This thesis analyses European Union foreign policy towards the Middle East peace process in the years between 1991-2002: it examines in which measure disagreement has characterised relations among Member States in the context of the formulation of a European Middle East policy, and if it’s possible to detect a trend towards the attainment of a broadly speaking “European perception” of the Arab-Israeli problem and of the policy Europe should adopt.

The question at the heart of the thesis is: why has the EU spent so much time on Middle East policy, to so little effect?

A set of possible answers has been tested:

- due to the failure in reaching a sufficiently convergent approach among EU members
- the EU lacks the relevant levers and instruments to affect the Middle East peace process
- strategic US interests in the Middle East and the dynamics of EU-US relations have relegated the EU to a secondary role in the Middle East peace process

The thesis argues that Member States’ policy differences are being watered down through the practice of discussions aimed at the elaboration of a common European foreign policy, but that at the same time the Member States have only occasionally been able to identify common interests in a number sufficient to encourage the implementation of a collective European policy, which could supposedly be more effective than 15 separate and distinct policies, and that their policy could be described as a policy of “converging parallels”, i.e. a policy that can at times converge and be harmonised with that of the other Member States but remains essentially a national foreign policy, clearly distinct from, and only occasionally similar to, that of the other Member States.

Furthermore, the thesis argues that the transatlantic dimension is crucial to understand European Middle East policy. It has become evident to all EU Member States that effective and autonomous policy towards the Middle East unavoidably carries with it disagreement with the USA – quite possibly involving active disapproval from the Americans. For all except France, this has been a strong disincentive to attempt to develop more than declaratory policy.
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This thesis is dedicated to those who have believed in me

London, July 2003
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Chapter One

Introduction

1.1: Research Problem

"The Europeans will be unable to achieve anything in the Middle East in a million years" (Henry Kissinger, 1974)

"Despite what is sometimes said, the Europeans do not want to interfere in the negotiations between the parties for the sake of appearing as another mediator. They want to help the parties to settle their differences in a way satisfactory for all. When we try to make our presence felt in the region, we do so in a way that will buttress peace efforts, not complicate them" (Miguel A. Moratinos, 1998)

This thesis analyses European Union (EU) foreign policy towards the Middle East peace process (MEPP) in the years between 1991 and 2002. The question at the heart of the thesis is the following: why has the EU spent so much time on Middle East policy, to so little effect?

A set of possible answers has been tested:

- due to the failure in reaching a sufficiently convergent approach among EU members
- the EU lacks the relevant levers and instruments to affect the Middle East peace process
- strategic US interests in the Middle East and the dynamics of EU-US relations have relegated the EU to a secondary role in the Middle East peace process

The European countries are directly and indirectly implicated in the Middle East conflict because of their geographic proximity, dependence on Middle Eastern oil, and security needs, as well because of the historical role played by several of them in the

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1 Henry Kissinger, US Secretary of State, quoted in the Daily Telegraph, 8 March 1974
3 One preliminary clarification should be made at this point regarding the use of the term “European” and “Europe”, that may be misleading. In this thesis, “Europe” will to all effects mean the “European Community” and, after 1993, “European Union”; where necessary reference will be made to the specific
region. The Arab-Israeli conflict, and the subsequent peace process, have been among the most strongly debated issues by Member States, not only since the creation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in 1991, but since the establishment of European Political Co-operation (EPC) in 1970; the peace process has been the subject of innumerable joint declarations and joint actions on the part of the EC/EU, and has always remained a high priority issue in the European foreign policy agenda. Furthermore, it must be noted that the Middle East has often represented a problematic issue in EU-US relations, given on the one hand Europe’s double dependence on the US as a security guarantor and on Middle East oil, and on the other the strategic American interests in the region and the United States’ desire to maintain control over the development of the peace process, which has frequently clashed with Europe’s attempts to cut a role for itself in the negotiations.

These few preliminary remarks are enough to establish how the question of the EU’s policy towards the Arab-Israeli peace process involves composite problems and closely intertwined interests.

The quotations at the beginning of this chapter very well encapsulate the complex issues tied to the study of the development of the EU’s policy towards the Middle East peace process. While trying to avoid attributing to the words of Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Moratinos meanings that were not originally implied, a textual analysis of their comments is highly suggestive; both quotations are indeed significant in a number of ways.

Henry Kissinger’s remark was made in March 1974, after the Yom Kippur War and in the midst of the oil crisis; it was a moment of harsh tensions between the US and Europe, as the former perceived the launching of the Euro-Arab Dialogue (an initiative undertaken by the EC mainly as a result of pressures exercised by France) as something of a “betrayal” of transatlantic solidarity and as a danger for the American-led attempt to create a consumer front to oppose the Arab oil embargo.

In 1974 the EPC project was only four years old and there was hardly any real coordination between the EC Member States’ foreign policy beyond the formal intentions stated in the 1970 Davignon Report. The Middle East was one of the EPC’s first fields of activity, although - as this thesis will show - it did not prove very successful in advancing the EC’s aspiration to “a united Europe capable of assuming its role played by individual Member States, and to the internal dynamics of relations between the Union as such and individual Member States.
responsibilities in the world of tomorrow and of making a contribution commensurate with its traditions and its mission\(^5\).

Notwithstanding the questionable successes of Europe’s Middle East initiatives, the simple fact that a US Secretary of State deemed it necessary to criticise the EC’s Arab policy in such a manner shows how the United States, while always supportive of European integration, also nurtured a distinct dislike for any European initiative - however ineffective - that was not fully consonant with US strategies.

American scepticism, if not contempt, with regards to the possibility that Europe could develop an effective policy towards the Middle East, appears clearly from a number of words in Kissinger’s comment: the use of the expression “the Europeans” instead of “the EC” or “Europe”, a symptom of how EPC was far from being considered the expression of a collective European foreign policy; the words “unable to achieve anything”\(^6\), which underlined the EPC’s lack of any real foreign policy instruments and the American perception that the Europeans – either as single Member States or collectively as the European Community – were unable to exercise any form of influence on the Arab-Israeli conflict; and finally the last three words, “in a million years”, which on the one hand highlights American condescension towards the idea of the EC possibly taking on a role as an international actor and – in this particular instance – as a credible player in the Middle East, and on the other arguably sheds light on the American determination to maintain leadership in the region.

Miguel Moratinos’s statement was made almost 25 years later. It can be said to symbolise in a nutshell all the changes that took place in those years, but also the persistence of certain patterns.

The first element of importance is the actual role of the person making the remarks: Mr. Moratinos was speaking in his capacity as EU Special Envoy for the Middle East Peace Process, a position that in itself indicates the progress made by the EU in developing a Common Foreign and Security Policy, with the creation of the position of Special Envoy in an attempt to enhance the coherence of the EU’s policy by providing a single European referent for external interlocutors.


\(^6\) emphasis added
On the other hand Moratinos, while describing the EU’s Middle East policy, refers to “the Europeans”, using the same expression adopted 25 years earlier by Kissinger and thus showing how, a quarter of a century later, a common European foreign policy was still an objective to be achieved and how EU Middle East Policy continued to be the minimum common denominator among the different national policies of individual Member States.

The second important point is contained in the first phrase of Moratinos’s statement: “Despite what is sometimes said, the Europeans do not want to interfere in the negotiations between the parties for the sake of appearing as another mediator”. It can be surmised that these words refer mainly to the old and clearly unresolved dispute between Europe and the US with regard to EU’s role in the negotiations between Israel and the Arabs. Once again, 25 years later the situation appears to be little changed, with Europe still attempting to define a role for itself in the Middle East and the US still determined to maintain their leadership and to remain the sole mediator between the conflicting parties.

The remaining words of Moratinos’ statements are also highly suggestive: the phrase “[The Europeans] want to help the parties to settle their differences in a way satisfactory for all”, apart from the obvious reference to EU’s aspiration to see the Arab-Israeli conflict solved, can arguably be said to allude also to the numerous European interests in the region and to the EU’s concern that a settlement of the conflict should not expose these economic, strategic and political interests to danger.

Finally, the sentence “When we try to make our presence felt in the region, we do so in a way that will buttress peace efforts, not complicate them” clearly indicates the EU’s consciousness of its secondary role in the region, which is a consequence on the one hand of the EU’s inability to express a coherent and effective policy and thus to become a reliable actor, and on the other of US hostility towards the idea of accepting the EU as a further mediator, which goes hand in hand with similar Israeli opposition to the idea of allowing the EU to play a political role beyond that of financing the Palestinian Authority.

Hampered by the differences between Member States’ foreign policies, by the formal limitations of the CFSP - which operates within the limits of an intergovernmental framework - and by the hostility of two of the major players in the peace process (Israel
and the United States), the EU indeed cannot but try to make its presence felt in the region, but with little hope of success until both its structural deficiencies and its internal elements of incoherence are overcome.

1.2: Aim and Contribution of the Thesis

This thesis intends to contribute to the literature on European Union policy towards the Middle East and, more generally, on the foreign policy making of the European Union.

The research conducts an extensive analysis of European policy towards the peace process, aimed not so much at measuring the EU’s success or failure in relation to the breadth of its economic involvement, but rather at identifying the factors and the interests underlying the formulation of the European Union’s policy. Furthermore, European policy towards the Middle East - and in particular towards the Arab-Israeli conflict and peace process - constitutes an ideal case study for the problem of political integration within the EU. As pointed out above, the Middle East has been one of the most widely debated issues among Member States in the past thirty years, and was one of the items discussed at the first EPC meeting in 1970. The study of European Middle East policy therefore offers the opportunity of testing the ability of Member States to harmonise their distinct foreign policies, to identify common interests, and to proceed along the road of further integration and towards the elaboration of a common European foreign policy.

Scholars of the European Union have often struggled with the issue of European foreign policy, trying to understand the rationale behind the creation of EPC and CFSP and studying its role as an international actor; linking the construction of a European foreign policy mechanism with the formation of a European identity; analysing its

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functioning and the causes of what has been referred to as its "paralysis"; examining its capabilities in relation to the expectations of external interlocutors and the effects of institutional constraints on EU policies. Other scholars have researched specific case studies, analysing in depth European policies towards specific countries, regions or issues.

As Greilsammer and Weiler have argued, the Arab-Israeli peace process provides a "laboratory" to examine the different conceptual frameworks behind European foreign policy making and in many ways offers the best possible prism through which to evaluate the ability of Europe to realise the objective of a common external posture.

While this thesis is empirical in its approach, the assumptions on which the research is based need to be clarified. The difficulty of analysing European foreign policy is already evident in the definition of the object of study itself. What, after all, is the European Union? A political system but not a state, as Simon Hix has argued? A partial polity, as William Wallace suggests? Little more than the sum of its parts, i.e.

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20 see Hix, S., *The Political System of the European Union*, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 1999

the Member States, as the analysis proposed by Andrew Moravcsik seems to suggest? Furthermore, is there a ‘European’ foreign policy? And what is the rationale behind it? Such questions have haunted researchers for fifty years and the criteria adopted for conceptualising the nature of the European Union and the EU’s foreign policy have differed profoundly.

As Christopher Hill has suggested, these criteria may in fact be geographical, political, institutional, economic, moral or any combination of the five. William Wallace has defined Europe as “a geographical expression with political significance and immense symbolic weight, but without clear definition or agreed boundaries”\(^\text{24}\). The ambiguity of Europe’s geographic reach is a grave liability, as “political systems cannot operate without boundaries, and boundaries necessarily exclude as well as include”\(^\text{25}\). This lack of agreed boundaries generates problems of identity that in turn contribute to what Jan Zielonka has defined as Euro-paralysis, i.e. the “apparent inability of the European Union to cope with a complex international environment”\(^\text{26}\).

Wallace describes the EU as a ‘partial polity’, without many of the features which one might expect to find within a fully developed democratic political system and particularly dependent on regulatory instruments as policy outcomes. He argues that policy-making within the EU may be described as post-sovereign, as it spills across state boundaries, penetrating deep into previously domestic aspects of national politics and administration\(^\text{27}\).

In his work, Simon Hix has defined the EU as ‘a political system but not a state’\(^\text{28}\). He bases his analysis on the characterisation of democratic political system given by Almond\(^\text{29}\) and Easton\(^\text{30}\), which consists of four main elements:

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\(^{22}\) Moravcsik, A., ‘Why the European Union Strengthens the State: Domestic Politics and International Cooperation’, Harvard University Centre for European Studies (Paper no. 52), 1994


\(^{25}\) Wallace, W., *op. cit.* P. 105

\(^{26}\) see Zielonka, J., *Explaining Euro-paralysis: why Europe is unable to act in international politics*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1998. P.1


\(^{28}\) Hix, S., *The Political System of the European Union*, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 1999


1. a stable and clearly defined set of institutions for collective decision-making and rules governing relations between and within these institutions
2. citizens and social groups seek to achieve their political desires through the political system, either directly or through intermediary organisations like interests groups and political parties
3. collective decisions in the political system have a significant impact on the distribution of economic resources and the allocation of social and political values across the whole system
4. there is continuous interaction between these political outputs, new demands on the system, new decisions, and so on.

In Hix’s view, the EU possesses all these element, and can therefore be seen as a political system. However the EU does not have a monopoly on the legitimate use of coercion, and it is therefore not a ‘state’ in the traditional Weberian meaning of the world.

Giandomenico Majone, on the other hand, suggests that the EU can be seen as an instance of a ‘regulatory state’, or at least a regulatory state in the making. As he put it, “a regulatory state may be less of a state in the traditional sense than a web of networks of national and supranational regulatory institutions held together by shared values and objectives, and by a common style of policy making”.

Politically, while not a state, the EU cannot be defined simply as an international organisation. In its definition of the European Union, the American Foreign Policy Association underlines how the EU has strived to combine the interests of fifteen member states under one international organisation and how the result is a system which could be described as “an entity that is somewhere between a collection of sovereign states in a free market and that of a federal super-state”.

In addition, the EU is constantly evolving, seeking to further integration among the member states as well as to enlarge, including a diverse range of new member states. The EU is indeed a significant experiment in building an international order between nation-states that challenges the traditional state-based system of international relations. As Vincent Wright has put it,

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32 The Foreign Policy Association (FPA) is a national, non-profit, non-partisan, non-governmental, educational organization founded in the USA in 1918 as the League of Free Nations Association: see www.fpa.org
"The EU combines elements of an incipient federation, a supranational body, an intergovernmental bargaining arena and an international regime [...] The ambivalence of the Union touches all aspects of its institutions – the lack of separation of powers between the legislature and executive functions which has important legal ramifications; the role of the Commission which oscillates between policy entrepreneurship and leadership and passive spectatorship [...] the constant interpenetration of national officials, elected officials (at EU, national and local levels) and commission officials, leading to a blurring of identities, loyalties and responsibilities."

Andrew Moravscik, on the other hand, has argued that membership of the EU ultimately enhances the domestic autonomy of governments and strengthens the state. Using an approach defined as liberal intergovernmentalism, he suggests that European integration can be seen as a two-level game: demands for integration arise within processes of domestic politics, whereas integration outcomes are supplied as consequence of intergovernmental negotiations. This process of intergovernmental bargaining at the European level ultimately strengthens states vis-à-vis their home politics.

A number of scholars, e.g. Adler ad Barnett, have concentrated on the vision of Europe as a "security community", following Deutsch's definition of a security community as a group of states where war is no longer a tenable means of dispute settlement.

In his 1967 work, Deutsch developed the concept of "amalgamated security communities" - for which the EC Six offered a primary case study. He argued that the development of functional linkages through informal economic and social interaction among separate West European communities creates, in the course of time, socio-psychological tendencies and learning processes that in turn lead to assimilation and integration. In time these induce elite-led attempts to institutionalise and formalize the initial functional linkages. This formal institution-building is a means to preserve the community that intense patterns of communication has created.

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34 see Moravcsik, A., 'Why the European union Strengthens the State: Domestic Politics and International Cooperation', Harvard University Centre for European Studies (Paper no. 52), 1994
35 the idea of 'two-level game' has been originally formulated by Robert Putnam: Putnam, R.D., 'Diplomacy and Domestic Politics', in *International Organisation*, 42, 1988
Thirty years later Rummel argued that the European Union as a "partly state-like and partly intergovernmental actor, can be regarded as a security building system per se which has many in-built mechanisms to limit or deny violent conflict."

Ole Weaver, too, using the EU as an independent variable to explain the absence of war, has maintained that the achievement of a security community in Europe was accomplished through a process of de-securitisation, with of the emergence of other issues of mutual concern to European states taking precedence and guiding their interactions. Paradoxically perhaps, he argued also that the deepening of formal European integration has brought security back onto the agenda, most obviously with the formalisation of foreign policy cooperation and the aspiration to create a Common Foreign and Security Policy.

If defining the nature of the European Union poses a number of difficulties, a further problematic field of debate opens up for the researcher when an attempt is made to define the nature, or even establish the very existence, of a European Foreign Policy (EFP). Once again, definitions are still open. As Michael Smith puts it

"The EC and now the EU have long established and material foundations for their presence and impact in the international arena. These foundations are the reflection of the economic and political weight of the EU, of its institutional capacity and of the ways in which it has enlarged its tasks and roles in the changing world arena. But they are not monolithic, nor do they suppress the claims or the prerogatives of the member states. There is no definite answer to the question "does the EU have a foreign policy?": rather there is a series of increasingly well-focused questions about the nature of EU international action and the foundation on which it is based."

Since the creation of European Political Cooperation in 1970, a number of concepts have been used by scholars to help conceptualise the idea of European foreign policy. In 1977 Sjostedt developed the concept of actorness, arguing that an international actor might be defined as an entity a) delimited from others; b) with the autonomy to make its own law and decisions; c) and which possesses certain structural prerequisites for action

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on the international level (such as legal personality, a set of diplomatic agents and the
capability to conduct negotiations with third parties.)

This definition of an international actor contributes to resolving the dilemma that, on
the one hand, actoriness in the world is a quality the EU is often automatically assumed
to possesses, but on the other hand the intergovernmental nature of European foreign
policy, on the other hand, suggests that EFP might be viewed as no more then the sum
of decisions taken by Member States. As Hill has underlined, however, Europe is a
genuine international actor in some respects, but not all.

A second concept, developed by Allen and Smith, is that of presence. According to this
notion, the EU has a variable and multidimensional presence in international affairs. A
cohesive European impact on international relation must be accepted, despite the messy
way in which it is produced. For Allen and Smith, the EU’s presence in the international
arena is characterised by two elements: a) the EU exhibits distinctive forms of external
behaviour; b) the EU is perceived to be important by other actors within the global
system.

Thus, actoriness is not only about the objective existence of dimensions of external
presence, but also about “the subjective aspects embodied in the validation of a
collective self by significant others”.

Furthermore, as Michael Smith has underlined, the EU is not simply an “actor” or a
“presence” but also a process; a set of complex institutions, roles and rules which
structure the activities of the EU itself and those of other internationally significant
groupings with which it comes into contact.

Central to the debate on the nature of the EU and of European foreign policy has been
the controversial idea of Europe as a “civilian power”.

In 1972 Duchene created the term civilian power, arguing that there is no point in trying
to build up a European superpower and a European army, as in our time there is more

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43 see Hill, Christopher, 'The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualising Europe's Foreign Policy',
44 see Allen, D. and Smith, M., ‘Western Europe’s presence in the contemporary international arena’, in
45 see Rosamond, B., *Theories of European Integration*, European Union Series, London. Macmillan
scope for civilian forms of action and influence. In his view, Europe should emerge as a model of a new type of interstate relationship, able to overcome the legacy of war, intimidation and violence. Europe should be a force for the international diffusion of civilian and democratic standards.

The notion of civilian power has prompted a fierce debate and numerous scholars have criticised Duchene's views: Hedley Bull defined civilian power Europe “a contradiction in terms”; others have underlined the importance of military power and have accused Duchene of making a virtue out of necessity (i.e. Europe is unable to become an international actor and tries to sell its failure as a success). The value of "civilian power" has been questioned by commentators as being conditional upon an environment secured by the military power of other states (for example the United States).

Other scholars, like Zielonka, have supported the idea of the EU as a civilian power, arguing that “aspiring to military power would be an expensive, divisive, and basically futile exercise for the Union.” For Karen Smith, a civilian EU is to be preferred because security in the post Cold War world has acquired a much broader connotation than military security: “threats to security within and between states arise from a variety of sources, including ethnic disputes, violation of human rights, and economic deprivation. And the EU is very well placed to address the long term causes of insecurity.” Moreover, commenting on the development of a European military capabilities, Richard Whitman has argued that this has not diminished the importance of EU "civilian power": “so far, the EU’s common security policy has been developed with

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51 see Zielonka, J., op. cit., p. 228
52 Smith, K.E., The instruments of European Union foreign policy., Florence, European University Institute, 1997
the purpose of furthering the structures that facilitate "civilian power", which continues to be at the heart of EU identity, relevance and effectiveness".53

While therefore this thesis is essentially empirical in its approach, the numerous concepts illustrated above both inform the study and constitute the basis on which the research is built. In analysing the ability of Europe to realise the objective of a common external posture towards the Middle East peace process, the thesis focuses particularly on the problematic dynamics between the Member States’ foreign policies and the elaboration of a common European stance, on the process of interaction and socialisation among foreign ministries within the framework of political cooperation at the European level, and on whether this process has brought about a convergence of national policies.54

The thesis utilises the concept of actomess, focusing in particular on what Sjostedt defines as "the structural prerequisites for action on the international level"55 such as legal personality and the capability to conduct negotiations with third parties. The idea of the EU as a process, i.e. a set of complex institutions, roles and rules, are explored with special reference to the development of EU foreign policy instruments and to the evaluation of their effectiveness.56

The vision of the EU as a model of security community in which war has been eradicated and the question of the EU as a civilian power are crucial in exploring the EU’s relations with the Mediterranean region and its efforts to develop a Euro-Mediterranean partnership, to evaluate the EU’s contribution to the peace processs, and at the same time to interpret some of Europe’s failures.57

A number of scholars have studied the problem of European Middle East policy: the first works date back to the 80s and focus on the EC’s early attempts to coordinate the Member States’ foreign policies and to reach a unified stance, and on US-Europe relations in the region.58

53 Whitman, R., The Fall and Rise of Civilian Power Europe, Paper presented to the conference on "The European Union in International Affairs, National Europe Centre, Australian National University, 3-4 July 2002
54 see Chapter Four
55 Sjostedt, G., op. cit., pp. 74-109
56 see Chapter Five
57 see Chapter Five and Six
In more recent years other works have focused on the issue, mainly in the form of journal articles\(^5^9\) or chapters in books\(^6^0\), plus a few monographs\(^6^1\). These works, however, have generally failed to analyse the problem of European foreign policy towards the Arab-Israeli peace process in its entirety. Instead, they have focused on specific aspects of the policy, e.g. the EU’s institutional limits, its economic involvement in the peace process, its policy towards the Mediterranean region (with only limited reference to the problem of the peace process) and the limitations imposed on the EU’s role by American leadership in the region.

This thesis aims to offer a comprehensive analysis of the problem of EU policy towards the MEPP, tackling it from different perspectives and bringing together in a single study all the relevant elements.

- The thesis focuses first on the problem of convergence among the different Member States’ policies; it examines to what extent Member States have disagreed with each other in formulating of a European Middle East policy, and whether it is possible to detect a trend towards the attainment of a “European perception”, broadly speaking, of the Arab-Israeli problem and of the policy Europe should adopt.

\(^{59}\) Hollis, R., 'Europe and the Middle East: Power by stealth?' International Affairs, vol 73, no.1, 1997;


- It then analyses the instruments of European foreign policy from a legal-institutional point of view, studying the construction of the edifice of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and how EU foreign policy instruments have been used in Middle East policy.
- Finally, the thesis focuses on the crucial issue of transatlantic relations, studying the dynamics of EU-US relations in the Middle East and how they have influenced the development of EU policy towards the region.

1.3: European Union Middle East Policy

As anticipated, a set of possible answers to the central question “why has the EU spent so much time on Middle East policy, to so little effect?” will be tested in this thesis. The first possible answer is the following: *due to the failure in reaching a sufficiently convergent approach among EU members.*

The Arab-Israeli conflict and subsequent peace process have been the subject of numerous joint declarations and joint actions on the part of the European Union: the Middle East policy was one of the questions discussed at the very first meeting of European Political Co-operation in 1970 (EPC, the original nucleus of what was hoped would become, in subsequent years, a common European foreign policy) and thereafter the EC/EU closely monitored the Arab-Israeli conflict, which remained a high priority issue on the European foreign policy agenda^{62}.

This thesis attempts to establish to what extent disagreement has characterised relations among member states in the context of the formulation of a European Middle East policy, and whether it is possible to detect a trend towards the attainment of a “European perception”, broadly speaking, of the Arab-Israeli problem and of the policy Europe should adopt. Harmonising the EU’s Member States’ viewpoints on the Arab-Israeli conflict is a task which has always proved difficult. As a quick overview of some Member State’s Middle East policies demonstrates, the individual interests and policy guidelines of the Member States are still some considerable way apart despite the common interest and common efforts in finding a just and lasting solution to the conflict.

French policy in the Middle East has privileged France’s relations with the Arab world, even if it has tried at the same time to maintain good relations with Israel. Paris has
often promoted an independent French policy in the area, and this independence has mainly implied conducting a policy that is independent from that of the United States. At times, such a policy has gone so far as to cause tensions with other EU Member States, with autonomous French initiatives in the Middle East seemingly taken without any prior consultations with its European allies.

For some European countries, such as Germany and the Netherlands, the sensitivities of relations with Israel were such that their governments have hesitated to criticise Israeli policy. For these countries the possibility of shifting national positions under the guise of a search for a common European position has proven attractive: it has allowed them to initiate a rapprochement to the Arab world while claiming this to be an “unavoidable price” in striving for the superior objective of reaching a unified European position, and at the same time avoiding to upset their own internal public opinions.

Great Britain has tended to go along the lines of American Middle East policy: on the British foreign policy agenda, transatlantic relations were a much higher priority than Middle East policy, in spite of the long historical involvement of the United Kingdom in the area. London has been inclined to favour a policy that secured American approval and avoided direct confrontation with US policy in the name of Europe taking on an independent role in the peace process.

Italy’s policy, on the one hand, supported a European involvement in the peace process in the framework of a broader “Mediterranean policy” which has to be, from the Italian point of view, one of the top European priorities and must not be neglected in favour of a policy more concentrated on enlargement problems and on the “northern dimension”; on the other hand, Italy’s internal political divisions tended to make its Middle East policy unsteady and unclear.

This quick overview is enough to confirm that all EU Member States continue to have their own foreign policy agendas and to set their own priorities within these agendas with regard to their Middle East policy. It is also true that – notwithstanding the existence of the CFSP - foreign policy is still the domain of the Nation State and that foreign policymaking within the EU is an intergovernmental process. Nevertheless, since the creation of EPC, the European states have committed themselves to cooperation in the field of foreign policy and this commitment has been confirmed and widened in scope with the Maastricht Treaty. In this context, the Middle East peace

process has been one of the main objectives of European foreign policymaking and one of the issues most discussed among the Member States.

This thesis tries to ascertain whether the distance between individual Member State policies is narrowing through the practice of discussions aimed at the elaboration of a common foreign policy, as envisaged since the creation of EPC and reasserted through the Treaty on European Union in 1991 and the creation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). It also seeks to verify whether Member States have been able to identify common interests in a sufficient number to encourage the implementation of a collective European policy, which would supposedly be more effective than 12 (and later 15) separate and distinct policies, or if their policy may only be described as a policy of "converging parallels", that is a policy that may at times converge and be harmonic with that of the other Member States, but remains, and will remain, essentially a national foreign policy, clearly distinct from, and only occasionally similar to, that of the other Member States.

1.4: The instruments of European Foreign Policy

The second possible answer that will be tested in this thesis is the following: the EU lacks the relevant levers and instruments to affect the Middle East peace process.

One of the main charges that has been brought against European foreign policy in the years of EPC is that it was mainly a declaratory policy without much substance, conducted in a "club-like atmosphere"; that being the result of endless discussions among the Member States it simply represented the minimum common denominator of all the different positions present within the Community, and that the instruments at its disposal were grossly insufficient in granting it much credibility, let alone effectiveness.

With the Treaty of Maastricht, and later with the Treaty of Amsterdam, the European Community tried to equip itself with new policy instruments that would assure coherence, consistency and therefore, it was hoped, effectiveness to foreign policy.

Two decades of experience with European Political Co-operation had made the Member States aware of the constraints that limited the existing foreign policy mechanisms, while at the same prompting them to maximise the potential of the European Community as a global actor with an influential foreign policy.

On the other hand, most Member States were still determined to retain control over foreign policy and reluctant to go beyond the intergovernmental framework of EPC and proceed towards a collective foreign policy. These contradictory aspirations are very well exemplified by the separation that the Member States were, and are, set on maintaining between economic policy (“low politics”) and foreign policy (“high politics”). This separation proved completely artificial and highly inefficient in the years of EPC: the two policies emerged as being inextricably intertwined, and Member States often found themselves forced to turn to the Community’s economic policy instruments in order to implement decisions taken in the separate intergovernmental framework of the European Political Co-operation.

With the Treaty of Maastricht the Member States aimed to reduce the incoherence and inconsistency caused by this separation, assuring greater co-ordination between the two policy areas, while at the same time preserving their sovereignty over foreign policymaking. The result of these two diverging aspirations is the formalised three-pillar structure of the “new” European Union, which includes: a) the first pillar, now referred to as the European Community, composed by the three originally separated Communities: European Steel and Coal Community, European Economic Community and European Atomic Energy Community; b) the second pillar for developing Common Foreign and Security Policy; c) the third pillar for developing co-operation in Justice and Home affairs, these last two pillars being intergovernmental.

\[\text{References}\]


Allan, D., op.cit., p. 49


This formalised pillar structure makes the whole foreign policymaking mechanism intricate and ponderous, and causes unresolved tensions between intergovernmentalism and Community action in foreign policy\textsuperscript{71}. However, the separate pillar structure was the solution the Member States agreed to ensure that foreign policymaking would remain under their control and would not slip through their hands to become the domain of Community action.

The Treaty of Maastricht introduced two new foreign policy instruments: \textit{joint actions and common positions}, which were to serve the purpose of providing European foreign policy with means of action; later, the Treaty of Amsterdam introduced a further instrument, the \textit{common strategy}. Thus, if joint actions address specific situations where operational action is needed\textsuperscript{72}, common positions define the approach of the Union to a particular matter of a geographical or thematic nature\textsuperscript{73}. The common strategy is not clearly defined, but could be set out as a framework that defines what the main EU interests in a region are, and by what general means they might be pursued\textsuperscript{74}.

One of the main complaints EU interlocutors in the international arena express, is the absence of a European counterpart, i.e. the old problem of “who speaks for Europe?” As a preliminary response to this demand the Treaty of Maastricht introduced the role of \textit{special envoy}, a sort of pilot project for a European diplomat\textsuperscript{75}, appointed by the EU Council (therefore in an intergovernmental framework) with a mandate in relation to particular policy issues. And further in the direction of solving the problem of giving a “human body” to the “European voice” goes the decision, taken with the Amsterdam Treaty, to create the position of a \textit{High Representative for CFSP}, finally implemented in 1999 with the appointment of Javier Solana to the role, who also combined the functions of Secretary General of the EU Council and Secretary General of WEU.

If the creation of these two positions seems to be a response to the need of facing external interlocutors and international crises with a single European referent, nevertheless the fact that both of them are appointed and respond to the Council, and

\textsuperscript{70} see Cameron F., \textit{The Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union. Past, Present and Future}, Sheffield, Sheffield Academic Press, 1999
\textsuperscript{71} Chris Patten, quoted in Howorth, J., \textit{European Integration and Defence: the ultimate challenge?} Chaillot Paper, n43, Institute for Security Studies, WEU, Paris 2000, p. 32
\textsuperscript{72} Treaty of Amsterdam, article J4
\textsuperscript{73} Treaty of Amsterdam, article J5
\textsuperscript{74} Calleya, S. Select Committee on the European Union: Ninth Report, House of Lords Reports, 2001
therefore to the intergovernmental dimension of foreign policy, shows to what extent
the Member States are still reluctant to delegate foreign policymaking to the EU.

The EU has used all of the aforementioned instruments in its Middle East policy, from
the declaratory common positions to the sending of a special envoy, from the
enunciation of a common European strategy to the participation of Mr. CFSP in the
negotiations. And together with these more properly "CFSP" instruments, i.e. second
pillar instruments, also first pillar EC instruments have been used to implement
decisions taken in the framework of CFSP: from trade and co-operation agreements, to
association agreements, to the provision of aid and extension of loans. The Middle East
Peace Process has in fact often been a sort of "testing ground" for European foreign
policy instruments and has offered the EU the opportunity to experiment with new
instruments and initiatives.

In their work "Europe's Middle East dilemma: the quest for a unified stance" Greilsammer
and Weiler, while analysing European Political Cooperation policymaking, draw a
distinction between a) an "active" policy, which seeks to influence events directly, to posit "Europe" as an initiator of policy and a veritable world actor; b) a "reactive" policy, which is less concerned with direct influence, but rather with reacting to world events in order to minimize the costs to the reactive actor; and finally c) a "reflexive" policy, i.e. a policy mainly concerned with the actual formation of a
common policy as an integrative value _per se_.

Indeed, this reflexive dimension of EU policy towards the peace process can be said to
hold relevant weight: the peace process has sometimes been used as a means to achieve
internal - i.e. European - objectives, and has become an instrument for "flexing
European muscles" innocuously.

The peace process, in a way, has constituted a context in which mechanisms have been
tried, structures experimented with, significant experience gained, and much sought-
after consensus often obtained; it has provided the European Union with a real

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77 The expression "reflexivity" or "reflectivity" has been used in a different sense by other scholars, like Keohane and Jørgensen, to describe an approach to the study of European governance according to which the investigator should always be theoretically aware and conscious of the assumptions that underlie their argument: see Keohane, R.O., International Institutions and State Power, Boulder, Westview Press, 1989; Jørgensen, K.E. (ed.), Reflective approaches to European governance, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1997
laboratory for the testing of most of its common foreign policy and security policy mechanisms.\textsuperscript{78}

The peace process in the Middle East has indeed often been used by Europe as a "testing ground" for a common foreign policy, and for the instruments this policy has at its disposal, offering the EU the opportunity to experiment with new instruments and initiatives - such as the appointment of a special envoy, the monitoring of elections in the Palestinian territories, and the training of Palestinian authorities in matters of security and the fight against terrorism in the territories under its control.

Thus, how can the ineffectiveness of this policy be explained? This thesis tries to establish if the instrument at EU’s disposal are:

1. Insufficient: insufficient foreign policy instruments would limit the EU’s range of action, even in the presence of the shared willingness among European Member States to develop an influential policy towards the Middle East that would make the EU an important actor and a referent for the parties involved in the peace process.

2. Inadequate: an inadequacy of the instruments may derive from the EU’s nature, in the years taken into consideration, as a civilian power, therefore devoid of military means. Given the political and military nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the importance of its security dimension, this would render EU policy intrinsically weak and scarcely credible, making an inclusion of the EU in the peace process as a mediator next to impossible, and limiting its role to that of aid donor and important economic partner.

3. Misused: the inadequacy of the institutions in charge and the bureaucratic complexity may negatively affect the EU’s capacity to use the available instruments to their greatest effect.

4. Under-utilised: an under-utilisation of foreign policy instruments may be the result of a lack, on the part of the Member States, of the political will to exploit the potential offered by the instruments at the EU’s disposal, in favour of the pursuit of separate national policies, that mirror divergent national interests.

The third answer tested in this thesis is: *strategic US interests in the Middle East and the dynamics of EU-US relations have relegated the EU to a secondary role in the Middle East peace process*

Indeed, in analysing EU policy towards the Arab-Israeli peace process, one cannot avoid the crucial problem: is EU Middle East policy *separable* at all from transatlantic relations?

The end of the Cold War has changed the world’s balance of power and security order: the United States have emerged as the only surviving superpower, and the new Russia has failed to fill the gap left by the Soviet Union.

The Middle East is no longer viewed in a cold war perspective. Global intervention in the Middle East no longer projects bipolar superpower rivalry in the region: post cold war global intervention takes on a unipolar form, with a dominant US using its influence in the region\(^7\) to protect its interests, which include:

- Ensuring the free flow of oil at reasonable prices;
- Regional stability and prosperity, that would help protect oil supplies, create a market for American products and reduce the demand for US military involvement in the area;
- The security of the State of Israel;
- The consolidation of the Arab-Israeli peace process, that could guarantee Israel’s security and at the same time contribute to the stability of the entire region.

The end of the Cold War also led to a redefinition of EU interests and foreign policy priorities: the fall of the Berlin Wall marked the dissolution of the political cement of the communist threat, and following the reunification of Germany, integration became an even more important issue for European stability\(^8\). With the Maastricht Treaty and the creation of CFSP, the European Union aimed to achieve a common foreign policy

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\(^8\) Wallace, W., ‘The Sharing of Sovereignty: the European Paradox’, *Political Studies*, 1999
able to project onto the international arena the combined power of its Member States, whose weight and influence in international affairs was hoped to be stronger than that exercised by each state individually. In the Middle East, the EU shares many interests with the US: the promotion of the region’s stability and prosperity, as well as the protection of the flow of oil supplies on which it depends heavily. Due to its geographical proximity and strong economic ties with the region, the EU risks being seriously affected by problems arising in the Middle East, such as an instability spill-over, uncontrolled migration flows, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the spread of terrorism.

The consolidation of the Arab-Israeli peace process is one of the EU’s interests, as it aids stability and enhances the chances of resources and efforts being directed to the economic and political development of the region. On the other hand, Europe must balance its support for the search of a just and lasting solution to the conflict between the Arabs and Israel with its interests in the Arab world.

The end of the Cold War and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union created a political vacuum in the Middle East that could have represented a political opening for the EU. Theoretically, there was the opportunity to redefine EU-US interaction and the dynamics of burden-sharing in the region, and Europe could potentially increase its role and influence in the Middle East peace process. This opportunity came about over the 1991-1993 period, following:

- the end of the Cold War and the redefinition of the balance of power in the Middle East
- the start of the Peace Process with the Madrid Peace Conference
- the redefinition of Europe itself and of its role in the international arena at the Maastricht conference, with the call for a Common Foreign and Security Policy.

The start of the peace process, however saw the United States as the only accredited mediator, (considering the inexorable decline of the Soviet Union) accepted by both

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83 see Serfaty, S., ‘Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East’, Joint Force Quarterly Forum, No. 24, Spring 2000; Moisi, D., ‘Europe’s Role in Making Middle East Peace’, Middle East Times, issue 2001-30; Neugart, F., Conflict in the Middle East- Which Role for Europe?, Impulse Paper, Bertelsmann
the Arabs\textsuperscript{84} and the Israelis\textsuperscript{85} and able to exert a definite political influence, and Europe as a guest, invited as a normal participant to the Peace Conference and whose potential role as additional mediator was refused by the main actors involved in the process. Although initially cut out from the core negotiations and diplomatic efforts of the peace process initiated at Madrid, the European Union nevertheless gradually expanded its role at least in its area of comparative advantage, i.e. the economic area. Over the 1990's, the EU's economic role in the peace process increased progressively, to the point that the EU became the major single aid donor to the Palestinians. The logic of the peace process - in the EU's view - was that trade and co-operation were to underpin peace, Palestinian economic development being Israel's best long-term guarantee of security. This assumption was the justification behind the European Union's massive financial assistance to the consolidation of the peace process, the underlying logic being that this was a necessary precondition for keeping the peace process on track\textsuperscript{86}.

Together with direct aid to the Palestinians, the EU also promoted regional dialogue and co-operation through the so-called Barcelona Process - from which the United States were excluded - which saw the EU engaged in a political and economic relationship with 12 Mediterranean states (including Israel) in a context that, at least in the European intentions, was parallel and separated from the peace process itself\textsuperscript{87}.

On the other hand Europe's enhanced economic role in the peace process has not been matched by a similar increase of its political influence: the United States remained the only mediator between the parts and the EU played a diplomatically and politically complementary role to that of the US\textsuperscript{88}. In a way, it provided the "basic economic foundation of the peace process", but lacked the military instruments and security institutions to make a contribution on the front of security - which remained the domain

\textsuperscript{84} see Sayigh, Y., 'The Gulf Crisis: Why the Arab Regional Order Failed', in \textit{International Affairs}, 67.3, 1991
\textsuperscript{85} see Adler, J., 'The Political Role of the European Union in the Arab-Israel Peace Process: An Israeli Perspective', \textit{The International Spectator}, Volume XXXIII, No. 4, October-December 1998
\textsuperscript{88} Hollis, R., 'Europe and the Middle East: Power by stealth?' \textit{International Affairs}, vol 73, no.1, 1997
The American position was ambivalent: on the one hand the US wanted to keep its primary role in the peace process, so as to protect its interests however it saw fit; on the other hand it was happy to delegate a relevant part of the financial assistance to the Palestinians to the EU, as it was not willing to accept a free-riding European Union that exploits the security coverage offered by the US without offering at least the limited assistance it is able to provide (limited diplomatically speaking, but substantial in economic terms). The US is as well aware of the fact that an economic growth of the Palestinian Authority is a necessary precondition for the consolidation of the peace process, and is willing to recognise a prominent role of the EU in this field, as long as it remains politically in line with US plans.

The United States' influence on the European Union takes on different forms:
- At a collective level, all EU Member States benefit from US presence in the region and the security guarantees that stems from that presence. The US keeps the Sixth Fleet stationed in the Mediterranean, has substantial military assets in the region and provides enormous military assistance to friendly countries of the region (like Egypt and Israel); all this, while protecting US security interests, guarantees a security coverage to Europe as well, and at the same time contributes to deferring the problem of a European defence capacity. Even France, which has always promoted a more active EU involvement in the Middle East, has come to realise, especially following the experience of the Gulf War, that the EU is not - or at least not yet - able to guarantee security either in region, or of its own territory from the dangers deriving from instability. In the period considered, and under the US security umbrella, the EU has been able to avoid tackling

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91 Author's interview with Sir Brian Crowe, Former Director-General for External and Politico-Military Affairs, General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union
in a decisive fashion the potentially highly divisive issue of how Europe should protect itself from dangers deriving from an insecurity spill-over from the Middle East.  

- Some Member States, like Britain, Germany, the Netherlands and Italy, are highly aware of the risk that a EU move from a declaratory policy towards active diplomacy would risk a crisis in transatlantic relations: these countries are inclined to favour a low-profile EU policy, complementary to that of the United States and limited mainly to providing economic aid to the region, and particularly to the Palestinian Authority; a contribution that the US itself welcomes for its stabilising effects.

- Some countries, in particular France, are not satisfied with a US-dominated peace process and wish for a more active EU policy. French leaders have argued that the European Union partly defines itself through emancipation from the USA's dominant influence, and that confrontation with the United States at times stimulates cohesion between Member States.

Transatlantic relations are indeed of paramount importance to understand and evaluate EU policy towards the Middle East peace process: this thesis tries to analyse the dynamics of these relations and of the burden-sharing process that takes place between the EU and the US in the Middle East, and tries to understand how, and in which measure, the USA exerts its influence over EU Middle East policy.

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92 Author's interview with Harry Kney-Tal, Israeli Envoy to the EC and to NATO
93 Author's interview with Sir Malcolm Rifkind, former British Minister of Defence and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
95 Tonra, B., The Europeanisation of National Foreign Policy: Dutch, Danish and Irish Foreign Policy in the European Union, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2001
96 De Michelis, G. and Kostner, F., La lunga ombra di Yalta. La specificità della politica italiana, Venezia, I Grilli per Marsilio, 2003
1.6: The Sources of the Thesis

This thesis is based on primary sources - official documents, newspaper articles and a number of interviews - and on secondary sources - academic literature, reports of think tanks, working papers.

Given the impossibility to access archival documentation for the years in question, this study is largely based on published documents available both in official EU and US publications and on the Internet.

The Internet has indeed proved to be an invaluable source of material: an enormous amount of documentation is now available on line, but the researcher is faced with a recurrent problem, i.e. the fact that the reliability of the sources is often questionable. To bypass this problem, this thesis relies mainly on “official websites”, whose content is guaranteed by the professionalism and trustworthiness of the Institution/Organisation to which they belong. This, of course, does not solve the issue of politically biased material, but this is obviously a problem that affects all kinds of documentation and that the researcher can hardly avoid.

Three categories of websites have been utilised:


- Websites of think tanks, Research Centres, Universities (e.g. Atlantic Council of the United States; The Foreign Policy Association; The Middle East Institute, The Middle East Policy Council; The Stanley Foundation; The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, the Nixon Centre, Harvard University)
A number of officials, diplomats and academics have been interviewed in the course of this research with the objective of verifying the working hypothesis. Officials working in the EU Council Secretariat and in the European Commission have provided invaluable information and insight: through conversation with them it has been possible to gain a better understanding of the mechanisms of CFSP and of its recent developments, of the relations between the Commission, the Council and the High Representative, of the tensions between Community action and intergovernmentalism. They have also given crucial information on EU's Middle East policy, on the initiatives of the Special Representative Mr Moratinos and of the High Representative Mr Solana, on the EC activities in financing the Palestinian Authority.

Interviews with Israeli diplomats and Palestinian officials have helped to understand how EU role in the peace process is perceived by the main actors of the conflict.

Interviews with Middle East experts working in academia and in think tanks in Europe, in the United States and in the Middle East have helped to understand the developments of the peace process, the respective European and American interests in the region and the dynamics of the relations between Europe, the United States and the Middle East.

1.7: Structure of the Thesis

This thesis is divided into seven chapters:

- Chapter Two provides the historical background, tracing the formulation of European policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict from the creation of European Political Co-operation in 1969, and analysing its development until the Maastricht Conference and the introduction of the Common Foreign and Security Policy; the chapter also offers a brief overview of the structure of EPC and of the instruments the Member States had at their disposal to deal with the problem of the Middle East conflict;

- Chapter Three provides an overview of the main developments in the Middle East Peace Process between the years 1991 and 2002. It highlights the most important changes in European foreign policymaking that took place in this period, with special reference to those innovations relevant to EU policy towards the Middle East. Lastly,

98 There is by now a vast literature on the subject of how to evaluate information on the internet: see for example http://www.marquette.edu/library/search/evaluatingweb.html
99 a list of all the persons interviewed can be found in the Bibliography
the chapter analyses the evolution of the EU’s strategy and initiatives towards the region, from the inception of the peace process at the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991 to the creation of the so called “Madrid Quartet” in April 2002;

- Chapter Four studies the dynamics of the relations between national foreign policies and foreign policy at the EU level towards the Middle East conflict, with the objective of establishing what has encouraged policy convergence, and to what extent a collective policy has been achieved; and what, on the other hand, has kept national policies “parallel” and therefore separate and clearly distinct from each other100;

- Chapter Five conducts an analysis of the progressive, incremental construction of the edifice of Common Foreign and Security Policy, and the stratification of the instruments at its disposal, with a parallel analysis of the immediate use of these instruments in a specific foreign policy context such as the Arab-Israeli peace process;

- Chapter Six focuses on American and European policy in the Greater Middle East and on the state of transatlantic relations in this region of critical importance for both the US and the EU. The chapter analyses the elements of convergence and divergence in American and European policies towards the region, with the objective of identifying the patterns of continuity and change that characterise the dynamics of the transatlantic relationship in this extremely contentious issue-area101;

- Chapter Seven brings together the guiding threads of all the chapters and summarises the findings of the thesis, with the objective of answering the question posed at the beginning of this chapter, i.e. “why has the EU spent so much time on Middle East policy, to so little effect?”.

100 Part of this chapter has been previously published as an article on the European Foreign Affairs Review: Musu, C., ‘European Foreign policy: A Collective Policy or a Policy of “Converging Parallels”?’, Eفار, Vol. 8, issue 1, Spring 2003, Kluwer Law International
Chapter Two

The Historical Background
European Political Co-operation and
the Middle East Peace Process: 1969-1990

2.1: Introduction

In late May 1967, in the midst of an international crisis on the eve of the Six-Day War, an EEC Summit of the Six Heads of State or Government took place in Rome, primarily to discuss the prospect of the UK’s accession to the Community, which was strongly opposed by France.

The international situation called for a common Community declaration on the Middle East crisis - or at least this was the opinion of some Member States - but positions were so irreconcilable that the Six went nowhere near such an achievement: “I felt ashamed at the Rome summit. Just as the war was on the point of breaking out, we could not even agree to talk about it”, were German Chancellor Kiesinger's words following the summit.

But this failure to reach a common position was only a prelude to what would happen a few days later, when the war broke out.

Indeed, the Six achieved the remarkable result of expressing each a different position, following their traditional national policy and privileging what was perceived to be the national interest: attitudes ranged from France’s strong condemnation of Israel and support for the Arabs, to Germany’s support of Israel, disguised behind a formal neutrality.

The Member States’ different traditions and interests in the Middle East, the differing intensity of their ties with Israel and with the Arab world, and the inability to agree on a political role for Western Europe alongside the United States, all contributed to the

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failure to reach an agreement on that occasion\(^5\). The two following years saw hardly any attempt to harmonise the Member States' policies towards the Middle East conflict\(^6\); however the inability of the EC to respond adequately and, if not unanimously, at least in harmonious coordination to major world crises, was becoming increasingly evident and was a striking contrast to the increasing economic weight of the Community especially in view of the likely imminent enlargement of the Community to include the United Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland.

The Six, and in particular France\(^7\), increasingly felt the urgency to promote an enhanced political role for Europe in the world. Arguably their failure to adequately face the Middle East crisis in 1967 was one of the main triggers of the new developments that were to take place shortly thereafter in the process of European integration.

In December 1969, with a few lines unobtrusively located at the end of the official communiqué of the Conference of the Heads of Government held at The Hague - known as The Hague Summit Declaration - the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the European Community Member States were instructed to "study the best way of achieving progress in the matter of political unification, within the context of enlargement"\(^8\).

In turn, the six Foreign Ministers instructed the Belgian Political Director, Vicomte Davignon, to prepare a report which would serve as the basis for the future European Foreign Policy. The report, on which Davignon worked with the Political Directors of the other five foreign ministries, was finally presented and approved at the Luxembourg Conference of Foreign Ministers on 27 October 1970, and is known as the Davignon or Luxembourg Report.

The Hague Summit Declaration and the Davignon Report sanctioned the official birth of European Political Co-operation (EPC) - the nucleus of what more than twenty years later would become the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) - and defined its initial structure. The rationale behind the creation of the EPC was, to use the Luxembourg Report's words, "to pave the way for a united Europe capable of assuming

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its responsibilities in the world of tomorrow and of making a contribution commensurate with its traditions and its mission"9.

The new European Political Co-operation was to be carried out through two annual meetings of the Foreign Ministers, and the work of a Committee of Political Directors and ad hoc working groups.

In fact, the activities of EPC were - at French insistence - kept as separate as possible from those of the Commission and of the Parliament, denoting France's clear intention to keep the process separate from that of the Communities and strictly within the limits of intergovernmental procedures.

This model of political co-operation basically "relied on the principle of official collegiality to build up the consensus in preparation for foreign ministers' intergovernmental decisions"10. The Member States, in other words, were torn between two different aspirations: on the one hand that of responding to international crisis more adequately, trying to project in the international arena the combined political weight of all the Community members through foreign policy coordination; on the other hand, that of retaining national control over crucial foreign policy decisions that were perceived to be of a State's exclusive competence11.

The first EPC ministerial meeting took place in Munich in November 1970. Together with the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), the Middle East conflict and the necessity to harmonise the Six's policy towards it was one of the topics chosen to be discussed. France in particular was pressing for the issue to be discussed among the Member States in the hope of influencing a shift towards a more pro-Arab stance - in line with France's own policy - in the EC12.

At the time of the meeting, though, the Member State's positions were still too divergent and distant from each other for an agreement over a common public document to be reached13. What is of interest here, however, is the fact that since that first meeting in Munich, the Middle East conflict has been an almost permanent feature of EPC discussions, regardless of the very limited success obtained by the EC in dealing with the matter.

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10 See Hill, C. and Smith, K. E., European Foreign Policy: Key Documents, Routledge, 2000. Pg 75.
11 For a discussion of the problem of national sovereignty and European political integration see Chapter Four
13 See Hill, C. and Smith, K. E., European Foreign Policy: Key Documents, Routledge, 2000. Pg 297;
It can be said that certain principles and guidelines of today's European Union Middle East policy took shape as far back as in the years of EPC, and in particular between 1970 and 1980, and it is therefore worth analysing these early EC initiatives (or lack of them) in order to identify possible patterns of continuity and change that may help understand and interpret the more recent EU policy.

After The Hague Summit Communiqué, EPC progressively developed and new instruments of political co-operation were slowly added, mainly in an informal and incremental fashion; the Middle East was then very often used by the Member States as a testing ground for these instruments. This chapter will conduct an analysis of EC policies towards the Middle East conflict during the years up to the creation of CFSP, but before that it will offer a brief overview of the structure of EPC and of the instruments the Member States had at their disposal to deal with the issue.

2.2: A Short Bureaucratic Digression: The Structure of EPC


The 1970 Luxembourg or Davignon Report defined the initial structure of European Political Cooperation (EPC). This embryonic form of European Foreign Policy - devoid of any kind of legal basis - was endowed with a very limited range of instruments, if any at all: the structure of EPC foresaw no more than two yearly meetings of the Member States’ Foreign Ministers, three yearly meetings of a Political Committee (consisting of the Political Affairs Directors of the national Foreign Ministries), and the creation of specialised working groups on specific issues of potential common interest. No secretariat was created and it was clear that EPC relied "on the principle of official collegiality to build up consensus in preparation for foreign ministers' intergovernmental decisions". The burden of EPC initiatives came largely to rest on the rotating Presidency, a fact that was bound to impose limitations in terms of the continuity and coherence of EPC action.

As mentioned above, the rationale behind the creation of EPC was the urgency, felt especially by France, to promote an increased political role for Europe in the world, at
the same time maintaining any form of co-operation in the field of foreign policy strictly within the limits of intergovernmental procedures.\textsuperscript{16}

The objectives of European Political Co-operation, as stated in the Davignon Report, were to be the following\textsuperscript{17}:

- to ensure, through regular exchanges of information and consultations, a better mutual understanding on the great international problems;
- to strengthen [Member States'] solidarity by promoting the harmonisation of their views, the coordination of their positions, and, where it appears possible and desirable,
- common actions.

\textit{The Copenhagen Report (1973): incrementalism and (in)consistency}

Two subsequent Reports modified – albeit moderately - the very light structure of EPC, in essence sanctioning its incremental and “unofficial” development. The Copenhagen Report in 1973 increased the number of Foreign Minister meetings to four a year and stipulated that the Political Committee should meet as frequently as needed (i.e. on a monthly basis); it also introduced the COREU (Correspondence Européenne) telex network among participating states, and set up a Group of Correspondents entrusted with the task of following the implementation of political co-operation.

In its last two articles (Part II, article 11 and 12.b) the Report touched upon an issue that was destined to permanently affect the formulation of a common European Foreign Policy: the question of consistency.\textsuperscript{18} The problem of consistency, or rather of

\textsuperscript{16} See ibid., paragraph 4: "[The Heads of State or of Government] have a common conviction that a Europe composed of States which, while preserving their national characteristics, are united in their essential interests, assured of internal cohesion, true to its friendly relations with outside countries, conscious of the role it has to play in promoting the relaxation of international tension and the rapprochement among all people, and first and foremost among those of the entire European continent, is indispensable a mainspring of development, progress and culture, world equilibrium and peace is to be preserved.

\textsuperscript{17} First Report of the Foreign Ministers to the Heads of State and Government of the Member States of the European Community (The Davignon or Luxembourg Report), Luxembourg, 27 October 1970 (Part Two, I)

\textsuperscript{18} Second Report of the Foreign Ministers to the Head of State and Government of the Member States of the European Community (The Copenhagen Report), Copenhagen, 23 July 1973. Part II art.11: "On [all important foreign policy] questions each State undertakes as a general rule not to take up final positions without prior consultation with its partners within the framework of the political cooperation machinery."
Part II art. 12.b: "The Political Cooperation machinery, which is responsible for dealing with questions of current interest and where possible for formulating common medium and long-term positions, must do this keeping in mind, \textit{inter alia}, the implications for and the effects of, in the field of international politics, Community policies under construction."
inconsistency, affects foreign policymaking at the European level in several ways, which have been very effectively categorised by Simon Nuttall[^19]:

- "horizontal" consistency between the different policies of the EU;
- "institutional" consistency between the two different bureaucratic apparatuses, intergovernmental and Community;
- "vertical" consistency between EU and national policies

Indeed, ever since its inception, EPC carried the seed of an inconsistency that was bound to characterise all its manifestations: its structure was light, strictly intergovernmental and entirely separate from the Community structure. On the other hand its aim was grand, as EPC was supposed to represent the channel through which Europe would speak with "one voice" and would finally take up the position it deserved in the world.

The Member States, while acknowledging the need for increased political coordination within the framework of the EC, nevertheless wanted to make sure that each of their voices would be adequately discernible, and provided for a structure that resembled more a "choir of voices" than "one voice", and a potentially very discordant choir at that. National foreign policy choices and priorities could potentially block political cooperation at the European level at any time; in addition, the artificial separation of EPC and Community policies, while affording the Member States the reassuring perception that EPC would safely remain within the limits of intergovernmental co-operation, soon proved to be a constant source of problems, as it was hardly possible to consistently keep external economic relations and foreign policymaking unconnected.

In order to at least alleviate these problems, therefore, the Copenhagen Report stipulated that "for matters which have an incidence on Community activities, close contact [would] be maintained with the institutions of the Community", and that "the Commission [would be] invited to make known its views [...]"[^20].

*The Gymnich Formula (1974): the informal dimension of EPC*

An illuminating episode in the development of EPC was the informal approval, in 1974, of the so-called Gymnich Formula, a gentleman’s agreement which provided that "if any member of EPC [would] raise within the framework of EPC the question of


informing and consulting an ally or friendly state, the Nine [would] discuss the matter and, upon reaching agreement, authorise the Presidency to proceed on that basis.\textsuperscript{21}

The agreement was devised to solve tensions that were arising with the United States as a consequence of America's demand to be allowed to sit in on all EPC meetings\textsuperscript{22}. The Member States had no intention whatsoever of consenting \textit{verbatim} to this request, permitting the US to be present at all levels of their policymaking, and on the other hand couldn't afford to badly compromise their relations with the US. The solution devised is strongly revealing of the nature of EPC: an informal agreement, not even in written form, that allowed the Presidency to consult the United States on behalf of its partners on matters of importance. Once again, then, much of the burden of EPC initiatives was to be borne by the Presidency; however, the unofficial nature of the agreement left enough room for alternative solutions, so that, should the rotating Presidency be held by either a small country or a country with less than idyllic relations with the US, contacts could be established through other channels, including - of course - bilateral channels.

\textit{The London Report (1981): the official birth of EPC bureaucracy}

The third Report that contributed to define and codify EPC was the London Report, in 1981. The Report, in the usual "EPC style", acknowledged developments that were already taking place and introduced a few new instruments. The former included the recognition of the so called "troika" system in the procedures for EPC-Third Country contacts\textsuperscript{23}, and the insistence on the principle of full association of the Commission with the work of EPC, with the objective of pursuing at least what has been referred to above as "institutional" and "horizontal" consistency\textsuperscript{24}.

The new instruments introduced were a crisis procedure, which provided that the Political Committee or a Ministerial meeting could convene within 48 hours at the request of three Member States\textsuperscript{25}, and the setting up of an embryonic EPC secretariat, in

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\begin{itemize}
  \item\textsuperscript{21} German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher speaking, announcing the outcome of a foreign ministers' meeting. 10-11 June 1974. Cit. in Hill and Smith, op. cit., pg 97
  \item\textsuperscript{22} tensions were also arising as a consequence of different US and European policies towards the Yom Kippur war and the subsequent conflict with OPEC.
  \item\textsuperscript{23} Report issued by the Foreign Ministers of the Ten on European Political Cooperation (The London Report), London, 13 October 1981, Part II, 7: "[...] If necessary, and if the Ten so agree, the Presidency, accompanied by representatives of the preceding and succeeding Presidencies, may meet with representatives of third countries".
  \item\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., Part II, 12: "[...] The Presidency will ensure that the discussion of the Community and Political Cooperation aspects of certain questions is coordinated if the subject matter requires this. Within the framework of the established rules and procedures the Ten attach importance to the Commission of the European Communities being fully associated with Political Cooperation at all levels".
  \item\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., Part II, 13
\end{itemize}
the form of a small team of officials seconded from preceding and succeeding presidencies to aid the Presidency in office\textsuperscript{26}. The Report also explicitly stated that EPC was an appropriate forum for discussing "certain important foreign policy questions bearing on the political aspects of security"\textsuperscript{27}.

\textit{The Single European Act (1985): an official basis for EPC}

EPC was finally given an official basis in the Single European Act (SEA), approved in December 1985 and ratified in July 1987. The SEA placed the Communities and EPC within one single document but kept EPC separate from the Community's legal order. An official EPC Secretariat to be based in Brussels was created, and the necessity to ensure consistency between EC external relations and EPC was once again reaffirmed.

2.3: European Foreign Policy Towards the Middle East Conflict (1969-1974)

These eleven years saw the first attempts of the EC to shape a unified policy towards the Middle East: from the first meetings of EPC - characterised by disagreements and the impossibility of reaching a compromise – to the Venice Declaration, a milestone of European policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict, which contains many principles that are still valid for the EU today.

However, if, on the one hand, the Venice Declaration may be seen as a positive achievement for EPC, as a form of political agreement over a difficult and controversial issue on the other hand, a closer look at the actual developments of the EC's political initiatives in this period reveals a tendency towards a minimum common denominator, an incapacity to display solidarity within the Community, a different prioritisation of policy issues (e.g. relations with Israel, relations with the United States, relations with the Arab States), which all led ultimately to an unsuccessful and ineffective policy, if for "effective" policy we mean a policy that intends to influence the events and does so successfully\textsuperscript{28}.

In analysing the EC policy towards the Middle East certain crucial elements should not be overlooked: following the 1956 Suez crisis, the decline of Great Britain's and

\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., Part II, 10

\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., Part I: "The Foreign Ministers agree to maintain the flexible and pragmatic approach which has made it possible to discuss in Political Cooperation certain important foreign policy questions bearing on the political aspects of security".

France’s influence in the Middle East had proven irreversible; the Six Day War saw the consolidation of American leadership in the area and the strengthening of the US-Israel special relationship; furthermore, the Middle East was increasingly becoming a crucial field of confrontation between the United States and the USSR in the framework of the Cold War. All these factors made it very difficult for the EC to become an influential actor in the region; considering also the very limited range of instruments that EC Member States had at their disposal to express a collective foreign policy and their even more limited willingness to actually make an effort to harmonise policy differences, it is not surprising that the EC’s Middle East policy has been less then a success.

1969-1974

As previously mentioned, after the chaotic and uncoordinated reaction to the Six-Day War, the Six attempted to harmonise their position, and the Political Committee was instructed to study the possibility of issuing a joint paper. During the first months of 1971, however, disagreement continued to characterise discussions on Middle East policy within the Political Committee, reflecting the different positions of each of the Member States; divergence spanned over issues as diverse as the refugee status, or the question of Jerusalem, and the attempt to find a common denominator resulted in each Member State presenting its own report on a chosen topic and defending its own position with a noticeable lack of conciliatory spirit. By May 1971, nonetheless, mostly following ongoing pressure from France in the direction of obtaining some form of consensus, an agreement – or rather a compromise – was found, and the Six announced the imminent release of their first “joint paper” on the Middle East conflict. However, this first European success was marred by German and Dutch objections to making the document’s content public. The paper, which is known as the Schuman Paper and was largely based on UN Resolution 242, remained unpublished, but its contents were

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32 Resolution 242 of the United Nations was passed on November 22, 1967 and called, among other things, for the “ 1) withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict; 2) termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries free from threats or acts of force.” United Nations, Security Council, Official Records: Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council, 1967.
leaked to the public in the German press, causing considerable opposition in German public opinion which saw it as too supportive of the Arabs.

Domestic pressures caused the German Foreign Minister Scheel to assert during a visit to Israel that the document was only a "working paper" and merely constituted a basis for further discussions among the Six, a declaration that in turn caused great irritation in Paris, clearly showing the limits of a common European policy towards the Middle East conflict.

In the two years that followed the Schuman Paper there were no other common initiatives on the part of the EC regarding the Middle East, but it must be noted that "each of the Nine continued to develop a positive reassessment of Arab demands [...] and relations with Israel continued to deteriorate." In fact, a certain trend was gradually taking shape: the completely divergent positions adopted by the Member States in the wake of the Six-Day War were slowly starting to converge, and especially the States more supportive of Israel were reconsidering their position towards the Arab world. This shift, well exemplified for instance by the visit of Joseph Luns of Holland to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in January 1971, or by the toughening of Belgian policy regarding the status of Jerusalem, was strongly supported by France, who favoured a convergence of the EC Member States towards its pro-Arab stance and insisted on the necessity of reaching some form of consensus before the accession of the three new Member States in January 1973. A new path in the cooperation among European Member States deserves to be mentioned. An upsurge of international terrorism, exemplified by the terrorist attack on Israeli athletes during the 1972 Olympic games in Munich, gave the European governments a clear perception of Europe's exposure to cross-border terrorism and prompted an enhanced cooperation on this issue. In December 1975 the so-called Trevi Group was created by the Rome European Council, with the objective of promoting a) cooperation in the fight against terrorism; b) exchange of information about terrorist organisation; c) the equipment and training of police organisations, in particular in anti-terrorist tactics. This initial informal cooperation among security services and law enforcement agencies represents

33 see Greilsammer, I. and Weiler, J., op. cit., pg. 28
34 ibid. Italics in text
35 ibid., pg 27
the original nucleus of what in the Maastricht Treaty became formalised as the third Pillar of the European Union, i.e. Justice and Home Affairs\(^37\).

The Nine’s reaction to the October 1973 Yom Kippur War was somehow similar to the reaction that followed the Six-Day War: each State adopted a different position along the lines of their traditional policy. What changed the situation was the subsequent oil crisis, which on the one hand persuaded some Member States – in particular France and the UK – of the necessity to find a common EC position, and on the other exposed the lack of solidarity among EC members, as each country started a competition to gain the Arab States’ favour\(^38\).

Immediately after the war, the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) decided to place an embargo on the EC and, to exploit the leverage of the “oil weapon” to the full, it differentiated EC Member States into three categories, thus effectively obtaining the result of setting all countries against each other. The countries were classified as follows:

1. “hostile countries”, on which a ban on exports was imposed (the Netherlands, plus of course the United States)
2. “neutral states” where a 5% cut-back sanction was applied (Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Italy and Luxembourg)
3. “friendly or most favoured nations” where no sanctions were imposed (France and the UK)\(^39\)

A direct result of the embargo was a Joint Declaration issued by the Nine in November, that marked a clear shift towards a more distinctly pro-Arab position, inspired by the French\(^40\): the declaration made mention for the first time of the “legitimate rights of the Palestinians” and spoke of “the need for Israel to end the territorial occupation which it has maintained since the conflict of 1967”\(^41\)

The statement obtained the desired results: the OPEC decided to interrupt the 5% cut-back on oil to the “neutral States” - but maintained the embargo on the Netherlands. The Dutch appealed to the other Member States to secure its supplies, but without success: Community solidarity was not important enough to risk antagonising the Arab States.

\(^{37}\) for an analysis of European perceptions and policies to fight terrorism see Chapter Six


\(^{40}\) see Dosenrode, S., and Stubkjær, A., *op. cit.*, pg. 86

\(^{41}\) Declaration of the Nine Foreign Ministers on the Situation in the Middle East, Brussels, 6 November 1973. Paragraph 3
The impasse and the tension between the Member States was later resolved through "secret diplomacy encouraged by the United States, resulting in allocation of oil on a pro-rata basis by the multinational oil corporations"^42.

Two elements emerged from the oil crisis: on the one hand the frailty of European cohesion and the extent to which the objective of a collective foreign policy was far from being achieved; on the other hand a conflict with the United States took shape that was to have several effects: it somehow encouraged further European integration, especially as a result of French pressures to differentiate European policy from American policy, pursuing an autonomous stance in the Middle East, while at the same time restraining this very same process of integration, as the full extent of the EC's dependence on the US became clear, not only in terms of security, but also in economic and political matters.

The following events deserve attention when analysing these developments.

In December 1973 an EC Summit was held in Copenhagen; on the first day a delegation of Foreign Ministers of several Arab States arrived at the Summit and delivered a message to the EC on behalf of the Arab League. No foreigners had ever been admitted to an EC Summit before, including the Americans, and this unprecedented event, described by one author as the "ultimate in fawning at the feet of the Arab leaders"^43, caused considerable resentment in Washington. At the conclusion of the Copenhagen Summit the EC announced its intention to enter into negotiations with oil-producing countries to promote "comprehensive arrangements comprising co-operation on a wide scale for economic and industrial development, industrial investments, and stable energy supplies to the Member Countries at reasonable prices"^44. This dialogue, which was to take on the name of the Euro-Arab Dialogue, was viewed quite differently by the two sides^45: the Europeans were interested in the economic dimension, whereas the Arab countries wanted to focus on the political dimension and "intended to use oil as a political lever in order to gain the support of the European Community in their war against Israel"^46.

^42 Ifestos, P., op. cit., pg. 428
^44 EC Bulletin, No 12, 1973
The second event took place in February 1974, when the United States government succeeded, after various delays, in convening thirteen-nations for the Washington Energy Conference, to work out a common program aimed at easing the energy crisis. Nonetheless, a clear divergence, if not conflict, between the French and American approaches to the oil crisis was taking shape: while the Americans wanted to build a “consumer’s front” to oppose the embargo, the French favoured bilateral negotiations and bargaining with oil-producing countries and the improvement of relations with the Arabs.

France refused to take part in the Washington Conference and the Energy Coordinating Group (ECG) that was created thereafter - and that would subsequently lead to the creation of the International Energy Agency (IEA).

However, while the rest of the EC Member States yielded to American pressures and participated in the ECG, at the same time they also followed at least a part of France’s policy. Only a few weeks after the Washington Conference, in March 1974, the Community Foreign Ministers, deliberating in the context of EPC, announced the official launch of the Euro-Arab Dialogue.

Tensions with the United States were mounting quickly: during the Washington Conference President Nixon had already underlined how “security and economic considerations are inevitably linked and energy cannot be separated from either”.

The announcement of the opening of the Euro-Arab dialogue further worsened transatlantic relations and prompted a succession of harsh public statements from the highest American authorities. President Nixon was very direct in outlining US views on the matter: “[...] The Europeans cannot have it both ways. They cannot have the United States' participation and co-operation on the security front and then proceed to have confrontation and even hostility on the economic and political fronts [...] We are not going to be faced with a situation where the Nine countries of Europe gang up against the United States which is their guarantee for security. That we cannot have.”

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47 United States, Canada, Norway, Japan and the EC Member States
48 however it must be noted that even the United States conducted some bilateral negotiations, for example with Saudi Arabia, and justified the subsequent agreements with their link to a Middle East settlement and an eventual moderation of oil prices. See Feld, W. J., op. cit., pg. 70
49 the ECG was charged with the following tasks 1. conservation of energy and restraint of demand; 2. setting up a system for allocating oil supplies in times of emergency or severe shortage; 3. acceleration of the development of additional energy sources in order to diversify energy supplies; 4. acceleration of energy Research and Development programs through international cooperative efforts. Bulletin of the European Communities, No. 2, 1974
50 Department of State Bulletin, 12 February 1974, cit. in Feld, W. J., op. cit
Henry Kissinger was also extremely negative in his comments, pointing out that American allies were losing sight of the greater common transatlantic interests while concentrating on self-assertiveness. He went further, clearly stating what his opinion was of the EC's role in the Middle East: "The Europeans will be unable to achieve anything in the Middle East in a million years."

What is particularly suggestive of this first phase of European Community's efforts to take on a role in the Middle East and of the subsequent tensions that arose with the United States, is that somehow they became paradigmatic of transatlantic relations in the region, as we shall see when analysing the nature of the same relations two decades later: certain dynamics of European and American policies and of their interrelations have changed very little since the time of the Yom Kippur War and the first oil crisis, even after the profound changes introduced to the international framework by the end of the Cold War.

As previously mentioned, after the Six-Day War the United States established their leadership in the region more clearly, and in an effort to consolidate and expand this leadership, did not welcome any interference from the European allies. Linkage tactics between the EC's policy towards the Arabs and the security guarantees offered to Europe by the US were used to keep the Member States under pressure, and to make them realise that an autonomous EC stance in the Middle East - i.e. a stance not welcomed by the US - could only be reached at the cost of damaging US-EC relations, and of putting into question American commitments in the Old Continent.

A further crucial element in the American attitude towards European Middle East policy, beyond the resentment against any form of intrusion in something that was considered an exclusive US domain, was a basic distrust in Europe's possibilities of actually achieving anything in the Middle East, closely linked with American contempt for the EC's incapacity to achieve consensus and express a united position. All these elements are still largely present in American views, as is Europe's inability, it must be said, to act harmoniously. Arguably, Nixon's and Kissinger's statements quoted above could easily be shared not only by members of the current George W. Bush administration, but also by officials of the previous administration led by President Clinton.

Ifestos, P., op. cit., pg. 433

Daily Telegraph, 8 March 1974

for a comparative analysis of European and American policies in the Middle East see Chapter Six
In 1974 the American administration, upset by the EC’s policy towards the Middle East in general and the Arab states in particular, by the reluctance with which the Member States where following American “directives” in the field of energy policy, and by the progressive shift of the EC’s stance on the Arab-Israeli conflict towards pro-Arab positions, decided that a way had to be found to enable the US to control and influence European foreign policymaking. Therefore, the US started to exert pressure on the EC to be allowed to sit in on all EPC meetings, “to ensure that they were able to influence any matters that the Europeans chose to discuss, which they felt impinged on their own interests”. The Member States were thus faced with what was to become a permanent dilemma: prioritising between their relations with the United States and the importance of furthering European political integration. If for France, for instance, the development of a European foreign policy had meant from the start differentiation from the Americans, even at the cost of putting transatlantic relations at risk, for the UK things were - and still are - very different: their relations with the US are considered a crucial national interest, far more critical than the construction of an independent European role in the Middle East. For this reason, the UK at first refused to support the launching of the Euro-Arab dialogue unless an agreement was found on how to associate the US in the political co-operation procedures. The solution found in June 1974 was the aforementioned informal agreement that took the name of “Gymnich Formula”, by which the EC Presidency was to consult the United States on behalf of its partners in time for the latter to influence outcomes on matters of importance. In other words the US were to be considered a “special case” among the third countries with which the EC entertained relations and, even if not allowed to be present during EPC deliberations, was to be granted the possibility of having a say when decisions could be relevant for their interests.

56 Ifestos, P., op. cit., pg. 434
57 see Hill, C. and Smith, K. E., European Foreign Policy: Key Documents, Routledge, 2000. Pg. 97
2.4: European Foreign Policy Towards the Middle East Conflict (1975-1990)

1975-1980

The first Euro-Arab Dialogue (EAD) ministerial meeting took place in July 1974; it was followed by a number of meetings up to 1979, when the Dialogue was basically suspended as a consequence of the signing of the Camp David agreement and of the expulsion of Egypt from the Arab League. From the start, the dialogue was haunted by the different expectations of the parties involved: European aspirations to keep the Dialogue within the boundaries of economic, technical and cultural co-operation were soon to clash with the clear intentions on the part of the Arab States to exploit it for political purposes. The divergence sparked an endless confrontation between the EC and the Arab States that ultimately emptied the Dialogue of its potential significance. The first move of the EC was to exclude both oil and the Middle East conflict from the matters to be put on the EAD’s agenda. However, this strategy did not succeed in preventing these issues from conditioning the Dialogue: in 1975 the Arabs asked the EC to give up the free trade agreement it was about to sign with Israel and, as a further crucial concession with important symbolic value, they tried to put pressure on the EC to allow an independent representation of the PLO in the Dialogue: neither of these two requests were met by the EC, which managed to stand firm on its decision.

However, in the years between 1975 and 1977, the EC’s relations with Israel deteriorated significantly: as criticism of Jewish settlements in the territories became harsher and the problem of the Palestinian people’s rights became increasingly central in EC discussions, even traditionally pro-Israeli countries like the Netherlands, West Germany, Denmark and Luxembourg started to shift their position towards a more pro-Arab stance. This deterioration of EC-Israel relations was then accelerated by the victory of Begin’s Likud in the Israeli elections of June 1977. The displacement of the Labour Party by Likud to all effects brought an anti-West European elite to power in Israel: Begin and his government looked much more directly to the United States, rather than Europe; they cultivated links with the Jewish communities in the United States, whereas the Jewish communities in London, Paris and elsewhere in Western Europe

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58 it must also be noted that “the gaping rift between European and US views robbed EC positions of much practical significance for the Arabs, for it was mainly the influence Europe could bring to bear in Washington that promised real advantage”. See Garfinkle, A., op. cit., pg. 11
59 Jawad, H.A., op. cit., pg. 94
60 see Greilsammer, I. and Weiler, J., op. cit., pg. 35
remained more favourable oriented towards Labour and the more moderate elements in Israeli politics. Furthermore, Begin’s policy of increasing the settlements in the territories and his claim to all the land of historic Israel gave reason to the European governments - or, as Greilsammer and Weiler put it, a pretext - to stiffen their position on the conflict⁶¹.

In June 1977 the Nine, at the European Council in London, issued a new joint statement, worth analysing as it contains relevant points that represented an evolution of the EC’s position. In fact, paragraph 3 of the London Statement declares: “The Nine have affirmed their belief that a solution to the conflict in the Middle East will be possible only if the legitimate right of the Palestinian people to give effective expression to its national identity is translated into fact, which would take into account the need for a homeland for the Palestinian people. They consider that the representatives of the parties to the conflict, including the Palestinian people, must participate in the negotiations in an appropriate manner to be worked out in consultation between all the parties concerned.”⁶²

With this Statement some of the most relevant features of what would become the distinctive European stance on the conflict were delineated:

- the Palestinian question was firmly placed at the heart of the Middle East conflict
- the idea of a homeland for the Palestinians took shape. At the time of the London Statement the concept of “homeland” was still undefined and didn’t necessarily imply the concept of a sovereign state, but soon after the project of a Palestinian State was to take form and become central in EC policy
- the EC claimed that the best approach to the resolution of the conflict was a comprehensive settlement rather than a process built on bilateral negotiations

Europe’s position as delineated above was very distant from Israel’s: in Israel’s view, the Arab world’s refusal to recognise the State of Israel was the central problem⁶³, and not the Palestinian question; the idea of the creation of a Palestinian State was strongly rejected at the time and bilateral negotiations that would imply mutual recognition and lead to separate peace treaties were considered the preferred option to solve the conflict with the Arabs.

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⁶¹ Greilsammer, I. and Weiler, J., *op. cit.*, pg. 37
⁶² Statement by the European Council on the Middle East, London, 29 June 1977
⁶³ see Greilsammer, I. and Weiler, J., *op. cit.*, pg. 39
A few months after the issuing of the London Statement, President Sadat’s visit to Israel and the subsequent opening of Egypt-Israeli negotiations seemed to prove that the policy of bilateral contacts was the one destined to bring the most successful results. These negotiations and the preponderant role played in them by the United States relegated the EC completely to the sidelines.

When the talks eventually led to the signing of the Camp David accords and, in 1979, of a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt under American auspices, the EC offered - if unenthusiastically - its support to the peace process, underlining nonetheless that it did so “as a first step in the direction of a comprehensive settlement”64.

In the following months the EC slowly distanced itself from the Camp David process as it developed the conviction that this process would not solve the Palestinian problem, that its members viewed as the core of the Middle East problem. France and Britain in particular put pressure on the other Member States to launch an autonomous European peace initiative for the Middle East that would clearly distinguish itself from the American-led Camp David process: the idea was quite ambitious at this stage, and it also had the advantage, in the eyes of the Europeans, of pleasing the Arabs, who had been asking the EC to issue a new statement for some time. But the project met with the strong opposition of both Israel and the United States: Israel launched a vigorous diplomatic campaign to block the European initiative, and the US exerted their influence to make sure that the content of the EC declaration would not harm the Camp David process, and to play down European aspirations of acting independently in the Middle East.

On 13 June 1980, the Heads of State and Government of the Nine met at the European Council in Venice and finally issued their joint resolution, known today as the Venice Declaration65. As was predictable following American pressures, the text of the declaration was a very “domesticated” one, even if it did contain some very relevant points. Indeed, Paragraph 6 of the Declaration states: “The Palestinian people, which is conscious of existing as such, must be placed in a position, by an appropriate process defined within the framework of the comprehensive peace settlement, to exercise fully

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64 Statement of the Nine Foreign Ministers on the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, Paris, 26 March 1979
its right to self-determination”; and in paragraph 7 it declares that “the PLO will have to be associated with the negotiations”\(^6\).

The United States were ultimately satisfied with the content of the Declaration, as they felt that they had attained the best possible result from the EC, managing to obtain through their pressures a much more moderate statement than originally intended.

Israel’s reaction, on the other hand, was extremely negative, as the document was in striking antithesis with Israeli policy in its definition - among other things - of the Palestinian problem and in its insistence on the participation of the PLO in the negotiations. Furthermore, the Palestinians themselves were not satisfied because, following the American intervention, the Venice Declaration did not recognise the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people, nor did it call for the desired modification of resolution 242 with the replacement of of the word “refugees” with the word “Palestinians”\(^7\).

The Venice Declaration is considered a landmark in Europe’s Middle East policy. As underlined, it did contain some crucial principles that still constitute the basis of the EU’s policy towards the Arab-Israeli peace process\(^8\) more than 20 years later, but it must be noted how, alongside the achievement of the issuing of a common declaration that would sketch out a specific European stance on a highly controversial issue, the EC had also proved the extent to which it was not only largely exposed to American influence, but also prone to tend towards the objective of a minimum common denominator to enable Member States to agree with each other\(^9\).

1980-1990

The ten years between 1980 and 1990 can hardly be considered a high point in European activism in the Middle East: not only did Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in June 1982 (strongly condemned by the EC) cause the slowdown, if not the paralysis, of most initiatives in the area, including American ones; but EC Member States generally went back to pursuing their own national policies in the region. The most active state was

\(^{6}\) Declaration by the European Council on the Situation in the Middle East (Venice Declaration), Venice, 12-13 June 1980

\(^{7}\) Greilsammer, I. and Weiler, J., op. cit., pg. 45


\(^{9}\) it must be recalled that not only the enlargement of the EC to the UK, Ireland and Denmark had increased the incoherence of Europe’s policy towards the Middle East, considering that the three countries had three national policies differing from each other as much as from of that of the original Member States, but that the entry of Greece into the EC in 1981 complicated things further, given Greece’s strong ties with the Arab world and the fact that it had not yet recognised the State of Israel.
once again France; however the presidential elections that in 1981 brought to power Francois Mitterand - considered to be a friend of Israel and a supporter of the Camp David process - generated a change in France's Middle East policy. This change, nonetheless, was not towards a new pro-Israeli French policy, but rather towards an irresolute, uncertain and at times contradictory policy that caused the other Member States to conclude that the times were not favourable for a renewed European initiative.

Furthermore, some EC Member States (France, Britain, Italy and the Netherlands) resolved to send a peacekeeping force in Sinai, thus expressing their support for the Camp David agreement, but also indicating the extent to which Europe was internally divided and hesitant in the formulation of its policy.

The ten-year period also saw numerous failed attempts, not at all welcomed by the United States, to revive the Euro-Arab Dialogue that had been suspended following Egypt's expulsion from the Arab League after the signing of the Egypt-Israel peace treaty. Between 1980 and 1988, a number of preparatory meetings and ministerial meetings took place, to no avail at all, until the Dialogue was definitively broken off.

While the EAD was stalled, the EC increasingly felt the need to establish some sort of contact with the Gulf States in order to secure stable trade relations. The Arabs were very wary of this initiative as they wanted to avoid a division between the Gulf States and the rest of the Arab world, but a window of opportunity opened for the EC in 1981, when the six Gulf States created the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC), which was charged with economic and political tasks. Immediately the EC initiated informal talks with the GCC with the aim of creating a co-operation agreement, but after lengthy negotiations only in June 1988 was such an agreement signed in Luxembourg.

According to Dosenrode and Stubkjaer the EC initiative towards the Gulf proved a number of points:

- it underlined the EC's dependence on oil supply from the Gulf
- it stressed the need to gain access to the lucrative Gulf state markets

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70 See for example the contradictory statements of the new Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson regarding the Venice Declaration; quoted in Greilsammer, I. and Weiler, J., *op. cit.*, pg. 65
72 Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates
73 for an analysis of the EC-Gulf Dialogue see Jawad, H.A., *op. cit.*, pg. 166-207
74 cooperation was to take place in the field of economic affairs, agriculture and fisheries, industry, energy, science, technology, investment, the environment and trade. Bulletin of the European communities, No 3, 1988. Pg 93
75 Dosenrode, S., and Stubkjaer, A., *op. cit.*, Pg 105
it showed the lack of confidence in the ability of the United States to help its allies and secure stability in the Gulf
it marked the end of EC paralysis
it showed that the Gulf states enjoyed priority over the rest of the Arab states.

Neither the Euro-Arab Dialogue nor the EC-Gulf Dialogue can be seen as huge successes for the EC from a political point of view: both initiatives were promoted by the EC to secure mainly economic advantages, but met with the determination of the Arab States to use all the instruments at their disposal for political purposes. The EC was very reluctant to allow such a linkage, mainly because of strong American pressures; on the other hand the concurrent temptation to give in to Arab pressures in order to both secure Euro-Arab relations (and therefore steady access to oil and prosperous economic ties) and to promote an independent European role in the Middle East conflict was great, the result being mainly a hesitant and contradictory policy that gained the EC the reputation of being an unreliable friend (from the Arab point of view), a difficult and disappointing ally (from the American point of view) and a dangerous actor that had to be marginalized (from the Israeli point of view).

2.5: Conclusion

From this analysis of the first twenty-two years of EC involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict and peace process, it is already possible to draw some critical conclusions and make some comments on the nature of Europe’s Middle East policy. In fact, as we have seen, many keys to understanding EC/EU policy in this area date back to this first period, which saw the birth of an embryonic European Foreign Policy through EPC and Europe’s first steps in the international arena as a new actor.

The first point to be made is probably an acknowledgement of the fact that the first “enemies” of European foreign policy in most cases are the Member States themselves, who turn to EPC and promote it when this is in line with their national foreign policy priorities (e.g. France’s insistence on promoting a closer relationship with the Arab States and an independent role for Europe in the Middle East, distancing the EC’s position from the United States’ as much as possible), but do not hesitate to revert to bilateral contacts and initiatives when this is convenient for their national interest. Control over foreign policy was obviously still very far from being considered
something that could be relinquished in the name of the higher objective of furthering European integration.

Another element that emerges is the fact that policy towards the Middle East provided the EC with an opportunity to “experiment” with the new instruments of EPC.

In their work “Europe’s Middle East Dilemma: The Quest for a Unified Stance” Greilsammer and Weiler, in analysing the Framework for Political Co-operation, make the distinction between an active policy, i.e. a policy that will seek to influence events directly, to position Europe as an initiator of policy and veritable world actor, a reactive policy, i.e. a policy less concerned with direct influence, but rather with reacting to world events in order to minimise costs for the reactive actor, and finally a reflexive policy, where the chief concern will be the actual formation of a common policy as an integrative value per se.76

What emerges from the analysis of these 22 years is that EC policy towards the Middle East has been rarely “active” (and when it has been active it has not achieved remarkable results, as in the case of the Euro-Arab dialogue or the Venice Declaration), but has been more frequently and perhaps more successfully “reactive” (as it tried to minimise negative repercussions on Europe of potentially dangerous regional and international events). As for the reflexive dimension of EC Middle East policy, it appears to have acquired progressively more importance since the creation of EPC: “in reflexive terms the Middle East has provided the real laboratory in which all mechanisms of the Framework [for Political Co-operation] were tested. And on a declaratory level, the Framework led to a convergence of European attitudes towards various issues connected with the conflict, such as Palestinian self-determination and a possible role for the PLO”.77

In fact, mainly as a consequence of French insistence and pressures, in this time span the EC progressively increased its involvement in the Middle East, to the point that the Arab-Israeli conflict became one of the most discussed issues of EPC; this in turn generated a slow convergence of the Member States’ positions around a number of shared principles regarding possible strategies to bring peace to the region. Furthermore, it must be noted that for certain Member States - like Germany, for instance - “Community discipline” constituted a very convenient explanation to justify both in the eyes of third parties (i.e. Israel) and of their own domestic public opinion, a shift in

76 Greilsammer, I. and Weiler, J., op. cit., pg. 19
77 Greilsammer, I. and Weiler, J., op. cit., pg. 20
national foreign policy from a position of clear support offered to Israel, to a more pro-
Arab stance that, for obvious historical reasons, was hardly welcomed.

The Arab-Israeli peace process constituted in a way an ideal issue-area to promote
political integration at the European level: not only some of the Member States had
special ties with the region because of their historical role in the Middle East (like
Britain and France) but events that affected the Middle East were of relevance to all
Member States because of the crucial importance of the region for Europe’s economy,
heavily dependent on Arab oil.

Given these premises, however, it must not be forgotten that all European initiatives and
attempts to forge an independent role for the EC took place under the umbrella of the
security framework provided by the United States, which no EC Member State was
prepared to renounce. American ties with Israel and the relevance of the Middle East in
the context of the Cold War bipolar confrontation constituted a guarantee for Europe
that it could “flex its muscles” innocuously, without incurring the risk of being forced to
take further steps and go beyond a declaratory policy towards a direct involvement “on
the ground”, an involvement that the EC was neither able nor - arguably - willing to
take on.

American determination to maintain complete and sole control over the Middle East
peace process and the limitation of foreign policy instruments provided for by the
Framework for Political Co-operation, have certainly contributed to relegating the EC to
a secondary role in the region; but one has to wonder to what extent there was a
deliberate willingness on the part of the Member States to keep this subordinate role and
avoid the direct and more complex responsibilities that might have derived to the EC
from an equal role as sponsor of the peace process alongside the United States.
Chapter Three

From Madrid to Madrid:
The EU and the Middle East Peace Process from the Madrid Conference to the Madrid Quartet. 1991-2002

3.1: Introduction

This chapter intends to offer an overview of the main developments of the Middle East Peace Process between the years 1991 and 2002; it will also highlight the most important changes in European foreign policymaking that took place in this period, with special reference to those innovations relevant to EU policy towards the Middle East. Lastly, the chapter will analyse the evolution of the EU’s strategy and initiatives towards the region, from the inception of the peace process at the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991 to the creation of the so called “Madrid Quartet” in April 2002. The period considered will be analysed as a succession of three phases: the dates that mark the beginning and the end of each of these phases may be interpreted as both turning points in a) the Middle East Peace Process and in b) the EU policy’s towards it: what follows is an outline of the chronological division proposed by this chapter, accompanied by explanations of the dates that define each period from both perspectives:

1991-1993

a) This phase opens with the Madrid Middle East Peace Conference, co-sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union, and comes to a close with the beginning in Norway of secret negotiations between the Israelis and the Palestinians

b) In 1991 the Treaty on European Union (TEU) was drafted in Maastricht and, from the original nucleus of European Political Co-operation, the Member States agreed to create the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP); the Middle East was identified as one of the crucial potential areas of action for the CFSP. The TEU was ratified and came into force in 1993.
1993-1995

a) In September 1993, as a result of the Oslo negotiations, Israel and the PLO exchanged documents of mutual recognition. In Washington Rabin and Arafat signed the Declaration of Principles, which would serve as a framework for the various future stages of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. This phase ends with the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin and the end of the “Oslo Spirit”

b) In 1993, at the Washington Donors' Conference, the EU pledged Ecu 700 million to put the Palestinian economy on the path to development in five years. In 1995 a Euro-Mediterranean Conference was held in Barcelona, bringing together the EU Member States and 12 Mediterranean Partners (including Israel and the Palestinian Authority). The Conference approved the Barcelona Declaration, which endorsed the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

1996-1999

a) This phase covers the three years of the Netanyahu government in Israel, during which there was a marked stalemate in the peace process that was not complete only because of strong American pressures on the Israeli government.

b) In 1996 the EU Council decided to appoint Miguel Angel Moratinos as Special Envoy to the Middle East Peace Process. The Special Envoy was the “pilot project” of an EU diplomat whose task would be to improve coordination of Member State policies. In 1999, in a further effort in the direction of promoting political integration within the EU, the Member States appointed Javier Solana, former NATO Secretary, as High Representative for the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy. Since his appointment, Mr Solana and his Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit have been closely involved in the peace process.

2000-2002

a) The year 2000 saw the Israeli unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon, but also the failure of the Camp David peace talks between Barak and Arafat and the initiation of the Second Intifada (the so called Al-Aqsa Intifada). In April 2002

1 The legal instrument regulating the EU’s pledge is Regulation (EC) No. 1734/94
US Secretary of State Colin Powell met in Madrid with the representatives of the European Union, the United Nations, and Russia. The so-called "Quartet" emerged with a clear common agenda: a peace settlement based on an equitable resolution to the conflict, including a two-state solution, security for Israel and the Palestinians, and a major effort to address the looming humanitarian crisis within the Palestinian community\(^5\).

b) In June 2000 the European Union approved the new Common Strategy on the Mediterranean Region. The document, drafted before the failure of the Camp David talks, foresaw a possible contribution of the Member States to the implementation of a final and comprehensive peace agreement between the Israelis and the Palestinians\(^6\). In April 2002, after a number of clashes among the Member States, who were unable to agree on a common strategy for the peace process, and after a failed diplomatic mission during which Israel prevented the CFSP High Representative and the Spanish Presidency from meeting Arafat in Ramallah, the EU finally decided to renounce launching an independent peace initiative and to back the US peace mission that led to the creation of the Madrid Quartet\(^7\).

In the following paragraphs, these phases will be analysed in depth with the objective of offering a comprehensive view of events that are not only closely intertwined, but that often overlap chronologically, creating a confusing picture that is difficult to decipher. In fact, a number of factors come into play and need to be taken into consideration at the same time: the international and the regional context, the influence of the great powers and in particular of the United States, the different and at times diverging interests of the Member States of the European Union, the evolution of the political integration process within the EU, the stratification of the foreign policy instruments at the EU’s disposal, and last but not least, the multifaceted nature of the EU’s contribution (or attempted contribution) to the peace process, in the form of direct involvement in the peace process itself and indirect involvement through regional initiatives such as the Barcelona Process.


3.2: From the Madrid Peace Conference to the Oslo Accords.
EU Foreign Policy and the Beginnings of the Peace Process. 1991-1993

The turmoil of the years 1989-1991, which saw the reunification of Germany and the collapse of the Soviet Union, had an inevitable direct fallout on the Middle East: with the end of the Cold War and the inexorable decline of the power of the USSR, the United States rapidly emerged as the only surviving superpower. Global intervention in the Middle East no longer projected bipolar superpower rivalry in the region: post-Cold War global intervention took on a unipolar form, with the US taking on a dominant position in the region and wielding all their power and influence.

Furthermore, the 1991 Gulf War profoundly altered the political balance in the region, opening a window of opportunity to achieve progress in the peace process after a long impasse. The United States decided to exploit the favourable moment, and to launch a peace initiative to reach a comprehensive settlement between Israel and the Arab States.

The Gulf War indeed prompted both the Israelis and Palestinians to initiate peace talks. Saddam Hussein's bombing of Israeli territory with scud missiles during the conflict had led Israel to reconsider its security needs. The Israeli government became aware that physical control of the territory through occupation was no longer a guarantee of military security, and was compelled to reconsider its strategy and the possibility of starting talks with the Palestinians. Moreover, the end of the Cold War meant that Israel no longer represented a strategic asset to the US in the confrontation between superpowers. It was therefore in its interests to avoid antagonising the United States - its main ally - and to support the peace initiative.

Yasser Arafat's support for Saddam Hussein, on the other hand, had left the Palestinians politically isolated. The PLO had trusted the Iraqi dictator's promise to solve the Palestinian issue once the war had been won; after Saddam's defeat, the Palestinians found themselves not only heavily compromised in their relations with other Arab

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9 See Reich, B., 'The United States and Israel. The Nature of a Special Relationship', in Lesch, D.W. (ed.), *op. cit.* P. 243-244
States who had fought against Iraq, but also aware that no Arab state would or could ever solve the Palestinian issue, and that the only path to follow was now the start of direct negotiations with the Israelis. In addition, the economic situation of the Territories was rapidly deteriorating and the collapse of the Soviet Union meant that they could not rely on its political, military and economic support: "participation in the American-sponsored peace process was perceived [by the Palestinians] as a means for regaining Arab and Western support."

These changes in the political vision and the security strategies of both Israel and the Palestinians, therefore, made possible the launching of the American peace initiative and the convening of a Middle East Peace Conference in Madrid in October 1991.

The Letters of Invitation to the Conference were issued by both the United States and the Soviet Union as co-sponsor of the event, but it was clear that this was primarily an American initiative: the United States had become the sole guarantor and manager of security in the region, and was determined to take on a primary role in the peace negotiations.

The delegations invited were those of Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Egypt and Jordan; the Palestinian delegation was to be included in the Jordanian one.

The European Community was invited as an observer alongside the Gulf Co-operation Council and the United Nations. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the EC had long claimed that to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict a Peace Conference should be convened, in order to reach a comprehensive settlement between all the parties involved. However, up to 1991 at least two of the main players (i.e. the US and Israel - but also Egypt, at least as long as the Camp David process was producing results) were not ready to embrace this point of view, and bilateral contacts between the parties continued to represent the main strategy pursued, despite the fact that successes were increasingly few and far between.

The European Community on the other hand hardly possessed the instruments or the willingness to impose its strategy. EPC, which was strictly restricted within the limits of intergovernmental co-operation, was proving to be - for reasons that will be discussed

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12 Full text of relevant documents from the Madrid Conference and from the subsequent developments in the Middle East Peace Process are available at [http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/mepp/docs_links.htm](http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/mepp/docs_links.htm) (Official website of the EU, pages dedicated to "The EU and the Middle East Peace Process")
later - a highly inadequate mechanism to promote the EC as an international actor. The Member States furthermore were still not at all in accord as to the substance of a possible European action. France favoured an initiative based on the Venice Declaration, while Germany and Britain were inclined to support the American initiative\textsuperscript{13}. Given the fairly unsatisfactory performance of EPC during the Gulf War, to which the Member States reacted without much coordination, the announced idea of a European Middle East peace initiative was finally abandoned in favour of support for the US sponsored Madrid Conference.

Nonetheless, the EC insisted on being included in the Conference as a full participant rather than as an observer, but met with the stern opposition of Israel, who did not trust European governments and did not want to accept the EC as an additional mediator. As pointed out by R.H. Ginsberg, in the eyes of the Israeli government the EC had made three tactical errors that doomed its role as an acceptable mediator in the peace process. It:

- demanded that Israel make concessions to the Palestinians in advance of direct peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians;
- made concessions to the Palestinians that prejudged Israeli interests in advance of direct peace negotiations; and
- insisted on the United Nations as the appropriate forum for negotiations towards a comprehensive peace settlement, knowing that this was totally unacceptable for Israel\textsuperscript{14}.

For these reasons Israel refused to agree to the EC's full participation in the opening of the Conference and, although it accepted that the event be located in an EC capital (Madrid), it rejected the possibility of the conference being held either in London or Paris\textsuperscript{15}.

The United States, on their part, was also not particularly keen on having another mediator to deal with, as in its view this would only complicate the relations with the negotiating parties, and it preferred to maintain the process firmly in its hands.

Somewhat ironically, then, when at last one of the crucial points of the EC's Middle East strategy was being accepted by the main players and all the parties, however

\textsuperscript{13} ibid.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
reluctantly, were to convene to discuss a comprehensive settlement, the EC found itself relegated to a very marginal role, and excluded from the most critical negotiations\textsuperscript{16}. At the opening of the Conference in October 1991, the EC President-in-office, Hans Van Den Broek, in his address to the participants, underlined the strong bonds existing between Europe and the Middle East, and emphasised the importance for the European Community and for the region as a whole of a peaceful solution of the conflict. Van Den Broek also stressed the importance of regional co-operation, stating, for instance, that “elements of the process set in motion by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe could serve as an inspiration and example. It shows how a modest start can bring great results”\textsuperscript{17}.

Despite these inspired words, however, and the suggestion that Europe could serve as a model of coexistence and integration for other troubled regions, the reality of European foreign policy integration at the Community level was still quite grim. EC participation in the Conference had been a problem in itself, not only because of the above-mentioned Israeli opposition to awarding the EC status as full participant, but also because the European governments irritated the Americans by asking that they be represented as the EC at the Madrid conference, and then turning up with the EC as such and with all 12 member governments, thus adding an additional delegation without presenting a single, coherent position.

In truth, after twenty years of European Political Co-operation, the inadequacy of the European foreign policy system had become increasingly evident, and the necessity to reform and improve it was felt by many Member States. Speaking at the College of Europe, in Bruges, in October 1989, the President of the European Commission had said: “We can assume the international responsibilities only through an accelerated deepening of the Community approach, thus facilitating the emergence of a Grand Europe”\textsuperscript{18}

The end of the Cold War had necessitated a redefinition of Europe’s interests and foreign policy priorities. The fall of the Berlin Wall had marked the dissolution of the

\textsuperscript{16} However, in 1992 Israel lifted its veto on full EC participation in the Madrid Middle East Peace negotiations when the Labour Government took office, and consented to have the EC join the multilateral working groups in exchange for the EC’s commitment to updating the 1975 EC-Israel Cooperation Accord. \textit{Ibid.}, P.121

\textsuperscript{17} Statement by the EC President-In-Office, Mr Hans Van Den Broeck, to the Middle East Peace Conference, Madrid, 30 October 1991, quoted in \textit{The Middle East Peace Process and the European Union}, working paper, Directorate General for Research, European Parliament, Poli 115,1999

political cement of the communist threat, and following the reunification of Germany, integration had become an even more important issue for European stability. Furthermore, the post-1989 changes in the world balance of power increased the demands on Europe to advance its role as an international actor and use its weight to achieve more political influence and ensure stability around its borders; the inability of the EC to react adequately to the Yugoslav crisis and to the outbreak of the Gulf War underlined the need for the EC to make qualitative progress in foreign policy, at least attempting to move on from co-operation to a common policy.

All these issues animated negotiations on the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (TEU) that took place during 1991 and during which "the definition and implementation of a common foreign and security policy" were discussed. However, the contrasts between the Member States who wanted to move towards an integrated Europe and those who wanted to keep foreign policy decision-making strictly in the hands of the national governments, were strong and were in the end clearly reflected in the Maastricht Treaty, especially in the establishment – within the three pillar structure created by the TEU - of the European foreign policy mechanism as an intergovernmental independent pillar of its own, and the creation at the same time of a single institutional framework.

The innovations introduced by the TEU will be analysed and discussed in detail in Chapter Five: what is of interest here is to highlight those changes that had a direct immediate bearing on the EU's policy towards the Middle East peace process in order to clarify the sequence of events and to better understand the nature of European initiatives.

The TEU did mark an important step by the Member States of the EC (that after the ratification of the TEU became the European Union - EU) towards the creation of a common European foreign policy. European Political Co-operation evolved into the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), with the aim - as said - of strengthening the Union's role in the international arena, and enabling it to speak "with one voice".

21 see the 19 April 1990 letter addressed by President Mitterrand of France and President Kohl of Germany to the Irish EC Presidency. Quoted in P. de Schoutheete de Tervarent, op. cit., p. 44
22 The three pillars are: a) the first pillar, now referred to as the European Community (EC), made up by the three originally separate Communities: European Steel and Coal Community, European Economic Community, and European Atomic Energy Community; b) the second pillar for the development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy; c) the third pillar for the development of co-operation in Justice and Home Affairs. See Wallace, H., Wallace, W., Policy Making in the European Union, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2000
“Joint actions” and “common positions” were created as new instruments, the possibility of appointing a special envoy to specific political areas and areas of crisis was also taken into consideration, and the Middle East peace process was identified as a possible context of action for the CFSP. The Member States decided that the CFSP would be carried out within the framework of the Union’s institutions, its aim being the creation of consistent policies that would be preventive rather than reactive, and that would assert the EU’s political identity. With the Maastricht Treaty and the creation of CFSP, in other words, the European governments aimed to achieve a common foreign policy able to project onto the international arena the combined power of its Member States, whose weight and influence in international affairs was hoped to be stronger than that exercised by each state individually.

As mentioned above, the early 1990’s brought increasing pressures on the EU to enhance its role as a relevant political actor on the international stage. In the Middle East, the end of the Cold War and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union had created a political vacuum that could have become a political opportunity for the EU: theoretically there was a possibility to redefine EU-US interaction and the dynamics of burden sharing in the region, and Europe could potentially increase its role and influence in the Middle East peace process filling the gap left by the Soviet Union. Gerd Nonneman has argued that

“The Gulf War of 1990-91 brought a renewed focus on finding a solution to the Palestinian question, because the US interest in wider regional stability, and the need to maintain support in the Arab and Muslim world, required a demonstration that the war was not simply an anti-Arab or anti-Muslim affair, and that Arab grievances, too, resonated in Washington. At the same time, the emerging post-Cold War order meant that such a search for resolution would no longer be shackled by the earlier Cold War dynamic. The PLO leadership was much weakened following its failure to embrace the international action against Iraq, while Israel itself was in some quarters being described as a strategic liability rather than an asset. The result was the Madrid peace process”.

As we shall see, however, the EU did not manage to take full advantage of this opportunity, for a number of reasons that range from American reluctance to concede political space to other actors, to Israeli hostility towards the EU’s involvement, to the EU Member States’ inability and unwillingness to make full use of the mechanisms


provided by the creation of CFSP, and to formulate a coherent common policy that could be taken seriously by all the other players.\footnote{25}{see Chapter Five}

After the Madrid Peace Conference, a double tier of negotiations was opened: bilateral talks between Israel and the Palestinians, and multilateral talks between Israel and Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.\footnote{26}{For a diagram of the Middle East Peace Process Multilateral Talks see the Appendix}

The bilateral negotiations were based on direct talks between the parties, in which neither the United States nor the European Union would have a direct role. In actual fact, while the role of Europe was limited to all effects to the participation of a revolving troika of "observers" to monitor the development of the talks, the American role was significantly more important: the US not only met with the parties separately to discuss the issues at stake, but also had the possibility of setting forth proposals aimed at supporting the dialogue. Furthermore, following the conclusion of the Peace Conference, over a dozen formal rounds of bilateral talks were hosted by the US Department of State in Washington.\footnote{27}{Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Information Division, The Middle East Peace Process, An Overview, Jerusalem 1999}

The multilateral negotiations, opened in Moscow in 1992, focused on more technical issues that crossed national borders.\footnote{28}{The Middle East Peace Process and the European Union, Directorate General for Research, European Parliament}

The United States, on the other hand, presided over the Water Working Group and, jointly with Russia, the working group charged with the most sensitive issues: Arms Control and Regional Security.

During these negotiations - which were not producing appreciable results or progress in the peace process - behind the scenes direct bilateral contacts between Israelis and Palestinians were initiated in Oslo: the European Community was left out of these talks, but so was the United States, informed of the results achieved only towards the conclusion of the negotiations.\footnote{29}{The price of non-peace: the need for a strengthened role for the European Union in the Middle East, European Parliament, Directorate General for Research, Political Series, Working Paper. Brussels, 1999}

The essence of the so-called "spirit of Oslo" has thus been described by one of the negotiators:


\footnote{30}{Author's interviews with senior Israeli diplomats in Rome (May 2001) and Brussels (May 2002)
"For those involved in the initial discussions in Norway the goal was to work towards a conceptual change which would lead to a dialogue based, as much as possible, on fairness, equality and common objectives. These values were to be reflected both in the character of the negotiations – including the personal relationships between the negotiators – and in the proffered solutions and implementation. This new type of relationship was supposed to influence the type and character of Palestinian-Israeli talks which would develop between other official and semi-governmental institutions in the future, as well as future dialogue between the two people."\(^{31}\)

3.3: From the Oslo Accords to the Barcelona Conference.

The First Steps of CFSP in the Middle East. 1993-1995

The outcome of the intensive diplomatic negotiations that took place in Oslo was an exchange of mutual recognition documents between Israel and the PLO, and the signing of a Declaration of Principles (DOP)\(^{32}\) which would serve as the framework for the various stages of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. The venue chosen for the signing of the DOP was Washington: a significant fact, as it underlined the important role played in the peace process by the US. The US may not have taken direct part in the talks, but nonetheless remained the sole mediator acknowledged and accepted by the PLO as well as by Israel. The role of Europe, represented at the ceremony by the EU President and by the President of the Commission, was limited to issuing statements of support.

The years between 1993 and 1995 were full of hope for the peace process: the events set in motion in Norway brought about a sequence of accords both on the Israeli-Palestinian front and on the Israeli-Jordanian one\(^{33}\). In May 1994 the Gaza-Jericho Agreement was signed in Cairo, for the withdrawal of Israeli administration and forces from Gaza and Jericho and the transfer of powers and responsibilities to a Palestinian Authority. Then, in August 1994, the so-called Transfer of Powers agreement was signed in Erez, for the early transfer of powers and responsibilities in specified spheres, in those parts of the territories not included in the Gaza-Jericho Agreement. Finally, in

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\(^{31}\) Pundak, R., 'From Oslo to Taba: What Went Wrong?' in *Survival*, vol. 43, no. 3, Autumn 2001, pg. 21. Ron Pundak has been involved in the 1993 Oslo negotiations and helped prepare the framework agreement that formed the basis of the 1999-2001 Israeli-Palestinian final status negotiations.


\(^{33}\) *The Middle East Peace Process: Official Documents*, Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Information Division, Jerusalem 1999
September 1995, the signing of the Interim Agreement - or Oslo II protocol - took place in Washington, an accord that lead to the extension of autonomy in the major centres of population in the West Bank, and the holding of elections for a Palestinian Council.

As regards talks with Jordan, on the other hand, the main steps were the establishment in October 1993 in Washington of a Trilateral US-Jordan-Israel Economic Committee to discuss economic co-operation and development; the signing of the Washington Declaration in July 1994, that put an end to the state of belligerence between the two countries, and the signing near Aqaba, in October 1994, of the Peace Treaty that established full diplomatic relations and defined international borders between the State of Israel and Jordan.

In this phase a predominant role was once again played by the United States, with the President of the US acting as witness – and in effect as guarantor – of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, the Treaty of Peace between Israel and Jordan, and the Oslo II accord. The European Union’s involvement in the negotiations was still minimal, and only on occasion of the signing of the Oslo II agreement was the EU invited to participate as witness.

The European Union, however, began taking on an increasingly important role in funding the peace process, in particular through an extraordinary flow of financial support for the Palestinian Authority. In October 1993, after the signing of the DOP, a Donors’ Conference was convened in Washington, at which the international community pledged 2.4 billion dollars to a plan to put the Palestinian economy on its way to development in five years (1994-1998). The European Union, on its part, inaugurated a special programme, committing to donate 700 million ECU’s in support of the Palestinian economy by the end of 1997. The Washington Conference also created an ad hoc Liaison Committee to co-ordinate economic assistance to the Palestinians, of which the EU became a member. At the signing of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, the Vice President of the European Commission, Manuel Marin, informed Mr. Arafat that the Commission would in future donate 10 million ECU’s for the

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35 Regulation (EC) No. 1734/94
36 the Committee comprised the USA, the EU, Canada, Japan, Russia, Norway and Saudi Arabia. Associate Members were Israel, Egypt, Jordan and the PLO. The Committee was to convene under World Bank auspices.
funding of a Palestinian police force. The underlying logic of this huge volume of 
external economic assistance was the assumption that Palestinian economic 
development was Israel's best long-term security guarantee, and a necessary 
precondition for maintaining the peace process on track.

Besides its economic support to the Palestinians, the EU progressively reassessed its 
Mediterranean policy with the objective of developing “an overall concept on relations 
with the region as a whole, encompassing security, economic development and social 
justice aspects”37. After the end of the Cold War, and with the intensification of the 
EU’s relations with the East, the southern Member States increasingly requested a re­ 
balancing of the EU’s commitments towards Central and Eastern European countries 
and the South, as well as a revaluation of the Mediterranean region as a foreign policy 
priority. The Mediterranean lobby within the Community became a “vociferous 
advocate of a new approach”38, and their pressures eventually led to the organisation of 
a conference in Barcelona to discuss ways of promoting a regional dialogue and co­ 
operation, with the aim of reducing economic, social and demographic imbalances 
existing between the two shores of the Mediterranean.

As Sven Behrendt has pointed out, the EU’s long term strategic approach to the 
Mediterranean region was focused on four objectives39:

1. to promote democratisation, as - in the European experience - democratic 
structures have proven to be efficient instruments of conflict resolution within 
states, and also effective in diminishing the risk of conflicts erupting between 
states;

2. to promote economic development and integration, an objective based on the 
assumption that free-market economies and liberalised international trade 
relations improve overall standards of living;

3. to contribute to the construction of a framework of effective regional 
institutions, that could provide mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of 
conflicts;

37 Agence Europe, 19 January 1991, p.3
38 Gomez, R., ‘The EU’s Mediterranean Policy: Common Foreign Policy by the back door?’ in Peterson 
J. and Sjursen H. (eds.), A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? Competing visions of the CFSP, 
39 see Behrendt, S. and Hanelt, C.H., Bound to Cooperate – Europe and the Middle East, Bertelsmann 
4. to favour a broader cultural dialogue underpinning all levels of political, economic and social interaction, in order to promote a Mediterranean identity on which more stable cross-regional relations could be based.

The Barcelona Conference took place in November 1995. It approved the Barcelona Declaration, which endorsed the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) between the 15 EU Member States and 12 Mediterranean Partners: Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey and the Palestinian Authority. The United States were completely excluded from the EMP, especially as a result of France’s desire to keep this process as an exclusively “European” initiative, free from American interference.

To use the words of Commission Vice President Manuel Marin, "[...] The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership provided for the first time a clear geopolitical and economic scenario for a priority region in the Union’s foreign policy, and it designed a far-reaching double structure at both the multilateral and bilateral level [...]"\(^{40}\). The EMP had three main declared objectives or pillars: to establish a common Euro-Mediterranean area of peace and stability, to create an area of shared prosperity through the establishment of a free trade area, and to promote understanding between cultures and rapprochement of the peoples in the Euro-Mediterranean region\(^{41}\).

This initiative, that took the name of Barcelona Process (BP), was meant from the beginning to be independent from, but parallel, to the Middle East peace process: the peace process would achieve the political breakthrough; the Barcelona Process would set up the real conditions for long-term stability and economic development\(^{42}\). It would also offer a forum for the parties involved in the peace process to meet in a different context from that of the difficult and controversial negotiations on political and security issues. However, the EU has achieved this objective only to a limited extent: in effect, it soon became apparent that the formal separation between the Partnership and the peace process could not serve to prevent the *de facto* linkages emerging between the


processes, and that any progress in the field of Mediterranean regional co-operation was continuously hampered by the difficulties encountered by the peace process. In other words, the EU's aspiration to be able to keep the process of economic co-operation and development isolated from the spill-over of the political consequences of the stalemate in the peace process proved to be an illusion.

And indeed the atmosphere of hope generated by the progress achieved in the Arab-Israeli peace process through the Oslo accords was soon to come to an end, as the unprecedented progress in the peace process generated increasing violent resistance from extremist political forces on both sides. In October 1994 a terrorist attack in Tel Aviv marked the start of a bombing campaign by Hamas and the Islamic Jihad against Israel, and on 4 November 1995 Prime Minister Rabin was assassinated by an Israeli right wing extremist. The peace process did not die but certainly suffered formidable blows, and the attempts of the EU to keep the BP separated from the peace process became untenable: peace process matters became the uninvited guest at every EMP meeting, to the point of bringing it to a paralysis with the progressive failure of the Oslo accords. The deadlock in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations effectively made any constructive discussion about the establishment of a common Euro-Mediterranean area of peace and stability impossible, as the resolution of the conflict became the precondition for any concession or effort geared towards reform.

A few additional considerations are worth adding: the Euro Mediterranean Partnership attempts to address the Mediterranean as a single region in terms of economics and security, an approach which reflects the European view of the Mediterranean as a coherent geo-strategic region. However, the Maghreb (North Africa) and the Mashreq (the Middle East) pose different challenges for Europe. For North Africa, the major issues are primarily in the spheres of economic development and civil society, while in the Middle East, politics and the Arab-Israeli peace process are priorities for the parties involved and for Europe. A number of commentators have argued that the attempt to

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43 Spencer, C. 'The EU and Common Strategies: The revealing case of the Mediterranean', in European Foreign Affairs Review, 6, 2001
deal with both issues in the same framework has not been successful and is doomed to failure 46.

3.4: From the Special Envoy to the High Representative for CFSP.
The Member States Try to Enhance the EU's Role in the Peace Process. 1996-1999

During Benjamin Netanyahu's period in office (May 1996- May 1999) the peace process slowed down significantly, almost coming to a complete standstill. The new Israeli Prime Minister was the first Likud leader to accept the "land for peace" idea, but beyond this formal acceptance of the principle on which the Oslo process was based, he did all he could to delay further Israeli redeployments and to hinder the process towards a definitive peace settlement between Israel and the Palestinians 47.

However, some steps forward were made, the most relevant being the first Palestinian elections in 1996 for the appointment of the President of the Palestinian National Authority and of the Legislative Council; the signing in January 1997 of the Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron, which provided for the partial redeployment of Israeli troops from the city and a timetable for future redeployments in the West Bank; and the signing in October 1998 of the Wye River Memorandum, which consisted of steps aimed at facilitating implementation of the Interim Agreement of September 1995 (Oslo II) and a second Israeli redeployment in the West Bank. The Palestinians, on the other hand, were to implement a security plan and to abrogate the articles of the Palestinian National Charter that called for the destruction of Israel. A long deadlock in the peace process followed the signing of the Wye River Memorandum, and the next relevant step took place only after Netanyahu's defeat and the election of Ehud Barak as Prime Minister of Israel in May 1999: in September 1999 the PLO and Israel signed a Memorandum in Sharm-El-Sheikh which set out to resolve the outstanding issues of the interim status.

In this phase of the peace process the Member States tried to enhance EU role in the Middle East, and European policy became markedly more active in nature and geared to directly influencing events through initiatives at times independent and at times co-ordinated with the Americans.

In January 1996 the EU gave a major political and financial contribution to the preparation, monitoring and coordination of the international observation of the Palestinian elections. The legal basis for the European Union’s political and financial involvement in these activities were two joint actions under the CFSP approved by the Council of the European Union, which provided for a total funding of Ecu 17m48.

In April 1996, Israel bombarded Lebanon extensively in retaliation for attacks by Hezbollah on Northern Israel (the operation is know as “Operation Grapes of Wrath”).

The crisis in Lebanon fully put in evidence the enduring difficulties that Europe was encountering in expressing a common policy: indeed, the first Member State to react was France, and not through the mechanisms of the CFSP, or even after consulting the other Member States, but with a completely autonomous initiative, much to the annoyance of the other 14 EU members. French Foreign Minister de Charette shuttled between Jerusalem, Beirut and Damascus to help broker a deal, and when an agreement between the parties was reached France became co-chair - with the United States - of the committee to monitor the cease-fire. France’s unilateral diplomatic action and its decision to proceed without consultation or coordination at EU level caused some irritation among its European partners, but a trip in the region by the EU’s troika, headed by Italian Foreign Minister Susanna Agnelli, rather than improving the role of the EU, seemed to make “a mockery of European pretensions to speak with one voice”49.

In October, France’s President Chirac toured the region visiting Israel, the Palestinian Territories, Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon; during one of his speech he suggested that the European Union should stand alongside the United States and Russia as co-sponsor of the peace process, and that the increased involvement of France and the EU would help restore confidence in the process50. His trip was as much welcomed by the

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48 Joint Actions 95/205/CFSP and 95/403/CFSP
Arabs as it was received coldly by both Israel and the United States. However, as Joel Peters has underlined, France's initiatives in this phase did achieve one objective on the European political integration front: they "led to increased diplomatic activism in the region by the European Union as a whole and spurred a broader and much overdue debate about Europe's potential role in the peace process".

One of the immediate results of this renewed European effort to play a more relevant role in the peace process was the appointment of Miguel Angel Moratinos, former Spanish Ambassador to Israel, as EU Special Envoy to the Middle East, his objective being to improve coordination of the Member State policies to reduce the inconsistencies of EU policy deriving from the system of the rotating Presidency, but also to offer the EU's external interlocutors a counterpart in "flesh and blood" rather than a vague set of principles, common declarations and contradictory initiatives.

It was also as a result of Moratinos' negotiations with the parties that the EU sent, within the context of the Hebron Protocol signing, and on official request of the United States, a collateral letter of assurances to the Palestinians in addition to the one already sent by the US to both Palestinians and Israelis. In its message, the European Union encouraged the Palestinians to reach a compromise on the deadline for Israeli withdrawal from the rural areas of the West Bank; although the letter was written in collaboration with the United States, the Palestinians appreciated the EU's additional vow to "use all its political and moral weight to ensure that all the provisions in the agreements already reached will be fully implemented".

In April 1997, the Council adopted a Joint Action under the CFSP, which regulated the establishment of a European Union assistance programme to support the Palestinian Authority in its efforts to counter terrorist activities emanating from the territories under its control, and thus fulfil Israeli security requirements.

In December 1998 the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians reached a deadlock after Netanyahu's government decided to suspend the implementation of the Wye River Memorandum, in response to what Israel viewed as insufficient Palestinian

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51 Hollis, R., 'Europe and the Middle East: Power by stealth?' in *International Affairs*, vol 73, no.1, 1997
52 Peters, J., *op. cit.*, p. 310
53 Joint Action no. 96/676/CFSP. 25 November 1996. See [http://ue.eu.int/pesc/envoye/cv/moratinos/moratinos.htm](http://ue.eu.int/pesc/envoye/cv/moratinos/moratinos.htm) (Official EU CFSP website dedicated to Mr Moratinos and his activities)
54 The term of the mandate of the Special Envoy and the limits to his action will be discussed more in detail in Chapter Five
56 97/289/CFSP
commitment to end terrorism and incitement to violence. A very tense situation arose from this decision: in Israel a vote of no confidence led to parliamentary and prime ministerial election being called for in May 1999; as for the peace process, Arafat threatened to proclaim a Palestinian State unilaterally on 4 May 1999 in accordance with his past declarations. Both the United States and the European Union made every possible effort to avoid this unilateral declaration of independence which, in their view, would worsen the situation between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.

In March 1999, with the Berlin Declaration, the European Union reaffirmed its support of the Palestinian right to self-determination, “including the option of a state”, basically offering - in exchange for Palestinian renunciation of the unilateral declaration of independence - the assurance that the European Union would in the future recognise a Palestinian State, on condition that it be established through negotiations with Israel. It was however underlined in the Declaration, that the Palestinian right to a state “was not subject to any veto”. In April, the PLO Central Council decided to postpone the declaration of Palestinian statehood.

In June 1999, in a further effort to co-ordinate and improve the effectiveness of the European Union’s foreign policy, the European Council decided to appoint Mr Javier Solana (former Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs and current NATO Secretary General: a figure of great international standing) as Secretary General of the Council and High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The appointment of Mr Solana was the implementation of a decision taken in 1997 and officially provided for in the Amsterdam Treaty: Article 26 of the Treaty stated that the Secretary General of the Council would add to his responsibilities the new function of High Representative for the CFSP. In a declaration annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam, the setting up of a Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit in the General Secretariat of the Council under the authority of the High Representative for the CFSP was agreed upon, comprising specialists drawn from the General Secretariat, the Member States, the Commission and the Western European Union (WEU). The hope

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57 Mr Arafat had on several occasions declared that he would proclaim a Palestinian State at the end of the interim period, (i.e. five years after the Oslo Agreement) if no progress had been made.
58 Conclusions of the European Council in Berlin, 24-25 March 1999
59 “[...] The European Union declares its readiness to consider the recognition of A Palestinian State in due course in accordance with the basic principles referred to above [...]”, ibid.
60 The Berlin Declaration and the full political and legal implications of its content will be discussed in depth in Chapter Five
62 Declaration to the Final Act on the establishment of a Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit. Treaty of Amsterdam

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was that joint analysis of international issues and their impact, and pooling of information, would help the Union to produce effective reactions to international developments. Since his appointment, Mr. Solana and the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit have been closely involved in the peace process. After the initial inevitable adjustments to co-ordinate the initiatives and to avoid the overlapping of competencies, Mr. Solana and the Special Envoy Mr. Moratinos have started a fruitful co-operation trying to improve EU’s role in the negotiations and to convince the other players – and in particular Israel – that the EU can be a reliable mediator and can contribute to broker a deal between Israel and the Arabs.

3.5: From the Common Strategy for the Mediterranean Region to the Madrid Quartet. The EU Strategy for the Middle East in the Bush era. 2000-2002

The election of Ehud Barak as Prime Minister of Israel gave new impetus to the peace process. Mr. Barak had been elected on the basis of a program that promised progress in the negotiations with the Palestinians and a unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon on the basis of United Nations Security Council Resolution 425; but if the withdrawal from Lebanon was indeed completed by June 2000, real advancements in the negotiations with the Palestinians, after the initial optimism, were harder to come by. Shortly after Barak’s election, the already mentioned Sharm-El-Sheikh Memorandum was signed with the Palestinians to resolve the outstanding issues of the interim status. Barak and Arafat set February 2000 as the target date for preparing a framework agreement for a permanent peace settlement, which was to be completed by September 2000. In July 2000 a summit took place in Camp David, involving Arafat, Barak and US President Clinton. During the talks a number of crucial questions were discussed, including highly controversial issues such as the status of Jerusalem and the right of return of Palestinian refugees, but none of them were resolved.

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63 The tasks of the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit include: a) monitoring and analysing developments in areas relevant to the CFSP; b) providing assessments of the Union's foreign and security policy interests and identifying areas on which the CFSP could focus in future; c) providing timely assessments and early warning of events, potential political crises and situations that might have significant repercussions on the CFSP; d) producing, at the request of either the Council or the Presidency, or on its own initiative, reasoned policy option papers for the Council.
64 Author’s interview with Pascal Charlat, Head of the Middle East Task Force, Policy Planning Unit, Council Secretariat. May 2002
65 see Reich, B., op. cit., p. 246
After the failure of the Camp David summit the situation deteriorated rapidly. On September the Second Intifada - also called Al-Aqsa Intifada - started, and a vicious cycle of Palestinian violence and Israeli retaliation began. In a last attempt to bring peace to the region before the end of his mandate, President Clinton convened a peace summit in October 2000 in Sharm-el-Sheikh, where he met with representatives of Israel, the PNA, Egypt, Jordan, the UN and the EU. At the summit the decision was taken to appoint a Fact Finding Commission with the task of proposing recommendations to end the violence, rebuild confidence and resume the negotiations. The Commission was to be chaired by former US Senator George Mitchell and included EU CFSP High Representative Javier Solana, Turkish President Suleyman Demirel, the Norwegian foreign minister Thorjorn Jagland, and Former US Senator Warren B. Rudman.

The Sharm-el-Sheikh (or Mitchell) Committee presented its report in April 2001 to the new President of the United States, George W. Bush, but the new administration (at least until September 11) was showing relatively little interest in the Middle East and was deliberately disengaging from the previous administration's detailed involvement as main mediator between the Arabs and Israel.

In June 2001, after having vetoed a UN Security Council resolution to establish a UN observer mission, Bush dispatched CIA Director George Tenet to the Occupied Territories to negotiate a cease fire plan. Hamas and the Islamic Jihad, however, rejected the plan, arguing that it failed to address the root of violence.

The terrorist attacks of September 11 forced a change in American policy. In order to secure the “coalition against terrorism” the US had once again to concentrate on the Arab-Israeli peace process: Bush declared his support for a Palestinian State, and in November 2001 retired Marine Corps General Anthony Zinni was appointed as senior adviser to work towards a cease-fire and to implement the Tenet plan and the Mitchell Committee Report. His mission, however, failed like the previous ones, as violence continued to escalate.

In April 2002 Colin Powell, US Secretary of State, met in Madrid with the representatives of the European Union, the United Nations, and Russia. The so-called "Madrid Quartet" emerged with a common agenda partly based on the 1991 Madrid

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66 see Sharm-el-Sheikh Fact Finding Committee (also known as Mitchell Committee), Summary of Recommendations. Available at http://usembassy-israel.org.il/publish/peace/archives/2001/may/mitchell.html

Peace Conference’s agenda: a peace settlement based on an equitable resolution to the conflict, security for Israel and the Palestinians, and a major effort to address the looming humanitarian crisis within the Palestinian community. The focus of this approach was on pursuing a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, with the active engagement of outside actors\(^68\).

In a Communiqué issued in New York in September 2002, the Quartet announced that it was working with the parties and consulting key regional actors on a three-phase implementation “roadmap” that could achieve a final settlement within three years\(^69\).

To use the word of Allen and Smith, “2000 was not a good year for the EU in the Middle East, despite the fact that a number of Arab states expressed a preference for much stronger EU involvement in the peace process\(^70\), the main reason being the deadlock in the negotiations after Camp David.

In June 2000 the European Union approved the new Common Strategy\(^71\) on the Mediterranean Region. The document, drafted before the failure of the Camp David talks, when hopes were still high that a settlement would be reached, foresaw a possible contribution of the Member States to the implementation of a final and comprehensive peace agreement between the Israeli and the Palestinians\(^72\): in paragraph 15 it declared: “The EU will, in the context of a comprehensive settlement, and upon request by the core parties, give consideration to the participation of Member States in the implementation of security arrangements on the ground\(^73\). The breakdown of the peace process, however, rendered the EU’s commitment useless, as the possibility of a “comprehensive settlement” became more remote.

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\(^71\) The Treaty of Amsterdam introduced the Common Strategy as an additional foreign policy instrument. The Common Strategy can be defined as a framework that defines what the main EU interests in a region are, and by what general means they might be pursued. See Calleya, S. in "**The Common Strategy of the European Union in the Mediterranean Region**", Select Committee on European Union (Sub-Committee C), Ninth Report, House of Lords Reports, London, 2001

\(^72\) see Musu, C., in "**The Common Strategy of the European Union in the Mediterranean Region**", Select Committee on European Union (Sub-Committee C), Ninth Report, House of Lords Reports, London, January 2001

The failure of the Camp David talks also influenced the Barcelona Process negatively: Lebanon and Syria refused to attend the fourth Euro-Mediterranean conference of foreign ministers in Marseilles in September 2000, and the EU had to drop any attempt to sign a Charter of Peace and Stability for the Mediterranean as the Arab participants were not prepared to discuss the issue and no agreement was possible. Once again, economic co-operation could not prove conducive to a political settlement.

In 2001 tensions arose between the EU and Israel as the Israeli army, in retaliation for Palestinian terrorist attacks, proceeded to systematic destruction of Palestinian infrastructures, most of which had been paid for by the EU, and due to the fact that Israel continued to export to the EU goods manufactured in the Territories (the so-called problem of the “rules of origin”). When Israel halted the payments of tax revenues to the Palestinian Authority, the EU approved a series of replacement loans and, in response to the “rules of origin” problem, it threatened to withdraw the preferential tariffs that Israel enjoys. The threat, however, remained such, and in general the EU’s action did not show great incisiveness. Arguably, the failure of the Camp David talks and the collapse of the peace process left the EU unable to react in a co-ordinated and effective fashion: notwithstanding High Representative Solana’s participation in the October 2000 Sharm-el-Sheikh Peace Summit, the Mitchell Committee and the uninterrupted behind-the-scenes diplomatic activity of both the High Representative and the Special Envoy Moratinos, the EU’s contribution to ending the violence in the area has not been particularly effective. In 2002, after a number of clashes among Member States, who were unable to agree on a common strategy for the peace process, and after a failed diplomatic mission during which the CFSP High Representative and the Spanish Presidency were not allowed by Israel to meet Arafat in Ramallah, the EU finally decided to renounce launching an independent peace plan and to back the US peace initiative that led to the creation of the Madrid Quartet. The EU Member States

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74 see Behrendt, S., op. cit., p. 21
75 Interestingly, the official Commission Website offers now an explanation of EU policy in this respect: in the section “The EU & the Middle East: Position & Background” it states that: “The EU’s policy is based on partnership and cooperation, and not exclusion. It is the EU’s view that maintaining relations with Israel is an important contribution to the Middle East peace process and that suspending the Association Agreement, which is the basis for EU-Israeli trade relations but also the basis for the EU-Israel political dialogue, would not make the Israeli authorities more responsive to EU concerns at this time. It is also a well-known fact that economic sanctions achieve rather little in this respect. Keeping the lines of communication open and trying to convince our interlocutors is hopefully the better way forward.” See http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/mepp/faq/index.htm#6
hoped that participation in the Madrid Quartet would gain the EU more visibility and influence in the peace process, and would provide Europe with a tool for influencing American policies as they are formulated\textsuperscript{77}.

\textsuperscript{77} The Madrid Quartet an the dynamics of EU-US relations in the Middle East will be analysed in more details in Chapter Six.
Chapter Four

European Middle East Policy: 
A Collective Policy or a Policy of ‘Converging Parallels’?

4.1: Introduction

European Foreign Policy and the Middle East:
The Paradox of “Converging Parallels”?

Much has been written and said about the process of political integration that has taken place among the Member States of the European Union in the course of the last few decades, and particularly in the last 11 years\(^1\). Undeniably, this process has experienced - since its first timid inception in the 1970’s with the introduction of European Political Cooperation (EPC) - a strong qualitative leap that has led Europe to add a defence dimension to its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and to set itself the headline goal of forming a Rapid Reaction Force of 60,000 men\(^2\).

But there are two sides to the story: one is that told by the creation of an ever closer union\(^3\), of the progressive, incremental construction of the edifice of Common Foreign and Security Policy\(^4\), of the stratification of the instruments at its disposal\(^5\), of the overcoming of old taboos with the introduction of the military dimension\(^6\).

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\(^{1}\) The use of the expression “Greater Middle East” in this context refers to a region that embraces the Maghreb, the Mashreq and the Persian Gulf.


The other, however, draws a different picture: that of the persistence of the primacy of national foreign policies, of the difficulty for Member States to overcome differences and harmonise interests, of their continuous struggle to keep foreign policy at a European level within the limits of national control.

As Regelsberger and Wessels argue, the difficulty lies in the “DDS” (discrete, discretionary, sovereignty) syndrome, in the sense that coordination of foreign policy and security immediately, and most visibly, raises the issue of national sovereignty.

In Paul Taylor’s words, “while there are discernible external ‘products’ of the EU, they do not arise from a unified policymaking process (which would be expected from a state), but via a form of loose intergovernmentalism; the European Union, he argues, is a unique arrangement between states which does not - and should not - question national sovereignty.

European policy towards the Middle East, and in particular towards the Arab-Israeli conflict and peace process, constitutes an ideal case study for the problem of political integration in the EU: in fact, as it has been evidenced in the previous chapters, the Middle East has been one of the most widely debated issues among Member States in the past thirty years, and was one of the items discussed at the first EPC meeting in 1970.

European countries are directly and indirectly involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict because of their geographical proximity to the region, their dependence on Middle Eastern oil, their fears of an insecurity spillover, but also because of the special relationship that many Member States have with the region as a consequence of their

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9 Taylor, P., ‘The European Communities as an Actor in International Society’, Journal of European Integration, 6 (1), 1982
past as colonial powers and because of historical memories from the complex patterns of persecution of European Jews, and of occupation and collaboration during the Second World War.

The study of European Middle East policy offers the opportunity to test the ability of Member States to harmonise their distinct foreign policies, to identify common interests and to proceed along the road of further integration and towards the elaboration of a common European foreign policy.

The main objective of this chapter is to conduct an analysis of two opposite trends that are clearly identifiable in the process of European political integration and, especially, in European foreign policy: a) the convergence of the Member States' policies and b) the concurrent persistence of profound differences between national policies.

The central question the chapter attempts to answer is the following: Has convergence between the EU Member States reached such an advanced qualitative level so as to allow the formulation of a truly collective policy towards the Middle East, or is the EU's simply a policy of "converging parallels"?

To anyone familiar with the Euclidean system of geometry, the idea of "converging parallels" will immediately come across as a geometrical impossibility. The uninitiated to the rules of Euclidean geometry, with the help of a dictionary, will find out that the word "parallel" designates "two or more straight lines that do not intersect [...] being an equal distance apart everywhere". Parallel lines - the dictionary explains - have the same tendency or direction but never converge.

Conversely, further research will determine that the meaning of the word "converging" is "to tend toward an intersecting point or a common conclusion or result".

It appears then that converging parallels cannot, indeed, exist; but in effect what seems to be a paradox in the world of geometry, actually appears to be a reality in the world of

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13 the latter an important contextual factor in both German and Dutch Middle East policy

14 in a speech to the Italian Parliament in July 1960, Christian Democrat Aldo Moro spoke of what he called "parallel convergences", referring to the parallel abstention of a left and a right Party (i.e. the Socialist Party and the Monarchic Party) which had allowed the formation of a new centrist government in Italy under the leadership of Mr Fanfani. Italian Parliamentary Acts, Stenographical Reports, 20-26 July 1960


16 WorldNet 1.6, Princeton University, 1997

European foreign policy, and even more so in the policy towards the Middle East: for over thirty years the Member States of the EC and then of the EU have debated the Middle East, have issued declarations of all sorts, but have also engaged in more practical initiatives, geared to financing the Palestinian Authority, arguably not very successfully or very effectively. It is ultimately possible to identify a “European approach”, broadly speaking, to the Middle East conflict – an approach which is, in appearance if not in substance, different from that of the United States; and that, after having been clearly set out with the Venice Declaration of 1980, in many respects has not been appreciably modified since.

But behind the façade of this common approach there lies the enduring reality of distinctly different national approaches to the issue, conflicting priorities and diverse and sometimes diverging interests.

It is the dynamics of the relation between national foreign policies and foreign policy at the EU level towards the Middle East conflict that this chapter attempts to analyse, with the objective of establishing what has encouraged convergence and to what extent a collective policy has been achieved, and what, on the other hand, has kept national policies “parallel” and therefore separate and clearly distinct from each other.

4.2: Some Reflections on the Concept of Convergence

Before analysing the specific problem of EU Middle East policy, it is worth considering the issue of convergence itself.

As Helen Wallace has pointed out, “much of the literature about EU policy integration and much of the discourse of practitioners, and indeed the formal EU texts, talk about

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21 Part of this chapter has been published as an article on the European Foreign Affairs Review: Musu, C., ‘European Foreign policy: A Collective Policy or a Policy of “Converging Parallels”?’ EFAR, Vol. 8, issue 1, Spring 2003, Kluwer Law International
policy convergence as either a prerequisite for agreement or a desired outcome of agreement\textsuperscript{22}.

On the economic front the EU set out in the EC Treaty four "convergence criteria" - price stability, government finances, exchange rates and long term exchange rates - that reflect the degree of economic convergence that Member States had to achieve\textsuperscript{23}: each Member State was called to satisfy all four criteria in order to be become part of the euro area\textsuperscript{24}.

However, in the intergovernmental framework within which the EU’s CFSP is elaborated, Member States have hitherto displayed no desire whatsoever to set out binding foreign policy convergence criteria that might limit their freedom of action\textsuperscript{25}. Acknowledging the fact that nevertheless coordination and convergence - albeit in an informal, incremental and not codified fashion - does take place in the sphere of foreign policy\textsuperscript{26}, it remains to be seen what factors can encourage or impede them.

A first set of factors are what could be referred to as the "exogenous variables", that include:

- Pressure for collective or at least co-ordinated EU action coming from the international arena as a consequence of external expectations linked to the EU’s perceived role as global actor\textsuperscript{27}. The increasing presence of the EU as a relevant actor on the international scene\textsuperscript{28} and its undeniable relevance in economic terms cannot but raise expectations with regards to a potentially significant influence of the Union on the course of events\textsuperscript{29}.

- Pressure exerted on the EU by external interlocutors who are also actors involved in the issues at stake (e.g., in the case of Middle East policy the Arab

\textsuperscript{23} see the SCADPlus database at http://europa.eu.int/scadplus
\textsuperscript{24} see Taylor, P., The European Union in the 1990s, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 107-108
\textsuperscript{25} Nuttall, S., European Foreign Policy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000
\textsuperscript{27} Ginsberg, R.H., The European Union in International Politics. Baptism by Fire, Boulder, CO, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2001
\textsuperscript{29} see Hill, C., 'The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualising Europe’s Foreign Policy', Journal of Common Market Studies, 31, 3, September 1993 and Hill, C., 'Closing the Capabilities – Expectations
states, the United States, the Palestinian Authority). It must be noted, however, that pressure from the actors involved may be of very diverse, if not openly contradictory, nature: pressure for increased EU involvement and action, countered by pressure for the EU to remain uninvolved.

The second set of factors are what could be called the "endogenous variables", that include:

- The similarity/dissimilarity of what Member States come to define as their interests, which inform national political agendas and priorities.

- The existence of common institutions at the EU level which are responsible for the implementation of certain aspects of a given policy, decided upon in the intergovernmental framework, and which in turn also shape the policy itself.

- The progressive harmonisation of the political discourse through the practice of continuous political discussion and bargaining within the various working groups and committees and the constant contacts between diplomatic services, that have worked together for a number of years.

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- The development of a common political vision, a fairly similar approach to a given geographical region, the tendency to privilege a certain diplomatic style that distinguish the EU from other international actors

But if these are the factors that may aid convergence in the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy, nevertheless two crucial points should not be overlooked: one is the fact that collective action might be triggered not by a true convergence, but rather by congruence. As Helen Wallace has put it, congruence can be defined as "the compatibility of the policy actors' preferences as the basis for establishing a shared policy regime. Different policy actors may have different preferences, but none the less choose the same collective action. Congruent preferences imply conditional commitments to collective regimes. Convergence of preferences may produce longer term stability of policy regimes".

Andrew Moravcsik, on his part, argues that "nearly all interesting agreements are cases of congruence and this does not in any way imply they are unstable or temporary. Most enduring agreements in social life - from the basic social contract to the WTO - are exchanges (political, economic or cultural) where, by definition, each party gets different things, and there is no reason to believe these are any more likely to change than congruent agreements, indeed probably less.

In analysing convergence in EU Middle East policy, we shall endeavour to identify the cases in which real convergence was achieved, and those in which a collective action was undertaken exclusively on the basis of different but congruent preferences. The other crucial point that should not be disregarded is that the lack of involvement of the national parliaments and national publics in CFSP has prevented any broader convergence of assumptions within the domestic debate in different European countries. If a convergence of policy has taken place, this might lead to a widening gap between domestic debates and the evolution of policy within government.

35 Wallace H., op. cit., pg 58
36 Author's private communication with A. Moravcsik
On the other hand it is quite true that even at the national level domestic publics rarely play an important role in foreign policy formulation. This was the case in Western Europe at least until the end of the Cold War, when a change occurred: since then "domestic forces have come to take a much greater interest and play a much greater role in the external activities of governments. […] The more that domestic forces shape foreign policy then the more national idiosyncrasies and interests will be highlighted, often in a way which challenges consensus at the European level".

As for the specific foreign policy issue on which this thesis focuses, i.e. the policy towards the Middle East and in particular towards the Arab-Israeli conflict, it is probably possible to identify a convergence of assumptions within the domestic debate in different European countries, which makes the gap between this debate, the policy choices of Member State governments, and EU policy, appear less dramatic. In fact, without indulging in senseless generalisations, it can be said that most of the founding principles of the overall EU Middle East policy - which will be discussed further in the chapter - are by and large shared by public opinions (if there is such a thing as a discernible opinion of the public - but it is not within the scope of this study to enter this debate) and supported by national parliaments.

In the next section an analysis of the above mentioned endogenous and exogenous variables and of their interaction will be conducted, in order to establish if, and to what extent, their combined pressure have brought about a true convergence in the European Member States’ policies towards the Middle East.

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37 Skidmore D. and Hudson V. (eds), The Limits of State Autonomy: Societal Groups and Foreign Policy Formulation, Boulder and Oxford, Westview Press, 1993
39 it is of course difficult to generalise and national specificities - such as German public opinion’s sensitivity about Germany’s relations with Israel - should not be forgotten. See Manners, I. and Whitman, R. (eds.), The Foreign Policies of European Union Member States, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2000
4.3: Elements of Convergence in EU’s Middle East Policy

4.3.1: Exogenous Variables: External Pressures

The EU policy towards the Middle East is subject to pressures of very different kinds:

- There is first of all the “general” international pressure deriving from the growing role of the EU as a global actor and consequently from expectations for an effective EU role in an area of high political instability. This pressure, in turn, generates internal EU expectations in relation to the CFSP and a demand for greater activity and decisiveness in foreign policy. As Christopher Hill put it, “the need to deal with powerful or problematic countries such as the United States or Israel has to some extent already imposed discipline and caution on the European group”. Member States have also been subjected to pressures for increased European involvement in the peace process by the international community through the United Nations: as Sir Malcom Rifkind has argued if, on a political level, the UN General Secretary wants to work with the US, the EU’s involvement is nonetheless very positively perceived, both from an economic point of view, and due to the prospect that the EU might contribute to mitigate the United States’ unilateral approach. Europe has supported the idea of the United Nations as the proper forum to discuss the peace process in a multilateral framework from the beginning, a position in line with the EU’s political culture of multilateralism and its inclination to support multilateral rules and institutions.

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41 Bretherton, C. and Vogler, J., The European Union as a Global Actor, Routledge, 1999
42 Hill, C., ‘Closing the Capabilities - Expectations Gap?’, in Peterson, J. and Sjursen, H. (eds.), op. cit., pg. 29
43 see Hill, C., Convergence, divergence and dialectics: national foreign policies and the CFSP, Florence, European University Institute, 1997, p. 38
44 Author’s interview with Sir Malcolm Rifkind (Former British Minister of Defence and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs)
45 as Ruggie put it, “multilateralism is more than simply counting the number of participants in international organisations or international negotiations, it is about the rules and the norms of behaviour by which states constitute their relations and through which they interact”; see Ruggie, J.G., Multilateralism Matters: the theory and praxis of an institutional form, New York, Columbia University Press, 1993. For a discussion on the meaning of multilateralism see also Caporaso, J., ‘International Relations Theory and Multilateralism: the search for foundations’, in International Organisation, 46-3, 1992. Caporaso distinguishes the meaning of multilateralism by suggesting that it entails three properties: a) indivisibility: the scope (both geographical and functional) over which costs and benefits are spread, given an action initiated in or among component units; b) generalised principles of conduct: norms exhorting general if not universal modes of relating to other states, rather than differentiating relations.
Secondly, there is the specific pressure coming from some of the main actors involved in the Arab-Israeli dispute, namely the Arab states\textsuperscript{47}. Since the early days of EPC, Arab states have tried to involve Europe in the peace process hoping that EC/EU policy could counterbalance American policy, which they saw as being biased in favour of Israel\textsuperscript{48}. Following the 1973 oil crisis this pressure was exercised mainly using the card of European dependence on Middle East oil, and at first resulted not only in a shift of the EC towards a more pro-Arab stance, but also in strong competition among the Member States themselves to ensure oil supplies\textsuperscript{49}. After 1973 and the Europeans' full realisation of its dependence on oil imports, the EC/EU has undertaken a number of initiatives to institutionalise its relations with the region\textsuperscript{50}: from the Global Mediterranean Policy to the Euro-Arab Dialogue, the EC-Gulf Dialogue, the Barcelona process and the Common Mediterranean Strategy\textsuperscript{51}. The EU has attempted to exclude any reference to the Arab-Israeli conflict from all these initiatives, trying to focus mainly on the economic dimension or on wider issues of regional security, whereas the Arab states have exerted all possible pressure to widen the political significance of the initiatives and to force the EU to assume a more proactive role in the Arab-Israeli peace process\textsuperscript{52}.

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However, if these are pressures for a deeper EU involvement in the peace process, pressures of an exactly opposite nature are exerted on Europe by other actors involved: the United States and Israel:

- the United States, which is and wants to remain the main mediator between the Arabs and the Israelis, opposed any European involvement in the peace process from day one, especially once the strong differences between American and EC/EU positions on the issue became clear. The US have often accused the Europeans of being unable to resist the pressure coming from the Arabs and of seeking to eliminate obstacles to commerce through political accommodation. The EU takes a completely different view on the matter, arguing that commerce may be viewed as a means of gaining political influence, and that trade and cooperation are to underpin peace; nonetheless, it has very often had to give in to American pressures and downscale the contents of its initiatives to avoid excessive damage to transatlantic relations, which after all are immensely more important to the EU than its Middle East policy. In the dilemma of Europe's double dependency - on the Arab countries for energy, investment capital and export markets, and on the United States for protection and diplomatic progress - it is usually transatlantic relations that have priority over other considerations.

- Parallel to the United States' hostility to EU involvement in the peace process comes the Israeli opposition, which took shape as early as 1967, immediately after the Six days War, when for the first time European public opinion - especially from the left - became critical of Israel and shifted its support to the

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54 see 'The Role of the European Union in the Middle East Peace Process and its Future Assistance', Executive Summary of the Communication to the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament made by Manuel Marin, Vice President of the European Commission, European Commission, 26 January 1998
Palestinians. The fracture between Europe and Israel became deeper with the accession to power of the Likud party, which had much stronger ties with the United States than the Labour Party, which had been traditionally much closer to Europe. Perceiving Europe’s position as biased in favour of the Palestinians and influenced by the Arab states and by economic considerations, Israel has opposed EU political involvement in the peace process and made every effort to keep it within the boundaries of economic support to the Palestinian Authority. In Israel’s view the EU should have a secondary role and seek to achieve complementarity of policy initiatives with the United States.

It is plausible to say that, given the opposite nature of the converging - or rather diverging - external pressures hitherto described, which would probably in the end nullify each other, and the natural tendency of the EU to inaction or to very limited and irresolute action in foreign policy, the final result might quite easily have been an absence of initiative on the EU’s part and a lack of motivation in searching for policy coordination in the Middle East, were it not for a number of other endogenous factors that came into play and forced the EU to try to coordinate its policy towards the Middle East.

4.3.2: Endogenous Variables: National Interests

As previously mentioned, European countries are directly implicated in the Arab-Israeli conflict because of their geographic proximity, their dependence on oil and security needs, as well as the historical role played by several of them in the region.

Harmonising the EU’s Member States’ viewpoints on the Arab-Israeli conflict is a task which has always proved difficult. As a brief overview of their approach to the Middle East demonstrates, the specific individual interests of the Member States differ appreciably, and very often policy coordination has been obtained not on the basis of

58 Steinberg, G.M., The European Union and the Middle East Peace Process, Jerusalem Centre for Public Affairs, Jerusalem Letter, 15 November 1999
59 Author's interview with Harry Kney-Tal (Israeli Envoy to the EC and to NATO) and Yehuda Millo (Israeli Ambassador to Italy and the Holy See)
60 In a private communication with the author, Andrew Moravcsik has argued that “we cannot entirely dismiss the "null hypothesis", namely that - absent a tie as close as US-Israel - ultimately European countries just do not care that much, which is why they do little and can afford to indulge parochial national interests”
convergence but rather on the basis of congruence, i.e. of a sufficient compatibility of Member State preferences allowing the elaboration of a common policy.

The analysis conducted in this paragraph will focus on four countries that have been particularly active in trying to influence EU Middle East policy: France, Germany, Great Britain and Italy. The objective is to show how, albeit for totally differing reasons, EU Member States have come to support, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, the idea of a common European policy towards the Middle East.

It is undeniably France that has most often taken the lead in European initiatives in the Middle East. Since the late 1960's, France's policy has been characterised by a markedly pro-Arab stance and its priority has clearly been the promotion of closer relations with Arab states. Many common declarations of the EC and then of the EU bear the clear mark of France's influence and reflect the acceptance of the political line suggested by France, particularly with regard to the Palestinian question. This contributed, Israelis argue, to creating the first deep fractures between Israel and the EU. As Margaret Blunden has put it:

"French governments have promoted the EU's international activity as a vehicle for those initiatives which France alone cannot accomplish, and which are intended to supplement French efforts at a national level. The European presence is particularly useful in those areas of the world where French influence is weak and American hegemony is strong, where memories of France's colonial past still linger, and where the scale of economic aid and investment required is beyond the scope of French bilateral capabilities."

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62 for an analysis of the smaller Member States' Middle East policy see for example Tonra, B., *The Europeanisation of National Foreign Policy: Dutch, Danish and Irish Foreign Policy in the European Union*, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2001 (Chapter 8). Tonra argues that on the Middle East there were no real dissimilarities between the three states: all three were concerned to prevent the larger member states from dominating the policy process. Neither Denmark nor the Netherlands wanted the European Union to challenge the primacy of the United States in the Middle East. The Middle East was not a large issue in the domestic debates in any of three states.


64 see Gervasoni, M., *Storia dei paesi europei nel secolo XX. La Francia*, Milano, Unicopli, 2003


66 Author's interview with Harry Kney-Tal, Israeli Ambassador to the EC, May 2002

France has sought to project a strong European political voice, to complement and amplify its national voice. Nicole Gnesotto has argued that "Europe is to France what the United States is to Britain, the optimum multiplier of national power"\(^{68}\)

On the other hand, as France's former Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine underlined: "the political construction of the Union as an amplifier of French power does not oblige France to abandon sovereignty"\(^{69}\). It may be said that for France, in general terms Europe is about "adding", not "subtracting". And in specific terms it is about asserting independence from the United States.

As for the Middle East, French governments have utilised a multilateral, European approach to promote French interests.

Following the Gulf War, France accelerated the Europeanisation of its foreign policy in the Arab world. It supported and promoted European initiatives in the Mediterranean to counterbalance the shift of the European centre of gravity towards the North East determined by the enlargement process, as well as to compete more effectively with the dominant American position in the region.

However, this has not ruled out simultaneous and complementary invocations of privileged bilateral links with a number of countries in the Mediterranean area. To France, the EU offers effective leverage and a vehicle for reasserting French influence in the region. As Kodmani-Darwish puts it, substantial EU aid to the Palestinian Authority has amplified the by no means insignificant French bilateral protocols\(^{70}\). France's policy of providing financial and diplomatic support to the Palestinians has become European policy, thus placing European means at the service of a French vision of the Arab-Israeli conflict and its solution\(^{71}\).

Parallel to France's desire to protect the interests it deems more relevant for the nation, there is also the desire to develop a different and independent policy from that of the United States: this objective has long been an important priority for France, and has been pursued at times by pushing for greater European assertiveness, while in other occasions, as in the case of Chirac's 1996 trip to the Occupied Territories discussed in Chapter Three, by launching autonomous French initiatives with no prior consultations.

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\(^{71}\) Blunden, M., *op. Cit.*
with the other EU Member States, therefore causing tensions with the European allies and embarrassment to the EU as a whole for its inability to express a coherent policy.

Germany has made a fundamental contribution in steering integration and shaping the EU's rules and agenda priorities, as part of its attempt to shape its regional milieu. However, for obvious historical reasons, Germany's relations with Israel are a highly sensitive issue and German governments have often hesitated to criticise Israeli policy too harshly: to use the words of Lord Weidenfeld, on the issue of Middle East policy Germany is "torn and confused".

As former British Secretary of State Malcolm Rifkind puts it, Germany has clear interests in the Middle East, but it hesitates to exert its diplomatic clout, especially against Israel. For Germany the possibility of shifting national positions under the guise of a search for a common European position has been attractive: taking advantage of the so called "shield effect", it has initiated a rapprochement to the Arab world, claiming this to be an "unavoidable price" to pay for the achievement of a unified European position and solidarity, while at the same time avoiding to upset the domestic public opinion. Given the reconciliation and the special relationship Germany has developed with Israel since the Holocaust, this remarkable reorientation of policy would not have been conceivable outside the framework of EPC/CFSP. Germany has recently been able to capitalise on its good relations with Israel by launching peace initiatives independently or under the aegis of the EU, initiatives which would otherwise have been difficult to realise given the strained relations between Israel and the EU.

The United Kingdom is somehow torn between two different tendencies: on the one hand, given its historical past as colonial power, it has a natural inclination to encourage European initiatives in the peace process and is very reluctant toaccept the secondary

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72 see Bulmer, S., Jeffery, C. and Paterson, W.E., Germany's European Diplomacy: Shaping the Regional Milieu, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2000
73 Author's interview with Lord Weidenfeld of Chelsea, member of the House of Lords and Vice-Chairman of the Europe-Israel Group (September 2003)
74 Author's interview with Sir Malcolm Rifkind, Former British Minister of Defence and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (September 2003)
76 see Aggestam, L., Germany, in Manners, I. and Whitman, R. (eds.), The Foreign Policies of European Union Member States, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000. P. 70
77 the effectiveness of these initiatives is quite dubious, but the intention here is to give an idea of the different approaches of the Member States rather than to comment on their efficacy
role to which the EU is relegated. On the other hand, its close ties with the United States and the high priority given to transatlantic relations prompt the UK to exercise caution in encouraging the development of an independent EU Middle East policy, that so often not only differs from the American policy, but goes openly against it. As Edwards has argued: “there has been an essential duality of purpose in British policy irrespective of the political complexion of the government; this has been to influence the Arabs as far as possible to take a more conciliatory attitude and to influence the Americans to press the Israelis to the same end”.

In an interview with the author, Sir Malcolm Rifkind underlined how the Member States – including Britain – share a genuinely common view of the preferred settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict: security for Israel, creation of a Palestinian state, cessation of the use of terrorism on the part of the Palestinians, and of the expansion of the settlements on the part of the Israelis. However, he argues, the British position differs from that of some other Member States (France in particular) in that it sees increased EU involvement in the political negotiations as a “distraction” in a domain that should be left to the Americans. The EU’s involvement should be limited to those activities that are welcomed by the Arabs, the Israelis and the Americans, first among them the economic support provided to the Palestinian Authority.

Italy supports a strong European involvement in the peace process mainly within the framework of a broader “Mediterranean policy”, which should be one of the top European priorities from the Italian point of view, not to be neglected in favour of a policy more concentrated on the “Northern dimension” and on enlargement problems. Italy’s perception of the risk of being marginalized due to the EU’s eastward enlargement has indeed increased, promoting what Mr De Michelis, former Italian Foreign minister, has defined as “the conscious adoption of a well-defined geopolitical

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81 Former British Minister of Defence and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
perspective qualifying Italy’s actions and initiatives in Europe and in the world, namely, the so-called “Mediterranean dimension” of the European Union. This was to be a complement and balancing element to the Baltic configuration resulting from the decision to expand the Union to 25 members. Europe taking on a Baltic configuration threatened to relegate Italy to a more marginal role, making even Northern Italy a peripheral region and sentencing the Mediterranean to a future of instability, conflict and underdevelopment. On the other hand, explicit affirmation of Europe’s Mediterranean dimension would make the exclusion of Italy from the group of guiding countries unthinkable. Good relations with most Arab States and with the Palestinians remain by and large a constant factor in Italy’s policy, but its relations with Israel have been ambivalent. Italy’s policy towards Israel has spanned from the colder and critical attitude of the Forlani and Andreotti’s governments, to the to the present stance of the Berlusconi’s government, which advocates Israel’s accession to the European Union.

The idea of opening to Israel the possibility of accession to the EU dates back to 1991. In the aftermath of the Gulf War, and on the eve of the Madrid talks, Italy made a proposal at the European Union level by which, once an agreement had been reached by the parties, the EU would have offered Israel the opportunity of taking part in the European integration process. The first step would have been to concede to Israel, as had previously been the case with Austria, Norway, Switzerland and Sweden, the status of country belonging to the so-called European common economic space.

Mr. De Michelis has thus described Italy’s view of Europe’s potential role in the peace process:

“In the past decades, in phases of conflict Israel has been able to count on the Americans for economic and military support. However, when it comes to the peace process, the United States are too distant, and guarantees for Israel can only come from Europe. And this would be the most important aspect of the prospected integration at the European level, on the hand offering European citizens the possibility of holding a European passport and of moving freely within the continent; on the other, of drawing advantage from economic integration, and the opportunities offered by a market of such considerable dimensions as the European. To the Palestinians, on the other hand, Europe should offer economic support in the form of a Marshall Plan of sorts, and a Euro-Mediterranean, Euro-Arab cooperation leading to the creation of advantageous general conditions”

To sum up, all these member states, for deeply different reasons, have encouraged the development of a common European Middle East policy: France in an effort to strengthen the EU’s (and its own) international role vis-à-vis the United States,
Germany in order to develop its relations with the Arab states without harming its relations with Israel, Italy in the context of its continuous insistence on the importance of a Mediterranean dimension for the EU, the UK for historical reasons but also as a way of taking on the role of mediator between the EU and the US in order to ease transatlantic tensions.

In addition to these specific national interests, unification is being strongly prompted by interests that are shared by all EU Member States, namely

- the free flow of oil at a reasonable price to grant energy supplies to Europe
- the political stability of the area to avoid an insecurity spillover and uncontrolled migration flows
- regional prosperity to create a market for European products.

The combination of these centripetal and centrifugal forces - compatible national interests and convergent shared interests vs. strong and diverging national interests - generates growing pressure for the development of an effective European common policy towards the Middle East which would allow the EU to take on an active role in the protection of its interests and an adequate say in the peace process, commensurate to its economic weight; on the other hand, though, it wields a restraining effect on the full development of this policy, pushing it towards the notorious target of a minimal common denominator, which has haunted EU foreign policy for over thirty years.

4.3.3: Endogenous Variables: The Transgovernmental Network and The Common Institutions

In thirty years of European political cooperation, EU Member States have developed an intensive transgovernmental network that has profoundly changed the framework within which European governments make foreign policy: as Forster and Wallace put it: “It has become normal practice within EU foreign ministries to work with diplomats seconded from other states, even in planning staff and defence policy departments. Information and intelligence are widely shared, dispatches drafted in common; foreign ministers meet several times a month, formally and informally”.

86 and that will be discussed in detail in Chapter Six
Policy towards the Middle East is discussed at all levels of the EU foreign policy mechanism; furthermore, it is discussed both in the intergovernmental framework of Pillar II, and in the framework of Pillar I, not only because Pillar I instruments are used to implement decisions taken in Pillar II, but also because the Commission is responsible for the developing and running of long term projects of economic assistance to the region\(^{88}\). The Middle East was actually one of the first policy areas (together with the CSCE) for which the boundaries between the EC and the EPC were broken down in the 1970s: the Euro-Arab Dialogue, for instance, had for the first time a special inter EPC-EEC working group, which reported to both the COREPER\(^{89}\) and the Political Committee of the EPC; this EPC procedural innovation was then institutionalised with the Amsterdam Treaty twenty years later\(^{90}\).

All this has not been without effect: in fact, it has led to a gradual harmonisation of the political discourse and the progressive softening of national differences in approach. Immersed in a process of socialisation, Foreign Ministries have imperceptibly shifted their preferences to make them compatible with those of the other governments. As Geoffrey Edwards argues, "through constant interaction at a myriad of levels [...] member governments are a part of a complex network of institutions and procedures that makes up EU decision-making. That interaction, indeed, the institutional network itself, inevitably plays a part in determining government strategies and in influencing the goals and objectives of governments both at the national as well as the European levels"\(^{91}\).

Parallel to this informal process of socialisation and to these incremental changes in working practices, a more formal process of institution building and a stratification of the instruments at the CFSP's disposal have taken place\(^{92}\).

Chapter Five will analyse in depth EU institutions and European foreign policy instruments. However, it is important here to underline the relevance of these institutions as both a vehicle and an obstacle to furthering political integration. Marta

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\(^{89}\) Committee of Permanent Representatives

\(^{90}\) Dosenrode, S., and Stubkjaer, A., The European Union and the Middle East, Sheffield Academic Press, 2002


Dassù and Antonio Missiroli have recently argued that “all evidence points to the fact that institutions do matter, if only because they can create crucial incentives to moderating divergence and inconsistency and facilitating a common output”\(^{93}\), and Gilles Andreani has underlined how “institutions matter for the EU in a unique way: the process of European integration is a joint exercise in norm-setting and institution building. Institutions are supposed to provide for fairness and predictability, and inspire EU countries with a sense of purpose and belonging”\(^{94}\).

On the other hand, as Chapter Five will argue, undeniable institutional complexity (or rather confusion) continues to handicap the EU as a global actor; the diffusion of authority within the Union and the permanent intergovernmental bargaining produces inertia, resistance to change, and artificial compartmentalisation of policy\(^{95}\).

The most significant innovations affecting EU policy towards the Middle East are undoubtedly the introduction of the “special envoy” and of the High Representative of the CFSP.

The appointment in 1996 of Mr. Miguel Angel Moratinos as EU Special Envoy to the Middle East Peace Process provided the EU for the first time with a single interlocutor for dealing with other regional actors, in an attempt to reduce the difficulties and inconsistencies of the CFSP due to the rotating EU Presidency system. The potential of this innovation, however, has been marred by the very nature of Mr Moratinos’ mandate\(^{96}\) which, if formally quite broad, does not include the possibility of committing the Member States to any step which has not been previously agreed upon. His action must take place in a strictly intergovernmental framework: he is guided by, and reports

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\(^{95}\) see Zielonka, J., ‘Weak Institutions’, in *Explaining Euro-paralysis: why Europe is unable to act in international politics*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1998 (Chapter Five, pp. 177-209).

\(^{96}\) The annual mandate, successively prolonged by the Council of Ministers until today, gives wide-ranging responsibilities (see [http://ue.eu.int/pesc/envoye/cv/moratinos/moratinos.htm](http://ue.eu.int/pesc/envoye/cv/moratinos/moratinos.htm)), which include among others:

- To establish and maintain close contact with all the parties to the peace process, and all other key regional and international countries and organisations;
- To observe negotiations and to be ready to offer the EU’s advice and good offices should the parties request this;
- To contribute, where requested, to the implementation of agreements reached between the parties, and to engage with them diplomatically in the event of non-compliance with the terms of these agreements;
- To engage constructively with signatories to agreements within the framework of the peace process in order to promote compliance with the basic norms of democracy, including respect of human rights and the rule of law.
to, the Presidency\textsuperscript{97}, and his scope for autonomous initiative is very limited and tightly bound to the indications received from the Council. As a consequence, Mr Moratinos has encountered great difficulties in creating for himself a role beyond that of "facilitator" of the peace talks, although he has taken part directly in many stages of the negotiations, earning the trust and respect of all the main actors involved.

In 1999 the EU finally agreed to appoint Mr Javier Solana High Representative of the CFSP, a role to be added alongside that of Secretary General of the Council. Since his appointment, Mr Solana and his Policy Planning Unit have been closely involved in the Middle East peace process, representing the EU's position in the negotiations and contributing autonomous initiatives\textsuperscript{98}. But the familiar pattern has repeated itself, and Mr Solana's action has been hampered by the political limits of his mandate and trapped within the limits of intergovernmental consensus.

A fitting example of the EU's enhanced role as a result of the introduction of a High Representative, is the inclusion of Mr Solana in the so called "Quartet", formed by the US, the UN, Russia and the EU and established in April 2002 with the purpose of pursuing a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with the active engagement of outside actors\textsuperscript{99}.

However - perhaps not surprisingly - the cumbersome structures of EU diplomacy have managed to squeeze the Commissioner for External Relations (Chris Patten) and the Foreign Minister of the Member State holding the Council Presidency into the 'single' EU seat\textsuperscript{100}.

In other words, once again the Member States have revealed their "schizophrenic" attitude\textsuperscript{101}, encouraging convergence through informal socialisation processes and formal institution building on the one hand, while on the other trying their best to block convergence by limiting the powers attributed to the new institutions and the continuous reliance on mutual trust and consensus.

\textsuperscript{97} and more recently to the High Representative
\textsuperscript{98} Author's interview with Pascal Charlat, Head of the Task Force Middle East of the Policy Planning Unit, May 2002
\textsuperscript{99} see Kemp, G., 'The Quartet: Can it be Effective?' From the July 21, 2002 edition of Al-Itihad, also available at http://www.nixoncenter.org/publications/articles/Kemp/072102Quartet.htm
\textsuperscript{100} see The EU's Mediterranean & Middle East Policy, News, 15/7/02: "Commissioner Patten participates at Quartet Ministerial meeting in New York City on 16\textsuperscript{th} July" http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/med_mideast/news/ip02_1051.htm For an outline of the Quartet's position on the peace process see Appendix, Communiqué issued by the Quartet, New York, 17 September 2002
\textsuperscript{101} The former President of the European Commission Jacques Delors, referring to the institutional set-up of the CFSP, has used the expression "organised schizophrenia". Quoted in Jorgensen, K.E., 'Making the CFSP work', in Peterson J. and Shackleton M. (eds.), The Institutions of the European Union, Oxford University Press 2002. P. 227
4.3.4: Endogenous Variables: The EU’s Strategic Culture and Political Vision

The paragraphs above have produced ample evidence of how difficult it is to generalise when dealing with EU foreign policy. Nonetheless, - with due caution - it is indeed possible to identify certain basic principles on which the EU’s stance towards the Middle East is based and that are shared by almost all Member States.

First of all, it must be stressed that, for Europe, Middle East policy overlaps with Mediterranean policy. The EU considers the Mediterranean as a coherent geo-strategic region, and in this perspective it sees political instability in the Middle East as a potential danger to the political stability of the whole region. As remarked by Volker Perthes, “the European discourse alternatively emphasises Europe’s common destiny with the peoples of the region and its responsibility for furthering peace, democracy and development among its neighbours, or European security and economic interests which require both socio-economic development and political progress in the region including, prominently, the peaceful regulation of the Arab-Israeli conflict”. There is a clear link between the Middle East peace process and EU’s interest in building a safer Euro-Mediterranean regional environment.

Focusing more closely on Europe’s approach to the peace process itself, it is possible to identify a number of fundamental principles on which the EU has based its policy since the signing of the Venice Declaration in 1980:

- the EU has constantly insisted on the need for all the relevant issues to be taken on simultaneously, and has repeatedly supported the idea of international peace conferences where regional actors meet in a multilateral framework. This position is consistent with the EU’s political culture of multilateralism, and its emphasis on the primacy of negotiation and diplomacy over the use of force
- the EU appeals regularly to United Nations resolutions and underlines the importance of respecting international law

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- From day one, the EU has emphasised the "legitimate right of the Palestinians" well before the Palestinian question was recognised by the Israeli and the Americans as being central to the resolution of the Arab-Israeli dispute.

- The EU is a strong supporter of the two States solution and of the principle that the PLO is the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

To better prove this point, a study carried out by Paul Luif of the Austrian Institute for International Affairs is of great help. In his paper, Dr. Luif analyses the voting behaviour of the EU Member States in the General Assembly of the United Nations in order to evaluate the Member States' ability to coordinate and harmonise their policies on a number of selected issues.

According to Article 19 of the EU Treaty, "Member States shall coordinate their action in international organisations and at international conferences. They shall uphold the common positions in such fora." The UN General Assembly is indeed a prime example of EU attempts to "speak with one voice".

Each year, from September to December, the UN General Assembly debates a wide range of issues pertaining to international relations, and passes some 300 resolutions (and a few decisions) on these issues. In the Tables elaborated by Paul Luif, and reproduced here, the data refer to the votes expressed by the Member States with regards to Middle East issues (including the Arab-Israeli peace process).

Table 1 considers all the "recorded votes" and calculates the percentage of votes where the EU member states "spoke with one voice", i.e. all EU states voted identically.

Table 2 and 3 illustrate respectively the number of recorded votes in the UN General Assembly, including votes on parts of resolutions, motions and decisions, and the percentage of votes with EU consensus.

In Table 4 the focal point is the EU "majority", i.e. the voting behaviour of the majority of the EU member states. With 15 member states, if at least 8 EU countries vote in the same manner, this position is used to calculate the "Distance Index". The "Distance Index" sets "0" as a minimum (the EU member state always votes with the EU

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105 Joint Declaration of the Nine Foreign Ministers on the Situation in the Middle East, Brussels 6 November 1973


107 Including for example security, disarmament, decolonisation and human rights.
majority) and "100" as a theoretical maximum (the EU member state always votes against the EU majority).

An analysis of these four Tables\textsuperscript{109} clearly shows how EU Member State voting behaviour on Middle East issues has steadily converged over the years, actually achieving full consensus over the years 1998-2000\textsuperscript{110}. This voting behaviour is consistent with Europe's support of the UN as the most appropriate forum for negotiations, as mentioned above, and with the shared European view that going through the United Nations means keeping the peace process on the necessary multilateral track.

In particular Table 1, which examines a) all Recorded votes, b) votes on Security Issues and c) votes on the Middle East, shows how the Middle East has represented an area in which, comparatively speaking, consensus has been reached with increasing frequency.

\textsuperscript{108} with kind permission of the author

\textsuperscript{109} Notes to the Tables: *1996 EU without Greece; ** until 31 December 2002; n/a: absent in more than one third of the votes; n/d: no data calculated.

\textsuperscript{110} The Tables also reveal the profound disagreements among the Member States over the 1981-1983 period.
Table 1. EU Voting Behavior in the General Assembly of the United Nations
Consensus Among the EU Member States in All Recorded Votes and Selected Issue Areas
(Percentage of All Recorded Votes)

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Table 2. Number of Recorded Votes in the UN General Assembly, Including Votes on Parts of Resolutions, Motions, Decisions

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Table 3. Percentage of Votes with EU Consensus

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Table 4. Voting Behavior of EU Member States in the General Assembly of the United Nations: Distance From the EU Majority For Votes Concerning the Middle East. (Maximum Distance from EU Majority = 100, Minimum = 0)

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4.4: Conclusion

“The Birds and The Bats” or

“The Phenomenon Of The Common European Foreign Policy”

The purpose of this chapter was to illustrate and analyse the problematic interrelation between two opposing trends in the evolution of European Common Foreign Policy: the development of a stronger convergence of Member State policies as a result of the influence exercised by a number of exogenous and endogenous variables, and the undiminished strength of specific national preferences and priorities that pose a challenge to the consolidation of this convergence.

With this objective in mind the paper focused on the case of European Middle East policy - and in particular of the policy towards the peace process, given its political relevance for the European Union and the long-standing involvement of the EU in the process.

The case study has shown how EU Middle East policy could be said to generate a paradox of *converging parallels*.

In other words, EU Middle East policy shows clear signs of convergence as a result of

a) converging external pressures
b) the similarity of Member States’ interests
c) the existence of a transgovernmental network and of common institutions, which contribute to the harmonisation of the different policies
d) the development of a European perception, in broad terms, of the issue.

On the other hand, however, the attainment of a real convergence, capable of producing a truly collective policy, has been consistently hampered by the persistence of differences in the individual Member States’ preferences, which remain clearly distinct from, and only occasionally similar to, those of the other Member States.

Therefore, this being the situation, how can convergence in European foreign policy be described?

A very suggestive idea comes to us from a search in the English Language Dictionary: the fifth meaning of the word “convergence” is in fact given as follows: “Convergent evolution: the evolutionary development of a *superficial resemblance between*
unrelated animals that occupy a similar environment, as in the evolution of wings in birds and bats"\textsuperscript{111}.

This description fits EU Middle East policy very nicely indeed; in fact, it strikes as being appropriate for European foreign policy in general: EU Member States have maintained, and struggle to maintain, tight control over their foreign policy in order to protect what they consider to be their national interests; nonetheless, they find ever more frequently that those interests can be better protected through a common European action, that is able to project into the international arena the combined weight of the 15 Members of the Union. As a consequence, more and more national governments, often prompted by totally different reasons and agendas, turn to the EU and encourage the elaboration of common European policies, creating precisely the effect of a convergence of policies that in most cases, however, will not intersect and will remain an "equal distance apart"\textsuperscript{112}.

\textsuperscript{111} Collins English Dictionary, Harper Collins Publishers, Glasgow 2000 (emphasis added)
\textsuperscript{112} The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition Copyright 2000 by Houghton Mifflin Company. Published by Houghton Mifflin Company
Chapter Five


5.1: Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is twofold: to conduct an in-depth analysis of the instruments of European Union Foreign Policy, and to conduct an analysis of how these instruments have been used within the context of European Union’s policy towards the Arab-Israeli peace process in the years between 1991 and 2002.

The EC/EU has long been directly and indirectly involved in the Arab-Israeli dispute, and has put most of its foreign policy instruments to use in dealing with it. The varying use of these instruments on the part of the EU has at times reflected the search for an active involvement in the issue, at times the compelled response to an inescapable entanglement with the fate of a neighbouring region, and at times the purposeful search for an area of viable political harmonisation among the Member States. The “reflexive” dimension of European Middle East policy - i.e. a policy mainly concerned with the actual formation of a common policy as an integrative value *per se* - has also very often played a primary role: the Middle East peace process has frequently been used as a “testing ground” for new European foreign policy instruments, or in other words as a means for achieving an internal objective, namely the development and consolidation of EPC and then of CFSP.

In general, the EU’s policy has been regarded as scarcely effective - in as much as an “effective policy” is one intended to directly and appreciably influence the other actors’ actions, and therefore the course of events, and does so successfully - and constantly

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subordinated to that of the United States, the truly powerful mediator whose role is
acknowledged and accepted by both parties: the Israelis and the Arabs.

This chapter, analysing the instruments at the EU’s disposal and how these instruments
have been used in the context of the formulation of a European policy towards the Arab-
Israeli peace process, will attempt to establish if one, or possibly more than one, of the
following conditions apply:

- A case of *insufficiency*: the EU does not have at its disposal enough instruments to
deal effectively with the Middle East peace process; more instruments would enhance
the EU’s action and involvement, increasing its chances of success.

- A case of *inadequacy*: the instruments at EU’s disposal are inadequate to deal with the
Middle East peace process due to the specific nature of the issues at stake; in particular,
the nature of the EU as a civilian power lacking the military instruments to back up and
support any kind of political initiative, renders the EU *per se* unable to act in the context
of the peace process if not in coordination with - and subordinately to - the United
States.

- A case of *misuse*: foreign policy instruments are not appropriately and effectively used
by the EU due to the inadequacy of the institutions in charge and the bureaucratic
complexity which characterise all levels of EU policymaking.

- A case of *under-utilisation*: the instruments at the EU’s disposal are deliberately
under-utilised by the Member States, the reason for this being the persistent desire of
the Member States to maintain control over their foreign policy, their reluctance to
proceed too speedily in the direction of political integration in the Union, their inability
to find common interests of sufficient number to justify, in their view, the renunciation
of the particularisms of national foreign policies and priorities in the name of the higher
objective of achieving a common European policy.

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3 see Blackwill, R. and Sturmer, M. (eds.), *Allies Divided. Transatlantic Policies for the Greater Middle
East*, CSIA Studies in International Security, Cambridge (MA), The MIT Press, 1997; Gompert, D. and
Larrabee, S., eds., *America and Europe. A Partnership for a new era*, RAND Studies in Policy Analysis,
Cambridge University Press 1998; Gordon, P.H., *The Transatlantic Allies and the Changing Middle East,
This chapter matches an analysis of the progressive, incremental construction of the edifice of Common Foreign and Security Policy, and the stratification of the instruments at its disposal, with a parallel analysis of the immediate use of these instruments in a specific foreign policy context such as the Arab-Israeli peace process.

The objective of this type of analysis is the following:

- on the one hand, through a legal institutional analysis of the foreign policy instruments at EU’s disposal, the chapter intends to offer an evaluation of the scope for EU action in foreign policy, taking into consideration both the “explicit” capabilities officially provided for in the various treaties, and the “implicit” capabilities that stem from EU’s potential power, from practice, from possible informal agreements among EU Member States;

- On the other, in examining the utilisation of these instruments in a complex and highly sensitive case such as the Middle East peace process, the chapter intends to investigate the political dimension of certain EU failures, which are not only the result of the constraints under which the CFSP is forced to operate because of the complexities of its legal institutional rules, but also of a deliberate choice on the part of the Member States, who inconsistently avail themselves of the instruments available, and intentionally keep the EU foreign policy machinery burdensome and scarcely efficient.

The chapter will first analyse the progressive construction of the EU’s foreign policy mechanisms, starting from the onset of the Common Foreign and Security Policy until the appointment of the High Representative of the CFSP.

It will then proceed with a systematic analysis of the use of European foreign policy instruments in the context of the Arab-Israeli peace process from 1991 to 2002, trying to establish if all of the available instruments have been utilised, and trying to assess both their intrinsic effectiveness and the ability of the EU to make use of them.

5.2: An Evaluation of the Status of European Foreign Policy before Maastricht

After the creation of European Political Cooperation (EPC) in 1969 and the 1985 Single European Act (SEA) - which gave an official basis to EPC - the next crucial step in the
construction of a European Foreign Policy was the Maastricht Treaty, which replaced EPC with the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

Before engaging in an analysis of CFSP and its instruments, a recapitulation of the status of European foreign policy as it stood at the beginning of the Maastricht Inter-Governmental Conference is indeed in order.

In summary, twenty years after its creation European Foreign Policy had at its disposal the following instruments - instruments intended both in a strictly procedural sense and in a broader sense:

- The will of the Member States to cooperate in the field of foreign policy. Such will can be qualified both as an active desire to promote Europe's role in the world, and as a reaction to external pressures of third parties who expected the EC to take on a political role adequate to its economic weight. This is the most critical and at the same time volatile variable of European foreign policy, capable of hampering EPC (and then CFSP) action even when sufficient instruments would be available, but at the same time capable of creating necessary instruments and procedures ex novo if deemed advisable;

- A consolidated mechanism for consultation that, by 1990, had created an habit of cooperation and collaboration in the field of foreign policy among the Member States, and was contributing to the progressive harmonisation of the different national policies at least on certain issues;

- The meetings of the Foreign Ministers on matters of political cooperation, preferably held in the capital of the state holding the Presidency of the EC;

- The central role of the rotating Presidency, which became the main body responsible for initiatives in the field of foreign policy;

- A bureaucratic apparatus, distinct and separate from the Community's, which included the Political Committee, the various working groups, and after the SEA, a small Secretariat

- A tentative informal mechanism for coordination with Community policies, codified not only in the Reports but also in the SEA

In the same way, it is already possible at this stage to identify those structural problems that later proved to be inherent in European foreign policy:

- An unstable and unpredictable dialectic between the foreign policies of the Member States and European foreign policy, that generated a tendency
towards “minimal common denominator” objectives and a declaratory policy - the safest option in dealing with controversial issues.

- A constant reliance on informal procedures and contacts which reflected more the Member States’ desire to maintain control over foreign policy than a deliberate search for a new “formula” of foreign policymaking in the framework of existing European Community institutions.

- An erratic approach to foreign policymaking ensuing from the mechanism that grants centrality of action to the rotating Presidency. External interlocutors were constantly faced with the necessity of adapting to a new Presidency and, consequently, to a potentially different view of what European priorities should be. Given the kind of foreign policymaking mechanism set up, it was indeed remarkably difficult to build a consolidated “historic memory” of a distinctly European foreign policy approach, as every single country holding the presidency wanted to assert its own view and agenda.

- A relationship with Community institutions and policies designed in such a way as to be a constant potential source of tensions and conflicts of competences, in addition to the previously mentioned problem of inconsistency. The unrealistic ambition to keep “low” (economic) politics and “high” (foreign) politics separate ultimately resulted in a situation of fuzzy competences and constant necessity to resort to complicated bureaucratic manoeuvres to implement decisions and avoid the assumption of political stances that were blatantly discordant with each other.

5.3: The CFSP. The new instruments of European Union Foreign Policy

5.3.1: The problem of the (lack of) legal personality of the EU

The Treaty of European Union (TEU), signed in Maastricht in December 1991 and ratified in November 1993, replaced EPC with the so-called Common Foreign and Security Policy, which was to be the second pillar of the new three-pillar structure of what would from now on be called European Union⁴.

⁴The three pillars are: a) the first pillar, now referred to as the European Community (EC), made up by the three originally separate Communities: European Steel and Coal Community, European Economic Community, and European Atomic Energy Community; b) the second pillar for the development of a
The EU was not given legal personality in the Maastricht Treaty, and it was maintained that only the EC (i.e. the first pillar) and the Member States could assume legal obligations with outsiders\(^5\).

The question of legal personality is an open problem, still much debated among scholars of international law\(^6\), to the point that even the very definition of "legal personality" is controversial. To use Bekker’s words, legal personality may be defined as "the concrete exercise of, or at least the potential ability to exercise, certain rights and the fulfilment of certain obligations"\(^7\).

Leaving aside the strictly technical debate over the questions of legal systems, legal institutions, legal facts and legal personality, what is of interest for the purpose of this chapter is understanding what legal personality entails in term of capacities, and if the EU has truly and entirely been denied these capacities.

Two main schools of thought may be identified in the different interpretations given of the acceptable criteria for attribution of international legal personality\(^8\): the so-called “objective approach” claims that international legal personality simply follows from the existence of an international organisation; the “will approach” – apparently the prevailing - claims that international legal personality is attributed only as a result of the will of the founding states. “This may take the form of an explicit provision in the constitutional treaty, or it may be an implicit attribution, in the sense that the quality can be derived from certain external capacities of the organisation”\(^9\).

The crucial point here is of course the distinction between the concept of \textit{explicit provision} and \textit{implicit attribution}. In effect the TEU contains no explicit provision intended to confer legal personality to the EU; furthermore, some Member States - like Germany and the Netherlands - have explicitly denied that the Union may be viewed as having legal personality.

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\(^7\) Bekker, \textit{op. cit}, pg. 53

\(^8\) see White N.D., \textit{The Law of International Organisations}, Manchester University Press, 1996

On the other hand, from the point of view of an "implicit attribution", matters seem to be less clear cut. Firstly, it is worth trying to establish why the possession of legal capacity is relevant at all: "the practical value of the possession of legal personality can be found in the fact that the entity has the required status to have certain category of rights that enable it to manifest itself on the international plane and to enter into relationships with other subjects of international law, traditionally referred to as the right of intercourse"\(^\text{10}\).

To be more specific, certain capacities may proceed from legal personality, such as, among others\(^\text{11}\):

- Treaty-making capacity
- The right to recognise other subjects of international law

As already pointed out, the EU was not given legal personality by the TEU. However, this did not mean that the Member States had a uniform position on the issue: on the contrary, the question was strongly debated both before the signing of the TEU, and during the travaux préparatoires of the Amsterdam conference, as proven by a Report of the Reflection Group on the IGC: "A majority of members point to the advantage of international legal personality for the Union so that it can conclude international agreements on the subject matter [...] concerning CFSP [...]. For them, the fact that the Union does not legally exist is a source of confusion outside and diminishes its external role. Others consider that the creation of international personality for the Union could risk confusion with the legal prerogatives of Member States"\(^\text{12}\).

These words lead to the conclusion that, alongside the usual preoccupation of maintaining foreign policy under the control of national capitals, and strong resistance against the idea of officially admitting that the EU could be regarded - in international law terms - as a separate entity from its founding members and therefore to some extent as independent from them, at least some of the Member States were forming the opinion that some of the capacities that ensue from the status of "legal person" could indeed serve the objective of enhancing the action of CFSP.

A rather ambiguous step in this direction was taken with the Amsterdam Treaty, of which a specific article - n. 24 - established for the Council the possibility of

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\(^{11}\) other capabilities may include the right to establish diplomatic relations, the capacity to bring international claims or international procedural capacity.

concluding international agreements\textsuperscript{13}, therefore envisaging a Treaty-making capacity for the EU\textsuperscript{14}; however, this seemingly very courageous innovation was immediately mitigated in the second part of the article, which specified that “no agreement shall be binding on a Member State […]”\textsuperscript{15}, and in a further Declaration which underlined that “the provisions of [article 24] and any agreements resulting from them shall not imply any transfer of competence from the Member States to the EU”\textsuperscript{16}. While the European Union has hitherto not entered explicitly into any international agreement, even before the signing of the Amsterdam Treaty and the adoption of article 24, as we shall see later when analysing its Middle East policy, the EU did take certain initiatives towards the Palestinian Authority that seemed to indicate that a Treaty-making capacity, if not explicitly, was at least \textit{implicitly} being employed.

The second capability deriving from the possession of legal personality, as mentioned above, is the right to recognise other subjects of international law. Once again, empirical data show us that the EU has not yet managed (or rather decided) to directly recognise a third state. There have been attempts of \textit{concerted} diplomatic recognition before the coming into force of the TEU: these attempts failed in the case of the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia (as Germany acted first, unilaterally) and Macedonia (whose joint recognition was blocked by Greece). A success was registered with the collective recognition of Bosnia/Herzegovina, co-ordinated with the United States. Obviously in these cases the recognition of the new sovereign state was to be given by the Member States acting in coordination with each other, and not directly by the EU as such. But once again, as we shall see in the analysis of EU policy towards the Palestinian Authority, the possibility of a direct recognition of a new state by the EU, far from being completely ruled out, has on the contrary been used by the EU as a means to exert its influence in a manner considered to be by far more effective than the separate, if concerted, action of the Member States.

From this analysis the tension between the Member States’ competing views of the EU emerges more clearly than ever. One view stresses the nature of the EU as a traditional mechanism of intergovernmental co-operation, and accordingly claims that the

\textsuperscript{13} “When it is necessary to conclude an agreement with one or more States or international organisations […] the Council, acting unanimously, may authorise the Presidency, assisted by the Commission as appropriate, to open negotiations to that effect”. Treaty of Amsterdam, Brussels, 1997. Art 24

\textsuperscript{14} see also Tilikainen T., ‘To Be or Not to Be?: An Analysis of the Legal and Political Elements of Statehood in the EU’s External Identity’, \textit{European Foreign Affairs Review}, n. 6, 2001.

\textsuperscript{15} ibid.
decisions taken on the basis of the CFSP provisions must in any case be regarded as multilateral agreements among governments. In certain circumstances, nonetheless, the integrationist view effectively emerges, as the Member States seem to perceive the necessity to widen the scope and strengthen the significance of certain European actions, and to proceed either officially enlarging the competencies of the Union, or undertaking initiatives that entail the attribution to the EU of at least implicit capacities. It has been suggested that some Member States might have been unaware of the implications of using certain legal formulations, and of establishing “non-first pillar” policy areas in which the EU as such plays a crucial role. However it might also be possible to surmise that the combined effect of the pressure originating from external expectations of EU performance on the international plane, and the incremental style of the construction of the European Union foreign policy, can in certain circumstances bring about sudden - if provisional and not codified - qualitative leaps in the development of CFSP action.

5.3.2: Who answers the phone?

Naturally it is of no great importance to establish whether Henry Kissinger truly asked the crucial question: “If I want to call Europe, who do I call?”, but finding an answer to it is. It is indeed hardly clear who’s in charge of the formulation of the EU’s foreign policy, and the complex and burdensome interaction between different institutions, bodies and working groups, within the framework of what the Member States want to keep as much as possible an intergovernmental process, cannot but puzzle any external interlocutor.

A quick and concise “bureaucratic excursus” provides the following - confusing - picture of the actors involved in the CFSP:

- The European Council is the gathering of the Heads of State or Government of the Member States. It is not a formal Community institution but has however been attributed a crucial role in the CFSP by the Maastricht Treaty: “The European Council shall provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its development and shall define the general guidelines thereof”. In

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16 Declaration n. 4 adopted by the Amsterdam IGC.
17 see for example Wessel, op cit., 2000
19 Article 4, TEU
essence, the European Council holds responsibility for setting the guidelines for the CFSP.

The Council of the European Union is composed of ministerial representatives of each Member State and its work is organised along "issue lines", i.e. foreign policy, agriculture, etc. The Council of Foreign Ministers, or General Affairs Council (GAC), is the main manager of CFSP, and its action is strictly interconnected with the European Council's action. In fact, the GAC does the preparatory and executive work that allows the European Council to function; on the other hand, the political decisions of the European Council can only be enforced once they have been adopted by the Council of Ministers. As Geoffrey Edwards put it, "the Council is both the ultimate arbiter of policy and an integral part of a supranational decision-making process. [...] This suggests the adaptation of the state (and the modification of the traditional principles on which it has been based) towards participation in a political system that bears strong comparison with cooperative federalist systems such as that in Germany, where responsibilities over a wide range of issues are shared". Helen Wallace has argued that the Council can be seen as both a European institution and the "prisoner" of the Member States and that its collective identity is always vulnerable to competition between member governments, as well as competition with the Commission.

The Presidency is held in turn by each Member State in the Council for a term of six months; furthermore, the Member State holding the Presidency of the Council also chairs the meetings of the European Council. The Presidency provides the impetus and ensures follow-up; it represents the Union in CFSP matters and is responsible for the implementation of CFSP decisions.

The General Secretariat supports the action of the Presidency under the responsibility of a Secretary-General.

The Commission, whose role in CFSP will be dealt with more extensively below, is fully associated with the work carried out by the Council in the CFSP field.

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- The Committee of Permanent Representatives of the Member States (COREPER) is responsible for preparing the work of the Council and for carrying out tasks assigned to it by the Council.

- The Political Committee (POCO), consisting of the Political Directors of the national Foreign Ministries, contributes to the definition of CFSP policies by delivering opinions to the Council; it also monitors the implementation of agreed policies.

- Various working groups carry out preparatory work or studies defined in advance on CFSP matters.

All this indeed makes for quite an extensive “phone book”, and hardly contributes to the objective of projecting a unitary image of the EU’s foreign policy on the international scene.

A first step in the direction of confronting the external world with an interlocutor “in flesh and blood” was taken in 1996 with the introduction of the role of special envoy, a pilot project of a European diplomat. The special envoy is appointed by the Council with a mandate in relation to particular policy issues, therefore the Member States maintain full control over his competencies.

The second, more significant step, was taken with the Amsterdam Treaty, in Article 26, where it was decided that the Secretary General of the Council would add to his responsibilities the new function of High Representative for the CFSP (Mr./Mrs. CFSP), with the aim of working towards a new working troika, consisting of the Presidency, the High Representative, and a senior representative of the Commission. A Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit was set up under the High Representative, with personnel drawn from EU institutions, the Member States and the WEU. According to article 26 Mr. CFSP was to assist the Council in matters coming within the scope of CFSP, in particular by contributing to the formulation, preparation and implementation of policy decisions, and by conducting political dialogue with third parties.

Among the objectives of introducing a Mr. CFSP was the hope of overcoming the discontinuity of CFSP action deriving from the system of the rotating Presidency, the desire to improve the ability of the Union to react promptly to current political events, the aspiration to facilitate the laying down of political guidelines which could transcend national interests. However, the usual reluctance to push too far in the direction of

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22 Hill and Smith, op cit., 2000. Pg 169
political integration, prevented the setting up of a truly innovative decision-making mechanism\textsuperscript{24}.

A quite telling example is the fact that the system of appointment of the special envoy has not been reformed: the special envoys are still appointed by the Council, and although they now report to the Council through the High Representative\textsuperscript{25}, they still have to work strictly within the boundaries of the intergovernmental framework.

This decision of the Member States not to create an efficient and organisationally reasonable system of managing foreign policymaking cannot but hamper the High Representative's chances of becoming the real broker of the EU's policy in the international arena, and creates potential confusion, if not a clash of competencies, between the functions of the High Representative and that of the Special Envoy.

5.3.3: Practical instruments for action

During the years of EPC, European foreign policy was mainly of a declaratory nature, and the significance of the political content of the various joint declarations varied according to the ability and willingness of the Member States to reach an agreement beyond the line of the lowest common denominator. The principle of consensus governed the system; however – as Simon Nuttall argued – EPC worked, within its limits, because it turned those limits to advantage:

"Foreign Ministries made sure that it remained a self contained operation, restricted to a small circle of initiates and powered by the forces of socialisation. The secret was that, in normal circumstances, those initiatives had the power to sway national policies. The Political Directors, the Heads of Department, above all the Foreign Ministers themselves, were well placed to align their countries on EPC positions if they so chose"\textsuperscript{26}

The Treaty of Maastricht introduced two new foreign policy instruments: \textit{joint actions} and \textit{common positions}, which had to serve the purpose of providing European foreign policy with further means of action. These were meant to be qualitatively superior to what had existed in EPC, but the failure to agree on a limited, operational list of

\textsuperscript{23} Amsterdam Treaty, Article 26
\textsuperscript{25} Author's interview with Pascal Charlat, Head of the Middle East Task Force, Policy Planning Unit, Council Secretariat. May 2002

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important interest in common, and on qualifies majority voting, left that, as Nuttall put it, "empty shells". The distinction between these two instruments was unclear and was only clarified years later, with the Treaty of Amsterdam, which also introduced a further instrument, the common strategy. Thus, if common positions define the approach of the Union to a particular matter of a geographical or thematic nature, joint actions address specific situations where operational action is needed, and are to be implemented gradually in the areas in which the Member States have important interests in common. The common strategy is not clearly defined, but could be set out as a framework that defines what the main EU interests in a region are, and by what general means they might be pursued.

It is worth mentioning at this stage the laborious process behind the introduction of the principle of qualified majority voting (QMV) in the field of CFSP. QMV made its first timid appearance in the TEU with article J3, which indicated that, provided that an issue had already been defined by unanimity, QMV could be used to implement specific measures, and the votes of the Member States would be weighted in accordance with EC procedures on QMV.

Not surprisingly, the Council has not made use of this possibility.

The Amsterdam Treaty represents "phase two" of the saga of QMV, a metaphor of the struggle between intergovernmentalism, integrationism and the incremental style of the evolution of CFSP. Article J.13 in fact provides for extended resorting to QMV, calling for QMV by the Council when it adopts or implements joint actions, common positions or other decisions on the basis of a common strategy previously agreed upon unanimously. In addition, the possibility of "constructive abstention" was introduced, allowing one or more Member States to opt out of a common position without preventing the whole policy from going ahead.

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27 *Ibid*, p. 184
28 Treaty of Amsterdam, article J5
29 Treaty of Amsterdam, article J4
Needless to say, a tool allowing Member States to block Council decision-making could not be absent, and was granted by providing that a council member may still declare that, for important and stated reasons of national policy, it intends to oppose the adoption of a decision to be taken by qualified majority voting. Specific criteria to define what an “important” reason would be were not specified. Qualified majority voting remains one of the most controversial issues among the Member States as its introduction and the extension of its applicability have a remarkable practical but also symbolic value, representing as they do the surrender of a stronghold of national sovereignty that many states are ready to defend tooth and nail.

5.3.4: The apple of discord: the relationship between the European Community and CFSP

There are two possible approaches to analysing the relationship between the European Community and CFSP: the first, and more formal, will provide a picture of the specific provisions that regulate this relationship and of the official efforts made to coordinate first- and second-pillar action in external relations, with the commendable objective of granting consistency and coherence to European foreign policy. On the other hand, a closer analysis will provide a bizarre picture of an anachronistic and unrealistic desire to maintain economic and foreign policies separate, a desire that is nonetheless challenged by reality, which has showed how the two policies cannot but be inextricably intertwined, thus often forcing Member States to turn to Community economic policy instruments\(^33\) in order to implement decisions taken in the separate intergovernmental framework.

The Treaty on European Union stipulates that the European Commission is to be fully associated with the work carried out in the CFSP field, underlining that such association is needed to ensure the consistency of the CFSP with external economic relations and development co-operation, which are Community policies in which the Commission plays a leading role\(^34\).

\(^33\) such as the imposition of economic sanctions, the conclusion of association agreements, the extension of aid, etc.

The President of the Commission joins the Heads of State or Government within the European Council. The Commission participates in meetings of the Council and its preparatory bodies. Like the Member States, it can lay before the Council any foreign and security policy issue and submit proposals to it; however, its right of initiative is not exclusive as is usually the case with Community policies. The Treaty also provides that the Council may request the Commission to submit to it any appropriate proposals to ensure the implementation of a joint action.

The relationship between the two pillars becomes particularly controversial where the financing of CFSP is concerned. As Jorg Monar has argued, the question of financing is indeed a crucial issue:

- Financing has a direct impact on the efficiency of CFSP. The lack of an adequate budgetary basis and effective budgetary procedures can endanger both the Union’s capacity to act and its international credibility.
- The practice of financing the CFSP has given rise to problems of democratic control of the use of EC funds which are closely related to the persisting democratic deficit in the second pillar of the TEU.
- The present system of financing CFSP causes major tensions within the Union’s dual system of foreign affairs with its increasingly complex mixture of intergovernmental and Community methods.

The Treaty of Maastricht provided that all administrative costs incurred by the institutions in the area of CFSP should be charged to the budget of the European Communities. Two alternatives were then envisaged for operational expenditures: the Council could either unanimously decide that operational expenditure was to be charged to the budget of the EC, or it could determine that such expenditure was to be charged to Member States. With the Treaty of Amsterdam the EC budget became the “default setting” for financing CFSP, “apart for expenditure arising from operations having

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35 TEU, Art.22
36 Treaty of Amsterdam, Art. 14
39 TEU, Art 28, paragraph 1
40 Wessel, op cit., 1999. Pg 96
military and defence implications and cases where the Council acting unanimously
decides otherwise. The trouble arises as a consequence of the fuzzy distinction
between “administrative” and “operational” costs and the Member State’s desire to
spare national budget. In fact, on the basis of the only identifiable distinction, which
indicates vaguely that administrative costs are incurred by the institutions, whereas
operational costs are incurred by the implementation of CFSP provisions, the Council
can decide to classify as administrative expenditure anything from the travel costs of
Commission and Council personnel to the organisation of international conferences.
At the same time, the desire to keep CFSP intergovernmental adds more confusion and
tensions as the Member States struggle to find an appropriate a satisfactory scale to
divide between them costs that are not charged to the EC budget.

In an analysis of the relationship between the first two pillars of the EU, the complex
relation between the External Relations Commissioner and the High Representative for
the CFSP also calls for a few comments. It is becoming increasingly evident that the
distinction between the two role causes more and more overlapping of competencies
and institutional inconsistency. Various solutions are being considered, ranging from
the transformation the High Representative into a Member of the Commission, to the
more conservative idea of “unifying the external relations bureaucracies of the Council
and the Commission under the supervision of the High Representative, who would act
as a Member of the Commission for matters requiring a Commission decision, and
report to the appropriate body in the Council [...] for the rest.

In May 2002 the Commission, in a Communication on the Future of Europe, has put
forward the option of reducing the inconsistency of the Union’s institutional design
(including CFSP) dismantling the current “pillar” system. Such an option would make
it possible to do away with the distinction between the community area proper and the
treaty provisions concerning the second and third pillars.

Later the same year, in the Final Report of Working Group VII on External Action, the
Members of the European Convention suggested that

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41 Treaty of Amsterdam, Article 28, paragraph 2
42 ibid.
43 Wessel, op cit., 1999. Pg 97
44 normally the GNP scale is used. See Rummel, R. and Wiedemann, J., ‘Identifying Institutional
45 Nuttall, op cit., 2001. Pg 8
"in order to ensure better coherence between foreign policy decisions on the one hand, and deployment of instruments in the filed of external relation on the other hand, the current roles of the High Representative for CFSP and the Commissioner responsible for external relations should be reconsidered [...] A large trend emerged in favour of a solution which would provide for the exercise of both offices by a "European External Representative". This person, who would combine the functions of HR and Relex Commissioner, would be appointed by the Council, meeting in the composition of Heads of State or Government and acting by a qualified majority, with the approval of the President of the Commission and endorsement by the European Parliament"47

It may indeed be argued that the stage of development achieved by the EU foreign policy machinery calls for courageous reform in the direction of a deeper integration, with the aim of not only allowing the CFSP to work efficiently and effectively, but also to avoid the risk of making CFSP a tower of Babel of discordant indications and kafkian institutions that induce distrust in most external interlocutors.

5.3.5: Covenants, without a sword, are nothing but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all. (Thomas Hobbes, The Leviathan)

An account of the instruments of European foreign policy would not be complete without a reference to the construction of a European military capability, or rather, to be precise, to the absence of a European military capability in the years taken into consideration48.

As already mentioned, the London Report of 1981 explicitly stated that EPC was an appropriate forum for discussing "certain important foreign policy questions bearing on the political aspects of security". However, one thing was discussing problems related to security, and quite another was discussing "defence", given the open reluctance of some Member States to extend the EU's competencies in that direction.

Since the end of the Cold War, the need to provide the EU with a military force able to support and bolster the credibility of its political and economic action was increasingly an issue among the Member States. Of course the situation was complicated by the "complex variable geometry of diverging memberships between the EU, NATO and

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48 for a discussion of the question of "civilian power Europe" and the development of a European Security and Defence Policy, see Chapter One
WEU, and by the contradictory position of the United States, that wanted the Europeans to bear a greater share of the burden of Europe's security and defence, but not at the expenses of NATO's supremacy in the field. There is fierce debate among EU Member States about the advisability of developing an independent European military capability, as many see NATO as the only appropriate organisation to grant European security and to carry out military operations, and share the American determination to avoid the so called “three D’s”: “duplication” of existing capabilities and military structures, “decoupling” from NATO and “discrimination” against non-EU NATO allies, in favour of what Lord Robertson, Secretary General of NATO, has called the “three I’s”, “indivisibility” of the transatlantic link, “improvement” of the capabilities, “inclusiveness” of all allies.

Article J.4 of the Maastricht Treaty specifies that the CFSP “shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence”.

A few months later, in June 1992, the Western European Union issued the Petersberg Declaration, in which the different types of military tasks that the WEU might undertake were defined: military units of WEU Member States could be employed for humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.

With the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 the two threads (i.e. the EU common defence policy and the role of WEU) were tied with the incorporation of the “Petersberg tasks” in the new Article 17 of the EU Treaty: those tasks were therefore now recorded as part of the EU’s mission, even if the possibility of a merger between the EU and WEU was still distant.

Christopher Hill has thus described the aims of the creation of a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP): (i) to give the EU a limited but real military capability, especially in its own region, for peacekeeping if not peace enforcement; (ii) to allow the Western European Union (WEU) to be abolished, and thus the relationship between the

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49 Hill and Smith, op cit., 2000. Pg 194
51 Declaration by the Western European Union’s Council of Ministers (The Petersberg Declaration), Bonn, 19 June 1992. Part II, art. 4
EU and NATO to be made more honest; (iii) to bind the UK into EU foreign and security policy, and thus to boost the forces of solidarity\textsuperscript{52}.

Two other steps of this process are worth mentioning in this context: the Cologne European Council Declaration in 1999, which announced the end of the WEU by the start of 2001 and the arrival of a legitimate EU defence policy system\textsuperscript{53}, and the agreement reached by the Helsinki European Council, which set the “headline goal” of the establishment by 2003 of a 60,000-men force drawn from EU states that could be deployed for a year within 60 days, and of a political body to direct it.

It is relevant to underline the time parallel between the progressive incremental process of the construction of a EU foreign policy and the introduction of the military dimension, as if increased EU involvement in international affairs would almost inevitably bring about the necessity to back up any political stance with a credible military capability. This axiom might not be true in every instance but, as this thesis will argue, it certainly seems to apply almost always in the case of the EU’s aspiration to influence the Arab-Israeli peace process.

5.4: The case study: The use of European Foreign Policy Instruments in the case of the Arab-Israeli Peace Process

This chapter has hitherto conducted a critical analysis of the foreign policy instruments the EU has at its disposal; it will now proceed by examining and evaluating how the EU has used these instruments in dealing with the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP).

The time frame considered embraces the years between 1991 and 2002, however a reference to the previous years will be necessary, as certain patterns of action and characteristics of the European Union’s political stance towards the Arab-Israeli conflict took shape in the years of EPC.

Rather than following a strictly chronological order, the chapter will analyse the use of the different \textit{typology} of instruments:

- declaratory instruments
- operational instruments
- economic instruments
- strategic instruments

\textsuperscript{52} See Hill, C., \textit{EU Foreign Policy since 11 September 2001: Renationalising or Regrouping?}, First Annual EWC Guest Lecture, Europe in the World Centre, University of Liverpool, 24 October 2002

\textsuperscript{53} Conclusions of the European Council Meeting in Cologne, 3-4 June 1999
The aim is not to reconstruct step by step every single initiative the EU has taken with regard to the peace process, but rather to focus on the most significant ones, trying to establish in which instances the formulation of a Middle East policy has provided the opportunity, or been a - deliberately? - missed opportunity, for the EU to experiment new instruments, to foster political cooperation among the Member States and to draw closer to the objective of an efficient common foreign policy.

5.4.1: Declaratory instruments

European policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict and the subsequent peace process has in effect been mainly of a declaratory nature. In the years of EPC, when joint declarations were basically the only instrument available, the Member States availed themselves of this instrument profusely: in 1973, after the outbreak of the Yom Kippur war and very much as a reaction to the pressure deriving from the oil crisis, the then nine Member States managed to issue a joint declaration meant to outline Europe's position, but also to "gain Arab support with little hope of actually influencing events". The declaration, on the other hand, did include important points, such as the reference to the "legitimate rights of the Palestinians", to "the need for Israel to end the territorial occupation which it has maintained since the conflict of 1967" and to the persuasion that "negotiations must take place in the framework of the United Nations". If we tentatively identify three possible objectives of such a declaration, namely a) to actively influence the course of the crisis; b) to endeavour a captatio benevolentiae towards the Arabs; and c) to improve European cooperation at the political level, we'll see that at least two of them, b) and c), were to a certain extent achieved.

In effect the Arab Heads of State issued a statement expressing their satisfaction with the declaration. At the same time, with regards to European co-operation, it is possible to observe the utilisation of what has been called the "shield effect", i.e. the exploitation, on the part of some Member States, of the reflexive element (the need for European unity, the superior objective of reaching a common European position) as

54 see Chapter Two for a history of this phase
56 Declaration of the Nine Foreign Ministers on the Situation in the Middle East, Brussels 6 November 1973
justification for a stance which might not have been possible for individual governments to adopt independently at home\textsuperscript{37}.

It would be hardly possible to argue that this joint declaration actively contributed to influence the course of the events, but it must be underlined that under the combined pressure of the oil crisis and the perceived urgency of reaching a common European position, the EEC was able to lay down the foundations of what was to become the specific European position on the Arab-Israeli conflict.

A subsequent declaration is commonly regarded as a watershed in the EC's approach to the conflict: the Venice Declaration of 1980. The Declaration emphasised the right of the Palestinian people to full self-determination and the need to include the PLO in any peace negotiations; together with the previously mentioned request for full Israeli withdrawal and the appeal to the United Nation's deliberations on the matter, these were, and largely still are, the basic points of the EEC's stance.

Since 1980 the EEC, and then the EU, have continued to resort to the Joint Declaration instrument widely: the Maastricht European Council of December 1991 included a declaration on the Middle East, and almost every new development in the MEPP seemed to call for either a Resolution from the European Parliament, or for a Declaration from the European Council or the Council of the European Union\textsuperscript{58}. In these declarations the EU, within the framework of the political position adopted since the Venice Declaration, "condemns violence", "encourages dialogue", "reiterates condemnation", "reaffirms support", "welcomes progress", and so on.

As usual, before judging its effectiveness, the purpose of an action must be established. In this case, if the purpose of this abundance of resolutions and declarations was to obtain at least an harmonisation of the different Member States' positions on the MEPP, through the ongoing practice of political discussions and bargaining at the EU level prior to the formulation of the official declarations, then the objective was at least partly achieved, given the detectable trend towards the attainment of a "European perception", in a broad sense, of the Arab-Israeli problem and of the policy the EU should adopt.

On the other hand, if through the use of the Declarations the EU intended to influence directly the development of the peace process, it can hardly claim success.

\textsuperscript{37} Greilsammer and Weiler, \textit{op. cit.} In the case of Germany for example any deviation from a pro-Israeli position was very hard to realise without the excuse of European solidarity: see Chapter Four for an analysis of German, French, Italian and British policies

\textsuperscript{58} for an overview of the activities of the EC/EU Institution in relation to the peace process see \textit{The Middle East Peace Process and the European Union}, working paper, Directorate General for Research, European Parliament, Poli 115, 1999
There is, however, at least one exception to this otherwise unsatisfactory success rate of EU declaratory policy: the case of the Berlin European Council Declaration of 25 March 1999. In this instance the European Union, in coordination with the United States, was trying to persuade Mr. Arafat to postpone a unilateral declaration of independence, and calling for a resumption of final status negotiations with Israel.

What deserves to be highlighted in this case is the fact that the European Council, in order to encourage Mr Arafat to drop the idea of a unilateral action, offered in exchange the assurance that the European Union would in the future recognise a Palestinian State, and in the wording of the Declaration the Heads of State or Government decided not to mention the fact that every single Member State would be ready to recognise a Palestinian State, but rather referred to “the EU readiness to consider recognition of a Palestinian State in due course”. What is of great interest here is the implicit reference to a “right of intercourse” of the EU, and more specifically to the right to recognise other subjects of international law. As already discussed above, the EU has not been given legal personality, and therefore lacks the formal right to recognise third states; nevertheless, on this occasion an empirical analysis of the EU’s behaviour shows that the Union was making at least an implicit use of this capacity, and it is reasonable to suppose that the reason for choosing this course of action was the perception that an assurance to the Palestinian Authority in such terms would be by far more effective than the separate, albeit co-ordinated, initiatives of fifteen Member States. Here again, the combined effect of external pressures and the Member States’ desire to increase the EU’s political influence in external affairs brought about an initiative whose implications, if ever formalised, would have strongly significant consequences on the status of European political integration.

In April, the PLO Central Council decided to postpone the declaration of Palestinian statehood, and it can be surmised that the EU’s assurance that it would be ready to recognise a State of Palestine on condition that it be established through negotiations with Israel did have a role in influencing Arafat’s decision, especially considering the strong ties, particularly of an economic nature, between the Palestinian Authority and the European Union.
5.4.2: Operational instruments

The Treaty of Maastricht introduced a new operational instrument: the joint action. This definition, that refers to a legal instrument under Title V of the Treaty on European Union, means "co-ordinated action by the Member States whereby resources of all kinds (human resources, know-how, financing, equipment and so on) are mobilised to attain specific objectives fixed by the Council on the base of general guidelines from the European Council".

Since this instrument was introduced, the Middle East peace process has been the subject of numerous Joint Actions adopted by the Council. The first two were of a more declaratory nature, expressing the Union's general and unreserved support to the peace process. The third, however was indubitably more significant, as it provided the basis for the Union's major political and financial involvement in the preparation, observation, and coordination of international observation of the first Palestinian elections, and allocated a total funding of 17 million Ecu's.

Three days later the EU, represented by the President of the Council Mr Felipe Gonzales, signed as a witness the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (known as Taba Agreement or Oslo II). Of particular interest is Annex II of the Agreement, which is the Protocol concerning the Palestinian Elections: the Protocol provides that "the European Union will act as the coordinator for the activity of observer delegations" and specifies that "the European Union will only bear [...] liability in relation to members of the co-ordinating body and to the European Union observers and only to the extent that it explicitly agrees to do so". As Wessel has underlined, this latter provision "reveals the Union’s acceptance of a possible future liability on the basis of the Agreement and thus of its standing under international law." Considering that this Protocol was signed even before the Amsterdam Treaty

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59 see Glossary of institutions, policies and enlargement of the European Union: http://www.europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/cig/g4000j.htm
60 94/276/CFSP: Council Decision on a joint action in support of the Middle East peace process;
95/205/CFSP: Council Decision supplementing Joint Action 94/276
61 Council decision 95/403/CFSP of 25 September 1995
62 see 'The Role of the European Union in the Middle East Peace Process and its Future Assistance', Executive Summary of the Communication to the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament made by Manuel Marin, Vice President of the European Commission, European Commission, 26 January 1998
63 The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; Annex II: Protocol Concerning Elections; Article V, par.4. http://www.israel-mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH000qC0
and the introduction of Article 24 (which established for the Council the possibility of concluding international agreements) it can be argued that the EU made at least an implicit use of one of the capabilities that may proceed from legal personality, namely the treaty-making capacity.65

Arguably one of the most significant steps taken by the EU in its policy towards the peace process is the appointment in November 1996 of Mr Miguel Angel Moratinos as EU Special Envoy to the Middle East Peace Process, through the adoption of joint action no. 96/676/CFSP. The special envoy's mandate was subsequently extended and rectified with four more joint actions. The main objective of this appointment was to pursue better coordination of individual Member State policies; undeniably Mr Moratinos not only has contributed significantly to the preparation of common positions and the development of European initiatives aimed at promoting progress in the peace negotiations, but has also participated directly in many stages of these negotiations, earning the trust and respect of all the main actors involved. The real problem is that his action is hampered by the very terms of his mandate, which is formally quite broad but still provides that his action must take place in a strictly intergovernmental framework: he is guided by, and report under the authority of the Presidency, and also reports to the Council's bodies on a regular basis; as a result, his scope for autonomous initiative is very limited and tightly bound to the indications he receives from the Council. He cannot officially commit any Member State to any step which has not been

65 In his article Wessel recalls the definition of "treaty" provided in Article 2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organisations or between International Organisations (1986). A treaty is defined as "an international agreement governed by international law and concluded in written form [...] between international organisations, whether that agreement is embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation".


67 The annual mandate, successively prolonged by the Council of Ministers until today, gives wide-ranging responsibilities (see http://ue.eu.int/pesc/envoye/cv/moratinos/moratinos.htm), which include among others:

- To establish and maintain close contact with all the parties to the peace process, and all other key regional and international countries and organisations;
- To observe negotiations and to be ready to offer the EU's advice and good offices should the parties request this;
- To contribute, where requested, to the implementation of agreements reached between the parties, and to engage with them diplomatically in the event of non-compliance with the terms of these agreements;
- To engage constructively with signatories to agreements within the framework of the peace process in order to promote compliance with the basic norms of democracy, including respect of human rights and the rule of law.
previously agreed upon, and it is therefore hard to envisage for him a role beyond that of "facilitator" of the peace talks.

A further joint action worth mentioning is the one that established an EU Assistance Programme to support the Palestinian Authority in its efforts to counter terrorist activities emanating from the territories under its control. The programme was quite wide and included training in surveillance, the establishment of a technical investigation bureau with forensic capabilities, and training of management personnel of security and police agencies.

It could be argued that the EU's increasing involvement in the MEPP made a European contribution to the field of security inevitable, especially as the EU found itself struggling to change its role in the Middle East from "payer" to "player". The aspiration to become an important player with a higher degree of political responsibility is quite significantly hindered by the EU's lack of military instruments: in a situation such as the Arab-Israeli peace process - or rather conflict - in which the military dimension and security concerns are of foremost importance, even the huge economic commitment the EU has pledged over the years has not been sufficient to enable it to directly influence the political development of the process.

5.4.3: Economic instruments

The European Union has made widespread use of economic instruments for political ends through the development of economic support for the Palestine Authority.

The EU's economic support of the peace process is indeed enormous; the EU is in fact:

- the largest donor of non-military aid to the MEPP. The EU's total economic support on average goes beyond 810 million euros a year in EC grants and EIB loans (747 million euros in 1999).

- The first donor of financial and technical assistance to the Palestinian Authority, providing over 50% of the international community's financing of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 1994 and 1998 (grants and loans from the EU and its Member States during that period total 1.5 billion euro).

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68 no. 97/289/CFSP, subsequently extended in 1999 to 31 May 2002
Total aid to the Palestinians for the 1994-1998 period amounts to 2 billion euros.

- The first trading partner and major economic, scientific and research partner of Israel, and the major political and economic partner of Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Egypt

At the 1 October 1993 Washington Donors’ Conference, the international community pledged US$ 2.4 billion to a plan to put the Palestinian economy on its way to development in five years (1994-98). The graphs below illustrate (1) the pledges for 1994-98 (total US$ 2.3 Billion), and (2) the real commitments in the years between 1993-97 (total US$ 2.8 Billion):

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70 see [http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/mepp/index.htm](http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/mepp/index.htm)

1: Pledges for 1994-98 (clockwise from USA 22%)

2: Real commitments 1993-1997 (clockwise from USA 10%)
And below is a graph of the Comparison Pledges 1993-Commitments 1997

At the 1998 Washington ministerial donor conference the EU pledged 400 million Euros for the period 1999 to 2003. Largely because of the emergency need that arose after the outbreak of the second Intifada this amount has already been exceeded: from 1993 to the end of 2001 the EU had committed approximately 1 billion Euros in grants and loans, and a further 407 million in contributions to UNRWA; these figures do not include additional bilateral EU Member State assistance.

The EU is also Gavel holder of the Regional Economic Development Working Group (REDWG) within the multilateral framework of the Peace Process, and co-organiser of the working groups on environment, water and refugees.

Furthermore, the EU promotes regional dialogue and co-operation through the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (or Barcelona Process) which operates both at the multilateral and bilateral levels with the declared long-term goal of progressively establishing an area of regional security and free trade, the latter to be achieved by the target date of 2010.

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72 Source: European Commission : internal paper, May 2002, courtesy of Christoph Heusgen, Director of the Policy Unit, Council of the European Union. Interviewed in May 2002. For a complete chart of EC aid to Mashreq in the years 1995-1999 see Appendix, p. 164

73 The partners are Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey and the Palestinian Authority
At the bilateral level, the strategy consists of concluding Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements between the Union and its twelve Mediterranean partners\(^74\), and establishing national indicative programmes for financial assistance under the Community's MEDA programme\(^75\). Association Agreements between the EU and Tunisia, Israel, Morocco and the Palestinian Authority (interim agreement) have already entered into force; negotiations with Egypt were concluded in June 1999 and the Agreement signed in June 2001; negotiations with Algeria were concluded in December 2001, and those with Lebanon in January 2002. As the Agreements are of a "mixed" type (drawing on both European Community and Member States' competences - the latter concerning the second and third EU pillar), after signature they have to undergo a lengthy ratification process by the national parliaments of the EU Member States.

In the multilateral or regional track, since 1995, the EU and its Mediterranean Partners have developed an architecture of regularly meeting coordination bodies including Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Ministers conferences. The Euro-Mediterranean Committee for the Barcelona Process, composed of representatives of the EU and the Mediterranean Partners\(^76\), meets on average every three months, to ensure the overall guidance of the established work programme on regional cooperation. Together with rotating EU Presidencies, the Commission is responsible for the coordination, preparation and monitoring of this process for the Union; furthermore, it is entrusted with the appraisal and implementation of political and security, economic and financial, social and cultural partnership activities in the fields described by the Barcelona Work Programme and by subsequent decisions of Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Ministers, particularly those which are financed from the EU budget.

\(^74\) The provisions of the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements governing bilateral relations vary from one Mediterranean Partner to the other but have certain aspects in common: a) Political dialogue b) Respect for human rights and democracy c) Establishment of WTO-compatible free trade over a transitional period of up to 12 years d) Provisions relating to intellectual property, services, public procurement, competition rules, state aids and monopolies e) Economic cooperation in a wide range of sectors f) Cooperation relating to social affairs and migration (including re-admission of illegal immigrants) g) Cultural cooperation. See http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/euromed/med_ass_agreements.htm

\(^75\) The MEDA programme is the principal financial instrument of the European Union for the implementation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. The Programme offers technical and financial support measures to accompany the reform of economic and social structures in the Mediterranean partner countries. The first legal basis of the MEDA programme was 1996 MEDA Regulation (Council Regulation no1488/96) for the period of 1995-1999 where the programme accounted for € 3.435 million. On November 2000 a new improved regulation (Nr.2698/2000) establishing MEDA II for the period of 2000-2006 was adopted. The funding of the new programme amounts to € 5.35 billion. Source: http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/euromed/meda.htm

\(^76\) The Committee is chaired by the EU Presidency and consists of the EU Troika, Mediterranean Partners, and European Commission representatives (Member States not in the EU Troika also participate).
The Barcelona Process was meant to develop separately from the peace process but to contribute indirectly to it by offering confidence building measures and an alternative forum in which the parties involved in the peace process could continue to meet even when the peace process were stalled. This strategy, as it has already been pointed out in Chapter Three of this study, has not indeed proved to be completely successful: even though the parties did meet in the framework of the Barcelona Process, progress in the various field has always been dependent on the state of the peace process and when the latter has been either in difficulties or completely in ruins like in the last two and a half years the Barcelona Process has been directly and negatively affected almost to the point of paralysis.

5.4.4: Strategic instruments

It would be far fetched to claim that the EU has been able to devise a comprehensive and coherent strategy with regard to the Middle East peace process. In this context however, it is worth mentioning the adoption, in June 2000, of a Common Strategy meant to set out the European Union’s policy in the Mediterranean Region. As just pointed out, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has found in the MEPP, from which it is formally separate, the main obstacle to its progress. The Common Mediterranean Strategy not only acknowledges the inevitable link between any possible progress in the field of regional co-operation and a successful outcome of the peace process, but in paragraph 15 goes as far to state: “The EU will, in the context of a comprehensive settlement, and upon request by the core parties, give consideration to the participation of Member States in the implementation of security arrangements on the ground.”

Once again the Member States found themselves confronted with the old dilemma: either step up the level and quality of Europe’s involvement through coordination of the national policies and full employment of the instruments at EU’s disposal, or renounce the aspiration to play a significant role and to exert political influence on the parties involved. And once again the solution devised was a compromise between the two options: in fact, although this document does take into consideration the hypothesis of participating in the implementation of security arrangements on the ground, it is

Committee acts as an overall steering body for the regional process with the right to initiate activities to be financed in accordance with the MEDA Regional Indicative Programme
nevertheless contingent upon a full peace agreement being in existence\textsuperscript{77}, therefore acknowledging implicitly that the EU Common Strategy was not going to contribute directly to achieving the final settlement itself.

\textbf{5.5 Conclusion}

In this chapter a legal institutional analysis of EU Common Foreign and Security Policy instruments has been carried out, with a subsequent analysis of how these instruments have been used by Member States in shaping the EU’s policy towards the Arab-Israeli peace process. The ultimate purpose of this analysis has been to establish whether CFSP instruments are misused or under-utilised by the Member States, and if they are quantitatively insufficient or qualitatively inadequate.

The following conclusions can be drawn on the basis of the analysis conducted:

The instruments of EU foreign policy appear to be indeed inadequate to deal with certain foreign policy issues, especially those in which the security dimension is of primary importance. In particular, the lack of military instruments appears to have a very negative effect on the EU’s chances of influencing the Middle East peace process and becoming an acknowledged and accepted mediator. Without military instruments, the credibility of EU policy is seriously diminished and the parties involved - Israel without a doubt, but also the Arabs - turn to the US, who is the security manager of the region and whose military power contributes to making it a credible mediator, as well as the only accepted one. As Sir Brian Crowe has put it, the EU is very unlikely to develop the amount of military power that would be needed to emerge effectively from the sidelines and contribute to the security dimension of the peace process; however, if the goal of building a European military force will be achieved, the EU might in the future be able to participate to peace keeping operations in the context of a UN or NATO-sanctioned initiative in the area, thus adding a crucial dimension to its participation to the peace process\textsuperscript{78}.

\textsuperscript{77} see Musu, C., in "The Common Strategy of the European Union in the Mediterranean Region", Select Committee on European Union (Sub-Committee C), Ninth Report., House of Lords Reports, London, 2001. It should be noted that the Document of the Common Strategy was drafted in June, when there were still high hopes that the Peace Process was at a turning point and that the Camp David talks would eventually bring close to a peaceful agreement.
If one looks beyond the problem of the lack of military instruments, CFSP instruments do not emerge as insufficient: outside the military dimension in fact, the EU has at its disposal a wide variety of instruments.

These instruments have been categorised in this chapter as declaratory, operational, economic and strategic. All of these instruments have been largely, if not always successfully, used by the EU in its policy towards the Middle East peace process. Moreover, as demonstrated in this chapter, the Member States have also made implicit use of certain capabilities that derive from an "implicit attribution" of legal personality to the EU, namely the treaty-making capacity and the right to recognise other subjects of international law. An empirical examination of the EU's behaviour can actually provide the grounds for the argument that the Member States have on some occasions "forced" the formal limits of the EU and operated as if the Union were an international legal person. One of the political successes of the EU in its policy towards the peace process - the above mentioned Berlin European Council Declaration of 25 March 1999 - is in fact the result of the use of one of these instruments.

The inadequacy of the institutions in charge, and the bureaucratic complexity which characterise all levels of EU policymaking, have led to a misuse of CFSP instruments (i.e. the instruments are not appropriately and effectively used by the European governments). This is quite clear, for instance, in the case of the Special Envoy and of the High Representative, whose actions have only very recently (in 2001) been officially coordinated in order to avoid overlapping of competencies and inefficiencies, and in the difficult and often inefficient coordination of first- and second-pillar action in external relations.

Finally it can be argued that the instruments at the EU's disposal are not underutilised by the Member States, but rather left undeveloped. There are different reasons behind this behaviour, such as the persistent desire of the Member States to maintain control over their foreign policy, their reluctance to proceed too speedily in the direction of political integration in the Union, and the inability to find common interests of sufficient number to justify, in their view, the renunciation of the particularism of national foreign policies and priorities, for the sake of the higher objective of achieving a common European policy. Once again, the cases of the Special Envoy and the High

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78 Author's interview with Sir Brian Crowe, Former Director-General for External and Politico-Military
Representative are particularly significant. Their potential role is not fully exploited by the Member States to enhance the EU’s role in the international arena. Rather, their scope for action is strictly regulated by the rules of intergovernmental cooperation, and their inability to commit the Member States to any type of action arguably symbolises the continuing unwillingness of most European governments to give up what they consider should be the domain of the Nation State.
Chapter Six

Transatlantic Relations and the Middle East
Patterns of Continuity and Change: 1991-2002

6.1: Introduction

This chapter focuses on American and European policy in the Greater Middle East\(^1\) and on the state of transatlantic relations in this region of crucial importance for both the US and the EU\(^2\). The guiding thread of the chapter is an analysis of the elements of convergence and divergence in American and European policies towards the region, with the objective of identifying the patterns of continuity and change that characterise the dynamics of the transatlantic relationship in this extremely contentious issue-area.

The analysis conducted in this chapter focuses on both European and American policies towards the Arab-Israeli peace process and towards the Greater Middle East in general, with particular attention to policies on the rogue states: the reason for this wider focus lies in the close interrelation existing between the two policies, which are inextricably connected and need to be analysed in parallel in order to understand the dynamics of reciprocal influence.

A number of interviews have been conducted in the course of this research\(^3\), with diplomats, Member States’ policy makers, academics, and Brussels-based officials. Each of these people have contributed a different view of the question of EU’s role in the Middle East but, by and large, they have all agreed on one point: the dynamics of transatlantic relations are crucial to understand the EU’s Middle East policy.

The central argument of the chapter is that strategic US interests in the Middle East and the dynamics of EU-US relations have relegated the EU to a secondary role in the Middle East peace process.

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\(^1\) One preliminary clarification should be made at this point: the expression “Greater Middle East” in this context refers to a region that also embraces the Maghreb, the Mashreq and the Persian Gulf. For convenience, throughout the chapter the expression “Middle East” will be used, and specific references to single countries in the region will be made when necessary.


\(^3\) for a list of the persons interviewd see Bibliography, p.
As Sir Brian Crowe has suggested during an interview with the author, even France, despite its efforts to promote both France’s and EU’s role in the Middle East⁴, considers the United States the only credible mediator in the peace process⁵.

As has already emerged from the analysis conducted in the previous chapters, the Middle East has indeed always been a highly controversial issue in transatlantic relations, sparking off some of the harshest instances of confrontation between the United States and Europe⁶: this was the case in 1973 during the oil crisis, when Europe’s Arab policy in response to the oil boycott outraged the American administration, that considered it an interference in both its small-steps strategy towards the Arab-Israeli dispute and in its construction of an “oil consumers front” by means of a new International Energy Agency; and contrasts arose again less than ten years later, in 1980, when the EC’s Venice Declaration on the Arab-Israeli conflict caused discontent – to say the least – in Washington, where Europe’s emphasis on the centrality of the Palestinian question and on the legitimacy of the PLO were seen as extremely untimely and potentially damaging to the peace process that had started in Camp David.

It may be argued that some of the patterns of US-European interaction in the Middle East began taking shape already at the time of the events mentioned above, with the United States progressively deepening their engagement in the region and becoming the main mediator in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the EC confined to a subordinated role, constrained and conditioned in its action by internal divisions, institutional inadequacies and a heavy dependence on Middle Eastern oil, but also by American reluctance to share the “driving seat” in the peace process and by the rigid dynamics of the Cold War – of which the Middle East was hostage – which allowed Europe very little leeway, caught as it was in the middle of a confrontation between superpowers.

In the last twelve years, a number of successive crucial events have transformed both the Middle East and the interrelations between the United States and the EU in the

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⁴ see Chapter Four
⁵ Author’s interview with Sir Brian Crowe (Former Director-General for External and Politico-Military Affairs, General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union). According to Sir Crowe in 2000 Hubert Vedrine referred to the US role in the peace process as “the only show in town”
region. The end of the Cold War totally modified the balance of power in the area, leaving the US as the sole superpower. The Gulf War transformed the dynamics of inter-regional relations, creating a window of opportunity for a resolution of the Arab-Israeli dispute and strengthening the role of the US as the only accepted mediator. The ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht and the creation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) marked an acceleration in the process of European political integration and in the transformation of the EU into a global actor, increasing its aspirations - and also its chances - of playing a more relevant role in the Middle East.

More recently, the election of George W. Bush and his initial apparent disengagement from the Arab-Israeli conflict created a brief political vacuum, that the EU, nonetheless, proved unable or unwilling to fill. The September 11 attacks, though, have forced the Bush Administration back into Middle East policy, and the war on terror has made necessary a reappraisal of their overall strategy and approach to the region as a whole. The redefinition of American strategy has had an immediate effect on the EU's role, opening up, on the one hand, some windows of opportunity for a greater European involvement in the Middle East, and in particular in the peace process, while on the other reducing Europe's margin for action with regards to some specific issues - such as its policy towards rogue states - given the increasingly unilateralist approach adopted by the American administration.

In this framework, this chapter conducts a two-level analysis:

The first level of analysis is concerned with a study of the elements of convergence and divergence in US and EU policies towards the Middle East and addresses the following issues:

- To what extent are the basic interests of the US and the EU similar and compatible?
- On what issues can convergence between US and EU policies towards the Middle East be said to exist?

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- Is convergence actually generated by a shared political vision or rather by the EU’s inability to challenge American supremacy?
- Are the divergent political approaches to defining and dealing with rogue states a symptom of radically different assumptions about the region and about the nature of threats from the region?
- Are American and European approaches to the Arab-Israeli peace process irreconcilable, or rather different but complementary?

The second level of analysis focuses on the patterns of continuity and change that characterise the dynamics of the transatlantic relationship in the Middle East, and tries to answer the following questions:

- What elements - of convergence and divergence - are long-term features in American and European policies towards the region, and have “resisted” untouched by all the upheavals of the last decade, including the failure of the Oslo process, the election of President Bush, and the September 11 attacks? May elements such as the EU’s inability to overcome its internal divisions in formulating its Middle East policy, its reluctance to forsake the security umbrella offered by the United States in the region, or the US and the EU’s approaches to the peace process or to countries like Iran and Iraq (dual containment strategy versus critical engagement) be included in this category?
- What events have actually brought about significant changes in US and EU policies, modifying the trend of continuity in the transatlantic relations in the Middle East? Can we inscribe in this category phenomena such as the progressive building of a European political identity and the institutional consolidation of the EU with the introduction of the High Representative for CFSP? Or the recent change in American priorities with the adoption of the “Bush Doctrine” and the strategy for the war on terror, which have seemingly encouraged the US to adopt a multilateral approach to the Arab-Israeli peace process, therefore creating perhaps an opportunity of strengthened co-operation with the EU through the so called “Madrid Quartet”, while on the other hand pushing the US towards unilateralism in dealing with perceived threats from the region and with rogues states?
6.2: EU and US Policies towards the Middle East
Elements of Convergence and Divergence

The first step in the direction of identifying the elements of convergence and divergence in EU and US policies towards the Middle East is to analyse their respective interests in the region in order to establish if they differ, and if so to what extent. This analysis of US and EU interests in the Middle East is essential in understanding their long term strategies on the one hand, and, on the other, to what extent the pursuit of different policies is an expression of different underlying interests, or rather of a different perception of the strategies necessary to pursue interests that are, on the whole, quite similar.

The complexities of both American and European relations and ties with the Middle East are such that any categorisation of their interests in the region will necessarily be incomplete; however for the purpose of this analysis three main interests can be identified:

- The settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict
- The free flow of oil
- Regional stability and prosperity

As this study will show, these are all interests that both the US and the EU share; however, a closer analysis of the policies pursued by each will reveal how the strategies and policy choices differ, and at times diverge.

These shared American and European interests are threatened by various dangerous trends, which may in turn be categorised as follows:

- Regional instability
- The threat posed by rogue States and by the diffusion of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
- The spread of terrorism

The analysis conducted in this section will be structured as follows: first it will focus on the Arab-Israeli peace process, devoting special attention to the different approaches of the US and the EU towards this issue and to the reasons behind their differing policies; it will then focus on the problem of free access to oil and on the importance of regional stability. Finally it will analyses the factors that constitute a threat to these European and American interests and the different policy responses.
In analysing American and European approaches to the problem of the Arab-Israeli conflict it emerges that divergence is more about policies and priorities that it is about interests: the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict is undeniably a shared interest of both the United States and the European Union, as the political instability and potential dangers that derive from the continuation of this dispute affect the US and the EU alike. However, the view they have of the conflict and of the appropriate strategies for solving it, and their relations with the parties involved, diverge markedly – to say the least.

Much has been said already in this and in the previous chapters about EU and US policy towards the Arab-Israeli peace process, but in this context it is worth mentioning some specific aspects of these policies that can help to compare and contrast EU and US attitudes.

The most standard characterisation that is normally given of the different American and European attitudes is that the US is more supportive of Israel whereas the EU tends to be more pro-Arab. Apart from the clear over-simplification and the obvious difficulty in labelling any policy as a “EU” unitary policy or stance, this description does hold a part of truth.

There are many reasons for American support of Israel, some of the main factors being:

- The presence in the United States of a strong, organised and well-funded Jewish lobby, able to exercise its influence both on the US Congress and on the President, who cannot afford to neglect the broad Jewish electorate.
- Sympathy for the Jewish community tied to the catastrophe of the Shoah
- An underlying cultural affinity between the two countries, both new, immigrant-absorbing, democratic societies


12 Given the size of the Jewish population in the US, of approximately 5.700.000 people, the biggest Jewish communities being in New York (1.900.000), Los Angeles (585.000) and Miami (535.000), such lobbies can rely on extensive resources. Source of the figures: World Jewish Congress, www.wjc.org.il

13 see Gordon, P.H., op. cit., p29
• The common Israeli and American interest in regional peace, security, openness and prosperity\(^{14}\)

• Israel's potential as a useful strategic regional partner for the United States, thanks to its role in fighting opponents of American interests and influence in the area such as Syria, Iran and Iraq

• The possibility of US-Israel military collaboration, through enhanced cooperation on counter-terrorism, various form of defence against ballistic missiles, American use of Israeli air space or collaboration between intelligence agencies (the precondition for this cooperation being - however - an easing of the Arab-Israeli conflict that would allow the open involvement of Israel in military operations in the region)

On issues tied to the peace process between Israel and the Arab states and between Israel and the Palestinians, American and Israeli positions are aligned: according to the American vision, the United States' function should be that of facilitating talks and negotiations between the two parties, not imposing predetermined solutions\(^{15}\).

An effective description of America's perception of its role in the peace process is one given by Middle East expert Stephen Cohen "In [...] the Arab-Israeli conflict there is such a struggle of wills within the competing parties, and between the competing parties, and the forces for and against change are so evenly balanced, that only a third party - with a clear vision - can swing things toward compromise. That is America's role. [Also] the parties themselves are always going to be focused on the immediate costs of doing something because the positive outcomes seem remote or even unlikely to them. Which is why they'll need [America's] push."\(^{16}\).

This role of the US as facilitator is also the one favoured by Israel, who does not welcome the idea of a mediator who wants to enforce its strategy against the will of the negotiating parties. The United States have been indeed quite reluctant to exercise strong pressures on Israel – because of domestic reasons (the Jewish vote and the pressures of the Jewish lobby) but also because of their perception of the issues at stake (American understanding of Israeli security concerns) - particularly on questions such


as the withdrawal from the Golan Heights or the problem of the return of the Palestinian refugees and their descendants to Israel; furthermore, there is a degree of flexibility on America’s part regarding United Nations resolutions on issues such as the status of Jerusalem, that in Washington’s view can only be determined by direct negotiations among the parties involved; the United States do not actually consider the UN an appropriate forum for debating issues that are the object of direct negotiations between Arabs and Israelis.

As for the European Union, the first comment to make is the usual disclaimer that most of the time applies to EU foreign policy, i.e. that the Member States do not share a common position, but rather a series of varying positions that, at times, converge more strongly\(^\text{17}\). This is indeed one of the main impediments to a truly effective and high profile involvement of Europe in the peace process, to which a number of other factors must be added:

- Europe’s image as being too supportive of the Arabs, which causes Israel to be wary of an extensive EU involvement in the negotiations
- The diplomatic strategy favoured by the EU, which is rejected by the Israeli
- The European Union’s lack of military instruments, that renders the EU unable to contribute directly to the security dimension of the negotiations (even though most of its Member States have participated in UN peacekeeping forces)

It must not be forgotten that, even though there are in Europe long-established Jewish communities, they are by far not as numerous, well organised or influential as the American Jewish communities\(^\text{18}\). There is on the other hand in Europe a significant Muslim presence (ca. 15 millions people. This figure includes the Turkish immigrants) which has accustomed rising generations to its diverse culture. Political dialogue, social interaction, and economic and financial interdependence have contributed to build links between elites; integration however have not always taken place easily or successfully and very often Muslim immigrants and their descendants represent the poorest layer of the population. The Muslim communities have only recently started to organise themselves politically and do not exercise political influence directly over the various governments; obviously though, the presence itself of these large communities of

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\(^{17}\) and that have been analysed in detail in Chapter Four of the thesis

\(^{18}\) The British Jewish community amounts to ca. 280.000 people, the French to ca. 600.000, the German to 100.000. Source of the figures: World Jewish Congress, www.wjc.org.il
immigrants does pose a constraint on European governments' actions and creates concerns for potential internal instability and security problems originating also from possible discontent regarding policies towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. These factors do contribute to generate a certain cautiousness in EU's policy towards the Arab world which, coupled with the historical ties of many Member States with the region, the close economic relations between the EU and a number of Arab states and the peculiarity of Europe's relations with Israel because of the historical legacy of the past, causes Israel to perceive Europe as biased in favour of the Arabs and to be, by and large, opposed to a EU role in the peace process.

A further important fact is that the European diplomatic approach to the peace process differs significantly from that of Israel and the United States. Europe has followed a well-defined policy with the clearly identifiable guidelines: focus on immediate results rather than on the process and the negotiation themselves, reiterated appeals to United Nations resolutions, emphasis repeatedly placed on the need for the issues on the floor to be taken on globally, within the context of international peace conferences.

This different approach to the peace process creates a deep fracture between the EU and both Israel and the United States: the Israeli diplomatic approach - supported by the United States - is in fact geared to affording the utmost priority to bilateral contacts, possibly supported by an external party acting as facilitator. Bilateral contacts are considered by Israel not only necessary, but almost a precondition for each set of talks. The origin of the Israeli diplomatic strategy may lie in part in the will to discuss different issues separately, optimising negotiating power and potential leverage; on the other hand, a further crucial objective is to meet with the counterpart in a context...
where mutual recognition and mutual acceptance as legitimate interlocutors are indubitable. Together with security, diplomatic recognition is incontrovertibly a central priority of Israeli policy.

The EU’s repeated requests for an immediate Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza and from the Golan Heights cause Israel to consider Europe not sufficiently understanding and supportive with regards to its need for security guarantees, deemed vital for the very survival of the State of Israel. Besides, EU’s lack of military instruments, and therefore obvious inability to guarantee security and to contribute directly to the military dimension of the peace process, relegates automatically the EU to a secondary role in the negotiations until a final settlement will be reached. In this phase indeed EU role continues to be linked to the development of financial assistance to the Palestinian Authority, used as a substitute for a foreign policy: in other words the EU makes use of economic instruments for political ends, as so often has been the case since the creation of EPC.

The American position is rather ambivalent: the United States are wary of a strong European involvement in the talks, and are set on safeguarding their primary mediation role in the peace process, also in order to protect American interests most effectively.

Yet the US are happy to leave Europe with the burden of financial assistance to the Palestinian Authority: within the burden-sharing dynamic Washington does not welcome the idea of a free-riding EU that exploits the security coverage offered by the US – the sole security manager of the region - without offering at least the limited assistance within its power - limited diplomatically speaking, but substantial in economic terms. Furthermore, the United States are aware that economic growth of the Palestinian Authority is a necessary precondition for the consolidation of the peace process, and are willing to acknowledge a prominent role for the EU in this field, as long as it remains politically in line with American strategy.

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6.2.2: EU and US Interests in the Middle East

The Free Flow of Oil

Europe and the United States share a dependence on oil from the Middle East to guarantee their economic prosperity and would both suffer greatly were access to such an important energy supply be limited, as they would from a sudden rise in oil prices. The need to ensure the free flow of oil has often been one of the vital reasons behind interventions of a military nature in the region, from the Suez invasion to the Earnest Will Operation during the Iran-Iraq war, when the United States escorted ships loaded with Kuwaiti oil, and on to Operations Desert Storm and Iraq Freedom against Saddam Hussein's Iraq.

It has been underlined, for example by Philip H. Gordon, that while the free flow of oil is a shared interest for the United States and Europe, their dependence on Middle Eastern oil is not the same: European Union member states — with the exception of Great Britain, that has its own oil reserves — depend on imported supplies in the measure of almost 50% of their energy, and almost 60% of the energy imported by Europe comes from the Middle East and North Africa, against a 20-25% share of the United States’ imported energy. According to some projections, in 2010 Europe will import up to 8 million barrels of oil per day from the Gulf alone, compared to less than 4.5 million by the US.

However, it should not be forgotten that the global oil market is essentially a single market and that US imports have increased rapidly over the last 15 years, while European imports have remained relatively stable.

American dependence on OPEC oil in the mid-1990s, indeed, was far higher than the British or German (for which North Sea oil provided secure supply), though

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26 see Appendix: EU Oil Imports, p. 172; US Annual Net Oil Imports, p. 173
28 The operation was originally to be called Operation Iraq Liberation, but the acronym (i.e. OIL) was thought to be inappropriate and the name was therefore changed
29 Gordon, P.H., The Transatlantic Allies and the Changing Middle East, p. 31
considerably lower than France or Italy's. Overall American oil consumption and imports, furthermore, rose steadily throughout the 1990s, as higher taxation and energy conservation in Europe held oil consumption and dependence levels stable\textsuperscript{32}. American interests in oil imports from the Middle East are in fact at least as strong as Europe's. Oil plays a key role in US energy security, providing approximately 40\% of the total annual energy requirements of the United States. The United States is actually the world's number one consumer of oil, with a consumption of 20 million barrels of oil per day, or one fifth of the world total. Of these 20 million barrels, the United States imports 9 million; its domestic production is declining, while its consumption is rising\textsuperscript{33}.

The United States depends on the Gulf/Middle East region for only about one quarter of its direct oil imports, as US imports primarily from Mexico, Canada and Venezuela\textsuperscript{34}, whose geographic proximity allows for minimal transport costs. However, given that oil is a fungible commodity, the United States is ultimately dependent on Arab/Gulf oil as a consequence of the entire world's dependence on Gulf oil. Considering the Middle East/Gulf region's hefty percentage of world oil production, any disruption in Gulf oil supply would force those countries that directly import high quantities of oil from the Gulf to try to buy from different suppliers, including those from which the United States imports heavily. Such competition would inevitably cause a dramatic increase in the price of crude oil for all consumers and thus impact on the US economy.

The cost for the United States of past oil price shocks and supply manipulation by the OPEC cartel has been enormous. Estimates place the cumulative costs from 1972 to 1991 at over 4 trillion 1993 US dollars. According to a study drafted in 1995 for the Office of Transportation Technology of the U.S. Department of Energy\textsuperscript{35}, future oil price shocks would be just as harmful to the US economy as those of the past. As the report says "[...] fundamental economics ordains that the potential market power of the OPEC cartel depends on its market share, the ability of consumers to reduce oil use in response to higher prices, and the ability of the rest of the world producers to expand oil production."

\textsuperscript{33} See Policy Brief No.3: Congressional Staff Briefing on "U.S. Challenges and Choices in the Gulf: Energy Security", jointly sponsored by the Atlantic Council of the United States, the Middle East Institute, the Middle East Policy Council and the Stanley Foundation; 10 May 2002. For a chart of US Net Annual Oil Import Data see the Appendix, p. 173
supply in response to a reduction by the cartel. Not only is OPEC's market share rising towards its historic high point, but recent studies provide no evidence of increases in the price elasticities of world oil supply and demand\(^{36}\). Greater market share and continuing oil dependence on OPEC oil will give the cartel the opportunity to raise oil prices. Studies reaffirm that oil price increases cause gross national product (GNP) to fall and prices to rise and suggest no significant differences between the impacts on the US economy of the 1990 price shock and those of 1973-74 and 1979-80 [...]". The reason for this situation is that little has changed compared to the past. According to the US Department of Energy figures, the cost of oil as percentage of US GNP was 1.5% in 1973 and 1.5% also in 1992. Oil imports covered 35% of US oil consumption in 1973 and peaked at 46.5% in 1977. US petroleum imports were 44% in 1993, 46% in 1994 and 55.5% in 2001\(^{37}\).

The ongoing availability of reliable sources of oil remains therefore crucial for the prosperity of the United States as well as Europe's. The United States use economic and diplomatic means to guarantee this availability, backed up by a huge military force and by the credible threat that they are ready to use it should the need arise.

One of the pillars of American oil policy has been the construction of a close relationship with Saudi Arabia\(^{38}\), whose supplies represent a relevant share of the oil imported by the United States, providing about 20% of total U.S. crude imports and 10% of U.S. consumption. It must be considered that the global oil market consists of two main consumer regions (the Atlantic and the Asia Pacific) and one main producer region (the Middle East); among global oil producers, Saudi Arabia, with its substantial oil reserves and excess production capacity, occupies a central place. Russian oil cannot be more than a partial substitute for Saudi oil, in part because the poor extraction technologies used in the Soviet period have degraded the remaining reserves, which are in any event far smaller than Saudi reserves. As for oil from the Caspian region, not

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\(^{36}\) In other words, there is an inability of supply and demand to respond quickly to shocks; this explains why prices can double or triple as a result of very small changes in supply.


only are the necessary pipelines still under construction, but strong doubts remain on whether its resources will ever be able to replace Saudi oil.\(^{39}\)

Over the years the United States and Saudi Arabia have become strategic partners and have a record of close co-operation: apart from ensuring the stable supply and price of oil on the world market, during the Cold War Saudi Arabia played a key role in meeting a number of US foreign policy objectives, including assistance in the effort to expel the Soviet Union from Afghanistan.\(^{40}\) On the other hand, American partnership with Saudi Arabia has proved to be difficult to reconcile with the USA’s close relationship with Israel (which will be discussed later in this chapter).

As already underlined, the free flow of oil has often been one of the vital reasons behind interventions of a military nature in the region, and in the 90’s the United States repeatedly demonstrated they are prepared to use military means to guarantee access to oil for themselves and for their friends and allies. As for the European states, they are obviously vulnerable to a possible interruption of their fuel supplies from North Africa, the Gulf or the Middle East\(^{41}\) but, to use John Roper’s words “they do not go on to analyse how a military response to this challenge could be organised.”\(^{42}\) The European Union’s strong dependence on Middle Eastern oil\(^{43}\) rather leads Europe to pursue policies that are geared to avoiding the direct hostility of the Arab world, and induce it to distance itself, within reason, from the harsher and more confrontational policy pursued by the US. Furthermore, as we shall see more in detail later in this chapter, through the use of economic instruments for political purposes, the EU Member States have tried to build close relations with crucial oil producer states in an attempt to be shielded from a possible oil supply crises.

\(^{39}\) See Policy Brief No.1: Congressional Staff Briefing on “U.S. Challenges and Choices in the Gulf: Saudi Arabia”, jointly sponsored by the Atlantic Council of the United States, the Middle East Institute, the Middle East Policy Council and the Stanley Foundation, 14 December 2001

\(^{40}\) Furthermore, The U.S. is Saudi Arabia’s largest trading partner, and Saudi Arabia is the largest U.S. export market in the Middle East. Source: Global Security.org; for an analysis of US Central Command (CentCom) facilities and of American relations with the countries of the area see http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/saudi-arabia.htm


\(^{43}\) 13.8% of EU oil imports come from Saudi Arabia, 9.1% from Libya, 6.9% from Iran and 6.4 from Iraq. Source: European Commission Services, 2000. For a complete chart of EU oil imports see Appendix, p.172
Containment towards Iran and Iraq, with the aim of weakening both countries through strict economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation, most EU Member States favoured a “Critical Engagement” approach with these regimes, in order to promote dialogue and trade relations which - in their view - would afford them the leverage to moderate difficult government behaviour. The same difference between American and European approaches is evident in policy towards Libya.

The main sources of friction in US-Iranian relations may be broken down into three categories: 1) Iranian support of violent opposition to Israel (military, economic and political support to Hezbollah, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad); 2) Iranian attempts to acquire weapons of mass destruction; 3) Iranian aspiration to regional hegemony (it is against the interest of the US to allow any hostile country to dominate the Gulf and/or access to the Gulf’s energy supplies).

However, the American policy of containment towards Iran, also rooted in the history of US relations with Iran, in the trauma of the 1979 Revolution and in the hostage crisis, is not without critics, both at home and abroad. What is viewed as particularly dubious is the effectiveness of coercive diplomacy and unilateral sanctions in compelling Iranian leaders to give up WMD options. As underlined by a report sponsored by the Atlantic Council of the United States, the Middle East Institute, the Middle East Policy Council and the Stanley Foundation, “many experts believe that even with US sanctions in place, Iran has enough money to spend freely on WMD development. According to this logic, a lifting of US economic sanctions - which have in any case proven less effective over time - need not automatically lead to higher Iranian spending on WMD or ballistic missiles, and would likely provide better access to Iranians. Even limited US-Iranian engagement could give the...

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56 The policy was termed Dual Containment in a speech delivered on 13 May 1993 by Martin Indyk, Director for Near East and South Asia at the National Security Council
58 As usual it is necessary to differentiate between different Member States' policies: the Critical Engagement approach is shared by most states, but the UK is clearly more supportive of the more intransigent American approach
59 See Policy Brief No.2: Congressional Staff Briefing on “U.S. Challenges and Choices in the Gulf: Iran”, jointly sponsored by the Atlantic Council of the United States, the Middle East Institute, the Middle East Policy Council and the Stanley Foundation; 8 March 2002
60 Policy Brief No.5: Congressional Staff Briefing on “U.S. Challenges and Choices in the Gulf: Iran and Proliferation Concerns”, sponsored by the Atlantic Council of the United States, the Middle East Institute, the Middle East Policy Council and the Stanley Foundation, 12 July 2002
valuable information and leverage – a better understanding of events in Iran and a greater potential to influence them”.

Also, Iran cannot but perceive its strategic environment as highly threatening to its security: in particular there is a risk of strategic encirclement by foreign powers61 or by states in the region such as Pakistan (which has both nuclear weapons and a recent history of tense relations with Iran). In this framework, American experts have suggested that the policy of isolating Iran should be reassessed and that consideration should be given to the possibility of inaugurating government-to-government dialogue with Teheran and of making efforts to “reach out to the Iranian people”62.

And engaging in a “Critical Dialogue” with Iran is precisely the policy chosen by many European governments and officially endorsed by the European Community at a meeting of the European Council in Edinburgh in December 1992. In EC intentions the Dialogue should be a vehicle for raising concerns about Iranian behaviour and for demanding improvement on various issues, especially human rights and terrorism, areas in which progress was considered crucial for building closer relations63.

Europe’s strategy, in contrast to the American punishment and containment policy, is once again to favour dialogue and trade, rather than coercion. The difference in approach is tied to the different perception of the dangers and of the most effective way to take on the issues, but also to the different economic involvement in the region of the United States and of the European Union. In fact, while the US have virtually no commercial relations with Iran, the volume of trade between European Union Member States and Iran adds up to over 11 billion dollars64. European economic and political contacts with Iran are substantial, and are steadily increasing65; many European leaders

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61 it should not be forgotten that since the war on Afghanistan US forces are based in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Turkey, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and elsewhere in central Asia: see www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/cencom.htm
65 see 2002 Index of Economic Freedom: Iran, by The Heritage Foundation and The Wall Street Journal. Available at http://cf.heritage.org/index/country.cfm?ID=68.0
advocate Iran’s entry into the World Trade Organisation, suggesting that the integration of Iran into the world economy would foster greater transparency and allow the international community to monitor worrisome Iranian transactions more closely. European governments do not view engagement as endorsing the regime in question per se, rather they believe — as mentioned above - that dialogue and trade relations allow them the leverage to moderate difficult government behaviour.

Divergent policies towards Iran have often been the cause of harsh transatlantic tensions. The 1996 Iran/Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), a unilateral attempt by the Republican-controlled US Congress to apply secondary sanctions to other states in order to prevent foreign investment in Iran and Libya, met with vigorous European resistance. The EU threatened to raise the issue at the World Trade Organisation and the threat was taken seriously enough to prevent ILSA from ever being enforced.

Since August 1990 Iraq has been considered a significant threat to American interests and has been subjected to vigorous coercive diplomacy to isolate its regime, stop its WMD program and contain its aggressive policy towards its neighbours and towards Israel. After 1998 (i.e. after Operation Desert Fox, during which Anglo-American forces bombed Iraq in response to Saddam’s refusal to co-operate with UN Inspectors) the objective of American policy became regime change.

The United Nations imposed sanctions on Iraq in 1990 and institutionalised them with the passing of a resolution in 1991: unlike the case of Iran, therefore, the United States did not act unilaterally in applying sanctions against Baghdad.

During the years 1991-2002 European governments by and large shared American determination to restrain Saddam’s regime and prevent his attempts to acquire WMD. Little by little however, a certain feeling of “sanction-fatigue” has settled in, coupled with the growing perception that the sanctions themselves where not as effective as hoped and harmed the civilian population rather than the regime. In addition, many European governments (in particular France and Germany, but not Britain) distinguished between the goal of ending Iraq’s WMD programs, which they supported, and the goal of pursuing regime change in the country, which they saw as not being essential for WMD control; they also worried that a military attempt to overthrow

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According to the report, Iran’s major export trading partners are: Japan 17.7%, Italy 7.9%, France 7.5%, United Arab Emirates 7.5%. The major import trading partners are: Germany 9.8%, Japan 9.4%, Italy 6.2%, United Arab Emirates 6.2%, China 4.9%.

Saddam could have a detrimental impact on stability in the region. As underlined in a US Congressional Staff briefing “many European leaders are sceptical of the forceful ouster of difficult regimes in the Middle East, and they argue that the threat of such action precludes the possibility of such regimes co-operating with the international community on controlling WMD. They reason that leaders such as Saddam Hussein have no incentive to comply with the US or Western demands when the stated desire of the United States is their removal from power”67.

As a result, some European governments have distanced themselves from American policy and have started suggesting an easing of economic restrictions on trade with Iraq. Europe does indeed have significant economic interests in Iraq, but it must be underlined that the magnitude of such interests is not superior to the United States’. The Heritage Foundation and The Wall Street Journal, for example, report that the single largest consumer of Iraqi products is in fact the United States, to where 46.2% of Iraqi exports are directed. Together, the two largest European consumers of Iraqi products (Italy and France) receive only 21.8% of Iraqi exports. These figures include oil sold legally by Iraq under the UN “oil for food programme”68.

Notwithstanding the uncertain success obtained by the sanctions, its economic interests in Iraq and the slow but constant distancing from its policy of many of its European allies, the US has maintained its tough stance towards Baghdad, making it even harsher after 9/11, when the new Bush Doctrine - delineated in the January 2002 “Axis of Evil” speech - laid the political and strategic foundations for the subsequent American-led attack on Iraq.69 This unilateralist trend in American policy increased tensions with

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67 See Policy Brief No.4: Congressional Staff Briefing on “U.S. Challenges and Choices in the Gulf: European Perspectives”, sponsored by the Atlantic Council of the United States, the Middle East Institute, the Middle East Policy Council and the Stanley Foundation, 21 June 2002
69 See President Bush’s State of the Union address, 30 January 2002: “[…] Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror. The Iraqi regime has plotted to develop anthrax, and nerve gas, and nuclear weapons for over a decade. This is a regime that has already used poison gas to murder thousands of its own citizens[...] This is a regime that agreed to international inspections, then kicked out the inspectors. This is a regime that has something to hide from the civilised world. States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States […] We will work closely with our coalition to deny terrorists and their state sponsors the materials, technology, and expertise to make and deliver weapons of mass destruction. We will develop and deploy effective missile defences to protect America and our allies from sudden attack. And all nations should know: America will do what is necessary to ensure our nation’s security […] I will
most European allies. As mentioned above, the EU has generally followed a policy of engagement with difficult regimes in the region, and only if engagement strategies prove ineffective would most European governments actively consider advocating sanctions, political coercion or military action. Even then they might question whether such action would endanger, rather than promote, the overall stability of the region.

6.2.5: Threats to US and EU Interests

The spread of terrorism

September 11, 2001, constituted a watershed in American perception of the risk of terrorism. Analysts had been suggesting well before 9/11 that the American homeland was increasingly likely to become a direct target of a terrorist strike\(^70\), but American perception and policy underwent a deep transformation after the New York and Washington attacks.

Before 9/11 US perception of the terrorist threat was mainly linked to the possibility of American interests abroad – civilian, military or economic - being targeted. American soil was thought to be relatively safe from any immediate danger of retort to the harsh policy strategies pursued by the US towards certain Middle East states like Iran, Iraq and Libya, or by American support of Israel.

Europeans, on the other hand, had a quite different view on the issue, having been the target of trans-national terrorism\(^71\) since the 1970's - including Arab terrorist attacks against American and Israeli targets on European soil\(^72\) - and feeling largely exposed to this danger\(^73\) given their geographical proximity to the Middle East. Many governments worried that European cities could easily become a target for terrorism or the retorts of Arab States or radical groups, and that with the advancement of military technology,
cities in Southern Europe could become vulnerable to WMD attacks. These fears were partly behind the more cautious and accommodating policy pursued by the EU towards the Arab states, behind the policy towards the Arab-Israeli peace process - in which the EU displayed far more attention to the claims of the Arabs than the US did - and behind the attempts to build a critical dialogue with the very same countries which the US wanted to isolate and contain through coercive diplomacy and even military intervention. These differences in approach have caused innumerable tensions between the US and the EU, and accusations from Washington that the European allies were negotiating and trading with the enemy while America kept security and peace were recurrent. However, despite the fact that from the 1970s cooperation in the fight against terrorism developed among European governments – in time evolving into the formal third pillar of Justice and Home Affairs - it must be noted that neither terrorism nor the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction have been the object of a common strategy on prevention or coercion at 15: a truly European threat assessment still does not exist.

The September 11 attacks definitely changed America's perception of its vulnerability to international terrorism; as Nicole Gnesotto has recently pointed out, the US reaction can be summed up in three words: urgency, militarisation and unilateralism. The fight against terrorism and the protection of the American homeland became the strongest priority in US policy, relegating all other issues - such as the resolution of European crises or peacekeeping tasks - to secondary importance. The Pentagon’s budget saw an increase of $48 billion for 2002, which brought it to a military expenditure of one billion dollars a day; furthermore, President Bush proposed a new cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security and requested $38 billion for this new department. Finally, in a strong swing towards unilateralism, the US adopted a policy

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77 See "Defending the American Homeland", a 2002 report from the Heritage Foundation's Homeland Security Task Force formed days after the September 11 attacks. Available at http://www.heritage.org/research/homelanddefense/project.cfm
of refusal of any form of external restraint on its strategies and actions, basing this choice on the need to have a free hand in effectively guaranteeing its security through whatever courses of action it saw fit - approved and supported by the international community or not.

European reaction to 9/11 was one of solidarity and support, as the invocation of Article 5 of the NATO Treaty showed\(^7^9\), but this did not mean total support of the anti-terrorism strategy adopted by the US. In particular, most European governments believe that terrorism emanating from the region will never be destroyed by military action alone: without denying the need for military measures, they place the emphasis on prevention and non-military strategies. Moreover, they see American focus on the strengthening of their traditional military power as an inadequate reaction to a form of terrorism that has proved able to adopt a largely non-traditional but lethal *modus operandi*. In Europe’s eyes, the West must think in terms of a more complex and multifaceted response: more substantial engagement with countries in the region should be attempted and an improvement of the Western image should be pursued in the context of a comprehensive policy aimed at preventing the surge of terrorism rather than repressing it, and which should include development aid, support of states in the region exposed to the risk of political instability, co-operation on the intelligence front to hit terrorist networks in Europe, and resolution of regional conflicts (such as the Arab-Israeli conflict) that feed discontent and radicalism\(^8^0\).

### 6.3: EU and US Policies towards the Middle East:
#### Patterns of Continuity

Given this analysis of American and European interests in the Greater Middle East, what elements - of convergence and divergence - can be deemed to be long-term features in American and European policies towards the region, and have “resisted” untouched to all the upheavals of the last decade, including the failure of the Oslo process, Bush’s election or the September 11 attacks?

A number of factors can be included in this category:

- EU’s inability to overcome its internal divisions in formulating its Middle East policy

\(^7^9\) i.e. the Alliance central article of collective defence, which makes an attack on one of the signatories an attack on the entire Alliance

\(^8^0\) See Gnesotto, N., *op. cit.*, p. 101-102
• EU reluctance to forsake the security umbrella offered by the United States in the region
• US reluctance to allow the EU to have a more prominent and independent political role in the region
• US reliance of diplomatic instruments coupled with the credible threat of military force
• EU reliance on economic instruments as a means to obtain political influence

Divisions among Member States have characterized and continue to characterize EU Middle East policy. There is first of all a problem of priorities, which sees some of the Member States interested in developing relations with the Southern Mediterranean States and in counterbalancing EU focus on enlargement towards the east with a more developed and effective Mediterranean policy. Such states, i.e. the so called "Mediterranean lobby"91, France, Spain and Italy, were largely behind the launching of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. For other Member States (like Britain or Germany) however, the development of a EU Mediterranean policy does not represent a high priority92, whereas the possible damage to transatlantic relations that could derive from an independent EU policy towards the region are of much greater concern. On the other hand both Germany and Great Britain (and France) have special economic interests in Iran, and the convergence of their interests was behind the launching of the critical dialogue in 1992.

In synthesis, as Peter Rudolf has underlined, "the European approach [towards the Middle East] is a mixture of widely shared political dispositions, distinctive national approaches and limited efforts at coordinating national policies at the intergovernmental level. Beneath the surface of coordination, there is unregulated economic and political competition. Critical dialogue remains largely a common declaratory policy with limited operational implications"93.

A further crucial element is EU reluctance to forsake the security umbrella offered by the United States: if on the one hand the EU Member States have made attempts to develop their own policy towards the Middle East, in order to protect their economic interests but also to pursue a strategy that they deemed more effective than American

92 see Forster, A., Britain, and Aggestam, L., 'Germany', in Manners, I. and Whitman, R. (eds.), The Foreign Policies of European Union Member States, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000
strategy to build relations with states in the region, this policy never went as far as implying a possible redefinitions of EU and US roles and burden sharing dynamics. The EU does not have the means, nor indeed the political will, to contribute to security in the area, which until now has been guaranteed by the United States through Sixth Fleet stationed in the Mediterranean, the massive military assistance to friendly countries, and the deterrence and power projection in the region implied in American military power and its readiness to use it.

The US have over the years consistently showed great reluctance in allowing the EU to have a prominent political role in the Middle East beyond that of agreeing with American policy. The priority that Washington gives to security concerns and instruments does not fit easily with European economic instruments and the US have repeatedly accused Europe of protecting and pursuing their own economic interest while exploiting the security cover offered by the Americans.

In short, the United States defined political and security policy, backed up by military forces and active diplomacy. European governments attempted to use economic relations as an indirect route to political partnership. But they stumbled over the conflicting interests of the EU’s southern member states and their trans-Mediterranean competitors, over attempts to introduce political conditions into economic agreements, and, above all, over their own reluctance to endanger their relations with the United States, a risk that for most Europeans – except perhaps the French and, from time to time, the British – was a strong disincentive to attempt to develop more than a declaratory policy.

6.4: EU and US Policies towards the Middle East: Patterns of Change

Some events, however, have brought about significant changes in US and EU policies and have modified the trend of continuity in transatlantic relations in the Middle East described in the last paragraph.

These events can be summarised as follows:

- The progressive building of a European political identity and the institutional consolidation of the EU with the introduction of new foreign policy instruments and the creation of the role of High Representative.
• The failure of the Oslo process which shifted European attitudes: the EU became less willing to follow the American lead when the Oslo process showed increasing weaknesses and finally collapsed.

• The apparent recent change in American strategy towards the Arab-Israeli peace process, with the creation of the Middle East Quartet which includes the EU, the US, the UN and Russia, and seems to open the door to multilateralism in the negotiations.

• The adoption of the "Bush Doctrine" and the strategy for the war on terror that have marked the adoption of a unilateral approach on America's part and have caused US-European relations to deteriorate from the surge of transatlantic sympathy and solidarity which followed September 11th 2001, to the mutual distrust that seems to characterise the relationship a year and a half later.

As emphasised in the previous chapters, following the ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht the European Union gradually introduced new foreign policy instruments that would allow the EU to play a more relevant role in the international arena. The progressive development of the EU's identity as an international actor, coupled after 1995 with the failure of the Oslo Process and the increasingly important role of the EU in financing the Palestinian Authority, diminished European willingness to be constantly relegated to a secondary role and to accept America's exclusive role as mediator between the parties.

During the two Clinton Presidencies, however, the US government did not accept the idea of conceding wider political responsibilities to the EU in the negotiations.

Things changed to a certain degree with the election of George W. Bush: the Bush Administration felt particularly strongly about differentiation on the Middle East, where - from their perspective - Clinton's overactive diplomacy had demeaned the Presidency without achieving a settlement. They were committed to a much more "selective engagement" in global diplomacy, to what Richard Haass, the new head of policy planning in the State Department, called in July 2001 "à la carte multilateralism". 84

The State Department decided to pursue a multilateral approach to the peace process, with co-operation with European governments as a key factor. On April 10th 2002,

Colin Powell announced the formation of a Madrid “Quartet”, reviving the agenda of the 1991 Madrid conference with the UN Secretary-General, the EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (Javier Solana), and the Russian foreign minister (Igor Ivanov). The cumbersome structures of EU diplomacy however also squeezed the Commissioner for External Relations (Chris Patten) and the foreign minister of the member state holding the Council Presidency into the “single” EU seat. The focus of this approach was on pursuing a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, with the active engagement of outside actors.

Formally, therefore, EU and US Administration approaches had converged, at least on this aspect of Middle East policy. It remained, however, unclear whether the US Administration beyond the State Department was seriously committed to this exercise, or whether national governments within the EU were fully behind their collective representatives.

In parallel with this multilateral approach the US Administration elaborated new policy guidelines that favoured unilateralism in dealing with perceived threats from the region and from rogues states in light of the 9/11 attacks.

The American approach to the region was set out by President Bush in his “Axis of Evil” speech in January 2002, which linked the efforts of Iraq and Iran (and North Korea) to acquire weapons of mass destruction to their sponsorship of terrorism. Though there was no evidence linking any of these states directly to al-Qaeda, this conceptual framework transmuted the war on terrorism into the pre-existing framework of rogue states and WMD, and thus into a potential war on Iraq. Iranian and Iraqi support for terrorist groups attacking Israel was an important part of their inclusion in this category, indicating how closely the Arab-Israeli conflict and the war on terrorism were linked in American minds. The priority for Western Middle East policy, in this formulation, was regime change in Iraq, combined with continued containment of Iran. The removal of a regime that encouraged Palestinian intransigence would in itself ease the Arab-Israeli conflict. The European allies would be invited to play supporting roles in the “coalition of the willing” assembled to enforce disarmament – and/or regime change – on Iraq, and to pay for subsequent social and economic reconstruction.

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85 See the Communiqué issued by the Quartet in New York (September 17th, 2002) in Appendix, p. 175
European governments, on their part, sympathised with the suffering and felt the outrage that the 9/11 attacks had generated in America. But they placed this new scale of trans-national terrorism within the context of the lower level of trans-national terrorism their countries had suffered in the past. As observers, too, of American strategy towards the region over previous years, largely without influence over that strategy and often critical of its sweep, there was an unavoidable undercurrent of differentiation: a feeling that the United States and the Muslim world were locked into a confrontation that both jeopardised European security and ignored European views.

In Europe’s eyes, what was needed after 9/11 was a broad diplomatic approach to the region, including an active and concerted attempt to bring the Israel-Palestine conflict back to the negotiating table and a dialogue with “friendly” Arab authoritarian regimes. In terms of power projection and political influence, however, European governments were acutely conscious of their limited capabilities in the face of American regional hegemony.

In 2002 the clash between the European approach to the Middle east, which traditionally favours multilateralism and negotiation, and the increasingly unilateral American approach, became more and more evident, bringing about a deterioration of transatlantic relations and generating mutual distrust.

The following passages, taken respectively from the “National Security Strategy of the United States of America” adopted in September 2002, and from President Bush’s “Axis of Evil” speech of January 2002, while providing American political justification for the adoption of a pre-emptive approach to the war on terror, offer a measure of the United States’ determination in pursuing their chosen strategy regardless of possible disagreements with their allies:

“For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack. […]

We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to attack us using conventional means. […]

The United States has long maintained the option of pre-emptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. To forestall or

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86 See for example Bill Clinton’s 1999 National Security Strategy, p. iv and p. 1: “America must be willing to act alone when our interests demand it”; “We will do what we must to defend these interests, including when necessary and appropriate, using our military might unilaterally and decisively”. Available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/other_pubs/nssr99.pdf (official website of the Defense Technical Information Center, the central facility for the collection and dissemination of scientific and technical information for the US Department of Defense)
prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act pre-emptively."³⁷

"My hope is that all nations will heed our call, and eliminate the terrorist parasites who threaten their countries, and our own. Many nations are acting forcefully [...] but some governments will be timid in the face of terror. And make no mistake: If they do not act, America will."³⁸

These words give indeed a measure of the extent to which the United States have moved toward unilateralism, and seem to confirm Christopher Coker's view that Europe and America, while sharing the same value systems (i.e. humanitarian, liberal, capitalist systems), are different political cultures, and their preferences render it difficult for them to work together as they once did when it comes to instrumentalizing those values.³⁹

³⁸ See President Bush's State of the Union address (know as the "Axis of Evil" speech), 30 January 2002. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/1790537.stm
Chapter Seven

Conclusion

“There is only one way to see things, and it is to see them in their entirety”

(J. Ruskin)

7.1: Research Question and Hypotheses of the Thesis

In the introduction to this thesis two quotations - by Henry Kissinger and by Miguel A. Moratinos - helped frame the central research question and the issues to be analysed. In the same fashion, in this conclusion a remark by the British Victorian art critic and writer John Ruskin helps define the sense of what this thesis has attempted to do and what it has hopefully added to the study of European foreign policy in general, and of European policy towards the Middle East in particular.

The objective of this study was to find an answer to the following question: why has the EU spent so much time on Middle East policy, to so little effect?

The thesis proposed to answer by verifying a number of working hypotheses:

- it first examined convergence among EU Member State policies in order to establish whether they differ so profoundly so as to make impossible the achievement of a common European policy towards the Middle East peace process;
- it then conducted a legal-institutional analysis of the instruments of EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, so as to verify the quantity, nature, and effectiveness of these instruments, and what use the Member States make of them to develop a common policy towards the peace process;
- it finally focused on the issue of transatlantic relations, analysing how they influence the policy of single Member States and the elaboration of a common European policy towards the Middle East

In other words, the thesis proposed to bring together in a single study different perspectives and angles of analysis and, by doing so, to achieve a better understanding
of the factors and the interests underlying the formulation of the European Union's policy towards the Middle East conflict.

The thesis intended to fill a gap in the literature by offering a study of European policy towards the Arab Israeli peace process that would simultaneously take into consideration the dilemma of the harmonisation of the different Member States' policies and interests, the continuation of separate national debates on foreign policy issues in parallel with convergent common declarations, the problem of the self-contained structure of CFSP, its mechanisms and its institutional and political limitations, the question of the EU's role as a global actor, of the diverse European interests in the Middle East, of the dynamics of transatlantic relations and of burden-sharing between the US and the EU in the Arab-Israeli peace process.

Only such an all-encompassing analysis, this thesis argues, could shed light on the complex issues linked to EU policy towards the Middle East peace process and at the same time help reach more general conclusions with regard to the EU's foreign policymaking.

7.2: Findings of the Thesis

This paragraph will illustrate the findings of this study with regards to the three working hypotheses described above.

Convergence

As anticipated, the first possible answer to the central question "why has the EU spent so much time on Middle East policy, to so little effect?" is the following: due to its failure in reaching a sufficiently convergent approach among EU Members States.

The analysis conducted by this thesis has shown how a number of variables, both exogenous and endogenous, have actually led to a certain degree of convergence in the Member States' approach to the Middle East. It is within the context of the formulation of the policy towards the Middle East that European governments have frequently been able to reach an agreement and unify their position, as the large number of Joint Actions and Common Declarations approved over the years testifies.
However, close scrutiny of the factors that have encouraged convergence also shows that, for each Member State, the rationale behind the harmonisation of their policy with that of the other Member States has differed.

In other words, what has proven to be the driving force behind the formulation of a distinct EU policy towards the peace process is more a "congruence" – defined, using Helen Wallace's words, as the compatibility of the policy actors' preferences as a basis for establishing a shared policy regime - rather than a real convergence capable of producing a truly collective policy, expression of a unitary European political strategy.

The undiminished strength of specific national preferences and priorities continues indeed to pose a challenge to the consolidation of political convergence among the Member States, generating what has been defined in this thesis as a paradox of "converging parallels".

EU Member States have maintained, and struggle to maintain, tight control over their foreign policy in order to protect what they consider to be their national interests. Nonetheless, this thesis argues, they increasingly find that those interests can be better protected through a common European action, that is able to project into the international arena the combined weight of the 15 Members of the Union. As a consequence, more and more national governments, often prompted by totally different reasons and agendas, turn to the EU and encourage the formulation of common European policies, creating the effect of a convergence of policies that in most cases, however, will not intersect and will remain an equal distance apart, and in this sense a policy of converging parallels.

**EU Foreign Policy Instruments**

The second hypothesis explored was the following: the EU lacks the relevant levers and instruments to affect the Middle East peace process.

In the light of a detailed analysis of the foreign policy instruments at the EU's disposal and of their use in shaping policy towards the MEPP, this thesis argues that the lack of military instruments has indeed hampered the EU's chances of influencing the peace process. The main actors involved - Israel and the Arabs - turn to the United States to guarantee security in the region and to reliably back-up any political and security arrangement agreed upon during the negotiations. The EU is therefore relegated to a
secondary role, limited to financing the Palestinian Authority, while lacking much influence on the actual peace process.

On the other hand, beyond the military dimension, the EU has at its disposal a large number of instruments through which to articulate its policy towards the Middle East, and that have been categorised in this thesis as: a) declaratory, b) operational, c) economic, and d) strategic instruments. All these instruments have been utilised by the EU in its Middle East policy, but this has not granted the EU the political influence it aspires to.

Moreover, the Member States have seemed reluctant to further develop certain instruments that could truly enhance the EU’s chances of acting effectively in the international arena – e.g. instruments such as the Special Representatives and the High Representative for CFSP – and, by keeping the actual decision-making powers in the framework of intergovernmental co-operation, have imposed strict limits to their scope of action.

Finally, the thesis argues that at times these instruments are not used appropriately and effectively by the EU due to a lack of consolidated experience in foreign policymaking at the EU level on the part of the Member States, the inadequacy of the institutions in charge, and the bureaucratic complexity which characterise all levels of EU policymaking.

Transatlantic Relations

The third answer tested in the thesis was the following: strategic US interests in the Middle East and the dynamics of EU-US relations have relegated the EU to a secondary role in the Middle East peace process.

A parallel analysis of American and European interests in the Middle East, and of the dynamics of transatlantic relations in this region of crucial importance to both, has indeed confirmed the working hypothesis.

The US has numerous interests in the Middle East, that can thus be summarised: a) the free flow of oil; b) regional stability and prosperity; c) the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In the eyes of the American government, regional instability, the threat posed by rogue States and by the diffusion of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), and the spread of terrorism are all factors that threaten these American interests.
Europe shares with the US the above mentioned interests, but does not always support the strategies adopted by Washington, nor does it always perceive the threats in the same way. Most EU Member States for example do not define States such as Iran and Iraq as "rogue" and, in contrast with the American-supported policy of double containment, favour instead a critical engagement with authoritarian regimes in the area and the promotion of commercial and economic ties as a means of acquiring political influence in the region.

As for the settlement of the Arab-Israeli peace process, this is also an interest the Europeans share with the US, but the diplomatic strategy proposed by the EU differs profoundly from the American one: it favours a multilateral approach instead of bilateral diplomatic negotiations, it appeals to UN resolutions, and called for the inclusion of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation in the negotiations long before either Israel or the US recognised the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

However, notwithstanding this different European approach to the Middle East in general and to the Arab-Israeli peace process in particular, what has emerged clearly in this study is the EU's unwillingness to endanger its relations with the United States by decisively promoting an independent European stance in the region. After the experiences of 1973-74 and 1980-81, it has become evident to all EU Member States that effective and autonomous policy towards the Middle East unavoidably carries with it disagreement with the US – quite possibly involving active disapproval from Washington. For all except France, this has proved to be a strong disincentive against attempting to develop a policy that is more than declaratory.

In most Member States' foreign policy agendas, transatlantic relations are indeed a much higher priority than the formulation of a distinct EU policy towards the Middle East.

Moreover, the security umbrella offered by the US, who is the sole "security manager" of the region, is not something to which any Member State - including France - is able or prepared to renounce. Neither the single Member States nor the EU as such (which does not yet have military instruments at its disposal) can protect Europe from insecurity spillover from the Middle East, or guarantee free access to the vital oil resources.
A further element that has emerged from the research conducted and from conversations with EU officials and Member State diplomats, is that even if the EU were equipped with effective military instruments, most European governments, would most likely be very reluctant to be actively involved in the military and security dimensions of the peace process between the Arabs and the Israelis. In this respect, America’s leading role as mediator between the parties, and its continuing commitment as security guarantor in the region, allows the Europeans to avoid tackling what could otherwise become a potentially explosive problem and a source of deep disagreement within the EU.

7.3: Final Considerations

In the previous paragraph, the findings of this thesis with regards to the three working hypotheses described in the Introduction have been outlined. However, a further set of conclusions may be added to the considerations hitherto exposed.

As underlined elsewhere in this study, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the subsequent peace process, have been among the most strongly debated issues by the Member States and have been closely monitored by the EC/EU since the creation of EPC in 1970. The reasons for this interest have already been mentioned, but an additional element deserves to be further underlined, i.e. the reflexive dimension of European Middle East Policy - what Greilsammer and Weiler have defined as a policy mainly concerned with the actual formation of a common policy as an integrative value per se – that when closely analysed appears to be a factor of crucial importance.

It may indeed be argued that one explanation for this large body of activity for no apparent output, stems more from the desire to prevent EU Member States openly disagreeing with each other than to influence outside actors: a form of “self-regarding” foreign policy coordination.

The Middle East peace process has somehow offered the perfect stage to afford the EU international visibility as a global actor. The sensitivity of the issue, coupled on the other hand with continuing involvement of the US and its determination to maintain leadership and to prevent the EU from gaining significant influence, have presented the EU with the opportunity to experiment with new foreign policy instruments and to gain significant – and much needed – experience in foreign policy coordination, without running the risk of becoming entangled in the intricacies of the operative aspects of the peace process.
More than in actually reshaping Arab-Israeli relations, European governments have often appeared more interested in protecting themselves from any fallout from the Middle East conflict while at the same time "flexing EU muscles" innocuously.

At this point one last comment should be added.
As this thesis has argued, European policy towards the Middle East constitutes an ideal case study for the problem of political integration in the EU, and in many ways it offers the best possible prism through which to evaluate Europe's ability to achieve the objective of a common external posture.

European policy towards the Middle East peace process, however, has proved to be in many ways a unique case study in EU foreign policy.

There is first of all the weight of history to consider. Many Member States were involved in the Middle East as colonial powers, and this has created long-lasting interests and ties between European governments and a number of Arab States. Other Member States, on the other hand, still bear the heavy legacy of the Second World War, and of their role in exterminating a large part of European Jewry.

These factors combine to create a unique situation and have direct repercussions on the formulation of both national and EU policies towards the region.

Furthermore, the very peculiar regional context must be also considered: the deep American involvement, the importance of the region as a vital source of oil for the West, continuing regional instability, the unavoidable linkages between the different conflicts that plague the area, the strong economic ties between Europe and many Middle Eastern states.

If on the one hand the long history of European involvement in the MEPP has offered an opportunity to observe the evolution of EC/EU policy coordination over a period of thirty years, and to draw some relevant conclusions about EU foreign policymaking in general, on the other hand the above mentioned factors render this case study unique and introduce some variables that find no place in different foreign policy issues.
MULTILATERAL TALKS OF THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

Launched 28-29 January 1992 in Moscow in the follow-up to the Madrid conference

STEERING GROUP
Co-Sponsors: USA and RUSSIA
Members:
EU, Japan, Canada, Norway, Saudi Arabia (GCC), Tunisia (UMA),
Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Palestinian Authority

REDWG
(Regional Economic Development)
Gavel Holder: EU (Presidency and Commission)
Co-organizers: USA and Japan
53 members (50 countries + World Bank and EIB)

ACRS (Arms Control & Regional Security)
Gavel Holder: USA and RUSSIA

WATER
Gavel-Holder: USA
Co-organizers: EU/Japan

ENVIRONMENT
Gavel-Holder: Japan
Co-organizers: EU and USA

REFUGEES
Gavel-Holder: Canada
Co-organizers: EU, USA, Japan

COPENHAGEN ACTION PLAN
SHEPHERDS
Communication & Transport: France
Energy: Austria
Tourism: Japan
Agriculture: Spain
Financial Markets & Investment: U.K.
Trade: Germany
Health: Italy
Training: USA
Network & Information: EC
Integrated Development Projects: EC

SECRETARIAT OF REDWG/MC
based in Amman

SECTORAL COM.
Trade
Chair: Israel

SECTORAL COM.
Finance
Chair: Egypt

SECTORAL COM.
Infrastructure
Chair: Jordan

SECTORAL COM.
Tourism
Chair: Pal. Auth.
European Community Aid to Mashraq countries 1995-1999
(all budget lines, excluding EU Member States)
All figures are in EUR

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</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNRWA</td>
<td>32,000,000</td>
<td>34,100,000</td>
<td>35,300,000</td>
<td>36,500,000</td>
<td>38,330,000</td>
<td>176,230,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Regional</td>
<td>43,300,000</td>
<td>34,100,000</td>
<td>50,300,000</td>
<td>41,600,000</td>
<td>60,060,000</td>
<td>229,360,000</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Totals by year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EC Grants</td>
<td>294,309,933</td>
<td>502,551,619</td>
<td>485,868,663</td>
<td>551,806,338</td>
<td>430,536,750</td>
<td>2,265,073,304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIB loans</td>
<td>75,000,000</td>
<td>75,651,750</td>
<td>81,000,000</td>
<td>59,431,000</td>
<td>84,452,409</td>
<td>375,535,159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>369,309,933</td>
<td>578,203,369</td>
<td>566,919,663</td>
<td>611,237,338</td>
<td>514,989,159</td>
<td>2,639,608,463</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

European Commission, External Relations DG (unit F.2), June 2000

29/05/01
European Investment Bank loans committed (1995-99)
European Community total aid (1995-99, excluding EU Member States)

EC Grants
EIB loans
Total European Community grants by country (1995-99, excluding EU Member States)

- **REGIONAL**: 20%
- **EGYPT**: 40%
- **WB-GS**: 15%
- **SYRIA**: 5%
- **JORDAN**: 11%
- **LEBANON**: 9%
Total EIB loans by country (1995-99)

- EGYPT: 54%
- LEBANON: 18%
- JORDAN: 16%
- WB-GS: 12%
- SYRIA: 0%
Total European Community aid (Grants and Loans 1995-99, excluding EU Member States)
European Community grants committed (1995-99, excluding EU Member States)
### 2.2.6 Imports of Oil and Gas to the EU

#### 2000 - Oil

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Imports from non-EU countries</th>
<th>Volume Mbbi</th>
<th>Share %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>841.7</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>573.9</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>491.8</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>323.8</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>245.7</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>229.3</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>166.9</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>139.6</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>98.6</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>87.2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>68.7</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>62.3</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Africa</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>120.7</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>3555.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Commission services

#### 2000 - Natural gas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Imports from non-EU countries</th>
<th>Volume million cubic metres</th>
<th>Share %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>78484</td>
<td>41.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>55519</td>
<td>29.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>44509</td>
<td>23.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>4126</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
<td>834</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>7314</td>
<td>3.8</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>199786</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
US Annual Net Oil Imports

Thousands of Barrels per Day

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<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>65242</td>
<td>69249</td>
<td>49370</td>
<td>65887</td>
<td>117174</td>
<td>100668</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top 20 Suppliers</td>
<td>59973</td>
<td>63720</td>
<td>44832</td>
<td>60148</td>
<td>105761</td>
<td>89965</td>
<td>89.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>10070</td>
<td>10070</td>
<td>7514</td>
<td>8935</td>
<td>16679</td>
<td>14478</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>11103</td>
<td>11648</td>
<td>7638</td>
<td>9488</td>
<td>16578</td>
<td>13275</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>8169</td>
<td>9000</td>
<td>5736</td>
<td>7569</td>
<td>13356</td>
<td>12485</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>6726</td>
<td>8439</td>
<td>5293</td>
<td>7204</td>
<td>12747</td>
<td>10201</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>5798</td>
<td>6303</td>
<td>4129</td>
<td>4302</td>
<td>10432</td>
<td>8525</td>
<td>8.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>1199</td>
<td>4193</td>
<td>6109</td>
<td>5801</td>
<td>5.8</td>
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<td>Norway</td>
<td>2214</td>
<td>2068</td>
<td>1228</td>
<td>2223</td>
<td>3929</td>
<td>3339</td>
<td>3.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>2815</td>
<td>2143</td>
<td>1514</td>
<td>2380</td>
<td>4104</td>
<td>3308</td>
<td>3.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>2678</td>
<td>2778</td>
<td>2247</td>
<td>2414</td>
<td>3543</td>
<td>3093</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1947</td>
<td>2060</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>3356</td>
<td>3893</td>
<td>2919</td>
<td>2.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>1826</td>
<td>2076</td>
<td>1311</td>
<td>1563</td>
<td>2442</td>
<td>2237</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>1611</td>
<td>1796</td>
<td>1240</td>
<td>1410</td>
<td>2693</td>
<td>1856</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>1916</td>
<td>2169</td>
<td>1232</td>
<td>1431</td>
<td>2172</td>
<td>1622</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>804</td>
<td>568</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>747</td>
<td>1037</td>
<td>1106</td>
<td>1.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>787</td>
<td>1102</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aruba</td>
<td>549</td>
<td>598</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>637</td>
<td>1434</td>
<td>1028</td>
<td>1.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>756</td>
<td>660</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>1221</td>
<td>971</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trin &amp; Tobago</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>534</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>1108</td>
<td>928</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>829</td>
<td>876</td>
<td>0.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>668</td>
<td>815</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPEC</td>
<td>29078</td>
<td>31611</td>
<td>21686</td>
<td>29104</td>
<td>52330</td>
<td>45120</td>
<td>44.8</td>
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</table>

SITC 333 (crude oil)

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Billion Barrels</th>
<th>Billion Dollars</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Billion Barrels</td>
<td>2.67</td>
<td>50.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Billion Dollars</td>
<td>3.08</td>
<td>37.53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$ per Barrel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18.98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Petroleum products are defined as SITC (Rev. 3) 33 and include crude refined and residual petroleum products. Unrevised data. The eleven OPEC member nations are listed in the Methodology section.
Communiqué issued by the Quartet
New York, 17 September 2002
(source: United Nations News Service)


Reaffirming their previous statements, the Quartet members reviewed developments since their last meeting, on July 16, 2002. They deplored and condemned the morally repugnant violence and terror, which must end. They agreed to intensify their efforts in support of their shared goal of achieving a final Israeli-Palestinian settlement based on their common vision, as inter alia expressed by President Bush, of two states, Israel and an independent, viable and democratic Palestine, living side by side in peace and security.

The Quartet will continue to encourage all parties to step up to their responsibilities to seek a just and comprehensive settlement to the conflict based on UN Security Council resolutions 242, 338, and 1397, the Madrid terms of reference, the principle of land for peace, and implementation of all existing agreements between the parties. The Quartet reaffirms the continuing importance of the initiative of Saudi Arabia, endorsed at the Arab League Beirut Summit, which is a vital part of the foundation of international efforts to promote a comprehensive peace on all tracks, including the Syrian-Israeli and Lebanese-Israeli tracks.

The Quartet is working closely with the parties and consulting key regional actors on a concrete, three-phase implementation roadmap that could achieve a final settlement within three years. Comprehensive security performance is essential. The plan will not succeed unless it addresses political, economic, humanitarian, and institutional dimensions and should spell out reciprocal steps to be taken by the parties in each of its phases. In this approach, progress between the three phases would be strictly based on the parties' compliance with specific performance benchmarks to be monitored and assessed by the Quartet.

The Quartet also supports, in preparation for establishment of a Palestinian state, efforts by the Palestinians to develop a constitution which ensures separation of power, transparency, accountability, and the vibrant political system which Palestinians deserve.

The plan will contain in its initial phase (2002-first half of 2003) performance-based criteria for comprehensive security reform, Israeli withdrawals to their positions of September 28, 2000 as the security situation improves, and support for the Palestinians' holding of free, fair, and credible elections early in 2003, based on recommendations established by the Quartet's International Task Force on Palestinian Reform. The first phase should include a ministerial-level meeting of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC) to review the humanitarian situation and prospects for economic development in the West Bank and Gaza and identify priority areas for donor assistance, including to the reform process, before the end of the year. The Quartet Principals will meet alongside the AHLC ministerial.
In the plan's second phase (2003), our efforts should focus on the option of creating a Palestinian state with provisional borders based upon a new constitution, as a way station to a permanent status settlement.

In its final phase (2004-5), the plan envisages Israeli-Palestinian negotiations aimed at a permanent status solution in 2005. Consistent with the vision expressed by President Bush, this means that the Israeli occupation that began in 1967 will be ended through a settlement negotiated between the parties and based on U.N. resolutions 242 and 338, with Israeli withdrawal to secure and recognized borders.

The Quartet welcomes the Task Force's report on the progress of the seven Reform Support Groups, and notes that a number of significant achievements, especially in the area of financial reform, have been realized in a short period of time under very difficult circumstances. Under the aegis of the Quartet, the Task Force will continue its work of supporting the Palestinians and the Palestinian Authority as they establish and prioritise reform benchmarks, particularly on the issues of elections, judicial reform, and the role of civil society.

Both the reform effort and the political process must include Israeli measures, consistent with Israel's legitimate security concerns, to improve the lives of Palestinians, including allowing the resumption of normal economic activity, facilitating the movement of goods, people, and essential services and to lift curfew and closures. Consistent with transparent and accountable Palestinian budget arrangements, the Quartet welcomes Israel's decision to transfer part of the Palestinian VAT and customs revenue that has been withheld since September 2000, and calls on Israel to continue this process and re-establish regular monthly revenue transfers to the Palestinian Ministry of Finance. And consistent with the recommendations of the Mitchell Commission, Israeli settlement activity in the occupied territories must stop.

The Quartet welcomes the report of UN Secretary-General's Personal Humanitarian Envoy Catherine Bertini as well as the latest UNSCO report on the impact of closures. It calls on Israel and the Palestinians to recognize and act upon their respective responsibilities and to move quickly to ameliorate the sharply deteriorating humanitarian situation in the West Bank and Gaza. In particular, Israel must ensure full, safe and unfettered access for international and humanitarian personnel.

Reiterating the critical importance of restoring lasting calm through comprehensive performance on security, the Quartet calls on the Palestinians to work with the U.S. and regional partners to reform the Palestinian security services, strengthen policing and law and order for the civilian population, and fight the terror that has severely undermined the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinians. Israelis and Palestinians should re-establish security cooperation and reciprocal steps should be taken by Israel as the Palestinians work to combat terrorism in all its forms.

The Quartet will continue to discuss the timing and modalities of an international conference.

The Quartet also met and discussed these issues with the Foreign Ministers of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, as representatives of the Arab League Follow-up Committee, and with representatives of Israel and the Palestinian Authority. The Quartet looks forward to continuing consultations.
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- Andrew Moravcsik (Professor of Government and Director of the European Union Program at Harvard University, Cambridge, MA)
- Antonio Badini (Director of the Middle East and North Africa Desk, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
- Antonio Missiroli (Research Fellow, European Union Institute for Security Studies, Paris)
- Sir Brian Crowe (Former Director-General for External and Politico-Military Affairs, General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union)
- Cesira D’Aniello (Official of the Policy Unit, General Secretariat, Council of the European Union)
- Christian Berger (Middle East Peace Process and West Bank and Gaza Programme, European Commission, External Relations Directorate-General)
- Christoph Heusgen (Director of the Policy Unit, General Secretariat, Council of the European Union)
- Colonel Elio Tagliaferri (Responsible of the Italian forces attached to the TIPH - Temporary International Presence in Hebron)
- Elisabetta Kelescian (Official of the Middle East Desk, Italian Foreign Affairs Ministry)
- Ghassan Salame (Director of Studies at the Centre national d’études scientifiques-CNRS/CERI and Professor at the Institut d’études politiques, Paris)
- Gianni De Michelis (Former Italian Foreign Minister)
- Harry Kney-Tal (Israeli Envoy to the EC and to NATO)
- Henry Siegman (Senior Fellow on the Middle East and Director, U.S./Middle East Project, Council on Foreign Relations)
- Sir Malcolm Rifkind (Former British Minister of Defence and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs)
- Massimo Ambrosetti (First Secretary, Italian Permanent Delegation to NATO)
• Nemer Hammad (Palestinian Representative to Italy)
• Nicola De Santis (NATO Information Officer for Mediterranean Dialogue and Partner Countries)
• Pascal Charlat (Head of the Middle East Task Force, Policy Planning Unit, Council Secretariat)
• Peter F. Mulrean (Deputy Political Counselor, U.S. Mission to the European Union)
• Raffaella Iodice de Wolff (Middle East Peace Process and West Bank and Gaza Programmer, European Commission, External Relations Directorate-General)
• Roberto Aliboni, Director of Studies and Head of Middle East Programme, International Affairs Institute, Rome
• Valdo Spini (President of the Italian Parliamentary Defense Commission)
• Yehuda Millo (Israeli Ambassador to Italy and the Holy See)
• Lord Weidenfeld of Chelsea (Vice-Chairman of the Europe-Israel Group)

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