subject, the nature of publicness occludes Dasein’s lostness in the ‘they,’ its behaviour of conformity (even in breaking the norms generated by the ‘they’ Dasein asserts their hold over it), and the levelling-down of its
possibilities through their convergence with the possibilities of the ‘anyone,’ resulting, in this way, into a generalised consideration of its ability-to-be (Seinskönnen). However, the critique of the ‘they’ has led a number of commentators to suggest that ‘[i]n Being and Time, there is thus an especially negative phenomenology of being-with, which at no point introduces a positive phenomenology of political sociability.’ As Dominique Janicaud argues,

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[t]he fundamentally ontological turn given by Heidegger to the phenomenological project...reduces the rational city-dweller [of Aristotle] and the political space to the “they” and only leaves open an apolitics, an indeterminate and (in Hegel’s term) “abstract” authentic sociability, to Dasein concerned with its possibilities.
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The purpose of the articulation of the ‘they’ as the ontological manifestation of Being-with was to render strange the familiar accounts of man as subject, that is, as autonomous and rational, giving instead a phenomenological description of the everyday being of Dasein as indistinguishable from others. Heidegger’s account of the ‘they,’ therefore, is an extensive criticism of humanism’s conception ‘of man as animal rationale, and hence on the basis of a preconceived notion of “nature” or “animality” or “objects”.’ At the same time, Heidegger’s implicit critique sought to avoid reifying the ‘they’ as a preferred ‘alternative’ to the subject. Nevertheless, according to Janicaud, the dismantling of the rational, reflective subject undertaken in Being and Time results in a lack of attention to political socialisation. Habermas largely concurs when he notes that ‘[a]tributing a merely derivative status to Mitsein (Being-with others) he [Heidegger] also misses the dimension of socialization and intersubjectivity.’ While other accounts of modernity might corroborate

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43 The term critique is placed in quotation marks because, although this is a widely held interpretation, for Heidegger the ‘they’ forms part of an ontological discussion of an existential structure, see (BT, 167).
47 See chapter four, section 3, for a fuller discussion.
this phenomenological description, in Heidegger, Janicaud claims, there is no 'rehabilitative' discussion of political sociability to provide alternatives for political socialisation.

Michael Theunissen concurs with this critique when he writes that 'individualisation is supposed to make being-with-one-another possible, a being-with-one-another that, by comparison with the absorption in the They, is presented as authentic'; yet, this purported authenticity, Theunissen further argues, only means '[t]hat Dasein which is individualised down to itself has equally to be with Others is derived, purely formally, by Heidegger, from the circumstance that authentic being-self remains being-in-the-world and that this latter is still being-with.'

The second contention disagrees with the first and proposes, instead, that the purported apolitical content has to come under closer scrutiny. Heidegger’s focus on practical comportment under the heading of 'engaged immersion' and his suggestion that rational and reflective relationships with the world and other entities subject are secondary might not be a sign of the apolitical character of his work. Miguel de Bestegui argues, instead, that the nature of the existential analytic might be better captured by the term ‘pre-political’ rather than ‘apolitical’:

If Being and Time is indeed apparently devoid of political views and opinions, if it displaces the terrain of the philosophical investigation in the direction of an analysis of being, or of the way in which things come to be present for Dasein on the basis of the way in which they are granted with meaning, it also acknowledges the essentially collective and historical dimension of human existence, prior to questions of organization of this being-in-common.

Although ‘pre-political’ in a direct sense, James Ward suggests that, ‘Heidegger is a political thinker if by “political” one means, in the manner of classical antiquity, the order of human things.’ As a result, ‘the seeming apoliticality of the project of fundamental ontology cannot be settled so


Theunissen, The Other, 189.

Miguel de Beistegui, Heidegger and the Political: Dystopias (London: Routledge, 1997), 11, emphasis added.
easily.'52 The notion that the recovery of the ‘ethical’ self lies at some ‘pre-political’ level leads, however, to the question of whether it is at all amenable to an analysis of politics. It will suggested below that, indeed, it offers an understanding of how community might come to be constituted from a practice of critique with regards to the ethical self’s tradition. First, however, the third and most serious contention deserves some discussion, namely, is the possibility for articulating an account of coexistence and communal constitution not impaired by the overly political, even nationalist, determination of the project of fundamental ontology by Heidegger himself?

At the most obvious level, Heidegger inserts the possibility of a political or ‘nationalist’ determination of Dasein’s co-historising when authentic Being-with is determined in the now infamous paragraph 74 of *Being and Time* as communal.53 Heidegger writes that,

> if fateful Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, exists essentially in Being-with Others, its historizing is a co-historizing and is determinative for it as destiny [Geschick]. This is how we designate the historizing of the community, of a people (BT, 436).

Why should Being-with be specifically determined in terms of a ‘people’ and what might this mean? A number of diverse opinions exist. Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, for example, calls this determination ‘an ontic preference’ of Heidegger’s, arising presumably from his own political persuasions.54 Jürgen Habermas regards it to be a consequence of the way understanding and sense are connected to disclosure, which is, of course, collective. He considers that ‘the historical destiny of a culture or society is determined by a collectively binding preunderstanding of the things and events that can appear in the world at all.’55 Beistegui, on the other hand, argues that the concept of historicality

52 Beistegui, *Heidegger and the Political*, 11.
53 Simon Critchley calls this determination the ‘political fate of fundamental ontology and the Dasein-analytic.’ For Critchley, thinking about politics in the space opened by *Being and Time* would have to avoid the ‘autarchic telos and tragic-heroic pathos of the thematics of authenticity, where in Paragraph 74, Mitsein is determined in terms of “the people” and its “destiny”.’ Simon Critchley, *Ethics - Politics - Subjectivity: Essays on Derrida, Levinas, and Contemporary French Thought* (London: Verso, 1999), 240.

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(Geschichtlichkeit, Geschehen) is ontologically vague, which allows it to be ‘from the start politically oriented.’ And finally, Newell suggests that the apparent political orientation of Being-with in the language of the ‘people’ comes from Heidegger’s political philosophic ‘concern of how to achieve a cohesive community in a world increasingly dominated by the values of liberal individualism.’ The identification with community is, however, what ‘gives a political orientation to Heidegger’s discussion.’

Lacoue-Labarthe lends credence to Newell’s claim by suggesting that the concept of mimesis to be the ‘formidable unanswered, or unformulated, question that continually haunts Heideggerian thought.’ Heidegger refuses, according to Lacoue-Labarthe, to examine the problem of identification, which is the ‘German political problem par excellence.’ With regards to the manifestation of this problem in the 1930s in the form of National Socialism, Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy argue that there is a complicity or responsibility of German thought in the continued mythic response to this problem of identification:

[t]here incontestably has been and there is still is perhaps a German problem; Nazi ideology was a specifically political response to this problem; and there is no doubt whatsoever that the German tradition, and in particular the tradition of German thought, is not at all foreign to this ideology.

But, indeed, Lacoue-Labarthe subsequently wonders ‘[w]hy would the problem of identification not be, in general, the essential problem of the political?’

Habermas dates the turn to Nazism, however, to 1929 noting that ‘from around 1929 on, Heidegger’s thought exhibits a conflation of philosophical theory and ideological motifs,’ Habermas, “Work and Weltanschauung,” 439. This amounts, for Habermas, to ‘the invasion of the philosophy of Being and Time by ideology,’ 441.

56 Beistegui, Heidegger and the Political, 19.
58 Beistegui, Heidegger and the Political, 20.
61 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, “The Nazi Myth,” trans. Brian Holmes, Critical Inquiry 16, no. 2 (1990), 295. Also, ‘it is because the German problem is fundamentally a problem of identity that the German figure of totalitarianism is racism...It is because myth can be defined as an identificatory mechanism that racist ideology became bound up in the construction of a myth,’ 296. See also, the discussion of Nazism’s revival and production of mythic identification, pp. 296-312.
How is Dasein’s historical happening (its co-historising, in terms of its past possibilities) to be understood? An interpretation of it is essential in order to take a stance with respect to the claim that there is an unacknowledged process of mimesis, which casts the thought of being-with as community-bounded and, seen in light of the terror of the 1930s and 1940s, nationalistic. Chapter five has argued that Dasein’s facing its death individualises Dasein but does not turn it away from its thrownness in the world, it does not, in other words, revoke its constitution as Being-in-the-world. Beistegui notes that in anticipatory resoluteness ‘Dasein understands itself as this being which is both projected against its own end and thrown into a world.’ Heidegger claims that the ‘resoluteness in which Dasein comes back to itself, discloses current factical possibilities of authentic existing, and discloses them in terms of the heritage which that resoluteness, as thrown, takes over’ (BT, 435). David Couzens Hoy suggests that such a ‘taking over’ of inherited possibilities effects ‘a recognition of the compelling situation of the actual historical world’ and can lead ‘to an urgent commitment to what is most unique and individual about one’s way of being-there.’ In other words, the ‘determination’ of historical being-there is always embedded in a historically situated public group – Dasein is radically embedded in its world and this world is manifested publically and historically. The reference to community may not be, arguably, a theoretical commitment to an understanding of Gemeinschaft but might be, rather, a reminder of the historical manifestation of the worldliness of being-there.

While it is true that ‘[t]hrough anticipatory resoluteness, the “there” or the situation of Dasein is made transparent to Dasein,’ the actual choices or options which might follow from such an understanding are intentionally not discussed by Heidegger. Neither is speculation about them entertained, because a consideration of actual factical possibilities is not possible in the abstract: they can only be thought through by each particular Dasein finding

itself in a factual situation. 'If an ethics or a politics could indeed unfold from this fundamental existential constitution, Heidegger refuses to consider it. Dasein's resoluteness remains empty."66

And yet, the emptiness of resoluteness is but a step away from 'the abyss of steely and völkish rhetoric.'67 A step which Heidegger takes, it seems, when he asserts that

[o]ur fates have already been guided in advance, in our Being with one another in the same world and in our resoluteness for definite possibilities. Only in communicating and in struggling does the power of destiny become free. Dasein's fateful destiny in and with its "generation" goes to make up the full authentic historizing of Dasein (BT, 436).

This can be, and has been, read as the emergence of nationalism in Heidegger, where the struggle of the community in its self-determination leads to a process of identification and mimesis. Such a reading would agree with Lacoue-Labarthe's assessment of the unstated identificatory process at play in Being and Time and justify his concern that '[a]n unacknowledged mimetology seems to overdetermine the thought of Heidegger politically.'68

Alternatively, one could argue with Hoy that '[d]estiny (Geschick) and fate (Schicksal) are technical terms for Heidegger' where 'fate represents the way Dasein becomes definite and actual through its relation to events in the world' and destiny 'involves the essential connection of the individual to the community or a people.'69 But is it so easy to consider this determination of the 'with' in terms of people a technical matter, a repercussion, so to speak of the primacy of relationality which dictates that 'since Dasein is essentially in the world with others...and since Dasein is essentially fateful or historical it follows that Dasein's fate is a co-fate and its history a co-history'?70 Is the content of this determination, in other words, inevitable? And is this 'we,' which is almost presupposed from the Being-with of Dasein, constituted

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66 Because of the emptiness of anticipatory resoluteness Beistegui refuses to identify it 'with the heroism and decisionism with which it has been often charged.' Both quotes from Beistegui, Heidegger and the Political, 15.
67 Beistegui, Heidegger and the Political, 16.
68 Lacoue-Labarthe, "Transcendence Ends in Politics," 300.
70 Beistegui, Heidegger and the Political, 17.
authentically in the same manner as Dasein, that is, by confronting death as an ownmost, unsurpassable and unrelational possibility?

The question of this ‘we’ deserves some additional attention especially as to whether it mirrors Dasein’s becoming-proper through death. Briefly, the concern lies primarily with the possible contradiction that such a conclusion would have with the account of Dasein’s death. How can this be reconciled with ‘a passage from a particular and individual Dasein to one that is general, no less particular by virtue of its generality – namely, one of German Dasein’? The reason for this concern emerges from the invocation of Carl Schmitt’s determination of the political in his monograph The Concept of the Political where the ‘we’ is formed when its continued existence is threatened and upon which it is able to name another collectivity as the enemy. Indeed, Karl Löwith suggests that there is a correspondence between Heidegger’s being-toward-death and ‘Schmitt’s “sacrifice of life” in the politically paramount case of war.’ Furthermore, does the co-historizing of Dasein, the passage from ‘one’s ownmost Dasein’ to a community, and later to a ‘German Dasein,’ not signify in a disturbing manner that the ‘mit’ (with) modifies ‘Sein’ (being), that the ‘with,’ in other words, is but a modification of that which is towards-death?

Despite the recent avalanche of writings on ‘Heidegger’s politics,’ not all of it is condemnatory. Amongst the numerous and diverse interpretations of Dasein’s co-historicality, David Wood suggests that ‘[t]he distinctive function played by destiny...is to provide a way of transcending the mere arithmetic addition of individual fates,’ to transcend, in other words, the determination of coexistence through what this thesis has called the ‘logic of composition.’ It is important to note that Heidegger avoided any references to society

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72 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 33.
(Gesellschaft) because he believed that ‘society today is only the absolutization of modern subjectivity.’\textsuperscript{75} Indeed, Beistegui argues that the usage of community (Gemeinschaft) by Heidegger is made ‘as much in favour of a specific understanding of the nature of our being-in-common as it is made against the view – associated with liberalism, capitalism and intellectualism – which articulates the meaning of communal life in terms of Gesellschaft and Staat.’\textsuperscript{76}

Beistegui suggests that Heidegger’s statement that ‘[o]nly in communicating and in struggling does the power of destiny become free’ (BT, 436) could be understood as an explicit stance against a subjectivist conception of Gesellschaft.\textsuperscript{77} The term ‘community,’ therefore, is invoked to contest and problematise this ‘absolutization of subjectivity’ through communication (Mitteilung) and struggle. Mitteilung communicates that which is shared, which is itself communicated through the sharing (Teilung)\textsuperscript{78}; it is in this way that historicality unfolds.\textsuperscript{79} Furthermore, Heidegger discusses struggle and sharing / communication, which form the internal contestation of community by its own members, in order to counteract the account of ‘idle talk’ with which the ‘they’ is said to drown all its communication.\textsuperscript{80} In the next section the question and charge of mimesis, or identification, is examined more closely and its configuration by the ‘ethical’ self is shown to introduce a productive conception of coexistence and communal constitution beyond composition.


\textsuperscript{76} Beistegui, \textit{Heidegger and the Political}, 22, first emphasis added.

\textsuperscript{77} The sentence reads in German: ‘In der Mitteilung und im Kampf wird die Macht des Geschicktes erst frei.’ Martin Heidegger, \textit{Sein und Zeit} (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1993), 384.

\textsuperscript{78} Beistegui, \textit{Heidegger and the Political}, 23.


\textsuperscript{80} Beistegui, \textit{Heidegger and the Political}, 168, n. 32.
The argument, advanced primarily by Löwith, that the co-historising of Being-with can be equated with the collective confrontation of an enemy considers Being-with as a subject and has attracted avid disagreement. Peg Birmingham, for example, argues that on the contrary in "[a]nticipating death, Dasein determines itself authentically in a co-determination of being-with wherein the indifferent and efficient mode of solicitude becomes emancipatory."81 As was discussed above, the recovery of the 'ethical' self implies that, understanding itself as Being-towards-death, that is, 'individualised' from the they-self, 'makes Dasein, as Being-with, have some understanding of the potentiality-for-being of others' (BT, 309). In this way, solicitude is 'radically transformed' into a liberating kind of comportment: 'no longer viewed as part of the indifferent emptiness of the crowd, the homogeneous anonymity of the anyone, the other is freed to be who he or she is in his or her potentiality-for-Being.'82 In Dasein's becoming-proper, 'being-with others now has a sense of a heterogeneous space, a differentiated temporality in which each is grasped in his or her own specificity.'83 The discussion of co-historicality, then, ought not to be thrust aside as the premonition of a conservative agenda; rather, it can be crucial towards the theoretical construction of an account of 'critical mimesis.'

To develop a notion of critical mimesis, one must outline the response of Dasein to 'that in which Dasein is always immersed and implicated: its historical possibilities.'84 Heidegger attempts to distinguish between history and his own claim that Dasein is historical. History is commonly understood as 'something past,' as 'that belonging to an earlier time,' as 'context of events,' and as 'the tranformations and vissicitudes of man, of human groupings and the "cultures" as distinguished from Nature' (BT, 430). Dasein, however, is itself said to be historical; he forthrightly asks, 'by what right do we call this entity "historical," when it is not yet past?' (BT, 431). But, he reminds us,

81 Peg Birmingham, "The Time of the Political," Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 14, no. 2 - 15, no. 1 (1991), 27.
82 Birmingham, "The Time of the Political," 27.
83 Birmingham, "The Time of the Political," 27.
84 Birmingham, "The Time of the Political," 29.
since Dasein is never present-at-hand, it can never be past in the sense of 'now no longer present-at-hand or ready-to-hand' (BT, 432). Dasein's capacity to be-a-whole (to be self-constant) 'is the movement of Dasein as it stretches itself through time and is called Dasein's happening or Geschehen.' Hoy argues that 'Dasein becomes aware of how it is its past (the past of its generation, i.e., its tradition) insofar as the past is an essential part of the constitution of Dasein's understanding of its futural possibility.' In this understanding of itself there is no guaranteed acceptance or easy submersion in what is 'past.' Rather, 'Dasein may relate to this constitution by trying to overcome the way the tradition conditions or limits its possibilities,' by engaging in practices of critique with respect to the possibilities available to it and conditioned by its 'heritage.'

Birmingham's suggestion regarding such a critical process of identification can now converse with Lacoue-Labarthe's claim that in the discussion of historicity there is a process of nationalist or communitarian identification at play. She claims that 'Lacoue-Labarthe overlooks a crucial aspect of the discussion of destiny and historicity in Being and Time, namely, Heidegger's discussion of Erwidert: Dasein's response to its repeatable possibilities.' The disposition of Dasein towards the tradition can be understood as repetition. 'Repetition is handing down (Überlieferung) explicitly – that is to say, going back to the possibilities of the Dasein that has-been-there' (BT, 437). Yet, it is wrong to assume that this implies the blind reenactment of what has occurred in the past. Heidegger is explicit that 'the Dasein that has-been-there is not disclosed in order to be actualized over again...repetition does not let itself be persuaded of something by what is “past,” just in order that this, as something which was formerly actual, may recur' (BT, 437-438.) Rather, this sort of handing down 'is an attempt to retrieve a more original, a more positive and hence constructive comportment towards one's history.' Therefore, repetition is not repetition of the same; on the contrary, 'the repetition of tradition opens

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89 Beistegui, Heidegger and the Political, 25.
up our destiny and affords a "going back" to a given situation, but in such a way that this situation is thus disclosed, illuminated in a new way, revealed as a unique historical possibility. Once this occurs, Dasein comports itself with this possibility in the manner of erwidern. What is the manner of such a response? Erwiderung is rendered as 'reciprocative rejoinder' by Macquarrie and Robinson's translation but this fails to clearly indicate its full implications, and those of the root wider, which include strife and in casual discourse mean 'contrary to or against'. To emphasise this aspect of repetition, Birmingham argues that '[t]he response to repeatable historical possibilities is one which disavows any notion of continuity or identity with the past.' Beistegui concurs, asking in addition, '[I]s it not in the context of such a strifely or adverse attitude of Dasein in the face of its own historical situation that we must understand the use that Heidegger makes of the word Kampf? Does the "struggle" not refer to Dasein's ability to engage with its own time in a strifely dialogue?'

This kind of repetition 'does not abandon itself to that which is past, nor does it aim at progress' (BT, 438). In this way, it neither lends itself to 'reactionism' as a political modality which 'is nourished by a thinking of the return (to the origins, God, to values, to meaning, etc.)' and yet nor does it support a progressivist understanding of politics and history as 'the arche-teleological unfolding of a meaningful process in a certain appropriation of the philosophy of the Enlightenment.' Heidegger's analytic, therefore, is as suspicious of the liberal political understanding as of the conservative alternative. The future does not unfold according to a teleology: it is perhaps best imagined (as an extrapolation from Heidegger's work) in the sense 'engender[ing] a collective field of imaginable possibilities...a restricted array of plausible scenarios of

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90 Wood, "Reiterating the Temporal," 150.
91 Beistegui, Heidegger and the Political, 25.
94 Beistegui, Heidegger and the Political, 25. Beistegui rightly points out that the best example of this Erwiderung is none other than Heidegger's method of Destruktion or 'destructive retrieve' through which he engages with traditional ontology in order to be able to restate anew the question of Being.
95 Beistegui, Heidegger and the Political, 29.
how the future can or cannot be changed. The future is critically imagined or projected upon past possibilities, which become ‘imaginable’ in a factical situation through the very process of critical mimesis. In this way, ‘a collective field of imaginable possibilities is both a system of meanings…and an arena for the play of rhetorical practices.’

The recovery of the ‘ethical’ self participates in a critical engagement with the customary practices of its historical being-there in order to reveal the positive possibilities in it and recover a constructive way of relating to it. This movement of a factical ‘destructive retrieve’ enables Birmingham to suggest that the concern regarding the nationalist identification entailed in Dasein’s co-historising must be reinterpreted on the basis of Erwiderung, namely, as ‘displacement and disruption.’ Employed in this disruptive mode, mimesis encourages a radical rethinking of the determination of Being-with in terms of a ‘people’ and also of the understanding of community as such, because Heidegger’s articulation of mimesis is ‘not based on a classical model of identification’ of part to whole.

If Dasein’s response is understood as a critical rejoinder with respect to its tradition (Überlieferung) and more generally to the social context in which it is thrown, there ought to be more than one possibility in which to think its co-historising. The suggestion that Being-with becomes historical by way of a critical mimetic response to the historically manifested publicness of tradition and ‘people,’ a response whose manifold meanings include struggle, accommodates both the condition of indistinguishability (Dasein does not distinguish itself from the ‘they’) and a struggle against the prevalent average

97 Cruz, “Identity and Persuasion,” 277.
99 Birmingham, “The Time of the Political,” 25. Regarding Heidegger’s involvement with the National Socialists she argues that at the time of the ‘turn’ Heidegger ‘begins to think that the Dasein’s destiny can be given a topos,’ 44. See also the discussion of ‘ontopology’ in David Campbell, National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity, and Justice in Bosnia, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 33-81.
intelligibility (and inauthenticity) of such understandings. Moreover, it leaves open the space to think about tradition or heritage not only in terms of people and national or local community but as a 'group-in-becoming', a group that can be inclusive in its practice of critical belonging.\textsuperscript{100} As Slavoj Žižek has recently noted in this regard there is a certain 'trangression' constitutive of the community which points to the 'way we are allowed/expected to violate its explicit rules,' to the extent that 'a subject which closely follows the explicit rules of a community will never be accepted by its members by 'as one of us.' In this way,

we are "in," integrated, perceived by the other members as "one of us," only when we succeed in practicing this unfathomable DISTANCE from the symbolic rules. It is ultimately only this distance, which exhibits our identity, our belonging to the culture in question.\textsuperscript{101}

In sum, Dasein's identification might be always already embedded, but if authentic, it ought to be critical, disruptive and, at the same time, productively applied to the factual situation. It is in this sense that communal constitution in Heidegger can be seen as an instance of critical mimesis, and coexistence can be understood as constituted through the practice of critique against the background of repeatable possibilities. The notion of critical mimesis, therefore, provides a response to the question of political identification, an identificatory response already infused with critique, rather than the mere unproblematic assumption of the historical heritage.

The conception of communal constitution presented above, as well as any 'critical explorations of alternative forms of political community have the unedifying effect of rediscovering the ancient tension between utopia and reality.'\textsuperscript{102} Does the understanding of 'community' as constituted through the practice of 'critical mimesis,' with respect to a historical public group in which Dasein is thrown, amount to a resurgence of 'poetic' or 'utopian' politics?

\textsuperscript{100} See also William E. Connolly, "Suffering, Justice, and the Politics of Becoming," \textit{Culture, Medicine, and Psychiatry} 20, no. 3 (1996): 251-277.
\textsuperscript{101} Both in Slavoj Žižek, "The Feminine Excess: Can Women who Hear Divine Voices Find a New Social Link?", \textit{Millennium} 30, no. 1 (2001), 93, capitals in the original.
A note on ‘poetic’ and ‘praxeological’ politics

Samuel Ijsseling suggests that any Heidegger-informed politics is necessarily ‘poetic,’ by which he means the new founding of political space:

According to this view the state or polis is seen as a work that must be made, instituted, or founded. Eventually it is seen as a work of art, or the total work of art (Gesamtkunstwerk)...Radical politics is always a poetical politics, one in which the ideal society has to be built from the ground up...\(^{103}\)

The quality of greatness appears to accompany ‘a politics that no longer belongs to everyday chatter; as essential politics, it is great politics.’\(^{104}\) However, if the above discussion on communal constitution belongs within the wider movement towards political non-self-sufficiency, the distinction between poetic and praxeological politics may not itself be sustainable. The notion of communal constitution as such is, in its theoretical function, interested in the ways in which coexistence might be rethought outside the ‘logic of composition.’ Therefore, in the sense that the unworking of modern subjectivity renders problematic the discursive utilisation of certain terms of politics, a politics of non-self-sufficiency may not be regarded ‘praxeological,’ if this is to be defined narrowly as the kind of politics which is ‘limited to the mere reform of existing conditions.’\(^{105}\) Understood in this restricted way, the ‘ethical’ self is not confined to praxeological politics because, in the words of Newell,

[ordinary political controversies about improving institutions, morality, culture, or the distribution of wealth are not radical enough in Heidegger’s view since the very familiarity of the disputes and their objects keep us chained to the everyday “present”].\(^{106}\)

If it is ‘feasibility’ or ‘policy relevance’ which distinguishes praxeological politics, then the notion of praxis itself becomes restricted: ‘[politics as praxis is always a politics of the feasible; it has to realize the good in this concrete

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\(^{104}\) Ward, *Heidegger’s Political Thinking*, 207.


situation, at this given place, at this given moment, and therefore it is involved in making compromises.107

However, it might be more productive to resist the relegation of ‘critical mimesis’ to the realm of the poetic by default, simply because it does not fall with this narrow understanding of praxis. If one recalls that Dasein’s resoluteness reveals to it its ‘concrete factual situation,’ praxis appears at the heart of this. Praxis is the comportment that is possible within Dasein’s facticity and its current situation. The ‘ethical’ self’s mimetic disruption of its public world is then itself praxeological in the sense that it is always constrained by the factual situation and can never be ‘poetic,’ if by this it is indeed meant the surpassing of the concrete towards something outside the factual situation. Furthermore, this understanding of the term ‘praxeological’ is heuristic and adheres to a conception of praxis as ‘a process which has no defined limit by which it ceases at some time and, by which an opposition occurs between a past and a present.’108 Since ‘critical mimesis’ is not an act with a defined end, but a process of continuous disruption and retrieval of repeatable past possibilities, what it brings into being, namely, ‘community through critique,’ might be

\[ a \textit{poiesis} \text{ that brings neither to the being of essence (the plan, one could say), nor to the being of substance (stone, mortar), but only to the being of existence. One must think here of a poiesis which is in itself a praxis.}\] 109

Moreover, ‘constrain’ is also applicable not only to the concrete situation but to the notion of ‘subjective will’ with which poiesis might be associated. When community constitution is rethought as critical mimesis, the thrownness of this mimetic yet critical selfhood discourages a conception of ‘active subject shaping the world according to [its] will.’110 Such a rethinking of poiesis as praxis, tied to the facticity and thrownness of existence, dispels the contention

that politics ought to always be considered as the 'appropriation of essences'\textsuperscript{111} and comes full circle to support the movement towards non-self-sufficiency.

3. Coexistence: worldly realms of meaning

\textit{the task of philosophy is precisely to destroy the fantasy of a falsely homogeneous and unified world while displaying the multiplicity and heterogeneity of the fields of signification which we inhabit.}

Jean Greisch\textsuperscript{112}

The previous section, importantly, had addressed the question 'how might one think about coexistence, if not in terms of composition?' The unworking of the politics of self-sufficiency tied to the modern subject enabled a conceptualisation of coexistence and communal constitution as occurring through a process of 'critical mimesis,' where membership is taken up by the self in its deconstructive repetition of the 'past possibilities' of the tradition. The radically embedded self becomes a member by sustaining a critical relationship (\textit{Erwiderung}) with the possibilities of its tradition. Through such a critical engagement those positive possibilities found within the tradition's past are emphasised and re-articulated within the political space opened up by the very act of critical engagement. The ones regarded as not wholly expressive of the tradition's historical potential are abandoned.

Having delineated the 'ethical' self's continuous practice of 'critical mimesis,' by which community is constituted, which might be called in shorthand 'community through critique,' it is important to consider the issue of heteronomy that has served as the impetus for challenging the 'logic of composition' at the outset of this project. In this regard, communal constitution through critique not only responds to the charge of an unstated 'mimetology' in Heidegger's early work, as articulated by Lacoue-Labarthe, but also offers

an understanding of communal constitution that is, moreover, open to otherness. Although any understanding of a historical public group would be exclusionary in some sense, the notion of a ‘critical mimesis’ as the mode of constitution of the group is exclusionary in ways which are not arbitrary. When critique becomes the mode of belonging, the public group is not arbitrarily excluding others because of race, religion, colour, birthplace, etc. The questioning of ethics, out of which the ‘ethical’ self is recovered, is paralleled in the political project of working out which possibilities are worth repeating from those ‘inherited’ by the tradition.

The act of disruption and retrieval is open to otherness because, as was shown in the previous chapter, this otherness is carried internally and it is as other that the ‘ethical’ self recovers itself. This recovery reveals how the subject is other to itself, in sense of being indistinguishable from, and constituted by, otherness in average everydayness, but also in the process of becoming-strange to itself through its recovery from habitual average practices and norms. Its propriety entails a certain becoming-strange, also to be understood as becoming not subject. Furthermore, others who might not be embedded in the specific historical public group in question are acknowledged by the ‘ethical’ self as having a voice, the voice that Dasein carries within, which is the ‘phonic presence’ of the other in the self. Regard for the other moves away from subjectivist self-sufficiency, is disclosed beyond additive ‘inclusion,’ by a self letting itself be seen as heteronomously coexistential. Hence, Nancy argues, ‘that which is not a subject opens up and onto a community whose conception, in turn, exceeds the resources of a metaphysics of the subject.’ In this sense, where the unworking of the subject shows it to be contingent, strange and other to itself, ‘[c]ommunity is what takes place through others and for others.’

114 Nancy, The Inoperative Community, 15.
Communal constitution, however, is open to otherness in a second, more concrete, way as well. Coexistence, being the proximal fact of Dasein’s everyday existence, becomes actively endorsed through the process of ‘critical mimesis.’ The openness of the ‘ethical’ self to otherness is paralleled also in the mode of communal constitution. Others, who wish to critically ‘repeat’ possibilities in a public group where they might not be members under more commonplace criteria, such as the figurations of family, nation, ethnicity, religion,115 may too engender critique and thus participate in the ‘critical mimesis’ of possibilities of the group in which they envision their future projection. Critical belonging notes only the desire to engage in a critique of the possibilities handed down to the group to which one wishes to belong (as in the case of migrants, for example).116 The ‘praxeological’ character of this critique, the engagement without end in the repeatable possibilities of the tradition, institutes ‘membership’ as such. The mimetic process does not limit belonging to territorial or other identity-related criteria.117 The tradition is historical, in the sense of the location of the ideas, projects and practices which it comprises in a specific public group; membership to it, however, need not be restricted to those who ‘inherit’ it in an actual sense (as might be the case with other immutable characteristics). This is because it is based on a substantially different understanding of ‘tradition’ as such, where the term is conceived as that which is not only open to critique, but that which is, moreover, constituted by one’s critical engagement with the past possibilities of the tradition in which one might wish to locate oneself.

Furthermore, the discussion of liberating solicitude as a disposition of the ‘ethical’ self for coexistence is presently relevant as well. Liberating solicitude allows the other to enter the critical mimetic process, that amounts to the community’s constitution, because it acknowledges,

the claim of others who, from beyond “our” horizon, call into question the parochialism of our tradition insofar as it does not speak for them and who

116 Again see, Žižek, “The Feminine Excess,” 93.
demand that we include their perspectives in the effort to understand ourselves.\textsuperscript{118} Multiplicity of perspectives, referred to as ‘value pluralism’ in the IR literature, does not temper with this process. On the contrary, it assists the forcefulness of critique by rearticulating and re-imagining the repeatable possibilities of the tradition by bringing difference to bear on them productively. This embedded yet critical relationship, which is open to those who wish to disrupt and retrieve ‘another’ tradition’s possibilities, can be most constructive for theorising the negotiations of multiple perspectives, the ‘friendly struggle’ of coexistence in an era of global transformations.\textsuperscript{119} Most significantly, the awareness of an internal, already present form of otherness, is exemplary in that it illustrates that plurality is to be found from within the tradition and that any externality ought not to be othered. This enables a movement from the community’s conceptualisation as uniform, to its diversification, both from inside and from an outside that is already within.

**Destructive retrieve and international discourses**

The two-fold task of unworking modern subjectivity and of rethinking coexistence beyond composition participates, moreover, in an additional layer of destructive retrieve toward international critical discourses on community. It recognises that they are similarly animated by a concern with otherness, although they have fashioned their response in significantly different ways, within the parameters of subjectivist discourse. Specifically, it may be recalled that the introduction had outlined three trajectories in post-Cold War thinking about coexistence, the third of these being the most theoretically sophisticated in its attempt to extend what it calls ‘moral inclusion’ beyond the schema of the sovereign state, a demand which processes of globalisation are said to make even more pressing.

\textsuperscript{118} Lawrence Vogel, *The Fragile “We”: Ethical Implications of Heidegger’s Being and Time* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1994), 70.

\textsuperscript{119} A ‘friendly struggle’ in the sense of ‘philopolemology’ as discussed in Derrida, “Heidegger’s Ear.” See also Diana Coole, “Thinking Politically with Merleau-Ponty,” *Radical Philosophy* no. 108 (July/August 2001), 25.
Taken as a response to similar concerns this thesis, however, attempted to move beyond the subjectivist premises and presuppositions of international critical discourses. With the 'logic of composition' as its point of departure, this project offered a response to otherness that did not aim to 'include' it, as one is want to do within subjectivism, but to let the coexistential heteronomy of existence show itself. Thus, both the recovery of the 'ethical' self beyond the customary norms of ethics and the exposition of critical mimesis, are most explicitly not concerned with the extension of moral inclusion in a 'quantitative-representative' sense. The account of how community might be constituted through a continuous process of 'critical mimesis' suggests that coexistence can be rethought as an interactive critical rejoinder to a historical group's repeatable possibilities. Seen in a parallel fashion as a critical rejoinder to IR, this project critiques and disrupts the (persisting) subjectivist ground of international critical discourses and seeks to retrieve, highlight and extend their positive possibilities, namely, their concern with otherness, with which it has most affinity and sympathy.

Exemplary of this scholarship, in both senses of the word, is Andrew Linklater's recent work. His conception of community relies on the logic of composition and thus can neither transcend the additive approach nor the occlusion of heteronomy to which it leads. In Linklater's desire to articulate a universalist alternative to the Westphalian state-form and state-system and to examine the prospects of a universalism that is sensitive to otherness, however, lies a positive possibility for dialogue. His desire to question current modes of exclusion arising from the international sociology of the modern state system, and also from certain 'robust' universalisms expressive of 'historically-specific configurations of power,' coheres with the thesis's interest in why and how compositional accounts of coexistence occlude the role of otherness. The common desire to address something like the 'claim of otherness' might open

120 It is intentionally that the thesis does not return, as might be expected, to the work of David Campbell, despite the emphasis that was placed on it in chapter two. As regards his thinking on responsibility, Campbell's Levinasian rejection of the Heideggerian 'side by side' in favour of the 'face to face' is too stringent and hinders further discussion.

121 See his introduction for a staking of the ground against both IR's systems of exclusion and also his weariness with certain other universalisms. Linklater, The Transformation of Political Community.
up the space to engage in an *unworking* of international critical concerns, which presently revolve around how community might be expanded, and to also suggest that greater inclusivity in terms of numbers alone is not the decisive issue. Indeed, a critical engagement and dialogue might show that the pivotal issue is not greater inclusivity as such, although this too is possible historically and has occurred. Rather, the crucial concern is *how* one allows existence to show itself as heteronomous and coexistential, so that issues of addition become of no consequence. 'Inclusivity' is not countable, the thesis has suggested in the discussion of hearing and silence in the previous chapter. The ontological letting-be seen of otherness as always within, of the self as strange to itself, and the repetition of possibilities which attest to this disposition or desire politically, show the worldly realm of community to be expressive precisely 'of the uncertainty of counting.'

Linklater's commitment to modern subjectivity and the limiting of his theoretical imagination to the 'juridico-theoretical model,' fail to rethink how community constitution might begin, not with subjects, but with 'an ontology of [their] interworld,' as Diana Coole has suggested. His dissatisfaction with the Westphalian ontology of International Relations, and the modes of exclusion that it entails, however, illustrate an openness to alternative possibilities and might well enable debates about this 'interworld' between radically embedded beings. The thesis is sympathetic, then, to the animating *spirit* of this third trajectory, as exemplified by Linklater's project, but not the *letter* of it. It wishes to participate in its discussion of otherness, despite the fact that it shares neither its subjectivist premises nor its universal aspirations.

In sum, it is be useful to conceive of the thesis's position with regards to international critical discourses as engaging in an another layer of 'destructive retrieve,' in addition to the unworking of modern subjectivity, the recovery of the 'ethical' self and the de-construction of political self-sufficiency. Such a retrieval would participate in the *critical* international 'domain of discourse'

123 Coole, "Thinking Politically with Merleau-Ponty," 25.
that seeks to go beyond the restricted view of coexistence as contained within
the state form and which excludes otherness.125 But it would, at the same time,
disrupt what is 'unjustifiable,' while striving to 'maintain those primordial
experiences from which genuine philosophical insights ultimately flow.'126 As
Richard Bernstein notes, this is an understanding of critique which means 'to
choose, separate, discern. Critique lives in the unstable gap, the in-between.'127
Thus the destructive retrieve would not overcome such critical international
tries to think about community but would think of its own task as
searching and retaining its problematique and preserving it as a possible
question. For Žižek, this upholding of the spirit, but not the letter, of a thought,
means that 'its essential core is redeemed through the very gesture of
overcoming / renouncing its particular historical shape.'128

Coexistence and globalisation: the basis for future research

To conclude, it is interesting to reflect briefly on some of the ways in which
the insights of this project might be utilised in future. Specifically, the
consideration of coexistence following the unworking of modern subjectivity
opens certain avenues for future research in the interface of globalisation and
community. It is often argued that in the last years of the twentieth century
there has been a 'stretching of political relations across space and time'
accompanied by the 'extension of political power and political activity across
the boundaries of the nation-state.'129 The changes in social and political life
attributed to economic and communicative processes of globalisation are
amongst the issues requiring urgent attention in social and political enquiry, as
it is often regarded that theorising ought to occur in a context shaped by the
current 'release of political and economic considerations from public

124 Žižek, Did Somebody Say Totalitarianism, 153.
125 In the sense meant by Mervyn Frost, Ethics in International Relations: A Constitutive
126 Joseph J. Kockelmans, "Destructive Retrieve and Hermeneutic Phenomenology in Being
and Time," in John Sallis (ed.), Radical Phenomenology: Essays in Honor of Martin
127 Richard J. Bernstein, "Metaphysics, Critique, and Utopia," Review of Metaphysics 42, no. 2
(1988), 257.
128 Žižek, Did Somebody Say Totalitarianism, 154.
129 Held, et al., Global Transformations, 49.
In particular, for scholars of political theory and international studies interested in issues of community, democracy and democratisation such changes present not only ontological challenges, but also substantial theoretic demands. Whereas the majority of the globalisation literature describes the effects of the recent intensification of global relations on the nation-state, either in terms of ‘internationalisation’ or transnationalisation, it is also important to contemplate how, in theoretic terms, thinking about coexistence might be brought in line with concerns about otherness addressed under the heading of ‘globalisation.’ Specifically, the perspective outlined in the context of the thesis can provide possibilities for examining how community might be made ‘worldly’ following the intensification of forces of globalisation, both economic and social.

In this vein, it can also be argued that globalisation has set political theory and international studies in an unsettling process of transition. Scholars such as David Held have proposed, in response, that thinking about community has to address the challenge brought about by global pressures to its traditional, territorially organised conception. His proposals amount to a cosmopolitan understanding, where ‘overlapping communities of fate’ are theorised on the basis of their global connections. Radical democratic theorists, such as Chantal Mouffe, have similarly addressed concerns about ‘community’ emerging from the globalisation of human relations, namely, the question of the ‘pluralism of values.’ Such pluralism, she suggests, is unavoidable in a rapidly globalising world. On their part, the radical democrats have suggested that the community members must be conceived as non-unitary subjects, able to simultaneously hold diverse and agonistic subject-positions. This, they claim, reconfigures political space into varied layers of contest amongst these subject-positions (as

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opposed to the subjects themselves). For this purpose, the reintroduction of the 'friend/enemy distinction,' offered by Weimar legal theorist Carl Schmitt, is seen to provide, in their account, the requisite element of contestation.133

As the initiation of a rejoinder to these debates, however, it is fruitful to illustrate how the optics of coexistence, along with the conceptualisation of coexistence and communal constitution through critical mimesis presented above, might provide a basis or starting point for future research about the interface of coexistence and globalisation. First, the conception of 'world' explicated within the optics of coexistence as a totality of meanings and signs is able to move beyond territorial and state-based conceptions of social relations and can be used to theorise connections, interactions and the production of meaning beyond the nation-state. In addition to the conception of 'world,' the very character of coexistential heteronomy is fundamentally 'worldly.' The embeddedness of existence shows that '[w]e always stand inscribed in many such worlds, each of which is phenomenalized according to its own law.'134 The hermeneutics of facticity 'is one of worlds – of economies, regions of manifestation, constellations of presencing, games of gathering (legein), contexts,'135 where 'world' refers to the web of meanings and referential assignments, which constitute any fundamental understanding of the self and its public context. The networks of meanings and relations are always already infused with otherness, as otherness is what constitutes a world not of 'our making.' Such a worldly account of existence is at the same time both communal and global, in the sense that the totality of references has no artificial or arbitrary boundaries. Contrary to accounts of modern subjectivity that 'have attempted to explain the world by extrapolating its existence outward from the inner workings of a subject,'136 the relations in which the

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133 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 26.
135 Schürmann, “Riveted to a Monstrous Site,” 314.
'ethical' self is embedded are ontologically prior to, and act to disclose, it in its heteronomy.

Once, therefore, Dasein begins to think ontologically, the world is disclosed as already imbued with meaning and reference. This 'already' signifies that it is towards otherness that one must look for the creation and sustenance of those meanings by which Dasein makes sense of itself in the world. Dasein uniquely understands and appropriates these meanings and ways of being in the world into which it is thrown prior to questions of subjectivity: 'not subject, but project, and since it lacks a project's constituted "pro," not a project, but a "ject," a throw.'\textsuperscript{137}

Second, the process of critical mimesis itself offers an account of communal constitution which is able to respond to the deterritorialisation of community and the pluralization of worldly perspectives that this entails. The understanding of the constitution of community through the critical mimesis of 'ethical' subjects, who understand themselves as open to alterity, in terms of their constitutive existential heteronomy and of their processes of becoming-proper, enhances a conception of coexistence that is not tied to a territorially constrained understanding of belonging. Primarily, it can be argued that the social transformations and forces arising from the varied processes of globalisation would further \textit{intensify} the critical engagement by which communal constitution occurs, both by increasing the variety of critique but also by bringing into interaction modes of mimesis as yet unknown to the specific tradition at hand. Thus, there could occur, in a \textit{theoretic} sense, the initiation of 'new political responsibilities' for community,\textsuperscript{138} for example, by articulating coexistence and community as 'multi-level.'\textsuperscript{139}

Taken together with a notion of the 'world' as the other-mediated totality of meaningful references, the consideration of coexistence elaborated above

\textsuperscript{137} Hamacher, "Heterautonomies," 12.
\textsuperscript{138} Molly Cochran, \textit{Normative Theory in International Relations: a Pragmatic Approach} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 14 and also, Linklater, \textit{The Transformation of Political Community}, 43 and 60.
\textsuperscript{139} Delanty, \textit{Citizenship in a Global Age}. 255
encourages a conception of the global context as based on multiple webs of meaning and sense. As such, it provides a workable basis for a theorisation of global relations, the conceptualisation of which is just as much about the processes by which social reality is hermeneutically produced and understood, as it is about the challenges to statehood and territoriality that globalisation is said to entail. Since the process of critical mimesis can be said to be, not only 'communal' understood in too narrow a sense, but also worldly, it can occur at in various domains in which past possibilities are encountered and 'retrieved.' In this way, critical mimesis is part and parcel of multiple levels of meanings and offers a way to examine and understand increasingly diverse modes of belonging.
Appendix I

Glossary of Selected Terms

Care (Sorge) Care is term that ‘pertains to Dasein itself.’ (35) Heidegger expands the term care to include, simultaneously, all its possible meanings: ‘the careworn, the careful and the caring’ (2) Contrary to ordinary usage, where a person might be both carefree and careworn, for Heidegger ‘everyone cares; no one is wholly carefree, careless or uncaring’ (3). Care has two senses: first, it refers to ‘to worry, be worried about something’ and second, ‘to take care of, see to, provide’ (35). Taken together with concern and solicitude they ‘distinguish [Heidegger’s] view from the view that our attitude towards the world is primarily cognitive and theoretical.’ (35)

Concern (bersorgen), also concernful There are three meanings of this term, which refers to ‘Dasein’s activities in the world.’ The first is ‘to get, acquire, provide’; the second is ‘to attend to, see to, take care of’; and the third is ‘to be concerned, troubled, worried.’ As a term it is distinct but inseparable from care and solicitude (35) and is used as a ‘general term for Dasein’s multifarious dealings with things in the world.’ In engaged immersion, ‘concern is guided not by knowledge or explicit rules, but by its informal know-how’ what Heidegger calls ‘circumspection’ (36)

Destruction, or destructive retrieve (Ab-bau) ‘must be understood strictly as destruere, “de-construct”, and not as devastation,’ whose intention is to ‘subvert current and traditional accounts’ and meanings and bring forward the unnoticed possibilities in what is being ‘destroyed’ (183). In this sense it is related to the movement of ‘repetition’.
**Existentialie** ‘Since Dasein exists in a way that other beings do not, we need to
distinguish its fundamental characteristics by calling them
*Existentialien* rather than categories.’ (61) (as in Aristotle’s categories
which apply to all entities, see chapter 3). Being-with, the ‘they,’
Being-in-the-world, etc., are examples of existentialia or existentiales
of Dasein.

**Existential** is an adjective which refers to the ontological structures of Dasein,
i.e. the existentialia and the understanding which one has of them. (See
62). ‘existential understanding is a worked out understanding of the
ontological structures of existence, that is, of what it is to be Dasein.’

**Existentiell** ‘applies to the range of possibilities open to Dasein, its
understanding of them and the choice it makes (or evades) among
them.’ (62)

**Guilt** Heidegger avoids the moral or theological sense of guilt. In an existential
sense, guilt refers to ‘being the ground of a being [Sein] determined by
a Not [Nicht, the existential counterpart of a lack of the present-at-
hand], i.e. being the ground of a nullity [Nichtigkeit, “Notness”]’ (BT,
283).

**Historizing or historical happening** refers to the way in which Dasein
‘stretches itself along between its birth and its death.’ In this way,
Dasein does not only have a past but ‘is its past’ which refers not only
its own past but the past of its tradition or generation (94).

**Possibility** there are two uses of ‘possibility’ in *Being and Time*. First,
‘something is the “condition of possibility” of something else’ (171).

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1 All citations are from Michael Inwood, *A Heidegger Dictionary* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999)
unless otherwise stated. The page numbers are indicated in brackets in the text. References to
heidegger’s *Being and Time* are noted as (BT) with page numbers in the text.
2 Hubert L. Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time,
Second, the term ‘possibility’ is closely related to Seinskönnen, Dasein’s ability or potentiality to be. It is in this way that Dasein is being-possible (BT, 143).

**Projection** the verb *entwerfen* is related to *werfen* which means ‘to throw.’ Heidegger connects the meaning of *Entwurf*, projection, with ‘throwing forward’ and, therefore, thrownness itself. A projection in this sense ‘is not a particular plan or project; it is what makes any plan or project possible (176).

**Repetition** is related to the unique appropriation of the world into which Dasein is thrown. Thus, Dasein brings its resoluteness to bear on those ‘past possibilities,’ which are found to be worth repeating after critically evaluating Dasein’s factical situation. Repetition, therefore, refers to the *critical* appropriation of the shared past.

**Resoluteness or having ‘resolve’** understood as to have the essence of a *decision*. ‘Resoluteness has little to do with a determined seizing of our freedom to act; it is closer to a *steadfastness* in the face of the vicissitudes of circumstance.’³ Also resoluteness ‘is the way in which Dasein comes back to itself, back to its original site, from the dispersion in everydayness into which it is for the most part Dasein thrown.’⁴

**Solicitude** has two meanings. First, as ‘actively caring for someone who needs help, i.e. as ‘welfare,’ and second, that which pertains to Dasein’s being with others, which can assume many forms. There are two polarised understandings of solicitude, that of ‘dominating’ solicitude, ‘which relieves the other of care and in its concern puts itself in the other’s place and that of ‘liberating or releasing’ solicitude, which ‘attentively

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leaps ahead of the other, in order to give him back care, i.e. himself’ (36).

‘They’ or das Man has been misleadingly translated as the ‘they’. It refers to the self of publicness. ‘The “they,” ...which we all are, though not as the sum, prescribes the kind of Being of everydayness’ (BT, 164). As the ‘they,’ others are not distinct in average everydayness; rather, ‘any Other can represent them’ (BT, 164). The answer to the question ‘who is Dasein?’ in average everydayness is not the ‘I’ but the ‘they.’

Thrownness refers to ‘the capacity to be affected by the world, to find that the entities and situations it [Dasein] faces matter.’ Dasein’s attunement ‘reveal[s] Dasein as thrown Being-in-the-world,’ into a factual sitation.

Transcendence refers to finite transcendence, as an anxious movement of Dasein towards the world, in other words, ‘a surpassing in the direction of world.’

World refers to the a referential totality of meaning and relations. It cannot be understood as ‘nature,’ or even a container of other entities; rather, the world appears as a totality of references and assignments, a set of relations and sense according to which Dasein orients itself.

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