LEADERSHIP AND POLITICS AMONGST ISRAELI YEMENIS

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ABSTRACT.

This thesis deals with leadership and political allegiance in three Yemeni communities in Israel.

The general question which is raised is this: what are the main factors which affect the form and functioning of leadership in these three immigrant, ethnic communities? The answer which is elaborated in the body of this thesis is as follows: there are two main sets of influences which are interrelated in different ways in each one of the three cases. The first set of influences derives from the internal structure of the community and from the structure of its relations with the wider society; the second set derives from conceptions of leadership, authority and allegiance, which have been moulded by the past.

The first community, Shaarayim - now a Yemeni quarter of a town - is examined in detail with respect to its internal structure, organization and composition, its relations with other sections of the local community and the wider society, and its history; the functioning of leadership and allegiance is analysed against this background. The other two communities - Rosh Ha' Ayin, a Yemeni township, and Zella fon, a cooperative village - which are of more recent origin than the first community, are considered in lesser detail, simply as suggestive cases for comparison. The social life of the Jews in Yemen
is discussed in order to throw light on the forces which have fashioned their conception of leadership and authority.

Comparison of the three communities as they are at present, and analysis of the past, shew the nature of the connexion between the two sets of factors, and demonstrates the extent to which, and the manner in which, circumstances can encourage or inhibit the persistence of traditional conceptions which influence conduct.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.

The material which I present in this thesis was obtained by field-work carried out between 1953 and 1958. I wish to acknowledge my debt to the Israel Ministry of Social Welfare which financed the studies of Shaarayim and Rosh Ha'Ayin, to the Henrietta Szold Foundation for their invitation to participate in the study of Shaarayim, and to the Department of Sociology of the Hebrew University for supervision of the research in Shaarayim. I am indebted to Professor S. D. Goitein, previously Dean of the Institute of Oriental Studies, Hebrew University, who gave me invaluable assistance in the study of Yemeni Jewish culture, and who advised me constantly during the period of my research in Moshav Zellafon.
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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION.

The Problem.

In this thesis I deal with leadership and political allegiance in some Yemeni communities in Israel. The chief problem is to examine the extent to which the pattern of leadership and politics in these communities is the product of circumstances in which communal leadership functions in the host society; and the extent to which these matters are affected by the social and cultural background of the Jews in Yemen. This is not merely a specific question of interpretation; it is part of a more general theoretical issue in anthropology and sociology - the relationship between "synchronic" and "diachronic" analysis. The more specific problem with which I am concerned - and it is closely related to the first - is that of the functioning of leadership and allegiance in circumstances of social change. This problem arises out of the assumption that leadership is of primary importance in processes of social change.

The People.

The Yemenis are one of the constituent "ethnic groups" in present-day Israel; they number about 120,000, or approximately 5% of the total population.
To describe them as an "ethnic group" is to beg one of the very questions which is raised in this thesis, namely: what are the conditions which affect the retention of group identity in any plural society, particularly in one composed largely of recent immigrants? The question is of special interest in Israel, where - ignoring Arab-Jewish differences - the overwhelming majority of the population recognizes a common cultural heritage. Though I believe that this question will be partly answered in later chapters, I propose to avoid it at present, and simply state that the Yemenis in Israel - or many of them - can be distinguished from other similar sections of the population, particularly where they live as local communities.

They are to be found in three main types of community, insofar as they constitute local-ethnic groups: in separate agricultural villages, usually cooperatives; in towns, living in particular quarters; in townships. Those living in agricultural cooperatives are mostly immigrants who arrived after the foundation of the State of Israel in 1948, and were settled in these villages (with their consent) by deliberate acts of policy. Those living in ethnic quarters of towns are often earlier immigrants, who came to Palestine before 1940; though some are more recent arrivals. The inhabitants of the new townships are almost entirely recent immigrants.
Yemeni immigration into Palestine started during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, and continued, intermittently, throughout the period of seventy years which ended with the mass emigration of all Jews remaining in Yemen. After the foundation of the Israeli state in 1948, about 45,000 immigrants were brought to Israel from the Yemen. The earlier migrations of Yemeni Jews, though possibly encouraged by the Jewish leaders in Palestine, were the acts of small groups finding their own way; the mass migration was largely organized by the Israeli authorities. The earlier immigrants, on arrival in Palestine, were left to seek their own places of work and residence, and form, if they so wished, their own communities; the later immigrants were settled and dealt with by a complex system of bureaucratic agencies.

Some of the communities founded by earlier Yemeni immigrants still exist - although in modified form - as quarters of towns, though they may have originally been separate villages; while the communities founded by more recent immigrants are very numerous.

Choice of Ethnic Group & Communities.

I chose to study the Yemenis in Israel for several reasons, but the most important reason was that they had come from a very different type of society. At the beginning of this century Yemen had been more isolated from
modern cultural influences than almost any other part of the world, and this was still the case less than fifteen years ago, when the last Jewish emigrations took place. Yemeni society, until recently, had altered little in its formal structure, since the fifteenth century. It had an agrarian economy - though with some commerce and money - a theocratic state, and a system of social stratification resembling, in some respects, that of feudal estates, and in others, that of castes.

The Yemeni Jews who emigrated to Israel after 1948 were presented with radically different social and cultural circumstances - with industrialization, democratic political institutions, and bureaucracy. Not only was their new social and cultural environment vastly different from their past one, but it was also very different from the one which they might have expected, on the basis of their messianic notions, to find. Those who immigrated earlier were also faced with a dramatic change in their cultural environment, though the earlier they immigrated the more likely were they to find some familiar conditions; those who came during the latter years of Ottoman suzerainty found many things familiar; and those who came later - but before the foundation of the State - found established Yemeni communities to which adjustment could be made with the minimum of difficulty. Despite the differences between
the earlier and later circumstances of immigration, all the Yemenis underwent a process of considerable social and cultural change. I was interested to discover whether, despite these changes, certain characteristics persisted; or whether the course of change was in any way affected by their social and cultural past.

When I first commenced field-work in Israel in 1953, I chose to study a Yemeni "Moshav" - a cooperative agricultural village - which had been in existence for less than three years. Some of the material collected on that community is presented in Chapter IX; however, my analysis of that material owes much to a wider experience of Yemeni "Moshavim" which I later gained.

In 1955 I was invited* to participate in a study of a Yemeni quarter of the town of Rehovoth. In this study I was responsible for most of the field-work, and was partly responsible for the planning of the research programme; however, I was almost solely responsible for the investigation of leadership and politics and for their analysis and interpretation. This study was carried out

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*The initial invitation came from the Szold Foundation in Jerusalem, which, jointly with the Department of Sociology of the Hebrew University, was responsible for carrying out this study. The research was sponsored by the Department of Community Development of the Israel Ministry of Social Welfare.
over a period of about fifteen months; however, I later
devoted more time to research on the history of this
community, and to an investigation of events which occurred
subsequent to the completion of the research programme.
The material on this community is presented in the following
six chapters.

In 1957 I carried out a final study of a Yemeni
community. On that occasion I was invited directly by
the research department of the Ministry of Social Welfare
to investigate some aspects of community relationships in
a Yemeni township. The material presented in Chapter X
is based on this research.

Though two of the studies were not chosen by me with
purely academic or scientific purposes in mind — they were
in fact commissioned by a government ministry with very
practical problems in mind — they lent themselves to a
disinterested analysis of a sociological and anthropological
nature. However, I would not like to suggest that the
three studies constitute a controlled comparison for the
purpose of rigorously testing an hypothesis, or set of
hypotheses. If this latter were to be achieved, the three
communities would have had to be similar in most respects,
differing in only one or two major features. In fact they
differ from one another in several important respects,
The first community with which I deal — and to which I devote most attention — is Shaarayim, the Yemeni quarter of Rehovoth. This community was fifty years old when studied, and consisted of about four thousand people. The second community is Zellafon, a "Moshav", which was three years old when I first visited it, and not more than five years old when I ceased work in it; it had a population of about four hundred people. The third community is Rosh Ha'Ayin, the Yemeni township, which had existed as such for about six years when my research commenced, and which had a population of about eight thousand. The first community is part of a larger one of mixed ethnic origin, while the two latter communities are distinct entities, and ethnically homogeneous.

It is clear then, that any significant differences between the communities, can hardly be attributed to any single factor. It is for this reason that these three studies are not presented as rigorous tests of hypotheses, but simply as cases which can be interpreted in the light of anthropological ideas.

The Significance of Leadership & Politics.

Leadership, though it has received some considerable attention recently in the literature of sociology and anthropology, was for some time a more neglected subject than government and politics as a whole. The reason for this is not difficult to find: anthropologists and
sociologists reacted strongly against the "great man" interpretation of social affairs; Durkheim, who long exerted a very marked influence which is only now beginning to wane, was largely responsible for the view that the form of leadership in a society was little more than a response to the leadership "needs" of that society. This "organismic" type of functionalism has served a useful purpose in reminding the social scientist of the need to relate the analysis of leadership roles to the wider social context within which leadership is exercised; but it has also served to obscure the fact that leaders (and other people) do have purposes and aims of their own, which are not simply a reflection of the so-called "needs of the social system". That these aims are often not realized, does not detract from their importance in influencing social processes. Leadership is not merely the effect of other social causes, but is itself a factor which contributes to change, as well as persistence, in social life.

Leadership is of primary importance in circumstances of social change and "acculturation", particularly where these processes are the result of immigration. In situations of social change, leaders are in a pivotal position: If they resist changes they find themselves in conflict with new leaders; if they accept changes, they invite the introduction of ambiguity and conflict into
the roles which they perform. In circumstances of immigration, leaders are usually compelled to act as agents between the immigrant and the host society, and the course of immigrant absorption is often dependent on their success in performing this difficult role. This success is itself dependent on a number of factors, of which two are of extreme importance: the first is the degree to which the immigrant leader is accorded prestige and authority by the representatives of the host society; the second is the extent to which the immigrant leader can retain or create a following, and command support in his own immigrant community. Consequently, the analysis of leadership in such circumstances must be accompanied by an analysis of those factors which influence political support, as well as those factors which affect the status of the immigrant leader, and the immigrant community, in the wider society.

**Types of Literature on Leadership & Politics.**

There are four main types of discussion in the literature of sociology, anthropology and psychology on the subjects of leadership and politics.

The first type contains general theoretical analyses of the nature of leadership, the function of elites, types of domination and authority, and the relationship between political and other aspects of social behaviour. This type of discussion is exemplified in the writings of Sigmund

The second type contains discussions of leadership or politics, or both leadership and politics, in particular types of society or in particular social conditions. This type of discussion is exemplified in the works of S.N. Eisenstadt (1954), who deals with leadership in immigrant societies, of M. Fortes and E.E. Evans-Pritchard, eds. (1940) who present cases of primitive political systems in Africa, of M. Gluckman (1955), who discusses leadership and authority in African tribal societies, of S.M. Lipset (1960), who analyses the relationship between political allegiance and social structure in several contemporary societies, of L.P. Mair (1957), who discusses the nature of chieftainship in modern Africa, of A. Richards, (ed. 1960), who presents cases of chieftainship in contemporary East African societies, and of I. Schapera (1956) who surveys the general characteristics of leadership and politics in (South African) tribal societies.

The third type of discussion contains descriptions and analyses of leadership and politics in specific societies or communities, or in specific sectors of particular societies. This type is to be found in the works of Barnes (1954), Barth (1959), Busia (1951), Epstein (1958), Fallers (1956), Frankenberg (1957),
Leach (1954) and Mills (1956).

The fourth type of discussion, which is scarcely relevant to the problems with which I am concerned, deals with leadership and following in small groups—usually task-groups, work-groups, experimental groups, or therapeutic groups in modern complex societies—and is exemplified in the works of Bell & French (1950), Borgatta, Bales & Couch (1954), Carter (1953), Gouldner (1950), Guetzkow (1951), Jaques (1951), Lewis & Lippitt (1955), Ross & Hendry (1957) and others.

The above survey is intended not to be exhaustive, but merely illustrative. Nor is it implied that I have used all of these sources in the analysis of my own material. In fact, I have found few of them of direct relevance to the problems with which I have to deal.

From Max Weber and, to a lesser extent, from Homans, Parsons & Pareto, I have obtained some general ideas which are useful for the analysis of leadership and authority; from Freud I have learnt something of the connexion between leadership and group identification. To Eisenstadt I am indebted for a general analysis of the functions of leadership in situations of immigrant absorption, and to Busia, Fallers, Gluckman and Mair, for ideas concerning leadership roles in situations of social change. To these last-mentioned authors, and to Schapera, I am indebted for
Aspects & Types of Leadership & Politics Considered.

Israel is both a democratic and bureaucratic society. This means that most people who enjoy positions of leadership and authority obtain these positions in two possible ways: they are either appointed as suitable office-holders within an administrative system; or else they are elected by supporters. Even those who lay claim to positions of authority on the basis of traditional status – i.e. status deriving from the social and cultural past – can only secure their positions by appointment or election.

I deal with two main areas of leadership – secular and religious – and with two broad functions of leadership – the practical and the symbolic.* Practical leadership is concerned with giving orders and initiating actions or interactions between others. Symbolic leadership is concerned with representing a group or collectivity which is distinguishable from similar collectivities. The two sets of categories – secular and religious; practical and symbolic – cut across one another. Religious leadership roles usually contain a marked symbolic component, but they

*These are what Parsons calls the "instrumental" and "expressive" functions of leadership. (T. Parsons: 1951, pp. 400 – 406.)
are seldom purely symbolic; while secular leadership roles almost always have some symbolic significance.

Leaders, whether they are secular or religious, require followers and supporters. This is simply a tautology, but one which should not be forgotten; the functioning of leadership is closely affected by the factors which govern allegiance and support.

**Plan of the Thesis.**

In the six chapters which follow, I deal with the nature of leadership and politics in the community of Shaarayim; I try to relate these matters to the wider social context of which they are a part, and to explain certain features in terms of the history of the community itself.

I then turn to deal with the problem of leadership and allegiance amongst the Jews in Yemen, in an attempt to understand the traditional conceptions of authority and experiences of leadership which these people bring with them from their country of origin.

Finally, I provide a brief description and analysis of leadership and politics in two recently-founded Yemeni communities.

In the last chapter I try to formulate some general statements concerning the determinants of leadership and politics amongst the Yemenis in Israel.
CHAPTER II. SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE COMMUNITY OF SHAARAYIM

Shaarayim is the name of one of the Yemeni quarters of the town of Rehovoth, which lies some 20 kilometres to the south of Tel Aviv, in Israel. It was originally a distinct political community, lying alongside of the 'Moshavah' of Rehovoth, which was then little more than a village. But gradually, the administrative network of the 'Moshavah' spread out to include all of the neighbouring villages and settlements under one municipal authority, and Shaarayim lost its official status as a separate community. Despite this, it retained certain distinct features as a sub-community, which were still evident in 1958, ten years after its final incorporation into the town of Rehovoth. From a sociological standpoint, it is still possible for certain purposes to refer to it as a 'community'.

* The term 'Moshavah', meaning 'colony' or 'settlement' is used in Israel to refer to the earliest agricultural villages, and specifically to those which were neither cooperatives or collectives.
Formerly, Shaarayim was an ethnically homogeneous community, consisting of immigrants from Yemen, and their children. But at present*, almost a third of its residents are non-Yemenis. These non-Yemeni residents, some of whom are 'Ashkenazi'** and others 'Sephardi'** Jews, are for the most part tenants of Yemeni landlords; they have been a fairly unstable element in the population of Shaarayim, treating it as a place of temporary residence. They scarcely share in most of the cultural and social interests which unite the Yemenis, and hardly recognize Yemeni leaders. I therefore treat the Yemeni population of Shaarayim as a distinct 'community', or 'sub-community', recognizing that this entails abstracting those relationships and shared customs which define the limits of group membership and identity.

*When I refer to the 'present', or make use of the present tense in writing about Shaarayim, I am referring to the period between 1955 and 1956, during which intensive research was carried out. However, the conditions described for that period were still, for the most part, to be found during 1957-1958 when further visits were made.

**'Ashkenazi' Jews are those Jews, or their descendants, who come from Central or Eastern Europe, and speak either German or Yiddish as their mother-tongue. 'Sephardi' Jews are those who claim descent from the Jewish population which was expelled from Spain in the 15th century, and speak 'Ladino' as their mother-tongue.
Shaarayim was founded* in 1907 by a group of Yemeni immigrants who came to Rehovoth to work as agricultural labourers for the Ashkenazi farmers who had settled this area in 1890. The community grew steadily as a result of continued immigration and natural increase, but remained ethnically homogeneous until the 1920's, when Ashkenazi tenants first appeared. These tenants were Ashkenazi labourers who had come to seek work in the area, and competed with the Yemenis for employment by the farmers, the earlier Ashkenazi settlers.**

* For a more complete account of the history of Shaarayim see Chapter VI.

**There were considerable differences between the two types of Ashkenazi immigrant, though they came from the same parts of Eastern Europe - Russia and Poland. The earlier Ashkenazi settlers were inspired solely by Zionism, and aspired to the private ownership of land and the employment of paid labour - Arab or Jewish; the later Ashkenazi settlers, those who came as tenants to Shaarayim, were often inspired by a joint ideology of Zionism and Socialism, and believed neither in the private ownership of land nor in the 'exploitation' of the labour of others.
The arrival of tenants in Shaarayim resulted in marked changes. The demand for accommodation gave rise to a spate of building, to land purchase and speculation, and even to a succession of disputes amongst the Yemenis over land boundaries. Till then, the majority of residents of Shaarayim earned their living by working as labourers, the women and girls supplementing the income of their menfolk by working as domestic servants for the Ashkenazi residents of the "Moshavah"; some succeeded in supplementing their earnings from the sale of the produce of their small plots. But the advent of tenants, and income from rent, brought about differences in material welfare. A small section of the community profited not only from rent but also from land speculation. These events had other consequences. Till then, the relations between Ashkenazi and Yemeni had been those between employer and employee, farmer and labourer, housewife and domestic, "superior" and "inferior":

*I use the terms "superior" and "inferior" in a sociologically descriptive sense, not in an evaluative one. I simply mean that the Yemenis were treated as inferiors, lacking knowledge of the more technically and intellectually sophisticated culture which the Ashkenazi Jews possessed.*
But after this change, the Yemenis experienced a different sort of relationship with the new Ashkenazi immigrants: that of landlord and tenant, and that of labourers competing in similar or identical occupations. The landlord-tenant relationship, as in almost all such situations, was bound to produce some degree of tension; similarly, competition between Yemeni and Ashkenazi labourers produced tension, particularly as the Yemenis were usually preferred as labourers. They were willing to accept lower wages than the Ashkenazim; they were rooted in one place, and were therefore accessible, while young Ashkenazi men, who married at a later age, moved about more; they were more subservient in their attitude to their employers, and were "unspoilt" by socialist doctrines.

During the late 1920's, a branch of the Jewish labour organization, which had been founded some years before in Palestine, was established in Shaarayim, and this, during the course of the next decade had far-reaching consequences. The conditions of many of the Yemeni workers improved; but, owing to the gradual equalization of wages in some occupations, the competition with non-Yemeni workers became sharper, and consequently, some of the Yemenis failed to enjoy the benefits of
their fellows, and were forced into more menial, irregular, and poorly-paid work. There gradually emerged a distinction between the better-off and worse-off Yemeni workers. Another effect of the rise of the labour organization was that many Yemenis became drawn into association with an organization and interest-group which cut across the bonds of locality and ethnic-grouping.

Parallel with these other trends was that towards the incorporation of Shaarayim into a wider community, and the establishment of other links between Shaarayim and the wider society of the 'Yishuv'. I refer to two main movements: the growth of a Rehovoth local authority, and later a municipality; and the growth of the local rabbinical authority. As a result of these two developments, and those mentioned previously, the administration of Shaarayim became more intertwined with that of the wider society, and its leaders came increasingly to participate in a wider bureaucratic structure.

*The term 'Yishuv' refers to the Jewish population of Palestine under the Ottoman & British Mandatory powers.*
Demographic Features of Shaarayim.*

The total population of Shaarayim is a little under 6,000, and of these, about 4,000 are Yemenis, either by origin or descent.

The distribution according to age is as follows:

- 400 children under the age of four
- 1,400 children between the ages of four and seventeen.
- 550 young people between the ages of seventeen and twenty-five
- 90 unmarried people over twenty-five.
- 750 married, widowed or divorced people between twenty-five and forty
- 800 married, widowed or divorced people between forty and sixty
- 250 people over the age of sixty.

4,240 total.

*All figures given for Shaarayim in this chapter are mere approximations, unless otherwise indicated. There are several reasons for this. No separate figures are kept by the municipality of Rehovoth for different parts of the town or for different ethnic groups, nor are these figures kept by anyone in Shaarayim itself. It was not possible to conduct a complete census during the research period, and consequently figures were arrived at by a mixture of guess-work and sampling. However, the approximations are probably close enough to reflect the actual picture, and nothing would have been gained, regarding the sociological analysis which follows, by having the exact figures. The figures were obtained in 1956.
The sex-ratio is very slightly in favour of females, but it cannot be said whether this reflects the normal birth rate, or whether other factors affect it. There is a greater tendency for young men to obtain work away from Shaarayim, than for young women. On the other hand, women marry out of the community more than men do. However, quite a number of young married men go to live in other parts of Rehovoth where there are Yemeni communities—such as 'Kfar Marmorak' or 'Shkhunath Ephraim'—and this may partly offset the greater tendency of girls to marry out entirely.

The figures on country of birth are shewn in Table I. They are divided according to age-group. The second column includes those who were born either in Shaarayim or some other part of Israel (or Palestine). The figures show that under half the residents were born in Yemen, but that of the adult population—those over the age of seventeen—about two-thirds were born in Yemen.

The figures on length of residence are given in Table II. They shew that more than a quarter of all the adults over the age of twenty-five have been resident in Shaarayim for over thirty years, and that about two-thirds have been in residence for over twenty years. More than


<table>
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<td>PALESTINE OR ISRAEL</td>
<td>YEMEN</td>
<td>TOTALS</td>
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<td>UNDER 4</td>
<td>400</td>
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<td>400</td>
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<td>4 - 17</td>
<td>1,100</td>
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<td>1,400</td>
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<td>17 - 25</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>550</td>
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<td>UNMARRIED OVER 25</td>
<td>60</td>
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<td>MARRIED OR ONCE-MARRIED OVER 60</td>
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<td>1,980</td>
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(All figures in this table are approximations only)
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<th>AGE-GROUP</th>
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<td>Under 10 Years</td>
<td>10 - 20</td>
<td>20 - 30</td>
<td>Over 30</td>
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<td>90</td>
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<td>25-40 Married, Widowed or Divorced</td>
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<td>Over 60 Married, Widowed or Divorced</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>90</td>
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<td>755</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>1,890</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*(All figures in this table are approximations only)*
90% have been in residence for over ten years. Since the number of immigrants arriving between 1940 and 1945 must have been small, it seems to follow that more than 90% of all those over the age of twenty-five have been in residence since 1940 or before.

The main conclusions to be drawn from these demographic data are as follows: of the adult population, the majority were born in Yemen, but most of these have been in residence in Shaarayim for fifteen years or more, while a very substantial part of the adult population has been in Shaarayim for thirty years or more.

**Types of Household**

The Yemenis of Shaarayim live, for the most part, in homes which they own. They have a distinct bias against living in rented apartments, though this is less evident amongst the younger married couples. From the earliest period of settlement, these people built their own houses, sometimes obtaining the help of skilled craftsmen, but often managing without them. The more modern houses, and the few large blocks of flats were built either by building contractors or with their assistance. Those who own their houses also own the leasehold on the land.

Those who do not own houses, fall into three categories: there are those, mostly younger married couples, who live in flats which they rent from Yemeni
landlords; there are those who rent rooms or separate houses on the land of Yemeni landlords; finally, there are those who are classified as 'social cases' by the welfare department, who live in shacks or wooden huts - the shacks were usually constructed by the tenants who 'squat' on land which has never been leased by the state land-holding organization, while the wooden huts have been leased for many years at a nominal rent by the state to those who are considered 'social cases'.

There are altogether 754 Yemeni households in Shaarayin. Of those, 43 are families or couples living in huts or shacks; 54 are tenants living either in flats, rooms or houses; 657 households own the property in which they live. Of this latter figure, 167 houses have tenants, for the most part non-Yemenis. (See Table III) I should make it clear that not all of the 54 Yemeni tenant-households are to be found living in the 167 houses which have tenants - some of them live in flats; further, not all of the non-Yemeni tenants live in the 167 houses mentioned above, as some of them also live in rented flats.

The composition of Yemeni households varies considerably. Five types of household are to be found. The childless household consists of one or more adults with no children - these are either newly-married couples; childless couples (of which there are very few); old couples, widows
### TABLE III

**TYPE OF HOUSEHOLD DWELLING OF YEMENIS IN SHAARAYIM**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF DWELLING</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Own House - Without Tenants</td>
<td>490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own House - With Tenants</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rented Rooms, Flat or House</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shacks, Huts etc.</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>754</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Figures in this table are exact.)
or widowers, living with or without another adult kinsmen, whose children have married and live elsewhere; unmarried men living with or without kinsmen who have no children.

The elementary family household consists of a man and wife and their un-married children, or of a widow or widower and un-married children, or of a divorced parent and children. The 'patriarchal' household consists of a couple or a widowed or divorced man, his married son and the latter's wife, his own un-married children, and his son's children, if any. The joint family household consists of two or more brothers, their wives and children and possibly their parent or parents. Finally, there is the elementary family with one or more dependents, such as the aged parent of the husband, or his un-married or widowed sister; occasionally, a kinswoman of the wife is to be found living in the house. The figures shewing the number of each type are to be found in Table IV.

The main conclusions to be drawn from these data are as follows: the overwhelming majority of Yemeni households are to be found in houses owned by a member of the household or by several members together; many of these households - between one-third and one-half - contain kinsmen other than members of the elementary family; a substantial number of Yemeni householders earn money from rent.
### TABLE IV

**TYPES OF HOUSEHOLD GROUP**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF HOUSEHOLD GROUP</th>
<th>NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS</th>
<th>NUMBER OF RESIDENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elementary Family or part Elementary family household</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>1,960*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary (or part Elementary) family household together with 1 or more dependent</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>1,580*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Childless household</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>120*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Patriarchal&quot; family household</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>310*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Family household</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>270*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>754</td>
<td>4,240*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*All these figures are approximations.*
Means of Livelihood and Occupations.

Three important economic features are to be noted in Shaarayim. A considerable proportion of the working population is employed in relatively unskilled labour; many of the workers are dependent on seasonal or irregular employment; a significant proportion of the population is dependent, partly or wholly, on welfare assistance. Whilst these features are common, and expected, in communities of recent immigrants in Israel, they are less so in more established communities. It is the presence of these features which serves to distinguish between the socio-economic status of Shaarayim as a whole, and that of the 'Moshavah' as a whole.

There are several reasons for this situation in Shaarayim. From the earliest period of settlement, the Yemeni men and their sons worked as simple agricultural labourers, while their wives and sometimes their daughters, went out to work in the homes of the Ashkenazi farmers. For a long time, the majority earned little, and what they did earn they spent on the building of houses and on giving large feasts at weddings, circumsision celebrations, and festivals. Only a small proportion managed, until recently, to spend much on the advanced education of their children, and many of the children of the earlier immigrants were forced to leave school
before acquiring the education necessary for occupational mobility. Though some of the Yemenis were finely-skilled artisans in the Yemen, they found little or no scope for the use of traditional skills in Palestine or Israel, and therefore no point in teaching them to their children.

A second reason for this situation lies in the nature of the local economy, which until recently has been largely agricultural. Citrus-growing has always been of primary importance, and out of this there have emerged the twin industries of citrus-packing and processing. The only other industry of any importance, is building. It is characteristic of the demand for labour in agriculture, citrus-packing and building, that it is subject to seasonal fluctuations or other irregularities. As a result, many workers in Shaarayim are unable to obtain regular employment throughout the year. Some are able to obtain seasonal work, in both summer and winter, often earning high wage-rates for skilled work in different occupations, but being unemployed for part of the year. Others are successful in obtaining year-round employment, often at low rates of pay owing to their lack of skills or education. But many have to rely on work which is both irregular and poorly-paid.

The material welfare of a household depends on a number of factors: the amount of work obtained by the
principal breadwinner(s) throughout the year; the type of work and rate of payment obtained; the ratio of bread-winners to dependents; the degree to which parents can command the earnings of their children. These conditions vary considerably, depending upon the composition of the household and the age-distribution and health of its adult members, and the nature of their contacts or access to avenues of employment.

The working population of Shaarayim can be divided broadly into two categories: the self-employed; and salary- or wage-earners. However, some people are in both categories, and both types are to be found in the same household.

The figures on type of employment are to be found in Table 5, which shews percentage figures derived from a sample of households. The figures refer only to the type of occupation of the main bread-winner in each household; in only a small percentage were the main bread-winners women or girls, so that sex differences are not shewn in this table.

It can be seen that 19% are self employed, 56% depend on wages or salaries, and 9% are both self-employed and wage-earning. In the remaining 16% of households, there is no active bread-winner; the members are either dependent on kinsmen and or public assistance.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FORM OF EMPLOYMENT</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Salaried or Wage-Earning</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Employed</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Employed and Salary or Wage-Earning</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The type of occupation* to be found amongst the wage-and salary-earners is shewn in Table VI. This shews that agriculture and citrus-packing alone provide work for about half of the principal bread-winners in this category.

Agricultural workers are mostly simple labourers, working for private farmers or else on state projects; but a small percentage of them have positions as supervisors or instructors.

The workers in citrus-packing are mostly younger men and women, though here I am more concerned with the men as main bread-winners, who are paid at either skilled or semi-skilled rates.

Factory-workers include all those who work in industry other than citrus-packing; this includes food-processing, cement production and one or two other enterprises in the area. They are for the most part in semi-skilled occupations, with a small number doing

* Each worker is classified according to the main source of his income; thus, the number shewn for agricultural labour, for example, includes all those who earn more from this source than from any other source during the year, regardless of whether they also earn money from citrus-packing or building or some other source when not employed in agriculture. This means that the number of those actually working in any one of these occupations at any time may be greater than the number shewn in Table VI.
### TABLE VI

**OCCUPATIONS OF SALARY AND WAGE-EARNERS.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OCCUPATION</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE ENGAGED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Labourers</td>
<td>14*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citrus-Packers etc.,</td>
<td>12*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building Workers</td>
<td>9*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Menial Workers etc.,</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factory-workers</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drivers of taxis, lorries, buses, mechanics etc.,</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical workers, civil servants, religious officials, etc.,</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>56</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*These figures refer to the percentage of those who earn the major portion of their income in this form of work, while possibly earning a substantial proportion from another source during certain seasons of the year.*
completely unskilled work, and a few occupying positions
demanding special skill, or supervision over others.

The building-workers range from totally unskilled,
semi-skilled to highly skilled, and differences in rates
of pay are graded accordingly.

Clerical and administrative workers constitute a very
small percentage of the total; a few occupy highly-paid
positions, though on the average their rates of pay are
little better than those of semi-skilled workers.

The remainder are, for the most part, totally unskilled
workers, and earn the lowest rates of pay.

A large number of these wage-earners are subject to
inconstant employment; between one-third and half of the
total, particularly those in agriculture, citrus-packing,
and building, can be certain of no more than seven or eight
months work in the year in their main occupation, and
often the period is even shorter.

The types of occupation found amongst the purely
self-employed are to be found in Table VII. The figures
show that the biggest single group are those engaged either
in producing ritual objects or in performing ritual
services; these are followed closely by petty merchants
and stall-keepers. Most of these classified as rentiers
earn a little from the letting of rooms, and are usually
older people who have ceased to work; a few, however,
own larger buildings, and are considerably richer. The
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OCCUPATION</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE ENGAGED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Makers of ritual objects, scribes, ritual slaughterers, etc.,</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small-shopkeepers, stall-keepers, etc.,</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drivers, mechanics, etc.,</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rentiers</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers, etc.,</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artisans, etc.,</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Builders, etc.,</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
drivers are amongst the most prosperous in this category; though they do not always own the vehicles which they use.

There is a third category of those who are both self-employed and wage-earning; they are usually more prosperous than their fellows. Some of them earn high seasonal wage-rates at skilled occupations, working as independent artisans out of season; others work throughout the year at a part-time occupation for a wage or salary, thus earning a small but regular income which supplements their earnings from agriculture or commerce.

Social and Economic Status.

The Yemeni population of Shaarayim can be divided roughly into three status categories.*

* The term 'status' is used to refer to a composite criterion whereby the households of the community can be ranked; this includes such indices as income-per-head in each household, style of life, mutual evaluation etc. It should be made clear that the basis of differentiation is imprecise, and was arrived at in advance of actual detailed investigation. However, subsequent investigation proved the usefulness of this method, and attested to its general appropriateness in this situation.
The more prosperous households are referred to as 'Mesudarim',* the less prosperous as 'bilti-Mesudarim'.* These two categories include all those who earn a livelihood and are independent of public assistance. The third category is referred to as 'social cases', and includes all those who are largely or wholly dependent for their livelihood on assistance of one form or another.

This classification is relative to the situation in Shaarayim, and the terms might denote very different standards elsewhere. About one-quarter of the households in Shaarayim are 'Mesudar', while over half are 'bilti-Mesudar', and the remainder are 'social cases'. (See Table VIII)

*The Hebrew term 'Mesudar' (pl. 'Mesudarim') can be translated roughly by the term 'established', but does not necessarily imply substantial wealth, particularly not in this case. The prefix 'bilti' implies the negation, so that the 'bilti-Mesudarim' are those whose standard of living etc., is lower.
### TABLE VIII (a)

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF HOUSEHOLD GROUPS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATUS</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE OF HOUSEHOLDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'Mesudar' (including &quot;elite&quot;)</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Bilti-Mesudar'</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Cases</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE VIII (b)

**STATUS AND FORM OF EMPLOYMENT OF HOUSEHOLD HEADS.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATUS</th>
<th>FORM OF EMPLOYMENT</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>TOTALS (percentages)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Salary &amp; Wage</td>
<td>Self-Employed</td>
<td>Self-Employed and wage or salary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Earners</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Mesuder' (including &quot;clite&quot;)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Bilti-Mesuder'</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS (Percentages)</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figures in this Table are precise percentages
The category known as the 'Mesudarim' includes people who are self-employed as well as some who are not, and some who earn part of their income in self-employment and part in the form of a wage or salary. The range of occupations in this category is wide, including: farmers or landowners; tradesmen or business-men - building contractors, shopkeepers, etc.; skilled artisans or labourers; clerical-workers, office-holders, overseers, foremen etc.; and drivers of taxis, lorries and buses. Whatever the nature of their employment, those in this category are either regularly-employed, or else earn at relatively higher rates during the main employment-seasons of the year. Some of the 'Mesudarim' are members of households where the ratio of bread-winners to dependents is high; but not all of them fall into this category for that reason.
The 'bilti-Mesudarim' are also either self-employed or wage-earning. This category includes petty-shopkeepers and stall-owners, semi-skilled artisans, cart-drivers, un-skilled and semi-skilled labourers, monials, and some clerical workers; and also households where the ratio of dependents to bread-winners is high.

The 'social cases' are all those households in which there is either no bread-winner, or those in which the main bread-winner earns insufficient for the minimum needs of subsistence. Some of the 'social cases' are maintained completely by the State; others are maintained partly by the State and partly by kinsmen; a small number are maintained partly by earnings and partly by kinsmen and the State. The term refers to all those who live on the very minimum of subsistence.

These three categories refer to the major distinctions in standard and style of life; but there is a fourth category, the elite, which comprises a very small percentage of the total population - about 3% or 4%. The elite are all those who are accorded special prestige in the community on the basis of wealth, learning, the possession of authority, or two or more of these qualifications taken together.

* As defined by the Ministry of Social Welfare.
The category of the elite includes leaders. Though by no means all of the elite are rich in comparison to the rest of the community, they are all 'Mesudarim'.

There are four means of attaining to the highest status in the community. There are those who are old communal leaders, often associated with particular families. There are learned men or rabbis, particularly those who have official status. There are labour organizers, political party representatives etc. Finally, there are men of considerable wealth, sometimes associated with the building trade, or else large property-owners.

Family and Kinship Ties.

It is exceedingly difficult to generalize about the nature of family and kinship structure in Shaarayim. There have been marked changes in these relationships, but there is no single pattern which has emerged as a result of the many influences which have been brought to bear on the behaviour of people towards their kinsmen. The rate of change has been unevenly spread, and the reactions to internal and external pressures have been varied, and dependent upon a number of circumstances. I shall only offer a brief outline of some of the main characteristics, insofar as these are relevant to the later discussion of leadership and political allegiance.
In order to describe the different types of Yemeni family to be found in Shaarayim, it is necessary to consider the present situation as a series of points between two extremes. At the one extreme there is the 'traditional' Yemeni family as it existed in Yemen; at the other, there is the 'modern' type of family which is to be found amongst the Ashkenazim of the 'Moshavah'. Of course, both of these types are 'ideal', in the sense that they serve only as approximations to reality; but they are nonetheless useful points with which to start, since it can truly be said that Yemeni family patterns are constantly changing, and that the move has been from the one extreme point - or somewhere near it - in the general direction of the other.

The first type I shall call the traditional patri-potestal family. In this pattern the following features are to be found: a distinct and marked separation of the roles of husband and wife, with the husband exercising the primary influence in family affairs; a marked degree of control by the father over the affairs of the children, - even grown daughters - over their education, and their choice of occupation; a tendency on the part of children to carry on the religious traditions of their parents.

This type of family is quite rare in Shaarayim, and is to be found in only 6% of the households. It is sometimes accompanied by a pattern of temporary or permanent
patrilocal residence, but not always.

This pattern is by no means identical to that which obtained in the Yemen. Wives go out to work in the present situation; whereas they would never have done so in Yemen. Sons do not always take their father's occupation, but are educated, and otherwise assisted, in obtaining some position carrying a degree of prestige—e.g., a clerical position, or teaching—or financial reward, such as a skilled trade. Daughters are sometimes given a formal education, including a formal religious education, and are encouraged and assisted in obtaining the sort of work deemed suitable for a girl—e.g., teaching in a nursery school—but are not permitted to work in factories as other Yemeni girls do.

In this type of family, the father is usually of the older generation—over fifty—and has usually immigrated within the last twenty or thirty years, but not earlier.

The second type of family I call the compromise male-dominated type. Here there is a lesser degree of submission on the part of wives and older children. Women take more interest in the affairs of the husband's work, and in the affairs of the community. They have some voice in the education of their children, though they are often too ignorant in these matters to contribute to the solution of practical problems. Sons do not necessarily shew the
same degree of religious favour as in the first type, and are often left to their own choice of occupation. The daughters may go out to work in factories or as domestic help. There is a marked degree of family cohesion as in the first type.

The father of this type of family is usually of the older generation, and often immigrated from the Yemen thirty years ago or more.

This type is much more common than the first, and is to be found in about 20% of the households. This pattern is sometimes accompanied by temporary patrilocal residence, and there are some instances of joint-family households surviving the death of the father.

This type is to be found largely, though not entirely, amongst the 'Mesudarim'.

The third type I call the **disorganized-traditional** pattern of family relations. Here the father attempts to exert some control over his wife and children, but with regard to the latter is often portly or wholly unsuccessful. Often the wife continues to work long after her children have grown up, usually as a domestic, and the family is considerably dependent upon her earnings.

Sons are often rebellious - particularly before they marry - and it is therefore difficult for the father to command a substantial portion of their earnings.
Daughters manage to attain a considerable degree of freedom from their parents, and sometimes seek occupations contrary to the wishes of their parents.

In this type, children often seek a way of life outside of the sphere of family influence – sons may go off to a collective settlement for a period, while daughters choose to do their military service rather than seek exemption; and both sons and daughters seek contacts with the wider society through youth organizations etc. – but in many cases they return home before marrying.

This pattern is to be found in about 25% of the households, and usually amongst the 'bilti-mesudarin' and 'social cases' where the father is of the older generation.

The fourth type I call the stable semi-modern family. Here there is a fairly smooth adjustment to present circumstances. The relations between husband and wife are on a more equal footing, with the latter taking more of an interest in the former's affairs. The parents – often the mother as much as, if not more than, the father – encourage what they consider to be the 'progress' of their

* Under Israeli law, girls as well as boys are liable for a period of compulsory military service. However, in the case of girls, parents of extreme orthodox religious views have the right of appeal to obtain exemption. In some cases the daughters are unwilling to accept the views of their parents, and insist on doing their service in order to escape home life and responsibilities, and to enjoy the greater 'freedom' and 'opportunity' which military life, paradoxically, offers.
children, in education, forming contacts with the wider society etc. There is less overt rebelliousness on the part of the young, as the parents are more flexible in their conceptions of children's needs and are more prepared to consider the aspirations of the young.

This type is to be found in about 20% of the households; amongst 'mesudarim' and 'bilti-mesudarim', particularly where the parents in the latter category are younger. There is usually a high degree of solidarity and mutual help in this type of family.

The fifth type I call the unstable semi-modern or unstable modern family. The main difference between this and the fourth type lies in the fact that the attempt to 'democratise' family relations is accompanied by strain; that is, conflict between husband and wife, and or, between parents and children.

This pattern is to be found in about 15% to 20% of the households, particularly where the parents are fairly young and where the husband is of a family that immigrated not more than twenty years ago. Most of these families are 'bilti-mesudarim', and some are 'social cases'.

The remainder of the households, a little over 10% of the total number, exhibit a pattern of stable modern family relations. Here, husband and wife may both work - though this is not always the case - and the wife's
earnings may be a considerable proportion of the total. But in many of these families the wife does not work for long periods - when the children are very young - but has worked, usually in industry, prior to her marriage.

The married couple are usually young, and in many cases they are quite well-off. Both husband and wife have usually enjoyed and continue to enjoy contacts with the wider society, and have similar aspirations regarding their children.

The patterns of wider kin relations in Shaarayim are as varied as those of family organization. In general, it is true to say that each individual is related, in one way or another, to a large number of other people who may live either in Shaarayim or in some other Yemeni quarter or Renovoth.

For most purposes, distant kin are of little importance, except on ritual occasions - weddings, circumcisions etc., and festivals. Close kin outside of the elementary family are sometimes of importance, both in the older and younger generations, in practical, daily affairs; e.g. a married man might obtain financial assistance from his father or brother, particularly in the form of a loan, or a man might help his kinsman to obtain work; mothers tend to assist their married daughters in practical family affairs.

There are no large corporate groups of kinsmen, or factions based on ties of kinship. Sometimes, however,
where ties of kinship coincide with those of neighbourhood, there are strong links between the members. This is usually on a bilateral rather than on a unilineal basis. In such circumstances, there is a great deal of informal gathering or meeting, and some degree of assistance or cooperation in work; e.g., a man might start some small business venture together with his close kinsmen.

Despite the general lack of importance of ties of wider kinship in economic and political affairs, their significance does emerge in one specific group or section of the community — the elite, or part of it. A number of the leaders and notables of the community are linked by ties of kinship and affinity.* However, the existence of these links between some of the leaders, does not lead to complete solidarity; on the contrary, there are important political cleavages within the community, and particularly within the group of leaders, which cut across those of kinship.

* For a more detailed analysis of this situation see Chapter III.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FAMILY TYPE</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Traditional Patripotestal</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compromise male-dominated</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disorganized traditional</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable semi-modern</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unstable semi-modern</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable modern</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figures in this table are approximations only.
Sub-Ethnic Ties.

The residents of Shaarayim - or more particularly, those of the immigrant generation - are divided into a number of sub-ethnic groups which originate in different parts of Yemen.* These groups can be divided and subdivided into larger or smaller units.

The three main groups are those of Northern Yemen - from the districts of Haidan and Saadah - those of Southern Yemen - particularly from the district of Shar-ab - and those of East-Central Yemen. There are smaller groups from other parts of Yemen, but they are not well-represented in Shaarayim. In their relations with each other, the members of each of the three main groups are clearly distinguished, but within each of the three groups other distinctions are recognized.

The first groups to immigrate were from Northern Yemen, but they were followed, not long after, by groups from Southern Yemen. The groups from Central Yemen were later arrivals. With each wave of immigration there was a tendency for new-comers to settle alongside their kinsmen or members of the same sub-ethnic group, so that for a while Shaarayim consisted of a number of neighbourhood pockets, with few ties uniting the groups

* For a detailed analysis of the structure and composition of these groups see Chapter VIII.
into a single community. There was also some tendency for marriages to take place within these groups. But it later became physically impossible for new-comers to settle in this way, and the pattern of relationships changed. In addition to this, ties were soon forged between older residents, which were not fully extended to new-comers, to the same extent. As a result, there emerged, and still exist, a number of cross-cutting ties based on kinship, sub-ethnic grouping, and length of residence.

These sub-ethnic ties are still important in ritual matters, at least amongst the older generation. But they are much weaker amongst the younger generation, and hardly exist amongst the local-born.

Where sub-ethnic grouping coincides with ties of neighbourhood, the links are strongest, and this may have important practical consequences; e.g. information regarding work may be passed on to people with whom these ties exist.

**Ritual Ties.**

Ritual ties find expression in three main forms; annual festivals; rites de passage; and prayer gatherings. The annual festivals are a regular occasion for the gathering of kith and kin, though this refers to fairly close kin, outside of the elementary family or domestic
group. Married children, of both sexes, visit their parents along with their own families, though there is a stronger tendency for them to visit the parents of the husband. But it is common for bilaterally-traced kinsmen to congregate at one home after another during the major festivals; this is more common amongst the older generation, but young people participate to some extent.

Weddings, circumcision ceremonies, and, to a lesser extent 'Bar-Mitzvah' celebrations*, are all occasions for large-scale gatherings. It is unusual, amongst the older generation for formal invitations to be issued on these occasions, as kith and kin are expected to come from far and wide, and great sums are spent on food and drink for the guests. However, amongst the younger generation, there is a growing tendency for certain guests to be invited, though no one is refused attendance, and kinsmen, however remote, are welcomed.

* The 'Bar-Mitzvah' or confirmation ceremony, which takes place at the age of thirteen, is of less importance amongst the older generation of Yemenis than amongst other Jews; however, younger parents place more importance on its celebration, and this can be taken as a sign of acculturation.
Prayer-meetings are, for some of the men* of Shaarayim, a daily affair. There are about fifty-seven small synagogues, and two large ones.

The smaller synagogues are all privately owned, and are usually attached to the house of the owner, who donates the synagogue to the community, or section of the community. As a rule, each 'Minyan'** consists of neighbours, but some men will seek out a 'Minyan' further from home, so as to be able to pray with their kinsmen, or with those of the same sub-ethnic group.

In addition to the smaller, privately-owned synagogues, there are two large public ones, which are used either by younger people who prefer to congregate in larger gatherings, or some of the older people who happen to live in the appropriate vicinity.

*Amongst the Yemenis, only men participate at prayer-meetings, and this is true even of the younger generation. However, in the larger synagogues, a separate room is set aside for women, from which they can view the men at prayer without being visible themselves.

**The term 'minyan' can be translated as 'congregation', but refers specifically to a minimum number of ten adult males whose presence is required for the recital of certain basic prayers.
The older men gather for prayers frequently and regularly; if not twice daily, at least several days a week, morning and evening. But most of the younger men attend prayers twice-weekly, on the Sabbath.

Yemeni synagogues, particularly the small ones, are not merely prayer-houses. The small group which constitutes a 'minyan', uses the synagogue for purposes of study, informal meetings, and a centre for conversation and discussion. According to Yemeni custom, most ritual duties circulate in rote amongst the members of the 'minyan'; and with respect to specific duties, this includes also young boys. As a result of these two factors, the prayer-group is a highly solidary one, particularly when it is small enough to allow of complete personal contact between all members. Consequently, matters relating to work, the community, and wider social and political affairs, are discussed; in this way opinions are circulated throughout the community. But the 'minyanim' do not have any other well-defined functions outside of the domain of ritual.

Shaarayim in Relation to the Wider Society

Up to this point it has been possible to describe the internal structure of Shaarayim with little reference to the urban and wider social milieu in which the community exists; but in order to discuss further aspects, it is
necessary to consider some features of the wider society.

1) Shaarayim as Part of the Rehovoth Municipal Area.

The community of Shaarayim enjoys the benefits of certain social services provided by the Rehovoth Municipality, and in return its members must pay local taxes to that authority; they also have electoral rights in the choice of the municipal council.

The main services provided by the municipal authority are: roads; public health; education; social welfare assistance; promotion of economic development; and recreational amenities. Not all of these are of equal relevance to my later discussion, so that I shall deal with some more fully than others.

Until Shaarayim was finally incorporated into Rehovoth, it was responsible for building its own roads. Being a relatively poor community, those provided were mostly rude sand-tracks. Until recently, the Rehovoth municipality had done little to improve on these, consequently the residents of Shaarayim have considered this as an instance of 'neglect', particularly as the 'Moshavah' is very much better provided for in this respect. However, such superior roads as there are in the 'Moshavah', were mostly built prior to the incorporation of Shaarayim and other quarters, since the municipal authority has had to devote its road budget largely to the newer parts of
the town. But this aspect of the problem is not considered by the residents of Shaarayim, who lay blame for the truly poor state of their own roads on the municipality, rather than on their own earlier poverty.

The same conditions pertain in regard to recreational amenities. These are by no means abundant in Rehovoth generally, but those that are available are concentrated in the 'Moshevah'.

Public health services are largely concerned with such matters as sanitation and garbage clearance, and these are provided equally for all parts of the town.

Education is an extremely important matter in affecting the relations between Shaarayim and the Rehovoth municipality. There are altogether seven schools in Rehovoth, which are administered by the education department of the municipality which acts as agent for the national Ministry of Education.

Five of them are primary schools, the other two secondary. Of the five primary schools, which are completely State-run, two are religious schools*, two are ordinary non-religious schools, and one is a combined primary and crafts school for girls. The two non-religious

*Almost all primary schools in Israel are now fully administered by the State; these are of two kinds, religious and secular — the former cater for the children of orthodox parents, and have a curriculum which is designed to include specifically religious instruction, in addition to the various aspects of Judaica which are taught in all schools.
primary schools are completely coeducational, whereas the religious schools avoid, insofar as it is possible, the mixing of the sexes in classes. The two secondary schools are state-subsidised only, though their curricula and standards of teaching etc., are supervised by the Ministry of Education.** One of these secondary schools is a religious school, the other not. As only a small proportion of the Yemeni children attend secondary schools, I shall be concerned mainly with the question of primary school education.

Children from Shaarayim attend all five of the primary schools. The number attending each school is shown in Table X as a percentage.

The 'Moriah' school is a religious primary school situated in Shaarayim itself. It was previously administered by the community of Shaarayim, but is now part of the Rehovoth municipal schooling system. Until recently, the school was mainly for boys, the small girls' school being situated on separate premises. While the majority of parents have always sent their sons to the 'Moriah' school, they have sent their daughters elsewhere, owing partly to the poorer facilities, but also to the lesser importance of securing for girls a religious-

* Primary school education in Israel is free and compulsory. The secondary schools are either private or state-subsidised, but in either case fees are charged, the number of scholarships being very limited.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SCHOOL</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE OF BOYS</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE OF GIRLS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'Moriah' Religious School</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Takkhemoni' Religious School</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary A (non-religious)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary B (non-religious)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
oriented education. The community of Shaarayim has always looked upon the 'Moriah' school as its own, and continues even now to do so. Apart from being a religious school, it is also an ethnic school, as there has been, and still is, an insistence on teaching certain strictly Yemeni customs. In a sense then, the 'Moriah' school, is, or has been an important means for the perpetuation of ethnic identity.

Though all primary schools in Rehovoth are open to all ethnic groups*, the number of non-Yemenis attending the 'Moriah' school is small, and of these the number of Ashkenazi children is insignificant. There are several reasons for this: the number of orthodox Ashkenazi families in Rehovoth is relatively small, and some live closer to the religious school in the 'Moshavah'; Ashkenazi parents are mostly unwilling to send their children to the 'Moriah', fearing that the level of education might be low, and that their children would be subject to "undesirable influences". Consequently, the character of the 'Moriah' school is Yemeni, though only one of the teachers - an elderly man who instructs the boys in the customary pronunciation and intonation of the scriptures -

* Parents have a choice between religious and non-religious education. Having made this, they are officially obliged to send their children to the school of the required type which is nearest to their home.
belongs to the community of Shaarayim.

The second religious school of Rehovoth - the 'Takhkemoni' school - is situated in the 'Moshavah'. As can be seen from the table, a small percentage of Yemeni boys and a larger percentage of Yemeni girls attend this school. The reasons, in the case of the boys, are as follows: some of the Yemeni families live closer to this school than to the 'Moriah'; some parents, while wishing to give their children an orthodox education, prefer to have them receive it at an 'Ashkenazi school', which they presume to be superior. In the case of girls the reasons are not quite the same; owing to the poor facilities of the 'Moriah' school for girls, parents grew accustomed to sending their daughters to school in the 'Moshavah'; when the facilities improved and the boys' and girls' schools in Shaarayim were combined, some parents continued to prefer the 'Takhkemoni' school for their daughters.

The whole question of religious education has become a political issue in Rehovoth. This issue was sparked off in 1954 when Ashkenazi families, who had come to Israel after 1948 from Eastern Europe, refused to register their children at the 'Moriah' school, despite their legal obligation to do so. The Yemenis of Shaarayim, and elsewhere in Rehovoth, reacted very strongly to this "clear case of discrimination and prejudice". In an
attempt to solve the problem, the Rehovoth municipality proposed amalgamating the two schools - 'Moriah' and 'Takhkemoni' - and to use the former for the first four grades of primary school, and the latter for the last four grades. This, and similar solutions, met with violent opposition from the community of Shaarayim, or from the majority of its leaders. This shews the extent to which the 'Moriah' school has come to symbolize the expression of group identity in Shaarayim."

A significant proportion of the parents in Shaarayim choose to send their children to non-religious schools, of which there are two in Rehovoth, both in or near the 'Moshavah'. In the case of boys, the reason for this is that their parents wish to have them educated in the most "progressive" manner possible; they hope also, that by sending them to these schools, their sons will cease to be ethnically different. Many of the parents who adopt such a view are young, and some of them are ardent supporters of the labour movement. In the case of girls the reason need not be quite the same: it is not considered as important for girls to receive a religious education, and in any case there is a lingering doubt as to whether

* This whole matter is discussed more fully in Chapter IV
the 'Moriah' school is suitable for girls. In addition, some parents want their daughters to learn home crafts etc., and there happens to be a school which caters for this requirement.

The question of social welfare assistance is another major source of contention between Shaarayim and the 'Moshavah'. Owing to a number of circumstances, the percentage of 'social cases' in Shaarayim, as in most other Yemeni communities in Israel, is relatively high. For a long time prior to the incorporation of Shaarayim in Rehovoth, these 'cases' had been the charges of the social welfare department of Rehovoth, as the Yemeni community could or would do little, if anything, for them; the traditional Yemeni method of assisting the needy was inadequate to the task of dealing with such numbers, and the old pattern of kinship responsibility had ceased to function. Since 1948, the community has become increasingly dependent on the department of social welfare for the solution of various problems. These include assistance for the poor and needy, the management of delinquent and sub-normal children, the "placing" of children of broken families, the provision of school meals, clothing etc., Owing partly to the excessive burden placed on social workers, the slender budget with which the department must manage, and the suspicious and hostile attitude displayed by some social workers
to applicants for assistance, (and vice versa), there has emerged a marked tension between wide sections of the community of Shaarayim and the department of social welfare. Not only is this to be found amongst those seeking assistance, but also amongst those who know of their plight, and who look upon the welfare department as responsible for the solution of these many problems. This leads to accusations of discrimination and prejudice amongst Yemenis.

In an attempt to solve some of these problems, the Rehovoth municipality set up a special committee in 1956; the chairman appointed to this committee is a Yemeni, one of the leaders of Shaarayim. This has had consequences which will be dealt with later.*

The promotion of economic development in Rehovoth is one of the principal tasks of the municipality. This can only be done by offering inducements in the form of low local taxes to industrialists, or by negotiating with the 'Histadruth' - the national labour federation - which owns a considerable proportion of all industry in Israel. The municipality does also engage in public works, but possesses a very limited budget; Rehovoth is not classed as an immigrant town by the Israeli Treasury, and for

* In Chapters III and IV.
this reason receives a smaller grant than some of the
new towns; it is therefore largely dependent on its own
local taxes. The whole problem of economic development
affects the welfare of the Yemenis directly, as so many
of them are dependent on seasonal demands for labour.

The question of local rates and taxes is of paramount
importance in affecting the relations between Shaarayim
and Rehovoth. As is usual in Israel and other countries,
these are levied on property and not on income. Properties
are graded according to their size, and the quality of the
neighbourhood. Despite the fact that Shaarayim, as a
neighbourhood, is graded lower than the 'Moshavah' and
some other parts of Rehovoth, the system of tax levy is
strongly resented by the overwhelming majority of the
community. The reasons for this resentment are plain
to see. The first and most important reason lies in the
fact that real estate is one of the few forms of investment
favoured by Yemenis; great sacrifices are made to build
houses and to add rooms to these from year to year, and
a number of families earn rent from these investments.
This applies to rich and poor alike. The second reason
is that many of the residents of Shaarayim resent paying
taxes to the Rehovoth municipality, which is accused of
"exploiting" the community for the benefit of the 'Moshavah';
they adopt the view that Shaarayim was taken over just for
this purpose. The taxes levied by the Rehovoth municipality are very much higher than those which were previously levied by the local Shaarayim committee. In voicing this objection, no allowance is made for the fact that the community of Shaarayim previously enjoyed many services provided by Rehovoth long before any taxes were paid at all; and the services now provided, however deficient they may be, are more extensive than any previously provided by the community for its members. However, the fact remains that Shaarayim is almost unanimous in its objection to the rates charged, and this provides an important political weapon for some of the leaders of the community.

Before it became part of the new municipality of Rehovoth, Shaarayim was for several years part of the Rehovoth local council area. During this period it obtained direct representation on the local council as a participating community. But once the municipality was formed, this right had to be foregone. The reason for this lies in the Israeli electoral system, which, for both national and municipal elections, is based on pure proportional representation of political party lists. The adult residents of Shaarayim are entitled to exercise their vote in choosing a municipal council, but they can
not vote as an electoral ward. Its members can simply vote for one or other of the contending parties. The parties can return a number of members to the municipal council in direct proportion to the number of votes received. There are fifteen members of the municipal council.

Because of the large number of parties in Israel, it seldom occurs that any one obtains an absolute majority in the Rehovoth council. For this reason, coalitions are necessary. In principle, it is possible for all council members to join the coalition and to administer the affairs of the town jointly, but this seldom occurs. In Rehovoth, the governing coalition consists of the parties of the left — those which are associated with the national labour movement.

2) Shaarayim and Political Parties*

Political parties appeared in Shaarayim some time before it became part of the wider administrative unit; however, it was only after this that they assumed much importance in local affairs.

The first national party to obtain any following was the Israel Labour Party — 'Mapai'. This party

* Political parties operate on both a local and national level; I am concerned here solely with the former.
has a local branch-headquarters and committee in Shaarayim, and is known as 'Mapai-Shaarayim'. The latter, while strictly a branch of the national party, has its own electoral list for local elections, and is quite distinct, for electoral purposes, from 'Mapai', which has its own list and its own headquarters and committee in Rehovoth. 'Mapai-Shaarayim' is affiliated to the labour movement, and receives its electoral and other expenses from 'Mapai' headquarters. Furthermore, its electoral list has to be approved by the Rehovoth 'Mapai' committee, and any representatives returned to the municipal council are expected, on pain of financial and other sanctions, to support the parent party on the council, and to join it in a coalition.

The second national party to obtain following in Shaarayim was 'Poel HaMizrahi', which is the labour faction of the national religious party, 'Mizrahi'. This party has no local branch or affiliated sub-party in Shaarayim, but previously did command considerable support amongst that community, as the Yemenis were for a long time the only religious orthodox section of the Rehovoth community. The party has a number of official members and some electoral support in the community. Amongst the members are the two Yemeni officials of the local rabbinical authority; the latter are obliged to become
members of one or other of the four main religious parties which are associated with the national and local rabbinical authority in Israel.

Another party which soon gained a following in Shaarayim after the formation of the State, was 'Heruth' - the extreme right-wing party which was formed out of the terrorist organization 'Irgun Zvei Leumi' which flourished during the latter period of the British Mandate in Palestine. This party has no local branch in Shaarayim, but its party-list for local elections usually included names of Shaarayim Yemenis.

Other national parties which have some following in Shaarayim, are, in order of importance: 'General Zionist' and 'General Zionist Sephardi' parties; 'Mapam' and 'Ahduth Avodah'; and 'Progressives'. The 'General Zionist' party is the moderate right-wing party in Israel, representing the interests of small and large property-owners, commerce, private farmers etc.; the 'General Zionist Sephardi' party is an off-shoot of the parent body, which aims to represent the interests of Oriental and Sephardi Jews. 'Mapam' and 'Ahduth Avodah' are the two left-wing parties which broke away from 'Mapai' and later split in two. The 'Progressive' party is a 'liberal' party. None of these parties has much following in Shaarayim in local elections; nor does any one of them
have a local party headquarters in the community. Some of them have full party members in Shaarayim, and those are active in securing followers - but to little effect.

The most important party in Shaarayim is 'Lemaan Shaarayim' - which means, literally 'on behalf of Shaarayim'. This party was originally formed, just prior to the first elections to the Rehovoth municipal council, in 1948, in order to secure for the community of Shaarayim continued representation in the local government of Rehovoth. At that time there were two factions in the party - those who espoused primary loyalty to the local-ethnic community, as a group; and those who proposed a wider support of the labour movement. The first faction saw Shaarayim as a distinct community with separate interests; the second saw the Yemenis of Shaarayim as workers, owing loyalty to the working-class movement. Each faction stressed a different aspect of the real situation. In 1951, when the next elections were held, these two factions split - one group called itself 'Shaarayim' and the other used the name 'Poelei Shaarayim', the 'workers of Shaarayim'. By 1955 the labour faction had become officially incorporated into 'Mapai', and the 'pure' local ethnic faction retained its name and political aims - the representation of Shaarayim as a local-ethnic entity.

Although 'Lemaan Shaarayim' is not a national party -
in fact its leaders do not refer to it as a party at all, asserting that its 'aims and interests are above party politics' - it is linked with a national political party, known as 'Hitachdut HaTemanim' - 'The Union of Yemenis'. The latter organization started out simply as a body to represent the interests of Yemenis in Palestine, and later became a political party in national elections in Israel. The head of 'Hitachdut HaTemanim' is an affine of one of the leaders of 'Lemaan Shaarayim'.

In addition to this link, there is another which ties 'Lemaan Shaarayim' to party politics. One of the leaders of 'Lemaan Shaarayim' is associated with the leaders of the Rehovoth branch of the 'General Zionist' party, from which 'Lemaan Shaarayim' obtains financial support in local elections.

3) Religious Organization in Rehovoth.

The major functions performed by the rabbinical authority in Israel are the licensing of marriages and the granting of divorces, neither of which can be performed by civil courts. In each district there is a rabbinical court which deals with these matters. Marriages can be performed by any qualified employee of the rabbinical authority; but divorce can be granted only by a court of three 'dayanim' - i.e. rabbinical judges - who are also official employees of the rabbinate.
The administration of recognized synagogues—i.e., those which are supervised by the Ministry of Religious Affairs in conjunction with the rabbinate—is in the hands of a district committee.

Rehovoth has both a rabbinical authority—and therefore a religious court—and a committee for religious affairs. The court consists of three 'dayanim', one of whom is the rabbi for Shaarayim, and three other employees, one of whom is from Shaarayim. Altogether three Yemenis—one from Karmorak—are employed by the court.

The Yemenis are represented on the committee for religious affairs by the same three people.

One of the conditions for employment by the rabbinate is that all employees, at whatever level, must be members of one or other of the religious parties, the more powerful one being 'Mizrahi' with its workers' faction 'Poel HaMizrahi.'

Apart from the legal duties of the court, the latter is responsible for the supervision of 'Kashruth'—the observation of the dietary laws of the Mosaic code; i.e., the court grants licences to butchers and ritual slaughterers who are then entitled to use the 'Kasher' seal.

4) Shaarayim and Labour Organization.

There are two main aspects of labour organization: the allocation of work; and the welfare of the labourers.
Work can be obtained either personally or through the labour exchanges of the Ministry of Labour. As many of the residents of Shaarayim are in seasonal and irregular employment, they are dependent upon the labour exchanges in Rehovoth. Those who work in largely unskilled occupations, and obtain occasional work, must approach the labour exchange directly. Those who work in more skilled occupations, particularly for extended periods, obtain their work through labour organizers, who receive a quota from the labour exchange; the latter conditions apply particularly to citrus-packing and building.

Labour welfare is the concern of the Israel Federation of Labour, known as 'Histadruth Poelei Eretz Yisrael', or more commonly as the 'Histadruth'. In every district there is a local workers' council which is a district administrative branch of the 'Histadruth'. The Workers' Council of Rehovoth is elected every four years by all adult members of the 'Histadruth'.

The Workers' Council is concerned with conditions of employment, and in addition with providing certain medical, educational, 'cultural' and recreational facilities for members of the 'Histadruth'. About 89% of all male workers in Rehovoth belong to the 'Histadruth' or to the religious workers' organization which is affiliated to the 'Histadruth'. The percentage in Shaarayim is a little lower than that.
for the whole of Rehovoth, as there are some men who have worked for the same employers for years, and see no advantage in paying dues to the labour organization. But the majority are unable to obtain work at all if they do not belong to the 'Histadruth' or the religious workers' organization.

One of the principal attractions of the workers' organization, for its members, lies in the provision of medical services through the 'Kupath Holim' - Workers' Sick Fund. There are clinics in several parts of Rehovoth, including one in Shaarayim. One of the leaders of Shaarayim is a clerical-administrative employee of the 'Kupath Holim'.

The official headquarters of the workers' council of Rehovoth is situated in the 'Moshavah'. Several members of the Shaarayim community are represented on the council, and several of them are employed by the council in an administrative capacity. There are special cultural and educational facilities provided for the Yemeni (and other Oriental) workers in Rehovoth, and a resident of Shaarayim is responsible for these. Shaarayim has its own unofficial workers' committee, consisting of all those communal leaders who have some official position in the workers' organization.

5) **Shaarayim in Relation to other Yemeni communities.**

Shaarayim is one of three Yemeni quarters in Rehovoth;
the other two are 'Gfar Marmorak' and 'Shkhunath Ephraim'.
Of the three, Shaarayin is the oldest by far, and the
largest. Its boundaries were once quite distinct from
those of 'Marmorak'; but now the two merge into one
another, and the physical division between them is
arbitrarily drawn by the residents of the two places.

For some purposes, the whole Yemeni population of
Rehovoth can be considered as a unity, as certain common
interests affect them. The leaders of Shaarayim, in some
matters claim to represent the interests of all Yemenis
in Rehovoth. Furthermore, there are ties of kinship
and sub-ethnic grouping which cut across the vague physical
boundaries which separate the communities.

Despite these factors, it is still possible to
delineate a local-ethnic identity which is shared by the
residents of Shaarayim, and a separate one for the community
of Marmorak. The existence of a number of "Multiplex"
ties which are found in Shaarayim, the presence of a
local leadership, and the recognition of a persisting
community, whose origin precedes that of all others except
the old 'Noshavah', all contribute to the maintenance,
however transient, of a separate community.

There are numerous ties which link residents of
Shaarayim with Yemenis outside of Rehovoth - ties of
kinship, political association, sub-ethnic grouping etc. —
but few of these apply to large sections of the community in any one relationship.

6) Ethnic Relationships in Rehovoth.

One of the most significant aspects of the relationship between Shaarayim and the rest of Rehovoth is the ethnic one.

The total Yemeni population of Rehovoth is about 6,500, of whom just over 4,200 live in Shaarayim - of the remaining 2,300, the majority live in Cfar Harmorak which lies alongside Shaarayim, and a small number in Shkhunath Ephrayim, which borders on Harmorak. The total population of Rehovoth is about 25,000, of whom about 16,000 are Ashkenazim, and about 2,500 are Sephardim, most of whom are fairly recent immigrants. Of the 16,000 Ashkenazim, approximately 4,000 are recent immigrants or the children of recent immigrants; while the remainder are established residents. The latter are of two types: the families of early residents - i.e., those who came before 1920; and those who came after 1920.

Thus, the Yemenis of Rehovoth constitute a significant proportion of the total population - about one-quarter. In some respects the relationships between Yemenis and Ashkenazim apply to all Yemenis in Rehovoth, not only those of Shaarayim; in other respects the relationship is more specific. I shall be concerned with four sets
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ETHNIC GROUP</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ashkenazi</td>
<td>16,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemenis</td>
<td>6,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Oriental and Sephardi groups</td>
<td>2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(All figures in this table are gross approximations only.)
TABLE XI (b)

DISTRIBUTION OF YEMENIS IN REHOVOTH.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QUARTER</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SHAARAYIM</td>
<td>4,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARORAK, SIKHUNATH EPHRAIM &amp; OTHERS</td>
<td>2,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>6,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(All figures in this Table are gross approximations only).
of relationships: between Yemenis of Shaarayim and the older families of the 'Moshavah'; between Yemenis of Shaarayim and the Ashkenazim whose residence dates from 1920 or later, and who are now to be found in the 'Moshavah' and neighbouring parts of Rehovoth; between Yemenis of Shaarayim and the most recent immigrants from Europe — those living in a housing estate for the orthodox; between Yemenis of Shaarayim and Ashkenazi residents of Shaarayim.

The relationship between Yemenis and the old Ashkenazi residents varies considerably; at one extreme relations are friendly, though marked by a strong attitude of patronization on the part of the Ashkenazim, for whom the Yemenis and their womenfolk have worked in the past; at the other extreme, the Yemenis express bitterness and resentment at having been "exploited" and treated as "no better than Arab labourers". The attitude of most Yemenis lies somewhere between these two points, and is marked by ambivalence. On the other hand the Yemenis look upon the Ashkenazim as cultural and social 'superiors' who take a personal interest in them; this is particularly evident where a whole Yemeni family has at one time been employed by an Ashkenazi family. But coupled with this, there is often a feeling of resentment; many Yemenis will describe the friendly relations which exist between
themselves and a particular Ashkenazi family, but will complain that "other Yemenis were exploited and treated without respect, as 'black labourers'." On the whole, Yemenis who have become supporters of the labour movement tend to express the view that they were exploited as cheap labourers.

The relationship between Yemenis and the later Ashkenazi arrivals — those who came after 1920 — is also complex. Many of these Ashkenazim have now become well-established either as farmers, as clerical and administrative officials of various levels, as politicians, and in professions etc. While they also tended to treat the Yemenis as 'inferiors,' this attitude was not often softened by personal or family contact, and patronization. However, it was due to them that many of the Yemenis were organized in the labour movement, and were able to improve their economic status. Those Yemenis who have not benefited as much as others in this way, and those who have improved themselves as men of property, resent this section of the Ashkenazi community. Furthermore, as it is this section which is largely in control of civic administration, it can be blamed for the so-called "neglect of haareyin" practised by the municipality.

The focus of widespread resentment and hostility are the recent Ashkenazi immigrants who live on the new
housing estate established by 'Poel HaMizrahi'*, the political party of the devoutly orthodox.

These Ashkenazim also tend to treat the Yemenis as cultural and social inferiors. As recent immigrants, with an insecure status in the society, their assumption of superiority is coupled with a degree of hostility; they refer to the Yemenis as 'blacks' and to their rabbis as 'black rabbi'. They question the ritual qualifications of Yemenis - of, for example, their ritual slaughterers - and the acceptability of their religious practices.

They also object to sending their children to the religious school in Shaarayin. Most of the Yemenis return in the same coin, and express strong feelings of hostility against these Ashkenazim. This emerges most clearly in the case of some of the Yemeni leaders.

*Political parties in Israel perform many functions, one of them being the provision of housing: the party arranges for loans which can be paid back over a long period at sub-economic interest rates. This is one way of attracting followers; it is particularly important in the case of orthodox people, who prefer to live together for many reasons.
The relationship between Yemeni and Ashkenazi residents of Shaarayim itself, is fairly characteristic of landlord-tenant relationships elsewhere. Where quarrels occur, they often lead to ethnic insults - in this practice the Yemenis are no less prone than their tenants and neighbours - but they do not seem to occur any more frequently than those between Yemeni neighbours or Yemeni landlords and tenants. It may be, that Yemenis "displace" some of the hostility felt towards Ashkenazi tenants, on to other Ashkenazim in Rehovoth; but on the whole, they have less reason on realistic grounds, to organize their opposition to them.

In general, the Yemenis find themselves relegated to a lower status than that of the Ashkenazim in Rehovoth, and this has the effect of uniting them in relation to the wider community and the wider society.

Apart from the factors already mentioned, there does not seem to be much real basis for Yemeni allegations of discrimination, as opposed to prejudice. It is undoubtedly true that some Yemenis fail to obtain work at the labour exchange because an Ashkenazi official has shewn preference for some applicant who speaks his own language; but the reverse also holds true. There are some jobs which are allocated by Yemenis.
There are several associations and committees which are purely internal to Shaarayim. Some of these are official - their status is formally recognized both within the community and in the wider society - others unofficial. The official ones are: the 'Kupath Milwe' Bank; the Shaarayim Burial Association; the Moriah School Committee; 'Maccabee-Shaarayim' and 'Pool-Shaarayim' sports associations; 'Lenaan Shaarayim' Political association; 'Mapai-Shaarayim' political association. The unofficial bodies are: Shaarayim 'Municipal' Committee; and the Shaarayim Workers' Association.

The 'Kupath Milwe Bank' was initially established in 1924, the aim being to assist Yemenis in the purchase of land and the building of houses, and to encourage saving. The principal clients of the bank are still Yemenis, though not all are from Shaarayim, but the bank does occasionally provide loans for members of other ethnic groups. The amounts provided are small, seldom rising above the sum of two hundred Israel pounds.

This so-called bank is not a bank in the full sense of the term - it has no facilities for lending money far beyond its liquid assets - but is associated with a parent bank in Rehovoth.
The bank has a committee of five which administers its affairs; four members are Yemenis of Shaarayim, the fifth being an Ashkenazi of the Rehovoth bank. It has only two employees—a full-time clerk and teller, who is a Yemeni of Shaarayim; and a part-time cashier-secretary-manager, who is one of the Shaarayim notables.

The Shaarayim Burial Association is a survival from the time when the community was a separate entity. Burial in Rehovoth is administered by the town Burial Association, but Shaarayim has been permitted by the Rabbinical authority to maintain its own association. The association has a committee of three, who are notables of Shaarayim, and a number of voluntary grave-diggers and burial officials; expenses of burial are of course borne by the family of the deceased. In the event that no funds are available to the family or widow etc., the amount necessary is provided by the committee from a special fund; this latter comes from donations made by the families of deceased.

The Shaarayim School Committee is in part a survival of the one which administered the affairs of the school when it was subject to the local authority of Shaarayim; but it is also in part a parents-teacher committee, such as exist in many Israeli schools, particularly those in small towns. The committee is therefore a mixed one, since some of its members are no longer parents of present pupils.
The committee is concerned with such matters as
school facilities, curricula - in particular with the
teaching of traditional subjects - the mixing of sexes
in classes, school meals etc.. Of late, the committee
has been more concerned with the survival of the 'Moriah'
school, and with the various municipal suggestions for
amalgamation of religious primary schools in Rehovoth.

The committee numbers about twelve people, (including
two women, whose attendance at meetings is not encouraged
by the men). One of the members is the school principal,
who is himself a Palestine-born Oriental Jew, and who
lives in Shaarayim.

The two sports associations in Shaarayim are in fact
foot-ball clubs, which compete in national competitions.
This is one of the very few activities in which Yemenis
of Rehovoth - and Shaarayim in particular - excel.

There are two youth clubs in Shaarayim. One is a
branch of 'Noar Oved' a national youth association which
is linked to the 'Histadruth'. It has very few members -
about twenty boys and girls between the ages of 13 and 17 -
and is led by a young Yemeni of Shaarayim. The second
is a religious youth club and has rather more members
than the first, all of whom are boys who are engaged in
religious studies.
The political party 'Labor Shaaravim' has a membership of about 35 men, and a committee of 5 men.

The party as a whole meets infrequently and at irregular intervals to discuss matters concerning its budget and its policy in municipal affairs. It holds meetings at election times to formulate and expound its policy, to discuss and order its electoral list. In principle, the list is supposed to consist of the names of those nominated by the party, the order being fixed by general consent.

As a rule, members of the committee of the party are most likely to secure the highest positions on the party list; they are also the principal influence in determining the nature of party policy. Finally, committee members usually contribute the most to party funds.

The committee is, in principle, elected by the party as a whole; in fact, the same people secure the highest positions in the party year after year, as there are few other contenders.

* The order of names on the party list is of major importance, as this can not be altered once it has been submitted to the local electoral authority. Once the order has been fixed it determines the priority which members have in taking places allotted to the party on the basis of the proportion of the total vote which it obtains.
The political party 'Kapai–Shaarayim' has 54 members including 9 women—all of whom are ipso facto members of 'Kapai'. There is a local committee of 3 members.

The members of the party meet at frequent, but irregular interval during the year. As a rule the meetings are called for educational or 'cultural' purposes—either a lecture is given or a film shown. But, less frequently, meetings are held to discuss political matters, such as municipal policy, or electoral preparations.

The party elects a list of names from its members, to be submitted for local elections. The ordering of the list is usually worked out jointly by the party-committee and the committee of 'Kapai' in Rehovoth.

Since party members are automatically members of 'Kapai' some of them attend 'Kapai' meetings also. But in fact, the educational and 'cultural' facilities offered to 'Kapai–Shaarayim' are more numerous than those offered to 'Kapai' itself. 'Kapai–Shaarayim has a small hall for meetings, which in fact the local workers' club, also used by the youth club and by 'Poel Shaarayim', the local workers' football-club.

The Shaarayim Municipal Committee is a purely unofficial body, since there is no Shaarayim municipality; in fact there never was a recognized Shaarayim municipality, but simply a local committee. This so-called municipal committee consists of a few men who wish to continue to
meet as a local committee, to discuss local affairs, and to make recommendations for political action. The members of the committee are mostly members of 'Lemaan Shaarayim', and are drawn from several other committees. However, it is not elected, nor is its existence widely recognized. None of the supporters of the labour movement are members of this committee; nor do they recognize its existence, except as a possible target for sarcasm.

It is rather difficult to state the number of its members, as this seems to vary between 4 and 10. Its meetings are held sporadically and infrequently.

The Shaarayim Workers' Committee does not pretend to official status, though its existence is not discouraged by the workers' Council of Rehovoth. The committee exists in order to represent the interests of Yemeni workers, regardless of their political affiliation or allegiance. The committee is drawn from supporters of 'Hapai-Shaarayim', the religious workers' party, and the left-wing labour parties. The committee is not elected, but consists of those who claim to represent the interests of the three groups. The committee has about 10 members, of whom 1 is a woman.

The committee meets frequently, but at irregular intervals. Meetings are not really closed to committee-
members, and are sometimes attended by ordinary supporters of one or other of the workers' parties.

The committee meets to discuss matters concerning Yemenis workers — the improvement of methods of labour-allocation, allotment of overtime, etc.

**Summary and Conclusions.**

Shaarayim is a community only insofar as there is a sense of social identity; it is neither physically nor politically distinct.

A sense of community rests on the basis of established local residence and ethnic unity, despite the presence of non-Yemenis in the present quarter of Shaarayim.

However, this sense of community is not an expression of strong internal bonds unifying the Yemenis of Shaarayim, but is largely a function of the relationship between Shaarayim and the wider society.

In fact, the community is divided internally by ties based on kinship, sub-ethnic grouping, neighbourhood, length of residence, age-group; and distinct social and economic interests, and political allegiances. Over-riding these divisions, at least to some extent, is the common element of opposition of interests to the wider society. The focus of this opposition varies from one section of the community to another, though in some cases there is a high degree of consensus. Of particular
importance in mobilising this opposition are the factors of social and economic status in relation to the wider society, local taxation and its connection with property-ownership, and the existence of alleged existence of ethnic prejudice and discrimination.

Insofar as prejudice and discrimination are alleged, this attests to the existence of social distance and separation to a certain extent.

For the most part, the administration of the affairs of Shaarayim, emanates from the wider bureaucratic organization. However, several factors combine to maintain a communal leadership: the existence of distinct interests within the wider framework of administration; the existence of internal associations; and the persistence of some degree of communal identity.

There are two main social orientations associated with leadership: the absorption of Shaarayim, at all levels, into the wider society; and the maintenance of communal distinctness. Between these two extremes lie a number of possible positions which are adopted by different leaders, or types of leader, in different situations. The positions adopted by leaders are dependent partly on their interests and outlook as affected by their relations in the wider society, and partly on the interests and outlook of their followers within the community. These
are the main problems to be dealt with in the following chapters.
CHAPTER III. LEADERSHIP ROLES AND PERSONALITIES.

It is usually considered desirable, in sociological analysis, to distinguish clearly between social roles and the particular incumbents of those roles. This can scarcely be avoided when large numbers of people are being considered, but is nonetheless deemed necessary for small numbers - and there are always a smaller number of leadership roles than most other social roles. The reason for making this separation derives from the theoretical assumption that the role itself - divorced from the personality of a particular incumbent - has some functional significance in relation to other social roles. This does not mean that personalities as such are ignored. It is recognized on the one hand, that certain social roles either demand or encourage the expression of certain personal characteristics; and on the other hand, that individuals interpret their social roles in idiosyncratic ways - at least within certain limits. But even where this recognition does occur, the emphasis is placed on role analysis, and this latter is held to precede, and be quite separable from, the consideration of personalities.

In the case of Shaarayim, it is difficult to follow this sociological precedent. It is not as if there are a certain number of leadership roles which must be filled by members of the community, and which are prescribed for them
by specific rules of succession or open competition. The situation, as outlined in the previous chapter, is rather different; it is rather that members of the community are eligible for the performance of certain leadership roles, and that they attain leadership status by mobilizing or enjoying support from within the community. These leadership roles are, for the most part, contained within a bureaucratic system which encompasses a social field wider than that of the community of Shaarayim. Owing to the social situation—and this includes the definition of the situation as perceived by members of the community—leadership roles are seen as related to the community. The performance of these particular roles can not be separated from the values, attitudes and intentions of individual leaders, since these are part of the roles, though they are not enduring qualities of these roles.

The leadership roles considered here, derive from three broad areas of social structure: there are roles which derive from nation-wide bureaucratic organizations and political parties; there are roles which derive from municipal administration; and finally, there are roles which are specific to Shaarayim itself. In all cases, the roles are exercised within a local context—either within the wider community of Rehovoth, or the narrower community of Shaarayim. Those deriving from the first
two sectors of the society are official, while some of those deriving from the third sector are unofficial. Official roles are those which are sanctioned by laws or rules recognized in the wider society.

Leadership Roles Deriving from Nation-Wide Bureaucratic Organizations and Political Parties.

There are 3 types of role in this category: labour-leadership; religious leadership; and political-party-leadership.

Labour Leadership.

These leaders derive their status from the power and authority of the 'Histadruth'. The following roles are found: membership of the Rehovoth Workers' Council; labour organizer; educational agent.

The Rehovoth Workers' Council, which is elected every four years by all adult members of the 'Histadruth' in the town, has eleven members, of whom three are Shaarayim Yemenis – Avraham Yerimi, Saadiah Cohen and Hezkiyahu Nadhalah. Previous members of the council were Pinhas Kaparah, and Naftali Gedassi, amongst others.

The members of the council are concerned with the administration of labour affairs in the local area: i.e., with questions of employment and employment conditions, the provision of health and other welfare services, and cultural and educational facilities.
The labour organizer, is concerned with the allocation of labour in the local citrus-packing industry, where there is a considerable seasonal demand for labour. Since many men and women in Shaarayim are dependent on this work, the labour organizer, Avraham Yerimi, exercises a considerable degree of power.

The educational agent, Pinhas Kaparah, is concerned with the provision of special educational and cultural services for the Yemenis of Rehovoth, and in particular for those of Shaarayim, on behalf of the labour organization.

Both the labour organizer and educational agent are nominated by the workers' council, and paid salaries for their duties, the former receiving full-time, the latter only part-time remuneration.

Religious Leadership.

There are two main offices held by members of the Shaarayim community: that of official rabbi, held by Rav Meir Mizrahi; that of member of the Rehovoth Religious Council, held by both Meir Mizrahi and Yosef Meshulam.

The rabbi, as a member of the local rabbinical court, can perform marriages and sit on a court of three 'Dayanim', to grant divorce or 'Halizah'. (i.e., exemption from leviratic obligation.) He also ministers to the religious needs of his particular community - Shaarayim - by giving counsel, making official religious announcements on behalf
Members of the Rehovoth religious council are concerned with the administration of religious education and the provision of facilities for ritual activity, as well as the supervision of ritual slaughtering etc., which latter requires the official licence of the rabbinate.

Political Party Leadership.

The two most important political parties in Shaarayim are not themselves nationwide organizations (though they are linked with them) and will therefore be considered later. Here I am concerned alone with party leadership which operates to represent external bodies. The most important parties in this category are 'Poel HaMizrahi', the General Zionist and General Zionist Sephardi Parties, 'Heruth', and 'Ahduth Avoda'.

Shaarayim is represented on the Rehovoth committee of 'Poel HaMizrahi' by Yosef Meshulam, on that of 'Heruth' by Shalom Madhalah and Miriam Mizrahi, and on the other parties by young men who are otherwise not prominent in the affairs of local leadership and politics.

These party representatives are concerned with winning allegiance from amongst the members of the community. They also negotiate certain arrangements whereby party supporters obtain certain privileges in the form of work, loans for housing etc.
Leadership Roles Deriving from Municipal Administration.

There are two offices to be considered here: member of the Rehovoth Municipal Council; and member of a special committee in a local government department.

There are fifteen municipal councillors in Rehovoth, elected on a basis of pure proportional representation, by the local electorate. There are three representatives of Shaarayim on this council: two represent the party known as 'Lemaan Shaarayim', and one the party known as 'Mapai-Shaarayim'.

The main function of municipal councillors is to promulgate local legislation, and to administer local affairs. The council is divided into a majority coalition, which allocates and divides the main executive offices; and an opposition. These are formed by agreement.

The three Shaarayim representatives are: Saadiah Cohen - representing 'Mapai-Shaarayim'; Yisrael Ovadiah Mizrahi and Moshe Mekaytan - representing 'Lemaan Shaarayim'.

Membership of a special committee is usually offered to a member of the 'government coalition'. It entails discussion of particular municipal-department problems and the formulation of policy or suggestions for the administration of that department. Saadiah Cohen is chairman of the Social Welfare Committee, which was set up in 1956 to enquire into the condition of welfare 'cases',
and to propose improved means of dealing with them. He was nominated by the municipal council.

Leadership Roles Specific to Shaarayim.

The following committees, membership of which implies some degree of leadership in the community, exist: 'Lemaan Shaarayim', 'Mapai-Shaarayim', 'Kupath Milwe' Bank, Religious Committee, 'Municipal' Committee of Shaarayim Workers' Committee, School Committee, 'Poel Shaarayim' and 'Maccabee-Shaarayim' Football Committees.

The political party, 'Lemaan Shaarayim', has a committee of five members: They are: Yisrael Ovadia Mizrahi - chairman; Moshe Mekaytan - vice-chairman; Haim Madhalah; Aharon Madhalah; and Yehudah Korath - secretary. This committee is officially elected by all members and supporters of the party; but very few of the latter in fact attend its meetings. The committee decides on the policy to be pursued in local government, and on electoral matters, preparing the list of nominees, and deciding on its order. In fact, this latter is one of its most important tasks, since the order of names decides who is to obtain a place on the municipal council following an election.

'Mapai-Shaarayim' has a local committee of three official members, recognized by 'Mapai' headquarters in Rehovoth. They are: Pinhas Kaparah; Saadia Cohen; and Naftali Gedassi. In addition, there are unofficial members,
who are locally recognized by virtue of their influence and prestige. They include Hezkiyahu Madhalah and Avraham Yerimi, amongst others. The former was previously a member of the official committee and a municipal representative; the latter is a member of the Rehovoth Workers' Council.

The major functions of the committee are similar to those of the 'Lemaan Shaarayim' committee; but the selection of names for electoral lists and their priority on the list must be ratified in conjunction with 'Mapai' headquarters.

The committee of 'Kupath Milwe Bank' is a semi-official body, consisting of Haim Madhalah, Pinhas Kaparah and Naftali Gedassi and Yisrael Ovadiah Mizrahi, who is both manager of the bank and the committee chairman. The members were either nominated to the committee when the bank was founded, or later coopted on to it. They share the trusteeship with a number of outsiders. The bank is administered as a communal "utility", and not as a business enterprise.

The Religious Committee of Shaarayim is a semi-official body having an unspecified number of members. It includes the committee of the Burial Association, which has some semi-official recognition from the Rehovoth Religious Committee. Its members are Haim Madhalah, Meir Mizrahi, Yosef Meshulam, Yisrael Ovadiah Mizrahi and Aharon Madhalah.
and a few other men who are at times coopted or self-appointed. Apart from the administration of burial, the committee is concerned with the maintenance and supervision of synagogues, the ritual bath of Shaarayim, and the maintenance of a certain degree of ritual conformity in public matters.

The 'Municipal' Committee of Shaarayim, so-called by its members, is quite unofficial in status. It is simply a survival of the old communal committee, which existed prior to the incorporation of Shaarayim into Rehovoth. It has about five members—not even the members know the exact number, which seems to vary between three and ten— including Haim Madhalah, Yisrael Ovadiah Mizrahi, Moshe Mekaytan and Aharon Madhalah, who is referred to as the chairman.

This committee has no clear functions, and seems to be self-appointed. Meetings are called from time to time to discuss local affairs—and in particular, matters relating to alleged discrimination.

The Workers' Committee of Shaarayim is an unofficial body. Its existence is encouraged by the Rehovoth Workers' Council, even though it is not granted official recognition. It includes representatives of 'Mapai-Shaarayim', 'Poel HaMizrachi', and other labour parties, but not of 'Heruth' supporters. Among its members are Pinhas Kaparah,
Hezkiyahu Madhalah, Avraham Yerimi, Saadia Cohen, Naftali Gedassi and Miriam Madhalah — all supporters of 'Mapai-Shaarayim'—one representative of 'Poel-HaNizrahi', and one of the other labour parties. The committee is self-appointed.

Its function is simply the discussion of matters relating to local labour and employment problems, for the purpose of making suggestions or recommendations to the Rehovoth Workers' Council.

The 'Moriah' School Committee is no longer an official body, since the school itself is no longer administered by representatives of the local community. The committee in fact, a parent-teachers' committee, such as exist elsewhere in Israel. But an attempt is made to maintain a semblance of its former status.

It includes Haim Madhalah, Saadia Cohen, Aharon Madhalah, Moshe Mekaytan; Yisrael Ovadiah Mizrahi — who is the chairman — the principal of the school, two or three other men, and two women. The latter seldom attend meetings, and are concerned primarily with the affairs of female pupils.

The committee is elected by parents of pupils, few of whom interest themselves in its affairs.

The football committees are elected by the members of the two rival sports clubs. 'Poel Shaarayim' is linked to the 'Histadruth', while 'Maccabee-Shaarayim' is linked to the national sports association, 'Maccabee'. Apart from
this, there is little significant connexion between the leaders of the two clubs and other areas of leadership and politics.

I turn now to consider the individual leaders, as personalities, in relation to the roles which they perform.

Haim Mochalah is a man between 65 and 70 years of age, and has resided in Shaarayim almost since the year in which the community was founded. At first he earned his livelihood as a teacher of 'Torah', but later speculated and invested in property and engaged in a number of business pursuits, and at present lives from the income accruing from his houses, buildings and orchards. By local standards, he is a rich man.

He has not been a practical leader for some years, but was formerly recognized by the British authorities, by the 'Yishuv', and by the community as the 'Mukhtar' or headman.

At present he is a member of the 'Lemaan Shaarayim' committee, the local unofficial religious committee, the unofficial municipal committee, school committee and the 'Kupath Milwe' Bank committee. This means that his position is almost entirely unofficial, and his practical concern with leadership is minimal. He is retained on committees largely as a figurehead.

He enjoys considerable prestige in the community, but little active power or authority.
He is an extreme traditionalist - both ethnic and religious - and is opposed to the changes which have gradually affected the relations between the community and the wider society.

In his relations with the wider community of Rehovoth, he is more favourably disposed towards the older Ashkenazi farming families, as opposed to the later immigrants with their practices of labour organization, and doctrines of socialism.

Yisrael Ovadiah Mizrahi, is between 60 and 65 years of age, and has lived in Shaarayim almost since the year of its foundation.

He worked, in his youth, as a labourer for Ashkenazi farmers; later he acquired his own land and various properties, but has also held paid positions, working for the community. At present he works as part-time manager of the 'Kupath Milwe' Bank, and, when he is not attending to his administrative duties, tends his orchards. He is considered quite rich, by local standards.

He has occupied various positions of leadership in the community for 30 years or more, and has been the acknowledged practical head of the community for at least twenty years.

At present, he holds the following positions: member of the municipal council of Rehovoth; chairman of the 'Lemaan Shaarayim' committee; chairman of the 'Kupath Milwe'
committee; member of the unofficial local religious committee and of the so-called 'municipal committee; member of the 'Moriah' school committee.

While his status is partly official, it can be seen that his role as leader is largely concerned with the community as an entity; he performs no roles in the bureaucratic structure of the wider society, except as municipal councillor. In this latter position, he is a member of the opposition, and therefore has no administrative or executive tasks.

His leadership role fits well with the parochialism of his outlook. He was opposed, in the past, to absorption of Shaarayim in the wider community, and still treats the outside world with suspicion and hostility.

He enjoys considerable prestige in the community, and is viewed largely as a leader of the community in opposition to external forces, at least by his supporters.

He is a traditionalist, both ethnic and religious - but less so than Haim Madhalah.

In the performance of his leadership roles he tends to avoid action which involves negotiating with external agencies, except where this entails the 'defence' of Shaarayim.

Moshe Mekaytan is a man in his early forties, and has lived in Shaarayim for less than twenty years. He was
born in Egypt of Yemeni parents, and lived some time in Tel Aviv before going to Rehovoth.

His father was a small builder in Tel Aviv, and on coming to Shaarayim Mekaytan began to work independently at this trade, and does now. In addition to this, he owns property, and is considered rich by local standards.

He showed his first interest in politics when he became a member of the General Zionist party, and only became a supporter of 'Lemaan Shaarayim' 3 years before he succeeded in becoming a municipal councillor, representing that party. He did not break off his contact with the General Zionists, and succeeded in obtaining financial support from them for 'Lemaan Shaarayim' in the electoral campaign of 1955.

With his useful contacts and persuasive and persistent personality, he had little difficulty in mustering sufficient support for himself to obtain second position on the 'Lemaan Shaarayim' electoral list.

At present he holds the following positions: member of the Rehovoth municipal council; member of the 'Lemaan Shaarayim' committee; member of the unofficial Shaarayim municipal committee; and member of the 'Moriah' school committee.

He is not a sincere traditionalist, either ethnic or religious; though he is moderately devout and observant in religious matters. But he exploits local and ethnic
loyalty for his own political ends, emphasizing the existence or alleged existence of ethnic discrimination and prejudice.

Aharon Madhalah is a man of about 60 years of age, and has lived in Shaarayim almost since the year of its foundation.

He too worked, as a youth, for the Ashkenazi farmers, and later acquired land of his own. At present he works his own land as well as holding a part-time job as agricultural overseer and instructor, and owns properties from which he draws rent. By local standards he is quite rich.

He has been concerned with communal affairs for more than twenty years, having been a member of the Shaarayim local committee and other committees. He has never held office in any organization external to the community itself.

At present he is a member of the 'Lemaan Shaarayim' committee, the local religious committee and the 'Moriah' school committee, and is the chairman of the so-called Shaarayim 'municipal' committee— the latter office is a sinecure without emoluments.

He is devout in religious practice, and an ethnic traditionalist. In this latter respect, he is less parochial than Haim Madhalah, more flexible and less suspicious than Yisrael Ovadiah, and less vehement in his denunciations than Mekaytan.
Pinhas Kaparah is a man of 60 to 65 years of age, and has lived in Shaarayim from the year of its foundation.

As a youth, he worked as a labourer for Ashkenazi farmers, gradually acquiring some of his own land, which he worked to supplement his meagre wages. Later, when he had been an ardent supporter and agent of the workers' organization for many years, he became an employee of the 'Histadruth', which he still is. Although his employment does not bring wealth, by local standards, it does bring considerable material benefits. He enjoys a regular and moderately high salary, and is able to borrow funds, for various purposes, at low sub-economic interest-rates. His position also enables him to seek favourable employment for his sons.

He has been concerned with communal affairs for more than thirty years; and with those of organized labour for almost as long.

At present he holds the following offices: he is educational and cultural officer on behalf of the workers' organization, a member of the 'Mapai Shaarayim' committee, the 'Kupath Milwe' Committee, and the local unofficial workers' committee. In the past he has been a member of the Shaarayim local committees and of the Rehovoth Workers' Council.

He is devoutly orthodox in religious practice, but opposes ethnic traditionalism and separatism; however,
he is also opposed to the political organization of religion. He is a firm supporter of 'Mapai' and the workers' organization, whose ideals, aims and interests are seen by him as valid for the wider society as a whole. 'Mapai-Shaarayim' - that is, some form of local-ethnic workers' organization and representation - is viewed as a vehicle for the social and cultural transformation of the community and ethnic group.

Saadiah Cohen is a man of about forty years of age, and has lived in Shaarayim since his arrival from Yemen at the age of about fifteen.

At first he worked as an agricultural labourer; later, having attended night classes, he became a clerk in the labour organization, and is now employed by the 'Histadruth' Sick Fund - known as 'Kupath Holim' - in an administrative capacity. In this position he enjoys a considerable salary and other benefits.

He has been concerned with communal affairs for the past fifteen years. His family had enjoyed considerable prestige in Northern Yemen, and he was himself able to secure a following amongst the more recent immigrants in Shaarayim. Furthermore, he benefited from the standing of his mother's brother, Yisrael Ovadiah, who had assisted the family in its journey from Yemen to Palestine.

At present he holds the following positions: member of the Rehovoth Municipal Council & Workers' Council;
chairman of the municipal welfare committee; member of 'Mapai-Shaarayim' committee; member of Shaarayim workers' committee and of the 'Moriah' school committee.

He is devout in religious practice, but neither supports nor opposes ethnic traditionalism. He favours the social and cultural absorption of the community in the wider society - but is more moderate in this respect than Pinhas Kaparaj.

Naftali Gedassi is a man of about 55 years of age, and has lived in Shaarayim since the age of 11 or 12. His family immigrated with one of the first large groups to come from Southern Yemen.

He worked many years as an agricultural labourer, but succeeded in obtaining and working some land of his own. At present he works as an agricultural instructor to new immigrants, and also maintains his own land.

He has been concerned with communal affairs for about 30 years, having been a member of the Shaarayim local committee. He joined the labour movement with Pinhas Kaparaj, and has been a member of the Rehovoth workers' council.

At present he is a member of the 'Mapai-Shaarayim' committee, of the local workers' committee and of the 'Kuath Milwe' Bank committee.

His views are largely similar to those of Pinhas Kaparaj,
sharing his religious orthodoxy coupled with a general belief in social and cultural "emancipation" and "progress".

Avraham Yerimi is about 45 years of age, and has lived in Shaarayim since early boyhood.

He worked as an agricultural labourer, and later in citrus-packing. He is now labour organizer for all citrus-packing firms in Rehovoth, being appointed by the labour organization and paid by the citrus board. He enjoys a relatively high salary and other benefits.

He has not been particularly concerned with communal affairs in the past, except with regard to employment. He became a member of the 'Rehovoth Workers' Council as a result of his occupational attainments.

At present he is a member of the Rehovoth Workers' Council, the committee of 'Mapai-Shaarayim', and the local workers' committee of Shaarayim.

He is observant in religious matters, but largely indifferent to ethnic loyalty and traditionalism as such. With his contacts in the wider community, he is implicitly committed to the views shared by Kaparah and Gedassi; but he is less ambivalent than the former, having, to some extent, already achieved social acceptance for himself and his family in the wider society.

Hezkiyahu Nadhalah, is about forty years of age and was born in Shaarayim of parents who had immigrated with the first group of immigrants from Northern Yemen.
He worked as an agricultural labourer, after receiving the rudiments of an elementary education in Shaarayim. He joined the Jewish Brigade in the second world war, and later worked in citrus-packing. After serving in the Israeli army, he was sent abroad to study citrus-processing and became an efficiency expert on his return. He is at present an agricultural instructor in immigrant villages.

As a youth he was an ardent supporter of the newly-formed workers' youth movement, 'Noar Oved', and became one of its leaders. He later became an equally ardent supporter of the 'Histadruth' and ultimately a member of the Rehovoth workers' Council. He began to take part in local politics after serving in the Israeli army, and was soon elected to the municipal council as a representative for Shaarayim. He failed to obtain a high position on the 'Mapai-Shaarayim' electoral list at the following election, as he had alienated the support of many of the older Yemenis in Shaarayim, as well as some of the representatives of Mapai in Rehovoth. This was due to the fact that he had treated the former with a degree of contempt - as "backward and uncultured" - and the latter with hostility, accusing them of ethnic discrimination.

At present he is a member of the Rehovoth workers' Council, of the 'Mapai-Shaarayim' committee and of the
local workers' committee.

He rejects all forms of traditionalism, whether religious or ethnic, and like Kaparah, favours the breakdown of communal and ethnic barriers. But his views are more extreme, in that he rejects compromises. Despite these views, he emphasizes the existence of ethnic discrimination and prejudice, and in this respect his attitudes resemble those of Mekaytan.

Like Mekaytan, Ḥeziyyahu Madhalah aspires to full acceptance in the wider society, and it is this conflict, in both cases, between identification with a "membership group" and a "reference group" which produces strong feelings of hostility. In Madhalah's case, these are directed equally against a section of the local community, and a section of the wider society.

Miriam Madhalah is one of the two main female leaders in Shaarayim. She is about 45 years of age, and was born in Shaarayim. She is a Madhalah by birth as well as marriage.

She works, as she has always done, as a char-woman. Her husband is an agricultural labourer.

She is a member of the Working Women's Association, and is responsible for the organization of evening classes for working women. She is also a member of the unofficial workers' committee of Shaarayim - the only female representative.
She is strongly observant in religious matters, but rejects ethnic traditionalism, favouring "emancipation" and "progress", particularly for Yemeni women. Her views resemble those of Pinhas Kaparah.

Rav Meir Mizrahi, is a man of about 65 years of age. He was born in Yemen, educated in Jerusalem, and came to Shaarayim during the first world war.

He came originally as a rabbi to the community, and has continued in this role ever since. The nature of his status altered during this period, as he gradually developed from being simply a local rabbi, supported by the community, to being an employee of the rabbinate.

He is now a member of the Rehovoth Rabbinical Council, a member of the local rabbinical court, a member of the Rehovoth Religious Council and a member of the Shaarayim religious committee, of which latter he is the acknowledged head.

Being an employee of the rabbinate, he is of necessity a member of one of the religious political parties - 'Poel HaMizrahi'; however, he has tended to remain aloof from all local politics. Since there is strong opposition from the leaders of both 'Lemaan Shaarayim' and 'Poel Shaarayim' to the religious parties, the Rav would, of necessity, have been involved in disputes and conflict with these two groups had he been active in espousing the cause of his party.
But, by withdrawing from party-political conflicts, he has risked criticism from his own party, which is thoroughly committed to the goal of creating a political front for the defence of religion.

Meir Mizrahi is, despite his identification with organized religion, also an ethnic traditionalist. Normally, this would entail no conflict; but in the situation in Shaarayim it means that he has to compromise between the pressures of strong ethnic loyalty and loyalty to the rabbinate, where this concerns Yemeni practices which are not countenanced by religious authorities.

Yosef Meshulam is about 60 years of age. He was born in Yemen, educated both there and in various parts of Palestine, and came to live in Shaarayim in the early 1930's.

He worked for some time as a teacher of 'Torah', as a 'Mohel' - i.e., as a performer of ritual circumcision - and as a scribe. Later he became employed as a clerk by the rabbinate, and this work is at present the source of most of his income, though he is still the most favoured 'Mohel' amongst the Yemenis of Rehovoth.

At present he is a member of the Rehovoth Religious Council, of the committee of 'Poel HaShaarayim' in Rehovoth, and of the Shaarayim religious committee.

Unlike Meir Mizrahi, Meshulam is politically active on behalf of 'Poel HaMizrahi', and this brings him into
conflict with other leaders in Shaarayim. He sees the religious party as a means for uniting the orthodox against secular forces; the political party is therefore a means of absorbing the Yemenis into a wider social group, which cuts across ethnic ties. Meshulam - rather like Pinhas Kaparch, though of a different political persuasion - seeks to compromise between local-ethnic loyalty and identity, and loyalty to and identification with a sector of the wider society.

Though he does not favour the persistence of local and ethnic separatism, Meshulam retains some of the characteristics of the ethnic traditionalist.

Shalom Madhalah is about 50 years old. He was born in Yemen, but has lived in Shaarayim since early infancy.

He started work, in early youth, after a brief formal education, as an agricultural labourer. Later he acquired land from his father and through his own efforts, and worked independently, taking occasional paid work to supplement his income. At present, he has a full-time job as overseer in a number of citrus orchards, working his own lands in his spare time, sometimes with the help of hired labour. His occupational success is due largely to his relations with a number of the larger citrus-farmers; this relationship is both personal and political, some of his associates being supporters of 'Heruth', of which he is a member.
He has participated in communal affairs for about twenty years, having been a member of the local committee, and a leader of the 'Heruth' supporters in Shaarayim. Between 1951 and 1955 he was a municipal councillor, representing 'Heruth', and securing some of his electoral support from Shaarayim. But in 1955 he was dropped from a high position on the party list as a result of a quarrel between several of the Yemenis supporting 'Heruth'; the Yemeni vote within the party was split, and none of them succeeded in obtaining a high position.

At present he is a member of the 'Heruth' committee, and is still acknowledged as the 'Heruth' leader in Shaarayim by all except the younger folk, who wish to replace him by one of their own number.

He is moderately observant in religious matters, but is indifferent to ethnic traditionalism. For him, the problem of ethnic discrimination is part of a larger problem concerning the power of the 'Histadruth' and 'Mapai', which "can only be challenged through 'Heruth'".

Miriam Mizrahi, who is about 45 years old, was born in Shaarayim — her father was a Madhalah.

She received no formal education, and married Avraham Mizrahi, brother of Yisrael Ovadiah Mizrahi, while very young.

She has long concerned herself with communal affairs —
particularly with social 'cases', children's kindergartens etc., - and has sought to publicize any act, whether real, alleged or imaginary, which could be interpreted as one of discrimination against Yemenis.

She has been a supporter of several political parties, including the religious parties and the local-ethnic party, but finally became a member of 'Heruth'.

Her influence is confined to women; partly on account of her welfare activities, and partly on account of her missionary zeal in combatting, what is, or is alleged to be, discriminatory behaviour, particularly in the field of social welfare assistance.

Relationships Between Leaders.

Having surveyed the main leadership roles, and the personal incumbents of leadership status, I turn now to consider the relationships between leaders.

One of the most striking features of this relationship is the extent of kin and affinal ties which exists between the main leaders.

Haim Madhalah, Aharon Madhalah, Hezkiyahu Madhalah, Shalom Madhalah, Miriam Madhalah (nee Madhalah) and Miriam Mizrahi (nee Madhalah) are all lineally related.

Yisrael Ovadiah Mizrahi is affinally related to Miriam Mizrahi - his brother's wife. He is cognatically related to Saadiah Cohen - his sister's son. His first wife -
These kin ties cut across those of political allegiance; neither Miriam nor Hezkiyahu Madhalah have ever supported Haim Madhalah - who is brother's son to their deceased paternal grandfather. Though Shalom Madhalah and Miriam Mizrahi have not openly opposed Haim Madhalah, they have tended to prefer another political party to that headed by their kinsman, and Yisrael Ovadiah. Though Saadiah Cohen is a close kinsman of Yisrael Ovadiah, to whom he has been indebted for assistance in the past, he supports a rival political party. It is not surprising, in view of these facts, that kinship does not account for political allegiance in the community as a whole.

Ties of friendship between leaders are as important as those of kinship. Yisrael Ovadiah, Aharon Madhalah and Moshe Mekaytan particularly the first two - are old friends; Pinhas Kaparash and Naftali Gedassi are firm friends, as are Hezkiyahu Madhalah and Avraham Yerimi.

Types of Leader and Leadership—Conclusion.

From the previous discussion of leadership roles and leaders, it is possible to state a few general points.

There is a clear correlation between type of leadership and source of income. Those who are primarily agents of external bureaucracy, depend for their livelihood largely on their salaries and perquisites of office; those who
are primarily internal leaders - whose position is based on status earned initially in the community - depend largely for their livelihood on private property.

There is some connexion between age and type of leadership. The older leaders, for the most part, derive their status from earlier service to the community, whereas the younger leaders derive theirs from their position in the wider bureaucracy.

The older leaders are more traditionalistic than the young. This means, that they either strive to defend traditionalism, or else feel more bound to compromise with it.

Leaders who are agents of external organizations have, of necessity, more contacts with the world outside Shaarayim; they also aspire, more directly, to acceptance in the wider society, and are consequently less sympathetic to the preservation of ethnic traditions.

Roles which are largely internal to the community tend to be less concerned with practical affairs, and are associated more with symbolic affirmations of group identity.

Leaders who are agents of some external organization or interest group, are less prone to express hostility to the wider society. Leaders who owe their status to a feeling of local-ethnic identity and solidarity, tend to foster and encourage hostility to the wider society. This serves to
strengthen the very sentiments which are necessary to the continuity of local-ethnic solidarity, and of their own position, which is dependent upon its preservation.

As a consequence, leaders who can not espouse local-ethnic solidarity as a primary principle - they must promote solidarity with the working-class or with the religiously devout, on ideological grounds, and in order to maintain their own positions - are forced to compromise with its existence. They are caught between conflicting loyalties and conflicting ideologies. In seeking a compromise, they have to treat local-ethnic solidarity as a means to the attainment of wider social identification, or else risk losing support.
CHAPTER IV  LEADERSHIP AT WORK IN SHAARAYIN.

The exercise of leadership occurs in certain types of situation. I propose now to describe some of the main types, and to illustrate the political function of leadership in Shaarayim by reference to one specific issue.

The main types of situation are connected with work, taxation, social-welfare assistance, schooling, 'cultural' and recreational activities, electioneering, family and personal disputes etc.

One of the main problems of work in Shaarayim is not so much a question of finding employment, but of obtaining regular and desirable employment, and this is particularly the case with regard to citrus-packing; for those who are fortunate, this work, which is well-paid, can be obtained for a whole season lasting from November to May. A great deal of activity in this industry revolves about the person of Avraham Yerimi, whose task it is to allocate work, negotiate conditions of pay - often according to piece-rates - hours of work, etc. This work is sometimes done in three shifts a day, continuing throughout the night, and there is a great deal of competition to obtain work on a particular shift, or of a certain kind.

A few people manage to obtain all-year work in this industry, but the majority are satisfied with a whole season
each year. The supply of labourers is nearly always in excess of demand, so that a fair amount of choice is left to Yerimi in deciding who is to receive work, or certain types of work.

The applicants for these jobs are not all from Shaarayim, nor are they all Yemenis. Thus Yerimi might seem to be in the position of allocating work primarily to members of his community. But the decisions are not merely his; a list of applicants is obtained by the labour exchange, and the allocation worked out by the exchange in conjunction with Yerimi. It means that although he can not give all the work, or all the best jobs to applicants from Shaarayim, he can recommend that a significantly large proportion of these jobs go to Shaarayim, Marmorak etc.. And in fact, it is extremely difficult for others to obtain many of these jobs; it has become established as custom, that the residents of Shaarayim (and Marmorak to a lesser extent) have first claim on work in citrus-packing. The situation is justified by Yerimi on the grounds that the Yemeni workers are older residents, and that it is the duty of the state to find employment for the more recent immigrants.

Yerimi also has considerable power in the allocation of different types of work, and in deciding on the 'expertise' of certain applicants for more skilled jobs. Once a
percon's 'expertise' has been established, it is very likely that he or she will continue to obtain the same work, or even better work, every season.

The problem of local rates and taxes is considered by the members of the community to be the responsibility of municipal councillors, of whom there are three Yemenis from Shaarayim. Residents who object to the rateable valuation of their property have only two official means of obtaining a lower valuation: they can apply direct to the municipality; or they can apply to the social-welfare department to intercede on their behalf. As a rule, direct applications are refused; in some cases the welfare department attempts to obtain a reduction, but applications will only be considered when the applicant is classifiable as a 'social case', or when temporary hardship can be fully established. Consequently, many disappointed applicants seek out the municipal councillors, or else some other leader who is requested to put the case to councillors. The latter are, as a rule, loathe to make direct application to the municipal treasury or the welfare department on behalf of any individual. However, at least two of the councillors, Yisrael Ovaishah and Moshe Makaytan, do raise the general issue of local rates and taxes very frequently at meetings of the municipal council, their aim being to
express the resentment of Shaarayim at the policy of the Rehovoth municipality. These frequent protests are well publicised throughout Shaarayim on each occasion, thus reflecting on the loyalty of Yisrael Ovadiah and Mekaytan to the "cause" of Shaarayim.

Applications for social welfare assistance of one form or another are frequent in Shaarayim. Cases in need of assistance are brought to the attention of the department in a number of different ways: by social workers who visit homes; by neighbours; by the schools; by doctors and nurses; by personal application on the part of those in need; or by others on their behalf. The welfare department classifies applicants into a number of categories, ranging from those requiring full assistance, to partial and specific help, or none; their budget is limited, hence orders of priority are important. As a result, many applicants are dissatisfied either with the extent of assistance, or with the manner in which their applications are viewed. These people then resort to their leaders.

In most cases, leaders are unwilling to make personal application to the welfare department, though there is one woman, Miriam Mizrahi, who does consider it her duty to appeal directly. More recently, when leaders like Yisrael Ovadiah or Mekaytan are approached in these matters, they refer applicants to Saadia Cohen, who is not only a
municipal councillor but also chairman of the social-welfare committee. The latter, particularly in view of his position, is unwilling to become personally involved in applications for assistance. However, if enough pressure is brought to bear on him from other leaders, he will sometimes agree to approach the welfare department in connection with a number of cases which are felt to be in need of attention.

Though leaders do not usually agree to approach the welfare department directly, they are willing to raise the whole issue of welfare assistance at meetings of the municipal council. On these occasions, Saadiah Cohen must choose between supporting Yisrael Ovadia and Moshe Mekaytan, or maintaining an independent position in view of his status as chairman of the municipal committee for social-welfare. As a rule, he supports the other two leaders of Shaarayim, but reluctantly.

In most cases, when approached by members of the community in connexion with welfare assistance, leaders confine themselves to giving advice only: in brief, they refer applicants to the welfare department, while pleading their own inability to do more. They usually excuse themselves with the familiar words: "What can I do? you know that the municipality neglects us, and we fight all the time to secure our rights. But if I make the
application on your behalf, they will say that we are trying to force them!"

Leaders are approached on a variety of matters connected with schooling and education.

Parents bring complaints regarding the treatment of their children at the 'Moriah' school to the local leaders who are known to be in some way connected with the school, and even to others, in the hope that they will intervene on their behalf. If the complaint is brought to a leader by a kinsman or friend, whose opinion and support he values, the leader is likely to pursue the matter with the principal. Similarly, if the complaint is brought by someone whose support the leader wishes to encourage, he will act on his behalf. But if the complaint is brought by someone who is known to be critical of the school administration, then the leader might simply refer the person to the principal, refusing to become personally involved.

Sometimes complaints are brought by parents whose children attend schools other than the 'Moriah', often alleging some form of discrimination on the part of teachers or pupils. In these cases leaders are often quick to raise the matter with the school principal, and even to pursue it at meetings of the municipal council.

Parents wishing to enter their children in special
schools - e.g. agricultural training schools, or trade-schools - will often approach leaders for assistance in these matters. Those leaders who are associated with the labour movement are considered influential in obtaining places in such schools, as the latter are often administered by some branch of the labour organization.

In many cases the leaders will help, by approaching the local workers' council and in seeking recommendations for certain applicants from Shaarayim. But here again, leaders do not wish to become involved in many applications, and will give preference to those applicants who are kinsman, or old friends.

In connexion with education and schooling, there is one major issue with which several leaders of Shaarayim are concerned - that is the status of the 'Moriah' school. This will be dealt with at greater length later in this chapter.

With regard to recreational and 'cultural' activities, only the leaders associated with the labour organizations have any role to perform. The main figure here is Pinhas Kaparah, who is the official intermediary between the Rehovoth workers' Council and Shaarayim, in organizing lectures, tours, film-shows etc., dramatic and other activities for youth. One of the major functions of these activities is to create the notion that the workers' organization caters for all the important needs of its
and consequently, this serves to link the Yemenis with the wider society through the acceptance of certain common cultural interests and symbols of social identification.

Electioneering, though it occurs only every few years, is one of the major activities involving leadership. This is particularly true of Shaarayim for the reason that it is for most purposes, merely a sub-community with no official status. There are elections for three separate bodies: the municipal council; the workers' council; and the religious council of Rehovoth.

Municipal elections, which occur every four years, are by far the most important, since they involve a number of interests which affect the whole community. Leaders, whatever their roles in relation to the community or the wider society, exert their influence, to a greater or lesser extent, in winning the allegiance of members of the community to one party or another. They act either as agents on behalf of some party whose following or potential following is drawn from many parts of Rehovoth, or as prominent members of a party whose following or potential following is local. In the latter case, special election meetings are held in Shaarayim itself.

The election meeting of 'Lebanon Shaarayim' which I witnessed in 1955, was attended by about fifty or sixty adults, mostly men, and was addressed by several of the
party leaders - Yisrael Ovadiah Mizrahi, Aharon Madhalah and Moshe Mekaytan. Haim Madhalah, who is considered the symbolic head of the party, presided, and was given the seat of honour, but took little part in the making of speeches, except to remind those assembled to pray for the party’s success in the municipal elections. The main tenor of the speeches was the degree of "neglect suffered by Shaarayim" and the "discrimination suffered by Yemenis in all spheres of life". But the manner in which this was expressed varied from one speaker to another. Yisrael Ovadiah was concerned primarily with warning the Yemenis against the dangers of supporting "political parties", implying that 'Lamaan Shaarayim' was non-partisan; his appeal was to the loyalty of Yemenis to their community, this being "the best means of ensuring that your rights will be protected". Aharon Madhalah spoke in a very similar vein, pointing out that the Yemenis of Rehovoth, and Shaarayim in particular, should draw a clear distinction between municipal and national elections: "Whatever party you choose to support in 'Knesseth' elections, remember that local affairs are above party-politics; you must support Yisrael Ovadiah and others on his list, otherwise you will find that Shaarayim will be totally abandoned to outside interests which have nothing to do with our affairs."

Aharon Madhalah warned against supporting the religious
parties in local elections, despite the degree of devout orthodoxy which Yemenis practise. But Mekaytan went further than the first two leaders. He spoke directly of the "treachery" of those who support "certain political parties, and in particular the parties of the left which are more concerned with what happens in Russia than what is good for Shaarayim or Rehovoth". He attacked the religious parties openly for "misleading Yemenis and others who are devoutly orthodox" into associating religion with party-politics, and accused the leaders and supporters of these parties of "using the 'Torah' for the dirty work of party-politics". It is noteworthy, that while Mekaytan did attack some parties specifically, he omitted direct reference to the parties of the right. However, he urged the Yemenis not to draw a clear distinction "between national and local elections, since those parties which are to be feared in local affairs are to be feared no less in national affairs". Whether this was to be interpreted simply as a warning not to support the parties of the left and the religious parties in national elections, or whether it was a direct exhortation to support the national Yemeni party, is not clear. Mekaytan is known to have personal connexions with the 'General Zionist Party' of Rehovoth, and to be instrumental in obtaining election funds from that source for 'Lemaai Shaarayim'; but he was prevented from urging support for that party in national
elections, lest this be interpreted by others as "partisanship".

Apart from local election meetings, the leaders of 'Lemaan Shaarayim', resort to other methods of propaganda. Posters are displayed in many parts of the Yemeni quarter, loud-speaker-vans tour Shaarayim, and leaders hold informal discussions on street-corners, and even go to the homes of those who are believed to be marginal voters.

The only other party which holds election meetings specifically for Shaarayim is 'Mapai-Shaarayim'. The meetings of this party are held in the local workers' club, and are addressed by several local leaders together with at least one outside speaker. The latter is often a Yemeni member of the 'Knesseth'. The main theme of these speeches, is simply that 'Mapai' is the party of the workers, and that the Yemenis of Shaarayim should support the party which represents the true interests of the majority who are wage-earners. There are strong warnings against supporting a "party which claims to be non-partisan, but which really has no real basis in local affairs, and is secretly allied with certain nefarious interests of the right, whose sole aim is to oppose the interests of the workers, and hence of the majority of Yemenis in Shaarayim". Similarly there are strong warnings against supporting the religious parties "despite the fact that we are all strongly religious, on the grounds that the religious parties serve to mix religion
and politics and this is contrary to the spirit of the 'Torah'. Much is made of the fact that the Histadruth protects the interests of the workers and that 'Mapai' is the true party of the Histadruth and the only true workers' party "which does not place the interests of other powers above those of Israel." The main local speakers, Pinhas Kaparah, Avraham Yerimi, Saadiah Cohen, and Meziyahu Madhalah, stress the identity of the interests between 'Mapai-Shaarayim' and 'Mapai' itself, but point out that there are certain local interests to be considered. They also claim that 'Mapai-Shaarayim' is merely the old 'Shaarayim-list' under a different name, explaining the need to distinguish themselves from 'Lemaan Shaarayim', whose leaders "simply wish to mislead people into thinking that it is they who have the interests of Shaarayim at heart". While some of the speakers tend to moderate expression, Meziyahu Madhalah indulges in strong attacks on the religious parties and their followers "who are the true culprits of ethnic discrimination", as well as on the leaders of 'Lemaan Shaarayim'.

In addition to holding election meetings, 'Mapai-Shaarayim' uses similar methods to those of 'Lemaan Shaarayim', having its own loud-speaker van supplied by the 'Mapai' party headquarters.

Election meetings for other parties are held in the
centre of Rehovoth, and some of these are attended, by people from Shaarayim. However, Yemenis are not prominent at most election meetings. The number attending the 'Lemaan Shaarayim' meeting is no more than fifty adults, and few more attend the meeting of 'Mapai-Shaarayim'. Supporters of the latter, whilst less numerous than the former, are less apathetic, politically.

Elections for the Rehovoth Workers' Council occur every four years, and like municipal elections, are held jointly with those for the national body. Every adult member of the 'Histadruth' is entitled to vote, and this too is organized on the basis of party lists and pure proportional representation. 'Mapai-Shaarayim' does not have a separate list - there is no fear of the Shaarayim workers supporting another local party - but, by agreement with 'Mapai', certain prominent labour leaders from Shaarayim are given high places on the 'Mapai' list, so as to ensure that the Yemeni workers will have some representation on this important body. Electioneering is conducted by Yemeni local leaders amongst the community, at meetings, informal gatherings, and through other publicity media. Mostly, this is done on behalf of 'Mapai' but there is some electioneering on behalf of other left-wing labour parties.

Elections for the Religious Council of Rehovoth occur
every four years. These are conducted partly on the basis of party lists, but since there is only one powerful religious party in Rehovoth, and most other parties do not submit a list in Rehovoth, this does not amount to major party competition. However there is a separate Sephardi list. The religious council is separate from the rabbinical authority.

This concludes my review of some of the types of situation in which leadership is exercised or sought. I now turn to the examination of one major issue in which the social function of leadership and allegiance is well demonstrated.

The Moriah' School Issue.

Until the end of 1952, most schools in Israel were controlled by political parties or other similar organizations. This system was duly abolished, and the State then took over the administration of all primary schools, except a few which were supported by private funds.

State primary schools are now divided into two types: those which cater for the children of the religiously orthodox, and others. The latter are numerically predominant.

In 1953, a State law was passed, compelling parents to register children due to commence primary school education in State schools, at the school nearest to their homes, but giving them the choice between the two types
of education.

At the time there were – and still are – two State administered religious primary schools in Rehovoth: the 'Moriah' School in Shaarayim, and the 'Takhkemoni' School in the central part of Rehovoth.

The school 'issue' arose over the registration of the children living in a housing estate called 'Mashkanoth'. This latter was established in 1951 by the political-religious organization 'Mizrahi', for religiously orthodox immigrants who had arrived in Israel after 1948. To begin with, the children of this housing estate were sent to the 'Takhkemoni' School by their parents. But in 1954 the latter were advised by the education department of Rehovoth municipality, to register those children who were due to start their primary education, at the 'Moriah' school, in view of the close proximity of 'Mashkanoth' to Shaarayim.

The parents of 'Mashkanoth' held a meeting, at which it was decided to oppose this official decision. It was stated quite openly, that the 'Moriah' school catered for an Oriental community, and that this was not in the best interests of the education of Ashkenazi children. A delegation, representing the parents of 'Mashkanoth', approached the municipal education department on the matter, and was received sympathetically by the head of the department,
who was also vice-Mayor of Rehovoth. It was decided to delay implementing the official decision for another year. Meanwhile, some officials of the municipality connived at a method whereby the protesting parents could register their children at the 'Takhkemoni' school. The whole affair received widespread publicity throughout the country just at the time when a murder occurred in Rehovoth, in which the victim was an Ashkenazi boy, and the culprit a Yemeni boy of Shaarayim.

Certain Shaarayim leaders – Haim Madhalah, Yisrael Ovadia, Aharon Madhalah, Moshe Mekaytan and others – reacted immediately to the stand taken by the people of 'Mashkanoth', and held a mass meeting in Shaarayim which was attended by a large number of people. At the meeting it was decided to appoint Yisrael Ovadia to represent the interests of Shaarayim in their opposition to "the connivance of the municipality" in the "act of insulting discrimination perpetrated by the people of 'Mashkanoth'." This occurred in the autumn of 1954, and the matter was allowed to rest until the following year, when, shortly before the municipal elections, the whole issue was raised again by some of the leaders of Shaarayim.

During the first stage of this demonstration, the main leaders concerned in the matter were those who were associated with 'Lemaan Shaarayim'.
When the new municipal council met in 1955 the 'Moriah' School' issue was raised by all three Yemenis, though more vehemently by Mekaytan, who tried to press for an inquiry into the behaviour of municipal employees. The matter was shelved for a short while, but shortly after, in the autumn of 1955, the issue arose again, because of the refusal of the people of 'Mashkanoth' to register children at the 'Moriah School'. The municipal council agreed to investigate ways and means of solving the problem and appointed a committee, headed by the new vice-Mayor, who was also in charge of education; Saadiah Cohen and Yisrael Ovadiah were both nominated for the committee.

Early in 1956, the committee proposed a series of solutions to the problem, some of which were supported tentatively by Saadiah Cohen, and opposed by Yisrael Ovadiah Mizrahi; the latter consequently resigned from the committee of inquiry.

The proposals for the solution of this problem were as follows: to alter the district boundaries so that the children of 'Mashkanoth' could be sent to the 'Takhkemoni School'; to build a new religious primary school to which all of the children of Rehovoth in need of religious education would be sent; to re-divide Rehovoth, so that more of the Shaarayim children would attend the 'Takhkemoni School' and some of the children of 'Mashkanoth' would attend the 'Moriah School'; to unite the two schools, and
use the 'Moriah School' for the first four grades, and
the 'Takhkemoni School' for the last four. The last of
these proposals was the only one considered practicable
by the Mayor and vice-Mayor of Rehovoth and was submitted
to the municipal council for discussion and a vote.

A week before the proposal was due for discussion, in
May 1956, a meeting was called in Shaarayim by Yisrael
Ovadia to discuss ways of opposing the solution. The
meeting was held in a small synagogue which belonged to a
kinsman of Haim Madhalah.

Present at the meeting were Haim Madhalah, Yisrael
Ovadia Mizrahi, Moshe Mekaytan, Aharon Madhalah, the
principal of the 'Moriah School' - a non-Yemeni - and six
other Yemenic of Shaarayim, all men. The meeting had been
officially called by Yisrael Ovadia Mizrahi, but had been
organized by Mekaytan and Aharon Madhalah. Neither Rav
Meir Mizrahi, nor Yosef Keshulam, the two religious leaders,
nor any of the labour leaders attended, though all of them
had been notified of the meeting. In fact, proceedings
represented the views of 'Lemaan Shaarayim' and its
supporters.

Everyone, except Haim Madhalah, was assembled by
7.30 in the evening, and when the old man arrived everyone
rose in deference to him and the meeting commenced. Yisrael
Ovadia was the first speaker, and he opened the meeting
by stating the proposed intention of the municipality to "destroy the Moriah School" in order to appease the people of 'Mashkonoth'. He then called for support in opposing the municipality in order to preserve "the school which the people of Shaarayim have built". He then went on to say: "there are certain faults to be found with 'Moriah', and it is perhaps true that the standard there is not sufficiently high. I have seen that my children do not have sufficient work to do at home. There is a great deal to be said for improvements." At this point the speaker was interrupted by a member of the school committee who said: "Are we here to criticize the school? Let the principal, Mr. Shauli reply to these criticisms." The principal then said that he did everything in his power to maintain the same level that was to be found elsewhere, to which Yisrael Ovadiah replied: "Nevertheless, I maintain that our school falls below the desired level." The committee-member then began to criticize Yisrael Ovadiah, who replied in an equally hostile manner. This developed into a fierce dispute between the two, whereupon the committee-member requested that someone other than Yisrael Ovadiah preside over the meeting, and suggested Aharon Madhalah. Yisrael Ovadiah, thereupon rose from his place and threatened to leave the meeting, claiming that he had been insulted and that it was his perfect right to criticize
the school if he so wished. Haim Madhalah then tried to pacify him by making some moderate comment on the school, but he was ignored by Yisrael Ovadiah. Aharon Madhalah then offered to take the chair, and succeeded in persuading Yisrael Ovadiah to remain. Mekaytan then spoke, and delivered a vehement attack on the religious parties and the people of 'Mashkanoth', all of whom were blamed for the issue which had arisen. He then went on to attack the vice-Mayor of Rehovoth, whom he accused of supporting the religious parties on the grounds that "they were all in the coalition together on the municipality, and 'Mapai' has to support the religious parties — of course at the expense of us," He then urged that Shaarayim should threaten to leave Rehovoth if the proposal to unite the schools in the way suggested was carried through. After this, more speeches were made in similar vein, and a unanimous vote was taken to oppose any proposal to "deprive Shaarayim of its school, and if needs be to make the school independent of the State, and administer it with privately-raised funds."

After the meeting, a discussion was held between Yisrael Ovadiah, Mekaytan and Aharon Madhalah concerning the support of other leaders in Shaarayim. Aharon Madhalah said: "We can count on the support of Rav Meir. He has already told me that on this matter he will oppose his party*, though he

* The reference is of course to the religious party, 'Poel HaMizrahi' of which the rabbi was a member.
could not attend the meeting because of his position. Well, his party is his bread." Mekaytan then said: "We can't expect any support from Yoseph Meshulam. He will do whatever 'Poel HaMizrahi' tells him to do, which means that he will not oppose their plan to unite the schools. But, more important is what Saadia Cohen intends to do. This matter will come up at the council discussion next week and a vote will be taken. We've spoken to him, but he avoided the issue. Will he vote with us or do what his party tells him to do? There's another one who gets his bread from his party, and he won't have the courage to oppose them."

"Pinhas won't support us," said Yisrael Ovadiah, "he always places his party first. In any case, he probably favours uniting the schools at the expense of the 'Noriah School'."

With this discussion, the meeting broke up. But during the week that followed, Mekaytan conducted a publicity campaign to stir up opposition to the municipal proposals. He saw to the placing of posters in many parts of Shaarayim, and, together with certain party supporters, disseminated propaganda throughout Shaarayim. This was so successful that many of the supporters of the workers' movement were persuaded that this was a simple issue between Shaarayim and the rest of kehovoth, between Yezenis and Ashkenazim; hostility was focussed primarily on the people of 'Nashkanoth'
and the leaders of 'Pool HaMizrahi' in Rehovoth, but partly on the municipality, and in particular on the coalition parties which govern the municipality.

At the meeting which occurred the following week, neither Mekoytan nor Yisrael Ovadiah knew what the outcome would be. The coalition of eight councillors was made up of 4 representatives of 'Mapai', 1 representative of 'Mapai-Shaarayim', 1 from each of the two left-wing labour parties, and 1 from 'Pool HaMizrahi'; of the remaining seven, 3 were General Zionists, 2 were representatives of 'Lemaan Shaarayim', 1 a 'Progressive', and 1 a representative of 'Heruth'.

The representatives of 'Lemaan Shaarayim', Yisrael Ovadiah and Mekoytan, were certain of obtaining the support of the 'General Zionist' and 'Heruth' councillors - they would oppose the coalition on principle. But they were not certain of either the 'Progressive' or of the representative of 'Mapai-Shaarayim', Saadiah Cohen; they feared that the latter would be forced to follow the dictates of his party. The 'Mapai' and other labour representatives would be forced to support the proposal because of the coalition agreement with 'Pool HaMizrahi', whose representative was anxious to solve the problem without having to force Ashkenazim to attend the 'Noriah' school, except by combining the two schools into one.

When the proposal had been put forward by the speakers
for the coalition, Yisrael Ovadiah spoke against it in uncompromising fashion, and was followed by Mekaytan who accused the coalition councillors of favouring ethnic discrimination. Saadiah Cohen then suggested that a solution might be found other than the one proposed. After long discussion a vote was taken, and both the 'Progressive' and Saadiah Cohen voted against the coalition proposal, which was thereby defeated.

As a result of this the matter was once again shelved, and the municipal department of education was forced to implement the State law regarding school registration, and in the autumn of 1956 some of the children of 'Mashkanoth' were registered in the 'Moriah School'.

As a result of his defection, Saadiah Cohen was brought before a 'Mapai' party committee and given a grave warning concerning party loyalty. However, it was clear that the majority in Shaarayim supported the stand taken by its leaders, although many of these people did not send their own children to the Moriah School. The issue became one of principle.

The reactions of other Shaarayim leaders to the outcome of this issue were varied, though the majority of them supported the attitude of the three councillors, though not in all respects. The labour leaders, with the exception of Pinhas Kaparalah and some of the younger men of more 'advanced' views, approved of the stand taken
by Cohen, but opposed the extreme position of Mekaytan. Pinhas Kaparah, however, expressed disappointment with Saadiah Cohen, and was totally opposed to the views of Mekaytan and Yisrael Ovadiah. He favoured the merging of the religious schools as this would create better relations between Ashkenazi and Yemeni, and would serve to break down the ethnic distinctiveness of the Yemenis. However, he did venture to place some of the blame for the whole issue on 'Poel HaMizrahi', and accused them of mixing politics and religion. Yosef Meshulam was the only other leader to express disagreement with the policy of the three Shaarayim councillors, and hoped that some means would still be found to amalgamate the two schools. Some of the younger people were indifferent to the whole matter.

This whole issue illustrates the function of leadership in Shaarayim, and points up the social and political factors which influence the actions of leaders. Leaders who are not unambiguously opposed to the merging of the local-ethnic community in the wider society, are caught up in conflicting loyalties.
CHAPTER V. NATURE OF POLITICAL ALLEGIANCE.

In this chapter I deal with two problems. In the first place I analyze the basis of party-political support in Chaarayim. Having done that, I consider the basis of support for particular leaders.

Factors affecting Party Allegiance

Political allegiance in Chaarayim takes the form of supporting a particular party in local elections. The data presented here are derived from an investigation of a sample of one hundred households. It appears from the analysis of this material that there is some correlation between party support and a number of other factors. The important factors are: socio-economic status; dominant form of employment; and age. There is also a correlation between party support and social outlook. I have chosen two indices of social outlook: allegations of discrimination and prejudice regarding the wider society; and choice of school for the young.

Before dealing with each of these factors in turn, it is necessary to provide information on the degree of support for various parties.

1. Degree of Party Support.

The relevant figures on this topic are presented in Table I. The first column shows the name of the party; the second gives the number of votes obtained by that
party in Shaarayim in the 1955 municipal elections; the third column gives the percentage of the total poll obtained in Shaarayim by each party; the fourth and final column gives the percentage figure of support for each party as shown by the sample interview. It is clear that the figures in columns 3 and 4 agree substantially with one another; for this reason, the last figures provide a legitimate basis for further analysis.

Before commenting on the figures in Table I, I offer a few words of explanation concerning the parties and their nature.

'Leamn Shaarayim' is the party led and organized by certain communal leaders in Shaarayim, and is a 'pure' local-ethnic party.

'Mapai-Shaarayim' is a local-ethnic party which is affiliated to 'Mapai', and which I call a 'compromise' local-ethnic party.

'Mapai' is the name of the right-wing Israel Labour Party; the latter was originally a single party, but split, at first into two parties, and then into three. The other two labour parties are 'Ahduth Avodah' and 'Mapam'.

* See Chapters II and III.
There are two main religious parties in Israel, each of which has a workers' faction. In Shaarayim, it is the workers' faction of one of these two parties which is supported; but for local purposes, the parties combined under a single name for the 1955 elections.

The 'General Zionist' party is a moderate right-wing party, which, by and large, represents the interests of private enterprise, both small and large, including agriculture. Allied to this party is the 'General Zionist Sephardi and Oriental Party', which represents or aims to represent the Sephardi and Oriental sections of the population, or a certain class thereof.

'Heruth' is the name of the extreme right-wing party in Israel politics, which is opposed to the 'vested interests' of the labour movement, on the one hand, and espouses rabid nationalism on the other; it is probably the nearest thing to a Fascist party in Israel.

Apart from these parties, there are one or two others for which a few of the Yemenis of Shaarayim vote; but they are of minor importance, and are not shown separately.

It should be noted that the sample figures add up to 90 only; this is because no reliable information could be obtained for 10% of the sample.

The main inferences which can be drawn from the figures in Table I are as follows:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTY</th>
<th>1955 Elections</th>
<th>1955 Elections</th>
<th>Interview Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NUMBER OF VOTES</td>
<td>PERCENTAGE OF ELECTORATE</td>
<td>PERCENTAGE SUPPORT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'LEMAAN SHAARAYIM'</td>
<td>824</td>
<td>35% (approx)</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'MAPAI SHAARAYIM'</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>13.5% (&quot;&quot;)</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'HERUTH'</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>10% (&quot;&quot;)</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'MAPAI'</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>9% (&quot;&quot;)</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RELIGIOUS PARTIES</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>7% (&quot;&quot;)</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'GENERAL ZIONIST' &amp; 'GENERAL ZIONIST SEPHARDI' PARTIES</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>4% (&quot;&quot;)</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEFT-WING LABOUR PARTIES</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>3.5% (&quot;&quot;)</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER PARTIES</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>2.5% (&quot;&quot;)</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO PARTY, UNKNOW</td>
<td>336 (approx)</td>
<td>14.5% (&quot;&quot;)</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>2,350 (approx)</td>
<td>100% (&quot;&quot;)</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(i) The biggest single party in Shaarayim is 'Lemaan Shaarayim', for which there is about 40% support.

(ii) The support for both local-ethnic parties taken together amounts to 50% or more.

(iii) The support for non-religious labour parties — that is 'Mapai-Shaarayim', 'Mapai', and the other two, taken together — amounts to about 30% of the total.

(iv) The support for parties representing the workers, including the religious parties, amounts to a little over 35% of the total.

(v) The support for religious parties taken alone amounts to no more than 8%.

(vi) The support for national right-wing parties amounts to 17%.

(vii) The support for all right-wing parties, including 'Lemaan Shaarayim' — the leaders of 'Lemaan Shaarayim' are by and large in sympathy with these right-wing parties — amounts to over 50% of the total.

These facts are of considerable interest for the following reasons: the overwhelming majority of the adult residents of Shaarayim are labourers — yet the support for workers' parties is weaker than the support for the 'pure local-ethnic party'; the overwhelming majority of the adult residents of Shaarayin are devoutly orthodox, yet the support for religious parties is negligible.
I turn now to an analysis of the correlation between party allegiance and other social factors. The figures presented in the following sections are based on the 100 household sample. But in presenting them, I have chosen to combine the figures for some parties. The term 'Other Labour Parties' covers 'Mapai', 'Ahduth Avodah' and 'Hapam'; the term 'Right-wing Parties' covers 'Herut', the 'General Zionists' and the 'General Zionist Sephardi and Oriental' parties; finally, the terms 'Others', 'None' or 'Unknown' cover all those not appearing under other party names or composite party names. I have left this last figure in for the sake of statistical accuracy.


The sample households are divided into three status-groups. The characteristics of these have been discussed in an earlier chapter, and need not detain us here. Suffice it to say that they were estimated in advance of my enquiry into political allegiance, so that there is no possibility of a bias in presenting these figures.

The figures presented in Table II invite the following inferences:

(i) Support for 'Lemaan Shaarayim' comes largely from the middle status-group, the 'Bilti-Mesudarim'.

(ii) Support for 'Mapai-Shaarayim' comes from both the middle and the upper status groups — from the 'Bilti-
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Socio-Economic Status</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Highest ('Mesudarim')</td>
<td>5 (18%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Middle ('Etathi- Mesudarim')</td>
<td>29 (52%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lowest ('Social 'Cases')</td>
<td>2 (12.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Support</td>
<td>'Lehavi Shabarath'</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>'HaPai Shabarath'</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other Labour Parties</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Religious Parties</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Right-Wing Parties</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other Parties, No Party</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>And Unknown</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Totals</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Mesudarim' and the 'Mesudarim'.

(iii) Support for the workers' parties, taken together, comes from both the middle and the upper status groups equally, as does support for the national right-wing parties.

(iv) In the upper status group - 'Mesudarim' and 'Elite' - only 18% of the total support 'Lenaan Shaarayim'; in the middle status-group 52% support that party; whereas in the lowest group, only 12.5% support it.

(v) In the upper group 21% support 'Mapai Shaarayim', while in the middle group only 13% support it, and in the lower group only 6% do.

(vi) Support for the two local-ethnic parties taken together amounts to 3½% in the upper status-group; it amounts to 65% in the middle group, and to 19% in the lowest group.

(vii) Support for all workers' parties (including religious) is strongest in the upper group - 53%; it is weakest in the middle group - 27%; and amounts to 51% in the lowest group.

(viii) Support for the religious parties is fairly weak amongst the upper group - 7%; it is even weaker amongst the middle group - 5%; but is strongest amongst the lowest group - 12.5%.

(ix) Support for national right-wing parties is strongest amongst the upper group - 22%; weakest amongst
the middle group - 12½; and fairly strong amongst the lowest group - 19½.

3. Party Support in Relation to Type of Occupation.

I have divided the sample into three groups; those who earn their livelihood predominantly in the form of wages and salaries; those who are self-employed; and those who are either totally unemployed or only partly-employed. The reason for my choice of this division is as follows: people who earn salaries and wages are more likely to be dependent upon a strong labour organization than those who are self-employed or unemployed. It is therefore of interest to see the extent to which this affects political allegiance.

The following inferences are suggested by the figures in Table III:

(i) Amongst the wage-earners, 41½% support 'Lemaan Shaarayim'; amongst the self-employed the figure is 37½%, whilst amongst the unemployed the figure is only 12.5½.

(ii) Of the wage earners, 18½% support 'Kapai-Shaarayim'; of the self-employed only 11½% support this party, and amongst the third group only 6% do.

(iii) Support for the two local-ethnic parties is strongest amongst the wage-earners - 59½; weaker amongst the self-employed - 48½; and weakest amongst the third group - 19½.

(iv) Support for the workers' parties - including the religious party - is strongest amongst the wage-earners -
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTY</th>
<th>FORM OF OCCUPATION</th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NONE</td>
<td>SELF-EMPLOYED</td>
<td>SALARIED &amp; WAGE-EARNING</td>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'LEMAAN SHAARAYIM'</td>
<td>2 (12.5%)</td>
<td>10 (37%)</td>
<td>24 (41%)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'MAPAI SHAARAYIM'</td>
<td>1 (6.25%)</td>
<td>3 (11%)</td>
<td>10 (18%)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER LABOUR PARTIES</td>
<td>2 (12.5%)</td>
<td>3 (11%)</td>
<td>9 (16%)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RELIGIOUS PARTIES</td>
<td>2 (12.5%)</td>
<td>2 (7.5%)</td>
<td>3 (5%)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIGHT-WING PARTIES</td>
<td>3 (18.75%)</td>
<td>7 (26%)</td>
<td>6 (11%)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER PARTIES, NO PARTY AND UNKNOWN</td>
<td>6 (37.5%)</td>
<td>2 (7.5%)</td>
<td>5 (9%)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>16 (100%)</td>
<td>27 (100%)</td>
<td>57 (100%)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
39%; but it is about equal amongst the other two
groups - 30%.
(v) Support for the religious parties is lowest amongst
the wage-earners - 39%; a little stronger amongst the
self-employed - 38%; but strongest amongst the third group -
12.5%.
(vi) Support for the national right-wing parties is
weakest amongst the wage-earners - 11%; strongest amongst
the self-employed - 26%; and fairly strong amongst the
third group - 19%.

4. Party Support in Relation to Age-Group.

I have divided the sample population into three age-
groups, taking 18 as the lowest age, this being the age at
which eligibility for voting is attained.

The following inferences can be drawn from Table IV:
(i) Support for 'Iemaan Shaarayim' is strongest in the
oldest age-group - 43%; a little weaker in the middle
age-group - 38%; and much weaker in the youngest age-
group - 17%.
(ii) Support for 'Kapai shaarayim' is weakest in the
oldest age-group - 9%; and about equally strong in the
other two age groups - 18% and 17%.
(iii) Support for the two local-ethnic parties taken
together is strong in the oldest group - 52%; even stronger
in the middle group - 58%; and weakest in the youngest
group - 34%.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTY</th>
<th>AGE-GROUP</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18 - 25</td>
<td>25 - 40</td>
<td>OVER 40</td>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'LEMAAN SHAARAYIN'</td>
<td>3 (17%)</td>
<td>15 (38%)</td>
<td>18 (42%)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'HAPAI SHAARAYIN'</td>
<td>3 (17%)</td>
<td>7 (18%)</td>
<td>4 (10%)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER LABOUR PARTIES</td>
<td>4 (22%)</td>
<td>6 (15%)</td>
<td>4 (10%)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RELIGIOUS PARTIES</td>
<td>1 (6%)</td>
<td>2 (5%)</td>
<td>4 (10%)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIGHT-WING PARTIES</td>
<td>5 (27%)</td>
<td>5 (12%)</td>
<td>6 (14%)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER PARTIES NO PARTY AND UNKNOWN</td>
<td>2 (11%)</td>
<td>5 (12%)</td>
<td>6 (14%)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>18 (100%)</td>
<td>40 (100%)</td>
<td>42 (100%)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(iv) Support for the workers' parties taken together is weakest in the oldest age-group - 29%; stronger in the middle group - 38%; and strongest in the youngest group - 45%.

(v) Support for the religious parties is strongest in the oldest group 10%, and about equal in the other two groups - 5% and 6%.

(vi) Support for the right-wing parties is about equal in the two older groups - 14% and 12%; but it is much stronger in the youngest group - 27%.

Summary and Interpretation of the Evidence Presented in Tables I - IV.

Figures, unhappily, do not speak for themselves; they have to be interpreted. I propose now to offer a sociological analysis of the data presented in the four tables; the analysis is conducted in terms of a theoretical scheme.

It suggests that political allegiance in Shaarayim can be divided into 3 types: 'pure' local-ethnic loyalty; 'compromise' local-ethnic loyalty; and loyalty to an interest group which extends beyond the confines of the community. The first type is manifest in support for 'Lemaan Shaarayim'; the second type is manifest in support for 'Mapai Shaarayim'; the third type is expressed in support for the national workers' parties, religious
parties, or the right-wing parties.

'Pure' local-ethnic loyalty is associated with people who, while earning a livelihood either as self-employed or as wage-earners, have not even achieved moderate prosperity; and of these it is commoner amongst the older age-groups. There are two elements in this situation: the first is related to material advantage; the second is related to the nature of group identification.

There are two main avenues to economic prosperity: either through the channels of the organized labour movement; or through success in private enterprise, whether in agriculture, commerce, industry or the professions. Success in both cases entails an emergence of common interests with a section of the wider society. To some extent, success results from association with an interest-group or organization; in other cases such association is entered into in order to ensure or protect interests which have emerged independently. But where, after some time, success is not forthcoming, there is either indifference or hostility to those organizations and associations which represent these interests. Thus, the 'Bilti-Macudarin' of Shaarayim tend to support the one political party which professes to protect these interests which derive from membership of a local-ethnic community - their low social and economic status being connected, in their own minds, with membership of a local-ethnic community.
in the form of real estate, is their major vested interest; the biggest threat to its maintenance lies in municipal taxation; hence there is a positive as well as a negative material aspect to support for a party which "defends the interests of the community".

Aided to this, is the factor of group identification, and the acceptance of local-ethnic solidarity as a way of expressing traditional values. The persistency of ethnic traditionalism is partly a reaction to what is considered as a hostile wide society; but it is also an expression of resistance to absorption in that society which accords to Yezenis a low social status. Of course, the enjoyment of low status is linked with relative poverty on the one hand, and the survival of ethnic characteristics on the other. The process involves a vicious circle of cause and effect. It is not fortuitous, that support for 'pure' local-ethnic loyalty is commoner amongst the older age-groups. It is here that tradition dies hardest; and it is also here that aspirations to success and absorption in the wider society are weakest.

'Compromise' local-ethnic loyalty, is, as the term suggests, a compromise between loyalty to the local-ethnic community, and to a wider interest-group - the organized workers' movement; it is a form of what earlier writers called, "accommodation". It is strongest amongst the highest status group, and is more prevalent amongst the
wage-earners than amongst the self-employed, and is commoner amongst the middle and youngest age-groups. These correlations suggest an obvious interpretation.

The adherents to this political outlook are predominantly people who have attained to some degree of success through the workers' movement, or who wish to defend their interests as workers by supporting the labour organization; in some cases, success is linked with a degree of actual ideological commitment, and acceptance of certain values of the wider society, or a section of it. But this acceptance is tempered by a recognition of local-ethnic interests and loyalties; it is through the agency of local labour leaders that certain privileges and benefits accrue to the workers of Shaarayim.

The fact that this outlook is strongest amongst the middle age-group is also significant, since traditional values and attitudes still persist amongst such people; they may be less traditionalistic than their elders, but this does not imply a complete break. They are aware, from their social experience, of the connexion between membership of an ethnic enclave and status in the wider society. Their political solution is sought through the means of using local-ethnic organization for the attainment of goals in a wider social context.
Political Loyalty to a section of the wider society is particularly strong amongst those who have attained to some degree of prosperity; and also amongst those who are destitute or near-destitute; and is considerably weaker amongst those who are neither prosperous nor destitute. It is commoner amongst self-employed people than amongst the wage-earners, and is stronger amongst the young than amongst the older age-groups.

The lowest status-group - the so-called 'social cases' - has less to gain from loyalty to either of the local-ethnic parties, than the middle status groups. Social-welfare subsidies and assistance are obtained by personal application, rather than through the agency of a leader. These people have little or no property, and are therefore not affected by local taxes. They have little or no work, and when they do manage to obtain a livelihood it is through the welfare department or through the religious organization that this is obtained. Having no vested interests, and being largely isolated from personal contacts with local leadership, they have fewer inducements to support local leadership or local parties. Their attitude towards political allegiance is essentially one of experimentation; they will try various parties in turn.

Members of the highest status-group - particularly those who are self-employed - have often achieved some
degree of prosperity without the help of local leadership and so have less cause to support it.

This third type of political allegiance is of three kinds: allegiance to the labour organization; to organized religion; and to right-wing parties.

Uncompromising loyalty to the labour movement is strongest amongst the younger age-groups, particularly those who have achieved some degree of prosperity as wage- or salary-earners. Younger people in this category have fewer personal ties with local labour leaders, and are often able to seek their own way in the wider society; they have less sympathy with the notion of local-ethnic solidarity.

Loyalty to the religious organization is strongest amongst the 'social cases'; the latter believe that with strong religious representations they are more likely to obtain increased assistance of one kind or another, since the religious organization is often associated with the Ministry of Social Welfare*, or with private charities. But this loyalty may also have a purely emotional significance. In all events, 'social cases' are less likely to be persuaded against supporting the religious

* The Minister of Social Welfare, in Israel, is normally a supporter of one of the religious parties in the Government coalition.
parties by local leaders, with whom they have fewer contacts.

Loyalty to parties of the right is strongest amongst the highest status-groups, though it is also found in the lowest, and it is strongest amongst the younger age-groups; this is particularly the case with regard to 'Heruth', the extreme right-wing party. This party appeals strongly to discontented sections of the population, and has a marked appeal to Oriental ethnic groups. For some of the younger people in Shaarayim, who have definite aspirations for acceptance in the wider society, and resent the connexion between ethnic origin and social status, Heruth represents a doubly useful channel. On the one hand it provides them with a means for identification with a wider social group, while on the other it permits them full expression of their hostility to a section of the wider society.

I have discussed two, interlinked factors, in explaining political allegiance: the attainment of concrete material or economic goals; and the expression of identification with a social group. The first of these two needs no further analysis; but the second, since it is more nebulous, needs to be more fully substantiated.

If political allegiance is asserted to be a function of social outlook, then it is necessary to establish
independent evidence for the existence of the latter; this I now propose to do. I have chosen two indices of social outlook: allegations of prejudice and discrimination as made by residents of Shaarayim in regard to the wider society; and the preference shown by residents of Shaarayim for certain schools. Before presenting the evidence, I shall discuss the significance of these two indices.

There is no doubt that prejudice concerning Yemenis exists amongst the non-Yemenis of Rehovoth and the wider society. There is also some evidence for discrimination. The extent of such prejudice and discrimination is not of importance in the present context. What is of importance, however, is the fact of its recognition, and the degree to which this is stressed. When people feel hostile towards an object, they tend to find hostility in the object itself - that is, they project their own feelings onto the object. Similarly, when hostility is attributed to an object, this is often, though not always, a sign of hostility in the subject. Allegations of prejudice and discrimination can be taken as an instance of this principle. The degree to which they are expressed by people in Shaarayim is related to the degree of hostility felt by different types of people in Shaarayim towards the wider society; and the degree of hostility is a product of the
social circumstances and outlook of the type of person concerned. Insofar as there is a variation in the degree of expression in Shaarayim, this variation can be taken as an index of one of two things: either, there is variation in the types of inter-ethnic experience; or, there is variation in the type of social outlook.

My investigations have shown that there is no correlation between objective conditions of inter-ethnic experience and attitudes of hostility; therefore, it should follow, that these attitudes must express variations in social outlook. Of course, I do not deny that social outlook may be determined by such things as security of social status in the wider society, or the degree of economic or other types of success. In fact, I would suggest that social outlook is associated with these factors, though not to any extent with actual experience of ethnic discrimination. Allegations of prejudice and discrimination, though they are based on fact, are not necessarily based on the facts of personal experience. In short, I think that it can be established, that the degree to which people allege discrimination or prejudice, indicates the degree to which they have a positive or negative attitude towards the wider society.

School preference is a useful index for two reasons: firstly, it reflects the relative degree of social identification with the local-ethnic group as against the
wider society; secondly, it reflects the aspirations of parents. If parents send their children to schools outside of Shaarayim, then it seems to indicate that they have less fear of ethnic discrimination, that they are favourably disposed towards the wider society, and that they aspire to greater social identification with the wider society — if only in vicarious fashion, through their children.

**Allegations of Prejudice and Discrimination in Relation To Political Allegiance.**

The data on this topic are to be found in Table V. The expression of opinions is divided into three categories: extreme allegations, moderate allegations and the absence of allegations. (The distinction between extreme and moderate is based on replies to a series of questions, and personal impressions.)

The following inferences can be made from these data:

(i) Supporters of 'Lemaan Shaarayim' are almost unanimous in alleging the existence of prejudice and discrimination against Yemenis; and extreme allegations are very prominent — 81%.

(ii) Supporters of 'Mapai-Shaarayim' are more cautious in expressing these sentiments. Only 29% of them make extreme allegations, though 72% make some allegations.

(iii) Supporters of national labour parties make no extreme allegations, but nearly half of them make moderate ones.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTY</th>
<th>ALLEGATIONS OF PREJUDICE &amp; DISCRIMINATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EXTREME</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'LEMAAN SHAARAYIM'</td>
<td>29 (81%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'MAPAI SHAARAYIM'</td>
<td>4 (29%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER LABOUR PARTIES</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RELIGIOUS PARTIES</td>
<td>2 (29%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIGHT-WING PARTIES</td>
<td>7 (44%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER PARTIES, NO PARTY UNKNOWN</td>
<td>4 (31%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(iv) Supporters of religious parties are far from unanimous in this matter, but over 50% do make allegations, and over 25% make extreme allegations.

(v) Supporters of national right-wing parties are in substantial agreement in alleging the existence of discrimination and prejudices - over 70% - but only 44% make extreme allegations.

On the whole, there is some correlation between the degree to which allegations are made, and the nature of political allegiance. People who profess a strong local-ethnic loyalty - whether in 'pure' or 'compromise' form - tend more to allege the existence of discrimination or prejudice; while people who profess a wider political allegiance are less prone to such allegations. However, the figures on right-wing national parties do contradict my hypothesis. It seems that some people are capable of exposing a wider political loyalty without adopting a positive attitude towards the wider society. However, the supporters of national right-wing parties are far less prone to making extreme allegations than supporters of 'Lemaan Shaarayim'.

School Preference in Relation to Political Allegiance.

School choice or preference is divided into three categories: preference for the 'Moriah' school; preference for a
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTY</th>
<th>PARENTS' SCHOOL PREFERENCE</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MORIAH</td>
<td>OTHER RELIGIOUS SCHOOL</td>
<td>NON-RELIGIOUS SCHOOL</td>
<td>NO INFORMATION</td>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'LEMAAN SHAARAYIM'</td>
<td>24 (67%)</td>
<td>8 (22%)</td>
<td>3 (8%)</td>
<td>1 (3%)</td>
<td>36 (100%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'MAPAI SHAARAYIM'</td>
<td>6 (43%)</td>
<td>2 (14%)</td>
<td>6 (43%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>14 (100%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER LABOUR PARTIES</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>14 (100%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>14 (100%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RELIGIOUS PARTIES</td>
<td>4 (57%)</td>
<td>3 (43%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>7 (100%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIGHT-WING PARTIES</td>
<td>4 (25%)</td>
<td>3 (19%)</td>
<td>7 (44%)</td>
<td>2 (12%)</td>
<td>16 (100%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER PARTIES, NO PARTY AND UNKNOWN</td>
<td>4 (31%)</td>
<td>3 (23%)</td>
<td>3 (23%)</td>
<td>3 (23%)</td>
<td>13 (100%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
religious school other than the 'Morish' school; and preference for a non-religious school.

The figures presented invite the following inferences:

(i) Supporters of local-ethnic parties show a greater preference for the 'Morish' school than supporters of other parties.

(ii) Supporters of national right-wing parties show a greater preference for the 'Morish' school than do supporters of national labour parties.

(iii) Supporters of religious parties show a greater preference for the 'Morish' school than do supporters of other national parties.

Here again, there is some general confirmation of my hypothesis that political allegiance is a function of social outlook. The school preference of those who support the religious parties might seem to contradict it; but it should be remembered that for people living in Shaarayim, and who choose a religious school for their children, it is more convenient to send them to the 'Morish' school than to the 'Takhkemoni' school. The fact that 43% of the supporters of religious parties do prefer to send their children to a school other than the 'Morish', despite the possible inconvenience caused by this choice, would support my hypothesis.

The fact that supporters of national right-wing parties show a greater preference for the 'Morish' school
than supporters of national left-wing parties, seems to suggest that the former are less fully identified with the wider society than the latter. This interpretation is also borne out by the data on allegations of discrimination. As I have already mentioned, supporters of right-wing parties are often younger people who express a strong hostility towards the established authority of the wider society; their political allegiance is an expression of their ambivalence - they wish to be accepted, but fear rejection.

This concludes my discussion of party allegiance. I turn now to a consideration of allegiance to particular leaders.

**Factors Affecting Allegiance to Leaders.**

In the previous section of this chapter I discussed the general nature of political allegiance in Shaarayi, and shewed that there were several forms of such allegiance, each associated with a particular social outlook. I also discussed the social and economic factors affecting the types of allegiance which exist. One factor which was not discussed, is the degree to which allegiance is affected by the support of a particular leader. Is the latter simply an expression or product of party allegiance? Or does allegiance to a particular leader affect the choice of party allegiance?
There is no single answer to that question. Two general statements can be made. In some cases, allegiance to a party and support of a leader, reinforce one another. Support or acceptance of a leader varies in nature: different leaders are accepted or supported in different ways; the same leader might be accepted or supported by different people in different ways. I propose to devote the rest of this chapter to elucidating these points.

Types of Leadership.

Leadership in Shaarayim can be divided, according to two criteria, into four types: symbolic and practical; religious and secular. In dividing leadership into these categories, I am not suggesting that any particular leader falls into one category alone.

**Symbolic leadership** refers to a relationship between leader and followers, such that the leader expressed the unity, common interests, or social identity of the group. This what Parsons calls the 'expressive' role of leadership. (Talcott Parsons: 1951).

**Practical leadership** is exercised when the leader either controls the activities of followers, or acts as their agent in affairs which concern them. This is what Parsons calls the 'instrumental' role of leadership. (Parsons, T.: ibid)

**Religious leadership** is that which is exercised within a framework of religiously defined roles, either
in ritual or administrative contexts. Religious leadership usually contains a strong symbolic component, since religious values and practices usually serve either to characterize group identification or to strengthen group relationships. However, religious leadership is not equivalent to symbolic or expressive leadership; the role of religious leader may be linked with highly practical matters, such as the legalization of marriage.

Secular leadership is simply the complementary of religious leadership: it may be predominantly symbolic, or predominantly practical or a combination of both.

In Shaarayim, different people, or different types of people, stress different aspects of the role of particular leaders, while some do not recognize particular individuals as leaders at all. There are sectional variations in the degree to which a particular component of leadership is stressed, as well as in the degree of recognition of leadership. These factors are functionally connected with political allegiance. I propose to deal, in these terms, with each of the important leaders.

Haim Madhalah, the so-called 'Mukhtar' of Shaarayim, is widely recognized as a man of importance in the community. Amongst the 'pure' local-ethnic loyalists, he is the symbolic leader par excellence. One supporter, a man 55 years old, a 'Bilti-Masudar', and a supporter of
'Leman Shaarayin', expressed his attitude in the following way: "Haim Nadhalah has been our 'Bakhtar' for many years, and to us he is still 'Bakhtar'. He is learned in 'Torah' and is of a fine family. We look to him for guidance and to set an example to us all, in his piety and learning. He used to do much for the community, but now he is old, and wishes to give the younger men their opportunity. He is our 'Moshal'."

However, this favourable characterization of his status is not shared by all. Some of the moderate opponents of the 'pure' local-ethnic loyalists, look upon H. Nadhalah as a mere figurehead; as a man who deserves prestige and deference, but little more. Amongst the more extreme opponents of local-ethnic solidarity, that is, amongst supporters of the workers' movement, this man is looked upon as a symbol of reaction; however, this does constitute some recognition of his influence. Amongst the supporters of the right-wing parties, Haim Nadhalah is considered more favourably – as an example of piety etc – but as too old and timid for effective leadership.

*The speaker, significantly, uses the word 'Moshal' rather than the word 'Hashig'. The latter term is the one used commonly in modern Hebrew to designate 'leader'. But the former term, a more traditional one, actually refers to a 'communal headman' or 'governor'.
Rav Meir Mizrahi, the official Rabbi of Shaarayim, is universally recognized as the religious leader of the community; since all but a small minority of the residents adhere to the basic practices of orthodox religion, and since a large section are devout in their adherence, it follows that Meir Mizrahi is both a symbolic as well as a practical leader. However, his status is not generalized or extended into the political field. The majority of the devoutly orthodox are supporters of 'Lemaan Shaarayim', and therefore distinguish between the domain of religion and the domain of local politics.

Yisrael Ovadiyah Mizrahi, is fully recognized as a practical leader by two sections of the population: the supporters of 'Lemaan Shaarayim' and the supporters of national right-wing parties. This applies also to Moche Mekaytan. These two leaders are accepted insofar as their chief concern is with the interests of property. Amongst the remainder of the population, two views prevail: the more moderate opponents of 'Lemaan Shaarayim', whether they support the religious parties, the 'compromise' party or others, tend to admit the possibility that Yisrael Ovadiyah, and perhaps Mekaytan, are capable of serving certain practical purposes on behalf of Shaarayim as a community; but the more radical opponents of 'Lemaan Shaarayim' deny this emphatically. They see leaders like Yisrael Ovadiyah as mere reactionaries, serving the interests of the right,
or as ethnic traditionalists, serving no real interests whatsoever, and merely obstructing the social and economic "emancipation" of the Yemenis.

To some extent, Yisrael Ovadiah is looked upon as a symbolic leader, particularly by the supporters of 'Lemaan Shaarayim'. They support him because they want local Yemeni leadership, and not necessarily because they believe that he can achieve any practical results. This viewpoint is well illustrated in the words of supporter Yisrael Ovadiah, a man of the highest social and economic status, about 45 years of age: "Perhaps there is not much that he can do for us, as everything is controlled by the 'Moshavah' and 'Mapai'. But he has always been our leader; previously he was head of our local committee. He is one of our community, and he has not sold himself to some political party. He is a good man, pious and honest. I would not support another."

Mekaytan, on the other hand, has not achieved this prestige and acceptance, and so is hardly looked upon as a symbolic leader except by some of the younger supporters of 'Lemaan Shaarayim'. It is probably for this reason that he lays so much stress on the factor of discrimination and prejudice, since there are few areas in which he can affect practical leadership. Support for Mekaytan is still a product of support for 'Lemaan Shaarayim', whereas
in the case of Yisrael Ovadia the two aspects of allegiance are mutually reinforcing.

**Rav Yosef Meshulam** is less widely accepted as a religious leader than Meir Mizrahi. There are two reasons for this: he occupies a lower official status, and is less qualified in rabbinical matters; he is more active politically on behalf of the religious parties. For this latter reason, he is looked upon as a political as well as religious leader by those who support his party. In fact, some of the latter do support this party because of his personal influence. He is looked upon as a practical as well as a symbolic religious leader.

**Pinhas Kaparah**, who is the elder amongst the labour leaders in Shaarayim, is accepted by supporters of 'Mapai Shaarayim' as both a practical and a symbolic leader, in that he represents the unity of the workers in the community. In fact, he now has few practical duties to perform, though his influence is still felt in matters relating to the local party, and in educational and cultural services which are provided for the Yemeni workers.

But outside of his own party, he now has little following. The younger supporters of the labour movement tend to look upon him as too moderate, traditionalistic and timid. The supporters of 'Lemaan Shaarayim' and the right-wing parties do not recognize his status in the labour movement as conferring on him the position of
communal leader.

Sebastian Cohen, is accepted as a practical leader, both by supporters of 'Mapai-Shaarayim' as well as by others. This is due to his position on the municipal council and on the social welfare committee. He has a personal following - though it was formerly larger - but is not influential in winning new supporters for his party. He is looked upon as too moderate and traditionalistic by the younger supporters of the labour organization, and as a "party dupe" by the supporters of 'Lemaan Shaarayim'. He does not have the long-standing prestige of Pinhas Kapherah amongst the supporters of 'Mapai-Shaarayim', but is recognized by the latter as able and enthusiastic.

Hezkiyahu Medhalah and the younger labour leaders, enjoy considerable following amongst the younger supporters of the labour organization, but little amongst the older ones, particularly those who support 'Mapai-Shaarayim'. They are primarily practical leaders, though Hezkiyahu Medhalah is looked upon by some as a symbolic figure, in that he represents a radical break with traditionalism, both ethnic and religious. It is for this last reason that he failed to obtain a second nomination for the leadership of 'Mapai-Shaarayim'.

Avraham Yerimi is solely a practical leader, in that he is responsible for the allocation of certain
types of work. His authority is widely recognized in Shaareyim, but his prestige stems largely from his position in the labour organization, and is therefore recognized more by those who support the labour movement.

I have not considered all leaders in Shaareyim in relation to their following, but only the main ones. The general features which emerge from this analysis are as follows:—

(i) There are two main foci of symbolic leadership in the community: the representation of ethnic traditionalism; and the representation of religious traditionalism. To some extent, the two merge; but the former is linked solely with local-ethnic solidarity, while the latter is linked with the organization of religion in the wider society.

(ii) The recognition of the symbolic status of local-ethnic leaders is strongest amongst those who have failed to achieve success through the agency of the workers' movement and amongst those who have succeeded in achieving material success, but solely through private means — the latter are in the minority.

(iii) The component of symbolic leadership is small in relationships between labour leaders and followers; acceptance of these leaders is more a consequence of party allegiance than its cause.

(iv) The mixture of political with religious leadership — except on a basis of local-ethnic solidarity — weakens the
symbolic component of religious leadership in Shaarayim. The reason for this lies in the conflict between Shaarayim and certain sections of the wider society.
Shaarayim was founded in 1907 by 117 immigrants who had arrived in Palestine in that year from the Yemen. They all came from one district - that surrounding the town of Saadah, in the north. Like most Yemeni immigrants, they landed penniless at the port of Jaffa, having exhausted their funds in making the journey. This group was invited by the Jewish farmers of the 'Moshavah' of Rehovoth to come to work as agricultural labourers, and accepted.

The group was composed almost entirely of kinsmen, - both lineal and cognatic; at their head was Saadiah Madhalah, who had been both a communal headman and rabbi in the Yemeni. Within three months, the first group was joined by a second from Northern Yemen, this time from the district of Haidan. Like the first one, the core of this group was a number of lineally-linked kinsmen, whose leader, Menasheh Kaparah, had been not only headman, but also 'Beth Din' for the whole of his district.

*The term 'Beth Din' refers in fact to the rabbinical court; but amongst the Yemeni the term was used in reference to the office as well as the person of rabbi who held court; not all rabbis are recognized as such, the term 'Rav' or 'Mori' being used indiscriminately for anyone who was a 'Shohet' let alone one who could perform marriages or grant divorces.
The Yemeni men and boys, at least those over the age of twelve or thirteen, went out to work as agricultural labourers, while some of the womenfolk went to work in the homes of the Ashkenazi farmers.

In 1911 the Yemenis were given 18 dunamas of land on the outskirts of the 'Moshavah', divided into plots of one dunam each; these were distributed amongst 'family heads', by the Palestine Investment Corporation, an organization sponsored by the Baron de Rothschild. In succeeding years, more land was distributed. Within two years there were twenty houses, and within another three, there were more than forty. The Yemenis, often assisted by their womenfolk, built their own houses in the hours after work. The new settlement was called 'Shaarayim' by its founders.

Though some of the Jewish farmers of the 'Yishuv'* still preferred to hire Arab labourers - particularly the landless 'fellaheen' of the neighbouring villages - others preferred Yemeni immigrants. There were two reasons for this: in the first place they could be hired as cheaply as the Arab labourers; secondly, they were Jewish. The Ashkenazi colonists could afford to be morally correct and economically prudent at one and the same time. As a

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*The term 'Yishuv' was used, by its members, to refer to the Jewish section of the population of Ottoman and Mandated Palestine.
result of the increased demand for Yemeni labourers, as well as the desire to encourage 'shovuth Zion', some of the leaders of the Jewish colonists of Palestine decided to send an emissary to the Jewish communities of southern Arabia, to stimulate further immigration into Palestine. And so, in 1912, Yavnieli set out for the Yemen, and in the following year the first group, following his call, arrived in Jaffa; and some of them were brought to the Rehovoth area. This group numbered about 100 people, all from Shar-aab in southern Yemen.

These Shar-aabis, like those who had preceded them, lived in outhouses and temporary huts until they received land in 1913, and were able to start building their own houses. They were different from the northern Yemenis in many respects - in physical type, as well as in dialect and other cultural features, and were accustomed to certain differences in social structure. Because of these sub-ethnic differences and the deeply-ingrained suspiciousness of Yemeni Jews - connected no doubt with the tight-knittedness of local and kin relations - the 'Shar-aabis' kept very much to themselves, as did the northerners. Each occupied a neighbourhood which was in many ways a community unto itself. There was little

* 'The return to Zion'. 
political or economic organization to weld the two groups together or even to weld each group separately; and ritual ties were confined to the sub-ethnic community.

Between 1914 and 1915, a further parcel of eighty dunams of land was given to the inhabitants of Shaarayim, this time by an organization known as 'Shomrai Torah' - i.e. the 'guardians of the Mosaic Law'. This gift was due to the protective interest taken in these Yemeni immigrants by the then chief Rabbi of Palestine, HaRav Kook. Twelve of these eighty dunams were to be set aside for communal purposes - a school, a synagogue etc. - while the remainder were to be allocated, a dunam to each household. Fifteen dunams were immediately distributed amongst those immigrants who were still homeless - mainly 'Shar-aabis' - while part of the remainder was retained for immigrants who were known to be arriving shortly. Money was obtained on loan, free of interest, from the Keran HaKayemeth* for purposes of building houses, and soon there were more than 70 houses in Shaarayim.

After the 1914-1918 war, the steady but small flow of immigration from the Yemen was renewed. Building continued as before, and the area occupied by the community expanded in all directions. The sub-ethnic differences

* Jewish Settlement Fund.
became even more varied; there were groups from all parts of northern, southern and central Yemen and even from the Aden protectorate; but the largest numbers were coming from southern and central Yemen. There were small enclaves of sub-ethnic neighbourhoods throughout Shaarayim, each with its own prayer-house and groups of kindred. Until 1925 there was no change in only one major respect—all the residents were from the Yemen or from Southern Arabia.

But after 1925 this did change. With the increased flow of immigration from eastern Europe of socialist Zionists, a new class of Ashkenazi resident appeared in Kehovoth; these Ashkenazi workers could not be absorbed in the ‘Moshavah’ and overflowed into Shaarayim as tenants. The appearance of tenants, and the earning of rent, acted as a strong stimulus to further building on the part of the Yemenis. There was a marked change in the outward appearance and composition of Shaarayim, which till then had been physically separated from the ‘Moshavah’ by a sandy hill. The style of building also changed, with many more modern-type houses and even a few blocks of flats appearing; rooms were added on to houses, and new houses sprang up on the small plots which till then had been used solely as vegetable gardens, or for raising poultry. As a result of these developments, there began an endless
series of disputes between Yemenis over land boundaries; erstwhile friendly neighbours became litigants. The Ashkenazi tenants tended to look upon Shaarayim as a place of temporary residence, but as some left others would appear to take their places. However, some tenants, especially those living in blocks of flats, became fairly permanent residents of Shaarayim, though it is to be noted that even these did not become identified with the community of Shaarayim – they remained residents only.

The Yemeni community of Shaarayim continued to expand with continuous immigration and with natural increase. Some of its residents left, while the children of others settled in Moshav Marmorak and Shkunath Ephraim, which had come into existence by 1935. By 1940 the Yemeni population of Shaarayim was about 3,500.

Between 1940 and 1945 little or no immigration took place, but after 1945 there was a small influx of immigrants; however, the number of recent immigrants – i.e., those who came to Israel after 1945 and more particularly after 1948 – is very small in Shaarayim.

Political Developments in Shaarayim.

In the first phase of settlement, between 1907 and 1912, Shaarayim was a community of no more than 250 to 300 people. Here the bases of social organization were kinship and sub-ethnic group. Each group had its prayer-house or prayer-houses. Other ties, which
expressed themselves on festivals, marriages and circumcisions, were confined to groups of kith and kin; the actual daily prayer association - the 'minyan' - constituting a very small group. There was little to bring the various sub-ethnic groups together. However, it was accepted, by common consent, that the leader of the northerners be recognized as 'Mukhtar' by the Ottoman authorities and by the representatives of the 'Yishuv'. This 'Mukhtar', Menasheh Kaparah, was recognized as a man of learning also; but the 'Sharaabis' had their own rabbi who would perform marriages, and give counsel. There was no school for the teaching of the young, this duty being performed either by fathers or by an elderly man employed by a number of families.

There were only two matters which were of concern to the community as a whole: the water supply, and burial. Both of these were administered by the 'Mukhtar'. It was his duty to ensure that a well was dug and water made available to all the residents of Shaarayim; and it was he who enlisted the assistance of voluntary grave-diggers for burial. No roads were made, nor any other communal services provided. The 'Mukhtar' solved disputes between those who brought them to his notice; but others relied on their own rabbi or even had recourse to the Ottoman authorities. But the latter did not wish to become
involved in the internal affairs of the communities in their districts. In this phase, while the needs of each family or individual may have been great—the Yemeni labourers, with their large families and meagre earnings lived in conditions of great poverty—the needs of the community as an organized body were minimal; hence the requirements of administrative leadership were also minimal, particularly as there was no representation in government proper outside of the small local community. The Ottoman system was not only pre-democratic—it was largely military.

But with the growth in size of the community, there came concomitant changes in the requirements of administration and organization. The water supply and burial facilities were considered inadequate. There were disputes concerning the authority of rabbis and so-called rabbis, to perform marriages and grant divorces. There was a demand for a proper school, such as existed amongst other communities in Palestine, for the more systematic instruction of the young. There was a need to ensure equitable distribution of land. There was a growing and pressing problem of 'social cases'—widows, and those too old or sick to earn their living.*

*Certain customary means of providing for the needy had existed in Yemen—but these had ceased to operate in the new situation.
The problem of an adequate water-supply was surely the most urgent one for the community. Two public wells were sunk within the first three years of the community's existence, while some households were fortunate in having their own; but these often proved insufficient in the long summer. Residents living nearer to the 'Moshavah' were able to use the wells there, but in general there were severe problems. The 'Mukhtar' attempted to control the use of water in the summer months, but had no means whereby to enforce his authority. It took more than 30 years for a final solution to be adopted, when a reservoir was constructed.

Burial facilities presented no difficult problem. A large piece of ground was set aside as a cemetery and voluntary grave-diggers appointed. The maintenance costs were very low and were covered by voluntary contributions; the administration of the burial association was in the hands of the 'Mukhtar'.

Owing to disputes over rabbinical authority, the 'Mukhtar' nominated two other rabbis - one from Sharab, in Southern Yemen, and one from Central Yemen - who, together with himself, were empowered with the joint right to constitute a rabbinical court of 'dayanim'.

The chief problem in opening a school was obtaining the money for the building; the land was available.
The money was obtained partly through the assistance of the Rav Kook, and partly from a levy imposed on all household heads, to be paid annually. The 'Mukhtar' appointed Haim Madhalah as teacher, the curriculum being solely traditional.

The allocation of land entailed two major problems: that of priority; and that of the definition of a family unit. An attempt was made to ensure that people received land in order of arrival in Palestine or Shaarayim. But this principle conflicted with that of kin- and sub-ethnic solidarity. Immigrants arriving from Northern Yemen considered their claim on the 'Mukhtar' as taking precedence over the claims of 'Shaar-abis' who may have arrived a little earlier and who still awaited their promised allotment of 1 dunam per family. But defining the family unit defied all a priori decision. Some groups received one piece of land, despite the fact that they constituted two or more elementary conjugal families, since they may originally have arrived as a single 'family'; while others, who arrived in larger groups of kith and kin were broken up into elementary families and given land accordingly. No doubt a degree of preferential treatment was shown here; as far as can be gathered, northern Yemenis were as quick to complain of such rulings as were the 'Shaar-abis'. It seems likely that considerations of status, closeness of kinship to the 'Mukhtar', and other factors entered
into the situation. Consequently, there were constant appeals to the 'Mukhtar' and numerous disputes between kinsmen concerning rightful ownership.

The existence of 'social cases' was hardly a new phenomenon to the Yemeni immigrants; it was simply that the old machinery for dealing with it, no longer existed. As a result, the 'Mukhtar' decided to revive the old method in modified form, sums being collected from the various congregations from the auctioning of ritual privileges.

The existence of these various problems, and the increase in disputes, lead ultimately to the formation of a committee to assist the 'Mukhtar' in the administration of communal affairs. This committee of five was nominated by the 'Mukhtar', who took care to ensure that each of the sub-ethnic groups was represented. The four nominated members - other than the 'Mukhtar' who had himself been a Rav and communal head in Yemen - were all men of previous prestige or authority, having been either heads of communities, rabbis, or both. One of these four men was Haim Madhalah who was then in charge of the newly-formed school, and was later to become 'Mukhtar'. The duties of the committee were to administer the school, the burial association, the water supply, the allocation of land, the distribution of alms, and religious affairs generally. This committee had no official status vis
a vis the Turkish authorities, the 'Mukhtar' himself being solely responsible for his community.

The emergence of a committee, in 1915 (or thereabouts) marks the second phase in the political development of Sharayim. With the passage of time the number of committee members grew, as did the number of functions performed by the 'Mukhtar' and his committee; there gradually occurred a degree of specialization of duties within the committee, with special committees being formed for limited purposes, such as the administration of the school, etc. But there was no public election of officers until the early 1920's.

Upon the death of Menasheh Kaparah, the 'Mukhtar'; his place was taken by Haim Madhalah, who also acted as Rav of the community, until the arrival of HaRav Meir Mizrahi in 1917. With the coming of the latter, the role of 'Mukhtar' became largely political. The Rav Meir was not himself a member of the communal committee but later became head of a separate committee which dealt with purely religious affairs. His advice was obtained on matters relating to education. Thus, there was a definite split between pure religious leadership and political leadership.

With the general disorganization, and cessation of immigration, brought about by the First World War, the affairs of leadership and political organization remained
fairly static, excepting for the arrival of a rabbi. But after the war immigration continued, on an even larger scale than before, and there was a concomitant expansion in the activities of the communal committee. In the early 1920's it was decided to levy an annual tax on each household. A flat rate per household was agreed upon by the members of the committee.

But with the growth in size of the community, the imposition of local taxes, and the increased authority of the committee, there was greater pressure for rights of representation. In 1923 the first elections were held in Shaarayim to elect a committee of five. The 'Mukhtar', Haim Madhalah, considering his status to be similar to that of the rabbi and not subject to popular nomination by election, did not present himself as a candidate, and this situation continued in the future. He remained 'Mukhtar' in name, if not in fact, for 30 more years.

The first elected committee of five, consisted of Yisrael Ovadiah Mizrahi, Pinhas Kaparah and three other men. In addition to the previous duties they now had also to administer the 'Kupath Milwe' Bank, and to collect rates. But they were assisted in their duties by a number of nominated committees which dealt with specific problems, such as the administration of the school, burial etc., water supply and tax collection were administered solely by the communal committee, who were also responsible for
the making of roads. Owing to limitation of budget, these latter were never more than sand tracks. By this time the community was receiving other social services through the agencies of the Jewish organizations in Palestine.

The boys' school of Shaarayim, known as 'Beth Sefer Moriah', had expanded considerably, and by the middle of the 1920's was employing three teachers instead of the former one; in addition to religious instruction the pupils received the elements of secular education. The school was maintained by the payment of fees, by a small grant from the communal funds, and was assisted by the religious educational organization of the 'Yishuv'. But no provision had been made for girls, as it was not customary for Yemenis to give their womenfolk formal education. Some young girls obtained some element of formal education at night classes, but otherwise very few enjoyed the benefits of schooling; those who did attend primary school, for two or three years at the most, went to the primary school in the 'Moshavah'.

During the late 1920's an entirely new element entered the political life of the community of Shaarayim, leading to a subsequent split within the leadership and to the formation of political factions; this was the organization of labour. Small trade unions, had existed in Israel before 1920, but the 'Histadruth' came into
bein only in the early years of that decade. Gradually, an attempt was made to enlist the support of all Jewish workers, particularly those in agriculture. The organizers approached some of the leading Yemenis in Shaarayim, and it was Pinhas Kaparah who responded first. The issues were simple and straightforward at that time: to ensure equitable pay-rates and to oppose the practices of 'cheap' labour to which workers were exposed through the employment of Arabs and Oriental immigrants at lower rates than those demanded by European immigrants; to secure other privileges connected with conditions of employment, dismissal, etc. As the overwhelming majority of the Yemeni residents of Shaarayim were simple workers, it was expected that they would respond readily to the call, with unanimous support. In fact it took several years before a substantial number joined. It was not that they directly opposed the aims of workers' unity, but that they simply failed to understand or appreciate its purpose; furthermore, membership entailed financial obligations, and it was here that resistance was met. The resistance was strongest amongst those whose earnings were lowest and who might have benefited most from a strong labour movement. Of course the best response was from the younger men, and it was this fact which led Pinhas Kaparah and the representatives of the labour movement to concentrate
largely on establishing an organization of working youth and later to form a youth movement for the children of the Yemeni workers.

Despite the difficulties of obtaining supporters, by the middle of the 1930's the movement had grown considerably, and membership gradually became the symbol of "advancement" and, in the case of women, of "emancipation". This period saw the rapid growth of 'Noar Oved', a youth movement which obtained its major support from the young people of Shaarayim. There were several aims to this association: to protect the rights of working youth — that is young people, of both sexes, between the ages of 14 and 19 — who had been particularly subject to a policy of cheap agricultural labour; to provide working youth with various educational and recreational facilities; to administer a separate labour exchange for young people; and to foster the growth of political consciousness, workers' solidarity, and general ideological awareness — both Zionist and Socialist — amongst these young people. This had important political consequences for Shaarayim, as it affected the outlook of those who would shortly become the first locally born and locally educated adults of Shaarayim.

At first the growth of the labour movement in Shaarayim had no direct effect on the form of leadership
and alignment in the community. The first leaders of the labour movement were Pinhas Kaparah and Naphtali Gedassi; the former was a member of the communal committee, while both were members of one or more specific committees. Thus the assumption of leadership roles as representatives of the labour movement was merely a further adjunct to their status as leaders within the community. There was no organized opposition between the labour leaders and others in positions of authority in the community. The new movement received neither support, encouragement nor even articulate recognition from leaders like Yisrael Ovadia Mizrahi, Haim Madhalah and their close associates; but it also received no opposition from them. They appeared indifferent to its aims. It was only later that organized opposition developed. However, the mere fact that certain leaders did represent an interest-group whose membership was supra-communal, had some immediate effect since it meant that for the first time there were some matters on which certain leaders had no opinion to voice. Why these leaders refused to support the new movement can not now be ascertained with any degree of certainty. It is likely that some leaders ignored the newly-found labour movement because they had no idea of its existence or potential, though they might well have continued to ignore it had they known of it or recognized its potential significance. Whatever else
they were, most of the leaders of Shaarayim were markedly conservative and parochial in outlook. It is perhaps more to the point to enquire why some leaders took notice of the labour movement at all. It may well be of some significance that it was Pinhas Kaparah, the lineal kinsmen of the late 'Mukhtar' of Shaarayim, who became the first leader of the local labour movement; his actions may well have been motivated by opposition to Haim Madhalah and Yisrael Ovadiah Mizrahi. The first had become 'Mukhtar' in succession to Menasheh Kaparah, while the second, his own sister's husband, had gradually become the acknowledged elected head of the Shaarayim committee.

By the late 1930's the situation of leadership and alignment in Shaarayim was as follows. There was a committee of five members, which was elected at rather irregular intervals of four, five or even six years; the reason for this was simply that there was no legal obligation to do otherwise. The members of the committee were mostly the same people for at least a decade, and were chosen on a personal basis, there being no official lists or parties in Shaarayim at that time. At the head of the committee was Yisrael Ovadiah Mizrahi. However, the 'Mukhtar', or official head of the community, was Haim Madhalah, who was not elected, but who simply retained his earlier title and some of the authority
which went with it. There were several specific committees to deal with matters relating to the school, the bank, and the burial association, and other matters; the members of the Shaarayim municipal committee were to be found as members of some or all of the specific committees. The major functions of the municipal committee were to coordinate the activities of the other committees as well as to manage the water supply, garbage disposal, road-making and the collection of taxes. Almost all other social services were provided by the wider community — of Rehovoth — and by the society of the 'Yishuv'.

The community had its own leading rabbi, whose duties were largely those of performing marriages, granting divorce, and settling personal disputes between members of the community who did not wish to take matters before a court. Other duties were performed by minor officials — e.g. teaching and circumcision — and the role of rabbi assumed a more symbolic form. In 1938 the rabbi of Shaarayim, HaRav Meir Mizrahi, received full recognition from the central rabbinical authority in Jerusalem; this authority was accorded to no other Yemeni rabbi in Rehovoth. At the same time a rabbinical court was set up in the district and HaRav Meir was offered a seat on it. This did not make him an employee of the rabbinate, a position which he occupied several
years later, but merely a recognized religious dignitary. The effect of this was to strengthen his prestige within Shaarayim and to extend it beyond the borders of the community. At that time this entailed no political commitment; there was no conflict of loyalties.

During the late 1930's and early 1940's some new leaders appeared on the communal scene; they were then quite young men. One of these was Saadia Cohen, sister's son to Yisrael Ovadiyah Nizri; he had not been long in the country, but already aspired to leadership and became a member of the Shaarayim municipal committee in 1940. Another was Hezkiyahu Hadhalah, who had been a leader of 'Noar Ovad' the workers' youth movement, and who by then had become one of the leading figures in the workers' organization in Shaarayim; on his return from military service in 1945, he immediately rose to a prominent position in the community, becoming a member of the Rehovoth local council and a member of the workers' committee of Rehovoth. Another such young leader was Avraham Yerimi, who became prominent in the workers' movement.

In 1940 the first signs of a definite cleavage in political alignments became fully evident. Though there is every reason to believe that this would have occurred in time, the actual process was precipitated by external pressures. For several years the leaders
of Rehovoth had attempted to incorporate the surrounding communities into a larger political unit. They urged that these communities were in any case largely dependent on the 'Moshavah' for many of their services, and that they were unable separately to provide these for themselves. For this reason they considered it only just that the members of these communities contribute to the development of what was in effect a single semi-rural conurbation of Rehovoth. The older leaders of Shaarayim, with the exception of Pinhas Kaharrah, resisted these pressures and suggestions. But finally, in 1940, the British Mandatory authorities agreed to the formation of a Rehovoth local council. The resistance of Shaarayim's leaders was of no avail once the decision had been taken by a higher authority with the full support of the leaders of Rehovoth. However, the leaders of Shaarayim were not blind to the positive benefits which might well accrue to the community, though there is no doubt that they feared for their own positions. The actual agreement entailed the sending of representatives from each of the communities, the number from each being roughly in proportion to its size. There were to be 4 representatives from the 'Moshavah' and its environs, three from Shaarayim, two from Marmorak, and six more from other neighbouring communities. The functions of this local council were to coordinate some

*They quite correctly assumed that this would be the first step in the inevitable process of abolishing the autonomy of each of the constituent communities.*
of the services which were provided for the whole area—roads, electricity, water, some educational, health and welfare provision, agricultural and industrial development—and to collect local taxes for meeting the costs of these services. When the council came to be elected, there was an element of open rivalry between the two main factions: in Shaarayim; in fact, this was the first time that the two sets of leaders found themselves openly competing for positions of authority. The first three members of the Rehovoth council for Shaarayim were Yisrael Ovadiah Misrahi, Saadia Cohen and Pinhas Kaparah. They were elected by the whole community, though there were no party lists at the time. Yisrael Ovadiah was by then the acknowledged acting head of the community, being chairman of the Shaarayim committee, and his following as unequalled. Pinhas Kaparah had been for many years a member of the municipal committee and of other committees, and for some time the acknowledged leader of the labour organization. But Saadia Cohen was a relatively recent arrival, and his nomination and election was due largely to the support which he received from his kith and kin; he had not yet become fully committed to the labour organization, and he could muster a certain following amongst those who had come from the same district in Yemen in which his family had enjoyed a degree of prestige.
After 1940 this cleavage in the political life of the community became more evident, so that not only leaders referred to the existence of two sides and even two 'parties'; though there were strictly no parties as part of the internal communal organization, until later. This particular form of political fission was later affected by other factors which made for an even clearer division between the two camps, though some of the later political divisions cut across the original ones. We shall deal with these shortly.

During the 1939-1945 war, and after, political allegiances in Shaarayim became complicated by yet another influence - namely, that of active terrorism. Many younger people - including some women and girls - and some older ones, gave active support, in one form or another, to the terrorist organization known as Irgun Zvei Leumi (IZL).* This terrorist organization, whose aim was the forcible ejection of the British Mandatory power and the use of violent retaliation against the Arab population for acts of aggression committed by Arab terrorists, was opposed not only to the non-Jewish enemy, but also to the moderate leadership of the 'Yishuv', which was intent on forming its own, purely defensive (at that time)

* Lit. "The national military Organization".
military organization known as 'Haganah'. It is commonly known that the terrorist movement relied rather heavily on support from the Oriental Jewish communities in Palestine, and in this matter Shaarayim was no exception to the rule.

It should be mentioned, at this point, that not all young people in Shaarayim rallied to the call of terrorism and opposition to the aims of the 'Yishuv'. A number of young Yemenis, from Shaarayim and elsewhere, joined the Jewish Brigade of the British army during the second world war, responding to the call of the leaders of the 'Yishuv'. While their individual motives for doing this may have varied, the fact that they did so shews clearly that they were aware of certain ideological issues which stemmed from the wider society. It is probable – though I have little evidence to support this statement – that those who were aware of such issues were those who had been members of the labour youth movement. It is known, however, that those young men of Shaarayim who did join the Jewish Brigade, supported the 'Haganah' rather than 'IZL' after their demobilization. In fact, the hostility between the supporters of 'IZL' and of the 'Haganah' was to become extremely fierce between 1945 and 1948; there were several incidents of open physical conflict between supporters of the two movements in Shaarayim.

While support of 'IZL' was not part of the expressed
policy of the "conservative" leaders in Shaarayim, the latter did, for the most part, give tacit support. Insofar as they were (unofficially) committed to one outlook rather than another, they sided with the terrorists. But the organization of the local terrorist group was not under their control. In all events, support for 'IZL' became yet a further issue dividing the two sets of leaders and their followers. Not all of those who supported the "conservative" leaders were fully aware of the aims or even activities of the 'IZL', nor even of the fact that its local supporters and sympathizers were numerous. (Naturally, membership of 'IZL' was a very secretive matter.)

After 1940 the drift towards the complete incorporation of Shaarayim (and other communities) in Rehovoth continued. The local council of Rehovoth was becoming increasingly responsible for the provision of services for the various constituent communities. After 1945, it became evident that incorporation was to be effected. However, the "conservative" leaders of Shaarayim still resisted this final assault on their much diminished status as communal heads - the municipal committee of Shaarayim still existed as an official body, despite the inevitable truncation of its functions - while the "progressive" labour leaders welcomed it, both
for its positive as well as its negative consequences. They were only too glad to witness the decline of their opponents. In 1946 an attempt was made on the part of the leaders of Rehovoth to achieve final incorporation and to secure for their town full municipal status. This was granted in 1948 after the formation of the new state.

Once incorporation became effective, elections were held for the new municipal council of Rehovoth, which was to consist of fifteen members. But there could no longer be guarantees of representation for the former member communities, since they were no longer separate units in a local federation. They were, legally and politically, merely quarters of the new town. Elections were held on the basis of pure proportional representation with regard to party lists, each party or organization to obtain a number of seats on the council in proportion to the number of votes secured by it. This did not rule out communal representation, as we shall see, as there was nothing to stop former communal leaders from forming their own personal or communal party lists; there was no law which forced parties in communal elections to be registered as national parties for parliamentary elections. On the other hand, there was nothing to prevent the members of each community from giving their support to any political party which might take their fancy.

The "conservative" leaders of Shaarayim (and Marmorak)
were not slow to exploit the possibility of continued communal representation - and also continued status for themselves - and immediately formed a political party which subsequently became known as 'Shaarayim'. This act was opposed by Pinhas Kaparah, who wished to persuade his followers and others to renounce ethnic and communal loyalty and to give their support to the labour movement. He interpreted this as merely another stratagem on the part of Yisrael Ovadiah, and Haim Madhalah and others, for retaining their position and thereby preventing others from "progressing in the right direction". But he failed to appreciate the very real sense of local-ethnic loyalty which did exist, or which could easily be stimulated, as he also failed to understand the very real basis for this loyalty and communal identification. He was persuaded of his error by his very close associates, who wished to ally themselves with Yisrael Ovadiah so as to secure places for labour leaders on the 'Shaarayim' party list. Reluctantly, he agreed to this policy, and after some bargaining, an agreement was reached concerning the priority of names on the list. Pinhas Kaparah, true to his principles - or perhaps unwilling to seek election - did not submit his own name. In the elections of that year, the 'Shaarayim' party obtained one seat on the municipal council, being represented by Yisrael Ovadiah, who had headed the list. The reason for this rather poor
representation seems to have been that there was only a small poll in Shaarayim. It is not known to what extent the Yemenis voted for other parties.

At this time there was no serious conflict between the "conservative" leaders of Shaarayim and the representatives of organized religion; nor was there any opposition to the parties of organized religion, though it was made quite clear that the 'Shaarayim' party was totally independent of all political parties. Rav Meir, while not taking an active part in political affairs, gave his tacit support to the 'Shaarayim' party by appearing at its election meetings along with that other notable, Haim Nadhalah. There was also no conflict between the "conservative" leaders and those who sympathized with 'Heruth', the party which was built on the support of the erstwhile terrorists organization, 'IZL'. In fact, the supporters of 'IZL' gave unqualified allegiance to Yisrael Ovadiah.

But by 1951, when the next municipal elections were held, the situation had altered somewhat. The surface unity of political allegiance had at last been broken. The labour faction broke away and submitted a separate list for the elections. One of the leaders of Shaarayim was proposed as a candidate for 'Heruth'. There was a degree of propaganda in favour of the well-organized religious parties. All of these factors were liable to
weaken the position of the "conservative" leaders and of their chances of continuing to represent the "interests" of Shaarayim on the municipal committee.

The existence of a break-away labour list was bound to create conflicting loyalties, particularly as the leaders of the labour faction insisted on retaining the character of a communal and ethnic party, while receiving assistance from the labour party, 'Mapai'. They called themselves simply 'Poalei Shaarayim', 'Shaarayim Workers'.

The result of the 1951 election was as follows. Each of the two factions of Shaarayim returned one representative; Yisrael Ovadiah for the "conservative" communal party, and Hezkiyahu Madhalah for the breakaway labour faction. The Yemeni 'Heruth' representative, Shalom Madhalah, was also successful. The poll was much higher than in 1948, in fact it was almost 75%. The result showed that a substantial section of the Yemeni population of Shaarayim considered communal loyalty as of primary importance.

During the period 1951 - 1953 the Rehovoth municipal council was administered by a coalition of labour and the moderate right-wing party. The Yemeni representative for 'Heruth' found himself in almost constant opposition, but this was true of neither of the other two representatives of Shaarayim, who found themselves sometimes in support and at others opposed to the coalition. But in 1953 the
coalition broke down, following a major scandal, and a new one was formed by the labour parties along with the religious party. The representative of the Shaarayim labour faction supported the coalition, in response to a request to do so, while the leader of the "conservative" faction preferred to remain uncommitted, and in fact opposed the coalition.

Between 1953 and 1955 there occurred two major incidents - in the case of one of them a series of incidents - which had important repercussions on ethnic relations in Rehovoth, and on political affairs in Shaarayim. The first was the murder of an Ashkenazi youth by a Yemeni youth; the second was the Korich school issue. As the second of these has been fully discussed in an earlier chapter, I shall confine myself at present to the first of these.

The murder of Rami Rosenberg in October 1954 was more than a mere criminal act; it became an issue. The murder took place near the building used by a leftwing youth club, in Rehovoth. This youth club was open to all who wished to join it, though few Yemenis of Rehovoth had in fact done so. Two Yemeni lads, who were connected with a disreputable Yemeni gang, were dismissed from the club for disruptive behaviour. Wishing to avenge their rejection, and influenced by a criminal psychopath who led the notorious gang, they made a regular habit
of waiting outside the club building and taunting the young members. On one occasion this resulted in a fist-fight between members of the gang and members of the club; during the fight, one of the two boys who had been dismissed, drew a knife and stabbed one of the club leaders to death. The reactions to the murder amongst the Ashkenazi community of Rehovoth were immediate; they were outraged and incensed. The Yemenis were accused of fostering hatred towards the Ashkenazim and of giving encouragement to the children to engage in acts of hooliganism similar to the acts of terrorism which had been countenanced earlier. Certain members of the Ashkenazi community even called for police action against Shaarayim so as to root out the delinquent underworld which was believed to thrive there. The Yemeni reaction - which went further than Shaarayim itself - was that of collective shame and guilt. Although Yemenis, particularly their leaders, protested violently against the Ashkenazi allegations, there was a widespread feeling of communal responsibility. Of course, some people reacted differently; and they saw the incident as due to provocation, though not fully justified on that ground, while others saw it as the act of a boy who had been misled, and still others as the act of a boy who was known to be "sick in his mind". But, there was a definite feeling that somehow the crime reflected on
Yemenis in general and those of Shaarayim in particular. The "conservative" Yemeni leaders brought out a pamphlet, written in the inimitable quasi-Biblical, purple prose of which they are so fond, denouncing the accusers of Shaarayim, and denying that Yemeni youth were more disposed to criminal behaviour than others. The writers of the pamphlet went on to complain of the low opinion in which Yemenis were held by so many Ashkenazim, and ended by accusing the Ashkenazim of Rehovoth of being responsible for any bad feelings which existed between the two ethnic groups. The Yemenis were portrayed as poor, long-suffering, but nevertheless pious and righteous people, who sought to bring up their children according to the highest principles of Judaic law. The "progressive" leaders of Shaarayim dissociated themselves from the views contained in this pamphlet, ascribing the motives of its writers to "politics". They stressed the need for a calm appraisal of the situation and for understanding of the reactions of the Ashkenazim. They also dwelt on the pernicious influence of the gang and gang-leaders, who were, in their opinion, aided and abetted in their exploits by those who had previously supported terrorism and other forms of gangsterism.

Both of these affairs, the murder and the school issue, were used as political propaganda by the "conservative" leaders of Shaarayim in the 1955 election
In 1955 the situation had changed again. The split between the labour faction and the pure local-ethnic faction had become final and official, and the labour faction acknowledged its tie with 'Mapai'; the party became known as 'Mapai-Shaarayim'. Further, the hostility between the local-ethnic leaders and the leaders of the religious-political faction had become intensified as a result of a number of factors, not least the school incident. The "conservative" local leaders were driven (or simply chose to move) towards an unofficial alliance with the 'General Zionist' party. The split between 'Heruth' and the local-ethnic party was partly healed, largely through the efforts of Nokaytan who had recently become prominent in local affairs, and mostly as a result of his vociferous condemnation of discrimination and prejudice. There began to emerge a right-wing faction, with a strong ethnicist element, and a left-wing faction with a milder ethnicist element; but there were still sources of dispute between proponents of different views within each camp.

This history of leadership and politics in Shaarayim has traced the line of development of a small ethnic community which has become gradually part of a wider one. Two things are of particular interest: the way in which official religious leadership has become divorced
from other spheres of authority; and the degree to which certain "conservative" leaders and their followers have opposed the margin of the community in the wider social sphere.
CHAPTER VII. LEADERSHIP & POLITICS IN SHAARAYIM — SUMMARY.

The community of Shaarayim has developed through a series of gradual stages of absorption in the wider society; however, its members still recognize distinct interests and identity. This situation is due to three factors: the low social and economic status which the Yemenis occupy in the wider community and society; the physical characteristics of the quarter of Shaarayim; and the fact that the Yemenis of Shaarayim have previously constituted a separate community.

In this situation there are two types of leader: the first aims at the gradual absorption of the members of the community in associations and interest-groups which cut across the bounds of local and ethnic origin, adopts the role of agent in this process, and espouses a social identification which is wider than that of the community; the second aims at the preservation of narrow communal loyalties, and stresses the importance of specific communal interests.

The second type of leader relies, for the maintenance of his position, on the continuity of some degree of local-ethnic solidarity; therefore, one of his major tasks consists in emphasizing the existence of discrimination or prejudice, or in fostering a sense of opposition and conflict with regard to the wider community.

These leaders do not merely create a climate of opinion, but exploit circumstances which are favourable to the
formation of such opinions. These circumstances derive from the association between locale, ethnic origin and low social and economic status; they have a real basis in the common interest in property and local taxation, and the provision of certain services.

Since these circumstances do exist, leaders who oppose conservatism are forced to compromise with it in order to secure their own status. On the other hand, the more "conservative" leaders must exploit the only available institutional means for the maintenance of their own positions. Thus, both types of leader are forced to ally themselves with wider associations, and both types seek positions of authority in a wider system of administration; the combination of local-ethnic and external allegiances varies in degree and kind from one set of leaders to another, and this variation even cuts across differences between secular and religious leaders.

Political allegiance in the community is affected largely by three sets of factors: social and economic status within the community; form of employment; and age. The importance of the first two factors shows that allegiance in this community is largely determined by present structural factors; however, the significance of age differences does shew that it is also affected by the degree to which traditional notions persist.

All the factors in this situation indicate that if
the formative conditions continue to develop in the same direction as they have done in the past, there will be a gradual disappearance of those forms of leadership and allegiance which function interdependently to maintain communal identity and to secure interests specific to a local-ethnic group.

At present there is a split in the leadership of Shaarayim which first emerged more than twenty years ago; but prior to that the leadership had been more united, having developed out of the yet simpler form with which the community began. This form was somewhat moulded on that of communal leadership in Yemen; I therefore turn now to consider the nature of leadership and allegiance amongst the Jews in Yemen itself.
CHAPTER VIII. LEADERSHIP, AUTHORITY & ALLEGIANCE AMONGST THE JEWS OF YEMEN.

In the previous chapters, I have described the working of leadership and allegiance in a Yemeni community in Israel. In this chapter, I shall try to reconstruct the social and cultural factors which moulded and fashioned the conception of authority which Yemeni immigrants brought with them from the Yemen. In doing this, I rely on two sources for my material: the available literature; and my own researches amongst Yemeni immigrants. Since the literature does not deal with many of the topics with which I am concerned, and is not the work of trained anthropologists or sociologists, it has to be interpreted - and this entails a good deal of guesswork. Furthermore, the analysis and interpretation of material supplied by informants, is fraught with many dangers: informants are prone to interpret their past in the light of their present circumstances. Despite these difficulties and objections, I think that an approximate and general picture of the past can be constructed from the many pieces of information which I have been able to assemble.

The literary sources on which I have relied most, are the following: "Masah LeTeeman", the report of a journey to Yemen by Shmuel Yavnieli; "Ethnologie der Jemenitischen Juden", by Erich Brauer; and an article
by S. D. Goitein entitled "Al Ha'Hayyim Ha'Ziburriim Shel HaYehudim B'Eretz Teman" - "The Communal Life of the Jews of Yemen." Of these three, by far the most helpful and reliable is the last, the material in it having been obtained from many Yemeni informants in Israel. However, none of these sources – nor any of the others to which I referred – gave me sufficient understanding of the structure and functioning of Jewish society within the wider social setting, so that I had to provide further material from my own informants, together with an anthropological framework for the interpretation and analysis of the facts.

Position of the Jews in Yemeni Society.*

Yemen was a theocratic state, ruled by the Imam, who was both spiritual and temporal ruler, and head of the Zeidi sect, which rose to power in the twelfth century (Christian Era).

It was divided into a number of provinces, ruled by governors responsible to the Imam. Each province was divided into a number of major districts each under a 'Sheikh' or 'Amil', which in turn were divided into smaller districts under 'Sheikha'. The small districts

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*In this chapter I use the past tense only, as the situation described here no longer exists – there are no Jews left in Yemen. Furthermore, some of my comments on the social structure of Yemen may no longer describe the situation in that country.
consisted of a number of villages and sometimes towns, each under a headman or 'Aqil'. Each headman or governor was responsible to the one above him in the hierarchy. In addition to the 'Sheikhs' and 'Aqils', there were also 'Qadis' — religious judges — who were usually responsible for larger districts, and who shared authority with the 'Amils' and 'Sheikhs'.

In some areas — particularly those which had been subject to relatively undisturbed control by the central authority — tribal allegiances had been broken down, but in others, they survived. This survival was most marked in the areas furthest from the capital, San'a, which was in central Yemen. In these latter areas, there was perpetual tension between the authority of tribal 'Sheikhs' and that of the State. But often conflict could break out in areas nearer the capital; this was particularly the case when central authority was threatened by other forms of opposition, e.g., the Turks, or internal rivals.

The population was divided into a number of Muslim sects, some of which were concentrated in specific areas. The ruling Zeidi sect were Shiites, but there were several other Shiite sects, in addition to a number of Sunnite sects.

Cutting across ties of locality, sect and tribe, were those of status. The whole society was divided into a number of rigidly-defined ranks, which in some respects resembled Indian castes. There was a traditional
connexion between rank and permitted occupation, certain juridical and political rights being also determined in this way. However, there was no explicit doctrine of pollution affecting most groups — this would be contrary to the spirit of Islam — though it is possible that status endogamy was practised, if not preached. The highest rank was that of the royal lineage, and a small number of other Zeidi lineages; they were followed, in the hierarchy, by the 'Sayyids' — the holy men, and after these came the 'Hashayikh' — which is the plural form of the word 'Sheikh' — the large landowners. All of these three ranks enjoyed prestige and authority. After these came the 'Gabili', small land-owners or free farmers. This rank was followed by that of the merchants, who engaged in a despised occupation — little wonder that most of them were Jews! After the merchants, came the peddlars and vagrants, the slaves and other parish groups, who engaged in the despised occupations of barber and smith, and at the bottom of the scale the non-believers, the 'Ahl-al-dhimmi' — protected peoples. Since there were neither Christians nor Zoroastrians to be found in any number in Yemen, this unenviable status was occupied solely by the Jews.

The status of the Jews in Yemen was governed by two sets of laws: the general Islamic law of 'Umar', and the specific Zeidi laws which obtained in Yemen.
The 'Umar' laws define the status of 'Ahl al chinnu', which means literally 'the people of the covenant'. This status is open to 'Ahl Ketera' - 'Peoples of the Scriptures'. Those people are not compelled, on pain of death, to accept Islam, as are pagans. They may keep their religion and enjoy 'protection', but must suffer certain obligations and lack of certain rights. They must pay 'Jizyiah' - poll tax - as determined by the authorities. They can not bear witness against a Muslim nor give testimony in a Muslim court. They are prohibited from carrying arms or riding on horseback, and must preserve a respectful attitude to Muslims. In return, they are entitled to protection of life and property, and to freedom of worship.

In addition to these obligations and duties, the Zeidic also demanded the forcible conversion to Islam of all Jewish orphans, and instituted other prohibitions which affected the life and status of Jews. Of utmost importance was their enforcement of the Islamic law which prohibits a Jew from engaging in the same occupation as a Muslim.

The interpretation and enforcement of the disabilities affecting Jews varied from one district to another, and from one period to another. Following the final expulsion of the Turks from Yemen, and later under the influence of the Arab league, the laws affecting Jews were more stringently applied. But at all times, the application of the laws depended on the degree of power of the local
Muslim authorities, and on their relations with the Imam. Some local conditions allowed of more leniency to Jews, others less.

Two basic institutions affected the position of the Jews in the social structure; they were: the system of 'protection'; and the system of occupational specialization.

Every Jew or Jewish community was the 'Jar' - i.e., protected subject - of a Muslim overlord. At the lowest level, they were the 'Jar' of the local village headman or tribal sheikh; but they were also the 'Jar' of the district head, the provincial governor, and finally of the Imam himself: the Jews of central Yemen, particularly those of San'a and its surrounding districts, were said to be under the personal protection of the Imam alone. This relationship was reciprocal, but asymmetrical: the Jew owed loyalty to his 'protector' and paid him the 'Jiz'ya'; in return, his overlord was, in principle if not always in practice, obliged to defend him, in cases of theft, assault or wrongful accusation, and act as his jural agent. The amount of tax paid depended on the assessment of the Muslim overlord: a poor man would be obliged to pay only one 'Real' per annum, while a richer man might be obliged to pay two, three, four, or occasionally even more.

The system of 'protection' rested on political and economic expediency, as well as on legal and moral
foundations. Every good Muslim accepted the Jew's right to 'protection', as this was a matter of doctrine; the Jew was, after all, a believer in the 'One God'. But in addition, failure to fulfil the obligations, would affect the status of the person concerned, as well as his economic well-being. If a headman did not protect a Jew when clearly wronged, this would indicate political weakness on his part, particularly when the offending party was a member of another tribe, or a resident of another village or district. Furthermore, if Jews were displeased with the treatment accorded them, they could move elsewhere, transferring their allegiance to other 'protectors'. This meant the possible loss of taxes, as well as the skills of Jewish craftsmen. This last point leads on to the second basic institution, that of occupational specialization.

By law, the Jews could not do the same work as Muslims. As Yemen was a predominantly agricultural society, it means that Jews could not engage in agriculture. The majority were artisans and craftsmen, some were also merchants, while a few were solely merchants. Since there were few Muslim craftsmen, it meant that the Jews and Muslims were economically interdependent. The Muslim depended upon the Jew for products and services of his craft skills, while the Jew depended upon the Muslim for agricultural produce. This economic relationship was often established in contractual form, according to the institution of 'Umleh'. The 'Umleh' agreement was
entered into between a particular Jewish craftsman and one or more Muslim farmers; the latter could be either 'Gabili' - small free farmer - or 'Mashayikh' - large landowners. In return for the provision of certain services and products, the Muslim undertook to pay an agreed proportion of the crops at harvest times. These agreements rested on good faith, and required ritual endorsement.

Not all Jewish craftsmen depended upon 'Umleh' agreement; some simply sold their products or services, using money to purchase their food and other goods; while other craftsmen would rely partly on 'Umleh' agreements, and partly on the sale of goods for money.

The Jews practised a great number of crafts. They were metal-workers - silversmiths, coiners and coppersmiths; carpenters and cabinet-makers; leatherworkers; tailors, weavers and spinners; potters and tinkers; book-binders; spice-makers; etc. Few Jews practised one craft only, some working at three or more; but most specialized in one or two. There were some Jewish communities where everyone practised the same craft, and in these cases Muslims would have to hire the services of Jews from different communities. Specialized craft knowledge was inherited, so that there was a tendency for families to specialize over a number of generations.

Since most Muslims, except the landless, looked upon
the craftsmen as inferior to the farmer, it was unlikely that the Jews would have to face competition from them. The Jews were therefore indispensable to the Muslims, and in particular to the richer landlords and political heads who required the more elaborate and complex skills which only Jews possessed. However, the Jew was still prone to economic insecurity. In times of poor harvest or drought the Muslims could dispense, temporarily, with the services and products of the craftsman; the Jews could not survive without agricultural produce. The richer craftsmen and merchants would store food, in case of need, but the possibilities were strictly limited; those with money could purchase food and other goods at inflated prices, but the poorer amongst them might well have spent any savings on bride-price or festivities. Even in times of relatively good harvest, the position of some craftsmen might be insecure, owing to competition between them; this made 'Uzleh' contracts, especially those with 'Nashaikh', highly desirable for Jews, and often advantageous for Muslims. When circumstances became quite intolerable for some Jews, they would move elsewhere.

In general then, the Jews were dependent on the Muslims, economically, politically and jurally. Economically, this dependence was reciprocal, except in adverse circumstances, when the economic insecurity of Jews
matched their political insecurity. In a sense, the insecurity of the Jews was countered by their fatalistic acceptance of low status in a society marked by fairly rigid notions of rank. Their position was ultimately made tolerable by the relative freedom to practice their religion, which provided a belief in ultimate redemption, and which gave them a sense of identification beyond the bounds of Yemeni society; however, Yemen was a highly isolated and closed society, so that for the most part Jewish conceptions of social, economic and political life were narrowly bounded by their own status, from which they saw all effective power and authority as emanating from an external source, and sanctioned by a foreign system of values and beliefs.

The Jews were not always accorded their rights as defined by law and custom, and were very much dependent on the goodwill of a particular 'protector'. They were commonly accused of various offences and malpractices of which they might well be innocent in fact; and they were an obvious target for allegations of sorcery and witchcraft, both by virtue of their minority position, and of their alleged superiority in learning and magical and religious knowledge. In times of misfortune and internal conflict and tension, their position often became untenable.
Unlike the Jews in many other societies, those of Yemen lived mostly in rural areas. They were scattered throughout the country in more than a thousand villages, small towns, and a few cities. The Jewish population in 1948 was about 50,000 out of a total of about 2,000,000. Of these, not more than 6,000 lived in San'a the capital, 2,000 in the city of Rad'a, and even less in Ta'iz and Ibb. (Gaitcin: 1954). About 40,000 lived in villages and small towns.

The reason for their settlement in rural areas was primarily economic; they had to live near their clients so as to provide the services required of them, and most of the Muslim population was rural. But there was also a political advantage often to be found in living in small communities: it allowed of personal relations between 'protected people' and their 'protector'—the fewer the number of Jews under a 'protector', the greater the likelihood of personal interest in them.

Most of the Jewish communities, with the exception or urban ones, were small, numbering about ten to forty households. In some villages there were no more than three or four joint-family households, or domestic compounds.

Jewish communities, whether rural or urban, were
always separated from the neighbouring Muslim ones. In towns, the Jewish quarter was either outside the walls, or at a small distance from the Muslim quarters. In rural areas the usual pattern was that of linked villages: a Jewish village was linked with one, but occasionally two or three Muslim villages. In some areas there were Jewish villages not immediately attached to any Muslim ones, but this was rare, and was only possible in very special political circumstances. This physical separation of Jewish communities was required by law, and sanctioned by religion. Although the Jews were forced to live apart, it did not mean that they were necessarily barred from close contact with their Muslim neighbours, and in many rural areas the two groups would attend each other's weddings etc.

Usually, Jewish villages were close to one another. This was partly due to the close proximity of Muslim villages. It allowed of constant intercourse between Jews in a local area.

Movement from one local area, or district to another was very common, and even movement from one province to another was not unusual. The reasons for this were as follows: competition between craftsmen; disease and famine; political pressures; the search for wives; disputes between rival factions; the desire to travel on the part of young men; and the discontent of orphans,
or their fear of forcible conversion to Islam. This mobility had the effect of creating cultural and linguistic unity amongst the Jews of one large area or province, and spread the network of kinship ties over wide areas, thus making for, or reinforcing a state of solidarity. Newcomers to an area or village were not, of necessity, fully incorporated into the existing Jewish communities; in many cases, they were designated as 'newcomers' for several generations by the original Jewish inhabitants, who might preserve the legal documents giving them title to a particular village territory.

Relations Within & Between Jewish Communities.

Jewish communities varied enormously in composition, depending upon their size, whether they were rural or urban, upon the length of residence of the constituent households and groups of kindred, upon the number of prayer-groups and the basis of prayer-group differences, and upon the structure of kinship ties between the members. Despite the obvious difficulties in generalizing about the internal structure of communal life, certain broad features can be delineated.

Most villages consisted of a number of large, patriarchal households; and many whole villages, or sections of villages, consisted of lineally related kinsmen and their wives. Patrilocality was the ideal, if not in terms of the household, at least in terms of the village.
Inheritance and succession were patrilineal, and authority was patripotestal.

There were few cases of deeply-traced corporate lineages or unilineal local descent groups. These served no economic, political, military or ritual functions amongst the Jews. A village could, as a rule, support only a limited number of people, so that agnatically-linked groups of kindred would tend to break up.

There were no stated rules of preferred marriage, but marriages between kinsmen were extremely common - roughly sixty per cent of all first marriages were with kinswomen.*

The Yemenis say that they preferred marriage with kinswomen, as they would know with what sort of 'blood' they were marrying. But whatever their motives may have been, the social consequences were considerable. This practice made for a highly inter-connected network of ties within groups, particularly within one area or district. Generation differences were no barrier to this sort of marriage - nor in fact to marriages generally - it being fairly common for a man to marry his brother's daughter, his sister's daughter, or even his mother's or father's sister. Polygyny was not common, though permitted, and there were even some cases of sororal polygyny.

* This figure is based on my own researches conducted amongst immigrants from different parts of Yemen.
Not all villages, areas and districts were linked together by these ramifying ties of kinship; nor were all the Jews in a particular area linked in this way. As there was considerable movement, this could not have been so; but physical mobility had the effect of extending the network of ties even further.

The village itself was not always characterised by complete unity. Frequently, a village would be divided by factional cleavages, and sometimes marriages between opposed groups were rare. Not all divisions implied overt hostility at all times; the emergence of hostile relationships depended on the occurrence of immediate causes of incitement - disputes between 'original' inhabitants and 'newcomers'; disputes over rights to property, water-wells etc.; economic competition; conflicts over marriage arrangements and contracts, or the dissolution of a marriage; controversies concerning the interpretation of Jewish law and ritual obligations. But the possibility of conflict and hostility was often latent in the structure of the community, or of neighbouring communities, by virtue of the existence of recognized group differences.

Some divisions were based on adherence to separate ritual groups of a traditional nature; in some places, different 'minyanim' - prayer groups of at least ten adult males - were necessary as a result of adherence to different liturgical traditions. There were two such
traditions among Yemeni Jews: 'Baladi' and 'Shami'. The former was believed to be indigenous to Yemen - the Arabic word 'Baladi' means 'my home' or 'my country' - while the latter, which is based on the code of Maimonides, was believed to emanate from the North. Where there were adherents to both traditions in the same community, there would be at least two 'minyanim'. But this was not the only reason for the existence of more than one 'minyan'; anyone could start a new one, if he could be sure of attracting at least ten adult males. A man might build his own 'knes' - prayer house - if he could afford to, because of the prestige which this would bring him; or he might do so in order to fulfil a vow taken in time of illness or misfortune. If he did so, his immediate kinsmen would come to pray in his 'knes', and the tradition of doing so would be handed on to their sons. But sometimes people would break away from one 'Zibur' - congregation - because of a dispute, and start their own. Disputes could arise over the allocation of ritual duties or over the interpretation of custom; but other disputes, having nothing to do with ritual matters - concerning property or divorce proceedings, or even personal animosities - could be carried over into the field of ritual relationships. The Yemenis were extremely quick to anger and to take offence, and one of the most commonly used Hebrew words was 'makhloket', which means 'conflict' or 'dispute'.
Participation in a 'prayer-group' entailed a highly equalitarian and solidary ritual relationship. Almost all ritual duties were allocated in rote, and certain duties were similarly allocated amongst young boys. Every adult male would be given the duty of 'Shaliah Zibur' - prayer leader - and of reading a portion of the law, in turn; the latter privilege was usually auctioned, but this did not prevent a poorer man from having his turn, as it was common for richer men to buy the privilege, and then give it to another. In view of these practices, it was essential that a high degree of consensus be maintained within the 'Zibur'. Fission, within the 'zibur', by being made easy, contributed to the maintenance of solidarity within it, by ridding it of conflicting parties.

In conclusion, it can be said that communal life was maintained by a precarious balance between consensus and conflict. Lack of solidarity within the community was often checked by the existence of kinship and ritual ties outside of the community. Religion provided a system of values, beliefs, sentiments and symbols which sustained the group in its relations with the dominant Islamic society.

Leadership & Authority Amongst The Jews of Yemen.

The allocation of roles of leadership and authority was based on four principle criteria; wealth; learning; family prestige; and personal acceptability. Before commencing an analysis of the system of leadership roles,
I shall discuss each of these criteria in turn.

For the most part, there were no great distinctions of wealth amongst the Yemeni Jews, though there was an elite, usually confined to the larger cities like San'a, Ta'iz and Rad'a, some of whose members were rich by the standards of other Jews in the society. These rich men were merchants and occasionally silver- and gold-smiths. Some of them engaged in large-scale trade, often extending beyond the borders of Yemen itself. But apart from these, there were few other men of considerable wealth.

In the villages, where the majority of the Jews lived, there were only slight differences in wealth. The fortunes of individual craftsmen and their families varied from one year and from one place to another. Nevertheless, there was often at least one man who was considered a little richer than others. He might be a small merchant as well as craftsmen. Frequently, a man at the head of a large joint-family would control more wealth than others, and this would tend to make him richer; sometimes, the 'original' residents of a village would comprise a single extended family, and the head of such a group would often control greater wealth than that available to families who were more recent settlers.

The attainment of higher learning amongst Yemeni Jews — as was sometimes the case amongst Ashkenazi Jews — was often
linked with the possession of wealth. A richer man could afford to let his son learn longer, and in this way the son could become a 'Rav' of one sort or another.

All, except a negligible minority, of boys received some formal education, the content of which was based on religious literature. In this respect the Jews of Yemen were quite different from their Muslim neighbours, particularly in rural areas. They commenced learning at about the age of five and continued until the age of twelve or thirteen. The elite of learning were those who continued to study past the age of 12 or 13, and usually the sign of 'higher education' was that a man learned 'shkhitah' - i.e. ritual slaughtering. To learn this it was not simply a matter of knowing the technique itself, but of being well versed in the law prescribing the correct, and proscribing the forbidden methods of slaughter. Here also, there were degrees of qualification; a man who could slaughter cattle, sheep or goats was more learned than one who could slaughter only poultry.

The knowledge of 'shkhitah' was followed, in the scale of qualifications by that of the art of circumcision, and that in turn by the right to perform marriages, and finally by the right to be 'Beth Din' - a member of a rabbinical court of three. I have not given a place on the scale to the teacher of children, for the following
reason. There were many types of teacher with varying degrees of learning. Some men were teachers of children simply because they were unable to earn sufficient at their craft, though they had usually studied a little longer than the normal period; others were teachers in addition to possessing qualifications such as that of 'Mohel', 'Shohet' etc. Only those who taught pupils who themselves intended to become men of high learning, were in fact men of very high learning, and they were usually to be found in the big cities or in towns.

It was usual for higher learning to be inherited, and thus, certain family names became associated with this quality, either within a particular village, district, province, or the country as a whole.

Family prestige usually rested on the twin foundations of wealth and learning. Certain families produced the greatest sages and rabbis, generation after generation. This was true not only of the capital city, but of many of the small villages; though it was unlikely that small villages would produce men who would take their place on the highest rabbinical court of the land. As I have already stated, only rich families could in fact permit their children the luxury of higher learning. However, not all men of higher learning necessarily attained to rabbinical office; learning was not considered a step
to the attainment of office, and almost never as a means to increased wealth. But the richer families ensured their continued prestige by fostering the tradition of learning. Yet, family prestige was not simply a matter of learning and wealth. An important family was one which had enjoyed prestige over a number of generations, and in a particular village, small town or city, length of residence could be an important criterion of prestige.

The final criterion on which leadership and authority were based, was that of personal character and acceptability. It was never enough for a man to be relatively learned or rich; people had to accept him, and if they did not, he could not exercise authority over them. This condition derives once again from the nature of the social status of Jews in the wider society; authority, in the case of Jews, could not be backed up by the threat of force or coercion, since this ultimate sanction rested only with the Muslim authorities. This was particularly true in the case of headmen of Jewish communities. Thus, authority rested on personal acceptance and the following which a particular individual could gather. An individual's following or support might rest on ties of kinship; but even kinsmen could reject the authority of a particular individual.

**Levels of Authority & Positions of Leadership.**

There were three or four main levels of authority amongst the Yemeni Jews, each with its related roles of
leadership. There was the central authority of San'a, which encompassed the whole of Jewry in Yemen; and that of other cities like Ta'iz, which encompassed the whole area of southern Yemen, though was in principle subject to that of San'a. (I have treated those as one level, as the functions of leaders in these positions of authority were similar, if not identical.)

There was in some areas, a district authority. Thirdly, there was communal authority. Finally, there was authority within the group of kindred or the family. I shall scarcely be concerned with this latter, except in so far as it impinges upon others. I shall now deal with each in turn, commencing at the highest level.

The highest Jewish authority in the land was the Beth Din Shel Chloashah, which sat in San'a, the capital. At its head was the Ab Beth Din or Father of the Court, known in recent times as 'Haham Basha', a title introduced from Istanbul. Associated with the members of the court were the 'Knei Hayeshivah', a group of sages, men of the highest learning in Torah and Talmud, who met each day to study and teach at the foremost prayer-house of San'a, Beth Salath. This loose association of learned men constituted a forum for the settlement of disputes concerning the Jewish law, and for answering the queries of those who wished to bring them. However, it should be made quite clear that this larger association was not Court of three - i.e. three 'Dayanim', judges.
an official or regular high court for the settlement of disputes for Yemeni Jewry as a whole, nor was it officially a court of appeal. Its authority lay simply in the high standard of learning attained by its members, and by their recognized qualification for answering the many questions which arose in the interpretation and application of Jewish law. This body was not empowered, e.g., to collect taxes from Jews outside of the capital city. It existed firstly as a loose fraternity of the intellectual elite, and secondly as an organization for the assistance of those in need of advice. These men were usually approached by people from the smaller communities who wished to obtain the most reliable judgement possible on any issue. It was not a professional organization - there were no fees for advice; Yemeni Jews did not look upon the 'Torah' as a source of income, but simply as a 'light and inspiration'. The study of the 'Torah' was a 'Miswah'. (i.e. a 'commandment')

The functions of the 'Beth Din' itself were two-fold. It performed all those duties which were the province of local 'Batei Din' throughout Yemen - such as the granting of divorce and the settlement of disputes between Jews - together with some others, in addition to some for which it alone was responsible, such as the granting of 'Halizah'. It was also responsible for the granting of rabbinical permits - of varying grades - to those who exercised authority both in the capital and in the many villages and towns.
The granting of rabbinical permits was effected through emissaries who travelled the land on behalf of the 'Beth Din Shel Chloshah' of San'a. These men could, on their own decision, empower others to practice 'shkhitah' (ritual slaughtering), to be recognized 'Mekadshim' (those who performed marriages), 'Mekadshim U-Krarashim' (those who could both perform marriages and grant divorce), or even to be 'Dayanim' (judges). These emissaries could also interfere in local disputes, where the authority of the local 'Rav' or even 'Dayanim' was questioned.

Sometimes special emissaries were dispatched by the Beth Din in San'a for the settlement of local disputes which had been brought to their attention by some headman, 'Rav' or interested party. These emissaries were paid a fee for their work, and this is perhaps one reason why they were seldom men of the most reputed families of highest learning - for the latter it was wrong to use their knowledge of Torah for profit. However, these emissaries were usually men of wealth, and their powers were quite considerable. A small percentage of the amounts which they received were paid to the 'Beth Din' in San'a, those accumulated funds being used for the maintenance of the court and possibly for distribution as charity.

The authority of the 'Beth Din' of San'a was supposed to apply to all areas of Yemen. But it did not always extend to large towns like Rad'a and Ta'iz, whose 'Batei Din'
were often loath to accept the interference of San'a. Jews in these large towns were not encouraged to take their disputes to the 'Beth Din' of San'a, and if they did, the local 'Beth Din' did not feel obliged to accept a ruling from outside. There were instances of open hostility, when the court of the capital opposed or criticized the ruling given by a court in Had'a or Ta'iz. But there were no means of compulsion open to the court of the capital; their only possible method of control was the threat to denounce the members of the Beth Din concerned, and this would have the effect of discrediting them in the eyes of those over whom they exercised authority.

The Muslim authorities in some parts of Yemen had a definite interest in upholding the authority of the 'Beth Din' in San'a. They did not wish to become involved in disputes between Jews, but they were concerned to maintain the peace; thus, when a dispute appeared to have reached dead-lock, they might refer the parties to the court of the capital, or even compel them to seek judgment there. In this way, the court did sometimes assume the characteristics of a Supreme Court or Court of Appeal, often against the wishes of its head or other members. It should be stressed that Muslim authorities would only take such steps when the matter clearly concerned Jewish law — for example in disputes over ritual matters or over the fulfilment of marriage contracts.
The reluctance of its members to act as a regular court of appeal was based on the litigious nature of Yemeni Jews, who would willingly bring every case to its notice; it should be remembered that the status of the court was not constitutionally defined, so that there was no accepted judicial procedure for deciding which cases merited application to a higher court. But at the same time, the court was unwilling to permit any rival claims to status on the part of courts in other large towns or cities. There was a very definite ambiguity in its status, which was a consequence of these opposing forces.

There does not seem to have been any very clear rule for the election or nomination of the members of the 'Beth Din Shel Shalosh' in San'a. It was definitely not elected by all male Jews of Yemen or even of San'a itself. Brauer says that it was elected by a group of seven Jewish notables of the capital, known as 'Shib'a Doba Ha'ir'. (Brauer:1934) But Goitein does not mention this; he suggests that men inherited their high status through lineal succession, and that as one man died, or resigned his position on the court, another was co-opted, the senior member becoming 'Rish Beth Din', or Head of the Court. (Goitein: 1954) This seems plausible and in keeping with the informal nature of Jewish authority in Yemen. However, as many informants have pointed out, there was often fierce disagreement amongst the members of the court, the notables of the city, and
other Jews of San'a and even notables from outside of San'a, on the choice of a particular man to be co-opted onto the court; and often there were factional disputes and rivalries concerning the choice of 'ish Beth Din'. In recent times there was even an ideological basis to factional disputes, at least in San'a and Central Yemen, with the emergence of a modernist movement calling itself the 'Dar-daim'. This term, a vernacular corruption of two Hebrew words 'Dor' (generation) and 'Dei-a' (knowledge) can be translated roughly to mean the 'Age of Enlightenment'. The 'Dar-daim', following the 'Misnagdim' of Eastern Europe, were opposed to the Cabbalistic influences, particularly in the form of magical practices, which were so strong amongst Yemeni Jews; they considered these beliefs and practices as fundamentally un-Jewish, and ascribed their strength in Yemen to Muslim influence.* The traditionalists reacted very strongly and defensively to the growth of this modernist movement, accusing its leaders of wishing to undermine the Jewish religion.

*Though this is undoubtedly an exaggeration, it contains a small element of truth, in that the content of these beliefs and practices were often the product of cultural diffusion from the surrounding Muslim population. But these beliefs and practices were absorbed into a traditional Jewish system.
This served to minimize these modernist influences, which would hardly have taken root amongst the rural Jewish population, and the 'Dar-daim' remained a vocal minority. Still, the movement had considerable following amongst some of the elite of the big cities – particularly amongst the big merchants – who wished to voice their opinion in the election of 'Dayanim'.

Some informants report that, in recent times, these disputes over succession, nomination and election to the highest rabbinical authority in the land, became so fierce that it was often impossible for a decision to be reached without the interference of the Muslim authorities. It is reported that on one occasion the Imam himself sent for the Jewish notables of the city and compelled them to elect a 'Beth Din' and 'Rich Beth Din' before quitting his presence.

The Jewish court in San'a was nominally responsible to the Imam for all the Jews of Yemen; but in fact, the court was only responsible for the Jews of San'a and perhaps Central Yemen. It was responsible for the collection of the 'Jizyeh', and for insuring that Jews abided by the many prohibitions which defined their status as 'Dhimmi'. But, since the court had no other means of coercion available to it, it could rely only on the threat of exposure to the Muslim authorities.
The court was not responsible for the collection of the 'Jizzyah' outside of the San'a area. But when difficulties were encountered by the Muslim authorities in the collection of this tax in some other area, it was common for the Imam's representative to approach the court of San'a to use its influence - on threat of imprisonment for those concerned.

The court did not collect its own taxes outside of the San'a area, but within this area it collected the usual tax on 'Shkhitah'; when meat was slaughtered by two or more men at a time, the skins and fat had to be sold and the money given to the court. These funds were distributed as alms.

The next level of authority amongst the Jews was that exercised over a district, or town, or group of villages, by a local 'Beth Din Shel Shalosh'. These local rabbinical courts were authorised by the court in San'a to settle disputes between the Jews, grant divorce, and collect the tax on 'Shkhitah'. However, they could not as a rule empower or authorize others to practise as rabbis of any grade; the exception to this rule was the court of 'Ta'iz' which did license others to so practise. These local courts were not authorized to grant 'Halizah', which was the special prerogative of the San'a court. ('Halizah' is the exemption from the leviratic obligation; amongst the Yemeni Jews this could be granted only under
very rare circumstances, and in this they differed from Jews in almost every other country of the world, where 'Halizah' was the rule and 'Yibbun' the exception.) The local court consisted of three 'Dayanim', who had to have achieved a high level of Talmudic learning, and be recognized by the court of the capital. Very often, the 'Dayanim' would receive their permission from the emissaries who were sent out from San'a and who would test their knowledge and receive the normal fee of one 'Riyal'. These local courts were sometimes responsible for the distribution of alms from the money collected from the 'Shkhitah' tax. But the 'Dayanim' were not as a rule paid for their services. They earned their living by working at a craft, or acting as legal advisers, and were usually from wealthier families.

The local rabbinical courts were not regular courts of appeal. In many areas the primary reason for their existence was to grant divorce and to give judgment on the fulfilment of marital contracts, since often enough there would be no other rabbi of sufficient authority to do this. But they were often forced to accept the role of Court of Appeal when the parties to a dispute refused

*The term 'Yibbun' refers to Leviratic marriage.*
to accept the judgment of the local 'Rav'. Finally, this role was often forced upon them by the Muslim authorities, who might compel litigants to seek the judgment of their Jewish court. But in many cases Jewish litigants might refuse to accept the verdict of a local rabbinical court, in which case they would either apply to the court of San'a - or 'Ta'iz, if they lived in Southern Yemen - or even to the local Muslims court. The Jewish court possessed no means of coercion other than the threat of public disapproval, and this latter was hardly effective where people were willing to change their place of residence, if necessary. The court was not usually responsible for the collection of the 'Jizyyah', nor for the observance by Jews of the various prohibitions of the 'Umar' and 'Zeidic' law.

On the local or communal level there were two sorts of leadership role - sometimes these were vested in one person, though often they were not. The first was that of 'Aqil' or headman, sometimes referred to by the Hebrew word 'Nasi'. The second was that of 'Rav'. I shall deal with each in turn.

The 'Aqil' of any Jewish community was the headman of that community, or group of linked communities, who was recognized by the local Muslim authority. This recognition was the defining characteristic of his status. The 'Aqil' performed several duties, though the extent and nature of these varied from one area to another, depending upon the
demands of the Muslim authorities and on the relationship between 'Aqil' and his community.

The 'Aqil' was responsible for the collection of the 'jizya n', though here the degree of responsibility varied. In some places he was obliged to assess the heads of households and decide on the amount of their tax, while in others he was responsible solely for the collection of the money and its payment to the local Muslim 'Aqil' or 'Sheikh'; in the latter case, the assessment would rest solely with the Muslim authority. In general, the members of the community preferred that the assessment rest with the Muslim authority, since they knew that he would be more open to appeal, having true authority. But in some areas the Muslim authority would appoint a Jewish tax-collector for a whole district, and he would be responsible both for assessment and collection and would also receive a small percentage of the amount collected. These Jewish tax-collectors were hated by the Jewish communities, as they had a professional interest in siding with the Muslim authorities.

The second duty of the 'Aqil' was to keep the peace within the Jewish community. In this he required some knowledge of both Jewish and Muslim law. He was responsible for mediating in disputes and even giving judgement. This was particularly the case where he happened also to be 'Beth Din', where he was not himself a 'Rav' of sufficiently high
qualification, he referred certain cases to the local 'Both Din', though he might be permitted to sit on the court in such cases so as to furnish necessary information on the background to the dispute and of the disputants. But in most areas, particularly where the local Muslim authority took a strong interest in the affairs of 'his Jews', the Jewish 'Aqil' would require special permission from the Muslim 'sheikh' to act as mediator or judge in cases between Jews.

The third duty of the 'Aqil' was to defend the rights of individual Jews or of the whole Jewish community against their Muslim neighbours. There were many matters which could provoke conflict between Jews and Muslims. There were disputes over rights to land or over the rights of a whole community to a particular territory, over the possession of water-wells, and the right to use certain lands as cemeteries; these were civil matters. But in addition there were criminal matters which required the mediation of the Jewish 'Aqil': if a Jew struck a Muslim he was liable for the payment of compensation and imprisonment; if a Muslim struck a Jew he might be liable only for compensation, which was paid to the Muslim authority, a very small amount being given to the victim; if a Jew killed a Muslim - a very rare occurrence - he was liable to suffer the penalty of death, unless he could establish
that it was an act of self-defence, in which case it might be the responsibility of his 'Aqil' to assist him; if a Muslim killed a Jew he was liable to pay blood money, a small proportion of which was given to the kinsmen of the victim. (even in the event that a Jew was killed by a Muslim of another tribe, his 'protector' was not bound to avenge his death, but might merely demand blood-money). Apart from questions of civil and criminal legal process, there were other matters in which the rights of Jews might require defence. In some areas the Jews were required to clean out the latrines of their Muslim neighbours or of the Muslim 'Sheikh'; they considered this a great indignity, and it was the duty of the 'Aqil' to try to obtain exemption from these obligations. In general it was the duty of the 'Aqil' to defend his community or individual members in case of accusations, real or imaginary, concerning the sale of wine to Muslims, the mixing of sexes at ceremonies and celebrations, and the practice of sorcery and witchcraft. Finally, the 'Aqil' might be responsible for securing the exemption of orphans from forcible conversion to Islam.

But the role of 'Aqil' was not confined to the duties of tax-collecting and assessing, maintaining the peace, and representing the interests of the community. In addition, he could be held personally responsible for the behaviour and obligations of his community. If a fine was levied
on the whole community, then the 'Aqil' was responsible for its collection, and this might necessitate personal outlay to make up the required sum. An 'Aqil' could also be thrashed or imprisoned if he failed to ascertain the identity of an offender or to find an offender who was being sought. He could be thrashed, imprisoned or even killed if he failed to hand over an orphan for forcible conversion to Islam. There were cases of 'Aqilis' who themselves accepted Islam rather than suffer the penalty of death.

Jacob Sapir has suggested that, because of the dangers inherent in the status of 'Aqil', it was considered undesirable, and avoided by the notables or learned men of the Jewish community, and accepted only by men of low intelligence, little education or no moral scruples. (quoted in Brauer; 1934). But both Brauer and Goitoin disagree with this view (Brauer: 1934, Goitoin: 1954); and my own researches lead me to suspect that Sapir has based his generalization on a few atypical instances or else on a misunderstanding of the situation. It would seem, on the contrary, that in most cases the 'Aqil' was the richest man in the community, or the head of the largest group of kindred, and often also the man of highest learning. Although he did not usually receive any official stipend in return for his duties, he did usually enjoy certain rewards. In the first place, his position as
head of the community, recognized by the Muslim 'Sheikh', enabled him to establish an 'Ulema' relationship with the 'Sheikh' himself; since the latter was the richest Muslim in the area, his requirements of Jewish craftsmanship were considerable. The Jewish 'Aqil' was not averse to receiving payments for favours from those members of his community whom he might be able to assist by using his influence over the Muslim 'Sheikh'. The position of 'Aqil' gave a man prestige. In fact, the 'Aqil' needed to be a man of more than average intelligence in order to know how to approach the Muslim authorities, and whom to bribe, if need be. In many areas the 'Aqil' did have a right to keep one-sixteenth part of the taxes which he collected. Some not only kept this part but also imposed added taxes on their communities, which were paid for fear of trouble with the Muslim authorities. There is no doubt that the latter offered this inducement to Jewish headmen in order to ensure that a substantial amount was collected. But there were many Jewish headmen who did not keep the part permitted, but only sufficient to reimburse themselves for the time spent on tax collection. There were even those who paid the taxes of others who were too poor to do so, granting them loans or even gifts.

Very often, the headman was also 'Aqil al-Knis', head of the synagogue. He administered the synagogue in every possible respect. He invited the 'Shalish Zibur'
(prayer-leader) to perform his duties, and arranged for the allocations of all 'Miswoth', or ritual duties, in strict rotational order. This latter duty was most important in view of the Yemeni custom of distributing all ritual duties amongst the men and boys of the congregation. He had the right to announce the first word of each paragraph while the congregation remained silent, and had to ensure that the rituals were performed according to local customs and general Jewish law and tradition. The latter were often a matter of much dispute, and the head of the synagogue was compelled to consider the views of the members of the 'Zibur'; if he did not, they abandoned him. He was fully responsible for the maintenance of the synagogue, which might also belong to him, and for keeping the accounts of income and expenditure. Income was obtained from the auctioning of certain prized 'Miswoth' and from donations - a man might vow to donate a sum to the 'knes' in time of sorrow or suffering - and expenditure was allocated for the purchase of rugs, oil, 'Sifrei Torah' (scrolls of the Law) and repair of the building etc. He could reserve for himself certain prized 'Miswoth' - such as reading the first passage of a newly-opened 'Sofer Torah' - but if he did this too often he was subject to the criticism of the 'Zibur'. 
A man enjoyed great prestige in the Jewish community when he combined the various duties of headman, head of the synagogue, and 'Rav', and this was quite often the case. But it was quite common—particularly in Southern Yemen—to find that the 'Aqil' was not also 'Rav'. Either there was a 'Rav' in the community, or else there was one who catered to the needs of a whole area of linked villages. The status of any 'Rav' depended on his qualifications as recognized by the 'Beth Din' in Sana. But where there was a 'Rav' in addition to the headman, the latter was often looked upon as little more than official agent for the Muslim 'Aqil' or 'sheikh'.

Sometimes a man of learning was accorded high prestige when he was believed also to possess magical and therapeutic powers. Such a man, known as a 'Baal Hefetz', who might also be a Rav or even a 'Dayan', could cure diseases through natural and supernatural techniques, could detect the workings of sorcery or witchcraft and counter them, and, most important of all, could diagnose the effects of the 'evil eye' and the 'evil spirits', known in Hebrew as 'Shedin' and in Arabic as 'Jinn'. These men were also respected by the Muslims in the area, who would

* The term 'Baal Hefetz' means, 'one who owns a book'; but reference was to a very special sort of book containing cabalistic information. Such a book could be obtained only through revelation during a dream.
approach them with requests to cure their ailments or banish the 'evil eye' or 'Jinn'. Only the most revered of these sages were believed to be capable of countering the 'evil spirits'; this was done by a method known as 'Lijmah WeYefruk', which means 'assembling and dismissing'. The 'Baal Hefetz' was believed to assemble the spirits by mystical means; having done this he would address the 'Beth Din' of the spirit world, threatening to curse the offending spirit with endless wandering unless it was withdrawn. Spirit possession was usually another name for mental illness, and so the 'Baal Hefetz' treated all illness, regardless of origin. He was not strictly a leader, but did have considerable authority and was often so respected and revered by the Muslim authorities that he was able to intercede in matters concerning the relations between Jews and Muslims.

Many are the stories told by Yemeni Jews of the powers of these 'Baalci-Hefetz', of the influence which they exercised over the Muslims, and of the magical techniques which they employed for securing the rights of Jews. These stories may contain an element of truth - i.e. ethnographic truth, in that they refer to real influences, not real powers - but in most cases they should be viewed as myths which performed an important psychological function for the Jews as a 'protected' people, enjoying few legal and judicial rights. They expressed their
compensatory feelings of intellectual superiority over their Muslim neighbors.

Before concluding this analysis of leadership and authority amongst the Jews in Yemen, I should mention the exercise of authority within the group of kindred or the family.

As I have mentioned earlier in this chapter, the kinship system was strongly patrilineal, patrilocal and patrilocostal. This meant that for most daily purposes, authority rested in the head of a large household who was economically independent of other household heads, though dependent upon the custom of his Muslim client or clients. The head of a household controlled the activities of its members in all spheres: he negotiated the marriage agreement of his daughter or sister and possibly of his brother's daughter or son's daughter; he influenced his own son's selection of a wife and participated in the negotiation of his marriage agreement; he controlled ritual activities in the home and supervised his son's studies. He was responsible for the observance of Jewish and also the Muslim law as it affected the members of his household. He was liable for the payment of fines incurred by any member of his household, and for ensuring that they did not flee when accused of some crime or offence; in the event that they did, he was liable to be imprisoned or whipped himself.
Kinship affected not only the exercise of authority in the home, but the exercise of authority generally. Positions of leadership and authority were usually obtained through succession, though this did not always accord with the rules of patrilineality; if a man had no son, he might be succeeded by his sister's son or even by his daughter's son. But, as I have already mentioned, succession was not sufficient. A man had to be considered desirable before succeeding to a position of authority, and it was one of his father's duties to teach him the right way of becoming acceptable to the members of the community as well as to the Muslim overlord.

**Conclusions.**

The Jews of Yemen were united by the bonds of kinship, religion and the common recognition of a central religious authority. They were a 'protected' people and occupied the lowest status in a society marked by a rigid hierarchy of ranks. Their position was insecure, both politically and economically. They sought comfort in the practice of their religion which united them to the 'God of Israel' and to 'His People'. They were not fully identified with the society in which they lived, and rejected some of the fundamental values upon which it rested.

Real authority, backed up by the threat of force, was imposed upon them from an external source over which
they had no legal control, but which they could only manipulate to serve their own ends. Their occupation made them indispensable to their Muslim neighbours; and their status as the personal proteges of a Muslim 'sheikh' or higher authority, served to ensure that they received a medium of fair treatment.

Their own leaders lacked the necessary sanction for their authority - the threat of physical coercion - though they could use the threat of moral disapproval. Their position was defined largely in terms of religious values and beliefs, and where it was not, it was dependent upon the support of an external authority, and therefore distrusted.

Jewish social life was characterised, on the one hand, by strong loyalties and ties of kinship and ritual participation; and on the other hand by constant rivalries, litigation and the splitting up of communities or prayer-groups. These rivalries and conflicts led to constant applications to leaders for the settlement of disputes. Where parties were dissatisfied with the judgments given, they would have recourse either to a higher Jewish authority or to Muslim courts. Ultimately, the acceptance of judgment depended either upon the authority of the Muslim court, or the support which Muslim authority lent to the Jewish court.

Jews had no direct jural rights; these latter could be mediated only through their 'protectors'. It was one of the major functions of Jewish leaders to act as agent
between the community and the 'protector'; Conversely, the communal leader might be held responsible for the behaviour and obligations of his community. For both reasons, Jewish leaders at all levels suffered a considerable insecurity of status. And their position could be undermined by the withdrawal of support and acceptance.

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CHAPTER IX. LEADERSHIP & POLITICS IN A YEMENI MOSHAV.

'Moshav' Zellafon' is in some ways typical of the many Yemeni Moshavim which have been established since the foundation of the state, in the Judean hills, the Galilee area and other parts of Israel; the analysis of leadership and political allegiance in this Moshav, therefore illustrates some of the general problems which arise in similar communities.

There are two main organizations of Moshavim in Israel, and most villages belong to one or other of these. Moshav 'Zellafon' is affiliated to the larger of the two organizations, which is known as 'Tnuath HaMoshavim'; the latter is associated with the labour organization, the 'Histadruth'. Every Moshav which belongs to this association is organized according to certain principles which are laid down as part of the charter of the movement; this affects, or even determines to some extent, both the nature of leadership roles, and the social context in which they function.

In addition, the affairs of every new Moshav - i.e., those settled by recent immigrants - are partly controlled by certain State organizations, which are responsible for the problems of immigrant absorption.

While the social structure of the community is partly determined by the rules of the Moshav movement, and while

* translated: 'The movement of agricultural cooperatives'.
its activities are affected by its relations with State agencies, the pattern of social relationships within the community is also affected by purely internal conditions. Thus, all of these aspects of the social situation must be described and analysed, before leadership and allegiance can be examined.

Introduction.

Moshav 'Zellafon' lies in that part of the Judean hills known as the Jerusalem corridor, and is situated approximately half way between Jerusalem and Tel Aviv.

It was established in the early months of 1950, when about 350 Yemenis were brought to the site from an immigrant camp in which they had been living for over a year. On arrival at the site, the immigrants were housed in tents, while the menfolk set about the construction of the new village, under the supervision of the Jewish Agency Settlement Bureau. After five or six months the houses had been built, and the people moved into the new village.

The village was planned in five double-rows of houses, which run from North to South, and from East to West, cutting across one another; each double-row comprises between 14 and 20 houses. There are altogether about 90 houses, of which 83 are inhabited.

The houses are of two sizes, one-roomed and two-roomed, the smaller being allocated to elementary families, and the larger to families with elderly dependents.
The choice of place of residence was not left to the settlers. Families were allocated houses in turn, depending upon the date of their arrival on the site, but priority was also given to those with elderly dependents. Some families did choose to be housed alongside their close kinsmen, but most accepted whatever system seemed to have been devised. Consequently, kinsmen or members of the same sub-ethnic group, were often placed in different rows, at some distance from one another.

The community was provided, at the outset, with houses, an irrigation system, a large hall, a local store, a school-house, a few small administrative buildings, and large central store-house, neighbourhood store-houses and prayer-houses.

Each house was built on a plot of five dunams - about an acre - to be used for the raising of poultry, a goat or two, and some crops, mainly for domestic consumption. But in addition to these, every household was to receive a share of the total land of the Moshav.

Between 1950 and 1953 the population increased from 350 to 432, due to further arrivals and to natural increase, and all but seven of the total number of houses which had been built, were occupied.

Economic Organization of the Moshav.

'Zellafon' belongs to the type of village known as a 'Moshav Ovdim' or small-holders' cooperative.
In this type of community every household has the right of use of several pieces of land; one on which the house stands, and others scattered throughout the village. Each household farms its own land, though in new villages certain initial projects are carried out cooperatively. Each household has its own small tools, poultry, seed, and livestock, but large and expensive agricultural machinery - e.g. tractors - are held by the village as a whole.

Each household has the right to purchase its seed, poultry and other agricultural requirements through the purchasing agency of 'Tnuath Hamoshavim', and is also obliged to sell its produce through the same agency.

Each household-head has an account at the village secretariat; he is credited with any amount accruing to him from the sale of produce or for work performed on behalf of the village, and is debited with the cost of his purchases, or for charges made for the use of communal implements and machinery. In established Moshavim, household-heads are permitted to raise interest-free loans from the secretariat, the funds usually being available from the credit balances of other members of the community. But in new villages, such funds are not available from internal sources, and are provided by State agencies.

In new Moshavim large-scale projects - such as the planting of vineyards and tobacco plantations in 'Zellafon'—
are begun in the early years of settlement, and the funds are provided in the form of long-term loans, which are repaid by the smallholders when each householder receives an allotment of the area which has been cultivated. Members of the community are paid for work on village projects — though at a lower rate than work done outside the village — and the earnings are credited to their accounts.

Because of the difficulties experienced by new settlers in earning a livelihood in the Moshav, outside work is provided by one of the State agencies. The Yemenis of 'Zellafon' are given several days' work a month in the State afforestation projects, or in the laying of irrigation pipes etc. However, the members of the Moshav are not permitted to obtain other types of paid labour. The allocation of outside work is organized on a rote system, as there is not sufficient work to provide daily employment for all. In any case, total reliance on outside work is discouraged, lest the Moshav itself be neglected by its members.

Payment for outside work is made direct to those concerned, and is kept quite separate from the accounting system of the Moshav itself.

Ties With The Moshav Movement

The rules of 'Tnuath HaMoshavim' govern the form of organization of the community, which receives numerous services from the 'movement'. Two instructors, a man and
a woman, live most of the week in the Moshav, advising on agricultural methods, administration, and domestic matters. These instructors are themselves old members of the 'movement', living in well-established moshavim; they receive a salary paid from funds allocated to the village by 'Tnuath HaMoshavim'. The female instructor is concerned largely with advising housewives on matters concerning cooking, domestic management, child-rearing, etc. She is not specially trained for this, and usually has little understanding of Yemeni family organization and values. Her role, is to act as agent of the 'Yishuv' - the old Ashkenazi population of Palestine - in communicating to new immigrants, particularly Orientals, the standards of her own social group. The male instructor not only gives advice on agricultural methods and administration, but also intervenes in the actual process of administration. The two instructors then, are not merely technical advisers, but are intended to be agents of social and cultural assimilation in the widest sense.

Periodically, district agents of 'Tnuath HaMoshavim' visit the village. The avowed purpose of these visits is to enquire into the nature of the problems encountered by the settlers, to hear complaints from settlers and instructors, to evaluate the suitability of the instructors, and to recommend plans for economic development and
organization. But one of the underlying purposes of these visits is to strengthen the loyalty of the villagers and their leaders to 'Tnuath HaMoshavim', by explaining the purpose of its rules, and by preaching the doctrine of cooperation and 'Halutziuth' - agricultural pioneering.

The Moshav movement also caters for certain 'cultural and educational requirements' of the village - both directly, and indirectly through the 'Cultural and Educational Department' of the 'Histadruth' - by arranging film shows, lectures and excursions.

'Tnuath HaMoshavim' is affiliated to the 'Histadruth', and its political policy entails complete support for one party - 'Mapai'; hence, part of the 'educational and cultural' programme embraces party-political propaganda. Party representatives - including even prominent leaders, like the Prime Minister - pay regular visits to the village, in attempts to persuade the villagers that 'Mapai' alone has the power to improve their economic circumstances, and that it alone embodies the true principles of social justice and patriotism.

Ties With State Agencies.

'Zellafon' is linked with a number of different State or governmental agencies or departments: the 'Jewish Agency' and in particular its settlement department; 'Keren HaKayemeth' - the State land-holding and agricultural
settlement agency; the army or border police; the district judiciary and police force.

The Jewish Agency is concerned primarily with immigrant absorption and settlement. In 'Zellafon', the major significance of this body lies in the fact that it provides material assistance to the village in the form of loans and grants, in both money and kind; it provides supervision of large-scale projects within the village, and certain educational and other facilities. Representatives of the 'Agency' visit the village periodically, supervising agricultural projects, giving advice to the villagers, etc. The 'Agency' is also responsible for the payment of workers who participate in communal projects.

The 'Karen HaKayemeth' owns most of the land in Israel, so that members of 'Moshavim' have only a use-right over their land, and can not sell it. This organization is also responsible for the afforestation programme in some parts of Israel, particularly the Judean hills, and employs workers from 'Zellafon' on this project.

Every Moshav is linked up with either the army or border police for the purpose of military protection, particularly in border areas; the whole Jerusalem corridor is bounded on both sides by the Jordanian border, and is therefore a strategic military area. Each adult male of military age is obliged to perform night-watch duty several days in the month, in lieu of annual service in the army.
reserve. The army organizes this night-watch duty, and reinforces the local guard in times of emergency.

'Zellafon' has neither its own judiciary nor police, but is part of the judicial and police district of Hartuv, a town which lies some seven kilometres to the east.

Social Services.

As the members of the Moshav belong automatically to the 'Histadruth' and pay their monthly dues to that organization, they receive the usual benefits, and in particular the health services of 'Kupath Holim', the 'Histadruth' Sick Fund. There is a clinic in the village, attended almost daily by a male nurse, and by a doctor from a neighbouring village twice every week.

A social worker visits the village once a week, attending to family matters, school absenteeism etc.

There is a primary school in the village, run on religious lines, which caters for the first three grades of schooling; thereafter, the children are sent to a neighbouring village school.

The youth - including the working youth, married and single - belong to a youth organization which is associated with the 'Histadruth', called 'Hoar Oved'. They are visited once a week by a youth worker. Evening classes are similarly organized for the working youth, and are attended by girls as well as boys and young men.
Internal Structure of the Community

I have already described the official form of organization, and so will now deal with those aspects of social relations which are not prescribed by virtue of membership of the moshav movement.

Population*

The population of Zellafon is 432, and there are 83 households. The composition is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adults, over the age of 20</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth, 14 to 20</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children 5 to 14</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infants up to 5</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>216</strong></td>
<td><strong>216</strong></td>
<td><strong>432</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the 83 households, 58 are small, containing only elementary families or part-families, while 25 are larger, containing elementary families together with dependents, and in one case a polygynous household.

*These population figures were obtained in 1953 when fieldwork in this village commenced, and three years after the village was founded. I continued my research in this community over a period of two years, but did not collect further population figures after the first period of work in 1953; therefore they are not an accurate reflection of the composition of the community for the whole period, though the analysis of this community is based on material collected during two years.
Sub-Ethnic Grouping & Kinship.

With the exception of the infants, the members of the community and their children were all born in Yemen.

The community is composed of three groups from different districts in Central and East-Central Yemen; the first and largest group comes from the district of Arhab, numbering 267 people, and 57 households; the second group is from Nihim, numbering 131 people, and 29 households; the third, and smallest group is from Wadi Sirr, and numbers 34 people and 7 households.*

Within each of these groups there are numerous ties of kinship and affinity, though not every member of each group is related to every other one. In some cases, the ties - whether unilineal or cognatic - are well-recognized and strong; but in other cases they are barely recognized. Amongst the group from Arhab, 39 of the 57 present households bear the name 'Tzabari'; however, these people do not all look upon themselves as members of a recognized lineage, though they may acknowledge the possibility of

*The figures for each group include local-born children, the women being included in their husband's group, whether the marriage took place in Yemen or Israel. The number of households refers to present households in the moshav and not to previous households in Yemen.
erstwhile connexions. However, many members of this group are connected by ties of recognized kinship, and this has considerable ritual significance and a certain degree of political significance.

The second group, from Nihim, is very much like the first one, but in the third group, almost all household-heads are agnates.

But ties of kinship — and friendship — cut across the sub-ethnic divisions. All of these three groups are from the same major area of Yemen, and there were innumerable links between these neighbouring communities.*

Economically, broad ties of kinship and sub-ethnic grouping are not very significant in 'Zellafon'. There is considerable economic cooperation within the household and the elementary family, and some cooperation in work between close kinsmen — sometimes agnatic, but often between cognatic or affinal kinsmen — but very little between more remote kinsmen.

But kith and kin are important in ritual matters; they gather together for the celebration of marriages and circumcisions and of course for funerals; and they visit amongst themselves on festivals.

**Neighbourhood.**

'Zellafon' is divided into five rows of houses. Each one of these has a small store-room for agricultural

*See Chapter VIII.*
implements, which are used by that row; and each one has a synagogue. These two factors affect the nature of social relationships within a row.

The use of agricultural implements in a neighbourhood must be clearly distinguished from the use of larger and more expensive implements which belong to the community as a whole. Communal equipment must be hired by each household head, or by several together, and payment made. But neighbourhood equipment is at the disposal of whoever wishes to use it; this includes such things as mule-drawn ploughs, irrigation pipes, and repair tools. There are no strict rules governing the use of these things, so that there must be some sort of implicit understanding between the people in a neighbourhood. If a man wishes to use equipment which another is already using, then he must approach the latter and come to some agreement regarding the time necessary for his work. On the one hand, this tends to foster an element of group consensus regarding the rights of use of this equipment, but on the other it creates a source of conflict between those who can not reach agreement.

The second factor which influences the relations between residents of a neighbourhood, is the common use of a synagogue. Most of the older generation in 'Zellafon' attend prayers twice daily, when possible, and the younger members attend at least three times a week, on the Sabath. Almost all the men attend the synagogue nearest to their
homes, which means that they attend one in the row in which they live. Some men prefer to pray in other rows, but this is not common.

Following Yemeni tradition, the major 'Mizvot' - ritual duties - are performed by all of the adult men in turn: these include the duties of 'Shaliah Tzibur' - prayer leader, reading of the Law, etc. Other 'Mizvot' are performed by young boys in turn. This circulation of roles requires and fosters a considerable degree of solidarity between the members of a 'Minyan'; and it is very much a solidarity of equals! Of course this sort of relationship does not preclude the existence of ranking within the 'Minyan'. Older men, particularly those who are more learned in religious matters and Jewish law, have greater prestige. A 'Cohen', if there is one, has greater privilege and prestige. And finally, in each 'Minyan' there is a 'Nasi', who is responsible for the allocation of ritual duties and for remembering the turn of each one.

Leadership Roles in 'Zellafon'

The following leadership positions are of importance: village committee men; religious leader; army commandant; labour organizer; and various informal and unofficial positions. I shall deal with each of these in turn. 'Zellafon,' like all other moshavim, has a local committee known as the 'Vaad Mekomi'. This committee is
elected, officially, every four years; but in fact, elections take place more frequently, owing to disputes and resignations, forced or voluntary. The committee comprises between five and nine men; the number varies because of the constant changes which occur, so that at any one time it is uncertain as to who is a member of the committee and who is not. Not all changes follow on formal elections; often enough men are coopted and then dropped. The only constant feature in this situation is the existence of a 'Maskeer Pnim' — secretary for internal village affairs, a 'Maskeer Hutz' — secretary for affairs relating to outside institutions — and a 'Gizbar' — village treasurer.

The 'Maskeer Pnim', who is often head of the local committee, is concerned with a number of matters connected with the internal administration of the village: with the distribution of seed, plants, agricultural equipment; the allocation of outside work and work on communal projects; the payment of local taxes, and the administration of accounts; enforcement of night-watch duty; administration of physical improvements of the village; and he calls village meetings and presides over them. He does not require any special clerical training for this work, as he does not himself keep accounts. He needs only to write occasional official letters. The 'Maskeer Pnim' is nominated from amongst the members of the local committee.
The 'Maskeer Hutz' has a far more responsible position than the 'Maskeer Pnim', who is really little more than a general overseer. The 'Maskeer Hutz' acts as agent for the village in its relations with the Jewish Agency, 'Keren HaKayemeth', 'Tnuath HaMoshavim' and the 'Histadruth'. He may even be the local representative of 'Mapai', though sometimes the committee headman will perform this role. One of the main tasks of the 'Maskeer Hutz' is to administer the purchase of agricultural and other requirements for the village, and the sale of its produce.

In fact, the two secretaries are expected to perform most of these tasks jointly. However, the 'Maskeer Hutz' is required to have a more specialized clerical training, which he receives from 'Tnuath HaMoshavim' which runs courses for this purpose.

Both secretaries have the important function of communicating to the villagers the suggestions or demands of the external authorities. This crucial task is performed at public meetings, which are held frequently in the village hall. Here the secretaries put forward various proposals for discussion, such as the need to purchase a certain type of expensive fertilizer, or the desirability of planting one vegetable crop rather than another; or, they inform the villagers of the need to pay for the use of communal equipment, and to cooperate in the use of tools and equipment in the neighbourhood store-rooms, and so on.
Here also, the villagers are informed of the order of night-watch duties, of plans for the development of the village, and of the need to send children to school etc.

The third important member of the local committee is the treasurer or 'Gizbar', as he is called. His task is to make and receive any money payments connected with community affairs or with outside work and to keep records of these; however, he does not keep the books, as this is done by a qualified book-keeper who is not a member of the community, but is appointed by 'Tnuath HaMoshavim'. Though the 'Gizbar' can not officially make any unauthorised payments, he can determine the priority of payments to people; this is important, because there is seldom sufficient cash to pay everyone at the same time for outside work, and so it is common for friends and kinsmen of the 'Gizbar' to receive payment earlier than others.

The two secretaries and the treasurer are the only committee-men who receive a salary, so that these posts are highly valued. However, both the 'Maskeer Hutz' and the 'Gizbar' need to be trained for their work, so that it is far more difficult to replace them; the majority of adult Yemenis do not know enough of clerical procedures, letter-writing, and the use of numerals, to be able to assume responsibility for these positions.

The religious leader of the moshav, or 'Rav', has several duties to perform, mostly connected with ritual,
He performs marriages and circumcisions, announces the hour on which Sabaths and festivals are due to commence, and makes public announcements concerning ritual usage in Israel. In addition to this, he sometimes concerns himself with breaches of ritual taboos on the part of the young, and with the indifference of youth in Israel to the 'Torah'.

The army commandant has an extremely important duty to perform, and his authority is backed up by the full weight of the military. He holds the rank of sergeant in the military reserve, and it is his duty to ensure that there is an adequate guard every night. This is important not only from the point of view of the villagers, who have to be protected from infiltrators, but from the point of view of national defence.

The task of the labour organizer is to enlist the exact number of men required each day for outside work, or for work on communal projects. The demand for labourers on outside work always falls short of the available supply; hence, there is considerable competition each morning to obtain this work, as it is better-paid than work done on communal projects, and payment is made direct. Officially, this work is supposed to be allocated on a rote system; but in fact other factors influence the choice of workers each day. Preference is given to men with a greater number of dependents; and to friends and kinsmen of the labour organizer, or of one or other of the secretaries. Since
no one, apart from the leaders, has access to the work register, only the leaders know whether a man is entitled to work or not.

While most men will gladly accept work on communal projects, failing outside work, there is insufficient work to satisfy all applicants, so that here again nepotism and favouritism operates.

The labour organizer is officially chosen by the village committee; but effectively he is appointed by the two secretaries. His job is a favoured one, as he is himself guaranteed work on almost any day that he wishes.

All of these official positions of leadership are paid, from funds which are obtained from various sources. The two secretaries and the treasurer are paid from communal funds which come from the Jewish Agency; the religious leader is paid by the Ministry of Religious Affairs; the army commandant is paid by the army; the labour organizer is paid from communal funds received from the Jewish Agency.

In addition to these official positions of leadership, there are a number of unofficial positions. There are heads of factions, synagogue heads, and 'medicine men'.

**Leadership Personalities & Selection**

The following men are of importance in the village:
Yehudah Kgaïsi; Moshe Menahem Tzabari; 'Mori' Salem Ftaikhi; and Shalom Hadad. There are a number of other men who became important, to a lesser degree, for short periods, but their status is soon occupied by rivals. I shall therefore deal only with the four stable leaders separately, and with the remainder jointly.

Yehudah Kgaïsi became a leader in the immigrant camp when the Jewish Agency began enlisting people for settlement in the Judean hills. The Agency representatives needed a leader who would gather together a large enough group for settlement, and he was one of the first to come forward and volunteer for this task. He claimed to be known to a large number of people from certain areas of Yemen, and it so happened that many of these people were in the same part of one camp. He had in fact been a communal headman in his native district of Nihim in Central Yemen, and was of a family which had enjoyed long prestige in the area. He encountered no serious rivalry, and was successful in persuading a number of people to follow him in settling on the land. These people in turn persuaded

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*The title 'Mori' is used by Yemenis either as a term of address or reference, and simply denotes respect. It is most commonly used in addressing a religious official, of whatever status, or a teacher of the young; but it is also used in addressing older men, particularly those who are considered learned. The term is probably derived from the Aramaic 'Mar', meaning 'Sir', and not from the Hebrew 'Moreh', meaning 'teacher'. (Vide: Goitein: 1954)*
their own kinsmen and erstwhile neighbours to do the same, and very soon the Jewish Agency was presented with a sufficient number to start a village.

While the village was being built, Kgaisi was sent on a course organized by 'Tnuath HaMoshavim' where he learnt the rudiments of clerical techniques; the course lasted two months, and on his return he was appointed as secretary. Shortly after, elections were held to appoint a communal committee, and he was duly elected. At the time he was the sole local administrator of the village, most of its affairs being conducted by agents of the State or 'Tnuath HaMoshavim'. When the first committee was elected, it was decided that Kgaisi should confine himself to external duties largely, and that someone else should assume other responsibilities. There were two reasons for this: the 'Maskeer Hutz' is expected to travel about and so can not be available for all local duties; 'Tnuath HaMoshavim' believes in the principle of decentralization of authority.

Between 1950 and 1953 the office of 'Maskeer Pnim', which included that of committee-headman, changed hands four or five times. Consequently, an agreement was reached between 'Tnuath HaMoshavim', the Jewish Agency and the local committee that Kgaisi should assume responsibility for both secretarial positions - in effect,
the two roles were temporarily combined in one person.

Kgaisi is a married man of about 35 years of age. Like the overwhelming majority of Yemeni immigrants of his age-group, he is markedly traditional with respect to outward appearance and religious orthodoxy. But in other matters he shews many superficial signs of accommodation or assimilation to the values and standards of the wider society. As a result of his training - which was both technical and ideological - he pays full lip service to the principles of cooperation, 'halutziuth', support for the 'Histadruth' and 'Mapai', national identification, and so on. Of course, this acceptance of the values, beliefs and symbols of the wider society, constitutes a mere cultural veneer. It is part of his official status. But these values and ideas, if they are imperfectly understood and accepted by Kgaisi, are quite remote from the conceptions of the ordinary villager; therefore, he must act as agent in communicating to the villagers the standards of the wider society, as well as communicating to external authority the difficulties and resistances of the villagers. If he appears to impose standards on the villagers which they find difficult to accept, he is opposed; but if he appears to side with the villagers in opposition to their superiors, then the latter find fault with his administrative ability. This conflict, inherent in his status, is not merely ideological, but
operates on a concrete situational level.

Moshe Menahem Tzabari, has been in a position of leadership for a shorter time than Kgaisi. He too was a man of some prestige in Yemen, a headman and ritual slaughterer, and was well-known amongst some of the people from the district of Arhab. It was only in 1950, after the first elections were held, that he became a member of the committee, and was appointed to be treasurer on the recommendation of Kgaisi. He too was sent on a short course and since then has held the same post, partly because no one else has yet obtained the requisite training for the work.

He is a married man of 43, strongly traditional, but shows less tendency to absorb the values of the wider society, than Kgaisi, even on a superficial level.

Like Kgaisi, he too is an agent between the village and the wider society, but has less authority and responsibility.

'Nori' Salem Ftaikhi was unanimously accepted as rabbi of the community, from the outset. He was not the only man of superior learning in the community - apart from others, his own two brothers were also well learned in 'Torah' - but he enjoyed the highest prestige of them all, having been a 'Megadaish U-megaraish' in the Yemen - that is, one who could perform marriages and grant divorces.
When the community was first established, he was appointed rabbi by the Ministry of Religious Affairs, and then tested by the Rabbinate. Subsequently, he was brought to Jerusalem to be given a short course of instruction by the Rabbinate, and there learned the elements of Israeli practice in matters relating to ritual—particularly marriage—and the law relating to minors, monogamy, the levirate etc. In short, he was forced to undergo a certain amount of re-education before he could be accepted by the Israeli Rabbinate.

Ftaikhi is an elderly man—he is about 65—with married children, and is totally traditional in outward appearance and values. Despite his short course of training at the Rabbinate, he is highly unassimilated to the wider society, and in his daily life is largely divorced from contact with the world outside of the village. He does not work at anything but his studies, and has very few duties to perform.

Shalom Hadad was appointed army commandant of the village in 1953, as part of the army plan to organize border defence by a system of village guard duties. He had completed his own military service in the previous year, and was then given the rank of sergeant in the reserves. As he was the only person in the village qualified to assume this responsibility, his appointment was ensured.
He is a young married man of about 23 years of age. He has discarded the outward signs of Yemeni traditionalism, but is observant in religious matters.

Apart from these principal personalities in the village, there are a number of other men who have at one time or another aspired to positions of leadership, or actually assumed certain roles of leadership. Four different men have at one time or another been 'Maskeer Pnim' and head of the local committee, and at least seven more have at one time been members of the local committee. But none of them has remained long in positions of genuine authority.

A number of men, apart from official leaders, do become faction leaders for short periods. But the composition of factions varies, as does the leadership.

In each neighbourhood certain elderly men are heads of synagogues, but apart from their ritual duties, none of them has shown signs of leadership in other spheres.

There is one 'medicine man' in the village. Some of his close kith and kin approach him for remedies for illness; but this is becoming less common. However, there is still some demand for charms and amulets against the 'evil eye'. But this man performs no leadership role in other spheres, and keeps very much to himself.

Situations of Leadership.

I propose now to illustrate some of the main features of the working leadership in 'Zellafon', by reference to
some concrete situations. I shall deal with the following instances: a public meeting to discuss agricultural and other village matters; a dispute over guard duty; the allocation of outside work; a dispute over village property; a ritual gathering; and a meeting with a representative of 'Tnuath Ha-Moshavim'.

First Situation.

The public meeting was convened by Avraham Tzabari, who was then 'Maskeer Psim', and Yehudah Kgaisi, who was at the time 'Maskeer Hutz' only. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss agricultural policy, and it was attended by about sixty people, most of them household heads.

The meeting, which took place in the main hall, which is also the only large synagogue of the village, opened with afternoon prayers. After this the people were addressed by Avraham Tzabari, who spoke of the plans to purchase large quantities of expensive fertilizer for the use of each household and for communal projects.

The chairman had not spoken for more than five minutes before he was interrupted from the floor with an outburst from one of the villagers, to the effect that this was simply another instance of 'wasting money; who wants these things? We do not ask for them. We want to plant tomatoes and peppers and we want more poultry from the government. They promised it. We are thrown
into these places on the border for nothing. What do we get from it?...."

The speaker, who was from Nihim, was immediately challenged by one from Arhab, a close kinsman of the chairman. The two men soon began to abuse each other. Before long, others had joined in on each side, each group abusing the other. An attempt was made by the chairman to call the meeting to order, but it was ignored. Other men then used their influence to pacify the two groups of disputants.

When relative quiet was restored, Kgaisi took the chair and pleaded with the villagers to be patient. He then went on to assure both groups that they had some right on their side, and proceeded to explain the value of chemical fertilizer. Someone, who was not one of the first disputants, then interrupted with the question: "Are we to waste money again as we did last year with the tobacco?" This man was from Arhab, and he was immediately assailed with abuse by several men from Nihim who reminded him of his ignorance. He replied in the same vein and a fresh quarrel broke out. People who had previously supported one another, then found themselves opposed. Once again mediators helped to restore order. Kgaisi then continued with his speech, reminding the Yemenis of all that they had received from the various external agencies, and of the need to be patient and to learn from those "who had brought
them to Israel out of bondage" etc.,

When a fresh dispute broke out, the army commandant took the chair. He called for order, and was successful for a short while. He then reminded the assembly that it was "uncultured to behave in this way like wild men. We are not wild men, but men of culture, therefore we should not behave as though we had no culture. There are some recent immigrants who are nearly like wild men, like animals. But we Yemenis are men of tradition and culture. We should not behave like others and show that we have no control over ourselves" etc., etc., etc., etc. He then went on to say that they should accept the advice and guidance given by experts, as they were after all still ignorant of matters relating to agriculture and the running of a moshav. Finally, he reminded them of the need to do guard duty and not to shirk their responsibilities. He then read out the names of those who were liable for duty during the following week. This produced fresh quarrelling about who was in fact liable, and the commandant's attempts to call the meeting to order were ignored.

When there was once again quiet, the rabbi rose to speak. He made no reference to anything which had preceded, but after a number of allusions to the 'Torah' and the 'Mishnah' from which he quoted appropriate passages which were completed by members of the assembly, he began to speak of the infallibility of the "Law which was given to Moses
on Mount Sinai". He then came to the point: "Some of the younger people are disobeying the laws relating to the Shabat; it is rumoured that they smoke and ride on this day. They will be punished by a terrible curse...." After this, the rabbi resumed his seat on the rostrum, and his words were greeted with "Amens" from the assembly.

After this, Kgaisi called for a vote to ratify the decision concerning the purchase of chemical fertilizer and other things. Hands were raised in favour and against, and a very hasty count was made, and the motion carried.

After this, the assembly joined in the evening prayer, and then broke up.

Second Situation.

This incident occurred at the house of one of the villagers who was celebrating the circumcision of his new-born son. A large group of men, including Kgaisi and the rabbi, were seated in the house, when a man stormed in carrying a rifle and announced to Kgaisi: "I refuse to do guard duty tonight. I did it only three nights ago. It is not my turn." Kgaisi replied that if he had been ordered to do guard duty, then clearly it must be his turn. The man asked: "Where is Hadad?" "He is not here," replied Kgaisi, "he is at army headquarters. If your name is on the list for tonight, then it must be your turn." "I don't care who is on the list. I don't care for any list. If someone else does not do guard-duty, then I shall never do it again."
I'll leave the moshav," the man replied. "If you don't do it you will have a court-case with the army," Kgaisi warned. "When did you or anyone else last do guard-duty?" the man asked. "Why do you argue this way?" Kgaisi asked, indicating discomfort and trying to appease the man, "if it is your turn, then tomorrow someone else will do it."

At this point the rabbi intervened: "You guard tonight, and someone else will guard another night." The rabbi was completely ignored by both parties to the dispute, but very soon others joined in and a quarrel broke out. The man stormed out of the house as he had stormed in, but did not go on duty that night.

**Third Situation.**

Incidents concerning the allocation of work are almost everyday events in 'Zellafon', and the one here described is fairly typical.

About twenty-five men and five youths were standing one morning, at 7 a.m., near the village-store, which was the usual meeting place for men hoping to receive outside work for that day. The labour organizer, who had been recently appointed to the job after three successive organizers had been dismissed within a period of nine months, arrived and read out the names of those who were to receive work for that day. He was joined shortly by Kgaisi, who was by then both 'Maskeer Hutz' and head of the village. One of the men, who had not been given work, began to quarrel
with the labour organizer. Kgaisi intervened and told the man that he had recently received work, and that he would be due for more shortly. The man flew into a rage and accused Kgaisi and the labour organizer of giving work to their kinsmen and friends. The altercation reached such a pitch, that the agricultural instructor was brought from his house. Kgaisi explained the situation, or his own version of it, and pointed out to the instructor how unruly the Yemenis could be. The instructor replied: "You are all like that; no matter what is done for you, you all demand more." The man then appealed to the instructor: "They don't give work to those who need it, but to their own people." The labour organizer pleaded: "If you say that, I'll resign". Kgaisi said: "You don't have to resign, he is talking nonsense." The man challenged Kgaisi: "Will you also resign? Will you let us see the work register? No one in this village trusts you except your friends! Who do you think you are? You are just a Yemeni like me. One day you'll have to resign, and then your friends won't get work every day."

**Fourth Situation.**

This incident occurred after a period of incessant quarrelling over the payment for communal property, such as fertilizer, agricultural tools etc. Some of this property belonged to neighbourhoods, and other things to the village as a whole. A number of villagers were growing
accustomed to simply taking things in unauthorised fashion. Members accused each other of these practices and two factions emerged, each alleging the guilt of the other.

The matter was brought to Kgaisi by a number of villagers. He promised to enquire into the circumstances, but nothing was done. A number of villagers then threatened to report the matter to the external authorities, and Kgaisi promised to do this on their behalf. He still failed to do anything, until finally several villagers accused him and the 'Gizbar' of being involved in the whole matter. At a general meeting both officials denied having anything to do with the matter, and alleged that all was under consideration by the Jewish Agency.

Shortly after this, a few families left the moshav, and during the following year, altogether thirteen households left. Some left because they were dissatisfied with conditions generally, others because they or their children had been accused of theft, and yet others because the "real culprits, Kgaisi and Moshe Menahem were not proved guilty."

**Fifth Situation.**

Nearly all the men of the village were assembled at the house of Kgaisi to celebrate the circumcision of his new-born son. Great sums had been spent on food and drink for all. After the performance of the ritual by the rabbi, the men were seated about drinking and eating, and the customary riddles were raised for the rabbi to answer.
One man asked: "When will the Messiah come? How is it that we have a State and no Messiah? Does this mean that the Redemption of Israel has not yet come?" The rabbi answered: "Everything takes its time. This is only the first stage. Perhaps the Messiah will come soon or perhaps in 1,000 years. But until his coming, the Redemption of Zion must wait." To this Kgaisi answered: "I think that the prophecy has already come true. Perhaps the Messiah is already here. It is not so important to worry about this, as we now have a State, a government and a leader. That is all that is important now. It is true that we do not know who the Messiah is, but perhaps that is how it is meant to be."

Sixth Situation.

The villagers of 'Zellafon' were becoming highly dissatisfied with their agricultural instructor. They complained to Kgaisi that he refused to give them advice or to help them, and that he never had time to give them proper instruction. They also complained of his curt and unfriendly manner. It is true that he was both reluctant to spend much time at his work, and adopted a superior and contemptuous attitude to the Yemenis, including the leaders. But at the same time, he was incapable of meeting many of the demands which were in fact made upon him. As a result of these complaints, Kgaisi, who was himself no friend of the instructor - the latter had once implied that Kgaisi
and his friends had embezzled communal funds - decided to bring a complaint against him to 'Tnuath HaMoshavim'. As a result, the district representative of the movement called at 'Zellafon' to hear the complaint. A meeting took place at the village office, at which Kgaisi and two members of the local committee were present, together with the instructor and the representative of 'Tnuath HaMoshavim'. The latter then asked Kgaisi whether he was satisfied with the services of the instructor. Kgaisi replied that he had no personal complaint, but that some of the villagers were dissatisfied, and that possibly they were wrong in their views. The instructor was then asked whether he was aware of this, and he replied that he did everything required of him. Then one of the committee-men commenced a direct attack on the instructor, describing his many failings. The instructor replied that he had tried his best, but that it was not possible to please these people. Kgaisi was then asked for his comment, but he declined once again to commit himself, saying that he agreed that the people were difficult to satisfy, but that perhaps the instructor might be at fault, though he did not personally wish to imply that this was necessarily so. The committee man then challenged Kgaisi on this point, and Kgaisi reluctantly admitted that the instructor had not seemed very eager to help the village, and that perhaps he did not like being there, and that this was understandable. The discussion continued on these lines for about 20 minutes. Finally, the district
representative began asking questions about the moshav and its development.

Soon after this incident the instructor left the village and was replaced by another.

These incidents are only a few of those which I witnessed during the period of my field-work, but I have cited them as suitable illustrations of the workings of leadership and allegiance in the community. They shew what Gluckman has called the "frailty in authority" (Gluckman: 1955), as well as the instability of the situation in which leadership must operate.

Allegiance and Factionalism.

It is clear from the preceding discussion that there is no communal agreement on the acceptance of leaders, except in the one case of the rabbi, and that the stability of two leadership positions is due more to the conditions of selection, than to strong and widespread loyalty. On the contrary, there is in general a marked instability in the status of leaders who seem to command no lasting authority.

In addition to this, there is factional opposition within the community, different leaders obtaining support from one group rather than another, only to lose that support within a short time.

But even the factions themselves are not stable in composition. When different issues arise, there is a common tendency for people to change their factional allegiance. However, in many cases there is a common core of factional loyalists.
Basically, the core of each faction is a group of people united by cognatic ties of kinship and sub-ethnic grouping. There are two such solidary groups in the community, one from Arhab, the other from Nihim. Almost no one from the third group, that from Wadi Sirr, belongs to either of these two factions, though the members of this group do become involved in disputes, sometimes on one side and sometimes on another. But, curiously enough, neither of these two factions gives loyal support to either of the two stable secular leaders, one of whom, Kgaisi, is from Nihim, the other, Tzabari, from Arhab. In fact, both Kgaisi and Tzabari have a common group of loyal followers, drawn from both sub-ethnic groups. This group is small, and consists of about ten to fifteen men.

The core group of the Arhab faction is no more than ten strong, and the other factional core is even smaller. The leadership of both of these groups varies; sometimes their spokesman is a man who is only a temporary supporter and who will abandon the faction when challenged by another member of it.

By and large, these factional disputes break out either at public meetings, or in informal discussions and arguments which take place near the village-store, where the men congregate during the afternoon. Apart from the constant core in each group, it is nearly always impossible to predict who will support one side rather than another.
Often enough, ties of close kinship and sub-ethnic grouping will prevail. But this does not always occur. Sometimes one group will support the official leadership and the other group oppose it, but at other times this situation is reversed. As a rule, only a few people will become completely involved in the dispute, and others will both support them, and at the same time exert their influence to bring about peace between them. It is here that cross-cutting loyalties come into play. The supporters of one faction may have present neighbours or kinsmen in the other faction, and this factor tends to exert some pacifying influence on the disputants. But for this very reason, no strong loyalties ever seem to develop. The consequence is a situation of every man or every household for himself.

I do not think that these factional disputes can be simply attributed to the influence of Yemeni culture, though some features which they display may well express Yemeni characteristics. It is true that there was a high degree of solidarity to be found in Yemen amongst the Jews who were related by a highly involute network of kinship ties within an area or district. But these groups did not constitute factions since they were not opposed to one another in that situation. It is the contemporary situation in Israel, and in particular the nature of small village existence and enforced cooperation which produces factional allegiance.

*cf. Gluckman: 1955*
out of these groups. Once a dispute starts between two individuals or small groups, others feel bound to express their support for one side rather than another.

These disputes do not usually arise over urgent daily objectives. e.g., If a man is not given outside work on a particular day, or if a man cannot hire a tractor on a particular day, this does not lead him into a dispute with ordinary villagers, but with one of the leaders, and in most cases this does not give rise to the sort of group antagonisms to which I have referred. These latter seem to arise over other matters, such as a decision to purchase one type of seed rather than another, or whether the community is willing to receive and pay for an increased number of poultry per head. These are certainly not matters on which the members have fixed and definite interests, but merely views, which are often enough transient. Yet the most fierce arguments, sometimes verging on violence of threats of violence, can break out over these matters.

I suggest that these conflicts are an expression of latent, but nonetheless powerful states of interpersonal tension, which in turn are the product of the circumstances of village life, and cultural change which is imposed from outside, and the relations between the community and external authority.

The first factor of importance is the conflict which arises for each villager between short-term and long-term
economic goals. Every household head is expected to make sacrifices in his present living-standard for the sake of long-term benefits. Money must be invested in communal projects and equipment, labour must be expended on the development of small-holdings, or on poorly-paid work, etc. But this whole idea is quite foreign to people who were previously craftsmen, and whose main aim in saving was to provide feasts or bride-price.

The second factor, which is allied to the first, concerns the conflict between the individual, family or household, on the one hand, and the interests of the community on the other. The idea that sacrifices are made not only for oneself or the future of one's children or kinsmen's children, but on behalf of others, is also alien to the Yemeni tradition. But in addition to this, there is the real factor of having to adapt one's preferences in order to contribute to the communal welfare. For example, if a man wishes to buy seed or plants of a certain kind through the cooperative purchasing agency, he can not do so unless there is sufficient demand for this item, since only large quantities are purchased at any one time, and no Yemeni householder has the resources to do this.

Thirdly, there is the relationship between the community and the various external agencies which seem to control so many aspects of social life, even to the point of limiting the authority of the Rabbi and placing Yemeni religious
and other customs on a lower level. This situation is coupled with an attitude of patronization towards the Yemeni immigrants, who are treated as social and cultural inferiors. The relationship between the moshav and the external authority does not produce a united community in opposition to the wider society simply because identification with the community as a whole would entail acceptance of communal goals of cooperation. As a consequence, these external relations seem to contribute to internal dissension.

As I have indicated, permanent factional cleavages which divide the whole community, do not emerge, because ties of sub-ethnic group, neighbourhood and kinship cut across one another. This, according to Gluckman, should contribute to the formation of a solidarity community. (Gluckman: 1955). It does seem to prevent one single factor from creating a decisive split; but it does not contribute to the acceptance of communal goals or local leadership. On the contrary, in 'Zellafon', as in many other Yemeni moshavim, there is a marked tendency for many small groups — either families, households, or groups of near kindred — to fall back on their own resources, or even, after a while, to leave the community. It is clear then, that the existence of cross-cutting ties is not enough to create communal stability.

Only the existence of at least one or two major factors, could contribute to the maintenance of the community as a
cooperative organization: a high degree of moral and ideological consensus on collective aims; a strong leadership with which the different segments of the community could identify.

The first of these two factors does not exist in 'Zellafon' for obvious reasons. Not only is the whole idea of communal economic organization alien to their traditional notions, but even more alien is the whole socialist ideology of cooperation, and the acceptance of communal goals in many spheres of social and economic activity.

The second condition, stable internal leadership, is also not realized. It is true that there is some semblance of stability in the performance of two secular roles, but this stability is not associated with internal communal acceptance, but with the purely fortuitous circumstances of selection. The secular leaders are suffered, rather than positively accepted, and deeply suspected of doing whatever is required for the maintenance of their own positions, and nothing more. Furthermore, their authority is barely recognized, except by a few close followers. The majority look upon them as merely carrying out the orders of external authority.

The only leader who is fully accepted, and accorded prestige and a degree of authority, is the rabbi. But his role is seen as highly specific and circumscribed,
and can not be generalized to cover non-religious or non-ritualistic spheres of activity. His influence can not be used in order to persuade people to cooperate in the economic or military sphere. The Yemenis are fully aware of the distinction drawn in Israeli society between the domain of 'Torah' and that of economic and other matters. Furthermore, they are aware of the limits set upon the authority of their rabbi even in the domain of 'Torah'. Finally, they are unwilling to draw the rabbi into discussion and disputes concerning secular matters, lest his prestige be thereby impaired; and he too shares this reluctance.

The only other leader who could conceivably exert influence in maintaining the necessary degree of social order, is the army commandant. But here other difficulties arise. Hadad is a fairly young man, with almost no following of his own in the community. His appointment was made from outside of the community entirely, and his authority - insofar as it is accepted, and this does not appear to be so to any great extent - derives totally from an external organization. Furthermore, military duties are considered unpleasant and are a source of much discontent; every attempt is made to shirk them. In view of this, the military commandant can hardly succeed in winning the respect and acceptance of the villagers; and even the young men, while they may envy him, do not accord him the prestige
which is necessary for a leader in all spheres of social activity.

Conclusions.

The Yemenis of 'Zellafon' do not readily accord prestige to their secular leaders, and accept their authority in reluctant and passive fashion. They see them as mere agents of an external authority which is simply imposed upon the community. They do accord prestige to their religious leader, but only insofar as his role is ineffectual outside of the realm of religious values and ritual. This latter position is, to some extent, in contrast with the situation which prevailed in Yemen, where religious values and practices were accorded an unquestioned primacy as the basis of social life.

In Yemen, secular leadership was linked up with the low status occupied by the Jews in the wider society, and derived its authority solely from the political system of the dominant group, whose values were largely alien to those of the Jews. Insofar as secular leadership in Yemen was linked with religious leadership, the incumbent of leadership roles was positively accepted; but otherwise, his position was viewed ambiguously. Thus, the Yemenis have little or no strong tradition of internal communal leadership divorced from religion, except insofar as this emanates from an external and hostile source.
This traditional conception of authority clearly constitutes a major obstacle to the functioning of leadership in the moshav. But it is not the sole or even the primary factor in the situation; it must be viewed in conjunction with situational determinants, which are partly connected with the structure of external relations, and partly with the internal structure of the community.

Political allegiance or alignment, is marked by intense factional dissension, which is in turn built on the recognition of sub-ethnic and kin ties. But it is my contention that factional disputes arise out of the very nature of the situation to which the Yemenis are forced to adapt. The moshav system, with its emphasis on communal goals and cooperation in a small village context, produces hostilities, instead of communal solidarity. The composition of opposed groups is highly fluid, and this in turn weakens the authority of factional leaders.

Most leadership roles in the moshav mediate between the community and the absorbing society, and this in turn adds to the insecurity of the leader. The nature of this situation is such as to bring out an element of flexibility and malleability which is demonstrated by some leaders.

The situation which is described here is to be found in many other Yemeni moshavim; and what is particularly striking is the fact that successful leaders in most of these communities seem to combine wiliness with flexibility
CHAPTER X. LEADERSHIP & POLITICS IN A YEMENI TOWNSHIP.

Rosh Ha'Ayin is a unique community. While there are Yemeni moshavim other than 'Zellafon', and old Yemeni quarters other than Shaarayim, there is no other Yemeni township in Israel.

In fact, this community came into being in rather accidental fashion. Ras-el-Ain*, which is situated at the source of the Yarkon River, was originally a British army camp; this was converted into an immigrant camp in 1948 when the British left Palestine. It was situated near to Lydda airport, and was therefore a convenient site for housing the Yemeni immigrants who were flown to Israel from Aden.

From this, and other similar camps, the Yemenis were gradually settled in new villages, or housing estates. Altogether, some 15,000 of the total number of 45,000 Yemeni immigrants passed through Rosh Ha'Ayin, and by the end of 1951 a fairly large residual population was still to be found there. Some remained because they preferred the security of camp life to the insecurities of rural existence; and there were at the time few opportunities for obtaining urban housing without the possession of substantial means.

*This is the Arabic form of the name, which means literally, 'the head of the spring', or 'the source of the river'.
Others remained because they had obtained work in the vicinity, and did not wish to sacrifice this without an assured occupation elsewhere. But many remained because of the illness or infirmity of some member of the family; while some, particularly older people, were simply abandoned by their kinsmen, who went to settle in new villages or housing estates. For this, and other reasons, a high proportion of those left were dependent on some form of welfare assistance, medical attention, or both.

Meanwhile, the government agencies, in their eagerness to clear as many of the immigrant or transition camps as possible, transferred the residual populations of other Yemeni camps to Rosh Ha'Ayin, and by the end of 1951 the population there was about 6,000. This process continued between 1952 and 1956, until the population in February 1957 had reached the figure of 8,200. During this latter period some of the previous residents of the camp had left, but natural increase more than off-set this.

It was not until 1951 that the decision was made to turn Rosh Ha'Ayin into a permanent place of residence for Yemenis. For the first year of its existence, the place was simply a camp. The inmates were not legally permitted to obtain work in the vicinity, for fear of swamping the labour market, and they were officially "charges" of the State. But, despite these restrictions, some of the Yemenis did find work outside of the camp, particularly as they
were prepared to accept wages lower than those prescribed by the 'Histadruth'. The women in particular found employment as domestics in the nearby towns; the men were content to work as menials or agricultural labourers.

But in 1950 official policy was changed, and the immigrant camps became 'Maabaroth' - transition camps... This was simply official recognition of a brute fact; there was insufficient housing for the mass of immigrants, and work simply had to be found for the thousands of people who were being supported by state charity. The men of Rosh Ha'AYin - i.e., those who could or would work - were employed for several days a week on road-building, in the quarries, and on other public works. But there was still no intention on the part of official agencies to maintain Rosh Ha'AYin in existence. The decision was only taken when no other solution could be found for the settlement of the 6,000 people who still resided in Rosh Ha'AYin. It was in this way that the camp became a township. Early in 1952 building commenced, and within a few months, the first families moved into the new houses which were constructed by the State housing organization. By late 1956 there were 1400 permanent households, and about 400 temporary households. The latter consisted of families who for one reason or another were unable or unwilling to sign contracts with the housing organization, and chose
to remain in large barracks.

The community was planned as a semi-rural township. Each household or family was allotted a small piece of ground - about one-quarter of an acre - on which to raise a few crops, or keep one or two animals or poultry for domestic use only - and facilities were provided for the purchase of tools, implements, seed, domestic livestock or poultry etc. It was intended that, ultimately, some local industries or commerce would develop to absorb some of the local population; but it was recognized that this would take time, and that at the outset the township would be a semi-rural dormitory community; it still is.

The functioning of leadership and political allegiance in this community can only be understood against the background of the wider society on the one hand, and the internal structure of the community on the other; I shall therefore deal with each of these matters in turn, before discussing leadership and politics.

External Organizations & Their Influence.

Many or most of the services which are rendered to the community are provided by organizations which lie outside of the control of the community itself; and many of these external agencies exert a considerable control on the internal affairs of the community. The most important of these are: the Ministry of the Interior; the Ministry of Labour; the Ministry of Social Welfare; the Ministry
of Health; the Ministry of Religious Affairs, and the Rabbinate; the State housing organization; the 'Histadruth'; and various political parties.

Ministry of Interior.

All local communities in Israel, with the exception of municipalities, are linked up with a system of district and sub-district administration. But this takes an extreme form in the case of Rosh Ha'Ayin, where the situation closely resembles that of British colonial administration; the local communal leaders are responsible to the sub-district officer and through him to the district officer; and both of the latter exercise a considerable degree of supervision over the affairs of the community.

When Rosh Ha'Ayin was first established as an immigrant camp in 1948, its affairs were completely controlled by the Jewish Agency and the Ministry of the Interior. This total control lasted until 1950, when the community was invited to elect its own local committee, which was intended to cooperate with the various external agencies, and in particular with the officer of the Petah Tikvah sub-district. But this attempt to encourage the growth of local authority had little success, mainly because there were so few matters over which the Yemenis could exercise any control. When the head of the committee resigned, after a dispute concerning the ownership of the local water-wells, the committee ceased to operate. Total control remained in
the hands of the various agencies, and the district officers were responsible for the administration of law and order. Several further attempts were made to establish a local authority, but all proved abortive until 1955, when a local council was elected. The elections were closely supervised by the Ministry of the Interior.

But after the elections, when the council was set up to handle some of the affairs of the community, close supervision and control were maintained. At present the sub-district officer has to be consulted in all matters requiring large-scale expenditure, and the annual subsidy which is provided by the Treasury is released to the local council through the sub-district officer. When disputes arise in the local council, or when there is some crisis in administration, both the sub-district and district officers intervene; and they have the power to disband the local council or to compel its reorganization if they think this necessary. The town treasurer is appointed by the district officer, from outside of the community, and he is directly responsible to him and not to the local council.

Rosh Ha'Ayin does not have its own police or courts, but is part of the judicial and police district of Petah-Tikvah.

Ministry of Labour.

While many of the residents of Rosh Ha'Ayin, particularly
the women, have found regular and permanent employment in the Petah-Tikvah area, a great many are still dependent upon the labour exchange for employment in public works, agriculture, building, etc. A labour exchange is situated in Rosh Ha'Ayin, and nearly one-half of the total working population still make use of its services from time to time, if not every week.

Ministry of Social Welfare.

This Ministry has had an agency in Rosh Ha'Ayin since the first year in which the camp was established. At first social work was done by voluntary workers and by the Jewish Agency. But very soon a government department was established to deal with the many cases requiring some form of assistance. In fact, for some time, almost the whole community were charges of the State. But even when employment became permitted, more than 70% of the total number of families were largely dependent on welfare assistance of one form or another, and this situation persisted for some time.

At present, about 30% of the households are partly or wholly dependent on direct money subsidies obtained through the welfare department. Another 25% of the households receive some form of non-monetary material assistance from the department - e.g. clothing, school-meals for children etc. Yet another 20% or more of the households receive some form of guidance or help from
the department in placing children or old people in various institutions, or in assisting divorced women in obtaining court-orders, and so on.

There are several reasons for this high degree of dependence on social welfare assistance and guidance: many people remained in Rosh Ha'Ayin because of sickness, old-age or inability to work; many remained because of break-down or disruption of family life brought about by immigration; many are still unable to obtain sufficient work to support their families, particularly in those households or groups of kindred where the ratio of dependents to bread-winners is high; finally, some people have, over the course of time, become increasingly dependent on external agencies for the solution of their problems.

Ministry of Health & Histadruth 'Sick Fund'.

The provision of health services in Rosh Ha'Ayin has always been of major significance, particularly when it was a camp. The majority of the camp inmates were in great need of medical treatment after their arrival in Israel, and two hospitals - one for children - were established.

At present there are no hospitals in Rosh Ha'Ayin, the urgent medical problems having been solved; but there are two important forms of medical or health service. Five health instructors attend the township regularly, teaching hygiene, child-rearing, first-aid etc. There is a permanent
The clinic of 'Kupath Holim' in Rosh Ha'ayin, attended daily by two doctors and three nurses.

The clinic is important not only because of the large number of people attending, but also because of the link between health, social welfare and employment. Many of the men in Rosh Ha'ayin are either unable or unwilling to do many forms of menial labour, and there are constant applications for medical exemption from work on these grounds; those who are successful, are then either recommended for special consideration on the part of the labour exchange, or for a subsidy from the welfare office, or for a licence to open a stall or shop in Rosh Ha'ayin.

The head doctor of the clinic has been working in Rosh Ha'ayin since the camp was founded, and is therefore personally acquainted with many of the regular attendants at the clinic; consequently, she exercises a considerable influence over their family and other affairs.

**Educational Services.**

There are two primary schools in Rosh Ha'ayin: one is a state school run on religious lines; the other is a private religious school sponsored and financed by one of the important religious organizations in Israel, known as 'Agudath Yisrael'. Both places provide free education for boys and girls; classes for the older girls are held in the afternoon at both schools to enable the working girls to complete their studies. About 60% of the total
number of male pupils attend the state school, while the girls are divided more equally between the two.

Both schools are administered and, or, supervised by external bodies; the state school by the department of education of the Petah Tikvah sub-district, and the private school by the local branch of its organization. However, the local authority of Rosh Ha'Ayin can exercise some influence over the state school - at least in principle.

Religious Authorities.

As elsewhere, religious organisation in Rosh Ha'Ayin is supervised and controlled by the Ministry of Religious Affairs, and by the Rabbinate.

The salaries of local religious officials are paid in part by the Ministry, which also subsidises the maintenance of synagogues; the balance of these funds are supposed to come from the local authority.

The Ministry and Rabbinate also control the degree of authority exercised by the local religious officials. One rabbi is authorised to perform marriages, and there is a small committee for the inspection of 'kashruth', and the supervision of some aspects of religious education. But the local religious officials are not permitted to grant divorce or 'Halizzah'; this can only be granted by the rabbinical court which sits in Petah Tikvah. None of the religious officials of Rosh Ha'Ayin can sit on
this court, as they are not recognized by the Rabbinate as 'Dayanim'.

**State Housing Organization.**

This organization, known as 'Amidar', was responsible for the building and planning of the township. The houses were sold to the occupants on favourable conditions of long-term payment, the interest on the loans being far below the market rate.

'Amidar' has an office in the township to which the householders make their monthly payments. This office is also partly responsible for maintenance for a period of years. Owing to the high proportion of 'welfare cases', some families pay a lower monthly rate than others, or their payments are subsidised through the agency of the welfare department.

**Histadruth.**

In almost every working-household in Rosh Ha'Ayin, there is at least one member of the labour federation. The reasons for this are two-fold: in the first place, more than 90% of all males who are employed, are wage-earners, and work can not be obtained, as a rule, except through the labour exchanges - the latter will not grant work to those who are not members of the labour federation; secondly, under normal circumstances, people can not benefit from the services of 'Kupath Holim' without being
members of the parent-organization, the 'Histadruth'.

The 'Histadruth' has an office in Rosh Ha'AYin, with a local committee and representatives. These are concerned with labour conditions, youth organization, and educational and cultural services.

Political Parties.

Political parties have been active in Rosh Ha'AYin since the earliest months of its existence as a camp. Previously, the influence of parties in Israel was greater than it is at present; they controlled schools, nursery schools, employment and cultural services of various kinds. At present, they are mostly concerned with election support, but to some extent with practical forms of assistance - in getting work, obtaining loans etc.

Three major national parties have local branches in Rosh Ha'AYin; they are 'Mapai', 'Mizrahi' and 'Agudath Yisrael'. The first is the right-wing labour party; the second is the more moderate of the religious parties; and the third is a more extreme religious party. In addition to these, there is one more important political organization, which is known as 'Bnei Teman' - the Sons of Yemen.

'Bnei Teman' was first founded during the camp-period, as a branch of the national organization known as 'Hitachduth HaTemanim'. But more recently it broke away from the parent organization, following a fierce dispute between its local leader and the leadership of the national body, concerning
election agreements.

The political parties are active in Rosh Ha'Ayin at election times; but their influence is felt constantly in the functioning of local leadership.

This summary description of the various bureaucratic agencies which exert an influence on Rosh Ha'Ayin, shows that various aspects of social activity are not only linked with the wider society, but are in fact highly dependent upon it.

I now turn to a description of the internal structure of the township community.

**Internal Structure of the Community.**

The main features of the social structure of Rosh Ha'Ayin which are to be discussed are as follows: population size; neighbourhood; family, kinship and sub-ethnic relations; means of livelihood and standards of living; religious and ritual relationships.

**Population & Housing**

The total population of Rosh Ha'Ayin is about 8,200* comprising about 1800* households. As can be seen from the table below, the average age is rather high, owing to the relatively large number of older married couples who formed a substantial part of the residual population of immigrant camps.

*These and all other figures given in this chapter are rough approximations.*
Adults over the age of 40 2,500 *
Adults between ages of 20 and 40 2,100 *
Youths between ages of 14 and 20 800 *
Children between ages of 5 and 14 1,900 *
Infants up to the age of 5. 900 *

Total 8,200 *

Of the total, between 6,500 and 7,000 are housed
in permanent homes, the remainder living in temporary huts
and barracks.

The permanent houses were built in two sizes, of
either one-and-a-half rooms or two-and-a-half rooms,
depending on the composition of the household group. But
at present some of the houses are larger than their original
size, owing to additions made by the householders themselves.

Each house has a small plot of ground, but in only
about half of these has anything been done to cultivate the
ground and raise crops or flowers; in about one-third
of the households there are to be found poultry or a goat used
for domestic purposes.

Neighbourhood & Town Planning.

The permanent dwellings of Rosh Ha'Ayin comprise six
large 'Shkhunoth' - neighbourhoods. These are the product
of town planning, and do not reflect any spontaneous

*These and all other figures given in this chapter are
rough approximations.
association on the part of the residents. The
neighbourhoods are of unequal size, some having only
about 150 households, others having as many as 300.

The principal neighbourhood, which lies nearest to
the main road, contains the town centre where shops,
administrative buildings, main hall and offices are to
be found.

In each of the other neighbourhoods there is a
communal building to be used as a prayer-house or meeting
place.

Families were settled in the neighbourhoods in order
of priority, though those who were willing or able to sign
housing contracts naturally moved in first.

While some attempts were made to accede to the requests
of those who wished to settle as neighbours - close or
more remote kinsmen, erstwhile neighbours, friends - this
was not always possible. Many were in fact left in Rosh
Ha'AYin without close kinsmen, apart from their own
elementary families of procreation, or without any members
of the same sub-ethnic group. Others were not able to
move at the same time as their kith or kin, and found
themselves in different neighbourhoods, or in different
parts of the same neighbourhood.

Consequently, there are various ties which cut across
those of present neighbourhood.
Family, Kinship & Sub-ethnic Relationships.

One of the early consequences of immigration, the administration of immigrant camps, and the removal of immigrants to permanent settlements elsewhere, was the break-up of the traditional organization of family life, kinship relations and notions of authority and responsibility in these groups. But later, when conditions became more favourable, some of these relationships were restored, although in modified form. On the one hand there has been an increased tendency, in comparison with the past, towards the fragmentation of kin ties, and the emergence of the elementary family life and household as the nucleus of communal life; but on the other hand, there are signs of a re-establishment of wider ties both within the community, and with those who have left it; however, the strength of these ties is more tenuous, and finds expression in fewer ways than before.

Insofar as there are solidarity groups within the community, based on ties of kinship and sub-ethnic grouping, they tend to be small and not highly interconnected with one another.

The residents of Rosh Ha'Ayin are from many different parts of Yemen. There are several large groups from the cities of San'a, Raada, Ta'iz and Ibb - there is less tendency for these city folk to volunteer for settlement
in rural communities - and they comprise about one-third of the total population; but the remainder are from more than twenty different small districts of Yemen.

**Religious & Ritual Relationships.**

In each of the main neighbourhoods there is a synagogue which has been provided by the housing company. But in addition to these there are over fifty more private synagogues dotted about the township in different neighbourhoods. There are two types of 'minyan': those that follow the 'Baladi' tradition and those that follow the 'Shami' tradition.*

As a rule, men attend the synagogue which is nearest to the home, provided that it offers them the liturgical form to which they are accustomed; though some men, rather than go elsewhere, are prepared to adjust to this difference.

As is usual amongst Yemenis, membership of a 'minyan' becomes regular, except where quarrelling occurs - which it sometimes does - and this tends to create a degree of solidarity amongst these small groups of neighbours, usually comprising between 20 and 40 households. The synagogue is a place for informal meetings, discussions and gossip, and are an important channel for the communication of public opinion.

*For an explanation of the difference between these two liturgical traditions amongst the Yemenis see Chapter VIII.
The 'minyanim' serve to forge links of familiarity and friendship not only amongst the men, but also amongst their womenfolk, who gather together at or near the synagogue on the Sabath or festival days.

A second form of ritual tie is created or maintained through the celebration of rites de passage and festivals. On these occasions — particularly on the occasion of a circumcision or marriage, or on the intermediate days of festivals — kith and kin pay visits from different parts of the township, and even from remote parts of the country.

**Means of Livelihood & Standards of Living.**

The overwhelming majority of the working population is employed outside of the township. The men work as agricultural labourers, in the nearby quarries, on the roads, in the factories of Petah Tikvah and Tel Aviv, as menials, as building labourers etc. The women work as domestic help, in the lighter forms of agricultural work, in factories etc., Very few people earn their livelihood in Rosh Ha'ayin: those that do so are usually stall-keepers or small shop-keepers, clerks, artisans, scribes, makers of ritual objects and ritual slaughterers.

Out of a total of about 1800 households, in about 300 there is no regular breadwinner, and in another 300 or so the main breadwinner or breadwinners do not earn sufficient to maintain the household at a reasonable level of subsistence. In these latter cases, the household is
either assisted by other kinsmen in the township, or by the welfare department in one form or another.

The remaining households, which comprise about two-thirds of the total, can be divided into two categories: those that manage to subsist without direct help from kinsmen outside of the household, and those that are relatively prosperous.

The relatively prosperous households do not account for more than 15% to 20% of the total; and it should be stressed, that the term "relatively prosperous" is indeed a highly relative one. These people can scarcely be called prosperous in comparison with the established families of Petah Tikvah, to say nothing of Tel Aviv. They are not even well-off in comparison with the established working-class of Israel. But they are definitely well-off in contrast to the rest of Rosh Ha'Ayin.

The major difference between the two sections of the community lies in the possession of regular work, or in the presence of a high ratio of breadwinners to dependents in a particular household. To some extent, these differences are purely fortuitous. In one household, a man, his wife, and grown children might all be employed, even in semi-regular or part-time occupations, and there may be few if any dependents outside of the household to be supported. This combination of factors will make one household fairly prosperous. But for others these differences may not be
based on such accidental conditions: one man may be far stronger and healthier than another, and therefore capable of engaging in whatever type of labour is available at any particular time. Once a man - or woman - finds his way in the labour market, he is more likely to be able to improve his circumstances and obtain better-paid work.

It is clear then, that the break-up of large groups of kindred has affected different households in qualitatively different ways: some people are affected adversely by being thrown on to their own resources or placed at the charge of the welfare department; while others are freed from the obligations to help their kinsmen who might well be in some remote community.

The many circumstances of social and economic absorption of the immigrant population of Rosh Ha'Ayin have produced four socio-economic groups: the prosperous; the self-supporting; the semi-welfare cases; and the complete welfare cases.

In this community, divisions and links based on kinship, friendship, ritual relationships and neighbourhood, cut across one another. The main tendency has been that of social fragmentation - enhanced by increasing differences in standards of life - partly offset by the formation of small-group ties of various kinds.

Before considering the nature of leadership and
politics in Rosh Ha'Ayin, I propose briefly to consider
the general nature of the relationships between the
community and the wider society, apart from the connexion
with bureaucratic organization, which has already been
considered.

**Relations with the Wider Society.**

These are of two kinds: relations with Yemenis in
the wider society; and relations generally with the wider
society. Both of these factors have an influence on
leadership and politics.

**Relations between Rosh Ha'Ayin & other Yemenis in Israel**

Rosh Ha'Ayin is by far the largest Yemeni community in
Israel.* This being so, there are few places where Yemenis
are found, where people do not have at least one remote
kinsman or erstwhile neighbour in Rosh Ha'Ayin. In addition
to this, Rosh Ha'Ayin houses an extremely important 'Sefer
Torah' - Scroll of the Law - which was brought to Israel
during the mass migration which followed the foundation of
the State. This 'Sefer Torah' - known as 'Al-Bom' - was
brought from the city of Ta'izz, which was the home of the
most renowned of Yemeni Jewish sages, the poet Shabazi,
and is for this, and other reasons, believed to possess
magical-therapeutic powers. For these reasons, Rosh Ha'Ayin

*There are doubtless bigger Yemeni populations in the larger
cities, such as Tel Aviv and Jerusalem; but these are
hardly communities in the sense that Rosh Ha'Ayin is one.
is looked upon, both by its inhabitants and by other Yemenis - whether they be old settlers or recent immigrants - as an important ethnic centre; it is referred to humourously as the "Yemeni capital". People travel from many parts of Israel to visit their friends and kinsmen, or to make a pilgrimage to 'Al-Bom'.

Consequently, the people of Rosh Ha'Ayin are made aware of their ethnic identity, and of their community as a repository of Yemeni values and traditions. This fosters a sense of identification with Yemenis throughout Israel, and also makes for a degree of communal solidarity, which is expressed on rare ritual occasions when the doubly sacred 'Sefer Torah' is removed from its usual position and paraded through the centre of the township.

Relations between Rosh Ha'Ayin & The Wider Society

Generally. If it is a general principle in Israel that the recent immigrants from Yemen have been patronized by the older Ashkenazi residents, then this characterization is a fortiori applicable to the situation in Rosh Ha'ayin. From the earliest period of the establishment of the camp, there have been voluntary social workers and other representatives of the 'Yishuv', all eager to assist in the work of relieving the lot of the Yemenis, encouraging their crafts, and teaching them the ways of the modern society into which they were transported. From the outset, there was established a definite relationship of patronization.
Consequently, there emerged a widespread attitude of dependence on these patrons, the representatives of the Ashkenazim. But this attitude soon became coupled with suspicion, resentment and outright hostility. The Ashkenazim were determined to change the Yemenis in many ways, though they were willing and even eager to preserve certain qualities which they considered favourable; however, the Yemenis were not given much voice in choosing which characteristics they wished to change. Decisions were simply made on their behalf, which were deemed beneficial on "objective" grounds. Children were "protected" from "neglectful" parents, and young girls from aged suitors, and so on... Rabbis were ordered to prevent polygynous and leviratic marriages. Women were effectively compelled to bear their children in hospitals, and people were removed from their families for medical treatment or isolation. All of this created resentment, frustration and a sense of helplessness.

Later, when conditions improved, many of the Yemenis lost this sense of dependence and inner suspiciousness and hostility, at least to some extent; but others, particularly those who experienced greater difficulty in adjusting to the new conditions, found it more difficult to free themselves from a state of dependency; and when attempts were made to compel a change in these relationships, the result was an intensification of resentment.
This resentment is largely focussed on certain service agencies, such as the welfare department and the local health clinic, and riotous behaviour has become a regular occurrence; but it has a more diffuse quality as well, and inspires allegations of ethnic discrimination and prejudice. Such sentiments spread easily; though they have an epidemic quality, in that they appear more readily or more potently in some circumstances rather than others. They also respond to stimulation; particularly on the part of influential leaders.

Apart from the representatives of outside agencies, Yemenis of Rosh Ha'Ayin come into frequent contact with other people outside of the community - with employers, bus-drivers etc. In many of these relationships they tend to be treated with positive favour; but nevertheless, as social and cultural inferiors, who have not yet been fully emancipated from the influences of their 'exile'. They are patronized, and they in turn play the role of the submissive subordinate; the link between ethnic origin and social status is thereby reinforced.

The joint effect of both types of relationship with the wider society, is to create a sense of group identity; however, this is not strong, in view of the size of the community and of the various divisions within it.
Leadership & Politics in Rosh Ha'Ayin.

There are two main areas of leadership: secular and religious. The important secular roles are as follows: local councillor; labour representative; party-political representative and faction leader; and youth leader. The significant religious roles are: rabbi; and member of the local religious council.

Local Council.

This council consists of 9 members who are elected every four years by the adult members of the population on the basis of pure proportional representation of party-or personal-lists.

The elected council then chooses from amongst its members a chairman and a vice-chairman, both of whom are paid salaries from the town budget. Owing to the system of proportional representation which produces a multi-party council, a coalition has to be formed for the administration of the affairs of the community. A coalition is created after the election by agreement between a number of councillors; once a majority is established, it is then possible to select office-holders. Coalition agreements are the product of bargaining; but certain restrictions are placed upon representatives of national parties in the matter of coalition agreements. e.g. The head office of 'Mapai' does not permit coalition agreements with 'Heruth' either in national or local councils; reciprocally, 'Heruth'
head office prohibits coalition agreements with 'Mapai'. The sanction for disobedience in these matters is withdrawal of party support and membership.

The council, or the majority coalition of councillors, are responsible for the following matters: the collection of local taxes; building of roads; flood-control; supervision and subsidization of education; industrial development and licensing of shops; garbage collection; (Water and electricity are not municipally controlled in Israel.); general development. These are the official tasks of the council; but in fact, few of these are effectively carried out at present.

One of the major concerns of the council is with the collection of taxes. As Rosh Ha'Ayin is classified as a poor community, the ratio of government subsidy to local revenue is very high. But the full subsidy can only be obtained if the full local internal revenue is collected; the amount due for collection is estimated by the sub-district officer. A major problem is created by the existence of a large number of 'social cases' and borderline 'cases'. The former are exempt from the payment of local taxes, provided that they receive an official exemption from the welfare department; but the latter are not exempt, and consequently there are many cases of application to the council for reduction of total exemption. The council will not grant these unless it is authorised to do so by the
welfare department; consequently, there are endless disputes between the council chairman and those residents whose rates are unpaid.

The first roads in Rosh Ha'ayin were built by the State. Since then, further improvements and additions have become the responsibility of the local council. But very little has been done in this respect, owing to the lack of money. This is a further source of discontent with the local council. When the necessary funds are forthcoming, there are disputes over the question of priority; most of the houses are served by sand-tracks only; and these often become almost impassable in rainy weather.

The local council is obliged to contribute towards the maintenance of the State Primary School and Nursery schools in Rosh Ha'ayin; here again only small amounts are allocated.

Industrial development in Rosh Ha'ayin is a grave necessity if the employment problem is to be solved. However, the council has been singularly unsuccessful in attracting small- or large-scale enterprises to the place. In an attempt to raise revenue, the rates on local factories were raised five-fold; consequently, one of the two existing factories closed down. Following this incident, a State-sponsored enterprise for diamond polishing was opened, but this was not due to the efforts of the local council, but
to the requests of the welfare department.

The licensing of shops and stalls is another source of dispute and discontent. In the first place, the number of these licences has to be kept down so that those who open small shops or stalls can earn a livelihood from their business. Secondly, priority is supposed to be given to applicants recommended by the welfare department. But the council is not always willing to adhere to these two principles. There is the natural desire to increase revenue by the issue of more licences; but, far more important, is the desire of councillors to obtain licences for kinsmen or friends, their reward being obtained in the form of support, a bribe, or both.

Garbage collection is provided in very rudimentary form. The council can only afford a partial service, so that some of the work must be done by individual householders cooperating with their neighbours. But in many cases this cooperation is not forthcoming, and the council is criticized for providing inadequate services.

General development has hardly been promoted by the local council. Any improvements requiring large outlays have now to be made in conjunction with the sub-district officer. For a short period such matters were left in the hands of the local authority, and considerable wastage is alleged to have occurred.

The council provides some forms of popular entertainment
for the community, particularly on holidays; during the rest of the year, lectures, films and stage-performances are organized, and paid for by the council.

Labour Representatives.

There is a workers' committee of three, which is elected every four years. It meets occasionally to discuss matters relating to employment and to suggest possible improvements in the system of labour allocation, or to discuss complaints concerning working conditions etc. These matters are then submitted to the workers' council in Petah Tikvah. Apart from this, the workers' committee arranges 'cultural activities' and entertainments which are provided by the 'Histadruth'.

Party-Political Representatives, & Faction Leaders.

Several political parties have local representation. They are: 'Enai Teman', which was formerly a local branch of 'Hitachduth HaTemanim', but is now independent; 'Mapai'; the two religious parties, 'Mizrahi' and 'Agudath Yisrael'; the 'General Zionist Sephardi' Party; the 'Progressive' party; and 'Heruth'. Other parties have attempted to establish a local representation, but with no success. Some parties have only one local representative, but the larger ones, like 'Enai Teman', the religious parties, and 'Mapai', have committees. The 'Mapai' committee is identical with the workers' committee.
The party representatives attained their positions in the following way. Party agents would previously come to Rosh Ha'Ayin at times of national elections, and seek followers or supporters. A man with some following in the community would offer his services as party representative in return for certain benefits: the party would either pay him a small salary, or offer him election expenses including a personal remuneration, or promise to help him with work, money-loans etc. In most cases, these men would have no concern with the nature of party ideology or interests. The party agents, on their part, were concerned with finding support and hardly with making ideological converts. In some cases, of course, there is an appeal to sectional interests - for example, the 'Mapai' agents try to arouse some loyalty to the interests of the working class; the agents of the religious parties exploit the fact that the Yemenis are devoutly orthodox; but the 'General Zionists', 'Heruth' and the 'Progressives' can hardly appeal to concrete vested interests or moral enthusiasm.

The local party representatives are mostly men who can boast of some following in the community; if their initial boast is only a pretence, then they are soon replaced, since their failure is soon apparent to party headquarters. These faction leaders, if they do have a genuine following, are not averse to changing their party loyalty if the
rewards of political success or material benefit are seen to be greater elsewhere.

Youth Leaders.

There are two youth organization in the township. They are 'Near Oved', the youth movement of the 'Histadruth'; and a local youth organization. The former is the larger of the two. Each organization has a volunteer leader drawn from the township. These leaders have no other political significance in their own right; but the leader of the smaller group is the son of one of the important local political leaders, and the youth movement is thereby linked with the party representing the aims of ethnic loyalty.

This concludes my survey of secular roles of leadership. I turn now to consider religious leadership.

Rabbis.

There is only one officially recognized rabbi in the community. His sole official duties lie in certifying and performing marriages; and in authorizing the 'kashruth' of ritual slaughtering. Apart from these duties, the official rabbi is approached by people who wish to obtain his advice or judgment in ritual or family affairs. He is from the capital city of Yemen, San'a, and was chosen by the rabbinate from a number of contenders for this office by virtue of his former position, and because he had the largest number of supporters in the community at the time when the choice was actually made. Although he was a 'Dayan' - judge -
in Yemen, he is not recognized as one in Israel, and so can not sit on the Petah Tikvah religious court in cases of divorce or release from leviratic obligation. The reason for this reluctance to recognize him as a 'Dayan' lies in the fact that at one time he broke the laws of the State in performing marriages to minors, in sanctioning polygyny, and in encouraging 'Yibbum' – leviratic marriages. The withdrawal of recognition of his status as a 'Dayan' dates from that time.

It is for these reasons that only one rabbi is recognized in the township, despite the fact that there are at least five men who could qualify for that position, and at least three who were 'Dayanim' in Yemen. By recognizing only one man, the rabbinate can exercise a closer control over matters relating to marriage, etc.; furthermore, it need only obtain funds for one full salary from the Ministry of Religious Affairs.

There are several unofficial rabbis in the township, recognized at least by those of the same sub-ethnic group, and in some cases by a wider section of the community. These men have no official duties, unless they are members of the religious council, but act as advisers to those with whom they have strong ties. They are, as a rule, heads of the synagogues which they attend.

Religious Council.

As Roch Ha'Ayin is a fairly large community, all of
whose members are devoutly orthodox, a religious council was set up by the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Rabbinate. The official duties of the council are as follows: to supervise ritual slaughtering—that is, to ensure that no unauthorized person does this on behalf of others; and to act as liaison between the township and the Rabbinate in Petah Tikvah. This latter involves such things as notifying the community of regulations imposed by the Rabbinate, or of arrangements for the celebration of certain minor festivals; finally, the committee has the function of disseminating propaganda on behalf of the religious parties. The committee is responsible for the maintenance of the official synagogues.

The committee consists of five men, all of whom were rabbis of one grade or another, in Yemen. The official rabbi is a member of the committee, but not its chairman. It receives a monthly budget from the Ministry, and this is supposed to be supplemented by the local council. However, the local council has always refused to do this so long as the religious parties have not been members of the coalition. As a result, the activities of the religious council are strictly limited; only two of its members receive a salary, one as a full-time worker, the other as a mere part-time employee. The others must earn their livelihood from writing—that is, as 'scribes', not authors—o making
ritual objects; otherwise they are dependent upon the support of their kinsmen. No member of the religious council would seek employment through the labour exchange.

This concludes my discussion of leadership roles. I turn now to consider political behaviour in Rosh Ha'Ayin.

**Politics in Rosh Ha'Ayin.**

Between 1948 and 1951 very little was done to encourage internal leadership except in the field of religion. A committee was appointed arbitrarily by the administrators of the camp, which was simply used as a means of communicating camp policy to the residents.

In 1951 Rosh Ha'Ayin became a township, and elections were held to choose a committee. There was only a 39% poll, and a committee of nine members were chosen. These were all men who had previously enjoyed some prestige in Yemen, and each one was supported by a loyal band of kith and kin. Party-politics played no part in the election; only personal lists were submitted.

The committee nominated as its head a man called Rav Zadok Yizhari, who had already shown himself to be the one single person of wide influence, possessing the qualities of leadership. He was widely known amongst the immigrants from Central Yemen, as he had travelled extensively in the area, and had enjoyed considerable prestige on several grounds: he was of a family which
had enjoyed wealth and prestige for a number of generations, and had produced men of learning; he had been both a wealthy merchant and a qualified rabbi; he had been known to be well-connected with the Muslim authorities - which means that he knew where to give bribes in order to obtain permits for the importation of foreign produce, and for obtaining favours on behalf of himself and other Jews - and had often been approached as an intermediary between Jews and Muslims; finally, he possessed the rudiments of a general education - he could write both Arabic and Hebrew, and knew something of arithmetic and the keeping of accounts.

Within the first year of his election to office, Yizhari announced his intention of laying personal claim to the nearby springs, which are the source of the Yarkon river. This might have been a valid claim in the Yemen, but was treated with derision by the Israel Water Board. Yizhari persisted in his claim; maintaining that his intentions were to control these springs on behalf of the community. On being advised of the absurdity of his claim, he threatened litigation. He was finally persuaded of the futility of this, and in due course resigned from the office of committee chairman.

This incident was merely a climax to a series of conflicts which had characterized the relationship between the local committee and the external authorities. Between
1951 and 1952 the committee shewed itself as either unwilling or unable to reach agreement on the various matters with which it was supposed to be concerned. Committee members would fail to attend meetings with the sub-district officer, and when they did attend they would become involved in heated disputes amongst themselves over seemingly trivial matters. Throughout this period Yizhari failed to control the behaviour of the committee, and simply used his position to make unrealistic demands on the external authorities. He paid little attention to the practical difficulties of finding employment for the community, providing health and welfare services and so on. He put forward proposals for the erection of factories and other enterprises, for the building of a rabbinical court, and for the immediate provision of electricity etc. He clearly entertained plans for his personal authority and wealth, but few practical ones for the solution of immediate problems.

As a result of Yizhari's resignation, the committee was simply disbanded, and the affairs of the community were administered almost solely by external authorities.

However, this exercise of external control ran counter to official ideology in Israel; and in addition, the authorities wished to be rid of the responsibility of administering a community of this size; therefore, in 1953 a second attempt was made to stimulate and mobilize a local
interest in communal affairs. A committee was established jointly by the representatives of the Jewish Agency and the Ministry of the Interior, which was composed of representatives of the external agencies and a few chosen members of the community. It was believed that if certain "natural leaders" were appointed to the committee, this would constitute a step in the desirable direction of promoting communal leadership and responsibility. The so-called "natural leaders" were all rabbis — Yizhari himself was excluded — and were reluctant to deal with matters which lay outside of the domain of religion.

Four meetings of this joint committee were held, and on each occasion there was a total failure of communication. The official purpose of these meetings was to discuss ways and means of reducing the number of welfare cases, increasing employment, and developing the township. But the three Yemeni representatives were more concerned with increasing welfare subsidies and obtaining more authority for the local religious leadership; in addition, they quarreled amongst themselves over such matters as the allocation of licences for stalls and shops — each representative had his own kith and kin in mind — and after a while, ceased to attend the meetings.

Nothing further was done by the administrative agencies until 1955, though meanwhile political parties had been
were often loath to accept the interference of San'a. Jews in these large towns were not encouraged to take their disputes to the 'Beth Din' of San'a, and if they did, the local 'Beth Din' did not feel obliged to accept a ruling from outside. There were instances of open hostility, when the court of the capital opposed or criticized the ruling given by a court in Kadh'a or Ta'iz. But there were no means of compulsion open to the court of the capital; their only possible method of control was the threat to denounce the members of the Beth Din concerned, and this would have the effect of discrediting them in the eyes of those over whom they exercised authority.

The Muslim authorities in some parts of Yemen had a definite interest in upholding the authority of the 'Beth Din' in San'a. They did not wish to become involved in disputes between Jews, but they were concerned to maintain the peace; thus, when a dispute appeared to have reached dead-lock, they might refer the parties to the court of the capital, or even compel them to seek judgment there. In this way, the court did sometimes assume the characteristics of a Supreme Court or Court of Appeal, often against the wishes of its head or other members. It should be stressed that Muslim authorities would only take such steps when the matter clearly concerned Jewish law - for example in disputes over ritual matters or over the fulfilment of marriage contracts.
to defend the interests of Yemenis". He made no explicit references to ethnic discrimination, but simply to the special nature of the problems facing Yemenis. He made vague, and somewhat unrealistic promises concerning welfare-assistance, improved housing, the solution of employment problems, and the promotion of ethnic culture, and so on.

The outcome of the 1955 election was favourable to Yizhari in three ways: 'Bnei Teman' emerged as the most powerful single party; Yizhari emerged as an undisputed leader; and, he benefited financially from the election, having appropriated to his own uses monies granted to him for election purposes, and for the promotion of party activities. As a result of this last matter, he became engaged in a dispute with the leaders of 'Hitachduth HaTemanim', which reached the courts. From then on, his ties with the parent body were suspended.

The result of the election, which obtained a 64% poll in Rosh Ha'Ayin, was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Provided</th>
<th>Representatives on the Council</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'Bnei Teman'</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Mapai'</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Religious Parties'</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Progressives'</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'General Zionists'</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>9</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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After the election there was a period of about two months during which the various councillors sought agreements with one another for the formation of a coalition. The immediate concern of most councillors centred around two issues: the division of 'spoils', and concessions to particular party interests. A split occurred in the 'Bnei Teman' party, and one of its members broke away from Yizhari; another split occurred between the representatives of the religious parties, which ironically called itself the 'United Religious Front'. As a result, a coalition was formed of the two 'Mapai' councillors and one of the 'Bnei Teman' councillors, with the 'Progressive' and the representative of the more moderate religious party.

The head of this coalition was one of the 'Mapai' representatives. This alliance lasted for eleven months, not because of any stable relationship between the five men, who quarrelled incessantly, but because no major decision was made in that period.

At the end of eleven months, the quarrel between Yizhari and his former ally was resolved, and the representative of 'Bnei Teman' resigned from the coalition; Yizhari obtained from him a written and signed statement of his resignation. The coalition could no longer continue, and so Yizhari renewed negotiations for the formation of a second coalition.
The second coalition was formed by 'Bnei Teman' together with 'Mapai'. Yizhari permitted the 'Mapai' representative to continue in office as chairman of the council, provided he too received a salary — he was not keen to take office, lest he be held responsible for the solution of urgent communal problems, but he was determined to benefit financially and to wield power in a more subtle fashion. A full agreement was drawn up between the five members of the coalition, whereby certain benefits were to be distributed amongst the members, and their friends and kinsmen; the agreement was duly 'notarised' by a rabbi.

But shortly after this, a dispute once again broke out between Yizhari and his rebellious associate. The former then sought to obtain the resignation of the latter, and when this failed he produced a document of resignation which he alleged to have been written and signed to this effect. The document was clearly a forgery — Yizhari had made use of the previous bona fide document, and by making a few alterations, sought to use it for the immediate resignation of his associate. Once more the coalition ceased to operate. Yizhari was successful in securing the necessary resignation — though later a law-suit arose as a result of the dispute — and another member of his party was co-opted onto the council. Once again the coalition was resumed.

Meanwhile, the district and sub-district officers were
becoming increasingly aware of the mismanagement and mal-appropriation of communal funds which was taking place in Rosh Ha'Ayin, and of the various agreements to divide the benefits of office and to allocate favours to supporters. The issue concerning the alleged forgery also came to light. Shortly before this Yizhuri had been threatened with court proceedings by 'Hitachduth' HaTemanin' and there was rumour to the effect that he was fraudulently collecting money from people in the township, to whom he had promised new homes. As a first step to the solution of these problems, a tight check on the communal budget was instituted through the book-keeper, who had been appointed by the district officer from outside the community. Following this, an enquiry was started concerning the various "malpractices" which had been going on. Some of the members of the council, angry at not receiving any of the alleged benefits which had been distributed, spread rumours concerning corruption amongst the coalition members.

The district officer, eighteen months after the formation of the first local council in Rosh Ha'Ayin, threatened to disband it. But no immediate steps were taken in this direction.

Meanwhile, Yizhuri had installed his son in the council office, as a part-time paid secretary. There was no provision for this in the conditions laid down by the
sub-district officer, but Yizhari insisted on this as a condition of his remaining in the coalition. Consequently, he was able to keep a close watch on the affairs of the council office without having to be there himself.

During this period, there were daily incidents at the council office, involving people who came to plead for a reduction in their taxes, or to complain about the poor roads, the non-collection of garbage and so on. In all these matters, the chairman of the council bore the brunt of discontent and abuse. Yizhari's refusal to take office was doubtless motivated by a desire to avoid just this. But he was still politically active. He held public meetings at which he indulged his demagogic talents, and continued to make vague promises concerning the future.

Another feature of the situation which was growing more prominent, was the degree of conflict between the local council and other external agencies. The department of social welfare, for example, wished to have shop- and stall-licences allocated to 'cases' recommended by their social workers; but instead, these were being granted to political allies, or kinsmen of councillors; at the same time, the council was trying to press for increased welfare subsidies, and for assistance to a greater number of families who were refusing to pay their taxes.

In the third quarter of 1957, exactly two years after the formation of the council, a third political crisis
occurred. This time there were disputes between 'Bnei Teman' and 'Mapai', between the two 'Mapai' councillors, and between Yizhari and his two associates. As a result, no one member of the coalition knew who could be relied upon as an ally. The outcome was a new coalition: this time Yizhari's two associates formed an agreement with one representative of 'Mapai', one of the religious parties, and the 'Progressive'. The second 'Mapai' representative, who had been chairman of the committee for almost two years, resigned his post, but remained a member of the council. This last incident shocked 'Mapai' headquarters in Petah Tikvah, and the matter was referred to a party committee in Tel Aviv. The party threatened to withdraw recognition from the councillor, who in turn threatened to change his party allegiance. No further steps were taken, and the 'Mapai' councillor became chairman, his associate joining the opposition, albeit in passive fashion.

The new chairman was then given a well-defined and restricted role, by the district and sub-district officers, who made it clear to him that the council would be dismissed on the slightest pretext. The chairman became a more agent of the Ministry of the Interior, and the council met more rarely, its discussions and deliberations taking on a perfunctory character. All matters of policy were in effect suggested and ratified by the district officers.
The local religious authority fared little better than the secular authority. Its attempt to obtain a larger budget for furthering its goals, was thwarted by the local council which refused to grant it a subsidy. The official reason for this refusal was the lack of money; but there was another political reason: Yizhari, and other councillors, feared that the increased prestige and influence of the religious council might lead to increased support for the religious parties. The religious council did in fact try to further its political aims, through the two representatives of the 'United Religious Front'. But only one of these men ever entered the coalition, and only limited concessions were made to his demands.

The question then arises as to why Yizhari wished to restrict the influence of the religious parties, and why he did not join with them in seeking to control all forms of authority in the township. There are several reasons for this, and their analysis affords us a fuller insight into the relationships between leaders in Rosh Ha'Ayin.

Yizhari wished to avoid being associated with a body which had suffered a severe curtailment of its functions and prestige in Israel; he also wished to evade the issue of the rights and privileges of the religious authority. In this he displayed considerable acumen; he had lost one battle with external authority, and had learned an important lesson from it.
Yizhari feared that a strong political-religious authority might weaken the basis of his own prestige and power; that he might prove expendable.

Yizhari was not well liked or trusted by the rabbinical leaders. The main reason for this was that he had been a supporter of the anti-traditionalist 'Dardaim' movement in Yemen. This movement, which had attracted a minority of the Jewish elite in Yemen, had met with strong opposition and fear from the organized religious leadership; its supporters were, and to some extent still are, treated with suspicion by all those in positions of religious leadership in Rosh Ha'ayin; though this does not extend to ordinary folk, who were less involved in the dispute between the 'Dardaim' and the traditionalists.

This concludes my description of political behaviour in Rosh Ha'ayin, and I turn now to the final question, concerning the basis of political alignment and allegiance amongst the mass of the community.

**Political Allegiance & Alignment.**

The original basis of political allegiance in Rosh Ha'ayin was of a group of people to a personal leader. In most cases these groups, composed of kindred and people of the same region or district in Yemen, were small; but

*For a fuller account of this matter see Chapter VII*
some leaders, like Yizhari and the official rabbi, could command a wider support.

Just as the leaders themselves were prone to change their party allegiance, so were their followers, who in some cases changed not only their party allegiance, but also their allegiance to a particular leader. Once political parties became influential in Rosh Ha'ayin, many people were persuaded to support them, regardless of their previous loyalty to an individual. But in most cases, loyalty to an individual persisted to some extent, so that members of the same party, by commanding a following, could then bargain for position in that party; this also explains why members of the same party could afford open conflicts with one another; each leader could threaten to shift his allegiance to some other party, in the hope of drawing his supporters in the same direction.

The mass of people in Rosh Ha'ayin are politically ignorant and apathetic; but they are prepared to support a political party if it offers some concrete reward for doing so, and will shift easily to some other party if the rewards are not forthcoming. Since no party can reward more than a small number of people directly, the number of stalwarts remains small. The latter are, as a rule, closely linked with a personal leader. Since the mass do not benefit directly from allegiance to an individual or party, they can easily be swayed by a demagogue who offers
strong emotional appeal as a substitute for concrete benefits. Allegiance to 'Bnei Teman' and more particularly, to Yizhari, provides many people with a sense of identity and the feeling that protection is being offered by a man who has access to those in power in the wider society. (Yizhari had the reputation in Yemen of being able to bribe the Muslim authorities, and of being in a position to secure favours for Jews.) Since his promises largely refer to the indefinite future, he can not be blamed for immediate discontent.

But it is not only those who are unemployed or dependent on welfare assistance, who show signs of political apathy. The same is true of the more prosperous section of the community. The latter are almost completely indifferent to local politics, and as a rule take no part in it. Their interests and material rewards are linked up with specific agencies in the wider society. Insofar as they support any political party, they prefer 'Hapai' or the more moderate of the two religious parties, both of which are linked with the workers' movement. Amongst this section of the community, allegiance to a personal leader is rare or, when found, weak. But their allegiance to the workers' parties is fairly stable.

Tables I and II shew the results of a random sample investigation of 100 household heads.

From the first table it appears that the most prosperous
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class 1</th>
<th>Class 2</th>
<th>Class 3</th>
<th>Class 4</th>
<th>Class 5</th>
<th>Class 6</th>
<th>Class 7</th>
<th>Class 8</th>
<th>Class 9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>0.25%</td>
<td>0.125%</td>
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<tr>
<td>25%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>1.25%</td>
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<tr>
<td>20%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>1.25%</td>
<td>0.625%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>3.33%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>1.25%</td>
<td>0.625%</td>
<td>0.3125%</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Support</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Religious Parties</th>
<th>Non-Religious Parties</th>
<th>Blue</th>
<th>Red</th>
<th>Green</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party Support</td>
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men tend to support the workers' parties, whether religious or non-religious, and that less than 20% of them support 'Bnei Tzeman'. Support for this latter party seems to come predominantly from the less fortunate. However, all groups, with the possible exception of the first, show marked instability in their party allegiances, so that the figures presented only reflect the situation which pertained at the time when they were collected.

The second table shows the relative tendency to support a personal leader. Here again, the tendency is greater amongst classes 2 and 3 than amongst class 1. But, in this matter, class 4 shows the weakest tendency of all. This is possibly explained by the fact that those who are fully dependent on welfare assistance hope to gain little from leaders and more from personal application. But the causation might well be reversed; it may in fact be that those who lack close contacts with leaders are less likely to obtain the type of work suited to their physical capacities. I doubt if this last factor is of major significance for a large number of people, though it may affect a few.

In general, as people find regular work, and the household begins to prosper, they also tend to withdraw into their own affairs; Rosh Ha'AYin is, after all, a dormitory community, and work and material prosperity are linked with the world outside. Those who are materially
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Socio-economic Status</th>
<th>Allegiance to Personal Leaders</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fully-assisted  (Class 4)</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-assisted  (Class 3)</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-supporting  (Class 2)</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prospering  (Class 1)</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
successful have little or nothing to gain by becoming involved with internal affairs; they are less concerned with reductions or exemptions from local taxes, or with the distribution of licences.

But those who barely manage to subsist on their earnings, or those who can not subsist on their own earnings, or those who have none, are the people to whom stable political allegiance to a workers' party may offer no immediate reward; therefore, they either change their allegiance frequently, or place some hope in a personal leader, who is either a close acquaintance, a kinsman, or an appealing demagogue.

It is possible that the causation is the other way: that people who have fewer dependents are more likely to prosper, and are at the same time less concerned with internal affairs. In all events there is a connexion between the two factors.

It is significant, that almost none of the leaders, with the exception of one of the representatives of the 'Histadruth', and Yizhari himself, are drawn from the most prosperous section of the community. The 'Histadruth' official plays no part in internal political affairs; he is concerned solely with the relationship between local workers and the 'Petah Tikvah' Workers' Council. Yizhari, on the other hand, seems to have obtained at least some of
his wealth as a result of political activity. Neither of these two cases invalidate my generalization. In fact, the leaders are, with two exceptions that I have mentioned, drawn from Classes 2 and 3; one of the motives of seeking office is to obtain some sort of material security, either through the receipt of legitimate payment and perquisites, or else through less legitimate means.

Summary & Conclusions.

The people of Rosh Ha'Ayin have been afforded little opportunity for the exercise of internal leadership; where internal leadership has been permitted some continuous authority, as in the domain of religious and ritual activities, traditional duties and powers have been considerably curtailed.

In the domain of secular leadership, there is considerable instability in the maintenance of roles; these roles entail a marked degree of conflicting obligations.

The desire for office is motivated by the possible material rewards of stipend and 'division of spoils', and the prestige which goes with office. The prestige is, as a rule, short-lived. Often enough, those who attain to positions of authority already enjoy a degree of prestige, which is lost as a result of the failure of leaders to satisfy the demands of their 'clients'.
Allegiance to leaders is, as a rule, initially based on personal relationships; this then becomes transferred to a party. But leaders change their party allegiances frequently; similarly, 'clients' change their party allegiances, and often abandon their initial leaders, either becoming independent supporters of a party or of another leader.

The relationship between leaders is marked by constant conflicts, with frequent formations and re-formations of alliances.

The only strong leader in the community is a man who evades immediate obligations of office, while using his influence to maintain his prestige and increase his material wealth.

Religious leaders, who enjoy a traditional and established prestige, find themselves relatively powerless as a result of opposition from secular leaders, and the curtailment of their traditional powers by the national rabbinical and religious authority.

There is considerable apathy and ignorance concerning local affairs, and little faith in the practical ability of leaders to cope with urgent problems. This is partly due to the unstable nature of local leadership, but also largely due to the influence wielded by external authority.

The representatives of external agencies are seen to
control much that is vital, and are recognized as the real source of authority.

The community is divided by ties of neighbourhood, ritual participation, kinship, sub-ethnic association, and political loyalties; in addition, there are differences in material standards which produce yet another source of cleavage. These divisions cut across one another and are reflected in attitudes towards leaders and leadership.

There is some basis to communal solidarity which lies in the common identification with the ethnic group; this derives partly from the fact of ethnic concentration, partly from the power of common cultural symbols, and partly from the connexion between ethnic membership and social status in the wider society.
CHAPTER XI

CONCLUSIONS.

The Problem of Explanation.

In the previous chapters I have been dealing with some aspects of social life amongst immigrants. In situations of this kind it is tempting to offer explanations in terms of the past: that is, to explain present aspects of social life as being due to the persistence of past characteristics. This form of explanation once enjoyed considerable vogue, at least in anthropology, often taking the form of what Radcliffe-Brown called, "conjectural history". In fact, for this last reason, it has attracted much criticism, and has been countered by a viewpoint which stresses the importance of the present structure of social life in attempting to explain other features of it.

Any general dispute as to the relative significance of the different factors seems to me to be sterile. There are few, if any situations, where an explanation can be carried out solely in terms of the present structure of immigrant social life. Immigrants or migrants move from one social system to another, and often do so in groups, carrying with them certain customary social relationships;

* Even S. N. Eisenstadt, who favours explanations in terms of the structure of the immigrant situation, introduces factor concerning the disposition of different categories of immigrants to change. (vide Eisenstadt: 1954.)
but even where these relationships fail to persist - either because of the form of immigration or because of the circumstances of immigrant settlement - certain conceptions of social relationships, which are located in the personalities of the migrants, do tend to persist; though these conceptions may not contribute positively to the form of social life in the new situation, they may contribute by obstructing the performance of social roles which are imposed on the immigrant by the host society. However, there are no situations where an explanation could be carried out solely in terms of the persistence of past characteristics, since there are no known cases where immigrants completely reproduce their past social structure and culture in a new environment; the very process of movement precludes this possibility.

I accept the view that all analysis and explanation should begin with the present structure of immigrant social life; there are certain features common to all such situations, regardless of the cultural background of the groups concerned. But I also contend that no two ethnic groups will respond in quite the same way to what appear to be objectively similar or identical situations; in fact, no two situations will be identical for the immigrants concerned, since their definitions of these situations become part of the pattern to be analysed; and these definitions of the immigrant situation will be partly affected by traditional conceptions. It is quite possible
that the degree and quality of differences between ethnic
groups might, in some cases, be sociologically negligible:
this might be due to the fact that the structure of the
immigrant situation is such as to exclude the influence of
those cultural characteristics which are the product of past
social life; or it might simply be due to the fact that
the actual differences between any two or more groups are
of negligible importance.

The real problem of explanation consists in weighing
up the significance of the various factors which are likely
to affect the social phenomena under consideration; this
can only be done systematically, by testing rival hypotheses
by controlled comparisons. However, for a factor to be of
importance, it must be present in the situation, regardless
of whether it originated there, or not. *

The adoption of a viewpoint which concedes the possible
significance of factors which derive from the past, leads to
my rejection of the more rigid form of functionalism;
however, there is no novelty in my rejection of this doctrine
in its crude form, as it is no longer accepted as a dogma
by the majority of anthropologists and sociologists. It
is no longer considered necessary to assume consistency
between all institutions, and between institutions and

other customs, beliefs and values, even in situations of "relative stability". But if traditional functionalist views are invalid for situations of relative stability, they are, a fortiori, inapplicable to situations of immigrant settlement. When people move from one social system to another — that is, when people move from one place to another and thereby assume social roles in novel systems of relationship — there is inevitably some inconsistency between their conceptions of social relationships and the demands made of them in these social relationships, particularly where these latter are not the product of spontaneous formation, but are imposed by the "needs" or alleged "needs" of the host society.

For these reasons, it can be assumed, in the cases of Zellafon and Rosh Ha' Ayin, that the functioning of leadership and politics is affected by Yemeni conceptions of authority and allegiance, as well as by the demands of the present situation. This assumption cannot be made so readily in the case of Shaarayim, at least as regards the present situation.

* There are two major reasons for this: the fact of "relative social stability" need only imply the existence of effective mechanisms for dealing with inconsistencies and conflicts within social systems; and the existence of social systems in which "parts are mutually adapted to one another" indicates an historical process whereby this mutual adaptation has taken place — in short, indicates that consistency has not existed at some time in the past!
situations this community has been established for fifty years, and it is less likely that traditional Yemeni institutions, customs and conceptions will be apparent.

In order to assess the relative significance of different influences, I propose to compare the three communities with respect to three sets of factors: their external relationships - i.e., relations between the community and the wider society; their internal structure and organization; and their past.

External Relationships.

Shaarayim is not, at present, a unit of local government; both Zellafon and Rosh Ha'Ayin are; consequently, the number of leadership roles, and the official nature of these roles is less clearly defined in the first case than it is in the case of the other two communities.

Shaarayim is part of a wider local community and unit of local government in which a state of ethnic hostility exists; therefore, one of the major emphases in leadership roles, is on conflict, and the defence of certain sub-communal "rights". This is not the case in the other two communities.

The official form of leadership roles is, in all three communities, largely governed by the structure and organization of the wider society, or some sections of it. In Shaarayim, most of the important leadership roles are
performed within the context of municipal, labour, religious, and other bureaucratic organizations. In Rosh Ha'Ayin the situation is similar, though there are two additional elements to consider: agencies external to the community exercise a direct control over internal administration; and a large proportion of the population are partly or wholly dependent on a number of agencies which operate independently of the internal administration. In Zellafon the form of most leadership roles is determined by governmental and other bodies, such as the cooperative movement. There is one major respect in which Shaarayim differs from the other two communities: most of the leaders in Shaarayim are merely official incumbents of roles within a bureaucratic system, and, as a consequence, are leaders within their community; while the leaders in the other two communities are incumbents of roles which are officially designed to provide leadership in the respective communities. Consequently, the leaders in Shaarayim are not officially responsible to their community, whereas those in Rosh Ha'Ayin and Zellafon are.

It is not only the form of leadership roles which is affected by external influences; the form of allegiance is also affected in this way. In both Shaarayim and Rosh Ha'Ayin allegiance to leaders is linked with party support and is affected by the system of proportional representation which is imposed from outside of the community; in most cases
the parties themselves obtrude on the community from outside of it. In Zellafon there are no such cleavages based on party support; the reason for this lies in the fact that the community is associated with the cooperative movement, 'Tnuath HaMoshavim', and through this organization with the 'Histadruth' and 'Mapai'; consequently, there is a single party monopoly in local political affairs, as representation of other parties is discouraged and, in effect, prevented.

Internal Structure & Organization.

With regard to the internal structure, organization and composition of the communities, there are few similarities.

In size they differ considerably: Shaarayim has about 4,000 Yemeni residents; Rosh Ha'Ayin has about 8,000; and Zellafon has little more than 400. In Zellafon it is possible for leaders to have direct personal relationships with a large proportion of the members of the community, and it is easier for the actions of leaders to become known to their followers or opponents; there are also greater opportunities for communal assemblies, where face-to-face conflicts between opposing groups can arise. In Rosh Ha'Ayin and Shaarayim apathy is less likely to be countered by the immediacy of contact which occurs in a smaller community.

The three communities differ with respect to the sub-groups of which they are composed: In Shaarayim there are a number of sub-ethnic groups recognized by
the older (immigrant) generation, a few of which constituted the original core of the community; in Rosh Ha'Ayin there are many such groups, mostly small, and few within which there are many extensive links of kinship; in Zellafon there are only three such groups which comprise the whole community, and in each of two of these, extensive and diverse ties of kinship are prominent, while in the third, smaller group, ties of kinship are close, and embrace all members. In Shaarayim these sub-ethnic and kinship ties do not determine political allegiance, nor even affect it markedly; they are off-set by other ties, such as those of neighbourhood, length of residence, age etc., and are less potent than economic and other interests in affecting political allegiance. In Rosh Ha'Ayin these ties do to some extent affect party allegiance, but only insofar as they affect allegiance to a particular person; and in this latter respect they are now less significant than they were. In Zellafon these ties are of some importance in affecting factional allegiance; however, they are not the sole cause of factionalism, but are merely mobilized in situations of conflict; furthermore, they cut across ties of present neighbourhood and ritual association.

In both Shaarayim and Rosh Ha'Ayin there are distinct differences in material welfare as between different sections of each community; these differences cut across other ties, and affect political allegiance. In Zellafon
such differences are less marked, and, where they occur, often temporary.

The three communities differ radically with regard to the nature of communal, group or individual interests and goals. In Zellafon there are collective and cooperative activities - albeit, imposed on the community from outside - which affect both the administrative activities of the leaders, as well as the demands made upon them by their followers or opponents. In both Rosh Ha'Ayin and Zellafon, leaders are directly responsible for the provision of, or administration of, certain services and amenities; while in Shaarayim this responsibility is smaller. In both Shaarayim and Zellafon leaders are empowered to allocate work, while in Rosh Ha'Ayin they have less power to do so.

In all three communities there is a marked division between the roles of religious and secular leaders. However, in Shaarayim and Rosh Ha'Ayin, religious leaders either profess party-political allegiances or engage in party-political rivalries and therefore find themselves in conflict with some secular leaders, at least on some issues; this does not occur in Zellafon. But in all three communities, the roles of religious leaders are narrowly circumscribed, and their authority can seldom be invoked in any general fashion.

The past.

In all three communities there are two sets of influences which derive from past circumstances: those
which derive from the specific history of the community in Israel; and those which derive from the society of origin. These two sets of influences have different degrees of significance for the three cases with which I have been dealing. In the case of Shaarayim the first set is clearly more relevant, as the community itself has a history of fifty years, while the second set is more remote; however, the latter is relevant insofar as it relates to the original form of the community, and to the conduct of the older residents, and some of the younger ones. In the case of Rosh Ha'Ayin the second set is much greater in its direct consequences, than is the case in Shaarayim; however, both sets are important. In the case of Zellafon, it is the second set of influences which seems to be more relevant to the understanding of the present situation.

When Shaarayim was founded, the form of leadership which was established bore a close resemblance to that of the local community in Yemen. Circumstances were favourable to this "transplantation" of a social institution: the internal functions of leadership were similar to those of the past; the community was relatively small, and its administrative requirements, were relatively simple; the relations between the community and the wider society - i.e., the representatives of Ottoman, and later, Mandatory authority, on the one hand, and the settlers of the 'Moshavah' and the 'Yishuv' on the other hand - were in
some respects similar to those which had obtained in the Yemen, insofar as the Yemeni community occupied a position of inferior status. However, there was one important difference between the old and the new circumstances: the leader in Shaarayim enjoyed a greater degree of jurisdiction. With the departure of the Turks, the Yemenis of Shaarayim, along with the other residents of Palestine, were subject to fewer restrictions and restraints, so that the traditional form of leadership could function in a manner quite unlike that of the past. However, this traditional form was short-lived; with the development of the community and the wider society - particularly the growth of the 'Yishuv' and its organization - the form of leadership became more complex and differentiated. Ultimately, with the greater interaction between Shaarayim and the wider society, there occurred a split within the leadership. What is of importance is the fact that the early circumstances of Shaarayim were favourable to the establishment of a traditional form of leadership whose functioning was subject to less restraint than in the past, and which provided a basis upon which leadership could develop with changing circumstances.

The founding of the communities of Rosh Ha'Ayin and Zellafon occurred in circumstances very different from those which attended the founding of Shaarayim; the settlers could not fashion their communities after their
own traditional conceptions to anything like the same extent, since the whole process of immigrant absorption and settlement had become bureaucratically organized; furthermore, traditional forms would have been totally inadequate to the demands made upon leadership by the host society. For these reasons, the positive influences deriving from the society of origin are less important than in the case of Shaarayim; however, the negative influences are more important. The functioning of leadership in the two newer communities is obstructed by a number of factors which are connected with the past: leaders must exercise authority in areas in which they have no experience to guide them; they can scarcely appeal to the traditional sanctions of their status in spheres of secular authority; they are required to sacrifice personal allegiances in favour of impersonal notions of suitability; they have to combat a deeply-ingrained negative conception of local secular leadership, which views all real authority as emanating from an external source.

The history of Rosh Ha'Ayin has done little to counter this traditional conception, so that there is a tendency for leaders to doubt their own authority, and for followers to question its efficacy. In Zellafon, similar tendencies are at work, though they may be a little weaker: but in this community, there is an additional factor which tends to undermine the authority of leaders, namely the conflict between traditional conceptions of personal, family and
communal goals, and those which are fostered by the agents of the cooperative movement; this conflict makes additional demands upon leaders.

Leadership in Situations of Social Change.

In many situations of social change, particularly where local leaders are also the agents of a wider system of authority which imposes changes, leadership roles are inherently unstable and contain elements of conflict. Examples of this are to be found in present-day Africa (and elsewhere), where tribal chiefs have involuntarily become agents in a bureaucratic administration which encompasses a number of tribal areas. Conflicts within such roles of authority are due to the following factors: leaders owe allegiance to tribal followers whose demands may be in conflict with those of the administration; leaders must initiate activities in areas within which they lack traditional precepts of conduct, rights and obligations; they are prohibited from securing or maintaining their following by resort to traditional measures; they must uphold traditions and act in accordance with tribal values, while at the same time emulating the standards of those who rely upon them as agents of change; they must maintain their authority despite the gradual corrosion of a system of symbols, beliefs, rituals and values upon which it is presumed to rest. (vide Busia: 1951; Fallers: 1956;
Any one or two of these factors will suffice to create some instability and insecurity in these leadership roles; but when all are present, the degree of insecurity is greatest.

This connection between intermediary status and role instability in the system of authority, provides an explanation of some of the phenomena which occur in the three communities of Shaarayim, Zellafon and Rosh Ha'ayin. In all three cases, at present, most leaders do occupy such an intermediary status, and it is significant that those who do not do so to the same extent, enjoy a greater prestige; though it should be emphasized that those leadership roles which are less intermediary also entail less administrative responsibility, so that their incumbents are less vulnerable.

In the case of recent Yemeni immigrants — and I refer here to the residents of Zellafon and Rosh Ha'ayin — there are some added factors, which, together with the structural factors mentioned above, explain the crises of leadership which are constantly experienced. These factors are as follows: the weakened authority of the religious leader, both in the sphere of general social control as well as within the specific sphere of ritual; the lack of a traditional model of strong local secular leadership; the traditional emphasis, amongst Yemenis, on strong personal ties based on kinship and affinity, which militates
against a conception of community not so based; the administrative demands generated by the strains of acculturation - of changing one's occupational and other social, economic and political customs and conceptions - which are made on communal leaders; and finally, certain personality characteristics of many Yemenis - both amongst leaders and followers - which dispose towards quick rage and unruliness in public situations, thus obstructing the work of administration, and lessening the possibility of even the most minimal forms of cooperation.

If all these factors are taken together with other elements in the situation - such as the relations between the communities and the wider society - it is not difficult to see why it is that local leadership, which has to cope with severe economic or other social difficulties, is unstable and insecure, and allegiance fickle. The Yemenis view all genuine authority as emanating from outside of their community; and present circumstances do little to modify this conception.

In the case of Shaarayim, there are some similarities and a number of differences. Leadership is more established and more firmly based, though it is more likely to disappear in the future with the possible disappearance of a communal identity. Furthermore, it is strengthened by the present and past hostility to the wider community, which in itself is fostered by one section of the leaders. Nevertheless,
there is a large element of insecurity of status which is
due both to the intermediary position of certain leaders,
as well as to the lack of a strong and firm conception of
local secular leadership — real support of leadership lies
predominantly in the sphere of opposition and defense,
rather than in positive administrative roles. It is not,
I think, far-fetched, to assume that the traditional
conception of authority has to some extent persisted, at
least in the older generation: the past circumstances
of Shaarayin were such as to foster its persistence,
insofar as the Yemenis occupied a low social and economic
status, and were somewhat dependent on external sources
for many services and for their livelihood; the notion
that all genuine authority emanates from outside dies hard
in such circumstances.

The Problem of Testing the Hypotheses.

I stated in the first chapter that I did not consider
this thesis to constitute a rigorous test of the hypotheses
presented; and I must, in conclusion, reiterate the view
that I have done little more than offer an interpretation,
in the light of anthropological and sociological ideas.

I do not hold with the view that more rigorous tests
are, by the nature of our discipline, impossible to obtain;
though I do not wish to make the dubious assertion that
precision, of the kind to be found in the natural sciences,
can be obtained, though I would urge that it be sought,
in the full knowledge that it can not be obtained. I make this seemingly paradoxical assertion because of a firm conviction that the rejection of the ideal of precision leads not to a superior social science in which modest aspirations become attainable, but to a return to metaphysics in which all propositions become equally acceptable, by virtue of being equally untested.

A more rigorous test of the hypotheses formulated here, would entail a more careful selection of cases for comparative study in all situations of social change, including those of immigration. Such studies would enable us to give greater significance in weighting the factors which affect the performance of leadership roles, and the forms of allegiance to leaders. Such studies would consist in comparing groups with different traditional conceptions of authority and allegiance in similar situations, and of groups with similar conceptions in different situations.

I can not presume to predict whether the outcome of such studies will in fact further the cause of greater precision; I can, however, predict that without such studies further precision will not be forthcoming.

Modern social anthropology has obtained much of its theoretical apparatus from Emile Durkheim, though in this respect favourable changes are now occurring with the greater incorporation of other ideas from Marx, Simmel
and Weber. What it has failed to do is to utilize some of the methodological prescriptions suggested by Durkheim, which proved so fruitful in his study of suicide.* I must confess to having done little to further this aim, but hope that I have succeeded in providing additional arguments for pursuing it.

* I should mention that this was constantly urged by Radcliffe-Brown, but has scarcely been taken up by his followers in the form suggested.

The material which I presented in the first seven chapters of this thesis was based on research carried out in Shaarayim in 1955 and 1956, and on subsequent visits between 1956 and 1958. But I have followed events between 1958 and 1961, and append this post-script in order to demonstrate the bearing of subsequent evidence on the hypotheses which I constructed.

The first event of importance was the dispute concerning representation on the local Rabbinical Court of Rehovoth. This arose out of the death of Rav Meir Mizrahi, in 1959. When this occurred, Yosef Heshulam was considered the most likely successor. However, his hopes, and those of his supporters, were not realized; a Sephardi rabbi was nominated instead.

Part-political considerations, having little or no connexion with conditions in Rehovoth itself, but concerning a conflict which stemmed from the centre of national politics, were largely responsible for this appointment; the fact that the appointed person was a Sephardi, rather than a Yemeni, was almost incidental!

*An agreement within the rabbinate specifies that Ashkenazi and non-Ashkenazi (i.e., Sephardi and Oriental) sections of the population will be equally represented, or represented in proportion to respective local populations; it does not specify that any particular ethnic group within the two major categories will be represented. It simply does not take account of the fact that Yemenis are only slightly more identified with Sephardim than they are with Ashkenazim.*
The effect of this appointment was soon made clear in Shaarayim; the residents rallied to the support of Yosef Meshulam. Even those leaders, and their followers, who did not support the party to which Meshulam owed allegiance — 'Poel HaMizrahi' — gave him their support on this matter. The failure to appoint him was considered an affront to Shaarayim and to the Yemenis of Rehovoth. The events which followed included public protests and allegations of discrimination; this, despite the fact that Meshulam had not previously considered himself a fully qualified rabbi!

The next events of importance concern the local elections which took place in Rehovoth, as in other parts of Israel, in the latter part of 1959. Before the election, a split occurred within the local-ethnic party, 'Lemaan Shaarayim', between those supporting Yisrael Ovadiah Mizrahi and those supporting a rival, who had quarrelled with Yisrael Ovadiah on personal grounds. In the elections, the Yemenis of Shaarayim failed to return a single representative to the municipal council, as the two parties could not agree to pool their votes. However, no less than 30% of the Yemeni electorate of Shaarayim supported these two parties.

*Noshe Mekaytan did not participate: Notions of personal grandeur had led him to seek election to the Knesseth as a representative of a Yemeni party; as a consequence he was returned to neither the Knesseth nor the municipal council.
The third set of events concerns riots which broke out in Rehovoth this year. (1961). These events were fired by Yemeni protests concerning anniversary celebrations in Rehovoth; the leaders of Shaarayim objected to the fact that their quarter, "one of the oldest in Rehovoth" had received scant attention from the municipal authorities, in planning these celebrations.

It would seem, from the evidence of these events, that a sense of communal identity and antagonism to the wider society, dies hard in Shaarayim.

The split within the political-party, 'Lemaan Shaarayim', though it could not have been predicted, does not detract from my argument that support of "conservative" local leaders is functionally related to a sense of community; it does, however, confirm my view that support of "conservative" leaders is based on negative, rather than on positive attitudes.

The fall in the number of supporters for local-ethnic parties, from about 33% to about 30%, between 1955 and 1959, can partly be explained by the fact that as the younger generation enter the local electorate, they tend to reduce the proportion of support for local-ethnic leaders.

*When I originally submitted reports on Shaarayim, it was stated by a number of people - including sociologists - that I had probably exaggerated the extent of this sense of local and ethnic solidarity, and of antagonism to the wider society. Subsequent events have vindicated my firm contention, at the time, that I had not done so.
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