THE PUZZLE OF TRUST IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS:
RISK AND RELATIONSHIP MANAGEMENT IN THE
ORGANISATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

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A thesis submitted to the University of London for the Degree of
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Abstract

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Christopher Andrejs Berzins
London School of Economics, University of London
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In this thesis, I explore the prospects for trust in international relations. I advance an agency-centred model that paradoxically emphasises both vigilance and vulnerability between states. I argue that trust is created through the dual diplomatic pursuits of risk management (e.g. monitoring and securing individual state interests) and relationship management (e.g. promoting shared goals, institutions and values). This model is then employed to evaluate the evolution of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) into the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 1972-2002.

Despite a recent surge in the study of trust in the social sciences, trust has not been explored comprehensively in the discipline of international relations (IR). In particular, the work done in IR has neglected the kernel of trust that distinguishes it from other concepts such as prediction and cooperation; that is, the dynamic of suspension, originally elucidated by the sociologist Georg Simmel, which permits the leap from uncertainty (and unacceptable risk) to positive expectation. Rather than ‘reasonable doubt’, trust involves giving another ‘the benefit of the doubt.’

The trust model is capable of providing a novel interpretation of the history, normative declarations and activities of the CSCE during the late Cold War; and the OSCE’s post-Cold War role in conflict prevention, conflict resolution and post-conflict rehabilitation among its member states. For example, the OSCE’s absent military capacity (e.g. vis-à-vis NATO) restricts its ‘thick’ risk management competence. The OSCE’s limited legal capacity (e.g. vis-à-vis the EU) likewise restricts its ‘thick’ relationship management competence. Nevertheless, the OSCE’s confidence-building activities, combined with its role as a forum for interstate dialogue explicitly linking security with international norms—especially democracy and human rights—fosters a ‘propensity to trust’ upon which member states are increasingly seeking to give each other the benefit of the doubt.
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This thesis is dedicated to my Canadian grandparents of Irish, French and Latvian origins: Herbert M. Barry, Gabrielle Levert Barry, Voldemars Berzins and Ilze Henriete Beldavs Berzins.
**List of Acronyms**

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<th>Definition</th>
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<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of South East Asian Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBM</td>
<td>Confidence Building Measure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCA</td>
<td>Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFE</td>
<td>Conventional Armed Forces in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPC</td>
<td>Conflict Prevention Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFSN</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CoE</td>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSBM</td>
<td>Confidence and Security Building Measure</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Committee of Senior Officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSS</td>
<td>Critical Security Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>EBRD</td>
<td>European Bank for Reconstruction and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FCS</td>
<td>Forum for Cooperation and Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRG</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Germany</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRY</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Yugoslavia</td>
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<tr>
<td>FYROM</td>
<td>Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</td>
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<tr>
<td>GSS</td>
<td>General Social Survey</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDR</td>
<td>German Democratic Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>GRIT</td>
<td>Graduated and Reciprocated Initiatives in Tension-Reduction</td>
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<tr>
<td>HCNM</td>
<td>High Commissioner on National Minorities</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations (the academic discipline)</td>
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<tr>
<td>KVM</td>
<td>Kosovo Verification Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>KLA</td>
<td>Kosovo Liberation Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>MFBR</td>
<td>Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAFTA</td>
<td>North American Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODIIHR</td>
<td>Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>OFE</td>
<td>Office of Free Elections</td>
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<tr>
<td>OFR</td>
<td>Office of the High Representative</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commission for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Kosovo</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>Security Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>SFOR</td>
<td>NATO Stabilisation Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>WVS</td>
<td>World Values Survey</td>
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Preface

Why study trust in international relations? Are international relations not, after all, the bona fide realm of distrust, of anarchy and insecurity? And of the limited trust, if any, that may or may not be present and/or possible in international relations, has it not already been considered at length through the study of 'international cooperation'? And what of the body of research on (and the practice of) 'confidence building measures,' in everything from disarmament to regional security to human rights? What is there left here to consider? In short, does not adding a 'newish' term such as trust to the IR vocabulary run the risk of stating the obvious and/or reinventing the wheel? Despite such concerns about why trust in international relations should be studied at all, there are a number of reasonably persuasive reasons for studying trust in the contemporary international context which, in this thesis, I seek to put forward.

To preface such a project, it is helpful to point towards the surge in the study of trust in recent years in the other social science disciplines, including economics, sociology, political science, psychology, even management and information systems. (Mayer 1995) These new theoretical and empirical developments, however, have been largely ignored by IR scholars to date. (Larson 1997) It is true that a considerable literature on 'confidence-building' exists in IR; confidence being a term which, as will be elaborated, is closely connected to trust. But confidence building theory has hardly developed in conceptual sophistication or rigour in the nearly half-century since it was first expounded. (Desjardins 1996) Of the diffuse studies of trust in the last decade, Francis Fukuyama's work on the importance of trust to national economic development is perhaps the one that is most familiar to IR scholars. (Fukuyama 1995) It is one of numerous studies that have added increasing support to the argument that 'social' factors are vital to economic development and the successful functioning of political institutions. Robert Putnam's research into 'social capital' even goes as far as to suggest that trust is the 'glue' that binds society together. (1993) If trust matters for relations within society, what about for relations between societies? Or between states? What about international society? An apt hypothesis to start from, then, is that some form of trust could also be relevant to successful international relations. Or, to start with a null hypothesis, without trust, might not further and deeper forms of international cooperation and co-existence, in the long run, remain either badly impaired or impossible?
Two Analogies

Two analogies are useful in establishing the backdrop for the tone and content of this thesis. They also provide a first taste of its multidisciplinary—and at times anecdotal—orientation. First, it has often been remarked by students of the human body that with so many known diseases, so many theorised medical conditions, so many systems that can go wrong in the human body, it seems almost a miracle that we are ever healthy. In fact, the very possibility of human health remains a substantial mystery to medical science. This analogy might be usefully extended to the domain of international relations today and to the dominant modes of theorising in IR. With so much potential for conflict in the world and with the multitude of factors which have been identified as potentially contributing to international strife, not to mention the multitude of varieties of strife which have been identified (from nuclear wars to regional and ethnic conflicts, to human rights violations, to man-made environmental disasters), is it not a miracle that any modicum of peace and well-being ever exists, however brief or fragile this may be? Just as a fundamental paradigm shift in medical science in recent years has turned away from studying the causes of disease towards studying the causes of health, one goal here is thus to turn away from studying the causes of distrust towards exploring the causes of trust.

The second analogy relates to the Internet. Intriguingly, some of the most sophisticated work on trust in recent years has come from the field of computer networking. This research has been propelled by legitimate concerns that individuals and organisations have about safely using the Internet, from using credit cards for making small purchases, to conducting routine large-scale financial transactions, to serious apprehensions about contamination by computer viruses, security breaches which expose sensitive data (cyber-spying) and even cyber-terrorism. Information systems theorists have been at the cutting edge of efforts to usefully define trust—for example, distinguishing between trust in an agent (e.g. an ‘e-business’ merchant) VS trust in the Internet as an overall medium of communication, etc—and designing security systems and customer trust-building initiatives with this in mind. This has been particularly challenging given the largely networked rather than hierarchical structure of the Internet.

A number of intriguing parallels may be suggested between the project of conceptualising and building ‘e-trust’ to building ‘IR-trust.’ One need only consider the similar problems of great geographical distance, cross-border cooperation/regulation and the myriad national/cultural barriers which must be surmounted. There is also, of course, the expanding vulnerabilities that both the Internet and global interdependence are bringing to so many areas.
of contemporary life. Add to this the uneven international distribution of both the Internet and globalisation in terms of geography, language, socio-economics, etc. Finally, consider the problem of interpersonal distance which modern communication technologies and contemporary international relations both surmount and hinder. That is, both Internet and IR theorists and practitioners are tasked with trying to make communications more personal in a wired world where we are inundated with data but face-to-face interactions between persons is growing rarer across expanding swatches of the cultural, economic and political activity. The claim is thus made from the outset that if such an ambitious trust-defining and trust-building project can be undertaken in a discipline as vast and complex as modern computer networking, then so too 'can' and 'should' it at least be pursued in the discipline of IR.

In the Beginning...

As many who have struggled through the PhD process will agree, the inspiration at the start of the intellectual journey often ends up exhausted—if not entirely obscured—at the finish line. Nevertheless, something of its ghost remains; and I have found it useful when describing my thesis to innocent victims to explain how I set upon the idea of trust in the first place. Like many a naive graduate student, my journey started with a poorly considered and overly-energetic attack on a big thinker: in my case, the Frankfurt School Critical theorist Jürgen Habermas.

Now, I had not yet read Habermas in any depth—in fact, I still have not—and his work does not feature at all in this thesis except for the odd indirect citation. However, I was familiar with the essential thrust of his 'discourse ethics' which seeks to locate a rational and just democratic process in open and fair debate where all voices are heard and agreement is settled upon via reasoned argument and, ultimately, by consensus. Beyond the ethical merits of this, which impressed me, I was—perhaps predictably—struck by the political impracticability of this for contemporary international relations. It was hard enough to envisage Habermas's ideal speech condition embodied concretely within domestic democratic institutions let alone within the realm of interstate relations that, to my mind, were still all too dominated by power politics. So how, then, to envisage a more practical—if less ethically satisfying—international 'democratic-like' process that still functioned with some modicum of rationality and justness? My half-baked intellectual instinct was straightforward enough: what you could not fall directly back on democratic institutions for in international relations today, what you could not always reasonably argue about, what you could not agree to by consensus and what you could not necessarily rely on the rule of law for you would just have to find a way to take on trust. The traces of these first ruminations can still be found here, if only in my encapsulation of trust in

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4 See for example Habermas (1996).
5 For further thoughts on this far more developed than my own, see Bohmam (1999).
international relations as the willingness, despite deep and continuing misgivings, to nevertheless choose to give another 'the benefit of the doubt.'

**Overview of Thesis Structure**

This thesis is laid out in nine chapters. In *Chapter 1*, the concept—and puzzle—of trust and its multiple definitions across a range of social science disciplines are introduced. The potential relevance of trust to European security relations, particularly the evolution of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) into the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) at the end of the Cold War is then sketched out. In *Chapter 2*, the risk management approach to trust is explored. The close relationship between trust and risk is considered and the economic-oriented literature is drawn on to outline a view of trust based predominantly in rational choice. This is followed by a survey of the IR literature on trust that adopts a rational choice methodology, especially three articles that have appeared in the journal *International Organisation* since 2000. The arms control literature on confidence-building measures (CBMs) is also surveyed and linked with the risk management approach to trust. Finally, this approach is placed in the context of realist theories which prioritise considerations of hard power and state self-interest. In *Chapter 3*, the relationship management approach to trust is explored. This involves a move gradually outwards from the rational choice perspective to encompass psychological, cultural and sociological dimensions of trust. These dimensions emphasise the role of cooperation and norms in building and reinforcing trust. With this in mind, a survey is undertaken of the IR literature on confidence-building measures (CBMs) that also takes an expanded view of the role of CBMs; that is, moving from risk management to relationship management. Adler’s theory of ‘security communities’, which is a rare instance of an IR theory that explicitly employs the idea of trust, is then reviewed in some depth. Finally, the relationship management approach to trust is placed in the context of institutionalist theories of IR.

*Chapter 4* lies at the heart of the thesis. In it, I elucidate the concept of ‘suspension’—drawn in particular from the work of the sociologist Georg Simmel—and its role in reconciling the interest-oriented and normative-oriented dimensions of trust. This is followed by a survey of the IR literature on trust which may be understood to fall loosely within this category, particularly Tuomas Forsberg’s constructivist explanation of the role of trust in the end of the Cold War. This is then followed by a discussion of the limits of CBMs and security communities for reconciling individual state interests and socially-embedded interstate norms. Last, suspension is considered in the context of ‘structurationist’ theories of IR as well as the English School. In *Chapter 5*, the ethical dimensions of trust are considered. Nicholas Rennger’s work on ‘The Ethics of Trust in World Politics’ is critiqued and Annette Baier’s ideas, particularly her two ethical trust tests, are mined for their relevance to international relations.
Having framed the theoretical backdrop for trust in international relations, I start off in Chapter 6 by setting out a multi-dimensional trust model in graphic form. The trust building process is then sketched out; the various trust 'targets' in international relations outlined (e.g. states, leaders, citizens); and some of the methodological assumptions and limitations of the trust model taken into consideration. This is followed by a deeper exploration of risk and relationship management in the context of particular features of contemporary international relations—such as some of the social dynamics of late-modernity (e.g. Ulrich Beck's notion of risk society) and of globalisation (e.g. interdependence and Anthony Giddens's ideas about changing forms of intimacy). These dynamics are likewise linked to evolving conceptions of international security. Finally, the possibilities for more deeply theorising the role of suspension in making the trusting leap possible are considered through aspects of Isaiah Berlin's philosophy of pluralism and Hegel's dialectical notion of 'patriotic trust.'

In Chapter 7, the trust model is applied to the CSCE. The history of the CSCE and its transformation into a permanent regional security organisation is evaluated. In Chapter 8, I interpret the OSCE—particularly its organisational structures and procedures—in the trust model's terms. Finally, a specific example, the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission, is also evaluated against Annette Baier's ethical criteria for trust. In the concluding chapter, I summarise the main arguments and findings and make recommendations for further research. Policy implications are touched on as is the model's potential to contribute to academic and public policy debates related to global governance.
1. Introduction

"The balance of trust has to be an element of the global order."
—Jack Straw, British Foreign Secretary: Address to the Russian State Duma, 31 Oct 2001

Trust has been—and continues to be—an essential element of international relations, be they social, economic or political. Furthermore, international actors such as politicians, diplomats, policy analysts, civil society representatives and citizens have it within their means to increase—or destroy—the trust between states and peoples around the world. Surprisingly, as it will be shown, few students of IR would disagree with these general statements or with the suggestion that trust is important to interstate security and to stable interstate relations as it is to much of human social and political life. Many (though not all) students of IR would also agree that this thesis’s illustrative studies, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and its offspring, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) have played a role in building and maintaining trusting relations between states over the last three decades. However, such general agreement can be attributed as much to the vagueness and confusion surrounding the word ‘trust’ as to any genuine consensus that trust is important and worth cultivating. For what really is trust? And can the concept of trust (and/or distrust) meaningfully contribute to a better understanding of international relations? Most importantly, can such an understanding allow us to prescribe a model of action for creating more stable, prosperous and just international relations?

In this thesis, I take up these daunting questions and explore the idea of trust in the study and practice of international relations. At the centre of this theoretical exploration is a particular puzzle—or paradox—about trust. It is one that runs through and animates the eclectic theoretical and methodological approaches of the following eight chapters. In a nutshell, the puzzle is this: Assume as a rough starting point that trusting someone involves a positive expectation; that is to say, an expectation that another person will act in a desirable way. It should follow, then, that the more certain you are of the other person’s future actions, the more you can be said to trust them. However, if you are more certain of the future outcome, should you not in fact need to trust less? Put another way, the starting assumption above suggests that to trust requires vigilance; but with greater vigilance, should not less trust in fact be necessary? Conversely, should not greater trust likewise require less vigilance? Take, for example, a scenario common to international relations: the build-up of military armaments along a state frontier. With stronger border defenses typically comes the decreased expectation of an attack and hence the increased expectation of non-aggressive neighbourly behaviour. But would not trusting relations in fact be characterised by fewer border defenses or even an entirely demilitarised border, such as between the U.S. and Canada? In other words, is trust a question of vigilance or vulnerability? This puzzle straddles two principal social scientific visions of
what underlies trust. That is to say, is trust built by monitoring, verifying and establishing diverse mechanisms to safeguard against potential breaches of trust? Or is it built by fostering conditions that encourage greater vulnerability—for example, regular and open-ended communication and the development of shared goals, values and identity—in order to reduce the need for costly vigilance mechanisms? If the trust puzzle is to be resolved, how can these two visions be reconciled?

As will be set out at length, how trust is defined depends very much on one's theoretical orientation, be it, in IR theory terms, realist, institutionalist, constructivist, and so on. Not surprisingly, some theories, such as institutionalism and constructivism, also place more emphasis and optimism on the prospects for deeper (or 'thicker') trusting international relations than others, such as realism. For realists, for example, the 'security dilemma' inherent to international relations severely limits the depth of trusting relations between states if it does not make them entirely impossible. Equally unsurprisingly, studies have shown that groups (such as states) that are most similar in terms of their social, economic and political structures, interests, values and identity are also more likely to trust each other; as are those that have a long, varied and successful history of interaction and cooperation. In IR, these studies derive in many cases from Deutsch's pioneering 1950s research on security communities. (1957)6 From a 'individual' perspective, what trust means also depends a great deal on your socio-economic and cultural background, even your gender. For example, global surveys have shown that if you are a woman, university-educated and comparatively well-off economically, you are far more likely to hold a 'trusting' attitude towards foreign states, superpowers, even international institutions such as the UN and NATO7 (Inglehart 1998)

Nevertheless, until recently, the concept of trust has remained curiously ill-defined and in the background of IR research, despite a surge in interest in trust across the social sciences in the last decade. As Deborah Larson writes,

In international relations. . .there is no theory of trust despite its importance. . .Many generalisations about trust appear in the international relations literature, although widely scattered. . .Scholars usually discuss trust and distrust as epiphenomena of more deep-rooted causes of international conflict. (1997, p.705)

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6 As will be elaborated in Chapter 3, Deutsche's ideas have recently received been adopted and adapted by constructivist IR scholars. (Adler 1998; McSweeney 2000)
7 Leaving aside for now the fact that many languages have no equivalent word for trust.
This is also despite the common use of the term in public debates about international affairs. References in the media to the loss of trust and the need to build trust in international affairs are pervasive and the term is widely employed in policy circles. As will be explored at length, this relative theoretical neglect of trust is partly due to its typically loose use in common parlance; that is, due to the difficulties of rigorously and usefully conceptualising trust. Similarly, it is due to the incommensurability of trust with any 'singular' theoretical approach; in short, trust appears to be inherently multi-dimensional.

With this in mind, a framework is developed in this thesis for theorising about trust in international relations which cuts across many of the general theoretical dividing lines of the academic discipline; that is, across realism and institutionalism and incorporating some of the recent insights of constructivist and normative theory. More specifically, the framework can also be seen as an extension of the IR literature on 'confidence-building measures.' The illustrative studies which are undertaken of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) can also be seen to elaborate on the IR literature on ‘security communities’, which privileges the notion of trust as one of its defining features, but leaves the underlying dynamics of trust largely undeveloped. Trust is conceptualised here in an ‘agent-centred’ way that seeks in a small way to ‘bind together’ what are frequently held as ‘contradictory’ approaches to theorising agency in IR, such as between ‘atomistic’ (‘individualistic,’ ‘rational choice’ approaches) and ‘holistic,’ (‘intersubjective,’ ‘constructivist’ approaches). A central argument here is that effective trust-building in international relations requires substantive efforts at both risk and relationship management. Trust, if it is to be meaningfully employed as a concept in IR, cannot be reduced to either the rational control of risks or the fostering of relationship norms; but, as will be explored, necessarily mediates between the two. Such a meta-theoretical project has its inherent drawbacks. But it is reinforced by a body of social scientific literature that conceives of trust as fundamentally multi-dimensional.9 The risk/relationship management duality also draws precedence from recent agent-structure theory in IR which sub-divides agency into various components, including ‘rationalised intentionality’ and ‘socially-embedded meaning.’10 (Wight 1999)

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8 U.S. President George W. Bush, for example, frequently refers to the importance of ‘trust’, particularly with reference to personal relations with foreign leaders, such as Mexico’s Vincente Fox, China’s Jiang Zemin and Russian’s Vladimir Putin. After meeting Putin, Bush said: “It starts with trust. From that basis, we can begin a very fruitful relationship;” And after meeting Fox, he highlighted “the mutual trust and respect between the two neighbouring countries;” adding “the governments are committed to seizing the opportunities before us in this new atmosphere of mutual trust.” (U.S. State Department, 2001) Trust building is also an increasingly popular term; for example, a ministerial-level South-East Asia conference on trust-building was set for September 2001, until the events of Sept 11th postponed it.

9 See for example Silver (1985).

10 See Section 4.4.
The exploration of trust in this thesis serves another useful function with respect to the critical security literature in IR. In a sense, it challenges critical security at its own game by calling into the question the continuing emphasis on the very term 'security' as a focal point of IR instead of 'trust.' Whereas 'trust relations' are a lynchpin of many (but certainly not all) conceptions of domestic politics and domestic society—for instance, recent theories of civil society and social capital—'security relations' remain the lynchpin of dominant conceptions of international politics and international society. That is, in domestic society, some degree of trust (however minimal) is often the default starting point; whereas in international society, it is distrust and hence the need for security. The principle differences between the structure and quality of domestic and international politics remain, by nearly all accounts, substantial. But taking on either of these starting points 'exclusively' obviates the possibility of a more nuanced view of the 'push and pull' of political and social forces, both domestically and internationally. In Western democracies, such as the United States, for example, the internal basis for trusting domestic relations is far from self-evident or uncontested in academic and political spheres. And distrust, spawning from divergent social and political groupings and ideologies across a vast geographical space, is persistent at many times and places in domestic life. Pervasive domestic distrust, likewise, can create volatile and persistent internal security concerns. It is thus one of the themes of this thesis that the unravelling—and problematisation—of what is at stake in conceiving trust in domestic political theory can also open up space for trust to be considered from the perspective of IR theory.

The aim in the last part of this thesis is thus to illustrate how the trust model can provide a useful interpretation of the OSCE's role in promoting a 'thin form of trust' between its member states. In the post-Cold War era, the OSCE, in its promotion of shared norms deliberately linked to international security, can be seen as a 'soft' contributor to the risk management dimension of trust but a 'harder' contributor to the relationship management dimension of trust. Conversely, NATO can be seen in many respects as harder on risk management. Reconciling the competing and sometimes contradictory objectives of each dimension is, following the model set out in Chapter 6, one of the central challenges of building and maintaining trust between states. A final theme which carries through the chapters relates to the idea of an 'agent-centred' model of trust. This is not to say that structural forces in their many guises (e.g. in the distribution of military and economic capabilities) do not permeate most, if not all, areas of international relations, including where trusting relationships are involved. But it is to say that trust, at least in the way it is conceived here, remains distinctly 'agent-centric.' To trust is something which agents (be they individuals or groups, such as states) choose to do—in relation to another—not something which happens to them. This, in my view, is also a 'popular' understanding of trust as involving a particular orientation towards a 'relationship' which at some level links together
persons or groups, be they political leaders, institutions or states. Structural forces inevitably play a shaping role, but they are not the ‘defining’ feature of trust relationships. The upshot of this is that, when it comes to international relations and especially international security, the focus for building trust is, in a sense, placed on the ‘art of diplomacy.’ It is also in this sense that core aspects of the trust model connect perhaps most closely with the traditions of the English School, which emphasises the sociological bases of diplomacy. Indeed, for what default starting points are worth, it might be said that whereas trusting relations within states derive much of their substance from the rule of law and the legitimacy of democratic institutions, trust relations between states derive much of their substance from the practice of diplomacy and the broad norms embodied within international institutions.

**The Trust Literature**

Trust is a pervasive feature of social interaction. Diego Gambetta writes that: “The importance of trust pervades the most diverse situations where cooperation is at one and the same time a vital and a fragile commodity: from marriage to economic development, from buying a second-hand car to international affairs, from the minutiae of social life to the continuation of life on earth.” (1988, p.1) However, this general awareness of the pervasiveness of trust appears to have created less analysis than paralysis

In the social sciences, the importance of trust is often acknowledged but seldom examined and scholars tend to mention it in passing, to allude to it as fundamental ingredient or lubricant, an unavoidable dimension of social interaction, only to move on to deal with less intractable matters. (ibid., p.2)

Annette Baier concurs that ‘trust’ has remained largely unexplored in recent and contemporary social and human sciences. (1995) Despite, Gambetta and Baier’s misgivings about the lack of research on trust, interest in the study of trust has a long, though admittedly sparse, intellectual history; and in some disciplines (sociology in particular), the trust literature has grown significantly over the last decade. The study of trust can be seen across the social science disciplines, including *inter alia* anthropology, economics, history, philosophy, political science, socio-biology, sociology, socio-psychology and more applied areas like business management, public relations and marketing.12

Different disciplines have tended to focus on very particular aspects of trust. As will be discussed over the next three chapters, this spans the horizon from the ‘purely rational’ payoff structures of economic models of trust to the strongly normative emphasis on the importance of trust in shaping understandings which some sociological theories give to trust. As will also be

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11 See Section 6.2 for a discussion of the ‘reification’ of states with regards to trust.
12 Trust has even been explored in relation to Darwinian evolutionary theory, where research into the cooperative behaviour of animals is employed to explain the evolution of trust in humans. (Bateson 1988)
seen in Chapter 6, in which the trust model is set out, as well as in the CSCE/OSCE illustrative studies in Chapters 7 and 8, making the distinction in practice between whether specific behaviour in international relations is based on rational interest or on the presence of shared norms is often an ambiguous task. This is why, following some—but certainly not all—theorists of trust, I argue for a conception of trust which is necessarily multi-dimensional. Doney et al., for example, write that:

Although multidisciplinary interest has added to the richness of the [trust] construct, there have been surprisingly few attempts to integrate the various perspectives on trust. Developing an integrated model of trust is particularly difficult, given the vagueness and idiosyncrasies in defining trust across multiple disciplines and orientations. (1998, p.603)

Examples of multidisciplinary (or integrated) approaches to trust includes Shapiro, Sheppard & Cheraskin, who suggest that trust has three bases:

- Deterrence-based trust, which emphasises costs and benefits;
- Knowledge-based trust, which emphasises past experience and learning about the other;
- Identification-based trust, which emphasises the development of shared values. (1992)

There is also (First Name)Zucker, who takes the approach that trust is based on:

- The exchange process;
- Characteristics of the trustor and the trustee;
- Societal institutions. (1986)

From yet another multidisciplinary perspective, it can be said that trust is simultaneously made up of economic, psychological and sociological components. (Parkhe 1998) Parkhe argues that trust is economic because tangible and intangible interests are at stake; psychological because it occurs within a person; and sociological because it occurs between persons. As these three multidisciplinary perspectives suggest and as will be explored in detail, various definitions and understandings of trust can contain varying degrees and blends of rational, cognitive and normative elements. How such conceptions of trust and what elements in particular might best apply to an explanation of international relations is a central theme here and is key to the risk and relationship management model set forth in Chapter 6 and then applied to the CSCE/OSCE illustrative studies. The literature review chart on the following pages offers a sample of the extraordinary range and diversity of properties theorised as underlying trust across the social sciences. (Bolmquist 2002; Meyer 1995, p.718)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trust-Building Property</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Competence</td>
<td>O'Brien 1995</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mishra 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sydow 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-reference (ability to understand difference and appreciate complimentarity)</td>
<td>Luhmann 1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stähle 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receptiveness (of organisational culture)</td>
<td>Dodgson 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal interaction (in the organisational culture)</td>
<td>Sydow 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Double-contingency (ability to connect to other actors in the system and to accept mutual interdependence)</td>
<td>Luhmann 1995</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sydow 1998</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stähle 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity</td>
<td>Das and Teng 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reciprocity</td>
<td>Creed and Miles 1996</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reliability</td>
<td>Mishra 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security and stability</td>
<td>Erikson 1950</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Creed and Miles 1996</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sydow 1998</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shared values</td>
<td>Jones and George 1998</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social similarity</td>
<td>Zucker 1986</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Creed and Miles 1996</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ladegård 1997</td>
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<tr>
<td>Personal chemistry</td>
<td>Powell 1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homophily/similarity of organisations</td>
<td>Sydow 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialisation and creating shared meanings</td>
<td>Zucker 1986</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tyler and Kramer 1996</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Hardy et al. 1998</td>
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<tr>
<td>Management philosophy</td>
<td>Barnes 1991</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Barney and Hansen 1994</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rule of signification</td>
<td>O'Brien 1995</td>
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<tr>
<td>Organisational culture</td>
<td>Creed and Miles 1996</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Whitener et al. 1998</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sydow 1998</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Giddens 1984</td>
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<tr>
<td>Goals and visions</td>
<td>Das and Teng 1998</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Sydow 1998</td>
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<tr>
<td>Organisational structure</td>
<td>Creed and Miles 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>Luhmann 1979</td>
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<td></td>
<td>O'Brien 1995</td>
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<td>Mishra 1996</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Das and Teng 1998</td>
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<tr>
<td>Multiplexity of communication</td>
<td>Sydow 1998</td>
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<tr>
<td>Information</td>
<td>O'Brien 1995</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Swan 1995</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Mishra 1996</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Das and Teng 1998</td>
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<tr>
<td>Concern</td>
<td>O'Brien 1995</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mishra 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Learning and understanding</td>
<td>Whitener et al 1998</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jones and George 1998</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### Chart 1: Literature Review of Trust Building Properties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Source(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inter-firm adaptation</td>
<td>Das and Teng 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commitment</td>
<td>Das and Teng 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shadow-of-the-future</td>
<td>Axelrod 1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal experience</td>
<td>Creed and Miles 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reputation</td>
<td>Barney and Hansen 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past interactions, index of caution based on prisoner's dilemma outcomes</td>
<td>Boyle &amp; Bonacich 1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Availability, competence, consistency, discreetness, fairness, integrity, loyalty, openness, promise, fulfilment, receptivity</td>
<td>Butler 1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trustworthy intentions, ability</td>
<td>Cook and Wall 1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credible threat of punishment, credibility of promises</td>
<td>Dasgupta 1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability, intention to produce</td>
<td>Deutsch 1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Openness, ownership of feelings, experimentation with new behaviour, group norms</td>
<td>Farris, Senner &amp; Butterfield 1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependence on trustee, altruism</td>
<td>Frost, Stimpson &amp; Maughan 1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Openness, previous outcomes</td>
<td>Gabarro 1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expertness, reliability as information source, intentions, dynamism, personal attraction, reputation</td>
<td>Griffin 1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability, intention, trustees' claims about how (they) will behave</td>
<td>Good 1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Openness/congruity, shared values, autonomy/feedback</td>
<td>Hart, Capps, Cangemi, &amp; Caillouet 1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expertise, motivation to lie</td>
<td>Hovland, Janis &amp; Kelley 1953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reliability</td>
<td>Johnson-Georg &amp; Swap 1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability, behaviour is relevant to the individual's needs and desires</td>
<td>Jones, James &amp; Bruni 1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competence, motives</td>
<td>Kee &amp; Knox 1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benevolence, honesty</td>
<td>Larzelere &amp; Huston 1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competence, integrity</td>
<td>Lieberman 1981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competence, openness, caring, reliability</td>
<td>Mishra 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral integrity, goodwill</td>
<td>Ring &amp; Van de Ven 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judgment or competence, group goals</td>
<td>Rosen &amp; Jerdee 1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability, value congruence</td>
<td>Sitkin &amp; Roth 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benevolence</td>
<td>Solomon 1960 Strickland 1958</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The social scientific literature on trust summarised in these charts is vast and unwieldy. Clearly, there is little or no consensus on what trust is or how to build it. In the next three chapters, the challenge will be to ‘loosely’ distil the key themes of the trust literature, at least to the point that
they can be usefully conceived, both in terms of an overall trust model for international relations and in the application of this model to the CSCE/OSCE illustrative studies.

**Defining Trust**

The word 'trust' and conceptions of trust can, unsurprisingly, mean very different things to different people across different cultures and within different contexts. *The American Heritage Dictionary*, for example, offers four different synonyms for the word trust: faith, confidence, reliance and dependence. (2003)\(^\text{13}\), Larson notes that each synonym varies slightly in meaning: Faith is the kind of trust that is unquestioning and emotionally charged; Confidence is less emotional and requires good evidence; Reliance implies a certain commitment; Finally, with trust that is connected to dependence, the commitment is not a free-choice. (Larson 1998)\(^\text{14}\) *The Merriam-Webster Dictionary* lists the word *trust* as both a verb and a noun and traces its origins to the 13\(^\text{th}\) Century Old English word *trEowe*, meaning faithful (and from which the word *true* also originates). (2002)\(^\text{15}\)

Doney et al., moreover, in her review of the trust literature identifies two general ways in which trust is defined:

- Trust as a set of beliefs or expectations;
- Trust as a willingness to act on those beliefs, e.g. exhibiting trusting behaviour. (1998)

This general distinction in defining trust as an expectation (or set of expectations) or as a behaviour (or set of behaviours) is an important one. It suggests either a passive (or psychological) conception of trust or an active, behavioural conception of trust. Understanding trust as both a psychological phenomenon and as a way of behaving considerably broadens the conceptual scope of what can be understood by the term trust; as well as broadening the scope of what can be associated with trust. This is both an advantage in terms of the richness of human activity and experience it can encompass and a methodological nightmare. As will also be explored in the CSCE/OSCE illustrative studies, drawing a clear line both in theory and practice between these two ways of defining trust is frequently less than self-evident.

Karen Jones identifies another key distinction in the way trust is defined, between:

- Trust as a rational decision-making process and
- Trust as an affective (emotional) attitude or state. (1996)

In terms of the trust model advanced in *Chapter 6*, these two distinctions can be understood to 'loosely' fall under the categories of risk management and relationship management,

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\(^{14}\) Larson's article is part of the 1998 special issue of the journal *International Negotiation* on 'social exchange theory.' (Vol. 3, no.2)

\(^{15}\) See http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary [27/09/2003].
respectively. As will be developed, the risk management approach to trust emphasises increased ‘vigilance’ through the rational promotion and protection of individual interests. Relationship management emphasises increased ‘vulnerability’ through the promotion and protection of shared goals, values and identity. Moreover, as Chapter 4 will seek to illuminate, the phenomenon of ‘suspension’, which is the ‘kernel’ of what trust is—and which distinguishes it from mere prediction or blind faith—acts in a unique way to mediate between these two fundamental dimensions of trust.

A Brief History of Trust

The idea of trust, as mentioned earlier, has a long, if scattered history stretching back at least to Greek philosophy. From the ancients up to modern times, trust has typically played an ‘accompanying’ role to theories of governance and justice. Discussing the roots of trust in moral philosophy, Baier writes that:

Plato, in the Republic, presumably expects the majority of citizens to trust the philosopher kings to rule wisely...His version of justice seems to imply such virtues of trust...but neither proper trust nor proper trustworthiness is among the virtues he dwells on as necessary in the cooperating parties in his good society. (1995, p.97)

Likewise, Aristotle's moral philosophy, besides indirectly recognising the importance of trust between friends, is similarly bare of discussion about trust. (ibid.) Thomas Aquinas and other Christian moralists have paid somewhat more attention to the virtue of trust, at least in terms of its relationship with faith and hope (trust in God). According to Allan Silver, trust also played an important part in medieval society, where loyalty, honour and condemnation of betrayal was emphasised and where trust “bound together some factions, families, corporations, or patrons and their dependents, in struggles against others.” (1985, p.54)

Moving on several centuries, David Hume touches on the issue of expectation-based trust when he provides his classic metaphor of two antagonistic farmers who, despite their lack of warmth for each other, nevertheless learn the benefits of cooperation. (Hume 1978 [1739-40]) Hume writes: “I learn to do a service to another, without bearing him any real kindness; because I foresee, that he will return my service, in expectation of another of the same kind.” (p.521) As I will look at more closely in Chapter 4, John Locke examines trust in government. (1988 [1690]) Thomas Hobbes, not surprisingly, sees trust as a ‘passion’ and grounds the role of trust in the social contract. (1750 [1640]) Hobbes writes that: “Trust is a Passion proceeding from whom we expect or hope for Good, so free from Doubt that upon the same we pursue no other Way to attain the same Good...” (quoted in Dunn 2000, p.74) Hegel’s political disposition of trust is also examined more closely in Section 6.6. Distrust too has long been a source of intellectual inquiry, however latently. Machiavelli observed that: In society the reality is that distrust and intolerance prevail, taking precedence over ‘what ought to be’: “The Prince must
appear to be filled with sympathy and trust, and seem to be humane, honest and religious, and indeed actually be so, and yet, when necessary, he must be mentally ready not to practice these virtues, ready, in a word, to do the opposite, and to do the opposite with class and skill.” (1978 [1513], Chpt.15) Hume also famously stressed designing political institutions that are ‘fit for knaves’; that is, based on distrust. (Braithwaite, p.351) Montesquieu likewise conjectured that vigilance, a sustained manifestation of personal trust, needs to be routinised in the rule of law, “so that those in power are compelled to systematically vindicate themselves under their reciprocal scrutiny and the scrutiny of the people.” (Pettit, p.309) By such routine, distrust is seen to remain in the social background, without inducing emotional tumult.

There are good reasons why, in the history of ideas, trust has not been developed extensively or rigorously as a stand-alone concept. As will be argued, trust needs to be embedded in a broader theoretical context in order to be meaningful. This is a both an advantage, in terms of its conceptual flexibility and a weakness in terms of its lack of specificity. Nevertheless, I will argue in this thesis that trust can potentially play a unique conceptual role in IR, but this requires that it be understood in a way that both pins it down and still accounts for its multi-dimensionality. In this vein, the various strands of historic and contemporary thought on trust will be picked up across the next seven chapters and woven into the trust model presented in Chapter 6.

**Trust and International Security**

There are several reasons why the late-Cold War CSCE and the post-Cold War OSCE have been selected as a tentative illustrative studies for exploring the role of trust in international relations via the trust model set out in Chapter 6. First, given the monumental scope of human interaction today which potentially (and often does) get placed under the umbrella category of ‘international relations’—and given the ‘exploratory’ nature of the trust model on offer—it makes sense to at least ‘begin’ in a well-trodden area of IR; namely one of the classical examples of multilateral security relations between states. Put another way, while perhaps less ambitious, it is helpful to consider new theoretical territory against the backdrop of somewhat more familiar empirical territory. The disadvantage of this is that the relevance which the concept of trust may have to contemporary international relations—increasingly characterised by relations far more multifaceted and diffuse than the billiard-ball-like model of diplomatic-military relations between states—is diminished. While in both the theoretical and illustrative components of this thesis, the boundaries and overlap between state and non-state (sub- and trans-state) relations are touched on—and their implications are alluded to, the core nevertheless remains ‘apologetically’ state-centric.

Similarly, the case of European security cooperation—from the first Cold War period of détente to the present environment of what some scholars have labeled a ‘security
community'—has been chosen because it is an area where trust-based relations are more plausible than elsewhere. Again, it makes sense to focus first on an area of international relations where trust may be more likely before considering areas, such as Israeli-Arab security relations, where the presence of trust may be far more doubtful or ambiguous. Indeed, the notion of a security community is one of the rare areas of IR theory where the idea of trust is more or less explicitly promulgated. Emmanuel Adler, for example, writes that: “At the most intuitive level, (security communities) facilitate and encourage transactions and trust by: establishing norms of behaviour, monitoring mechanisms and sanctions to enforce those norms.” (1998, p.17) Adler offers a framework for how trust in security communities develops, from limited, interest-based relations, to more elaborate and shared ideas and eventually to shared values. In Chapter 4, a critique is offered of Adler’s theory, particularly stressing the contradictions in his combination of agency and structural factors in fostering or discouraging trust relations. The trust model which is advanced in Chapter 6, while building from Adler, offers an arguably more robust—if more limited—risk and relationship management framework for conceptualising agent-centred trust in international relations.16 This model incorporates recent insights from the social science literature on trust as well as recent work in international security studies on risk management and the ‘intersubjective’ nature of modern risk society.

**Confidence-Building Measures**

The CSCE/OSCE is also a natural first stop along the trust and international relations road since it offers one of the earliest uses of the concept of ‘confidence-building measures’ (CBMs) or ‘confidence and security-building measures’ (CSBMs) as they are presently termed. CBMs had their start in the frustration that Cold War American and Soviet officials felt towards stalled arms-control negotiations and were seen as a ‘better-than-nothing’ alternative for moving the ‘de-escalation’ process forward. CBMs were initially envisaged as serving to increase transparency and reduce the risk of ‘accidents’ in military activities. The original wave of CBMs included requirements for member states to report in advance any troop, air or naval activities exceeding a certain scale (e.g. movements in excess of 25,000 troops) as well as the establishment of direct lines of communication (hot-lines) between military command and control centres. Over the next two decades, subsequent waves expanded the domain of CBMs to include increasingly diverse forms of reporting, supervising and monitoring of military affairs. Moreover, in the sphere of OSCE cooperative security activities today, everything from elections monitoring to the re-establishment of public bus transportation between rural villages

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16 Separating agency from structural factors, at least initially, allows for a clearer picture to emerge of how trust is created in international relations. It is then possible to apply this agency-centred model to the wider context of power relations to consider the content and dynamics of specific international security arrangements, such as the OSCE.
of different ethnic make-up is wont to be referred to in policy documents as forms of ‘confidence-building.’

Though widely adopted in practice, the theoretical basis of CBMs has remained rudimentary and has arisen largely as an addendum to practice. According to Marie-France Desjardins, there is no recognised or accepted theory of confidence building measures in IR. (1996) Moreover, the expanding practical methods and tools that CBMs are said to involve have not been accompanied by a corresponding conceptual expansion in any systematic fashion. Thus, in Chapters 2 and 4, I examine and critique the confidence building literature in IR and seek to incorporate it into a more comprehensive model of trust in international relations.

From Distrust to Thin Trust: From the CSCE to the OSCE
The CSCE was a Cold War European forum for arms control negotiations, confidence-building measures and debate over limited normative commitments between the two superpower camps. Its origins lie in efforts between East and West to establish détente through a series of regular meetings on security cooperation, which led to the 1975 signing of the Helsinki Final Act. The ‘original’ security conference, its structure and mechanisms have been appropriated and adopted in many other regions of the world, notably in South-East Asia and South America. The CSCE’s history as well as its evolution into its present post-Cold War form as an international organisation, the OSCE, might be plausibly hypothesised as having served to build and maintain trust relations between its member states. Indeed, the CSCE has been characterised by scholars and policy makers alike as:

- The most comprehensive commitments to values and conduct between states ever put to paper. (OSCE 2002)
- A ‘laboratory’ for the development of political norms and values. (Ghébali 1995)

The empirical evidence that is drawn on in Chapters 7 & 8 will suggest, however, that the reality of the CSCE/OSCE and its impact on the relations between its member states is much more ambiguous. Critics, for example, have also contended that:

- The CSCE was a source of international conflict, not a mechanism for either coping with it or transcending it (Holsti 1984)
- The OSCE represents not the coming together of East and West but the victory of the West over the East (Heraclides 1993)
- The OSCE is a synonym for Russian power (Kuus 2002)

One focus of the illustrative studies will thus be devoted to the problem of distinguishing between the development of genuine forms of trust and the presence of the rhetorical ‘façade’ of
Christopher Berzins

trust. It will also consider instances of power operating as a functional equivalent to trust as well as associated ethical issues, following the terms set out in Chapter 5.

The OSCE is often considered to epitomise the 'soft diplomacy' approach to international relations. That is, it is said to rely on the influence of open communication and dialogue, shared normative commitments and institutionalised and diffuse conflict prevention activities to deepen relations between member states and their citizens. The OSCE and its processes are also often considered to embody the idea of cooperative security, where security is non-zero sum and one state's insecurity is every state's insecurity. Likewise, the OSCE embodies the idea of comprehensive security, where security is extended conceptually beyond the realm of military and political affairs to include social, economic, environmental and other areas of concern; in other words, overlapping with a wide range of 'domestic' affairs. Thus, another benefit of employing the OSCE as an illustrative study is that it offers the chance to consider the potential for more 'institutionalised' forms of trust in international relations. That is to say, trust as an element of broader—if still shallow—forms of international governance. The limited work on trust in international relations to date, in contrast, has largely focused on trust—or distrust—as causal explanations for international 'events.' Tuomas Forsberg's study of the role of trust in the ending of the Cold War and in the conflict between Russia and Japan over the Kurile Islands is a good example. (1999) The impact of the CSCE's transformation into a permanent international organisation offers the opportunity to consider the possibility of trust and its maintenance as a more regularised condition of international relations.

The Ethics of Trust

It is a truism that power is rarely distributed evenly in social relations. As will be seen in Chapter 5 via the thinking of the feminist philosopher Annette Baier, this can invariably impact on trust relations, including between states. According to Baier, political theorists have by and large focused on the 'cool', 'contractarian' relations which underpin society. Baier's starting point is in questioning the assumption which she feels many philosophers and others have that trust is always a good thing. She writes:

The few discussions of trust that I have found in the literature of moral philosophy assume that trust is a good and that disappointing known trust is always prima facie wrong, meeting it always prima facie right. What is a trust-tied community without justice but a group of mutual blackmailers and exploiters? I think it is high time we look at the morality and immorality of relations between the powerful and the less powerful, especially at those in which there is trust between them. (1995, p.120)

Baier argues that social contract theorising generally assumes a rational starting point between individuals of roughly equal power and status. But what this approach tends to neglect are the many societal relationships which, veil of ignorance notwithstanding, are still characterised by
an asymmetrical power distribution where one person or group is far more vulnerable than the
other; one need think only of the relationship between parent and child, or between doctor and
patient. (ibid.) Likewise, in international relations, weak states are in a position of considerably
greater vulnerability with regard to more powerful states. Thus, following Baier, when it comes
to deepening the possibilities for trust in international relations, be it between member states of
a security community, between citizens and multi-national corporations, etc, further engagement
with normative theory (such as questions of justice) eventually becomes necessary. That is,
while minimal forms of basic trust appear to be intrinsic to all social relations, including the
contractual relations of self-interested actors, building ‘thicker’ trust appears to require stronger
(warmer) normative commitments. In Chapters 5 and 6, I thus explore the ethical prerequisites
for thicker forms of trust in international relations. Baier’s two ethical trust tests, set out in
Chapter 5, are also considered in the context of the illustrative studies and the conclusion
offers some general directions for further normative exploration.
2. Risk Management

"Doveray, no proveryay" ("Trust but verify")
—Ronald Reagan quoting Gorbachev quoting Lenin quoting an old Russian Proverb,
on signing the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty
The Puzzle of Trust in IR

2.1 Trust as Rational Choice

As thinkers such as Annette Baier, Francis Fukuyama, Russell Hardin and Guido Möllering have noted, a majority of research on trust across the social sciences, particularly in economics, political science and social psychology has emphasised the individualistic rational choice approach. (Baier 1995; Fukuyama 1995; Hardin 1993; Möllering 2001) This approach typically conceptualises trust in game-theoretical terms. Following the (in)famous prisoner’s dilemma:

*One can be said to ‘trust’ another to the extent that the other can be expected to act in line with one’s interests; in other words, the likelihood that he/she will cooperate rather than defect.*

As will be shown, the small but growing IR literature on trust is not a special case in this respect. In this chapter the rational choice approach to trust is explored and situated within the concept of risk management.

_Homo Economicus_

According to Dasgupta, the mainstream economics literature has by-and-large ignored the role of trust. (1988) Where it has considered trust it has done so largely in rationalist and, more specifically, probability terms. Here, trust can be understood roughly as the probability judgement that another actor will behave in agreement with one’s interests. This perspective finds one of its most influential expositions in the work of Russell Hardin who argues that a rational probability judgment about trust must incorporate careful considerations of the other actor’s interests and character. (1991) What are the other actor’s incentives to cooperate or not cooperate (or cheat)? Based on past experience, can the other be deemed trustworthy? According to Hardin, a decision to trust and cooperate is only rational in a situation where it is clearly in the other actor’s interest to also cooperate.

This view, as mentioned above, is epitomised by the ‘game theory approach.’ In the classic prisoner’s dilemma game, two prisoners (players) are each, in isolation of the other, offered the same two choices: either to betray the other prisoner by testifying against him (in game theory terminology, defecting) or to cooperate by remaining silent. If both cooperate they both receive a light sentence. But if one defects and the other cooperates, the defector is freed and the co-operator receives a heavy sentence. According to mathematical models, in a single game, both prisoners (if they act rationally) will testify against the other and receive the heavy sentence, despite the fact that this is clearly not in their common interest. (Axelrod 1984) The crux of the problem lies with their lack of the knowledge (or expectation) about each other’s behaviour. The prisoner cannot trust that the other will not testify against him, therefore he is not willing to risk cooperation. Critical to the link between trust and probability is thus the

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17 See also Barney (1994) and Lyons (1997).
awareness that this judgement (to trust or not to trust) involves a degree of risk. It involves making oneself vulnerable to the possibility of loss because, like in the prisoner’s dilemma game, one believes that the benefits, despite the potential costs, are worth it. This invariably requires a judgement which, in rational terms, takes the form of a cost-benefit analysis.

In game theory, one way to skew the balance of costs and benefits in favour of the benefits is by developing a ‘reputation’ for trustworthiness. In order to do this, a player may start by making a costly concession in the interest of the co-operative relationship with the other player(s). For example, in the classic prisoner’s dilemma game ‘Tit-for-Tat,’ which Robert Axelrod developed to demonstrate the rationale behind trust in cooperation, reciprocity is a central part of the strategy. (1984) In Tit-for-Tat, the first player makes an initial co-operative move. After this co-operative move, the first party then imitates all of the other party’s subsequent moves. If this first co-operative move is reciprocated, the first party then likewise reciprocates with another co-operative gesture, and so on. If the other party’s response is non-co-operative, then the initial party responds in kind. Axelrod demonstrates that such imitation (Tit-for-Tat), if both parties follow a rational strategy, will eventually result in repeated reciprocation of co-operative moves and hence mutually co-operative behaviour. (ibid.) This reciprocity-based strategy demonstrates that mutually beneficial cooperation is both feasible and rational in terms of assuring the best of possible outcomes. As will be elaborated in the literature review in Section 2.2, in IR, studies of Tit-for-Tit are multiple. (Larson 1998) A state may, for example, decide to release political prisoners from another state as an act of goodwill towards that other state and in the hope that this act will be reciprocated with an equivalent or similar act and so on.¹⁸ The two International Organisation articles reviewed in Section 2.2 embody the game-theoretical approach to trust and there is no need to elaborate further here at the moment, except to quote Andrew Kydd who offers an admirable defence of their purposefulness:

[The IR] literature presents a welter of hypotheses and conjectures, some of which are rationalist whereas others are not and has often focused on prescription rather than analysis. Overall, the reader is left with the impression that leaders usually fail to pursue reassurance strategies because they are irrational or cognitively limited, but this judgement is impossible to sustain unless we know when it is rational to pursue reassurance strategies in the first place. (2000, p.330)

Trust and Risk

A common theme across rational choice conceptualisations of trust is that some element of risk is invariably required. Though risk is itself a complex subject, it can be said very generally for

¹⁸ A number of conventional caveats can be made here, such as the fact that international relations typically involves multiple games; that is, repeated interaction across a range of issues over a period of time, as well as multiple actors. For example, international agreements, such as security arrangements, are often signed by numerous countries and security concerns change over time and often quite rapidly. These and other factors substantially muddy the real-world rational decision-making process.
The Puzzle of Trust in IR

now that risk involves some form of vulnerability and/or uncertainty about the future. As such, risk can be defined as:

_The adverse effects that can result if a threat is actualised or vulnerability is exploited._\(^{19}\)

In the absence of uncertainty, if all possible outcomes were already known ahead of time, there would be no need to trust or build trust. (Lewis 1985) But when, in an uncertain world, we are required to entrust something of value to another, we run the risk of loss. Hardin writes that: "Trust involves giving discretion to another to affect one's interests. This move is inherently subject to the risk that the other will abuse the power of discretion." (1993, p.507)

Trust is a thus a common way of dealing with certain risks; in fact, as is often argued\(^{20}\), there is some element of trust involved in all efforts to deal with (control, manage, contain) risks. (Kollock 1994) Niklas Luhmann writes that "Trust is a solution for specific problems of risk." (1988, p.95) An important distinction needs to be made between risks which are avoidable (such as the risks involved in a decision to cooperate with another) and risks which are unavoidable. When a risk is avoidable, trust involves a calculation of the potential for undesirable outcomes vs. the potential benefits. If it is deemed that the potential benefits outweigh the potential negative effects, then the decision to cooperate with another, to take the risk and to trust that the outcome will be beneficial, is made. When risk in unavoidable, trust can still play an important role. To the extent that such risk can be limited, decisions can be made as to the degree to which to trust another. One may decide to run smaller risks and trust at a lower level, rather than run a high risk and trust at a high level. Just as issues of trust (and its opposite distrust) pervade international relations (as they pervade all human interaction), so too does risk. In the more traditional sphere of relations between states, whether at war or in peaceful cooperation (or in the plethora of contexts in between), state actors invariably calculate the risks associated with their interaction and relationship with other states. What, for example, are the risks of agreeing to a ceasefire? Of signing an arms-control agreement? What is the risk that another state will use a ceasefire to prepare for a renewed attack? Or renege on the terms of an arms-control agreement? The point here is not to undertake a comprehensive analysis of the kinds of risks encountered in international relations but to highlight that given the field's broad and multi-disciplinary scope, the forms of risk encountered in international relations evidently are multiple, frequently nuanced and vast. (Griner 2002)

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19 For further empirical definition of risk, particularly with respect to international conflict, see Bueno de Mesquita (1992) and Waring (1998).
20 This is elaborated in the section on risk and modernity in Section 6.4.
Defining Risk Management

One way in which international actors cope with such multiple, nuanced and vast risks is through the development of specific risk management strategies. Risk management can be broadly defined as:

*a field of activity seeking to monitor, eliminate, reduce and generally control risks.* (Coles 2000, p.24)

As is explored further in *Section 6.4*, the nature of recent developments in world politics, particularly the U.S.-led ‘War on Terrorism’ after Sept 11th 2001 as well as its efforts to restrict the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have encouraged new thinking about risk management in IR as a way of addressing proliferating, frequently ambiguous and continuing threats. (Coker 2002; Heng 2002). Risk management thinking also finds expression in policy documents such as NATO’s new ‘Strategic Concept’ (1999) and The U.S. Department of Defense’s ‘Quadrennial Defense Review’ published in 2001, which devoted a full chapter to ‘managing risks.’

Generally, risk management involves the identification and evaluation of all possible threats and vulnerabilities in a particular area and the likelihood that these will be exploited; and then the development of contingency plans and specific actions directed at minimising or counteracting these risks. However, the field of risk management is itself a mixed bag of ambiguous and often conflicting methodologies and prescriptions which often fall short when put into practice in complex environments. At worst, risk management-oriented policy recommendation can give policy makers a false sense of security and a narrow view of how best to go about promoting and achieving policy goals. At best, risk management, while important in helping define the parameters of what is at stake, can only play a ‘part’ in an overall trust building strategy. For, as is elaborated in *Chapter 3*, trust demands not just risk management but also relationship management. First though, the IR literature connected with the risk management approach must be considered.
2.2 The Risk Dimension of cooperation, Reassurance and CBMs

An excellent example of recent efforts to elaborate a model of trust in international relations are two articles which appeared in the journal *International Organisation* in 2000: Fiona McGillivray and Alistair Smith’s ‘Trust and Cooperation Through Agent-specific Punishments’ and Andrew Kydd’s ‘Trust, Reassurance and Cooperation.’ It is telling that in 2000, two of the four issues of what is a leading American academic journal of IR contained articles on trust. Both articles are exemplary of the dominance of the singularly rational choice approach that, as is developed in *Chapter 3*, other trust theorists such as Baier and Fukuyama are critical of. Both articles are also suggestive of a ‘compartmentalised’ approach to the study of trust in international relations; for they offer a restricted definition and interpretation of what constitutes both international relations and trust (or at least what part of trust and international relations they propose to study).

*Trust and Cooperation Through Agent-Specific Punishments*

McGillivray and Smith’s article ‘Trust and Cooperation Through Agent-Specific Punishments’ uses the prisoner’s dilemma game to examine how domestic political leadership affects the ability of states to trust and cooperate with each other and how punishing leaders may lead to greater trust. In the previous section, I touched on how game theorists have applied the prisoner’s dilemma model to international cooperation, where each prisoner is a state (or state leader, representative, etc.) and must weigh the potential benefits and risks of cooperation; for example, signing an arms-control treaty without perfect knowledge of how the other state will act in the future. Will the other state comply with the agreement or cheat and continue to build-up armaments secretly?21

McGillivray and Smith write “Extant theories of cooperation suggest that nations maintain trust and cooperation by threatening to punish exploitative behaviour through the removal of future cooperation.” (p.809) They argue that if punishing behaviour is directed specifically towards another state’s leader rather than to the other state as a whole, then this applies pressure on that leader to be more accountable and trustworthy (or else face removal by that state’s citizens); and this in turn should foster greater international cooperation. A few significant points in relation to McGillivray and Smith’s conceptualisation of trust in international relations are worth highlighting. The authors state in their conclusion that “trust is the key to international cooperation.” (p.821) Yet they do little to delineate their specific

21 More interesting prospects for cooperation are uncovered when considering iterated (multiple) games, where patterns of behaviour emerge and it becomes possible to develop reliable expectations of the other’s future behaviour. Repeated games are more reflective of international relations, where negotiation and cost/benefit-oriented decisions about cooperation or non-cooperation may take place on a continual and/or long-term basis. This is where the concept of trust as the rational expectation of another’s repeated behaviour (in agreement with one’s interests) comes into play.
conceptualisation of trust. As will also be seen with Kydd next, they do not differentiate in any way conceptually between trust and cooperation. Exactly ‘how’ is trust the key to international cooperation? This is left unanswered. The authors seem to suggest that ‘punishment’ (of state leaders rather than entire populations) is the key to trust. They write: “By threatening to withdraw future cooperation as punishment for exploitation behaviour, nations make their partners trustworthy.” (p.810) According to this model, punishing a leader (specifically targeting the leader by manipulating negative public opinion and thereby increasing pressure on him/her to conform) should make this leader more trustworthy. What stands out in this particular interpretation of trust, besides its conceptual narrowness, is its employment of negative behaviour (punishment) to bring about what is normally considered to be associated with positive (or affective) behaviour: trustworthiness. The authors write that: “…the threat of future punishment keeps nations honest.” (p.821)

The trustworthiness demonstrated here is clearly very one-sided. That is, there is no discussion of any degree of trust developed on the part of the punished leader or for that matter his/her citizens (towards the punishing state). Rather, the model suggests the opposite; that the punished leader is likely to trust the other state even less. Trust, in the way it is conceived here, is far from mutual; and it is even likely to bring about less trust (and greater hostility) from one side. Trustworthiness is thus closely linked with coerciveness and negative affect. In the same vein, what is understood to be trustworthy behaviour is only determined by one party. So long as the other party conforms to its wishes, that other party may be deemed trustworthy. Moreover, in this model, there is no space for normative debate about the rightness of such behaviour. In sum, the rational choice model of trust advanced here points to the potential differentiation of trust targets in international relations (such as individual leaders as opposed to states in their entirety) and to the various merits (or at least outcomes) associated with distinguishing (isolating) specific trust targets. However, it gives no weight to the potential ‘normative’ content of trust and trust-building behaviour. The exposition in Chapter 5 of Annette Baier’s work on the ethics of trust and trust building explores the potential ‘normative’ dimension of trust and trust building which, it will be argued, exclusively rational choice approaches fail to adequately take into account.

**Trust, Reassurance and Cooperation**

In his article, ‘Trust, Reassurance and Cooperation’ Andrew Kydd develops a rational choice theory of reassurance. By reassurance, Kydd means incremental steps which one state can take through deliberate gestures (which involve a certain amount of vulnerability and risk) in order to reassure another state that its intentions are trustworthy. This understanding of reassurance builds primarily from Osgood’s theory of Graduated and Reciprocated Initiatives in Tension-Reduction (GRIT) whereby an initial reassuring gesture of vulnerability is reciprocated by
another state, sparking further mutual reciprocation, increasing vulnerability and a spiral of 'tension reduction.' Kydd describes these gestures as 'costly signals' and by way of game-theoretical modeling, identifies the conditions under which players can successfully employ costly signals to reassure the other side. This model is then applied to a case study: the reassurance strategies pursued by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev at the end of the Cold War.\textsuperscript{22}

Kydd's model of reassurance and its application to his case study demonstrate, in his words that:

Reassurance can rationally overcome distrust and lead to cooperation. When the trust game is modified to incorporate the possibility of reassurance, the scope of cooperation increases greatly, in that actors who would be too fearful to cooperate in the trust game find it rational to reassure each other and cooperate in the reassurance game. (p.352)

Rather than tangle with the mathematical details of Kydd's reassurance model, its internal empirical consistency is assumed for the sake of focusing on a number of other points about both its methodological perspective and how it fits into the wider trust and trust building literature. First, despite its invocation of Elinor Ostrom's call for exploring trust as a core concept of human relations (and integrating it into political theory), Kydd's model offers a very narrow interpretation of what trust is. Indeed, as is the weakness of many rational choice explanations of trust, there is little (if anything) to explain the difference between trust and cooperation. (Lane 1998) Trust, as this model sees it, is the expectation that if one sends out a costly signal, another state will cooperate through reciprocation of that signal. Cooperation is the rational decision to send this costly signal because the probability is high enough that it will be reciprocated. The problem is that between the model's concept of trust (as expectation) and its concept of cooperation (as acting on this expectation), there is no mediating concept. From this perspective, it can be said to advocate a 'behavioural model' of trust, which makes no differentiation between the psychological 'content' of trust and the observable trusting 'behaviour' (in this case, cooperation) which emanates from it. (Lewis 1985) The model leaves the 'black box' (or Pandora's box) of psychology unopened, thus ignoring a wealth of psychological factors that other trust theorists argue contribute to the creation, maintenance or destruction of trust. (Hollis 1998)

Despite these shortcomings, Kydd's model of reassurance offers a good 'starting' rational choice model of trust building which, as will be argued, is linked most appropriately to the 'confidence' building literature. Kydd writes that:

Much empirical work has been done on reassurance tasks undertaken by the U.N., the OSCE, NATO's Partnership for Peace and on confidence-building measures more generally. However, ...the theoretical basic for this approach has been largely undeveloped since Osgood and Etzioni

\textsuperscript{22} The model's implications for the case of ethnic conflict are also briefly discussed.
advanced their basic reassurance hypothesis in the early 1960s. The reassurance game presented here is a first step in providing a rational choice foundation for this literature. (p.353)

The literature on confidence-building measures (CBMs) and the conceptual differences between confidence and trust are explored later in this chapter. I draw largely similar conclusions regarding Kydd's point about the need for greater theoretical sophistication and refinement in the area of CBMs. But though he develops a straightforward mathematical model of reassurance based on rational choice, it is less rigorous than he claims in that it does not lay adequate definitional foundations for 'reassurance.' The model makes no distinction, for example, between the terms confidence and trust, or between reassurance and confidence-building, using them interchangeably. Like his model for trust discussed above (which he calls the trust game), Kydd's model for reassurance (the reassurance game) similarly neglects to consider the multiple psychological and ethical factors potentially associated with reassurance and the decision to engage in reassuring behaviour. It likewise side-steps questions or arguments that more fundamentally cast a strict view of rational decision-making (and rationality in general) into doubt.23

Kydd tellingly concedes that: "Many issues remain to be explored, such as problems introduced by the existence of multiple actors and mass public, asymmetries between the actors and bounded rationality." (p.353) Many aspects of these issues are explored in the following chapters. For example, in terms of the problem of multiple actors, the conception of trust developed in this thesis distinguishes between not just human actors, but the many different kinds of actors—both trustors and trustees—including states, international organisations, ethnic groups, and NGOs potentially engaged in 'international' trust relationships.24 Even this limited web of trust relations illustrates the complexity of evaluating trust relations in contemporary international relations; an issue which is further probed by the CSCE/OSCE illustrative studies in Chapters 7 & 8. Kydd's call for further work on asymmetries between trust actors is also addressed in Chapter 5 on ethics, particularly through the ideas of Annette Baier, who discusses the special importance and features of trust between actors in asymmetrical power relationships.25 (1995) Such power imbalances both heighten the gravity of nurturing trust and impart particular ethical obligations on more powerful actors to engage in trust building behaviour; for example by demonstrating accountability and making deliberate and significant corresponding gestures of vulnerability.

Kydd's call for further work on trust and bounded rationality is also addressed in a number of places in this thesis, including in the exploration of trust's mechanism of

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23 As I will argue in Chapter 6, the rational choice approach epitomised by the articles in International Organisation is an important element of trust's risk management dimension; but I argue that a broader theory of trust in international relations is needed.

24 See for example the discussion of 'trust targets' in Section 6.3.
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Interestingly, Kydd alludes to how his reassurance model adds value to (and helps ground) the trend in ‘End of the Cold War’ theorising towards ‘epistemic community’ approaches which emphasise the role ‘new ideas’ had in shaping Soviet foreign policy. He writes that this trend “focuses on the origin of these ideas about common security, the way they were introduced to the Soviet political system and the way they infiltrated the institutions of power in the Soviet Union and eventually became predominant.” (p.350) Kydd argues that his model of reassurance goes further to show how such new ideas need to be communicated clearly and expressed through explicit reassuring behaviours in order to gain credibility and the trust of other actors. What is interesting is that Kydd nevertheless overlooks more fundamental questions about the role of ideas in shaping the very understanding of what it means to reassure and what it means to trust. As the next chapter points to, both the definition of trust and the tendency towards particular trust-building behaviours (and interpretations of this behaviour) are strongly shaped by sociocultural factors. The deeper exploration of the boundaries of rationality which Kydd calls for necessitates more careful consideration of such ‘multi-dimensional’ foundations of trust in international relations. At the end of his International Organisation article, Kydd paraphrases Elinor Ostrom’s argument that “trust is one of the core concepts in human relations and it needs to be more fully integrated into the theoretical understanding of political action.” (p.353) Both Kydd and McGillivray and Smith’s articles, however, are suggestive of the absence of thorough-enough consideration of all the potential dimensions of trust, including an ‘individualist-oriented’ dimension (risk management), a ‘social-oriented’ (relationship management) dimension and, as will be argued, how these dimensions hang together (e.g. via the mechanism of suspension). This is a large task (and largely impossible within a single journal article) to consider a concept as potentially broad as trust within a discipline as potentially broad as IR. In this thesis, I make a start of this.

Risk and CBMs

A well-known, but theoretically poorly developed area of the IR literature that has an evident, if ill-defined, connection with trust is the literature on confidence building measures (CBMs). In this section, I offer an overview of CBMs, emphasising the dimensions that correspond most closely with the risk management approach. So what is a CBM? Alford writes that:

Almost anything that increases the mutual confidence between potential adversaries could be called a CBM. A trade agreement sustained over time builds confidence; an arms control treaty adhered to builds confidence; even an apparent willingness to negotiate seriously over an outstanding issue can build confidence. (1981, p.134)

25 See Section 5.2.
26 See especially Section 4.1.
Christopher Berzins

This definition hints at the complex, multiple and overlapping factors in international relations which may serve to build confidence between states. The challenge of moulding this broad range of potential factors into a coherent and useful theory of trust is one of the themes of this thesis. To this end, it is worth starting with a look at how CBMs first came to be known more narrowly; that is, as specific measures aimed at reducing Cold War tensions. As Lodgaard writes:

The need for confidence building rests on the assumption that anxieties and fears are often exaggerated. CBMs lead to increased openness. Increased openness is necessary in order to enhance predictability; predictability is essential for the development of mutual confidence. (1986, p.423).

From their roots in the Helsinki Final Act, the substance and scope of CBMs have expanded both in Europe and between other states and in other contexts around the world. A diverse but theoretically inadequate literature exists on CBMs in international relations, which has grown up alongside their implementation. Indeed, the ‘theory’ of CBMs has developed little since Johan Jørgen Holst’s first conceptualisation in 1977 and generally suffers from the same lack of synthesis as theories of trust in international relations. Desjardins writes that:

Unlike other important instruments of foreign and security policy, the ‘theory’ of confidence-building measures was an afterthought. In contrast to arms control, for instance, which benefited from a conceptual foundation on which to base the practice, the application of confidence building measures preceded its conceptual exploration. (1996, p.7)

Given the Cold War context in which CBMs first developed, it is not surprising that their potential merits have been bent by the literature in the direction of narrow military cooperation. And even then, there has always been considerable scepticism. As Holst writes:

Confidence building measures provide no panacea for the solution of problems of international security...Confidence is the product of much broader patterns of relations than those which relate to military security. In fact, the latter have to be woven into a complex texture of economic, cultural, technical and social relationships if the military factor is to be contained, muted and prevented from dominating international relations. (1983, p.14)

In Holst’s view, the constraints of Cold-War realpolitik limited the potential for confidence to develop more extensively. One of the goals here is thus to explore the ways in which the recent social scientific literature may shed light on the potential for the further development of confidence—and possibly also trust—in the post-Cold War world. As will be seen, many of the characteristics of CBMs correspond strongly with ‘individualist-oriented’ rational choice accounts of trust and hence to its risk management dimension. Some characteristics are also potentially connected (though more loosely and indirectly) to ‘social-oriented’ accounts of trust and hence to its relationship management dimension.
The Origins of CBMs

CBMs have their origins in Cold War Europe and were first envisioned as being potentially complimentary to arms-control treaties. In the early-mid 1970s, arms control negotiations had largely stalled and CBMs were seen as a possible introductory step to arms control in circumstances where the successful negotiation of an agreement for actual arms reductions was not yet possible. They were thus, in a sense, the 'lowest common denominator' for arms control cooperation and an alternative to doing nothing when nothing more significant was possible. The first CBMs were agreed to by 35 states in the CSCE’s Helsinki Final Act of 1975. The goals of these CBMs were ambitiously worded: “To eliminate the causes of tensions; to promote confidence and contribute to stability and security; and to reduce the danger of armed conflict arising from misunderstanding or miscalculation.” (OSCE 1975, p.53) Yet, in actual fact, they involved only the most modest exchanges of information, notification and observation of major military activities. Prior to the opening of the Helsinki conference (which resulted three years later in the Final Act) the Western states which proposed the measures had undertaken no study of CBMs, had no articulate policy statement on their purpose and “had no clear view of what they wanted to accomplish or how it was to be done.” (Desjardins 1996, p.8)

At the time of the Helsinki negotiations Western officials played down the military value of CBMs, emphasising instead their political and psychological role. Out of this, many different interpretations of the goals and functions of CBMs developed; and by the mid-1970s, a general consensus emerged that the goal of CBMs was to reduce the risk of surprise attack. (Desjardins 1996) CBMs were generally thought to reduce the risk that routine military activities by one side would be misinterpreted as hostile by the other side. As the use of CBMs expanded, they began to be used in reference to forms of international activity beyond what was narrowly proposed at Helsinki, including for example, the ‘Hot-Line’ direct communications link established between Moscow and Washington. But such new activities called into question the meaning of the term as they no longer seemed to relate to the building of confidence per se. The hotline, for example, presupposed a crisis already underway. (ibid.)

Theory of CBMs

The most widely recognised definition of CBMs is Holst and Melander’s: “Confidence-building involves the communication of credible evidence of the absence of feared threats.” (1977, p.147) Jonathan Alford further defines CBMs as measures that tend to make military intentions explicit: “In marked contrast to...arms-control measures...Confidence-Building Measures can by-pass assessments of capabilities...and go straight to intentions.” (1979, p.5, emphasis

27 They were first proposed at the conference to the former Warsaw pact countries.
And a 1985 U.S. State Department paper defines CBMs as: "agreements between countries (designed) to increase openness, mutual understanding and communication; ...to reduce the possibility of conflict through accident, miscalculation, or failure of communications; and to inhibit opportunities for surprise attack or political intimidation, thereby increasing stability in time of calm as well as crisis." (p.97) But why the term 'confidence' and is this the same as trust? To begin, Webster's dictionary defines 'confidence' as "an assurance of mind or firm belief in the trustworthiness of another or in the truth and reality of a fact." (2001) From the perspective of this definition, at least, there appears to be some kind of link between confidence and trustworthiness. The term security also enjoys a certain connotational association with the term confidence and likewise, with trust. E Fernando Bustamante, for example, writes that "The concepts of 'security' and 'confidence' are closely linked; indeed, measures designed to raise the level of confidence among actors are viewed as mechanisms that tighten security." (Bustamante 1998, p.9) The trust model developed in Chapter 6 will consider more closely the links between confidence, trust and security. To set the stage for this, in the remainder of this section the main precepts of 'confidence-building' theory are outlined.

The first systematic attempt to theorise 'confidence building measures' in IR is widely acknowledged to be Holst's. (1983) Holst developed his ideas in the years following the first agreement on CBMs at Helsinki. CBMs were not then considered to be arms-controls in and of themselves. But they gradually came to be seen as a part of the 'arms control process.' (Epstein 1981) Given this context, it is hardly surprising that the scope of the goals and objectives that thinkers such as Holst gave to CBMs is modest.29 Likewise, the theoretical ground that CBMs were rested on was similarly unambitious and in line with the dominant realist thinking of the Cold-War era. Holst writes, for example, that:

International conflict is endemic in the sense that it derives from the structure of international society, the absence of a central authority and the consequent need for states to protect themselves... We are not suggesting that CBMs should be based on the assumption that conflict is essentially a matter of inadequate confidence and that increased confidence will necessarily reduce the incidence and intensity of conflict. (1983, p.2)

Such a view is grounded in the inherently conflictual world of structural realism; that is, in the assumption that conflict and distrust are largely the result of an anarchical state system. Thus, CBMs, which help to build confidence by reducing the potential for misperceptions (and the misperception of surprise attack in particular), can only be seen as of minor significance for

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28 Alford notes further that there are "psychological and physical dimensions to the building of mutual confidence between adversaries. On the one hand, states or groups of states will require indicators to show that the intentions of potential adversaries are benign; on the other, they will look for real constraints which will make it more difficult for states to attack their neighbours." (ibid., p.1)

29 As Alford writes "CBMs are relatively easy to negotiate because they do not constrain capabilities in any very serious way: One suspects that the moment that they did seriously curtail options, they would become rather hard to agree on and much more difficult to verify." (1981, p.142)
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overall confidence between states. In this view, the kinds of conflict and distrust which CBMs address, then, are peripheral or inconsequential compared to the main source of conflict and distrust, which is structural. Holst writes:

It cannot be presumed that international conflict is basically a result of ‘cognitive dissonance’, although the prism of perception may certainly serve to exacerbate and accelerate conflicts among states. CBMs, therefore, affect the margins of international conflict, they do not address the core. (1983, p.2)

Aravena has developed a list of characteristics common to all CBMs. (1998) These characteristics are loosely defined and frequently overlap but nevertheless offer a useful means of surveying the core assumptions of CBMs in the context of the trust model advanced in Chapter 6. For preliminary purposes, it is useful to group five characteristics of CBMs under the trust model’s category of risk management: transparency, predictability, verification, coherence and feasibility.30

**Transparency**

Transparency involves efforts to improve the ‘clarity’ of a state’s foreign policy objectives and actions. Transparency measures seek to make as clear as possible to other states the logic and reasoning behind what is externally demonstrated by the state. Verification can play an important role in improving transparency. This allows another state, or a third party intermediary, to authenticate the truthfulness of the state’s claims; for example, that the number of troops stationed on a certain border has been reduced. Some thinkers, however, caution against considering such forms of transparency as necessarily contributing to building confidence. (Holst 1983) In line with realist thinking on deterrence, they point out how secrecy and uncertainty can in fact have a stabilising influence; for when states are not able to accurately gauge the risks involved or misperceive them as too great, this may act as a deterrent to aggressive behaviour. A link can nevertheless be made between transparency as it is understood here as a typical characteristic of confidence building measures and the risk management dimension of trust. Transparency measures are aimed at making the interests of ‘State A’ more self-evident to ‘States B & C’ in order for them to make a more objective and accurate assessment of State A’s interests. To the extent that trust, following the risk management paradigm, is based on common interests, the ability of States B & C to accurately evaluate State A’s interests is crucial. The risk management dimension of trust involves a cost-benefit evaluation of the risks of cooperating or not cooperating. This evaluation hinges on the analysis of how one’s own interests correspond with other states’ interests. Thus, the greater the

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30 Three other of Aravena’s characteristics of CBMs—communication, reciprocity and popular support—are grouped along the trust model’s relationship management dimension, considered in the next chapter.
transparency, the more information there is and the better states are able to gauge each other’s interests and make reasonable cost-benefit evaluations.

**Predictability**

Predictability similarly involves reducing uncertainty—and hence managing risks—in the sense of improving the ability of states to predict each other’s future actions. Aravena writes, “predictability seeks trustworthy and reliable conduct.” (ibid., p.133) Predictability is connected with transparency in the sense that a clearer perception of another state’s interests makes it easier to predict their future behaviour. Predictability can also be understood here in more concrete terms, such as the advance notification of military activities, so that these activities, especially if they are novel (different from past patterns of activity) do not come as a surprise to other states. Such notification can serve to reduce both immediate fears—when novel behaviour such as troop movement occurs—and longer-term anxieties associated with uncertainty about another state’s overall interests and intentions. Aravena’s use of the term ‘trustworthy’ in connection with predictability seems to imply that the role of trust in confidence building measures, as he sees it, is tied to routine behaviour. (ibid.) It follows, then, that a state can be said to be trustworthy if its behaviour is both recognisable (transparent) and expected (predictable). This is in line with the literature on trust that points to predictability being closely associated with routine behaviour over time. (Hardin 1993) The more familiar we are with the behaviour of another—that is, the longer we are able to discern a recognisable and regular pattern of behaviour in the other—the more assured we become about predicting that such a pattern will continue to emerge in the future and the more likely we are to trust in that behaviour and in the other (provided that this behaviour remains in line with our interests).

**Verification**

Verification is common and essential to all CBMs (Aravena, p.134) Verification ensures, for example, that a commitment to reduce troops along a border is satisfactorily carried through in practice. Verification is an integral component of confidence building measures in that it offers ‘the assurance’ that the words and promises of the other are followed with concrete actions. Verification measures can include formal inspections of military troops and facilities, such as arms-building and storage facilities, fly-by’s, provision of documents, in short, access to whatever kind of information assures that the terms of an agreement are being met. It is important that verification is frequent enough that the possibilities for (and concerns about) cheating are reduced. In the same vein, it is important that verification follows a systematic pattern over time. The conceptual puzzle arises when considering the role of verification over a long period, as it does in the literature on trust, as to why verification is required for

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31 The trust literature also indicates that ‘repeated’ cooperative behaviour is a powerful tool for building trust. (Axelrod 1984)
maintaining trust if the very notion of trust seems to also suggest not verifying but trusting (either not being able to verify, or simply not doing so and instead choosing to trust). This is yet another variation of the trust puzzle set out in the introduction. The very term confidence seems to imply a lack of need to verify because we are confident that our expectations will be met. From a situation of zero (or extremely low) trust, verification procedures may indeed help build it. But once a relatively higher level of trust has been achieved, is continued verification necessary to maintain it? In Chapter 4, I explore this apparent paradox further and the necessary co-existence of both trust and distrust. When confidence building measures are discontinued or become less frequent, the likelihood of mutual confidence dropping again is high. (Holst 1983) Diminished contact, communication and cooperation lead in the opposite direction: to increased uncertainty about other states’ activities, interests and motives; and the fears associated with such uncertainty lead to the danger of exaggerated perceptions. Continued verification thus seems to be required for maintaining confidence; and, as will be seen, also trust.

**Coherence**

The coherence of CBMs in the context of other policies and other forms of contact and cooperation with other states and in the context of overall foreign policy objectives is also essential. Other policies and actions that contradict the goals of particular CBMs reduce their coherence and the likelihood that they will be seen as credible indicators of the state’s overall intentions. Conflicting policies may also increase the chances that particular CBMs are seen simply as appeasement or worse as a ploy for veiling more hostile underlying motives. Hostile rhetoric at the domestic level can also undermine the effectiveness of CBMs. (Aravena, p.134) This is in line with Larson’s exploration of the domestic factors which can potentially contribute to increased distrust in international relations.\(^2\) (1997) The extent to which such factors may influence interstate trust relations is also explored in more detail in the CSCE/OSCE illustrative study.

**Feasibility**

Feasibility is another important characteristic of CBMs. (Aravena, p.133) Negotiators must be realistic about the feasibility of implementing CBMs. Those which are too expensive (requiring, for example, sophisticated monitoring equipment not within the budget of a smaller state); or too slow (such as verification procedures which take months to complete while the tension and uncertainty experienced is immediate); or which are too comprehensive too soon (which may overwhelm the short-term resources available and be deemed too intrusive) are all less likely to

\(^2\) Larson’s framework for distrust in international relations divides the causes of distrust into three categories: rational distrust (because of a lack of shared interests between states and the rational evaluation that cooperation is disadvantageous); psychological distrust (as a result of cognitive biases which lead to misperception of the other’s interests, motives and character); and domestic factors (which pressure foreign policy actors to talk and act distrustfully and characterise other states as untrustworthy).
be effective. CBMs which are overly complex (for example, agreements which are so technically specific that the terms are only understood by experts) or too ambiguous (for example, agreements which are vague about the regularity and content of information exchanged) are also less likely to have a positive impact and may even have the opposite effect of increasing uncertainty and tension.
2.3 Trust and Realism

In this section, I seek to show that realism, with its emphasis on power relations and individual rational calculation, contributes importantly, but only partly, to building trust in international relations. It is argued that though many realist principles and practices can—and do—assist international actors in managing risks, unless they are carefully combined with corresponding relationship management, they cannot produce trust in any meaningful sense of the word. Here, I consider the realist prioritisation of hard power (e.g. military power); and the less-than-obvious conceptual difference between coercion and trust in realist thought. Many of these issues are further illuminated by the CSCE/OSCE illustrative studies in Chapters 7 and 8.

According to Kydd:

[Some] realists argue that there is little room for trust among states because intentions are difficult to discern and hence fear can never be reduced to a trivial level. . .At the heart of the security dilemma is distrust, a fear that the other side is malevolently inclined and bound to exploit one's cooperation rather than reciprocate it. (2000, p.325)

Likewise, Nicholas Rengger suggests that the idea of distrust is central to realist thinking in IR. (1997) Is this true? Is its opposite, trust, then, antithetical to realist thinking? Whether it is the early realist thinkers who tended to put the roots of international problems down to human nature; or behavioural realists who point to cognitive psychology and game theoretical rationality; or neo-realists who point to the structural constraints of the international system; or even the contemporary realists who offer some idiosyncratic blend of these and other features of international relations, the international remains fundamentally the realm of distrust.

Traditional Premises of Realist Theory

Frank Wayman and Paul Diehl write, “Broadly speaking, realism in social science is the analysis of human relations emphasising power and strategy.” (1997, p.3) They also recognise that realist-oriented approaches are (and arguably always have been) the dominant way of conceiving international relations. (ibid.) In this section, I situate the concept of trust within

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33 In summarising the realist literature in IR, Wayman and Diehl list eleven propositions which they consider to be the core propositions of realist theory. These assumptions do not stand as complete or incontestable; however their concision is useful for illustrative purposes. According to Wayman and Diehl, then, the core assumptions of realism are the following:
1. States are the key actors in world politics;
2. The state system is anarchic;
3. States are unitary and pursue state interests;
4. States act rationally, or at least consistently;
5. States try to maintain a territorial base from which they can project power and ensure their own survival;
6. Military security matters most in interstate interaction;
7. To secure their interests states must engage in threat assessment, taking into account power, including its basis in national material capabilities and in view of some, intentions;
the key premises of realist theory in IR; that is, premises that are typically (but not always) associated with the long-standing traditions of realist scholarship. Chief among these are the premises that states are the key actors in international relations, that the international realm is largely characterised by anarchy and that states tend to act in an internally unified and rational manner.

To the extent that traditional realist thinking in IR concentrates on states as the primary international actors, trust relations—or the lack thereof—like the relations of states, take on a billiard ball-like model. In this sense, the classical thrusts of realist thought have played down or deliberately chosen not to consider the role of non-state (sub- and trans-state) actors in international relations. (Booth 1995; Clark 1999; Groom 1994) Thus, trust relationships and trust building activities in international relations, at least for the sake of their theoretical consideration, take place primarily between state actors. For many IR theorists and particularly realists, the decision-making process of each state is, at least for theoretical purposes, largely taken to be unitary. (James 2002; Snyder 2002) Though there may be numerous policy activists such as political leaders, diplomats, senior civil servants, even business leaders, religious leaders, media, NGO and other interest group activists who may influence the policy debate within one country, the sum total (or outcome) of this debate, in terms of governmental foreign policy, is considered in unified terms. In the final analysis, each state has specific interests vis-à-vis other states, a specific foreign policy and takes specific actions based on this

8. In order to secure their interests in an anarchic and threatening environment, states work to build up their material capabilities vis-à-vis rivals;
9. When their own capabilities are insufficient, states seek support from allies, usually by balancing with other threatened states against the source of threat;
10. When pitted against rivals in a crisis, states test each other’s resolve in crisis bargaining;
11. These first ten propositions are rooted in the inherent character of human institutions and hence valid for all historic time; the realist model remains despite such changes as industrialization, modernization, democratization and the advent of weapons of mass destruction.

These premises, while exemplary of realism, are not necessarily unique to realism. They are frequently present in varying manifestations and degrees in other IR theories, particularly those associated with liberal institutionalism.

34 As theories that also consider other non-state actors are looked at in the following chapters, the implications of this for trust and trust building internationally will be touched on, though the emphasis in this thesis remains on inter-state relations.

35 It is also a central tenet of much thinking in IR—and particularly realist thought—that states are self-interested rational actors. (Keohane 1989; Onuf 1989; Smith 1986) As was considered in the previous section, this view holds that, on the whole, states should be seen to act in a rational way in the pursuit of the their own specific interests. Critics of this approach have typically problematised among other issues the fact that states rarely have ‘perfect’ information both about other states and the corresponding risks and benefits of various international actions; the fact that what is considered to be rational judgement and behaviour is itself a subjected and contested issue; and the related fact that there are potentially various competing depths of rationality (such as the breadth of what is understood as self-interest, be it interest in the short-term prosperity of one’s own citizens or the long-term well-being of humanity). Nevertheless, as will be argued, there is little point in throwing out the baby with the bathwater, and while the rationality of states may indeed be imperfect, the model advanced in Chapter 6 assumes that states at least ‘try’ on some, however basic level, to act in a rational manner, no matter how influenced this rationality may be by external factors. That is to say, an essential part of interstate trust involves individual agency and the effort of states to gauge their and other states’ interests, capabilities and intentions.
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policy. Hence, each state can be seen as a single international actor. If, according to such thinking, states are unitary actors, what are the implications for trust and trust building in international relations? Do states really trust or distrust one another in such a unified fashion? Is trust a concept that can be depersonalised? Or does it make no sense to 'reify' the state; that is, to invoke traits which are typically associated (reserved) for relations between individuals, such as trust? This line of questioning regarding the reification of the state is by no means exclusive to the problem of trust. It is part of the larger problem or debate about rationality and the validity of considering the state as a single, unified actor in international relations. Sufficiently addressing the finer points of this debate would alter the focus here on broadly modeling trust; nevertheless, some of them will be touched on in subsequent chapters, and particularly in Section 6.37

As will also be seen in the review of the trust literature in sociology in Chapter 3, groups of individuals such as families and larger human communities including states can be considered as legitimate and indeed important trust actors and trust targets. Further, even inanimate objects such as cars (their safety, the environmental hazards they pose, etc) and even abstract subjects such as science or categories such as gender are sometimes considered as potential trust targets, at least to the extent that their trustworthiness is linked at some point back to particular social relationships. Indeed, the increasing abstraction of trust targets—for example, where individuals must come to trust medical systems rather than just the doctor or food safety systems rather than just the farmer—is an increasingly prominent feature of most contemporary societies. Trust in largescale technical, social and political systems is becoming ever more essential to the proper functioning of societies. (Giddens 1984) Following this rationale, then (that is, following the lead of the sociologists, such as Anthony Giddens, as is a recent trend in IR)38, conceiving the state as a potential trust actor and trust target—and deliberately exploring the level of analysis of the state as a unit in a wider system of states—may prove to be a particularly relevant undertaking.

Realists also generally hold that the distribution of hard power between states in the anarchical international system is what is most important in determining or shaping interstate relations.

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37 The reader may be surprised and/or concerned at this point about the numerous references which have been made so far here to larger debates and in particular to the fact that there can only be a limited discussion of these debates here (but that far more discussion is warranted). The provision of a logical and unencumbered structure and coherence in this thesis demand that these restrictions be made. Where possible, references to further sources in the literature where these debates are considered at greater length are given. It should also be pointed out that one of the goals of an exploratory project such as this one is to locate the subject (in this case trust) in the context of the wider literature and to connect it to the framework of broader debates in the discipline. It is also a goal of such work to point in the general direction of where future research is both possible and needed.

38 See for example the recent sociologically-inspired work of Alexander Wendt (1999).
behaviour.\textsuperscript{39} This especially means military power, but also economic power and the ability to gain advantage from other scarce resources. This is in contrast to arguing for the primacy of diplomatic, cultural and other social and interpersonal relations.\textsuperscript{40} Without delving into the controversial issues about the validity of such a prioritisation of hard power over all else,\textsuperscript{41} what can be said to be the most crucial aspects of this realist tenet for trust? Probing some of the literature on trust and power is useful in this regard. For example, for Luhmann, trust and power are inter-related, indeed interdependent. (1988) Luhmann pointedly argues that power acts as a functional equivalent to trust, in the sense that it also serves to reduce social complexity.\textsuperscript{42} That is, where social control is possible through the exercise of power, trust is not necessary. Trust only need arise where power cannot ensure the complete reduction of risk. Hence, for Luhmann, trust begins where knowledge and power end. It follows that if all of political life, including in international relations, involves some degree of risk, and power is never absolute, then some degree of trust is unavoidable.

In this vein, T.V. Bonoma distinguishes between the types and bases of trust that stem from multilateral, bilateral and unilateral power relationships.\textsuperscript{43} (1976) In a multilateral system, actors have different degrees of power and a combination of mutual and competing interests. Generally, they seek to bargain and compete to pursue their individual interests without upsetting the institutions upon which their mutual interests rest. They must trust each other (only) to the extent required by the institutional relationship. (Lewis 1985, p.465) Initially grounded in familiarity, trust builds over time in a feedback process whereby reciprocity expands incrementally, following a process familiar to students of game-theoretical analysis; of which Axelrod’s ‘The Evolution of Cooperation’ is an exemplar. (1984) In bilateral relationships, in contrast, there are greater prospects for shaping mutual interests and closer inter-personal ties. As interactions, interdependence and collective identity develop, so too does trust.\textsuperscript{44} And in a unilateral power system, one party has near-total power over the other(s). There is little need for trust on the part of the strong actor, while there is great need for trust on the

\textsuperscript{39} Realist thinking also (in)famously postulates the fundamentally anarchic nature of the state system. (Fawn 1996; Lieshout 1996; Oye 1985; Schmidt 1998; Starr 1997) But does anarchy exclude the possibility of trust? Is an anarchical state system ‘inherently’ distrustful? That is, are the state actors which make up such a system completely distrustful of one another? Or can some degree of trust, however minimal, exist within such a system? For the purposes of sketching a model of trust in IR, it is argued roughly here that to the extent to which some form of minimal international cooperation is acknowledged as possible by IR theorists, space is opened up for the similar existence of minimal trust.

\textsuperscript{40} Some realists also rightly focus attention on the impact of other forms of power relations (such as diplomatic power, the power of reputation, credibility, knowledge and technical expertise, domestic unity and political stability, bureaucratic efficiency, and so on). See for instance Buzan (1993).

\textsuperscript{41} Also ignored is the accuracy and validity of attempts to consider this realm separately and as distinct from (not interconnected with) the others realms of international relations.

\textsuperscript{42} Or conversely, that trust acts as a functional equivalent to power.

\textsuperscript{43} In other words, from where the power individual states possess in multilateral, bilateral or unilateral power relationships ends.
part of the weak actor(s) if a cooperative relationship is to develop. According to John Braithwaite, building trust under these circumstances, particularly the trust the weak hold in the strong, requires that it be built through the accountability of the system; that is, by increasing the accountability of the actors to the system and hence to each other indirectly rather than to each other directly. (1998) Such accountability can take a number of forms, including through the provision of public goods by the dominant actor.  

This notion of public goods plays a prominent role in the discussion of 'fiduciary' relations. Fiduciary relations and their relevance to contemporary interstate relation are considered in the next chapter on 'relationship' management as well as in Chapter 5, which addresses the 'ethics' of trust in international relations, particularly under conditions where one or a few states wield considerable power over others.

Considerations of power are inevitable in international relations, but relationships based purely on power and individual interests are not trusting in and of themselves, as will be developed at length in the next chapter. The problem with equating trust solely with the expectation that another will act in one's interests, as rational choice trust models of trust contend, is that there is no practical difference between trust and coercion. Such a definition would mean that as long as one retains the power to control the other—by whatever means necessary—one can be said to trust the other and the other to be trustworthy. But this is not an 'intuitive' understanding of what trust is. After all, why even use the word trust when prediction and control appear to suffice? I will argue in this thesis, rather, that both risk and relationship management—that is, both individual and collective concerns—must be addressed if trust is to be a meaningful concept for IR. This is not to say that in trusting relations, including between states, coercion is completely absent. Rather, different relationships will involve different quantities and qualities of risk and relationship management. Some 'thinner' trust relationships will involve substantial considerations—and uses—of power and only minimal development of the relationship. Other 'thicker' trust relationships will involve more substantial normative development and less reliance on realpolitik. Moreover, the strategies a state chooses to employ for risk management, from basic intelligence gathering to the deployment of effective deterrents to hostile behaviour, or some combination, will also inevitably vary. Overall, as will be seen, for the risk management side of trust, it is most useful to employ the term 'confidence', with the term trust reserved for the duality of risk and relationship management.

As one author argues, it is the role of the military and its leadership to prepare for worst case scenarios. (Borawski 1986) They must anticipate the most distrustful and aggressive behaviour possible from other states and accordingly plan practical measures for the protection

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44 There are significant similarities here with Adler's conception of a security community, elaborated in Section 3.3. (1998)
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of their state's citizens, territory and vital interests. Hence in realist thought, the military must, on account of the nature of its responsibility to protect, if only in planning and training, maintain and in fact thoroughly develop a rigorous state of suspicion and distrust. More sophisticated analysis of military strategy may, however, distinguish between form and intensity of distrust. For example, the threat of nuclear hostility from a superpower is normally far more threatening than a border skirmish with a poorly armed neighbour. Military hostilities with potentially high casualty rates are more threatening than wars such as the Gulf War and the NATO bombing of Kosovo which resulted in very few soldier deaths for the U.S.-led allies.46 Similarly, hostilities with potentially high civilian casualties (especially genocides) and prolonged violent engagements leading to massive infrastructure and environmental damage are also likely to be highly threatening. The importance of clearly stating trust targets is highlighted here, as it is particularly demonstrative of the weaknesses of an overly state-centric realist approach. For realists, the critical trust actors are states and they are likewise the key trust targets; but such a one-dimensional model of trust in international relations would fail, for example, to fully account for the potentially complex influence of domestic public opinion in international relations. Do high soldier casualty rates, such as for American soldiers during the Vietnam War, lead to more domestic public distrust of the enemy state or to more domestic distrust of the competence of one's own military and state government?47 From another angle, it has been argued, for example, that the Nazi bombardment of British civilians in WWII led not to a decrease in public morale and support for the Allied war effort, but conversely to greater outrage at the Nazis and a reinvigorated sense of public solidarity.48 (Carruthers 2001)

Under different circumstances then, it is possible for different outcomes to be discerned. In liberal democracies, public opinion is invariably also fragmented, with different interest groups divided in their support (and the quality of their support) for certain military and other foreign policy objectives. A realist model which only posits unified states as trust actors in the international system fails to take into account important subtleties in trust relations (and the role of diverse trust actors and targets) such as the ones highlighted above. Again, in the

45 The concept of the provision of global public goods by a hegemon in the interest of the overall system is one which is familiar to students of international political economy. (e.g. Gilpin 1991, 2001)
46 The Vietnam War is a good example of where high soldier casualty rates, growing domestic concern and an activist anti-war movement turned public opinion against the military.
47 And possibly even its justification for being at war.
48 More sophisticated strategic analyses may also highlight patterns within military engagement where talks between sides lead them closer to a ceasefire or breakdown. This corresponds with an understanding of trust and trust dimensions as multi-layered, where greater trust may be gradually developed in one area, such as through diplomatic negotiations, but still be absent in other areas. Likewise, individual groups within each state, such as non-government peace activists or political opposition may also be engaged in trust building with the other state. For realists, however, these relations are typically deemed peripheral and trivial in comparison to the military realm. The CSCE/OSCE illustrative studies in Chapters 7 and 8 will highlight some of the multi-level features and challenges of an adequate trust model for international relations.
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OSCE/CSCE illustrative studies in *Chapters 7 and 8*, many of the details of these challenges to the trust model will be fleshed out further.
3. Relationship Management
3.1 Bringing in Social Trust

The sociologist Niklas Luhmann writes:

Trust begins where knowledge ends. Trust makes confident action possible where knowledge alone would leave the actor in a . . . state of indecision and doubt. To this extent, trust is a functional equivalent of knowledge for basing the expectancies underwriting social action. However, it provides a broader base because it warrants 'over-drawing' on the available information base. (1988 , pp.32-8)

The solely rational choice approach to trust has been contested at length by a strand of sociological thinking with roots in the works of Niklas Luhmann, Emile Durkheim, Erik Erikson, Georg Simmel, Talcot Parsons and Anthony Giddens, among others. (Durkheim 1972; Erikson 1953; Simmel 1950; Parsons 1967; Luhmann 1988; Giddens 1990) These authors argue that what the rational choice approach misses is the usefulness ('function') of trust for reducing complexity 'beyond' what is possible simply via prediction. Moreover, it misses the 'foundational' aspects of trust, upon which all social relations, including relations typified by rational choice, appear to rest; and without which, any such relations, however minimal, would be impossible. It neglects trust, in Durkheim's view, as the silent partner behind individual contractual agreements; trust which is both antecedent and subsequent to specific bargaining situations. (1972) Thus, from a sociological perspective (for example, a social system of states), trust can be tentatively defined as:

A reciprocal orientation and interpretative assumption that is shared and which has the relationship (or an aspect of the relationship) as the object.49

In this chapter, I explore the social-oriented approach to trust across the social sciences—as well as its nascence in the field of IR—and situate it within the concept of 'relationship management.'

Modifying Homo Economicus

Though the bulk of research on trust in economics has focused on its rational aspects, alternate accounts have gradually gained an intellectual foothold. An important strand of economic thinking has sought to expand the narrow rational choice economic model and is epitomised by the work of James Coleman, discussed below. Economists have recognised that many economic decisions are made more efficiently in the presence of trust. An eclectic range of research has suggested that in relationships between business firms, for example, trust can lower transaction costs in unpredictable environments and that trustworthiness is thus a source of competitive

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49 This definition is derived from Lewis & Weigert (1985a,b).
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advantage. That is, relying solely on detailed contractual terms and legal recourse to settle all disputes can be very costly and economic actors often have much to gain from relying instead on trusting relationships. Economists have also highlighted the important link between trust and time in economic transactions. That is to say, they recognise that some form of trust is essential in the time gap between, for example, when a commodity or service is offered (or ordered) and when it is paid for (or traded for another commodity).

The classic contemporary example of the role of trust in economic relationships is the one provided by Coleman of diamond dealers in New York City. As part of the diamond distribution process, dealers typically hand over little bags of diamonds to each other for inspection, something which can take days to weeks at a time. They do this without any legal insurance, without a financial bonding process and without a complex set of regulations or paper-work, which would only serve to burden the transaction process and increase costs significantly. Coleman calls this example of trust, derived within long-standing, tightly knit interpersonal networks, ‘social capital.’ This form of capital, Coleman suggests, has tangible economic value, just like physical capital, such as machinery (and human capital, such as staff and senior management). Coleman’s purpose is to provide a counter-weight to what he sees as an overly individualistic interest-based rational economic model. Without discarding the model, he complements it with the idea of social capital, which accrues via the norms of reciprocity found in social networks. Social capital is examined in more detail later in this chapter and the prospects for international forms of social capital are examined in Section 6.5.

In sum, the thrust of new economic thinking such as Coleman’s is that strictly rational choice economic models lack the wealth of social and normative understandings which also seems to underlie the concept of trust. But how can such alternate accounts of trust, such as Coleman’s ‘social capital’ be combined with rational accounts of trust, as theorists construct multi-dimensional (or meta-) models of trust which include rational and social/normative elements? This is a central problem that, in this thesis, I have set out to probe for trust in international relations.

Psychology

Psychological approaches to trust stress the perceptions, beliefs and sentiments associated with a target’s trustworthiness. Larson, for example, derives a psychological definition of trust as “reliance on another at the risk of a bad outcome should the other cheat or renege”

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50 Partha Dasgupta, for example, singles out the essential role of trust in trade and industry in modern economies. (1988)
51 Trust in long-standing relationships between employers and employees is another good example of the value of trust. Rather than strictly monitoring employees, or limiting their responsibilities at the cost of far less efficient business practices, employers frequently prefer to depend on trust. (Lyons 1997)
52 See for example Coleman (1988).
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from the work of Deutsch and from Schlenker, Helm & Tedeschi. (Larson 1997, p.713; Deutsch 1958; Helm & Tedeschi 1973) Alternatively, John Dunn, following Hobbes, conceives of trust as a passion (1988); Govier talks about trust as an attitude (1993); Becker explores the motivational traits and dispositions associated with trust (1996); and Baker illuminates the forms of trust which are evidence resistant; that is, where trust is resilient in the face of contradictory information. (1987) As will be seen shortly in the work of Karen Jones, trust can also be linked to identity as well as to emotion. More accurately, to the extent that we identify with a trust target, we also invest emotionally. As will be explored in depth in Section 3.3, Emmanuel Adler’s theory of security communities also considers identity as critical to deeper levels of trust. In fact, Adler turns this around to argue that “because a minimal measure of mutual trust is needed for a collective identity to develop, trust logically comes prior to identity. Once some measure of trust develops, however, a collective identity is likely to reinforce and increase the depth of trust.” (1998, p.46)

Notwithstanding Adler’s theory of security communities, psychological explanations in IR to date have largely focused on the variables which may lead to greater distrust, rather than greater trust. Osgood also identifies psychology as a source of mistrust between states. He says that cognitive mechanisms such as ‘us versus them’ thinking and self-fulfilling prophecies lead to raised tensions in U.S.-Soviet Cold War relations. (1959) Nevertheless, some of the work on international negotiation, mediation and, as has been seen, confidence building, prescribe techniques which have distinctly psychological features and which are intended to lead to more trustful relations. The next sub-section considers how psychological approaches to trust can be separated into affective and cognitive categories.

Affect and Cognition

Karen Jones has developed an influential psychological model of trust which draws on both cognition and on affect. (1996) She says that to trust is to have “an attitude of optimism about the goodwill of another and the confident expectation that, when the need arises, the one trusted will be directly and favourable moved by the thought that you are counting on her.” (p.6) Here, the words ‘attitude’ and ‘optimism’ allude to the affective content of Jones’ definition of trust. This attitude of optimism is directed towards the other. Trusting involves the psychological development of such an attitude of optimism about the goodwill of the other. This is in contrast

53 A few years after Coleman, Fukuyama had similar things to say as he compared trust and economic well-being between societies. Fukuyama provided empirical evidence to support his argument that high-trust societies fared far better in their long-term economic development than low-trust societies. (1995)

54 At this deepest level of Adler’s security community, it is collective identity which reinforces mutual trust. Calculation of interests still play a role here, but they are overshadowed by the impact of collective identity in ensuring mutual trust.

55 In stressing the role of ‘human nature’ in IR, it may be said that some early realist thinkers such as Morgenthau invoked, however vaguely, psychological causal explanations for distrust. See for instance Morgenthau (1985); and Butterfield (1961).
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to distrust, where there is suspicion and pessimism about the goodwill of the other. Furthermore, as Jones cites of Baier, trust cannot be willed. (Baier 1995) Trust as an action based solely on calculated interests, can be willed. But trust as an affective attitude cannot be willed. Jones also points out that affective attitudes such as optimism also contain cognitive elements, so should not be interpreted as ‘non-cognitive;' and that cognitive elements are likewise never void of affective elements. With this in mind, Jones sets out the following schemata for the cognitive and affective dimensions of trust:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RATIONALITY</th>
<th>EMOTIONALITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Ideological trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Emotional trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virtually absent</td>
<td>Faith</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Chart 2: Emotionality Vs Rationality*

There are important consequences for the trust model in relation to Jones’s elucidation of the affective dimensions of trust. The first is that affect, if present, binds us as individuals to the trust relationship in ways which involve more than just the purely rational calculation of interests. Moreover, affective elements of trust may not just include optimism. They may also include the fear of the unknown which remains in the background despite the trust that we have placed in the other.5 7 The second consequence is that, according to Jones, affective trust tends to be resistant in the face of rational evidence which contradicts it. Even when all evidence points to the other as un-trustworthy, lacking goodwill and of danger to our interests, affective trust may persevere. This is because that in which we have invested emotionally, we are more hesitant to abandon. In emotional terms, the losses resulting from abandoning the relationship are greater than the cool rational analysis of costs.58

As Giddens explores, the affective elements of trust tend to be more powerful the closer they are to the inter-personal; that is, to what Giddens calls ‘face relations.’ (1994) As trust moves both away from the interpersonal towards the more impersonal, such as trust in government and towards the abstract, such as trust in political systems, it tends to lose its affective quality. At the same time, the ability of individuals to influence change with respect to the risks associated with the trust relationship decreases. Whereas the conditions under which trust is placed in a friend or colleague can often be directly influenced (and the decision made

57 Trust may be stronger than fear and may ultimately guide the actions, but the fear may still remain.
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whether or not to trust that person), the risks associated with nuclear war are not directly controllable by most people. Hence, the affective qualities of fear and vulnerability increase as the affective qualities associated with the personal and the tangible decrease. As Giddens argues, this phenomenon is an increasingly regular feature of many areas of modern life. As will be shown through the CSCE/OSCE illustrative studies in Chapters 7 and 8, this also has a number of implications for the discussion of trust in international relations. At the level of the interpersonal, between, for example, state leaders at an international summit or between diplomats negotiating a treaty, the potential for developing affective forms of trust exists through their face-to-face contact and dealings; that is, in the personal relationships they form. But to the extent that many international relations actors—and persons affected by international relations—are more distant from the ‘action’, the likelihood (or intensity) of affective trust decreases. This has obvious repercussions for the breadth and quality of the trust that, for example, the OSCE can be understood to develop in international relations.

On the cognitive side, both trust and distrust have also been linked to the psychological phenomenon of the self-fulfilling prophecy. (Smale 1977) This is the phenomenon whereby what one expects one tends to confirm despite objective data to the contrary. From a slightly different angle, Larson writes that: “a large psychological literature shows that that behaving towards others as if they were hostile, unfriendly, stupid, or incompetent can cause them to act accordingly, thereby confirming the perceiver’s original preconceptions or stereotypes.” (1997, p.717) This suggests that not only do stereotypes of trust or distrust cloud the perceptions of the trustor, they can also influence the behaviour of the trustee. Another related cognitive factor potentially influencing trust is the ‘fundamental attribution error.’ That is, the psychological literature points to a common cognitive bias towards ‘character’ judgements, at the expense of ‘circumstance’ judgements. Various experimental studies have indicated that individuals are more likely to base their explanation for another’s behaviour on the person’s character than on the circumstances surrounding the behaviour. (Sabini 2001) From an international relations perspective, this bias may lead, for example, to one state predicting that another state will break their treaty promises not because it is in that other state’s interests to do so given a reasoned evaluation of the particular circumstances but, rather, because the first state sees the other states’ character as being fundamentally untrustworthy. Both the self-fulfilling prophecy and the fundamental attribution error are connected with a wider psychological literature that includes a number of cognitive biases which may influence trust in international relations. The important general point to be drawn at this point is that this can have a considerable impact on definitions and theories of trust which are based solely on a ‘rational choice’ approach; that is, based

58 If we identify with the object in which we have vested trust, to abandon this trust is also to abandon (part of) ourselves.
59 For a review of research on the fundamental attribution error, see Sabini (2001).
exclusively on the weighing of subjective circumstances and interests. Finally, whether or not trust is a 'conscious' phenomenon divides theorists of trust. Some, like Luhmann, suggest that trust involves the conscious awareness of uncertainty and risk, whereas confidence involves 'unconsciously' accepting them. (1988) Confusingly, other theorists argue just the opposite. The multi-dimensional trust model set out in Chapter 6 allows for both conscious and unconscious forms of trust. The model indicates that risk management is largely a conscious task. But because regular interaction of almost any kind would be impossible if every reasonable risk had to be consciously weighed first, relationship management offers an alternative trust building strategy which can foster unconscious, or more aptly more 'habitual' forms of trust.

Culture

Since trust and trust building in international relations takes place, by the very nature of the milieu, in a cross-cultural setting—between states and other international actors of diverse cultural backgrounds—it is useful to briefly consider the potentially different understandings of trust and the potentially different trust building behaviours which can exist across different cultures. Doney et al. argue that since each culture's collective programming results in different norms and values, the processes trustors use to decide whether and whom to trust may be heavily dependent upon a society's culture. (1998) In order to make basic cultural distinctions about trust, Doney et al. develop a framework which outlines five different cultural processes by which trust is developed:

• Cultures which value self-interest and individual initiative (i.e. the pursuit of individual wealth and power) will tend to develop trust through 'calculative' processes. For example, if it is rationally concluded that cheating is not in the interest of the other actor (because the benefits of cheating outweigh the high costs associated with being caught) then trust may develop.

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60 See for example Cohen (1979); Jervis (1976); and Sylvan (1984).
62 Following Fukuyama, different national cultures can exhibit different levels of trust among their members. Simply put, high-trust cultures exhibit higher levels of trust among their members compared to low-trust cultures. Moreover, high-trust cultures can be seen to enjoy measurable economic benefits. (1995)
63 It is important to clarify at the outset that the relationship between the concept of culture as it is more broadly understood by sociologists and national and/or state culture is by no means necessarily the same and/or fixed.
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- Cultures which value predictability will tend to develop trust based on knowledge garnered from past experiences and current information. Likewise, cultures which associate unpredictable behaviour with high costs (i.e. cultures which value conformity, solidarity, even authoritarian norms) will also tend to develop trust through this process.

- Cultures which value benevolence (and the interests of the group over the individual) will tend to develop trust based on intentions (or motives) and the perception and interpretation of the other's motives.

- Cultures which value individual qualifications and professional expertise will be more likely to develop trust based on an evaluation of a trust target's abilities; for example, the skills, competencies, expertise, characteristics, etc, which make them most likely to fulfil the responsibilities with which they have been entrusted.

- Cultures where trust both in individuals and institutions is already high will be more likely to develop trust based on the transfer of the trust placed in one individual or institution to another (i.e. from a known and trusted target to an unknown target). It is these individuals and institutions which create the link (and encourage the transference process) between the trusted and the unknown. (ibid.)

Clearly, following Doney et al.'s framework, there is the potential for significant cultural differences in the conception and development of trust.

Sociology

Adam Seligman asserts that trust is ubiquitous to social relations (1997); and according to David Good, sociologists have finally discovered the clear and simple fact that, “without trust, the everyday social life which we take for granted is simply not possible.” (1988, p.32) Nevertheless, at the end of the 1980s, Luhmann, in summarising the sociological literature on trust, wrote that neither classical nor modern sociology had used the term in a theoretical context. (1988) The last ten years, however, have seen an expansion and diversification in theoretical and methodological approaches to the sociological study of trust, which now include rational-choice, culturalist, functionalist, symbolic-interactionist and phenomenological perspectives, to name just a few. (Sztompka 1999) Bernard Barber's 'The Logic and Limits of Trust' is an example of a prominent systematic attempt at theorising trust—or in his case,
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distrust—in the discipline of sociology (and in the social sciences in general). (1983)64 Barber develops a framework for evaluating the content and causes of distrust. He distinguishes between three different dimensions in which trusting expectations may fail: the continuity of the natural and moral order; the technical competence of actors in roles; and the fiduciary obligations of actors, meaning their duty and motives to place the interests of others ahead of their own. (ibid.) Luhmann, in contrast, is most interested in trust building; that is, in the social mechanisms that generate trust. (1988) Luhmann points to the conceptual confusion between ‘familiarity’ and ‘trust,’ where familiarity is a common fact of life, but trust is a solution for a specific problem of risk. Trust is more than simply the familiar or habitual; it involves the development and continuity of cooperative relations both within a familiar world and in response to changing features of the world. (ibid.)

Sztompka argues that the growth of interest in the study of trust in sociology is connected with the larger trend towards a focus on culture. (2000, ix) This trend involves a movement away from systemic or structural images of society (‘hard variables’) towards ‘softer variables’, the domain of ‘intangibles and imponderables;’ or in other words, the mental and cultural dimensions of social reality. (ibid.) Hard variables include class, professional position, social status, economic situation, demographic trends, technological developments and organisational forms. Cultural explanations, conversely, focus on meanings, symbols, rules, values, norms, codes, frames and forms of discourse. (p.2) This trend from hard variables to soft ‘culture-related’ variables is also broadly noted in the academic discipline of IR. Realist or neo-realist accounts of IR typically focus on the hard variables of power which can be quantified in military, economic and other material terms.65 The recent constructivist trend in IR, in contrast, embodies this similar social turn towards an emphasis on the role of soft variables such as shared norms and values in shaping international behaviour and outcomes. (Onuf 1989; Wendt 1999)

Social Capital

Social capital has been called one of the ‘hot’ areas of political science research in recent years.66 Over the last decade, ‘social capital’ approaches have spread into and across academic disciplines, including economics, sociology, political science and anthropology. The topic itself is vast, if still under-theorised in terms of its potential international dimensions. As Jackie Smith writes, part of the reason may be because “although political scientists and sociologists exploring national politics typically begin with the assumption of a national polity, IR scholars

64 Piotr Sztompka’s ‘Trust: A Sociological Theory’ is another. (2000)
65 Though both (neo)realist and (neo)liberal thinking can also incorporate to varying degrees softer variables such as rules (in international organisations and regimes) and shared values (articulated, for example, through international agreements).
66 See for example McLean (2002); Rotberg (2001); Healy (2001); Edwards (2001); Lin (2001); Burt (2001); Robinson (2002); Field (2002); Putnam (2002).
have had to defend the notion that an international polity exists. (1998, p.94) The idea of social capital is briefly introduced here. The focus is naturally on ‘trust’, which is considered by many thinkers to be a fundamental building block of social capital. The key theoretical shortcomings of Robert Putnam’s social capital approach are alluded to, particularly the weaknesses of an ethically neutral conception of social capital. Instead, following Pierre Bourdieu, a looser approach is advocated for international relations.

The roots of the idea of social capital can be traced back to Alexis de Tocqueville’s reflection some 140 years ago that what made American communities and democracy so vibrant was their ‘civil society’. (1864) What de Tocqueville was referring to were the local grassroots organisations, such as church groups, charity groups, recreation groups and other diverse forms of informal association, which seemed to forge a vital sense of belonging: of ‘hanging-together.’ These informal bonds, he argued, were the glue which reinforced general social order and allowed democracy to flourish. The idea of social capital has been popularised more recently by Robert Putnam who, inspired by de Tocqueville, James Coleman and others, hypothesised that interpersonal trust is strengthened by voluntary civic participation, such as in charity organisations, parent-teacher associations and in his classic example, bowling leagues. (1993; 2000) While many social scientists have developed social capital-like concepts, it was Putnam who was to first suggest succinctly that trust at a macro level (e.g. across society) could be correlated with voluntary association. In his example of the bowling league, he correlated the decline of interpersonal trust across America with a similar decline over the last two decades in American participation in bowling leagues. This drop was likewise correlated with a decline in trust in government. Putnam typically measured these via a standardised survey question, asking individuals the extent to which they trust their neighbours, the government, etc. Indeed, Putnam culled much of his trust data from the General Social Survey. (Chicago 2002) Other

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67 Putnam credits Jane Jacobs for the first-known employment of the term ‘social capital.’ (1972)
68 In his 2000 review article, Martin Paldam identifies five general definitions of social capital belonging to three families, all of which having in common a ‘central area.’ (pp. 629-30)
69 At the same time, the activity of bowling has actually become more popular overall.
70 Putnam also linked trust and civic participation via other standard measures, such as the frequency of participation in such as parent-teacher associations, newspaper readership and participation in elections (voting, campaigning, etc). He also attributed declining trust to other myriad factors, such as migration to the suburbs from more tightly knit rural and metropolitan communities; the breakdown of the traditional family (e.g. two-parent households); and the increase in television viewing instead of interpersonal contact during leisure time.
71 The discussion of the World Values Survey in Section 6.2 considers some of the conceptual and methodological issues related to such trust surveys. It is also worth noting that Putnam has not claimed to offer a theoretical framework for understanding exactly ‘how’ these micro level bonds of association act to build trust at a macro level; something he made clear from his first article. Nevertheless, Putnam, like most social capital theorists to date, have been interested in sketching its ‘nature’, rather than theorising its ‘function’. (Paldam 2000) Indeed, this absence of ‘deeper’ theory remains perhaps the central weakness of studies of ‘social capital’ and is a gap which is only starting to be filled in this relatively ‘new’ area of inquiry.
social capital groundbreakers include Mancur Olson, James Coleman and the French political theorist Pierre Bourdieu, who conceptualised several different forms of capital: cultural, economic, functional, linguistic, personal, political, professional, social and symbolic (Olson 1982; Bourdieu 1991) However, for Bourdieu, like Coleman, social capital was a private good—in contrast to Putnam’s public good—and involved investment in ‘specific’ social networks by individuals.

Despite their popularity, however, theories of social capital have recently faced serious criticism, many of which are applicable to social capital’s potential international dimensions. Critics, for example, have argued that Putnam’s theory adds a generic and unrealistic ‘normative’ dimension to social capital which is artificial, simplistic and which harks back to the now disreputed empirical democratic theories of the 1950s. For example, by suggesting that trust itself was ‘de facto’ a public good, Putnam’s conception of social capital paints social harmony as invariably a good thing to the neglect of other viewpoints or political models which give more purchase to social unrest and even distrust as potentially important catalysts for social change. Moreover, significant ‘distrust’ may be ‘deliberately’ built into a system of constitutional democracy which separates powers between estates precisely because of the dangers of trusting too much. (Levi 2000; Warren 1999)

Margaret Levi, for example, notes that de Tocqueville’s seminal thesis about trust in American society came with important caveats:

In the small towns [de Tocqueville] observed, the basis for the kind of trust that would facilitate a healthy democracy and economy was not the existence of community per se but rather the development of organisations. In fact, what he noted was that self-interest led to the creation of institutional arrangements that made possible business collaborations, and it was from these collaborations that individuals learned to trust each other. Only then did they recognise the value of organisation in the voluntary sphere and of trust more generally. (Levi 2000, p. 6)

And as events such as the civil rights movement and the experience of the 1989 revolution in Soviet-controlled Eastern Europe aptly demonstrate, distrust (of unjust laws and government) can also be a precursor to effectively mobilising for social change.

From another angle, critics complain that Putnam’s theory over-simplifies how social capital is dispersed across society. Subsequent research has sought to explore how social capital is often spread unevenly between groups in society, such as minority groups, and the underlying
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processes which lead to more or less of its accrual\(^7\) (Stolle 1998) In short, Putnam's ethically benign conception of social capital has been deemed too focused on the status quo; something which relates very closely to the discussion of the trust model's ethical dimensions in Chapter 5. For Michael Foley, Bob Edwards and others, while the concept of social capital has proved in recent years to be a useful heuristic in many ways—and an excellent counterbalance to rational choice approaches—the concept breaks down when attempts are made to more rigorously operationalise it as well as when it is treated as the basis for elaborating further theory. (ibid.)

_Fiduciary Relations and the Rule of Law_

Trust, Martin Hollis argues, must be placed within a re-oriented conception of reason. (1998) One way of achieving this is by reconsidering the nature of the contractual arrangements between individuals and groups. Here, a 'contract' can be understood in the conventional sense as a formal agreement, such as a business contract between a principal and an agent. It can also be understood in terms of international legal treaties between signatory states. Or it can be understood in the philosophical sense as a 'social contract' between the participants—or citizens—of any social, economic or political system. While limited amounts of trust may be present in 'formal' principal-agent types of contractual arrangements, the more 'open-ended' and 'informal' a contractual arrangement is, the more 'fiduciary obligations' come into play. Indeed, as is explored in this section, a tradition of legal thought has contrasted the role of fiduciary relationships with principal-agent relationships in forming the basis of contractual agreements.

To begin, considerable disagreement exists in legal scholarship over the nature and interpretation of contracts; and specifically, the degree to which parties to a contract are required to act 'to the letter' in accordance with its terms.\(^6\) Must all agreed to (or restricted) behaviour be spelt out explicitly in the terms of the contract? And are all different or changed circumstances—no matter how trivial—therefore not covered under the contract? Or can parties to certain kinds of contracts trust that the contractor is bound to take their 'overall' interest and well being into consideration? This is where fiduciary relationships come into play. Some minimal amount of trust can be understood to underwrite even contractual relations based primarily on constraining the actions of individuals.\(^7\) (Seligman 1997) That is, some degree of trust must invariably be present in such contractual relations if they are to proceed because of the impossibility of drawing up a 'perfect' contract which provides a complete and incontestable

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\(^7\) Recent research has also explored the varied ability of groups to produce social capital; for example, between groups which differ in the diversity of their membership (Eastis 1998) New research has also examined the structural barriers within societies which serve to direct and constrain the flow of social capital to different groups. (Foley 1998)

\(^6\) See for example Glover (1995).

\(^7\) For example, setting out in precise detail what individuals are 'restricted' from doing as well as setting out 'positive' obligations.
set of terms and conditions and which can account for all possible scenarios involving the contracting parties. The inevitability and unpredictability of future change and the potential impact of unaccounted for third parties are related problems which critics of ‘contract-based theories’ frequently draw attention to. It is important not to consider trust here as simply an extra or residual component of rational contracts between principals and agents. A proper understanding of trust requires, as Hollis argues, that it not just be bolted onto rational choice. (ibid.)

In contrast to a principal-agent relationship, the essence of a principal-fiduciary relationship can be defined as “the expectation that the fiduciary will adopt the other-regarding preference function that is the hallmark of trustworthy behaviour.” (Parsons 1967, p.343-5) Lewis and Weigert write, “Fiduciary relationships are safeguarded, not by explicit substantive rules that would be too narrow and inflexible in the face of contemporary complex knowledge and techniques, but by ethically vague...standards governing relationships, especially those between relatively expert, autonomous parties and relatively unknowing, dependent parties.” (Lewis & Weigert 1985, p.978) Similarly, Parsons points out that in fiduciary relationships, there is typically an ‘asymmetrical power relationship’ between parties, such as between doctor and patient, with the patient in a position of significant vulnerability.78 As a result, the patient, if she is to enter into the professional relationship with the doctor, must to some degree come to trust her. When it comes to principal-fiduciary relationships, Parsons goes further to posit four conditions which under-gird the trust placed in the fiduciary:

- All participants must believe that action is aimed at common values;
- These common values must be translatable into common goals;
- Each participant’s expectations must generally fit into his or her general set of solidarity involvement (with his or her other identities);
- Participants’ trust must be reasonable in light of relevant empirical information. (1967, ibid, emphasis added)

From another angle, Robert Flannigan suggests four principal areas of concern for anyone holding a position of fiduciary responsibility:

- Refraining from conflicts of interest;
- Acting impartially;
- Ensuring transparency and oversight;

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78 The patient lacks the information and expertise to fully evaluate the competence and integrity of the doctor; moreover, due to illness, he is dependent on the doctor.
• Refraining from shirking or delegating responsibility. (1989)

It is intriguing to compare these proposed imperatives of fiduciary duty for an actor in a position of significant power and discretion over another with recent IR literature by U.S. scholars on the ‘accountability’ of international organisations, as well as on what the U.S. should provide the international community with in terms of global public goods. Robert Keohane’s recent work, for example, is concerned with elaborating the concept of democratic accountability in relation to the “so-called ‘democratic deficit’ afflicting global governance.” (2001, p.1) Keohane proposes a multi-dimensional conception of accountability which takes on five principal forms:

• Electoral
• Hierarchical
• Legal
• Reputational
• Market-driven

Keohane argues that democratic accountability, particularly in global governance, need not only be of the electoral variant. Other forms of accountability exist, including accountability involving supervision (hierarchical), sanctions (legal) and economic incentives (market-driven). Perhaps most relevant to the trust framework and to global governance (where electoral accountability is notoriously indirect and weak; as is hierarchical and legal accountability) are Keohane’s remarks about reputational accountability: “the most generalised form of accountability in world politics is reputational. . .Reputation is the only form of external accountability that appears to constrain the United States with respect to its political-military activities.” (2000, p.26) Indeed, recent work on the concept of ‘reputation’ in international bargaining and elsewhere in a number of ways bears a telling resemblance to the concept of trust. Nevertheless, Keohane continues to base his theoretic conceptions of accountability on ‘formal’ contractual relations, referring to “the actor holding an agent accountable as a ‘principal’ when the accountability relationship is institutionalised. When the relationship is not institutionalised, he again refers to the actor seeking to hold the agent accountable as a ‘would-be-principal’ (not as a fiduciary). (p.6-7)


• Maintaining the balance of power in important regions;

• Promoting an open international economy;
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- Preserving international commons;
- Maintaining international rules and institutions;
- Assisting economic development;
- Acting as a convenor of coalitions and mediator of disputes. (Nye 2002, p. 65)

As the discrepancies between these lists hint at, for dominant international actors such as the United States, building stronger trust relationships in the international sphere may actually have less to do with assuming and rigorously promoting formal contract-like relationships between supposed equals than with taking on and fulfilling more informal fiduciary obligations. It also may also have less to do with substantive issues, such as promoting an open international economy than with being perceived as fair, transparent and consistent in its motives and actions.

As the trust model I advance in Chapter 6 will outline, like the dual individual and social-oriented nature of trust, principal-agent and principal-fiduciary duties can co-exist and frequently overlap. The challenge for students of IR is to identify the circumstances under which a particular ‘blend’ of contractual and fiduciary duties may be present and/or suitable.80

Trust finds its thickest expression in the rule of law, at least in symbolic terms.81 But following the above and the trust puzzle identified in the introduction, it is unclear where and when the bases of this trust emanate from risk or relationship management. On the one hand, for

79 See for example Aykens (2002, p.5).
80 Indeed, scholars have already made tentative steps to identifying the presence and nature of fiduciary duties in the context of international relations, most notably in relation to the European Union. See for example Bellamy (2001).
81 Some theories of trust lean too heavily on the role of fiduciary relations and the rule of law, however, in that they tend to negate the possibility of thinner forms of trust emerging in their (relative) absence. An excellent example of this is Aaron M. Hoffman’s article ‘A Conceptualization of Trust in International Relations’ in the European Journal of International Relations, in which he promotes a fiduciary based model of trust. (2002) Hoffman writes: “In interstate relations trusting relationships develop when leaders enact policies that delegate control over their states’ interests based on the belief that their counterparts are trustworthy. . .States enact discretion-granting policies when they transfer the capacity to determine political outcomes to others. . .Examples of discretion-granting policies include the ‘blank check’ Germany granted Austria-Hungary on the eve of World War I [and] the 1986 decision by European Community member states to relinquish their vetoes in favour of a system of qualified majority voting.” (pp.377,385) Hoffman appears to be following Giandomenico Majone (2001) here, whom he cites, equating trust with the delegation of authority, albeit in Hoffman’s case, only under verifiable conditions of ‘good faith.’ However, Hoffman appears to contradict himself when he states earlier in his article that “mechanisms that create certainty about a potential trustee’s future behaviour replace the need for trust in relationships. Actors that entrust their interests to others always run the risk of betrayal. . .If there were no threat of betrayal, the ‘problem of trust’. . .would be no problem at all. For this reason, binding commitments are incompatible with trusting relationships because these devices make betrayal impossible.” (p.376) He also writes that “the superpowers’ use of highly invasive and regular checks of each other’s nuclear weapons stockpiles to monitor compliance hardly seems like the kind of behaviour in which trusting partners engage.” (p.385) Hoffman wants to argue that the more intensive the mechanisms of oversight in place, the less trust there is likely to be present; or conversely, the less oversight, the greater the trust. Hoffman, like Fukuyama, despite his uncertain conception of certainty in international commitments, is no doubt leaning heavily here on the relationship side of the trust equation, to the detriment of a more nuanced conception of trust that incorporates more robust elements of risk management and which makes room for the possibility of thinner forms of trust.
example, law can be drawn from the need to protect individuals; to shield individuals from contraventions of their basic interests (or in more familiar terms, from breaches of their basic rights). Hence, the thickest forms of risk management can (and should) involve the legal capacity to intervene against such breaches; and the force to back up such legal capacity. On the other hand, law can be drawn from the shared responsibilities which members of a community of one form or another deem to have towards one another. In symbolic terms, the law thus becomes an encoded reflection of a community's common goals, values and identity. This thick form of relationship management sets out the 'fiduciary' responsibilities of individuals, which stretch beyond mere individual interests (or protection of these interests) to reflect concern for—and accountability to—the group as a whole. The institutionalisation of such fiduciary duties thus helps to foster the social conditions under which vigilance becomes less necessary as a matter of course. All things being equal, the relationship management dimension of trust should benefit the more vulnerable in a society, who are more dependent on such socially oriented responsibility norms and have less recourse to thicker forms of (individualistic) risk management. However, as will be considered in Chapter 5, this is not to say that the trust that such responsibility norms help to make possible is, de facto, just. The ethical content of such trust bonds are another matter altogether; and it is quite possible, even likely, that the form and content that the trust relationship takes are determined in small or large part by the interests of the more powerful party or parties to the relationship.

**Defining Relationship Management**

The strategies which international actors employ to address the social content of trust may be usefully understood through the concept of 'relationship management.' Relationship management can be defined as straightforwardly:

*All activities directed toward establishing, developing and maintaining successful relationships.*

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82 This might also be seen to bleed into the risk management perspective, where the institutionalisation of collective responsibilities increases the predictability of like-minded behaviour and hence serves to reduce risk.

83 For the greater presence of 'other-regarding' behavior permits certain forms of institutionalised 'vulnerability' (within limits) to become a more reasonable, indeed commonplace, condition.

84 Which is why an 'ethic of responsibility' (roughly speaking here, towards more social-oriented 'other-regarding' behaviour) tends to fall more directly upon the powerful, while an 'ethic of vigilance' tends to fall more directly upon the vulnerable. But while it is one thing to argue that the powerful have a duty to be more responsible (and to a degree less individually vigilant), it is harder to argue uncontroversially that the vulnerable have a duty to be more individually vigilant (and to a degree less dependent on social benevolence). Nevertheless, following the model, the trust-building process seems to demand both. For other perspectives on 'responsibility,' see Daniel Warner's 'An Ethic of Responsibility in International Relations' (1991) and his book review 'The Responsibility to Protect.' (2003, pp. 109-21)

85 Relationship, as will be developed in Chapters 4 & 6, is understood here in the 'agent-centred' sense, and may involve an agent-principal and/or agent-fiduciary relationship. For a more elaborate social-oriented definition of trust, see Lewis & Weigert (1985a,b).
Relationship management has as its goal not the individual but the social arrangement, be it a relationship between two states, an exclusive network of states such as the OSCE or the international system of states. Much can be said at a general level about the dynamics that take the relationship between states as the primary focus rather than individual states' interests. The past decade and a half since the end of the Cold War has witnessed, for example, the continued growth (but also diverse setbacks) of international law, which while rarely enforceable and frequently ignored, nevertheless has formally bound states to certain minimum standards of behaviour; that is, once in place the long-term interests of the international 'community,' formalised in international law, are, at least in 'principle,' prioritised over conflicting short-term interests of individual states. Part and parcel with this has been the ever-increasing institutionalisation of international cooperation. Such institutionalisation has occurred through the development of rule and norm-based practices—across a range of political, economic, social and cultural life—channelled through permanent bodies such as the U.N. and the World Trade Organisation, as well as through regional bodies such as the Organisation of American States and the OSCE.

Alongside this more formal process of institutionalisation of international relations, the last decade has similarly witnessed the rise of a vast and expanding web of more informal international relations, through the exponential growth of the international NGO sector. This phenomenon has lead scholars to posit the rise of an 'international civil society.' Finally, and relatedly, the last decade has witnessed the advent of global real-time telecommunications, the spread of global trade and growth in cross-border tourist and business travel; in short, these and the copious other related phenomena which are frequently loosely (and often contentiously) grouped under the umbrella concept of globalisation. These have all contributed to an increase in the frequency, intensity and diversity of social contact between states, organisations and individuals around the world. So what do these broad political, social and economic dynamics of the post-Cold War era bode for the prospects of trust in international relations? In Chapter 6, I look more closely at some of the particularities, challenges and limitations of relationship management in contemporary international relations. In advance of this, I consider in the next section several specific areas of the IR literature on trust which emphasises the notion of relationship management.

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86 For example, "For example, one of the keystones of international law, which was created by self-interested actors, is the principle of *pacta sunt servanda*, the idea that agreements create obligations for the signatories that must be fulfilled in good faith." (Hoffman 2002, p. 383-4) I nonetheless recognise here that various normative conceptions of international law may be grounded—in part or in whole—in individual state interests, be they short or long-term.

87 For good reviews, see Kaldor (2003) and Keane (2003).
3.2 Building Relationships via CBMs

Expanding CBMs

In addition to the risk management dimensions of CBMs examined in Chapter 2, some—but not all—scholars also see ‘relationship’ as a key element of CBMs. (Aravena 1998)88 The concept of relationship is present in theories of CBMs in both the short term, with the establishment of regular communication and initial steps towards specific CBMs and in the longer-term with an evolution towards more comprehensive CBMs and permanent, institutionalised forms of cooperation. Routine—in terms of the pattern and frequency of contact—and content—in terms of the specific measures put in place—all serve to define the relationship. Regular evaluation of the relationship, adjustment of the relationship (e.g. changing contact, such as meetings involving different and/or additional actors) and expansion of the relationship (e.g. developing new and more comprehensive verification measures) are all a part of the evolution of confidence-building-measures.

With the internationalisation of CBMs beyond Europe—frequently under the advocacy of the U.N.—their meaning and application have evolved.89 The number and types of international actors and the variety of contexts in which CBMs take place have multiplied dramatically. CBMs are now applied by states at war, by states with long-standing peaceful relations, by states of roughly equivalent economic and military power and by states of vastly unequal military and economic power.90 The actions which the first CBM Agreement at Helsinki defined have also changed substantially. The practical steps involved in CBMs have expanded, been re-ordered, repeated and redefined in countless (yet arguably according to some theorists, insignificant) ways. (Desjardins 1996) For example, some Third World countries have claimed that the European model of CBMs, with its emphasis on military risks, are unsuited to their context where security risks are often better considered in terms of potential ethnic, religious, social or economic conflicts. Developing countries have thus helped to transform the notion of ‘confidence building’ from narrow military measures to confidence building in the larger sense between states in general. (ibid.) A 1982 U.N. study undertaken to comprehensively analyse CBMs listed numerous ‘policies and measures’ which could contribute to building confidence. These include respect for human rights and the sovereignty of states and the establishment of a new economic order. Security, in this U.N. view, cannot develop from military measures alone, but requires comprehensive confidence-building measures in numerous areas of interstate

88 Holst, for example, considers CBMs as “building blocks which could provide operational substance to the notion of ‘common’ security.” (1983, p.2)
89 Since Helsinki, the use of CBMs has grown exponentially and since the end of the Cold War have been extended from their origins in Europe to almost every other region of the world, including South-East Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America.
relations. Furthermore, confidence-building needs to be tailored to suit the specific security needs of the actors and regions involved.

From this split between the original narrow European model to the broader U.N. model, two competing approaches to understanding CBMs can thus be identified. These two approaches likewise correspond well with the trust model's risk and relationship management dimensions respectively. The first considers CBMs by and large procedurally, with specific goals not surpassing their manifest intention; for example, the provision of precise kinds of information with the aim of building confidence in a limited military domain. The second approach sees CBMs as a more comprehensive process. This process is general and not entirely clear but the crux of it is that it contributes to changing 'perceptions' about security. (ibid.) Dialogue and negotiation are key aspects of this process. Desjardins writes that:

[The] process allows participants to become more aware of their respective positions and concerns—and the basis for their actions. The result of these activities is a transformation in thinking, a reassessment of policies and a redefinition of objectives, all of which lead to the adoption of policies. . .Finally, these meetings. . .help to ease tensions and establish an atmosphere of trust. (p.18)

In addition to those set out in Chapter 2, three more of Aravena's properties of CBMs are thus usefully grouped under the trust model's category of relationship management: communication, reciprocity and popular support. Added to these is the potential for a 'spillover effect.'

Communication

Communication is a key and integrative characteristic of all confidence building measures. Communication is integrative in that it plays a role in all aspects of confidence building. According to Aravena, direct and regular dialogue between states, in an open and non-confrontational atmosphere is a precursor to developing more specific confidence building measures, such as agreements on the exchange of information and verification mechanisms. (1998) Effective communication (which is clear, substantial, goal-oriented and efficient) plays a crucial role in the effectiveness of the specific measures which are agreed to. Communication is also the first step towards building relationships.

Reciprocity

Another key characteristic of confidence building measures is reciprocity. This is in the sense that the actions of each actor should be matched with (or at least be equivalent to) the other's actions: "There should be a basic symmetry in the commitments, or at least a balancing." (ibid., p.133) Actors should exchange the same forms of information (about, for example, military manoeuvres); participate in the same kinds of verification procedures; and agree to the same

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90 Non-state (sub- and trans-state) actors have also become increasingly involved in CBMs, particularly in terms of overseeing their implementation.

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constraints on certain activities (such as the withdrawal of heavy armaments from borders or other hotspot areas). The notion of reciprocity is also key to many of the ideas developed in the trust literature. (Sztompka 2000) Baier, for example, writes of the need for reciprocity and for the selective or even deliberate 'self-disempowerment' of the powerful in order to build trust with weaker actors. (1995) An act of reciprocity can also take the form of words, rather than deeds. (Lindskold 1978) A political leader's conciliatory speech, for example, where she offers words of peace or calls for a new round of peace talks, may be reciprocated with a conciliatory statement. In negotiations, verbal acts of reciprocity are commonplace and part and parcel of the negotiation process. Such reciprocal acts can go a long way towards eventually finding common ground and in building a lasting relationship.

The Spillover Effect

Aravena does not include the spillover effect in her list of properties but it can also be considered as potentially fitting under the relationship management dimension of CBMs. Though not defined rigorously here, the spillover effect involves CBMs acting as catalysts (or contributors) to building cooperation in other areas of a relationship between two or more states. The spillover effect suggests that the development of confidence in one area can lead to the development of confidence in other areas. The idea of a spillover effect is certainly not original to CBMs. It has a long-established history as part of the extensive theoretical work on cooperation. The spill-over effect plays an important role, for example, in theories of European cooperation, where enhanced cooperation in a specific area (such as trade) is seen as a catalyst for enhanced cooperation in other areas (such as environmental protection or immigration policies) and greater European integration overall. Though there is not the space here for sufficient analysis of the theoretical merits and empirical evidence for and against the 'spillover effect', it is worth noting that the concept has a mixed and in many cases poor record of living up to empirical scrutiny. In the case of European cooperation, for example, many comprehensive studies have illuminated the explanatory weakness of the concept. Despite often years (even decades) of enhanced European cooperation in very specific policy areas like trade, other areas like taxation have remained resilient to further cooperation.

There is, however, evidence from at least one classic case which indicates that CBMs are capable of setting the stage for the further development of cooperative relations and which

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91 See for example Parks and Komorita (1998); and Leogold and Shambaugh (1998).
92 See Mitrany (1975).
93 See for example Alter (2000).
94 Helen Wallace describes a 'pendulum effect' as most suggestive of European cooperation, where the level of cooperation seems to shift back and forth in certain specific and often isolated areas, sometimes growing, sometimes shrinking back, depending on a multitude of contextual factors, such as the strength of the economy, political trends, the role of individual actors, and so on. (2000)
provides some evidence for the existence of a spillover effect. This is the case of the 1979 peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. Alford writes with reference to this peace treaty that:

Without a prior and effective CBM regime, political settlement would not have been possible... By first instituting a series of measures to separate forces and reduce military tension in the Sinai, the conditions for a political solution were created. (1981, p.133)

The particular geography involved (the largely empty Sinai desert) and the presence of a neutral force (U.N. and U.S. monitoring teams) also played considerable roles in assuring the effectiveness of the CBMs. And it is unlikely that CBMs would have been effective under different circumstances, such as in the Golan or the West Bank. (ibid.) Nevertheless, the Egypt-Israel CBMs are an example of where CBMs did play a role in contributing to broader cooperative relations between two states.

Popular Support

Finally, popular support at the domestic and international level is likewise an important potential factor to be considered for CBMs and can tentatively be placed under the relationship management category. If CBMs have popular support domestically, then this adds to their legitimacy and can reinforce the CBM process. Domestic factors can impact on whether CBMs are initiated in the first place and/or expanded. If there is popular support behind CBMs, if they receive favourable media coverage and if they are tied in with popular support for other compatible foreign policy objectives, this can help to ensure their continuation. Popular support provides a good example of where trust 'targets' can overlap and where the absence of a 'general theory' of trust in international relations is problematic. The issue of popular support raises questions, for example, about the role of citizens (and popular opinion) as trustors and not just state actors in the realm of international relations. This potentially moves the framework of trust outside of the billiard ball-like model of relations between states.95

95 Traditional CBM theories typically focus on the role of diplomats and military officials involved in the monitoring of compliance with treaty commitments. However, the issue of popular support for CBMs suggests that the citizens who, as a whole, make up domestic popular support should also be considered as legitimate trust targets for CBMs. Likewise, actors who shape public opinion, such as domestic politicians, the media, interest groups and so forth should also be considered as potential trust targets.
3.3 Shared Understandings, Identity and Security Communities

In contemporary IR theory, another area where the ideas of trust and trust-building have received more specific treatment is in the study of what are called security communities (SCs), whose main proponent in the last decade has been Emmanuel Adler.\(^6\) (1998) Adler argues at length, for example, that the “activities and practices [of SCs] are working to spread new norms and establish collective transnational identities and mutual trust.” (1997, p.18) As will be shown, many of the notions of trust and trust building associated with SCs do in fact fit with the wider literature on trust, particularly its relationship management dimensions. Indeed, this is very much in line with Adler's orientation as a middle-of-the-road constructivist, who embraces a traditional realist and rationalist focus on power and interests respectively, while coupling it with a constructivist perspective which also makes space for the influence of knowledge, norms and shared identities. (1997) Nevertheless, a number of weaknesses in SC theory with regards to its conceptualisation of trust can be pointed to. First, I also consider in this section one other constructivist application of trust to international relations, Tuomas Forsberg's 'Power, Interests and Trust.'

Power, Interests and Trust

Forsberg's work on the role of trust in the ending of the Cold War develops the idea that trust building involves changes in intersubjective understandings. It offers one of the few concrete case studies of trust in international relations.\(^7\) (1999) Though the rational aspects of trust are also acknowledged, Forsberg emphasises trust's connection with constructivist theories of IR. Forsberg argues that trust is not mono-causal and that it can thus be understood in terms of identification and as an affective attitude in addition to rational choice. That is, “instrumental rationality only offers a partial explanation for the development of trust.” (ibid., p.606) Forsberg’s work also helps to situate a trust explanation alongside two other major theoretical explanations for international cooperation: realism and institutionalism. Forsberg argues that the

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\(^6\) It is also relevant to this thesis, since the OSCE, considered in Chapter 8, has been studied and evaluated by Adler and Barnett as a prime example of a 'security community building institution.' (1997)

\(^7\) Perhaps the most broad-based contribution to research on the role of trust in international relations so far, at least in terms of its scope, is the 1997 book by Ralph Goldman and Willard Hardman entitled 'Building Trust: An Introduction to Peacekeeping and Arms Control.' As the title suggests, the authors employ the concepts of trust and trust building to introduce, in textbook style, the fields of international peacekeeping and arms control. Despite a number of limitations linked to the overly-simplistic sketching that an introductory textbook demands, Goldman and Hardman's book is a good example of both the usefulness of the concept of trust for explaining the 'healthy' aspects of international relations—as per the medical analogy in the preface of this thesis—as well the surprisingly broad 'relationship management dimension' this can involve.
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development of trust in international relations "cannot be reduced to changing relationships of power or redefinitions of interests but requires communicative elements."  

A 'trust explanation' partly opposes and partly complements two other major explanations for the end of the Cold War. The first, Forsberg says, is one of Western military build-up (an explanation based on external changes). The second is one of Soviet 'new thinking' (an explanation based on internal changes). Both these explanations have appeal and have been thoroughly examined by the IR literature. However, a third explanation can also be put forward: the development of trust, which may offer (in combination with the other two explanations) a better 'overall' explanation for the end of the Cold War. To support his argument, Forsberg employs evidence from two historic events: German unification (and in particular Mikhail Gorbachev's actions in relation to German unification); and the Soviet dispute with Japan over the Kurile Islands. The argument is made that the development of trust in the case of German unification and the absence of trust in the case of the Soviet-Japanese dispute led to a positive outcome in the former and a negative outcome in the latter.

The first explanation for the end of the Cold War can be described as broadly (neo)realist. Such an account suggests that the outcome "simply reflected changing power relations" and that "Gorbachev was forced to do what he did." (p.605) However, Forsberg writes: "Neither military and economic resources, nor the reasons of the key actors for their behaviour in these specific cases, match very well with the realist theory according to which changes in power relations explain the outcome." (p.612) A second explanation for the end of the Cold War may be described as broadly liberal. Such an account suggests that the outcome was a "rational consequence of Gorbachev's 'new thinking' and that Gorbachev acted deliberately according to the rational interests of the Soviet Union." (p.605). But such an interest-based explanation runs into problems in explaining Soviet behaviour in the case of Japan and the Kurile islands:

The rational value of the islands—whether strategic or economic—was not particularly great. In terms of strategic and economic thinking, if the Soviets found it rational to retreat from East Germany, it would have been equally logical to retreat from the Kurile Islands. (p.614)

A third explanation for the end of the Cold War is the development of trust. Though trust can also be based on capabilities and knowledge, Forsberg links his trust explanation largely with constructivist—and reflectivist—theories of IR. Trust, from this perspective, can be understood in terms of 'identification' and not "as an epiphenomenon of material changes or their perception." (p.605) Therefore, to understand how trust is built, 'communication', 'pre-agreements' and 'mutual tests of behaviour' should be looked at. Building trust through

98 In justifying his pursuit of a trust explanation for the end of the Cold War, Forsberg quotes Alexander Wendt's appeal to examine "what kind of foundations offer the most fruitful set of questions and research strategies for explaining the revolutionary changes that seem to be occurring in the late twentieth century international system." (1992, p.422)
'personal relationships,' Forsberg says, is likewise important since it is often easier to build trust individually than in groups. The gradual development of trust between the Soviet Union and Germany can be viewed through the distrust-trust lens. During the Cold War, the relationship was characterised by distrust. But years of West German cooperation, beginning with Germany’s Ostpolitik, softened Soviet attitudes and built up a ‘reservoir of trust.’ Then, in the late 1980s, the personal relationship between the two leaders, Mikhail Gorbachev and Helmut Kohl, helped to mediate the growing trust between the two states. That is, Gorbachev trusted that Kohl was not going to abuse his initiatives and Kohl trusted that Gorbachev was sincere. This trust between Gorbachev and Kohl was created communicatively. The process of trust building continued with the probing of ideas for further cooperation and the continued testing of each other’s sincerity. But in the Soviet-Japanese relationship at the end of the Cold War, there was no such gradual development of trust. According to Myles Robertson: “If we were to try to establish a general theme of the history of Russian/Soviet-Japanese relations, it would on balance have to be one of distrust and fear.” (qtd. in Forsberg, p.619) A historical and cultural gap in understanding, past negative relations, a lack of routine contact and the Japanese insistence on the return of the Kurile islands as a precondition for any discussion of future cooperation all contributed to the continued cold relations and distrust between the two states. Despite the intriguing trust argument which Forsberg develops to explain the end of the Cold War, his conception of trust leaves many questions unanswered. In particular, his conception is vague about how to reconcile the rationalist and constructivist aspects of trust. This is a void which I seek to partially fill with the trust model presented in Chapter 6.

The Theory of Pluralistic Security Communities

The concept of a pluralistic security community has been called ‘neo-Deutschian.’ (Adler 1997) That is, though the term was first proposed by Richard Van Wagenen in the early 1950s, it subsequently received wider attention and was popularised by Karl Deutsch’s landmark 1957 study ‘Political Community and the North Atlantic Area.’ (Deutsch 1957; Van Wegenen 1952) Deutsch defined a pluralistic security community as a group of people that had become integrated to the point that there is “real assurance that members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way.” (Adler 1998, p.6) He observed that rather than just a stable order between states, in certain milieus a stable peace could be achieved. In such milieus, increases in interstate transaction flows—diplomatic, economic and cultural—was leading to the development of shared understandings, shared values and, in the sense of a ‘we-feeling’, of community. At the time of Deutsch’s study,

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99 Such testing was sometimes done using third parties, for example, Gorbachev’s discussions with Bush about the attitudes of the German leadership. Germany’s economic assistance to the Soviet Union also reassured the Soviets about its goodwill.
however, the Cold War was in full bloom and his thinking, though widely read, was considered radical and was ultimately unfruitful in terms of stimulating further research. In the post-Cold War era, however, the seeds sown by Deutsch have been resurrected by IR scholars seeking to interpret a changing international environment which many believe increasingly parallels Deutsch's 40 year-old notion. Contemporary 'security community' theorists have sought to expand on Deutsch's notion based on developments in IR theory over the last half-century—in particular, the normative and sociological turns—as well as based on the post-Cold War promise of a new world order.

In developing a framework for the study of security communities, Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett outline a conceptual vocabulary and expound a theoretical model for the emergence of pluralistic security communities. (Adler 1998, p.29) They develop a pluralistic security community model which includes three tiers, each building upon the other in a hierarchical fashion. The first tier involves 'precipitating factors' which encourage states to cooperate. The second tier incorporates "the 'structural' elements of power and ideas and the 'process' elements of transactions, international organisations and social learning." (ibid., p.31) The third and final tier is categorised as the development of trust and collective identity. It is of course this final tier which is of interest, though the first two must also be considered, since Adler and Barnett's theory states that "The sequenced and causal relationship between these three tiers is responsible for the production of dependable expectation of peaceful change." (ibid.) The diagram on the next page illustrates the three-tier model for the development of a security community (p.38):
The Puzzle of Trust in IR

Adler and Barnett argue that the multi-dimensional elements of the first two tiers are necessary for the development of mutual trust in the third tier. They are quick to point out that rational choice-based interests and incentives are important in orienting states towards each other in the first place. They also identify numerous exogenous and endogenous factors which can be seen as motivating factors, including technological developments, external threats that lead states to form alliances and transformations in economic, demographic, migratory and environmental patterns. (p.33) The first tier of the security community model serves to expressly maintain the link with the general underpinnings of neo-realist and neo-liberal IR theory; that state actors are self-interested, seek to protect themselves from perceived threats from other states and from this act based on a calculation of anticipated costs and incentives. The second tier of security community development then moves, albeit tentatively, into the constructivist realm. The authors divide the second tier into ‘structure’ and ‘process’ categories. Power here plays an important structural role in the development and maintenance of security communities. (p.39) Power is understood in the conventional realist sense of strong states compelling weaker ones to
take a collective security position. But it is also understood in the constructivist sense of strong states drawing on their “authority to determine the shared meaning that constitutes the ‘we-feeling’ and practices of states and the conditions which confer, defer, or deny access to the community and the benefits it bestows on its members.” (ibid.)

Knowledge is also understood in the second tier as a cognitive structure which engenders shared meanings and understandings. Adler and Barnett write, “We are interested in those cognitive structures that are tied to the development of mutual trust...”100 (p.40) The process category in the second tier includes transactions, international organisations and institutions and social learning. Transactions can be symbolic, economic, material, political or technological.101 In the second tier of the security community model, social learning processes serve as generators of mutual trust.102 Social learning, which often occurs within institutionalised settings, can, “by promoting the development of shared definitions of security, proper domestic and international action and regional boundaries...encourage political actors to see each other as trustworthy.” (p.45) Through dynamic and reciprocal actions, Adler and Barnett argue all these first and second tier factors lead to the third tier, namely “the development of mutual trust and collective identity, which in turn, are the proximate necessary conditions for the development of dependable expectations of peaceful change.” (ibid.) In the strongest form of SC, the tightly coupled SC, indicators of mutual trust include:

- Cooperative and collective security;
- A high level of military integration;
- Policy coordination against ‘internal’ threats;
- Free movement of populations;
- Internalisation of authority;
- A multiperspectival polity.

Finally, the SC model also indicates that a variety of internal and external factors can lead to the disintegration of a security community; and are often the result of changes in the shared values

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100 In the contemporary world of international relations, they identify liberalism and democracy as most related to the formation of security communities; and indeed the OSCE is seen as a prime knowledge broker of these. (ibid.)
101 Durkheimian ‘dynamic density’ of transactions is invoked here to show how critical masses of these transactions can reshape social facts. (1972). Oran Young’s conception of international institutions is likewise invoked, not as formal organisations per se, but “social practices consisting of easily recognised roles coupled with clusters of rules or conventions governing the relations...” (1989, p.32) In this vein, both security and non-security organisations and institutions can be understood to contribute to the overall development of trust.
102 Social learning is defined as “an active process of redefinition or reinterpretation of reality—what people consider real, possible and desirable—on the basis of new causal and normative knowledge.” (p.43)
and identities which led to their creation. But the most important factor is the loss of mutual trust. (p.58) In *Chapter 4*, I provide a critique of security community theory, acknowledging its insights but also highlighting some of the evident ambiguities and contradictions in its conceptualisation of trust. But first I turn to the place of trust in 'institutionalist' IR theories.
3.4 Trust, Institutionalism and Constructivism

How can the concept of trust be understood from the liberal institutionalist perspective in IR? In other words, how does the concept of trust fit or not fit within the basic premises of institutionalism? The institutionalist position in IR is associated with international cooperation and can typically be distinguished from realism by the greater faith it places in the ability of international actors to find common rational ground and build peace in an anarchical international system. However, following the trust model developed in Chapter 6, the trust building potential of institutionalism depends significantly on the extent to which it integrates a strong enough social-orientation with the familiar rationalist approaches to international relations; that is, the extent to which relationship management is emphasised. In this section, I briefly survey institutionalist theory in IR, particularly in its popular contemporary form, 'regime theory.' Institutionalist thinkers in IR generally agree with the idea that some minimal level of cooperation is possible. At the most rudimentary level, cooperation may involve a tacit agreement between two or more states to leave each other alone. Where such an implicit understanding is either non-existent or broken, there may be 'base-line' rules of warfare which are implicitly or explicitly understood and followed, such as long-standing rules about not harming envoys and procedures for surrender where, if followed, one can expect to not be killed. Of course many IR theorists are prepared to acknowledge the existence of far more sophisticated forms of minimal cooperation within an anarchical system, such as traditions of international law, diplomatic customs and the role of international institutions such as the U.N. in providing some quality of ordered interaction to international affairs. Generally, however, for institutionalist thinkers in IR, the existence of these traditions and institutions does not alter the defining feature of the international system as one of anarchy. (Ashworth 1999; MacMillan 1998)

Goldman and Hardman, who have considered the role of trust building effects of peacekeeping and arms control, employ Deutsch’s definition of an institution as “an orderly and more or less formal collection of human habits and roles, that is, of interlocking expectations of behaviour that result in a stable organisation or practice whose performance can be predicted with some reliability.” (1980, p.175) The institutionalisation of trust can take diverse forms: the structure and activities of interstate organisations such as the U.N., the International Court of Justice and the World Trade Organisation; the establishment of international treaties and conventions, such as the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights and the anti-landmine treaty; the

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103 Given again that the task here is one of tentatively situating trust among the dominant theoretical traditions in IR, the pursuit of exactitude in telling the story of international liberalism must be side-stepped in favour of a more general picture. Before the aesthetically pleasing and refined details of a house can be added, the foundation must be poured and the coarse frame erected.

104 See for instance Doyle (1997); Keohane (1986); and Nye (2000).
negotiation of arms control agreements; even international trade itself, as “selling Pepsi-Cola rather than tanks to China may have more than symbolic significance in the promotion of international political trust and the maintenance of peace. . .In sum, political communication and exchanges promote trust.” (Goldman & Hardman 1997, pp.168-9) Nevertheless, despite the sophistication of Deutsch’s definition of institutionalisation, Goldman and Hardman maintain that from a general perspective, institutionalised trust can be understood to be “nothing more than the attitude of trust that results from and is reinforced by the predictable behaviours of the members of an institution.” (p.165) Clearly, more ground needs to be cleared in order to usefully conceptualise the institutionalisation of trust in international relations. In two more specific examples, Goldman and Harman examine the role of institutionalised trust in peacekeeping and arms control, the focus of their book.\textsuperscript{105} They write:

Perhaps [the] most important function of peacekeeping is the promotion of institutionalised trust in world affairs. . .Institutionalised trust requires (a) predictable behaviour that (b) produces consequences for the transactor in an exchange. Well-established and assertive third-party peacekeeping interventions by the United Nations or regional organisations such as the European Union tend to encourage predictable behaviour by the adversaries. . .As [these] supranational organisations persist in providing regular and reliable peacekeeping efforts and as the political habits of responding positively to such peacekeeping interventions become established, the predictability of international conflict scenarios, from military engagement to negotiating table, will increase and strengthen the structure of international institutionalised trust. (p.263)

Similarly, the authors write about arms control:

Through successful negotiation, the major powers and their allies have been. . .expanding the area of political trust and may well be backing the world into a viable, effective and stable collective security system. . .The necessary antecedent condition of world disarmament is a system of world security that includes arrangements that build on institutionalised trust. . .Beyond its practical benefits [the START treaty’s nuclear arms reductions], it reinforces the development of trust. . .Arms control negotiations, treaties and agreements have been essential for the development of institutionalised trust... (pp.296-324)

Given their enormous scope, the above examples make readily apparent the limitations of too broad and general a model of trust and trust building in international relations. This is a limitation which, given this thesis’s own broad scope, is taken to heart. But, as will be argued in Chapters 4 & 6, without at least some multi-dimensionality, trust becomes irrelevant as a concept unique from some concepts such as cooperation, prediction and faith, even confidence. Likewise, not less but more theoretical development and rigorous evaluation across varying circumstances is required in order for trust as a concept to be of practical utility in explaining and understanding international relations.

\textsuperscript{105} Considered in the previous section.
The Socialising Function of Regimes

For explanations of international relations which do entail something more than minimal cooperation, regime analysis has been the dominant paradigm in the discipline for the last quarter century.\(^{106}\) (Crawford 1996; Francisco 2000; Krasner 1983; Rittberger 1993; Tooze 1990; Vogler 1995) Regime analysis takes its place alongside and quite often mixed (to varying degrees and with varying outcomes) into other schools of thought on international cooperation, from neo-realism to constructivism.\(^{107}\) Classic examples of international cooperation which can be interpreted in a regime context include the international postal regime, the aviation regime and the mechanisms of international financial cooperation established at Bretton Woods.\(^{108}\) The bulk of work on regimes in international relations to date has been on international economic (mostly finance and trade-related) regimes, with a large growth in work in the last decade on international security as well as environmental regimes.\(^{109}\) Stephen Krasner's definition is a standard definition of regimes in IR. Krasner defines regimes as:

sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation and rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice. (1982, p.186)

Krasner's definition indicates that a core feature of regimes is that they involve 'social practices' of one form or another. Indeed, one of the basic premises regime theories have in common and one which is appropriate and important to the development of a trust explanation of international relations, is that social practices or institutions play a significant role in shaping behaviour and outcomes. That is, these social practices are 'understood' by the actors involved; are 'regular', in that they are predictable and occur on a frequent basis; and are 'standardised' in that there are sets of norms, rules and procedures to be followed or adhered to. In this specific sense, it can be said that such social practices are 'institutionalised.' (Krasner 1983) For the purposes of the trust model, the important question is the extent to which institutionalist thinking continues to ground itself in an atomistic (individual, rationalist) or holistic (social-oriented, normative) conception of international relations; that is, the extent to which it moves from risk to relationship management.

\(^{106}\) IR is not the only discipline whose literature includes regime theory and regime analysis. Political science, sociology, history, economics and law, among others, have developed various conceptions of regimes. (Vogler 1995)

\(^{107}\) The regime theory literature is plentiful and includes comprehensive summaries by Haggard & Simmons (1987), Tooze (1990) and Milner (1992).


\(^{109}\) Other issue areas conceived as international regimes include, \textit{inter alia}, human rights, migrants, refugees and emergency aid; in short, any form of institutionalised cooperation which takes on an international dimension.
The Puzzle of Trust in IR

**Individual or Constructivist Trust?**

Institutionalist theories of IR can be said to remain along the risk management dimension of trust to the extent that their fundamental premises and focus rest on individual rational interests; in short, to the extent that they follow an economic model of exchange relations. This approach makes up a large extent of the regime literature, including much of what is often referred to as the neo-liberal model. (Keohane 1986) Prominent in this literature is the coercive nature of regimes—that is, the extent to which regimes constrain the behaviour of their participants—and the related role of powerful states in shaping regimes and punishing non-compliance. (Ruggie 1997) As with realism, the problem with equating such forms of international cooperation with trust is that, in practice, there is little if any difference with coercion. Again, while issues of power are never fully absent from trusting relations and while individual interests form an important ‘part’ of the equation, there is something intuitively more to trust than this. Trust is also a social phenomenon. To the extent that institutionalist IR approaches place the relationship at its centre—that is, through the presence of common goals, values and identity between states—then they can be understood as falling along the relationship management dimension of trust. Such relational variables can be fostered informally in international relations, through more frequent and deeper contact; but also formally, via political and legal commitments. Such an approach is also more amenable to ‘constructivist’ explanations of state behaviour in IR. A constructivist perspective focuses on interaction. It emphasises the development of shared understandings and identities and challenges conceptualisations of rationality based on purely instrumental or strategic understandings. A constructivist perspective stresses the ‘independent’ role of shared understandings and identities in shaping the interests of key actors.

Forsberg writes that:

According to the constructivist explanation, the Soviet acceptance of German unification and her membership in NATO was not predetermined on the basis of power relations, nor was it a logical consequence of the rational calculation of the Soviet interests; rather it resulted from the fundamental redefinition of the Soviet identity in relation to Germany. The point of constructivists is that the Soviet understanding of their security needs changed due to an interactive process in which the role of ideas—knowledge, values and strategic concepts—was central (Forsberg, p.616)

Such a constructivist approach is a reflection of the social turn in contemporary IR theory. This in turn, as has been discussed, is a reflection of the recent trend across the social sciences away from strictly rational choice and hard variables such as power towards an emphasis on softer more social-oriented variables and more interpretive approaches. This takes several forms. At a narrower level, it involves the recognition of the limits of a strictly rational choice approach for accounting for the proliferation of ‘risks’ in modern societies; risks which it seeks, but too often fails, to effectively manage. The sheer scope, complexity, opacity and reflective nature of most
modern ‘risk’ relations are typically such that present rational choice models simply cannot usefully cope with many ‘real-world’ scenarios.\footnote{The most prominent popular discussion of modern risk relations is Ulrich Beck’s. (1992) See Section 6.5 for further discussion along these lines.} Trust, as it is conceptualised here, offers an alternative to a strictly rational choice approach to dealing with the proliferation of risks in contemporary international relations.

At another level, the social turn involves the recognition that hard structural variables fail on their own to adequately account for a significant amount of human interaction. Put another way, theories of power, for example, offer a simplified model of interaction on the assumption that what falls outside the model’s reach either cancels itself out or is ‘tolerably’ negligible. However, the neglect of such ‘residuals’ is increasingly coming to be perceived as ‘intolerable.’ According to some theorists, trust plays as prominent a role as power in shaping social relations, including in many areas of international relations (Adler 1998; Forsberg 1999). At a deeper level, the social turn reflects the growing awareness that concepts such as power are themselves shaped by ideas, which, in turn, are socially constructed. This level of critique of rational choice calls into the question the objectivity of hard concepts such as power, suggesting that, like anarchy in international relations, they can come to mean very different things, depending on the particular social actors and circumstances involved.\footnote{It has become almost customary at this point to quote Alexander Wendt to the effect that “Anarchy is what states make of it.” (1992)} Power, like trust, is deemed to have inherent social content. The deepest levels of critique—post-modern or otherwise—call into question not just the epistemology of hard variables, such as power, but also their ontology. Here, ontology may even be entirely subsumed by epistemology, as any ‘objective’ position in dismissed as artificial and all social scientific concepts become, even in their very existence, a question of interpretation, be it personal, social or otherwise. For this level of critique, the term social science is no longer appropriate.

At deeper levels, as is explored in Chapters 5 and 6 and in the conclusion, trust may require even firmer normative grounding. The CSCE/OSCE illustrative studies will explore in detail the relationship dimension of trust, particularly the ways in which trust relations can evolve as well as be undermined. But are the individualist-oriented and social-oriented dimensions of trust like apples and oranges? Are these two different starting points for understanding trust fundamentally incompatible? Or can risk and relationship management, at some level and/or to some degree, be reconciled? The reconciling of individual and social perspectives on trust, I argue in this thesis, requires engagement with the mechanism of suspension, which is the kernel of trust. This is looked at next.
4. Suspension

"The problem of trust lies in what Kant termed 'man's asocial sociality.' If we were wholly asocial, there would be no trust; if wholly social, no problem. Since we have both elements, however, we need to decide how elastic to make the bonds of society".\textsuperscript{112}

\textsuperscript{112} Martin Hollis (1998, p.105).
4.1 The Benefit of the Doubt

A key part of the trust model set out in Chapter 6 involves the ‘mechanism of suspension.’ It is also perhaps the most conceptually challenging and opaque part of the model. But it also happens to be the ‘kernel’ which makes trust possible; which binds its risk and relationship dimensions together; and which makes trust unique from other concepts. In this chapter, I consider the mechanism of suspension more closely, particularly via the work of the sociologist Georg Simmel—and the contemporary adaptation of Simmel’s ideas by Guido Möllering.

Simmel’s Notion of Suspension

In addition to the trust theorists that offer a socially embedded understanding of trust—reviewed in the previous chapter on relationship management—a small but influential group of thinkers stress the duality of self-interest and social embeddedness underlying trust. (Lyons & Mehta 1997) That is, they do not do away with the rational, ‘calculative’ aspects of trust. Rather, like much contemporary social scientific thought, they see such real-world rational calculation as imperfect and ‘bounded’, invariably involving the realm of ideas, beliefs and hence diverse interpretations of reality. Neither self-interest nor social oriented trust is possible without some degree of the other. This strand of thinking finds its earliest and perhaps clearest voice in the work of Georg Simmel. According to Barbara Mistzal, Simmel’s “contribution to the sociological conceptualisation of (trust) is significant. Many of his brilliant analyses of the nature of trust relationships were later adopted and developed by scholars such as Luhmann and Giddens.” (1996, pp.49-50) In this section, I consider how Simmel’s conception of ‘suspension’ may open up the possibility of reconciling the contrasting dynamics of risk and relationship management underlying trust.

Simmel’s ideas on trust are found in a few, relatively brief, passages in his *Philosophie des Geldes* (The Philosophy of Money) and his *Soziologie.* (1990 [1950]) In *Philosophie des Geldes,* his discussion of trust is embedded in his theory of “the transition from material money to credit money. Simmel argues that this transition is ‘less radical than it appears at first’ given that an economy based on material money and in fact any economy, already depends on ‘elements of credit’ which represent trust.” (1990, p.179, qtd in Möllering 2001, p.405) For Simmel, “the feeling of personal security that the possession of money gives is perhaps the most concentrated and pointed form of trust in the socio-political organisation and order.” (p.179)

Without fully elucidating Simmel’s theory, two key points can be drawn out. The first is that such trust only involves a “weak form of inductive knowledge.” (ibid.) That is, it is only partly based on rational proof. Simmel gives the example of the farmer who trusts that his crops will grow or the trader that his goods will be desired. While the farmer or trader may have sound reasons for their trust, they cannot be absolutely certain. Indeed, they may often be far from
certain, yet still choose to trust. Second, there is a “further element of socio-psychological quasi-religious faith” that is typically involved. (ibid.) According to Simmel,

To ‘believe in someone’ without adding or even conceiving what it is that one believes about him, is to employ a very subtle and profound idiom. It expresses the feeling that there exists between the idea of a being and the being itself a definite connection and unity, a certain consistence in the conception of it, an assurance and lack of resistance in the surrender of the Ego to this conception, which may rest upon particular reasons, but is not explained by them. (ibid.)

Guido Möllering frames Simmel’s basic ideas about trust in what he calls the ‘mechanism of suspension’, which is the ‘essential’ part of trust:

Trust can be imagined as the mental process of leaping—enabled by suspension—across the gorge of the unknowable from the land of interpretation to the land of expectation. . .This is the mechanism of bracketing the unknowable, thus making interpretive knowledge momentarily certain. (2001, p.403, 412)

For Luhmann—who was strongly influenced by Simmel’s thinking—trust is functionally rational as a tool for reducing complexity, but, given the ‘leap of faith’ required, is epistemologically and ontologically transcendental. (Möllering, p.409) Simmel indeed believed an essential element of trust was ‘metaphysical’, in the sense that it was necessarily prior to—and/or beyond—rational knowledge and calculation.113 In sum, “the Simmelian idea that comes through strongest is that trust performs a crucial function in modern societies whilst the bases for trust are actually rather weak. Less pronounced. . .but still present. . .is Simmel’s proposition that there exists a ‘further element’ of a transcendental ‘quasi-religious’ nature in trust that enables the ‘leap.’ In a simple formula, for Simmel trust combines good reasons with faith.” (Möllering, p.411) The question for the purposes of developing a model of trust in international relations is thus “how can this ‘essential’ element of trust best be accounted for; this ‘leap of faith’ that it involves?” For both Simmel and Möllering’s conceptions of suspension, though important, are vague and incomplete and leave many questions unanswered. How can ‘suspension’ be understood as falling ‘in between’ individual interest and social embeddedness; in other words, between risk and relationship management? Figure 2 on the next page sketches four possible dimensions to the mechanism of suspension:

113 For the social psychologist Erik Erikson, the ability to make this ‘leap of faith’ was so important to basic human interaction that he identified it as the second psychosocial task which infants must master in order to overcome anxiety and to develop naturally. (1953)
First, Simmel's writing hints at the metaphysical nature of suspension:

Even in the social forms of trust, no matter how exactly and intellectually grounded they may appear to be, there may yet be some additional affective, even mystical, 'faith' of man in man. Perhaps what has been characterised here is a fundamental category of human conduct, which goes back to the metaphysical sense of the relationships and which is realised in a merely accidental, fragmentary manner by the conscious and particular reasons for trust. (Simmel 1950, p.318)

Roughly speaking, such a conception of suspension might fall under a 'human nature' or 'socialising instinct' category. However, Möllering, interpreting Simmel's writing some half-century later, offers a more contemporary social scientific conception of suspension. He emphasises the 'interpretative' and 'hermeneutic' nature of trust. While not specifying or developing a deeper 'language' theory himself, Möllering's conception of suspension might usefully be placed in a second, 'social constructivist' category.

Perhaps the most straightforward conception of suspension is the one that emphasises relationships. In this third category, the common goals, values and identity that typically begin to emerge in long-term relationships serve as the bridge between individual calculation and social connectedness. Finally, a fourth category suggests that suspension could be understood as deriving from a sense of ethical obligation. Here, rational scepticism and uncertainty is overcome by moral sensibility. This is a sensibility that is shared by one's community—be it one's family, society or mankind—about how one should act—and in turn, how others should be expected to act. What these four categories of suspension dynamics do not appear to
adequately address, however, is the 'tension' that frequently exists between the individual and social components of trust. That is, the challenge of finding a way to mediate the frequently incompatible goals, interests and values of the individual and the collective. Thus, in Chapter 6, I also explore the mechanism of suspension through two other lenses: Isaiah Berlin's pluralism and Hegel's notion of 'patriotic trust.'
4.2 From Confidence to Trust

In the previous two chapters, it has been argued that confidence building measures are a useful, if limited, tool for encouraging the concrete and incremental development of more confident relations between states, particularly in the military sphere, where a lack of confidence frequently exists. As Alford writes: “CBMs are relatively easy to design, relatively cost-free to negotiate in political terms and relatively effective in clarifying intentions.” (1981, p.142) Their value can be over-estimated, however:

The dangers of CBMs are clear. They may seem to promise more than they can deliver; they may operate asymmetrically, given the geographical and doctrinal differences between powers; and they may encourage a lowering of the guard to a greater extent than the reality warrants. (ibid.)

It is their simplicity and relative easiness to implement, ironically, which perhaps are CBMs most significant weakness. That is, they do not necessarily reflect both the complexity and entrenchment of the dense and inter-connected network of trusting (and too often distrusting) relationships between states. In this section, a critique is offered of the limits of CBMs for creating and maintaining trust in international relations.

The Limits of CBMs

Desjardins asks the question: Do CBMs really prevent wars, bring arms control and disarmament, alter long-held patterns of distrust between states and shift relationships from confrontation to cooperation? . . . Or is it a concept overburdened with promises and likely to disappoint? (1996, p.6)

Similarly, John Borawski, in the introduction to his 1986 edited book on confidence-building measures, remarks:

The term ‘confidence building measure’ is . . . probably somewhat of an unfortunate choice of appellations in that it implies that CBMs can somehow cause states to have confidence in or to ‘trust’ their potential adversaries. In times of strained relations, hence, or even in the normal course of international relations between states with less than friendly ties, talk of CBMs can appear woefully misplaced. (p.9)

Borawski was writing, of course, in the context of the late Cold War period, around the time of the military build-up in the early years of the Reagan administration, which magnified the ever-present nuclear threat and deep ideological differences between East and West. Borawski goes on to state that:

CBMs have little direct bearing on what is ultimately the political question of building ‘trust’ among nations. They cannot sweep away deep-rooted suspicions between states of different social systems and perceived ambitions. . . . CBMs are not, in other words, a deus ex machina,
whose implementation would automatically allow the West to 'trust' the Russians and vice-versa. (ibid.)

To this extent, claims that CBMs can directly contribute to 'eliminating causes of tension' among nations, as stated, for example, in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, are rejected by Borawski as unrealistically overreaching.

Such an analysis points rather starkly to the potential weaknesses and dangers of overselling CBMs as involving fundamental transformative processes rather than focusing on them strictly as cooperative military procedures; that is, emphasising the political aspects of CBMs can detract attention from the much more modest efficacy of their military function. Holst also warns about the potentially negative impacts of CBMs, such as the possibility of concealing hostile preparations under the normalised veneer of CBMs. (1983) Despite Borawski and Holst's evident biases towards the more realist interpretation of international relations which dominated Cold-War thinking on international relations (and which in certain respects still dominates), their comments raise very legitimate concerns. For the doubts that they both have about the effectiveness—and ultimate purpose—of CBMs parallel a central tension of the trust model for international relations presented here; that is, the extent to which the risk and relationship dimensions of trust can be reconciled. These authors call into serious question whether both the narrow role of building confidence in military relations ascribed to CBMs (e.g. reducing fears of surprise attack) and the larger role also often ascribed to CBMs—of leading towards deeper cooperation and trustful co-existence—are mutually compatible. For states who do not trust each other and who do not seek to build greater cooperative relations, a focus on the efficient and effective implementation of CBMs remains the priority. Further, if appropriate military confidence is not established, greater cooperation in other areas may not follow. Thus, it is important not to be too far ahead of the ball at the risk of jeopardising the original, narrower, aim of CBMs. (Desjardins 1996) And even in the presence of greater cooperation, military tension can still result. For these reasons and for further theoretical reasons which will be elaborated in Chapter 6, it makes sense for the purpose of developing a basic model of trust in international relations to restrict CBMs to the risk management dimension of trust. As will be seen, CBMs and their associated objectives and processes thus make up only one part of the overall trust equation.

Beyond this, problems related to the 'measurement' of the confidence that develops (or fails to develop) from CBMs also parallel similar conceptual and methodological problems with measuring trust overall, as will be seen in Section 6.2.\footnote{For example, the intercultural dimensions of international relations also clearly compound the development of objective measurement criteria—as do the frequently multilateral dimensions of CBMs involving numerous actors.} CBMs are also more likely to build confidence between the actors most closely connected with them, such as the military officials
who engage in the exchange of information and inspections and the officials who negotiate and oversee the terms of the agreements. CBMs are less likely to build confidence between individual actors further removed from the CBM process, such as the citizens of the countries involved. This raises challenging questions about how best to conceptualise the appropriate ‘targets’ of confidence in international relations\textsuperscript{115}, which likewise mirrors the methodological discussion of trust targets in Section 6.2.

\textsuperscript{115} This is particularly relevant when confidence and/or trust building activities are based in interstate state security arrangements such as the OSCE, which are often little known to the general public.
4.3 Trust and Critical Security

Parallels can be drawn between the idea of suspension elucidated in this chapter and some of the ideas that have gained currency recently in IR under the banner of critical security studies (CSS). Drawing on CSS here is also particularly relevant given the illustrative studies in Chapters 7 & 8, where I seek to frame the CSCE and OSCE in terms of ‘trust building’ rather than the more obvious ‘security building’ with which they are typically associated. This, in some senses, parallels CSS’s objective of problematising and reconceptualising security, its definition, study, methodology, referent object(s) and so on. In this section, I consider some of these parallels and then move to a trust critique of security community theory.

The authors and works commonly connected with CSS share the goal of calling into question dominant ways of thinking about security. As Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams write, and it is worth quoting them at length:

The basic claims of the critical and constructive approaches are that ‘security’ is not an objective condition, that threats are not simply a matter of correctly perceiving a constellation of

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116 Richard Wyn Jones offers a useful, if somewhat loaded, summary of the general distinctions between traditional and critical security studies. (1999) For Wyn Jones, the traditional conception of security:

- Tends to reify the prevailing status quo because of its scientific-objectivist epistemology
- Is ahistorical and deeply resistant to notions of contingency and change because of its state-centric ontology;
- Is blind to the way in which notions of security are dependent on deeper assumptions concerning the nature of politics;
- Focuses exclusively on a narrow military understanding of security;
- Is tied to the state in a way that privileges the state’s ethical position...

In contrast, a critical conception of security is:

- Deeper, in that it understands that security is a derivative concept; that is, security reflects deeper assumptions about the nature of politics and the role of conflict in political life;
- Broader, in that it recognises that military force is not the only potential threat to security and that other threats are equally important and equally worthy of consideration in security studies;
- Extended to include referent objects other than the state; individual human beings, however, are regarded as the ultimate referents;
- Focused, crucially, on emancipation as the prism through which both the theory and the practice should be viewed (pp.155-6)

It goes (almost) without saying that not all who subscribe to (or are stamped with) the critical security label would sign up equally to the above points, particularly the last one. Keith Krause, for example, argues that rather than a being a distinct approach of its own, critical security studies is a collection of disparate (and often contradictory) approaches which have in common a basic objection to the narrow meta-theoretical assumptions of traditional (or mainstream) security studies. (1998)

117 'Capitalized' Critical theory is sometimes used to distinguish works connected with the Frankfurt School. It has its roots in German philosophy and in aspects of Marxist thought and shares the characteristic of repudiating dominant socially constructed truths. One of its most influential thinkers in recent years, Jürgen Habermas, exemplifies the combination of reflectivism with a concerted effort to establish firmer ground for reason (Habermas 1986; Brown 1994). Like many postmodernists, Habermas's aim is emancipation from contrived and dominant social norms. Habermasian ideas are picked up by critical international theorists such as Andrew Linklater and international political economists such as Robert Cox. Cox's 'Power, Production and World Order,' for example, famously makes the distinction between problem-solving theory which addresses the current environment and critical theory which is concerned with change and more specifically, emancipation (Cox 1987 & 1990; Linklater 1998).
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material forces, and that the object of security is not stable or unchanging. Instead, questions about how the object to be secured (nation, state, or other group) is constituted and how particular issues (economic well-being, the risk of violence, environmental degradation) are placed under the 'sign of security' become central. 'Security' (especially, 'national security') is understood as a particular set of historical discourses and practices that rest upon institutionally shared understandings. (1996, p.242-3)

To 'securitise' an issue or area of behaviour/interaction is, following the above, an inherently political act. That is, it is subjective, open to contestation and frequently arbitrary and/or largely shaped by the interests of the powerful and those interested in maintaining the status quo. It is thus also open to questioning—intellectually and politically—and, importantly, to alteration. Over the last decade, the critical security 'agenda', so to speak, has thus sought to broaden the concept of security to include, for example, economic, environmental and human rights issues. It has also sought to deepen the concept of security by transferring or extending it downwards, for example to the level of minority groups and, ultimately, the individual; and/or upwards to the regional and global level. But the point here is not to offer an exhaustive account of the CSS agenda (which, in any event, is far from singular or uncontested); but, rather, to consider CSS's general connections (synergies or discontinuities) with the trust model. Without rigorously defining security per se—given that such rigorous definition is largely anathema to the CSS perspective—it is still possible to make some key, if rudimentary, connections. First, security and trust need not be contradictory, nor even mutually exclusive. Indeed, a sense of security can be understood as an important aspect of trust. Risk management, after all, involves concrete efforts to mediate against perceived threats. As such, the risk management dimension of trust seeks to determine threats to individual (state) interests and then develop the means to deal with them (remove or lessen these threats) accordingly. Risk management is thus more closely aligned with realist-oriented approaches to security studies that prioritise, if not exclusively consider, the security of individual states; and then evaluate such security and security-building efforts by means of quantifiable (hard) measures. However, a significant difference between the risk management dimension of trust and traditional security studies is that, whereas material factors play a direct and frequently decisive role in neo-realist security studies, they play only an indirect (but still relevant) role in building trust. This is to say that agency always lies at the heart of considerations of trust; but with neo-realist conceptions of security, the question of agency can sometimes be completely subsumed by that of structure. The most strictly neo-realist theories, for example, conceive of security purely in material terms (e.g. in terms of military capacity). More specifically, for 'hard core' neo-realists, in an anarchical system of self-interested and competitive states the only way any significant state

118 For an excellent applied example of this to post-Apartheid South Africa, see Booth and Vale (1995).
security can be achieved, if at all, is structurally; that is, in terms of the order that results from
the balance of power. Generally speaking, for theoretical purposes, agency is trumped by
structure.\textsuperscript{120} Trust, on the other hand, is agent-centric. There is always a trustor and a trustee.\textsuperscript{121}
Trust, in other words, cannot be reduced to structural factors. While such factors as the
distribution of material capabilities inevitably can/will play a role in shaping the interests of
agents, the perception and evaluation of these interests—and the actions agents undertake to
protect them—remain their own.

Accounting for the impact of social (and socialising) factors on the determination of what
security is (and whom it is for) is a prerogative of critical approaches to security—and is,
conversely, something that aligns itself in a general sense with the relationship management
dimension of trust. As with security, trust is a socially-embedded phenomenon; that is, it cannot
be considered independently of its social context. Frequent and open communication, the
development of common goals, institutions, shared values, even social identity can all
contribute positively to the social environment in which trusting relations between individuals
take place. But while these social conditions can be important contributors to trust, they are not,
in and of themselves, trust. Again, it needs to be stressed here that trust is an agent-based
phenomenon.\textsuperscript{122} It is not simply a question of social structures (e.g. social identity) shaping the
interests of individual agents and hence their conception of security as some CSS and
constructivist theorists would hold; though such a dynamic could no doubt have a role to
play.\textsuperscript{123} Nor is it is enough to say that social structure and individual interests are reflexive and
co-determinate.\textsuperscript{124} Though it is not an easy thing to grasp this analytically, it seems that trust is
even less concrete than the flexible, subjectively conceived security of CSS theorists. For the
kernel of trust is something beyond security. To paraphrase Luhmann, it can be said to begin
where security ends. (1988) It involves, as has been explored, a ‘leap of faith’, from conditions
of insecurity to the expectation of being secure. It is based on both individual interests and
social norms, but reducible to neither. It is not, to reiterate, a question of actually being secure;
but, rather, trusting that you will be secure. To put it another way, if you were completely

\textsuperscript{119} Ken Booth writes that “Security means the absence of threats.” (1991, p.319) But what are deemed to
constitute threats and to whom (not to mention how such threats are dealt with) remain, of course, open
questions.

\textsuperscript{120} Some neo-realists, however, have more systematically incorporated the role of agency into their
theories. See for example Buzan and Jones (1993); But the point is that structure still plays a central and
defining role.

\textsuperscript{121} See the discussion of trust targets in Section 6.3.

\textsuperscript{122} It is both a state of mind (or the collective state of mind of a group) and an act (e.g. a demonstration of
trusting behaviour). For more on this, see the discussion of reification in Section 6.3.

\textsuperscript{123} See for example Wendt (1994).

\textsuperscript{124} As Pinar Bilgin writes in the context of critical theories of international security, “conceiving the
relationship between . . . identity and interests as co-constitutive allows one to understand the fluidity,
uncertainty and inherent instability of each and therefore have a better grasp of the potentialities of human
agency…” (2001, p.277) See for example McSweeney (1999). See also Arts (2000) and my discussion of
structuration theory in the next section (4.4).
secure, you wouldn’t need to trust. Yet security invariably contributes to trust. This draws us back to the paradox at the heart of the trust puzzle set out in the introduction; namely, that trust is a function of both security and insecurity; or, more aptly, that it lies at the intersection of security and insecurity.

In the (however vague) sense that the trust model seeks to transcend this security-insecurity dichotomy, it moves even closer to a socialised conception of international relations. Taking the cue from the sociological approaches of CSS and constructivist IR thinkers, it moves away from an emphasis on security (as the overwhelming priority of international relations). At the very least, it explores the possibilities for considering trust as an IR concept alongside security. As we have seen, this is not to say that security does not still play a role in society. All societies face security issues as well; and sometimes dramatically. But it is to say that there is something more than security that binds society together; that acts as a glue. This is to suggest that security will (and/or should) continue to play an important role in international society. But it is not everything. There is also trust.

**A Trust Critique of Security Community Theory**

The model of trust in international relations that is advanced in *Chapter 6* shares much in common with Security Community theory (as it does with the wider school of critical security studies with which SC theory is associated). This includes the various strengths and weaknesses of its multi-dimensional approach. However, in addition to the general similarities and differences between the trust model and CSS discussed above, the critique of SC theory below will point to several key shortcomings upon which the development of the trust model seeks to improve. These include the role of power alongside trust; and the competing ideals of order and justice as the ultimate ends of trusting relations.

Following the elaboration of SC theory in the *Section 3.3*, it is argued generally here that the deepest level of Adler’s security community runs the risk of overstating the unity of identity and of mutual trust in any community—be it an SC at the international level or a domestic political community (i.e. at the state or sub-state level). This is not to forget that domestic communities, unlike security communities, typically have the advantage of binding and enforceable laws upon which to ground trust relations. Rather, this is precisely because domestic communities in liberal democracies have formalised elements of ‘distrust’ into their institutional structures. As Russell Hardin elucidates, political and economic liberalism in many respects holds distrust, particularly in government, as one of its central tenets. (2001) What is pointedly absent from the SC model is an adequate integration of the role of such ‘distrust’ in constituting community, not just limiting it. In the discussion of ‘risk management,’ I have paradoxically sought to partly address this void, by re-conceiving the idea of distrust as,
in fact, a distinct element of trust. The dynamic of risk management, as will be elaborated further, is a necessary but insufficient element of trust.

SC theory is also too cavalier about the complex relationship between trust and power. SC theory suggests both that trust relations necessarily co-exist with more manipulative/coercive forms of power-politics and that power plays a constructive role in building trust to the extent that powerful actors can persuade others towards their point of view and thus positively shape the security agenda. However, the main problem, as many students of trust point out in various ways, is how to discriminate between genuine or legitimate trust and the 'façade of trust'; that is, power and coercion masquerading under the 'rhetoric of trust.' This problem cuts to the core of the idea of trust and indeed is the source of some of the major criticisms of thinking on trust, particularly of the recent work led by Robert Putnam which sees trust as a building block of social capital. The criticism is that trust essentially reinforces the status quo and is thus unmindful of the ways that power and the powerful may unjustly set and abuse the terms under which trust relationships take place. Similarly, theories of trust are often criticised for having little or nothing to say about social transformation—about changing the status-quo. As such, despite claims to transcend the boundaries of self-interested behaviour and to emphasise shared ideas and values, it is argued here that the SC conception of trust risks remaining firmly planted on the individualistic or risk management side of the trust equation, notwithstanding the presence of limited forms of social trust; this is as long as the possibility exists that power—hidden or otherwise—remains the dominant mechanism for social control. The trust model that is developed in Chapter 6 is part of the attempt in this thesis to more adequately confront the conceptual problems associated with power and trust; and some of the more practical aspects of this is are further explored in the illustrative studies in Chapters 7 & 8.

Lastly, and along related lines, it is important to note that the SC definition of trust offers a very restricted normative perspective. Adler and Barnett write that: "Dependable expectations of peaceful change, the confidence that disputes will be settled without war, is unarguably the deepest expression of trust possible in the international arena (particularly so if one assumes that states exist in a formal anarchy and this in the brooding shadow of violence)." (1998, p.18) This is certainly an intriguing statement, particularly in its contention that such a position is 'unarguable.' To be blunt, it fits with the ethically superficial interpretation of trust which the security community model promotes. What it conspicuously leaves out, despite its enshrinement of the powerful role of norms and values in building security communities, is any conception of justice. Could it not be argued that 'justice' is the deepest expression of trust possible in the international arena? What is missing is the conception that there may be more than just one benchmark for trusting relations in international relations. The understanding of order as

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126 See for example Dunn (1996).
'peaceful change' or the absence of physical violence is clearly an important 'part' of trust. Thus, in the last section of this chapter, the normative dimensions of trust in international relations, such as the competing values of order and justice, are probed further; and Chapter 5, considers the 'ethics' of trust.\textsuperscript{27}

\textsuperscript{126} See the discussion of trust and social capital in Section 3.1.

\textsuperscript{127} At the same time, I highlight in Chapter 6 and in the conclusion that considerably further normative development for trust in IR is necessary and I point to a few paths which such development might take. In this sense, I acknowledge that, as with SC theory, my own basic model of trust in international relations remains too normatively limited.
4.4 The 'Duality of Agency' and the English School

Structuration

One way to conceptualise the dual elements of risk and relationship management under-girding trust—and how the two interact and are mediated by the mechanism of suspension—is via Giddens's structuration theory. As will be explored in this section, structuration theory has either been applied directly to or has strongly influenced a range of theoretical work in IR. Since the risk and relationship management model of trust presented in Chapter 6 emphasises the 'agent-centred' features of trust, it is the agency side of Anthony Giddens's structuration theory which is focused on here.\(^\text{128}\) In the last part of this section, I move beyond the structure/agency (positivist) paradigm to also sketch the normative contours of trust. The 'English School' is employed as a useful—if somewhat arbitrary—segue into normative IR theory. What, then, might the 'English School' have to say about the idea of trust, including its normative dimensions and especially its 'mechanism of suspension', in comparison with the other traditions of the discipline? As will be seen, this question provides an opening for discussing the competing normative ideals of order and justice—and their relationship to the trust model.

By way of brief background, Giddens's structuration theory is a grand, formal theory of sociology and one of the most influential of the last half-century.\(^\text{129}\) Emerging from the wide shadows of Weber and Durkheim, structuration "tries to find a middle road between 'objectivism' and 'subjectivism.'" (Arts 2000, p.514) As Colin Wight points out, Giddensian structuration is a social ontology—it posits the existence of particular kinds of entities in the social world, namely agents and structures—but it is not a philosophy of science in and of itself, as it is often mistaken for. (1999, p.116) Nevertheless, in the prominent agent-structure debates of the last decade and a half in the discipline of IR, structuration theory has frequently found itself aligned—or combined—with the philosophy of scientific realism, most notably in the works of David Dessler and Alexander Wendt.\(^\text{130}\) Other students who have integrated structurationist features into theories of IR include Arts, Buzan, Suganami and Wight. (Buzan 1993; Arts 2000; Suganami 1999; Wight 1999) Some argue (and others such as Roxanne Doty disagree) that scientific realism, particularly of the variant propounded by Roy Bhaskar, is compatible with Giddens's structuration. (1997) However, in this thesis, I do not profess or even seek to develop or defend a position on deeper issues related to the philosophy of science.\(^\text{131}\)

\(^\text{128}\) However, Giddens's structuration theory is also apt for taking into account indirect structural factors such as the distribution of material resources, which can also powerfully shape the context in which trusting (or distrusting) relations take place.

\(^\text{129}\) For a summary of the central tenets of structuration theory, see Giddens (1984).

\(^\text{130}\) See for example Wendt (1987); Wendt (1992); Dessler (1989).

\(^\text{131}\) Thus, Wight's view is supported here: "Approaches to the agent-structure problem should be viewed from the perspective of better or worse than prevailing alternatives (such as) methodological
Moreover, as Wendt notes, "Structuration theory by itself...does not make a direct contribution to the substantive understanding of international relations per se." (1987, p.369)

So what of a more limited nature can the agency-side of structuration theory add to the risk and relationship management model advanced in Chapter 6? First of all, it is worth pointing out that Giddens himself is strongly influenced by the work of Simmel. Like Simmel, he holds that human agents are social beings, integrated in social practices. They also have knowledge and capabilities that they are able to act on. That is, they are able to reflect on the social practices they are engaged in; and with the resources they have at hand, attempt to change or adjust them if they so desire. Giddens divides these features of agency into three categories. The first is what Giddens calls 'practical consciousness', which involves tacit knowledge and routines. The second is 'discursive consciousness', which involves rationalised and intentional behaviour. The third is 'unconscious motives', which involve "deep, tacit human driving forces, such as the need for 'ontological security' (that Giddens derives from ego-psychology)." (Arts 2000, p.523) In structuration theory, behaviour is not solely (or singularly) a product of agency—but nor is it solely a product of structure, which Giddens defines as "rules and resources, or sets of transformation relations, organised as properties of social systems." (1984, p.25) Rather, structuration theory holds a dual role for agency and structure. According to Giddens's notion of 'the duality of structure', "the structural properties of social systems are both medium and outcome of the practices they recursively organise." (ibid.) Such duality "emphasises the continuous and mutual constitution of both action and structure." (Arts 2000, p.525) Thus, agency and structure co-determine behaviour, partly intentionally, partly unintentionally; and structures need to be continually reproduced by agents.

But just as Giddens conceives of a 'duality of agency and structure', so too can a 'duality of agency' be conceived. Like Simmel, Giddens holds that human agency is bounded. Capabilities and knowledge are finite. As has been considered in Chapter 3, because every action and consequence cannot be thoroughly examined (and every risk calculated and so on), routines and predictable social practices are required for regular social relations to take place. Indeed, as per above, Giddens in fact locates both practical consciousness (tacit social knowledge and routines) and discursive knowledge (rationalised behaviour) on the agency side of agent-structure dichotomy. While Giddens elaborates three categories of agency, for the purpose of conceiving a model of trust in international relations, his third category, involving deep-psychology, may be set aside for the moment. This is because, for this category, Giddens draws primarily on Erik Erikson's theories of early childhood psychological development—and the mother-child bond in particular—which is clearly less directly relevant to interstate relations, even in metaphorical terms. (Erikson 1953) Thus, following Giddens, a duality of individualism and methodological structuralism." Structure-agent constructs should not be viewed as
practical-discursive consciousness can be conceived as arising from agents, who in turn (re)produce and are constrained by structures.

This idea of further elaborating and 'dividing-up' the role of the agent in the agent-structure debate has recently been pursued in the discipline of IR by Colin Wight. (1999) Building from Giddens, as well as Bhaskar and Archer, among others, Wight argues that the dual notions of meaning and intentionality are both properties best reserved for agents. (p.126) Wight develops a tri-level account of the character of agency, because as he sees it, "agency refers to both individual and social predicates. . .(and because) the human agent is neither the sole origin of the social, nor the passive product of an externally imposed system of social constraint " (pp.129, 134). Following Bhaskar, Wight conceives of agency as "embodied, intentional causality, or praxis." (Bhaskar 1994, p.100) That is, agent involves a "self" which is "never automatically or deterministically instituted" but, rather, is "capable of reflecting upon and constantly renegotiating, the forces of construction." (Wight, p.130) Following Archer, Wight conceives of agency as referring to "the way in which agency becomes an agent of something and this something refers to the socio-cultural system into which persons are born and develop." (Archer 1995, p.133) Agency need not refer to an entire socio-cultural system, but may be limited to particular groups with which agent identifies. For international relations, for example, this might be the military or the diplomatic corps or an international organisation such as the U.N. Wight conceives of agency as 'position-practice-places' or specific 'roles' which agents inhabit on behalf of agents. Examples might be a secretary or army general or diplomat. But Wight "disambiguates 'position-practices' from the agents that occupy them and thus these become structural properties that persist irrespective of the agents that occupy them." As such, they "cannot be reduced to the properties of the agents that occupy them. (Wight, p.133)

Given the rudimentary nature of the risk/relationship management/suspension model which is advanced here, it is not feasible to attempt to break the risk/relationship management duality down further to match Wight's 'tripartite' categorisation of agency. This would require more deeply theorising how trust is generated at the 'micro' level. This might include, as per Giddens, theorising the place of trust in the deep psychology of human interaction as well as the way social trust develops from its basis in language and interpersonal communication. It suffices to note Wight's view that such a breakdown of the agent-role into 'levels' allows 'the possibility' of theorising "the interplay of these various levels of agency without prioritising one

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'final solutions' but as 'differing complex social ontologies' which offer 'alternatives.' (1999, p.131)

132 See for example Archer (1995) and Bhaskar (1975).

133 Some recent work in IR exploring the deeper primary bases of social constructivism, for example, through the practice theory of John Searle, touches on the important role of trust. See for example Home (2002).
over the other in an *apriori* manner. Each level of agency is necessary to account for the other, but none is reducible to the other” (ibid., original italics)

The agent-structure paradigm, involving in the above case, agent-agent or in Wight’s case, agent-agent-agent dimensions, is one way of conceiving of the different primary bases of trust. Another, altogether different (yet perhaps not entirely incompatible) conceptual pathway is via more normative-oriented theoretical development, such as the distinctions between order and justice as competing framework principles of IR. That is to say, does trust between states derive primarily from order or justice—or from some combination of the two? The discussion of the English School of IR next explores the parameters of this question.

*The English School*

The English School of IR is said to have its roots in a loose association of scholars working in Britain, beginning with the formation of the British Committee in the late 1950s and influenced by the work of E.H. Carr among others. The School’s approach stood as a challenge to the behavioural and positivist methodological trends in the American realist approach to IR at the time. Though it is arguable whether the School and its contemporary proponents can still usefully be identified with any distinct and unified position (or indeed if this was ‘ever’ the case), the School is nevertheless most commonly associated with the historical and interpretative approach to IR and with the idea of an ‘international society.’ It is argued here for the purpose of the development of the trust model that the English School shares certain arguments with realism—and likewise, with the concept of risk management—about the threats that self-interested and frequently conflicting states co-existing in an anarchic international realm pose to one another. Yet, it nonetheless also offers its own idiosyncratic and interpretative notion of the nature of (and possibilities for) an ‘international society of states’—and likewise, the possibilities for relationship management. (Dunne 1998)

Key to the English School understanding of international society are the particular historical circumstances—almost exclusively European in origin—which are said to have led to the development and maintenance of the present international ‘order’; an order which is characterised by layers of legal principles and settled norms. The ‘normative’ underpinnings of this quest for ‘order’—how it has been perceived, justified, pursued and maintained by states through their interaction—are emphasised. Both the independent efforts (agency) of states, via their representatives, and how existing norms ‘constrain’ the range of choices states have (and how they ‘socialise’ state behaviour) are of interest to English School scholars. Thus, the classic definition of international society from one of the English School’s leading associates, Hedley

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134 In the interest of this general and cursory survey, Timothy Dunne’s historical, ideological and methodological location of the English School in the discipline of IR is roughly adopted. See Dunne (1995, 1998); Other helpful overviews of the English School include Buzan (1993); Wilson (1989); Grader (1988); and Hall (2001).
Bull, is as follows: A society of states (or international society) exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another and share in the working of common institutions. (1977, p.13) Not surprisingly, the key divisions within the English School involve the degree to which common values do (or should) play a role in international society. ‘Thin’—or ‘pluralist’ or ‘procedural’ or ‘communitarian’—accounts tend to argue that social norms are (or should be) limited to a framework of basic rules for cooperation and order between states. ‘Thick’—or ‘solidarist’ or ‘substantive’ or ‘cosmopolitan’—accounts tend to argue that international norms should not just concern relations ‘between states’ but should also concern relations ‘within states’; for example, when it comes to protecting the human rights of citizens. In a nutshell, the English School can be distinguished by several factors, including its ‘interpretative’ approach to the history of ideas about international relations, its aversion to positivist scientific method and its recognition that a society of states embodies rules and norms which socialise its members. (Dunne 1998, p.16)

Critics of the English School sometimes label it as simply a milder, somewhat disingenuous version of realism. The imperatives of anarchy as well as the consideration of material factors, such as military and economic power, do continue to play a considerable shaping role in the English School perspective on international relations; but they nevertheless do so in tandem (and indeed linked with) the powerful role of ideas.

The dimensions of the trust model explored thus far have been largely set out employing the language of contemporary social scientific and especially sociological, methodology, which makes it somewhat alien to the English School’s leanings towards a more classical or historical approach. A few of the most straightforward synergies, however, may be pointed out. For one, the English School’s combination of power/interest-based politics within past and present (as opposed to fixed or insurmountable) conditions of international anarchy, together with the presence of limited forms of international society, perhaps aligns as closely with the trust model as any other theoretical orientation in IR. That is, it allows for a duality of individualistic and social-oriented behaviour, while emphasising the historic and interpretative basis of the present international political environment. The English School’s emphasis on history and the traditions of diplomacy and law for maintaining order are likewise a good match for the emphasis which next to all students of trust place on the importance of the ‘continuity’ of relationships and the predictability of behaviour over ‘long’ periods of time for the deepening of trust. But while this suggests that some modicum of order can be achieved and maintained at the level of international society, particularly via the actions of a few dominant states, it has little to say about the individual needs or wishes of smaller states. Indeed, another related type of criticism of some English School thinking relates to the attention it gives to the normative ‘status-quo’ maintained by the few dominant states often at the expense of more ‘just’ normative ideas and
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goals of international society as a whole. (Hall 2001) Thus, it is worth next briefly exploring the problem of addressing both order 'and' justice in international relations through the writings of a figurehead of the English School, Hedley Bull.

Hedley Bull's Order vs. Justice

Nicholas Wheeler and Tim Dunne offer a compelling interpretation of Hedley Bull's body of work, arguing that he struggles to develop a balance between the competing ideals of order and justice in international relations. They write that "There is a curious ambivalence at the heart of Hedley Bull's understanding of international society. . .Despite his attraction to solidarism, the realist in him prevented him from embracing (it fully). . .Nevertheless, Bull sought to resolve the tension between order and justice by suggesting that an unjust world would be a disorderly one." (Wheeler 1996 pp.91-2) Bull developed his ideas on the possibility of international society largely in reaction to E.H. Carr's seminal realist work, 'The Twenty Years' War.' For Bull:

The idea of an international society—of common interests and common values perceived in common by modern states—is scarcely recognised in the Twenty Years' Crisis. In the course of demonstrating how appeals to an overriding international society subserve the special interests of the ruling group of powers, Carr jettisons the idea of international society itself. (Bull 1969, p.638)

Instead, Bull argued fervently for a pluralist conception of international society, which emphasised the classical norms of diplomacy and the minimum standards of international law; which preserved order; and where Superpower cooperation was in the interest of the wider society of states. (Wheeler & Dunne 1996)

Bull went as far as to suggest in The Anarchical Society that the superpowers might be seen as "trustees for mankind as a whole." (1977, p.288) But during the second Cold War, Bull became increasingly disillusioned with the ideological polarisation of the two Superpower camps. He reversed course and claimed that "The United States and the Soviet Union have little claim to be regarded as nuclear trustees for mankind. . .it is difficult to find evidence in any part of the world that they are still viewed as the great responsibles." (1980, p.447) However, in his later years, Bull began to develop a more 'solidarist' theory of international society which sought to place justice at the centre of foreign policy, writing:

The measures that are necessary to achieve justice for the peoples of the third world are the same measures that will maximise the prospects of international order or stability, at least in the long run. . .The issue that [the Third World] raises for the Western powers is not mainly or even chiefly a moral one. . .We must take the Third World seriously primarily because of the vital interests we have in constructing an international order in which we ourselves will have a prospect of living in peace and security into the next century and beyond. (1983, pp.128-9; 1984, p.14)
Bull struggled with the invariable tension between the role of states as protectors of their own interests as well as promoters of the common interest. In his Hagey lectures at the University of Waterloo, he acknowledged the potential for states to act as “agents of a world common good” but also that “states are notoriously self-serving in their policies and rightly suspected when they purport to act on behalf of the international community as a whole.” (1984, p.14) Bull’s struggle to find a balance between the competing prerogatives of order and justice in international relations is suggestive of the challenge of the trust model’s mechanism of suspension; that is, successfully mediating between risk and relationship management. The trust model set out in Chapter 6 indicates that trust, if it is to be meaningfully employed as a concept, cannot be reduced to either—but must be somehow mediated by a convincing and workable conception of suspension.

A central concern at this point is that such a multi-dimensional conceptualisation of trust is so broad that it risks vapidity and worse, being meaningless in practice. To properly gauge such a concern, it should be remembered that such distinctions, such as between order and justice in IR, are at the core of competing conceptions of the discipline. So why should trust be judged on different or harsher terms? These ‘big’ questions in many ways continue to form the grammar of the discipline of IR. There are certainly limits to which the model of trust can offer a deeper, more elaborate or more insightful understanding of the discipline’s philosophical and methodological conundrums. But these same problems haunt much of contemporary IR and indeed, social science and the philosophy of science. In sum, one of the central challenges for the trust model advanced here is the degree to which trust in international relations is—and/or should be—order or justice-based? And how can a mechanism of suspension be understood to mediate in some way between the two? The English School and Hedley Bull offer no firm answer. The challenge for a feasible model of trust in international relations is perhaps then to find ways of more practically identifying which forms/blends of trust are present under which international circumstances. The illustrative studies of the CSCE and OSCE that I turned to in Chapters 7 and 8 offer such an opportunity. First, the ‘ethical’ dimensions of trust, and the potential implications for international relations are further explored, particularly through the ideas of the feminist philosopher Annette Baier.
5. Ethics
5.1 The Ethics of Trust

Trust is not necessarily always a good thing. In and of itself, the word trust does not say anything specific about justice. Trust may be present in circumstances of injustice either in a specific trust relationship or in the wider social/political environment in which the trust relationship takes place. In this section, some of the ethical issues surrounding the concept of trust are looked at. After surveying the trust literature and the scant IR literature in this area, I draw in particular on the ideas of the feminist political philosopher Annette Baier to consider the ethics of trust when considerable power asymmetries exist between various actors; a common situation in international relations. Finally, the ‘ethical’ nature of trust relationships, including in international relations, are placed in the context of Baier’s two trust tests.

The word trust has moral connotations for many people. Though, as has been discussed, the literature on trust has primarily had a rationalist bent to it, some significant work has also been undertaken on moral understandings of trust and trust building. Some writings on trust take the view that trust involves something beyond simply rational expectation based in self-interest. According to Jon Elster, trust is an inherently normative notion. (1979) Baier’s work, as will be shown, develops a philosophical distinction between moral and immoral forms of trust. Other works focus on the ethical implications of actions which serve to build trust (which might be understood as an applied ethics of trust building). Though his is not a philosophical work, Rotter, for example, emphasises an understanding of trust as the ability to rely on another’s word or promise. Similarly, Rotter emphasises the moral need for consistency in one’s behaviour. (1971) In the previous three chapters I have largely addressed conceptual questions about what trust is and how trust is developed. What has yet to be discussed is whether trust is in fact desirable. Is it possible for there to be bad forms of trust? Gambetta, for example, discusses the strong bonds of trust, cooperation and community which frequently exist in the Mafia world. (1988) Sztompka, likewise, points towards the pervasive cooperation and trust which “accompany the extreme chauvinism of some ethnic or national communities as well as the radical fundamentalism of some religious groups.” (2000, p.113) Mistzal also discusses the exclusive and divisive features of trust, where a particular trust relationship between two individuals (or two groups, etc) creates an ‘us’ and ‘them’ mentality between the trustors and other individuals and groups outside of the trust relationship. (1996) Are these examples or bad kinds (or qualities) of trust? If so, how can they be distinguished from good kinds of trust?

As the review of the historic literature on trust in Chapter 1 pointed to, the study of trust has a brief moral history in the writings of the Christian moralists such as Thomas Aquinas and enlightenment philosophers such as Adam Smith and John Hume. Prominent among more recent works on the morality of trust is the writing of Annette Baier. (1995) In her book Moral Prejudices, Baier argues that trust is neither intrinsically good or bad. She writes: “There are
immoral as well as moral trust relationships." (p.232) Russell Hardin, however, objects flatly to claims that trust has moral content. He says that moral claims about trust are confused with the concept of trustworthiness, which relates rather to a person's character (which is trustworthy, Hardin says, if, for example, one is willing to reciprocate even when it is not in one's own interests. (1991)\textsuperscript{135} The argument between a rational choice theorist such as Hardin and a moralist such as Baier is mostly perhaps a question of the scope in which the term trust is used. This difference in the conceptual or definitional scope of trust can also be seen in the wider trust literature. Hardin prefers a narrow definition of trust based on self-interest, whereas others, including Larson, seek an understanding of trust which encompasses self-interest, but also stretches farther to include other forms such as benevolent trust. (1997) But the argument between Hardin and Baier (who critically evaluates how trusting in general may be considered a moral activity) is an ontological, apples and oranges, debate as well. Simply put, the rationality Hardin seeks can only be found in the individual. Hardin even qualifies his statement about the virtues of a trustworthy character with an interpretation of these supposedly moral behaviours as self-interested: "Promise keeping, honesty and fidelity to others often make sense without any presupposition of a distinctively moral commitment beyond interest." (1991, p.13) Rather than directly engage Hardin's ontological challenge to moralists such as Baier who may place the centre of rationality elsewhere than the individual (or more accurately of Baier, offer a more intricate, less fundamentalist version of rationality), it suffices for the moment to acknowledge the contested intellectual ground on which the rationality and morality of trust is planted. Such ontological debate and uncertainty is also reflected more widely in the discipline of IR today.

It is helpful to recognise for IR purposes that this duality in fundamental conceptions of trust also in some important respects mirrors the competing liberal and communitarian positions in contemporary political philosophy.\textsuperscript{136} The IR variant is best known as the communitarian-cosmopolitan debate.\textsuperscript{137} The dividing lines between liberals (cosmopolitans) who tend to consider the identity and universal values of individuals independently of society in the first instance and communitarians who tend to prioritise the shared identities and values of the particular communities which individuals are constituted by, are familiar ones (though they are now also often accepted as 'not incommensurable').\textsuperscript{138} The work of Nicholas Rengger on the ethics of trust in international politics—which is surveyed next—considers the prospects for trust in international relations along similar communitarian-cosmopolitan lines. (1997) His

\textsuperscript{135} For Hardin, trust is an inherently rational or intentional commitment or judgement and it must be grounded in expectations that are particular to the individual, not in generalised expectations. Hardin thus ontologically centres both the idea and function of trust in the individual.

\textsuperscript{136} See for example Walzer 1990; for an application of the debate to IR theory, see Morrice (2000).

\textsuperscript{137} Unlike the sociological study of trust, however, the liberal-communitarian debate, which finds itself on the normative side of the political theory playing-field, mostly (wisely) hesitates to mix itself up with positivist and constructivist methodological conundrums—bounded, middle-of-the-road, or otherwise.

\textsuperscript{138} See for example Taylor (1989).
conclusion is that the international political realm presently holds few prospects for cosmopolitan-based trust, relegating trust instead to communitarian-oriented relations. While the conclusions Rengger draws may be by-and-large sound, they are derived from a view of trust which, it will be argued, is overly formalised. Part of this overly-formalised view of trust has to do with the way 'contractual relations' are conceptualised, which is a central thrust of the work of Annette Baier, considered in the final section of this chapter.

The Ethics of Trust in World Politics

Nicholas Rengger's work on the ethics of trust in world politics explores the 'habitual' nature of trust and the possibility of a 'presumption of trust' existing in world politics and in international law. He argues that trust can be understood both in terms of rational, self-interested cooperation and in terms of shared norms and values. Rengger's discussion of Francis Fukuyama (1995) suggests that norm-based trust may be more efficient than rational choice trust; and importantly, that contemporary international relations may not (yet) be characterised by such normative presumptions and habits. Ultimately, however, Rengger's conception of trust may be too legalistic and, like Fukuyama, focused too exclusively on norms and hence overly pessimistic in contrast to the model of trust in international relations which is developed in this thesis.

Rengger's article is part of his ongoing work on norms, institutions and practices in the context of globalisation. His article explores the idea that “there is a growing problem of ‘trust’ in contemporary world politics” and that this is due both to difficulties in how trust is understood and to changes in world politics connected with globalisation. (p.469) Rengger begins by contrasting the realist image of world politics, which he says is “par excellence, the realm of the lack of trust: of suspicion, of fear, of no overall authority”, with an image of contemporary world politics as a realm of “increasing connectedness and interdependence.” (p. 471) Rengger outlines how actors (politicians, diplomats, etc.) in world politics operate on the assumption of a “general propensity to comply” with international obligations and that this propensity to comply is rooted in a “presumption of trust” (ibid.). He defines trust in the sense of this presumption of trust, as: “the exercise of discretionary power by some agent (individual or artificial) on behalf of another over matters that the trusting agent cares about.” (p.472)

Rengger derives his definition from the philosophical work of Annette Baier—which will also be explored in detail next (p.472) There are two central aspects to Rengger’s understanding of trust. The first is the ‘habitual’ character of trust, meaning both that trusting is not done consciously (in terms of the weighing of options) and that trusting is done regularly (it is part of a habitual pattern of behaviour and interaction). Rengger writes that: "Trust is the generic name
for habitual practices in which processes of long-term cooperation are embedded in world politics." (ibid.) The second is that understood in this way, it can be said both that trust can exist between states in the form of habitual cooperation and that, indeed, trust may be pervasive in many areas of public and international life. Prominent examples include the mundane or frequently taken for granted, such as the global air traffic regime and regimes of insurance and finance. Such 'authoritative habitual practices,' Rengger argues, are key to whether or not a presumption of trust can be sustained in contemporary world politics. He says that although the idea of a presumption of trust fits better with the U.N. Charter model than the Westphalian model of world politics, neither model allows for an adequate development of such an idea because the 'character of law' in both models is ultimately purpose-oriented, rather than practice-oriented. Though he does not substantiate his argument empirically, the crux of Rengger's position appears to fall on the absence of enforceable international laws (understood as 'continuing authoritative processes') in contemporary world politics in which to ground an 'expectation of trust.' In order to better understand Rengger's argument, which offers a good entry point into more normative understandings of trust, it is necessary to briefly outline its development.

Rengger describes two views of international law. In the first view, international law is understood in terms of the rules of the game established between states and thus "where it has any force at all, (it) has a role only as a neutral arbiter." (p.474) Rengger sees the Westphalian model as encompassing this view. In the second view, international law is understood in terms of "continuing processes where extra legal considerations must, of necessity, play a part." For example, "claims and counter-claims, state practice and decisions by a variety of authorised decision-makers." (ibid.) The U.N. Charter model can be considered to fall more firmly within this second view of international law. Rengger's argument then draws on Terry Nardin's distinction between 'purposive' and 'practical' international association (which Nardin himself develops from the work of Michael Oakeshott). (Nardin 1983; Oakeshott 1975) Purposive association involves "the joint pursuit of shared ends" and for international society, this means "an association of states...or of individuals linked across national boundaries by shared beliefs, values or interests—joined in a cooperative venture to promote common ends." (Nardin 1983, p.5) Practical association, in contrast, sees international association in terms of shared authoritative practices, not shared purposes and thus, those forms and procedures which states are 'obligated' to undertake.

Rengger considers both the Westphalian and U.N. Charter models of world politics as falling under Nardin's 'purposive' form of international relations. Though, in the U.N. Charter model, shared interests and norms are more plentiful than in the Westphalian model, Rengger argues that the 'authoritative common practices' that a 'presumption of trust' requires are still not developed. This lack of development of 'authoritative common practices' in contemporary
world politics is attributable largely to the imbalances created by globalisation. Rengger avoids an elaborate (and unavoidably contestable) discussion of globalisation, but points towards many aspects including the growth in economic forms of power, the evolving role of culture, the emergence of sexual and gender politics, the implications of new technologies and the rise of nationalism and religious fundamentalism which are all contributing to making the Westphalian and Charter models outmoded for explaining world politics today. Rengger suggests that the complexity of issues (and actors on the global stage) is leading to increasing complexity in international institutions; the word institution taken broadly to mean forms of international cooperation. The result of such change and complexity is a loss of the 'presumption of trust' in world politics, which has been largely state-based traditionally. Rengger argues that the new forms of international cooperation which are emerging via globalisation may not have the general normative framework of the previous system and the loss of old habits, by definition, are resulting in a loss of trust. A few brief examples can be employed, such as the hostility towards European integration, the decline of trust in politicians in general and the mid-1990s crises of governability in Italy as suggestive of the effects of changes in trust levels globally. Rengger also draws on the work of Francis Fukuyama, among others, to discuss the benefits of understanding trust as a virtue. (1995) Fukuyama argues that: “trust...is the expectation that arises within a community of regular, honest and cooperative behaviour based on commonly shared norms, on the part of other members of that community.” (p.26) Fukuyama says that communities that are based on shared ethical values are the most effective because “they do not require extensive contract and legal regulation of their relations because prior moral consensus gives members of the group a basis for mutual trust.” (ibid.) Several more distinctions between rational, interest-based forms of trust and trust based on shared values and norms can also be made. Rengger says interest-based trust is motivation-focused and transparency, reciprocity, accountability and reflexivity are important. Conversely, though reciprocity and reflexivity are still important, norm-based trust is more institution-focused and emphasises creating the ‘conditions’ for trust through culture and community.

In sum, Rengger’s conclusion is that international conceptions of trust, by and large, are still premature, given the limitations of international law and the present upheavals of globalisation. His conclusion may ultimately be quite reasonable. But I argue that it rests on too narrow a conception of trust—and one which fails to account for the highly nuanced balance of individual and social elements which appear to ultimately foster trust. Moreover, Rengger appears to over-estimate the degree to which such trust can be said to exist domestically, in contrast to the international realm. That is, it may underestimate the role that ‘distrust’ also plays alongside trust, both in domestic and international politics; the dynamics of which, in this thesis, I seek to further tease out and clarify. In the rest of this chapter, I look more closely at the
potential 'ethical' facets of trust in international relations, particularly through the ideas of Annette Baier, for which Rengger's article has laid the groundwork.
5.2 Annette Baier’s Trust Ethics

In her influential book ‘Moral Prejudices’, Annette Baier offers a powerful alternative conceptualisation of trust and trust relationships. (1995) Baier’s methodological and ethical (re)interpretation of trust is a cogent rebuke of the dominant rational choice approaches to philosophy and the social sciences and hence to the conceptualisations of trust which have largely prevailed to the present. Her vision of trust also contains critical elements that make it a convincing candidate (or at least guide) for conceptualising the ethical facets of trust in international relations. This is particularly with respect to the impact that global interdependence and the rise of global civil society may be seen to be having on contemporary international relations.

First, a bit of the background upon which Baier develops her work. Baier sets her exposition and conceptualisation of trust against a wider canvas of philosophical and methodological tradition in the humanities and social sciences. As a feminist philosopher, one of her primary interests is demonstrating the ways in which the dominant modes of moral thought, best characterised (and sometimes stereotyped) by the work of Immanuel Kant, have largely ignored the ideas, interests, beliefs and needs of women. This male-centric moral epistemology has only rarely been transcended by a few prominent philosophers such as Hume, Hegel and Nietzsche, who, Baier argues, from life experience were more sensitive to the position of women (as well as by some contemporary women philosophers such as Carol Gilligan). As a result, in Baier’s view, moral thought has suffered overall from both methodological weaknesses and an inability to address and reflect so many of the moral situations and conundrums that exist across human societies. In her words, the male-centric fixation on rationalist ‘contractarian’ ethical thinking has “managed to relegate to the mental background the web of trust tying most moral agents to one another (by) focussing philosophical attention so single-mindedly on cool, distanced relationships between more or less free and equal adult strangers.” (p.114) Baier comments pejoratively that such relationships are only typically representative of “say, the members of an all-male club, with membership rules and rules for dealing with rule breakers and where the form of cooperation was restricted to ensuring that each member could read his Times in peace and have no one step on his gouty toes.” (ibid.) Despite Baier’s wry prejudice towards English gentlemens’ clubs, her exposition of the limitations of much of the tradition of Enlightenment moral thought sets out four fundamental points of contention. These inter-related points of contention offer a competing vision/version of the bases of trust and importantly can serve as wedges to prying further from the rational choice approach to conceptualising trust in international relations. As will be

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139 For feminist approaches to international ethics, see Kimberly Hutchings. (2000, 2001)
elaborated, these ideas may be particularly apt for studying trust given a contemporary
globalising context.

*Equity Vs Inequity*

Baier’s first point of contention regards the premise—or at least the implicit assumption—made
by most traditional philosophers that trust bonds can be understood as contracts made between
equals. The great moral theorists, she argues, assume that the parties to a contract out of which
the conditions for trust arise will be

more or less equal in power to secure the enforcement or the rules (as well as negotiate the
original terms) of the contracting game (to extract damages for broken promises, to set in
motion the accepted penalty for fraudulent promises and so on). [But] as Nietzsche emphasised,
(such power, let alone equal power) is not possessed by everyone in relation to everyone else.
[For example,] slaves, young children, the ill and the mentally incompetent do not fully possess
it. For those who do not possess it...the extent to which use of it regulates their relations with
others varies with their other social powers. (pp.112-3)

It may not be too large a step to generalise this imbalance in the power to negotiate ‘trust
contracts’ from the hypothetical communities postulated by such moral philosophers to the
international community of states and potentially to trust bonds negotiated or assumed by other
international actors.140 Few would disagree that there are vast power imbalances present
internationally, including between states. These interstate imbalances take on military,
economic, political and other forms.141 Such power imbalances between states and other
international actors not only distort the ethical departing point for a theory of trust in
international relations, they also distort a purely self-interest-based rational choice model of
trust in international relations. For the game theoretical modeling of trust relations between
international actors fails to fully account for a starting point of vast inequity between the
players. The implications of such initial inequity cannot be reduced, as Hardin speculates, to a
weighing of interests. This is because such a model presupposes an initial environment where
all the principle players are themselves largely able to determine the starting terms upon which
they then choose to trust and cooperate or conversely, to not trust and defect.

Again, it may not be too large a stretch, certainly in light of the review of IR theory in the
previous chapters, to suggest that some international actors, including states, are not equally

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140 After all, it should be remembered that such contracts were devised by philosophers such as Kant as
thought experiments for considering/conceptualising the moral foundations of society and as guides for
the development of proper ethical thought and action. They were not (nor were they intended to be) in any
sense formal legal contracts, such as state constitutions. For the moment this keeps us clear of Rengger’s
argument against the embeddedness of an ethics of trust in world politics which is based on the current
status of international law; and which, as was seen in the previous section, Rengger concluded is wanting.
141 As has been discussed in the review of IR theory, these power imbalances can also take forms such as
imbalances in the accumulation and use of knowledge, negotiating ability, reputation, moral authority,
etc. See Susan Strange’s ‘States and Markets’ for her seminal account of the bases of power in
international relations and political economy. (1988)
able to negotiate the initial terms of trust cooperation. For many, the starting point is already one of inequity and frequently manifest and/or latent coercion. When a developing country, for example, negotiates the terms of development aid it will receive from a developed country, it often comes to a bargaining table that has already been pre-set and where its bargaining position is not the one it would have chosen in the first place had there been less of a power imbalance. Whether the developing country chooses to trust and cooperate or to distrust and not cooperate is not in the larger view ‘solely’ a matter of the straightforward weighing of its present interests. This point will be made clearer by elucidating Baier’s second and subsequent points of contention.

Autonomy Vs Reliance

The second—related—point of contention against the dominant rationalist approach to trust is that unlike the voluntary agreements posited by the endorsers of cool, rational contract-oriented ethics, many of the trust relationships with which we are faced in society are ‘non-voluntary’ in their nature. This a crucial point both for methodological reasons and in the interest of addressing many of the common trust dilemmas that modern individuals and societies (and perhaps even states) face. From a methodological perspective, this contention flies in the face of contractarians who—however metaphorically—posit as their starting point the negotiation of a trust bond between two or more freely consenting adults. For a limited range of trust relationships, such as those of the English men’s clubs satirised by Baier, this may certainly be close to the case. But many trust relationships, such as between child and parent, are largely, if not entirely non-voluntary. This is a fundamentally different picture from the one typically modelled by rational choice game theorists. In the prisoner’s dilemma game, each player is faced with just two choices, either to cooperate or to defect; or along similarly constructed lines, to trust or not trust. But this core structure of the ‘trusting game’ runs counter to the core of many real-life trust relationships. For many of these, this binary choice is non-existent. In short, there is no ‘black and white’ choice between cooperation and defection for the dependent party. In many cases, this initial independent starting point which the prisoner’s dilemma posits simply does not exist.

Ontologically, a prisoner’s dilemma conception of trust depends for its rationality on initial conditions of ‘some degree’ of player independence. Each player is free to choose—based on his or her subjective weighing of his or her own interests and the interests of the other player—whether to trust or not. If this independence is lost, the logic of the prisoner’s dilemma breaks down. Such perfect independence and the freedom to withdraw at will from social interaction and ‘some degree of trust’ is rare in most contemporary social relations. One does not need to look to the extreme examples, such as between child and parent or slave and master
or the mentally ill who are wards of the state for this point of contention to be sufficiently reinforced. Indeed, it is in its subtler examples and dimensions that the point achieves its greatest poignancy. But first, let me address a related methodological counter-argument.

Russell Hardin would argue that even under conditions of imperfect independence or loss of the freedom to defect, a player may still be free to choose to not trust. Hardin would subtly point to the rational choice definition of trust as the ‘expectation’ that another’s will act in a manner that is in agreement with one’s own interests. As such, a player can lose the ability to withdraw from cooperation but still retain the ability to form a subjective ‘expectation’ about the convergence of interests between players. Thus, even in enforced cooperation, a player is still free ‘psychologically’ to distrust. This counter-argument is compelling at first glance. However, from a game-theoretical approach, this is paradoxically irrelevant for the only interests which matter in the prisoner’s dilemma are the ones which are at least eventually observable; that is, which come out of the play of the game. As has been considered in Chapter 2, this is of course part of the game theoretical model’s shortcomings. Only the superficial or supposedly manifest trust expressed by the decision to cooperate can be evaluated. Distrust which persists despite enforced cooperation is treated in the same way as trust based on shared interests.

Only Interests?

Baier’s third—related—point of contention against the rational choice approach to trust stresses that the focus on (and prioritisation of) interests above all other possible bases and motivations for trust is fundamentally a male-centred approach. This approach neglects to consider that interests may play a secondary role for women (and indeed others less favourable to the traditional male-Western-philosopher’s disposition) when it comes to trust relationships. Baier argues that trust may be more than just interests:

Trust and distrust are feelings, but like many feelings they are what Hume called ‘impressions of reflexion’, feeling responses to how we take the situation to be. Trust is one of those mental phenomena attention to which shows us the inadequacy of attempting to classify mental phenomenon into the ‘cognitive’, the ‘affective’ and the ‘conative.’ Trust, if it is any of these, is all three. Trust has a special feel...(pp.131-2)

This is in line with the discussion in the previous chapters of the various components of trust which have been postulated by different theorists. For Baier, care, love and empathy can be considered as alternative sources of trust which many women and others frequently prioritise over more traditionally-defined interests (such as the pursuit and/or consolidation of power). Put simply, individually-oriented zero-sum interests do not necessarily have the same importance to

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142 As will be argued, it is similarly if not equally rare in contemporary international relations.
women as to men (at least men of the game-theoretical-impassioned persuasion) and there is no objective reason why such preferences are not just as legitimate a basis for trust.

**Intimacy**

A fourth and final wedge against the rational choice approach also ties in with these latter points. Baier says that the great contractarian moralists have concentrated on fairly 'cool' relationships between non-intimates.\(^{143}\) This cool contractarian approach neglects many of the non-interest-based elements that are also associated with trust. This includes the sentiments of care, empathy and altruism mentioned above. This is not to negate the relevance of interests to trust, but to object to a 'stand-alone' interpretation of trust based singularly on the numb calculation and weighing of interests alone. This point of contention stresses that many of the trust relationships we face on a daily basis are with intimates, or at least those with which we share more than just a 'hypothetical' social contract. Here, the word 'intimate' does not need to be employed in its strongest form (such as between lovers or between a parent and child) for the point to be reinforced. Again, it is most poignant in its more subtle application. For example, trust between doctor and patient may be seen to involve intimate elements less readily explained by the 'cool' contractarian model. There may be a sense of responsibility or obligation or even care on the part of the doctor, as well as an emotional vulnerability in the ill patient which fosters conditions of trust that stretch the boundaries of pure self-interest. At a minimum, what is required for 'intimacy' is a condition of social familiarity where the relationship can be said to be derivative and/or evocative of more than affect-less self-interest. 'Intimacy' thus can be said to change the composition and flavour of trust relations into forms which exceed the autonomous weighing of interests.

So where would this fit into a model of trust in international relations? Surely, such conditions of intimacy must be a world apart from interstate relations. One example, however, is the trust relationship that may develop between two state leaders. The memoirs of Gorbachev and Reagan serve as compelling documentation of the development of affective trust between two world leaders and were impressively exposed with this in mind through the research of Tuomas Forsberg. (1999) In the gradual thaw of Cold War relations leading up to the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the friendship and mutual trust which developed between Reagan and Gorbachev was instrumental in promoting peaceful and increasingly cooperative relations between the two superpowers. This trust bond, though no doubt solidly based in respective self-interest, cannot be adequately explained through an interest-based approach alone.\(^{144}\)

\(^{143}\) Recall Baier's morose *Times* reader with his gouty toes.

\(^{144}\) See the review of Forsberg's work in the literature review section.
Christopher Berzins

Two Moral Trust Tests

With these four inter-related points of contention closely in mind, Annette Baier develops two moral tests for trust. Baier’s two tests have important implications for the model of trust in international relations. The first of the two tests, as will be discussed, offers reasonably cogent moral criteria for a trust relationship. The second provides a rougher gauging of the wider climate in which a particular trust relationship needs to be embedded if it is to be deemed just. The second trust test is less developed, which in some senses makes it more flexible to integrate with IR theory. Chart 3 below identifies the basic criteria that Annette Baier employs in her two trust tests. The tests are used in Chapters 7 & 8 to tease out some of the key ethical considerations of the CSCE’s role in the end of the Cold War and the OSCE’s Kosovo Verification Mission respectively.

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<tr>
<th>ETHICAL TRUST TEST #1</th>
<th>ETHICAL TEST #2</th>
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<td>A trust relationship is ethical to the extent that the open expression of what each party relies on in the other for the continuation of the relationship would not weaken the relationship.</td>
<td>A trust relationship is ethical to the extent that it is not harmful to the wider set of relationships in which it is embedded.</td>
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Chart 3: Annette Baier’s Two Tests for Ethical Trust

In her first test, Baier proposes “a test for the moral decency of a trust relationship, namely, that its continuation need not rely on successful threats held over the trusted or on her successful cover-up of breaches of trust.” (p.123) This then takes the form of an ‘expressability test’; namely, a test of the implications for the relationship if these threats and/or breaches are openly expressed by the two parties; that is, made known to each other. Baier writes:

To the extent that what the trusted relies on for the continuance of the trust relation is something which, once realised by the trustor, is likely to lead to (increased) abuse of trust and eventually to destabilization and destruction of that relation, the trust is morally corrupt. A trust relationship is morally bad to the extent that either party relies on qualities in the other which would be weakened by the knowledge that the other relies on them. (ibid.)

What is of particular usefulness in this expressability test is that it truly confronts head-on one of the major weaknesses of the rational choice game theoretical approach to trust. That is, the expressability test makes the critical differentiation between coercive and non-coercive forms of trust. The rational choice model makes no such differentiation. What is even more exceptional about Baier’s expressability test is that it only calls into moral question the forms of trust which would cause the trustor himself/herself to reject or seek to disrupt/discontinue the relationship if knowledge of what the trusted relied on for its maintenance/continuation were revealed. That is
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to say, the moral evaluation of the trust relationship lies subtly at the discretion of the trustor. Though the expressability test sets the broad parameters for this evaluation, the individual trustor is free to accept or reject the basis of this trust depending on his or her own standards for evaluation (which can include past experience, interests, beliefs, sentiments, etc). The trustor in this sense is not locked into the prisoner’s dilemma of merely counting and weighing interests.

There are a few necessary semantic caveats, as the vocabulary of the expressability test needs to be carefully considered in relation to the development of an appropriate IR conceptualisation of trust. First of all, Baier says the expression of the motives, reasons, etc upon which the trusted relies need not kill the trust relationship in order to be deemed morally improper. It suffices if it is likely to “lead to (increased) abuse of trust.” (ibid.) Second, Baier’s vocabulary is deliberately vague. For example, she employs the term ‘reliance’ when she refers to that which the trusted relies on for the maintenance of the trust relationship. But reliance can have a number of meanings and interpretations here, both for the trusted and the trustor. Crucially, it need not necessarily refer (at least entirely) to the trustor and/or trusted’s interests. If the trusted relies on threat, manipulation, coercion or concealment of any form and for any purpose, be it conscious or unconscious, rational or irrational, interest-based or affect-based or otherwise and this is deemed unacceptable by the trustor, then the trust relationship cannot be considered morally decent. Neither party to a trust relationship is locked in by the expressability test to a moral vocabulary or set of moral rules not of their own choosing. Even coercion in any form as long as it is freely chosen and deemed tolerable for whatever reason by the trustor can be morally acceptable, provided that it is also acceptable to the trusted (or co-trustor, given a relationship of mutual trust). Baier writes:

My proposed test of the moral decency of trust is quite noncommittal as to what cases of reliance on another’s psychology will be acceptable to others. What will be offensive forms of reliance on one’s psychological state will vary from context to context, depending on the goods entrusted and on other relationships between the trusting and the trusted. Variations in individual psychology will also make a difference. (pp.124-5)

Baier writes further:

In some cases. . .such as trust in national intelligence and security officers to look after national security, some ignorance in the trusting is proper and awareness that such persons may be relying on one’s not knowing what they know will not destabilize any trust one has in them to do what they are entrusted to do. (ibid.)

The test’s flexibility and the autonomy it provides the individual to determine (based on his or her own criteria) the moral decency of the trust relationship is also its weakness. For it does not appear as if any form of trust relationship could not be justified, as long as it were accepted by the trusting parties with the full knowledge of its dimensions. The keys to this problem (but not the answer) lie in the words ‘realise’ and ‘knowledge.’ The term ‘realise’ refers, presumably, to
the conscious awareness of the individual of, as Baier says, that which the trusted relies upon for the maintenance of the trust relationship. This realisation can be brought about by deliberate expression on the part of the trusted or by unintentional or other means. From a theoretical perspective, Baier’s sentence structure, despite her emphasis on the ‘awareness’ of the individual, remains ambiguous about allowing for the possibility and consideration of immoral structures or dynamics beyond the ‘realisation’ of the trustor. Are these dynamics immoral only if they are ‘actually’ known by the trustor, or if they were ‘hypothetically’ to be known by the trustor? In other words, can we, as theorists and moralists, decide for the passive ‘trustor’ by examining his or her interests, beliefs, feelings, past beliefs, psychological make-up and overall relationship with the trusted, etc (combined with what we know about the trusted)? Or is it only the ‘trustor’ herself who can actively make this moral evaluation? Baier’s phrasing leaves us with an imperfect answer though the direction of her argumentation seems to suggest the latter.

Along the same lines, the ‘knowledge’ of the trusted’s motivations, reasons, etc (what she relies upon) for the maintenance of the trust is also open to critique. Is there space in the expressability test to consider wider dynamics and structures which distort the trusted’s awareness or interpretation of knowledge (or forces the trustor to employ a particular epistemology)? Can we as theorists judge, given such distortions, that the trust relationship is immoral? Or is again the only criteria the ‘actual’ knowledge or more exactly the actual creation and/or interpretation of knowledge by the trustor? Baier’s phrasing leaves this unclear, yet her argumentative direction seems to once more suggest the latter. Finally, it is worth making explicit that Baier is not suggesting through her ‘expressability’ test that trust relationships need necessarily be ‘expressed’ (i.e. aloud) in actual fact. To the contrary, Baier writes that: “Healthy trust rarely needs to declare itself and the mere occurrence of the injunction ‘Trust me!’ or of the reminder ‘I am trusting you’ is a danger signal.” (p.133)

Baier offers her second trust test more as a general comment. She leaves this comment largely undeveloped, though its potential implications, especially for the purposes of conceptualising trust in international relations, are considerable. Her comment is perhaps left undeveloped because Baier recognises both the need and challenge of placing it within a wider moral theory of society that stretches beyond the bounds and purposes of her writing task at hand. Baier’s comment begins with the remark that there exist trust bonds within certain elements of society, such as within the mafia, which are demonstrably and undeniably strong,

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145 This recalls the contentious Marxist theoretical construct of ‘false consciousness.’ It also opens up a potential avenue in the conceptualisation of trust in international relations for the numerous Marxist and neo-Marxist inspired IR theories.
but which most would agree, given the wider context in which they exist, cannot be considered morally decent.\textsuperscript{146}

Baier’s point is that in order to be considered just, a trust relationship cannot be evaluated entirely on its own. Rather, it must be considered within the context of the wider web of trust relations spread across society. Following the reading above, it is entirely possible that a mafia trust relationship might pass the first ‘expressability’ test for trust, if the two parties to the relationship, in full awareness of the elements upon which each relied for the continuation of the trust relationship, still accepted its existence. However, it is not a stretch to propose that the trust relationship, were it to include cooperation in robbery, murder and other forms of criminality, might still be deemed unjust. The challenge, of course, is developing a moral philosophy that sufficiently addresses this possibility. Baier’s contention is straightforward: a trust relationship cannot be morally evaluated alone but must be weighed against the wider context of trust relationships in which it is embedded. Unfortunately, this is more of a ‘rule of thumb’ than a rigorously developed and comprehensive moral theory of trust. As such, it needs to be integrated into a deeper moral theory. This leads us naturally into considerations of what IR theory or theories might fit best. To begin, this precludes a number of leading IR theories, such as neo-realism, because these theories claim that questions of morality are not within their domain of interest. These theories which claim ‘scientific’ status reject ‘normative’ considerations in favour of rational description and where possible, prescription. In the case of international regimes, for example, what criteria could possibly serve to evaluate the moral decency of the trust bonds which arise from institutionalised forms of international cooperation? What is demanded here, rather, is a deeper theory of morality (involving notions of freedom, justice, etc).\textsuperscript{147}

With wider trust webs we are also confronted with the prospect of underlying dynamics and structures such as the ones postulated by critical theories of society and of IR. These underlying factors may call into question the moral decency of trust relationships which on the surface seem justifiable and healthy. Such an evaluation may be better made following a closer inspection of several varied illustrative studies. It may also benefit from a closer examination of the processes of globalisation, in particular in terms of how they may (or may not) be influencing the development and maintenance of trust in international relations. Baier, however, concludes the exposition of her proposed moral tests for trust with a warning about the application of such ethical tests for trust. She writes:

\textsuperscript{146} Baier’s example about the tightly-knit trust bonds which are characteristic of the mafia conjures the image of Al Pacino’s character in the film ‘The Godfather’ and his hoarsely voiced lines about family being everything! (Ford Coppola 1972)

\textsuperscript{147} This recalls Susan Strange’s critique of the ‘superficiality’ of international regime theory and its inability to discern and address the deeper structural and normative problems of IR. (1998)
There are, as far as I have yet discovered, no useful rules to tell us when to trust or even when we should have trusted... The Kantian rational capacity to be law-abiders, to apply guiding rules, cannot give us much help here (in the absence of suitably trustworthy rules.) [Although] this test is an appropriate moral test, it is another matter to decide whether and when it should be applied to actual cases of trust. [In some cases] it may well be that the attempt to apply it will ensure its failing the test. Trust is a fragile plant, which may not endure inspection of its roots, even when they were before the inspection, quite healthy. (pp. 129, 151)

Both these remarks should serve to humble any who dare to explore, with any pretence of being systematic and objective, the concept of trust (with its varied roots, forms and implications), including in international relations.
6. A Model of Trust in International Relations

"Of course it works in practice; but will it work in theory?"
—French management saying
6.1 A Policy-Oriented Model

In the first part of this section, a basic model of trust in international relations is set out in graphic form. This is followed by a discussion of the trust building process; and then of methodological issues associated with the model. A discussion is then undertaken of some of the specific features of risk management and relationship management associated with contemporary international relations. The chapter wraps up with a further exploration of the potential theoretical underpinning of the kernel of trust: suspension.

The model is divided into three figures. First, Figure 3 outlines the basic structure of trust; that is, its dual individualistic and social-oriented dimensions, both of which are mediated by the mechanism of suspension.

![Diagram of Agent-Centred Model of Trust]

*Figure 3: An Agent-Centred Model of Trust*

Next, Figure 4 formulates the model in broad policy-prescription terms. The dual strategies of risk and relationship management are outlined, both of which are required for successful trust building. The core components (or general tasks) of each strategy are also set out.
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1. Monitor behaviour
2. Evaluate intentions
3. Reduce or off-set vulnerabilities
4. Establish deterrents
5. Intervene against non-compliant behaviour

1. Foster frequent and open-ended communication
2. Promote common goals
3. Establish permanent institutions
4. Promote common values and identity
5. Expand fiduciary relationships

Figure 4: A Policy Model for Building Trust

Lastly, Figure 5 considers the model's outer boundaries; that is, in terms of the potential structural factors, such as the distribution of power, that may have an impact on the trust relationship—as well as the ethical context in which the trust relationship is embedded:

Figure 5: An 'embedded' model of trust

As Figures 3-5 indicate, trust is conceived by the model as multi-dimensional. Trust is not simply rational expectation, nor is it blind faith. Rather, trust can be understood as arising from a combination of individual calculation/prediction (bounded rational choice) and
social/normative embededness (including collective cognitions, values and normative obligations); moreover, a mechanism of 'suspension' is required in order for trust to be realised. It is this 'leap of faith' that binds the individualistic and social dimensions of trust together. For the purpose of policy prescription, 'trust building' in international relations can thus be conceived as requiring a 'combination' of 'risk management' and 'relationship management'; each involving a set of loosely defined tasks. In other words, trust is not reducible to either risk or relationship management, but demands an idiosyncratic blend of the two. Also, while such trust can be understood to reside in agency, it can nevertheless be impacted by structural factors, such as the distribution of material power resources. This model offers a broad conceptualisation of trust in international relations, some of the nuances of which are teased out in the illustrative studies in Chapters 7 and 8. Despite the model's 'scope', the illustrative studies will also seek to show its 'usefulness' for understanding the kinds of behaviour that states engage in (or neglect to engage in) in an effort to build and maintain trusting interstate security relations. Nevertheless, numerous limitations to the model can also be pointed to from the outset. Chief among them are weaknesses inherent in meta-theorising; for example, the difficulty the model's 'generality' poses when applied to specific cases; and the potential for contradictions and ambiguities in a model drawn from a diverse range of disciplinary and methodological backgrounds. As the conclusion will point to, further research is necessary in order to clarify the trust model's social scientific and normative underpinnings; to develop more sophisticated measurement techniques; and to expand the model to areas of international relations beyond interstate security relations.
6.2 Trust Building Processes

There is no single trust building process or at least one which has been broadly and unambiguously affirmed by academic research to date. Moreover, as the four previous figures suggest, the trust building model proposed here casts a very wide net, encompassing a vast range of factors; though it still deliberately excludes some from direct purview. In the first five chapters, I have emphasised how trust building is an idiosyncratic, agent-centred phenomenon that is nevertheless inextricably linked to particular social relationships. As such, it is highly sensitive to the vagaries of individual actors, groups and circumstances. The present trust building model is thus better viewed as providing a 'procedural framework', for want of a better term. That is, it points to the broad 'tasks' which trust building involves but without pre-determining—or restricting—their exact content. For example, as has been shown in Chapter 2—and will be consider further in the third section of this chapter—the first part of the model, risk management, is itself a varied concept. That is to say, there is no single generic model of risk management applicable in all contexts. (Hood & Jones 1996, p.5) However, for conceptual purposes here, risk management can be broken down into five roughly sequential, if 'skeletal', tasks or strategies: monitoring behaviour; evaluating expectations; reducing or offsetting vulnerabilities; establishing deterrents; and intervening against non-compliant behaviour. Likewise, as was surveyed in Chapter 3—and as will elaborated in the fourth section of this chapter—relationship management is a multi-dimensional concept. It integrates ideas from disciplines such as interpersonal communication, interorganisational behaviour, and social psychology and involves loosely woven social orientations such as towards openness, mutual understanding, reciprocity and hence a general willingness to negotiate, collaborate and mediate lasting solutions to common issues of concern. (Bruning & Ledingham 1999, p.159-60) Relationship management too can be separated for conceptual purposes into five step-wise tasks or strategies: fostering frequent and open-ended communication; promoting common goals; establishing permanent institutions; promoting common values and identity; and expanding fiduciary relationships and the rule of law.

While each risk and relationship management task is subject to the vagaries of particular actors and their circumstances, and thus may not always be present or in the same order,

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148 The advantages and disadvantages of this approach are discussed in the next section on methodological issues.
149 In other words, it is not attempted here to pin down a rigorously defined trust building process that can be generalised across all cases. The present social scientific knowledge of trust simply does not justify such an attempt.
150 Sophisticated quantitative risk analysis methods, for example, range from 'decision tree' analyses (for simple cases involving sequential decision making) to stochastic simulation methods (such as the Monte Carlo simulation, where, in more complex cases, risk distributions are more appropriate than single values) to artificial intelligence models, such as fuzzy logic systems, where risk-related predictions can be made from vague and incomplete information:
generally speaking, the tasks can be understand to move from thinner to thicker forms. That is, thin risk management involves only the (partial) monitoring and evaluation of behaviour and intentions, whereas thicker risk management includes the enablement of mechanisms for deterring behaviour where the level of risk of an undesirable action becomes unacceptable; or intervening where the risk in fact becomes a reality and action is necessary to contain it and/or reduce the risk of it reoccurring. Likewise, thin relationship management involves opening basic channels of communication and possibly establishing minimal common goals for cooperation; whereas thicker relationship management includes efforts to foster deeper common values and identity and the institutionalisation of these through the expansion of fiduciary relationships and the rule of law.

Moreover, it is in fact typical of trust as it is conceived here that the boundaries between risk and relationship management should frequently become blurred. Take as an example the thin risk management task of monitoring behaviour. It may be (as indeed is the case with the CSCE's confidence building measures considered in Chapter 7), that the mutual monitoring of behaviour in fact becomes a common goal; and is also the result of regular communication; in this sense, the risk management task begins to blur (or blend in) with the relationship management dimension of the trust model. Conversely, the thicker relationship management task of promoting common values and identity, for example, can also involve a certain risk management dimension. For the more convergence there is within a trust relationship in terms of values and identity, the greater the likelihood that there is a convergence of specific interests; and hence the less risk there is that these interests will be compromised by one of the parties.

Where such overlap between risk and relationship management occurs, it is useful to employ a 'rule of thumb' for distinguishing conceptually between the two. That is to say:

Risk management efforts are those which are targeted primarily at achieving 'increased vigilance.' Conversely, relationship management efforts are those which are targeted primarily at achieving conditions where 'less vigilance' is ultimately required.

This rule of thumb takes us back to the trust puzzle set out in the introduction: namely, that the act of trusting appears to require both vigilance and the giving up of oneself (making oneself vulnerable) to another. There will always continue to be (often specific) doubts, and we should endeavour to reduce and guard against such doubt; but, in the act of trusting, we prepare ourselves, based on more loosely oriented relationship norms, to momentarily suspend these


Suspension, after all, is said to act as a momentary bridge between risk and relationship management, enabling an actor to give another 'the benefit of the doubt.'

These interests, however, are rarely perfectly aligned and some degree of risk will always remain that they will be compromised. To trust thus demands a 'leap' from the uncertainty that this presents to momentary certainty based on relationship norms. Here it can be seen how 'suspension,' however
individual (and interminable) uncertainties and to give the other the benefit of the doubt. This is also to say that risk and relationship management are to a degree symbiotic. One cannot exist without some degree of the other.\textsuperscript{153}

Indeed, it is fair to say that at a particular, however hypothetical, point, the trust model breaks down. This is in the sense that it is, analytically at least, always possible to consider all aspects of relationship management in terms of individual interests (risk management); or vice-versa, to suggest that all individual interests are (pre-)determined by the social norms in which they are embedded. However, such polemical interpretations tends to go against the intuitive sense of what trust involves. One does not trust another purely on the basis of being able to monitor and guard against risk. For there will always be 'something' or 'some degree of something' in the other which one will be unable to account for and/or guard against. Rather, the kernel of trust lies at the boundaries of certainty and uncertainty. Trust is not merely prediction and coercion. Conversely, one does not trust another purely on the basis of social norms. The individual is embedded—but not completely absorbed—by his/her social environment. Trust is not blind faith. Rather, as has been discussed, the trust model stresses the 'agency' that is inherent in trust. This is not to say that the act of trusting need always be entirely conscious. In fact, an important feature of trust is that it allows us to operate normally, routinely, without always having to review the intentions of the other and the status of the relationship with them.\textsuperscript{154} Nevertheless, the roots of this trust still lie with the individual. That is, to trust is intuitively an individual act, be it the act of an individual person, or individual persons on behalf of a group, such as a state. While this act is deliberately in relation to another (individual, group, state, etc) and is thus socially embedded, it is still agency-centred in that it never becomes a structure in and of itself. While the trust act is inherently connected to its social context, it is never independent of the individual. Likewise, trust is agency-centred in that it distances (de-centres) structural factors such as power (material resources, etc) from the trust equation. This is to say that structural factors such as the distribution of power may still play a shaping role—as will be amply shown in the illustrative studies in \textit{Chapters 7 & 8}—but they are not the 'defining' features of trust. To turn things around, trust is impossible without agency.

Finally, in terms of the thicker forms of risk and relationship management that deeper forms of trust building entail, it is clear that further normative development is required here. For such propositions as the above about the bases of deeper trust in the social contract and the law fleetingly, serves to reconcile the risk and relationship management dimensions of trust. That is, it creates the possibility for trust yet preserves both risk and relationship management dimensions.\textsuperscript{153} However, trust relationships will inevitably involve greater or lesser proportions of either dimension; and the same trust relationships will vary in their content and form with time and circumstance. See the next section for more on this.

\textsuperscript{154} Trust thus typically exists both consciously and unconsciously, with longer-term, more stable, relationships tending to depend less on the conscious consideration or vocalized expression of trust and
Christopher Berzins

cannot stand up independent of a deeper normative context. It is not sufficient, for example, to leave open the possibility of drawing law from both individual rights and social responsibilities without further elaboration. In this respect, a valid criticism of the trust model is that it is suspended in air, so to speak, without a broader normative grounding, let alone solid foundation. I can only justify this normative ambivalence here strictly on the pragmatic grounds that such issues of thick trust are a world away from the empirical reality of contemporary international relations; and that one of my central aims in this thesis has been, instead, to point towards the possibility of thinner forms of trust emerging, for example through the confidence building and normative declarations and activities of the OSCE. Moreover, when it comes to the real world of international relations, it is not typical for international declarations to explain clearly and profoundly in any sense of the terms what ethical tradition, such as a 'Kantian Global Rationalist' tradition, they are trying to represent and abide by. Nor do they even necessarily admit that they are trying to establish ethical standards. Their vocabulary is usually much more vague, referring to 'common values', 'right' and so on, without articulation of how such values are derived, and why they are agreed upon. Johannes Morsink, for example, describes the atmosphere of the drafting of the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (which, as will be seen, also fits well with the historical record of the drafting of the Helsinki Final Act):

When Eleanor Roosevelt first convened a drafting committee in her Washington Square apartment in February 1947, a Chinese Confucian and a Lebanese Thomist got into such an argument about the physical and metaphysical bases of rights that Mrs. Roosevelt concluded that the only way forward lay in West and East agreeing to disagree. [The Universal Declaration] doesn't explain why people have rights [and] this silence was deliberate. (qtd. in Ignatieff, 1999, p.654)

Nevertheless, a more ethically developed trust model would be important for further understanding and exploring the 'potential' foundations for deeper forms of trust in international relations. As a matter of general conjecture, it is possible to suggest that the blurring of lines between the trust model's risk and relationship management dimensions may

I am willing to take on board what I interpret to be Rengger's scepticism about the legal bases of thicker trust in international relations. But, as per my discussion of Rengger's work in Section 5.1, my point is exactly that his approach is overly legalistic and that it may be possible instead to conceive and discern the emergence of more informal, thinner forms of trust in international relations.

Moreover, it is never an easy or straightforward thing to move from theorising ethics to testing ethics in real world settings. This is particularly the case in international relations, where the scope of activity available for analysis, historic and contemporary, is potentially so vast and unwieldy. More than that, the space available for differing interpretations can seem limitless. As a result, the task of developing a theory of ethics in international relations may produce more systematic, rigorous, internally consistent and satisfying results than the task of appropriately applying the theory to 'actual cases' of international relations. A foremost challenge thus lies in developing terms and parameters of measurement and analysis which are narrow and specific enough for drawing defendable and useful conclusions. All of which is newer, less stable, relationships requiring more deliberate or frequent evaluations of trust and expressions of trusting behaviour.

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mirror, in some respects, the blurring lines between liberal and communitarian schools of political theory. This is to suggest that the grounding of an ethical approach on the sole consideration of either the individual (and his/her universal rights) or the group (and its particular social values, traditions and rules) becomes somewhat artificial and arbitrary. Rather, in the larger normative project, an idiosyncratic and perhaps more dialectical balance between the two needs to be found. The exploration of Annette Baier’s ethics of trust in Chapter 5 have provided a good, if novel and embryonic, starting point. But it needs to be reiterated that Baier’s leaning towards intimate forms of trust remain a far cry from contemporary international relations, where thinner rather than such thicker forms of trust remain the rule.  

why work on ethics in international relations has typically been heavy on the theory side, and conspicuously light on the applied side.

157 Quentin Skinner and Philip Pettit’s recent elucidation of what has been termed ‘neo-republican’ political theory provides one possible avenue for further exploration, particularly given the emphasis on balancing individual rights with responsibilities towards society. See for example Pettit (1997) and Skinner (1998). But here too, any conception of a (global) republic would be far removed from contemporary forms of international governance, and thus would only reflect a thicker, perhaps ‘utopian’ ideal. Some such as Richard Bellamy, however, have attempted to apply neo-republican ideas to the emerging EU political body. (2001)
6.3 Methodological Issues

**Trust Targets: Who/What Do We Trust?**

In broadly exploring trust as a concept for international relations, it is important to make clear distinctions between the various potential targets of trust. Developing such a framework of trust targets, though by no means a straightforward task, is one of the hallmarks of a more rigorous conceptualisation of trust. Because there is no comprehensive theory of trust in the discipline of IR, this rigour has been lacking in the IR trust literature to date. Thus, for the purpose of developing a basic model of trust in international relations here, a general framework for trust targets is elucidated.\(^{158}\)

In principle, trust targets can vary both in their form (a person, a group, a model of car)\(^{159}\) and in their specificity (for example, whether you trust a person to perform a particular task, or whether you trust a person in general). The different social science disciplines and their various approaches tend to focus on certain kinds of trust targets. For example, interpersonal psychology focuses on trust between individuals, whereas inter-group psychology focuses on trust between groups. There can clearly be some overlap between disciplines as well, with sociology dealing with trust in all forms of human relationships, from the interpersonal to relations between cultures and nations. For international relations—and as will be developed in the illustrative studies—such overlap is also prominent. Trust can develop between individual leaders or between diplomats negotiating a treaty, but also within international organisations and between states as a whole. During the Cold War, for example, Forsberg argues that trust between both the leaders and citizens of the U.S. and the Soviet Union was low; but trust gradually developed between Gorbachev and Reagan (and then Bush) and trust also gradually developed between the two countries in general. (Forsberg 1999)

An analytical distinction can also be made between primary, secondary and combined trust targets. (Sztompka 2000) The first order of primary targets is other persons (agents). Typically, these will be persons with whom we have direct personal contact. Though trust in persons can include those with whom we have no direct contact, such as political leaders or celebrities, trust is typically strongest when the relationship is interpersonal. (Earle 1995) The order of primary trust targets then expands in a similar way that an individual’s social world expands. Fukuyama, for example, writes of ‘radii of trust’, where trust expands from a core of interpersonal trust outwards: from trust in immediate family members and personal friends to trust in neighbours and colleagues, to wider categories of trust in others with whom we share

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\(^{158}\) In this section on trust targets, I draw in particular on the recent theoretical work of Piotr Sztompka (2000).

\(^{159}\) Though see below for elaboration of the difference between trust in persons and confidence in inanimate objects such as a make of car.
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something in common, such as members of the same ethnic group, country; and, ultimately, humanity. (1995)

When trust moves away from the immediately personal to wider categories of groups such as race, religion, profession, nationality or even gender, it is better categorised as social trust (rather than interpersonal trust). On the outer edges of the trust radius, where there is less or no direct personal contact, we have only, in Benedict Anderson’s words, an ‘imagined community.’

Trust can be surprisingly powerful and resilient even along these outer edges of the trust radius, depending on circumstances (such as a war bringing members of a nation together). Though such trust can also have a strong emotional component to it, it is generally of a more abstract and rational nature than interpersonal trust. Trust can also be placed in more abstract concepts such as social categories or roles. (Sztompka 2000) We can trust or distrust gender (men or women), an age group (young or old) or social roles such as doctors, scientists, priests or judges. We can also distrust objects, such as cars or computers or certain kinds of medicines and we can even trust or distrust abstract concepts themselves, such as science or religion. Trust can also be vested in procedures. The process of democracy, for example, can be trusted as the most just process of governance; or capitalism trusted as the most effective form of wealth creation.

These ‘connections’ with objects and even abstract concepts and processes, however, can only said to be ‘trusting’ in nature if, following the trust model, they involve at some point—and to some degree—a social relationship. If it is just a matter of reliance on a car to get you from Point A to Point B, then ‘confidence’ is the more apt term. In other words, where concerns and actions are ‘merely’ a function of risk management, it can be said that we seek to have confidence in the other (be it a person, object, process, etc). But to the extent that this confidence is also connected to a social relationship—i.e. to intersubjective goals and understandings and identification—then it can be said that we seek to trust the other. Invariably, the social content of a trust relationship becomes a matter of degree. The issues of your car getting you from Point A to Point B may be almost entirely a question of confidence: a rational weighing of the likelihood of this occurring, given your car’s past performance, and so on. But to some small degree, it may also depend on what the salesperson who sold you the car assured you of with regards to its reliability and your judgement of his personal character. (In this case, as will be seen in a moment, the salesperson would be categorised as a ‘secondary’ trust target.) It may depend on your impression of the competence of the mechanic who last fixed your car. It may depend on the reputation of the car brand, which was communicated to you through television commercials that identified the car, car makers and car owners with

160 A group of people who form a community only in the minds of the individuals, as there is no possibility of every member knowing every other member personally; or even of knowing a significant ‘proportion’ of the others.
certain values and lifestyle. It may even be related to the fact that your father always drove the same make of car and swore by its quality and dependency.\textsuperscript{161} Trust can be said to develop (or deteriorate) to the extent that these and other relationship-based factors come into play alongside purely calculative factors.

Secondary targets are different from primary trust targets in that they become trust targets only indirectly, or derivatively, as a consequence of the trust in (or interest in trusting/distrusting) primary targets. (ibid.) Examples include experts, witnesses and credentials (such as university degrees); in short, whatever sources of evidence point in the direction of trust or distrust of a primary target. Secondary targets act as cues about the trustworthiness of primary targets and in the process become targets themselves, in that if we are to rely on them to correctly cue us, we must develop trust in them too. Primary and secondary trust targets combine in the sense that they can never be mutually independent. That is, there are often many (even innumerable) connections between primary and secondary trust targets (indeed between trust targets in general). For example, you may trust someone both because she is a doctor (your trust in her professional role) and because she was recommended to you by a friend (your trust in your friend’s advice being the secondary target). As you continue to see this doctor, your personal trust in her may also grow (and so trust in a personal primary target develops). As a result of this positive personal trust, your trust in doctors or in medicine— even scientific progress in general—may then also develop. Consequently, your trust in your friend’s advice may then also increase, and so forth. Conversely, if your experience with this doctor is a negative one, then an opposite interaction of trust targets (in the direction of distrust) may result.

As this brief exposition of primary and secondary trust targets already suggests, trust targets have a tendency of combining and even ‘cascading’. A distrust in one person of a particular national background may lead to a more general distrust of all members of that nationality, which may lead to a general distrust of all black or white persons. This ‘cascading’ potential of trust and distrust is a key one for both understanding and developing practical trust building mechanisms. Trust targets also have a tendency of blurring and it is here that the psychological facets of trust become increasingly evident. Trust targets blur in the sense that individuals may not be wholly conscious of the specific categories of their trust or distrust. As Jones suggests, trust has a strong affective element to it. (1996) Individuals who trust or distrust may not consciously reflect on the finite features of their feelings. For example, unless asked, a European business person may only be aware of his vague distrust of Americans. He may not have consciously reflected on the distinction between his distrust in one or several IBM sales representatives from Florida with whom he has recently had a particularly unpleasant experience and his distrust in American business negotiation style (or American business

\textsuperscript{161} Analogous relationship-based factors can be said to play a role— to greater or lesser extents—in trust
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practices or foreign policy or culture in general). This notion of the blurring of trust targets is also connected with the degree of specificity or generality of trust, which is examined shortly.

Just as trust can depend on the trust target (we trust doctors to fix the bodies and mechanics the cars), trust can depend on the context. Simply put, we do not necessarily trust someone in every possible situation. (Larson 1997) We may, for example, trust a person to serve us a meal in a restaurant but not entrust that same person with the care of the children. Or we may trust a person as a friend but not as a business colleague or as a lover. We can say the same about other kinds of trust targets. For an object of trust, for example, we may trust that the car will get us across the city but would not undertake a cross-country journey with that same car. We may trust an institution such as a university to provide us with an education and degree but we would not trust it to protect us from a nuclear assault. Even for an abstract idea such as work, we may trust that it will make us money but not trust that it will make us happy. Clearly, with the same trust targets, we can trust and distrust depending on the context, as some contexts clearly require greater or different trust from us than others do.

Finally, trust may also be distinguished not only by a difference in context but also by a difference in the level of generality or specificity in a given situation. We may, for example, trust another state to keep ‘all’ its treaty promises or we may only trust that it will keep certain promises and not others. Or we may simply not define the terms very concretely but rather choose to hold a looser, more flexible, trusting disposition. Such generality and specificity also often has to with the degree of trust. The OSCE/CSCE illustrative studies will seek to further unpack these distinctions for international relations, at least with respect to European interstate security relations. The relative complexity of the schemata outlined above is one of the primary reasons why it is useful to employ interstate security relations (via the CSCE/OSCE) as a first illustrative study. For starting instead with a comprehensive exploration of diverse forms and instances of international relations (and involving a diverse range of international relations actors) would likely prove unwieldy and untenable.

The Problem of Reification

Along the lines of the discussion of trust targets set out above, one of the most significant general concerns about whether the concept of ‘trust’ is appropriate to the study of IR—and interstate relations in particular—has to do with whether it makes any sense at all to suggest that two or more states can be said to trust (or distrust) each other; for is not trust intuitively a phenomenon unique to individual persons? Is not exploring trust between states thus another example of reification; that is to say, of conferring intrinsically human traits upon objectified in government, political processes, and so on.

162 Again, to the extent that these dispositions are simply a matter of prediction, then confidence is the more appropriate term. But to the extent that we can link these rational expectations back to particular or even more general social relationships, then they also become a ‘matter of trust.’
constructs, such as the state? Similarly, and just as importantly, does this not also assume without justification that the capacity to trust/distrust can be 'objectively fixed' at the state level, ignoring the processes and practices by which people and groups within the state interact? There are two preliminary ways of tackling this charge of reification. The first is brusquer, and following the discussion of the realist premise of 'states as unitary actors' in Section 2.4, involves pointing out that this problem of reification is by no means unique to the concept of trust. The methodological problems associated with thinking of states—for theoretical purposes at least—as singular actors interacting with one another, are familiar to large swathes of IR theory, including neo-realist, neo-liberal and various middle-of-the-road constructivist-inspired theories; and many, but by no means all, scholars consider it a necessary and tolerable, if acknowledgeably artificial, construct for modeling interstate behaviour. Following this line of argument, there is thus no 'special' need to justify the idea of two or more states trusting or distrusting one another any more—or any differently—than the idea of two states deeming each other to be security threats or cooperating on the basis of shared information, goals and perhaps even values. Indeed, the multi-dimensional way in which trust is conceived in this thesis actually encompasses (albeit in a unique way) these more familiar IR constructs. Also, following the above logic, there is no immediately apparent benefit to be gained from seeking to outline an ontological and/or epistemological basis unique to the concept of trust; or in other words, independent of the wider philosophical debates taking place in IR and across the social sciences.

A second way of tackling the reification question is to point towards some recent theoretical developments in IR that may suggest a general direction through the methodological morass. In Section 4.4, I sought to do this, however anecdotally. After all, one of the defining features of trust, as I have made pains to highlight, is that it is agent-centred. And it is thus useful to 'reify' the state to the extent to which it can be understood to be a collective, yet at some level, independent agent—that is, the concerted international face of a domestic polity (i.e. citizens, political system, government). It should neither be just some kind of abstract structure detached from the individuals, social groups and processes which it embodies nor just some form of indeterminate process. After all, while some may object to the idea of endowing a state with the capacity to trust/distrust in a way analogous with the capacity of individuals to trust/distrust, at the same time, most would intuitively agree that the ability of states to trust each other is important, if not vital, to stable, peaceful and possibly even just international relations. So how to reconcile this discomfort with a reified notion of the state with the sense

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163 Indeed, this general concern about reification has arisen repeatedly in the presentation of elements of my thesis-in-progress to various academic seminars and conferences.

164 For example, Copenhagen School theorists such as Barry Buzan and Ole Waever recognise that their treatment of 'societies' as 'units of analysis' and 'independent social agents' is vulnerable to charges of reification but they nonetheless view this approach as 'essential' to their model. (Theiler, 2003, p.255)
that trust in the international realm is nonetheless essential? The problem it seems has less to do with the idea of trust as such and more to do with its representation at the level of the state—and between states. Here we are faced with two limitations in the social scientific literature on trust. The first, as Section 4.4 highlighted, is the absence of a substantive ‘micro’ theory of how trust between individuals is generated/fostered/maintained/destroyed. By micro, I mean at the most basic level the role of language and how meaning is created between individuals and between groups. The second limitation is a specific account of how sub-state trust is represented at the state level? That is, what sub-state dynamics between individuals, groups, social, cultural and political factors, and so forth combine/interact to (re)produce the trusting (or distrusting) outward face of the state? These other levels are obviously not sufficiently accounted for by the model I have presented here—and in the absence of such deeper accounts, the model is vulnerable to diverse charges of reification. However, while these limitations are important to keep in mind, it does not discount the relevance and usefulness of concentrating on one particular level of analysis, namely interstate security relations.

**Measuring Trust**

A significant number of empirical studies exist which seek to measure trust. Such studies, which may look at psychological traits, social values or various aspects of political culture, are typically very general in nature in terms of their conceptualisation of trust (such as public surveys asking whether we trust in government; or in the education system; or who we trust among political parties). (Anderson 1993; Ashford 1993) One of the earliest systematic measures of trust, for example, is Julian Rotter’s ‘Interpersonal Trust Scale’, which by way of a five-point Likert scale questionnaire, seeks to measure the belief that another person’s word or promise can be relied upon. (Rotter 1967) Empirical research on trust and distrust in politics has frequently depended on overly general and unspecified ideas and has often confused problems of trust with positive or negative attitudes towards political leadership or political institutions. (Luhmann 1988, p.95) The general nature of such empirical explorations of trust is strongly suggestive of the many methodological problems connected with conceptualising and evaluating trust. In this section, the key issues associated with how trust can be measured are outlined. In particular, one prominent ‘international’ example, the ‘World Values Survey’, is examined.

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165 Rotter’s questionnaire includes such items as: To what extent do you agree with these statements? In dealing with strangers, one is better off trusting them—within reason—until they provide evidence of being untrustworthy; Most people can be counted on to do what they say they will do; The courts give fair and unbiased treatment to everyone; Most elected public officials are really sincere in their campaign promises; Most salesmen are honest in describing their products. (Rotter 1967)
The World Values Survey

One intriguing source of empirical data on confidence and trust is the World Values Survey (WVS). (Inglehart 1998) Indeed it comprises the only comprehensive cross-national body of data on societal levels of trust. It is equally interesting because it includes measures of confidence and trust in society in general (i.e. neighbours); in different ethnic groups (majority and minority); in neighbouring countries; in superpower countries (i.e. the U.S. and previously, the Soviet Union); in international institutions such as the EU and the U.N. and even in international security institutions such as NATO. Many of the insights and especially some of the weaknesses and ambiguities found in the survey can tell us a lot about the problems of theorising and measuring trust at the international level. For example, trust differences between social groups within countries are often more significant than between countries. Also, the correlates of trust appear to be largely historic, cultural and economic in nature and only loosely related to democratic development—which appears at odds with at least one of the theories implicating trust in IR: security community theory.

Representing 70% of the world’s population, the WVS

examines the basic values and attitudes of the peoples of more than 60 societies around the world. . .It provides standardized cross-cultural measures of people’s values and goals concerning politics, economics, religion, sexual behaviour, gender roles, family values and ecological concerns. (Inglehart 1998, p.1)

Moreover, the survey covers the range of different societies globally

from societies with per capita incomes as low as $300 per year; from long-established democracies to authoritarian states. . .from societies with market economies to societies that still had state-run economies at the time of the survey; and from societies that were historically shaped by a wide variety of religious and cultural traditions, from Christian to Islamic to Confucian. (ibid.)

The survey has been carried out in four waves, beginning with a wave of European Values Surveys first carried out in 1981. The second wave expanded the survey globally and was completed in 1990-91. A third wave was carried out in 1995-96 and a fourth wave from 1999-2001.166

A typical WVS question asks individuals to what extent they consider their neighbours to be trustworthy. Indeed the WVS employs a standard form of trust question which operationalised has been in the American General Social Survey. Other similar questions relate

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166 In the third wave, almost 350 different questions were posed to more than 60,000 respondents by a worldwide network of social scientists. A minimum of 1000 respondents were surveyed in each country following a standardised questionnaire and surveying procedure. For more background information on the World Values Survey, see: http://wvs.isr.umich.edu/ [16/04/02].
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to individual’s trust in government, business and community organisations.\textsuperscript{167} The survey’s lead researcher, Ronald Inglehart, has extensively analysed the survey’s findings on trust. He summarises the findings as follows:

- Interpersonal trust is a relatively enduring characteristic of given societies: it reflects the entire historical heritage of a given people, including economic, political, religious and other factors;

- Interpersonal trust (with other cultural factors) is conducive to stable democracy, as the political cultural literature has long claimed but could not demonstrate directly;

- Democratic institutions do not necessarily produce interpersonal trust. A society’s political institutions are only one among many factors involved in the emergence of a culture of trust or distrust. (1998, p.88)

Survey results also generally confirm the hypothesis put forward by Putnam, Fukuyama and others that trust is related to higher degrees of economic development. (Fukuyama 1995; Putnam 1993) Wealthy societies show higher levels of interpersonal trust than poorer ones (and wealthy people higher levels than poor people do). However, it is important not to equate this with economic determinism. Rather, the survey evidence suggests that trust ‘shapes’ economic-development rates; but this does not make a positive correlation between trust and economic development a foregone conclusion.\textsuperscript{168} For example, a 2001 study by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) on economic growth in the transition countries of Central/Eastern Europe and of the former Soviet Union found that economic growth in the transition countries was not related to trust. And in the 1995 World Values Survey, for example, economically despondent Ukraine had the highest score for trust among transition countries, while booming Poland had the second-lowest. (Raiser 2001, p.6)

Significantly, analysis of World Values Survey findings also highlights that democratic institutions do not necessarily lead to greater interpersonal trust. (Inglehart 1998) Inglehart concludes from his multivariate analysis that “A society’s level of interpersonal trust seems to reflect its entire historical heritage, of which her political institutions are only one component.” (ibid., p.93) Indeed, religious heritage may be at least as important factor in interpersonal trust. Furthermore, interpersonal trust can fall as well as rise under democratic institutions, as it has in the United States, one of the world’s leading democracies, over the last half-century. Nonetheless, WVS findings suggest that relatively high levels of interpersonal trust are conducive to the stability of democratic institutions; though, as the EBRD study shows, they are not necessarily conducive to transitions to democracy. (ibid.)

\textsuperscript{167} It is interesting to note that in America, citizens consistently rate their trust in businesses, NGOs and government in that order and that in Europe, NGOs are more trusted than both business and government. See for example, the World Economic Forum’s 2002 survey on trust.

\textsuperscript{168} Inglehart notes that poverty leads to distrust too. (1998)
Survey approaches to trust, such as the WVS, have a number of clear methodological shortcomings, including when it comes to an international relations perspective. Raiser et al. write, for example, that the responses given to questions that measure trust may be influenced in important ways by cyclical swings in public morale, or by specific events in any one year. Since the resulting variations are unlikely to coincide across countries, substantial biases could result from comparing countries at one point in time. (2001, p.5)

Raiser et al. also write that "Equally important is the bias given to answers on issues of belief (such as trust and civic mindedness) by varying cultural traditions, or by the absence of routine of opinion surveys" (ibid.) The WVS also asks respondents about their trust about a specific international relations topic: NATO. (Inglehart 1998) But what is most striking is the degree to which survey results vary within countries. Older people, for example, are significantly more likely to trust NATO than younger people; the more educated more than the less educated; the rich more than the poor; men more than women and so on. (ibid.) Moreover, recent studies of the overall trust data have shown than when the results are broken down by ethnic group, the differences within countries outweigh the differences between countries. All of this is to say that when measuring differences in trust in NATO, for example, international differences are frequently irrelevant when compared to intra-national differences. As for the OSCE, though there is no similar question in the WVS, it seems quite likely that the majority of people in member states surveyed, if they were asked, would not be able to answer whether or not they trusted the OSCE—because they would never have even heard of the OSCE in the first place.

Methodological Limitations of a Trust Explanation

Not surprisingly, there are many other qualitative and quantitative problems and ambiguities associated with the measurement of trust, both across the social sciences and in international relations. For any illustrative study, this poses a significant challenge. Most of the measurement difficulties that will be dealt with here are concerned with the limited conceptual development of trust. This is not the place to address the more fundamental problems connected with measurement in the social sciences in general and the various competing philosophical arguments associated with scientific explanation and understanding, including in international relations and I do not attempt or claim to solve them, or even to do them adequate justice here. Throughout the literature review, a number of allusions have been made to the methodological difficulties of both conceptualising and seeking to support through the illustrative studies a trust

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169 This is beyond the obvious point for the trust model here that what is being measured in the WVS are the trusting attitudes of persons not states. Systematic WVS-like surveys of the trusting attitudes of acting state leaders and/or other state representatives have, to my knowledge, never been attempted.
explanation of international relations. Included among these have been: the problems associated with falsifying psychological explanations; the subjectivity (and contestability) of historic analyses; differentiating between trust and merely the 'rhetoric' of trust; and similarly, the difficulty of controlling for the potentially myriad confounding variables in IR.

The game-theoretical approach embodied in the risk management dimension of the trust model offers a useful example of trust’s methodological limitations. According to this approach, a decision to trust and to cooperate is only rational in a situation where there are probable grounds to expect that it is also in the other actor’s interest to cooperate. However, the difficulties involved in making a probability judgement about the risks and benefits associated with one’s own decision whether or not to cooperate are the same in determining the other’s interests in cooperating; which, as has already been discussed, involves subjective evaluation. To the delight of many game theorists, such an analysis of the other’s interests becomes far more complex as one incorporates into the equation the fact that the other actor (if acting rationally) is also gauging one’s own interests and you in turn are gauging his gauging of your interests and so on, ad infinitum. Where the line can be drawn between rationally informed decision-making and interpretative chaos is a hazy one and one which has inspired the game-theoretical turn towards chaos theory.171

The role of the self-fulfilling prophecy alluded to in Section 3.1 offers another useful example of trust’s many methodological conundrums. While the self-fulfilling prophecy is well established by experimental psychology, in real-world settings, establishing firm and unambiguous evidence in support of its influence is a less than certain task. For example, consider the methodological challenge of ascertaining the source (root cause) of distrust between two negotiators at a international conference: Did the distrust of the one negotiator towards the other lead, as a result of a self-fulfilling prophecy, to the distrustful behaviour of the other negotiator; or was it the distrustful behaviour of the second negotiator that led to the first negotiator’s reasonable distrust in the first place? This is the of course the classic chicken or the egg question. Efforts to objectively disentangle the causal relationships potentially at play in trust relationships in international relations invariably suffer the same difficulties as analyses of social behaviour in other disciplines which also take place outside of a controlled laboratory setting. Without the experimental ability in the illustrative study analyses of IR to control for independent and dependent variables, it is often ultimately concluded that many (if not infinite) causal factors, including varied psychological factors, are potentially at play, with more or less evidence usually stacked (inconclusively) in favour of a few.172 It must be noted, however, that

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170 With regards to trust in international relations, parallels would presumably exist with respect to measures of interstate trust being highly dependent on rapidly fluctuating domestic and international factors.
171 See for example Garfinkel (1997); Henderson (1998).
172 Or the researcher chooses simply to focus on the role of a select few factors.
even in elaborate experimental analysis in the social sciences, it is always only a select number of variables (dependent and independent) that can be controlled for and focused on. In sum, these methodological issues and constraints must be kept closely in mind, particularly when drawing conclusions from the illustrative studies. One goal of the illustrative studies is thus to point in the direction of some form of balance between trust’s conceptual richness and its methodological validity and usefulness as a tool for considering/evaluating the past and present state and future possibilities of international relations.
6.4 Risk Management: International Risk Society?

A number of sociological authors, including Giddens, Seligman, Misztal and Sztompka, connect the growth of interest in the concept of trust with particular features of human society at the end of the twentieth century; namely risk, complexity and change, all of which can also be broadly linked to the ubiquitous and umbrella term 'globalisation.' (Sztompka 2000; Giddens 1990; Misztal 1996; Seligman 1997) Misztal writes that: “Trust (has) become a more urgent and central concern in today’s contingent, uncertain and global conditions.” (1996, p.87) Indeed, a common thread among writers on trust across a variety of disciplines is the urgent need for more trust due to changes occurring in the world today. As early as 1979, Luhmann related the need for more trust to the increasing complexity, uncertainty and risk characterising modern society. In the next two sections of this chapter, I explore in more detail the concepts of risk and relationship management as well as their potential relevance to contemporary international relations. Giddens’s work on risk and modernity and Beck’s conception of a ‘world risk society’, among others, are considered, as well as nascent applications of ‘risk management’ to international security studies. From the relationship management perspective, the burgeoning field of social capital is further mined for its potential relevance to international politics, particularly in the context of an emerging global civil society. The myriad effects of globalisation on relationships and the impact of this on trust and trust building are also contemplated. And in the final section of this chapter, Georg Simmel’s notion of suspension is furthered explored as a way of mediating between the risk-relationship management dichotomy. Isaiah Berlin’s pluralism and Hegel’s dialectics are touched on as possible frameworks for further conceiving the problem of suspension.

Risk and Modernity

Ulrich Beck describes modern societies as risk-oriented societies (1992). Risk in modern society, according to Beck, is largely socially constructed and connected more with technology (such as the risk associated with air travel, or the risk involved in nuclear energy), than with the natural dangers of pre-modern societies. Risk in modern society is also connected with complexity; that is, with the emergence of real and perceived risks as a result of many interrelated human actions, such as the environmental dangers resulting from mass industrial production or the risks of ethnic conflict as a result of the collapse of social and political systems (e.g. in the former Soviet Union). (Sztompka 2000) Not surprisingly, many of these complex phenomena clearly have international dimensions. Whereas pre-modern societies contrasted and sought a balance between danger and security, modern society seeks a balance between risk and trust. (Beck 1992) Risk is modern society is also characterised increasingly by inevitability. (ibid.) That is, the risks we are presented with on a daily basis are not necessarily
risks of our choosing or risks which we could avoid. This is true for both individuals and large organisations, including states; and these risks potentially impact huge numbers of individuals, if not in some cases all of humanity. (Sztompka 2000) Further, this globalisation of risk (such as the risk of nuclear war) means that most of the risks we encounter are outside of our control as individuals (and as individual groups, such as states) and we must therefore ‘collectively’ rely on abstract and expert systems to manage them.

Risk in modern society is increasing both in objective terms (e.g. via the emergence of new and greater risks such as the threat of nuclear warfare, super-terrorism, environmental degradation, etc) and subjectively, in terms of the growing awareness of these diverse risks. (ibid.) This growing risk perception has to do with a broad number of factors, including an increased understanding of risk’s social construction (that is, we no longer believe that our fates rest with the whims of God and nature); the increased role of education in modern societies; and the increased awareness of the limits of expertise and the faults and vulnerabilities of organisations. (ibid.) Because risk in modern society, as understood by Beck and Giddens, is socially constructed, so too is trust a product and by-product of social organisation. Likewise, the ways in which trust is built and sustained will be different from pre-modern society and will focus on various modes of social organisation.

Risk and Reflexivity

The idea of reflexivity essentially involves the re-inventing of beliefs about life and society which were previously either not considered or taken as given and fixed. (Beck 1992) The reflexive act involves individual and societal questioning of such unconsidered or given and fixed beliefs and recasting them into new moulds suited to a specific individual or societal group and/or new context. For Beck, such reflexivity was characteristic of what he termed ‘the late-modern age’ in which we live today. The great contemporary paradox is that the vast growth in the information and knowledge available today is leading not to less risk but in fact to more risk as with new information and knowledge we are continually discovering new risks (and/or new aspects to old risks). (ibid.) This proliferation of reflexive risk is resulting in increased distrust in society. From traditional (entrenched and given) relationships of trust, such as trust in the healthiness of the environment and in the food we eat, with new knowledge we are increasingly moving towards more distrust and more distrustful relationships. Reflexivity in general has of course been looked at in great detail through a burgeoning critical and post-modern literature in IR. The reflexive turn in IR thinking is considered by some to be the most

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173 The roots of reflexivist theories stem from a long tradition of philosophy and from a general philosophical and methodological movement in the social sciences that has run parallel to the foundationalist tradition which epitomises the Enlightenment quest for rationality; and which has gradually found its way into the discipline of international relations.
significant trend in the discipline in the last decade and it is thus surprising that the concept of reflexive trust has not been addressed directly.\textsuperscript{174}

**Risk and International Security**

The concepts of risk society and reflexive risk have led to a flurry of subsequent work in other fields building on Beck's ideas and are just now starting to see fruit in the field of IR. In the area of international security studies, for example, where conceptions of risk are central, the notion of reflexive risk and its implications are just starting to crystallise.\textsuperscript{175} (Coker 2002) As we gain further knowledge and information about potential international security risks, the consideration of these risks and our recognition of new risks both increase. The field of international security has likewise developed notions of common and collective security and the re-evaluation (re-imagination) of international security institutions such as NATO have been connected to the development of reflexive risk. (Coker 2002; Griner 2002; Rasmussen 2001)

Not only is the concept of risk growing in prominence in the field of international security, but so too is the concept of ‘risk management.’ While, as has been seen, there is no generic definition or model of risk management, it may be broadly conceived as a “field of activity seeking to monitor, eliminate, reduce and generally control pure risks”; (Coles 2000, p.24) and more specifically, as “as a set of ongoing activities including feedback mechanisms and continuing performance monitoring, with no finite point.” (Waring 1998, p.3) Along similar lines, NATO's new ‘risk management’ role is taken up by Christopher Coker in his 2001 *Adelphi Paper*. According to Coker,

we no longer seek to insure against [risks] by constructing new world orders or putting together new security systems, as we did in the past. Instead we have a risk-management ethos, which has emerged in response to the greater insecurity that seems to stem from globalisation. (p.61)

The management of risk operates at two levels in international security. One is through surveillance, which aims to minimise opportunities for offending. The second is through preemptive campaigns such as the ‘war against terrorism’:

\textsuperscript{174} The terms reflexivism and reflectivism are sometimes used interchangeably and include postmodern, post-structural and critical theories of international relations (though some postmodernists would deny that they are engaged in theorising). Some reflectivist authors also make reference to the late-modern and many more ‘traditional’ or ‘modernist’ theorists include reflectivist ideas in their works. Likewise, not all critical theorists consider themselves to be reflectivist and some theories of social constructivism, structuration, etc., either fall somewhere in between or defy categorisation altogether. (Brown 1992; Onuf 1989). The term reflectivist is also sometimes employed to point out reflectivism’s awareness of it’s own reflection (Waever 1997). For a summary of reflectivism in IR see for example Smith (2000), Groom (1994) and Neumann (1996).

\textsuperscript{175} Early pioneering work on the ‘risk preferences’ of states in international relations was undertaken by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita (1981, 1985) and subsequently by Morrow (1987), Vertzberger (1995), Schneider & Weisman (1997), and Weisman and Shambaugh (2002), among others. This work is important in the way it distinguishes between states that are risk-accepting, risk-averse and risk-neutral,
Today, there are no solutions, only risk management strategies. Instead of managing security, we manage insecurity (nuclear proliferation, terrorism, etc.). For not acting is often seen as an even more unacceptable risk. [But] doing nothing and doing too much both transform the world into a series of intractable risks. This is what sociologists call the ‘risk trap’ (pp.61-2, 75)

Coker believes that today, NATO can be more accurately described as a risk community “that secures the interests of its members against the new global insecurity they face.” (p.71) NATO’s 1991 ‘Security Concept’, for example, identifies a “new security environment" made up of “security challenges and risks.” (NATO 1999) And in 1999, NATO’s revised ‘Security Concept’ referred to a wide variety of risks that were often multi-directional and increasingly difficult to predict. (Coker 2002)

The idea of reflexive risk in international security is given its most direct expression in Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen’s 2001 article which, like Coker, applies Beck’s theory of world risk society to NATO and particularly NATO’s new ‘Strategic Concept.’ Finally, the ‘risk management’ paradigm has been recently employed to conceptualise the post-9/11 U.S.-led ‘War on Terrorism.’ In a 2002 article in Security Dialogue, Yee-Kuang Heng argues that risk management provides “a more appropriate analytical prism for understanding such a ‘war’ where enemies are elusive networks, the aim is simply avoiding harm with no prospect of closure and success is defined more by non-events than by what can be seen.” (p.227) Heng sees the war on terror—as well as the political rhetoric in support of the war—as exhibiting the hallmarks of a risk management strategy; namely taking anticipatory action to forestall adverse outcomes and a utilitarian moral calculus rather than a focus on guilt or justice. (p.228) In the illustrative studies in Chapters 7 and 8, I address the OSCE/CSCE’s efforts to confront the proliferation of risks in European security through diverse risk management activities, including an expanding range of confidence and security building measures.
6.5 Relationship Management: The Globalisation of Social Capital?

In this next section, I seek to expand the relationship management dimension of the international relations trust model advanced in this thesis. This is done through an exploration of the possibilities for the development of international forms of social capital. The role of interdependence in international relations and its impact on social conceptions of trust is also considered. Finally, how globalisation may be changing the way in which intimacy in trust relations are both conceived and fostered is also discussed.

The Limits of Social Capital

When it comes to civil society, the discipline of IR is familiar with many of the same conceptual and methodological challenges as political science. In recent years, substantial efforts have been made to document and dissect the emergence of global civil society. The global civil society yearbook is one prominent example (Anheier 2001) IR scholars are not at all unfamiliar with the myriad problems associated with defining and categorising global civil society actors. A short list includes differentiating pure non-state actors from state-sponsored or hybrid actors (again based on origins, membership, funding, etc); differentiating profit from not-for-profit organisations; and finally, differentiating social interest groups, such as environmental lobbyists, from criminal groups such as the mafia and terrorist networks. The IR field has been and remains deeply engaged with theorising the many notions of civil society and their attendant challenges.176 However, where social capital is relevant at all to international relations, it appears to be more useful to focus on James Coleman and Pierre Bourdieu’s earlier conception of social capital rather the conception of social capital popularised in the last decade by Robert Putnam. As will be shown in Chapters 7 and 8, this appears to be particularly the case with regards to the CSCE/OSCE. For the problem with the Putnamesque conception of social capital, beyond the obvious point that it focuses on voluntary, non-government associations is that it also focuses on relations that are not primarily politically motivated. That is, organisations with specific political goals, in Putnam’s interpretation, serve to exacerbate social and political cleavages, not bridge them. (Smith 1998) Moreover, these interest groups, in his view, mostly lack the ‘face-to-face’ relations necessary for engendering trust. This naturally excludes a wide range of ‘association’, from local to national level, including many ‘mass membership’ organisations. In IR, with much of the focus is on interstate relations, including those based within the context of the OSCE, just the fact that these are politically based excludes them from Putnam’s definition. Moreover, the large part of what might be called ‘global civil society’ is also clearly politically motivated and mass membership-based. One need only think of such transnational actors and networks as Amnesty International, Greenpeace or

176 See for example Colás (2002); Frost (2002); Korten (1999).
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the anti-globalisation movement. Finally, the vast and loose networks which comprise global
civil society tend to lack much of the informal ‘face-relations’ of local forms of association.\textsuperscript{177}

There may be some analogous apolitical voluntary associations which do have
international dimensions and which involve significant ‘face time’. One need only consider
international exchanges between students, sporting organisations, cultural groups, etc. But,
beyond the usual arguments that these associations too, invariably have political motivations,
albeit often subtle or covert,\textsuperscript{178} they of course only cover a fraction of non-state international
activity. The impact of this limited dimension of international ‘voluntary association’ on
‘international social capital’, its expansion, the density of its networks and the frequency and
intensity of its social relations would prove fascinating if there was relevant data against which
to gauge it; namely a generalised measure of ‘international trust.’ But there is no analogous
question in standardised survey questions. These ask rather about trust in your ‘neighbours’,
‘foreigners’ or the citizens of specific countries, such as ‘Americans’ or ‘The Japanese’; and
questions about trust in the U.N., EU or NATO are designed to gauge attitudes towards those
‘institutions’ not the populations they represent.\textsuperscript{179} Nevertheless, as has been seen in the review
of the security community literature, the pioneering work of Karl Deutsch in the 1950s was
already hot on the trail of empirically measuring international trust. Deutsch went to lengths to
measure and evaluate the increased informal social contact across borders that he theorised
leads to greater familiarity, social learning, dialogue and even the development of shared
meanings and identities.\textsuperscript{180} Deutsch considered data as diverse as the amount of postal mail
criss-crossing the Atlantic, tourist visits, scientific exchanges and so on. The sum of all of these,
he speculated, could reflect developing trust between the citizens of states forming a ‘security
community’. (1957)

Social capital approaches face a number of further methodological shortcomings in terms
of their potential application to IR. The standard survey approach, as has been seen, asks
individuals to what extent they consider their neighbours, government, business and community
organisations, etc to be trustworthy.\textsuperscript{181} Critics, however, have cogently pointed out numerous
problems with this approach. Broadly, they argue that measurements of trust in government can

\textsuperscript{177}From an ethical perspective, Putnam’s idea of a benign, apolitical form of trust permeating society is
also troublesome for civil society activists in international relations who seek to bring about change by
emphasising social, economic and political injustices which might similarly heighten distrust in the status
quo.
\textsuperscript{178}Or that they are embedded in, acquiescent of and (re)produce a particular hegemonic political and
economic structure.
\textsuperscript{179}And in any event, these again are inter-state institutions, where the more appropriate ‘level of analysis’
is ‘interstate trust.’
\textsuperscript{180}Such processes have also been shown to be effective in the context of reducing inter-ethnic tensions.
For a review of the literature on social contact and inter-ethnic conflict, see Ryan (1990).
\textsuperscript{181}It is interesting to note that in the U.S., citizens consistently rate their trust in businesses, NGOs and
government in that order; whereas in Europe, NGOs are more trusted that both business and government.
(Forum 2002)
The Puzzle of Trust in IR

vary for many reasons, not just due to a decline in civic participation. A number of factors may have contributed, for example, to the decline in measures of trust in American government over the past half century, including Watergate, Iran-Gate and changing social values which are less deferential towards (and hence more critical of) authority. Surveys have also long noted that trust in government is highest in times of war and declining trust may also be related to the waning of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union and of the immediate nuclear threat. This view is further supported by the dramatic jump in trust in government in the U.S. immediately after Sept 11th, 2001. (Gallup 2003) Moreover, distrust does not preclude political consent, as was markedly evidenced by Bill Clinton’s return to office in 1996 despite polls showing he was deeply distrusted by Americans. (Marable 1996, p.9)

So where does this leave us in terms of an international relations perspective on social capital and especially for the CSCE/OSCE illustrative studies in the next two chapters? There is only one academic article which does apply the concept of social capital specifically to international relations: Jackie Smith’s 1998 article in *American Behavioural Scientist*, which considers social capital in transnational social movement organisations. Smith holds that trust is indeed generated within these networks through the exchange of knowledge and the development of norms and shared identities. But, if following the critique above and in Section 3.1, trust cannot be easily generalised across society (be it domestic or international), then, following Bourdieu and Coleman, it may be more useful to theorise it based on more narrow, closed networks and not diffused across society as a whole. (Bourdieu 1991; Coleman 1988) This approach in fact preceded Putnam’s, who coupled it with civil society and empirical democratic theory. Intended as a correction to economic models of cooperation, Coleman and Bourdieu’s approach instead says something more modest about the benefits of regular and deeper social relations: that they can serve to facilitate relations between specific actors and networks. This can include networks of political leaders, diplomats, NGO actors and other participants in international organisations such as the OSCE. Bourdieu and Coleman’s narrower approach to social capital better suits the ‘interstate’ and ‘interstate security’ (network) level of analysis. It also fits particularly well with ‘thinner’ forms of trust in international relations in the sense that it is largely based on “the notion of reciprocity in social and economic relationships rather than universalistic moral norms and values.” (Raiser 2001, p.2) For thicker forms of trust, however, what still needs to be better explained and as will be probed further in Section 6.6, is

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182 According to Gallup polls, two years after Sept 11th 2001, “Trust in government to handle both domestic and international problems remains slightly higher than what was measured before 9/11. Prior to the attacks, 14% of Americans expressed a great deal of confidence in the government to handle international problems and 6% in its ability to handle domestic problems. Those numbers increased to 36% and 24%, respectively, in an October 2001 poll. [Two years later] the figures are 17% and 14%.” (ibid.)

183 There is of course no general theory of social capital in IR, though there is much in the ‘sociological’ theories of IR which is quite familiar.
how to reconcile the normative tensions between trust and distrust, which, while reflecting competing value-orientations, nevertheless appear to be co-dependent.

Trust and Modernity

It has also been argued by numerous sociological thinkers that the rise in interest in the study of trust in the last few years can be connected with the awareness of changes in modern society and in particular certain phenomena associated with what is broadly (and not un-contentiously) described as globalisation. (Misztal 1996) The work of Anthony Giddens on trust in modern society provides a good starting point for a discussion of trust in the context of modernity and, likewise, its relationship to contemporary international relations. (1994) Misztal writes that: “Trust has...become the core concept in all three of Giddens’s latest books, is firmly grounded within his previously developed concept of ontological security and it relates to the main characteristic of modernity as developed in many of his earlier works.” (1996, p.90) To summarise Giddens’s thinking brusquely, he compares the sources of trust relations in pre-modern societies to those of modern societies. There may not be less trust in modern society compared to pre-modern societies, but its sources are fundamentally different. Trust in pre-modern societies was based primarily on personal trust; that is, on trust between individuals who know each other personally and engage in intimate, face-to-face, communication. (1994) Further, such personal trust was reinforced by kinship, community, religion and tradition. (Misztal 1996) In modern societies, in contrast, trust relations are often detached from the personal (trust in an individual) or local (trust in a community of people we know personally). Further, because modernity involves the destruction of traditional orders, trust is largely detached from the context of religion and tradition and rests instead in modern institutions. These modern institutions are “grounded in ‘reflexivity’ and modern individuals, without the guidance of traditional authority, must self-reflexively construct their identities.” (ibid., p.89)

Trust in modern society can be classified under two categories: personal trust (trust in persons) and abstract trust (trust in abstract systems). Though personal (face-to-face) trust may still play a role in modern society, it has been supplemented by new abstract mechanisms of trust; the two most significant of which involve abstract systems of symbols (such as the political legitimacy of presidents and economic currencies) and expert systems (such as the technical accreditation of car mechanics or the professional accreditation of air traffic controllers). However, these abstract systems still need to be reinforced by personal trust. (Giddens 1994) Giddens writes that “With the development of abstract systems, trust ... becomes indispensable to social existence.” (1991, p.133) With abstract systems, including in

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184 Giddens defines trust as confidence in the reality of a person or system, regarding a given set of outcomes or events, when that confidence expresses a faith in the probity of love of another, or in the correctness of abstract principles. (1990, p.54)
international relations (such as arms control verifications mechanisms) trust developed through routine may be more a question of effectiveness than any sense of psychological security. (Giddens 1994) This is because abstract systems which lead to increased organisational and bureaucratic structures tend to depersonalise. The extent to which trust in international relations can be understood at 'personal' and 'abstract' levels is explored in the CSCE/OSCE illustrative studies. For example, can individuals not directly involved in the OSCE’s activities also be understood to benefit from the interstate trust the OSCE develops? Or is such trust only attributable to the diplomats, military officials and politicians involved directly in the OSCE’s institutional affairs? And what of NGOs and other sub-state or transnational groups at the margins but still involved and affected by OSCE’s activities?

**Interdependence and Intimacy**

One of the most interesting premises suggesting changing forms of trust relations in international relations is the one which is connected with a ‘globalising’ contemporary international relations context. Again, this requires a stretch which initially appears to be a dangerously tenuous one, but which upon closer examination fits reasonably well within the argumentative framework advanced thus far.  

185 It has become a cliché to say that we are living in a world of increasing interdependence. In contemporary social life and increasingly in contemporary international relations, interdependence appears to be more the rule and less the exception. That it is increasingly the rare case when complete non-cooperation—and certainly when complete withdrawal—is at all an option is one of the central themes behind interdependence theory in IR and its loose partner, globalisation theory. (Clemons 1998) It suggests that states in the international system in many cases have little choice but to cooperate with each other. It can be argued that interdependence theory would also suggest that states have little choice but to engage in trust relationships with other states across growing issue areas, many of which must be dealt with on a routine or even daily basis.

A good example is climate change. Few of us as individuals have much power (if any) to influence international negotiations on climate change, such as the Kyoto Protocol. Yet we are not really free to shrug this off for we still must breathe the same air every day and live under the same climactic conditions. Even the state leaders and diplomats who represent our interests as citizens and who do have a position at the international bargaining table cannot—if they accept that climate change is a serious concern—just raise their arms in exasperation and walk away when talks with others states about what to do about it break down. For they cannot solve

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185 The academic debate on globalisation, its content, dynamics and merits is vast and noisy and only appears to be expanding in terms of the amount of research and debate, the number of academic disciplines and sub-disciplines adopting it as a topic for avid study; and in terms of the lines of division which split academics, not to mention the ideological and political animosity engulfing its activist advocates and critics. (Clark 1999)
the problem of climate change on their own. By its nature, it needs to be addressed at a global level; and this demands trust between states. Moreover, even when the need for international collaboration is accepted, the extraordinary complexity of the climate change issue demands that state representatives engage a wide range of actors in the policy-making (and policy implementation) process. States are thus thrust into a vast web of trust relationships with scientists, industrial lobby groups, environmental NGOs, international agencies and so on. Similar things can be said about trust in the safety of the food we eat. We may be able to change what food we buy or where we buy it, but at some point and to some degree we must come face to face with a web of trust relations which spread across the individuals, institutions, systems and processes involved in ensuring food safety. With globalisation, such trust webs invariably spread into the international realm, from international organisations which bring scientists and other experts together to develop standards for the safe shipping and storage of food, to the diplomats who negotiate the opening of national markets to food imports or the closing of borders to defend against the spread of suspected diseases, such as Mad Cow Disease.

More than just increased interdependence, globalisation may also be shifting the dynamics of intimacy we experience in many of the trust relationships we are involved in on a daily basis. On the one hand, globalisation is shifting many trust relationships away from the immediately inter-personal and away from the local level. More familiar and intimate trust relationships, such as between a customer and a farmer or market vendor are spreading outward into increasingly complex webs of social interaction. As such, much of the intimacy gained through personal acquaintance is being diluted into a pastiche of ever-more complex and less familiar trust webs. On the other hand, the claim can also be made that certain dynamics of the globalisation process, such as the spread of real-time mass communication to almost every corner of the globe and the interactive nature of new communications technologies, is giving rise to a greater sense of personal acquaintance, familiarity and intimacy (with public personalites and with ‘imagined communities’) where previously none existed. For example, take an issue such as the dispute over the safety of the Ford Explorer, a multi-purpose family vehicle which has a dangerous record of ‘rolling over’ at high speeds, leading to driver and passenger injury and death.186 The Ford Motor Company was engaged for several years in a long and expensive process of recalling the vehicles and either replacing or repairing them, not to mention repairing its damaged reputation. Ford contends that the rollover problem lay not with its manufacturing of the vehicle but with the vehicle’s tires which Ford had a contract with Firestone to supply each Ford Explorer with. The key issue has been customer trust; and this complex trust relationship has involved international dimensions and has demonstrated dynamics suggestive of the impact of globalisation processes on trust. For example, many of the

186 For a summary, see The Economist (2000).
tires in question were manufactured at a factory outside of the United States and Canada where
most *Ford Explorer* owners live. This raised complex questions about how to ensure trust in the
manufacturing processes and standards of non-North American countries and how to monitor
and regulate (and communicate to customers) these dimensions of this trust.

Continuing the example above, the flurry of newspaper and television advertisements
which *Ford* put out in response to the rollover issue invariably involved personal appeals from
the CEO and senior executives from *Ford* for customers to continue to trust their family’s
transport safety to *Ford* vehicles. Such personal appeals involved the head of *Ford* looking the
customer in the eye and calmly and soothingly appealing for continuing trust in *Ford*, citing its
long history of customer relations and listing the exhausting precautions it has taken to ensure
the safety of its vehicles. 187 This is the sort of ‘face’ contact that Giddens advocates. (1991) This
kind of mass personal appeal to customers across the country and potentially around the world,
is only made possible through the media technologies which are part of the globalisation
phenomenon. Such personal appeals arguably foster a situation where the customer is
encouraged to trust the *Ford Explorer* based on the trustworthy character which the head of
*Ford* demonstrates on TV. The dynamics of this form of trust appeal are certainly not those of
the cool contractarian type nor do they singularly involve the purely rational calculation of
interests proposed by game theoreticians.

Internet technologies also allow customers to educate themselves in the finer features of
the *Ford Explorer* safety debate, from the scientific reports and opinions which abound on the
Internet to the carefully worded testimonials of *Ford, Firestone*, road safety and consumer
protection lobby groups and others, which appear every minute on websites and newsgroups
accessible across the planet. 188 Furthermore, customers are encouraged to communicate
themselves and post on the Internet their personal experiences and opinions, sign petitions, and
debate with experts and others in chat rooms and through other interactive media. These
communication dynamics, only possible through the advent of globalisation, arguably foster
new forms of intimate trust relations. The counter-argument can also be made, however, that
such new forms of trust are still simply not comparable to the regular ‘face to face’ contact (not
via technology) between individuals. Trusting your local farmer, whom you know on a first
name basis, following the counter-argument, is certainly more intimate than an Internet
broadcast by a panel of international food scientists which is intended to reassure consumers
that British beef is safe.

187 Tire manufacturers, meanwhile, have been famous for advertisements which likewise emphasise trust
in the safety of their products. An excellent example of this is a Michelin tire advertisement which
features a baby sitting in a tire.

188 Factor in to this the damage done to trust from all the misleading or outright false information,
(innocent and malicious) circulating on the Internet.
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It has been a long time, however, since the customer was able to go and see Henry Ford for personal reassurance. And a car mechanic is not the same as a car manufacturer. Nor is a farmer necessarily a disease expert. Further, international food and other imports have been with us for a long time; and though earlier ignorance was perhaps in many ways bliss, globalisation is undeniably bringing about an increasing knowledge of the complex web of trust relationships which can permeate something as seemingly benign as the import of bananas. In any event, the larger question left hanging is the extent to which the loss of interpersonal empowerment and intimacy in many contemporary trust relationships due to the dynamics of globalisation is offset by any gains in knowledge and new forms of intimacy fostered by other dynamics. While this question is still open, it is fair to say that the dynamics of globalisation are contributing to the creation of unique and evolving forms of trust relationships across growing swaths of social life.

189 This comment that 'ignorance is bliss' is not a frivolous statement either. It hints at the paradoxical and perhaps somewhat depressing Socratic realisation that the contemporary exponential increase in knowledge seems to only lead to exponentially more questions, more uncertainties and more risks.
6.6 Suspension: Reconciling Conflicting Values

Suspension is the 'kernel' of trust which makes it distinct from other concepts, such as prediction, cooperation or norms. As has been explored in Chapter 4, the 'suspending' nature of trust has been lucidly exposed in the work of the sociologist Georg Simmel. (1950) Simmel considers that trust only involves a form of what he terms 'weak inductive knowledge.' That is, there is only a weak link between the bases of trust in knowledge/rational prediction and "the actual expectations which human beings have when they reach the state of trust" in a relationship (Möllering 2001, p.404) For trust to take place, this 'gap' between risk and relationship must be bridged via a 'leap of faith', a mechanism which Giddens and Möllering call 'suspension.' Suspension brackets out uncertainty, thus making knowledge momentarily certain and enabling the leap to favourable expectation. (Giddens 1991, p.244) In a phrase, it involves giving another 'the benefit of the doubt.' Without suspension, trust is impossible. But how can the gap between risk and relationship be bridged, both theoretically and practically (and particularly in an area of social/political life so notoriously chaotic and distrustful as international relations)? The possibility of suspension in international relations is further explored in this section through the ideas of two perhaps unlikely-paired thinkers: Isaiah Berlin and G.W.F. Hegel.

Isaiah Berlin's Pluralism

One thinker who has placed the inevitable tension between competing ideals at the centre of his political philosophy is Isaiah Berlin (1909-1980) Berlin's political philosophy offers potential insight into how the kernel of trust, suspension, may require a very particular psychological outlook: one which is tolerant of ambiguity and which is empathetic. As he remarks in his seminal 'Four Essays on Liberty':

The ends of man are many and not all of them in principle compatible with each other, the possibility of conflict—and of tragedy—can never be wholly eliminated from human life, either personal or social. The necessity of choosing between absolute claims is then an inescapable characteristic of the human condition. (1969, p.169)

Perhaps ironically for the purposes of the trust model here, Berlin points to Machiavelli as the first political philosopher to have truly recognised the centrality of the tension between individual and social moralities in the history of ideas. (1980). Berlin identifies as the 'nodal point' of Machiavelli's political philosophy the question of how two moralities, the public 'paganism' of the prince and the personal ethics of the Christian, can be held by the same man. (Morgenbesser 1991, p.4). Ultimately, as is well known, Machiavelli renounced one system of morality, Christian ethics, "in favour of another system, another moral universe...in which men
fight and are ready to die for (public) ends which they pursue for their own sakes.” (Berlin 1980, p.48) While disagreeing vigorously with the substance of Machiavelli’s philosophy, Berlin nevertheless recognised that “(he) planted a permanent question mark in the path of posterity by his discovery of the diversity and incompatibility of human values—of ‘pluralism.’” (Morgenbesser, p.7)

As Berlin’s biographers have written, “In agreement with this fundamental insight of Machiavelli, Berlin views conflict among values as a permanent feature of life, which no system or theory is likely to remove.” (ibid.) Berlin writes that the notion that “it is in principle possible to discover a harmonious pattern in which all values are reconciled...seems to me invalid and at times to have led (and still lead) to absurdities in theory and barbarous consequences in practice.” (1969, p.52) Rather, in Berlin’s view, “the distribution of these many, competing values is a matter of balance, of intelligent adjustment, case by case, as each situation demands, with no guarantee that each value will be satisfied to the same degree as the others.” (Morgenbesser, p.23) Berlin is deeply sceptical of general and permanent solutions to political problems. Instead, he insists that different, unpredictable problems arising at different times and in different circumstances require solutions that are appropriate to their situation. (ibid., p.24) In his words,

The concrete situation is almost everything. There is no escape. We must decide as we decide; moral risk cannot, at times, be avoided. (1990, p.18)

Berlin’s political philosophy also invokes important ‘psychological’ facets. That is, it demands a psychological disposition of tolerance and even empathy. As Michael Ignatieff stresses,

empathy plays an important role in [Berlin’s] account of how conflicting views are reconciled in liberal society. Compromise between competing values would be impossible if individuals were unable to enter into the views of those with whom they are in disagreement. Were such understanding impossible, political argument would have little point; attempts at persuasion would be in vain; and force or the tyranny of the majority rule would decide all political outcomes. (1991, p.135)

In short, “Empathy and its twin, self-detachment, are what make. . .compromise possible.” (ibid., p.136) Bernard Williams has also noted that in Berlin’s political philosophy, loss plays a central role. That is, “tragic choice—achieving one good, but sacrificing another—is inescapable.” (1990, xvi: qtd in Ignatieff 1991, p.138)

The articulation of Berlin’s thought here can only be anecdotal in terms of its application to the mechanism of suspension that is so critical to trust. Nevertheless, it suggests that the dual components of risk and relationship management which make up trust may be fundamentally and irredeemably incompatible. Fortunately, this is nothing new to political philosophy, to

190 For a book-length exposition of Isaiah Berlin’s political philosophy, see Kocis (1989).
social science or to the competing goals and values of humankind. Berlin’s ideas suggest that
the task of ‘perfectly’ harmonising such tensions is ultimately futile. Rather, we must strive to
develop a psychological disposition which tolerates such ambiguity—both within ourselves and
in our relationships with others. And alongside empathy towards others in the face of difference,
we must seek practical, rather than general, solutions to specific problems. While Berlin’s ideas
point towards a potential ‘ethico-psychological’ disposition for dealing with—or ‘coordinating’
in management speak—the tensions that invariably arise between the dual tasks of risk and
relationship management, Hegel’s ideas point towards a potential ‘ethico-political’ disposition.

Hegel’s Patriotic Trust

Though not a well-known feature of his political philosophy, Hegel’s notion of ‘patriotic trust’
has recently been impressively brought to light by Alexander Kaufman. (1997). Kaufman finds
that Hegel’s ideas about trust are “designed to ground both a direct and a reflective relation
between individuals and their ethical and political tradition.” (p.807) Hegel’s overarching
conception of the dialectic, in which his ideas about trust are embedded, thus offers potential
further insight into the ethical underpinnings of suspension. Zeitz writes: “In its most general
and loosest sense, dialectics refers to any aspect of social processes having to do with conflict,
paradox, mutual interaction, unintended consequences and the like.” (1980, p.73) The notion of
the dialectic was first made explicit by Hegel and then further developed and empirically
applied by Marx. Other prominent theorists who have developed dialectical theories include
Gurvitch, Lukacz, Marcuse and Habermas. (Gurvitch 1962; Lukacz 1971; Marcuse 1976;
Habermas 1976) However, the ideas of Hegel are focused on here, since he also directly
addresses the idea—and—importance—of trust. But contrary to ‘trust’, other dialectical
thinkers, such as Marx and his intellectual offspring have emphasised that “systems of exchange
(relationships) develop dialectically into complex, emergent structures in which concealment,
manipulation and domination are pervasive.” (Zeitz, p.86)

Broadly speaking, the dialectical logic of social interaction holds that both individualistic
and socially-guided tendencies exist and represent stages in a continuing interactive process.
That is, the independent actions of intentional subjects become constrained by social structures
that are residues of previous actions. (ibid., p.73) Hegel writes that “the inner voice can. . .come
into collision” with the society’s traditions, since “the human being claims to have within
himself the measure of what is right. . .Particular interests should certainly not be set aside, let
possible by an interplay of rational reflection and social embeddedness. Trust is the ethical
‘disposition’ which unites the rational and the subjective. It involves the recognition that
“particular interests should. . .be harmonized with the universal, so that both they themselves
and the universal are preserved.” (sec. 261, 285) As Kaufman writes, “Hegelian theory...
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...incorporates the tension between its two motivating insights: Free choice must be reflective; and...identification requires a direct and unmediated relation between the desires of the individual and the substance of ethical life. ...Hegel’s account of trust is designed to address this tension.” (p.812) That is, Hegel’s trust involves a complex ‘equilibrium’ between unmediated identification and reflective evaluation. Patriotic trust thus involves both reflection and sentiment: “The political disposition of trust approximates the ‘unity of form and content’ sought by Hegelian political theory in order to reconcile the individual to the rationality embodied in the actual.” (Kaufman, p.813; Hegel, p.22)

In sum, for Hegel, trust is that disposition held by “private persons, who have their own interest as their end”, yet who nevertheless recognise that, “in the normal conditions and circumstances of life, these ends will be most fully realised within their community’s political institutions.” (Hegel, secs.187-224, 268-289; Kaufman, p.814) The intricacies of Hegel’s dialectical thought cannot be dealt with at length here—in order not be distracted from the central project of conceptualising trust in international relations. Nevertheless, the account which Kaufman provides of Hegel’s notion of patriotic trust offers potential insight into how suspension may serve to ‘bind’ together the self-interest-oriented and social-oriented bases of trust. Many questions of course remain. Kaufman, for example, argues that Hegel’s notion of trust allows for ‘weak identification’ with the basic rules/beliefs which form the basis of a stable civil society. That is, contrary to most communitarian thinking, Hegel’s theory allows for identification which is still reconcilable with the principles of deontological liberalism.191 (Kaufman, p.807) But is such an account of ‘patriotic’ trust transferable from the state level to international society? Can trust and its unique mechanism of suspension usefully serve to mediate between the individual interests of states and their sense of belonging and obligation to an international society of states? Or, in the absence of even sufficient ‘weak’ identification—and of the means to enforce the rules/norms of international society—is such a dialectical relationship condemned to dissolve into manipulation and domination? Much normative ground remains to be cleared in order to confront these questions more adequately. Hegel’s ideas on trust nevertheless provide a useful avenue into the last part of this thesis, in which the trust model is applied to the evolution of the CSCE/OSCE.

191 Disagreement over strong and weak accounts of social identification is a controversial matter in modern political thought. Broadly speaking, communitarians such as Charles Taylor suggest that an adequate ethical framework allows individuals to identify directly with the rules, norms and practices of their society—whereas the deontological liberal reliance on more abstract principles of justice may be seen to promote a weaker form of identification. (Kaufman 1997)
7. The CSCE and the Building Blocks of Trust

"The CSCE has won the Cold War"
—Andrei Kozyrev, Soviet Foreign Minister, 1994
7.1 The CSCE: from Vancouver to Vladivostok

Despite the quote on the previous page, it is not my aim in this chapter to provide 'yet another' explanation for the end of the Cold War.\textsuperscript{192} To the contrary, in this chapter it is argued that the Cold War—being just that, war-like—was characterised up until almost the end by an atmosphere of pervasive distrust between the two superpower camps. Nevertheless, the trust model developed in this thesis is useful for pointing out where certain 'building blocks' of trust did emerge during the Cold War, particularly in the context of the CSCE process and its 'embryonic' risk management and relationship management efforts.\textsuperscript{193} These building blocks, moreover, indirectly helped to enable the peaceful transition to the post-Cold War era.

The life of the CSCE process, from the talks which preceded the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, to its institutionalisation as a permanent post-Cold War pan-European regional security arrangement, can be seen as spanning five phases in 20\textsuperscript{th} century international history, roughly outlined by Ki-Joon (1997, p.5) as the following:

- Cold War I
- Détente
- Cold War II
- Entente
- Post-Cold War

If the OSCE is the child of today's 'Cold-Peace' then the CSCE was truly the child of the Cold-War. (Heraclides 1994) The proposal for a European conference on security was first put forward in 1954 by the Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov. But it was not until nearly 20 years later that the West was ready to consider engaging with what it had till then perceived as a veiled Soviet attempt to seek legitimacy for its Eastern European aggressions. With the cautious rapprochement of the superpowers towards the end of the 1960s and with West German Chancellor Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik, increasingly concrete but still tentative proposals were put forth for greater security cooperation between East and West. In Reykjavik in 1968, NATO invited the Warsaw Pact countries to talks on conventional arms reductions Mutual Balanced Force Reductions—or MBFR) and bilateral treaties were signed in the next few years between the Soviet Union and West Germany; and between West Germany and Poland.

\textsuperscript{192} For a 'trust' explanation for the end of the Cold War, see the review of Forsberg's article in Chapter 3.
\textsuperscript{193} Nor does this entail an exhaustive study of the CSCE. It serves, rather, as an empirical illustration of the potential explanatory ability of the trust model. For excellent overviews of the CSCE's history and structure, see Birnbaum (1980); Bloed (1994); Ghebali (1989); Holsti (1984); OSCE (2000); and Sizoo (1984).
But contrary to resembling anything like ‘trust building’, these early years of discussion about a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, (which commenced with multilateral preparatory talks in 1972), were fraught with the Cold-War tensions between East and West blocs that were so typical of superpower interaction in international institutions in that era. (Vincent 1974) Indeed, right up until the late 1980s, the model of ‘intense rivalry’ and even ‘animosity’ between East and West has most frequently been the one participants, observers and scholars have employed to describe the atmosphere of negotiations at the CSCE. It took, for example, three years of laborious and halting negotiations just to agree to the procedural and structural framework through which the conference could take place. Nevertheless, in 1975, the Helsinki Final Act was signed by 35 Heads-of-State or government, including all Eastern and Western European states (except Albania), the Soviet Union, the U.S. and Canada. It marked the first ‘formal’ step towards détente between East and West and the beginning, however tentative, of the end of the Cold War.\(^\text{194}\) Consisting of a set of politically, rather than legally binding principles and commitments, all agreed to by consensus, the Act set out the guidelines for non-threatening, cooperative behaviour between states. Included were declarations of the principles of sovereign equality; refraining from the threat or use of force; the territorial integrity of states; the peaceful settlement of disputes; non-intervention in internal affairs; respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; and the equal rights and self-determination of peoples.

Following Helsinki, successive conferences were held every two years (with the real grit of the discussions appearing in regular lead-up talks between each formal conference); until 1995, when the conference process was institutionalised into an organisation: the OSCE. The Helsinki process, as it came to be known, also brought into being elaborate ‘Confidence and Security Building Measures’ (CSBMs), with the aim of reducing tensions and increasing transparency in military relations. These measures included gradual reciprocal reductions in military arms; the regular notification, monitoring and inspection of military activities; and improved channels of communication.\(^\text{195}\)

\(^{194}\) See Appendix B for the full text of the Helsinki Final Act.
\(^{195}\) For an overview of the CSCE’s CSBM regime, see Ki-Joon (1997); and Ghebali (1989).
7.2 Managing Cold War Risks

In this section, the risk management dimension of the CSCE process is considered. That is, the pursuit by member states of their individual security interests via the CSCE is examined. Indeed, the volatile negotiation and the final wording of the Helsinki Final Act both clearly reflect the divergent interests of the two superpower camps. The trust model helps to tease out some of the idiosyncrasies and limits of risk management via multilateral interstate relations. While substantial arms control agreements proved impossible until the closing stages of the Cold War, the confidence building measures established through the CSCE process nevertheless allowed for modest yet important steps to be taken to manage military risks.

Interests

Numerous, if not the majority, of CSCE scholars/commentators have concluded that the primary motivation of the Soviet Union in calling for and engaging in the CSCE process was its desire to legitimise the existing borders of Europe; that is, its (and the communist world’s) sphere of influence in Eastern and Central Europe. The Western powers (The U.S., Western Europe and their allies) had never recognised the annexation of the Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania by the Soviet Union in 1940 nor did they recognise the non-democratically elected governments of Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and the other Eastern Bloc countries as legitimate. Through the CSCE process, the Soviet Union and its allies sought formal recognition of these via the original and subsequent CSCE Charters; and this was reflected in the quality and specific nature of the demands they made in the negotiations leading up to the agreements. In line with the ‘rival bloc’ model, the main Soviet motives and goals for the CSCE have thus been described, inter alia, as:

To have the Western and other states accept the existing frontiers in Europe; to legitimise the existence of the German Democratic Republic (GDR); to acquire a droit de regard on Western European affairs; to preserve the Soviet hegemonic position in Eastern Europe and to have this fact recognised at least indirectly by the West; to drive a wedge between the United States and Western Europe, limiting United States influence. . .to counteract the strengthening and consolidation of the West; to weaken EEC integration; to demilitarise the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG); [and] to gain economic and technological benefits from cooperation with the West. (Heraclides 1993, p.126)

Interestingly, however, there are few archival records which have been kept of early CSCE negotiations where more careful analysis of the details of the discussions (comprehensive minutes, transcripts, etc) is possible. This has much to do with the informal nature of the CSCE as an occasional ‘conference’ with few institutional resources (human, financial, etc) at its disposal. Until it became the OSCE in the early 1990s, it had little institutional memory and documents were scattered in the different national ministries. Only since 1993 has there been an ‘OSCE archive’ where comprehensive historic records are kept. This makes the task of evaluating the history of the CSCE all the more difficult. (OSCE 2002)
From the beginning, the United States has frequently been viewed as the least interested Western member of the CSCE. It attached little significance to the results achieved and instead relied on and stressed the West's NATO alliance for the maintenance of its security interests in Europe. (Holsti 1984) It was at best ambivalent in its pressing of various issues in the CSCE, only occasionally lending its weight to human rights questions. In the early years, under the influence of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and his doctrine of realpolitik, the CSCE was used more by the U.S. as a bargaining chip for Soviet concessions in other areas than for anything else. That is not to say that, when engaged with the CSCE, American diplomats did not pursue U.S. underlying interests as much as they could. Far from it, as most OSCE observers attest to, the American-led Western Bloc relished the opportunity of a forum in which to embarrass the Soviet Union and its satellite states about their human rights record. But the larger question as regards the pursuit by both East and West of their opposing interests most often laced with animosity towards one another is how to reconcile this with the laudable vocabulary of 'détente' in which the CSCE process was officially couched.

The principle historic CSCE battle lines were thus drawn between the East’s defence of sovereign and territorial integrity and the West’s defence of human rights, with a few states maintaining more or less neutral positions in between. The East-West struggle over the contents of the Final Act, its principles and statements of intent, typical of the years of CSCE dialogue to follow, was excruciatingly contentious, cautious and technical, with endless debate over the subtleties of wording and even punctuation. This battle was an outright result of the clearly incommensurable overall interests and aims of the two blocs. On the Soviet side, the ultimate objective was to "strengthen not diminish...the separate political-economic systems of Europe's two halves." (Legvold 1983, p.387) The ultimate objective of the Western side, meanwhile, was nothing less than the dismantling and defeat of one-half of Europe's two halves: the Communist halve. For the West, the only acceptable long-term outcome was one system: democracy; and, as will be seen, it pursued this goal through the CSCE by pressuring for an international human rights agenda.

The end result in the Final Act was less a measure of either commensurability or compromise and more a measure of contradiction. The last section of this chapter will consider the extent to which participating states were in fact successful at pursuing (or failed to pursue) their broad individual interests through the CSCE. For despite the evident tensions in the CSCE process from its inception, it can be argued that—however 'thinly'—the CSCE ultimately

197 Other Western European state's policies have ranged from positions of neutrality to a strongly persistent interest in the CSCE process and outcomes and an ardent pursuit of the human rights dimension from the very beginning. (Vincent 1974)

198 On the issue of human rights, for example, Ignatieff writes that: "From 1948 until the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, there were two...cultures in the world—socialist and capitalist—one giving primacy to social
succeeded in contributing over the long term to 'managing' Cold War risks, especially through establishment of several generations of Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs), each increasing in their scope and sophistication.

Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs)

As has been looked at in Sections 2.2 and 4.2, 'confidence building measures' were formally promoted and adopted for the first time by the CSCE in 1975. (Lodgaard 1986) The foundations of the CSCE's CBM regime were originally established as part of 'Basket I' of the Helsinki Final Act. The member states at the time came to agreement on the application of measures designed "to contribute to reducing the dangers of armed conflict and of misunderstanding or miscalculation of military activities which could give rise to apprehension, particularly in a situation where the participating States lack clear and timely information." (OSCE 2000a, p.66) This first generation of confidence-building measures (or CSBMs as they subsequently came to be known) were described as prior notification of major military manoeuvres and movements; exchange of observers; and other confidence-building measures, such as the exchange of military personnel. (OSCE 2000) Ki-Joon's chart on the next page provides a useful summary of this first generation of as well as the two subsequent generations of CSBMs: (1997, pp.96-7)

and economic rights—the other putting civil and political rights first. Sterile polemics between these two made a genuinely global human rights culture impossible." (1999, p.138)

199 The original Helsinki CBMs dealt with the normal activities of conventional ground forces in Europe and did not make any restrictions on the number or types of forces. As such, they can be can considered a form of 'operational arms control.' This in contrast with the 'structural arms control' of other agreements such as the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) which involved mutual reductions in the amounts of troops and weapons. (Ben-Horin 1986)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Application zone</strong></th>
<th><strong>First generation Helsinki CSBM s (1975)</strong></th>
<th><strong>Second generation Stockholm CSBM s (1986)</strong></th>
<th><strong>Third Generation Vienna CSBM s (1990)</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>European territory, extending 250 km into the USSR and Turkey</td>
<td>The whole of Europe, extending 250 km into Turkey and the adjoining sea and air space</td>
<td>Not changed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Degree of enforceability</strong></td>
<td>Observation and prior notification of military movements are of a voluntary nature</td>
<td>All provisions are politically binding</td>
<td>Not changed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Notification threshold</strong></td>
<td>25,000 troops, independently or combined with any possible air or naval components</td>
<td>Ground forces: 13000 troops or 300 tank battalions; Amphibious landings: 3000 troops; Parachute assaults: 3000 troops; Air forces: 200 sorties;</td>
<td>Not changed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Activities covered</strong></td>
<td>Confined to manoeuvres, incl. movements at parties' discretion</td>
<td>Agreed military activities, incl. Exercises, movements and transfer of troops from outside to the zone</td>
<td>Not changed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Prior notification period</strong></td>
<td>At least 21 days, no annual calendar</td>
<td>At least 42 days, with annual calendar and 2 year forecast</td>
<td>Not changed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Observation threshold</strong></td>
<td>Not specified</td>
<td>Ground forces: 17000 troops; Amphibious landings: 5000 troops; Parachute assaults: 5000 troops</td>
<td>Not changed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Observation</strong></td>
<td>Left to the discretion of the inviting state</td>
<td>Detailed specification of host country obligations and observer rights</td>
<td>Improved safety for observers; provided an aerial survey; permitted equal access to media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constraints</strong></td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Time constraint: activities with &gt;40000 troops and &gt;75000 troops not permitted unless notification is given 1 and 2 years in advance, respectively</td>
<td>Lowered from 75,000 to 40,000 troops for exercises that require two years' advance notice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Verification</strong></td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Each state must accept up to three obligatory on-site inspections, excluding inspection within the same alliance on the ground, from the air or both</td>
<td>Included inspection within the same alliance; Evaluation mechanism; Annual implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Information on military budgets</strong></td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Annual exchange of information on military budgets for the forthcoming year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Risk reduction mechanism</strong></td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Establishment of CPC; Reporting of unusual military activities &amp; hazardous incidents of a military nature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Military contacts</strong></td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Visits to air bases at peacetime locations; Exchanges between</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Christopher Berzins

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Communications</th>
<th>None</th>
<th>None</th>
<th>Computerised communications network</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Chart 4: First, Second and Third Generation CSBMs**

The second stage in the development of the OSCE's CBMs was initiated with a review of CBMs at the CSCE meeting in Madrid from 1980-83. This meeting called for the improvement and broadening of the scope of CBMs, to be negotiated through a Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) and Disarmament in Europe, more commonly called the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE), as was originally proposed by the French (emphasis added). This conference took place in Stockholm from 1984-86, the outcome of which was the Stockholm Document.\(^\text{200}\) The most significant contribution of the Stockholm Document was the establishment of the requirement for 'compulsory' inspections.\(^\text{201}\) The third phase in the development of the CSCE's CSBM regime occurred at the follow-up meeting held in Vienna from 1986-89. This meeting called for further negotiations on CSBMs to be held at the same time as the negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). In 1990, these negotiations resulted in the Vienna Document.\(^\text{202}\)

As Desjardins notes, from a theoretical perspective, explanations of confidence building processes have invariably been vague and general:

*The specific elements which constitute, contribute or trigger a particular confidence-building process are not usually acknowledged. The idea is perpetually discussed in the abstract.* (Desjardins 1996, p.44)

Moreover, as was seen earlier, the first writers on CBMs such as Holst and Alford have cautioned that, in terms of the dense number of inter-related military, political, social and cultural factors which potentially contribute to the development of trust, CBMs can play but a minor role overall. Their 'catalytic' influence should not be over-estimated. (Holst 1983; Alford

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\(^\text{200}\) Adopted in 1996. The objective of the Stockholm negotiations and the final agreement has been described as promoting a sense of predictability and mutual understanding about the routine military activities of member states. (Ben-Horin 1986)

\(^\text{201}\) As per the above chart, the Stockholm Document also strengthened other key provisions of the Helsinki Final Act related to CSBMs. For example, the thresholds were significantly reduced: the time-frames were extended for the prior notification of certain military activities; for the invitation of observers; and for the exchange of annual calendars of planned military activities. According to the OSCE handbook: "Due to the improvements and the widened scope, these measures were seen as the 'second generation' of CSBMs." (OSCE 2000, p.96)

\(^\text{202}\) In the post-Cold War period, arms control talks—particularly on the CFE Treaty and the Open Skies Treaty—continued, despite the changed security environment, with the former signed in 1990 between the two blocs and the latter in 1992.
In other words, the presence—and even exacerbation—of distrust alongside any confidence which does develop out of CBMs, given the dense network of trust relations between states, is quite possible. This, indeed, appears to be the case when one considers the history and context of the 'original' CBMs. At a time of pervasive distrust between superpower camps (when more substantial arms control negotiations were impossible to negotiate), these CBMs served as the 'lowest common denominator' in terms of what little multilateral risk management was possible. As has been discussed, this involved increasing 'predictability' in normal patterns of military activity, thus allowing states to confirm the absence (or limited presence) of certain threats. Moreover, the CBM regime managed to survive—and even expand—after the original period of détente, despite the breakdown of broader superpower relations (sometimes called the Second Cold War) a few years later, and into the period of entente in the mid-1980s and the eventual end of the Cold War.

The first generation of CBMs were largely designed to reduce the danger of surprise attack, embodying the idea that prior notification takes away the ability to use military manoeuvres as threats (coercive taunts) towards particular states. (Holst 1997) From this perspective, the first generation of CBMs might be better understood as 'threat inhibiting' rather than confidence building. However, as Chart 4 indicates, an evolution in the substance and scope of CBMs is clearly evident as the second and third generations can be seen to have gone farther than the first in deliberate efforts at building confidence (through the establishment and implementation of mechanisms of reassurance, exchange of information, verification, etc). A number of important factors clearly limited the risk management capacity of the CSCE's CBM regime, such as the inability to enforce them and their modest scope compared to broader arms control (arms reduction) agreements. Nevertheless, their very survival suggest the value—however modest—that state leaders and particularly the military attributed to them for helping to secure state interests. As such—and following the trust model set out in Chapter 6—it can be argued that they played a contributing (yet insufficient) role in building trust between states. As will be explored in Chapter 8, it is more questionable the extent to which CSCE-style CBMs can play an even further expanded role given the more diverse and complex risk management demands of the post-Cold War era.
7.3 Managing an Adversarial Relationship

"The delegation believes in the importance of words"
—American delegation to the Helsinki Conference, 1975

In this section, following the trust model, the CSCE’s relationship management dimension is considered. In particular, the role the CSCE process played in increasing but not necessarily improving communication between member states is looked at. Its role in setting out—at least in rhetorical terms—common goals for European security is also looked at. Lastly, the CSCE’s far from straightforward contribution to engraining shared values and a collective identity among its member states is considered. For what is perhaps most striking about the history of the CSCE—and which stands out immediately given the proposed trust model—is the manifestly confrontational and coercive atmosphere of CSCE talks which participants and observers have recorded. This is despite, in principle at least, the free choosing of all states to participate and the freedom of all participating states to agree or to disagree and ultimately whether or not to sign the Final Act. (Heraclides 1993; Holsti 1984; Vincent 1974; Ignatieff 1999) Even more notably, this confrontational atmosphere prevailed despite the highly-vaunted words of goodwill formally expressed as the ‘raison d’être’ of the CSCE. The challenge for the trust model is thus to show how, despite the evident animosity, the CSCE’s relationship management dimension nevertheless contributed in the long term to the conditions which eventually allowed the Cold War to end peacefully.

Communication

The nature of the communication between participating states in the CSCE process—its frequency, openness, intensity and scope—can be seen as an important dynamic in the role the CSCE played in efforts towards encouraging détente between East and West. Stefane Lehne writes, “The CSCE process helped to preserve dialogue and a minimum of cooperation in times of tension, in particular during the renewed Cold War at the beginning of the 1980s.” (1991, p.5) But Lehne also reminds that “At the same time, it served as one of the most important forums for the ideological struggle between East and West...while serving as a constant reminder to the East that a full normalization of relations would require fundamental internal reforms.” (ibid.) From the beginning, the CSCE process served to increase the frequency of contacts between member states at times when real peace and cooperation was only a distant hope. Indeed, one of the founding premises of the CSCE was that increasing the breadth of communications, via a forum for debate, might serve in a small way to reduce tensions between the two Cold War camps. In the early days of the CSCE’s existence, the rationale was that if no

\[^{203}\text{Heraclides (1993).}\]
other form of peace promotion was possible—for example via significant arms reductions—then if nothing else, an increase in the frequency of contacts might serve a stabilising and possibly even constructive function.204 (Heraclides 1993) As Ghébali, who by no means views the history of the CSCE through rose-coloured glasses, writes,

Until 1989, the CSCE had served as a means of communication between countries whose relationships had been characterised by alternating periods of extreme tension and ambiguous détente. Slowly and unobtrusively, yet effectively, it introduced a number of qualitative changes into international relations in Europe. (Ghébali 1991, p.8)

In addition to frequent communication, the CSCE process encouraged ‘open’ communication between participating states. Openness is a broad parameter, which can be realised in many forms, from formal meetings, which review the rules/terms of the relationship, to more informal forms of dialogue where participants debate and inevitably argue over, negotiate and finally agree to the terms of the relationship. Such dialogue may be not just over the status of the terms but also the particular issues or events which fall under the terms. As a forum for dialogue between member states, the CSCE is perhaps the classic example of a facet of international relations where the emphasis, above everything, is placed on open communication. Indeed, for most of its history, the CSCE was less an operational instrument of cooperation than a forum for ‘considering’ cooperation in the light of the broad concerns of security, peace and stability which its remit encompassed. (Ghébali 1991, p.9) However, despite the CSCE’s historic record of promoting frequent and more open dialogue among all participating states, any direct translation of this into a ‘trust-building capacity’ would be mistaken. As Lehne summarises, “the CSCE has been both an instrument of détente policy, as well as a forum of East-West confrontation.” (1991, xi) Other scholars are less generous than this, claiming, as Kalevi J. Holsti has, that the CSCE has “been a source of international conflict, not a mechanism for either coping with it or transcending it.” (1984, p.164) Indeed, during the Cold War period, commentators such as Alexei G. Arbatov, a Soviet IR scholar writing in Pravda in the 1970s, lamented that “the purpose of the CSCE should be a comparison of ideas and facts and a dispute over the intrinsic values of a particular system and must not be turned into a conscious incitement of distrust and hostility, the falsification of reality or, least of all, subversive activity.”205 (1977, p.1) Heraclides observes, nonetheless, that such confrontation was ‘instrumental’ in that it put the Soviet Union in the dock as never before in an intergovernmental gathering. This initiation of ‘criticism’ (of the Soviets for failing to implement their agreements) came to be seen as part and parcel of the CSCE and rendered

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204 The way in which communication between CSCE participating states was eventually transformed from an intermittent and indeterminate ‘conference’ process into a permanent ‘institution’ is considered in Chapter 8.
human rights issues tangibly a legitimate international concern and not exclusively an internal affair. (Heraclides 1993, p.10) As will be reviewed shortly, this, in turn, paved the way for the CSCE’s ‘Human Dimension’ in the 1980s and contributed eventually to the revolutionary events of 1989.

Quotes about the CSCE’s history, such as the above, point to the invariable ‘relativity’ of specific relationship management measures such as the encouragement of frequent and open communication. That is, as the record shows, depending very much on the context, frequent and open communication can be used as a tool for increasing hostility as much as for contributing to enhancing trust. In the case of the CSCE, the forum for debate, ostensibly constructive, was most often held hostage to narrow ideological goals; namely, as a wedge by the American (Western) camp to embarrass the Soviets on human rights and by the Soviet (Eastern) camp to push for full recognition of their own international legitimacy.206

**Common Goals**

The set of common issues and concerns that the CSCE process sought to identify and address and the way they were linked together in negotiation, agreement and follow-on dialogue was unique to international relations. As Ghébali notes, the CSCE process extended the pan-European dialogue from the sphere of economics (that is to say, from the sole area of debate offered by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe) to political, military, ecological and humanitarian issues...The CSCE is singular in terms of its comprehensive mandate, which embraces (these as well as) scientific technological social and cultural spheres. (1991, p.8,10) As Lehne intriguingly notes further:

Arms control, for example, is a matter of trust; this trust, in turn, is obviously closely related to the legitimacy of a government and the way it treats its people. The entire CSCE process was based on this intrinsic inter-relationship between security, human rights and cooperation.207 (1991, p.15)

The Helsinki Final Act called for three broad areas of activity, which fell under what were labeled ‘baskets.’ Basket I encompassed the politico-military aspects of security; that is, the ‘Decalogue’ of principles guiding relations between states as well as military confidence-building measures. Basket II encompassed cooperation in the fields of science and technology and the environment. Finally, Basket III encompassed cooperation in humanitarian and other

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206 Since 1993, Arbatov has been a member of the Russian State Duma and since 1997, Deputy Chairman of the Defence Committee of the Duma. (Arbatov 1977; Vincent 1974, p.69)

207 Nor, as has been discussed in the previous section, was the CSCE necessarily always taken seriously, particularly by the Americans who often appeared to be the party the least interested in the process, preferring other avenues of political influence. (Vincent 1974)

207 As will be seen in Chapter 8, The OSCE today addresses specific security issues in a way that also promotes common ends, including via arms control, preventive diplomacy, confidence and security
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fields, a formula covering human rights issues under the headings of 'human contacts', 'information', 'cooperation in the field of culture' and 'cooperation in the field of education'.\textsuperscript{208} The overarching common goal of member states to promote 'comprehensive security' meant that each of these baskets was viewed as interlinked with the others. This meant, at least in principle, that

the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, along with economic and environmental cooperation [were] considered to be just as important for the maintenance of peace and stability as politico-military issues and as such [were] an integral component of CSCE activities. Furthermore, the various aspects of security [were] seen as interconnected and interdependent—security [was] regarded as indivisible. (ibid., pp.1-2)

This interlinking of security goals (through the concept of comprehensive security) within the gamut of a single, integrated forum for dialogue and cooperation between participating states actors was the defining feature of the CSCE process. However, in the Cold War era, it can be argued that this was overshadowed by the ulterior self-interested objectives of the superpower rivals. As will be elaborated in the remainder of this chapter, the linkage of common security goals with international norms, such as the protection of human rights, contributed only in an 'indirect' fashion to the conditions which permitted the peaceful transition to the Post Cold-War era.

\textit{Values and Identity}

Despite the frequently high blown rhetoric, the CSCE process had little success during the Cold War era in establishing any 'genuine' set of shared values and collective identity between East and West. If anything, it served to sharpen opposing value systems and identities. Such contradiction is evidenced from the outset in the CSCE's founding principles. For example, the Helsinki Final Act asserted both the principle of 'non-intervention in the internal affairs of states' and the principle that 'respect for universal human rights and fundamental freedoms is of concern to all states'. While still upholding the principle of non-intervention, later CSCE documents have taken the human rights principle further, declaring that "gross violations of human rights cannot be regarded as the internal affair of any state." (Gyarmati 1998; OSCE 1995)\textsuperscript{209} This, in other words, suggests an obligation on the part of the international community to involve itself in the internal affairs of a state that fails to uphold the human rights of its citizens. As the historical overview in this chapter has indicated, during the early years of détente between East and West, the Soviet Bloc, looking to establish its legitimacy in the world, particularly that of East Germany, pressed hard on issues of sovereignty and non-intervention.

\textsuperscript{208} It also included a specific set of recommendations related to Mediterranean issues.

\textsuperscript{209} See http://www.osce.org/odihr/documents/oscecommitments.pdf [01/11/2003].
The West, hoping to support the Soviet dissident movement and promote democratic change, pressed hard on human rights issues.\textsuperscript{210} Thus, the CSCE, up until the closing moments of the Cold War certainly did not produce any real clarity in values and identity.\textsuperscript{211}

In short, while Adler’s conception of mutual trust, for example, stresses cooperation through the shared values of freedom, equality and non-coercion, the CSCE process demonstrates that the ‘formal’ and ‘rhetorical’ evidence of such values do not necessarily reflect the latent reality of the political atmosphere.\textsuperscript{212} That is to say, goals and values which are stated explicitly are not necessarily the goals and values which prevail implicitly. In fact, academics have gone so far as to suggest that ultimately, “the CSCE has been a source of international conflict, not a mechanism for either coping with it or transcending it.” (Holsti 1984, p.164) Even the late human rights theorist R.J. Vincent concluded that “the CSCE was not only a dreary diplomatic conference, but worse. . .fanned the flames of the Cold War with remarkable abandon.” (quoted in Heraclides 1993, p.145)

Despite these important caveats, the common values and identity that were espoused at Helsinki and thereafter served in an intriguingly ‘indirect’ fashion to help create the conditions which allowed a peaceful transition to the post-Cold War period. As Daniel C. Thomas has elucidated powerfully in his book, ‘The Helsinki Effect’, the CSCE agreements provided an important platform for Eastern bloc human rights groups to challenge their governments to change. (2001) In addition to their vested interest in normalising political relations with the West as already discussed, the communist regimes, led by the Soviet Union, faced an additional pressure to increase trade and the transfer of technology from the West in order to boost the stalled communist economies. The communist regimes pursued these interests through the CSCE process and signed the Helsinki Act, which, to their dislike, also contained significant human rights norms. These were a compromise with the West for the other Helsinki norms, including non-intervention in internal affairs and increased economic and technological cooperation. Thomas argues that the communist authorities, apparently at the highest political levels, decided that the risks associated with agreeing to these human rights norms was tolerable.\textsuperscript{213} Where the communist leaders miscalculated, however, was in the determination of

\textsuperscript{210} When challenged by the West about its human rights record, the East countered with a defense of its sovereignty over its own internal affairs, and vice-versa.

\textsuperscript{211} As Holsti has written of the first conference at Helsinki, “uncertainty, ambiguity, shifting interests and improvisations were the rule.” (1984, p.57)

\textsuperscript{212} For example, given that ‘non-coercion’ was the CSCE’s \textit{modus operandi}, it is telling that Alex Heraclides has written that: “When we examine the real world of multilateral CSCE negotiations, matters are not as ideal. . .Participating states have often had to accept commitments they detest (and have tried to avoid implementing them), because they found themselves in a minority of one, or of two or three, or in bad company say with Ceausescu’s Romania), or because they lack convincing arguments.” (1993, p.184)

\textsuperscript{213} This is because the Helsinki norms were sufficiently vague; because the East could always argue for the greater importance of the norms of non-intervention (which they, indeed, did for decades with great gusto); because these norms were only ‘politically’ binding and therefore could not be enforced; and
opposition forces ‘within’ their own countries to mobilise in support of human rights and democracy. According to Thomas, the West ‘responded’ to the extraordinary efforts of these dissidents and gradually, albeit often reluctantly, brought human rights issues to the centre of their relations with the East. (ibid.)

The CSCE follow-up meetings provided the perfect venue for which to press the case for human rights, as states were forced to defend their ‘compliance’ with the Helsinki norms. Dissident groups across the Soviet Union and its satellite states organised Helsinki Monitoring Groups, which recorded and reported systematic violations of Helsinki norms on the part of their governments—which the West then took up at CSCE meetings on their behalf. Moreover, social rights and democracy movements, such as Solidarity in Poland and Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia made overt reference to Helsinki norms in their founding documents and statements, which the communist governments could hardly disagree with, since they themselves had publicly agreed to these same norms. As such, they were often reluctant to crack down on these dissident groups, like they had done so readily—and with such force—in the past, because of their vested interest in maintaining the legitimacy of their international agreements. In a sense, the East bloc regimes became stuck between eliminating the internal threat to their authority and pursuing the international legitimacy they so desperately desired by at least giving the appearance of living up to the agreements they made at Helsinki. But, as the historical record indicates, these groups did frequently come under the heavy hand of the communist authorities. As R.J. Vincent notes of this struggle, “Saddest of all, in terms of what the West wanted from the Helsinki process, has been the harassment, arrest, exile and imprisonment of members of Helsinki Monitoring Groups in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.” (1974, pp.67-8) Nevertheless, the authorities held back from the absolute crackdowns so familiar before.\textsuperscript{214} Importantly, they refused to abandon in principle the complete set of norms they had negotiated and agreed to through the CSCE. And when the tide of change gathered momentum and rushed over Europe in the late 1980s, CSCE values were held up even more prominently by revolutionary movements and provided the legitimacy under which the mass mobilisation—and eventual democratic transformation of the East—was able to take place largely without violence.

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\textsuperscript{214} Where the communist authorities did intervene to quell dissident uprisings they did so with more restraint and less decisiveness.
7.4 Reasonable Doubt

"It was the dual character of the CSCE as both an instrument of détente and as an agent for systemic change which kept it alive and relevant in a changing East-West climate."215

As has been explored thus far, the CSCE process offered member states a permanent channel of communication, a forum for the pursuit of shared security goals and was based on a set of international norms unparalleled in their scope that all member states recognised and agreed to abide by. (OSCE 2000, p.10) As Ghébali writes,

In the first place, the CSCE multilateralised, or to put it another way, Europeanised East-West relations, which, in general, had been little more than a tête-à-tête between the superpowers. Secondly, it transcended the bloc to bloc mentality, enabling the neutral and non-aligned countries to develop their role as full participants and as independent mediators in a world normally presented as black and white. (Ghébali 1991, p.8)

Moreover, as will be considered closely in the next chapter, the transformation of the CSCE into the OSCE in the early 1990s involved significant expansion of its operational remit and deepening of its normative basis. The transformation of the CSCE at the end of the Cold War reflected the ascendancy of human rights and especially democratic ideology over communism. But was this apparent ideological convergence between West and East the result of gradually increasing trust? Or did it represent the final defeat of the East by the West after 50 years of deep distrust, coercion and barely restrained hostility? As has been pointed out, there is a fair deal of evidence that points towards the latter. From the earliest days of the CSCE, it was the vehement confrontation between the East and West ostensibly over non-implementation of CSCE commitments (particularly of human rights commitments by the Soviets) which made up the substance of CSCE meetings. Despite the CSCE’s vaunted claims of open dialogue in a forum where all participating states were free to voice their concerns, this ideal was rarely the reality.216 And until the closing moments of the Cold War, the CSCE clearly served primarily as a vehicle for struggle.

In the larger theoretical part of this thesis I have taken pains to elaborate a model of trust that, while grounded in specific individual interests and shared norms, in the final analysis involves an overall judgement.217 This judgement invariably takes into account the broader context in terms of evidence of the other’s interests and motives and the relationship that has developed or decayed over time. Paradoxically the inverse of a court of common law, the trustor

216 As Heraclides highlights, “in practice, in the real world of CSCE negotiations, member states often had to accept commitments they detested, particularly on human rights. Moreover, they consequently often avoided implementing these decisions and/or dodged monitoring by NGOs and other states”. (1993, p.21)
must judge whether there is ‘reasonable doubt’ or whether to trust and give the other the ‘benefit of the doubt’. The historic record of the CSCE drawn on in this chapter suggests that, overall, CSCE member states and particularly East and West blocs maintained ‘reasonable doubt’ towards one another during the Cold War. After all, despite the embryonic risk and relationship management activities pursued through the CSCE, East and West were engaged in exactly that, a cold ‘war’, and hence deeply distrustful of each other. Following the trust model, some of the ‘building blocks’ of trust may have been put in place through the CSCE. But given the hostile wider environment which frequently undermined and/or contradicted these both within and beyond the CSCE process, member states were, in the final analysis, unprepared to make the ‘leap’ to trust.

Nevertheless, the CSCE led to a transformation of the values which participating states were prepared to recognise—however grudgingly and duplicitously—as shared. The corresponding expansion of issues for debate between East and West via the CSCE process legitimised new areas for international discussion, especially human rights. In the short term, this exacerbated relations between East and West as they confronted one another over compliance with their international agreements. In the long-term, however, this struggle provided a ‘legitimate’ platform around which dissident groups in the East could mobilise. In a paradoxically indirect fashion, the international legitimacy of the CSCE provided normative grounding which contributed to the eventual peaceful transition to the post Cold-War era. Indeed, in the dying days of the Cold War, the CSCE’s modus operandi of ‘normative legitimacy as conflict prevention’ began to take a more concrete form via ‘the Vienna Mechanism’, foretelling the CSCE’s post-Cold War institutional and operational development. The Vienna mechanism was invoked some seventy times during the dramatic events of 1989, including to secure the release of Vaclav Havel. ‘Multilateral political obligations under the CSCE’ were also cited by the Hungarian government for opening its borders in September 1989, allowing the citizens of East Germany to travel freely to the West and precipitating the fall of the Berlin Wall.

Trust Ethics and the CSCE Process

As was seen in Chapter 5, Baier’s first ethical trust test poses the question: Would the knowledge of what the trusted other relies on for the continuance of the relationship, if uncovered by the trustor, lead to the damage or destruction of the relationship? Since the

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217 This in turn involves an idiosyncratic blend of specific reasoning and looser sentiment.
218 And one which raises some intriguing questions about the interplay of state and civil society in the fostering of trust in international relations.
219 In 1989, at the CSCE Vienna Follow-up Meeting, member states agreed to a ‘human dimension mechanism.’ The mechanism allowed any member state, through an established set of procedures, to raise questions relating to the human dimension situation in another OSCE state. (OSCE 2000)
evidence in this chapter has indicated that CSCE interstate relationships during the Cold War
cannot be characterised in any broad sense as 'trusting', the question of the 'ethical merits' of
any such trust obviously do not arise. Nevertheless, in the interest of further fleshing out the
theoretical considerations of Chapter 5, in this section, I consider 'hypothetically' here some of
the 'real-world' conditions under which such judgements would have to be made; that is, some
of the practical conundrums of considering the ethical dimensions of trust in international
relations. This lays the ground for Chapter 8, where Baier's second trust test is looked at,
particularly in the context of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission and the role of the OSCE
in the context of a broader range of interstate and non-state relationships.

So how, following Baier, might it be objectively determined whether the evident mix of
coercive and constructive (and ambiguous) elements in the CSCE relationship between East and
West was something that both blocs were fully aware of and acquiescent to? Put another way,
what kinds of reliance, including on 'threats' and 'deceptions' would 'hypothetically' have
proven unacceptable to CSCE member states and hence damaging or destructive to their trusting
relationships? Baier reminds us that, at least as concerns her first test, there is nothing ethically
wrong with a trust relationship that is based on less than noble premises, provided that all
parties are fully cognisant and accepting of all its premises. Furthermore, Baier stresses the
ethical questionability of trust relationships which rely upon threats and cover-ups of breaches
of trust. It has been shown in this chapter that with respect to superpower relations within the
CSCE, the use of threat as a method of interaction was less prevalent at least compared to the
overall Cold War context of arms races and ideological confrontation; but it was nevertheless
still present in various direct and frequently indirect guises. Certainly, there were many
instances in the CSCE process where some states were cajoled, if not outright coerced into
agreeing to specific terms or taking specific actions. And both superpower camps did their best
to maximise their self-interests. Nevertheless, 'threat' was never the 'defining' feature of the
CSCE; and the CSCE was one of the few areas where some degree of closer interaction and
diplomatic negotiation was possible. This, after all, was the principal idea behind détente.

There no doubt were cover-ups and more narrow breaches of 'confidence' within the
CSCE process, as a cursory glance at the evidence suggests; and it is more than likely that far
more actually occurred, since the very nature of a cover-up tends to lead to its being hidden
from the historical record, sometimes forever. This is perhaps the methodological Achilles'
Heel of Baier's ethics of trust, since in evaluating illustrative studies such as the CSCE, where
the relationship, despite highs and lows, has persevered and evolved, one can only speculate
about what different outcomes the revelation of cover-ups might have resulted in. The
simplest, but by no means entirely satisfying, way around this methodological dilemma is to
consider the extent to which the specific details of such cover-ups are beside the point. That is, the extent to which, in general, the parties to the trust relationship—at least, for example, in the limited context of the CSCE—willingly took these cover-ups for granted—and nevertheless continued with the relationship.\textsuperscript{222} One can consider, for example, that the CSCE process did move forward (and the OSCE as an institution has evolved) and that this is some indication at the very least that the terms of the CSCE relationship were ultimately accepted by the political leadership of the member states, despite the invariable presence of threats and cover-ups.\textsuperscript{223}

It is important to remember, however, that the ethical evaluation of the CSCE process does not (even ‘hypothetically’) pose the question of whether or not any such trust relations can be seen to have developed or not between participating states. Baier is clear, after all, that both moral and immoral trust relationships can exist and even flourish. So the evaluation of the CSCE in the context of Baier’s first moral test for trust would not negate the evidence suggesting the presence of trust if it could be shown to have developed. Rather, it would offer an ethical interpretation of these trust bonds.\textsuperscript{224} In the last part of Chapter 8, I consider more broadly the ethical dimensions of the present-day OSCE’s trust building capacity, particularly in the context of Baier’s second ethical trust test.

\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{221} This necessary employment of ‘counterfactual reasoning’ for Baier’s first trust test is similar to Larson’s exploration of trust and ‘missed opportunities’ in international relations. (1997)}

\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{222} This, in some ways, though, is still as complicated a question, for it raises the problem of how minor or infrequent such threats and cover-ups need to be for ‘willing’ trust to still be ethical. How thin can Baier’s trust be before it loses its ethical content? Or put the other way, if such cover-ups and breaches are willingly accepted, how major do they have to be before the ethical content of the trust is lost? How ‘thick’ must ethical trust be?}

\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{223} Less can be said, for example, of the end of the Soviet empire, where decade after decade of repressive threats held by Soviet authorities over its people, as well as the rampant corruption which can be equated with innumerable cover-ups of breaches of trust eventually contributed to its dissolution.}

\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{224} That is, it would evaluate the ethical quality of these trust bonds, not the factors favouring their presence.}
8. The OSCE's Trust Building Role

"The OSCE stands today between force and diplomacy"
—Madeleine Albright, U.S. Secretary of State\textsuperscript{225}

\textsuperscript{225} Quoted in McGoldrick (1995).
8.1 The OSCE: Comprehensive Security

In 1990, the CSCE’s *Charter of Paris for a New Europe* officially and multilaterally declared the end of the Cold War and the institutionalisation of the CSCE. Five institutional bodies were established (and provision made for a sixth, a CSCE Parliamentary Assembly).\(^2\)\(^2\)\(^6\) And in 1992, the CSCE declared itself to be a regional security arrangement in the sense of Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter.\(^2\)\(^2\)\(^7\) In 1994, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe formally changed its name to the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Today, OSCE commitments are the most comprehensive collection of norms and values regulating interstate behaviour and forming the basis of democratic societies, all agreed to by consensus between member states. (OSCE 2000) The OSCE seeks to apply cooperative, comprehensive and non-coercive methods of advice, assistance, dialogue and mediation to promote peaceful dispute resolution, human rights, democracy and the rule of law. As will be seen, the main advantage of the OSCE over other security forums has been described as its inclusiveness and its flexibility. (Borawski 1986) Moreover, with the dramatic shift in security concerns in Europe since 1989 from interstate to intrastate conflict, the OSCE has managed to adapt and to continue to develop new mechanisms for preventing conflict while maintaining the principle of open dialogue and consensus.

It is useful by way of introduction to the analysis in this chapter to roughly categorise the major structures and activities of the OSCE in terms of the trust model’s dual components: risk and relationship management. As will become apparent, the OSCE is not nearly as effective in some areas as it is in others. The OSCE’s capacity to accomplish each of the ten principal tasks specified by the trust model is outlined in *Charts 5 & 6* below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RISK MANAGEMENT</th>
<th>TASK</th>
<th>CAPACITY</th>
<th>EVALUATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Monitor behaviour</td>
<td>Expanded range of CBMs</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Evaluate intentions</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Reduce or off-set vulnerabilities</td>
<td>HCNM (includes monitoring and evaluating tasks)</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Establish deterrents</td>
<td>Reports of fact finding missions</td>
<td>Very weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Intervene against non-compliant behaviour</td>
<td>Absent (except for suspension of membership)</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Chart 5: Evaluating the OSCE’s Risk Management Function*

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\(^2\)\(^6\) In the Helsinki-II document of 1992 and in subsequent conferences, further institutions have been established.

\(^2\)\(^7\) For an overview of the role of the CSCE at the end of the Cold War, see Ghébali (1991); Cuthbertson (1992); Freeman (1991); and Lehne (1991).
The analysis that follows will seek to tease out in further detail the strengths and weaknesses of the OSCE’s trust-building capacity in terms of its risk and relationship management dimensions and the links between the two.\textsuperscript{228} However, the basic trust model does not say anything about the ethical merits of any such trust-building capacity. Thus, the snapshot of the OSCE’s institutions and activities taken here is also set against the criteria of Baier’s second trust test.\textsuperscript{229} The evidence gathered in this chapter suggests that the OSCE is uniquely influential in international relations because of its ‘droit de regard’—historically, normatively and to a growing extent operationally—on security issues which are principally ‘intrastate’ in nature yet continue to have significant interstate implications. (Ghebali 1991, p.35) However, the OSCE, despite the innovative array of mechanisms and institutions it has developed, is limited in ‘conflict resolution’ because of its ‘thin’ risk management capacity compared, for example, to NATO. It is likewise limited in ‘post-conflict rehabilitation’ because of it is ‘thin’ relationship management capacity compared, for example, to the EU (and also in certain respects the Council of Europe). Nevertheless, for the very reason that its capacity is thin—but still undeniably present—along both these dimensions, the OSCE excels at ‘conflict prevention’. Its weakness is thus its strength. Across the vast OSCE space and where other organisations falter or simply have no mandate, the OSCE helps to build a ‘thin’ form of trust between member states by operating at the intersection of risk and relationship management. As the last section of this chapter will elaborate, the lesson to be drawn is that the OSCE should seek to further align its mandate and operational goals not in the area of ‘thick’ risk management (e.g. conflict resolution, peace enforcement and peacekeeping) nor in the area of ‘thick’ relationship management (e.g. democratic and legal institution building) but rather, at the intersection of thin

\textsuperscript{228} It will also tentatively place this capacity in the context of the wider European security environment; that is, in terms of the OSCE’s place alongside the U.N., NATO and other European security arrangements.

\textsuperscript{229} Like the previous chapter on the CSCE, this chapter on the OSCE serves as an illustrative application of the trust model to an empirical case and by no means entails an exhaustive study of the OSCE.
risk and relationship management, where it continues to be uniquely suited to play a leading role.
8.2 Managing Post-Cold War Risks

The end of the Cold War brought with it shifting security concerns and a greater understanding of the diverse requirements of 'cooperative and comprehensive' security. Far from entering a period of relative stability, the CSCE was faced with new problems which were as challenging as they were unsettling and required new tools. The rise of internal conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, Moldova, the Caucasus and Tajikistan thus compelled the OSCE, in very a reactive fashion, to develop a conflict prevention and crisis management mandate. Despite frequently heroic efforts by OSCE missions staff, these new conflicts nevertheless starkly highlighted both the vulnerabilities which still existed in the post-Cold War European security environment and the OSCE's frequently glaring inability to effectively tackle them on its own. Noble normative assertions aside, the OSCE was largely helpless in the face of the brutal bloodshed occurring in the former Yugoslavia and in the Caucasus and threatening to spill over to other areas of Europe. In this section, the OSCE's risk management capacity is considered, following the trust model, in terms of its ability:

1) To monitor member states' politico-military activities through its expanding range of CSBMs;
2) To evaluate internal state security risks (e.g. ethno-nationalist conflict and human security risks) through the Human Dimension Mechanism, the High Commissioner for National Minorities (HCNM) and fact-finding missions;
3) To reduce risks, in however limited a way, through 'quiet diplomacy' (dialogue, recommendations, mediation) and long-term missions, such as the Assistance Group to Chechnya;
4 & 5) To operate jointly with other security organisations such as NATO and the U.N. which have the capacity to establish deterrents and intervene decisively.

Monitoring and Evaluating Risks: A Revolution in Military Confidence

While the OSCE in the 1990s primarily struggled to find ways to address the proliferation of new kinds of security risks in Europe, particularly at local and regional levels, it still found time to revisit and expand its traditional pan-European confidence and security building measures. Before looking at the OSCE's new risk management efforts aimed at conflict prevention and resolution in ethno-national hotspots, it is important to take into account the OSCE's continuing

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230 Hereafter, for simplicity, referred to as the OSCE (though as mentioned, the formal name change did not occur until 1994).
The Puzzle of Trust in IR

politico-military activities; that is, its role in mitigating overall military risks in the OSCE area. To begin, a second version of the Vienna Document of the Negotiations on Confidence and Security-Building Measures was produced in 1992. It was aimed at broadening the scope of information exchange and verification and introducing new communication and consultation measures, including points of contact for hazardous incidents of a military nature; a communications network able to transmit computerised information; and emergency meetings to clarify unusual military activities. (OSCE 2000) Member states also agreed to hold ‘Annual Implementation Assessment Meetings’ to discuss the implementation of CSBMs. Then in 1994 and again in 1999, the Vienna Document was expanded even further, introducing additional thresholds for notification and observation and provisions regarding defence planning and military contacts. (OSCE 2000a, p.67) Since the negotiation of these founding documents, regular dialogue on the further development of CSBMs has continued through the OSCE’s Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC).231

At the end of the 1990s, it seemed the OSCE’s confidence building regime—like the world of arms control more broadly—was destined to move off the front page of security issues for the foreseeable future.232 Across the OSCE area, the management of global military risks

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231 The FSC’s work is supported by the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC), established by the Charter of Paris. Today, the OSCE handbook describes the OSCE Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) as “provisions for the exchange and verification of information regarding the participating states’ armed forces and military activities, as well as certain mechanisms promoting cooperation among participating states in regard to military matters.” (OSCE 2000, p.16) The aim of these measures, according to the OSCE handbook is to promote mutual trust and dispel concern about military activities by encouraging openness and transparency. (emphasis added) CSBMs are described as including, inter alia:

- an annual exchange of military information;
- risk reduction measures (i.e. mechanism for consultation and cooperation as regards unusual military activities);
- provisions regarding military contacts and cooperation;
- prior notification of certain military activities;
- observation of certain military activities;
- exchange of annual calendars of military activities;
- constraining provisions on military activities;
- compliance and verification measures;
- a network of direct communications between the various capitals;
- annual implementation assessment meetings;
- a global exchange of military information;
- stabilizing measures for localized crisis situations;
- principles governing arms transfers. (OSCE 2000)

232 The mid-late 1990s and turn of the century also saw significant advances in the areas of the two treaties implemented under the auspices of the OSCE—the CFE and Open Skies treaties—in order to adapt them to the post-Cold War security environment. Between 1992 and 2002, nearly 4,000 on-site inspections were conducted under the CFE and more than 400 trial observational flights completed under Open Skies (CFE was adapted in 1999 and Open Skies finally came into force in 2002). (Dunay 2000, p.6) OSCE-supported CSBMs (based on the Vienna document and the CFE treaty) also played a significant role in the implementation of the 1996 Dayton Agreement that imposed peace in the former Yugoslavia. However, none of these—despite their connection with the OSCE—fall entirely under its multilateral remit—since they are based on legal treaties agreed to separately by some—but not all—OSCE member states.
Christopher Berzins

had generally been supplanted by more immediate security concerns associated with localised (or regionalised) outbreaks of nationalist, ethnic and religious violence. However, the terrorist attacks on the U.S. on Sept 11th, 2001 brought a renewed focus to the OSCE’s politico-military dimension. In recent years, a Code of Conduct on Political-Military Aspects of Security and a Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) have come into being with important information exchange requirements. In June 2003, the OSCE’s first Annual Security Review took place with a view, among others, of examining how the OSCE might best continue to adapt its CSBM regime to new security risks, of which terrorism stands out prominently.

The role that the OSCE’s confidence and security building measures have played—and continue to play—in the management of politico-military risks across the OSCE area should not be underestimated. It is in many ways to their credit that military risks such as those associated with accidents and incidents between the major powers have been sidelined. It is fair to say that across the OSCE area, confidence in the continuing successful management of conventional military risks—at a pan-OSCE level—is considerable. While this confidence does not directly translate into overall trust between member states, it is nevertheless an important part of the equation. In the next section, I consider the more problematic ‘intrastate’ risk management issues which the OSCE has sought to tackle over the last decade with more modest—and at times mediocre—success.

Preventive Diplomacy

As is well known, the end of the Cold War, though considerably diminishing the ‘immediate’ risk of large-scale military conflict in Europe, nevertheless ushered in a range of new security risks. In particular, the dissolution of the former communist regimes in the East opened up a floodgate of political movements towards ethnic and nationalist self-determination, which deteriorated quickly into conflict and bloodshed, especially in the Balkan and Caucasus regions. Where widespread violence did not result—such as in the newly independent Baltic States—political tensions regarding the status of minority groups were pervasive and threatened to worsen. The OSCE, like other European security arrangements (e.g. NATO, the U.N.) was abruptly confronted with these new security risks. And it made efforts to address them by

233 As mentioned in the previous footnote, in contrast to the OSCE’s CSBMs, arms control treaties which provide for substantive reductions in the military capacity of signatory states do not fall cleanly under the OSCE’s droit de regard (even though these treaties frequently incorporate corresponding CSBMs of their own which the OSCE may be involved in overseeing). Interestingly, while at first glance, such arms control treaties would seem to fall along the trust model’s risk management dimension, the trust model would in fact suggest that they fall primarily (or essentially) along the relationship management dimension. This is because, following the model’s ‘rule of thumb’, arms control treaties can be understood to essentially serve the purpose of reducing rather than increasing vigilance; or conversely, of increasing rather than reducing subjective vulnerability. Arms control treaties also point towards the role of international law in codifying trust relations between states. But as Chapters 3 and 6 have explored and as the conclusion will indicate, a satisfactory account of the bases of trust in law requires further normative development.
agreeing in a relatively short space of time (1990-92) to a set of normative, institutional and operational innovations that would come to define its role in the post-Cold War security architecture.

Before surveying these specific innovations aimed primarily at 'intrastate' security risks, it is worth analytically pointing out the 'internalisation' of risk management efforts here. The relevance of this to the trust model will be further explored in section four of this chapter. By way of preface, it is noted here that the result of this internalisation is that it moves risk management closer to relationship management; and in certain ways, it even causes it to overlap with relationship management. For while monitoring, evaluating and dealing with security risks is still the focus, it means that this takes place in a very particular normative context, where the internal security risks of one state are deemed—and treated—as legitimate security risks of other states. Without such normative relationship management, it would be impossible to conceive this 'interstate' role in 'intrastate' risk management. Where, as will be shown, the analytical distinction between risk and relationship management functions becomes necessarily more blurred, it is helpful to employ the model's 'rule of thumb' which harks back to the trust puzzle presented in the introduction of this thesis. That is, risk management efforts are those where the aim is primarily and in the first instance at achieving 'increased vigilance.' In contrast, relationship management efforts are aimed primarily and in the first instance at achieving conditions where 'greater vulnerability' is demanded. As will be shown, the preventive diplomacy efforts of the OSCE often employ varying degrees of each. Moreover, as the interstate-intrastate example above suggests, the two are symbiotic; neither could exist and persist in any meaningful sense without the other.

In the face of the outbreak of violence in Yugoslavia in the winter and spring of 1991, the OSCE sought—however late and ineffectually—to put into place measures to deal multilaterally with the situation. The third generation of Vienna CSBMs—agreed to in Paris in 1990— included a mechanism whereby a state could request clarification of any unusual military activity by another state within forty-eight hours and if the clarification was unsatisfactory, could call for an emergency meeting of the CSCE. The Vienna Concluding Document of

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234 See also Section 6.2.
235 For example, for analytical purposes, the negotiation of the OSCE's founding norms (giving member states a 'droit de regard' into certain areas of each other's internal affairs) would fall under relationship management. The establishment of mechanisms designed to gauge compliance with these norms, on the other hand, would fall under risk management. It is obvious, however, that both are closely related to the other.
236 For an excellent overview, see 'The OSCE and Preventive Diplomacy.' (Ghebali & Warner 1999)
237 Another excellent example of this would be traditional arms control agreements, where the negotiation and agreement to disarming requires heightened vulnerability and hence falls under relationship management whereas the implementation of corresponding verification mechanisms are aimed at greater vigilance and hence fall under risk management. Neither, however, would be possible without the other.
238 In response to the crisis in Yugoslavia—as well as growing tensions in the Baltics—the CSCE added to this a 'general emergency mechanism', agreed to in Berlin in 1991. The mechanism again involved, in
1989 also included a mechanism whereby a participating state could raise questions relating to the human dimension situation in another OSCE state. To these, the OSCE added two more innovations that ultimately shaped the course of its conflict prevention activities over the next decade. The first, the Moscow Mechanism, established at the last meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension in Moscow in 1991, constituted a further elaboration of the Vienna Mechanism. The Moscow mechanism additionally provided for the establishment of ad hoc missions of independent experts tasked with investigating alleged violations of the human dimension and, where possible, assisting in the resolution of a specific problem. Starting with Kosovo in 1992, the Moscow mechanism eventually evolved into a "semi-informal set of procedures" whereby the CSO would decide to send a fact-finding mission, "which would spend a few days examining a situation and could, if deemed necessary, recommend a mission of long duration, the constitution and funding of which would be determined by the CSO." (Flynn 1999, p.523) At the Prague Council of Ministers in 1992, a 'consensus-minus-one' principle was formally adopted, which allowed for political sanctions against a recalcitrant state, including suspension from the organisation. This was promptly used to suspend Yugoslavia a few months later. The OSCE's early failures in Yugoslavia, like those of the rest of the international community, are well documented. The Mission of Long Duration to Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina was abandoned after nine months when its extension was blocked by Belgrade. The Mission had been mandated to promote dialogue, monitor human rights violations and make recommendations on the protection of minorities and democratic reforms. But its presence had little to no impact on stemming the bloodshed.

Off-setting Vulnerabilities: The HCNM

The OSCE's second major innovation was the creation of a High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) at the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting of 1992. The HCNM's is mandated with providing

'early warning' and, as appropriate, 'early action' at the earliest possible stage in regards to tensions involving national minority issues [that] have the potential to develop into a conflict

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239 At the conclusion of the last chapter, it was shown how this mechanism played a legitimising role in the revolutionary events of 1989.

240 See: http://www.osce.org/odihr/human_rights/moscow_mechanism/ [01/11/2003]. Marking a departure from the consensus principle, the mechanism could be enacted without the consent of the state in question.

241 Any such mission of long duration would, however, require the consent of the 'host' state.


243 For further detail of the mission's mandate, composition, deployment and duration, see http://www.osce.org/publications/survey/survey26.htm. [15/08/2003].

244 More commonly referred to as Helsinki II.
The Puzzle of Trust in IR within the OSCE area. The High Commissioner is empowered to conduct on-site missions and to engage in preventive diplomacy...to assess...the role of the parties directly concerned, the nature of the tensions and recent developments therein and, where possible, the potential consequences for peace and stability in the OSCE area.245

As such, in his/her monitoring and evaluation capacity, the HCNM’s mandate is primarily and in the first instance one of thin risk management246 The HCNM is also tasked with, where necessary and expedient, acting as a mediator; that is, a neutral third party who “seeks to promote dialogue, confidence and cooperation” between the parties involved. (OSCE 2000, p.53) But here, precisely because of his/her neutrality and the absence of any ‘enforcement capacity’—the HCNM’s mandate shifts over to one of relationship management, relying solely on normative influence. The HCNM is further limited here by not being permitted “to consider national minority issues in situations involving organised acts of terrorism—or to communicate with or acknowledge communications from any person or organisation that practices or publicly condones terrorism or violence.” (OSCE 2000, p.54) This also points in the direction of the OSCE’s thick relationship management shortcomings, discussed in the next section.247

The HCNM’s first decade, led by the first High Commissioner, Max van der Stoel of the Netherlands, has been one of the OSCE’s success stories.248 The HCNM has been active in some fifteen countries; involved in face-to-face dialogue with the highest representative of both majority and minority groups; and has issued ‘non-binding’ recommendations in thirteen countries as well as two reports on the situation of the Roma and Sinti. (Zellner 2002) His influence has been particularly lauded for de-escalating tensions in Estonia and in the Ukraine. The HCNM contributed to the controversial debate in the former over amending citizenship laws for the Russian minority and in the latter over a new constitutional arrangement for the minority Crimean Tatars. The HCNM has also experienced significant setbacks. For example, the Turkish government has persistently refused to allow him to visit Turkey to look into concerns about the equal treatment of all segments of the population (including the Kurdish minority). According to the former High Commissioner Max van der Stoel, “this violated one of the basic rules of the OSCE...that OSCE member states have to admit the High Commissioner.” (Homan 2002, p.9)

245 See http://www.osce.org/hcnm/mandate/ [01/11/2003]. Preventive diplomacy has come to be defined in the OSCE as “the use of diplomacy to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent disputes from developing into conflicts, to eliminate conflicts when they occur and to contain and limit the spread of those conflicts not amenable to swift elimination.” (Ugglas 1994, p.8)

246 This is only within the limits of the information that can be assembled by overt rather than covert means (such as via the ‘spying’ techniques typically associated with state intelligence agencies). As the title also suggests, he/she is the High Commissioner ‘on’ not ‘for’ national minorities and is thus not, like an ombudsman, concerned with investigating individual cases of rights violations.

247 This is especially as regards the absence of shared and/or unequivocal interstate agreement (e.g. a common set of principles, values, laws) on peaceful and democratic minority secession, which leaves some minority groups, rightly or wrongly, with the belief that violence is the only alternative.

248 He was succeeded in 2001 by Rolf Ekeus of Sweden.
As only an instrument of 'early warning', with only the ability to make 'non-binding' recommendations and without any carrots or sticks of its own besides its normative legitimacy, the HCNM is clearly 'thin' on risk deterrence. Nevertheless, as will be considered in the last section of this chapter, the HCNM manages to contribute to building trust, by substituting, in one observer's words, a 'managerial' for an 'enforcement' capacity. (Chigas 1996) By asserting himself as an 'internal third party' and focusing on interstate 'security' concerns specifically in relation to intrastate minorities, he succeeds in small yet undeniably significant ways in bridging the gap between thin risk and relationship management.

Establishing Deterrents: The Assistance Group to Chechnya

The OSCE's thin risk management capacity is also observable in its various 'missions'. The OSCE's institutional and operational evolution over the last decade has meant that much of its mission work now falls under the realm of relationship management; that is, in its efforts to promote democratic institutions and the rule of law in hosting states. Nevertheless, with their 'fact-finding' origins, and efforts at conflict resolution and with the renewed interest in the OSCE's politico-military dimension since Sept 11th, the OSCE's 'missions of long duration' still retain a risk management dimension, however thin. In the next section of this chapter, I will consider the trust-building role of these missions in more detail; but for present illustrative purposes, it is useful to briefly consider the risk management accomplishments—and notable failures—of one in particular: the OSCE Assistance Group to Chechnya.

With the outbreak of violence in Chechnya in early 1995, the countries of the European Union, supported by the United States and others, came forward with the proposal that Russia make use of the OSCE human dimension mechanisms allowing it to request and determine the composition of a fact-finding human rights mission, to which it would then have to grant full access to its territory. But Russia declined, with Foreign Minister Kozyrev stating that the OSCE was not needed for the resolution of 'this purely internal affair'. Other states declined to activate mandatory use of the same process or to invoke procedures which would have required a high-level OSCE meeting or a discussion of the military aspects with or without Russia's consent. Instead, the OSCE's Chairman in Office at the time, Hungary, made use of

249 Beginning in 1995, twenty months of war devastated the Russian Federation's Republic of Chechnya, killing roughly 50,000 or about 5% of the local population. Statistics on the number of Russian soldiers killed in those 20 months vary between 3,000 and 19,000. Thousands more remain missing. Rachel Denbar writes of both sides that: "From the very beginning, the war was characterised by massive, appalling violations of humanitarian law... (including) shelled and bombed civilian areas; directly attacked civilians; torture, hostage-taking and summary executions." (1997, p.96)

250 Ironically, an initial OSCE request for a mission to Chechnya and a subsequent Russian refusal came just two days after Russia has signed a significant OSCE human rights declaration.

251 The Americans were very reluctant to seriously press the Russians on the Chechnya situation, due to the strategic importance of Russia as an ally, the perceived sensitivity of Russia—diminished in power since the end of the Cold War—to threats to its sovereignty and American concerns generally about not harming the overall American-Russian relationship. (Heraclides 1993)
its discretionary powers to send to Moscow, on behalf of the OSCE a senior Hungarian diplomat, Istvan Gyarmati, for a series of exploratory meetings. Meanwhile, the European Union dramatically raised the stakes in mid-March by setting the establishment of an OSCE mission to Chechnya as a condition for the signature of an interim trade agreement with Russia, originally scheduled for March 1995. The result of the combined Hungarian-EU pressure was agreement from Russia and support from the Permanent Council of OSCE States to send a small OSCE team of experts to Moscow and Chechnya.

Besides monitoring and evaluating the human rights situation, the Group was tasked with conflict resolution; that is, "to promote the peaceful resolution of the crisis by pursuing dialogue and negotiations and assisting in the preparation of possible new constitutional arrangements". It was also tasked with post-conflict rehabilitation, such as fostering the development of democratic institutions and helping to organise elections, which for the purposes of the trust model, fall under the relationship management dimension. To work towards these ends, the Group developed direct relations with all parties concerned, reported on the evolution of the situation and advanced mediation proposals. Negotiations under the auspices of the OSCE led to the signature on 30 July 1995, of an agreement on 'Military Issues' calling for an immediate ceasefire, the release of prisoners and troop withdrawal. However, this ceasefire agreement and several later agreements which also involved the setting-up of commissions to locate missing persons, were all subsequently violated and violence in Grozny escalated. The 1996 peace agreement between the Chechen rebels and Moscow was also aided significantly by the diplomatic efforts of Tim Guldimann, the Group's Head of Mission. The mission had support from Moscow and the other OSCE states, but it often faced strong criticism by the parties. In June 1996 the Moscow-backed local government in Grozny threatened to expel the mission from Chechnya, because the Swiss Head of Mission, in particular, was suspected of having too strong sympathies for the rebels. On other occasions the Chechen rebel party also expressed its discontent about mission activities and purported prejudices. However, the main parties to the conflict still seemed to consider the mission a useful mediating tool. With the resumption of hostilities in 1998, the Group's international staff was evacuated from Grozny to Moscow due to the deteriorating security situation, from where it conducted working visits. In 2001, after months of negotiation, Russia permitted the OSCE's international staff to return to Znamenskoye in the north of Chechnya. Nevertheless, the mandate of the Group was not extended beyond 2002.

252 For the full text of the mandate of the Group, see http://www.osce.org/publications/survey/survey12.htm [28/06/03].
253 Considered in the next section.
254 The Group remained in Grozny throughout the renewed violence, working to get the conflict resolution process back on track and acting as a facilitator between Russian and Chechen officials. The
There are three points worth making here with respect to the OSCE’s risk management capacity, beyond the fact that its conflict resolution efforts, however well placed, were ultimately futile in the face of the widespread violence and human rights atrocities in Chechnya. The first has to do with the external influence on the part of the EU that was required to compel the Russian government to allow an OSCE presence in Chechnya in the first place. This points to the OSCE’s frequent need—in order to operate effectively and in some cases at all—to depend on other international organisations that are capable of wielding bigger carrots and sticks. Indeed, OSCE Missions, most notably in the former Yugoslavia, have increasingly been compelled to work in tandem with ‘thicker’ risk management organisations, such as NATO and even the U.N., in order to pursue their goals. Nevertheless, more subtle forms of pressure on Russia, which should not be discounted, were also no doubt at play in the establishment of the Assistance Group to Chechnya. For while Russia did not appreciate the immediate benefits of a mission certain to put Russia’s internal problems even further in the international spotlight, it still wished to avoid the negative impact of non-responsiveness to OSCE demands and rules. After all, Russia had been instrumental in the creation and development of the OSCE and had long called, especially since the end of the Cold War, for an increasingly important and active OSCE role in European security. But by undermining the legitimacy and authority of OSCE mechanisms—including the ones which made such missions possible—and by refusing to allow it to take place, Russia had much to lose. Such ‘softer’ pressure to comply with OSCE rules thus also likely encouraged Russia to cooperate.

The second point relates to the importance and delicacy of the OSCE being perceived as a neutral and objective third party. This, for example, became an issue when the Swiss Head of Mission was accused of favouring the Chechen rebels and of other forms of unfairness. That the OSCE, due to its inclusive membership and common principles, is generally deemed to be neutral by its member states is one of the reasons that it was the only international actor initially allowed to play a direct role inside Chechnya. This fact suggests caution in terms of any moves that could hinder even the perception of such neutrality. In this light, the EU trade pressure on Russia and the Hungarian Chair’s assertiveness, though successful, should not be taken ‘prima facia’ as a mandate for more forceful threats or acts of coercive pressure in the future. This ties in with the third point that, perhaps ironically, the power of the OSCE continues to be its lack of

Group played a leading role in the organisation of the presidential and parliamentary elections, which marked a further, if short-lived, step towards peace.

255 The OSCE Chairman’s initiative to send a representative to Moscow was also indicative of the OSCE’s nascent institutional capacity to act independently of its member states (at least in the first instance).

256 This is considered further in the last section.

257 This was in many ways similar to the pressure Russia experienced with regards to compliance with CSCE norms in the Cold War era, considered in the previous chapter.

258 As a counter-balance to Western European and North American reliance on NATO for their security interests and the plans to expand NATO to former East bloc countries.
coercive power. For where it was able to play any role at all, and clearly it did, the OSCE's effectiveness was equally a measure of the limits of its influence. Russia would most certainly not have allowed the Mission to go ahead if the Mission's authority had been stronger. Russia, for example, was by no means prepared to allow U.N. peacekeepers\textsuperscript{259} with a U.N. Security Council mandate to deploy. Nor was it even prepared initially to tolerate the presence of internationally active NGOs such as Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch (Denbar 1997). Given the scale of violence—against armed fighters and civilians alike—that occurred in Chechnya, it is difficult to refer to any peace efforts by the international community, including the OSCE's, in terms of 'success.' By any measure, the OSCE's conflict resolution efforts were ultimately a dismal failure. Nevertheless, the OSCE was the only security organisation that was able to play any role at all in the Chechnya conflict by sending a delegation to monitor and report on human rights and to mediate between the conflicting parties.

\textsuperscript{259} Or even special U.N. diplomatic envoys, for that matter.
8.3 Managing the Common European House

In this section, the OSCE is considered along the trust model's relationship management dimension. Taken into account, following the chart in the introduction to this chapter, is the OSCE's emphasis on:

1) Prioritising multilateral, inclusive and consensual communication;
2) Broadly focusing on the goals of cooperative security;
3) Establishing a light and flexible, yet permanent, institutional structure;
4) Linking the values and principles of security with human rights, democracy and the rule of law;
5) Remaining an institution based on non-binding, political declarations rather than developing a legal identity with corresponding legal powers and obligations.

As the previous chapter has explored, the OSCE originated as a multilateral conference for dialogue on Cold War security issues. In the post-Cold War order (if it can be called that at all) the OSCE has retained the emphasis on multilateral communication as one of its core premises. Indeed, if anything, the OSCE has been most often criticised for being too much of a 'talk shop,' all words and not enough action. (Moens 1994) The OSCE has also retained—and in fact expanded—its broad emphasis on the goals of cooperative and comprehensive security, in some ways to the detriment of a more explicit and forceful role in promoting and maintaining European security. That is, it lacks not only military capacity but also formal legal status not to mention mechanisms of legal recourse and thus has no way of enforcing its normative declarations beyond appeals to their political legitimacy. Nevertheless, while the OSCE's relationship management capacity remains severely restricted by these factors, it will be argued that the fact that its 'thinness' nevertheless contributes to encouraging a propensity to trust should not be discounted.

Prioritising Multilateral Communication

Three points are worth taking up with respect to the quality of the multilateral communication which the OSCE seeks to foster. First, with regards to 'openness', the OSCE functions formally under an 'alliance-free' rule. Military and other alliances are officially not recognised in the OSCE. In accordance with the common goals and norms of 'cooperative security' (which will be considered next), dialogue between member states does not formally take place in blocs and all member states are treated as equals. However, the Helsinki Final Act also states explicitly

260 As Section 4 discusses, the OSCE Court of Conciliation and Arbitration is the exception; but it has never been used nor has it been endorsed by all participating states.
that states are free to form military and other alliances independently outside of the OSCE.\footnote{Alliances, defence-related or other-wise, outside of the OSCE include NATO, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the EU and the WEU. Additionally, a large proportion of member states are members of the Council of Europe and all OSCE states are members of the United Nations (but only the U.S., Russia, Britain and France are permanent members of the U.N. Security Council). See Appendix A for a diagram of OSCE member state participation in other international organisations.} As such, while, in principle, external alliances are supposed to be left on the OSCE doorstep, in practice they cannot but still play a background (and sometimes prominent) role, even with the post-Cold War dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the clear East-West political demarcation line.\footnote{Interestingly, this has in some ways made discussion and agreement more challenging because the OSCE has lost much of the CSCE’s Cold War coherence in terms of ideological dividing lines and a more direct awareness of each state’s interests and motivations. (Ghébali 1995)} The previously discussed EU initiative to make the signing of a trade agreement external to OSCE affairs conditional on Russia agreeing to an OSCE Chechnya Mission provides a good illustration of this.

Second and connected with the first point, compared to the other regional security organisations and especially NATO, the OSCE encompasses a larger number of participating states. This should make finding and expanding common ground more difficult than with smaller multilateral security arrangements and compared to bi-lateral arrangements between more homogenous or like-minded states. Is this the case? The historical record indeed shows the limitations of a forum where so many states and their often widely diverging interests, goals and values are represented. In this environment, there is frequently bound to be less comprehensive agreement than might be reached with fewer participants. The large number of participants, moreover, reduces the personal nature of meetings, as representatives from fifty-five participating states are unable to all sit around the same small table, let alone engage in entirely ‘informal’ or ‘unstructured’ conversation. Less direct contacts such as these means fewer opportunities where closer personal relationships can be built.\footnote{From a risk management perspective, larger numbers of member states also means greater possibilities for breaches of trust, as monitoring compliance across a vast geographic, political and military space becomes a greater challenge.} ‘Face-relations’ here, of the kind argued for by Giddens for maintaining social trust bonds in a late-modern technocratic age are fewer and further between. For practical reasons, working groups, which invariably include only a handful of participating states, need to be established in order to work on specific areas and report back to the larger forum. While more efficient, this reduces the representation of all member states on all issues. Individual states are obliged to defer their direct input and negotiation efforts to other states on some issues, while still retaining indirect influence and an ultimate veto when the issue is put to the final vote. Finally, despite its ostensible inclusivity, the issue of OSCE membership has also been a controversial one, especially since 1990 and the
dissolution of the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{264} It is less than clear, for example, what Europe’s geographic boundaries are exactly. How the notion of being ‘European’ can be objectively conceived is not self-evident.

**Promoting Cooperative Security Goals**

These two points fit neatly with a discussion of the OSCE’s broad goal of promoting cooperative security throughout the OSCE region. Cooperative security, in the OSCE sense, centres on the notion that security cannot be reduced to individual units. This leads to the important idea that state security in interdependent. That is, one state’s security is another state’s security; and conversely, one state’s insecurity is every state’s insecurity.\textsuperscript{265} Comprehensive security, additionally, is the idea that security must be understood in more than just a military sense; comprehensive security also includes societal issues such as civil and minority rights, economic development and the environment. (OSCE 2000)\textsuperscript{266} For example, in an October 2000 speech, the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, Austrian Foreign Minister Benita Ferrero-Waldner, made reference to “the OSCE-advocated ‘comprehensive approach’ to security that advocates the interdependence of the human, political, economic and environmental dimensions.” (OSCE 2000b) In the next section, I consider in closer detail the OSCE’s normative commitments in relation to comprehensive security, particularly the promotion of human rights, democracy and the rule of law.

For the moment, it is useful to also briefly consider the OSCE’s cooperative security goals in procedural terms: that is, in terms of the OSCE’s ‘consensus-based’ decision making process. For if cooperative security means each state’s security concerns should be of common concern, then each state should have equal opportunity to voice its particular concerns and to freely negotiate and agree to the means of addressing these common concerns. Like with its predecessor, the CSCE, all OSCE decisions of importance must be reached by a consensus of all member states, with the exception of the rare ‘consensus-minus-one’ rule in the event of serious concerns about the violation of the human dimension.\textsuperscript{267} As the OSCE Handbook states, “because decisions are made on the basis of consensus all states participating in OSCE activities have equal status.”\textsuperscript{268} (2000, p.7) To the extent that it reflects participation, dialogue and

\textsuperscript{264} After the break-up of the Soviet Union, the three Baltic States were the first to apply for membership and all ten former republics were accepted in 1992. The current OSCE membership tally stands at 55 States. See *Appendix A* for the list of OSCE member states.

\textsuperscript{265} The Charter of Paris for a New Europe is famous for its statement that “Security is indivisible and the security of every participating state is inseparably linked to that of all the others.” (OSCE 1993, p.15)

\textsuperscript{266} Included here are the corresponding comprehensive security ‘risks’ associated with civil unrest, financial instability, environmental degradation, etc. The idea of ‘human security’, which emphasises ‘individual security’ has also made significant inroads into the OSCE’s ideational realm.

\textsuperscript{267} And with the exception of the ‘consensus-minus-the disputants’ rule, where a conciliation procedure is invoked (but which has never been used).

\textsuperscript{268} The consensus principle is defined as ‘the absence of any objection.’ This is distinct from ‘unanimity,’ which implies accepting every part of a document or all aspects of a question. (Heraclides 1993)
equality in agreed outcomes, consensus is an important element of relationship management. But it is not without its limitations. For example, it does not in practice eliminate many undertones of coercion. By and large, smaller and more dependent states are less eager to disagree with the great powers. (Canada typically sides with the U.S. on important matters.) Such 'lack of eagerness' often resides beneath the realm of the manifest and arises out of the often unspoken relationship between states rather than out of the structure of OSCE rules and procedures. \footnote{269} Strained or 'restrained' relations between great powers are also often latently present; take, for example, the great reluctance on the part of the U.S. to voice strong concerns about Russia's actions in Chechnya. The consensus rule has also been particularly vulnerable to criticism by academics and policy analysts who argue that the need for consensus can severely limit the OSCE's ability to take the kinds of quick, painful and controversial decisions and actions necessary to address immediate security concerns. (Ramelot 1995) Such cumbersome procedural rules are often pointed to as justification for other more powerful and assertive security organisations such as NATO carrying the real burden of responsibility for European security. \footnote{270} The historic record suggests, however, that despite what some critics say about both the logistical challenges of the OSCE's broad membership and its consensus rule, it has been remarkably effective in three crucial areas: reaching comprehensive agreements; adapting to changing security concerns; and reacting quickly to evolving security crises (Ghébali 1998). The extent to which its quick actions have had a significant impact on the security of member states is open to debate and is discussed further in Section 8.4. Notwithstanding this, cumulative OSCE agreements amount to the most comprehensive multilateral commitments to values and conduct between states ever put to paper.

*The Institutionalisation of European Security*

Lehne writes that "historically the absence of permanent CSCE structures had been an expression of the deep distrust between the East and West." (Lehne 1991, p.10) And as Heraclides has written,

In the latter part of 1989, it seemed to many that the time had come for the Helsinki process to succumb to a quiet but honourable death having earned its place in the history of the Cold War as one of the main vehicles for change. After all, the CSCE had not become an

\footnote{\footnotetext{269} States can also get into the game (as they often do) of seeking to trade concessions on different issues. Malta, for example, has long argued for the inclusion of Mediterranean security issues on the OSCE agenda and has been historically notorious for blocking debate and withholding consent on various issues in protest. (Ghébali 1991)\footnotetext{270} See for example Moens (1994).}
intergovernmental organisation with a bureaucratic stake for self-preservation *ad infinitum* even when irrelevant. (1993, p.13)

With the Cold War winding down and animosity between East and West largely dissolved—even if it wasn’t immediately replaced by ‘trust’—it seemed time for the Conference to wrap up as well. Instead, the Paris Summit of November 1990 set it on a new course. The reason for this renewed impetus has variously been described as emanating from the desire of many within the member states “to codify norms for a new Europe, to cement the Eastern European democratic revolutions in international agreements and to build a new European order on the basis of these agreements.” (Flynn 1999, p.513) Consequently, The Charter of Paris, though it is a short document, established ‘permanent’ institutions as well as enshrined the principles of human rights, pluralistic democracy, the market economy and the rule of law across the OSCE region.

Before looking at the normative impact of the Charter and subsequent documents, it is useful to briefly survey the CSCE’s institutional development as a distinctive aspect of relationship management.

The Charter, in addition to heralding the end of the Cold War, established five permanent institutions for the CSCE and made provisions for a sixth:

1) The Council (comprised of foreign ministers)
2) The Committee of Senior Officials (CSO)
3) The CSCE Secretariat
4) The Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC)
5) The Office for Free Elections (OFE)\(^\text{271}\)
6) Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE 1993, pp.17-8, 20)

The Charter also put on paper that thereafter, CSCE follow-up meetings, including a summit of heads of state, would occur every two years.\(^\text{272}\) As was discussed in the previous chapter, a High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) was added in 1992. And in 1994, the Budapest Summit recognised that the CSCE was no longer simply a conference and changed its name to the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe.\(^\text{273}\)

Just as important as the OSCE permanent structure has been the evolution of its field activities, as throughout the 1990s, member states expanded the organisation’s operational

\(^{271}\) The name of the OFE was changed to the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in 1992 to reflect the expansion of its mandate to include human rights and democratisation.

\(^{272}\) The full text of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe is available in *Appendix B*.

\(^{273}\) A Representative on Freedom of the Media was also created in 1997. Each year, the organisation is led politically by a Chairman in Office (CiO) who is the foreign minister of a member state (and is assisted by the outgoing and incoming CiOs, thus comprising a ‘Troika’) The OSCE’s major institutional structures are set out in *Appendix A*. 

200
mandate at successive Ministerial Summits. For example, its role has been expanded in relation to conflict prevention, particularly with regards to minority rights; democracy promotion, especially elections monitoring; and civil capacity building, such as police and legal expert training. These are considered in the next part of this section. Overall, increasing institutionalisation of the OSCE has resulted in somewhat more efficient and independent OSCE mechanisms (Möttölä 1986) but perhaps less democratic control. For example, in the case of the Assistance Group to Chechnya, the Chairman in Office was able to independently send a monitoring mission to the conflict region without first seeking the consensus of the member states (as refusal by Russia was a near certainty). The institutionalisation of the CSCE into the OSCE can be also understood as a clear 'next step' in the level of permanence in the relations between the OSCE’s fifty-five member states, at least as concerns security issues. In the early ‘process’ stage of the CSCE, from 1972 to 1990, the relationship simply entailed an intermittent series of distinct, associated or interlinked meetings, follow-up meetings and conferences, lasting for a limited period of time, with major conferences resulting in new formal agreements only recurring every few years. Moreover, the conference process endlessly seemed on the verge of breaking up since the threat of this was often used to gain political advantage. (Lehne 1991, p.10) The evolution of the CSCE process into an organisation is thus a significant signal of the shift to the expectation of the relationship continuing indefinitely on the basis of shared institutional goals and values.

Common Values and Identity: Linking Security with Human Rights and Democracy

"A state that cannot stand criticism must do without culture"274

As has been elaborated up to this point, far from ending up in the dustbin of 20th century history after 1989, the CSCE process was likewise swept along in the extraordinary and euphoric currents of change. Indeed, the 1990 Charter of Paris was astonishing in its normative scope, given the depth of disagreement that had existed over the previous five decades.275 The Charter indeed ‘charted’ new common ground by emphasising as essential to security: assistance in the transition to democracy of newly independent states; the development of market economies; economic liberty; social justice; and a sense of responsibility for the environment. In this part of Section 8.3, I look at relationship management in terms of the development of shared values and identity within the OSCE and their connection to security. I also consider how the OSCE promotes these values through its diverse field activities. Given the scope of the OSCE’s efforts, this invariably ends up with mixed results. Moreover, the OSCE’s mandate frequently runs the

274 Bloed (1994, p.57)
275 The Charter of Paris was preceded by the OSCE’s Copenhagen Document a few months earlier which itself was revolutionary in its normative pronouncements given the long-entrenched ideological divisions of just a few months earlier.
risk of overlapping with that of other organisations, such as the EU, the Council of Europe (CoE) and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), who may be better placed (politically/legally) and better resourced to work in certain areas. The preamble to the Charter of Paris states that "The era of confrontation and division of Europe has ended. We declare that henceforth the relations will be founded on respect and cooperation." The Charter posits, in no uncertain terms, that relations both within countries in Europe and between the countries of Europe are to be based on peaceful exchange and respect for human rights as specified by the CSCE’s human dimension. Moreover, the Charter reaffirms the declarations of the Human Dimension Copenhagen document, signed by OSCE foreign ministers a few months earlier (and frequently overlooked for its normative importance), establishing democracy as the only legitimate political system for member states:

Member states...recognise that pluralistic democracy and the rule of law are essential for ensuring respect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms, the development of human contacts and the resolution of other issues of a related humanitarian character. They therefore welcome the commitment expressed by all participating States to the ideals of democracy and political pluralism as well as their common determination to build democratic societies based on free elections and the rule of law.276

The Charter also emphasises the commitment to market economies:

Freedom and political pluralism are necessary elements in the common objective of developing market economies towards sustainable economic growth, prosperity, social justice, expanding employment and efficient use of economic resources. The success of the transition to market economy by countries making efforts to this effect is important and in the interest of us all.277

Over the last decade, the OSCE has continued to play a prominent normative role in reinforcing the interconnectiveness of comprehensive security issues across the spectrum of military, political, legal, economic, social and environmental affairs. The 1999 Charter for European Security, for example, stresses that:

Security and peace must be enhanced through an approach which combines two basic elements, we must build confidence among people within States and strengthen cooperation between States. [Furthermore.] We will build the relations in conformity with the concept of common and comprehensive security. The security of each participating State is inseparably linked to that of all others. We will address the human, economic, political and military dimensions of security as an integral whole.278

277 See Appendix B for the full text of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe. The Charter also reinforces that “environmental degradation may have serious implications for the security” and calls for further substantive cooperation in this area as well.
278 See Appendix B for the full text.
A few points about the content and quality of the OSCE's shared values and collective identity can be highlighted. First, the OSCE's declarations clearly link the internal political and economic status of individual states with external OSCE norms; that is, the only legitimate internal political and economic structures are declared to be those based on the principles of democracy and free markets. Member states thus declare themselves to share a collective identity, at least with reference to these declarations. Their 'relationship', therefore, is one which is based not just on shared 'external' values and identity as sovereign states in the international system, but also on shared 'internal' values and identity. But what is the extent of this shared internal identity? More aptly, to what extent does it not represent 'the lowest common denominator'? For member states agree to abide by democratic and free market principles in just that way: in principle. But despite the impressive scope of the OSCE's normative declarations, an extraordinary degree of vagueness and ambiguity remains in the interpretation and implementation of these principles. In short, the substance (the political and legal content) of these principles is left largely undeclared—at least, under collective OSCE auspices.  

OSCE member states thus share a framework of common values and the skeleton of a collective identity based on these values; but their relationship to one another remains limited to the extent that the actual content of these values and identity is left at best vague (and at worst, contradictory) and the extent to which the undefined substance of their values still in actual fact differ significantly. This is in addition to the reality of many of the 'transitional' member states, particularly from Central Asia, who have clearly yet to even close to meeting some of the most basic OSCE democratic norms. In sum, despite the normative breadth of OSCE declarations, their detail remains sketchy. In terms of relationship management, the point is not just that what member states agree on is actually less than what the declarations may appear to suggest. It is also that member states do not even clearly agree to disagree. The implications of this are made more apparent in the discussion of the OSCE's political and legal status in the last part of this section. In Section 8.4, I will also advance the—perhaps somewhat mundane—argument that the OSCE should do its best to restrict its operations in broad areas such as democracy, economic development and the rule of law—even human rights—to where they are most closely and clearly linked to security concerns. This is where the OSCE is uniquely

279 For example, while the Charter for European Security cites environmental degradation as a security risk, it offers no specific directions or even guidelines for tackling the issue, such as signing and implementing the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change, which the EU, for example, has collectively undertaken to do.

280 For example, the norms of non-intervention in internal state affairs and legitimacy of international concern over the human rights situation within states remain from the CSCE years. Member states will obviously continue to disagree over the degree to which one takes precedent; how (e.g. what kind of human rights intervention and how intrusive on sovereignty?); and when (e.g. Russia has been adamant about human rights issues in the Baltic States but dismissive of human rights issues is Chechnya).

281 For instance, with regards to freedom of the press.
positioned to play a role compared to other organisations who may have more thoroughly
developed norms in specific areas (and reflect them in their political and especially legal
structures), but who lack the OSCE’s scope and, importantly, the inclusivity of its membership.

Strengthening States

The OSCE engages in a range of field activities aimed at promoting its comprehensive security
norms. Indeed, the OSCE’s field activities have expanded exponentially in the last decade. The
organisation currently has about 1,000 international and 2,000 local staff in the field engaged in
diverse projects aimed at promoting human rights, democratic institutions, the rule of law,
economic development and environmental protection.\textsuperscript{282} (OSCE 2002) The chart on the next
page provides an overview of the OSCE’s present field activities.\textsuperscript{283}

\textsuperscript{282} For a full account of the OSCE’s past and present field activities, see http://www.osce.org
[03/11/2003].

\textsuperscript{283} Adapted from Barry. (2003, pp.35-6)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location/ Mission Title</th>
<th>Year Started</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania/ Presence in Albania</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Gives advice and assistance to Albanian authorities on democratisation, development of free media, promotion of human rights and preparation of elections. Coordinates work of international organisations and bilateral donors. Supports weapons collection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia/ Office in Yerevan</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Promotes cooperation with Armenia in all OSCE dimensions, including human, political, economic and environmental aspects of security and stability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan/ Office in Baku</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Promotes cooperation with Azerbaijan in all OSCE dimensions, including human, political, economic and environmental aspects of security and stability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus/ Office in Minsk</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Promotes institution building, consolidation of the rule of law, development of relations with civil society in accordance with OSCE principles and commitments and development of economic and environmental activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)/ Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Fosters democratic values, monitors human rights and implements arms control and security-building measures. Enforces rules of media conduct and helps oversee military stabilisation. Organises and supervises elections until BiH Election Commission established. (Commission appointed in November 2001 and took over responsibility of organising elections with support from OSCE mission.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia/ Mission to Georgia</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Promotes negotiations aimed at peaceful settlement of conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Liaises with government officials and NGOs. Coordinates work with other international organisations and monitors peacekeeping and elections. Helps establish democratic framework. Mandate expanded to include border monitoring between Georgia and Chechnya in 1999.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia/ Personal Representative of the Chair in Office (CiO) on the Conflict Dealt with by the Minsk Conference (Nagorno-Karabakh)</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Represents OSCE Chairman-in-Office (CiO) on issues related to Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Assists CiO in achieving an agreement on cessation of armed conflict and creates conditions for deploying OSCE peacekeeping operation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan/ Centre in Almaty</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Maintains contact with government and its specialised agencies, such as Human Rights and Central Election Commissions. Works with NGOs, especially in environmental and human rights sectors. Coordinates activities with other international organisations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo/ Mission in Kosovo</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Within framework of UNMIK, leads institution and democracy building, human rights monitoring and election organising. Also assists in media affairs, development of rule of law and police education. (Previous missions conducted in 1992 and 1998-99.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan/ Centre in Bishkek</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Fosters economic, environmental, human and political aspects of security and stability. Facilitates and maintains contacts with government, local authorities and NGOs. Encourages cooperation between international organisations and Kyrgyzstan.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A prime area of OSCE expertise—and one which it has drawn on extensively to establish itself—is the electoral process. For the last decade, the OSCE has been the pre-eminent international organisation for advice on the development of electoral legislation, organising and monitoring elections and overseeing the implementation of elections results.\(^{284}\) The OSCE's overall field mission work is supported by the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (in the area of the human dimension) as well as by the Office of the Coordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities, which provides advice (including through data collection, research, analysis and a pool of experts)\(^ {285}\) Recent prominent OSCE field activities include Missions to Kosovo and Albania. In Kosovo, for example, the OSCE's efforts towards post-conflict rehabilitation includes ‘the Institute for Civil Administration,’ established by the OSCE Mission in February 2000. The Institute has worked to create a professional civil service

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\(^ {284}\) The organisation even sent a delegation to monitor the 2002 U.S. Congressional elections after the fiasco of the 2000 Presidential election count, which served to enforce the OSCE’s commitment to improving democratic institutions in all member states, not just the ‘transitional’ democracies.

\(^ {285}\) The OSCE’s institutional framework (Committees of the Permanent Council, the Secretariat and the Chairman in Office) likewise provide the missions with operational coordination and political guidance.
by training more than 3,200 senior and middle-management civil servants in principles of democratic governance. And the OSCE Office in Armenia concentrates its efforts on co-ordinating efforts by the international community to assist the Armenian Government in putting in place a strategy to combat corruption. Armenia’s accession to the Council of Europe at the beginning of the year also brought about the Office’s involvement in activities related to the reform of legislation required to bring it into compliance with Council of Europe standards.

Given the scope of activities the OSCE is mandated to carry out, it is not surprising that it faces severe resource constraints in carrying out much of it, particularly of a budgetary nature, with member state contributions being a fraction of what they are, for example, to the U.N. Moreover, across such a range of issues (political, economic, environmental, etc.) and with the OSCE typically undertaking relatively small, focused projects, objectively measuring its actual influence becomes a considerable if not impossible task. OSCE declarations state that it seeks “to enhance the OSCE’s ability to address (economic and environmental issues) in ways that neither duplicate existing work nor replace efforts that can be more efficiently undertaken by other organisations.” (OSCE 1999, p.17) But as will be elaborated in Section 8.4, the extent to which the OSCE’s current range of activities is effective in addressing such broad-based issues—without competing with other organisations and given its restricted legal status—is questionable. I argue that the OSCE would be better off concentrating even more exclusively on its ‘thinner’ risk and relationship management competencies.

Fiduciary Relations and the Rule of law

The OSCE’s 1990 Copenhagen Document and Charter of Paris have been described as Europe’s ‘constitutional moments.’ (Flynn 1999) Nevertheless, as has just been pointed out, the OSCE’s declarations, despite their unparalleled comprehensiveness in international relations, only provide the rudimentary framework for a collective identity. This invariably has consequences for the expansion of fiduciary relations between member states; that is, as was explored in Chapters 3 & 6, for the development of a sense of responsibility that encourages other-minded behaviour. This sense of responsibility, moreover, is something that goes beyond the letter of the law and shifts the relationship into the ethical realm. This, from the very outset, is a couple of stretches too far for the OSCE, since it remains decidedly without a legal status to move beyond. It is helpful to briefly clarify this.

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286 See the ‘Annual Report 2001 on OSCE Activities’:
287 Ibid.
288 Let alone what EU members contribute to the EU.
Christopher Berzins

From an international legal perspective, at least in the context of the OSCE, all member states retain full formal sovereignty, as the statutes of the OSCE are notably ‘politically’ rather than ‘legally’ binding. As the OSCE handbook states,

The OSCE has a unique status. On the one hand, it has no status under international law. Nevertheless, it possesses most of the normal attributes of an international organisation. Most of its instruments, decisions and commitments are framed in legal language and their interpretation requires an understanding of the principles of international law and of the standard techniques of the law of treaties. (2000, p.7)

The OSCE official line is also defensive of the valuable non-legal role of OSCE statutes: “Furthermore, the fact that OSCE commitments are not legally binding does not detract from their efficacy. Having been signed at the highest political level, they have an authority that is arguably as strong as any legal statute under international law.” (Lehne 1991, p.5) Notwithstanding this claim, the OSCE’s non-legal status provokes problems, including of a practical nature and in recent times there has been considerable debate over eventually endowing the OSCE with some kind of formal legal status. As the OSCE’s Secretary General stated at the Ministerial meeting in Bucharest in 2001,

We are facing difficulties in the absence of an agreement on the OSCE legal capacity, privileges and immunities, which would reflect today’s OSCE realities and requirements. This situation renders the work of the OSCE, notably in field operations, more difficult and indeed risky. (quoted in Zellner 2002, p.69)

As Zellner notes, “nearly all of the participating states are in favour of granting the OSCE some form of legal capacity, privileges and immunities, which would reflect today’s OSCE realities and requirements. This situation renders the work of the OSCE, notably in field operations, more difficult and indeed risky. (quoted in Zellner 2002, p.69)

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Thus, not only does the absence of legal status for the OSCE restrict the parameters of any 'constitutional' relationship between member states in terms of a collective identity based in international law; the absence of legal recourse also clearly restricts the OSCE's risk management capacity. The duality of risk and relationship management and its basis in the rule of law requires further normative development, as has been indicated in the theoretical chapters
The Puzzle of Trust in IR

(see especially *Chapters 4 & 6*). Nevertheless, such 'thick' forms of trust remain clearly beyond the grasp of the OSCE in its present form. This is not necessarily a bad thing. As will be argued in the final section of this chapter, the OSCE still has much to contribute in terms of building 'thin' trust between member states.

289 Another reason U.S. authorities, for their part, have eschewed endowing the OSCE with legal status is concern for being unable to get this passed through Congress.
8.4 An Emerging Propensity to Trust

In the previous two sections, I have sought to evaluate the OSCE's institutional structures and activities in terms of the trust model developed in Chapter 6. That is, I have considered the various risk and relationship management parameters (five respectively) set out in the model; from monitoring behaviour as a first stage of risk management to promoting fiduciary relations and the rule of law as the final stage of relationship management. It has quickly become evident that the OSCE is far more capable in certain areas than others; and this has clear implications for its trust building capacity. Overall, it is reasonable to say that the OSCE promotes a 'thin' form of trust through its expanded 'diplomatic' activities (subsumed under the term 'preventive diplomacy') rather than a 'thick' form of trust embedded in international law. The evaluation of the OSCE which follows also usefully serves to illuminate some of the model's ambiguities and limitations.

Diplomacy Vs the Rule of Law

As has been seen, in the last decade and a half the OSCE's CSBM regime has evolved to the extent that the risk of accidental military confrontation between member states has been reduced to almost nil. That is, the level of confidence in military relations is substantial. Moreover, it has been achieved at the OSCE-wide level through inclusive and consensual political agreement; and not by recourse to binding legal agreement or the means of enforcement by force. Nevertheless, James Ferguson has argued that CSBMs must necessarily remain meaningless in a high tension environment, whereas in a low tension environment, they become superfluous. (Ferguson 1991) Pal Dunay takes a similarly cynical view of the various 'risk management' mechanisms (such as the Vienna and Berlin mechanisms) that the OSCE has developed in the post-Cold War era, suggesting that they have become "increasingly irrelevant because for those states which have successfully integrated into the Western stability zone not even such soft mechanisms are necessary to provide for compliance with European standards of cooperation, whereas for determined violators such a soft mechanism is certainly insufficient to deter." (Dunay 2000, p.303)

Such comments as these reinforce the clear 'limits' of the OSCE's risk management capacity. They also serve as a useful lead-in to two points. First, in my view, Ferguson and Dunay's suggestions that such soft (or 'thin') risk management mechanisms as the OSCE's CSBMs are meaningless, superfluous or even irrelevant embody a too narrow and one-dimensional consideration of their utility. It brushes aside: first, their historic context in contributing to the stabilisation of Europe; second, the fact that member states still choose to adhere to them, suggesting that they still deem them useful to their individual interests; and third and most importantly, that they serve as 'benchmarks' for trusting behaviour, however
thin. They remain valuable exactly because they are a measure of the standards member states expect of one another and they serve as legitimate indicators of unacceptable behaviour when some states fail to adhere to them. Nevertheless, it is true that the OSCE’s thin risk management capacity only has recourse to the legitimacy which member states invest in it; and this ties in well with the second point, which is that there is a clear overlap here with relationship management, which seeks to develop the conditions for the reinforcement—and expansion—of such legitimacy.\textsuperscript{290} Indeed, in the last decade, that which OSCE member states have collectively determined constitutes a ‘risk’ to their security, such as human rights violations and minority issues within states, has very much been a product of their establishment of shared values and identity and thus the management of their normative relationship with each other.

Moreover, it is also on the basis of these deepening relations—through open communication and the establishment of shared goals, values and identity—that the perceived danger of many more tangible risks, such as military confrontation, have now melted into the background. Here, the mechanism of suspension allowing the leap to trust is apparent. For risks still exist. Indeed, as has been shown, new risks continue to emerge (and old risks can re-emerge). And it is essential that these risks continue to be accounted for. But, where relationships have developed and deepened, trust emerges to the extent that we member states are nevertheless prepared to give each other the benefit of the doubt. This trust is a ‘generalised’ phenomenon but is based on specific conditions. And it is far from ‘uniform’ across the range of issues that member-states are collectively faced with. For while trust in military relations, for example, has increased, there is still far less trust (or almost no trust at all) with respect to issues such as human rights and minority issues (as was seen with Chechnya) and, among emerging concerns, the gamut of issues related to curbing the rise and spread of terrorism. Furthermore, the trust that has emerged is a ‘thin’ form of trust. For, in addition to the lack of ‘hard’ (or thick) risk management means, the shared goals, values and identity that have emerged also remain in many ways rudimentary in substantive terms as well as without legal basis. Unlike the EU or even the Council of Europe, there is no established legal recourse in the event that ‘codified’ principles are violated.

What this suggests is that the OSCE is to a fair extent ‘out of its depth’ so to speak when it comes to thick risk and relationship management. As many have described it, it remains primarily a vehicle for ‘conflict prevention’, rather than ‘conflict resolution’ or ‘post-conflict rehabilitation.’ The OSCE’s field activities are separated into these categories in the chart below.\textsuperscript{291} (Ghébali 2001, p.34)

\textsuperscript{290} Ferguson also hinted at this indirectly when he projected in 1991 that arms control would shift from an emphasis on deterrence to an emphasis on addressing the causes or conditions of war. (Ferguson 1991, p.193)

\textsuperscript{291} Following Ghébali, these categories could similarly be entitled ‘preventive diplomacy’, ‘peace-making’ and ‘peace-building.’ (2001, p.33)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict Prevention</th>
<th>Conflict Resolution</th>
<th>Post-Conflict Rehabilitation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo (1992-93)</td>
<td>Nagorno-Karabakh</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Azerbaijan)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FYROM (until 2000)</td>
<td>South Ossetia and</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Abkhazia (Georgia)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>Transdniastria (Moldova)</td>
<td>Albania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>Chechnya (Russia)</td>
<td>Kosovo (since 1999)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>FYROM (since 2001)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HCNM’s activities unconnected to an OSCE field mission</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Chart 8: Conflict Prevention, Resolution & Post-Conflict Rehabilitation**

Conflict resolution, to be effective, frequently (but not always) requires a thicker risk management capacity, where the mediator has at her disposition significant carrots and sticks with which to compel the disputants to conciliate.\(^{292}\) Alternately, it often requires thicker relationship management via some form of legal recourse (e.g. binding arbitration). The OSCE clearly lacks both of these.\(^{293}\) Post-conflict rehabilitation, to be effective, likewise typically requires a thicker risk management capacity. That is, it frequently demands the presence of a peacekeeping force.\(^{294}\) Much of the OSCE’s post-conflict rehabilitation work, in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo, for example, has required the presence of NATO and/or U.N. peacekeepers in order to operate with any modicum of stability. Without the capacity to maintain immediate security and enforce the rule of law, deeper efforts at rebuilding war-torn societies can be, at best, seriously compromised, at worst, frivolous. Post-conflict rehabilitation also requires thicker relationship management to the extent that it demands both substantive ‘authority’ and ‘capacity’ to shape and bring into being the broad range of civil, political and economic institutions upon which liberal democracies and market economies depend. The OSCE’s post-conflict rehabilitation efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, have frequently required the authority of the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and the NATO Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in order to function. The OSCE could not have helped draft the Bosnian election law without the authority with which the OHR vested it. When it came to overseeing the implementation of Bosnian property laws—key to the peaceful return of

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\(^{292}\) As has already been pointed out, the OSCE needed, for example, the external incentive of an EU trade agreement even just to compel Russia to permit the establishment of an OSCE mission to Chechnya in the first place.

\(^{293}\) Indeed, a rare exception, the OSCE’s Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, can only adjudicate if invited to by the disputants; but it has never been used.

\(^{294}\) Provisions have been made in OSCE agreements for the development of an OSCE peacekeeping capacity; and the necessary means towards this end have generated a good deal of discussion and planning. But no peacekeeping force has ever been assembled or deployed. The OSCE is also a potential candidate for a peacekeeping mission to Nargorno-Karaback (pending Russian approval) in the event of a peaceful settlement, as well as in Moldova (Transdniestria).
refugees—the OSCE mission likewise needed the authority of the OHR to remove obstructionist officials, including at the ministerial level.\textsuperscript{295} (Barry 2002, p.30) And in Kosovo, a U.N. administration—in addition to the substantial NATO presence—has been needed to maintain ‘residual’ responsibility. (ibid., 34)

More generally, the role of international actors (be it the OSCE, NATO or the U.N.) in both ‘establishing’ and ‘enforcing’ the rule of law is suggestive of the further overlap of risk and relationship management. For example, assume for the moment that the role of legislating—at least in a liberal democracy—should fall under relationship management; and enforcing breaches of the rule of law should fall under risk management.\textsuperscript{296} The two, nevertheless, are clearly symbiotic in many respects; that is, the risk of a breach of the law would not exist if it had not been decided to establish the law that defined such a risk in the first place; and such a law likely would not have been established if there was not some kind of risk already perceived (the establishment of the law thus serving as a first step in regulating the said risk).\textsuperscript{297} Moreover, the authority of any external actor to shape/determine the internal relations of an individual state pushes the ethical boundaries of the trust model and points to the need for further ethical underpinning. For there seems to be little use in conceiving of the ‘imposed’ will of an external actor on the civil and political institutions of a state as ‘relationship building’ unless it can be positioned within an ethical framework that links it with the rights and duties of a wider political community (otherwise it is certainly undemocratic and of indeterminate justness). The OSCE’s political declarations can be seen in only a very partial or embryonic form as providing the ethical substance for such a link. This is addressed further in the last section of this chapter.

In addition to ‘authority’, the OSCE’s ‘capacity’ for thick relationship management is diminutive. That is, the OSCE lacks sufficient resources—human, material, financial, etc.—to take on the full range of post-conflict rehabilitation tasks. This is despite the extraordinarily broad spectrum of issues which its concept of comprehensive security encompasses, from the politico-military to the human to the economic and environmental dimensions. For example, the Council of Europe, with its built-up specialised structures focused exclusively on the problems of democracy and human rights has a staff ten times the size of the OSCE’s. (Rotfeld 1999, p.63) And the OSCE has nothing even approaching the economic development resources of organisations such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), let alone the financial resources of the EBRD, World Bank or IMF.\textsuperscript{298}

\textsuperscript{295} The authority of SFOR was likewise needed to push through unpopular reforms, such as the reduction and restructuring of the armed forces within a single, integrated command structure under civilian control.

\textsuperscript{296} See Section 6.2 for a discussion of these normative premises.

\textsuperscript{297} This is a variation of the infamous ‘chicken or the egg’ question.

\textsuperscript{298} Not to mention the ever-expanding resources and capacity of the non-governmental sector.
The Charter for European Security declares that the OSCE “will focus on areas in which [it] has particular competence.” Despite this, OSCE missions are frequently vaguely mandated to address a spectacular range of rights monitoring and protection, civil society promotion, democratic institution building and rule of law capacity-building and reinforcing activities. But instead, the application of the trust model suggests that the OSCE should focus pre-eminently—if not exclusively—on conflict prevention activities that are as directly and immediately linked to security as possible; that is, in the domain of ‘thin’ risk and relationship management to which it is uniquely suited. At the same time, it should be kept in mind that in some cases, the OSCE’s ‘thinness’ even limits its effectiveness in the domain of conflict prevention. For example, the government of Belarus has blocked the work of the OSCE Advisory and Monitoring Group after it refused to certify the Presidential elections as free and fair. (Barry 2002, p.38) And, despite the good offices and impressive record of the OSCE’s HCNM, there remains conspicuously little normative agreement within the OSCE on the right of minority groups to secession. Nevertheless, the OSCE remains the most capable international organisation for dealing with conflict prevention precisely because of its thin risk and relationship management competency. That is, because it operates as closely as possible to the borders of both, where core issues of security are encountered. And the OSCE operates where these security issues, located on both sides of the risk-relationship management dichotomy, begin to overlap and bleed together; and where, through the phenomenon of suspension, the rudiments of trust can begin to emerge. The OSCE is thus endowed with a thin trust building capacity that derives from the OSCE’s expanded form of ‘preventive diplomacy’ rather than from a deepening of the law and the imposition of order. It is a thin form of trust, but it should not be discounted.

299 See Appendix B.
300 Given the broad nature of the concept of comprehensive security, defining what issues and areas lie ‘closest’ to security is by no means a straightforward or completely objective task. What, after all, counts as ‘mission creep’ when the OSCE’s ‘overall’ mission is so broadly defined? Nevertheless, the point still stands that, following the trust model, the OSCE can be seen to operate most effectively where risk and relationship are most closely linked; that is, where the legitimacy of the OSCE’s norms can be brought most immediately to bear on pressing security concerns such as tensions stemming from human rights disputes. The work of the HCNM is perhaps most emblematic of this.
301 The Lukashenko government denied travel visas to the Advisory Group and blocked the appointment of a new Head of Mission, insisting on a new, reduced mandate for the OSCE. According to some commentators, including delegates of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, this clear breach of OSCE principles has seriously undermined the OSCE’s legitimacy and should be met with the expulsion of Belarus from the organisation.
302 For example, while the HCNM has repeatedly insisted that he favours political/legal solutions which allow minorities to co-exist within the same state, there is no normative consensus at the OSCE level over the ‘democratic’ rules for secession (e.g. referenda) or the conditions (such as historical grievances, brutal repression, ethnic cleansing, etc) under which minority uprisings are deemed legitimate rather than ‘acts of terrorism.”
Trust Ethics and the OSCE’s Kosovo Verification Mission

Baier’s second trust test takes into account the wider web of relations within which a specific trust relationship is embedded. In the case of the OSCE, this can refer to a myriad wider contexts, which is simplified, for the illustrative purposes here, to three: the OSCE’s relationship vis-à-vis other European and Transatlantic security arrangements; the OSCE’s role in relation to global security; and importantly, the OSCE’s relationship to non-state (sub-state and trans-state) actors, such as minority groups and other civil society actors (e.g. NGOs).\textsuperscript{303} To this end, it is useful to employ a particular illustrative case: the OSCE’s Kosovo Verification Mission, which, in the autumn of 1998, was the largest, most complex, challenging and high-profile mission that the OSCE had ever undertaken. With the consent of the government of Yugoslavia and endorsed by the U.N. Security Council, over 1,400 unarmed civilians were deployed to Kosovo to oversee the safe return of Albanian refugees. After the failure of the Rambouillet talks and the gradual deterioration of conditions in Kosovo, the Mission was forced to withdraw five months later.\textsuperscript{304} Importantly, given Baier’s trust test, The Kosovo Verification Mission is also notable for its less-than-neutral position on the conflict and for the wider controversy that a Head of Mission stirred.

During the nearly five months that the KVM was deployed, many of the numerous tasks set forth by the mandate were carried out, but with increasing difficulty. Many serious violations of the ceasefire and peace agreement were witnessed and recorded. The KVM released regular reports both to authorised government and non-government sources, as well as to the media. Information released in the reports included detailed accounts of the abduction of civilians; bomb explosions and hostile fire; beatings and shootings; threats against the local media; and escalating deportations. The KVM reported violations on both conflicting sides, with Kosovar Albanians criticised for unauthorised and hostile protests and for blocking roads.\textsuperscript{305} The KVM also reported that in several incidents, members of the KVM contingent came under hostile fire and in one incident, two mission members were wounded when their

\textsuperscript{303} The OSCE also includes formal partnerships with Mediterranean Region countries and links with other regions of the world.
\textsuperscript{304} On 17 October 1998, an Assessment Mission was dispatched to the FRY, starting in Belgrade and continuing to Kosovo. By mid-November, the Mission’s Headquarters had been established in Pristina, a Liaison Office set up in Belgrade and Regional Centres established in smaller towns throughout Kosovo. The Head of the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) was Ambassador William G. Walker of the United States, who was appointed by the CiO of the OSCE. A Senior Deputy Head of Mission and five Deputy Heads of Mission were subsequently appointed. OSCE personnel for the KVM were seconded from OSCE participating states and included staff with military and/or police backgrounds, lawyers specialising in human rights issues, and persons with knowledge and experience in the areas of democratisation, civil society building and refugee issues, along with administrative personnel. The initial estimated budget for the mission was USD 204 million.
\textsuperscript{305} At the same time, the KVM reported occasional signs of improvement and expressions of goodwill by both sides, including the postponement of criminal trials for terrorism, the release of prisoners and hostages and the return of property.
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vehicles were shot at.306 One of the most serious incidents uncovered by the KVM was the discovery of a Serbian massacre site.307 Two weeks later, on the 15th of January, the KVM reported the mass killing of forty Albanian civilians at Racak. The KVM also criticised the lack of co-ordination and sensitivity in FRY arrangements for the transfer of the bodies to families for proper burial. The KVM Head of Mission, Ambassador William Walker, was subsequently criticised himself by the Yugoslav leadership and efforts were made to have him expelled from Kosovo. On 19 March, the OSCE’s CiO, Norwegian Foreign Minister, Knut Vollebaek, decided to withdraw the KVM force from Kosovo. He cited the deteriorating security situation for unarmed verifiers; the virtual collapse of the ceasefire; and refused access and cooperation by Yugoslav officials.

As was elaborated in Chapter 5, Baier’s second test—though vaguely defined—requires that a specific trust relationship be considered within the context of the wider web of relationships which it potentially affects.308 Baier would ask us, then, to consider how the OSCE’s norms, procedures and in this example, specific activities, impact upon individuals and groups not represented by the OSCE’s membership. The KVM shows the problem of considering the role, interests, welfare (vulnerability, etc) of groups external or peripheral to the OSCE’s interstate membership. For one thing, because Serbia’s membership in the OSCE was suspended in 1992 during the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, it was never a state member of the OSCE. The OSCE was thus involved for the first time in a conflict in which both conflicting parties were entirely external to its present membership.309 Yet their situation was nevertheless perceived as a danger to OSCE collective security.310 At a broader international level, what was also at stake in Kosovo when it came to intervention—particularly NATO military intervention, which the KVM’s mission was connected with—was both its perceived justness and legality.

306 The security of the unarmed OSCE personnel in Kosovo was a significant concern. The agreement on the KVM signed by the FRY authorities and the OSCE stated that the FRY government would guarantee the safety and security of the KVM and all its members. Furthermore, U.N. Security Council Resolutions restated the FRY’s responsibility and NATO established an ‘over the horizon’ extraction force based in FYROM. (OSCE 2002)

307 On 29 December, the OSCE was informed by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) of an alleged mass gravesite in the Urosevac area, south of Pristina. The KVM visited the site on the 5th of January, spoke with eyewitnesses, noted details and photographed the site. Witnesses alleged that 13 persons buried at the site were all killed while fleeing Serb artillery fire.

308 It is worth highlighting again here the importance of not equating trust building ‘per se’ and Baier’s conditions for ‘ethical’ trust. Trust, following the model, may be said to accrue regardless of the trust’s particular ethical content or status.

309 In the Chechnya conflict in contrast, Russian membership in the OSCE played a prominent role in setting the cautious and modest tone of OSCE proposals and actions. Russia, however, also took strong interest in the Kosovo conflict and its outcome and played a vocal role throughout. In giving its agreement at the OSCE Permanent Council, Russia also endorsed the deployment of the KVM.

310 As numerous journalists, policy analysts, diplomats and politicians argued, not incontestably, the instability in Kosovo threatened, if left unattended, to spill over to other parts of the OSCE region where similar underlying ethnic tensions were thought to be vulnerable to exacerbation. The Kosovo Albanians also posed an enormous potential refugee problem for the OSCE area. Moreover, the violence between
The Puzzle of Trust in IR

The NATO bombing was ultimately undertaken without the authorisation of the U.N. Security Council and was hence of questionable legitimacy from the perspective of international law. Furthermore, the OSCE’s Head of Mission for the KVM upon departure from Kosovo concluded publicly that NATO bombing was now both inevitable and warranted. This despite the adamant position expressed by Russia, China (a non-OSCE member) and other international state and non-state actors that the bombing of Kosovo was neither legal nor justified.311

So where do all of these evident concerns (of which only the most obvious have been briefly noted here) on the part of actors external to the OSCE’s involvement in Kosovo leave us with respect to Baier’s second trust test? Because the KVM’s mandate was limited largely to monitoring the terms of the ceasefire between the Serbs and Albanian Kosovars, the question of its impact on the wider non-OSCE web of trust relations is not so controversial. There was no widely-disseminated disagreement by any prominent international actors with the establishment of the KVM. There was, however, considerable scepticism of the KVM’s neutrality once the mission had commenced. In contrast to the Assistance Group to Chechnya, the Kosovo Verification Mission was more overtly biased in the stance it took towards hostilities between the two conflicting parties. This may be understood by way of several factors. First, a certain amount of criticism about alleged non-neutrality of the OSCE by various individuals and groups is to be expected despite the best of intentions and efforts.312 Next, it should be noted that the Head of Mission appointed was an American diplomat, William Walker, which was perhaps not the most ‘diplomatic’ of decisions given the sensitivities of Russia to the Serbian cause and the aggressive leadership role the U.S. was playing by threatening NATO bombing. In addition, Ambassador Walker was, rightly or wrongly, strongly outspoken about the atrocities that his Mission reported the Serbs committing. On several occasions, Ambassador Walker included in his reports emotional condemnation of the acts committed. For example, in press statements strong and subjective terms such as ‘acts of terrorism’, ‘irresponsibility’, ‘insensitivity’, ‘lack of discipline’ and ‘indiscriminate’, etc. were used frequently in addition to objective statements of the facts.313 Likewise, when commenting on the premature withdrawal of the KVM (and when the media spotlight on the OSCE was at its brightest), Ambassador Walker stated his opinion that the use of significant force in Kosovo was now unavoidable and warranted. This is far from what can be considered a position of neutrality. Overall, however, it is fair to say that the

the primarily (Orthodox) Christian Serbs and the primarily Muslim Kosovar Albanians even threatened—albeit very indirectly—to compound the already highly volatile atmosphere in the Middle East.

311 A U.N. Security Council Resolution, however, was passed shortly after the commencement of the NATO intervention and Russia grudgingly vocalised its support. China’s sensitivities, however, were dealt a further blow when the Chinese embassy in Belgrade was inadvertently destroyed by the NATO aerial bombing campaign.

312 Any evaluation of the OSCE and its operations should reflect this and respect the potential for a wide range of dissenting opinion.

313 See the press releases at the time of the Mission available on the OSCE’s website: http://www.osce.org [03/11/2003].
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Mission served to raise the public profile of the OSCE to a level it had never previously attained and overall media coverage of the Mission was sympathetic.\textsuperscript{314}

As has been discussed in Chapter 5, the terms and parameters of Baier's second trust test are vague; and this can frustrate attempts to apply it to particular circumstances, not least international relations, the OSCE and the KVM. Nevertheless, with respect to the trust model, I believe there are a couple of important points that can be drawn from the exercise. The first has to do with the question—or problem—of OSCE neutrality highlighted above. Admittedly, the idea or issue of neutrality is not one that at first glance has overpowering ethical resonance. And the point here is not to develop an elaborate ethical conception of it. The point, rather, is that it serves as a useful 'baseline' for considering the impact that the OSCE's activities have on other external actors and/or their perception of these activities. Neutrality here does not, however, mean not taking a position on issues such as the systematic violation of the human rights of Kosovar Albanians by the Serbian military.\textsuperscript{315} Rather, the idea of neutrality is best equated with acting as fairly and impartially as possible, given the circumstances. The accusations of impartiality during the KVM suggest that senior OSCE officials were at times—consciously or not—hostage to the more narrow perspective of certain individual member-states or groupings of member states. And in this vein, precaution is warranted. For if the OSCE as a cooperative security organisation is to maintain its advantageous standing as a legitimate and unbiased mediator in conflicts between parties either within or external to its membership, all efforts to distinguish itself from the exclusive and/or narrow political concerns of some of its members must be tactfully made. It is, as has been shown, the OSCE's operating philosophy of consensus and impartiality which distinguishes it from other security organisations who are mandated to play more forceful roles in managing conflict.

The other lesson to draw from Baier's test is, more generally, that that the conditions for trust and trust building among a group of states, for example, can impact on other external groups. And external actors can likewise impact on the conditions for trust within a group of states such as the OSCE. The issue of neutrality in the activities of the OSCE, such as its KVM, tie in, for example, with larger questions about its role alongside the other prominent security arrangements, namely NATO, the U.N. and the EU's nascent defense capacity.\textsuperscript{316} And it ties in with questions related to the OSCE's role in global security more generally. Of course, the OSCE's impact can be a positive one as well, for example, as a role model for other regions. As was seen in Chapter 2, many other regions in the world and regional security arrangements,

\textsuperscript{314} Moreover, the line between objective and subjective description and interpretation is not easily measured, particularly in the frequently precarious and stressful circumstances under which the OSCE is often mandated to operate.

\textsuperscript{315} And there is always the risk that purported or perceived neutrality can in actual fact be a cover for the (relative or absolute) prioritisation of individual interest under the 'veil' of neutrality.

\textsuperscript{316} See Appendix A for a schema of OSCE member state membership in other international organisations.
notably ASEAN, have patterned their own CSBM after the OSCE's. And the OSCE's declarations—particularly the Helsinki Final Act—are cited in many international treaties (such as the European Convention on Human Rights) as a basis for their own declarations.

Finally, the OSCE's state-centrism raises the question of its impact on sub-state and trans-state actors, such as minority groups and NGOs who are not, at least directly, represented through the OSCE's inter-state membership. The OSCE's gradual institutionalisation over the last decade has, in fact, led to greater participation of non-state actors as well, such as the involvement of non-government organisations in providing expert advice and other important services to field missions. And as has been shown, the establishment of a High Commissioner on National Minorities has been instrumental in underscoring the rights of sub-state minority groups and the impact that not appropriately addressing their rights can have on collective security. But such broadening of representative identities and concerns among OSCE activities has not included an equal broadening of formal authority. NGOs perform primarily an advisory function and are not part of the formal consensual dialogue process. And the HCNM is not an advocate for minority groups per se, but deals with minority relations more generally (as a neutral third party). Thus, it is the member states at the diplomatic (and Ministerial) levels who remain unquestionably the authority in OSCE matters. While further exploration of the trust relationships between the OSCE and civil society (both at the state level and globally) is necessary, it should be clear through these two chapters that the relationships developed between OSCE members at the state level—in and of themselves—remain of significant relevance as well. And while it is clear that the OSCE impacts on—and is impacted by—other relationships, it should also be accounted for independently, even while it cannot always be completely separated from the larger context of other bilateral and multilateral security arrangements and actions. In sum, Baier's trust test would indicate that deliberate political efforts by the OSCE to assert and maintain its neutrality and its inclusive basis—and to expand this basis where possible—are crucial if its collective and comprehensive security objectives are to be perceived as justified to other actors at both the sub-state and trans-state levels.

Contextualising the Trust Model in IR

One of the main lessons to be drawn from the CSCE/OSCE illustrative studies, in terms of their feeding back into the development of the trust model, is the importance of context; that is, not just the particular actors involved and the particular circumstances they face, but also the specific and more general issues around which they are seeking to build trust in one another. It

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317 And as was mentioned in Chapter 7, NGOs played an important role during the Cold War in documenting and publicising member state breaches of their Helsinki commitments, particularly in the human dimension. The offshoots of one of these, Helsinki Watch, continues today as Human Rights Watch, now a leading global NGO which continues to monitor human rights around the world.
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is, thus, also useful to distinguish broadly between various contexts and their implications in terms of 'levels of analysis', as set out in the following chart:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OSCE TRUST RELATIONS: LEVELS OF ANALYSIS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>LEVEL</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actors directly involved in OSCE activities (e.g. political leaders, diplomats, officials involved in CBMs, Missions, etc)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interstate security relations overall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interstate relations generally (including other political/economic/social dimensions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International relations overall (including sub-state and non-state actors)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chart 9: OSCE Trust Relations: Levels of Analysis

As the details of the chart indicate, the closer an individual is to trust building activities (e.g. political leaders, diplomats, etc.), and the more issue-specific these activities are (e.g. weapons stockpile verification, negotiations on normative declarations, etc.), the stronger the trust building impact on these individuals and in these specific issue areas is likely to be. As trust building become more distant and more general in terms of the proximity of the individuals to be influenced and the issues around which trust is to be built, the impact weakens. This can be fairly easily illustrated by again taking one of the concrete examples surveyed earlier in this chapter, the activities of the OSCE’s High Commissioner on National Minorities.318 The most

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318 As has been seen, the HCNM is charged with acting independently, and/or on the advice of one or more member states, to investigate concerns about the situation and rights of national minorities within
direct trust building impact the HCNM could be said to have is on the particular individuals
with whom he comes into contact and specifically on the issue of the security concerns that
national minority tensions can cause. For example, in his visits to Estonia in the 1990s, the
HCNM Max van der Stoel met frequently with the representatives of Russian minority groups
and with Estonian government officials and politicians at the highest levels to discuss issues of
concern, such as the development of new language laws (e.g. on the teaching of official and
minority languages in state schools) and citizenship laws (e.g. ancestry, residency and language
requirements). In so much as his extensive dialogue and mediation efforts with these individuals
were productive and served to promote the tasks identified by the trust model (e.g. exchange of
information, open channels of communication, pursuit of common goals, etc) then their impact
on trust building can be considered to be strong, at least with respect to the specific issues under
discussion.

The more interesting questions, with respect to the trust model and the levels of analysis
identified above, arise from this point forward. What, for instance, is the impact of the HCNM’s
trust building efforts: first, on the overall relationship between the mediating parties—that is, on
matters of concern beyond the issues at hand (for example, overall trust in each other’s good
will, future political intentions, etc)—and second, on the larger groups which these individuals
represent directly/formally/legitimately or otherwise. With regards to the first question, to the
extent that the trust relationship moves beyond the specific issue(s) at hand—for example, from
teaching minority languages in states schools, to minority language rights more generally, to the
sum total of minority political rights to the legitimacy of the political system overall (and its
implicit bargain(s) between majority and minority groups)—then the impact of specific trust
building activities, such as those embarked upon by the HCNM, can be said to weaken
accordingly. This is not to say that they will not have some impact, but that this impact will
certainly be more indirect as well as subject to many other potentially confounding dynamics
(e.g. other issues in question, like citizenship laws). With regards to the second question, to the
extent that the issues at hand also affect/implicate other individuals and groups with whom the
HCNM has no direct contact—such as the members of those minority groups in question, the
other citizens with whom they co-exist, and the state which represents them all, as well as
neighbouring states and the other member states of the OSCE region)—the further these other
individuals and groups are removed from the specific trust building activities of the HCNM, the
weaker the impact of these activities will be. Again, other conflicting issues and actors may
play an undermining role. Other questions arise as well, such as the role the media can play in
disseminating information about trust building efforts, and more importantly, offering a positive
or negative ‘spin’ on these. The HCNM did occasionally engage in media interviews, issue

member states, and if necessary, and at the earliest possible time, to offer his or her good offices in the
press releases, write op-ed articles, etc, though, as seen, his was by-and-large a behind-the-scenes role. Clearly, more theoretical development, perhaps along the lines of ‘policy-dissemination’ models, is necessary to more fully conceptualise the many possible linkages between the myriad levels-of-analysis involved in trust building. This is particularly given the special role of the OSCE in connecting state and even sub-state security concerns with international security concerns.

Of course, the impact of the HCNM’s activities on international actors, like other OSCE member states and on broader international issues, like security relations and on international relations overall, is weakest, which is no small irony, given the ambitions of the trust model in conceptualising the role of trust in IR. But the fact that, at the broadest levels, it is weakest, does not make it negligible. Overall, the lesson that comes out of the illustrative studies and the multiple potential ‘levels of analysis’ which it exposes is three-fold. First: the trust model, thus far developed, is certainly not the last word on international relations; it does not have an answer to everything. Second, and relatedly: despite its scope, the model primarily says something small but important: that the key to building trusting relations lies in the subtle interplay between individual interests and group norms; and that on their own, neither is sufficient for building trust. This happens to fit extremely well with the core philosophy of the OSCE: that ‘security is indivisible,’ meaning that ‘one state’s insecurity is every state’s insecurity.’ Again, ironically, critiques of the looseness of this philosophy and of the OSCE’s activities more generally (often in favour of harder risk management measures, like NATO’s, or harder relationship management measures, like the EU’s, or of some as yet developed form of regional/world government), of which many commentators have never failed to remind, stand similarly for the trust model. And again, looseness aside, as was stressed in the previous section, just as the OSCE says something small, yet profound about the inherent connection between individual and group security, so too does the trust model about the inherent connection between individual interests and social norms in building trust. Finally, the need to contextualise the concept of trust in IR, as per the levels of analysis considered above, from the level of individuals right through to group inter-relations at an international level, suggests that, fundamentally, the concept of trust is one that may fit best with notions of governance, even global governance as a whole; that is, with a better understanding of what is involved in creating, at all levels, a deeper sense of global political community.

mediation and resolution of any tensions and conflicts that may arise or be expected to arise.

I am referring here to the ‘micro-macro’ linkages, so to speak, which, as was seen in the earlier theoretical chapters, remain notoriously shallow and contested in the trust literature across the social sciences to date.
Conclusion

Trust is a concept that has remained under-developed in IR theory, despite its growing prominence in other areas of social science, including sociology, economics and political science. This is in large part because the international realm has typically been characterised by IR scholars as the realm of pervasive distrust. For most, the absence of reliable information about the intentions of other states, the absence of deeper forms of cooperation, let alone deeper norms embodied in binding and enforceable legal statutes, has made the basic idea of trust in international relations seem inappropriate; some minimal confidence in certain areas, perhaps, but trust has seemed too thick a term for overall relations between states; better to leave the idea of trust, if at all, to tightly-knit and well-organised domestic communities. Yet at the same time, many would also agree at an intuitive level that some form of trust between states is important. For how can states co-exist, how can there be even limited international cooperation without at least some modicum of trust? Is it possible, then—in the interest of reconciling this intuition that trust is important with the concern that it is too thick a notion—to conceive of a thinner form of trust in international relations? What would such trust consist of? How would it be similar or different from the trust present between individuals and communities within states? How could such trust be fostered and perhaps gradually thickened?

These questions have exercised the central project in this thesis of advancing a basic model of trust in international relations—as well as a compatible policy-oriented model for trust building—and applying it first to a more traditional area, interstate security and then, by way of illustration, to the evolution of the CSCE into the OSCE. To this end, I have proceeded through five general steps. The preliminary but lengthy first task has been to survey the diffuse literature on trust and consider it in the context of the broad traditions of IR theory, particularly realism, institutionalism, more recent constructivist approaches and the normative predilections of the English School. Second, based on this survey, I have sought to develop a model of trust in international relations that contains within it both individualistic (atomistic) and social (holistic) dimensions and importantly, is further mediated by a mechanism unique to trust: 'suspension.' Trust, I have argued, is a multi-dimensional phenomenon that is not reducible to either individual interests or socially-embedded norms; and with regard to this feature, the bulk of the diverse research on trust, including in IR, has remained obscured and self-limiting.

320 I have sought here to shed light on the potential 'value added' of conceptualising trust in IR—such as the emphasis on the dual individualistic and socialised nature of IR—but also trust's limits as a stand-alone and easily over-generalised (or over-extended) concept. My basic point here is that trust is whatever scholars choose it to be. That is to say, it holds little analytical usefulness independent of a broader theoretical context.

321 Still, the multi-dimensional model is not without its own distinctive methodological weaknesses, as Section 6.3 has outlined. In essence, arguments in support of and against such an approach are similar to
Exclusively self-interest-based trust in international relations has been deemed severely restricted or absent by most IR scholars because of the problems associated with sufficiently predicting and securing these interests, given the stakes involved in international security (e.g. state survival). Exclusively normative-based trust in international relations has been likewise typically dismissed given the limited common goals, values and identity of states; and the absence of a substantive and enforceable enough legal framework upon which to base these norms. Rather, I have argued in this thesis that trust involves 'both' knowledge and norms. For what solely knowledge-based and solely normative-based conceptions of trust neglect on their own is the kernel of trust that permits the leap between the two; that is, from the point where knowledge ends across the gap of uncertainty to positive expectation. Or in other words, rather than 'reasonable doubt', trust involves giving another 'the benefit of the doubt.' Third, in the interest of developing a model that is more easily amenable to policy prescription, a compatible trust-building model has also been put forward. This model outlines the dual dimensions of risk and relationship management, both of which successful trust building in international relations appears to require. By breaking down the concept of trust into these dual risk and relationship dimensions and by then setting out the basic tasks of each, it becomes possible to distinguish more clearly between certain qualities and degrees of trust, and to discern a continuum from thin to thicker forms of trust. This in turn allows the possibility of determining whether these qualities and degrees of trust are present or possible in international relations in general and in specific instances of interstate relations in particular.

The basic tasks of each strategy have also been elaborated through a fourth step; namely, applying the model to an illustrative study: the evolution of the CSCE into the OSCE. In this vein, the CSCE’s historic role in the ending of the Cold War has been considered in the context of whether or not the Conference and its associated processes in fact served to build trust between participating states. Following the model, the overall conclusion has been that, while the CSCE set in place many of the building blocks of trust, such as increased dialogue, monitoring of behaviour, the establishment of common goals and so forth, the wider Cold War context meant that participating states still did not meet the model’s overall litmus test for trust: that they be prepared to give each other the benefit of the doubt. Rather, despite growing cooperation and normative development is some important areas, participating states overall retained the opposite general orientation towards one another: reasonable doubt about each other’s intentions. The post-Cold War OSCE’s confidence building measures, declarations, structures and its comprehensive security mandate have also been considered in the context of the trust model’s dual risk and relationship management dimensions. Here, following the model,
The Puzzle of Trust in IR

a weak but not negligible propensity to trust can be said to be emerging between member states. Though still a far cry from the thicker forms of trust typically associated with domestic societies, member states have been able to 'institutionalise' concrete risk and relationship management mechanisms to the extent that across an expanding swath of issues linked explicitly to security, they are increasingly seeking to give one another the benefit of the doubt. Finally, Annette Baier's two ethical trust tests have been applied to the illustrative studies: first, in the context of the OSCE's role in the end of the Cold War more generally; and second, in terms of the actions of the OSCE's Kosovo Verification Mission more specifically. Baier's trust tests seek to establish ethical criteria for trust relationships and have been employed to compensate for the model's lack of ethical specificity.

In the introduction, I began with a puzzle—or paradox—about trust and so the first question that must be addressed is whether this puzzle has been solved in the three hundred odd pages that have followed. And if so, what are the implications for the study of IR? The crux of the puzzle was how trust could seemingly be based on both vigilance and vulnerability when these appear to be opposite and/or contradictory dynamics. That is to say, before asking what trust, if any, exists between states, what trust in fact involves needs to be unpacked: Can states be said to trust when they are vigilant or vulnerable towards one another? This puzzle has been unpacked over eight chapters, but only to a point; and a prescriptive model for building trust has been developed which reconciles these two dynamics, but again, only to a point. The challenge, as was set out in the introduction, has been to find a way to weave together two competing social scientific visions of trust: one subjective, the other intersubjective. To the extent that these two visions are in fact reconcilable, the concept of 'suspension', illuminated in Chapter 4, has served as the lynchpin. But to the extent that these two visions, particularly at their extreme horizons, remain unreconciled (and perhaps irreconcilable), the model is more usefully conceived as a heuristic tool than a full-blown epistemology of trust. And this is why the language of 'management'—of both risks and relationships—has been deemed the most appropriate here.

The application of the trust model to the OSCE, as was discussed in the previous chapter, has made it possible to point to some of the strengths and weaknesses in the OSCE's ability to build and sustain trust between its member states. For example, regularised dialogue, transparency and neutrality come out as important OSCE tools for promoting trust, while the realm of power politics within and beyond the OSCE, as well as the restricted legal accountability of member states (to the OSCE's shared principles) come out as significant limitations to its trust building capacity. The important thing is that the model nevertheless international relations—it offers fewer obvious and unambiguous 'propositions' than other general theories of IR, such as Waltz's neo-realism or neo-liberal regime theories.
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allows for the conception of an emerging propensity on the part of the OSCE's member states to trust each other and likewise allows for the teasing out of the different features of the OSCE's structures and activities which serve to foster this propensity to trust. The OSCE, following the trust model, is evidently thin along both risk and relationship management dimensions compared to other international organisations that have particular strengths along one or the other dimensions (e.g. NATO's military capacity and the EU's legal framework). But these organisations lack the OSCE's inclusivity. Most importantly, the OSCE is the only pan-European security organisation that, with its confidence building measures and its normative declarations and activities, combines, however embryonically, both dimensions. And as the model emphasises, the kernel of trust, the trusting leap, lies precisely at the intersection of these two dimensions. It remains to be seen whether this propensity to trust can be expanded over time. At best, the model, at its current level of development, is flexible enough to account for a variety of ways in which this expansion might take place. At worse, it remains too loose to account for the specific processes that allow for the thickening of trust into domestically analogous forms. Part of this looseness has to do with the absence of a substantive enough theory of trust in the social sciences. Part of it has to do with the lack of consensus on what domestic trust itself involves. And part of it has to do with the apparent generality—or looseness—of trust as a phenomenon. Finally, the additional application of Baier's trust tests to the illustrative studies has also made it possible to consider the ethical parameters of the OSCE's trust relations and to tentatively draw general conclusions about their impact on the wider network of relations in which they are embedded. The impact of the OSCE's activities on sub-state actors within the OSCE region, such as ethnic minority groups, and actors outside the OSCE region, such as neighbouring states, is particularly relevant here. Such ethical

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322 Nor is the management model exhaustive. It can be seen to serve, rather, as a preliminary set of guidelines.

323 Might, for example, trust be thickened through a deepening of normative commitments, such as the establishment of an OSCE Court of Human Rights similar or linked to the Europe Court of Human Rights or the International Criminal Court? Or might it be thickened by further military cooperation, such as mobilising a muscular OSCE peacekeeping force—or perhaps expanding a future U.S. Missile Defense Shield to protect all OSCE member states? Or through both normative and military strengthening?

324 The history of the EU, for example, seems to suggest that the thickening of trust relations between states starts with further economic cooperation and that via a gradual and by no means completely linear process, such cooperation expands to further political cooperation and perhaps eventually to military cooperation (if the EU's military capability ever gets off the ground). But Europe also already had a long common history of shared Christian values and painful war experiences as normative motivation for post-war economic cooperation; and there is little use for conjecture here without closer consideration of the vast EU literature. Unlike the EU 'evolutionary' experience of deepening trust relations, the U.S. experienced more of a 'Big Bang,' where a comprehensive economic and political framework for trust relations between the states of the union was brought into being through a relatively brief 'constitutional moment' (but again, based upon a painful Civil War experience and a common desire to enshrine democratic principles in a 'New World' liberated from the cycles of violence and tyranny of European history).
considerations challenge the conceptual boundaries of both the trust framework advanced in this thesis and the state-centric bias of the OSCE. They also set the rough bearings for exploring the role of trust across the many other areas of international relations, highlighted under prospects for further research in the last part of this conclusion.

Some further general policy implications have also been drawn from the two shorter illustrative studies, the OSCE Assistance Group to Chechnya and the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission. These have included the importance to trust building of ensuring and communicating neutrality and accountability. Promoting the specific tasks set out in the model itself—keeping in mind some of the limitations that have been noted—can also take the form of policy recommendations. Overall, the trust model’s implications are best read in two broad ways. First, the model offers a potential new/alternative perspective for thinking about international relations; and given the illustrative study material, particularly in the area of security studies. Secondly—and similarly—it sets the context for asking further questions about the social dynamics of international relationships and for developing and testing more specific and rigorous trust and trust-building theories of IR.

The Value Added of the Concept of Trust in IR

So what, in sum, is the value added of trust as a concept in IR theory? First, it useful to compare the concept, as it has been developed in this thesis, with the more familiar IR concepts of confidence and cooperation. As has been shown particularly in Chapter 2, there is a strong link between confidence and trust. Confidence, it can be said, is necessary but insufficient for trust to exist. Confidence makes up the risk management dimension of the trust equation. It is based on the ability to predict the likelihood that one’s interests will be fulfilled and is therefore closely linked with rational choice approaches in IR. What trust ‘adds’ to the concept of confidence is the relationship management dimension, but without discarding the risk management dimension. That is, it also brings in the ‘social’ aspect, whereas ‘confidence’ is neutral on whether one is dealing with a person or with an inanimate object (such as the prediction/confidence that your car will start in the morning). To the extent that trust also brings in the social aspect, including communication and the development of shared goals, values and norms, it moves beyond, yet still depends partly on, prediction/confidence. The benefits of this are clear: trust allows for the reduction of uncertainty, based on relationship, in circumstances where perfect prediction is impossible.

325 For example, while we may often trust another only in certain areas and to a certain extent, that trust inevitably involves an overall judgement (mixed with overall sentiment) in that certain area. Trust is like a rule of thumb that we adhere to but nevertheless cannot pin down exactly.
326 However, as will be elaborated below, Baier’s normative tests, which consider when it is ‘right’ to trust, have been shown to be too loose in their current form for specific policy recommendations.
But what is the value of this for international relations? The most direct answer is, as per the above, that the concept of trust opens up avenues for the creation of order and cooperation in circumstances of imperfect knowledge where rational choice approaches would suggest otherwise. Take the classic example of nuclear arms. The objective risks posed to one country of another state possessing them can hardly be underestimated, at least in terms of their devastating potential. Moreover, there is no room for learning about intentions based on past experiences, given the repercussions of a single aggressive act. So how can states achieve a sense of stability and security in the presence of these weapons? One way is through risk management; for example, monitoring the deployment of these weapons via satellites and other intelligence; evaluating the intentions of the states who possess these weapons, based on the available intelligence; developing contingency plans in the event that the risks of their use increases; establishing deterrents, such as the parallel build-up of one’s own arsenal and credibly communicating the threat of reprisals; and finally, intervening, for example via a pre-emptive strike, to punish non-compliant behaviour and/or to reduce/remove what are perceived as unacceptable risks. Any or all of these measures could be said to increase a state’s confidence that it is secure from attack. But what if these measures are insufficient? What if, for example, the available intelligence is meagre or unreliable? What if the evaluation of the other state’s intentions based on this intelligence is ambiguous? What if contingency plans as well as deterrents are deemed inadequate? And what if the risks associated with an intervention are perceived as too risky? In such situations, is a sense of order and stability an impossibility?

The trust model suggests that it is not. Where the ability to predict is insufficient or precarious, a sense of order and stability is still possible through trust. But this requires relationship management in addition to risk management. That is, if communication, shared goals, values, identity and the rule of law have developed to a sufficient extent, two or more states may be willing to extrapolate beyond the immediate and certain knowledge available to them and, despite this absence of perfect predictability, choose to trust by giving one another the benefit of the doubt. While the trust model thus emphasises the value of social norms in allowing for the possibility of order and even, through the fostering of shared identities, the beginnings of a sense of political community between states, it doesn’t depend overwhelmingly or solely on these, as do some of the more extreme social constructivist-inspired theories of IR (where, for example, all knowledge is seen as socially constructed). Indeed, the trick, and once again the value-added, of the trust model is that, just like in its role in moving beyond imperfect prediction, the model seeks to move beyond perfect agreement/consensus on social values. For where value-disagreements exist and identities differ, as they invariably do to differing degrees in any form of political community, the leap to trust may still be achieved by relying on the risk management dimension of the equation: the prediction that your individual interests will still be protected despite normative discrepancies; that is, provided that such prediction is still done.
from a position of at least some minimal level of social cohesion. So, all things considered, the key benefit of the trust model is that it allows students of IR to theorise the possibility of a stability of expectations and some modicum of political community, even in the absence of perfect knowledge and/or consensus on values, provided (and this is critical) that at least some minimum degree of both knowledge and shared values among individuals states exists.

In addition to not privileging the role of either individual interests or social norms, the model demonstrates the particular interplay of the two that is vital to engendering trust. The result is a partly 'de-essentialised' understanding of trust; that is, rather than trust being a question of the 'absolute' presence of certain underlying factors (such as interests and norms), trust instead becomes a function of the interaction of these underlying features; each of which may be present in variable degrees, and, as a rule, is on its own incomplete/imperfect. While minimal or 'threshold' levels of both risk and relationship management are necessary for fostering an atmosphere of trust, the model also opens up space for theorising different kinds of trust, depending on the particular individuals/groups involved, the particular circumstances/issues at play, and the blend of underlying risk and relationship management elements present. The model is thus 'phenomenologically-oriented.' Whether a trust relationship is based primarily (but not solely) on either the promotion/prediction of individual interests or shared norms—or a relatively even balance of the two—or whether or not two or more groups are willing at all in the end to give each other the 'benefit of the doubt' is, as per above, very much context-dependent. This was particularly highlighted by the CSCE/OSCE illustrative studies in the previous two chapters.

The World Trade Organisation (WTO), for example, would offer an idiosyncratically different illustration of trust building, at least with respect to trade. Overall, the trade relations among member states which are embodied in WTO agreements can be said to reflect both risk and relationship management elements; on the one hand, in terms of securing member states' individual interest in greater prosperity through increased trade; and on the other, by promoting this through an ongoing dialogue and institutional process which has led to common rules on the principles of open trade and even a mechanism for adjudicating and guarding against rule-infringements. But while the WTO's risk management dimension has evolved impressively over the years, it could be said that its relationship management dimension has lagged behind and that this has now become a real source of blockage in terms of advancing the multilateral trade

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327 It could be said that the alter-ego of the 'leap of faith' which trusting involves is, perhaps ironically, a 'leap of alienation' or, to the extent that a community's social norms correspond to notions of justice, a 'leap of injustice'. As counter-intuitive as this seems, this 'other side' of the trust coin simply reinforces the essentialness of the 'individualistic' perspective to trust alongside its social perspective.

328 The WTO also invokes (or at least is linked to, albeit somewhat more indirectly) economic relations as a whole.
agreement process. For example, to date, member states have been unwilling/unable to make substantial progress towards establishing a common set of values centred on ‘development’, in terms of emphasising economic growth opportunities in the developing world, and on ‘equitable’ growth overall. This has become increasingly unacceptable to a large block of member states. It is reasonable to speculate that unless these crucial issues along the relationship management dimension are eventually satisfactorily addressed, the WTO will remain hampered in its ability to build deeper trust with respect to economic relations among its members.

The more complex answer to what value there is to the concept of trust beyond the concept of confidence, more familiar to IR, which was alluded to in Chapter 6, is that, as many commentators (academic and otherwise) have noted, contemporary international relations are marked by a proliferation or real and perceived risks. This is particularly true in the area of interstate security, where, as has been illustrated, there is now an increased awareness of risks stemming, not just from armed conflict, but also from economic, environmental and numerous broadly defined societal concerns; all of which are connected, however loosely, to growing interdependence and globalisation more generally. Because many of these new and expanding forms of risk are partly or wholly social in nature and because risk management efforts can fall short in adequately addressing them, and because this shortfall can have dire consequences for states, ‘confidence’ may be quite limited; and even where vigorous risk management efforts do create greater confidence, the inevitable gap that remains between ‘greater’ confidence and ‘perfect’ confidence may be increasingly troublesome. The concept of trust, as it is developed in this thesis, offers a way of bridging this gap.

The question of what the value added is of the trust concept to IR, as compared to ‘cooperation’ is far more straightforward. Simply put, the trust model offers a particular theorisation of what potentially lies ‘behind’ certain acts of cooperation in international relations; of which ‘cooperation’ in and of itself says nothing. As has been seen, trusting individuals or groups tend to cooperate regularly and more deeply with one another, whereas those who distrust do not. But cooperation can take place for other reasons as well; for example, when one state ‘coerces’ another to cooperate. So the value added of the concept of trust is that it offers a particular, but by no means exclusive, category of ‘reasons’ for why certain individuals/groups may be induced to cooperate.

Finally, it is important not to overlook two other broad-based potential benefits that the concept of trust brings to IR. First, trust is comparatively cheap. That is, compared to an excessive focus on risk management efforts, such as intelligence-gathering and vast military build-up, trust can offer a more affordable alternative by at least partly substituting risk management for relationship management (on top of bridging the ‘confidence gap’ that

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329 Interestingly, the organisation has sought to overcome part of the relationship deficit in recent times
inevitably remains even with the strongest risk management efforts). Certainly, in the long run, trust’s comparative cheapness is an enormous potential advantage. Second, as has been examined in various places in this thesis, individuals and groups tend to hold a general preference for trusting relations, where they are possible; not just for material reasons, but also, it could be said, for psychological reasons. The social-oriented nature of trust offers important psychological advantages over exclusively individualistically-focuses approaches to international relations, because, for example, trust serves to reduce excessive/insurmountable anxiety about the potentially negative future intentions of others. It is a truism that humans are social beings. This should hold equally for IR, and the concept of trust offers an overarching way of satisfying this need.

This is not to say that states will always see pursuing a trust building approach as intrinsic to their interests; far from it, and particularly in the short term. As has been considered, it will depend very much on the context. The US, for example, clearly has pursued (and continues to pursue) a trust building approach will allies like Canada, with whom is shares the longest undefended border in the world, and participates in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and security alliances such as NATO (not to mention the OSCE). However, with other states with which it shares few interests and certainly extremely limited if any common values and sense of collective identity, such as North Korea and Iran, US leadership has typically deemed a ‘containment’ strategy as most appropriate. Here, risk management strategies, which seek to deter the other state from hostile behaviour, are prioritised. While limited relationship management efforts may also come into play, such as the communication and agreed goals which are set out in nuclear capability agreements (the US, for example, agreeing to offer North Korea aid in exchange for halting its nuclear development programmes), these fall far short of any reasonable threshold whereby the US would be prepared to give the other state ‘the benefit of the doubt’.

The Normative Project

As has been considered in Chapter 5, the concept of trust, in and of itself, says nothing specific normatively; and neither does the trust model as it is set out in Chapter 6, except to the effect that the deepening of the relationship management dimension of trust demands the development of shared norms (but the content of these norms is entirely up to the individuals or groups who collectively develop them). The trust model, as it currently stands, is thus normatively neutral. Indeed, as seen earlier, the trust ties of certain groups, such as the mafia and violent ethnic nationalists, can be very strong, suggesting that trust, in some circumstaces, can be far from

through concerted efforts to engage in a dialogue with non-state groups.

330 This is beyond the more obvious methodological point that all theoretical models at some point and to a certain degree invoke normative positions, choices and judgements.
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moral, depending on one’s views of the goodness of these groups and their actions. If anything, as the section on contextualising trust in the previous chapter and the above suggests, the concept of trust, as developed in this thesis, is largely phenomenological in orientation. Nevertheless, given the discussion in the later sections of Chapter 6 of the ideas of Isaiah Berlin, G.W. Hegel, and even, in the case of IR, Hedley Bull, in potentially underpinning a more developed understanding of the phenomenon of suspension, which is the kernel of trust, a normatively neutral model of trust in IR may ultimately be unsatisfying. This is also given the conclusions of the illustrative studies, which suggest that, in the bigger picture, the concept of trust may fit best with an overall conception of international political community, which again has stronger normative implications.

Chapter 5, as has been seen, offered, independently of the basic trust model for now, a preliminary attempt to determine the parameters of a more ethically developed conception of trust, employing the ideas of Annette Baier. However, the conclusions drawn by the illustrative studies in Chapters 7 & 8 suggest that the generality of Annette Baier’s terms—notwithstanding their insightfulness—make their rigorous and unambiguous application to concrete situations, including in international relations, somewhat problematic. Developing a fuller conception of the role of trust in international relations thus requires, I would argue, further engagement with political philosophy—for example, working through the ideas of liberals such as John Rawls, communitarians such as Charles Taylor and neo-republicans such as Philip Pettit. For beyond the present framework, it is not clear what else trust as a general and morphable concept would have to offer in normative terms with respect to international relations. Moreover, if isolated from deeper normative context, trust risks remaining a shallow idea of a largely rhetorical nature—and easily manipulable to serve not necessarily compatible needs. Rather, trust should be considered in concert with other key normative questions that animate contemporary political philosophy debates; for example, questions about justice, about universal rights (and corresponding duties) and the possibilities and limits of international forms of community. While, as it has been argued, some amount of minimal trust appears to be inherent to any form of social interaction—for example, following Luhmann, potentially existing prior to justice—such fundamental questions may nevertheless actively mediate the extent to which deeper forms of trust can and should develop.

A better normative understanding of the positive tensions between trust and distrust is also necessary. Distrust—again following Luhmann for example—serves to reduce complexity and thus appears intrinsically important for negotiating the anarchy of international relations.

331 Phenomenology can be defined as a description of experience. It is restricted to analysis of the intellectual processes of which we are introspectively aware, without necessarily making any assumptions about their causal or normative implications. Philosophers who have made extensive use of diverse
The idea of distrust has also played a prominent role in the creation of certain domestic liberal democratic institutions, exemplified by the writings of James Madison in the Federalist Papers. The positive function of distrust is institutionalised in the American Constitution via checks and balances, including the separation of powers between the various branches of government (i.e. the Administration, Congress, Senate and Judiciary). While citizens are asked to place their trust in the government they elect to act in the public interest, the division of powers between branches of government, together with diverse mechanisms of accountability (e.g. oversight and impeachment mechanisms) aims to ensure that no one individual or political group is able to breach the public trust; or at least that there are adequate remedies in this event. In international relations, the capacity to institutionalise distrust via enforceable mechanisms are, at least multilaterally, minimal or non-existent compared to domestic relations and this represents one of the clearest obstacles to international forms of governance. The closest parallel in the international arena may be, as we have seen, ‘confidence-building measures’ (CBMs), including, for example, nuclear and chemical weapon inspection regimes.332 Thus, as the discussion of prospects for further research will suggest, conceptualising the normative role of both trust and distrust in nascent forms of global governance would be a potentially valuable way of developing the trust model further. Along similar ‘governance’ lines, perhaps the most significant normative shortcoming of the trust model presented here is the absence of a cogent elaboration of the legal bases of trust. For example, as Section 6.2 touched on, how can trust between individuals and groups within a social and political system be codified in legal structures? Should laws and the legal system as a whole primarily be a function of risk management—that is, aimed at protecting the interests and rights of individuals—as liberal-oriented theories would hold? Or should law be a function of relationship management—that is to say, the embodiment of group traditions, values and identity and the codification of corresponding rules and duties—as communitarian-oriented theories would hold? Or should the law involve some idiosyncratic blend of the two, as some recent developments in political theory, such as neo-Republicanism would point towards? And what is the role of democratic phenomenological methods include Brentano, Husserl, Hartmann, and Merleau-Ponty. See, for example: http://www.philosophypages.com/dy/p2.htm [13/05/2004]

332 Another (albeit only loosely) analogous mechanism would be the veto retained by the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council. The veto permits a check on the legal authority of other states to engage in unauthorised military interventions. However, this check is severely limited, at least in legal terms. Without digressing here into the debates about the normative bases of international law, a central problem lies in the status of such international conventions within the domestic legal frameworks of individual states. For example, within the EU, European Law has become the final authority in specific areas of legislation, particularly related to the internal market, and this authority has been enshrined in the national constitutions of member states. The European Commission has been charged with acting independently on certain key matters, including proposing new legislation, and there is recourse to European Courts with the power to take punitive actions. But on matters of international security, even among EU member states, domestic law still prevails. In this sense, there is no international political or judicial body with real authority to check the power of individual states to act on matters of national security. See Majone for further discussion related to the EU. (2002)
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processes in building trust in international relations? Would internationalised democratic processes simply add an important layer to the checks and balances of institutionalised risk management or, more than that, would they be fundamental to drawing out the roots of trust in civil society; that is, in the social capital-like features of informal political and non-political association? A better understanding of how to move from a propensity to trust in international relations to trust as core element of thicker, more domestically and democratically-analogous forms of global governance requires further unpacking and working through of these complex and fascinating themes.

Nevertheless, it seems that some degree of trust is both necessary and desirable to the extent that the international realm continues to contain within it a significant degree of the unknown and indeed unknowable (despite the best efforts of the proponents of realist and regime-based strategies). A distinct quality of trust is essential wherever power and cooperation are insufficient for predicting and controlling the totality of future possibilities (and the totality of potential differences between states). Further normative excavation is also a question of systematically sorting out, prioritising, discounting and synthesising the many hypothesised building blocks of trust. Chart 1 in the introductory chapter is illustrative of the dozens of sources of trust which have been hypothesised—and to varying degrees tested and shown to be present in different settings—across a jumbled trust literature. The risk and relationship management model developed here is a first step in this direction for international relations. It thus seems that at some point the task must fall to normative theory of coherently discriminating between these disparate and frequently contradictory potential elements of trust. As Annette Baier points out, not all trust may be good or desirable trust. Moreover, theorists who favour ‘interpretative’ understandings of social science will point out that theory invariably involves subjective choices, giving preference to some sources to the neglect of others. I would argue that it falls to normative theory to give ‘better’ reasons for these choices.

**Prospects for Further Research**

In this thesis, I have in some respects raised questions for further research directions more than I have offered concrete policy recommendations. In addition to extending the normative project on trust as outlined above, a couple of other potential lines of further questioning are worth briefly highlighting. Perhaps most obviously, it would be useful to consider other illustrative studies and illustrative study areas beyond the OSCE and the more traditional IR arena of interstate security than has been considered. What, for instance, is the relevance—if any—of the

333 Apart from the primary conceptual issues that I have attempted to sketch across the chapters—such as the relative merits of rational choice, intersubjective and normative approaches to trust—the larger question which perhaps remains insufficiently addressed is whether a certain degree of trust is really actually necessary, desirable or achievable given the present characteristics of international relations. This
present trust framework for other regime areas, such as trade, environmental, biotechnology (e.g. trust in food safety?), or air transport regimes? And as the normative discussion has also hinted at, how can the present framework be extended to consider important areas of international political economy, where issues of power inequity are often equally prominent and questions of economic equity—and its role in trust relations—must be addressed in greater depth than has been done here. To what extent, for example, can trust be built and sustained between states in an international system which is characterised by extreme levels of economic inequity? Again, more sophisticated normative development is required. At the same time as different illustrative studies are called for, the same can be said for expanding the range of empirical methods employed. Given the preliminary nature of the project that has been undertaken here, a fairly relaxed approach has been pursued—part historical interpretation, part qualitative textual analysis, with a good dose of anecdotal quotes mixed in—while still pointing out along the way to the diverse methodological problems which can arise when attempting to measure and interpret trust relations. Clearly, various empirical approaches would benefit from being more rigorously delineated and tested and their advantages and disadvantages more closely compared.

Another potential avenue of future research would involve inquiry into the nature of trust in less state-centric international relationships. The present trust framework has focused on trust relations between states. Further research could inquire into the relevance of adapting and/or extending the present framework to better take into account the myriad sub-state, non-state and mixed relationships which characterise much of contemporary international relations. As Keohane’s recent work stresses, understanding, developing and enforcing the accountability of these other influential international actors is a question of growing importance to international relations. The role of trust, I would argue, is an equally critical question and, indeed, may be at some level inseparable from that of accountability. To what extent these other actors can and should be trusted, by whom and about what (and whether such distinctions are even feasible in contemporary international relations) remains to be explored.

Yet another future line of inquiry would seek to establish tighter links between the concept of trust and the cluster of issues and debates centred around the phenomenon of globalisation; and following from this, global governance. As has been explored in several sections of this thesis, particularly Chapter 6, the issue of trust is key to a number of core dynamics and problems often identified with globalisation. These include, generally, building and sustaining trust in an environment characterised by rapid and continuous change (social, economic, cultural, etc); proliferating socially-constructed risks; and the deepening interdependence across increasingly vast and complex swaths of human life (and the parallel sort of inquiry invariably invokes normative questions of pragmatism (or utility), which have yet to be
Christopher Berzins

reactions against this, i.e. fragmentation). Is globalisation eroding trust? Is trust less possible in an increasingly globalised world? Given what has been theorised to underlie trust, such as familiarity, continuity, tradition—not to mention face-to-face relationships, cultural commonalities and some form/degree of independence, control and accountability—are the forces of globalisation encouraging or discouraging of trust? And are new understandings or forms of trust and trust building (and likewise of global governance) needed as a result?

I started off in the preface of this thesis with two metaphors—or challenges—for the project of exploring how to build trust in international relations. The first metaphor related to the shift in medical science over the last decade from exploring the causes of disease to exploring the causes of health. The second related to the ambitious task taken up in the IT field over the last decade of not just theorising trust in the Internet but developing practical mechanisms and strategies for fostering, reinforcing and safeguarding this trust. I suggested that a similar shift from focusing on the causes of conflict and distrust to focusing on the causes of peace and trust might also be of value to IR; and that if the IT field could tackle the daunting complexities of trust in the Internet then the same was worth at least attempting for IR. The subsequent unpacking of the concept of trust in this thesis has helped to demystify the divide between trust within states and trust between states. But at the same time as this has suggested that intrastate trust is far from a straightforward matter itself, it has also suggested that there is still a long road to be travelled down towards substantive interstate trust. The building blocks of trust have been outlined as have the dimensions of an emerging propensity among member states across the OSCE area to trust one another when it comes to specific but widening areas of interstate security relations. But the challenge of developing concrete ways of thickening this trust and expanding it to other areas of international relations still remains to be both theorised and realised.
Appendix A: OSCE Structure and Institutions

Participating States

- Albania
- Andorra
- Armenia
- Austria
- Azerbaijan
- Belarus
- Belgium
- Bosnia and Herzegovina
- Bulgaria
- Canada
- Croatia
- Cyprus
- Czech Republic
- Denmark
- Estonia
- Finland
- France
- Georgia
- Holy See
- Hungary
- Iceland
- Ireland
- Italy
- Kazakhstan
- Kyrgyzstan
- Latvia
- Liechtenstein
- Lithuania
- Luxembourg
- Malta
- Moldova
- Monaco
- Netherlands
- Norway
- Poland
- Portugal
- Romania
- Russian Federation
- San Marino
- Slovak Republic
- Slovenia
- Spain
- Sweden
- Switzerland
- Tajikistan
- the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
- Turkey
- Turkmenistan
- Ukraine
- United Kingdom
- United States of America
- Uzbekistan
- Yugoslavia (suspended 1992)
Organigram

Summit
Meeting of OSCE Heads of State or Government

Ministerial Council
Meeting of OSCE Foreign Ministers

Forum for Security Cooperation
Regular body for arms-control and CSBMs (weekly)

Senior Council
Periodic high-level meeting of Political Directors and annual Economic Forum

Permanent Council
Regular body for political consultation and decision-making (weekly)

Chairman-in-Office
Portugal (2002)

Troika
Romania, Portugal and the Netherlands (2002)

Personal Representatives of the CiO

Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
Warsaw

OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media
Vienna

Secretary General
Vienna

OSCE Secretariat
Vienna

High Commissioner on National Minorities
The Hague

OSCE Field Activities

OSCE Mission in:
- Bosnia & Herzegovina
- Croatia
- Fdr. Republic of Yugoslavia
- Georgia
- Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje
- Moldova
- Tajikistan
- Kosovo
- OSCE Presence in Albania
- Advisory and Monitoring Group in Belarus
- OSCE Assistance Group to Chechnya
- The Personal Representative of the CiO on the Conflict Dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference
- OSCE Centres in Almaty, Ashgabad, Bishkek and Tashkent
- OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine
- OSCE Offices in Yerevan and Baku

High-Level Planning Group
Planning OSCE Peacekeeping Force for Nagorno-Karabakh

OSCE Assistance in Implementation of Bilateral Agreements
- The OSCE Representative in the Russian-Latvian Joint Commission on Military Pensioners
- The OSCE Representative to the Estonian Government Commission on Military Pensioners

OSCE RELATED BODIES

Court of Conciliation and Arbitration
Geneva

Joint Consultative Group
Promotes Implementation of CFE Treaty, meets regularly in Vienna

Open Skies Consultative Commission
Promotes Implementation of Open Skies Treaty, meets in Vienna
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Membership in Other International Organisations

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<td>United States</td>
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* The following countries are expected to join the EU on 1 May 2004: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia. Bulgaria and Romania are expected to join in 2007. Discussions with Turkey have also been opened regarding eventual accession.

+ The following countries are expected to join NATO by May 2004: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.
Primary Bodies and Functions

1) OSCE Council (comprised of Foreign Ministers): meets at least once annually to consider issues relevant to the CSCE and to prepare meetings of heads of state or government;

2) Committee of Senior Officials (CSO): meets in order to prepare the meetings of the Council (also meet to deal with a variety of pressing issues);

3) OSCE Secretariat: based in Vienna with purely administrative tasks, such as supporting of the Council and CSO meetings;

4) Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC): based in Prague, in the first instance—limit itself to assisting the implementation of the CSBMs (but this without prejudice to any tasks which may be assigned to it in the future)—comprised of a Secretariat and a Consultative Committee composed of representatives of all the participating states;

5) Office for Free Elections (OFE) in Warsaw: facilitates contacts and exchange of information on elections within participating states.

6) Economic Forum: meets within the CSO framework to discuss economic cooperation, the transition to market economy and other related issues—with the participation of experts which can bring together economic policy members, parliamentary leaders, NGO’s and the private sector.

7) High Commissioner on National Minorities: An institution aimed at early warning and early action with regard to tensions involving national minority issues which have not yet developed into a conflict within the CSCE area.

8) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR): Organises flexible, highly focused CSCE meetings aimed at the exchange of views on vital questions with the participation of NGO’s and specialists in their individual capacity.

9) Court of Conciliation and Arbitration (1992). Created to settle disputes among OSCE participating States that are parties to the Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration within the OSCE. The Court is based in Geneva.

10) CSCE Parliamentary Assembly: Comprises 300 national legislators with its Secretariat in Copenhagen. Has a direct seat at OSCE negotiations in Vienna and thus a permanent voice that many other assemblies do not enjoy. (Borawski 1986; Heraclides 1993)
Appendix B: OSCE Declarations

Helsinki Final Act

(Part I: Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States)

1 August 1975

QUESTIONS RELATING TO SECURITY IN EUROPE

The States participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe,

Reaffirming their objective of promoting better relations among themselves and ensuring conditions in which their people can live in true and lasting peace free from any threat to or attempt against their security;

Convinced of the need to exert efforts to make détente both a continuing and an increasingly viable and comprehensive process, universal in scope and that the implementation of the results of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe will be a major contribution to this process;

Considering that solidarity among peoples, as well as the common purpose of the participating States in achieving the aims as set forth by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, should lead to the development of better and closer relations among them in all fields and thus to overcoming the confrontation stemming from the character of their past relations and to better mutual understanding;

Mindful of their common history and recognising that the existence of elements common to their traditions and values can assist them in developing their relations and desiring to search, fully taking into account the individuality and diversity of their positions and views, for possibilities of joining their efforts with a view to overcoming distrust and increasing confidence, solving the problems that separate them and cooperating in the interest of mankind;

Recognising the indivisibility of security in Europe as well as their common interest in the development of cooperation throughout Europe and among selves and expressing their intention to pursue efforts accordingly;

Recognising the close link between peace and security in Europe and in the world as a whole and conscious of the need for each of them to make its contribution to the strengthening of world peace and security and to the promotion of fundamental rights, economic and social progress and well-being for all peoples;

Have adopted the following:

1. (a) Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States

The participating States,

Reaffirming their commitment to peace, security and justice and the continuing development of friendly relations and cooperation;

Recognising that this commitment, which reflects the interest and aspirations of peoples, constitutes for each participating State a present and future responsibility, heightened by experience of the past;

Reaffirming, in conformity with their membership in the United Nations and in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations, their full and active support for the United Nations and for the enhancement of its role and effectiveness in strengthening international peace, security and justice and in promoting the solution of international problems, as well as the development of friendly relations and cooperation among States;

Expressing their common adherence to the principles which are set forth below and are in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, as well as their common will to act, in the application of these principles, in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations;
Declare their determination to respect and put into practice, each of them in its relations with all other participating States, irrespective of their political, economic or social systems as well as of their size, geographical location or level of economic development, the following principles, which all are of primary significance, guiding their mutual relations:

I. Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty

The participating States will respect each other's sovereign equality and individuality as well as all the rights inherent in and encompassed by its sovereignty, including in particular the right of every State to juridical equality, to territorial integrity and to freedom and political independence. They will also respect each other's right freely to choose and develop its political, social, economic and cultural systems as well as its right to determine its laws and regulations.

Within the framework of international law, all the participating States have equal rights and duties. They will respect each other's right to define and conduct as it wishes its relations with other States in accordance with international law and in the spirit of the present Declaration. They consider that their frontiers can be changed, in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement. They also have the right to belong or not to belong to international organisations, to be or not to be a party to bilateral or multilateral treaties including the right to be or not to be a party to treaties of alliance; they also have the right to neutrality.

II. Refraining from the threat or use of force

The participating States will refrain in their mutual relations, as well as in their international relations in general, from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations and the present Declaration. No consideration may be invoked to serve to warrant resort to the threat or use of force in contravention of this principle.

Accordingly, the participating States will refrain from any acts constituting a threat of force or direct or indirect use of force against another participating State.

Likewise they will refrain from any manifestation of force for the purpose of inducing another participating State to renounce the full exercise of its sovereign rights. Likewise they will also refrain in their mutual relations from any act of reprisal by force.

No such threat or use of force will be employed as a means of settling disputes, or questions likely to give rise to disputes, between them.

III. Inviolability of frontiers

The participating States regard as inviolable all one another's frontiers as well as the frontiers of all States in Europe and therefore they will refrain now and in the future from assaulting these frontiers.

Accordingly, they will also refrain from any demand for, or act of, seizure and usurpation of part or all of the territory of any participating State.

IV. Territorial integrity of States

The participating States will respect the territorial integrity of each of the participating States. Accordingly, they will refrain from any action inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations against the territorial integrity, political independence or the unity of any participating State and in particular from any such action constituting a threat or use of force.

The participating States will likewise refrain from making each other's territory the object of military occupation or other direct or indirect measures of force in contravention of international law, or the object of acquisition by means of such measures or the threat of them. No such occupation or acquisition will be recognised as legal.

V. Peaceful settlement of disputes

The participating States will settle disputes among them by peaceful means in such a manner as not to endanger international peace and security and justice.

They will endeavour in good faith and a spirit of cooperation to reach a rapid and equitable solution on the basis of international law.
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For this purpose they will use such means as negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement or other peaceful means of their own choice including any settlement procedure agreed to in advance of disputes to which they are parties.

In the event of failure to reach a solution by any of the above peaceful means, the parties to a dispute will continue to seek a mutually agreed way to settle the dispute peacefully. Participating States, parties to a dispute among them, as well as other participating States, will refrain from any action which might aggravate the situation to such a degree as to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security and thereby make a peaceful settlement of the dispute more difficult.

VI. Non-intervention in internal affairs
The participating States will refrain from any intervention, direct or indirect, individual or collective, in the internal or external affairs falling within the domestic jurisdiction of another participating State, regardless of their mutual relations.

They will accordingly refrain from any form of armed intervention or threat of such intervention against another participating State.

They will likewise in all circumstances refrain from any other act of military, or of political, economic or other coercion designed to subordinate to their own interest the exercise by another participating State of the rights inherent in its sovereignty and thus to secure advantages of any kind.

Accordingly, they will, inter alia, refrain from direct or indirect assistance to terrorist activities, or to subversive or other activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another participating State.

VII. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief
The participating States will respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.

They will promote and encourage the effective exercise of civil, political, economic, social, cultural and other rights and freedoms all of which derive from the inherent dignity of the human person and are essential for his free and full development.

Within this framework the participating States will recognise and respect the freedom of the individual to profess and practice, alone or in community with others, religion or belief acting in accordance with the dictates of his own conscience.

The participating States on whose territory national minorities exist will respect the right of persons belonging to such minorities to equality before the law, will afford them the full opportunity for the actual enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms and will, in this manner, protect their legitimate interests in this sphere.

The participating States recognise the universal significance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for which is an essential factor for the peace, justice and well-being necessary to ensure the development of friendly relations and cooperation among themselves as among all States.

They will constantly respect these rights and freedoms in their mutual relations and will endeavour jointly and separately, including in cooperation with the United Nations, to promote universal and effective respect for them.

They confirm the right of the individual to know and act upon his rights and duties in this field.

In the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the participating States will act in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. They will also fulfil their obligations as set forth in the international declarations and agreements in this field, including inter alia the International Covenants on Human Rights, by which they may be bound.

VIII. Equal rights and self-determination of peoples
The participating States will respect the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination, acting at all times in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the relevant norms of international law, including those relating to territorial integrity of States.

By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, all peoples always have the right, in full freedom, to determine, when and as they wish, their internal and external political status, without external interference and to pursue as they wish their political, economic, social and cultural development.

The participating States reaffirm the universal significance of respect for and effective exercise of equal rights and self-determination of peoples for the development of friendly relations among
themselves as among all States; they also recall the importance of the elimination of any form of violation of this principle.

**IX. Cooperation among States**
The participating States will develop their cooperation with one another and with all States in all fields in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. In developing their cooperation the participating States will place special emphasis on the fields as set forth within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, with each of them making its contribution in conditions of full equality.

They will endeavour, in developing their cooperation as equals, to promote mutual understanding and confidence, friendly and good-neighbourly relations among themselves, international peace, security and justice. They will equally endeavour, in developing their cooperation, to improve the well-being of peoples and contribute to the fulfilment of their aspirations through, inter alia, the benefits resulting from increased mutual knowledge and from progress and achievement in the economic, scientific, technological, social, cultural and humanitarian fields. They will take steps to promote conditions favourable to making these benefits available to all; they will take into account the interest of all in the narrowing of differences in the levels of economic development and in particular the interest of developing countries throughout the world.

They will strive, in increasing their cooperation as set forth above, to develop closer relations among themselves on an improved and more enduring basis for the benefit of peoples.

**X. Fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law**
The participating States will fulfil in good faith their obligations under international law, both those obligations arising from the generally recognised principles and rules of international law and those obligations arising from treaties or other agreements, in conformity with international law, to which they are parties.

In exercising their sovereign rights, including the right to determine their laws and regulations, they will conform with their legal obligations under international law; they will furthermore pay due regard to and implement the provisions in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

The participating States confirm that in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the members of the United Nations under the Charter of the United Nations and their obligations under any treaty or other international agreement, their obligations under the Charter will prevail, in accordance with Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations.

All the principles set forth above are of primary significance and, accordingly, they will be equally and unreservedly applied, each of them being interpreted taking into account the others.

The participating States express their determination fully to respect and apply these principles, as set forth in the present Declaration, in all aspects, to their mutual relations and cooperation in order to ensure to each participating State the benefits resulting from the respect and application of these principles by all.

The participating States, paying due regard to the principles above and, in particular, to the first sentence of the tenth principle, "Fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law", note that the present Declaration does not affect their rights and obligations, nor the corresponding treaties and other agreements and arrangements.

The participating States express the conviction that respect for these principles will encourage the development of normal and friendly relations and the progress of cooperation among them in all fields. They also express the conviction that respect for these principles will encourage the development of political contacts among them which in time would contribute to better mutual understanding of their positions and views.

The participating States declare their intention to conduct their relations with all other States in the spirit of the principles contained in the present Declaration.
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Charter of Paris for a New Europe

(PART I: A new era of Democracy, Peace and Unity)

19-21 November 1990

We, the Heads of State or Government of the States participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, have assembled in Paris at a time of profound change and historic expectations. The era of confrontation and division of Europe has ended. We declare that henceforth the, relations will be founded on respect and cooperation.

Europe is liberating itself from the legacy of the past. The courage of men and women, the strength of the will of the peoples and the power of the ideas of the Helsinki Final Act have opened a new era of democracy, peace and unity in Europe.

Ours is a time for fulfilling the hopes and expectations the peoples have cherished for decades: steadfast commitment to democracy based on human rights and fundamental freedoms; prosperity through economic liberty and social justice; and equal security for all the countries.

The Ten Principles of the Final Act will guide us towards this ambitious future, just as they have lighted the way towards better relations for the past fifteen years. Full implementation of all CSCE commitments must form the basis for the initiatives we are now taking to enable the nations to live in accordance with their aspirations.

Human Rights, Democracy and Rule of Law

We undertake to build, consolidate and strengthen democracy as the only system of government of the nations. In this endeavour, we will abide by the following:

Human rights and fundamental freedoms are the birthright of all human beings, are inalienable and are guaranteed by law. Their protection and promotion is the first responsibility of government. Respect for them is an essential safeguard against an over-mighty State. Their observance and full exercise are the foundation of freedom, justice and peace.

Democratic government is based on the will of the people, expressed regularly through free and fair elections. Democracy has as its foundation respect for the human person and the rule of law. Democracy is the best safeguard of freedom of expression, tolerance of all groups of society and equality of opportunity for each person.

Democracy, with its representative and pluralist character, entails accountability to the electorate, the obligation of public authorities to comply with the law and justice administered impartially. No one will be above the law.

We affirm that, without discrimination, every individual has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion or belief, freedom of expression, freedom of association and peaceful assembly, freedom of movement,

no one will be:
subject to arbitrary arrest or detention,
subject to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;
everyone also has the right:
to know and act upon his rights,
to participate in free and fair elections,
to fair and public trial if charged with an offence,
to own property alone or in association and to exercise individual enterprise,
to enjoy his economic, social and cultural rights.

We affirm that the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of national minorities will be protected and that persons belonging to national minorities have the right freely to express, preserve and develop that identity without any discrimination and in full equality before the law.

We will ensure that everyone will enjoy recourse to effective remedies, national or international, against any violation of his rights.

Full respect for these precepts is the bedrock on which we will seek to construct the new Europe.
The States will cooperate and support each other with the aim of making democratic gains irreversible.

**Economic Liberty and Responsibility**

Economic liberty, social justice and environmental responsibility are indispensable for prosperity.

The free will of the individual, exercised in democracy and protected by the rule of law, forms the necessary basis for successful economic and social development. We will promote economic activity which respects and upholds human dignity.

Freedom and political pluralism are necessary elements in the common objective of developing market economies towards sustainable economic growth, prosperity, social justice, expanding employment and efficient use of economic resources. The success of the transition to market economy by countries making efforts to this effect is important and in the interest of us all. It will enable us to share a higher level of prosperity which is the common objective. We will cooperate to this end.

Preservation of the environment is a shared responsibility of all the nations. While supporting national and regional efforts in this field, we must also look to the pressing need for joint action on a wider scale.

**Friendly Relations among Participating States**

Now that a new era is dawning in Europe, we are determined to expand and strengthen friendly relations and cooperation among the States of Europe, the United States of America and Canada and to promote friendship among the peoples.

To uphold and promote democracy, peace and unity in Europe, we solemnly pledge the full commitment to the Ten Principles of the Helsinki Final Act. We affirm the continuing validity of the Ten Principles and the determination to put them into practice. All the Principles apply equally and unreservedly, each of them being interpreted taking into account the others. They form the basis for the relations.

In accordance with the obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and commitments under the Helsinki Final Act, we renew the pledge to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or from acting in any other manner inconsistent with the principles or purposes of those documents. We recall that non-compliance with obligations under the Charter of the United Nations constitutes a violation of international law.

We reaffirm the commitment to settle disputes by peaceful means. We decide to develop mechanisms for the prevention and resolution of conflicts among the participating States. With the ending of the division of Europe, we will strive for a new quality in the security relations while fully respecting each other’s freedom of choice in that respect. Security is indivisible and the security of every participating State is inseparably linked to that of all the others. We therefore pledge to cooperate in strengthening confidence and security among us and in promoting arms control and disarmament.

We welcome the Joint Declaration of Twenty-Two States on the improvement of their relations.

The relations will rest on the common adherence to democratic values and to human rights and fundamental freedoms. We are convinced that in order to strengthen peace and security among the States, the advancement of democracy and respect for and effective exercise of human rights, are indispensable. We reaffirm the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations and with the relevant norms of international law, including those relating to territorial integrity of States.

We are determined to enhance political consultation and to widen cooperation to solve economic, social, environmental, cultural and humanitarian problems. This common resolve and the growing interdependence will help to overcome the distrust of decades, to increase stability and to build a united Europe.

We want Europe to be a source of peace, open to dialogue and to cooperation with other countries, welcoming exchanges and involved in the search for common responses to the challenges of the future.

**Security**

Friendly relations among us will benefit from the consolidation of democracy and improved security.

We welcome the signature of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe by twenty-two participating States, which will lead to lower levels of armed forces. We endorse the adoption of a substantial new set of Confidence— and Security-building Measures which will lead to increased transparency and confidence among all participating States. These are important steps towards enhanced stability and security in Europe.
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The unprecedented reduction in armed forces resulting from the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, together with new approaches to security and cooperation within the CSCE process, will lead to a new perception of security in Europe and a new dimension in the relations. In this context we fully recognise the freedom of States to choose their own security arrangements.

Unity

Europe whole and free is calling for a new beginning. We invite the peoples to join in this great endeavour.

We note with great satisfaction the Treaty on the Final Settlement with respect to Germany signed in Moscow on 12 September 1990 and sincerely welcome the fact that the German people have united to become one State in accordance with the principles of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and in full accord with their neighbours. The establishment of the national unity of Germany is an important contribution to a just and lasting order of peace for a united, democratic Europe aware of its responsibility for stability, peace and cooperation.

The participation of both North American and European States is a fundamental characteristic of the CSCE; it underlies its past achievements and is essential to the future of the CSCE process. An abiding adherence to shared values and the common heritage are the ties which bind us together. With all the rich diversity of the nations, we are united in the commitment to expand the cooperation in all fields. The challenges confronting us can only be met by common action, cooperation and solidarity.

The CSCE and the World

The destiny of the nations is linked to that of all other nations. We support fully the United Nations and the enhancement of its role in promoting international peace, security and justice. We reaffirm the commitment to the principles and purposes of the United Nations as enshrined in the Charter and condemn all violations of these principles. We recognise with satisfaction the growing role of the United Nations in world affairs and its increasing effectiveness, fostered by the improvement in relations among the States.

Aware of the dire needs of a great part of the world, we commit ourselves to solidarity with all other countries. Therefore, we issue a call from Paris today to all the nations of the world. We stand ready to join with any and all States in common efforts to protect and advance the community of fundamental human values.

GUIDELINES FOR THE FUTURE

Proceeding from the firm commitment to the full implementation of all CSCE principles and provisions, we now resolve to give a new impetus to a balanced and comprehensive development of the cooperation in order to address the needs and aspirations of our peoples.

Human Dimension

We declare the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms to be irrevocable. We will fully implement and build upon the provisions relating to the human dimension of the CSCE.

Proceeding from the Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension, we will cooperate to strengthen democratic institutions and to promote the application of the rule of law. To that end, we decide to convene a seminar of experts in Oslo from 4 to 15 November 1991.

Determined to foster the rich contribution of national minorities to the life of the societies, we undertake further to improve their situation. We reaffirm the deep conviction that friendly relations among the peoples, as well as peace, justice, stability and democracy, require that the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of national minorities be protected and conditions for the promotion of that identity be created. We declare that questions related to national minorities can only be satisfactorily resolved in a democratic political framework.

We further acknowledge that the rights of persons belonging to national minorities must be fully respected as part of universal human rights. Being aware of the urgent need for increased cooperation on, as well as better protection of, national minorities, we decide to convene a meeting of experts on national minorities to be held in Geneva from 1 to 19 July 1991.

We express the determination to combat all forms of racial and ethnic hatred, antisemitism, xenophobia and discrimination against anyone as well as persecution on religious and ideological grounds.
In accordance with the CSCE commitments, we stress that free movement and contacts among the citizens as well as the free flow of information and ideas are crucial for the maintenance and development of free societies and flourishing cultures. We welcome increased tourism and visits among the countries.

The human dimension mechanism has proved its usefulness and we are consequently determined to expand it to include new procedures involving, *inter alia*, the services of experts or a roster of eminent persons experienced in human rights issues which could be raised under the mechanism. We shall provide, in the context of the mechanism, for individuals to be involved in the protection of their rights. Therefore, we undertake to develop further the commitments in this respect, in particular at the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension, without prejudice to obligations under existing international instruments to which the States may be parties.

We recognise the important contribution of the Council of Europe to the promotion of human rights and the principles of democracy and the rule of law as well as to the development of cultural cooperation. We welcome moves by several participating States to join the Council of Europe and adhere to its European Convention on Human Rights. We welcome as well the readiness of the Council of Europe to make its experience available to the CSCE.

*Security*

The changing political and military environment in Europe opens new possibilities for common efforts in the field of military security. We will build on the important achievements attained in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and in the Negotiations on Confidence—and Security-building Measures. We undertake to continue the CSBM negotiations under the same mandate and to seek to conclude them no later than the Follow-up Meeting of the CSCE to be held in Helsinki in 1992. We also welcome the decision of the participating States concerned to continue the CFE negotiation under the same mandate and to seek to conclude it no later than the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting. Following a period for national preparations, we look forward to a more structured cooperation among all participating States on security matters and to discussions and consultations among the thirty-four participating States aimed at establishing by 1992, from the conclusion of the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting, new negotiations on disarmament and confidence and security building open to all participating States.

We call for the earliest possible conclusion of the Convention on an effectively verifiable, global and comprehensive ban on chemical weapons and we intend to be original signatories to it.

We reaffirm the importance of the Open Skies initiative and call for the successful conclusion of the negotiations as soon as possible.

Although the threat of conflict in Europe has diminished, other dangers threaten the stability of the societies. We are determined to cooperate in defending democratic institutions against activities which violate the independence, sovereign equality or territorial integrity of the participating States. These include illegal activities involving outside pressure, coercion and subversion.

We unreservedly condemn, as criminal, all acts, methods and practices of terrorism and express the determination to work for its eradication both bilaterally and through multilateral cooperation. We will also join together in combating illicit trafficking in drugs.

Being aware that an essential complement to the duty of States to refrain from the threat or use of force is the peaceful settlement of disputes, both being essential factors for the maintenance and consolidation of international peace and security, we will not only seek effective ways of preventing, through political means, conflicts which may yet emerge, but also define, in conformity with international law, appropriate mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of any disputes which may arise. Accordingly, we undertake to seek new forms of cooperation in this area, in particular a range of methods for the peaceful settlement of disputes, including mandatory third-party involvement. We stress that full use should be made in this context of the opportunity of the Meeting on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes which will be convened in Valletta at the beginning of 1991. The Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs will take into account the Report of the Valletta Meeting.

*Economic Cooperation*

We stress that economic cooperation based on market economy constitutes an essential element of the relations and will be instrumental in the construction of a prosperous and united Europe. Democratic institutions and economic liberty foster economic and social progress, as recognised in the Document of the Bonn Conference on Economic Cooperation, the results of which we strongly support.

We underline that cooperation in the economic field, science and technology is now an important pillar of the CSCE. The participating States should periodically review progress and give new impulses in these fields.
We are convinced that the overall economic cooperation should be expanded, free enterprise encouraged and trade increased and diversified according to GATT rules. We will promote social justice and progress and further the welfare of the peoples. We recognise in this context the importance of effective policies to address the problem of unemployment.

We reaffirm the need to continue to support democratic countries in transition towards the establishment of market economy and the creation of the basis for self-sustained economic and social growth, as already undertaken by the Group of twenty-four countries. We further underline the necessity of their increased integration, involving the acceptance of disciplines as well as benefits, into the international economic and financial system.

We consider that increased emphasis on economic cooperation within the CSCE process should take into account the interests of developing participating States.

We recall the link between respect for and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms and scientific progress. Cooperation in the field of science and technology will play an essential role in economic and social development. Therefore, it must evolve towards a greater sharing of appropriate scientific and technological information and knowledge with a view to overcoming the technological gap which exists among the participating States. We further encourage the participating States to work together in order to develop human potential and the spirit of free enterprise.

We are determined to give the necessary impetus to cooperation among the States in the fields of energy, transport and tourism for economic and social development. We welcome, in particular, practical steps to create optimal conditions for the economic and rational development of energy resources, with due regard for environmental considerations.

We recognise the important role of the European Community in the political and economic development of Europe. International economic organisations such as the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), the Bretton Woods Institutions, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) also have a significant task in promoting economic cooperation, which will be further enhanced by the establishment of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). In order to pursue the objectives, we stress the necessity for effective co-ordination of the activities of these organisations and emphasise the need to find methods for all the States to take part in these activities.

Environment

We recognise the urgent need to tackle the problems of the environment and the importance of individual and cooperative efforts in this area. We pledge to intensify the endeavours to protect and improve the environment in order to restore and maintain a sound ecological balance in air, water and soil. Therefore, we are determined to make full use of the CSCE as a framework for the formulation of common environmental commitments and objectives and thus to pursue the work reflected in the Report of the Sofia Meeting on the Protection of the Environment.

We emphasise the significant role of a well-informed society in enabling the public and individuals to take initiatives to improve the environment. To this end, we commit ourselves to promoting public awareness and education on the environment as well as the public reporting of the environmental impact of policies, projects and programmes.

We attach priority to the introduction of clean and low-waste technology, being aware of the need to support countries which do not yet have their own means for appropriate measures.

We underline that environmental policies should be supported by appropriate legislative measures and administrative structures to ensure their effective implementation.

We stress the need for new measures providing for the systematic evaluation of compliance with the existing commitments and, moreover, for the development of more ambitious commitments with regard to notification and exchange of information about the state of the environment and potential environmental hazards. We also welcome the creation of the European Environment Agency (EEA).

We welcome the operational activities, problem-oriented studies and policy reviews in various existing international organisations engaged in the protection of the environment, such as the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). We emphasise the need for strengthening their cooperation and for their efficient co-ordination.

Culture
We recognise the essential contribution of the common European culture and the shared values in overcoming the division of the continent. Therefore, we underline the attachment to creative freedom and to the protection and promotion of the cultural and spiritual heritage, in all its richness and diversity.

In view of the recent changes in Europe, we stress the increased importance of the Cracow Symposium and we look forward to its consideration of guidelines for intensified cooperation in the field of culture. We invite the Council of Europe to contribute to this Symposium.

In order to promote greater familiarity amongst the peoples, we favour the establishment of cultural centres in cities of other participating States as well as increased cooperation in the audio-visual field and wider exchange in music, theatre, literature and the arts.

We resolve to make special efforts in the national policies to promote better understanding, in particular among young people, through cultural exchanges, cooperation in all fields of education and, more specifically, through teaching and training in the languages of other participating States. We intend to consider first results of this action at the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting in 1992.

Migrant Workers

We recognise that the issues of migrant workers and their families legally residing in host countries have economic, cultural and social aspects as well as their human dimension. We reaffirm that the protection and promotion of their rights, as well as the implementation of relevant international obligations, is the common concern.

Mediterranean

We consider that the fundamental political changes that have occurred in Europe have a positive relevance to the Mediterranean region. Thus, we will continue efforts to strengthen security and cooperation in the Mediterranean as an important factor for stability in Europe. We welcome the Report of the Palma de Mallorca Meeting on the Mediterranean, the results of which we all support.

We are concerned with the continuing tensions in the region and renew the determination to intensify efforts towards finding just, viable and lasting solutions, through peaceful means, to outstanding crucial problems, based on respect for the principles of the Final Act.

We wish to promote favourable conditions for a harmonious development and diversification of relations with the non-participating Mediterranean States. Enhanced cooperation with these States will be pursued with the aim of promoting economic and social development and thereby enhancing stability in the region. To this end, we will strive together with these countries towards a substantial narrowing of the prosperity gap between Europe and its Mediterranean neighbours.

Non-governmental Organisations

We recall the major role that non-governmental organisations, religious and other groups and individuals have played in the achievement of the objectives of the CSCE and will further facilitate their activities for the implementation of the CSCE commitments by the participating States. These organisations, groups and individuals must be involved in an appropriate way in the activities and new structures of the CSCE in order to fulfil their important tasks.
Charter for European Security

Istanbul, November 1999

1. At the dawn of the twenty-first century we, the Heads of State or Government of the OSCE participating States, declare the firm commitment to a free, democratic and more integrated OSCE area where participating States are at peace with each other and individuals and communities live in freedom, prosperity and security. To implement this commitment, we have decided to take a number of new steps. We have agreed to:

— Adopt the Platform for Cooperative Security, in order to strengthen cooperation between the OSCE and other international organisations and institutions, thereby making better use of the resources of the international community;

— Develop the OSCE’s role in peacekeeping, thereby better reflecting the Organisation’s comprehensive approach to security;

— Create Rapid Expert Assistance and Cooperation Teams (REACT), thereby enabling the OSCE to respond quickly to demands for assistance and for large civilian field operations;

— Expand the ability to carry out police-related activities in order to assist in maintaining the primacy of law;

— Establish an Operation Centre, in order to plan and deploy OSCE field operations;

— Strengthen the consultation process within the OSCE by establishing the Preparatory Committee under the OSCE Permanent Council.

We are committed to preventing the outbreak of violent conflicts wherever possible. The steps we have agreed to take in this Charter will strengthen the OSCE’s ability in this respect as well as its capacity to settle conflicts and to rehabilitate societies ravaged by war and destruction. The Charter will contribute to the formation of a common and indivisible security space. It will advance the creation of an OSCE area free of dividing lines and zones with different levels of security.

1. THE COMMON CHALLENGES

2. The last decade of the twentieth century has brought great achievements in the OSCE area, cooperation has replaced previous confrontation, but the danger of conflicts between States has not been eliminated. We have put Europe’s old divisions behind us, but new risks and challenges have emerged. Since we signed the Charter of Paris it has become more obvious that threats to the security can stem from conflicts within States as well as from conflicts between States. We have experienced conflicts which have often resulted from flagrant violations of OSCE norms and principles. We have witnessed atrocities of a kind we had thought were relegated to the past. In this decade it has become clear that all such conflicts can represent a threat to the security of all OSCE participating States.

3. We are determined to learn from the dangers of confrontation and division between States as well as from tragedies of the last decade. Security and peace must be enhanced through an approach which combines two basic elements, we must build confidence among people within States and strengthen cooperation between States. Therefore, we will strengthen existing instruments and develop new ones to provide assistance and advice. We will reinforce the efforts to ensure full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the rights of persons belonging to national minorities. In parallel, we will strengthen the capacity to enhance confidence and security between States. We are determined to develop the means at the disposal to settle peacefully disputes between them.

4. International terrorism, violent extremism, organised crime and drug trafficking represent growing challenges to security. Whatever its motives, terrorism in all its forms and manifestations is unacceptable. We will enhance the efforts to prevent the preparation and financing of any act of terrorism on the territories and deny terrorists safe havens. The excessive and destabilizing accumulation and uncontrolled spread of small arms and light weapons represent a threat to peace and security. We are committed to
strengthening the protection against these new risks and challenges; strong democratic institutions and the
rule of law are the foundation for this protection. We are also determined to cooperate more actively and
closely with each other to meet these challenges.

5. Acute economic problems and environmental degradation may have serious implications for the
security. Cooperation in the fields of economy, science and technology and the environment will be of
critical importance. We will strengthen the responses to such threats through continued economic and
environmental reforms, by stable and transparent frameworks for economic activity and by promoting
market economies, while paying due attention to economic and social rights. We applaud the
unprecedented process of economic transformation taking place in many participating States. We
encourage them to continue this reform process, which will contribute to security and prosperity in the
entire OSCE area. We will step up the efforts across all dimensions of the OSCE to combat corruption
and to promote the rule of law.

6. We confirm that security in areas nearby, in particular in the Mediterranean area as well as areas in
direct proximity to participating States, such as those of Central Asia, is of increasing importance to the
OSCE. We recognise that instability in these areas creates challenges that directly affect the security and
prosperity of OSCE States.

II. THE COMMON FOUNDATIONS

7. We reaffirm the full adherence to the Charter of the United Nations and to the Helsinki Final Act, the
Charter of Paris and all other OSCE documents to which we have agreed. These documents represent the
common commitments and are the foundation for the work. They have helped us to bring about an end to
the old confrontation in Europe and to foster a new era of democracy, peace and solidarity throughout the
OSCE area. They established clear standards for participating States' treatment of each other and of all
individuals within their territories. All OSCE commitments, without exception, apply equally to each
participating State. Their implementation in good faith is essential for relations between States, between
governments and their peoples, as well as between the organisations of which they are members.
Participating States are accountable to their citizens and responsible to each other for their
implementation of their OSCE commitments. We regard these commitments as the common achievement
and therefore consider them to be matters of immediate and legitimate concern to all participating States.

We reaffirm the OSCE as a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United
Nations and as a primary organisation for the peaceful settlement of disputes within its region and as a
key instrument for early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation.
The OSCE is the inclusive and comprehensive organisation for consultation, decision-making and
cooperation in its region.

8. Each participating State has an equal right to security. We reaffirm the inherent right of each and every
participating State to be free to choose or change its security arrangements, including treaties of alliance,
as they evolve. Each State also has the right to neutrality. Each participating State will respect the rights
of all others in these regards. They will not strengthen their security at the expense of the security of other
States. Within the OSCE no State, group of States or organisation can have any pre-eminent responsibility
for maintaining peace and stability in the OSCE area or can consider any part of the OSCE area as its
sphere of influence.

9. We will build the relations in conformity with the concept of common and comprehensive security,
guided by equal partnership, solidarity and transparency. The security of each participating State is
inseparably linked to that of all others. We will address the human, economic, political and military
dimensions of security as an integral whole.

10. We will continue to uphold consensus as the basis for OSCE decision-making. The OSCE's flexibility
and ability to respond quickly to a changing political environment should remain at the heart of the
OSCE's cooperative and inclusive approach to common and indivisible security.

11. We recognise the primary responsibility of the United Nations Security Council for the maintenance
of international peace and security and its crucial role in contributing to security and stability in the
region. We reaffirm the rights and obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, including the
commitment on the issue of the non-use of force or the threat of force. In this connection, we also
reaffirm the commitment to seek the peaceful resolution of disputes as set out in the Charter of the United Nations.

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Based on these foundations we will strengthen the common response and improve the common instruments in order to meet the challenges confronting us more efficiently.

III. THE COMMON RESPONSE

COOPERATION WITH OTHER ORGANISATIONS: THE PLATFORM FOR COOPERATIVE SECURITY

12. The risks and challenges we face today cannot be met by a single State or organisation. Over the last decade, we have taken important steps to forge new cooperation between the OSCE and other international organisations. In order to make full use of the resources of the international community, we are committed to even closer cooperation among international organisations.

We pledge ourselves, through the Platform for Cooperative Security, which is hereby adopted as an essential element of this Charter, to further strengthen and develop cooperation with competent organisations on the basis of equality and in a spirit of partnership. The principles of the Platform for Cooperative Security, as set out in the operational document attached to this Charter, apply to any organisation or institution whose members individually and collectively decide to adhere to them. They apply across all dimensions of security; politico-military, human and economic. Through this Platform we seek to develop and maintain political and operational coherence, on the basis of shared values, among all the various bodies dealing with security, both in responding to specific crises and in formulating responses to new risks and challenges. Recognising the key integrating role that the OSCE can play, we offer the OSCE, when appropriate, as a flexible co-ordinating framework to foster cooperation, through which various organisations can reinforce each other drawing on their particular strengths. We do not intend to create a hierarchy of organisations or a permanent division of labour among them.

We are ready in principle to deploy the resources of international organisations and institutions of which we are members in support of the OSCE's work, subject to the necessary policy decisions as cases arise.

13. Subregional cooperation has become an important element in enhancing security across the OSCE area. Processes such as the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe, which has been placed under the auspices of the OSCE, help to promote the common values. They contribute to improved security not just in the subregion in question but throughout the OSCE area. We offer the OSCE, in accordance with the Platform for Cooperative Security, as a forum for subregional cooperation. In this respect and in accordance with the modalities in the operational document, the OSCE will facilitate the exchange of information and experience between subregional groups and may, if so requested, receive and keep their mutual accords and agreements.

SOLIDARITY AND PARTNERSHIP

14. Peace and security in the region is best guaranteed by the willingness and ability of each participating State to uphold democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights. We individually confirm the willingness to comply fully with the commitments. We also have a joint responsibility to uphold OSCE principles. We are therefore determined to cooperate within the OSCE and with its institutions and representatives and stand ready to use OSCE instruments, tools and mechanisms. We will cooperate in a spirit of solidarity and partnership in a continuing review of implementation. Today we commit ourselves to joint measures based on cooperation, both in the OSCE and through those organisations of which we are members, in order to offer assistance to participating States to enhance their compliance with OSCE principles and commitments. We will strengthen existing cooperative instruments and develop new ones in order to respond efficiently to requests for assistance from participating States. We will explore ways to further increase the effectiveness of the Organisation to deal with cases of clear, gross and continuing violations of those principles and commitments.

15. We are determined to consider ways of helping participating States requesting assistance in cases of internal breakdown of law and order. We will jointly examine the nature of the situation and possible ways and means of providing support to the State in question.
16. We reaffirm the validity of the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security. We will consult promptly, in conformity with the OSCE responsibilities, with a participating State seeking assistance in realising its right to individual or collective self-defence in the event that its sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence are threatened. We will consider jointly the nature of the threat and actions that may be required in defence of the common values.

THE INSTITUTIONS

17. The Parliamentary Assembly has developed into one of the most important OSCE institutions continuously providing new ideas and proposals. We welcome this increasing role, particularly in the field of democratic development and election monitoring. We call on the Parliamentary Assembly to develop its activities further as a key component in the efforts to promote democracy, prosperity and increased confidence within and between participating States.

18. The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) and the Representative on Freedom of the Media are essential instruments in ensuring respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law. The OSCE Secretariat provides vital assistance to the Chairman-in-Office and to the activities of the Organisation, especially in the field. We will also strengthen further the operational capacities of the OSCE Secretariat to enable it to face the expansion of the activities and to ensure that field operations function effectively and in accordance with the mandates and guidance given to them.

We commit ourselves to giving the OSCE institutions the full support. We emphasise the importance of close co-ordination among the OSCE institutions, as well as the field operations, in order to make optimal use of the common resources. We will take into account the need for geographic diversity and gender balance when recruiting personnel to OSCE institutions and field operations.

We acknowledge the tremendous developments and diversification of OSCE activities. We recognise that a large number of OSCE participating States have not been able to implement the 1993 decision of the Rome Ministerial Council and that difficulties can arise from the absence of a legal capacity of the Organisation. We will seek to improve the situation.

THE HUMAN DIMENSION

19. We reaffirm that respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, democracy and the rule of law is at the core of the OSCE's comprehensive concept of security. We commit ourselves to counter such threats to security as violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief and manifestations of intolerance, aggressive nationalism, racism, chauvinism, xenophobia and anti-semitism.

The protection and promotion of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities are essential factors for democracy, peace, justice and stability within and between, participating States. In this respect we reaffirm the commitments, in particular under the relevant provisions of the Copenhagen 1990 Human Dimension Document and recall the Report of the Geneva 1991 Meeting of Experts on National Minorities. Full respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to national minorities, besides being an end in itself, may not undermine, but strengthen territorial integrity and sovereignty.

Various concepts of autonomy as well as other approaches outlined in the above-mentioned documents, which are in line with OSCE principles, constitute ways to preserve and promote the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of national minorities within an existing State. We condemn violence against any minority. We pledge to take measures to promote tolerance and to build pluralistic societies where all, regardless of their ethnic origin, enjoy full equality of opportunity. We emphasise that questions relating to national minorities can only be satisfactorily resolved in a democratic political framework based on the rule of law.

We reaffirm the recognition that everyone has the right to a nationality and that no one should be deprived of his or her nationality arbitrarily. We commit ourselves to continue the efforts to ensure that everyone can exercise this right. We also commit ourselves to further the international protection of stateless persons.

20. We recognise the particular difficulties faced by Roma and Sinti and the need to undertake effective measures in order to achieve full equality of opportunity, consistent with OSCE commitments, for persons belonging to Roma and Sinti. We will reinforce the efforts to ensure that Roma and Sinti are able to play a full and equal part in the societies and to eradicate discrimination against them.
21. We are committed to eradicating torture and cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment throughout the OSCE area. To this end, we will promote legislation to provide procedural and substantive safeguards and remedies to combat these practices. We will assist victims and cooperate with relevant international organisations and non-governmental organisations, as appropriate.

22. We reject any policy of ethnic cleansing or mass expulsion. We reaffirm the commitment to respect the right to seek asylum and to ensure the international protection of refugees as set out in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, as well as to facilitate the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons in dignity and safety. We will pursue without discrimination the reintegrations of refugees and internally displaced persons in their places of origin.

In order to enhance the protection of civilians in times of conflict, we will seek ways of reinforcing the application of international humanitarian law.

23. The full and equal exercise by women of their human rights is essential to achieve a more peaceful, prosperous and democratic OSCE area. We are committed to making equality between men and women an integral part of the policies, both at the level of the States and within the Organisation.

24. We will undertake measures to eliminate all forms of discrimination against women and to end violence against women and children as well as sexual exploitation and all forms of trafficking in human beings. In order to prevent such crimes we will, among other means, promote the adoption or strengthening of legislation to hold accountable persons responsible for these acts and strengthen the protection of victims. We will also develop and implement measures to promote the rights and interests of children in armed conflict and post-conflict situations, including refugees and internally displaced children. We will look at ways of preventing forced or compulsory recruitment for use in armed conflict of persons under 18 years of age.

25. We reaffirm the obligation to conduct free and fair elections in accordance with OSCE commitments, in particular the Copenhagen Document 1990. We recognise the assistance the ODIHR can provide to participating States in developing and implementing electoral legislation. In line with these commitments, we will invite observers to the elections from other participating States, the ODIHR, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and appropriate institutions and organisations that wish to observe the election proceedings. We agree to follow up promptly the ODIHR's election assessment and recommendations.

26. We reaffirm the importance of independent media and the free flow of information as well as the public's access to information. We commit ourselves to take all necessary steps to ensure the basic conditions for free and independent media and unimpeded transborder and intrastate flow of information, which we consider to be an essential component of any democratic, free and open society.

27. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) can perform a vital role in the promotion of human rights, democracy and the rule of law. They are an integral component of a strong civil society. We pledge ourselves to enhance the ability of NGOs to make their full contribution to the further development of civil society and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

THE POLITICO-MILITARY DIMENSION

28. The politico-military aspects of security remain vital to the interests of participating States. They constitute a core element of the OSCE's concept of comprehensive security. Disarmament, arms control and confidence—and security-building measures (CSBMs)—are important parts of the overall effort to enhance security by fostering stability, transparency and predictability in the military field. Full implementation, timely adaptation and, when required, further development of arms control agreements and CSBMs are key contributions to the political and military stability.

29. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) must continue to serve as a cornerstone of European security. It has dramatically reduced equipment levels. It provides a fundamental contribution to a more secure and integrated Europe. The States Parties to this Treaty are taking a critical step forward. The Treaty is being strengthened by adapting its provisions to ensure enhanced stability, predictability and transparency amidst changing circumstances. A number of States Parties will reduce further their equipment levels. The adapted Treaty, upon its entry into force, will be open to voluntary
accession by other OSCE participating States in the area between the Atlantic Ocean and the Ural Mountains and thereby will provide an important additional contribution to European stability and security.

30. The OSCE Vienna Document 1999, together with other documents adopted by the Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) on politico-military aspects of security, provide valuable tools for all OSCE participating States in building greater mutual confidence and military transparency. We will continue to make regular use of and fully implement all OSCE instruments in this field and seek their timely adaptation in order to ensure adequate response to security needs in the OSCE area. We remain committed to the principles contained in the Code of Conduct on politico-military aspects of security. We are determined to make further efforts within the FSC in order to jointly address common security concerns of participating States and to pursue the OSCE's concept of comprehensive and indivisible security so far as the politico-military dimension is concerned. We will continue a substantial security dialogue and task the representatives to conduct this dialogue in the framework of the FSC.

THE ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL DIMENSION

31. The link between security, democracy and prosperity has become increasingly evident in the OSCE area, as has the risk to security from environmental degradation and the depletion of natural resources. Economic liberty, social justice and environmental responsibility are indispensable for prosperity. On the basis of these linkages, we will ensure that the economic dimension receives appropriate attention, in particular as an element of the early warning and conflict prevention activities. We will do so, *inter alia*, with a view to promoting the integration of economies in transition into the world economy and to ensure the rule of law and the development of a transparent and stable legal system in the economic sphere.

32. The OSCE is characterised by its broad membership, its comprehensive approach to security, its large number of field operations and its long history as a norm-setting organisation. These qualities enable it to identify threats and to act as a catalyst for cooperation between key international organisations and institutions in the economic and environmental areas. The OSCE stands ready to play this role, where appropriate. We will foster such co-ordination between the OSCE and relevant international organisations in accordance with the Platform for Cooperative Security. We will enhance the OSCE's ability to address economic and environmental issues in ways that neither duplicate existing work nor replace efforts that can be more efficiently undertaken by other organisations. We will focus on areas in which the OSCE has particular competence. The OSCE's efforts within the human dimension have significant economic effects and vice versa, for example by mobilizing human resources and talents and by helping to build vibrant civil societies. In the spirit of the 1998 Århus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, we will in particular seek to ensure access to information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters.

RULE OF LAW AND FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION

33. We reaffirm the commitment to the rule of law. We recognise that corruption poses a great threat to the OSCE's shared values. It generates instability and reaches into many aspects of the security, economic and human dimensions. Participating States pledge to strengthen their efforts to combat corruption and the conditions that foster it and to promote a positive framework for good government practices and public integrity. They will make better use of existing international instruments and assist each other in their fight against corruption. As part of its work to promote the rule of law, the OSCE will work with NGOs that are committed to a strong public and business consensus against corrupt practices.

IV. THE COMMON INSTRUMENTS

ENHANCING THE DIALOGUE

34. We are determined to broaden and strengthen the dialogue concerning developments related to all aspects of security in the OSCE area. We charge the Permanent Council and the FSC within their respective areas of competence to address in greater depth security concerns of the participating States and to pursue the OSCE's concept of comprehensive and indivisible security.
35. The Permanent Council, being the regular body for political consultations and decision-making, will address the full range of conceptual issues as well as the day-to-day operational work of the Organisation. To assist in its deliberations and decision-making and to strengthen the process of political consultations and transparency within the Organisation, we will establish a Preparatory Committee under the Permanent Council's direction. This open-ended Committee will normally meet in informal format and will be tasked by the Council, or its Chairman, to deliberate and to report back to the Council.

36. Reflecting the spirit of solidarity and partnership, we will also enhance the political dialogue in order to offer assistance to participating States, thereby ensuring compliance with OSCE commitments. To encourage this dialogue, we have decided, in accordance with established rules and practices, to make increased use of OSCE instruments, including:

—Dispatching delegations from the OSCE institutions, with the participation of other relevant international organisations, when appropriate, to provide advice and expertise for reform of legislation and practices;

—Dispatching Personal Representatives of the Chairman-in-Office, after consultations with the State concerned, for fact-finding or advisory missions;

—Bringing together representatives of the OSCE and States concerned in order to address questions regarding compliance with OSCE commitments;

—Organising training programmes aimed at improving standards and practices, inter alia, within the fields of human rights, democratization and the rule of law;

—Addressing matters regarding compliance with OSCE commitments at OSCE review meetings and conferences as well as in the Economic Forum;

—Submitting such matters for consideration by the Permanent Council, inter alia, on the basis of recommendations by the OSCE institutions within their respective mandates or by Personal Representatives of the Chairman-in-Office;

—Convening meetings of the Permanent Council in a special or reinforced format in order to discuss matters of non-compliance with OSCE commitments and to decide on appropriate courses of action;

—Establishing field operations with the consent of the State concerned.

OSCE FIELD OPERATIONS

37. The Permanent Council will establish field operations. It will decide on their mandates and budgets. On this basis, the Permanent Council and the Chairman-in-Office will provide guidance to such operations.

38. The development of OSCE field operations represents a major transformation of the Organisation that has enabled the OSCE to play a more prominent role in promoting peace, security and compliance with OSCE commitments. Based on the experience we have acquired, we will develop and strengthen this instrument further in order to carry out tasks according to their respective mandates, which may, inter alia, include the following:

—Providing assistance and advice or formulating recommendations in areas agreed by the OSCE and the host country;

—Observing compliance with OSCE commitments and providing advice or recommendations for improved compliance;

—Assisting in the organisation and monitoring of elections;

—Providing support for the primacy of law and democratic institutions and for the maintenance and restoration of law and order;
—Helping to create conditions for negotiation or other measures that could facilitate the peaceful settlement of conflicts;

—Verifying and/or assisting in fulfilling agreements on the peaceful settlement of conflicts;

—Providing support in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of various aspects of society.

39. Recruitment to field operations must ensure that qualified personnel are made available by participating States. The training of personnel is an important aspect of enhancing the effectiveness of the OSCE and its field operations and will therefore be improved. Existing training facilities in OSCE participating States and training activities of the OSCE could play an active role in achieving this aim in cooperation, where appropriate, with other organisations and institutions.

40. In accordance with the Platform for Cooperative Security, cooperation between OSCE and other international organisations in performing field operations will be enhanced. This will be done, inter alia, by carrying out common projects with other partners, in particular the Council of Europe, allowing the OSCE to benefit from their expertise while respecting the identity and decision-making procedures of each organisation involved.

41. The host country of an OSCE field operation should, when appropriate, be assisted in building its own capacity and expertise within the area of responsibility. This would facilitate an efficient transfer of the tasks of the operation to the host country and consequently the closure of the field operation.

RAPID RESPONSE (REACT)

42. We recognise that the ability to deploy rapidly civilian and police expertise is essential to effective conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. We are committed to developing a capability within the participating States and the OSCE to set up Rapid Expert Assistance and Cooperation Teams (REACT) that will be at the disposal of the OSCE. This will enable OSCE bodies and institutions, acting in accordance with their respective procedures, to offer experts quickly to OSCE participating States to provide assistance, in compliance with OSCE norms, in conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. This rapidly deployable capability will cover a wide range of civilian expertise. It will give us the ability to address problems before they become crises and to deploy quickly the civilian component of a peacekeeping operation when needed. These Teams could also be used as surge capacity to assist the OSCE with the rapid deployment of large-scale or specialized operations. We expect REACT to develop and evolve, along with other OSCE capabilities, to meet the needs of the Organisation.

OPERATION CENTRE

43. Rapid deployment is important for the OSCE's effectiveness in contributing to the conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation efforts and depends on effective preparation and planning. To facilitate this, we decide to set up an Operation Centre within the Conflict Prevention Centre with a small core staff, having expertise relevant for all kinds of OSCE operations, which can be expanded rapidly when required. Its role will be to plan and deploy field operations, including those involving REACT resources. It will liaise with other international organisations and institutions as appropriate in accordance with the Platform for Cooperative Security. The Centre's core staff will, to the extent possible, be drawn from personnel with appropriate expertise seconded by participating States and from existing Secretariat resources. This core will provide the basis for rapid expansion, to deal with new tasks as they arise. The precise arrangements will be decided in accordance with existing procedures.

POLICE-RELATED ACTIVITIES

44. We will work to enhance the OSCE's role in civilian police-related activities as an integral part of the Organisation's efforts in conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. Such activities may comprise:

—Police monitoring, including with the aim of preventing police from carrying out such activities as discrimination based on religious and ethnic identity;
—Police training, which could, *inter alia*, include the following tasks:

—Improving the operational and tactical capabilities of local police services and reforming paramilitary forces;

—Providing new and modern policing skills, such as community policing and anti-drug, anti-corruption and anti-terrorist capacities;

—Creating a police service with a multi-ethnic and/or multi-religious composition that can enjoy the confidence of the entire population;

—Promoting respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in general.

We will encourage the provision of modern equipment appropriate to police services that receive training in such new skills.

In addition, the OSCE will examine options and conditions for a role in law enforcement.

45. We shall also promote the development of independent judicial systems that play a key role in providing remedies for human rights violations as well as providing advice and assistance for prison system reforms. The OSCE will also work with other international organisations in the creation of political and legal frameworks within which the police can perform its tasks in accordance with democratic principles and the rule of law.

PEACEKEEPING

46. We remain committed to reinforcing the OSCE's key role in maintaining peace and stability throughout the area. The OSCE's most effective contributions to regional security have been in areas such as field operations, post-conflict rehabilitation, democratization and human rights and election monitoring. We have decided to explore options for a potentially greater and wider role for the OSCE in peacekeeping. Reaffirming the rights and obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and on the basis of the existing decisions, we confirm that the OSCE can, on a case-by-case basis and by consensus, decide to play a role in peacekeeping, including a leading role when participating States judge it to be the most effective and appropriate organisation. In this regard, it could also decide to provide the mandate covering peacekeeping by others and seek the support of participating States as well as other organisations to provide resources and expertise. In accordance with the Platform for Cooperative Security, it could also provide a co-ordinating framework for such efforts.

THE COURT OF CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION

47. We reiterate that the principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes is at the core of OSCE commitments. The Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, in this respect, remains a tool available to those, a large number of participating States, which have become parties to the 1992 Convention of Stockholm. We encourage them to use this instrument to resolve disputes between them, as well as with other participating States which voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the Court. We also encourage those participating States which have not yet done so to consider joining the Convention.

V. THE PARTNERS FOR COOPERATION

48. We recognise the interdependence between the security of the OSCE area and that of Partners for Cooperation, as well as the commitment to the relationship and the dialogue with them. We emphasise in particular the long-standing relations with the Mediterranean partners, Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia. We recognise the increased involvement in and support for the work of the OSCE by the Partners for Cooperation. Building on this interdependence, we are ready to develop this process further. Implementing and building on the Helsinki Document 1992 and the Budapest Document 1994, we will work more closely with the Partners for Cooperation to promote OSCE norms and principles. We welcome their wish to promote the realisation of the Organisation's norms and principles, including the fundamental principle of resolving conflicts through peaceful means. To this end, we will invite the Partners for Cooperation on a more regular basis to increased participation in the work of the OSCE as the dialogue develops.
49. The potential of the Contact Group and the Mediterranean seminars must be fully explored and exploited. Drawing on the Budapest mandate, the Permanent Council will examine the recommendations emerging from the Contact Group and the Mediterranean seminars. We will encourage the Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation to draw on the expertise in setting up structures and mechanisms in the Mediterranean for early warning, preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention.

50. We welcome the increased participation in the work by Japan and the Republic of Korea. We welcome the contribution by Japan to OSCE field activities. We will seek to strengthen further the cooperation with the Asian partners in meeting challenges of common interest.

VI. CONCLUSION

51. This Charter will benefit the security of all participating States by enhancing and strengthening the OSCE as we enter the twenty-first century. Today we have decided to develop its existing instruments and to create new tools. We will use them fully to promote a free, democratic and secure OSCE area. The Charter will thus underpin the OSCE's role as the only pan-European security organisation entrusted with ensuring peace and stability in its area. We appreciate the completion of the work of the Security Model Committee.

52. The original of the present Charter, drawn up in English, French, German, Italian, Russian and Spanish, will be transmitted to the Secretary General of the Organisation, who will transmit a certified true copy of this Charter to each of the participating States. We, the undersigned High Representatives of the participating States, mindful of the high political significance that we attach to the present Charter and declaring the determination to act in accordance with the provisions contained in the above text, have subscribed the signatures below.
Appendix C: OSCE Mission Mandates

Assistance Group to Chechnya

According to OSCE public documentation, the OSCE Assistance Group to Chechnya sought to perform, in conjunction with the Russian federal and local authorities and in full conformity with the legislation of the Russian federation, the following tasks:

- Promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the establishment of facts concerning their violation; help foster the development of democratic institutions and processes, including the restoration of the local organs of authority; assist in the preparation of possible new constitutional agreements and in the holding and monitoring of elections;

- Facilitate the delivery to the region by international and non-governmental organisations of humanitarian aid for victims of the crisis, wherever they may be located;

- Provide assistance to the authorities of the Russian Federation and to international organisations in ensuring the speediest possible return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes in the crisis region;

- Promote the peaceful resolution of the crisis and the stabilization of the situation in the Chechen Republic in conformity with the principle of the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation and in accordance with OSCE principles and pursue dialogue and negotiations, as appropriate, through participation in ‘round tables’, with a view to establishing a ceasefire and eliminating sources of tension.

- Support the creation of mechanisms guaranteeing the rule of law; public safety and law and order. (OSCE 2002)
Kosovo Verification Mission

In Decision No. 259 of 15 October 1998, the OSCE Permanent Council, acting within the framework of United Nations Security Council Resolution No. 1199, declared the preparedness of the OSCE to embark upon verification activities related to compliance of all parties in Kosovo with the requirements set forth by the international community with regard to the solution of the crisis in Kosovo. In Decision No. 263 of 25 October 1998, the Permanent Council agreed to establish the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) in accordance with the mandate contained in the agreement signed by the Chairman-in-Office. According to OSCE public documentation, the Agreement on the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission signed by the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE and the Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), included the following tasks:

- To verify compliance of all parties in Kosovo with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1199 and to report instances of progress and/or non-compliance to the OSCE Permanent Council, the United Nations Security Council and other organisations. These reports are also to be provided to the authorities of the FRY;

- To maintain close liaison with FRY, Serbian and, as appropriate, other Kosovo authorities, political parties and other organisations in Kosovo and accredited international and non-government organisations to assist in fulfilling its responsibilities;

- To verify the maintenance of the ceasefire by all elements [and] investigate reports of ceasefire violations;

- To look for and report on roadblocks and other emplacements which influence lines of communication erected for purposes other than traffic or crime control;

- To maintain liaison with FRY authorities about border control activity and movement by units with border control responsibilities;

- When invited or upon request, the Verification Mission will accompany police units in Kosovo as they perform their normal policing roles;

- To assist UNHCR, ICRC and other international organisations in facilitating the return of displaced persons to their homes. The mission will verify the level of cooperation and support provided by the FRY and its entities. (OSCE 2002)
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