The Politics of German Defence Policy

Policy Leadership, Bundeswehr Reform
and European Defence and Security Policy

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Abstract

This thesis is a study of the role of policy leadership in German defence and security policy between 1990 and 2002, with particular reference to reform of the Bundeswehr. It situates this case study in the framework of a set of analytical perspectives about policy change derived from public policy theory, arguing that public policy theory has either underestimated policy leadership or failed to discriminate different leadership roles, styles and strategies. The author rejects the dominant contextualist and culturalist approach to leadership in studies of German defence and security policy in favour of an interactionist approach that stresses the dialectical interaction between policy skills and strategic context. The case study also shifts the focus in studies of policy leadership in Germany away from a preoccupation with the Chancellor to the role of ministerial and administrative leadership within the core executive. The thesis illustrates the strongly self-referential nature of Bundeswehr reform, despite adaptational pressures from Europeanisation and ‘NATO-isation’, and the domestic politics of base closures. It also shows how domestic macro-political arrangements predispose leadership roles in German defence and security policy towards brokerage and veto playing rather than towards entrepreneurship.
Wir fühlten alle, wie tief und furchtbar die äusseren Mächte in den Menschen hineingreifen können, bis in sein Innerstes, aber wir fühlten auch, dass es im Innersten etwas gab, was unangreifbar war und unverletzbar.¹

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Acknowledgements

Numerous people have been very generous and helpful to me during the research for and writing up of this thesis. Many officials, politicians and policy experts have discussed German defence and security policy with me over the last four years. I have been pleasantly surprised by the amount of time given to me and the information many have divulged. A number of people have also taken the time to discuss ideas and comment on drafts of my thesis, including Stephan Boeckenforde, Alrun Deutschmann, Vessilin Dimitrov, Kenneth Dyson, Jonathan Grix, Adrian Hyde-Price, Werner Jann, Klaus Larres, Claudio Radaelli, Thomas Risse and Graham Timmins.

I would like to thank my PhD supervisors, Klaus Goetz and William Wallace for their invaluable support and encouragement. I would also like to express my gratitude to the staff and students of the Government Department of the London School of Economics for helping fashion such a collegial research environment. I am very grateful to the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) for my PhD scholarship and the Deutsche Academische Austausch Dienst (DAAD) for granting me a short-term research scholarship from January-March 2004.

Several institutions provided crucial support during my fieldwork. I would like to thank the staff of the SPD Archive at the Willy Brandt House who made me feel very welcome and whose helpfulness has made a significant contribution to the empirical richness of this thesis. I would also like to thank Margit Hellwig-Bötte and Axel Schneider of the SPD, Michael Alvarez of the Heinrich Böll Stiftung and Thomas Schiller of the CDU/CSU for their help upon my arrival in Berlin by putting me in contact with so many interesting interview partners. I am also very grateful for the opportunity given to me by Werner Jann of Potsdam University to base my DAAD research grant at the Department of Political Science at Potsdam which was a very stimulating environment from which to conduct my research.
My family has provided fantastic support. I owe a special debt to my parents, Ann and Kenneth Dyson and brother Charles who have encouraged me throughout my studies and have been an unfailing source of support, inspiration and love. Charles has always been there for me and has helped me keep a healthy sense of perspective about my work, something absolutely vital during a PhD. My thanks also to my Grandmothers, Freda Dyson and Emily Holmes for their encouragement and support during the thesis. Denitza Kostadinova has given me exceptionally generous and unstinting support, both emotional and practical, during my thesis. Thank you for your patience, love and kindness. I am also very grateful to Babken Babajanian and James Cook for their support and invaluable friendship.
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Chapter 1: The Theoretical Approach

1.1 Introduction

This thesis examines the role of policy leadership in German defence and security policy using the case study of Bundeswehr reform (1990-2002) to explore five analytical perspectives about policy change originating from public policy theory, arguing that public policy theory has underestimated policy leadership and failed to discriminate different leadership roles, styles and strategies. The research also seeks to improve upon what is identified as a dominant constructivist approach to German defence and security policy by developing an interactionist approach, stressing the dialectical interaction between policy skills and strategic context.

Hence the thesis will attempt to make original conceptual and empirical contributions to several fields of study within political science - to theoretical work on German defence and security policy, public policy theory, leadership studies and Europeanisation. The empirical material presented in the thesis also fills an important gap in the literature on German defence and security policy, documenting the previously under-researched area of Bundeswehr reform during the Kohl Chancellorship in the post-Cold War period (in particular giving greater emphasis to the politics of base closures than previous accounts) and the Schröder government (1998-2002).²

The empirical content adds to an increasingly important field. The reform of the Bundeswehr must be placed into the context of the changed international environment of the post-Cold War period – the wars of succession in the former Yugoslavia, the Kosovo conflict, US hyper-power and the two Iraq Wars. These events and the

changing international security environment mean that the ability of Europe to act as one in the area of defence and security policy is imperative. The Second Iraq War cast the spectre of future conflicts fought not on a multilateral basis but as ‘coalitions of the willing’, with each state deciding for itself how its national interest and security is served. Unless Europe is able to pool its resources and capabilities and act as one militarily, it is will be powerless in the face of US defence spending and military might.\(^3\) In short, the development of a functioning CESDP is critical to the international system and future of multilateralism, the raison d’être of the EU. Along with securing an equal application of justice and better distribution of welfare outside the boundaries of the EU this is one of the key future tasks of the EU.

Paradoxically, the EU will have a greater ability to stop conflict and act as a ‘civilian power’ if it has a stronger military capability. With an effective CESDP the EU would have more weight when promoting soft forms of security that in the long-term may well be more effective in fighting the causes of terror and conflict. The ‘war on terror’ can surely not be won by military might but by tackling the root causes of this threat: low living standards, poverty, inadequate education, and healthcare which lead to the weak state structures and civil societies in developing countries that hinder democratisation and allow terror organisations to find root and support amongst populations.

The thesis explores the factors determining the extent to which the Bundeswehr has transformed from an armed force structured around the military doctrines of the Cold War – *Landes und Bündnisverteidigung* (Territorial and Alliance Defence) - to being able to respond to the new security environment of the post-Cold War era characterised by low-intensity and ethnic conflicts, terrorism and the consequent challenge of being able to contribute to peace-making and peace-keeping operations.

The reform of the Bundeswehr, and its ability to engage in crisis reaction and prevention tasks with a European-wide pooling of military resources and capabilities

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is a key barometer of the German willingness to address the 'capabilities-expectations gap' that continues to beset the European Union. Thus the research makes a small but significant contribution to this question.

However, the thesis not only attempts to add to knowledge about the issue of Bundeswehr reform, but also seeks to make an important contribution to work on leadership in Germany, shifting the focus from the Chancellor to the ministerial level and the roles played by top officials and brings new empirical material to bear on Germany’s role in NATO and the EU and the influence of these institutions on German defence and security policy. Finally, the thesis provides an original case study of the role of a Commission in policy making, analysing the role played by the Weizsäcker Commission in Bundeswehr reform, contributing to work on the policy style of the Schröder government and the concept of the ‘Räterepublik’ (Schröder’s policy style of using Commissions to prepare for major reforms).

The thesis also attempts to make a number of conceptual contributions to political science, seeking to apply public policy theory to explain how German defence and security policy has changed in the period 1990-2002, within the ‘policy subsystem’ of the Bundeswehr. It focuses on the roles, styles and strategies of leadership in policy change in the context of examining five analytical perspectives about policy change that are derived from public policy theory. Particular attention is paid to the three leadership roles of policy entrepreneur, policy broker and policy veto player with reference to the governments of Helmut Kohl and Gerhard Schröder and the Federal Defence Ministers Volker Rühe (1992-98) and Rudolf Scharping (1998-2002), in contrast to the ‘contextualist’ consensus that dominates the literature on German defence and security policy. The thesis utilises an interactionist approach to policy leadership that draws out the complex relationship between leadership skills and strategic political context.

Bundeswehr reform throws up the vexed problem of the relationship between structure and agency. Existing work on German defence policy has focused on

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5 Heinze, R. *Die Berliner Räterepublik: Viel Rat, wenig Tat?* (Wiesbaden: Westdeutsche Verlag)
applying international relations theory, with a dominance of the field by constructivist accounts that stress culture and offer a contextualist approach to leadership. Thus Berger stresses Germany’s ‘culture of antimilitarism’, rooted in Germany’s ‘struggle to draw lessons from its troubled past’; Longhurst identifies a specific German ‘strategic culture’, analysing it into foundational elements that are highly resistant to change, ‘security policy standpoints’ that translate these core values into policy, and ‘regulatory practices’ that make up specific policies and are more amenable to change. These accounts share two basic beliefs – (1) that German policy is driven by core shared ideas rather than material factors, producing a ‘culturally-bounded’ pattern that persists over time; and (2) that German definitions of national interest and identity in relation to defence and security are constructed by these shared ideas. The result is a conception of a national security culture that: ‘predispose(s) societies in general and political elites in particular toward certain actions and policies over others.’

In short, previous accounts have sought to demonstrate the importance of structure, culture and the inheritance from past formative periods rather than agency and leadership skills in explaining change in German defence and security policy. Ideational structures emerge as deeply conservative, and strategic culture as self-reproducing. This thesis seeks to provide a clearer understanding of the relationship between structure and agency in the area of Bundeswehr reform by showing that – to the extent that policy change is culturally conditioned - culture is an on-going accomplishment of agents whose role can be transformative and not simply a self-fulfilling prophecy. It does so by uniting the insights from public policy theories – notably multiple streams and punctuated equilibrium theories – and highlighting the role of individual leadership.

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Policy theory is concerned with understanding the role played by ideas in policy change, the precise mechanisms through which some ideas are successful and others not, and crucially the role of agency in this process. Hence the thesis seeks to provide a clearer understanding of the relationship between structure and agency by examining the mechanisms through which policy change takes place. Public policy theory is well-adapted to this task because it has had a special concern with the transmission of ideas and argument, in short with the cognitive basis of policy. As Majone argued: 'We miss a great deal if we try to understand policy-making solely in terms of power, influence, and bargaining, to the exclusion of debate and argument.'

In attempting to disentangle the relationship between structure and agency in policy making the thesis stresses the complementarities and overlaps within public policy theory and the potential cross-fertilization with institutionalist accounts. Given the interactionist approach developed here, the greatest potential for cross-fertilization is with historical institutionalism. Within historical institutionalism policy change is seen as 'as the consequence... of strategic action..., filtered through perceptions of an institutional context that favours certain strategies, actors and perceptions over others.' The institutional context of the configuration of rules matters in ways that public policy theory often fails to acknowledge adequately. It provides reasons for action through the normative expectations associated with its framework of roles, and it affects actors' choices of strategies and venues.

However, institutions do not fully script in advance what agents must do, reducing them to 'plastic' men. Deeper beliefs and intentions – often of a moral character – are at work, including motives external to the particular institution. They mean that agents are capable of self-directed conduct. Also, institutional leaders operate in the

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more fluid and open-textured context of the interface with other institutions with which there are relationships of mutual dependence. This endows them with further potential for autonomous conduct. As this case study will seek to show, the leadership skills and strategic actions of players in key institutional positions also partially transform the institutions and therefore the strategies, actors and perceptions that an institutional context favours. Such an understanding of institutions is more amenable to public policy theory and allows for a more effective exploration of the relationship between agents and structures than rational choice and sociological institutionalism which privilege agency and structure respectively.

Thus five analytical perspectives about policy change are identified that derive from public policy theory:

Perspective 1. The context and opportunity for major policy change is provided by significant perturbations external to the policy subsystem, notably the effects of international crises, governmental changes, ‘public opinion’ shocks for instance as manifested in Länder (state) elections, changes emanating from other policy subsystems including international institutions like NATO and the EU (NATO-isation and Europeanisation), and court rulings on Bundeswehr reform.

Perspective 1.1: Significant perturbations external to the subsystem are a necessary, but not sufficient, cause of change in the policy core attributes

Perspective 2. Policy change requires a shift within the policy subsystem in the coalition in power so that new beliefs are brought to bear on policy.

Perspective 3. Policy change is a long-term process, requiring policy-oriented learning by means of technical information and analysis of the nature and magnitude of problems, their causes, and the probable impacts of different policy solutions.

Perspective 4. Policy change requires skilful policy entrepreneurs, capable of manipulating short-term ‘windows of opportunity’ to bring new ideas to bear. These windows are opened by ‘compelling problems’ or by events in the ‘politics’ stream.
Perspective 5. Policy change requires a shift of institutional venue, bringing in new actors and ideas and changing the decisional bias.

Building on this, the thesis develops an interactionist approach to policy leadership stressing the interaction between a policy leader’s policy skills, policy traits and strategic political context.

Leaders are shown to be critically important in policy change by manipulating the processes of policy-oriented learning, by using information to reframe issues and by selecting policy forums and new institutional venues. They play different types of policy leadership role. In some instances, they act as policy entrepreneurs, adopting and pushing through particular solutions, typically involving radical change to the policy paradigm. In other situations, they behave as policy brokers, seeking to negotiate consensus amongst competing policy ideas. Sometimes, their role is that of policy veto players, minimising the political costs of pressures for policy change emanating from within the policy subsystem.

Finally, in its focus on the role played by NATO and the EU in Bundeswehr reform (chapter 6) the thesis will seek to build upon previous work on the Europeanisation of German Defence and Security Policy and argues that greater attention must be paid to the role of agency in the process of Europeanisation than previous accounts posit. ¹⁵

Hence the thesis will attempt to break new empirical and conceptual ground, applying public policy theory to explain how German defence and security policy has changed in the period 1990-2002, within the ‘policy subsystem’ of the Bundeswehr. Before going into greater detail about the analytical perspectives of policy change and interactionist approach to policy leadership, the next section will outline the main debates within study of policy change and the concept of policy leadership.

1.2 The Concept of Policy Leadership and the Study of Policy Change

Leadership is what Stephan Körner terms an inexact concept – one that in contrast to key concepts of mathematics, cannot readily resolve the problem of borderline cases (when is ‘what a leader does’ not leadership?). Its ambiguity stems from the difficulties both of gaining agreement about its boundaries and to what it refers and of measuring its presence and effects. As we shall see below, disagreements exist about such matters as its empirical referents, the bases and forms of leadership (e.g. whether it is coercive or ideational), and how it relates to companion concepts like power and management.

Many of these differences are ultimately not resolvable because they are linked to contrasting ontological starting points about the nature of reality and about the way that the world works. One source of contest is about whether it refers to a property of one or more agents (and the relationship between them) or to a relationship between one or more agents and a policy sub-system and a macro-political framework. To the extent that there it is agreed that leadership is a relationship between actors and a policy sub-system or macro-political framework, there are disagreements about how this relationship should be conceptualized (notably between the ‘contextualist’ and the ‘interactionist’ approaches). There are also deep differences of view about what should be included and excluded (e.g. what types of effect, what types of role, which policy skills?) and what prioritised (e.g. personal traits or situational contingencies like institutional and political context).

For some leadership is a transformational activity, involving vision, charisma and symbolic powers. The leader is ‘an individual who creates a story’ and someone to whom others attribute significant symbolic powers. From this perspective leadership is bound up with a process of attribution in which others – seeking to explain policy failure or success – invoke poor or good leadership as the ‘real’ cause. Another perspective – more skeptical of the ‘romance of leadership’ notion – focuses on

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situational contingencies, such as the institutional and policy environment. Their stress on constraints leads them to identify a wider range of roles. Alongside transformational leadership, they identify ‘transactional leadership’, in which policy brokers are involved in the negotiating difficult compromises, and laissez-faire leadership (similar to Mintzberg’s ‘quiet’, enabling leadership) that focuses just on broad strategic direction but is ‘hands-off’ in relation to policy management.

A second reason why leadership is an inexact concept is that it cannot be numerically measured, at least not in a way that would avoid the accusation that the procedure and the results were arbitrary. Even if one can agree on its proper dimensions, it is by no means clear how it could be ranked, nevermind give them clear numerical expression. Its use involves an unavoidable exercise of informed judgment, not scientific precision. It is difficult for those who use it to avoid entrapment in the ‘romance of leadership’ notion in which special powers are attributed to leaders when trying to explain policy success or failure when it is difficult to determine the ‘real’ causes at work. This problem is made all the more difficult to handle because attribution by others is itself an important part of leadership. As we shall see below, it produces methodological difficulties in using interviews to identify aspects of leadership.

These two problematic aspects of the concept – as with other concepts of everyday experience – mean that it is destined to remain contested and its application fraught with difficulties. In this context the thesis settles for the modest, but nonetheless challenging task of seeking to describe the imprecise relationships that are associated with policy leadership in as precise a manner as possible. In doing so it can aim to be coherent in terms of the ontological and epistemological foundations of the thesis and to be useful in guiding empirical research on the questions posed (and is to be properly criticised on these grounds). However it cannot hope to avoid the ongoing disputes that derive from different ontological and epistemological positions.

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A review of the main literature on leadership within political science and organization theory underlines the definitional problems. Given the endemic nature of these problems in discussing leadership both bodies of literature tend to offer complex analytical models rather than definitions. In both literatures there has been a clear shift over time from an actor-centred emphasis on personal traits to one that gives more attention to contextual variables, from 'leadership character' to what might be termed 'contextualisation of leadership'. Beyond that both literatures are characterized by tensions and unresolved conflicts. Notably there are those who give primacy to context - 'contexts make leaders' - and those who stress the interaction between personal leadership skills and context - that leaders negotiate contexts and the resources, constraints and opportunities that they present. Political science has great difficulties in disentangling leadership from the concept of power, and moving beyond the dualism of the cognitive and the strategic aspects of leadership. Organization theory has similar problems of differentiation from the concept of management, and has no settled position about the relationship between the task-oriented and the socio-emotional aspects of leadership. Both bodies of literature lack a settled position on contextualist versus interactionist approaches to leadership.

Within political science there is a widespread recognition that the concept of leadership overlaps with the concept of power. Thus, just as with the concept of power, definitions of leadership have proved contentious. As Jean Blondel noted, 'power is the key element of political leadership', and went on to define leadership as the 'ability to make others do what they would not otherwise do'. This emphasis on the 'powering' aspect of leadership can be criticized for underplaying the inspirational

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In political science see Elgie, R.C. (1995) *Political Leadership in Liberal Democracies* (Basingstoke, Macmillan)  
and cognitive aspects of persuasion, whether through a common vision or through initiating policy learning.

Therefore in discussing leadership it is useful to distinguish between 'power over' – which derives from strategic skills in using constitutional position, executive organization, and party, coalition and electoral management - from 'power to' – which rests on cognitive skills of imparting vision, of persuasion through convincing narrative and of policy learning and lesson drawing. This distinction is mirrored in The Oxford English Dictionary which in defining leadership covers a wide spectrum from 'directing the course of action to be followed' through to 'guiding action by argument and persuasion' and to 'directing by example'. In seeking to arrive at a definition of policy leadership it is helpful to focus on both cognitive and strategic skills in negotiating different structural contexts. However, consistent with 'critical' realism, they are to be seen not as independent aspects of leadership but as internally related or mutually constitutive aspects in a dialectical manner.

The literature on leadership in German politics has been preoccupied with the Federal Chancellor and has had much less to say about executive leadership by ministers or administrative leadership by top officials. Both federal ministers and State Secretaries have been neglected in studies of the German core executive. Hence this literature is really only of value to studies of public policy to the extent that a policy falls directly within the constitutional sphere of the Chancellor or is identified as a Kanzlersache because of its preeminent political importance for the governing party and coalition. This view of leadership is, however, too restrictive for understanding policy change. By looking at policy leadership at the policy sub-subsystem level this thesis hopes to make a contribution to core executive studies in Germany by delving more deeply to look at the determinants of policy change.

Studies of Chancellor leadership have mirrored wider features of the political science literature. Analytical modeling has focused on mapping the various political constraints and resources that shape and provide the context for German Chancellors.


\[27\] Giddens, A. (1979) Central Problems in Social Theory (London: Macmillan) p.69
in trying to provide leadership, paying particular attention to constitutional, party, coalition, electoral and policy resources. Of importance for this thesis have been the findings about how Helmut Kohl and Gerhard Schröder have defined and practiced leadership. Kohl developed the so-called 'Kohl system' which relied on a broad and deep cultivation of a network of contacts centred around the CDU. Thus party management was always critical to his Chancellor leadership. Kohl also nested his political and policy management in a long-term value of the political necessity of the coalition with the Free Democratic Party (FDP). This allowed him to use the argument of coalition logic to discipline would-be critics within the CDU/CSU. Finally, historical vision played an important role in his formula of leadership, especially in relation to European unification. In this respect Kohl displayed a capacity for 'transformational' leadership, most notably over Economic and Monetary Union. These three elements defined the scope for leadership in the defence and security policy subsystem during his governments.

During his first term (1998-2002) Schröder's leadership style was characterized by two main features: the search for consensus across the boundaries of parties and groups (his so-called Räterepublik of commissions preparing major reforms); and his careful attention to media image and to opinion polls and recognition that jobs and employment were the central concerns of voters. The guiding theme was no longer historical vision but economic policy competence and to desire to project a personal image of a 'modern' Chancellor directly to the German public. His Chancellorship rested on a combination of leadership as 'modern opportunity management' with the arts of symbolic politics. There were clear implications for defence and security

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Smith, M (1991) *Analysing Organisational Behaviour* (Basingstoke, Macmillan)  
Banchoff, T. 'German Policy towards the European Union: The Effects of Historical Memory', *German Politics*, 6, 1 (1997), pp.60-76.  
31 Heinze, R. *Die Berliner Räterepublik: Viel Rat, wenig Tat?* (Wiesbaden: Westdeutsche Verlag)  
policy. For Kohl, defence and security policy mattered to the extent that it was about Germany's historical obligations: to repay the United States for its support over German unification and more broadly over the post-war period, and as part of the process of European political unification and the strengthening of the Franco-German motor in this process. For Schröder, defence and security policy was very much secondary to economic policy when it came to making issues a *Kanzlersache*. The result was a very different context for leadership in the defence and security policy subsystem under Schröder.

However, as with political science more generally, the challenge for the literature on the Chancellor leadership had been how to conceptualize the relationship between its cognitive and strategic aspects. Those of a constructivist inclination have been disposed to stress the 'vision thing' or the role of discourse. However, seen from the perspective of 'critical' realism, the challenge is to draw out the complex dialectical relationship between the cognitive and the strategic aspects of Chancellor leadership and how these relate to a changing structural context and the resources, constraints and opportunities that this context presents.

Since the 1980s leadership studies has been a major growth area in organizational and management theory. Traditionally, this literature had focused on leadership 'traits' and later, from the 1940s under the impact of behaviouralism, had gone on to examine leadership in the socio-psychological context of group dynamics. From the 1960s the emphasis shifted towards an interactionist approach that, whilst still rooted in social psychology, paid more attention to task requirements as a variable conditioning leadership. The result was a 'contingency' perspective on leadership. The 'take-off' of leadership studies in the 1980s owed much to the popularity of the work of Peters and Waterman, which stressed 'benchmarking' successful corporate leaders and drawing practical lessons. Leadership was identified as a more critical variable in corporate success as the business environment was becoming more competitive, fast-changing

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and uncertain. It was about coping with change and thus was to be distinguished from management, which was about coping with the complexity of large-scale organizations.

Reviewing the complex organizational and management theory literature on leadership, Charles Handy concluded that this concept 'is a complex one, riddled with ambiguity, incompatibility and conflict.' Rather than providing a definition, he contents himself with a 'differentiated trait' approach that identifies three dimensions of leadership. They can be adapted to public policy theory as follows:

1. The leader as mobiliser and activator of the policy subsystem, setting a clear and firm direction of change through both a vision and a skilful exploitation of windows of opportunity for change. This dimension is consistent with the transformational leadership role of the policy entrepreneur.

2. The leader as ambassador of the policy subsystem, acting as a ‘linking-pin’ or integrator, finding common ground amongst its different actors and effectively representing the values and interests of the subsystem externally so that it achieves a high level of autonomy of operation and finds it easier to acquire necessary resources. This dimension can be seen as a key attribute of the ‘transactional’ leader as policy broker.

3. The leader as model to the policy subsystem, incorporating a set of shared values, attitudes and forms of behaviour that are highly valued as points of reference for the conduct of others. This dimension is close to the concept of charisma. It can be seen as consistent with the laissez-faire leadership role.

Within Handy's broad summary of a large literature on organizational leadership is a set of unresolved tensions and conflicts. Most prominently, is the appropriate relationship between the socio-emotional aspects of leadership and the task-oriented aspects. At the heart of the socio-emotional aspect is how leaders interact with others who are significant for performance. Some stress the importance of building supportive relations – like the policy broker - by allowing others to influence policy and building up trust and respect so that there is commitment to policy. In this view,

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leaders are important as ‘linking-pins’. Others emphasise the psychologically distant leader who seeks informal acceptance but – like the transformational leader - is strongly task-centred. In this view leadership is about providing clear definitions of activity so that control can be enforceable.

One common problem that is thrown up by political science and organization theory is a tendency to identify leadership with a particular type of effect, namely change. The implication seems to be that leadership must have an effect and that effect must be change; also, that change is good and that good leaders produce change. Hence it is to be ‘measured’ in terms of the degree of change that it produces. This implication underpins the emphasis on ‘transformational’ and ‘transactional’ leadership – or, in the language of public policy theory – on policy entrepreneurs and policy brokers. This viewpoint ignores, however, that the effect of leadership can be to maintain continuity in the face of growing pressures for ‘undesirable’ or ‘unnecessary’ policy change. In this case the leader influences policy change by preventing it, by acting as a policy veto player on behalf of maintaining a set of policy beliefs. Hence this thesis adds the role of policy veto player to the characterization of leadership. The definition of policy leadership offered here does not take up a position on whether and in what ways it is bound up with particular effects.

Consistent with ‘critical’ realism this brief overview of political science and organization theory suggests the following working definition of policy leadership:

Policy leadership refers to the dialectical relationship between the cognitive and strategic personal and policy skills of those in positions of authority as they negotiate specific contexts at the policy sub-system and macro-political levels. These skills are used both in adapting to or seeking to shape structural contexts - and the institutional and political resources and constraints that they provide - and in tailoring their roles - as policy entrepreneurs, brokers and veto players - to these variable contexts. Leadership takes place within contexts that favour certain narratives and strategies over others but at the same time has the potential to recast these contexts.

1.3 Public Policy Theory and Analytical Perspectives of Policy Change

The use of public policy theory brings its own problems. First, it is not a unified field. It contains differing views on the relationship between structure and agency, the causal mechanisms involved in policy change, the time-scales of such change, and the nature of the dependent variable (agenda setting for the multiple streams and punctuated equilibrium frameworks; decisions for the advocacy coalition framework). In particular, public policy theory does not provide an agreed account of leadership. The advocacy coalition framework inclines towards a contextualist approach to leadership, the multiple streams framework towards a 'skill-based' approach. On the positive side, public policy theory offers an opportunity to use multiple approaches to test their comparative advantage in explaining

Bundeswehr reform is an invitation to think more precisely about causal mechanisms. It is also possible to explore complementarities between these theories and see how they might cross-fertilise and help remedy each other's main weaknesses. Notably, certain key concepts are shared across public policy theories: crisis/perturbation, policy entrepreneurs/brokers, institutional venues, 'venue shopping' and policy or professional forums. Though they are wrapped up in different frameworks of variables, these concepts represent an important degree of commonality in public policy theory that will be explored in this thesis. Cross-fertilisation is potentially fruitful in examining the extent to which leadership skills can make a significant difference to policy change.

Secondly, it is by no means easy to distinguish major policy change from minor. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith distinguish change to the policy core (major) from change to secondary aspects (minor) and both – which are specific to the policy subsystem - from change to deep core beliefs about fundamental political values that transcend the policy subsystem and are deeply entrenched in actors’ cognitive frameworks. 41 Policy

core beliefs represent basic normative and empirical commitments about priorities, causal mechanisms and appropriate strategies within the subsystem. Secondary aspects refer not just to the domain of technical information about how policy should be implemented (Sabatier's view) but also – as this thesis argues - to whether good or bad reasons can be given for adhering to particular policy core beliefs. But in practice this distinction is difficult to sustain.

Bundeswehr reform has tended to combine partial change to aspects of policy core beliefs with change to secondary aspects. The belief systems of leading actors tend to be more complex, nested within each other, and subject to the pulls and pushes of politics, than the advocacy coalition framework suggests. Not least, it should be remembered that changes in policy cores are a matter of perspective. What, from the perspective of NATO and especially the US Defence Department, was seen as 'minor' change to a secondary aspect of the Bundeswehr was 'major' change to the policy core for those within the Bundeswehr policy subsystem. This shows that the secondary aspects of the NATO belief system can constitute the policy core aspects of the Bundeswehr belief system. The level of analysis problem and the nesting of policy sub-systems complicate judgements about the magnitude of change.

A third problem is less often admitted in public policy theory. As we shall see below, public policy theory attributes a high degree of significance to 'external perturbations', in short to events and crises and the role of contingency in explaining policy change. Public policy theory also gives (to greater and lesser degrees) importance to agency in processes of policy change. This raises awkward questions about intentions and motives of individual leaders, in particular about personal traits like ambition, ideological fervour, self-confidence, assertiveness and risk-taking and about personal policy skills such as expertise, bargaining, articulation and setting of clear objectives, and managing party and public opinion. The point is that contingency and agency (leadership traits and skills) introduce powerful elements of indeterminacy into policy change and complicate the tracing of causal mechanisms. What public policy theory lacks is an interactionist approach that seeks to explain leadership in terms of strategic political context and leaders' personal traits and policy skills.

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The five analytical perspectives about policy change outlined below are derived from public policy approaches and draw out, in various ways, the roles of contingency, cognition and leadership in shaping Bundeswehr reform. Above all, they move analysis of policy change away from static models of decision-making, by stressing how the various elements of the policy process interact over time. At the same time public policy theory gravitates towards one of two types of explanation and neglects a third. The advocacy coalition and the punctuated equilibrium frameworks are useful in highlighting the extent to which agency is constrained and shaped by the characteristics of policy subsystems and the macro-political political conditions within which these subsystems interact. In short, they have a contextual understanding of leadership in the policy process. In contrast, the multiple streams framework takes a more agency-centred view of policy change that has little to say about institutional context. Against these two dominant views within public policy theory, this thesis argues for an interactionist approach that explores the relationship between leadership skills and context. In particular, it stresses the role of individuals in shaping processes of policy change and defining the limits of change.

**Perspective 1. The context and opportunity for major policy change is provided by significant perturbations external to the policy subsystem, notably the effects of international crises, governmental changes, 'public opinion' shocks for instance as manifested in Länderelections, changes emanating from other policy subsystems including international institutions like NATO and the EU (NATO-isation and Europeanisation), and court rulings on Bundeswehr reform.**

This perspective is common to public policy theories and shared with historical institutionalism, which stresses critical junctures. Thus, for instance, the punctuated equilibrium framework stresses how macro-political forces intervene to push an issue out of a policy subsystem and onto the governmental agenda. However, theories differ in whether they see major policy change as a product of a single 'watershed' event or external shock (notably the multiple streams framework) or a series of events extending over a decade and more (the advocacy coalition framework).

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The thesis seeks to identify and examine ‘watershed’ events and turning points and how they affected policy. Such examples include the Srebrenica massacre of 1995, the Kosovo War of 1999 and the terrorist assault on the US on 11 September 2001; the election of the Schröder government in 1998 and associated generational change; the relevant rulings of the Federal Constitutional Court; and domestic budgetary crises, especially associated with the risk of breaching the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact. Where public policy theories agree is in seeing no necessary connection between the size of an event and the degree or pace of policy change. One factor is the skill (or lack of it) of policy entrepreneurs in seizing the window of opportunity to effect change. This point is stressed strongly in the multiple streams framework and the punctuated equilibrium framework and recognized by the advocacy coalition framework. It highlights the roles of contingency and leadership in explaining policy change.

This perspective is also consistent with the 'second image reversed' literature in which domestic change is seen as embedded or nested within requirements and pressures emanating from the international arena. Domestic leaders can use NATO and EU requirements to strengthen their positions within domestic policy and change the terms of policy debate. Seen from this perspective, change in German defence policy is shaped by two mechanisms. The ‘top-down’ mechanism involves adaptational pressures from Atlanticisation and Europeanisation consequent on lack of ‘goodness of fit’ with German policy. The ‘bottom-up’ mechanism of Atlanticisation and Europeanisation takes the form of domestic actors using NATO and the EU to strengthen their power over policy.

The perspective raises a number of problems. First, the independent variable is not specified very clearly. ‘Crisis’ is more an attention-directing device than a precise,

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clearly specified explanatory concept. A crisis can be defined as an 'epoch-making' moment of decisive intervention, marking the historical transition between phases of political time. But, helpful as such a definition is, it does not make it easy to distinguish a crisis from an event that dislocates policy routines. When precisely is an event a crisis? How does one measure the independent variable and compare, say, a change of government with a budgetary crisis and both with Srebrenica or 11 September? In the absence of clear answers to these questions, it remains impossible to predict what kind of event would produce a particular scope or level of policy change. Secondly, not all exogenous shocks translate into policy change. Thus the perspective needs modification, as Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith later recognized:

_Perspective 1.1: Significant perturbations external to the subsystem are a necessary, but not sufficient, cause of change in the policy core attributes._

This leads on to a third problem with the perspective. There is an important perceptual dimension to crisis. An event is a crisis or shock because it is perceived to be so and because a leader provides a narrative of systemic failure. Hence a crucial aspect of policy change is the role of leaders in identifying and defining a crisis (e.g. of Joschka Fischer defining Srebrenica as a crisis for German defence and security policy). The creation and manipulation of a crisis consciousness by leaders is a critical component of policy change. Therefore one is forced to consider what prompts leaders to define events as crises and to use them as instruments of change.

An additional problem is that policy change will not occur unless policy leaders in an active display of agency skilfully exploit the opportunity created by a crisis consciousness. This involves leadership skills in managing the strategic context of consensus building required by domestic constitutional arrangements. In the case of Germany the semi-sovereign character of its domestic institutional arrangements

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mean that consensus creation requires highly developed negotiating skills across party and intergovernmental boundaries. The result of this contextual factor is a leadership bias towards policy brokerage and policy veto playing rather than towards policy entrepreneurship. This has implications also for leadership styles and strategies, with a preference for 'salami-slicing' and opportunistic actions, for creating professional forums and for sidelining and excluding change agents (see below).

Similarly, there is an important perceptual dimension to 'goodness of fit' with international requirements. Domestic actors can help create or define away a lack of fit with NATO and EU requirements. Thus American actors may define a lack of German fit with NATO requirements pointing to the 'hard' dimension of military power and war-fighting capacity and German unwillingness to share in international crisis intervention in this manner. This translates into external pressure on the issue of 'burden sharing'. The effects of such pressure on policy change in the Bundeswehr were demonstrated by the way in which German Defence Minister Franz Josef Strauss justified lengthening the period of compulsory military service from 12 to 18 months in January 1962. It was a matter of fulfilling NATO obligations and matching the length of compulsory service in other member states. In contrast, German policy actors can respond by stressing other aspects of NATO commitments and Germany's role in the stabilization of Europe, especially in the east. Thus in the 1990s Schröder and Scharping could point to the increasing 'crisis prevention' role of NATO, linked to the UN, and Germany's disproportionately high contribution to the 'soft' dimension of defence and security, including nation- and state-building. Defined in this way, there is a goodness of fit and little adaptive pressure. 'Fit' is, in short, a definitional matter and a dimension of the process of leadership.

**Perspective 2. Policy change requires a shift within the policy subsystem in the coalition in power so that new beliefs are brought to bear on policy.**

This perspective derives from the advocacy coalition framework, which highlights the importance of core beliefs ('deep core', 'policy core' and 'secondary aspects' of beliefs) shared by actors from a variety of institutions at the level of the policy

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subsystem. These beliefs – rather than the preferences or desires of rational choice and game theory – are seen as the motor of action. Advocacy coalitions give an important degree of structure and stability to a policy subsystem over time and are characterized both by shared beliefs and by co-ordinated behaviour. Shared core beliefs are seen as highly resistant to change, in contrast to secondary aspects of beliefs that relate to policy objectives and how these are implemented and to the reasons given for holding particular beliefs. Hence the question arises of whether the Bundeswehr policy subsystem is characterized by one or more advocacy coalitions whose members not only share core beliefs but also co-ordinate their actions and contend for power over policy. If so, it will be necessary to examine how they have been able to resist or accelerate change (for instance by seeking out sympathetic institutional venues, engaging in policy-oriented learning and using exogenous crises).

Again, there has been a tendency to underplay the significance of individual policy leadership in the development of a belief system and in the formation of advocacy coalitions, not least in their transformation from nascent to mature coalitions. This typically takes the form of leaders acting as policy entrepreneurs, both adopting a set of policy ideas and organizing co-ordinated action on their behalf.

_Perspective 3. Policy change is a long-term process, requiring policy-oriented learning by means of technical information and analysis of the nature and magnitude of problems, their causes, and the probable impacts of different policy solutions._

This perspective also derives from the advocacy coalition framework, which stresses the important role of new technical information and/or experience in producing relatively enduring alterations of thought and behaviour by ‘probing’ belief systems.

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and the adequacy of the reasons for supporting given policy beliefs. Policy-oriented learning involves greater knowledge of the parameters of problems and the factors affecting them, of the determinants of policy effectiveness and of the probable impacts of different policies. It leads to the reframing of policy arguments. According to the advocacy coalition framework, policy analysis and learning is essentially an instrumental process of improving the quality of the reasons for holding a particular policy belief.

This perspective requires an examination of whether and how policy learning occurs, including the role of think tanks (like the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik and the party foundations), academic experts and journalists, as well as the role of different levels of government (from EU and NATO down to the Länder). It is also important to investigate the roles of both policy brokers and of professional forums (notably the Weizsäcker Commission on Bundeswehr reform during the Red/Green government). However, the advocacy coalition framework argues that changes in the policy core aspects require a perturbation or shock in non-cognitive factors external to the subsystem and that professional forums rest on fragile foundations.

Though the advocacy coalition framework focuses on policy-oriented learning as a social process, it implies a role for individual leadership in policy brokerage. Leadership can take the form of establishing a professional forum as a means of giving greater momentum to policy change. Professional forums are a mechanism for facilitating learning across coalitions by bringing together actors with contrasting beliefs. They are effective when a stalemate exists, each coalition regards a continuation of the status quo as unacceptable, deliberations are confidential and based on professional norms, and the forum is led by a policy broker who is respected by all parties as relatively neutral. Policy change then represents a form of power sharing among coalitions. The advocacy coalition framework underplays the role of

individual policy leadership in this process. Secondly, policy brokers can be independently important in policy-oriented learning. In the absence of learning across coalitions policy change can be accelerated when there is learning by a policy broker who has the authority to make short-term changes to policy.58

Perspective 4. Policy change requires skilful policy entrepreneurs, capable of manipulating short-term 'windows of opportunity' to bring new ideas to bear. These windows are opened by 'compelling problems' or by events in the 'politics' stream.

This perspective derives from the multiple streams framework, which stresses the critical role of individuals in conditions of ambiguity: of unclear preferences, vague and shifting problem definitions, fluid participation, and bureaucratic politics (the so-called 'garbage can' model of choice). Individual policy leadership takes the form of coupling the three separate streams that comprise the policy process, each with its own dynamics and rules. In consequence, and in contrast to both the advocacy coalition framework and the punctuated equilibrium framework, the policy process displays considerable randomness rather than a disposition to settle into equilibrium.

The policy process consists of the problem stream in which various definitions of problems are offered and data about problems presented; the policy stream in which a wide variety of ideas float around in the 'policy primeval soup' and are generated and pursued by various policy specialists; and the politics stream which consists of elections, swings in public opinion, political and administrative turnover, and pressure group campaigns, each influencing how opinion formers define problems and evaluate solutions.59 Coupling of the streams takes place in conditions of flux in the interactions amongst the three streams, giving rise to discontinuity. In such circumstances policy leadership – rather than coalitions or institutional arrangements - is seen as playing the major role. Hence it is important to identify policy entrepreneurs, how they effect change, and under what conditions they are able to

connect particular Bundeswehr reform proposals to a changing configuration of problems and politics.

This perspective is useful in offsetting the contextualist bias in the advocacy coalition framework and in the punctuated equilibrium framework by directing attention to the role of the ‘internal calculation processes’ of policy entrepreneurs in policy change. It has two weaknesses however. Firstly, in specifying the strategic context it underestimates the importance of the institutional characteristics of the decision setting and the use of these characteristics by entrepreneurs to shape the direction of choices. Secondly, it focuses on only one leadership role – policy entrepreneurship – and ignores two other leadership roles that significantly affect policy change – policy brokerage and policy veto.

**Perspective 5. Policy change requires a shift of institutional venue, bringing in new actors and ideas and changing the decisional bias.**

This perspective derives from the punctuated equilibrium framework, which posits that policy monopolies are responsible for stasis in a policy subsystem by controlling the venue that oversees the policy. The resultant equilibrium is punctuated by bursts of policy change. Policy monopolies dominate the important institutions of a particular policy subsystem with a supportive ‘policy image’ so that decision-making remains for long periods in a condition of equilibrium. This policy image is reinforced by its own success in a ‘negative feedback process’ (success dampening pressure for policy change). Policy change occurs when the policy monopoly is challenged by competing images. This happens when a compelling external perturbation or policy failure (‘positive feedback’) excites public and media interest and propels new issues onto the macro-political agenda of Federal Chancellor and Bundestag. Opportunities for change depend on a policy system experiencing positive feedback, leading to a gathering momentum behind new ideas that ‘punctuates’ the equilibrium, a shift of issues to the macro-political level and a burst of policy change.

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Again, as with the advocacy coalition framework, individual policy leaders intrude back into the model. A critical strategy for changing policy is for leaders to seek to change the institutional venue or to have actors from other venues become involved. This change of venue within which policy is considered – in the characteristics of the decision making setting – is critical because it frames the problems that actors confront. It alters the policy monopoly and policy image and leads to change to the policy core. In this ‘politics of punctuation’, as in the ‘multiple-streams’ framework, policy leadership is critical, and policy change can be rapid and radical. However, in contrast, to the multiple streams framework, policy change is less dependent on the internal calculation processes of the policy entrepreneur than on characteristics of the decision setting. Hence the punctuated equilibrium framework offers an opportunity to link Bundeswehr reform to the way in which institutions shape policy change by offering a more dynamic view of the role of policy leadership in this process. This examination includes the effects of institutional structures within NATO and within the EU as well as of institutional structures within the German core executive, the legislature and the political parties. Because of its focus on the characteristics of the decision setting, the punctuated equilibrium framework has a greater affinity than the multiple streams framework with historical institutionalism.

These analytical perspectives suggest that public policy theory allows a more nuanced understanding of how policy change occurs and the context and conditions for that change than the rather one-dimensional approach posited by constructivist ascendancy in German defence and security studies. These five analytical perspectives allow for a more sophisticated analysis that seeks to tease out the role played by external perturbations and the role of policy leadership in shaping the policy process, for instance through creating and sustaining a crisis consciousness, reframing issues, acting as a catalyst for new advocacy coalitions, changing institutional venues, and creating professional forums to promote policy-oriented learning.

The punctuated equilibrium framework has three key contributions to make to understanding the role of policy leadership. Firstly, it shows that leaders can manipulate actors’ frames of reference by the use of information to change the characteristics of the situation to which they have to respond. In the words of Jones: ‘Information is viewed as inherently ambiguous, so that there is a very important role
for leadership and policy entrepreneurship in the framing of issues… The manipulation of information plays a key role in forcing governmental attention to problems.” Policy entrepreneurs seek out opportunities to reframe issues and to guide processes of policy learning in particular directions. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’s concept of policy broker represents a concession in this direction but one limited by the constraint of co-ordinated action built into the advocacy coalition framework.

Secondly, the punctuated equilibrium framework stresses the importance of control over institutional venues for shaping the pace and direction of policy change. Institutional venues are seen as creating decisional biases, changing these venues or those who participate in them as instigating cognitive change. Hence in the punctuated equilibrium framework institutional settings are seen as pivotal both in shaping the context of policy leadership (notably semi-sovereignty, veto players and potential for blockade) and in the means by which leaders affect policy change.

Finally, the punctuated equilibrium framework scores against the advocacy coalition and multiple streams frameworks by paying more attention to the institutional setting of policy change. The advocacy coalition framework underplays the link between policy beliefs and institutional settings; the multiple streams framework has too little to say about how these settings shape the ‘coupling’ possibilities of policy entrepreneurs. Crucial significance is attached to the structures of the political system in setting the context for policy change. This perspective fits well within Peter Katzenstein’s interpretation of Germany as a ‘semi-sovereign’ state in which power is shared across the federal system, political parties and parapublic institutions and jurisdictions are overlapping. The result is a policy bias to incremental change. This insight was further developed in Holtmann and Voelzkow’s view of Germany as a

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mix of competitive majoritarian democracy and ‘negotiation’ democracy. The institutional nodes of ‘negotiation’ democracy are federalism (including the ‘dual’ majorities in Bundestag and Bundesrat), coalition government and neo-corporatism. In short, German policy making is, at the macro-level, bound up with an institutional structure of interlocking politics (Politikverflechtung).

The result is that policy leaders have to negotiate a range of institutional veto points, creating a potential for inertia and Reformstau (reform blockage). From the perspective of those favouring radical reform of the Bundeswehr, semi-sovereignty becomes a liability rather than an asset. Not least, constitutional structure is crucial not just in specifying the fundamental values of German defence and security policy but also in shaping the degree of consensus required for major change. Thus there are high potential political costs of Bundeswehr reform that shape the kinds of policy leadership role that are likely to emerge in Germany. They act against the policy entrepreneurship role of the multiple streams literature and favour the policy brokerage and policy veto roles.

At the same time, as this thesis argues, policy leadership remains more important in policy change than either constructivist accounts or public policy theories (on the whole) have been prepared to concede. As Donald Coleman states when writing about the importance of business entrepreneurs and their neglect by neo-classical economic theory: the policy leader ‘having been exorcised by abstractions, has reappeared through the back door. He insists upon intruding back into the model.’

1.4 The Interactionist Approach to Policy Leadership

This emphasis on the role of policy leadership is not linked to the development of a new theory of public policy or to a new perspective about policy change. Instead, the critical analysis of the above five analytical perspectives about policy change is bound together by the development of a model of the role of leadership in the policy process

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that follows an interactionist approach. In this approach leadership is conceptualised as a complexity of interactions between leaders' skills and context, focusing on three sets of variables: personal leadership traits, policy leadership skills and strategic political context. Given that Bundeswehr reform is clearly located within the defence and security policy subsystem, the leadership issue clearly relates to the role of the Federal Defence Minister

**Personal Leadership Traits include:**
- Policy and political ambition
- Ideological fervour
- Self-confidence
- Judgement
- Affiliation or follower satisfaction
- Risk-taking
- Pacific versus coercive persuasive styles
- Accommodativeness
- Decisional initiative and assertiveness
- Activism.

**Policy Leadership Skills include:**
- Articulation and setting of clear policy priorities

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On policy leadership skills see:

On strategic political context see:
Discernment of favourable and unfavourable opportunities for leadership
Expertise and experience
Timing
Mobilizing and conciliatory skills with respect to the Bundestag coalition parliamentary parties and the public
Bargaining and conciliation with affected groups.

*Strategic Political Context* includes:
Constitutional scope for action, especially as defined by the Federal Constitutional Court.
Electoral context
Salience of the issue
Size of the majority in the Bundestag
Relations between the parties in the coalition government
Whether the federal government also has a majority in the Bundesrat
Extent to which the Federal Defence Minister enjoys the support of the Bundestag and the Bundesrat and a majority of her/his political party
Institutional context of the Bundeswehr, of the federal government and of the legislative process
Reputation of the Defence Minister within the ministry and within the federal government and whether he/she has the confidence of the Federal Chancellor
Poll ratings of the Defence Minister
Public reputation and political skills of the Chancellor on this issue

Analysis of these complex interactions enables us to identify three distinct policy leadership roles – entrepreneurship, brokerage and veto playing – and to relate the type of role adopted to the conditions, especially of institutional context, in which specific skills are useful. Policy entrepreneurship involves adopting and pushing a particular policy solution, typically requiring radical policy change. Policy brokerage is about seeking consensus amongst contending ideas. Policy veto playing seeks to minimise the political costs of policy change emanating from within the policy subsystem. Broadly, as indicated above, the semi-sovereign macro-political arrangements of Germany create a disposition to opt for policy brokerage or for policy veto playing roles over policy entrepreneurship. It can be argued, consistent
with the advocacy coalition framework, that Germany's high consensus building requirements reinforce the general disposition of policy leaders to weigh losses more heavily than gains, to remember defeats more than victories and to exaggerate the power of opponents.\(^70\)

These policy leadership roles are linked to different policy leadership styles and strategies. In the case of policy entrepreneurship, leadership takes on a heroic style of bold policy initiative in which the leader acts as *animateur* of change. The characteristic leadership policy strategy involves creating and sustaining a crisis consciousness and reframing policy issues in a manner that provides an historical legitimation for bold change. The policy leader develops a new policy narrative that attributes proposals with political coherence and historical meaning and significance. The appropriate skills involve the arts of discourse and persuasion aimed at getting agreement on a particular policy model.

However, one of the weaknesses of the multiple streams literature is that its analysis of policy entrepreneurship is confined to agenda setting. Effective policy entrepreneurship requires strategic skills not just in agenda setting but also in translating ideas into policy decisions. A characteristic strategy when faced with powerful opposition is 'salami-slicing', in which the policy leader pursues policy change as a 'nibbling' or iterative process by a series of opportunistic actions designed to circumvent opposition. This may involve creating *faits accomplis*. Volker Rühe provided an example between 1992 and 1994. In a more favourable political context the policy entrepreneur is more likely to mobilize co-ordinated action around the proposed policy model, seeking to create a powerful advocacy coalition on its behalf. This second type of strategy was less visible within Bundeswehr reform. It made a fleeting appearance with Klaus Kinkel and Joschka Fischer during the Kohl period, but was ineffective in both agenda setting and decision making about Bundeswehr reform.

In contrast, policy brokerage is associated with a 'humdrum' leadership style of pursuing incremental change. Its characteristic leadership policy strategy involves the facilitation of policy-oriented learning and the 'binding in' of opposition, particularly by the creation of a professional forum. This means gaining the agreement of key actors that a continuation of the status quo is unacceptable, that there are important empirical questions to be addressed, that key interests are represented and that professional norms of policy analysis will be respected. It is close to a mode of power sharing amongst competing policy beliefs. This type of leadership policy role, style and strategy was characteristic of the Scharping period (1998-2002).

Policy veto playing is associated with an immobiliste leadership style of preventing forces for change from shaping policy. The immobiliste style of policy veto players is reflected in a policy strategy of sidelining or excluding change agents in a form of *Denkverbot* (ban on thinking), of blocking new policy ideas from emerging. It was apparent under Rühe between 1994 and 1998 when much greater weight was attached to the potential losses than to the gains from Bundeswehr reform.

The analytical perspectives of policy change outlined above can be mapped onto this analytical framework of leadership roles, styles and strategies. Thus the policy entrepreneur role fits into the multiple streams framework with its stress on how leaders create and exploit the windows of opportunity opened by developments in the problems, politics, and policy streams (perspective 4). The policy broker role is addressed by the advocacy coalition framework, notably with its stress on policy-oriented learning (analytical perspectives 2 and 3). The policy veto player role is most closely linked to the punctuated equilibrium framework (perspective 5). These linkages suggest the ways in which policy leadership skills are related to the different contexts outlined in the major public policy theories: a context of ambiguity in the case of policy entrepreneurship, of a policy process structured by contested beliefs in

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the case of policy brokerage, and of macro-political conditions that impose high political costs on policy change in the case of policy veto playing.

1.5 Ontology and Epistemology

Consistent with ‘critical’ realism the thesis accepts the ‘foundationalist’ argument that there is an ‘observable’ world of public policy that exists independently of our knowledge of it and that provides essential data as the basis for establishing how policy processes work and the role of leadership within these processes. Thus research is concerned with mapping this structural context – which includes policy beliefs - and establishing causal mechanisms of policy change (see the five analytical perspectives examined in this thesis). The implication for epistemology is an interest in programmatic positions and public statements and what they show about how structural contexts are ‘strategically selective’, that is are more open to some kinds of leadership roles, styles and skills than others.\(^73\)

However, in order to penetrate into the complex world of leadership skills, and how leaders adapt to and seek to shape different and changing contexts, it is necessary to go beyond ‘foundationalist’ theory and its positivist epistemology to look at phenomena such ‘strategic learning’. As Neumann states: ‘... the immediately perceived characteristics of objects, events, or social relations rarely reveal everything.' Critical’ realism argues for attention to the extent to which public policy is discursively constructed and the product of social interaction and to which leadership is constituted in and through narrative. Thus the epistemological position draws heavily on the ‘hermeneutic’ or ‘interpretative’ tradition that seeks to understand the policy world ‘from within’ by delving into the reasons behind actions, opaque as they may be, and the beliefs of actors. According to the ‘double’ hermeneutic it involves understanding policy actors and their perceptions of their role in the policy process. The result is a close attention to qualitative methods designed to reveal those parts of the policy process that are unobservable.


\(^74\) Neumann, W.L. (2000) Social Research Methods, Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches, 4th Edition (Boston, Allyn and Bacon), p.77
‘Critical’ realism also informs the interactionist approach to the question of how policy leadership works that is adopted in this thesis. This approach builds on and develops Giddens’ argument for avoiding an unnecessary dualism of agency and structure, which are seen in a dialectical relationship with each other and as mutually constitutive, to seeing them as in practice completely interwoven.\(^\text{75}\) The stress is on how policy actors interact with their contexts and on the element of temporal fluidity as actors and contexts constantly alter. It is important to focus on complex and changing structured contexts, on how actors perceive and act on these contexts – notably how they construct their interests - and on the unintended consequences of their actions as they are mediated through and in part change these structures.

Therefore, consistent with ‘critical’ realism, contingency and variability are seen as crucial aspects of the policy leadership process.\(^\text{76}\) This is reflected in the stress in perspective 1 on external perturbations and policy change. Also, according to ‘critical’ realism, as policy actors gain greater knowledge of the structured context, ‘strategic learning’ takes place.\(^\text{77}\) This is reflected in the perspective dealing with policy-oriented learning and policy change. Policy leaders are under pressure to examine the quality of their reasons for holding onto particular policy beliefs. The complex and changing contexts and how actors perceive and act on them are dealt with in the analytical perspectives relating to advocacy coalitions and to institutional venues. In short, the analytical perspectives about policy change cover the broad fabric of concerns of ‘critical’ realism and its attempt not just to overcome the dualism of structure and agency but also to bridge positivist and ‘interpretivist’ epistemological positions.

1.6 Research Methodology

The role of policy leadership in German defence and security policy can be usefully examined by a strong reliance not just on qualitative methods but also on the case study method. These methods are especially well adapted to examining the complex

\(^\text{76}\) Giddens, A. (1979) *Central Problems in Social Theory* (London: Macmillan) p.69
leadership roles, styles and strategies that shape policy change, the complexity of interactions between leaders and contexts, as well as the difficult questions of causation that arise. It must be stressed that after decades of research experimental psychology has reached no clear conclusions about the conditions in which specific leadership skills are useful, how, why and when. Hence this thesis does not set itself the bold objective of offering such conclusions with reference to the role of leadership in German defence and security policy. It seeks to examine the extent to which the leadership roles, styles and strategies of key actors made a significant difference to policy outcomes under changing contextual conditions between 1990 and 2002.

1.6.1 Qualitative Method and the Case Study Method

As argued above, the appropriate epistemology to explore research questions about policy leadership is an interpretative approach that goes beyond the observable face of policy to examine both particular skills and their appropriateness to different and changing contexts and complex processes of cognitive change. There was, of course, an observable public domain to be uncovered. Thus party and government policy papers were used to demonstrate specific policy changes; press, television and radio reporting provided insights into the presentation of policy by leaders, especially how they were legitimated. Also, secondary data could be gathered on trends in defence spending, public opinion, on the spatial distribution of base closures and on privatisation/procurement. However, they were used in the context of knowledge acquired from archival research and semi-structured interviews, which were the central methods employed in the thesis.

The working analytical perspectives about policy change set out in the chapter on theoretical approach are tested using Bundeswehr reform as a single case study. According to Yin: "The case study method... is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, addresses a situation in which the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident, and uses multiple sources of evidence."78 By opting for a single, in-depth case study the thesis seeks to provide 'a thorough analysis of an individual case' and situates itself in

the literature on contextualisation in cross-national comparative research. However, the context is not an object of study in its own right, as with proponents of culturalist explanations. Instead, public policy theory is used to identify general factors that influence policy change and to test them with reference to the specific context of German defence and security policy.

A single case study provides an opportunity to delve more deeply into the complexities of policy change by testing a variety of analytical perspectives. In this respect it has an advantage over a set of case studies where it is usually only possible to test one or two analytical perspectives. The advantages that the single case study offers would be lost by focusing on just a single perspective.

Consistent with the nature of the research questions, the thesis opts for explanatory and interpretative case study rather than exploratory or descriptive case study as the most suitable method for empirical investigation. The case study of the Bundeswehr is used both to interrogate public policy theory (Lijphart’s ‘theory-infirming’ case study) and as a means to assess what light public policy theory can throw on German defence and security policy. This type of case study aims to produce an analytical narrative framed around leadership as a variable rather than just ‘thick’ description. Because this individual case study uses and assesses the utility of concepts developed within public policy theory and tests analytical perspectives about policy change derived from this body of theory, it can lay claim to be comparative.

Explanatory and interpretative case study offers several advantages, notably:

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Griffit, J. (2001) Demystifying Postgraduate research, From MA to PhD (Birmingham, University of Birmingham) pp.66-68
• The emphasis placed on policy context, especially the way in which Bundeswehr policy is embedded in the changing nature of the post-Cold War security environment and of the domestic institutional and political environment
• The ability to chart processes of change over time, thereby enabling the comparison of policy leadership skills in different contexts
• The opportunity to examine processes as well as outcomes, especially important when investigating policy leadership
• The analysis of causal mechanisms as identified in various analytical perspectives about policy change
• The assembly of evidence from various sources and the possibility of using both quantitative and qualitative methods
• The possibility of generalizing results to the body of public policy theory from which the original analytical perspectives about policy change were derived, following the logic of replication (rather than of statistical sampling).

Within the framework of maintaining a logic of interconnectedness between ontology, epistemology, methodology, sources and methods, the research developed in an iterative and pragmatic manner. Fieldwork was initially informed by a set of preliminary working analytical perspectives about policy change derived from the literature but then fed back – via the refinement of the research questions - into the further development of a remodeled theoretical account.82 This remodeled account centred on leadership as a variable in the policy process, how it was exercised and with what effects. It aimed to do more justice to the complexity of policy change uncovered in the empirical investigations whilst also trying to meet criteria of clarity and parsimony.

82 Grix, J. (2001) Demystifying Postgraduate research, From MA to PhD. (Birmingham, University of Birmingham) pp.73-95
1.6.2 Sources of Evidence

The research for this study was conducted over a three-year period from October 2000 to December 2003. During the first year, in preparation for the fieldwork, the focus was on re-analysing the key academic texts on public policy theory and on German defence and security policy, including its historical background and the main ontological and epistemological positions adopted. This work was undertaken with the aim of identifying and refining the initial working analytical perspectives about policy change, which provided the guiding theme or angle. The theme or angle was then further refined to the role of policy leadership, leading to a survey on leadership in both political science and organization theory. In addition, a start was made with the collection of official documentation (see below), including key policy positions and Bundestag debates, and with the collection of newspaper and journal articles and interviews. Some of this material could be obtained by post or over by on-line computer search, but the main work had to be conducted using archival research during the period of fieldwork.

The fieldwork stage began in October 2001. It was conducted according to the principle of triangulation, which states that an outcome finds confirmation when at least three different sources of evidence coincide. This involves correlating and cross-checking the secondary literature (including newspaper reports) with the materials yielded by archival work and the content of the interviews. Three main sources of evidence were used.

1. The continuing collection and analysis of official documentation, notably relevant key Bundestag debates, legislative texts and regulations, court rulings, interviews given to newspapers, and policy statements by the federal government (especially the Federal Defence Ministry), by NATO and by the EU. As the principal focus of empirical research was on the SPD/Green government from 1998-2002, the main source was the Archiv of the SPD’s federal executive (Bundesvorstand). This provides a detailed overview of policy positions on defence and security, press

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83 Peters, G. *Comparative Politics: Theory and Methods* (Basingstoke, MacMillan) p.97
Grix, J. (2001) *Demystifying Postgraduate Research, From MA to PhD.* (Birmingham, University of Birmingham) pp.84-85
releases and media reactions, not least with reference to key policy leaders. Also useful as sources of secondary materials were the *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik* and the *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik*.

2. Interviews with key actors principally within the defence and security policy subsystem and key related policy subsystems, including from NATO, the EU, the Federal Defence Ministry, the Bundeswehr, the Federal Chancellor’s Office, the Foreign Ministry, the Federal Finance Ministry, members of the Weizsäcker Commission, as well as officials in the main political parties, notably their federal executives, and in the Bundestag’s main committees and working groups.

3. Canvassing of expert opinion through interviews and many informal conversations with foreign embassy staff, policy analysts (e.g. in the *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik* (SWP) and *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik* (DGAP)), journalists and academics and through the collection of articles, reports and other official publications.

The collection of documentation and interviews were at the heart of the empirical research and represented the main use of time in fieldwork. In particular, interviews were essential in order both to look behind the official discourse of policy statements and legislation to deeper, often unarticulated aspects of Bundeswehr policy (like the political targeting of base closures) and also to more precisely and fully reconstruct the sequence of events. At the same time, consistent with the principle of ‘triangulation’, they had to be checked not just against other interviews (e.g. with policy experts and academics) but also against the other sources of evidence to identify willful or unconscious misinformation and subjective accounts that rewrote the narrative to personal advantage. Interviews were on occasion misleading about developments over time and from a broader perspective, because interviewees lacked the appropriate experience or were too close to the policy process and engaged in assertion. In particular, as noted above, the interview method was affected by the ‘romance of leadership’ notion. Interviewees were prone on occasion to attribute important symbolic importance to individual leaders in offering opinions about the reasons for policy success or failure. Hence care had to be taken in interpreting interview evidence and in careful triangulation with other sources.
47 interviews were conducted during the fieldwork, principally in Berlin but also in Brussels, following best practice as prescribed in the relevant literature.\textsuperscript{84} Interviews were in almost every case conducted in German. They were arranged by letter, email and telephone, with particular attention paid to anonymity and confidentiality so that interviewees could feel more relaxed and free to comment. It was agreed that interviewees would not be cited directly. It was important to establish confidence in this way because defence and security policy is surrounded by a mystique of secrecy that adds difficulties to the interview process.

The interviews varied in length from one hour to over three hours. In the early exploratory stage interviewing technique took the form of open-ended interviews; as the research design matured and the interests narrowed to more specific topics more use was made of semi-structured interviews. The semi-structured questionnaire is detailed below, along with an appendix listing the interviewees. This format gave the interviewees some freedom in responding to questions and enabled the interviewer to identify what was important to them and explore these aspects.

Initially, interviewees were identified by seeing which names most frequently recurred in press coverage and could be identified from institutional charts. This was complemented by the ‘snowball’ method of asking interviewees to identify the key ‘influentials’ who should be interviewed. The actors mainly worked with the relevant Federal Ministers of Defence, with the Weizsäcker Commission, with the relevant party and Bundestag committees and working groups, and with NATO and EU relations. The opinions of academics, journalists, policy researchers and foreign embassies about who to interview were also sought.

Chapter 2: The Domestic Context of Bundeswehr Reform

This chapter focuses on the domestic parameters of policy leadership in Bundeswehr reform, focusing on the characteristics of the policy subsystem and its interactions with related policy subsystems and the wider macro political system. In short, it seeks to give more specificity to explanations of policy leadership by disaggregating the German state and moving the level of analysis from the macro to the meso level. The focus is on how the institutional organization of the armed forces, defence and security policy, foreign policy and budgetary policy, and not least the relationship to NATO and to the European Union, determines the scope for, and nature of, policy leadership in Bundeswehr reform.

This approach situates the chapter within the scholarship of historical institutionalism with its stress on how the behaviour of leaders is structured by institutions.¹ In this perspective institutional context is seen as shaping not just the opportunities for, and constraints on, policy leadership but also the preferences and hence calculative activity of policy leaders. However, the chapter departs from the more radical structuralist bias in the variant of historical institutionalism that emphasises the concepts of path dependency and sunk costs.² These concepts are seen as lacking in specificity and adding little to the older concept of ‘habit’.³ Above all, they predict too much stability and limit policy change to the impact of exogenous shocks. They have little to say about mechanisms or processes of endogenous policy change and the dynamic and contingent nature of historical change.⁴ This chapter argues for a form of historical institutionalism that is useful in opening up the black box of policy leadership (the micro level) by relating actor strategies and styles to the meso level of institutional context.

2.1 The Bundeswehr Policy Subsystem

The Bundeswehr can be characterized as a subsystem that is both separate from and nested within the larger subsystem of German defence and security policy. Though its boundaries are pervious, it represents a set of actors and organizations that interact regularly to influence policy formulation and implementation within a given policy domain. This policy domain embraces, in addition to the armed forces, the federal defence administration, the armaments sector, military pastoral work, and the administration of military justice. The Bundeswehr is, moreover, a ‘mature’ subsystem in that it has existed for a decade and more as a common reference point for action. As will become clear, its properties – notably its ethos of professional consensus and reflective practice - are different from those of the defence and security subsystem in which it is nested.

At the same time it must be emphasized that the Bundeswehr policy subsystem and the wider defence and security policy subsystem are nested within a macro-political framework of constitutional law. This constitutional framework is crucial in shaping the identity of the policy subsystem and reflects the enduring imprint of the historical catastrophe of the Nazi period in setting the terms of debate about the Bundeswehr. Of particular note are articles 26 and 115a-l of the Basic Law. Article 26 bans preparations for a war of aggression. It is a criminal offence to undertake acts ‘with intent to disturb the peaceful relations between nations, especially to prepare for a war of aggression’.

In this spirit article 115a-l regulates the definition and declaration of ‘a state of defence’ (rather than a ‘state of war’) and its implications for the functioning of political institutions. It is a matter of determining ‘that the federal territory is under attack by armed force or imminently threatened by such an attack’. Article 115a is also crucial in reinforcing the Parliamentary control and oversight of a definition and

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declaration of a state of defence. It requires a two-thirds majority of the votes cast in the Bundestag (including at least a majority of members) and the consent of the Bundesrat. These constitutional provisions are to be understood in terms of ‘the determination to promote world peace’ outlined in the Preamble to the Basic Law. Taken together, they promote a particular, historically rooted conception of the identity of the Bundeswehr and of the kind of expertise that it requires. This conception stresses an orientation to territorial defence (article 115a) and to peace and humanitarian missions (the preamble and article 26).  

Figure 2.1 The Structure of the Defence Ministry

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7 Basic Law, Deutsche Bundestag, December 2000
The Bundeswehr has the six key attributes of a policy subsystem.  

The relevant actors regard themselves as a semi-autonomous community that shares a domain of expertise and a particular policy identity. Key actors include the Federal Minister of Defence, the Ministry’s planning staff, the General Inspector of the Bundeswehr (and his deputy and the inspectors of the individual armed forces), the Defence Commissioner of the Bundestag, members of the Bundestag Defence Committee, and the two Bundeswehr universities in Hamburg and Munich where officer training takes place. According to Article 65a of the Basic Law the Defence Minister is the commander of the armed forces during peacetime and thus the highest military superior over all soldiers.

Its shared identity as a policy subsystem has three roots. First, as stressed above, it derives from the key constitutional provisions regulating national defence. Secondly, shared identity within the Bundeswehr policy subsystem is influenced by the way in which it is nested exclusively within the NATO command structure. Given the dominant position of the United States within NATO, this involves a connection to the thinking within the US Department of Defence. In consequence, it is exposed to a US and NATO preoccupation with threat assessment, deterrence and war-fighting capacity. This simultaneous nesting within domestic constitutional thinking and NATO/US doctrines creates an ambiguity within Bundeswehr identity that is less noticeable within the Foreign Ministry. It contrasts with the EU- and UN-orientations of the Foreign Ministry and its emphasis on a civilian power view of German security policy. This civilian power view rests on a symmetry or fit of security policy conceptions between the EU and UN, on the one hand, and German constitutional thinking, on the other. Over issues like modernization of short-range nuclear weapons in 1988-89 and NATO enlargement to the east in the 1990s, the Defence Ministry proved willing to mobilize support in Washington against the Foreign Ministry.

Thirdly, the shared identity comes from the notions of the Bundeswehr as ‘citizens in uniform’ and *inner Führung* (‘inner leadership’), both closely bound up with

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conscription. The strength of embeddedness of these notions in the policy subsystem owed much to the fact that their two main proponents since 1951 – General Count Wolf von Baudissin and General Ulrich de Maiziere – served as Inspector Generals of the Bundeswehr. It is also reinforced by the work of the Defence Commissioner in safeguarding the basic rights of soldiers and dealing with their complaints.

The notions of ‘citizens in uniform’ and of *innere Führung* are given statutory form in the Federal Law Governing the Legal Status of Soldiers (*Soldatengesetz*) of March 1956 (amended 1975) and the Military Appeal (Complaints) Act of December 1956. Of particular note are the provisions relating to a soldier’s rights, commitment to the free democratic basic order, obedience, comradeship, the duties of a superior officer, the right of complaint and the right to continuing general and professional training. In addition, a Ministry of Defence regulation of 1972 clarified the principles and practice of *innere Führung*. The shared value system of the Bundeswehr is also regulated by the directive on the problem of traditions in the armed forces, issued by the Ministry of Defence in September 1982. Taken together they manifest a self-conscious concern with a Bundeswehr that, in the words, of the 1982 directive, manifests ‘orientation not only towards success and the successful, but also towards the suffering of the persecuted and the humiliated’, ‘political participation and common responsibility, awareness of democratic values, judgement without prejudice, tolerance, readiness and ability to discuss the ethical aspects of military service, the will for peace’, ‘the active contribution to the shaping of democracy through the role of the soldier as a citizen’, ‘an open-minded attitude to social change and the readiness for contact with the civilian citizen.’

These sources of shared identity are important in influencing the dominant ideas about how the Bundeswehr should operate. These ideas stress the primacy of the experience of members of the Bundeswehr as the source of valid knowledge rather than the primacy of externally generated research findings. This affects the Bundeswehr policy subsystem in two ways. First, the notions of ‘citizens in uniform’ and of *innere Führung* encourage constant self-criticism by soldiers of their own practice in an

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open, collegiate manner, supported by the regular reviews of the Defence Commissioner on behalf of the Bundestag. This takes the form of 'reflective practice' in the Bundeswehr.\(^\text{10}\) Secondly, the Bundeswehr is strongly oriented around the generation of professional consensus.\(^\text{11}\) This involves bringing together the key professionals to agree common positions, for instance in Bundeswehr conferences, again based on personal experience. These two models of reflective practice and of professional consensus support a high degree of autonomy and resilience of the Bundeswehr as a professional policy subsystem.

The relevant actors have sought to influence Bundeswehr policy over a long period of time and thus engage in policy-oriented learning. From the time of Adenauer’s Memorandum to the Allied High Commission on the Security of the Federal Republic of August 1950 – when he proposed a German military contingent – the Bundeswehr policy subsystem was in the making on a cross-party, consensual basis. By 1957 its essential features were in place. Though conflicts have taken place over the Bundeswehr – for instance during the Bundestag Committees of Investigation in 1980 and 1997 – successive federal governments have adhered to this norm of cross-party consensual policy making on the Bundeswehr. The result has been strong cohesion within the policy subsystem. This political tradition of maintaining consensus about the Bundeswehr has been important in sustaining the models of reflective practice and professional consensus in the operation of the policy subsystem.

Policy-oriented learning within the subsystem is also strongly conditioned by the operational experience of the Bundeswehr. This learning process was stimulated by political decisions during the 1990s to commit more and more troops to 'out-of-area' operations of a peace-making and humanitarian nature. The result was an internal dynamics of learning, leading to pressures for policy change from within the policy subsystem relating to the role and structure of the Bundeswehr. Under Rühe and Scharping political leadership found itself caught up in responding to this bottom-up process. In particular, two operational issues suggested the need for new types of


expertise: the problems of protecting civilian populations in a context of aggressors and victims; and the requirements of involvement in civil-military co-operation projects aimed at reconstruction, for instance the rebuilding of schools, kindergartens, health centres, police stations and the provision of field hospitals. New operational experiences of this nature have generated new forms of policy narrative about the Bundeswehr.

Within the Federal Defence Ministry, the Federal Chancellor's Office and the Bundestag Defence Committee there are specialized units dealing with the Bundeswehr. On occasion the Bundestag Defence Committee constitutes itself as a special Committee of Investigation to probe into possible policy failures. Thus, it investigated the violent demonstrations in Bremen in 1980 against the twenty-fifth anniversary celebrations of the Bundeswehr's integration into NATO. In 1997 it investigated media claims of extreme-right-wing infiltration of the Bundeswehr. However, the investigative activities of the Bundestag have had more to do with auditing the reflective practices and professional consensus within the Bundeswehr to ensure that guidelines are effective than with developing and applying new, externally generated policy ideas to the Bundeswehr.

Within the Länder governments too key actors are drawn into Bundeswehr policy. The Länder governments take an interest because Bundeswehr policy affects their territorial and economic interests, especially through base closures. These bases involve close ties between the military and locals and become an important focus of community relations, sustaining often many thousands of local jobs, for instance in hotels, restaurants, leisure facilities, and construction companies. Hence the local political interests of Länder politicians - as well as of Bundestag members - are at stake. As we shall see in chapters 4-5, the politics of base closures has proved especially problematic for Bundeswehr reformers. It has strongly engaged the interests of Länder Economics Ministries and of State Chancelleries in the issue.

In addition, the development of German participation in peacekeeping missions has drawn Länder Interior Ministries - and the Federal Border Police - into closer association with the Bundeswehr. This reflects the increasing involvement of civilian police contingents in peacekeeping. Germany seconded police officers to missions in.
Cambodia, Namibia and Western Sahara. More important was the increasing scale of such contributions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia and Afghanistan. This was part of the process in which the Bundeswehr was drawn into civil-military co-operation projects through peacekeeping.

There exist interest groups, and specialized subunits within interest groups, that regard the Bundeswehr as an important issue. The Bundeswehr has its own professional association to represent its collective interests. Also, the churches, youth organizations and the trade unions take an interest in Bundeswehr policy. The development of peacekeeping operations has increased the involvement of civil society with the Bundeswehr, especially as the Foreign Ministry - supported by the Bundestag - has led German attempts to strengthen the civilian component. Relief organizations like the Malteser Hilfsdienst and the Johanniter-Unfall-Hilfe have played a role in providing medical care services and supporting civil-military projects in developing health services.

A range of social groups - including the Länder - have an interest in the practice by which conscientious objectors are allowed to do Ersatzdienst by working in hospitals and care homes for the elderly and the disabled. This community service represents a large pool of cheap labour that helps underpin German social services. Hence Bundeswehr reform has financial as well as community-wide implications and links to the social policy subsystem and the concerns of the Federal Ministry for Family. These implications were not lost on the SPD and on the social wing of the CDU for which there was an important social dimension to Bundeswehr policy. Key SPD policy makers feared that a professional volunteer army could lead not just to higher defence spending but also to higher social policy spending. This threatened major electoral consequences and set constraints on the capacity of SPD leaders to act as policy entrepreneurs on behalf of a volunteer professional army.

A number of research institutes (such as institutes for peace and conflict research in Frankfurt and Hamburg) and specialized units within institutes (such as the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik) deal with Bundeswehr issues. Potentially at least, they are a source of new policy ideas and long-term influence over the context in which Bundeswehr policy is debated. However, compared to the United States, there are
relatively few research institutions working in this policy subsystem, and ‘think tanks’
have had a minor role in Bundeswehr reform and indeed on wider defence and
security policy issues. The notion that valid knowledge about Bundeswehr issues is to
be derived mainly from external research findings rather than from personal
professional experience has found little acceptance. Bundeswehr reform was not
based on guidelines developed out of scientific research by academic experts.

Not least, a powerful structure of business interests depends on Bundeswehr policy
and its implications for armaments’ procurement. The role and the structure of the
Bundeswehr has direct bearing on their commercial interests, and Länder in which
these companies are heavily represented – notably Bavaria and Lower Saxony – have
an interest in promoting their interests for the sake of local investment, employment
and tax revenues. The defence industry was not a catalyst for policy change towards a
more mobile, flexible Bundeswehr and hesitant in its support for joint European arms
procurement. In these areas policy change came from the Federal Defence Ministry.
The defence industry was essentially dependent and conservative, more a brake on
change.

Hence the Bundeswehr policy subsystem embraces a wide range of economic and
social as well as political interests that must be negotiated by policy leaders. In the
German case – compared to the US – a key feature is the absence of a pivotal role for
research institutes in developing new thinking and providing new ‘winning’ policy
narratives or ‘causal stories’ that can be taken up and used by policy leaders to make
sense of ill-defined, problematic situations. To the extent that new policy narratives
have emerged, they have done so from the ground upwards through the operational
experience of the Bundeswehr in new peace-keeping operations, notably in Bosnia,
Kosovo and Afghanistan.

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Convergence, The Case of ‘Scientific Bureaucratic Medicine’ in the United States and the United
September 2002
2.2 Interlocking and Nested Policy Sub-Systems: Defence, Foreign, Security and Budgetary Policy

The opportunities for, and constraints on, policy leadership over Bundeswehr reform are conditioned by the complex interactions between this policy subsystem and related subsystems. These interactions take two forms. First, the Bundeswehr is part of the larger defence and security policy subsystem, which (as we shall see) in turn overlaps with the foreign and security policy subsystem. Secondly, both the Bundeswehr and the defence and security policy subsystems are nested within NATO and increasingly the EU. The Bundeswehr is appropriately seen as a distinct subsystem from NATO and the EU in that *innere Führung* is seen as a specifically German policy innovation and conscription as part of a German concept of the 'citizen in uniform'. In short, Bundeswehr policy is an expression of a sense of a specific national identity and of national sovereignty. In addition, only a very small proportion of those involved with Bundeswehr policy are actively involved in NATO policy.

With German unification and the end of the Cold War *Landesverteidigung* (territorial defence) and conscription were the dominant concepts in the policy subsystem of the Bundeswehr. They found their legitimation in the post-war bloc system, in which the Federal Republic, as a result of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer’s diplomacy, was firmly locked in the pro-West camp. Moreover, it was a distinctively exposed part of the Western bloc because of both its extensive land borders with the pro-Soviet Eastern bloc and the uniquely exposed position of West Berlin as an island in that bloc. The weight of Eastern bloc military capability in Europe was poised on the borders of the Federal Republic. Hence the Federal Republic was structurally vulnerable and highly dependent on collective NATO commitment to its territorial defence. In this context of the bloc system territorial defence was bound up with the notion of an ideological commitment to defend a way of life based on freedom against socialism. In short, territorial defence and post-war political identity were closely interwoven. More

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practically, German leaders prided themselves on having the largest European army in NATO, some 500,000 men, of which about 220,000 were conscripts.

The policy subsystem of the Bundeswehr was in turn nested within the wider policy subsystem of defence and security. This wider subsystem was characterized by a number of key features. In particular, as chapter three details, it contained contending advocacy coalitions rather than the professional consensus that characterized the Bundeswehr policy subsystem.

- The constitutionally enshrined rules within which it operates, notably the Basic Law’s Preamble and article 26. Not least, German defence and security policies are committed to: ‘... to promote world peace as an equal partner in a united Europe...’. The Basic Law establishes three basic principles: (1) the exclusive power of the federation to establish the federal armed forces and to subject them to rigorous political control; (2) the exclusively defensive aim of German defence and security policies; and (3) the principle both of compulsory military service, if need be, and of the right of conscientious objection, the latter linked to the obligation to serve Germany in a ‘civilian alternative service’ (Ziviler Ersatzdienst).\(^6\)

- The pivotal position of the Federal Defence Ministry and its institutional interest in its autonomy in the conduct of its affairs, supported by article 65 of the Basic Law. Because of its origins in the debate about rearmament in the context of NATO entry, the Defence Ministry had a traditionally strong NATO orientation and a deep commitment to deterrence doctrine.\(^7\) Interestingly, as late as 2001 it was the only federal ministry still lacking a European policy unit, whether in the form of a division (as in the Foreign Ministry and the Finance Ministry) or even a section (Referat). This underlines the lack of a strong European specialization in the Defence Ministry. Over time Europeanisation pressures have grown, notably via the Franco-German Defence Council (established in 1988), the Eurocorps, the integration of the WEU into the EU’s structures, the development of the ESDP’s institutional machinery in Brussels and its rapid reaction force, and joint defence procurement projects.

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\(^6\) Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany (German Bundestag, Berlin, 2001)

Its possession of all the attributes of a mature policy subsystem listed above, including not least a policy-oriented learning process after German unification that led to a gradual redefinition of identity. Earlier policy identity had been founded on territorial defence and the capacity to mobilize very large numbers of ground troops for this purpose. During the 1990s this notion began to give way to the idea of a crisis reaction, mission-oriented Bundeswehr, capable of taking on larger international responsibilities. This meant a much more mobile, highly trained Bundeswehr taking on new tasks of crisis management and humanitarian action, in which policing the safety of civilian populations became a key priority.

The relatively low incentive for senior politicians to interest themselves in, let alone specialize in defence policy, given the low prestige of military values in German public life and the minor position given to defence in the priorities of the public. Far more attractive in career terms was specialization in economic, employment and social policy issues, given the greater importance that electors assigned to them.

In consequence, only a very small number of politicians seeking or gaining senior office had experience and expertise in defence and security policy. Amongst Chancellors only Helmut Schmidt had been Federal Defence Minister and took an active interest. During the 1950s the bitter debates about German rearmament and the formation of the Bundeswehr generated a group of politicians with a defence expertise: notably, Fritz Erler, Carlo Schmid and Schmidt in the SPD; Erich Mende in the FDP; and Konrad Adenauer and Franz Josef Strauss within the CDU/CSU. However, Willy Brandt, Helmut Kohl and Gerhard Schröder did not show much enthusiasm for this policy sector. On the whole, Federal Chancellors and party leaders were reluctant to become identified with military issues, for electoral as well as historical reasons. In this respect they differed significantly from US Presidents, French Presidents and British Prime Ministers. There was no electoral incentive for a German Chancellor or Chancellor candidate to present her/himself as leader of a ‘warrior’ nation.

The high degree of sensitivity of the national mood to rearmament and deployment issues, especially on the left of the political spectrum, underpinned a general ‘culture of restraint’ within the defence and security policy subsystem. This sensitivity has been manifested many times. Examples include the early
1950s’ issue of the European Defence Community and NATO; the debate in 1959-60 about whether the Bundeswehr should be equipped with tactical nuclear weapons; the early 1980s debate over deployment of American Pershing and Cruise missiles on German soil; the 1985 debate about the US’s proposed Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI); the issue of modernization of short-range tactical nuclear weapons in 1988-89; the Gulf War of 1991; the Kosovo War of 1999; the Afghan War of 2001; and the Iraq crisis.

Over the period since 1983 on average some 70-80 per cent of Germans wish to remain within NATO. But this support was distinguished from a much more critical attitude towards war-fighting strategies and missile and troop deployments that might be seen as offensive rather than defensive. This attitude was strongly represented amongst German intellectuals and amongst the young, especially students, who were prepared to take to the streets in huge mass demonstrations. The Pershing and Cruise deployments were implemented against prevailing public opinion but legitimated in terms of NATO loyalty. Despite NATO loyalty, ‘war’ was a deeply emotional issue for a people still living in the trauma of the Second World War, the carpet-bombing of its own cities and the acute sufferings of its wartime and post-war refugee population. Notions of associating the Bundeswehr with a strategy of pre-emptive military action of the kind outlined by the Bush Administration in 2002 were anathema and threatened high domestic political costs.

- Within the policy subsystem three distinct policy narratives arose, based on contending definitions of the principal source of security threat (discussed in chapter three). For the ‘freedom’ coalition the threat came from the enemies of Western values (the Soviet empire and then ‘rogue’ states); for the ‘peace’ coalition the threat derived from the ‘spiral of violence’ associated with the military-industrial complex; and for the ‘pacifist’ coalition the threat was aggressive and overwhelming US power. The presence of these advocacy coalitions distinguished this policy subsystem from the professional character of the Bundeswehr policy subsystem.

- The work of research institutes like the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik and the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik fed into these advocacy coalitions.

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18 Figures provided by interview partner in Chancellor’s Office, Berlin, 2nd September 2002
However, it was more important in sustaining and adapting their shared beliefs than in generating new policy ideas. In the United States, by contrast, a range of think tanks played an active pace-setting role in defence and security policy ideas and agenda change. The Brookings Institution was very much at the heart of the 'liberal' coalition with its beliefs in interdependency, 'soft' power and multilateralism. The Heritage Foundation was at the heart of the traditional conservative coalition with its beliefs in American exceptionalism but tied to an essentially pessimistic view of the world. The Hudson Institute, the Centre for Security Policy and the Project for New American Century spearheaded the neo-conservative coalition which tied belief in American exceptionalism to an optimism about the US’s ability to transform the world in its image. There were no German equivalents. Also, there is not the same circulation of people and ideas between Defence Ministry and think tanks as in the US – seen for instance in the influence of actors like Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz on behalf of the neo-conservative agenda. Nor does the German defence industry play an important role in funding think tanks. More important in the German case is the role of the party foundations like the SPD’s Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and the CDU’s Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in organizing debates around defence and security policy topics. However, they provide a platform for the exchange of ideas rather than an independent research and think tank capacity that seeks to shape the political imagination.

Because it was so nested within defence and security policy the Bundeswehr was affected by three key aspects of the interaction of the larger policy subsystem with other subsystems. Firstly, defence and security was nested within the budget policy subsystem. From the very origins of the post-war Bundeswehr the Finance Ministry had presented obstacles to planning and frustrated German ability to meet its NATO commitments.\textsuperscript{19} The traditional policy prerogatives of the Federal Finance Ministry in this domain were reinforced by two factors: the greater political weight of Finance Ministers than of Defence Ministers in coalition and party politics (eg. Theo Waigel and Volker Rühe, Hans Eichel and Rudolf Scharping); and the impact of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) on the relative power of the Finance Minister in

imposing fiscal discipline. Budget constraints remained a key part of the politics of the Bundeswehr reform and were accentuated further by the implications of German unification.

The Federal Finance Ministry was an important source of pressure for change, especially in pressing the agenda of NATO and EU pooling of military capabilities and the agenda of privatisation so that significant long-term expenditure savings could be made. Pooling avoided a duplication of efforts by different states and, by economies of scale and overhead, enhanced military capability. Privatisation was seen as the route to efficiency gains. Both the Defence Ministry and the German armament industry were more disposed to identify and stress the potential costs of such changes. The savings from pooling seemed greatest in aircraft procurement – especially fighters and military transport - because of their high purchase and maintenance costs when states were buying the same type.

Secondly, defence and security overlapped with the foreign and security policy subsystem. The Federal Chancellor’s Office acted as policy broker between the two, but had a policy bias towards the foreign and security policy subsystem. This policy bias reflected the weight of the Foreign Policy Division within the Federal Chancellor’s Office and the greater political weight of the Foreign Ministry in coalition politics.\(^{20}\) The Foreign Ministry and the Defence Ministry shared an overall commitment to the Harmel doctrine of deterrence with détente adopted by NATO in 1967 as the basis for a durable and just ‘peace order’ in Europe as a whole. However, within this broad commitment – and the framework of constitutional constraints outlined above - the Foreign Ministry was disposed to stress the reduction of tensions through diplomatic and political means, the Defence Ministry to emphasise the requirements of deterrence and the value of coercive diplomacy.

There was also a difference in the weight that they attached to different multilateral forums for security policy. The EU and the United Nations figured prominently in the thinking of the Foreign Minister. In particular, the UN was very much a key arena for the Foreign Ministry. This gave the Foreign Ministry a key voice in the development

of German participation in UN peacekeeping operations. Under the Kohl Chancellorship Klaus Kinkel sought to claim credit for this development. As a Green Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer attached particular importance to strengthening this new security role for the UN. The Defence Ministry had a traditional attachment to the primacy of NATO. As chapters four and five show, the Foreign Ministry under Klaus Kinkel and Fischer was to prove more open to new ideas about Bundeswehr reform than the Defence Ministry.

Thirdly, as chapter 6 shows in more detail, Bundeswehr reform and defence and security policy were subject to a dynamic of change associated with European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). By means of its key co-ordinating role in European policy through chairing the Committee of ‘European’ State Secretaries and through the Permanent Representative in Brussels, the Foreign Ministry saw in sponsorship of ESDP a means to gain more influence over defence and security policy. The Defence Ministry could not distance itself from ESDP as an emerging key element in Germany’s priority to European political union, post-Maastricht and especially post-Kosovo. Considerations of bureaucratic politics led it to concentrate on ensuring that institutional mechanisms were in place with the new European security committee in Brussels to minimize the opportunities of the Foreign Ministry to interfere. This relative autonomy was justified by reference to the distinctive nature of defence and security policy; it depended on a high degree of confidentiality and secretiveness in order to protect the lives of soldiers and to prevent potential enemies gaining an advantage.

ESDP was associated with Europeanisation pressures on the Bundeswehr. These took two forms. ‘Top-down’ Europeanisation involved pressures to adapt the role, structures and ways of doing things in the Bundeswehr to meet the stated requirements of ESDP, notably the Helsinki Headline Goals. ‘Bottom-up’ Europeanisation involved the use by German actors of Europe as a means to push through and legitimate Bundeswehr reforms. As suggested above, however, ESDP – like NATO – is best seen as a distinct policy subsystem that interacts with the German

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21 See Joschka Fischer’s speech to the 35th Conference on Security Policy, Munich, 06.02.1999, Proceedings of the 35th Munich Conference on Security Policy, Munich, Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, February, 1999
defence and security policy subsystem and with the Bundeswehr policy subsystem rather than as in a hierarchical relationship to these subsystems. It has been above all important in opening up domestic political opportunities for policy change, as the Weizsäcker Commission shows (see chapter 5).

As we shall see in chapters 3 and 6, potentially far more important for German defence and security policy was the implications of the Bush Administration’s unilateral commitment to a new military strategy of pre-emptive war, of its use of NATO as a military toolkit for the Afghan invasion, and of the threat of unilateral military action against Iraq in 2002-3. These developments created a new flux and uncertainty about the respective values of the United Nations, NATO and the EU as contexts for effective multilateral action on security. They gave a renewed emphasis to developing the UN and EU peace-keeping and humanitarian roles of the Bundeswehr, for instance in Macedonia and Afghanistan, a development that was consistent with longer-term SPD and Green policy thinking about international security. On these matters there was relatively little difference of view between Schröder, Fischer and Scharping (and later Peter Struck).
2.3 Conclusion

Bundeswehr policy is at one level a highly specialist subsystem, involving a small elite of actors who are tied together in an intimate world of highly confidential information and a mystique of secretiveness. In the German case, in contrast to the United States or Britain, this mystique does not derive from the high social and political status and respect accorded to military professionalism. The role of the military in the downfall of the Weimar Republic and in the Third Reich made such claims politically unsustainable. It is rooted in the more practical concern – shared across states - not to jeopardise the lives of German soldiers or the general public by advantaging those who threaten the use of armed force against Germany.

In addition, the Bundeswehr policy subsystem is held together by a strong sense of shared professional identity that has evolved over nearly fifty years and that is supported by a carefully cultivated cross-party consensus within the Bundestag. It is dominated by the models of reflective practice and professional consensus, which value the personal experience of soldiers as a source of valid knowledge. Conversely, the organization of the Bundeswehr policy subsystem shows little support for the idea of new policy ideas generated by external scientific ‘think tanks’. Such ‘think tanks’ would open up the Bundeswehr to a more critical external scrutiny. This dimension has been lacking in Bundeswehr reform because it has not been built into the organization of the policy subsystem. In addition, policy leaders have shown little interest in reforming its organization in order to encourage radical new thinking.

This shared identity provides Federal Defence Ministers with a formidable political resource in negotiating policy change, not least at NATO and EU levels. The Bundeswehr is a core element in German post-war political and social reconstruction and – crucially – symbolic of a ‘new’ Germany in which Germans are proud.

This degree of autonomy is offset by the extent to which Bundeswehr policy is embedded in a much more complex institutional context and one, moreover, that generates a great deal of bureaucratic politics around the interacting interests of the Federal Defence, Foreign and Finance ministries as well as of the Länder and of the EU and NATO. The result is a formidable set of constraints that policy leaders must
negotiate. An analysis of the complex set of policy subsystems with which Bundeswehr policy interacts and in which it is nested suggests that the EU and NATO are important but by no means central to defining the scope and nature of policy leadership.

The institutional context does, however, select for certain kinds of policy leadership roles, strategies and styles over others. In particular, it favours brokerage and veto playing roles over entrepreneurship. There is little scope or incentive to embrace a heroic leadership style and to pursue a strategy of creating and sustaining a crisis consciousness. Far better adapted to such an institutional context are strategies of promoting policy-oriented learning and 'binding in' opposition by means of professional forums (see Rühe and Scharping in later chapters) or of sidelining or excluding change agents (see the chapter on Rühe). But, equally, policy leaders do have choices about roles, strategies and styles and on occasion policy entrepreneurship has made an appearance. This issue is taken up in the empirical case studies.
Chapter 3: The Post-Cold War Context of Bundeswehr Reform: Exogenous ‘Shock’ or Policy-Oriented Learning?

The end of the Cold War represented an exogenous ‘shock’ that, according to one major variant of historical institutionalism, raised fundamental questions about the nature, role and structure of German defence and security policy, upsetting the logic of path dependency in policy change. This interpretation raises, however, the issue of whether the processes of policy change respond so swiftly and directly to exogenous ‘shock’. This chapter argues that the missing factor was policy leaders prepared to mobilise perceptions of crisis and construct a narrative of crisis about the Bundeswehr to legitimate decisive intervention by the macro-political level in the policy subsystem. Exogenous shock was important in another way. It led to a reconfiguration of domestic advocacy coalitions, providing new opportunities for the ‘peace’ coalition to identify itself with a policy narrative that privileged the peacekeeping and humanitarian roles of the Bundeswehr.

The reasons for this lack of crisis mobilization and narration lie partly in the domestic institutional context of Bundeswehr policy and the strong sense of shared identity within the policy subsystem (see chapter 2). They also relate to the perception of a relatively smooth process of adaptation between domestic policy on the role and structure of the Bundeswehr and the emerging requirements of the international, and above all European, security environment (no radical ‘misfit’). These requirements were not defined by German policy leaders in terms of a crisis narrative that stressed fundamental structural transformation of the Bundeswehr. The emphasis was on tinkering with the pre-existing and largely unmodified basic structures of the Bundeswehr. In essence, the process of Bundeswehr reform was defined more in terms of the perspective of long-term policy-oriented learning than in terms of ‘exogenous’ shock and crisis narrative leading to the displacement of dominant policy ideas. Emerging new information about international security challenges and the

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accumulating experience of Bundeswehr policy makers with new ‘out-of-area’ operations created an independent dynamic of endogenous policy change.

When, in 2002-3, a crisis narrative emerged, it took the form of identifying the crisis as in German-US relations rather than in German defence and security policy and in the Bundeswehr. The narrative was of failure in US policy towards the Middle East and terrorism – especially the new doctrine of pre-emptive strike – rather than of failure in the Bundeswehr. In this changed context the Schröder government sought allies – notably the French – that would support its opposition to this new strategic doctrine. The form in which this crisis narrative emerged testified to the autonomy and resilience of the Bundeswehr and the defence and security policy subsystems.

This chapter focuses on the nature of the new, unfolding strategic context of the post-Cold War world as a basis for analysing German policy leadership roles in chapters 4-6. The previous chapter shows how leadership roles were ‘selected for’ by domestic institutional context. Here the emphasis is on how the international strategic context also ‘selected for’ leadership roles. Together, they suggest that policy entrepreneurship by ‘salami tactics’ was the most radical form of Bundeswehr change to which German policy leaders could aspire.

3.1 The Bundeswehr in the Cold War Period: A Policy Monopoly in a Framework of Adversarial Politics

During the Cold War period up to 1989-90 the defence and security policy subsystem came to possess a basic structure formed around three advocacy coalitions. Their boundaries were by no means firm, and individual actors could cross them and sometimes combine them in complex and changing ways. Nevertheless, these coalitions gave a long-term stability to Bundeswehr policy based on different policy core beliefs that glued them together. Above all, they offered different policy narratives about the nature and role of defence and security policy, framing how the problems were defined, where their causes are located, what solutions are proposed,

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and who are identified as heroes and villains. Domestically, the Cold War period was characterized by competition between the ‘freedom’ and the ‘peace’ coalitions, with the ‘pacifist’ coalition as the outsider to the policy process and the ‘freedom’ coalition as ascendant.

The ‘freedom’ coalition was united by a shared core policy belief in defence of the Western way of life by an Atlanticist approach rooted in deterrence of a clearly defined enemy – the Soviet empire. It was represented most strongly by the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) and on the right of the SPD. The political ascendancy of this coalition derived from the successful way in which Adenauer had used the Korean War crisis of 1950 – and later the brutal Soviet repression of the East Berlin revolt of 1953 and the Hungarian uprising of 1956 - to push the agenda of a ‘policy of strength’ in confronting the enemies of liberal democracy. This was tied to a policy narrative that located defence and security policy in the historical story of the ‘long journey to the West’. ^

The ‘peace’ coalition was united in a shared core belief about internationally negotiated disarmament and arms control measures and bonded by a deep emotional bonding to peace and confidence-building measures. The ‘spiralling arms race’ was seen as transforming both sides into potential victims, making the enemy the military-industrial complex. Membership of this coalition stretched from the ‘realist’ wing of the Green Party into the centre-left of the SPD and was strongly represented in the churches, especially the Lutheran Church, youth organizations, the trade unions and peace research institutions. Protagonists of this policy narrative looked to Austria, Finland and Sweden rather than NATO and its constituent states as models. Its influence extended into the SPD where leading politicians – like Anna-Marie Weiczoreck-Zeul, European spokesman in the 1990s – preferred imitation of these three states to France as a model for building a European defence and security policy.

Each advocacy coalition offered a different policy narrative based on drawing different lessons from history. For the ‘peace’ coalition history taught that Germany had a special responsibility to work to avoid war, notably through a détente policy

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4 Winkler, HA (2000) Der Lange Weg nach Westen (München, Beck Verlag)
that guaranteed a durable and just comprehensive peace order throughout Europe based on collective security.\(^5\) Its preferred institutional arenas for policy development were the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations. For the ‘freedom’ coalition history taught that Germany must never again isolate itself by seeking to pursue a ‘special path’ (*Sonderweg*).\(^6\) Its peace and security depended on the closest possible integration into the Atlantic Alliance and the EU as a reliable, loyal ally. Its preferred institutional arena was NATO and development of a European pillar within NATO, preferably linked to the EU. The particular political skill of Hans-Dietrich Genscher as Foreign Minister (1974-92) was to act as policy broker between these two coalitions.\(^7\)

A third ‘pacifist’ advocacy coalition comprised those opposing the policy image of *Landesverteidigung* and conscription and was to be found on the fringes of the political system. These figures and organisations were united by deep core policy beliefs stemming from a fundamentalist opposition to war and advocacy of unilateral disarmament and neutrality. The epicentre of this coalition was provided by the ‘fundamentalist’ wing of the Green Party and the wider peace movement. Pacifism had deep roots in the country’s catastrophic experience of war in the twentieth century and was influential within university towns and cities, notably amongst critical peace researchers. However, it was an ‘outsider’ rather than a ‘insider’ coalition. Its means of influence were petitions (like the Krefeld Appeal of November 1980 against the NATO ‘dual-track’ decision) and mass demonstrations, using strident public protest to catch media attention and force the peace issue up the public agenda. In the context of huge mass demonstrations, as in Bonn in October 1983 over the deployment of Pershing and Cruise missiles, the boundaries between the ‘peace’ coalition and the ‘pacifist’ coalition could become blurred. However for Brandt they remained clear in the commitment to ‘negotiated’ multilateral disarmament and to support of the role of the Bundeswehr in territorial defence.\(^8\)


Of particular importance was that the main split between the ‘peace’ and ‘freedom’ coalitions cut right through the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and was opened wide by Chancellor’s Schmidt’s initiative of 1977 in calling for a co-ordinated Alliance response to the challenge of Soviet medium-range missile deployments in central Europe. For those associated with Willy Brandt, the SPD’s chair, the party’s mission was to promote international peace and reconciliation; for the fewer around Schmidt the priority was defence of the Western way of life based on freedom and fulfilment of Alliance commitments. In the aftermath of the highly divisive deployment of Cruise and Pershing missiles in 1983, the ‘peace’ coalition gained power within the SPD. Under Brandt’s chairmanship the SPD advocated arms control, disarmament and a ‘nuclear-free’ zone in central Europe to reinforce détente, distancing itself from deterrence. The ‘peace’ coalition gained power in part because Brandt found himself cast into the difficult political position as party chair of having to act as policy broker between the presence of the ‘pacifist’ coalition with the SPD’s ranks and the ‘freedom’ coalition.

However, crucially, the SPD’s advocacy of Egon Bahr’s ideas of a ‘second Ostpolitik’ and of ‘common security’ – endorsed at the Nuremberg party conference of 1986 – did not challenge the conception of the Bundeswehr as purely defensive, to be used only to defend the territory of Germany or that of another NATO member. The key questions and debates were about how that defensive role was to be organized, notably what role - if any - nuclear weapons should play in war-fighting. Thus a broad consensus existed amongst all the major parties (FDP, SPD and CDU/CSU) academics, journalists and defence institutions about the basic role of the Bundeswehr. Critically, this consensus was reinforced by the constitution (see chapter two).

Despite this overall adversarial contest about defence and security policy, the Bundeswehr policy subsystem during this period can be understood in terms of punctuated equilibrium theory. It was dominated by a policy monopoly with a supportive and deeply entrenched policy image of Landes- and Bündnisverteidigung, of conscription and of ‘citizens in uniform’. They formed the key elements within a policy narrative that resonated with past historical military failures. The reach of the policy monopoly was spread widely across the Federal Defence Ministry, the
Chancellor's Office, the Foreign Ministry, the two main 'catch-all' parties (Volksparteien) of the CDU/CSU the SPD, the Free Democratic Party (FDP), Länder governments and a range of social institutions like the churches and the trade unions. It was also supported by the international institutions in which Germany was embedded. Even at the height of the polarization on defence policy between SPD and the CDU/CSU in the early and mid 1950s this policy image was not contested. The debate was about the political and institutional context of a future Bundeswehr and whether this context should be NATO or the SPD-sponsored idea of a system of collective security for a unified Germany.

Notwithstanding this polarization, Adenauer proceeded — on the basis of advice from his key military advisers — to base the foundation of the Bundeswehr on careful cross-party agreement about basic principles. In this process there were very careful consultations with the Bundestag's new security committee, involving many meetings between key SPD politicians like Erler and military officers. Hence from the outset, Adenauer adopted a leadership role of policy brokerage rather than policy entrepreneurship. This approach prevented the formation of advocacy coalitions within the Bundeswehr policy subsystem.

In consequence, the Bundeswehr policy monopoly was supported by the macro political system as well as the policy subsystem itself. It was reinforced by Germany's semi-sovereignty: externally, as a 'penetrated' state constrained by the international treaty system under which Germany was rearmed in the 1950s. Internally, the policy monopoly was buttressed by the Federal Constitutional Court's role in interpreting the constitution, by the Länder (state) interest in maintaining military bases, by the Federal Finance Ministry's interest in budgetary control, and the interest of a range of social groups in Ersatzdienst and the dependence of the social policy subsystem on this supply of carers. In particular, the Basic Law prescribed a limited role for the German armed forces, allowing their use only in the context of attack upon German territory or that of another NATO member. At the same time the Bundeswehr policy monopoly owed a great deal to Adenauer's choice of leadership role.

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10 Hanrieder, W.F. (1971) *Die stabile Krise* (Düsseldorf, Bertelsmann)
The two elements within the policy narrative of 'territorial defence' doctrine and conscription gained legitimacy not just from the geo-strategic position of West Germany during the Cold War but also from her historical experience. Her position as a 'front line' state of the West necessitated a large number of ground troops ready for mobilisation in the event of any 'first strike' by the Soviet Union. Conscription was justified by the fear that a professional army would never be able to attract enough troops to provide effective territorial defence, deter a potential Soviet aggressor and meet NATO commitments.

More fundamentally, conscription was bound up closely with the refashioned political identity of the post-war state. The system of conscription was seen as crucial in the context of Germany's past civil-military relations. In one sense it was a useful way of connecting to German tradition and establishing appropriate and much needed role models after the disaster of complicity with the Third Reich. The idea of a 'citizens army' could be linked to Prussian military reformers like Gerhard von Scharnhorst, August Count Gneisenau, and Karl von Clausewitz.

However, above all, the 'citizens army' was a way of transforming the new Bundeswehr into a different type of institution from the old Wehrmacht. One key aspect was a change in leadership style, a new code of conduct and tough parliamentary control. This theme was pressed by the SPD. The emphasis was to be on personal responsibility and a culture of discussion and persuasion rather than unthinking obedience. Here the crucial innovator was Count von Baudissin and his concept of innere Führung. This concept of 'inner leadership' emphasised the importance of political education, teamwork and, above all, personal responsibility as the essential components of an army of 'citizens in uniform'. Democratisation of the Bundeswehr was underpinned by the specification of the aims and objectives of the Bundeswehr in the Basic Law (especially in the Preamble and in article 26 (1)); the unwillingness to recreate a General Staff on the Wehrmacht model; the new Defence Commissioner accountable to the Bundestag; the subservience of members of the Bundeswehr to the civil courts; and explicit regulation of military tradition, including the symbolic aspects of the Bundeswehr.

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11 See Fritz Erler in Bundesminister der Verteidigung, 1975, pp.161-165
A second aspect was conscription as a way of ending the military’s isolation from society, a theme was pressed by the CDU/CSU. The role of the military during the Weimar Republic was seen as a central example of how the first republic had been doomed. The lesson was to put in place arrangements that would ensure the Bundeswehr’s political loyalty by closely integrating it into society. Conscription was justified as a means of ensuring that there could be no recurrence of a ‘state within a state’. Through a citizens army conscription would firmly embed the notion of the military’s subordination to democratically elected government in German political culture. It was essential to bind it to society by direct contact with the population at large.

The policy monopoly was sustained by a clearly recognisable ‘negative feedback process’. Its success was demonstrated by the way in which Germany was brought back into the international community as a respected partner and by the way in which Germany built a civic society with strong civil-military relations. Most important of all, the policy monopoly was deeply bound up with post-war German political identity. In this respect it can be argued that conscription went beyond a policy core belief to partake of the characteristics of a ‘deep core belief’ in conscription as ‘a pillar of our democratic state’ through its contribution to a sense of citizenship. In consequence, it was a deeply entrenched belief as an integral part of actors’ value systems and highly resistant to change.

Conscription was also valued at the Land and local level as a means of reinforcing loyalties. Conscripts tended to serve very near home in local bases, meaning that they retained close contacts to their families and localities and that the notion of territorial defence was given a pronounced regional expression. These loyalties would be lost with a professional army that served overseas. In the make-up of the Bundeswehr values of local patriotism played an important role, and regional and local bases took on an important symbolic value that made reform a politically sensitive matter.

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12 See Theodor Blank, the first Defence Minister, in Bundesminister der Verteidigung, 1975, 153-8; also Theodor Heuss, the first Federal President, speaking in 1949, and quoted in Brühl and Rautenberg, 1987, p.35
Landesverteidigung and conscription remained the dominant policy image right up to the end of the Cold War. Its dominance was intimately related to the bipolar character of the international security environment, Germany's vulnerable front-line status, and the depth of German embeddedness in NATO. Not least, conscription was a key part of post-war national political identity, linked to painful historical memories of elite behaviour during the Weimar Republic. It was deeply entrenched and resistant to change as a deep core belief. Both concepts were further held in place by the institutional constraints of internal semi-sovereignty represented by the Federal Constitutional Court, Länder interest in avoiding closures of bases on their territory, and the Federal and Land Finance Ministries' interest in defraying costs by retaining the use of young men in civilian alternative service as the counterpart to conscription. In this strategic context the prospects for leadership in support of an alternative policy image were very limited.

3.2 Military Intervention and Crisis Management: The Reconfiguration of Advocacy Coalitions and a Changing Policy Narrative

During the 1990s the new issue of the Bundeswehr's role in military intervention and crisis management displaced the traditional centrality of its role in collective defence. This issue was focused on the participation of Germany in UN-led and NATO-supported peacekeeping missions and the question of NATO 'out-of-area' operations. The development of a military intervention and crisis management role and capability challenged the traditional policy narrative of Landesverteidigung and a conscript army. It also opened up a new political opportunity for the reconfiguration of domestic advocacy coalitions within the defence and security policy subsystem.

In essence, the development of a military intervention and crisis management role responded to the emerging realities of the post-Cold War world, notably the growing instability associated with state failure, for instance in Yugoslavia, Somalia and Rwanda. Two critical aspects of these realities were the responses of the UN and of the US. The UN was crucially important in providing the moral authority for German participation through the 'Agenda for Peace' strategy of its Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali in June 1992. In particular, this initiative expanded the traditional
concept of peacekeeping operations, as set out in Chapter VI of the UN Charter, to include preventive deployments. It also began a debate – into which German policy makers were inevitably drawn - about the right and indeed duty of the international community to intervene in the traditionally sovereign internal affairs of states and about the links between conflict prevention and democracy and good governance.¹⁴

The second important factor was the way in which successive US Administrations redefined US security policy on military intervention. Most problematic for Germany was the tying of this policy development to a progressive toughening of the notion of coercive diplomacy in the United States and the emerging political consensus between Democrats and Republicans around the idea of a role for the US as a global sheriff, forging coalitions or posses of states. The events of September 11 2001 – a major terrorist attack on the territory of the US - were critical in this respect.¹⁵

Broadly, two phases in the development of a military intervention and crisis management role can be detected. The first phase involved the elaboration of a new security strategy of intervention during the Presidency of Bill Clinton (1992-2000) under the auspices of both the UN and NATO. This strategy began with the Gulf War, and stretched through Bosnia, Somalia and Haiti, to Kosovo. For the US – and especially the Democratic Party – it involved the exorcising of the ghosts of the Vietnam War of the 1960s and a new optimism about the use of American military power. Its reception in Germany was influenced by the fact that this new tough-minded military interventionism emerged under the Democratic Presidency of Bill Clinton. Clinton was a multilateralist by conviction, and humanitarian ends of protecting civilian populations and opposing ethnic cleansing seemed to play an important role in his attitude to crisis intervention. There was room for tension with the domestic German 'peace' coalition – which feared being drawn into an escalating spiral of violence in crisis regions – and continuing implacable opposition from within the 'pacifist' coalition where the collusion of exploitative US corporate interests with US military intervention remained the chief suspect.

¹⁵ De Benoist, A. Die Welt nach 9/11: Der Globale Terrorismus als Herausforderung des Westens (Tubingen: Hohenrain)
However, and crucially, the notion of a role in protecting civilian populations from ethnic cleansing created a new strategic opportunity for domestic policy leadership from within the ‘peace’ coalition. Joschka Fischer was able to relate this new interventionism to long-standing, constitutionally-mandated German goals of promoting world peace and situate it in a policy narrative that emphasised Germany’s special historical responsibility (‘never again Auschwitz’). Notably, this transformation within defence and security policy was not linked to a crisis narrative about the Bundeswehr. There was no attempt to define a radical ‘misfit’ between these international security developments and domestic conceptions of defence and security and of the role of the Bundeswehr. The focus was on the Bundeswehr having a new opportunity to meet the purpose for which it was designed.

The second phase in the development of a US interventionist role was more complex, problematic and dramatic. It was linked to a perception of a radical misfit, both in Washington and Berlin: with the Bush Administration arguing that Germany’s absence of an appropriate Bundeswehr marginalized it; and the Schröder government rejecting the role that the US sought from it. This new US interventionist role was driven by the response of the Bush Presidency to the watershed events of September 11 2001 and the subsequent Afghan War and the Iraq crisis. Its response was informed by the enhanced influence of the traditional conservative and the neo-conservative advocacy coalitions within the Bush Administration. In particular, September 11 and the ease of US victory in Afghanistan empowered the neo-conservatives.

These events engendered an increased optimism about US military power and its capacity to serve as a force for good by transforming the world in the US image and making the world safer for Americans. This new emphasis on US primacy went along not just with an accentuation of the coercive element in US diplomacy but also with the development of a new American political programme to rewrite the post-war world order. In this new US narrative American interests no longer lay principally in Europe, and the test for Europeans was which were prepared to enter into coalitions of the willing with the US as it pursued its world interests in the Middle East and
elsewhere. A multilateralism of conviction gave way to a multilateralism of convenience.

This evolving phase drew out a crisis narrative in Germany but one whose referents changed as events unfolded. In the immediate aftermath of 11 September Schröder and the SPD situated themselves firmly in the narrative of the 'freedom’ coalition. He declared ‘unlimited’ solidarity with the US. Envisioning a global ‘expansion of the area of the deployment’ (Entgrenzung des Einsatzraums) of the Bundeswehr, Schröder forced German military participation in Operation Enduring Freedom through the Bundestag by tying it to a vote of confidence in his government over the deployment of 3,900 troops for combat. Against this dramatic background, observers such as Heins concluded that the historic frame of reference of German defence and security policy had been abandoned, notably the ‘culture of restraint’ rooted in the traumas of the Third Reich.16 This transformation seemed to be signalled by the militant Atlanticism of the editorials of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and their identification of the crisis as residing in the lack of combat-readiness of the Bundeswehr for taking an active part in the anti-terror alliance fighting for Western civilization.17

The turning point came in 2002 with the Bush Administration’s unilateral definition of a new world order based on the right to pre-emptive military strike against potential enemies. The National Security Strategy reserved to the US the right to decide who might be its enemies and how they were to be dealt with. Both the process involved (which bypassed NATO) and the content (the assumption of US primacy and aggressive war-fighting) deeply offended elite and public opinion in Germany (and in much of the rest of Europe). This new security doctrine was a ‘watershed’ event in that it represented both a challenge to the core beliefs of the ‘peace’ coalition (which was strongly represented within the SPD/Green coalition) and a radical ‘misfit’ with the role and structures of the Bundeswehr. One effect was to mobilize the ‘pacifist’ advocacy coalition around opposition to the United States as the cause of a potentially

16 Heins, V. (2002) Germany’s New War: 11 September and Its Aftermath in German Quality Newspapers, German Politics, Vol.11, No.2, pp.128-146
uncontrollable escalation of violence, by its ‘failed’ Middle East policy and aggressive conduct stimulating the growth of terrorism.

Above all, however, the behaviour of the Bush Administration offered a mobilizing and unifying issue for a politically beleaguered coalition government that faced the imminent prospect of defeat in the federal elections of September 2002. From a mixture of principle and opportunism Schröder crafted a political position for the federal elections that simultaneously met two requirements. He took a stand on widely accepted principles of defence and security policy in Germany (no commitment of German troops to a war based on pre-emptive strike) and unified both party and public opinion on this issue to his electoral advantage. His position – outlined in the Bundestag debate of 13 February 2003 – was that: ‘No Realpolitik and no security doctrine should lead to the fact that, surreptitiously, we should come to regard war as a normal instrument of politics.’ This position opened up a profound political gap between the Bush Administration and the Red-Green coalition.

Strikingly, this turn of events put the ‘freedom’ coalition on the defensive and was widely judged to have contributed to their narrow defeat of the CDU/CSU in 2002. Its strongest advocates were still to be found within the CDU/CSU, especially the CDU party chair Angela Merkel. They focused on the historic debt to the US for defeating Hitler, for confronting the Soviet threat and for backing German unification, and the consequent obligation to show loyalty in a time of acute danger. They also stressed the historical lessons about the dangers of German isolation and about the need to sustain pressure on dangerous dictators. But they faced two problems. German public opinion was overwhelmingly anxious about the new US security doctrine of pre-emptive strike. Also, the Bundeswehr was not structured or equipped for such a role. There was, in short, a closer fit between the ‘peace’ coalition’s conception of defence and security and the changing role of the Bundeswehr than between the ‘freedom’ coalition’s conception and the Bundeswehr’s capability. In public debate two definitions of crisis competed: a crisis in German-American relations, ascribed to US’s unilateralism; and a crisis of isolation of the Schröder government. But neither

18 ‘Schröder hält Kurs gegen die USA: Kanzler wirft Union Kriegsbereitschaft vor – Merkel schliesst gewaltsame Lösung nicht aus’ Handelsblatt, 14.02.2003
crisis narrative identified the Bundeswehr as the source of the problems and sought to address the problems by its structural transformation.

These external developments towards a new crisis interventionist role illustrated the resilience of the domestic ‘peace’ coalition and the way in which events had empowered it. Schröder could proudly point to the transformation in defence and security policy and the Bundeswehr. Germany was by 2002 the second biggest contributor to international peacekeeping after the US, with an annual budget of euros 2 billion, compared with euros 22 million in 1998. The missions in Macedonia and Afghanistan were seen as models of a new kind of defence and security policy that cast the Bundeswehr in a major role in economic and social reconstruction and protecting civilian populations through confidence building. In short, the Red/Green government was no longer appealing to a ‘culture of restraint’ grounded in the historical traumas of the Third Reich, as Kohl had over rejecting military participation in the Gulf War. Its policy narrative stressed German defence and security policy and the Bundeswehr as positive role models about which post-war Germans could be proud.

3.3 The Post-Cold War World

The end of the Cold War brought three fundamental changes that gave it the quality of a critical juncture for German defence and security policy. At the same time its main effects were longer-term and took the form of a process of policy-oriented learning over a decade and more.

3.3.1 German Unification

The most direct and immediate effect of the end of the Cold War for Germany was a new united Germany that was unleashed from the remaining constraints of Four-Power Allied control. Consequently, new questions emerged about whether and in what ways Germany might pursue a more interest-based and assertive security

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19 Figures provided by interview partner in Finance Ministry, Bonn, 28th August 2002
policy. Observers detected a new discourse of ‘normalization’, citing in particular Gerhard Schröder’s more neo-realist views. But, in the case of the Bundeswehr, it became clear that ‘normalization’ did not mean a structural transformation into a professional, war-fighting army on the British, US and (after 1995) French models. It meant a stronger assertion of a specifically German interest in retaining conscription and developing a new international crisis prevention and peacekeeping role.

The change in German defence and security policy did not involve a new effort to project power at the international and European levels but rather a complex adaptation to changing domestic and international conditions. These conditions included: the enormous budgetary problems that Germany faced consequent on unification and subsequent long-term fiscal transfers from west to east; the relative decline in German economic performance, notably in growth and employment; and the more assertive behaviour of Länder governments that were keen to protect their economic interests in this more restrictive context. The problem for political leadership was how to reconcile these mounting domestic constraints with growing international pressure – especially from the US – on Germany to radically upgrade its defence contribution.

The difficulties that such pressure could cause for Germany were apparent in the embarrassed reaction of Kohl to President Bush’s early offer of a ‘partnership in leadership’ with the US. This offer reflected US estimation of the pivotal role of Germany in the development and provision of European security stretching across the continent. But it also contained the implication of a partnership at the global level. The offer reflected thinking in the US State Department under James Baker. It was not taken up in Bonn because it threatened to create both internal political difficulties – over the idea of a global security role for Germany – and external difficulties, especially within the Franco-German relationship and for the process of European integration. These two related arenas were too central to German definition of security interests to be jeopardized by this American policy offering.

German unification had more immediate, major implications for the Bundeswehr. Upon unification the Nationale Volksarmee (NVA) of the GDR numbered some 520,000 troops. However, the first democratic government of the GDR sacked all senior personnel over the age of 55. Additionally, 60,000 soldiers deserted. Hence by the summer of 1990, the (NVA) amounted to some 100,000 troops. The 2+4 Treaty set a ceiling for the upper limit of permitted troop numbers at 370,000. Hence the goal was by the year 2000 to have 38,000 officers, 122,000 NCO's, 40,000 other non-commissioned personnel, 135,000 conscripts and 3,000 reserve officers and 137,000 civilians.  

The result was a radical reorganization that involved downsizing and problems of cultural change as elements of the much more traditionally organized, hierarchical NVA were absorbed into the Bundeswehr’s concepts of ‘citizens in uniform’ guided by innere Führung. In consequence, irrespective of other changes that came with the post-Cold war order, German unification imposed an immediate major reform that meant politically sensitive base closures. There was little time and energy to reflect on other major reforms till this period was over. Hence the process of policy-oriented learning about the new security environment was impeded in the short-term by the exigencies of German unification.

German defence and security policy was also influenced by the changing domestic political context with unification. Public opinion in the Eastern Bundesländer was less enthusiastic in its endorsement of loyalty to the Atlantic Alliance. The policy narrative that Berlin was in danger of serving as a satellite of Washington gained resonance from the way in which the GDR regime had served as a satellite of the Soviet Union. This was accompanied by a lack of the kind of economic benefits associated with US bases located in western Länder like Bavaria and Rhineland-Palatinate. In addition, the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) aligned itself closely with the ‘pacifist’ coalition, with leading members showing a willingness to assign blame to the US even in the immediate aftermath of 11 September. As the East had a

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23 ‘Ein Staat-ein Arme: Streitkräfte im vereinten Deutschland’ IAP-Dienst Sicherheitspolitik (1 August 1990)
24 Interview, Bernd Weber, CDU/CSU Bundestagsfraktion, Arbeitsgruppe Verteidigung, Berlin, 26th August 2002
much higher percentage of floating voters than the West, the political parties came to view the East as a critical battleground in federal elections. Hence a political strategy that neutralized the appeal of the PDS to anxious Eastern voters had an obvious appeal to the SPD, especially when it was under great pressure on economic and employment issues. German unification provided, in other words, a political incentive to adopt a less Atlanticist defence and security policy. At the same time this incentive had to be balanced against the dangers of losing Western voters who were more likely to fear isolation from the US.

3.3.2 US Hyper Power and NATO Crisis

The second fundamental change was that Germany no longer found itself caught up in the bloc rivalry between two super-powers, the US and the Soviet Union. This rivalry – with its ideological basis and its clearly defined external threat – had imparted a powerful sense of a shared transatlantic security identity, symbolized by NATO. The shared transatlantic security identity was further reinforced by memories of the critical importance of US resources and will for victory in the two world wars. But the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Warsaw Pact left NATO and, above all, the US militarily ascendant and acted as triggers for a long-term process of redefining both NATO and how individual states like Germany related to the US through NATO. Crucially, it was no longer so clear that Germany and the US were united in NATO against a common enemy. In this new context, US and European actors had slowly to come to terms with the realization that they had overlapping but frequently different interests and perspectives and that these divergences were growing.26

In the early stages of this process of redefining NATO Germany played an important role, especially in shaping NATO’s ‘London Declaration’ of July 1990 and the far-reaching ‘Strategic Review’ and subsequent ‘New Strategic Concept’ adopted at the November 1991 Rome summit. The trigger was the withdrawal of Soviet troops from central and eastern Europe and the disbandment of the Warsaw Pact. This process of engagement in NATO reform involved close co-ordination between Genscher’s

Foreign Ministry and Stoltenberg's Defence Ministry, with a strong role for the Federal Chancellor's Office under Joachim Bitterlich. Genscher also worked very closely with US Secretary of State James Baker to achieve German-US co-ordination in developing political dialogue with the Soviet Union and eastern Europe through the new 'North Atlantic Co-operation Council'. More importantly, from a military perspective the 'New Strategic Concept' involved a shift from forward defence and a reliance on nuclear response to a new stress on reinforcements in the event of war, and smaller, more mobile forces configured in multinational corps. The German government welcomed the consequent development of a NATO Rapid Reaction Corps.

But of more immediate importance for German defence and security debate was the shift in NATO's strategic concept away from an emphasis on nuclear escalation. This emphasis had been a key trigger for the formation of the 'peace' coalition and for support for withdrawal from NATO. The 'London Declaration' defined nuclear weapons as 'weapons of last resort' and called for the negotiated elimination of all short-range, ground-launched nuclear weapons. Crucially, NATO's nuclear strategy was no longer the key divisive issue in German defence and security policy. This development reduced the incentives for the 'peace' and the 'pacifist' coalitions to mobilize.

But another development - the US's emergence as the military 'hyper-power' and its implications for NATO - provided a new catalyst for the 'peace' and 'pacifist' coalitions and sharpened domestic debate about defence and security. A poll in FT Deutschland in February 2002 showed that 74 per cent of German respondents believed that the US had too much power.\(^{27}\) This change in public opinion suggested that Germans no longer felt so confident that what was happening within NATO, and to NATO, reflected German policy preferences and ways of doing things.

The first change was an accelerating imbalance of military capacity within NATO. The US's undisputed military superiority as a war-fighting machine was practically demonstrated in the Gulf War; in the former Yugoslavia, notably the Kosovo War in

\(^{27}\) FT Deutschland, 2.02.2002
1999; and in Afghanistan in 2001-2. Illustrative of the imbalance was that the planned defence budget of the Bush Administration in 2002 exceeded the combined military budgets of the next 14 biggest spenders — including western Europe, Russia, Japan, and China. New military technologies — as well as new external security challenges — forced a reassessment of US military strategy, based on the recognition that the US had a ‘war-fighting’ capability way beyond other states. This transformational leap in military capabilities found expression in the Bush Administration’s adoption of a ‘preventive’ strategy in its National Security Strategy of September 2002. It also underpinned the belief that US military dominance would alter the strategic incentives of its enemies towards the use of more flexible biological and chemical weapons, made available by ‘rogue’ states like Iraq and North Korea.

This new US strategy raised very serious and sensitive political problems for a German defence and security policy subsystem that was constitutionally forbidden from anything other than defensive policies. As we saw above, it contributed to an increasing difficulty of communication and understanding between the Red/Green government and the Bush Administration. This difficulty was accentuated when the Bush Administration demonstrated a new willingness to isolate the Schröder government, its Defence Minister Ronald Rumsfeld wrote Germany off as part of ‘old’ Europe and threats of closure and relocation of US bases outside Germany were made. This behaviour of the Bush Administration provided the context for the Schröder government to re-examine its traditional caution about working with the French government in pushing a European defence and security policy. It also offered a political opportunity for President Jacques Chirac to woo the support of Schröder for his policy ambitions in this sector — central to which was a more independent European role. Hence defence and security emerged as a key pillar of strengthened Franco-German co-operation in Schröder’s second term.

28 See www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2002
29 See Article 26, Basic Law
30 ‘Zorn auf die Zauderer’, Die Welt, 24.01.2003
‘Gott lacht uns jetzt zu’ Die Zeit, Nr.6, 30.01.2003
‘Old Donald rudert zurück’ Neue Presse, 08.02.2003
‘USA schliessen Standorte’ Welt am Sonntag, 14.12.2003
The second, linked change was in the US's attitudes to NATO, signalled above all in its behaviour in the wake of NATO invoking Article 5 in the immediate aftermath of 11 September. This article states that an attack on one ally is an attack on the whole alliance, obliging other states to assist the victim. But, influenced by the lessons of the Kosovo War, the US did not wish to be impeded by the requirements of multilateral action within NATO. Instead, for the war in Afghanistan the Bush Administration opted to use NATO as little more than a forum for building coalitions of convenience and picking and choosing what it wanted from its allies on the principle that the mission determines the coalition. In addition, given the US's very low estimation of the military capabilities of its European allies, it wanted very little from them. In consequence, there was a loss of confidence amongst German policy makers in the capability of NATO to influence the use of US power. The result was a crisis narrative about NATO that focused on US policy and behaviour as the cause.\textsuperscript{32}

More positively for German policy makers, discussions about reform of the role and structures of NATO pointed to its transformation into a strengthened role in out-of-area operations based on a structure that encouraged niche capabilities and force specializations amongst its expanding membership. In this context Germany – like other NATO members – had the potential to develop its own special relationship to the US based around its particular, limited military capacities, especially in peace keeping and humanitarian role. This emerging NATO doctrine offered a domestic opportunity to stress that Bundeswehr reform should focus on a clearly specified and specialized range of tasks that were suited to Germany, namely in crisis prevention and management. However, this role specialization could not overcome the political problem that Germany and other NATO members were seen as being treated like dependents and used as convenience dictated.

These changes in the US role and NATO meant that the parameters of German defence and security policy had changed. No longer was it defined by the ideological clarity of a bipolar system and by contending advocacy coalitions over nuclear weapons policy.\textsuperscript{33} It was characterized by a new uncertainty about how far to go

\textsuperscript{32} 'Neue Aufgaben, neuer Kurs' Der Spiegel, 42/2003
along with the consequences of a radical change in both structural and relative power that left Germany as a marginal player. Many key players in the German defence and security policy subsystem were not prepared – and did not feel that Germany was capable – of participating in new US-style war-fighting strategies. For them Bundeswehr reform did not go beyond a crisis prevention role. In this respect the parameters of Bundeswehr reform were set more by domestic than NATO factors. In so far as Germany was to be subject to ‘top-down’ pressures, these were more likely to come from the development of an EU defence and security policy whose development Germany could shape more readily than it could shape NATO.

A key result of post-Cold War developments was an increasing sense that German defence and security interests were more effectively promoted in an EU context than a NATO context because German policy actors were better able to ‘upload’ German ideas within the EU. This shift of view threatened the autonomy of the defence and security policy subsystem because EU policy co-ordination was traditionally the preserve of the Foreign Ministry. The challenge for the Defence Ministry was to work with fellow EU ministries to develop arrangements in Council decision-making that would insulate EU defence and security policy from both the foreign ministers and from the German Permanent Representative in Brussels. Chapter 6 will examine Bundeswehr Reform in the context of the development of the European Security and Defence Policy in greater detail.

3.3.3 New Security Challenges

A third source of transformation came from new forms of conflict within the international security environment – from the 1991 Gulf War, via heightened ‘ethnic conflicts’ with the Balkan wars of succession, to the terrorist challenge represented by the events of 11 September 2001. The consequent uncertainties about the nature of security challenges, about the international institutions best suited to the new security environment, and about whether US policy should be followed threw the defence and

security policy subsystem into flux. In the words of Volker Rühe, the newly united and sovereign Germany had to 'redefine its foreign and security policy under changed conditions'. In 1992 it was not clear just how far those conditions were changing. Hence the process of redefinition extended over the period of a decade and more in a process of policy-oriented learning involving new information about sources of threat. This learning process generated two main policy narratives.

The two central questions that challenged the traditional policy image were the nature of the source of threat and the appropriate response. The first question was whether the traditional inter-state model of security challenge, with its priority to territorial defence and war-fighting capability, was becoming an anachronism. For some, especially neo-conservatives and 'realist' unilateralists within the US Bush Administration, the key threat was now from 'rogue' states and hence there was a continuing need for a war-fighting capability to topple their regimes. Seen from this perspective, the problem was the rapidly increasing military capability gap between the US and Europe. The crisis was defined as the lack of combat preparedness of Germany, and the appropriate response was fundamental structural transformation of the Bundeswehr.

More influential within Germany was an alternative model that stressed the importance of multilateral action in areas of 'soft' power in an age in which the information revolution, technological change and globalisation elevated the importance of trans-national issues. In this perspective the key threat came form new types of privately-organized warfare against civilians (the 'privatisation' of war), spilling across borders in the form of refugees, asylum seekers, organized crime, identity-based networks and terrorism. According to this model, the priority shifts to

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35 Rühe, V. (1994) *Deutschland's Verantwortung. Perspektiven für das neue Europa* (Frankfurt am Main, Ullstein Verlag), p.467
a more piecemeal restructuring of the Bundeswehr around international law enforcement in defence of civilian populations.

These two policy narratives about new security challenges had important implications for the role and structure of the Bundeswehr. In one narrative – embraced by the conservative *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* - the appropriate response was the classic security approach of raising defence expenditure, especially on increased military capability in precision weapons, transport and intelligence. This narrative accorded with the position of those who sought to liberate German policy thinking from the constraints of the Nazi period around a reconstructed post-war identity. In the other narrative – represented by the left-wing *Tageszeitung* - the pressing need was for new more flexible forms of humanitarian intervention and policing beyond borders to protect civilian populations and support nation-building. This second narrative had greater resonance in a German defence and security policy subsystem in which the 'peace' coalition had a stronger impact than in the US and in which the 'pacifist' coalition was a more influential contextual constraint.

3.4 Conclusions

This chapter has analysed policy change within the German defence and security policy subsystem from the perspective of the advocacy coalition framework. It has shown how individual coalitions have been empowered or disempowered by developments within the international system, with effects on policy narratives. It has also shown that exogenous shocks have not led to radical structural transformation of the Bundeswehr because they have not been translated into a persuasive crisis narrative that have identified the problem of failure as residing in the Bundeswehr. To the extent that an influential crisis narrative has arisen its referent has been elsewhere. More influential with respect to the Bundeswehr has been a long-term policy-oriented learning process deriving from its accumulating operational experience in international crisis management. This process has been linked both to policy change (which is analysed in chapters 4-6) and to the emergence of a policy narrative which reflects an increasing sense of confidence in the Bundeswehr as a model.
However, useful as it is in identifying the main lines of policy thinking, the advocacy coalition framework needs to be handled with caution. It has three main limitations. The first stems from its essentially heuristic nature and the danger of reifying coalitions as if they were actors. In practice it is not easy to clearly shoehorn individual actors and institutions into coalition membership. This is true, for instance, with respect to the SPD (whose members cross the ‘freedom’ and ‘peace’ coalitions) and the Greens (where members of both the ‘peace’ and the ‘pacifist’ coalitions are to be found). Hence the Red-Green government is crosscut by, and bestrides these contending coalitions, and it is not surprising that a wide variety of narratives inform German defence and security policy.

Within the SPD opposition during the 1990s the dominant feature in defence and security policy was a strengthening belief in the EU as the core security framework, in concert with the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), but with ambiguity about the role of NATO. But ‘western Europeanists’ (like Oskar Lafontaine) and ‘pan European institutionalists’ (such as Karsten Voigt, Heidmarie Wieczorek-Zeul, and Günther Verheugen) had different views about the relative usefulness of these three institutional settings. The SPD was also characterised by other factions such as the Civil Democrats. The governing CDU/CSU and FDP were also subject to internal debates about German defence and security policy. Their thinking was much more clearly dominated by the ‘Atlanticism’ of the ‘freedom’ coalition and by the importance of NATO to German security policy and the need for an emerging European defence and security identity to be within this framework. But it was by no means clear what this set of core policy beliefs implied, as the next chapter shows.

The second limitation of the advocacy coalition framework stems from the fact that, even if it can be shown that they share core policy beliefs, there is not always clear evidence of significant – or even minimal – co-ordinated action across institutional boundaries. This is a more serious limitation. Thus the FDP and then the Greens came to agree on the need for a professional rather than conscript Bundeswehr. But they did so independently and without sharing much in the way of deep policy beliefs. It can

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be argued that the Green Party and the FDP came to adopt this position despite their ideological distance. Each party took up the idea of a professional Bundeswehr because of its own particular ideological outlook, in short for internal reasons related to its own clientele. But there was no co-ordinated action to promote this idea.

Finally, it is important to remember that individual policy actors – rather than advocacy coalitions – seek out leadership roles in defence and security policy, whether by promoting a particular idea and policy narrative or acting as a broker. Their strategies are important: whether creating a crisis narrative or pursuing 'salami tactics' to push through new ideas; promoting policy-oriented learning and 'binding in' opposition'; or sidelining or excluding change agents. These leadership roles and strategies are explored in the following chapters.
Chapter 4: Policy Leadership on Bundeswehr Reform during the Kohl Chancellorship

During the first Cold War phase of the Kohl Chancellorship (1982-90) Bundeswehr reform had been very much a case of what Peter Hall terms third-order change. It focused on the adaptation of existing policy instruments (for instance, the length of conscription) rather than the creation of new instruments or the change of policy objectives. The post-Cold War phase (1990-98) was characterised by the elevation of the Bundeswehr to an issue of second-order change (like the replacement of conscription by a volunteer army) and even first-order change to its basic role (from purely Landes- und Bündnisverteidigung to crisis management). As the last chapter showed, this shift in the level of policy change was attributable to a series of interrelated changes in the international security environment – notably German unification, new security challenges, transformation in the roles of the US and of NATO towards crisis intervention, and an emerging European security and defence identity.

This and the next chapter seek to open up the 'black box' of the policy process of managing Bundeswehr change, testing the analytical perspectives of policy change (outlined in chapter one). Particular attention is paid to policy entrepreneurs, shifts of institutional venue, and policy-oriented learning as variables in explaining change. The next two chapters also seek to assess the nature and impact of policy leadership by analysing policy change by reference to different leadership roles, strategies and styles. This perspective reveals how policy leaders negotiated the complex domestic institutional context (outlined in chapter two) and the evolving international security environment (outlined in chapter three). A key theme is the attempt to manage the policy process, for instance by organizing processes of policy-oriented learning and using institutional venues. This is apparent in Volker Rühe's use of 'salami tactics' to secure policy change in the role of the Bundeswehr (1992-94) and then his attempt to impose a Denkverbot on new policy ideas about the structure of the Bundeswehr (1994-98). Paradoxically, Rühe emerges as more willing to embrace first-order policy change to the Bundeswehr's role than second-order change to its structure. The

political factors that explain this paradox are analysed in this chapter, with particular reference to the politics of base closures.

This chapter seeks to show how the analytical perspectives about policy change that were presented in chapter one complement each other. It suggests the value of 'cross-fertilisation' of approaches in gaining an adequate understanding of the complexities of the policy process. Thus, for instance, the perspective about policy entrepreneurship is shown as more relevant to agenda setting about both the role and the structure of the Bundeswehr than to explaining policy making. Above all, however, the focus is on the role of policy leadership and the interactions between actors and institutional and strategic contexts in this process. Existing analytical perspectives of policy change either underestimate this dimension or – like multiple streams literature – take too narrow a view of policy leadership and of the forms that it takes.

The context of policy change was provided by an established consensus that had been reaffirmed in the wake of Germany's membership of the UN in 1973. UN membership brought the issue of deploying German soldiers for UN peacekeeping missions onto the agenda. From the outset, however, the Foreign Ministry took the view that Article 87a of the Basic Law ruled out Bundeswehr participation in missions mandated by the UN Security Council under Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter. This view was reinforced by the Federal Security Council (Bundessicherheitsrat) in early 1982 and then by the new CDU/CSU/FDP coalition government in November 1982. From 1990 onwards the Kohl government sought to redefine a new consensus about the role of the Bundeswehr.

4.1 From the Gulf War to Sarajevo: Helmut Kohl as a Policy Leader

The Gulf crisis of 1990-91 was a watershed event in that, for the first time, it raised the policy problem of Bundeswehr deployment outside the territory of the Federal Republic in an acute manner. It involved highly sensitive issues of Germany's historical and political responsibilities in defence of a NATO state (Turkey) and in

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support of a US-led ‘out-of-area’ intervention against an aggressor (Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and Iraqi threat to Israel). At one level, it was a test of Germany’s loyalty as an ally and of historic debts and responsibilities to the United States and Israel. In the Foreign Ministry view, these considerations were balanced by potentially difficult issues in relation to the Soviet Union. At another level, the Kohl government faced serious domestic constitutional and political problems about a German role in military intervention, especially outside NATO.  

Kohl crafted a complex policy leadership role in response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 and the UN Security Council’s immediate resolution condemning Saddam Hussein as aggressor and demanding Iraqi withdrawal. On the one hand, he determined not to take the political risk of stepping outside established policy consensus. Externally, Kohl stressed the constitutional prohibition on German troop deployment to the Gulf, combined with German willingness to make a generous financial contribution to support UN-sanctioned military intervention.  

Internally, he pursued a policy brokerage role that was designed to keep the SPD leadership on board. On the other hand, as made clear by Defence Minister Stoltenberg at a WEU meeting in August 1990, Kohl made clear that he aimed to change the Basic Law to enable Bundeswehr deployment. The policy entrepreneurship role was announced but deferred.

Kohl and the key ministers involved – Genscher and Stoltenberg – hesitated to identify this event as a crisis for German defence and security policy or for the Bundeswehr, requiring a comprehensive transformation of its role and structure. There were critical outside voices that created a crisis narrative. Some within the freedom coalition - led by the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung - stressed that Germany must assume a new role of international responsibility and solidarity alongside US, British, French and other troops against Iraq. For them there was a crisis of Bundeswehr capability that had to be addressed. This position was strongly supported.

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4 Asmus, R.D. (1992) Germany after the Gulf War (Santa Monica, California, RAND)
by external actors, not least in and close to the US Administration. The Kohl government hesitated to adopt this position not just because of constitutional problems but also because it feared adverse political consequences in the imminent federal elections of December 1990 from frightening the German public. Leadership style was shaped by a preference for avoiding open public debate about the Bundeswehr's role and structure.

More numerous were the voices from within the 'peace' and 'pacifist' coalitions which stressed that Germany must avoid any association with war and devote its energies exclusively to finding a political and diplomatic solution. For them the crisis was either about minimizing the loss of lives or about American power (see Tageszeitung). The huge anti-war demonstrations, notably involving over 200,000 in Bonn, were testament to the capacity of these coalitions to mobilize against government policy. Nevertheless, the Kohl government distanced itself from Willy Brandt's high-profile personal mission to Saddam Hussein in November 1990 because it feared a further loss of international, and especially US respect consequent on not sending German troops to the Gulf. Given this strategic context – and the accident of political timing that connected the Gulf crisis to the German federal elections - the Kohl government chose a low-profile leadership role and style.

By its nature as an issue of war and peace, the Gulf crisis was a Kanzlersache (matter for the Chancellor). It was a matter for the macro-political system rather than for the policy subsystem and hence was associated with change of institutional venue. This was all the more true because President George Bush and US Secretary of State James Baker dealt directly with him on German policy, expressing their disappointment and frustration with German responses as early as September 1990. Hence the Chancellor was under considerable external pressure, including the calling in of political debts for US support of German unification and threats from the Bush Administration that Congressional hostility to Germany could escalate and become politically dangerous for US-German relations. Kohl’s deep core beliefs set him firmly within the freedom coalition; his language was consistently about primacy to deterrence of dangerous

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5 Asmus (1992) Germany after the Gulf War (Santa Monica, California, RAND)
dictators and to loyalty to the United States. Germany’s $2 billion financial assistance to back Operation Desert Storm was designed to placate US Congressional hostility towards German lack of gratitude for the US’s role on behalf of Germany.

However, during the Gulf crisis he pursued consistently a leadership role of policy brokerage, seeking to bind in potential opposition and draw the opposition into responsibility. Stoltenberg was very careful to keep the Bundestag Defence Committee informed, whilst Kohl met with SPD leaders to ensure that they were bound in to what the government was doing. His leadership style was not heroic as over German unification or over the Maastricht Treaty and European economic and monetary union in 1989-90. It was essentially low key and humdrum, carefully focused on avoiding a war and peace issue in the December 1990 federal elections that could frighten voters. Voter reaction was all the more uncertain given the fact this was the first all-German election, and the behaviour of the new East German electorate was potentially very volatile. This increased the political caution of Kohl.

Stoltenberg was under even more external pressure from US Defence Secretary Dick Cheney and would have liked the Bundeswehr to do more, especially over Turkey, to demonstrate its credentials as a loyal NATO ally. But he was in no position to play the role of policy entrepreneur because the strategic context offered no real window of opportunity to take bold initiatives. Kohl was immeasurably more politically powerful within the coalition government than Stoltenberg, especially after the December 1990 elections. The constitutional constraints on committing German troops ‘out of area’ were by general consent too tight to offer room for manoeuvre.

Also, Stoltenberg faced the influence on Kohl from Genscher and the Chancellery’s foreign policy division. Both were agreed that the Gulf crisis must be managed in the framework of German unification. This meant acceding to US pressure to repay it for its decisive political support on this issue in 1989-90. Equally, Kohl was impressed by the foreign policy argument that a new German military role in the Gulf would empower hard-line domestic critics of Mikhail Gorbachev and could threaten ratification of the Two Plus Four treaty in the USSR. The Foreign Ministry argument

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was that completion of the process of putting in place a stable, enduring framework for German unification – without threatening the reform process in the USSR – had to have precedence over any policy proposals for a new role for the Bundeswehr.

In the language of the multiple streams framework, developments in the politics and policy streams did not provide potential policy entrepreneurs within the federal government with a window of opportunity to couple proposals for policy change to the Bundeswehr with a new pressing policy problem. The advocacy coalition framework better captures Kohl’s policy leadership role, strategy and style. He opted for the leadership role of policy broker, seeking out a position that enabled the three advocacy coalitions in defence and security policy to share power. This meant satisfying three conditions:

- enabling Germany to continue to hold back from the use of force (satisfying the ‘peace’ coalition)
- doing something to fulfil its role as a fully sovereign and loyal member of the NATO alliance and the UN (satisfying the ‘freedom’ coalition)
- making it possible for the SPD leadership to unify the representatives of the ‘peace’ and the ‘pacifist’ coalitions in their ranks behind his policy.

For this purpose Kohl embedded German action – especially ‘cheque-book’ diplomacy - in the traditional policy narrative of the historical and constitutional restraints on German defence and security policy consequent on the Nazi period.8 His policy brokerage role is more consistent with the stress on seeking out consensus between contending advocacy coalitions than with the leadership behaviour predicted by the multiple streams framework. He situated it in the context of heavy external pressure from the US Administration of George Bush, which made issue linkage (German unification/Gulf War participation) and called in high political debts.

Mayer, H, ‘Early at the Beach and Claiming Territory? The Evolution of Ideas on a New European Order’ International Affairs, 73, 4, pp.722-724
The multiple streams framework also underestimates just how important the domestic institutional context of interacting and nested policy subsystems was in shaping (and narrowing) the strategic choices that Kohl faced. The punctuated equilibrium framework, which gives more stress to institutional context, suggests that the Gulf War was likely to be important in producing a 'politics of punctuation', consequent on the policy process shifting from the subsystem level to the macropolitical level of the Chancellor and the Bundestag. This elevation of the issue into a Kanzlersache reflected the high political stakes and the problem of matching the traditional policy narrative of Landesverteidigung to the new security challenge posed by Iraq. But, contrary to this framework's prediction, the change of institutional venue amounted to no more than a minimalist punctuation of the policy stasis and left the established policy image intact. Hence this perspective is not corroborated.

In negotiating the Gulf crisis Kohl laid greatest stress on reassuring the US that he was doing all that he could within the framework of the Basic Law. He also emphasised the need to pursue constitutional amendment so that Germany could participate not just in 'blue helmet' missions under Article VI of the UN Charter (pacific settlement of disputes) but also in military operations under Article VII. In March 1991 Kohl responded to US and UN pressures by sending 2,700 troops to take part in minesweeping operations in the Persian Gulf (a request that had been rejected in 1986 after the Iran-Iraq war). This deployment represented the first deployment of German troops outside of Europe since the end of the Second World War and the first use of 'salami tactics' to change the role of the Bundeswehr. It was followed by air support for UNSCOM in Iraq and the UN mission in eastern Turkey and western Iraq, with nearly 2,000 troops providing humanitarian aid to Kurdish refugees.

Kohl's leadership role, style and strategy drew lessons from the way in which the Gulf conflict tested the limits of German consensus on military intervention. This was most clear in the widespread opposition, both from the opposition SPD and public opinion, when Kohl sent 18 jet fighters to Turkey to deter Saddam Hussein. Here he invoked the collective defence of a NATO member as legitimation. Kohl sought to appeal to the public mood by emphasising the importance of such an effort for the credibility of NATO and of Germany's role in NATO.
Even more sensitive was the issue of German assistance for Israel to deter Scud missile attacks from Iraq. To justify making Patriot anti-Scud missiles available to Israel Kohl used an historic policy narrative that drew on Germany's responsibilities towards the state of Israel after the Holocaust. However, here he faced a much more difficult problem when the Israeli government reminded him that German companies were responsible for having sold gas and biological weapons to Iraq that were now being used against Israel. This pressure was extremely embarrassing for the Kohl government and limited the capacity of the opposition to object.

This testing of the limits of the domestic consensus deterred Kohl from acting as policy entrepreneur on a constitutional amendment. It threatened to raise such serious political disagreements with the SPD and between the coalition parties as to make the necessary two-thirds parliamentary majority very difficult to achieve. At the same time it was soon clear that the issue of military intervention and a crisis management role for the Bundeswehr was not simply a one-off event confined to the Gulf War and its aftermath. Against this background Kohl opted for a humdrum leadership style that avoided open debate about the Bundeswehr's role and pursued a salami tactics that justified each new German participation in crisis interventions as for humanitarian purposes. In this way he was able to retain SPD support for Bundeswehr deployment as part of the UNTAC mission to Cambodia in May 1992, when - for the first time - German troops were doing more than just provide logistical support.\(^9\)

The political sensitivity of this issue, even in the context of a humdrum leadership style, was displayed in April-May 1992 over the deteriorating situation in the Balkans, especially the crisis surrounding the siege of Sarajevo. This crisis raised the issue of whether German troops should be involved in 'out-of-area' humanitarian operations to protect civilians in nearby and familiar countries like Bosnia and Croatia against Serbian aggression. German interests were directly affected: the Balkan crisis threatened to erupt into a flood of refugees and potentially domestically destabilising use of this crisis by right-wing German populists; whilst insecurity threatened to spill over into eastern Europe and promote wider destabilization. The Foreign Ministry in particular feared a humanitarian nightmare across Europe, associated with feeble EU

and NATO responses. At the same time it was reticent about taking on a policy leadership role, especially given French reluctance to intervene.

Once again the dynamic factor was US policy which – still influenced by memories of the nightmare of failed military intervention in Vietnam - was focused on getting the EU to assume responsibility in the Balkans. The Bush Administration sought to encourage the British and the German governments to play a lead role in developing a united EU position that would, at a minimum, impose tough sanctions and isolate the Serbian political leadership and, at a maximum, involve military intervention under the auspices of the UN.\textsuperscript{10} By May 1992 US pressure on Germany to play a more active agenda-setting role was mounting, and the Sarajevo crisis was a source of mounting embarrassment to the German government. Its outcome was the decision of 18 July 1992 to commit German destroyers as part of a NATO force monitoring the UN’s embargo against Serbia. This deployment was not supported by the SPD parliamentary party, which argued that it went beyond Alliance treaty obligations. US pressure had encouraged the federal government to push its salami tactics too far to retain SPD support.

In the rapidly changing context of crisis escalation in the Balkans, Cambodia and Somalia, Kohl’s leadership was no longer simply about agenda setting but about defining German policy on military intervention. One issue was what form Bundeswehr intervention should take: whether just peacekeeping and humanitarian aid missions or extending to peace enforcement and Gulf-style combat missions against aggressors. Another issue was under what conditions and within which institutional frameworks such interventions should take place. These issues were tackled by policy brokerage, with Kohl using individual crisis situations as the occasion for a salami tactics. These salami tactics and his policy brokerage were at the same time cover for policy preferences that were firmly embedded in the ‘freedom’ coalition. Kohl’s core policy belief was that Germany must assume the full range of international responsibilities, including the entire spectrum of military interventions. Precisely because the policy brokerage was an ongoing process, there was an unwillingness to spell out clear policy positions on the forms, conditions and

frameworks of military intervention. These positions evolved in practice within the framework of the consensus policy style of the Bundestag Defence Committee. By 1992 it was possible to infer the German policy position as requiring that Bundeswehr interventions should be limited to humanitarian missions on the basis of the moral authority of the UN, overseeing the implementation of its resolutions.

More importantly, interventions in Bosnia and Cambodia - and later Rwanda and Somalia – had unleashed a policy-oriented learning process. This learning process involved aspects of reflective practice and the generation of professional consensus within the Bundeswehr about viable forms of intervention and about how they should be managed. Experience threw up lessons about the appropriate structures and skills required within the Bundeswehr; about the risks and problems involved in German troops protecting civilian victims from aggressors in peace enforcement operations (here later US experience in Somalia was important); and about developing new capabilities to assist in economic and social reconstruction through civil-military projects.\(^\text{11}\)

A mounting caseload of interventions and increased uncertainties about policy placed new demands on policy leadership. They also created a greater incentive for the federal government to attempt to shape the policy debate within the key international institutions - UN, NATO, the WEU, the EU and the OSCE - about the terms under which crisis interventions should took place. The retirement of Genscher in May 1992 after 18 years as Foreign Minister also offered a new political opportunity for Kohl to strengthen his grip on foreign and security policy. The new Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel lacked Genscher’s political authority with respect both to his FDP and to the electorate. Hence developments in the three streams of problems, policies and politics conspired to offer a window of opportunity for policy entrepreneurship about the role of the Bundeswehr. A new phase opened that appears to approximate more closely to the conditions for policy change outlined in the multiple streams framework.

By April 1992 Kohl was keen to seize the opportunities for policy leadership that had been opened by German unification and the emerging problems of the post-Cold War

\(^{11}\) Interview, Defence Ministry, Berlin, 6th August 2002
era. His strategic response involved combining a positive response to mounting US pressure from the Bush Administration, especially James Baker, for Germany to play a lead role with nesting this role within the top political priority that he gave to European political unification and giving a defence dimension to this process. This balancing act was by no means easy given the different conceptions of the US and France – the two key pivotal players within NATO and the EU respectively – about a European defence and security identity. Kohl’s main political advantage lay in his accumulated credit as a loyal ally and partner in both these contexts. Also, domestically, he enjoyed a high degree of policy autonomy in these two domains, not least related to his length of office and experience. To the extent that defence and security policy touched on relations to the top of the US Administration and the French Presidency Kohl had a substantial measure of autonomy of action.

However, Kohl faced three constraints. First and foremost, the domestic institutional context of the Bundeswehr and the defence and security policy subsystems offered only very limited opportunities for policy change to roles and structures. To a considerable extent he was hostage to this institutional context, with its strong bias towards reflective practice and professional consensus (policy-oriented learning) and to political consensus building around the Bundestag Defence Committee (see chapter 2). Secondly, Kohl lacked confidence in the ability of Kinkel to make much impact on policy development within the UN, the EU and other international forums. He needed a new policy leader who could develop the Bundeswehr’s role in military intervention and crisis management.

The Federal Defence Minister, Gerhard Stoltenberg, was a safe pair of hands, a very competent departmental manager, but essentially a conservative, cautious figure. He lacked significant independent political authority. His early success as Federal Finance Minister (1982-89) had ended in what was widely seen as relegation to the Defence Ministry, following a politically costly tax reform and political scandal in his home state of Schleswig-Holstein. Also, he lacked the kind of background and expertise in defence and security policy matters that could give him authority over Bundeswehr policy. His original political task – as defined by Kohl in 1989 – had been to ensure order and discipline in the Federal Defence Ministry, which had a
reputation for causing political embarrassments. But his personal qualities did not equip him to play the role of policy entrepreneur in transforming the role of the Bundeswehr. To the extent that German unification imposed requirements of ‘downsizing’ on the Bundeswehr and integration of two armed forces, Stoltenberg could be expected to do it efficiently. But he was less interested in new policy ideas and their promotion. Above all, he was not, in Kohl’s view, the man to shape the institutional context to accelerate change to the role of the Bundeswehr. He was more hostage than shaper of this context.

Under Stoltenberg the key agent of policy change was General Klaus Naumann, Inspector General of the Bundeswehr. Naumann was critical in seeking to move the Bundeswehr away from a pure Landesverteidigung role to a crisis intervention role. As early as 1990 he used the London Declaration of NATO as an opportunity to promote a shift away from forward defence within the Defence Ministry. Naumann had a major influence on the key policy statement under Stoltenberg:

*Militärpolitische und Militärstrategische Grundlagen und Konzeptionelle Grundrichtung der Neugestaltung der Bundeswehr* (Reform of the Bundeswehr, Military Policy and Strategy and its Conceptual Framework). This paper acted as an initial means of ‘softening up’ the national mood for a redefinition of the role and structures of the Bundeswehr. Equally, the critical reaction to it demonstrated the high hurdles to policy change in the Bundeswehr. By 1992 it was clear to Kohl that a bolder leadership role was needed in Bundeswehr reform to empower change agents like Naumann, and he looked to Volker Rühe to provide it.

**4.2 Volker Rühe as Policy Entrepreneur and Broker, 1992-1994: Developing the Crisis Intervention Role of the Bundeswehr**

In appointing Rühe as Federal Defence Minister in April 1992, Kohl sought out a

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12 Interview, Defence Ministry, Berlin, 6th August 2002
much more pro-active German role in influencing the redefinition of defence and security policy in the wake of the Gulf War and emerging crisis intervention issues. In doing so, he wanted a CDU politician who was prepared to challenge conventional thinking and not allow the Foreign Ministry under the FDP to gain the initiative on defence and security policy issues. Kohl was aware that the UN was emerging as a key institutional venue on peacekeeping issues and that the Foreign Ministry had a lead role as gatekeeper to the UN. Hence it was in a strong position to stake out a central role in shaping Bundeswehr policy. He wanted a more confident Defence Minister who could work closely with the Foreign Minister but stake out a stronger role in policy development. Kohl appointed the man whom he regarded as the top foreign policy specialist in the CDU.\textsuperscript{15}

Above all, he wanted a Defence Minister who could seek to actively influence policy decisions in international institutions about the terms on which future crisis interventions were to be made and operated. This was a matter of ‘uploading’ German policy preferences to the key institutional venues, especially both NATO and the WEU as a link between NATO and the EU, venues in which the Defence Ministry had a lead role. It was about a new agenda setting role for Germany in defence and security policy and the political profiling of the CDU’s impact in this role.\textsuperscript{16}

Importantly, Rühe’s appointment coincided with a boom in UN peacekeeping operations between 1992 and 1994. Bosnia, Cambodia, Rwanda, and Somalia provided Rühe with external events that he could use to effect change to the Bundeswehr’s role (see table 4.1). His appointment followed on the heels of a cabinet split on 2 April on deployment of the Bundeswehr in AWACS flights over Bosnia. The deployment went ahead against FDP opposition, which argued that it was a new type of combat mission that went beyond the Basic Law and required constitutional amendment. The CDU remained keen to avoid such an amendment process because of the high political hurdles, whilst Rühe was also keen to keep the SPD onboard by fully exploiting the room for manoeuvre within the Basic Law.

\textsuperscript{15} Interview, Bernd Weber, CDU/CSU Bundestagsfraktion, Arbeitsgruppe Verteidigung, Berlin, 26th. August 2002; See also ‘Mehrzweckwaffe Volker Rühe wechselt auf die Hardthöhe’, Stuttgarter Zeitung, 1/04/1992
\textsuperscript{16} ‘Kohl’s Mann für den Notfall’, Frankfurter Rundschau, 02.04.1992
Table 4.1  Principal German Contributions to UN Peacekeeping Operations, 1990-98

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Peacekeeping Operation</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Amount in $US</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNPROFOR 1992-95</td>
<td>former Yugoslavia</td>
<td>448,508,789</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFOR 1996</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFOR 1997-98</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOSOM 1992-95</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>147,640,135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAC 1992-93</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>136,836,241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMIR 1993-96</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>43,977,383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAES 1996-97</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>42,928,145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIBH 1995-</td>
<td>Bosnia/Herzegovina</td>
<td>32,482,949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINURSO 1991-</td>
<td>Western Sahara</td>
<td>26,263,201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIKOM 1991-</td>
<td>Kuwait/Iraq</td>
<td>22,774,791</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUAL 1991-</td>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>10,855,779</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Rühe brought with him a self-confidence that derived from a long period spent on foreign policy. From 1982 to 1989 he had served as deputy chair of the CDU/CSU parliamentary party responsible for foreign and security policy. In addition, before becoming general secretary of the CDU in September 1989, he had been chair of the CDU’s federal expert committee on foreign policy. His ambitions were, in short, as a foreign policy specialist who had sought to carve out a distinctive CDU foreign policy from the FDP’s ‘Genscherism’. Rühe had wanted the position of foreign minister and had carefully cultivated contacts in Washington.¹⁷ His strong background in foreign policy meant that he started with a reputation of being prepared to ‘step on Kinkel’s toes’.¹⁸ His background gave him the confidence and standing within the CDU/CSU to frame his ideas about the Bundeswehr and defence and security policy in a wider context of foreign policy.

¹⁷ ‘Mehrzweckwaffe Volker Rühe wechselt auf die Hardthöhe’, Stuttgart Zeitung, 1/04/1992
¹⁸ Kohl’s Mann für den Notfall’, Frankfurter Rundschau, 02.04.1992
At the same time he had a clear political sense for the importance that Kohl attached to the FDP as a coalition partner and recognized that his own political career would not be helped by being seen as a divisive force. Hence he was careful to try to work closely with Klaus Kinkel as Foreign Minister, though relations were often very tense – for instance in 1993 over the date for withdrawal from Somalia and over the retention of German personnel in AWACS flights over Bosnia. By framing his thinking about Bundeswehr reform – notably the strengthening of its crisis management capabilities - as part of a stronger EU Rühe succeeded both in giving a new political direction to defence and security policy and in establishing common ground with Kinkel. He also made his position more attractive to SPD leaders, in relation to whom he carefully pursued a strategy of embrace (*Umarmungsstrategie*). This also enhanced his career options in the case of a future Grand Coalition with the SPD; he would then be a likely CDU Foreign Minister.

Rühe's self-confidence in policy leadership was reinforced by strong and explicit support from Kohl in three important areas: the strengthening of a European defence and security identity, dealing with the changed security environment in central and eastern Europe, and responding to the task of justifying the size of the German armed forces with the ending of the Cold War. He was especially active in promoting the importance of a crisis reaction capability for Germany as part of the EU, one of his stated aims upon taking office. This made the WEU a particularly important institutional venue for him to pursue policy change. As chapter 6 shows, Rühe was closely linked to the revival of the WEU as an instrument for a stronger European security and defence identity.

For this reason Rühe – backed by Kohl - used the German presidency of the WEU to push hard for the adoption of the Petersburg Declaration at its Bonn meeting on 19 June 1992. This initiative was designed to strengthen the WEU’s operational role by identifying peacekeeping, crisis management, and humanitarian and rescue roles as central to a redefined defence and security policy. Rühe argued that this role definition was consistent with the German constitutional mandate to ‘promote world peace’ and the prohibition on aggressive acts by Germany. It would help promote a

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19 Kohl’s Mann für den Notfall”, Frankfurter Rundschau, 02.04.1992
more secure and predictable environment within which the Bundeswehr could adapt smoothly to a new crisis intervention role, whilst bypassing difficult constitutional issues. Even so, leading SPD figures argued that the Petersburg Declaration represented a change to the Paris Agreement and Brussels Treaty and hence needed parliamentary approval. The Petersburg Declaration also created adaptive pressures for the Bundeswehr to enhance its capabilities.

This was swiftly followed by strong German support for two other developments. In July 1992 at its Helsinki meeting the CSCE decided to launch peacekeeping and other humanitarian operations. In December 1992 NATO agreed to participate in UN operations on a case-by-case basis, ending the formal ban on 'out-of-area' activities. Rühe was helping to create a 'top-down' Europeanisation/NATO-isation bandwagon effect that was bound to have strong domestic resonance and reframe the terms of domestic debate about military intervention. The effects were demonstrated in growing policy consensus that accompanied German participation in IFOR (Implementation Force) and then in SFOR (Stabilization Force) from late 1995 onwards.

Kohl also sought to embed the Bundeswehr more strongly in his policy on Franco-German reconciliation and European political unification, and Rühe was seen as an enthusiastic European (see chapter six). A Franco-German initiative of 1993 – previously submitted to the WEU for its approval - led to the formation of the Eurocorps, which was seen as a substantial contribution to realization of a European defence and security identity. Kohl sought – with the active co-operation of Rühe – to embed the Bundeswehr in a process of Europeanisation of its functions and identity and to give a practical expression to the work of the Franco-German Defence Council. This Council had been set up on initiative of the Federal Chancellor's Office to coincide with the 25th anniversary of the Elysée Treaty in 1988.

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22 'Neue Chancen aus der Wiedergeburt der Europäische Mitte', Welt am Sonntag, 12.06.94
23 'Plädoyer für eine neue Bundeswehr: Höchste Zeit für eine Grundlegende Reform', Das Parlament, 36/37, September 1995
Under Rühe, the WEU and the Franco-German relationship were instrumentalised for
the purpose of strengthening the political pillar of European integration and giving
clear political direction to the reformulation of defence policy in a changed context.\(^{24}\)
This political direction was informed by the perceived imperatives after German
unification of giving a defence and security dimension to an accelerated European
political union and of repaying the US for its support at a critical juncture in 1989-90.
Kohl was preoccupied with moving beyond the very limited endorsement to the idea
of a European security and defence identity in the Maastricht Treaty of 1991 (notably
the declaration on strengthening the role of the WEU as both the European pillar of
the Atlantic Alliance and the defence component of the EU).

Rühe was very skilful in combining agenda setting by pursuing a policy
entrepreneurship role in relation to specific crises with a broker role on defining
intervention policy. His skill rested in carefully managing domestic strategic
opportunities and constraints, especially the constraints of the institutional context.\(^{25}\)
The result was innovation in policy narrative with a new type of tactics for promoting
policy change. The new policy narrative justified a crisis intervention role for the
Bundeswehr in historical and political terms, in particular by nesting it within the
framework of European political unification (see chapter six).\(^{26}\) This was
accompanied by an opportunistic leadership strategy of ‘salami-slicing’ that involved
the creation of a series of \textit{faits accomplis}, designed to wrong foot opposition in the
SPD and within the CDU/CSU.\(^{27}\) This approach to policy change did not directly
challenge and seek to disempower the traditional policy monopoly and pursue radical
policy change by dislodging the policy image of \textit{Landesverteidigung} and of
conscription.\(^{28}\) Rühe was an experienced CDU and Bundestag politician and fully
aware of the institutional constraints represented by the Basic Law and the Federal

pp.26-29
\(^{25}\) See ‘Der Mann mit dem Bulldozer-Image verfügt über ein enggeknüpftes Netz von Kontakten in die
Bonner Parteien und in die Bundesdeutsche Gesellschaft.’, in ‘Volker Rühe, Der Bulldozer wird
Minister’, Berliner Morgenpost, 01.04.1992
\(^{26}\) ‘Nur ein geeintes und geschlossen hanlungsfähiges Europa ist für die USA ein gleichrängiger
4/1995, p.27
\(^{27}\) ‘Salamitaktik’, \textit{Die Zeit}, 17.01.1997
Constitutional Court, by the Länder and by the Federal Finance Ministry. This awareness shaped the complex leadership roles that he used to pursue a bolder change than under his predecessor.

Under Rühe policy change to the Bundeswehr was not just confined to secondary aspects of policy beliefs. It went beyond a long-term endogenous policy-oriented learning process in which policy professionals debated the technical aspects of security challenges and how best to respond. More important was the political element of policy leadership under Rühe. He situated external events and crises in a new policy narrative that sought to give a greater urgency and direction to policy change. His policy leadership in Bundeswehr reform mixed limited change to core policy beliefs with change to secondary aspects by relying on 'salami' tactics rather than confrontation and by a policy narrative that sought to change the boundaries of what was deemed to be both desirable and necessary. Despite the limited changes to core policy beliefs consequent on domestic institutional constraints, Rühe's 'salami tactics' represented a series of daring policy proposals about the role of the Bundeswehr. Their highly sensitive nature was evident in the difficulty that policy leadership faced in managing societal debate surrounding each extension of the Bundeswehr's role and alteration of its structure, notably over Bosnia.

Both Kohl and Rühe were determined to expand the role of the Bundeswehr beyond Landes- und Bündnisverteidigung. The Gulf War had set a small, but important precedent. Though his actions during the Gulf War had reflected a cautious leadership role of brokerage, Kohl's underlying thinking derived from the core beliefs of the 'freedom' coalition and was bolder. In particular, he sought to align the federal coalition government and the CDU behind a reinvigorated conception of German defence and security policy. This conception sought to firmly embed a reunited Germany within NATO and the UN, whilst simultaneously anchoring Germany

29 Interview, Herr Rudiger Huth, CDU/CSU Bundestagsfraktion, Arbeitsgruppe Verteidigung, Berlin, 26th August 2002
within the developing security framework of the EU (the so-called ‘not only/but also’
approach). Kohl and Rühe argued that this reinvigoration of German defence and
security policy could only be achieved through changes to the core policy beliefs
about the Bundeswehr. In the manner of policy entrepreneurs, they successfully
exploited the policy problems presented by Cambodia and Somalia in 1992-93 to
widen the scope of the Bundeswehr’s role, aided by the precedent set by the Gulf
War. This new leadership role involved Kohl and Rühe in creating a ‘crisis
consciousness’. Emerging policy problems were used as a referent for identifying a
crisis about reunited Germany’s position and role in the international community and
its willingness to assume its new responsibilities.

However, the German political system provides a number of veto points, notably the
ability to challenge the constitutionality of government policy. Kohl and Rühe’s
‘salami’ tactics were challenged by the SPD and FDP, which asked the Federal
Constitutional Court to rule whether the use of Germans in the NATO airborne early-
warning aircraft (AWACS) in daily monitoring of the UN-mandated ‘no-fly’ zone
over Bosnia-Herzegovina over the former Yugoslavia contradicted the Basic Law.
The Federal Constitutional Court’s landmark ruling of 12 July 1994 legitimated
Rühe’s strategy. It confirmed the constitutionality of Bundeswehr deployments in
peacemaking or peacekeeping operations as long as they were within WEU and
NATO missions under the authority of a direct UN mandate or Security Council
resolution and had the approval of two thirds of the Bundestag. This ruling created a
clear opportunity for the restructuring of the Bundeswehr in the light of its new
constitutionally approved roles.

Rühe’s early willingness to act as policy entrepreneur on reform of the Bundeswehr’s
structures to facilitate an extension of its roles was exhibited in key policy statements
of 1992 and 1994. During this initial period, up to the Federal Constitutional Court’s
ruling, he had prepared the Defence Ministry to take advantage of any window of
opportunity that might emerge consequent on political or policy developments. This

32 ‘Politiker mit Overdrive’, Rheinische Merkur/Christ und Welt, 03/06/1992
33 ‘The requirements of political and military security mean that no state in Europe is alone, Europe
must be developed into a true economic and military union that embodies a common foreign and
security policy’, in Rühe, V. ‘Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik: Die Rolle der Bundeswehr’, Internationale
Politik, 4/1995, p.26
willingness to be entrepreneurial was supported by General Klaus Naumann, the Generalinspekteur (General Inspector) of the Bundeswehr, who had also served under Stoltenberg and was a long-standing master of the bureaucratic politics of the Bundeswehr.

Both Naumann and Rühe sought to manage the post-Cold War 'flux' and ambiguity by embedding a reinvigorated German defence policy within NATO and the EU. The institutional venues of NATO and the WEU provided a means with which to 'manage' the domestic policy process by changing the range of actors involved and redefining the role of the Bundeswehr in terms of positive symbols of Germany's post-war rehabilitation. The use of institutional venues played an important role in Rühe’s policy entrepreneurship. Naumann was a pivotal player in this process. Already, under Stoltenberg, the requirements of these institutional venues had been used to develop and legitimate new thinking about the Bundeswehr. This thinking had first been spelt out in Stoltenberg's *Militärpolitische und Militärstrategische Grundlagen und Konzeptionelle Grundrichtung der Neugestaltung der Bundeswehr* (Reform of the *Bundeswehr*: Military Policy and Strategy and its Conceptual Framework).

The *Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien* (Defence Policy Directives, VPR) of November 1992 emerged as a key policy statement. Like Stoltenberg’s paper, the VPR stressed the need for the Bundeswehr to participate in, and orientate its structures and expertise, to the prevention, containment and resolution of crises and low-intensity conflicts. The VPR, taking into account the critical reaction to the Stoltenberg paper, presented similar proposals, but in a more 'palatable way'. Above all, its proposals were framed within the terms of the roles specified in the Petersburg Declaration. This was followed in 1994 by the White Paper on the Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Situation and Future of the Bundeswehr. This spoke boldly of the transformation of parts of the Bundeswehr into highly mobile

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34 The Trans-Atlantic Alliance and European integration remain Europe's decisive anchors of stability, 'Soldat in bewegter Zeit, General Naumann prägte die Bundeswehr im Umbruch', IFDT, 1/1996 p.14
crisis reaction forces (*Krisenreaktionskräfte*) which could cover 'the entire spectrum of possible missions', from peacekeeping and humanitarian aid to peace enforcement against guerrilla fighters to combat missions. Here the thinking of Naumann was most visible.\(^{37}\) Such missions were to take place within UN, NATO, WEU and CSCE frameworks, without precisely spelling out the conditions.

Rühe continually linked the importance of changes to the role and structure of the Bundeswehr as the only means to overcome German 'difference' on issues of security policy and to move towards European cooperation in the area of foreign and security policy as set out in the Maastricht treaty.\(^{38}\) German embeddedness in international institutions provided Rühe with the external discipline to control the range of competing ideas about the roles and structure of the Bundeswehr. To be legitimate they had to be compatible with this evolving framework; and Rühe was newly active in promoting the evolution of this international framework.

Analysis of Rühe's policy leadership highlights – in a way that the 'multiple streams' framework does not – the importance of its macro-level and meso-level institutional context. At the same time the way in which he acted out this leadership reflects a more complex relationship between actors and institutions than is allowed for either in sociological institutionalism or in the 'path dependency' variant of historical institutionalism.\(^{39}\) Rational action is more than just socially constituted. Institutions provide cognitive filters through which information and events are perceived and consequently shape how responses are formulated. However, as Rühe shows, policy leaders have a measure of autonomy and are not necessarily hostage to their institutional context. They are able to changes characteristics of the decision setting in order to enable access by other actors to the policy area – managing institutional venues. In this way leadership has direct effects on the institutional contexts in which action takes place, changing the environment and altering the tempo of action. Secondly, leadership can involve organizing and being affected by processes of policy-oriented learning. This learning is not just a process of discovering the


\(^{38}\) ‘Ein Plädoyer für Europa, Minister Rühe legt neues Buch vor – ‘Natioanlstaat Obsolet’’, *Die Welt*, 23/06/1994

strategic opportunities and constraints of the institutional context but also about the characteristics of problems and the cogency of policies.

Against the background of the new flux and ambiguity of the post-Cold War period, the Federal Defence Ministry provided an institutional context that both constrained and facilitated policy leadership. Rühe's 'salami' tactics can be understood in terms of his use of a series of key events to open up opportunities for strategic action. This action took the form of increasing the roles of, and consequent adaptational requirements on, the Bundeswehr within the institutional constraints of a Defence Ministry that was dominated by the concept of \textit{Landesverteidigung} and by the provisions of the Basic Law. However the Defence Ministry also presented opportunities for policy leadership by Rühe and Naumann as it was firmly embedded in NATO and Atlanticist in orientation. The ability of Rühe to use the institutional venue of NATO was crucially important. Rühe was able to legitimate his appeal for Bundeswehr reform by reference to the credibility of NATO in the context of the challenges of a new security environment.\textsuperscript{40} This in turn triggered and guided a process of policy-oriented learning amongst defence specialists that prepared the ground for further policy change.

Rühe's policy leadership was enabled by a changing strategic context that created the ambiguity necessary for major policy change. However, strategic context alone was not enough to force change. Rühe also displayed the leadership traits and skills needed by successful policy entrepreneurs, notably a high degree of self-confidence, political ambition, calculated risk taking, an activist leadership style and good sense of political timing. He was renowned for a coercive, autocratic and arrogant leadership style, earning him the nickname 'Volker Rüpel' (yob), 'bulldozer' and 'Rambo'.\textsuperscript{41} At the same time, like Kohl, Rühe was capable of striking an appropriate heroic pose of framing his policy leadership within a discourse of historical legitimation, citing the necessity to embed Germany within the international structures of NATO and the EU during a period of flux.\textsuperscript{42}

\textsuperscript{40} 'Höchste Zeit für eine grundlegende Reform', Das Parlament, 36/37, September, 1995
\textsuperscript{41} 'Volker Rühe, Der Bullozer wird Minister', Berliner Morgenpost, 1/04/1992
\textsuperscript{42} Rühe, V. 'Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik: Die Rolle der Bundeswehr', \textit{Internationale Politik}, 4/1995
Despite his reputation, Rühe was also careful to build support within the Defence Ministry and within the Bundestag for his policy proposals. He was careful to tailor his leadership style to a political system that was replete with potential veto points (in particular the German constitution). Rühe did this by engineering *faits accomplis* and then by the skilful binding in of opposition by taking opponents into his confidence. Entrepreneurship in agenda-setting on a Bundeswehr role in military intervention was accompanied by policy brokerage in translating this role into policy making and implementation.

Rühe's framing of his strategic action in support of a new military interventionism within the ideational context of international institutions involved an appeal to macro-political common deep core beliefs (notably Atlanticism and Europeanism) to justify changes to the policy core beliefs within the policy subsystem about the roles and structures of the Bundeswehr. This framing activity was particularly important for Rühe in 'softening up' key members of the Bundestag Defence Committee, managing the debate about policy options by stressing the necessity of embedding Germany within the institutional context of NATO and the EU. Rühe would later find resonance within the SPD membership of the Defence Committee by arguing that German action in Yugoslavia was crucial to the development of European Common Foreign and Security Policy. He was thus able to manage political developments to increase the prospects for acceptance of his preferred Bundeswehr policies when – according to the multiple streams framework - developments in the 'problem' stream made a coupling of politics and policies possible. This 'softening up' approach was decisive to Rühe's management of the process of change and involved a combination of 'salami tactics' with a persuasive policy narrative that resonated widely in the Bundestag Defence Committee and beyond. It also helped in refashioning the traditional cross-party political consensus about the Bundeswehr that went back to Adenauer.

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44 Interviews, CDU/CSU Bundestagsfraktion, Arbeitsgruppe Verteidigung, Berlin, 16th and 26th August 2002, see also 'Der Edel-Reservist', Die Woche 29/11/1997, and 'das Amt hat ihn verändert', Berliner Zeitung, 3/09/1997, see also ,Rühe has indirectly worked his way into the Foreign and Security decision-making processes of the SPD and Bündnis90/Grünen, certainly as a bogeymann, but also as a middlemann whose intentions are everything but militaristic'. in 'Die Erfolgsgeschichte eines Querdenkers', General-Anzeiger, 26/06/1998
This refashioning of the consensus was exhibited in the three critical decisions on German deployments to Bosnia by the Bundestag in 1995-6. In the first vote in June 1995 participation was supported by 386 to 258 (11 abstentions); in the second vote in December 1995 on IFOR participation support rose to 543, with 107 against (6 abstentions); in the third vote in December 1996 499 voted for participation in SFOR, 93 against (with 21 abstentions). With so many SPD and Green members of the Bundestag voting for deployment, Rühe felt able to write about a new consensus about the role of the Bundeswehr. The SPD defence spokesperson, Walter Kolbow, praised Rühe’s role in this process.

In this ‘softening up’ approach Rühe was aided by NATO force structure proposals that increasingly recognised the need for a crisis prevention capability. These proposals surfaced in the new Strategic Concept of November 1991, which looked to smaller, more flexible and mobile forces for crisis management as well as collective defence (endorsed at the Rome summit of the North Atlantic Council). This was followed by the proposal for Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) to facilitate NATO contingency operations, first endorsed at the Brussels summit of January 1994 and completed by the Berlin summit of June 1996. Similarly, changes within the force structures of Germany’s closest and most important security partners in Europe, Britain and France, also helped him to manage the agenda of Bundeswehr reform.

Not least, Rühe’s ‘softening up’ approach was assisted by intense media coverage of the carnage in Bosnia and Croatia, and the prevailing public sentiment that something had to be done to bring this to a halt and that German interests were directly engaged. Public opinion was a resource that Rühe could use to his advantage, especially in the Bundestag Defence Committee.

Rühe’s leadership style was clear in the particularly active role that he played in the Bosnian crisis. He prompted a visit of Green members of the Bundestag to Bosnia in

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46 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 17.12.96, also interview, Axel Schneider, SPD Bundestagsfraktion, Arbeitsgruppe Verteidigung, September 2002
order to ‘soften up’ members of the opposition. Rühe was also in close contact with key opposition members of the Bundestag, attempting to convince them of the need for German support for UN peacekeepers in Bosnia. This involved calling upon political favours that he done in the past and attending endless Bundestag committee sessions.

Thus whilst Rühe’s toughness and abrasiveness was displayed in his agenda setting on behalf of a new role for the Bundeswehr, his leadership style in policy making implementation can best be described as ‘consensual’, persuasive and accommodative. Whilst he used assertiveness to promote this new interventionist role, he recognized the importance of caution when seeking to gain domestic support for policy in the face of various veto players. Thus Rühe was careful to try to solve any problems within the coalition or between the coalition and the opposition before they came to public prominence by meeting with working groups of the coalition and influential figures of the opposition.

Rühe’s ability to ‘bind in’, bargain with, and accommodate opposition to his policy ideas on the Bundeswehr’s role was highlighted by Peter Glotz: ‘One has to hand it to Rühe, he is not just capable of shaming his political opponents, he can also listen to them and over the months give the feeling that he is taking their arguments seriously and championing them, as far as his role allows him.’ Rühe was, in short, a cunning political player, who modelled himself upon Kohl: ‘I have drawn my instincts from Helmut Kohl.’ Thus Rühe combined the key leadership traits and skills of a policy entrepreneur in agenda setting with those of a broker in policy making and implementation.

A final factor affecting Rühe’s leadership role and style was his own political ambitions. He was seen by many within the CDU/CSU as the ‘crown prince’

51 ‘Politiker mit Overdrive’, Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt, 03/06/92, see also ‘Auf dem Weg zum Gipfel’, Die Woche, 14/08/1998, see also ‘In talks with the working groups and with influential members of the opposition the minister has attempted to solve every problem before it became a problem’ in ‘Stehvermögen für die schnelle Gangart’, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 24/09/1992.
successor to Helmut Kohl. The Defence Ministry had developed a reputation as a dangerous political post, as the demise of Manfred Wörner and Stoltenberg illustrated. Therefore, it was necessary for the CDU/CSU that Rühe avoided becoming another 'victim' of the Defence Ministry. Whilst it was important for Rühe to maintain an image of a forward-thinking future leader of the CDU, he had to be careful not to alienate sections of the party. Hence he had to work very closely with Wolfgang Schauble, chair of the CDU/CSU parliamentary party – and the most important rival 'crown prince'. This aspect of political ambition adds another dimension to his consensual politics: he was keen to move away from the 'Rüpel' image that he had developed during his time as CDU General Secretary between 1989 and 1992.54

Kohl's and Rühe's behaviour as policy leaders over the period 1992-94 seems to accord well with the multiple streams framework in drawing out the way in which they sought to couple developments in the problems, politics and policies streams. They were focused on windows of opportunity to effect policy change through agenda setting. However, this theoretical account focuses on agenda setting rather than policy making and implementation. In the process it misses the importance of the domestic institutional context of their policy leadership and of the structuring of the policy process by the 'freedom', 'peace' and 'pacifist' advocacy coalitions.

What emerges as crucial for their policy leadership in agenda setting was their use of institutional venues like NATO and the WEU – and the moral legitimacy bestowed by UN peacekeeping operations – to effect domestic policy change. This created an opportunity to identify an objective basis for Bundeswehr reform in the need to adapt the Bundeswehr for a new role. It also created the basis for developing a policy narrative to justify change that was anchored in the reflexive multilateralism that characterized German policy. At the same time their leadership in policy making and implementation was designed to avoid enflaming political sensitivities about the use of the Bundeswehr and to negotiate the constraints of a semi-sovereign polity and its many potential veto players, including the Federal Constitutional Court. This meant that, in addition, to use of institutional venues, Rühe gave primacy to 'salami' tactics and to preparing policy change by encouraging a longer-term policy-orientated

54 'Im Profil: Volker Rühe', Süddeutsche Zeitung, 25/06/1998
learning process within the Defence Ministry under the guidance of Naumann. The institutional context conditioned the scope of policy change (no direct radical challenges to core policy beliefs), the mechanism of change ('salami' tactics), the process ('softening up' opposition and instigating policy-oriented learning) and the pace of change (incremental and slow). It did not, however, prevent Riihe from acting as policy entrepreneur in agenda setting on the role of the Bundeswehr or as policy broker in domestic policy making and implementation.

4.3 Volker Rühe as Policy Broker and Veto Player, 1994-1998: The Structure of the Bundeswehr and the Politics of Base Closures

The Federal Constitutional Court ruling of 1994 acted to remove the constitutional constraint that had impeded change to the core policy beliefs about the role of the Bundeswehr. In its wake Rühe continued to press ahead in developing its crisis intervention role. Thus in 1995 he sanctioned further Bundeswehr deployments, with 14 jet fighters sent to northern Italy to ‘protect and assist’ in the withdrawal of UNPROFOR peacekeepers. This was followed by strong Bundestag support for the IFOR and SFOR deployments. The extent to which policy learning had taken place amongst the SPD about the need for German involvement in such an operation was tied up with the horror of the Srebrenica massacre in 1995. In addition, the development of this role was twinned with the political consensus on the need for the development of a European defence and security identity.

However, and seemingly paradoxically, the period after the Constitutional Court’s landmark ruling heralded a new era of policy stasis on the structure of the Bundeswehr. This stasis was due to a combination of external factors that constrained Rühe from acting as a policy entrepreneur on the structural reform of the Bundeswehr and, correspondingly, led him to re-emphasise defence of the traditional role of Landes- and Bündnisverteidigung. The result was a situation in which the FDP

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55 Dorff, R.H. ‘Germany and Peace Support Operations, Policy After the Karlsruhe Declaration, Parameters, Spring 1996, pp.73-90
56 Interview, Dr. Wolfgang Biermann, Head of International Policy, SPD Parteivorstand, Berlin, 3rd. September 2002.
sought to position themselves as the radicals on Bundeswehr structural reform and Rühe – abetted by Kohl – emerged as policy veto player. Both Kohl and Rühe identified high political risks in implementing structural reforms and pursuing the logic for structures of the shift to a crisis management role. They also feared high political costs from using the Constitutional Court ruling to open up public debate about the Bundeswehr’s role.

The paradox was that the role shift towards crisis deployment continued – although with greater caution – whilst structural reforms were subject to veto. The greater caution about crisis deployments was seen over Albania in April 1997; Rühe, supported by Kohl, rejected Bundeswehr deployment after Kinkel had initially backed it. It was seen again in January-February 1998 over weapons monitoring in Iraq when Rühe again rejected deployment to the Gulf despite strong US pressure. These deployments would involve the Bundeswehr in peace enforcement and potential combat missions.

The crucial change was that Kohl’s political advisers identified electoral dangers in structural reforms to the Bundeswehr. They became much more cautious in 1993 and early 1994 when the prospects for the Kohl government in the forthcoming federal elections became bleak. Hence any notion of swift follow-up action on the Court ruling was ruled out as too politically dangerous. The narrowness of the CDU/CSU/FDP victory in the federal elections of September 1994 did nothing to change the judgement that reform of the Bundeswehr posed dangerous political risks. After past political embarrassments associated with Wörner (1982-88) and Rupert Scholz (1988-89), Kohl wanted above all stability in the Federal Defence Ministry. In a Bundestag context of a small majority Kohl wished to avoid political ‘bad news’

58 The necessary five ‘Länderverbände’ (State Party Groups) of the FDP called for a vote amongst the FDP membership on conscription. The young liberals stood against conscription, with Rainer Brüderle and Jürgen Möllemann. However many high-ranking FDP politicians were in favour of conscription such as Klaus Kinkel, Wolfgang Gerhardt, Guido Westerwelle and Günther Nolting; see ‘Rühe warnt FDP vor Irrweg bei der Wehrpflicht’, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 8th August 1997; see also ‘Die FDP legt sich ein Kuckucksei ins Nest’, Handelsblatt, 01/08/1997. The end result was in favour of the continuation of the party’s positive stance on Wehrpflicht with 41.84% for a Freiwilligenarmee and 56.98% for Wehrpflicht. However, only 19% of the party membership voted on the issue, short of the necessary 33% for the vote to carry weight. (‘FDP-Befragung: Für Wehrpflicht – aber nicht genugend Beteiligung’. (DPA 171333, November 1997)

59 ‘Kohl: Es bleibt bei der Wehrpflicht’, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 09/08/1997, on the potential costs of an end to Wehrpflicht and Zivildienst see ‘Helden an der Kostenfront: Ohne Wehrpflicht keine Zivis’, Was würde ohne sie aus dem Sozialsystem?’, Das Sonntagsblatt, 26/09/1997
with Bundeswehr reform, and Rühe’s career prospects were bound up with meeting this political requirement. Such political ‘bad news’ could have a negative impact on three critical Länderelections in March 1996 (Baden-Württemberg, Rhineland-Palatinate and Schleswig-Holstein) on which the capacity of the federal government to steer its legislative programme through the Bundesrat depended. In this changed political context Kohl feared that the Defence Ministry could generate too many ‘bad news’ stories, especially if its proposals involved large-scale base closures that could damage local economies and the careers of many CDU/CSU politicians and undermine the parties’ electoral-strategic interests.

The crucial factor restraining structural change to the Bundeswehr was the strong incentive for political manipulation of reform. Above all, Bundeswehr reform involved a high number of base closures across Germany that would be staunchly opposed by Länder governments and that would affect the electoral interests of a significant number of members of the Bundestag (MdBs). Bundeswehr reform also threatened the system of Zivildienst that was an important pillar of the German social system. Already, the reductions in the Bundeswehr that were consequent on German unification had led to the closure of many bases, necessitating large compensation payments to the Länder affected, and causing political conflicts with the Länder governments. These payments brought Bundeswehr reform firmly into the orbit of a Federal Finance Ministry that was already having to deal with the mammoth implications of German unification for budget deficit and debt levels.

The Finance Ministry had two particular concerns about base closures. Firstly, Theo Waigel was chair of the CSU as well as Finance Minister and enjoyed a particularly close personal and political relationship with Kohl. Unlike Rühe, Waigel was a

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60 Interview, Defence Ministry, Berlin, 6th August, 2002
61 Interview, Defence Ministry, Berlin, 6th August 2002
63 see ‘To abolish conscription and instead create a general service for all young men and women is financially risky and politically bound to fail...would one really employ 700,000 young men and women per year with a total cost of 21 Billion DM? Hence a professional armed force is without question more expensive than a conscript based armed force.’ in ‘Die Zivis sind untauglich für die Wehrpflicht-Debatte’, Welt am Sonntag, 07.07.1996 see also ‘Die Kostendämpfer: Der Streit um die Wehrpflicht beunruhigt die Wohlfahrtsverbände. Ohne Zivildienstleistende, fürchten sie, brüche die Alten und Krankenpflege zusammen’, Die Woche, 19.06.1996; Also interview in Finance Ministry, Bonn, 28th August 2002.
pivotal coalition player, and not least helpful to Kohl in managing a difficult relationship to the Bavarian prime minister, Edmund Stoiber. Waigel was above all concerned to prevent federal measures that would have negative economic and political impacts on the CSU in Bavaria. As CSU chair he had to be preoccupied with issues that affected the potential electoral performance of the CSU in both the Land and federal elections. This protected his political flank against Stoiber and was vital to the continuing political influence of the CSU and Waigel within the federal coalition government. Base closures were very unpopular in Bavaria, and their threat generated considerable local media attention and political mobilization. He could not afford politically to be associated with such unpopular measures when Stoiber was pursuing the more politically popular course of opposing them. Hence, for reasons of electoral-strategic interest, Rühe could not expect support from the Finance Minister for base closures. This narrowed Rühe’s political room for manoeuvre over Bundeswehr reform.

Secondly, and crucially, from the perspective of the Finance Ministry Bundeswehr reform was very much secondary to its own major policy project – ensuring that Germany’s commitment in the Maastricht Treaty to complete Economic and Monetary Union by 1999 at the latest was honoured. The overriding problem was that this commitment had to be honoured against the background of a swelling public debt consequent on the huge fiscal transfers after German unification and of slowdown in German growth and higher structural unemployment. The net effect was higher budget deficits. EMU strengthened the political pressure for fiscal consolidation because German negotiators, led by the Finance Ministry, insisted on the strictest possible application of the 3% budget deficit limit contained in the Maastricht Treaty as a prime condition to be met for the final transition to stage three. Again under pressure from his home state of Bavaria, where the CSU feared populist exploitation of the issue of losing the D-Mark, Waigel insisted on ‘3.0’ as a guarantee that the new euro would be ‘at least as stable as the D-Mark’.

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Reassuring German public opinion on the stability of the new currency played a critical role in Waigel’s definition of his political self-interests. Such reassurance depended first and foremost on Germany itself remaining within the 3.0 budget deficit limit. This view was backed unequivocally by Kohl who viewed EMU as the central project of his government and the test and measure of his reputation as the ‘Chancellor for Europe’. Hence Kohl and Waigel presented a firm and fixed axis on budget consolidation. Waigel’s prime task was to deliver a 3.0% budget deficit maximum for Germany in 1998. From this vantage point the end of the Cold War was seen as an opportunity to earn a large peace dividend. This dividend was earned in the form of huge cuts in the German defence budget over the 1990s. Rühe loyally delivered these cuts. Hence Bundeswehr reform was nested in a budgetary policy subsystem that gave top priority to EMU and to the peace dividend as a key contribution to budget consolidation.

66 See Table 4.2
Table 4.2 German Defence Spending 1991-2002 (In DM Bn.)

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(Source: Interview Partner from Finance Ministry, Bonn, 28th August 2002)

The implications of Germany's fiscal difficulties and EMU obligations for Bundeswehr reform were clear, not least for a Defence Minister who needed the political support of Kohl and Waigel for his career ambitions and who projected
himself within the CDU as a key foreign policy thinker. A major structural reform of the Bundeswehr modelled around crisis reaction capabilities would necessitate an initial injection of financial resources to compensate for the closure of a large number of barracks. The Finance Ministry was not prepared to make available the scale of resources required for such a compensation scheme. By 1996 it was becoming increasingly clear – and a source of political alarm in the Federal Chancellor’s Office – that Germany had not only failed to meet the Maastricht criteria at the first scheduled review of whether to proceed to stage three. More seriously, it risked failing to meet the conditions in time to qualify for the final date fixed for January 1999. The risk of acute political embarrassment was heightened because Waigel was taking the initiative in proposing a new tough Stability Pact – enshrining the 3% deficit limit in stage three with tough sanctions. Tough action to enforce fiscal discipline was crucial both for German reputation and for ability to meet its overriding political commitment to qualify for stage three by 1999. EMU was a key project for Kohl and meant that any increase in the defence budget was out of the question. A costly reform of the Bundeswehr would have been a political ‘hot potato’ and the kind of ‘bad news’ that Kohl wished to avoid.

As the last section showed, Rühe had been able to push through changes to the policy core of German defence and security policy. These changes were given structural expression in the VPR of 1992, with the creation of a crisis reaction force of 50,000 troops. The ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court in 1994 legitimised the CDU’s policy of extending the role of the Bundeswehr and represented a victory for Rühe’s policy entrepreneurship. It provided the opportunity to make further changes to the Bundeswehr, but this opportunity was not taken.

The Conceptual Guidelines for the Further Development of the Bundeswehr (Konzeptionelle Leitlinien zur Weiterentwicklung der Bundeswehr) of 1994 did little to develop the existing crisis reaction capability. It outlined a Bundeswehr of 340,000, containing 140,000 conscripts and 53,600 crisis reaction troops deployable at short

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67 Um den Büffel wird es einsam: Warum Theo Waigel immer Gewinner bleibt und Maastricht wichtiger ist als die Bundeswehr", Focus, 08/06/1996, also interview, Finance Ministry, Berlin, 14th August 2002
notice, with a military service of 10 months. These changes were justified in relation to recent NATO and WEU decisions (outlined above). There were also changes to the Bundeswehr’s command structure, with the General Inspector’s role strengthened, thereby further empowering the reform agenda of Naumann. However, this policy statement suggested a very cautious approach to policy change.

The strategic context had changed in ways that led Rühe to modify his leadership role, strategy and style. Above all, given his political ambitions as a future CDU chair/Foreign Minister/Chancellor, he did not wish to be linked in any way with electoral costs to the CDU/CSU, either in 1994 or in 1996. Rühe could not afford to incur the wrath of powerful regional political leaders like Erwin Teufel in Stuttgart. Also, he had to pay particularly close attention to Bavaria because of the pivotal role of the CSU in the federal coalition and the CSU’s importance for his career ambitions as Federal Chancellor. Moreover, Bundeswehr reform had become bound up with wider issues about the health of the German economy and political survival of the CDU/CSU.

The scale of the difficulties that this changed strategic context made for Rühe’s policy leadership were made clear to him by the reaction in the Bundestag and from the Länder to the programme of base closures contained in the ‘Ressortkonzept zur Anpassung der Streitkräftestrukturen, der Territorialen Wehrverwaltung und der Stationierung’ of 14 March 1995. It detailed the precise structure of the armed forces and details of base closures. The aim of the base closures was to release DM 1.5bn to increase the investment part of the defence budget from 21 per cent to 25 per cent by 1998. It involved reducing the Bundeswehr from 370,000 to 340,000 men. This ‘Ministry Concept’ led to widespread protest. The number of bases to be closed was reduced from 19 to 16 after Länder opposition, with large reductions (of around 500 soldiers) in a further 32 barracks (out of a total of 734 bases). The final concept

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68 Konzeptionelle Leitlinie zur Weiterentwicklung der Bundeswehr, Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Bonn, 12 July 1994

69 ‘Ressortkonzept zur Anpassung der Streitkräftestrukturen, der Territorialen Wehrverwaltung und der Stationierung’ Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Bonn, 15 March 1995

70 ‘Rühe macht 19 Standorte Dicht’, Frankfurter Rundschau, 15/03/1995; ‘Bundeswehr löst weniger Standorte als bisher vorgesehen’ 30/05/1995, DPA 311355. The concept was altered after heavy protests from the Länder, particularly from Schleswig-Holstein and Niedersachsen, where a number of barracks were saved.
was agreed in early June 1995. Evidence for the political targeting of base closures is provided by the way in which Baden-Württemberg, Schleswig-Holstein, Lower Saxony and Bavaria were notably successful in reducing the numbers of troops lost in their regions.

A number of patterns in the political targeting of base closures were discernible. First, there was a clear correlation between the pattern of complaints and the targeting of closures. By 28 April the Defence Ministry had received over 500 petitions from local authorities, politicians, trade unions such as the OTV (Transport and General Workers Union) and soldiers, in particular from Bavaria (112), Schleswig-Holstein (91) and Lower Saxony (77). These complaints detailed the negative economic consequences for their regions. By 30 May the Defence Ministry had received over 700 statements of protest from the Länder. This mobilisation was supported by active opposition of the Länder prime ministers – notably Edmund Stoiber in Bavaria, Heidi Simonis in Schleswig-Holstein, and Gerhard Schröder in Lower Saxony, as well as uproar in the local media.

Secondly, the timing and pattern of base closures were affected by both the national electoral cycle and the Länder electoral cycle, in other words by electoral-strategic interests. In Länder where there were forthcoming elections, Schleswig-Holstein and Rheinland Palatinate, a number of bases were saved, with other bases subject to smaller reductions than previously planned. Other Länder also benefited from revisions to the closure programme, including Lower Saxony, Bavaria, and Baden-Württemberg. In contrast, Bremen, Hamburg, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, Thuringia and the Saar saw no changes to their levels of troop reductions, Hesse one more closure and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern saved one base. The Kohl government’s weak popularity and electoral threat in the Länder provided an increased incentive for political manipulation of base closures.

Thirdly, the pattern of base closures suggested that key beneficiaries were ‘flagship’ Länder – ones that are seen as models of CDU/CSU policy success and that contribute

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71 ‘Um die Soldaten kämpfen’, Das Sonntagsblatt 24/03/95
72 ‘Bundeswehr löst weniger Standorte als bisher vorgesehen’ 30/05/1995, DPA 311355.
73 ‘Bundeswehr löst weniger Standorte als bisher vorgesehen’ 30/05/1995, DPA 311355.
disproportionately to CDU/CSU national electoral success. There seemed to be special Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg factors within the coalition, translating into a particular political weight for Edmund Stoiber and Erwin Teufel in Bonn.

The controversy surrounding Rühe’s base concept was to be expected. Nevertheless, it was an event that Rühe did not want to repeat, as it was a process that could make a number of political enemies, a factor that weighed heavily in his political calculations as potential successor to Kohl.74

There appears to have been a clear political manipulation of base closures. Rühe paid close attention to balancing the political costs and benefits of base closures. The result was a skilful combination of careful spatial targeting of reductions in proposed closures with a use of a ‘scattergun’ approach that spread the costs widely. Electoral threat and career calculations were central to these calculations of targeting and show just how important politics was in shaping Bundeswehr reform. In particular, in a federal system like that in Germany – where control in the Bundesrat is so important – there are particular incentives for targeting because of the implications of Länder election results for the federal government.

This experience shows that for reasons of political ambition and electoral and party strategy Rühe was not prepared to pursue the logic of his policy entrepreneurship on the crisis intervention role of the Bundeswehr into structural reforms. He was not willing to take unnecessary political risks beyond pursuing ‘salami’ tactics in developing this role by proposing the kind of domestic policy reforms to the Bundeswehr’s structure that were necessary to ensure an appropriate crisis reaction capability. This position of misfit between developing role and missing structural reforms left German defence and security policy and the Bundeswehr vulnerable to external criticism of a lack of logic.

Rühe adopted a complex policy leadership in this period. He was a policy broker in dealing with base closures, seeking to bind in a wide range of actors across party boundaries to support the reform. But on other issues of structural reform he shifted to

a policy veto role. In particular, he had to deal with the unanticipated effects of his 'salami' tactics in extending the role of the Bundeswehr. These tactics had set in place a dynamic of policy-orientated learning that was hard for him to control and that threatened to produce policy change that was politically threatening to him. Hence his political caution began to have effects within his leadership of the Defence Ministry. This was most evident in the controversy in May 1995 surrounding the development of a *Mehrzweckschiff* (multi-purpose ship).\(^7^5\) This ship was to cost DM 620 million and was designed for 700 soldiers with 271 tanks, transport vehicles and artillery, and room for 105 medics. Most importantly, it was purposefully designed for crisis operations, drawing on the lessons of the Cambodia and Somalia missions.\(^7^6\)

Rühe was unaware of the plans for the 'multi-purpose' ship and was only informed through an article published in *Marineforum* by Jens Detlefsen, who was the head of the study group in the *Führungsstab* (Leadership Staff) of the Navy and had been charged with the job of developing what had been an innovative concept of Naumann and *Stellvertreter Vizeadmiral* (Deputy Vice-Admiral) Hans Frank for a *Führungsschiff* ('Leading ship'). Rühe immediately torpedoed the plan. He feared that the ship would create increased pressure for Germany to involve itself in international military interventions. More seriously, it was designed purely for crisis interventions and hence challenged the primacy of the concept of the Bundeswehr as *Bündnisverteidigung*.

This kind of policy thinking was anathema to Rühe, who was concerned with careful management of policy development so that it caused minimum political disturbance. The electoral-strategic context offered more threats than opportunities, as the painful process of base closures demonstrated. Hence there was nothing in the politics stream to encourage him to a policy entrepreneur role. More seriously, Rühe's 'salami' tactics were in danger of becoming a 'ham' tactic, as the Defence Ministry began to develop its own dynamics of change as a result of policy-oriented learning. Any policy proposals emerging out of this learning process that challenged the core rationale of *Bündnisverteidigung* with new crisis reaction capabilities contained high

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\(^7^5\) 'Schiffversenken auf der Hardthöhe', Verteidigungsminister Rühe will ein gigantisches Rüstungsprojekt der Marine stoppen' Süddeutsche Zeitung, 03/03/1995

\(^7^6\) 'Schiffversenken auf der Hardthöhe', Verteidigungsminister Rühe will ein gigantisches Rüstungsprojekt der Marine stoppen', Süddeutsche Zeitung, 03/03/1995
political risks. The Defence ministry had developed a dynamic of policy orientated learning of which Rühe was losing control. Rühe had worked carefully to build a consensus with the SPD and Greens/Bündnis90 about Auslandseinsätze (Troop deployments outside Germany). Such a project would raise fears amongst the SPD and Greens/Bündnis90 about the development of an 'intervention army' and unravel this delicately constructed consensus. Rühe was concerned about proposals from within the policy subsystem that raised the sensitive issues of conscription and Zivildienst. More seriously, they suggested further base closures.

Another issue deterred Rühe from acting as policy entrepreneur on structural reform of the Bundeswehr: its consequences for the social policy subsystem. The abolition of conscription would spell the end of Zivildienst. Without its replacement by an Allgemeiner Dienst for both men and women, social policy, especially care services, would be placed under unbearable pressure. This issue added to the impetus within the CDU/CSU to resist any unnecessary changes to conscription by moving the Bundeswehr closer to a volunteer force. Such changes threatened to unleash a process of policy-orientated learning that would spill over from secondary aspects to core aspects of policy beliefs, meaning comprehensive first-order policy change. This social policy context helped to close windows of opportunity for policy change and impeded the 'politics of punctuation'.

Michael Glos, chair of the CSU Landesgruppe in the Bundestag, stressed this issue in the context of debate within the FDP about conscription (and Jürgen Koppelin's statement that the abolition of conscription was 'but a matter of time')

'Whoever begins to put a question mark over conscription must openly admit that the discussion about a general service (Allgemeiner Dienst) for men and women is tied to this...if conscription is abolished there is no more justification for Ersatzdienst.'

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79 DPA 0212209 July 96
The defence and security policy speaker of the CSU *Landesgruppe*, Christian Schmidt, took up the same position in a press release on 4th June 1996. Similar worries about the consequences for *Zivildienst* were also expressed by Dr. Klaus Rose (CSU), chair of the Bundestag Defence Committee.\(^1\) Michael Wonneberger, a member of Bundestag Defence Committee and chair of the CDU Brandenburg *Landesgruppe*, pointed out: ‘With the creation of a professional army the future of the *Zivildienst* and thus the effectiveness of many social institutions would be threatened... In the short run there is no possibility of compensating for this work.’ \(^2\)

Policy actors involved in social care prophesied disastrous consequences for the old, sick and disabled if *Zivildienst* were to be abolished. A voluntary social year was seen as an inadequate replacement for the ‘absolutely necessary’ service. According to Rüdiger Loehle, spokesperson for the *Bundesamt für den Zivildienst*: ‘If this disappears the state would have to finance other forms of this absolutely necessary service.’ \(^3\) Dieter Hackler, the *Bundesbeauftragter für Zivildienst* in the Federal Ministry for Family, the Elderly, Women and Youth, highlighted how, if *Zivildienst* were to be shortened to eight months, it would make it pointless as there would be very little time left for active service after training. \(^4\)

In short, the interlocking subsystems of social policy and defence and security policy made changes to conscription particularly complicated and difficult. The issue of structural reform to the Bundeswehr fell into the orbit of not only the Federal Finance Ministry but also the Federal Ministry for Family, the Elderly, Women and Youth and its minister Claudia Nolte (especially division 5: *Zivildienst* and welfare work). Rühe did not wish to court political difficulties with the social policy wing of the CDU. A professional army of volunteers might have been cheaper in the long run. However, the short-term costs were far too high to encourage policy entrepreneurship by Rühe – in terms both of base closures and of the repercussions for *Zivildienst* and welfare.

\(^1\) Presse Mitteilung, CSU Landesgruppe 2nd July 1996
\(^2\) Fernseh-/Hörfunkspiegel Inland II 22.02.96
\(^3\) DPA 160210 16 June 1996
\(^4\) DPA 07080 5 June 1996
\(^5\) Fernseh/Hörfunkspiegel 17/12/96
work. With the Finance Ministry looking to trim the budget, Bundeswehr reform threatened to add to financial burdens at an inopportune time.

Thus Rühe began to restrict policy making in the Defence Ministry to a small core of people who lacked creativity. His Denkverbot is an excellent example of how the control of information and policy learning is critical for a policy veto player to manage and dampen change. It shows how attaining a policy stasis requires active policy leadership. Rühe acted to remove any ‘threat’ to the status quo. Responding to pressure from the Federal Chancellor’s Office, and Kohl’s worries about the political consequences of a wide debate about conscription and Landesverteidigung, Rühe put in place a Denkverbot in the Defence Ministry about further changes to the structures of the Bundeswehr. Vordenkers were marginalized, and any challenging papers were filed away, not entering into broad discussion in the Defence Ministry.85

The seriousness of the ‘Denkverbot’ is demonstrated by the case of air force officer Jürgen Rose, a researcher at the George C. Marshall Centre. Rose was placed under a great deal of pressure by Rühe after questioning Rühe critically about conscription at a conference and publishing an article in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung that stated ‘conscription must and will end.’86 He was forced to resign his position. Above all, the Denkverbot was signalled by the replacement of General Naumann by the more conservative Hartmut Bagger in February 1996. Naumon had advocated an increasingly global role for the Bundeswehr, pleading in 1994 for the full participation of Germany in UN peacemaking operations.87 This put his position closer to that of Kinkel than that of Rühe.

Additionally, Rühe’s political position within the government had weakened, affecting his ability to act as a policy entrepreneur. He had poor relations with

85 Interview with Axel Schneider, Referent, SPD Bundestagsfraktion, Arbeitsgruppe Sicherheit, Berlin, 10th. September 2002, see also DPA 151210 December 1996
86 ‘Druck von Oben’, Der Spiegel, 1 December 1997; ‘Zapfenstreich für die Wehrpflicht’, Focus, 3 November 1997
87 ‘Neue Sicherheitsrisiken bringen der Bundeswehr neue Aufgaben’, 30/05/94, DPA 300442. See also ‘During his four and a half years in office, the departing General Inspector has more than once said and done things that have ignited serious internal political debates...on numerous occasions he has fallen out with his minister, also in public’ in ‘Abschied eines politischen Kopfs’, Der Tagesspiegel, 06/02/1995. Naumann had become too much of a loose cannon for Rühe and a political liability to his consensus building with the SPD and Greens. Naumann had once spoken of the ‘kampfauftrag’ in Yugoslavia.
Wolfgang Schaüble, the main heir apparent of Kohl. Schaüble held the powerful position of chair of the CDU/CSU parliamentary party and had no incentive to see Rühe succeed at the Defence Ministry. Rühe lacked the political following (Hausmacht) within the CDU to build support for, and push through, a radical reform of the Bundeswehr. From his constituency upwards (in Hamburg, which was an SPD ‘fortress’), his internal political support was weak so that he depended greatly on Kohl’s favour and hence was acutely sensitive to signals from the Chancellor’s Office.\(^8^8\) Rühe was in no position to engage in independent action, without Kohl’s support. This led to conceptual stagnation in the Defence Ministry, and a high level of apathy as the brakes were applied to any ideas of policy change that might touch on core beliefs about Landesverteidigung and conscription.

4.4 Policy Change Agents: Kinkel, the Foreign Ministry, the FDP and the Greens

However, there were actors in other policy subsystems and in the macro-political context who favoured opening up debate about not just the role but also the structure of the Bundeswehr. Most notably, Rühe’s Denkverbot did not extend to the Foreign Ministry under Klaus Kinkel. To the great irritation of both Rühe and Kohl, Kinkel sought out a policy entrepreneur role on Bundeswehr reform. In May 1997 a memorandum from the Foreign Ministry’s planning staff proposed a Bundeswehr of 250,000 men, with a reduction of conscription from ten to six months.\(^8^9\) This proposal surfaced in the context of an increasingly strained relationship between the FDP and CDU/CSU over the issue of conscription.

Kinkel was a supporter of conscription. Nevertheless, his proposals placed greater pressure on Rühe.\(^9^0\) The remodelled Bundeswehr would consist of 180,000 professional soldiers and 70,000 conscripts. The Foreign Ministry memorandum

\(^8^8\) See SPD Biography of Volker Rühe for 1998 Federal Elections, see ‘In the party, said one Christian Democrat, he has no friends and is lacking the necessary regional power base’, Woche, 29.11.97, see also ‘...The Hamburger has no real regional power base in the Party and little support in the parliamentary party’, Focus, 13.10.97, both articles quoted also in the SPD Biography of Rühe for the 1998 Federal Elections.

\(^8^9\) ‘Mit Berufsmarine aufgaben nicht zu erfüllen’, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 23 May 1997, see also ‘Unter Verschluss: Wie viele Soldaten braucht das Land? 250000 Mann sind genug, meint Kinkel’s Aussenministerium – zu Rühe’s Ärger’, Der Spiegel, 05/05/1997

\(^9^0\) ‘Mit Berufsmarine aufgaben nicht zu erfüllen’, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 23 May 1997, see also ‘Unter Verschluss: Wie viele Soldaten braucht das Land? 250000 Mann sind genug, meint Kinkel’s Aussenministerium – zu Rühe’s Ärger’, Der Spiegel, 05/05/1997
stressed the contradiction between the new problems and uncertainties thrown up by changes in the security environment and the current structure of the Bundeswehr and the consequent difficulties for German foreign as well as defence and security policy. The policy image of the Bundeswehr had negative effects for policy actors outside the policy subsystem. In particular, the state of the Bundeswehr, notably the need for greater investment in modern armaments, was of increasing concern to the Foreign Ministry, for whom the Bundeswehr was becoming an ever more important tool of foreign policy. This issue added to a series of serious conflicts of view between Rühe and Kinkel, notably over NATO enlargement. The NATO enlargement issue had been resolved in Rühe’s favour.\(^9\) However, it had left a legacy of strained political relations. Rühe resented Kinkel’s intervention on Bundeswehr reform as interference in his domain of ministerial autonomy and responsibility.

Rühe sought to fend off this criticism by appealing to NATO again, citing how Germany would lose its ‘weight’ and reputation within the Alliance through reductions in troop numbers. He also sought to veto policy change by linking the idea of a career army to a ‘world-wide intervention force’, an idea that was designed to strike a chord with the ‘peace’ coalition.\(^2\) The proposals of the Foreign Ministry were killed off, and the few copies of the memorandum that existed were filed away. In the view of the Federal Chancellor’s Office, the Foreign Ministry memorandum risked opening up a dangerous debate before the 1998 federal elections and raised potential problems for the CDU/CSU in forthcoming Länderelections.

Kinkel’s exercise in policy entrepreneurship can be seen as an attempt to couple developments in the problem and the politics streams. On the one hand, the Foreign Ministry’s proposals were a pragmatic response to the reality of a Bundeswehr that was increasingly stretched financially by its continued over-emphasis on Landesverteidigung at the expense of creating effective, well-equipped and mobile crisis reaction forces. The Foreign Minister favoured a UN-based, more global role for the Bundeswehr as a crisis intervention force. But the difficulties in an effective

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\(^2\) I don’t need a professional armed force. I would only need one if a I wanted to intervne worldwide in places like Hati’, in ‘Zapfenstreich fur die Wehrpflicht’, Focus, 03/11/1997
policy entrepreneur role on Bundeswehr reform resided in the politics stream. Here developments had simultaneously encouraged and frustrated this policy leadership role. Kinkel's difficulties stemmed from his lack of political weight and reputation to act as a policy entrepreneur on this issue. The FDP had suffered a series of 'public opinion' shocks from defeats in Länder elections, losing in 12 out of 13 elections between 1993 and 1995 and failing to overcome the 5 per cent hurdle in the nine Länder elections of 1993 and 1994. These sub-national electoral shocks led to the replacement of Kinkel as party chair by Wolfgang Gebhardt in 1995. Much of the responsibility was attributed to Kinkel's weak leadership as party chair, and hence he lacked political weight within the coalition government.

At the same time Kinkel was emboldened to act by the more assertive political strategy of the FDP before the federal elections. Faced by the prospect of being eliminated from the Bundestag in 1998, the FDP sought out a more distinctive policy profile. Kinkel had to respond to pressures emanating from within his own party, which were seeking to remodel FDP defence policy, to reflect the changing security environment. The idea of a more professional Bundeswehr fitted in with such a profile. The problem was that Kinkel had very little ability to draw on the politics stream for support on this issue. With Kohl keen that 'bad news' should be kept to a minimum, the opportunity for Kinkel to open up a policy window on Bundeswehr reform was non-existent. Kinkel lacked the ability to couple a compelling policy problem with a supportive politics stream. The internal debate within his own party - whilst forcing him to act - also served to weaken his political base for engaging in entrepreneurship. In short, Kinkel lacked a favourable strategic context for effective policy entrepreneurship.

Nevertheless, policy-oriented learning continued amongst the wider political elite. The Bundeswehr policy monopoly and its supportive policy image of Landesverteidigung and conscription faced a challenge from two fronts – ideological and pragmatic. Ideological criticism came from the traditional fundamentalist and pacifist wing of the Greens and pacifists within the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS). They shared a 'deep core' opposition to conscription based on the belief that
conscription serves to perpetuate the role of force in international relations. Pacifists within the Greens also stood for the abolition of *Ersatzdienst*. Along with pacifists in the PDS, they opposed conscription as part of a policy of dismantling the Bundeswehr and withdrawing from NATO in favour of a European peace order based on the CSCE as a regional organization of the UN. But these shared policy beliefs did not lead to the formation of a new advocacy coalition because pacifists in the Greens and in the PDS did not exhibit any co-ordinated action. The inhibiting factor is that such co-ordinated behaviour would have split the Green Party.

The second, more serious challenge was from what can be termed ‘pragmatic critics’: actors who questioned the rationale of *Landesverteidigung* directly, arguing that the core role of the Bundeswehr was now peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention. These actors also sought to abolish conscription, citing the need for better-trained, more professional forces able to engage in international crisis management and prevention tasks. The policy leaders here were within the ‘realist’ wing of the Greens, notably Joschka Fischer, and within the FDP. The FDP was initially the more important because it was within the Kohl government, with Kinkel as Foreign Minister. The FDP was split on this issue. Some younger members of the party argued that, in the context of the current international situation, conscription could no longer be justified, and that crisis management tasks required a fully professional Bundeswehr.

The FDP demonstrated well the extent to which policy learning was disseminating through the German political system, with the party taking the lead on this issue. The 1994 Constitutional Court ruling had broken the macro-political support for the *Landesverteidigung* policy image, allowing actors at this macropolitical level to question the relevance of established Bundeswehr structures, notably conscription. The FDP’s constitution allowed the party membership to vote on key issues, but such a vote required a proposal by five regional party associations (*Landesverbände*). In

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93 'Die PDS ist eine pazifistische Partei', Neues Deutschland, 14/11/1995
96 ‘Nur die Junge Union möchte an der Wehrpflicht festhalten: Vertreter der anderen politischen Jugendorganisationen dagen’, Der Tagesspiegel, 23/08/1997
August 1997 the hurdle for a vote on conscription was cleared. The FDP was split on
the issue. Its party chair, Wolfgang Gerhardt, Klaus Kinkel and Günther Nolting
backed the retention of conscription, Jürgen Koppelin, Jürgen Möllemann, the leaders
of a number of Länder branches of the FDP and the Young Liberals favoured a
volunteer, professional army. Following strong pressure from their coalition partner
the CDU/CSU, and Rühe in particular, the FDP finally decided to officially campaign
for the retention of conscription. However, the stage had been set for the FDP to
abandon this principle once it had a younger leader and was released from the
constraints of coalition discipline.

Within the Green Party the key entrepreneur on defence and security issues was
Joschka Fischer. He used the events in Srebrenica in 1995 to reframe Green thinking
about these issues, in particular two major impassioned speeches in the Bundestag
that had a resonance and influence within the ‘peace’ coalition and the wider political
Left in Germany. At maximum the ‘peace’ coalition and the political Left had been
prepared to envisage a Bundeswehr committed to territorial defence. Fischer argued
that for reasons of history Germany could not distance herself from violations of
human rights and dignity in the rest of Europe. He considered it Germany’s historic
and moral responsibility to ensure that Auschwitz would never again happen on
European soil. Srebrenica required Germany to rethink its defence and security
interests.97

Fischer’s views had clear implications for the Bundeswehr’s future role and structure.
It would have to be restructured as the instrument of a security policy that focused on
crisis prevention, humanitarian intervention, civilian policing and a wider framework
of political, economic and social reconstruction. For historical and moral reasons,
Germany would play a lead role in multilateral and, above all, European structures
that would undertake these tasks. Hence Fischer pushed the idea of Europeanisation
of the Bundeswehr’s role and structures.98 It was also clear that such highly complex
and specialized tasks required a much more professional Bundeswehr. Nevertheless,

97 Interview, Helmut Hüber, Referent, Büro Anglika Beer MdB. Green/Bündnis 90 Bundestagsfraktion,
Berlin, 18th July 2002, also interview with Michael Alvarez, Heinrich Böll Stiftung, Berlin, 13th.
98 Interview, Helmut Hüber, Referent, Büro Anglika Beer MdB. Green/Bündnis 90
Bundestagsfraktion, Berlin, 18th July 2002, also interview with Michael Alvarez, Heinrich Böll
despite Jürgen Trittin's backing for Fischer's views, at the Magdeburg party congress in March 1998 just before the elections, the Greens continued to see the abolition of conscription mainly in terms of a move toward the demilitarisation of Germany and a 'humanization' (Zivilisierung) of foreign policy.99

4.5 Adapting to Rühe: The SPD and the Deferral of Bundeswehr Reform

Paradoxically, Rühe had fewer problems with the opposition SPD than with his coalition partner, the FDP, over conscription. A key explanation is to be found in the shared character of the CDU/CSU and the SPD as Volksparteien, afraid of alienating voters through base closures and through the damaging social effects of ending Zivildienst along with conscription. Such fears of electoral damage were less pressing for the FDP and for the Greens. On Bundeswehr reform the SPD was relatively open to a wide range of interests, manifesting a high degree of internal pluralism, especially in social policy. This electoral-strategic factor was reinforced by the SPD's interest in profiling itself as a 'government-in-waiting' and counteracting its lack of credibility on defence and security issues by being seen to act responsibly on issues like Bundeswehr reform.100

The plurality of policy beliefs on defence and security was an additional factor impeding SPD policy change on the Bundeswehr. Internal SPD policy leadership was essentially about brokering agreement amongst the three advocacy coalitions that ran through it. Hence the SPD had a problem of presenting a united face on Bundeswehr reform other than around vague generalities. A crucial influence on policy brokerage was the past identification of two key actors - Oskar Lafontaine and Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul - with the New Left's rejection of a Bundeswehr role in out-of-area operations, even for peace-keeping. As Lafontaine stressed at the Mannheim party conference in November 1995 on his election as party chair: 'we want to remain a

99 'SPD lehnt Berufsarmee ab: Plädoyer für Wehrpflicht', Welt am Sonntag, 21 June 1996
peace power... we stand back when it comes to military operations, and so it shall stay.101

A third factor was the internal institutional context of the SPD. Its effects were complex. The institutional context gave a great deal of power and influence to a very small group of SPD parliamentarians in the Bundestag Defence Committee and the security policy working group. As a Fachausschuss the Defence Committee was strongly permeated by norms of Sachlichkeit and consensus. Here a strong role was played by traditionalists on conscription like Walter Kolbow (the SPD's defence spokesperson) who were close in policy positions to traditionalists in the CDU like his counterpart Paul Breuer. Rühe was particularly skilful in exploiting these working norms of the Bundestag Defence Committee through his technique of 'salami slicing'.102 On the other hand, the SPD was a weakly institutionalised party, characterized by 'loosely coupled anarchy' in which the federal, regional and local levels displayed a high degree of autonomy of each other.103 The result was considerable opportunity for personal rivalries, internal frictions and lack of party discipline to express themselves, especially between the party chair and powerful regional leaders. Regional SPD leaders were especially sensitive to the political implications of base closures and keen to deal directly with Kohl and Rühe on this issue. They were otherwise largely uninterested in defence and security policy questions and had little expertise in this area. In this context it was difficult for the SPD leadership to plot a clear direction of policy change on the Bundeswehr's role and structure. The key leadership resource for overcoming this 'loosely coupled anarchy' was appeal to the SPD's shared electoral-strategic interest in becoming a party of government (above all by being perceived in these terms by the electorate).

The period 1995-97 was critical in SPD thinking about defence and security policy and about the role and structure of the Bundeswehr. Crucially the policy context changed, especially as the SPD had to face up to the implications of the Constitutional Court ruling of 1994 and then digest the horrors of Srebrenica. How the SPD

101 Parteitag der SPD in Mannheim 14-17 November 1995
102 Interview, Axel Schneider, SPD Bundestagsfraktion, Arbeitsgruppe Verteidigung, Berlin, 10th. September 2002
103 Lösche, P. (1993) 'Lose verkoppelte Arnachie: zur aktuellen Situation der Volksparteien am Beispiel der SPD' Politik und Zeitgeschichte, Vol.43
responded to these exogenous events was shaped by the preoccupations of the party leadership with both electoral-strategic interests and ideological renewal. Those most actively concerned with the SPD’s foreign, European and defence policies - Kolbow, Rudolf Scharping (chair of the SPD parliamentary party), Norbert Wieczorek (chair of the Bundestag European Affairs Committee), Wieczorek-Zeul (the SPD’s European spokesperson) and Günther Verheugen - were alert to the need to establish the SPD as competent on defence and security issues for the 1998 federal elections. Here the SPD had been traditionally vulnerable, and had to reappraise policy in the wake of the 1994 ruling and Bosnia.

This preoccupation with establishing the SPD as a government-in-waiting concentrated political attention on the importance of unity within the SPD’s federal executive and presidium. It also involved the elite level of the federal executive and presidium leaving the details of defence and security policy to a small group of SPD parliamentarians in the key policy groups both at SPD headquarters and within the Bundestag as well as within the Bundestag Defence Committee. During the period of opposition the working groups played an important role in policy formation, with the same very small number of actors figuring prominently across these forums. As defence spokesperson, with one foot in the Bundestag Defence Committee (and its norms of Sachlichkeit and consensus) and the other in the SPD’s internal policy groups, Kolbow was a pivotal actor in determining the scope and degree of policy change on the role and structure of the Bundeswehr. The security policy working group around Kolbow played an essentially reactive role to Rühe’s initiatives. Fine-tuning the details of SPD policy and differentiating the SPD within the consensus about the Bundeswehr by a somewhat differently weighted ordering of priorities.

Secondly, as new party chair after his November 1995 putsch against Scharping, Oskar Lafontaine sought a new ideological unity as a motor for identifying the SPD with policy change. This motor was in a new stress on the Europeanisation of SPD

106 ‘Tabubruch mit Rücksicht auf den Wahlkampf vertagt’, Die SPD will jetzt erst die Experten sprechen lassen’, Berliner Zeitung, 9th June 1997
policies and their nesting in the Franco-German relationship. By reframing policy in this way Lafontaine aimed to provide not just a new dynamic of change but also a greater respectability for new policy ideas by linking them to the consensual theme of closer European integration. This stronger European dimension to SPD policy thinking was in the first instance through collaboration with the French Socialist Party and was coloured by the French party’s interest in European defence and security. SPD policy thinking on defence and security was in short linked to a new external dynamic of Europeanisation that was essentially 'bottom-up' (see chapter six).

Hence Lafontaine’s arrival as party chair was a catalyst for policy change. This strategic orientation empowered Wieczorek-Zeul as a presidium member and head of the *Koordinierungsstelle* (co-ordination point) for European policy and of the *SchwerpunktKommission* on EU affairs established by the Mannheim conference in November 1995 (and including Scharping and Wieczorek) to clarify European policy for the 1998 federal elections.\(^\text{108}\) It also led to the EU Affairs working group of the SPD parliamentary party taking a greater interest in defence and security policy issues and seeking to co-ordinate it through the 'cross-cutting' group (*Querschnittsgruppe*) on European policy. Even so, defence and security played a subordinate role in this European policy work compared to the much more electorally salient issues of economic growth and employment. The result of the different electoral priorities between economic and defence issues was that the SPD’s defence specialists around Kolbow were not put under strong new pressures to adapt policy on the role and structures of the Bundeswehr.

By these means SPD leaders sought to organize processes of policy-oriented learning with a view to brokering policy change amongst the three key advocacy coalitions that cut across the party in defence and security policy. As Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith suggest, such processes tend to be long term and result only in changes to the secondary aspects of policy beliefs. Hence they would not lead one to expect significant policy change before the 1998 elections. Nevertheless, the SPD underwent

\(^{108}\) ‘Tabubruch mit Rücksicht auf den Wahlkampf vertagt’, Die SPD will jetzt erst die Experten sprechen lassen’, Berliner Zeitung, 9th June 1997
a deep internal debate about the foundations of its defence and security policy. This policy learning was aided by public debates about the role and structure of the Bundeswehr and the relevance of conscription organized by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung - for instance, on 7 September 1995 between Karl Feldmeyer (FAZ), Pfr.i.R. Ulrich Finck (Organisation for Conscientious Objectors.), Oberst Bernhard Gertz (Chairman of the Bundeswehr Trade Union.), and Walter Kolbow. Similar events also took place in 1997 such as ‘Allgemeine Dienstpflicht: Alternative zur Berufsarmee’ (General Service: An Alternative to a Professional Armed Force) with the same participants, apart from Walter Kolbow. This new debate within the SPD (and also the FDP) also provided an opportunity for researchers within universities (like Professor Ingo von Münch in Hamburg) and research institutes to promote professional armed forces. Thus Dieter S. Lutz of the Hamburg Institut für Friedenforschung (Institute for Peace Studies) suggested that estimated savings from the abolition of conscription could amount to between DM 4.2 and DM 13.2 billion.

This stress on policy leadership by brokerage and by organizing policy-oriented learning was accompanied by the efforts of some key actors on defence and security policy within the SPD to act as policy entrepreneurs on behalf of a professional volunteer Bundeswehr. They identified the potential for radical policy change opened up by the internal ‘flux’ within the SPD in 1996-1997 opened up by events in Srebrenica, by armed forces reforms in both France and the UK, by tightening financial constraints on the Bundeswehr, and by the new challenges of out-of-area operations. The SPD Commission on foreign and security policy under Rudolf Scharping offered an internal opportunity to open up debate about the role and structures of the Bundeswehr in time for the Hannover party conference in December 1997. In the summer of 1996 Manfred Opel, who had been critical of conscription since unification, began to press for a volunteer army, with the support of Hans

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111 ‘Die neue Spartruppe: Experten halten eine verkleinerte Freiwilligenarmee für weitaus kostengünstiger und mindestens ebenso kampfenstark’ Die Woche, 26 July 1996.
Wallow, and using the media to attempt to build support. However, the SPD was quick to distance itself from Opel's position. Kolbow, Scharping, Karsten Voigt and the Minister President of Lower Saxony, Gerhard Schröder, all spoke out in favour of conscription. They were supported by other members of the 'policy monopoly' notably FDP and CDU members of the Bundestag Defence Committee, led by Paul Breuer (the CDU's defence spokesperson) and Günther Nolting (FDP). Nolting accused Opel and Wallow of being 'populist and wrong'; Breuer termed them 'once more offside of the opinion of the SPD Fraktion'.

Behind the defence of conscription by SPD and CDU members of the Bundestag Defence Committee lay a real concern about the disadvantages of a volunteer army. Of paramount importance to the SPD leadership, and empowering traditionalists like Kolbow over policy entrepreneurs was a deep fear of the consequences of the abolition of conscription for Zivildienst and the effects of its abolition on the social system. Its abolition would open up a difficult debate about whether to create a Freiwilliger Allemeiner Dienst for both men and women in Germany. For the SPD the issue would also be a divisive factor in any possible coalition negotiations with the FDP or the Greens after the 1998 elections: both the FDP and the Greens were in favour of the abolition of any obligatory service. But above all, as highlighted below, the necessary social spending that would result from the lack of Zivildienstleistende or Allgemeindienstleistende would cripple the social system. Thus raising the issue of abolition of conscription was an acutely sensitive and risky venture for the SPD in the run up to the 1998 federal elections, especially as it sought to differentiate itself from the Kohl government as the party of solidarity and modernization with social justice.

113 'SPD debattiert über Wehrpflicht', Stuttgarter Zeitung, 26 August 1996; 'Vorstoss aus der SPD zur Aufhebung der Wehrpflicht', Berliner Zeitung, 29 August 1996
114 DPA 2815336 28 August 1996.
115 Fernseh/Hörfunkspiegel, Info am Morgen 28/08/96
116 Interviews, Finance Ministry, Bonn, 28th August 2002, see also 'Die Zivis sind untauglich für die Wehrpflicht Debatte', Welt am Sonntag, 07/07/1996; the article highlights how a 'Zivi' costs 1500 Dm per month and that the state would have to pay at least twice that for a professional in the same position. The state would have to employ an extra 700,000 men and women at a total cost of 21 Billion DM per year. Whilst the article stresses how this formally has no effect on the Bundeswehr debate (because 'Zivis' are not supposed to occupy jobs which could otherwise be filled by professionals (the principle of Arbeitsmarkt Neutralität) the article recognises that this would mean a professional army would certainly be more expensive than a conscript army and hence politically and economically very risky. See also 'Die Kostendämpfer', Die Woche, 19/06/1996
In December 1996 the SPD's parliamentary party chair, Rudolf Scharping, set forth his concept for SPD policy on the Bundeswehr. By exploiting events and developments in the 'problems' stream, he attempted to create a 'crisis consciousness' within his own party, stressing that the roles, structure and resources of the Bundeswehr were no longer compatible.\textsuperscript{117} Scharping's timing was aided by the internal debate taking place within the FDP, the coalition partners of the CDU/CSU, about conscription. It followed a paper that surfaced in the SPD in November 1996 from the working group on the Bundeswehr, based on close links to the armed forces. This paper proposed that the SPD should continue to support conscription but that the Bundeswehr was in need of modernisation and legitimation in a changed security environment and increasingly tight financial constraints. The proposals were strongly influenced by a letter sent from the \textit{Wehrbeauftragterin} Claire Marienfeld in August 1996, outlining the poor state of the armed forces. The SPD experts went as far as to warn that at current levels of expenditure the only means of sufficiently increasing the Bundeswehr's share of the budget would be to abolish conscription. Strikingly, the \textit{Arbeitskreis} stressed that the abolition of conscription would have no negative consequences on the integration of troops into society.\textsuperscript{118} In short, in the context of the increasing financial constraints placed on the Bundeswehr, it was becoming harder to justify conscription.

Scharping sought to twin this policy 'problem' with a new policy by proposing a Bundeswehr that would be reduced to 300,000 men, with conscription cut from 10 months to 6 months. This would free up money within the Bundeswehr's budget in order to increase investment in new equipment and weapons, allowing the Bundeswehr to fulfil both territorial defence and crisis prevention roles equally.\textsuperscript{119} Scharping was not in favour of abolishing conscription. Indeed, he was attempting to bolster it by a reform that would maintain its health into the 21\textsuperscript{st} century. However, Scharping was also keen on stressing the importance of developing compatibility between European armed forces, opposing the Eurofighter project on the grounds that common transport and satellite capabilities were the key assets that should be

\textsuperscript{117} Welche Armee soll's dann sein?' Die Zeit, 27/12/1996, see also 'Bonn weiterhin gegen eine Berufsarmee', Neue Zürcher Zeitung', 21/12/1996
\textsuperscript{118} 'SPD-nah Soldaten: Vier monate Wehrdienst genügen', Ekkehard Kohrs, General-Anzeiger, 14 November 1996
\textsuperscript{119} Welche Armee soll's dann sein? Die Zeit, 27/12/1996, see also 'Bonn weiterhin gegen eine Berufsarmee', Neue Zürcher Zeitung', 21/12/1996
developed. In short, Scharping wanted to modernise SPD thinking on defence and security policy, by allowing Germany to play an active role in the development of a European defence and security identity. This fitted in with Lafontaine's priority to Europeanisation of SPD policy and the policy ideas of Wieczorek-Zeul.

Meanwhile, the 'flux' and ambiguity about defence and security policy occasioned by exogenous events and developments led to alternative proposals from other policy entrepreneurs, most notably Verheugen and Wieczorek-Zeul. They also sought to create a 'crisis consciousness' and mobilise support for a broad debate that would question the relevance of conscription in the changed security environment, including the abolition of conscription in France. Verheugen was also an advocate of a possible Red/Green coalition after the 1998 elections. Verheugen and Wieczorek-Zeul proposed a defence and security concept to the Scharping's Commission, advocating an end to conscription.

The internal debate within the SPD on Bundeswehr reform came to a head just before the 'Fachkongress' on 18th June 1997. Above all, the SPD federal executive and presidium was keen to avoid a debate about conscription breaking out at the Hannover party conference in December from which the CDU/CSU could profit electorally. The SPD leadership decided that the internal debate had to be resolved in the Commission before 18th June. The attempts at policy entrepreneurship by leading SPD figures on this matter made it clear to the leadership that the SPD was on the brink of a potentially harmful political debate. The SPD Commission led by Scharping had been effectively taken over by Verheugen. Thus the SPD party leadership sought to stamp out the debate, empowering the traditional 'policy monopoly' supporting conscription and territorial defence as the core role of the Bundeswehr within the SPD. The Commission ended in a victory for supporters of Walter Kolbow and Volker Kröning. Kröning had advocated a model that was designed to reinforce conscription, reducing the Bundeswehr from 340,000 to 250,000, and the percentage of *Berufs- und Zeitsoldaten* from 55 to 50 to create more places for conscripts.

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120 Interview, Rudolf Scharping, Berlin, 5th June 2003
121 'SPD will ganz neue Bundeswehr', Bild am Sonntag, 15 December 1996
122 'Tabubruch mit Rücksicht auf den Wahlkampf vertagt', Berliner Zeitung, 09/06/1997
123 'Tabubruch mit Rücksicht auf den Wahlkampf vertagt', Berliner Zeitung, 09/06/1997
retaining an average service length of nine months.\textsuperscript{124} Kröning was keen that the SPD remain strong supporters of conscription, ensuring that - in the event of a coalition with the Greens - it would not be the first.\textsuperscript{125}

Had Verheugen and Wieczorek-Zeul’s position prevailed, their policy entrepreneurship could well have led to the formation of an advocacy coalition uniting members of the Greens, the SPD and followers of Koppelin and Möllemann in the FDP behind a professional armed force. Scharping’s reduction of conscription to 6 months would also have placed real pressure on the policy monopoly of territorial defence, by leaving little time after training for active service. Whilst Kolbow’s concept was not implemented, he found a means of attaining his goal of securing the party’s stance on conscription by proposing a \textit{WehrstrukturKommission} after the elections. Rather than modernising the SPD’s policy to fit the changing security environment, the traditionalists within the SPD (the ‘experts’ led by Kolbow) were empowered by the SPD leadership to outline the SPD’s official position as: \textit{‘Die Landes- und Bündnisverteidigung bleibt auch in der Zukunft die Kernaufgabe der Bundeswehr’} (‘Territorial and Alliance Defence remains for the future the core task of the Bundeswehr’).\textsuperscript{126} It was deemed that Germany’s security would be best protected through a Bundeswehr compromising of both professionals and conscripts.\textsuperscript{127} There were concerns amongst SPD traditionalists and supporters of conscription that professional armed forces encouraged ‘Rambos’. In contrast, conscription promoted transparency in the Bundeswehr, forced politicians to carefully scrutinise each troop deployment and provided well-qualified and educated recruits.\textsuperscript{128} The result was an acceptable compromise to all sections of the SPD, allowing debate about a sensitive issue to be postponed until after the federal elections. As Kolbow stated: ‘Die Leute die die Wehrpflichtdebatte zu früh haben wollen haben wir gebremst’ (‘We have put the brakes on those who started the debate on conscription too early’).\textsuperscript{129} Oskar

\textsuperscript{124} ‘Tabubruch mit Rücksicht auf den Wahlkampf vertagt’, Berliner Zeitung, 09/06/1997
\textsuperscript{125} ‘Tabubruch mit Rücksicht auf den Wahlkampf vertagt’, Berliner Zeitung, 09/06/1997, Kröning is quoted as stating, ‘Die Wehrpflicht darf nicht nach der Wahl die erste Konzession der SPD an die Grünen sein’.
\textsuperscript{126} ‘Tabubruch mit Rücksicht auf den Wahlkampf vertagt’, Berliner Zeitung, 09/06/1997
\textsuperscript{127} ‘SPD lehnt Berufstarmee ab: Plädoyer für Wehrpflicht’ Welt am Sonntag, 21 July 1996
\textsuperscript{128} ‘Zapfenstreich für die Wehrpflicht’, Focus, 3 November 1997, plus interviews in SPD Bundestagsfraktion, Arbeitsgruppe Aussenpolitik/Verteidigung, June-September 2002
\textsuperscript{129} ‘Tabubruch mit Rücksicht auf den Wahlkampf vertagt’, Berliner Zeitung, 9 June 1997
Lafontaine had succeeded in dampening down the debate that had surrounded Scharping's public proposal for his concept of the Bundeswehr.\textsuperscript{130}

In short, whilst a significant degree of flux existed within the SPD, the problems and politics streams could not be effectively coupled, as the electoral-strategic interests of the party and internal divisions of policy belief on defence and security militated against a clear policy position on the abolition of conscription. Electoral-strategic interests closely followed opinion poll figures. Quoting Stefan Schmitz in the aftermath of the deployment of conscripts to deal with flooding of the river Oder in the summer of 1997: *Die Bundeswehr ist so populär wie selten in ihrer Geschichte. Über 60% sprechen sich in Umfragen für die Wehrpflicht aus* ('The Bundeswehr is more popular than ever before in its history. In opinion polls over 60% speak out in favour of conscription').\textsuperscript{131} The German public had a high level of trust in the Bundeswehr during the 1990s. In 1995 the Bundeswehr ranked third in a poll measuring the trust of Germans in their institutions, with 74% of those polled expressing trust in the institution, behind schools (77%) and universities (80%).\textsuperscript{132}

Whilst other polls contradicted these findings and showed many Germans were in favour of a professional armed force, the Germans were more cautious about the abolition of Zivildienst. The conclusion drawn by party strategists was that the abolition of conscription would be a vote loser – the economic repercussions would be severe, particularly in the short term, necessitating large-scale base closures and bringing Zivildienst into question, another sensitive and potentially costly issue. Over 140,000 Zivildienstleistende were active in Germany in 1997, each costing DM 1,000 per month. If this work were to be undertaken by professionals, the cost would rise to DM 3,700 per post, per month.\textsuperscript{133} Such were the conclusions resulting from an internal discussion paper in the SPD on Zivildienst that also had an important influence upon the conscription debate. The paper argued that the abolition of Zivildienst (an inevitable consequence of a professional army) would reduce the


\textsuperscript{131} ‘Zapfenstreich für die Wehrpflicht’, Focus, 3 November 1997, also see Frage der Woche, RTL (Representative Forsa-Umfrage im Auftrag von RTL, 11 August 1997)

\textsuperscript{132} EMNID-Umfrage August 1995

\textsuperscript{133} Material from SPD interview partner
quality of service to the most vulnerable in society, in particular those with severe disabilities. The financial implications of ending Zivildienst would be that many people with disabilities would no longer be able to live independently in their own homes but instead would have to be placed in homes for the disabled.

Such conclusions raised alarm bells within the SPD – the abolition of Zivildienst would have the effect of creating a very difficult situation for the SPD and would be deeply unpopular, particularly amongst core SPD support, striking deeply at SPD principles. The SPD was committed to defending and bolstering the rights of the vulnerable in society, according to the principles set out in the SPD’s basic programme agreed at the Berlin party conference on 20 December 1989, and modified at the Leipzig conference on 17 April 1998. After the decision of the SPD to put in place a WehrstrukturKommission (Commission on the Structure of the Bundeswehr) after the 1998 elections, even Verheugen began to modify his position and become increasingly moderate on the question of Bundeswehr reform, actively promoting the idea of a commission and stressing caution.

Thus the key questions about Bundeswehr reform were delayed until after the elections and the SPD declared its ‘unanimous’ support for conscription, stating that conscription should be upheld ‘as long as possible’. Policy veto players within the SPD were empowered by the large number of veto points within the party and the wider German political system resisting change to the policy monopoly and any politics of policy entrepreneurship. Thus Kolbow acted as a policy veto player and was able to block the translation of policy orientated learning within the SPD into policy change. The internal SPD debate and attempts at policy entrepreneurship had had no effect on the policy core beliefs about conscription tied to territorial defence. However, they did have the effect of altering secondary aspects – through new information about the state of the Bundeswehr, the seriousness with which the issue of its reform was taken, and a new questioning about its capability to play its roles.

Günther Verheugen stated: ‘Es ist kein Tabu, darüber [the relevance of conscription]

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134 See ‘Verkürzter Zivildienst erschwert die Arbeit mit Behinderten’ DPA 041716, August 1999
135 ‘Zivildienst Arbeitsgruppe tagte: Bergmann für erhalt des Dienstes’ DPA, 301706, May 2000
136 See in particular chapter.3, ‘Durch soziale Gerechtigkeit zur solidarischen Gesellschaft’, part 1
137 Reuters 161012 August 1997
138 ‘Wehrpflicht kein Tabu mehr’ Süddeutsche Zeitung, 4th June 1997
zu diskutieren' (‘It is no longer taboo to debate the relevance of conscription’). The taboo of debate had not been fully broken, as Verheugen claimed, but had certainly been weakened.\textsuperscript{138}

The effects of policy orientated learning and the conscription debate within the SPD were evident at the Berlin regional party conference in August 1997, where Manfred Opel actively promoted a volunteer army whilst Wolfgang Thierse, deputy SPD party chair, defended conscription and backed the party line on a future WehrstrukturKommission. The delegates voted for keeping conscription by a tiny majority, 126 votes to 124, demonstrating the groundswell of support for the position of those such as Wieczorek-Zeul, Verheugen and Opel.\textsuperscript{139} Similar policy oriented learning was taking place in other L"{a}nder, with the SPD in Schleswig-Holstein threatening to break the party line on the issue.\textsuperscript{140} This brought strong opposition from Norbert Gansel, the MdB for Kiel in Schleswig-Holstein who sought to counteract such moves by the SPD Landesgruppe.\textsuperscript{141}

4.6 Conclusion

The hesitations of party political actors about abandoning territorial defence and conscription derived from the politics stream, in particular from a combination of electoral-strategic interests with ideological dynamics. For ‘catch-all’ parties (Volksparteien) like the SPD - and the CDU/CSU - there were much clearer electoral costs than benefits from abandoning traditional policy beliefs about the role and structure of the Bundeswehr. The ‘catch-all’ parties – unlike the FDP and the Greens – had constituencies to defend in which Bundeswehr bases were located. Hence many CDU/CSU and SPD members of the Bundestag were fearful of the local political implications of base closures consequent on a move to a smaller professional army, with many more troops serving abroad than in their local areas. Whatever political gains there might be from such a radical shift in policy belief were more diffuse. For the opposition SPD to advocate radical policy change to the Bundeswehr would have provided electoral ammunition to the CDU/CSU that voting SPD would mean base

\textsuperscript{138} ‘Tabubruch mit R"{u}cksicht auf den Wahlkampf vertagt’, Ralf Beste, Berliner Zeitung, 9 June 1997
\textsuperscript{139} DPA 152031 August 1997
\textsuperscript{140} ‘Nord-SPD will die Freiwilligen-Armee’, Lauenb"{u}rgische Landeszeitung, 12 June 1997
\textsuperscript{141} Sozialdemokratischer Informationsbrief, Kiel, 06.03.1997
closures and unemployment.\textsuperscript{142} It would have opened up potential conflicts with powerful regional SPD leaders concerned to defend their territorial economic interests. The result would have been a lack of internal unity that would have undermined the SPD's claims to be a government-in-waiting.

Also, abolition of conscription raised deeply sensitive issues about the staffing and costs of social programmes that went to the heart of the SPD's deep core belief in solidarity and social justice.\textsuperscript{143} It risked opening up ideological divisions within the party that would undermine its capacity to mobilize its voters. A further constraint on policy change came from the ideological commitment of the SPD leadership around Lafontaine, including Weiczorek-Zeul, to retain the party's identity with peace and hence to stand back from out-of-area operations. This policy position on the role of the Bundeswehr reduced the pressure to reconsider conscription. Hence the SPD lacked an electoral incentive and ideological justification to reject conscription. Electoral-strategic constraints were less in the case of the FDP and the Greens; they depended for their Bundestag representation on clearing the hurdle of 5% of the vote and hence were more distant from local constituency issues.

Policy leadership on Bundeswehr reform within the SPD was characterized by a few unsuccessful attempts at policy entrepreneurship (Verheugen and Weiczorek-Zeul) but, above, all by a combination of policy brokerage (Scharping) with policy veto playing (Kolbow) that resulted in minimal change. Policy entrepreneurship failed because the 'problem' stream could not be effectively coupled with the 'politics' stream, especially the ideological beliefs and electoral-strategic interests of the SPD. Crucially, the Bundeswehr policy subsystem was interrelated with those of social policy and of economic policy. As a result changes to policy core beliefs were too politically sensitive. Above all, the SPD leadership of Lafontaine, Münsterling and Schröder were keen to avoid a politically harmful debate on the issue. They had wider political ambitions for the electoral success of the party. Thus the SPD leadership empowered traditionalists within the party to defend the policy beliefs of territorial

\textsuperscript{142} Opel, Manfred (November 1996) 'Auslaufmodell Wehrpflichtarmee: Eckdaten zur Kontrolle einer Freiwilligenarmee' in Auslaufmodell Wehrpflichtarmee (Zentralstelle KDV, Bremen)
\textsuperscript{143} www.sdp.de/servlet/PB/show/1010243/programmedebatte_grundsatzprogramm.pdf
defence and conscription. In any case, the issue of the Bundeswehr's role and structure lacked the political salience to warrant risk-taking and also threatened to be a divisive factor in any future Red/Green or even SPD/FDP coalition. Whilst acknowledging the need for a debate, it was 'swept under the carpet' until after the 1998 elections.

Thus, despite the dynamics of policy learning within the SPD set in place by Rühe's 'salami' tactics and the Federal Constitutional Court ruling of 1994, the critics of the prevailing policy core beliefs were unable to effectively challenge territorial defence and conscription. Their policy positions were judged to be too politically and electorally risky for a 'government-in-waiting' that was anxious to display its unity and responsibility. Given the CDU/CSU's political advantage on defence and security policy, it seemed hazardous to promote a radical policy change beyond that of the federal government. In these circumstances the SPD leadership was anxious to close down debate about radical policy change, never mind prepared to take the action necessary to forge a new advocacy coalition promoting a professional Bundeswehr. It did not define the problem as politically serious enough.

Policy orientated learning was taking place within the institutions of government, but at different speeds. Within the Defence Ministry and the wider Bundeswehr policy subsystem policy learning was responding to the logistical problems of 'out-of-area' deployments and the implications of the 1994 Constitutional Court ruling and setting in place a dynamic that threatened to escape political control. This dynamic of policy oriented learning had been created by Rühe's past 'salami' tactics. In the Chancellor's Office the pace of change was different in the absence of political steering on behalf of Bundeswehr reform from Kohl. The Chancellor's Office was concerned with retaining control over the Defence Ministry and limiting the potential political and electoral costs from Bundeswehr reform. From Kohl's perspective, which was strongly influenced by electoral-strategic interests, Bundeswehr reform had progressed far enough. Several factors militated against further changes to the Bundeswehr:

- the potential political costs of further base closures and the internal strife and image of disunity that could be occasioned within the CDU/CSU
• the desire to avoid internal coalition conflict with the FDP
• the macro-economic situation and EMU commitments which combined to restrict the defence budget and place a premium on the peace dividend
• the economic and social consequences of abolishing conscription, and the abolition of Zivildienst, were far too uncertain
• the deep political sensitivity to debating conscription because it touched on fundamental and entrenched beliefs about the German polity and citizenship.

In short, the political consequences of a broad societal debate about territorial defence and conscription could only be damaging for the CDU/CSU.

Thus Rühe and Kohl were cautious about further changes to the Bundeswehr. The policy learning that had been set in place by Rühe’s ‘salami’ tactics was stymied by marginalizing those attempting to act as Vordenkers, and imaginative figures like Naumann were replaced. Responding to signals from Kohl, Rühe had set limits on policy change. External perturbations, notably the worsening economic situation in Germany, made any investment of Rühe’s personal time and reputation in challenging territorial defence and conscription fruitless. Rühe’s own personal ambitions to succeed Kohl as CDU party chair and Chancellor served to heighten his caution.

It was more difficult for Rühe to control the policy-orientated learning taking place within the CDU and its coalition partner the FDP. However, he did not face the problem of a nascent, let alone mature advocacy coalition for a professional Bundeswehr. The principal opposition parties – the SPD, Greens and PDS – proposed a wide range of policies and were too inwardly focused on their ideological and electoral interests to engage in developing coherent advocacy coalitions and mobilising a wider group of societal actors behind the issue.

What emerges from this analysis of policy change during the Kohl Chancellorship in the 1990s is the importance of agency. Policy leadership took the form of organizing or blocking policy orientated learning and of managing institutional venues. In this way policy leaders attempted to control the flow of ideas. A key factor here was the Chancellor’s assessment of electoral-strategic interests, along with the SPD
leadership's assessment of its own electoral-strategic interests as a government-in-
waiting. Of particular importance was the way in which leaders in the macro-political
system intervened to constrain the development of new ideas and potentially
politically risky proposals from within the Bundeswehr policy subsystem. In contrast
to what punctuated equilibrium theory suggests, the shift of a policy issue from the
policy subsystem to the macro-political level was not the precondition for policy
change. The pressures for change came more from within the policy subsystem, based
on policy orientated learning, and were blocked by the macro-political level. The
result was the inability of Rühe and of Kinkel in the coalition government - and of
Verheugen and Wieczorek-Zeul in the SPD - to act as successful policy entrepreneurs
on conscription.

Within this macro-political context of electoral-strategic interests and ideological
factors Rühe played a key policy leadership role. He exhibited a high level of political
skill in practising a form of salami tactics that kept SPD members of the Bundestag
Defence Committee on board with his evolving policy on out-of-area operations. This
skill was demonstrated in careful respect for the norm of consensus whilst using
Europeanisation as a basis for shifting the nature of the consensus towards a redefined
role for the Bundeswehr. In consequence, Rühe earned a great deal of respect from
SPD defence specialists and, in the process, furthered his prospects of becoming
Foreign Minister in a possible Grand Coalition with the SPD (without the FDP) after
the 1998 elections. Rühe also displayed a considerable skill in tailoring his leadership
role and style to changing assessments of the electoral-strategic interests of the
CDU/CSU and to the overriding need in this context for internal party unity, not least
by not annoying powerful regional leaders by savage base closures or by alienating
the social wing of the CDU by putting Zivildienst at risk.

Strategic culture offers only a limited and partial understanding of Bundeswehr policy
change, situating it in a context of historical memory and constitutional doctrine
opposing any association with acts of aggression. As this chapter shows, Rühe was
able to use German strategic culture selectively to provide himself with a political
rationale, whether to promote policy change (as consistent with Germany's European
vocation) or to block change (as leading to a 'pure intervention' Bundeswehr). Cultural
explanation offers little insight into the dynamics of policy change over this period,
especially the pragmatism of policy leaders in dealing with external events and
developments and relating them to generational change, electoral-strategic interests
and ideological renewal. Cultural explanation neglects the characteristics of the
Bundeswehr as a policy subsystem and how it relates to the defence and security
policy subsystem in which it is embedded. In particular, the policy orientated learning
that followed from out-of-area operations meant that the pressures for change were
greater from within the policy subsystem than in the wider macro-political system.
This aspect is not captured by strategic cultural explanations. In addition, core policy
beliefs about the Bundeswehr are bound up in a complex symbiotic relationship with
the dynamics of electoral-strategic interests in securing party unity and governmental
power. They are also closely interrelated to core policy beliefs in related policy
subsystems, notably budgetary policy and social policy. As we shall see on chapter
six, the linkage to European policy was associated with the increasingly important
theme of Europeanisation. These interrelationships amongst policy subsystems, along
with electoral-strategic interests, are central in shaping the potential scope for change
and define the parameters of policy leadership.

Neither a constructivist account in terms of strategic culture or a path-dependency
form of historical institutionalism explain the changes in Rühe’s leadership role and
style over Bundeswehr reform. Initially in the period 1992-94 he sought change to the
policy core of the Bundeswehr, facilitated by the presence of a key *Vordenker*,
General Naumann, who encouraged policy orientated learning about its roles and
structures. Thus the Defence Ministry began to develop its own dynamics of change
which threatened to escape political control. In order to regain political control, and
reduce electoral-strategic risks, Rühe replaced and marginalized key agents of change
within the Defence Ministry. Thus more was at work than just strategic culture acting
as a constraining variable on policy change. The flow of policy ideas was manipulated
by leadership in order to promote and protect their own political interests. In short,
policy leadership was important in defining the direction, scope and pace of policy
change.

The paradox of policy leadership on Bundeswehr reform during the Schröder Chancellorship was the combination of a new political opportunity for reform with the lack of a powerful sponsor for radical reform. The opportunity took the form of the creation of the Weizsäcker Commission as a professional policy forum that produced radical proposals for Bundeswehr reform. The lack of a powerful sponsor derived from the leadership style of the Defence Minister Rudolf Scharping and the strategic context of his policy leadership. Essentially, Scharping attempted to play a leadership role as policy broker in trying to encourage debate and end Rühe's Denkverbot. However, he proved to be a veto player.

There were some important differences between his predecessor Rühe and Scharping in style and in context. A key contextual difference was that Scharping had to deal with the radical proposals from the Weizsäcker Commission, which he had established and against which he was measured. The idea of an expert commission had been developed in opposition as a way of covering over and diffusing internal party conflict about SPD policy towards the Bundeswehr. What was useful in fighting the federal election campaign in 1998 proved, however, a hostage to fortune in government. The Weizsäcker Commission proved to be a powerful independent player, creating a problem of managing unintended consequences for the federal government and the SPD. Scharping's leadership role was defined by the attempt to manage these unintended consequences. Another important contextual difference was the embattled position of Scharping as a former internal party rival of Schröder. Their relationship was characterized by profound mutual mistrust. In contrast, Rühe had enjoyed the confidence of Kohl. The difference in style derived from the inability of Scharping to develop and sustain the cross-party and even internal party confidence that Rühe had achieved. Scharping differed from Rühe in not being able to establish his personal authority within the Bundestag Defence Committee or within the federal government. Hence whereas Rühe framed the terms in which the SPD debated Bundeswehr reform through 'salami-slicing' tactics, Scharping was less important than the Weizsäcker Commission in framing the later terms of debate.
As we shall see in chapter 6, on entering office Scharping and the new SPD/Green government faced an important new window of opportunity opened by the Franco-British initiative at St.Malo. The Schröder government was able to use the WEU presidency and the EU presidency in the first half of 1999 to situate the role and structure of the Bundeswehr within a revived debate about European defence and security identity. Also, the Kosovo War gave Scharping an early opportunity to pursue agenda change about the Bundeswehr. However, as we shall see, he did not adopt a leadership role as policy entrepreneur. This unwillingness to define a policy entrepreneur role derived in part from problems in the 'politics stream', making it unattractive for him to try to couple policies for a reformed Bundeswehr with urgent defence and security problems. It also related to his lack of personal and political authority to take on such a role. Instead, Scharping resorted to defending the old policy monopoly, with its image of territorial defence and conscription, from the threat posed by the Weizsäcker Commission. When seen from the perspective of conscription, what seemed like a policy brokerage role turns out on closer examination to be a veto-playing role. Scharping's political reading of the Weizsäcker report was that it was too politically dangerous for his own ambitions. More accurately, the Weizsäcker Commission played a brokerage role, providing a forum for policy-oriented learning. Scharping denied it full political support when, in seeking a compromise, he did so on terms that favoured and sustained the traditional policy monopoly and image.

5.1 The Weizsäcker Commission as a Professional Forum

The Schröder government saw the formation of a 'nascent' advocacy coalition with a common policy core belief in a 'crisis prevention' role and conscription. The emergence of this nascent coalition can be explained in terms of policy-oriented learning. It embraced both members of the German political parties, most notably in the Greens and the FDP, and other actors in the policy subsystem who had to grapple with the problems thrown up by handling an escalating number of 'out-of-area' operations. During the Schröder government this policy learning was triggered by two
key events: the Kosovo War of 1999 and the Afghan War of 2002.¹ For the FDP it was triggered by electoral defeat in 1998.

By 1998 policy-oriented learning had advanced considerably within the Bundeswehr policy subsystem, especially amongst the officers and troops². Change was less advanced within the Federal Defence Ministry.³ In short, there seemed to be a clear link between nearness of direct exposure to problems of ‘out-of-area’ operations and a willingness to contemplate the kind of radical reform that could prepare the Bundeswehr for the next decade and more. In its work the Weizsäcker Commission was to pick up this signal and respond to it.

What was striking was the unwillingness of Scharping and the Red/Green government to respond to this policy-oriented learning and to lead this nascent advocacy coalition. By the time of the federal elections in September 2002, only moderate change had occurred to the structure of the Bundeswehr, despite further extensions of its tasks. Such relative stagnation in the policy subsystem of the Bundeswehr cannot simply be understood as the consequence of a resilient strategic culture providing a strong institutionally embedded ideational framework that was able to deal with such challenges. This approach fails to capture both the way in which policy-oriented learning was changing this culture from the operational level upwards and the role of the strategic behaviour of key actors in Bundeswehr policy. The policy monopoly was not simply a reflection of the deep core beliefs of those within the macropolitical system or staunchly defended from within the Bundeswehr. It was supported by the macro-political level for its instrumental value, namely the diffuse and uncertain nature of the benefits of radical change and the much clearer economic and political costs of changing the policy image. In this respect there was continuity with the post-Karlsruhe era of the previous CDU/CSU government.

Three factors facilitated adaptive change. Firstly, once the implications of the 1994 Constitutional Court ruling had been fully digested, marginal change to the policy

² Interviews Defence Ministry, Berlin, 6th August 2002
³ Interviews Defence Ministry, Berlin, 14th August 2002
image no longer brought a great deal of political controversy. The ruling had cleared
the way for more open thinking about Bundeswehr issues, especially on the political
Left and within the FDP. Secondly, Srebrenica and Fischer’s policy entrepreneurship
in 1995 had had a powerful resonance within the political Left. The Left found a new
rationale for advocating change. In this respect much of the ground for policy change
had already been laid in opposition. The Scharping Commission had already achieved
a good deal of adaptation in SPD thinking about defence and security. Thirdly, as
stressed above, the problems associated with ‘out-of-area’ operations were yielding an
increased amount of policy-oriented learning on the technical level that political
actors could not avoid. These problems were discussed within the Bundestag Defence
Committee and resonated within the main parties.

Bundeswehr policy was one of the first reform areas in which the new Schröder
government practised its technique of using representative and expert commissions as
instruments to build a climate of ‘professional’ consensus and to bind in affected
interests so that its decisions were more likely to prove acceptable. The technique was
well-suited to the macro-political context of a ‘negotiation’ democracy in which
powerful veto players could block change. The technique was later referred to by the
State Secretary in the Chancellor’s Office, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, as ‘the
innovative power of consensus’. Thus the Governmental Commission on the
Common Security and Future of the Bundeswehr was appointed under Richard von
Weizsäcker (a highly respected former German President and a CDU politician). Its
task was to examine the structure of the Bundeswehr in the light of the changing
security environment and new security challenges. The Commission was designed as
a means of ‘acceptance management’ – bringing actors together from key institutions
affected by Bundeswehr reform and thereby allowing the easy transmission of its
proposals into society. It was to act as a professional forum that would engage in
impartial analysis outside of the traditional constraints of the policy monopoly, and
distancing it from the normal mechanisms of policy making within the Defence
Ministry.

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5 Interviews, Defence Ministry, Bonn, 23rd September 2002
In order to distance its discussions from the ministerial hierarchy and potential veto by vested interests, the Commission members were appointed by the government after discussions between the new Defence Minister Rudolf Scharping and Schröder. Its membership was purposefully drawn from the various institutions that made up the Bundeswehr policy subsystem. The Commission members included three distinguished ex-generals: Peter Heinrich Carstens, Vice-Chairman of the Commission (formerly SHAPE Chief of Staff); Manfred Eisele (former Assistant General Secretary of the UN); and Helge Hansen (former NATO Commander in Chief for Central Europe). It also contained eminent representatives of the key religious groups: Ignatz Bubis (President of the Council of German Jews), Dr. Jürgen Schmude (Head of the Synod of the German Evangelical Church), and Professor Christian Bernzen (lawyer and Vice President of the Central Committee of the German Catholic Church). The press was also present through Dr. Theo Sommer (editor of Die Zeit), Dr. Arno Mahlert (Member of the Board of the publishing house Georg von Holzbrink). Two leading German think-tanks were represented by Dr. Christoph Bertram (director of the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik) and Professor Harald Müller (managing director of the board of the Hessen Foundation for Peace and Conflict Research). Several academics also participated: Professor Helga Haftendorn (Professor of Political Science at the Freie Universität, Berlin), Professor Dr. Knut Ipsen of the Ruhr Universität Bochum (and, most importantly, president of the German Red Cross, and Richard Schröder. Professor of Theology at the Humboldt Universität Berlin). Other members included Dr. Eckhard Cordes (member of the board of DaimlerChrysler), Agnes Hürland-Bünning (Parliamentary State-Secretary), Dr. Walter Kromm (an army doctor), Hermann Lutz (the former chairman of the police trade union), Lothar de Maziere (Ministerpräsident), and Waltraud Schoppe (former member of the German Parliament).

Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith define the success of a professional forum by the extent to which the forum reaches 'consensus among previously disagreeing scientists on whatever technical and policy issues are placed before it' and where the conclusions

6 Gemeinsame Sicherheit und Zukunft der Bundeswehr: Bericht der Kommission an die Bundesregierung, May 2000
that the forum reaches are through the involvement of all coalitions involved. Four criteria are outlined for a successful 'professional forum': composition, funding, duration, and context of a mutually unacceptable policy stalemate. The first criterion was fulfilled by the Weizsäcker Commission: the forum was composed of a wide range of experts and representatives of groups affected by either a continuation of the status quo or radical reform of the Bundeswehr. It was also chaired by a man considered to be impartial, former federal president Richard von Weizsäcker, an appointment acceptable to both the governing party and the opposition. This appointment was designed to lend prestige and dignity to its work and to reinforce the impression that it would be conducted according to norms of professionalism, independence and neutrality.

In addition to a number impartial scientists from various German universities, the Commission consisted of experts from opposite sides of the German debate: on the one side, Professor Müller of the Hessen Foundation of Peace and Conflict Research, who was in favour of a professional armed force, on the other, members of the armed forces, representing the status quo. Thus coalition leaders were able to trust their representatives, whilst impartial members were able to give specialist advice on the area and help a consensus to emerge.

Though the Commission was funded by the government, an attempt was made to underline its independence by specifically giving it the task of reaching its own verdict on the future tasks and structure of the Bundeswehr. In duration, the Commission more than exceeded the stipulations of Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith: namely, that a forum must meet at least six times during a year. The Commission's work lasted from early 1999 until May 2000 and involved 30 plenum meetings, with broad and protracted debate. The Commission began with an initial debate about the risks, interests and role of Germany and their implications for the future needs of the armed forces. The work was then divided into three working groups: personnel,

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9 Interviews, Defence Ministry, Bonn, July 2002. See also 'Friedensforscher greift Scharping an', Frankfurter Rundschau, 25.05.2000
organisation, and armaments. After 8 meetings lasting a number of hours each, each working group reported its findings to a plenum session.\textsuperscript{10}

Hence the Commission had adequate time for a critical evaluation of the evidence. Evidence and information - an area undervalued by Jenkins and Sabatier's criteria for a successful professional forum - was critical, for whilst the Commission included a number of experts in the area of the armed forces it also included figures with little knowledge of the armed forces. Evidence was of critical importance. As interviews testified, every member of the Commission took her/his work very seriously and sought to become experts in the subject area. Each representative had to be able to go back to the groups that they represented and stand by the verdict of the Commission.

The Weizsäcker Commission and the working groups heard evidence from a number of witnesses (referred to by the Commission as 'guests'), 107 in total, ranging from the Finance Minister Hans Eichel and financial consultants to NATO representatives and a cross section of the Defence Ministry.\textsuperscript{11} However, rather than influencing the members of the Commission in favour of the dominant policy image, the witnesses from the German military establishment created a negative impression of vested interests from which the Commission sought to move away.\textsuperscript{12} The three ex-generals on the Commission played a quieter role than might have been expected, and their influence was most felt on secondary and technical issues.\textsuperscript{13} Indeed, General Hansen changed from being an advocate of territorial defence and conscription to being a proponent of crisis prevention and professional armed forces during the course of the Commission’s deliberations.\textsuperscript{14}

A further factor that should be added to Jenkins and Smith’s criteria for a successful policy forum: a Commission must hear evidence from a wide range of sources

\textsuperscript{10} Interview with Professor Helga Haftendorn, Berlin, 27\textsuperscript{th}. May 2003 and interviews in Defence Ministry, Bonn, 23\textsuperscript{rd}. September 2002

\textsuperscript{11} Gemeinsame Sicherheit und Zukunft der Bundeswehr: Bericht der Kommission an die Bundesregierung, May 2000

\textsuperscript{12} Interview in Defence Ministry, Bonn, 23\textsuperscript{rd}. September 2002

\textsuperscript{13} Interviews in Defence Ministry, Bonn, 23\textsuperscript{rd}. September 2002

\textsuperscript{14} Helge Hansen in Die Welt, 27.02.1996, quoted in Opel, Manfred (November 1996) 'Auslaufmodell Wehrpflichtarmee - Eckdaten zur Kontrolle einer Freiwilligenarmee' in Auslaufmodell Wehrpflichtarmee (Zentralstelle KDV, Bremen). In this article Hansen makes the case for Wehrpflicht. However in an Abweichende Voten in the report of the Weizsäcker Commission, General Hansen advocates a Freiwilligenarmee rather than the 30,000 Wehrpflichtige recommended by the Commission’s report (Gemeinsame Sicherheit und Zukunft der Bundeswehr: Bericht der Kommission an die Bundesregierung, May 2000, Abweichende Voten, Anhang 1, p.147).
representing all possible points of view about the subject area, facilitating broad
debate, a critical examination of opinion, and allowing important actors not involved
in the Committee to express their thoughts and provide a greater depth of expert
opinion. If the results of the work of a Commission are to be translated into policy, it
is important that those not included in a Commission - who will be important in the
effective implementation of a Commission's work - feel they have been able to impart
their perspective and knowledge of the policy subsystem.

However, the final criterion of Sabatier and Jenkins Smith - the context of a mutually
unacceptable policy stalemate - was fulfilled only to a certain extent. As the
Commission began its work, the political context was favourable to the development
of a compromise, and indeed the Commission itself resulted in compromise. The
readiness of those representing the status quo to compromise was highlighted by the
'Damascus'-style conversion of General Helge Hansen from advocate of territorial
defence and conscription to supporter of a professional army. Others like Theo
Sommer had also been staunch supporters of conscription and the continued need for
a focus of resources on maintaining territorial defence as the core mission.\footnote{Zeit zum letzten Zapfenstreich? Fünf Argumente gegen eine Armee aus lauter Freiwilligen', Die Zeit, 1/03/96 - point 4 stressing how loss of Zivildienst would have severe repercussions for social care}

However, as we see below, the political context was changing outside the
Commission's deliberations and was to have the critical effect on the eventual success
of the forum in generating internal policy change. Whilst the members of the
Commission were prepared to compromise, the key political decision makers
responsible for translating the Commission's report into policy were not. The success
of a policy forum is only seen when its recommendations are translated into policy.
This points to another important criterion that must be added to Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith's criteria. A policy forum must not only include members of a policy
subsystem but members of the macro-political policy system who are ultimately
responsible for implementing the conclusions of a policy forum.

The Commission was greatly influenced by two key events: the Kosovo War and the
subsequent Helsinki Headline Goals (stipulating that, by 2003, Germany should be
able to mobilise 20,000 troops as part of a 50-60,000 force within 60 days); and the
budget consolidation policy announced by Eichel in summer 1999 and backed
strongly by Schröder as a means of restoring an image of financial competence to the government. The Commission took the Kosovo War and, in particular, the Helsinki Headline Goals as a confirmation that the Bundeswehr’s tasks were overwhelmingly those of crisis prevention and that the policy image of territorial defence – guarded by the Defence Ministry - was increasingly ineffective. The critical priority was seen as strengthening European crisis reaction capabilities. Hence the Commission’s thinking became Europeanised in response both to events and to ESDP developments at the EU level. As the members of the Commission heard the evidence given by witnesses, they became more and more convinced about the necessity to structure the Bundeswehr around crisis prevention tasks. The necessity for a change in policy image was further facilitated by a general impression amongst the Commission members that vested interests within the Defence Ministry were the main rationale behind the policy image of territorial defence. Starting with the observation that Germany was surrounded by a 'stable peace' and friends for the first time in its catastrophically troubled history, the Commission came to advocate the policy image of 'crisis prevention'. \textit{The Commission recommends that the abilities, structure and size of the Bundeswehr be determined primarily from the perspective of crisis deployment}.\footnote{17}

However, the Weizsäcker Commission was not only influenced by the changing security environment of Germany. It was also concerned to propose a Bundeswehr reform that could be implemented in the context of the financial difficulties that Germany faced. It was particularly concerned to create a Bundeswehr that would be able to invest in the necessary weaponry for its new tasks. The ability of the Bundeswehr to invest in this way was seen by the Commission as critical for meeting the European ‘perspective’ and NATO requirements. One effect of the Bundeswehr structure that was proposed by the Commission would be to free up of some DM 3bn in the medium term, explicitly for investment in new weaponry. The Commission was well aware of the financial constraints and hence sought to propose several methods of increasing the financial efficiency of the Bundeswehr. It also recommended that the defence budget should be fixed from 2001-2006, with an initial injection of extra funds to cover the first period of reform.

\footnote{16 Interview with Professor Helga Haftendorn 27/05/03 and interviews in Defence Ministry, Bonn, 23rd September 2002.}
\footnote{17 Gemeinsame Sicherheit und Zukunft der Bundeswehr: Bericht der Kommission an die Bundesregierung, May 2000 (Punkt 64).}
In the end the policy-oriented learning process within the Weizsäcker Commission extended beyond the secondary aspects of beliefs about the Bundeswehr to embrace change to the policy core beliefs of the dominant policy image. It recommended that the central role of the Bundeswehr should be crisis management and crisis prevention and that its operational capabilities had to be adjusted to this role. The Bundeswehr was to be reduced to a peacetime strength of 240,000 troops, with 30,000 conscripts (a selection system) and 140,000 as the operational force component ready for deployment as part of the Alliance. A ‘selection system’ with 30,000 conscripts would, in effect, have meant the end of conscription due to the issue of Wehrgerechtigkeit – the principle of justice in defence service – the call up of all eligible males for military service. Before 1990 the number of men fit for and willing to do military service not called up was around 2%. However this rose as high as 16% in the post-Cold War period. A selection system would be an affront to any principle of equity in service and conscription: a large number of those willing and fit to do military service would not be allowed to.

Table 5.1 The Weizsäcker Commission’s recommendations on conscription

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional and Regular Soldiers</td>
<td>203,000</td>
<td>210,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDWL</td>
<td>23,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GWDL</td>
<td>112,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of soldiers</td>
<td>338,000</td>
<td>240,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FWDL: Freiwilligen zusätzlichen Wehrdienstleistende (Conscripts signed up for extra service)
GWDL: Grundwehrdienstleistende (Basic conscripts)

The Commission wanted to retain a small number of conscripts because: ‘it allows for strategic, personnel and societal flexibility and avoids the risks of an uncertain future.' Above all, it was concerned with restructuring the Bundeswehr to enable it to engage in two simultaneous, time-unlimited crisis deployments. The army was to contain two brigade-size operational contingents, the air force two operational contingents of 90-100 combat aircraft, and the navy and the medical service also to be structured into two operational contingents. Other priorities included streamlined command structures, privatisation, greater efficiency, increased European armaments procurement cooperation, and increases in the defence budget. In short, the Commission recommended deep core change to the policy image of territorial defence. ‘Minor adaptations no longer serve to accommodate the extent of the transformation [in the security environment]: what is now needed is a fundamental reform’.

The Weizsäcker Commission is an example of the way in which a professional forum can be effective in promoting policy-oriented learning. A consensus was reached among a set of actors from within the Bundeswehr policy subsystem who had not started their work with agreed views on the key policy and technical issues. Its recommendations were also accepted by most of the main institutions involved in Bundeswehr policy. The reasons for this success were, in part, to be found in the composition of the Commission. It represented key interests and strands of opinion and in this way was able to establish a measure of trust within the policy subsystem. It also contained people whose expertise was recognized and who could reassure others that the work and recommendations had been based on professional norms of Sachlichkeit. In addition, though its secretariat was provided from within the Federal

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19 Gemeinsame Sicherheit und Zukunft der Bundeswehr: Bericht der Kommission an die Bundesregierung, May 2000, Punkt 109
20 Gemeinsame Sicherheit und Zukunft der Bundeswehr: Bericht der Kommission an die Bundesregierung, May 2000, Punkt 5
Ministry of Defence, this secretariat distanced itself from the ministerial structures and interests and encouraged the process of professional consensus building within the Commission. A third factor was the way in which its meetings were conducted as a genuine seminar discussion on tasks and structures of the Bundeswehr in the context of emerging international security challenges. There was both opportunity and time for a critical evaluation of assumptions and evidence and for the building of trust. Weizsäcker’s chairmanship was well-suited to this process.

According to sources within the Commission, von Weizsäcker’s chairmanship was fully independent for the first six few months when he acted as a moderator. However, when the Commission’s work was brought forward and came under greater time constraints, his influence was felt more strongly in attempting to get the Commission to develop concrete proposals. Von Weizsäcker also had a strong influence in the Commission’s stress on crisis prevention as being the new policy image of the German armed forces and on the ‘European Perspective’. He was not responsive to proposals of members of the Commission for the inclusion of terrorist threats and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as part of the risks facing Germany and for the removal/alteration of the first and crucial point made by the report (‘For the first time in its history, Germany is surrounded by Alliance and Integration Partners and has no immediate external threat to its territorial integrity from its neighbours’). This was a critical foundation for the new policy image of crisis prevention.

But, perhaps most crucially of all, the work of the Commission was shaped by events (from Kosovo to the Helsinki Headline Goals) that made for a consensus that the status quo was no longer acceptable. Commission members, not least the three ex­generals, proved willing to alter their perceptions of the challenges, especially their urgency. Above all, Weizsäcker skilfully moved the europeanisation issue to the centre of the Bundeswehr reform agenda. In this respect the radical nature of the policy-oriented learning that took place in the Commission cannot be divorced from

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21 Interviews, Defence Ministry, Bonn, 23rd. September 2002, also interview with Professor Helga Hafendorn, 27th. May 2003  
22 Interviews, Defence Ministry, Bonn, 23rd. September 2002, also interview with Professor Helga Hafendorn, 27th. May 2003  
23 Interviews, Defence Ministry, Bonn, 23rd. September 2002  
24 'Weizsäcker-rede löst Verstimmung aus' Die Welt, 20.09.2000 see also 'Kommissionsvorsitzender betont Notwendigkeit europäischer Sicherheitspolitik', Handelsblatt, 24.11.1999
the impact of external perturbations and the way in which these events and developments were used by Weizsäcker to manufacture a climate for policy change.

5.2 Marginalizing the Weizsäcker Commission: The Politics of Base Closures

Within the Federal Defence Ministry it soon became clear that the Weizsäcker Commission was producing a report that meant radical change for the Bundeswehr and that the policy monopoly would have to defend its policy image of territorial defence. For the governing Red/Green coalition and within the Federal Chancellor’s Office it also became clear that the proposals of the Commission could not be financed, and also that the consequences for social policy and for local and regional economies from associated base closures were too politically sensitive.

At this point the strategic position of the Chancellor was pivotal. Schröder played a key role, providing staunch support for the policy image of territorial defence. Von Weizsäcker became aware of attempts to marginalize the work of his Commission, notably of Scharping seeking to influence the Commission’s Report by stressing his utter commitment to conscription. Hence on 8th March 2000 he met with the Chancellor in an attempt to defend the work and proposals of his Commission.

However, Schröder was happy for the radical proposals of the Commission to be marginalized. Firstly, a radical reform of the Bundeswehr would entail a large number of base closures and raise questions about general military service that would have been politically difficult. Not least, his political image was that of the Chancellor who saved jobs, not one who presided over decisions to axe large numbers of bases. Schröder was especially preoccupied by the temporal dimension of the reform.

The original publication date of the Weizsäcker Report in autumn 2000 meant that it would miss the budget negotiations for the year 2001, thus postponing the Bundeswehr reform. In the view of the Chancellor’s Office this delay caused by an

25 ‘Reform? Welche Reform? Der Tagesspiegel, 30.05.2000
26 Reformkampf an allen Fronten, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 06.04.2000 also see ‘Friedensforscher greift Scharping an’, Frankfurter Rundschau, 25.05.2000 and ‘Streit über die Zukunft der Bundeswehr. Die Welt, 23.03.2000
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The accident of timing in presenting the report would open up the possibility for a broad societal debate about the Bundeswehr reform. The Chancellor was keen to avoid a wide debate that would have the effect of forcing the issue onto the macro-political agenda and out of the hands of the policy monopoly. In Schröder's view, Bundeswehr reform was an issue that could only cause difficulties for the SPD. A wide debate would lead to heightened intra-coalition tensions and conflict with the Greens and could result in a loss of control over the process of reform.

Worse still, postponement of the Bundeswehr reform would mean that the SPD/Green government would be unveiling its base closure concept, with attendant large-scale job losses, in the run up to the next federal elections in 2002. The Weizsäcker proposals were unacceptable for the SPD and for Schröder. Upon hearing the proposals of the Weizsäcker Commission, the SPD General Secretary, Franz Müntfering made it very clear that he did not want any 'softening' of conscription and that it must remain the building block of the armed forces. It made little political sense for the Chancellor to jeopardise the SPD's re-election over an issue that was low on the list of voters' concerns and over a set of proposals from the Weizsäcker Commission that were unacceptable to the SPD and the Chancellor. Not least, Schröder was acutely aware of the consequences that a large number of base closures could have for forthcoming Länder elections, notably in the SPD's pivotal state of North-Rhine Westphalia in May 2000 and in Baden-Württemberg and Rhineland Palatinate in March 2001 (the latter was SPD-led).

The second factor informing Schröder's policy leadership on the matter was the necessary consequences for ziviler Ersatzdienst. With the Weizsäcker Commission's proposal for conscription reduced to only 30,000 Zivildienst was inevitably going to be brought into question. The consequences of the abolition of Zivildienst were uncertain to say the least and, as has been highlighted, threatened core aspects of SPD ideology. Whilst the abolition of Zivildienst would create much-needed jobs, within the context of budget consolidation the removal of Zivildienst - and the cheap labour that it brought (130,000 young men per year) - would have severe financial implications and necessitate a sharp increase in social spending. The short- to

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28 'SPD Pocht weiter auf Wehrpflicht' Frankfurter Rundschau 09.05.2000
medium-term financial costs would be high. It was the Chancellor’s job to ensure that
the SPD won the elections in 2002. To close almost half the bases in Germany and
raise question marks about a ‘supporting pillar’ of the German social system would
have created unnecessary problems for the SPD in an electoral year. The electoral-
strategic context left little room for manoeuvre to the SPD.  

Thirdly, in addition to these problems, Scharping, similar to Rühe, was convinced that
public opinion would not support a radical reform of the Bundeswehr. The issue of
out-of-area operations continued to be politically sensitive in Germany. Scharping
perceived his leadership opportunities as tightly constrained by his strategic context -
a conservative military establishment, traditional SPD wariness of the military and
attachment of its security experts to conscription as a means of ensuring a strong
control over the armed forces, and a general public still sensitive to German military
action, especially the idea of pure crisis reaction forces. As Scharping stated: ‘It was
important not to overstretch those who were necessary to agree – the armed forces
themselves, members of parliament and general public’.  

Thus it was in the interests of the Chancellor and the Finance Minister to avoid
challenges to the policy core of territorial defence and conscription and to the policy
monopoly guarded over by the Defence Ministry. Once again, the issue of base
closures came to the defence of the policy monopoly and dominant policy image,
highlighting how a federal political system, with strong Länder and frequent,
politically significant, elections can help contribute to policy inertia.

In these ways politically sensitive linkages to other policy subsystems and electoral
considerations made for a strategic context within which changes to the policy image
and policy monopoly were anathema to the Chancellor. Above all, it was the
Chancellor’s job to ensure that the SPD won the federal elections in 2002. To
effectively abolish Zivildienst and close almost half the bases in Germany would have
caused unnecessary problems for the SPD in an electoral year. This electoral-strategic
context left little room for manoeuvre to the SPD. Thus Schröder made it clear to
Scharping that there would be no move away from the SPD’s support of conscription.

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29 Ohne die Drückeberger geht es nicht’, Die Zeit, Nr.18, 27.04.2000, Fernseh/Horfunkspiegel
Mittagsmagazin 04.05.00 and interviews in Finance Ministry, Bonn (28th August 2002) and Berlin
(18th August 2002)

30 Interview with Rudolf Scharping, Berlin, 5th June 2003
In this electoral-strategic context - and given his perception that there would be no money forthcoming to finance Bundeswehr reform and that he was in no political position to challenge Eichel on this issue - Scharping opted for the political strategy of doing his duty in line with budget consolidation. He placed his faith in small-scale base closures and, crucially, in privatisation and greater efficiency to free up the necessary resources for the reform. Scharping wanted to strengthen his position within the SPD by engaging in a reform that proposed changes to the policy core (funded through privatisation and efficiency measures) but without obstructing the project of budget consolidation. In this way he aimed to minimize internal criticism within the SPD.

Thus the electoral-strategic context within which Scharping was operating interacted with Scharping’s leadership traits to lead to the conclusion that policy entrepreneurship was an inappropriate strategy. However, with a reform process firmly underway, and given NATO and EU policy developments, Scharping had to be seen to be engaging in some level of reform and adaptation of the Bundeswehr to the new security challenges facing Germany. Not to do so would foster an image of lack of imagination and innovation.

The most appealing strategy for Scharping was that of policy broker between the Weizsäcker Commission, the electoral-strategic context of the SPD, and the bureaucratic interests within the Federal Defence Ministry and the Bundeswehr.\(^{31}\) However, in attempting to play a broker role Scharping actually played the role of a policy veto player, blocking any challenge to the policy monopoly. The first step in Scharping’s strategy was to marginalize the findings of the Weizsäcker Commission. He did so by changing the timing and tempo of the reform process, in short by the management of its temporal aspect. The proposed publication date of its findings was brought forward from autumn 2000 to 23\textsuperscript{rd} May 2000 to allow the Bundeswehr reform to be passed through cabinet before the budget negotiations began in August 2000. This would allow the base closure concept to be agreed in late 2000/early 2001, thereby decreasing its potential negative effects on the September 2002 federal elections. This political manipulation of the timetable of Bundeswehr reform was

Der Minister will keine Berufsarmee, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 08.05.2000
justified publicly by the need to establish clarity for the Bundeswehr and increase its Alliance capability (Bündnisfähigkeit). Thus Scharping stated that without this action: 'Then the German Defence Minister must send a letter to the NATO Generalsecretary and cancel the participation of the Bundeswehr'.

Whilst the Weizsäcker Commission had been allowed to conduct most of its work without political steering from the SPD/Greens, it was not free from attempts at outside influence. In a final and rather desperate attempt to dissuade the Commission from instigating a 'positive feedback process', members of the Commission began to receive telephone calls from the Defence Ministry in its last weeks of their debate. Their callers sought to persuade them to adopt a more moderate stance on issues such as conscription and the stress on crisis prevention as the core policy image of German defence and security policy. The Commission and the Defence Ministry were closely linked, and the deliberations of the Commission were known within the ministry.

According to one source, on a visit toward the end of the Commission's deliberations Scharping made it clear to the Commission that the report would not be implemented as he could not enforce the Commission's recommendation of the closure of half of all barracks and sale of half of Bundeswehr real estate. Scharping had also become increasingly frustrated with the Commission, stating that 'some of its members seem to have mistaken a request for advice as a request to give orders'.

Within the Federal Defence Ministry von Kirchbach acted on Scharping's request and developed a concept, released in April 2002, for Bundeswehr reform under the heading of 'Cornerstones for the Further Conceptual Development and Planning of the Armed Forces'. It was a 'mini-reform', making small policy core changes to the Bundeswehr, and reflected his roots in the era of Rühe's Denkverbot. Kirchbach's proposals envisaged a reduction from 323,000 soldiers to 290,000, increasing the number of professional soldiers from 189,000 to 202,300 and reducing the conscript numbers from 134,000 to 84,500. The paper was drawn up with key generals in the

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32 Hannoverische Allgemeine Zeitung 19.04.1999
33 Interview with Professor Helga Haftendorn, Berlin, 27th June 2003
35 Interview, Rudolf Scharping, Berlin, 5th June 2003
36 'Griine attackieren Bundeswehr-Konzept, Die Welt. 20.04.2000
planning staff and in the army, navy and airforce. It drew sharp criticism for its lack of ambition and neglect of the problem of _Wehr gerechtigkeit_, as one in every three of those judged capable and willing would miss military service.\(^{37}\)

Table 5.2 Basic Positions of German Political Parties on Bundeswehr Reform

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Bundeswehr 2000</th>
<th>General Inspector</th>
<th>Weizsäcker Commission</th>
<th>SPD (Model of Kröning)</th>
<th>CDU (Model of Breuer)</th>
<th>Bundnis 90/Grünen</th>
<th>FDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Size of Armed Forces</strong></td>
<td>338,000</td>
<td>280,000-290,000</td>
<td>240,000</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>260,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Length of Conscription</strong></td>
<td>10 Months with option of extension to 23 months</td>
<td>9 Months</td>
<td>10 Months</td>
<td>9 Months</td>
<td>9 Months with option of extension to 23 months</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5 Months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of Conscripts</strong></td>
<td>135,000</td>
<td>84,500</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>105,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>65,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Kirchbach’s proposals were much more conservative than those of the Weizsäcker Commission and, if followed by Scharping, would have created the impression of an unimaginative minister – in effect, identifying Scharping as a policy veto player. The negative reactions to Kirchbach’s proposals showed Scharping that a reform that did not make significant adaptations to the policy image and was too close to the status quo would not do. The Defence Ministry was well aware of the challenge to its policy monopoly from the far-reaching proposals of the Weizsäcker Commission and some concession to its proposals had to be made. Scharping continued to harbour ambitions of occupying the Chancellor’s Office and wanted to be seen as a reformer and man of action. At the same time he wanted to be seen as responsible and not as opposing the project of budget consolidation. Thus Scharping had to be seen as a policy broker.

whilst in reality defending the core of the policy monopoly of
Landes/Bündnisverteidigung and conscription.

The SPD budgetary policy spokesperson in the Bundestag, Volker Kröning, had already made clear his position about the concept that the SPD members of the Budget Committee were prepared to fund in May 1999. His concept involved 270,000 troops, of whom 105,000 would be conscripts, with personnel costs sinking from 50 to 44 per cent of the defence budget and the investment share of the budget rising to 30 per cent.³⁸ Kröning's concept noted how a professional army would necessitate many base closures.³⁹ In close co-operation with the head of the planning staff, Harald Kujat, Scharping developed a 'middle way' between the recommendations of the Weizsäcker Commission and von Kirchbach's internal ministry proposal. It represented adaptation to the policy core, whilst leaving the policy monopoly firmly in place. In short, Scharping acted as a policy broker, seeking to reconcile these two sets of recommendations with each other and with the budget consolidation programme. Central to Scharping's concept was the claim that it could be financed through a relatively small number of base closures and from the economic gains from privatisation and increased economic efficiency within the Bundeswehr. Hence Scharping founded the Gesellschaft für Entwicklung, Beschaffung und Betrieb (GEBB) to carry out this task. Scharping's concept envisaged a Bundeswehr of 277,000 (with 22,000 in further education and training), of whom 77,000 were to be conscripts. In addition, the economic efficiency of 166 small bases was to be tested.⁴⁰ The concept was agreed in cabinet on 14th June 2000.⁴¹ With the maintenance of such a large number of conscripts, Scharping failed to focus the armed forces on crisis prevention, ensuring that the scarce resources of the Bundeswehr would continue to be over-stretched.

³⁸ 'Ein gangbarer Weg in die Zukunft der Bundeswehr', Handelsblatt 03.05.2000; 'Reformkampf an allen Fronten', Süddeutsche Zeitung, 06.04.2000
³⁹ 'Ein gangbarer Weg in die Zukunft der Bundeswehr', Handelsblatt 03.05.2000
⁴⁰ Die Bundeswehr sicher ins 21. Jahrhundert, Eckpfeiler für eine Erneuerung von Grund auf, Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 14.06.00
⁴¹ 'Kabinettbeschluss mit Protestnote', Berliner Morgenpost, 14.06.2000
'Bundeswehr vor ihrem grossten Umbau', Süddeutsche Zeitung, 15.06.2000
Table 5.3 Rudolf Scharping’s Reform Concept

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personnel Category</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Armed Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regs/TCV’s</td>
<td>112,000</td>
<td>47,000</td>
<td>19,000</td>
<td>178,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short Service</td>
<td>21,000</td>
<td>3,200</td>
<td>2,800</td>
<td>27,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W9 Conscripts</td>
<td>17,700</td>
<td>6,300</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W6WÜ Conscripts</td>
<td>21,300</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSVs/Conscripts</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>77,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standing Forces</td>
<td>172,000</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>23,000</td>
<td>255,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


However, Scharping’s strategy for Bundeswehr reform was to backfire, for three reasons. Firstly, he was confronted by the institutionalised interests and bureaucratic politics at the heart of the policy monopoly. His privatisation strategy was slow to take off. Despite successes in the vehicle fleet and clothing areas, Scharping’s proposals encountered the same bureaucratic obstacles that General Huber’s had met eight years earlier. Privatisation involved the close co-ordination between a number of different institutions and actors who had an interest in the process. The proposals had to pass through the Defence Ministry. As they passed from one office to another, each official raised critical points with the result that the proposals had to be passed back
along the chain for further amendment. Privatisation proposals also had to be approved by the Finance Ministry and the Bundesrechnungshof (Federal Auditing Office), where more objections about the feasibility of proposals were raised, not least the constitutionality of the reforms. The net result was to stall the privatisation project. Scharping had set unrealistic targets for privatisation. Whilst there were some successes, most notable within the clothing and vehicle fleet, Scharping was unable to meet the high level of expectation that he had generated.

Figure 5.4: Gesellschaft für Entwicklung, Beschaffung und Betrieb (GEBB), Pilotprojekte Bundeswehr (Council for Development, Procurement and Enterprise: Pilot-project Bundeswehr)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aufgabe</th>
<th>Ziel:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bewirtschaften des Materials in den Bundeseigenen Lagern und Sonderverwehlarern</td>
<td>Effiziente Bewirtschaftung bundeseigenen Materials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schaffen eines Verkehrs- und Transportverbundes Bundeswehr</td>
<td>Optimieren des Verkehrs- und Transportwesens der Bundeswehr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Betrieb von administrativen Rechenzentren der Bundeswehr</td>
<td>Wirtschaftlicher Betrieb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flächendeckendes und leistungstarkes Kommunikations- und Datennetz</td>
<td>Moderne und kompatible Kommunikationstechnologie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Einrichten von Kompetenzzentren Informationstechnologie</td>
<td>qualifiziertes IT-Personal für Bundeswehr und Industrie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Betrieb des Gefechtsübungszentrums Heer</td>
<td>Wirtschaftlicher Betrieb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Einrichten eines Flottenmanagements für PKW, LKW, Busse sowie</td>
<td>Wirtschaftlicher Fahrtbetrieb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ausbildungsfahrzeuge der Panzertruppenschule</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Betrieb von Ausbildungseinrichtungen der Luftwaffe für EF 2000 und</td>
<td>Kostensenkung durch gemeinsamen Ausbildungs-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hubschrauber NH90</td>
<td>betrieb mit der Industrie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistische Vollunterstützung der Radargeräte APAR und SMART-L für die</td>
<td>Angabe von unterstützungsleistungen, die privatwirtschaftlich</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fregatte Klasse 124</td>
<td>günstiger erbracht werden können</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liegenschaftsmanagement in den Wehrbereichsverwaltungen</td>
<td>Betrieb unter Nutzung ziviler Leistungen oder in gemeinsamer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nutzung mit gewerb. Partnern</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Quelle: BMVg, 2001

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42 Interviews in Defence Ministry in Bonn (23rd. September 2002) and Berlin (6th August 2002); Interview with Axel Schneider, Referent, Arbeitsgruppe Sicherheitsfragen, SPD Bundestagsfraktion, Berlin, 10th September 2002.
The central problem was that those charged with the implementation of privatisation and efficiency measures within the Defence Ministry were those who would be most adversely affected: the civilian personnel. This was the key reason why proposals were passed backwards and forwards between ministerial sections (Referate) and were stalled in the hope that the CDU/CSU would win the 2002 federal elections and reverse the reform process. In short, institutionalised interests, bureaucratic politics and inadequate planning acted to apply the brakes to Scharping’s initiative. Whilst consulting groups were called in to review financial practice and help increase efficiency, they found deeply entrenched institutionalised interests hard to overcome.

One source recalled the statement of a high-ranking official in the Hardthohe: ‘The flies [consulting groups] may come and the flies will leave, but the s*** [referring to himself] always stays’. Faced with these constraints, the privatisation and efficiency initiative failed to release the necessary financial resources for Scharping’s other reform proposals. The second reason related to Scharping’s own political self-interests. He had banked on a number of base closures, in particular of small bases, to help raise resources for the reform. With a 16 per cent drop in troop numbers, base closures were a necessary part of Scharping’s reform.

Scharping’s base closure plan took place in three phases: main planning from June until September 2000, fine planning from September to December 2000, and the final decision in early 2001. During the main planning stage Scharping made it clear that the 166 small bases with less than 50 soldiers would mostly be closed unless they were needed for special purposes such as radar surveillance. The more sensitive issue of closure of the 439 larger bases was left open. Such bases were often the lifeblood of a local economy. A garrison of 10,000 troops would, for example, consume over two million bread rolls, 1,250 pigs, 130 cows, and DM 500,000 of fruit and vegetables in a year. The average annual expenditure of an employee of the

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43 Interview, Herr Axel Schneider, Referent, SPD Arbeitsgruppe Sicherheitspolitik, SPD Bundestagsfraktion, Berlin, 4th. September 2002
44 Interview, Defence Ministry, Bonn, 23rd. September 2002
Bundeswehr in the local economy was DM 60,000. For this reason Scharping made it clear that the majority of closures would take place in the more prosperous regions of the western Länder rather than the new Länder which had already suffered large closures under Stoltenberg and Rühe and were no longer in a position to sustain further cuts. Electoral-strategic interest also played a role in this judgement. The SPD saw the East as pivotal for its success in the forthcoming 2002 federal elections. The sensitivity of base closure was such that members of the Green party, who previously protested against the military, opposed the closure of bases in their own Länder and constituencies.

The SPD was also concerned that the base closure programme could have a negative impact on the two key Länder elections due on 25th March 2001 in Baden-Württemberg and Rhineland Palatinate, especially on the prospects for Kurt Beck, Ministerpräsident in Rhineland Palatinate. Scharping was bound to be sensitive to this latter argument because he was a former Ministerpräsident of Rhineland Palatinate, which remained his home state. Baden-Württemberg and Rhineland Palatinate saw a drop of 4 per cent and 15 per cent in troops numbers respectively. Indeed, Scharping’s meetings with Kurt Beck were particularly intensive and took place before Scharping met with other Ministerpräsidenten. In particular, the SPD parliamentary party put pressure on Scharping to push through the concept as fast as possible. It was also critical to troop morale that their future be clarified as soon as possible. Scharping acted quickly to put to rest fears stoked by the CSU that Bayern was to suffer disproportionately. Scharping ‘took the wind from the CSU’s sails’ by securing the future of bases such as Freyung in Bayern. In this way it was hoped to uncouple the timing of a base closure programme not just from the federal elections of 2002 but also from sensitive Länder elections in 2001.

The closure of larger bases was to be determined through testing by a number of publicly articulated criteria: the social and economic importance of the base to the region, the relationship between the local population and the base, the amount of new

45 'Jobs für Wachhunde', Alexander Szandar, Der Spiegel 09.10.2000
46 'Alle lieben die Bundeswehr', Rheinische Post, 18.08.2000
47 DPA 141542 December 2000
48 'Fraktion mahnt Scharping zur Eile', Süddeutsche Zeitung 02.12.01 'Scharpings Konzept ist ausgewogen'
49 'Nur kleine Bundeswehr Standorte werden geschlossen', Die Welt 18.08.00
recruits that a base produced, and the concentration of bases in the region (the army had to remain 'in der Fläche präsent', allowing soldiers to remain near their homes). Two very important but less articulated criteria were the prices to be fetched by the real estate left vacant and, secondly, the political sensitivity to the SPD of the closure of the base.\(^{50}\)

Scharping was very careful during the large-scale and fine-planning stages to keep all details about base closures within the *Führungsstab* of the Defence Ministry. Scharping wanted to push his concept through quickly as a 'short, sharp, shock' in early 2001 and avoid mass protest and negative media coverage. Crucially, Scharping wanted the support of his SPD colleagues in his attempts to secure a higher budget for the Bundeswehr. Scharping also had one eye upon his political future, and his political ambition of the Chancellorship and had to be careful to avoid alienating fellow colleagues through an insensitive programme of base closures.

However, on 14th December 2000, Scharping's plans were leaked to *Die Welt*.\(^{51}\) Scharping had planned to speak with the *Ministerpräsidenten* in early 2000 about their concerns. The leak meant that opposition had more time to mobilise. Scharping's strategy and personal popularity within his own party was dealt a severe blow, as the leak placed a number of his colleagues in a very difficult position, causing them to feel betrayed by Scharping.\(^{52}\) The leak forced the 'fine planning' stage of Scharping's strategy to be completed sooner than anticipated.

Scharping encountered a high level of opposition from the chair of the Bundeswehrverband, Bernhard Gertz, who had publicly warned about threats to up to 80 bases.\(^{53}\) Heavy-weight opposition came from a number of *Länderministerpräsidenten* and other *Länder* politicians. Examples included Lower Saxony, notably Siegmar Gabriel (SPD Ministerpräsident) and Heiner Aller (SPD Finance Minister).\(^{54}\) Lower Saxony was Schröder's home state). In Schleswig-Holstein *Ministerpräsident* Heide Simonis continued to support Scharping's reform publicly, but her Interior Minister Klaus Buss was sharply critical (he had been

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\(^{50}\) 'Alle lieben die Bundeswehr', Rheinische Post 18.08.00


\(^{52}\) '79 Bundeswehr Standorte im Viser der Reformer', Die Welt, 14.12.2000

\(^{53}\) 'Bundeswehr reform bedroht bis zu 80 Standorte', Tagesspeigel 10.01.01

\(^{54}\) DPA 101612Jan01 'Widerstand gegen Bundeswehrreform aus den Ländern'
promised by Scharping that he would be consulted before any decision was made).^55^ 
Criticism of the base closure programme also came from the CSU and Bavaria, most notably Edmund Stoiber, Peter Ramsauer (Geschäftsführer der CSU Landesgruppe), Erwin Huber (head of the Bavarian Staatskanzlei), and Thomas Goppel (CSU General Secretary). Meanwhile, Kurt Beck, SPD Ministerpräsident in Rhineland Palatinate had been lobbying Scharping for months for ‘gentle treatment’.^56^ 

Most importantly, the implementation of Scharping’s base closure programme highlights the difficulties that he would have faced in implementing the recommendations of the Weizsäcker Commission. The potential damage both to the SPD and to his own personal popularity within the SPD and in the eyes of the public would have been high.^57^ As the *Handelsblatt* noted: ‘A large-scale closure of bases would have meant mass protests, also internal to the party. No minister could withstand that’.^58^ 

Scharping's programme of base closures planned on bringing in DM 1 billion to help finance Bundeswehr reform, in comparison with the recommendation of the Weizsäcker Commission for an initial financing of DM 1 billion per year from this source.^59^ The Weizsäcker Commission had recommended the closure of roughly half of all bases and sale of half of the real estate of the armed forces. Scharping’s concerns in designing the programme were two-fold: to attain as much money for the Bundeswehr as possible, whilst simultaneously retaining as much support within his own party as possible.^60^ It was later revealed that much of the information in the leak was inaccurate. However, the damage had already been done and the leak to *Die Welt*  

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^55^ 'Die Bündesländer kämpfen um den Erhalt von Kasernen und Standorten’, Berliner Morgenpost, 18.12.00 

^56^ 'Opposition und Länder kritisieren Scharping’s Streichliste', Die Welt 15.12.2000 

^57^ Poll in *Der Spiegel* 19.03.2001 demonstrates the unpopularity of barrack closure. 'Bundeswehr Sparen – aber wie'? ‘The armed forces need around 2 Billion DM. How should this hole in the finances be filled? The Bundeswehr should pull its troops out of the Balkans – 27%; the number of troops should be reduced by 25,000 – 22%; close 50-60 further bases – 11%; take the missing money from another budget – 21%. (Emnid-Umfrage für den Spiegel vom 13 und 14 Marz 2001; rund 1000 Befragte; Angaben in Prozent) 

^58^ ‘Scharping’s Konzept ist ausgewogen’, Handelsblatt 30.01.2001 

^59^ Gemeinsame Sicherheit und Zukunft der Bundeswehr: Bericht der Kommission an die Bundesregierung, May 2000, pt. 249 

^60^ Interview with Herr van den Busche, Refernt, Büro Volker Kröning, SPD Bundestagsfraktion, Berlin, 15th August 2002
ensured that Scharping’s concept was brought into the public before his first round of talks with Länder politicians, scuppering Scharping’s own damage limitation project planned for January.61

Scharping went public with his ‘fine planning’ and final decision concept on the 29th January 2001, after a first round of consultation with Länder politicians. Following an examination of 439 large bases, his initial plan foresaw the closure of 39 with a further 53 large bases facing reductions of up to 50 per cent. This was to be accompanied by the closure of 20 smaller bases, with a further 72 smaller bases also facing reductions of up to 50 per cent in numbers.62

Scharping’s concept was agreed in cabinet on 31st January 2001. However, Scharping continued to encounter protest from within his own party as well as the CSU. Indeed in the week of 13th February, Scharping had 15 meetings with Länder politicians and members of the opposition.63 Länder politicians began to argue for a compensation package for base closures. However, the Defence Ministry, having received the backing of the Chancellor’s Office and the cabinet for the ‘final concept’, was insensitive to such pleas. There were also a number of marches and public protests against base closures across the Länder. Nevertheless whilst politicians protested against the reforms, there was little unrest about the base closure concept amongst the troops, the Wehrbeauftragter, Willfried Penner, stating: ‘my mailbox is hardly spilling over’.

On 16th February 2001 Scharping presented his final concept, after a second round of talks with Länder politicians, embodying one major correction: the garrison of 1000 soldiers in Schneeberg, Saxony, was to remain. This was the result of a joint campaign by all the parliamentary parties on the Landtag of Saxony against the closure of the base. In total, the second concept cut the number of posts lost by 2,500.64

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61 ‘Die Bundesländer kämpfen um den Erhalt von Kasernen und Standorten’, Berliner Morgenpost, 18/12/00
62 Kleine Armee, weniger Standorte, Frankfurter Rundschau, 30.01.2001
63 DPA 021535 February 2001
64 ‘Scharping ändert Konzept für die Bundeswehr- Standorte’, Süddeutsche Zeitung 17.02.2001
Scharping's own leadership traits, crucially, follower need satisfaction and political ambition were clearly of importance in his humdrum leadership style on the issue of Bundeswehr reform. His base closure concept was a compromise between purely military reasons for closures and their political, economic and social consequences. Scharping's concept necessitated a reduction in troops from 340,000 to 282,000, a reduction of 16 per cent. The base closure programme was sensitive to forthcoming Länder elections with Rhineland-Palatinate losing 15 per cent of its troops (from 39,512 to 33,600) and Baden-Württemberg losing 4 per cent (from 34,293 to 32,800). The CSU-led Land of Bavaria was a big loser from closures, with a drop of 19 per cent (from 71,696 to 57,900). However, SPD-led Länder were also far from immune to large-scale troop reductions, most notably North-Rhine Westphalia losing 17 per cent of its troops (from 59,371 to 49,000). The scale of the opposition to base closures and sensitivity to the reduction of troops by 16 per cent demonstrates the political, economic and social difficulties that Scharping and the SPD would have incurred had they followed the recommendations of the Weizsäcker Commission and reduced the number of troops by a further 42,000 to 240,000. Such a concept would have made many more political enemies for Scharping and caused the SPD electoral damage. As one interview partner stated: 'Better to have a small-scale reform than a large-scale reform which would bring such negative consequences that it would be reversed before it could begin by the victory of the CDU/CSU in the 2002 federal elections'.

Within sections of the Federal Defence Ministry and from Green members of the Bundestag Finance Committee there was a great deal of disappointment about Scharping's lack of courage over base closures. Scharping himself stated that from a purely military and rational point of view he should have closed a further 60 bases. Scharping had been unable to close the large number of smaller bases that he had wished to, only closing 20 of the 166 small bases that had come under threat in his earlier proposals in the summer and autumn of 2000. The result was that Scharping

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65 'Scharping's Konzept ist Ausgewogen', Handelsblatt, 30.01.2001; 'Weniger Soldaten, weniger Standorte: Scharping wehrt sich gegen alarmistische Kritik', Frankfurter Allgemeine, 30.10.2001
66 Interview, Defence Ministry, Bonn, 23rd September 2002
67 'Scharping ändert Konzept für die Bundeswehr-Standorte', Süddeutsche Zeitung 17/02/01
had not been able to free up the necessary funds by base closures to finance the reform of the Bundeswehr.\textsuperscript{68}

Thus by early 2001 Scharping realised that he would be unable to secure the necessary funds to carry out the reform of the Bundeswehr. Along with the General Inspector of the Bundeswehr he began a campaign to secure more funds for the Bundeswehr in the 2002 budget.\textsuperscript{69} By having saved the government from a difficult debate about the future of Zivildienst and large-scale base closures he hoped that he would be seen as having ‘done his duty’ with the Bundeswehr reform and appropriately rewarded with funds that would alleviate some of the financial constraints of the Bundeswehr.\textsuperscript{70}

In his \textit{Material und Ausrüstungskonzept} Harald Kujat outlined the need for DM 220 billion to be spent on new equipment by 2015. Armed with these figures, as well as the implications of the base closures, Scharping met with Schröder and Eichel in March 2001 to highlight how there was a hole of DM 2 billion in the defence budget. This hole had to be filled if he was to push through his Bundeswehr reform. One of the reasons for this situation was that, behind the scenes, budget negotiations between the State Secretary in the Finance Ministry, Manfred Overhaus, and the State Secretary in the Defence Ministry, Klaus-Guenther Biederbeck had already broken down.\textsuperscript{71} By the end of May 2001 Scharping, Eichel and Schröder had met three times. However, the Finance Minister, with the full support of the Chancellor, ruled out any increases in the defence budget. The budget had been frozen at DM 47.7 billion and was to remain so until 2006. For Eichel to give way to Scharping at such an early point in the process of the budget negotiations would have set a bad example to other ministries that were seeking extra funds. Those responsible for the defence budget within the Finance Ministry were immune to the tactics of the Defence Ministry for

\textsuperscript{68} ‘Die Wehr ist nicht mobil, ohne Geld ist Rudolf Scharping zur Untätigkeit verdammt’ Rheinische Merkur, 01.06.2001; ‘Der Minister steht unter Druck, um seine Pläne umzusetzen, fehlt Scharping das Geld, und die Truppe murmmt’, Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, 02.06.2001; ‘Scharping allein zu Haus’, Der Spiegel, 11.06.2001; ‘Nachschuss Nötig: Der Verteidigungsminister Braucht mehr Geld’, Die Zeit, 08.03.2001

\textsuperscript{69} ‘Schweres geschützt: Finanzkrise der Bundeswehr: Scharping’s vehemenz im Wehretat-Streit zwingt den Bundeskanzler zum eingreifen’, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 08.03.2001

\textsuperscript{70} Interview with Herr van den Busche, Refernt, Büro Volker Kröning, SPD Bundestagsfraktion, Belrin, 15th August 2002.

\textsuperscript{71} ‘Schweres geschützt: Finanzkrise der Bundeswehr, Scharping’s vehemenz im Wehretat-Streit zwingt den Bundeskanzler zum eingreifen’, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 08.03.2001
gaining more money. Any reports about the poor state of the Bundeswehr were perceived by them as ‘pure propaganda’ and not taken seriously.

Scharping was thus in a very difficult position. The financial difficulties of the Bundeswehr were such that figures in the *Führungsstab* began to lobby the CDU/CSU parliamentary party, notably Paul Breuer and Volker Rühe. They attempted to encourage the opposition to place greater pressure on the Schröder government by highlighting the financial plight of the Bundeswehr. Scharping had promised to push through his reform without endangering the budget consolidation programme. It was now clear that this was not possible, and that he faced major policy and political risks. He was in danger of being attacked for endangering the ability of Germany to fulfil its international commitments to NATO and the EU and of growing criticism of his reform concept from within his own party. His critics argued that the Weizsäcker Commission’s report would have been a cheaper option and also more suitable to Germany’s international commitments. In late 2001, in the context of the deployment of troops in Afghanistan, there was increasing frustration within the SPD about the continued reliance of the Bundeswehr on conscription and about the dichotomy between territorial defence and crisis prevention and management. Hans-Ulrich Klose (chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Bundestag) stated that Scharping’s reform had to be scrutinised and that the model proposed by the Weizsäcker Commission had been the ‘best’. However, these dangers were counterbalanced by the necessity for the SPD parliamentary party to ‘carry through’ Scharping’s reform until the federal elections in 2002. They were condemned to live together because of the shadow of the elections. The SPD parliamentary party and Schröder were keen to avoid Scharping’s resignation for two reasons. Firstly, the government could be damaged by the loss of another key figure. Scharping’s resignation would be the eighth ministerial resignation since the election of the Red/Green government. Secondly, Scharping’s

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72 Interview with Herr van den Busche, Referent, Büro Volker Kröning, June 2002; Interview in Finance Ministry, 15th August 2002; see also ‘SPD und Grüne weisen Forderungen Scharpings nach mehr Geld zurück’, Handelsblatt, 27.03.2001
73 Interview in Finance Ministry, Bonn, 28th August 2002.
74 Interview, Dr. Jasper Wieck (Mitarbeiter, CDU/CSU Bundestagsfraktion, Arbeitsgruppe Verteidigung), Berlin, 16th. August 2002
75 Der Spiegel Nr. 51, 17/12/2001 pp.22-24
presence in the Defence Ministry neutralised a key potential challenger to Schröder’s position as Chancellor. He had already been involved in plotting one failed coup d’état during the legislative period. Schröder was keen to keep him isolated in the Defence Ministry, where he was seen to be doing a good job of destroying his own popularity. This leads to the final reason for the inability of Scharping to implement his reform proposals.

The third reason was termed by one source - ‘the Scharping phenomenon’, his ability to walk from one political embarrassment to another. A series of political mistakes and scandals saw him lose the support and respect of many within his own party and within the Defence Ministry. Scharping’s leadership style also demonstrated poor mobilising and conciliatory skills. Scharping began his time in the defence ministry using former defence ministers Leber and Schmidt as models. This led him to attempt to accommodate as many points of view as possible, encouraging open discussion about the state and future of the Bundeswehr. He consulted figures from the ‘grass roots’ upwards in a Bestandsaufnahme (stocktaking). However Scharping’s accommodative, consensual leadership style was short lived. As it became clear that the Bundeswehr was to gain no new resources, Scharping closed down access to decision making in the Defence Ministry, granting influence to a small circle of advisors within the Planning Staff. The Leber model led Scharping to conclude that he should not change the personnel within the Defence Ministry but instead work with those already in office. This proved to be a mistake, as he found himself surrounded by Rühe’s appointees, figures interested in maintaining the status quo and lacking imagination. Rühe’s appointees were also active in leaking information to the CDU/CSU.

Scharping alienated - and made unnecessary enemies of - members of the Bundestag Budgetary Committee and many within his own ministry by failing to supply basic information about his financial plans. He gained a reputation as arrogant and

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76 Interview, Chancellor’s Office, 2nd September 2002
77 Interview, SPD Bundestagsfraktion, August 2002
78 ‘Der stille Star’, Rheinische Post, 01.04.1999
80 Interview, Rudolf Scharping, 5th June 2003
81 Dr. Jasper Wieck (Mitarbeiter, CDU/CSU Bundestagsfraktion, Arbeitsgruppe Verteidigung), Berlin, 16th August 2002
unnecessarily coercive in his dealings with his coalition partners and colleagues within the SPD. This exacerbated his problem of raising more funds for the Bundeswehr. He also failed to consult and ‘bring along’ key figures within the Defence Ministry whose support was crucial for an effective implementation of the reform. Scharping’s ineptitude was eventually to lead to his dismissal from office by the Chancellor in the summer of 2002 and replacement by Peter Struck, the SPD’s parliamentary party leader. The final nail in Scharping’s coffin was a scandal about payments for an autobiography and his close ties to a lobbyist. This scandal came at the end of a number of damaging revelations, many of which could have been avoided by Scharping, demonstrating poor judgement. These included inappropriate timing of holidays in Majorca during the deployment of German troops in Macedonia, the use of military aircraft for personal appointments, and the poor handling of a scandal involving radioactive munitions. Scharping became something of a joke figure within his own party and amongst the general public. Scharping’s position was now so weak that he had become a liability to the government as it faced a very difficult federal election. He was no longer in a position to challenge Schröder’s leadership.

Hence the Red/Green government found itself locked into a policy concept for the Bundeswehr that was manifestly failing. As the budgetary situation deteriorated in 2001-2, and the federal government was threatened with a ‘warning letter’ (Blauer Brief) from the European Commission over its budget deficit, it was clear that there would be no further available funds for the Bundeswehr. The emerging SPD position

83 Interview in Defence Ministry, 6th August 2002. Scharping’s leadership style had changed from collegial and accommodative to coercive and authoritarian. One source recalled how in a meeting shortly after his concept was passed in cabinet Rudolf Scharping’s was thoroughly dismissive of the reservations held by a number of key figures within the ministry who would be responsible for implementation of the reform, causing a great deal of resentment. See also ‘Das Vertrauensverhältnis Scharpings zu seinen obersten Führungsstäben hat einen Knacks bekommen’ (After the sacking of General-Inspekteur Hans-Peter von Kirchbach and his replacement with Harald Kujat (Former Head of the Planning Staff) – this significantly soured the atmosphere in the Defence Ministry) in ‘Aus dem Reichstag’, Die Welt, 30.05.2000; see also, ’Even the closest Generals to him said in Berlin at the weekend in a private and frank conversation, The Minister has broken the bond of trust to the Generals with his recent behaviour in Hannover’ in ‘Viele Generals haben vertrauen zu Scharping verloren’, DPA 140938, April 2002, ‘Bundeswehrangehörige protestieren gegen Reformpläne von Minister Scharping’, Die Welt, 08.06.2002
84 ‘Rudolf retten – bis zu Wahl’, Die Zeit, 31.05.01
was that the Bundeswehr reform was to be ‘carried through’ to the elections of 2002, after which a ‘reform of the reform’ would take place.\footnote{Interview, Jürgen Schnappertz, Referent, Büro Peter Struck MbB., Bundestagsfaktion, Berlin, 5th August 2002}

In this context, later external developments and shocks - the deployment of German troops to support peacekeeping in Macedonia as part of ‘Operation Fox’, September 11\textsuperscript{th} and the subsequent deployment to Afghanistan - had little effect on the shape or implementation of the Bundeswehr reform. September 11\textsuperscript{th} was the catalyst for the anti-terror package, which relied on increased insurance and tobacco taxes to generate an additional DM 1.5 million for the Bundeswehr. However, this money was to be used only for the purpose of anti-terror measures. It was also placed within the \textit{Einzelplan} 60, necessitating the Defence Ministry to apply to the Finance Ministry for access to the fund.\footnote{See Table 4.2} In reality, then, there were no extra funds available to support the Bundeswehr reform. Even long-term weapons projects such as the A-400-M transport aircraft, a lynchpin of European defence and security co-operation, and the NATO DCI came under threat. The percentage of the defence budget allocated to investment in armaments continued to lie well beneath the necessary 30 per cent, at 23 per cent.\footnote{‘Bundeswehr wehrt sich gegen Sparkurs’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 02.05.2002} Only after long and arduous negotiations between the Defence Ministry, the Finance Ministry, the Bundestag defence and budgetary committees, and the Federal Chancellor’s Office was a reduced number of aircraft (73) ordered.\footnote{‘Bundeswehr wehrt sich gegen Sparkurs’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 02.05.2002}

The Bundeswehr was faced with tasks of equipping itself not only for crisis prevention capabilities but also for territorial defence. The continuing commitment to territorial defence was apparent in its purchase of some of the heaviest immobile artillery in Europe, infuriating Germany’s partners, especially the British.\footnote{Interviews with Mr. Paul Williams (Political Military Affairs) and Col. Jack Sheldon (Defence) British Embassy, Berlin, 9\textsuperscript{th} September 2002; ‘Verteidigung braucht Zukunft’, Die Zeit, 06.06.2002, Christoph Bertram} With 77,000 conscripts, the territorial defence/crisis-prevention dichotomy of the Bundeswehr continued, preventing the movement of the Bundeswehr towards the goals set by NATO and the EU.
As far as Bundeswehr reform was concerned, the key external perturbations came not from the international security environment but from the budget policy subsystem. Budget consolidation was a much higher priority of the SPD-led government than defence policy, in part because it was so closely bound up with the German EU priority to EMU, and in part because financial competence mattered far more to German voters than Bundeswehr and wider defence and security policy issues. Hence Bundeswehr reform, low on the list of voters’ concerns, was to be ‘fudged through’ until after the 2002 elections. Meanwhile, no challenges to the policy monopoly would be permitted. Scharping had altered the policy image to the furthest extent he saw possible within the budgetary and political constraints. There had been no politics of punctuation and no change to the ‘deep core’ of the policy image supporting the Bundeswehr.

The budgetary implications of Bundeswehr reform became contested. Proponents of a professional army, like the Green parliamentary party’s budget spokesman, Oswald Metzger argued that the maintenance of conscription was financially crippling the Bundeswehr. Others, like Rühe, stressed the potentially higher costs of a professional army. The most influential position was that of the Finance Ministry: that budgetary consolidation meant priority to efficiency measures and privatisation. Less contested were the politics of radical Bundeswehr reform which was ruled out on electoral-strategic grounds. It was seen as endangering the electoral chances of the SPD and thus weakening the position of the Chancellor who wished to be associated with measures that increased rather than reduced employment and that did not threaten the delivery of social care. The macro-political system thus would allow no change or dissent to the policy image.

Despite this political line from the top, opposition to conscription grew within the SPD parliamentary party, and criticism of Scharping’s reform concept increased within the press and public debate. The events of 11th September 2001 and their

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90 Interview with Herr Voringer, Referent for Oswald Metzger, Green Budgetary Spokesperson and Obmann in Finanzausschuss, Berlin, 18th August 2002.
91 Interviews, Finance Ministry, Bonn, 23rd September 2002
92 ‘Wie Scharping wieder Tritt fassen kann: Er muss jetzt die Vorschläge der Weizsäcker-Kommission zur Bundeswehrreform übernehmen’, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 03.01.2002., ‘Scharpings schwache Truppe’, Die Woche, 11.01.2002; ‘Wehrpflicht darf kein Tabu bleiben: General Willmann über Nötige Änderungen bei der Bundeswehr’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, 03.02.2002; ‘Die arme Armee’, Die Welt, 01.03.2002. See also criticism of Wehrpflicht from Ute Vogt, Landesvorsitzenden,
aftermath set in place a ‘positive feedback’ process in which it became increasingly clear that a Bundeswehr committed to territorial defence was in no position to respond flexibly to the new security challenges. Indeed, within the Defence Ministry itself, the lessons from the deployment in Afghanistan played an important role in policy-orientated learning. An internal paper, written by a group of generals surfaced within the Defence Ministry in February 2002, spurred by the new security challenges facing Germany. It argued that to meet humanitarian and crisis reaction commitments and to increase *Wehrgerechtigkeit* the Bundeswehr required to be a professional armed force of 200,000 to 250,000 men.\(^3\)

The paper was particularly concerned by the bad impression created by the late arrival of German forces in Kabul due to the time taken to gather troops from the whole of Germany. The generals stressed that the German armed forces were simply not structured for such deployments and that greater flexibility and responsiveness was needed in the new security environment. Change was inevitable in order to avoid always being the ‘taillight’. It was becoming clear to many inside the military that the German armed forces were in no position to meet the challenges faced by the new security environment. Policy orientated learning was taking place, kick-started by the consequences of September 11\(^{th}\), and deployment with the British and Americans. A process that had started under Rühe continued as figures within the Defence Ministry underwent changes to the policy core of their belief in territorial defence and conscription as a result of the practical experiences of engaging in multinational combat missions. However, the SPD leadership was determined to stick resolutely to the traditional policy image, at least until after the 2002 elections.\(^4\)

5.3 Rudolf Scharping as Policy Leader: The Strategic Context of Bundeswehr Reform

The radical policy change proposed by the Weizsäcker Commission contrasted with the hesitant and cautious response of the Federal Defence Minister, Scharping. Its...
work was in effect marginalized by Scharping in favour of the existing 'policy monopoly'. Thus whilst the majority of Commission members themselves were convinced of the need for a change in the status quo, the strategic context and actions of key political decision makers inhibited the transmission of the Commission’s proposals into policy.

A range of factors inhibited policy change.

- The unwillingness of Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer to put his full political weight behind the Weizsäcker Report, particularly given the continuing sensitivities within the Green Party about ‘out-of-area’ deployments. Fischer was inhibited by the relatively weak position of the Green Party in the federal coalition, its consequent difficulties in profiling distinctive positions, and the demands of coalition discipline from the SPD. Fischer did not pursue the agenda-setting role on Bundeswehr reform of his predecessor Kinkel.

- The unwillingness of the CDU/CSU opposition (unlike the FDP) to embrace and mobilize around the new policy image of a professional, crisis-prevention Bundeswehr. It feared drawing attention to the Kohl government's record of deep financial cuts in defence policy and was still strongly influenced by the role of Rühe as a deputy chair of the CDU/CSU parliamentary party in defending his legacy.

- Scharping's conception of the difficulties of managing policy change within the defence and security and the Bundeswehr policy subsystems. He believed that their internal complexity made a heroic leadership style counterproductive and stressed building confidence and trust through dialogue, especially with ordinary soldiers. This led him to embrace a policy leadership role of brokerage, in which he sought to earn the respect of service personnel by showing that he listened to their concerns: ‘management by co-operation after management by terror’. However, his problems in playing this role derived

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95 Interview with Axel Schneider, Referent, Arbeitsgruppe Sicherheitsfragen, SPD Bundestagsfraktion, Berlin, 4th September 2002
96 Interview with Axel Schneider, Referent, Arbeitsgruppe Sicherheitsfragen, SPD Bundestagsfraktion, 4th. September 2002.
from the fact that he was not neutral on the issue of conscription. In consequence, advocates of a professional, crisis-management Bundeswehr saw him as in reality a veto player.

- The lack of political power and influence of Scharping, not least vis-à-vis Schröder. Schröder distrusted Scharping’s political motives and ambitions. In consequence, despite his best efforts to profile the requirements of the Defence Ministry at the centre, Scharping was never an insider at the Federal Chancellor’s Office. This relative political isolation of Scharping had implications for his authority and standing within the SPD and the Bundestag, and not least within the Bundeswehr policy subsystem.

- The primacy that Schröder gave to backing Eichel’s budget consolidation programme, with consequent strict financial constraints on the Bundeswehr. The budget division of the Finance Ministry justified these constraints as a means of extracting greater efficiency from the Bundeswehr and thereby releasing resources for modernization. The Federal Chancellor’s Office argued that stress should be placed on Germany’s disproportionately high contribution to non-defence security rather than to higher spending on the Bundeswehr. Scharping was critical of what he saw as the conservative and bureaucratic outlook of the Finance Ministry under Eichel, especially of its powerful budget division.

- The deep political sensitivities within the social care policy subsystem about the vital role of ziviler Ersatzdienst as a central pillar of social policy and fear that the end of conscription would lead to the collapse of this pillar, with large transitional and short to medium term financial and human costs. These sensitivities were felt acutely within the SPD, whose political identity was bound up with social solidarity.

With a selective Wehrdienst of 30,000, Zivildienst was inevitably going to be brought into question. The consequences of the abolition of Zivildienst were uncertain, to say the least, and threatened core aspects of SPD ideology.

Morgenpost, 12.02.1999. See also ‘Scharping bevorzugt auf der Hardthöhe die sanfte Tour’, Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 09.01.1999

98 Interview in Chancellor’s Office, Berlin, 2nd. September 2002 and with Herr Axel Schneider, Referent, Arbeitsgruppe Sicherheitsfragen, SPD Bundestagsfraktion, 10th September 2002

99 Interviews in Finance Ministry, Bonn (28th August 2002) and Berlin (18th August 2002)
Whilst the abolition of Zivildienst would create much needed jobs, within the context of budget consolidation the removal of Zivildienst - and the cheap labour that it brought (130,000 young men per year) - would have severe financial implications and necessitate a sharp increase in social spending. The short- to medium-term financial costs would be high. Some within the Defence Ministry, notably the Bundeswehr University in Munich, had attempted to influence the reform process by a study undertaken under the leadership of ex-Deputy General Inspector Jürgen Schnell. This study concluded that a force with 280,000 professional soldiers would lead to significant savings. However as Scharping stated: "If those doing Zivildienst and Wehrdienst were to be replaced by professionals, the costs would rise dramatically." As one high-ranking official in the Finance Ministry stated: "The abolition of Zivildienst plays a big role in the issue of Bundeswehr reform – it would be very expensive at least in the short to medium term – no government is prepared to open up this debate.

In order to avoid this issue there was a preference for keeping conscription off the political agenda. This factor points to a 'mobilization of bias' within German public policy, with interests within social policy having the power to prevent the question of conscription from being openly discussed.

- The electoral strategic constraints that faced the SPD/Green government, with a number of sensitive mid-term Länder elections. The SPD federal executive and the Federal Chancellor's Office hesitated in dealing with the political 'fall out' from large-scale base closures. It was agreed amongst the SPD party leadership that, in the short to medium term, a professional army would

100 See Interview with Heiner Bartling, SPD Innenminister, Niedersachsen in 'Ein Pflichtjahr wäre für alle ein Gewinn', Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung, 06.04.2002, who states, 'It is a big illusion that the holes [left by the possible abolition of Zivildienst] could be filled by professionals. No one could pay for it.'

101 A study at the Bundeswehr University in München found that 7 Billion DM could be saved with Streitkräfte of 280,000 Zeit- und Berufssoldaten in 'Teuere Wehrpflicht', Der Spiegel 21.02.2000

102 (DPA 0485) 201754 Feb 00

103 Interview in Finance Ministry, Bonn, 28th August, 2002

104 See classically, 'non-decision-making' as the second face of power, Bacharach, P and Baratz, M. 'Two Faces of Power', American Political Science Review, Vol.56, No.3, pp.947-952

105 Interviews in Defence Ministry, Bonn, 23rd September, 2002.
involve high political costs as well as be financially more expensive. Hence Schröder was keen to prevent any debate about conscription.\textsuperscript{106}

- The vested interests within the Federal Defence Ministry, notably within the \textit{Führungsstab}, which consisted of many Rühe appointees who continued to oppose the reductions in personnel that a large-scale Bundeswehr reform would bring. The \textit{Führungsstab} had been less involved in policy-oriented learning than the Weizsäcker Commission and those closest to the operational problems of the Bundeswehr. As one source stated: ‘The armed forces always prefer the status quo’.\textsuperscript{107} Bundeswehr reform was bound up in bureaucratic politics within the core executive.

In the language of ‘multiple streams’ literature, key building blocks for a policy entrepreneurship role were in place. There was a compelling policy problem that was widely recognized after the Kosovo War (1999) and a coherent set of policy solutions in the Weizsäcker Report (2000). Moreover, the Weizsäcker proposals stood alongside a proliferation of NATO, WEU and EU initiatives designed to develop military capabilities for a crisis management role:

- NATO's updated Strategic Concept and Defence Capabilities Initiative (April 1999)
- The Bremen Declaration of the WEU Council of Ministers (May 1999)
- The European Council Declaration on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence (June 1999 at Cologne)

Scharping played a key role in this hectic round of diplomatic activity, not least because of the German Presidency and the pressure to respond to the Anglo-French St. Malo Declaration. Thus in the context of the Kosovo crisis he chaired the informal meeting of EU and European NATO defence ministers in Bremen that called for an

\textsuperscript{106} ‘Die Zeit ist Reif’, \textit{Der Spiegel}, 15, 08.04.02, ‘Kanzler Schröder will eine Debatte vermeiden’
\textsuperscript{107} Interview in Defence Ministry, Berlin, 14\textsuperscript{th} August 2002
enhanced European crisis management capability in the framework of the Petersburg tasks.

However, consistent with what multiple streams literature suggests, Scharping did not offer heroic leadership on Bundeswehr reform because he did not see the politics stream as offering a window of opportunity for domestic policy entrepreneurship on strengthening military capabilities for making the conduct of Petersburg operations more effective. The humdrum rather than heroic leadership style of Scharping had a number of causes that were identified above and are analysed in this section. An important role was played by his beliefs about the constraints posed by the nature of the defence and security policy subsystem and what these constraints implied for policy leadership.

From the perspective of the ‘advocacy coalition’ framework and perspective two, Scharping and Schröder were unwilling to throw their weight behind a nascent coalition for a professional, crisis-management Bundeswehr. Without their policy leadership it had little short-term prospect of forming, let alone becoming a mature advocacy coalition. According to ‘punctuated equilibrium’ theory and perspective five, the politics of punctuation of the policy image of territorial defence and conscription was frustrated by a macro-political environment that was unreceptive to policy change and institutional access for those proposing a professional armed force. As under Rühe and Kohl, the policy image of territorial defence and conscription was sustained not so much by strategic culture as by political calculation of key policy leaders in the macro-political system that policy and deep core changes were not in their interests.

This kind of strategic political calculation was apparent in the CDU/CSU. The inadequacies of the Bundeswehr in carrying out crisis management missions did not receive the attention that they deserved because of the unwillingness of the CDU/CSU to act as an effective opposition on this issue.\(^{108}\) In consequence, those advocating the crisis-management policy image within the policy subsystem lacked the

\(^{108}\) Interview with Axel Schneider, Referent, Arbeitsgruppe Sicherheitsfragen, SPD Bundestagsfraktion, 10th September 2002, Interview, Dr. Jasper Wieck (Mitarbeiter, CDU/CSU Bundestagsfraktion, Arbeitsgruppe Verteidigung), Berlin, 16th. August 2002
encouragement to press effectively for and gain full implementation of the Weizsäcker Report and a bigger share of the federal budget. This unwillingness of the CDU/CSU to prioritise Bundeswehr reform stemmed from a political fear of highlighting their own failures during their years in office, notably the effects of the massive defence cuts with the end of the Cold War. Hence the CDU/CSU was not very receptive to radical Bundeswehr policy change. This attitude worked to the benefit of the status quo and the policy image of territorial defence and conscription. As a deputy chair of the CDU/CSU parliamentary party Rühe was able to sustain the Denkverbot in opposition.

The CDU/CSU’s opposition to the SPD on the issue of the Bundeswehr was hampered by their own record on the issue during the mid- to late-1990s. There was a broad consensus amongst military experts in Germany (see interview notes) that the Bundeswehr was in a poor state for international engagement after the budget cuts under Volker Rühe. Hence, for the CDU/CSU to highlight the desolate state of the Bundeswehr would be to draw attention to their failures while in office.

The CDU/CSU opposition acted to support the traditional policy image of territorial defence, stressing the importance of conscription. In this way it facilitated and supported Scharping’s role as a ‘policy broker’ rather than outlining an alternative agenda-setting role on the Bundeswehr. The main roles of the CDU/CSU opposition during the Schröder/Fischer government were to press for a higher budget for the Bundeswehr and to oppose base closures. Volker Rühe, who had decided upon leaving the Defence Ministry after the 1998 elections to distance himself from the Bundeswehr, was inundated with requests from figures within the Defence Ministry to become active on the issue and push the Red/Green government for more resources.

Despite this widespread support for territorial defence and conscription within the CDU/CSU, there was a growing feeling that CDU/CSU policy on conscription was

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110 Interviews in Defence Ministry, Bonn and Berlin, August and September 2002
111 Dr. Jasper Wieck (Mitarbeiter, CDU/CSU Bundestagsfraktion, Arbeitsgruppe Verteidigung), Berlin, 16th. August 2002
outdated and was in need of ‘modernisation’\textsuperscript{112}. Younger members of the CDU/CSU started to question whether conscription was the correct basis for an armed force involved in international missions. A senior party figure, Wolfgang Schaüble (former chair of the parliamentary party and for a brief period in opposition of the CDU), took up the cause of reform against Rühe and Breuer. Before the 2002 federal elections Edmund Stoiber, the CDU/CSU Chancellor candidate put together an election team called ‘40 plus’. Wolfgang Schaüble was given responsibility for European, foreign and security policy and was charged with producing a paper on future security concepts for the CDU/CSU. In April 2002, Schaüble - along with Rupert Scholz and Karl Lamers (the foreign policy spokesperson of the CDU/CSU parliamentary party) - delivered this paper to Angela Merkel (the CDU chair) and to Stoiber and his team ‘40 Plus’. Schaüble’s concept was strongly influenced by the events of September 11\textsuperscript{th}. It called for a shortening of the length of conscription to five/six months and a separation of the Bundeswehr into two groups: \textit{Heimatschutzkräfte} (national guard, consisting of mostly conscripts), and \textit{Einsatzkräfte} (crisis reaction troops, consisting of career soldiers)\textsuperscript{113}. Stöiber was convinced that the events of September 11\textsuperscript{th}. necessitated a stronger level of domestic security and that international missions were better carried out by professional troops. Schaüble also proposed that the government should be given the power to deploy the Bundeswehr without the consultation of Parliament.

In contrast, ex-defence minister Volker Rühe developed an alternative concept on CDU/CSU Bundeswehr policy, entitled: ‘\textit{The Future of the Bundeswehr: 10 Theses}'.\textsuperscript{114} Rühe and Breuer strongly rejected any shortening of conscription, recommending a Bundeswehr of 300,000 troops, including 100,000 conscripts. Rühe warned that splitting the Bundeswehr into \textit{Heimatschutz} and \textit{Einsatzkräfte} would have the effect of creating a ‘two-class army’, with de-motivated and under-funded troops at home and well-equipped troops on international duty. Most importantly, Rühe warned against Schaüble’s concept as the ‘beginning of the end’ for conscription, which he saw as the ‘jewel in the crown of the Bundeswehr’. He also highlighted how Schaüble’s concept would necessitate base closures and would meet with ‘revolt’ amongst CDU/CSU supporters and be a certain vote loser. Rühe also pointed to the

\textsuperscript{112} Interview with Herr Markus Lackamp, CDU/CSU Bundesgeschäftstelle, Berlin, 6th August 2002
\textsuperscript{113} ‘Union entschärft internen Streit um die Bundeswehr’, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 06.04.2002
\textsuperscript{114} ‘Schlappe für Schaüble’, Die Welt, 06.04.2002
consequences of a shortening of conscription for Zivildienst. Zivildienst would have to be shortened and would be rendered impractical.\textsuperscript{115}

The CDU/CSU leadership was aware that conscription needed rethinking. Indeed, advised by a security policy group including Naumann, Edmund Stoiber was a strong supporter of Schaüble’s ideas about the Bundeswehr. However, once again, the ramifications of base closures - especially sensitive in Bavarian local politics - extinguished opportunities for action on the issue. When Stoiber was informed of the mood within the CDU/CSU parliamentary party about Schaüble’s concept, and about the implications for base closures, his support for Schaüble’s concept disappeared quickly.\textsuperscript{116}

After a number of hours of discussion it was decided unanimously to retain conscription at 9 months. Schaüble’s idea of splitting the Bundeswehr into two sections was sceptically received. From this point on Paul Breuer, a staunch defender of conscription was put in charge of developing CDU/CSU policy on the Bundeswehr. Merkel’s and Stoiber’s policy leadership in favour of stasis and the traditional policy monopoly was critical. They realised that Schaüble’s paper had touched on a sensitive issue within the CDU/CSU, and acted fast to stop any policy-orientated learning by putting a policy veto player in charge of the issue for the election. Nevertheless, whilst Schaüble’s paper was vetoed, it helped to promote a process of policy-orientated learning within the CDU/CSU. It served to act as an aid to the small group of reformers within the CDU/CSU that sought to alter the secondary aspects of the belief system of supporters of conscription in the CDU/CSU. There was a growing consensus amongst younger members of the CDU/CSU (like Bruno Zierer and others in the CDU/CSU Parteivorstand) that Rühe and Breuer were outdated in their thinking on the Bundeswehr and that conscription was in need of adaptation to the post-September 11th security environment.\textsuperscript{117}

Thus Schaüble, with the support of Lamers and Scholz, sought to carve out a policy entrepreneur role on Bundeswehr reform within the CDU/CSU. However, his ability to engage in the ‘coupling’ of the three streams of problems, policies and politics was

\begin{flushleft}{\textsuperscript{115}} ‘Schlappe für Schaüble’, Die Welt, 06.04.2002
\textsuperscript{116} ‘Union will bei Wehrpflicht von neun Monaten bleiben’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 06.04.2002
\textsuperscript{117} Interview with Herr Markus Lackamp, CDU/CSU Bündesgeschäftstelle, Berlin, 6th August 2002\end{flushleft}
circumscribed by the pressing requirements of electoral-strategic interest, especially as the 2002 federal elections neared. In addition, Schäuble was not considered an expert on issues of defence and security. He was, however, very active in lobbying to promote agenda change, using the press to help get his message across. The problem was that, by the time of the presentation of his paper, Schäuble was still not prepared enough to push through such a concept, depending heavily on the support of Scholtz and Lamers. The CDU/CSU parliamentary party continued to stand firmly behind conscription, despite the presence of a nascent coalition forming against the current model of conscription.

Schäuble's failure as a policy entrepreneur cannot be explained by inadequacies in his personal leadership traits. He was operating within an unfavourable electoral strategic context, where his proposals threatened more political electoral losses than gains for the CDU/CSU. He was unable to create any kind of 'crisis consciousness' within the CDU/CSU because it retained a greater credibility on defence and security issues with the public than the SPD or the Greens. It might be argued that Schäuble's timing was poor. However it must be remembered that it was Stoiber and Merkel, not Schäuble who requested that Schäuble present a paper on the issue. Rühe and Breuer were able to act as policy veto players by appealing to the ramifications for wider macro-political objectives, and the campaign team was highly sensitive to electoral arguments. The issue of base closures remained the defining element of CDU/CSU policy on the Bundeswehr.

The net result of CDU/CSU opposition during the Red/Green government was more help than hindrance to Scharping's policy broker role, by reinforcing the dominant policy image and policy monopoly. CDU/CSU opposition was most damaging to the SPD in highlighting Scharping's lack of political judgement and political scandals. The CDU/CSU was also very active in pushing for an increase in the Bundeswehr's budget, and was able to protest more against the implications of budget consolidation

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119 Interview with Herr Markus Lackamp, CDU/CSU Bündesgeschäftsstelle, 6th. August 2002; see also Rühe had warned the party leadership before that base closures were a consequence of a shorter period of duty for conscripts. The argument that such a closure would lead to an unprising from the regional party organisations and electoral districts and could then cost the CDU votes in the coming election acted to convince Stoiber [against Schäuble's concept]. 'Schlappe für Schäuble', Die Welt, 06.04.2002
for defence than Scharping, who had to toe the government line. The CDU/CSU was also supportive of the idea of privatisation within the Bundeswehr. Paul Breuer, Thomas Kossendy and Dietrich Austermann reserved their criticism for Scharping's implementation of the initiative. The CDU/CSU was also in favour of maintaining conscription, and like Scharping stood against the radical recommendations of the Weizsäcker Commission.

Thus, whilst there were figures within the CDU/CSU who were seeking to instigate policy core change to party thinking on the Bundeswehr, they were hindered by the electoral strategic context within which they were operating. The CDU/CSU opposition was more aid than hindrance to Scharping, urging him to be as conservative and humdrum as possible on the key issues of territorial defence and conscription.

Nevertheless, the Kosovo War had an effect on the policy monopoly and its supportive policy image of territorial defence by uniting the opposition to this policy image and by giving momentum to a nascent advocacy coalition for a professional, crisis-management Bundeswehr. The Greens, who provided the most important strand of the 'ideological' opposition to territorial defence, now joined the FDP in their practical opposition to the policy image. The Kosovo War presented an opportunity for Fischer to act as policy entrepreneur within his own party to marginalize the 'fundamentalist' pacifists and empower the 'realists'. It demonstrated in practical and vivid terms Fischer's contention of 1995 (against the background of the Srebrenica massacre) that military force sometimes had to be used to defend human rights and the moral values that underpinned Green thought. With the triumph of Fischer's policy entrepreneurship within the party, the Greens' opposition to conscription was transformed into a practical critique of the ineffectiveness of this policy image in the new and emerging international security environment. Instead of pushing for abolition of conscription as a step toward disarmament, it was seen as an opportunity to structure the armed forces around crisis prevention. In another sense Green opposition shared a common basis with that of the FDP in its libertarian rejection of the requirement that a citizen had such deep obligations to society.

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121 Angelika Beer, 'SPD Pocht weiter auf Wehrpflicht', Frankfurter Rundschau, 09.05.2000 and interview with Herr Helmut Hüber, Office of Angelika Beer MdB, Berlin, 18th July 2002
This transformation within the Green Party was potentially an important event. It meant that a nascent advocacy coalition was emerging to oppose territorial defence. It also demonstrates the importance of leadership in the formation of advocacy coalitions. However, crucially this opportunity was thwarted by the Red/Green coalition agreement of 1998. Under pressure from the SPD, notably from its chair Lafontaine who played the lead role and was closely aligned with the peace coalition, the Greens had committed themselves not to make a coalition issue of their opposition to conscription. Nevertheless, this development demonstrates the importance of policy leadership by animators of change for the formation of 'nascent' advocacy coalitions. The transformation of a 'nascent' coalition into a 'mature' coalition capable of gaining power over policy was, however, frustrated by the lack of a powerful ministerial sponsor within the SPD.

The unwillingness of Scharping to play a leadership role as policy entrepreneur in agenda-setting on Bundeswehr reform was closely linked to his belief that the policy subsystem was too complex and porous to accommodate an heroic policy style. The Bundeswehr policy subsystem had a reputation as a graveyard of political ambitions. As an ambitious politician, Scharping's central interest - like that of Rühe earlier - was in avoiding becoming another victim of the Defence Ministry. Interests that were adversely affected by policy proposals were prepared to brief against a minister and undermine his reputation. In order to try to cope with these difficulties Scharping opted for a dual approach, modelled on two previous, successful SPD defence ministers in the previous SPD/FDP governments: Helmut Schmidt and Georg Leber.122 Schmidt's reputation stemmed from a detailed policy knowledge that derived from a close working relationship with officials, with whom he sought to cultivate a relationship of trust.

The lesson that Scharping drew was the importance of building confidence by opting for continuity in senior official positions in the Defence Ministry. Despite criticism from within the SPD, he retained the same State Secretary as under Rühe: though making it clear that any sign of disloyalty would lead to instant dismissal. Because these senior officials were the legacy of Rühe's Denkverbot, this continuity was not...

associated with an interest in policy innovation. Instead, bureaucratic vested interests tended to prevail. The model of Leber was reflected in Scharping’s efforts to go outside the formal hierarchy to make contacts with ordinary soldiers and gain their respect and admiration. He wanted to be seen as a responsive minister who had the interests of soldiers at heart rather than as a remote, top-down policy maker (which is how he saw Riihe). Scharping initiated a series of meetings with soldiers that were designed to illustrate a desire on his part to learn from them. He sought a more bottom-up approach to policy leadership.

Scharping’s opinion was that Riihe’s style of leadership, which he termed the ‘leadership of control’, was not conducive to effective leadership of a large institution such as the Defence Ministry. Instead of attempting to stop ‘leaks’ by strict control, which could have had the consequences of undermining confidence and engagement, Scharping made a conscious effort to cultivate confidence and motivate his staff. This was one reason why Scharping did not replace a large number of Riihe’s appointees on taking up his post within the Defence Ministry; it would have been a confidence-destroying rather than confidence-boosting measure. Instead, Scharping was prepared to trust the loyalty and qualifications of the personnel appointed by Riihe and release them later if they failed to meet his expectations.

Scharping’s leadership style was also strongly influenced by his conception of the nature of the flow of information within the Defence Ministry. At the top of the ministry Scharping would have to wait until the information came to him by the Dienstweg (service path), rising upwards through the ranks, so that hierarchy could shape the intelligence that he received. The Dienstweg was slow and filtered out information, with successive spins placed on it by the time it reached the minister. As Scharping stated, he wanted: ‘To create a situation were the quality of thought rather than rank counts’...

123 Interview with Rudolf Scharping, Berlin, 5th June 2003
124 Interview, Defence Ministry, Berlin, 14th August 2002, Interview with Rudolf Scharping, Berlin, 5th June 2003
125 Interview with Rudolf Scharping, Berlin, 5th June 2003, see also Willensky, H.I. (1967) Organizational Intelligence, Knowledge and Policy in Government and Industry (New York, London, Basic Books)
126 ‘Ein sanfter Mann fürs Militär’, Die Zeit, 25.03.1999
200 meetings and conferences during his time in office).\footnote{127} The result was an openness to policy-orientated learning. At the same time this approach made Scharping critical of the Weizsäcker Commission, whose approach he saw as too intellectual and remote from the concerns of ordinary soldiers.

Scharping entered office with the advantage that he had been involved in SPD foreign and security policy and a long time advocate of modernising the image of the SPD in this policy area. In substantive terms he emphasised the importance of the trans-Atlantic relationship and NATO as the key to German defence and security policy, whilst advocating a European defence and security policy that fitted into this wider framework. Hence his views represented a fundamental continuity with, rather than radical change to, the basic foundations of German foreign policy. In fact, Scharping's views were closer to those of Rühe than to those of Lafontaine who stressed the Franco-German relationship and was more critical of NATO and the US role. This pointed to an internal strategic problem for Scharping within the SPD, the product of the way in which different advocacy coalitions within defence and security policy ran through the party. Scharping's political ambition of attaining leadership of the SPD and the Chancellorship acted as a break upon his willingness to take political risks on behalf of Bundeswehr reform.\footnote{128}

Scharping's leadership problems had their origin less within the policy subsystem than in his own personal attributes and in the domestic strategic context of relations within the SPD and within the federal government. Over the period 1995-98 he had acquired a grasp of the key issues because of his chairmanship of the SPD's policy review of foreign and security policy (see chapter 4). During the 1998 federal elections he had been the SPD's 'shadow' foreign minister. However, the coalition negotiations of 1998 had been a setback for Scharping. Lafontaine wished to remove him from the potentially powerful position of chair of the SPD parliamentary party, which could become a potential rival power base. The result was that Scharping was offered the post of Defence Minister. This put him in the second rank within the new federal

\footnote{127 Interview with Rudolf Scharping, Berlin, 5th June 2003 and with Axel Schneider Referent, Arbeitsgruppe Sicherheitsfragen, SPD Bundestagsfraktion, Berlin, 10th September 2002
\footnote{128 'Als Schatten-Aussenminister in den USA', Berliner Morgenpost, 25 May 1998}
government - behind Schröder, Lafontaine (as Finance Minister) and Fischer (as Foreign Minister).\textsuperscript{129}

For Scharping it was another bitter blow after his shock displacement as party chair by Lafontaine at the Mannheim conference in 1995.\textsuperscript{130} In three years he had moved from top position through the first rank to the second. This development was good neither for his political self-confidence nor for the confidence of other actors in the policy subsystem that he could provide policy leadership. Both his personal attributes as a SPD figure in political decline and the domestic strategic context in which he operated conspired to rule out a heroic policy style and an entrepreneurial policy leadership role. Scharping's lack of internal SPD support was exemplified at the party conference in Nuremberg in November 2001: he got only 58.8 per cent in the elections to deputy party chair, compared to 68.9 per cent for Wolfgang Clement and 80.8 per cent for Franz Müntefering.\textsuperscript{131}

Central to the domestic strategic context was a difficult political relationship to Schröder. Scharping had defeated Schröder in the internal SPD ballot of party members for party chair in 1993. More seriously for their relationship, Scharping had later sacked Schröder as the SPD's economic policy spokesperson. He regarded Schröder as a political maverick who could not be trusted. In turn, after the resignation of Lafontaine from all his political posts in 1999, Schröder viewed Scharping as his most dangerous potential rival.\textsuperscript{132} He was convinced that Scharping was conspiring to unseat him in summer-autumn 1999, especially following electoral defeats in the Landtags elections of Hesse, the Saarland and Thuringia, the image of chaos in the first year of the government and poor opinion poll figures. The Federal Chancellor's Office identified in Scharping a political threat as an alternative candidate for those dissatisfied with Schröder.\textsuperscript{133} Hence Scharping was a distrusted politician who lacked the confidence of Schröder. This was not a macro-political context in which Bundeswehr reform was likely to thrive. In this strategic context

\textsuperscript{129} 'Jawoll Herr Schröder', Hamburger Morgenpost, 13.10.98, 'Schröder und Lafontaine', Frankfurter Allgemeine, 13.10.98
\textsuperscript{130} 'An Niederlagen gereifter Parteisoldat', Leipziger Volkszeitung, 01.12.98
\textsuperscript{131} 'Streicheleinheit nach dem Nasenstüber', Badische Zeitung, 23.11.2001
\textsuperscript{132} 'Wählt Anständig' Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 21.11.2001
\textsuperscript{133} Scharping - der Mann mit dem langeren Atem versagt sich Hämme, Rheinische Post, 15.03.1999
\textsuperscript{134} Interview, Chancellors Office, September, 2002
\textsuperscript{135} Interview, Chancellors Office, Berlin, 2\textsuperscript{nd} September, 2002
Scharping was hardly likely to be an effective policy entrepreneur on Bundeswehr reform.

Scharping's leadership problems were aggravated by the low priority that Schröder attached to defence and security - and especially the Bundeswehr - in his priorities as a Chancellor of modernization. Above all, Schröder knew that the Bundeswehr was of minor interest to voters compared to such issues as growth, jobs and financial responsibility. A relaunch of the government after the chaos of the first months and Lafontaine's dramatic resignation had to address these issues and not defence. Hence the central policy axis was not to Scharping but to Hans Eichel, Lafontaine's successor as Federal Finance Minister. Eichel owed the salvation of his political career after his defeat as Hessen's Ministerpräsident to Schröder. The result was a relationship of close confidence that Scharping did not enjoy. In turn, Schröder gave central priority to Eichel's budget consolidation programme (Agenda 2000). This programme was designed to bring down the heavy and mounting debt servicing charges of the federal government, thereby releasing funding for the social policy programmes that the SPD favoured and giving the government more room for political manoeuvre. Schröder was able to regain the moral high ground in the SPD by aligning himself with the principle of intergenerational equity through reducing the debt burden on future generations. In contrast, Bundeswehr reform was seen as less relevant to the core political theme of 'modernization with social justice'.

No less importantly, the new Schröder government coincided with the launch of the final stage of EMU on 1 January 1999. EMU was Germany's project par excellence, and a euro that worked – in the sense of being stable – was in Germany's basic interests, especially given the strength of the value of economic stability within German public opinion. The Schröder government would not be able to escape responsibility for an economic failure of the euro and would pay a heavy political price. Hence it was in German interests to be a 'model pupil' (Musterknabe) in fiscal policy by staying within the boundaries of the Stability and Growth Pact. This Pact had been initiated by German negotiators with the aim of strengthening the euro through EU rules to promote fiscal discipline. For the Schröder government to be seen

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134 'Der ungerechte Staat' Die Welt, 28.11.2002
to break these rules would be an acute political embarrassment. For these reasons the Schröder government identified budget consolidation as the top priority.\textsuperscript{135}

In this context of tough pressures from the budgetary policy subsystem Scharping had no real prospects for delivering the larger defence budget that he needed for Bundeswehr reform. He found himself the impotent spectator of a budget consolidation programme that undercut his ability to carry through Bundeswehr reform and that further diminished his political reputation and credibility. Scharping was very active in advocating higher defence spending, being a 'permanent visitor within the Federal Chancellor's Office' and lobbying extensively in the Finance Ministry. However, Scharping's assertiveness and activism could not counteract the problem of his weak political position. The deployment of the Bundeswehr in Kosovo and Macedonia brought an increase in defence spending. The defence budget grew from Euro 23.962 billion in 1998 to Euro 24.320 billion in 2000, with an additional Euro 1.02 billion in the Epl. 60 (overall budget) allocated for Bundeswehr deployments.\textsuperscript{136}

Nevertheless, in the context of the economic problems besetting Germany, Scharping was unable to convince Schröder and Eichel about the need to free up substantial extra funds for the Bundeswehr outside of those for these deployments. The Finance Minister made his position clear: 'Wer den Wehretat erhöht, der muss sagen, an welcher anderen Stelle er Ausgaben streichen will'.\textsuperscript{137} Schröder stated at a Bundeswehr conference in November 1999 that the Bundeswehr would have to find any extra money from privatisation and efficiency measures. Indeed, by July 1999 Scharping had already accepted a reduction of DM 3,4637 million in his budget.\textsuperscript{138} Scharping could count on figures such as US Defence Secretary William Cohen, George Robertson, the NATO Secretary General, the British government and pressure from the opposition parties advocating higher defence spending in Germany.\textsuperscript{139} However, the Red/Green government was set on its paramount political goal of

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{135} Interviews in Finance Ministry, Bonn (28\textsuperscript{th} August 2002) and Berlin (18\textsuperscript{th} August 2002)
\textsuperscript{136} See Table 4.2
\textsuperscript{137} Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung, 19.4.1999
\textsuperscript{138} See 'Von Schrumpfaushalt zum Rumpfaushalt', Verteidigung, 29.07.1999
\textsuperscript{139} 'Kritik aus den USA am Etat der Bundeswehr', Handelsblatt, 02.12.1999 and 'Streit um die Bundeswehr', Berliner Zeitung, 02.12.1999 for Cohen; on Robertson see 'Deutschland gibt ein schlechtes Beispiel', der Tagesspiegel, 12.11.1999; on British Pressure see Die Zeit, 01.09.99, see also 'Briten sind sauer auf Scharping' Stuttgarter Nachrichten 22.05.2000.
\end{footnotesize}
budget consolidation. Scharping’s own weak political position and his difficulties in raising funds for the Bundeswehr were compounded by the SPD’s Green coalition partner, which was by ideological nature unfriendly to increases in defence spending.

The lack of financial resources forced Scharping to look elsewhere for money to finance the Bundeswehr and provided the context for his project of privatisation and financial efficiency within the Bundeswehr. This project represented a policy change to secondary aspects of the policy belief system that was attributable to the new consolidation policy within the budget policy subsystem in which defence and security policy was nested. Crucially, the lack of funding led Scharping to the conclusion that a large-scale Bundeswehr reform to the policy core was out of the question. It also contained a number of potentially serious political risks and costs, adversely affecting a large number of actors across the German political system.

- Base closures threatened Länder interests and the SPD’s political success at this level and its power within the Bundesrat
- Related cuts in ziviler Ersatzdienst from abolition of conscription threatened a range of groups concerned with providing care and social services and would necessitate large and costly changes to the provision of social services.\(^{140}\)

Eckhard Fuhr succinctly summed up the position of the SPD: ‘To abolish conscription in the end is all to do with social policy. Without conscription there is no community service. The conscientious objectors are the greatest supporters of what they object to’.\(^{141}\)

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\(^{140}\) Interview in Finance Ministry, Bonn, 28th August 2002, see also ‘Ministerium setzt Arbeitsgruppe zum Zivildienst ein’. Berliner Zeitung, 20.03.2000, see also ‘Ohne die Drückeberger geht es nicht’. Die Zeit, Nr.18, 27.04.2000, describing the ‘Zivis’ as a ‘The main pillar of the German social system’, see also DPA 041623, May 2000 for Wohlfahrtsverbände. See also ‘Stürbt der Zivildienst mit der Wehrpflicht?’, Berliner Morgenpost, 14.05.2000, ‘the German Hospital Federation can see a catastrophe looming….there will be less help for the old and disabled.’

\(^{141}\) ‘Fragen zur Wehrpflicht’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 25.03.2000
At the same time Scharping found himself in an international strategic context, especially after the St. Malo Declaration, and then the Kosovo War, that was linked to intensifying external pressures on German defence and security policy to meet greater commitments. This pressure came from NATO – notably from the US Administration – and from the EU with the development of the Helsinki Headline Goals, which were adopted by the European Council in December 1999 and set targets for a European Rapid Reaction Force. The Headline Goals were especially important for those involved in defence policy in the SPD. Setting defence policy within the context of the EU and the Petersburg tasks (enshrined in the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997) made the justification of defence spending easier for the SPD as well as for the Greens. These developments went hand in hand with the NATO Defence Capabilities Initiative of 1999, which set aims for the Alliance members to improve their capabilities in the areas of deployment and mobility, sustainability and logistics, operational effectiveness, survivability, and command and control. Such international commitments acted as an important external pressure for reform of the German armed forces. They were complemented by direct pressure from the US Defence Secretary and the US Secretary of State for enhanced German defence capabilities and willingness to commit to an international role.\textsuperscript{142}

For NATO conscription was not an issue as long as Germany was in a position to fulfil its crisis-management commitments as set by the force structure proposals. However, as the legislative period progressed, doubts increased within NATO about the ability of a conscription army to fulfil these commitments. Areas such as logistical support, which was traditionally manned by conscripts, demonstrated the weaknesses of conscription to many Germans working within NATO. The logistical units had to be manned by those willing to be away from home for sustained periods of time, a task to which conscripts were not suited. Indeed, one source within the German representation to NATO hints at the disposition of Germans working in NATO by stating: ‘Within NATO the Weizsäcker Commission was seen as the best set of proposals for Bundeswehr reform there has been’\textsuperscript{143}

\textsuperscript{142} ‘Kritik aus den USA am Etat der Bundeswehr’, Handelsblatt, 02.12.1999 and ‘Streit um die Bundeswehr’, Berliner Zeitung, 02.12.1999
\textsuperscript{143} Interview at NATO HQ, Brussels, 16th and 17th September 2002, see also ‘Ein Sprengsatz für den Kanzler’, Die Welt, 28.04.2000
Contacts on the international level notably in NATO, and also increasingly in the EU, were an important source of policy-orientated learning. The Defence Capabilities Initiative and the Helsinki Headline Goals worked to place greater pressure on the German government to increase defence spending, in particular to help finance investment in weapons, machinery and equipment and thereby increase the capability to engage in crisis management operations. This increased external pressure on the policy image of territorial defence highlighted the financial constraints on a Bundeswehr that was attempting to equip itself for both territorial defence and crisis management. At the same time there was also a sense of a German ‘model’ of conscription to be defended from states such as the Britain and the United States and of their failure to understand the German reasons for retaining conscription. These reasons were bound up with shared deep core beliefs about the post-war political order.

Through the intergovernmental imperatives set by Helsinki Headline Goals and the Defence Capabilities Initiative, the EU and NATO wielded influence within the German political system and placed ever-greater adaptive pressure on Germany to move away from the doctrine of territorial defence. However, this influence was diluted on entering the German political system through its contact with vested interests within the defence and security and the Bundeswehr policy subsystems. During the Red/Green government there were increased contacts between the EU and NATO levels and the domestic level of policy making. However, despite regular contacts with the domestic level, German representatives in NATO and the EU lacked the ability to disseminate new ideas about the key issue of conscription within the Federal Defence Ministry. This inability was linked to bureaucratic politics within the Defence Ministry.

Crucially, the Defence Ministry was still dominated by Rühe’s appointments and was not very receptive to policy learning. Under Generalinspekteur Hartmut Bagger and Rühe Denkverbot appointees, it was in the grip of staunch advocates of territorial defence and conscription. Any recommendations from NATO and EU representatives

144 Interviews at NATO HQ, Brussels, 16th and 17th September 2002
146 Interviews in the Defence Ministry, Bonn, 23rd September 2002
had to pass through this cognitive filter and generals who were strongly in favour of conscription and the policy image of territorial defence. Discussion of radical change remained taboo – of policy core as well as of secondary aspects. Important bureaucratic interests were at stake. A professional, crisis management Bundeswehr would have meant a smaller force, the closure of a large number of bases, and a large reduction in personnel. As one source within the Federal Defence Ministry, highly involved with the implementation of the reform stated: 'you cannot expect the frogs to drain their own pond'. The role of bureaucratic veto players defending vested interests is suggested by the number of ex-generals who – once liberated from the constraints of office - immediately changed their policy positions from advocating conscription to staunch support for a professional army.

Despite this bureaucratic politics, NATO and particularly the EU with its Helsinki Headline Goals played an important role during this period. They began to empower those within the German political system and the defence and security policy subsystem to challenge the policy image of the territorial defence policy monopoly. The Kosovo War did not immediately set in place the 'politics of punctuation' on the issue of the tasks and structure of the Bundeswehr. In the short run the existence of the Weizsäcker Commission allowed the federal government to postpone decisions pending its report. Moreover, the CDU/CSU and FDP opposition was characterised by too much ambiguity and too great a weight of responsibility for the current situation in the Bundeswehr to effectively mobilize and challenge the policy image of territorial defence. The critical effect of the Kosovo War was that it shifted decision-

147 Interview in the Defence Ministry, Berlin, 30th August 2002. There was also a Warnstreik by civilian workers at the Defence Ministry, ‘Heisse Zeiten für die Bundeswehr’, General-Anzeiger, 15.05.2001
making about crisis-management capability not to the domestic macro-political level but to the international level.

5.4 Conclusion

The legislative period encompassing the Schröder/Fischer period is illustrative primarily of the importance of the policy leader, in particular the role of the ‘policy veto player’. However, whilst leadership plays an important role, the strategic context within which Scharping was operating made policy entrepreneurship impossible. Several factors hindered policy change and the transmission of the recommendations of the Weizsäcker Commission into policy.

- The unwillingness of Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer to put his weight behind the Weizsäcker Report. Fischer was inhibited by the relatively weak position of the Greens in the coalition, its difficulties in profiling distinctive positions, and the SPD’s demands for coalition discipline.

- The unwillingness of the CDU/CSU to mobilize around the new policy image of a professional, crisis-prevention Bundeswehr. It feared drawing attention to the Kohl government’s deep financial cuts in defence policy and was still strongly influenced by Volker Rühe.

- Scharping’s conception of the difficulties of managing policy change within the defence and security and the Bundeswehr policy subsystems. He believed that their complexity made a heroic leadership counterproductive and stressed confidence-building and trust through dialogue. This led him to embrace a leadership role of brokerage, seeking to earn the respect of service personnel by showing that he listened to their concerns: ‘management by co-operation after management by terror’. However, his problems in playing this role derived from his lack of neutrality on the issue of conscription. Hence

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149 Interview, Axel Schneider, Referent, Arbeitsgruppe Sicherheitsfragen, SPD Bundestagsfraktion, Berlin, 4th/10th September 2002.
151 Interviews in Defence Ministry in Bonn (23rd September 2002) and Berlin (14th August 2002) and Rudolf Scharping, Berlin, 5th June 2003. See also ‘Scharping – find ich gut’, Berliner Morgenpost, 12.02.1999 and ‘Scharping bevorzugt auf der Hardthöhe die sanfte Tour’, Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 09.01.1999
advocates of a professional, crisis-management Bundeswehr saw him as a veto player.

- The lack of political power and influence of Scharping. Schröder distrusted Scharping’s motives and ambitions. Despite his best efforts, Scharping was never an insider at the Federal Chancellor’s Office.\(^\text{152}\) Scharping’s political isolation had implications for his authority.

- Schröder’s backing of Eichel’s budget consolidation, with strict financial constraints on the Bundeswehr. The budget division of the Finance Ministry justified these constraints as a means of extracting efficiency from the Bundeswehr.\(^\text{153}\) The Chancellor’s Office argued for a stress on non-defence security rather than increased spending on the Bundeswehr and Scharping was critical of what he saw as the conservative and bureaucratic outlook of the Finance Ministry.\(^\text{154}\)

- The political sensitivities within the social care policy subsystem about the role of *ziviler Ersatzdienst* as a pillar of social policy and fear that the end of conscription would necessitate large transitional and short to medium term financial and human costs.\(^\text{155}\) These sensitivities were felt acutely within the SPD, whose identity was intertwined with social solidarity.

The Commission’s proposals meant that *Zivildienst* would inevitably be questioned. Whilst this would create jobs, within the context of budget consolidation abolishing *Zivildienst* - (130,000 young men per year) - would necessitate a sharp increase in social spending.\(^\text{156}\) As one high-ranking official in the Finance Ministry stated: "The abolition of *Zivildienst* plays a big role in

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\(^\text{153}\) Interviews, Finance Ministry, Bonn, 28\(^{\text{th}}\) August 2002

\(^\text{154}\) Interview, Defence Ministry, Berlin, 14\(^{\text{th}}\) August 2002

\(^\text{155}\) Interviews, Finance Ministry, Bonn (28\(^{\text{th}}\) August 2002) and Berlin (18\(^{\text{th}}\) August 2002)

\(^\text{156}\) Ex-Deputy General Inspector Jürgen Schnell at the Bundeswehr University, Munich, produced a study concluding that a force of 280,000 professional soldiers would save 7 Billion DM (DPA 0485) 201754 Feb 00. However as Scharping stated: "Wenn sie die Zivildienstleistenden durch Arbeitnehmer und die Wehrpflichtigen durch Arbeitnehmer ersetzen, entstehen erhebliche Mehrkosten", *Teuere Wehrpflicht* Der Spiegel 21.02.2000
the issue of Bundeswehr reform – it would be very expensive at least in the short to medium term – no government is prepared to open up this debate".  

Hence conscription was kept off the agenda, highlighting a 'mobilization of bias' within German public policy, with interests within social policy having the power to prevent conscription from being openly discussed.  

- The electoral-strategic constraints facing the SPD/Green government, with several mid-term Länder elections. The SPD federal executive and Chancellor's Office hesitated in dealing with the political 'fall-out' from large-scale base closures. Hence Schröder was keen to prevent debate about conscription.  

- The vested interests within the Defence Ministry, particularly the Führungsstab, consisting of many Rühe appointees who opposed the personnel reductions. As one source stated: 'The armed forces always prefer the status quo'. Bundeswehr reform was bound up in bureaucratic politics within the core executive.

The domestic politics stream could not be coupled with the problems and policies streams. The international context of the Helsinki Headline Goals also circumscribed a 'policy veto' role. Hence the strategic context constrained Scharping into attempting a role as policy broker, making humdrum leadership on the issue an optimal strategy for Scharping and the SPD. However, Scharping ended up playing the role of policy veto player. As we have seen, the period 1998-2002 did see the development of a 'nascent' advocacy coalition advocating from common deep core beliefs. However, a clear 'policy monopoly' supportive of the policy image of territorial defence was evident. It was in the interests of Schröder and Scharping to ensure that no 'politics of punctuation' would occur and that the 'policy monopoly' continued. Thus whilst Scharping wanted to be seen as a policy broker, he was a veto player.

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158 See 'non-decision-making' as the second face of power, Bacharach, P and Baratz, M. 'Two Faces of Power', American Political Science Review, Vol.56, No.3, pp.947-952

159 Interviews, Defence Ministry in Bonn, 23rd September 2002

160 'Kanzler Schröder will eine Debatte vermeiden', 'Die Zeit ist Reif', Der Spiegel, 15, 08.04.02

161 Interview, Defence Ministry, Berlin, 14th August 2002
This chapter has also shown the importance of perspective three: policy-orientated learning, notably through the work of the Weizsäcker Commission. However, again, the importance of the policy leader in acting on policy-orientated learning has been vital. Policy-orientated learning can only induce policy core change if key macro-political figures are prepared to act to facilitate and support it. It is vital for the success of a policy forum to contain members of the macro-political system responsible for the implementation of the reform. The Schröder/Fischer legislative period demonstrates how this willingness is determined by the strategic context of policy leaders and their own particular leadership traits. Scharping was not willing to attempt to create a crisis consciousness and attempt to couple the streams of ‘problems, politics and policies’ in such an unfavourable political climate.

However, the policy monopoly was not immune to the effects of policy-orientated learning. Whilst the results of the Weizsäcker Commission had been largely marginalized, the Commission had begun its work in the context of a mutually unacceptable stalemate. It was clear to all interests that the Bundeswehr had to be changed to meet new challenges like Kosovo and CESDP. This pressure to structure the Bundeswehr to its new tasks forced Scharping to move the German armed forces a small step closer to ‘crisis-prevention forces’ by reducing the number of troops to 280,000 and the number of conscripts to 77,000. Scharping began also to use the discourse of crisis prevention more, signifying changes to the secondary aspects of the policy monopoly. The policy monopoly was, in short, undergoing changes to the secondary and indeed core policy aspects of its policy image of territorial defence. The role of crisis prevention was being taken seriously, and the armed forces were being designed with the Helsinki Headline Goals in mind. However, the deep core of territorial defence remained in the form of 77,000 conscripts, hamstringing the Bundeswehr, draining its finances and impeding it in meeting its growing tasks in crisis management.

External linkages both to the consolidation programme of the budget policy subsystem and to the social policy subsystem - as well as the impact of electoral-strategic interests of the SPD on the temporal dimension of political management of the Bundeswehr reform - worked in favour of the policy monopoly. The policy learning of the Weizsäcker Commission was marginalized. Its results were judged to
be too dangerous for the SPD. The government had the more compelling problems of budget consolidation and unemployment reduction to face. It was not prepared to allow its coalition partner, the Greens, or international pressure to abolish conscription and, by proxy, *ziviler Ersatzdienst*, which would in the short term cause unemployment and raise public expenditure. Action as a policy entrepreneur within such a strategic context would have led to failure and also to alienation within his own political party. Scharping could see no way of coupling the politics stream with the problem and policy streams.
Chapter 6: Bundeswehr Reform and Strengthening the Common European Security and Defence Policy: Between Atlanticisation And Europeanisation

This chapter situates the reform of the Bundeswehr's roles and structure in the context of Germany's role in the development of a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within the NATO alliance (as its European pillar) and - after the Cologne and Helsinki European Councils in 1999 - of a Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP) as a component of the EU. Bundeswehr reform has been caught up in these two complex and interrelated dynamics of 'uploading' and 'downloading' associated with the emerging security and defence component of European integration, and represented respectively by Atlanticisation and Europeanisation.

Successive German governments sought to reconcile these twin dynamics in the traditional 'bridge' concept (Brücken-Konzept). According to this concept, the strengthening of a European security and defence policy was not to be understood as emancipation from the United States, but as the European pillar (europäischer Pfeiler) in the transatlantic alliance. It fitted into the notion of German interests as bound up in a dual integration strategy of European and transatlantic Einbindung that went back to the beginnings of the post-war Bonn Republic. This concept was put under increasing strain as - by the Helsinki European Council - the EU's goal had become 'an autonomous military capacity... to launch and conduct EU-led military operations.' The formulation of the need for an autonomous EU military capacity, which was led by the Foreign Ministry, challenged the Defence Ministry's traditional position - that the military dimension was a matter for NATO under the ESDI/CJTF arrangements.

The key question is the extent to which, and the ways in which, the dynamics of Atlanticisation and Europeanisation affected Bundeswehr reform, shaping the scope and pace of domestic policy change. In addressing this question the chapter seeks to show how public policy theory can offer new insights into the processes of Atlanticisation and Europeanisation, especially by highlighting the role of domestic

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policy leadership. It draws on the rapidly expanding literature of Europeanisation studies, and suggests the value of public policy analysis in shifting attention from its dominant institutionalist perspective. In contrast to the emphasis on 'misfit' between domestic and European institutional requirements as the trigger for domestic change, the chapter highlights the role of domestic policy leadership in determining the extent to which, and the manner in which, German defence and security policy is Atlanticised and Europeanised.

The central argument of this chapter is that policy leaders have played a central role in the bottom-up and top-down processes of Europeanisation in German defence and security policy, whether as entrepreneur, broker or veto player. CESDP has been an increasingly important part of the strategic context within which these roles are played.

6.1 The Defence Ministry, the Foreign Ministry and CESDP

Europeanisation - and to a lesser extent Atlanticisation - of German defence and security policy are conceived as, first and foremost, 'bottom-up' processes in which domestic policy leaders contest how European requirements should be defined and use these requirements to set and control the scope and pace of domestic Bundeswehr policy change. Crucially, successive German Defence Ministers have defined European requirements within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance (as its European pillar) and sought to control its development so that the Foreign Ministry is kept on the margins. In the Defence Ministry view, the Foreign Ministry's proper responsibility is institutional issues about where and how security policy decisions are best taken at the European level rather than military capability issues. Both Rühe and Scharping were keen to route policy development through the Western European Union (WEU) and NATO and away from the European Council - at which Foreign Ministers had a privileged role - and the General Affairs Council. 'Atlanticisation' has deeply influenced how the Defence Ministry and the Bundeswehr have framed Europeanisation and the way in which successive defence ministers have used it. ESDI/CJTF and CESDP were, above all, seen in the Defence Ministry as a clear demonstration of 'burden-sharing' in defence that would help to strengthen the
transatlantic alliance. From the perspective of the Defence Ministry Bundeswehr reform has interacted with CESDP but both have been nested within NATO and Atlanticisation.

In contrast, the Foreign Ministry sought to define CESDP as an issue of backing the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) by credible operational capabilities, thereby keeping it in the framework of the General Affairs Council of the EU and the European Council. The stress was on CESDP as an integral part of CFSP, as drawing on civilian as well as on military assets, as having a strong crisis-prevention dimension, and consequently as needing Foreign Minister co-ordination at EU and domestic levels. The centrality of the new Political and Security Committee (PSC) within the new CESDP was seen as an important victory for the Foreign Ministry, cementing the notion of political control over the military. Hence policy leadership was very much about a bureaucratic politics of designing and managing institutional venues in order to retain control of process, ideas and outcomes. CESDP was the story of the Defence Ministry's difficulties in moving beyond an observer role with respect to EU defence policy. Before Cologne, it engaged in reactive damage-limitation by ensuring that the PSC was served by a structure of military advice through the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and the EU Military Staff (EUMS). After the Cologne European Council, its damage-limitation was directed at maximising the autonomy of the new Military Committee and the Military Staff within the Council structures - keeping them at a distance from COREPER and the German Permanent Representation in Brussels. It sought - belatedly - a more central and proactive role for the new Council of Defence Ministers in developing the EU 'Force Catalogue' and the Review Mechanism put in place with the Nice Presidency Report.

Secondly, domestic policy leadership on Bundeswehr reform has been only imperfectly Atlanticised, let alone Europeanised, reflecting what Goetz describes as a bifurcation within the federal executive. At official working levels the Defence Ministry has a very high level of contact with, and immersion in, NATO business so that it is possible to speak of a strong NATO and transatlantic identity. Hence the

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Defence Ministry devoted far more attention, time and energy to the North Atlantic Council meeting in Washington DC in April 1999 and to the Bremen Declaration of the WEU Council of Ministers in May 1999 than to the European Council meeting in Cologne in June 1999. Inherited departmental philosophy suggested that an evolving European dimension to European integration should be embedded within the Atlantic Alliance. No less importantly, Atlanticisation offered a rationale for seeking additional roles and resources for the Bundeswehr, and Europeanisation was associated with similar 'bureau-shaping' behaviour. This behaviour suggests a strong 'bottom-up' dimension to Atlanticisation and Europeanisation within the Defence Ministry as officials seek to use NATO and the EU to increase domestic political leverage, for instance vis-à-vis the Finance and Foreign ministries.

However, Atlanticisation and Europeanisation are constrained in two main ways. Firstly, to a greater extent that Goetz allows, at the administrative level Atlanticisation is imperfect because the Defence Ministry has a range of supporters of the traditional Bundeswehr identity as a conscript army devoted to territorial defence. Bundeswehr identity and Atlantic identity are in tension within the ministry. In essence, the Federal Defence Ministry is the key reference point of the Bundeswehr policy subsystem and the point at which it connects to, and interacts with, the NATO policy subsystem. The consequence is that 'bottom-up' pressures within the ministry for the Atlanticisation/Europeanisation of policy leadership on the Bundeswehr are muted. Secondly, at the political level, Federal Defence Ministers have a different range of preoccupations with respect to Bundeswehr reform, situating it within the external domestic framework of party, parliamentary and coalition management and of federal and electoral politics. Crucially, this larger political framework is only very limitedly Atlanticised or Europeanised. Hence defence ministers have little incentive to frame and justify Bundeswehr reform in terms of either of these processes. This characteristic of domestic institutional structures means that successive defence ministers have no real incentive to derive Bundeswehr reform from the 'top-down'

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requirements of the Atlantic Alliance or of the EU. Hence, despite Atlanticisation of
the Federal Defence Ministry's working official level, Bundeswehr reform ultimately
owes more to domestic political factors as ministers give priority to cultivating their
political standing and building their political credit in the domestic arenas of party,
parliamentary and coalition politics. Moreover, Rühe's centralization of policy making
within the Federal Defence Ministry can be seen as an attempt to better control the
internal processes of Atlanticisation and Europeanisation so that they were compatible
with domestic political requirements. This analysis of Atlanticisation/Europeanisation
in Bundeswehr reform suggests that the bifurcation between bureaucratic and
governmental dimensions is not as pronounced in the Defence Ministry as Goetz
suggests.

The chapter argues that public policy theory and Europeanisation studies can usefully
enrich each other. Public policy theory provides useful insights into processes of
Atlanticisation/Europeanisation, especially by highlighting the role of policy leaders,
for instance in managing institutional venues and organizing policy learning. Equally,
Atlanticisation and Europeanisation are essential to understanding processes of policy
change. First, it is necessary to examine current studies of Europeanisation and their
weaknesses when applied to the policy subsystems of German defence and security
policy and of the Bundeswehr. Above all, it is important to set how one understands
Europeanisation in the context of the nature of CESDP as a policy field.

The central characteristic of CESDP is that it avoids the traditional 'hard' Community
method of European integration with its clear prescriptive institutional model that is
enforced by a supranational institution like the European Commission. CESDP
represents 'soft' integration in a voluntarist rather than coercive manner, strictly
intergovernmentalist in approach (with governments retaining the national veto), and
eschewing the ambition to create a common European army. In particular, the
characteristics of CESDP as an integration process shaped how it affected
Bundeswehr reform.

4 Goetz, KH. 'The Federal Executive, Bureaucratic Fusion vs. Governmental Bifurcation' in Dyson,
K.H. and Goetz, K.H. (Eds.) Germany, Europe and the Politics of Constraint (Oxford, Oxford
University Press)
5 Goetz, KH. 'The Federal Executive, Bureaucratic Fusion vs. Governmental Bifurcation' in Dyson,
K.H. and Goetz, K.H. (Eds.) Germany, Europe and the Politics of Constraint (Oxford University Press)
pp.57-72
CESDP lacked a clear, shared vision of the EU's strategic interests, especially between Europe's two major military powers, Britain and France. The initial momentum to establish an autonomous and credible European defence capability from the Franco-British St. Malo Declaration of December 1998 was soon lost in disagreement about the EU's strategic interests. The EU lacked a co-ordinated view on its implications for the future of NATO. Would CESDP undermine or strengthen NATO? There was also a lack of unity on how to respond to the three US conditions for supporting CESDP: no decoupling, no duplication and no discrimination. The rudiments of a shared vision of the EU's strategic interests did not really begin to emerge till after the Iraq war in 2003 and the associated crisis in transatlantic relations, and then only in a vague form. Even limited soft forms of integration were frustrated by continuing differences of national security cultures, which framed and constrained policy leadership, notably on the issue of autonomy of the EU as a security and defence actor. Neither the High Representative for CFSP - Javier Solana - nor PSC had much ability to influence essentially domestically driven defence policies that showed only limited signs of convergence.

CESDP lacked a prescriptive institutional model for force structures that would give the EU the military capability to pursue its strategic interests in a credible manner. The Helsinki Headline Goal was mainly about earmarking existing capabilities for the overall EU 'Force Catalogue'. In this respect it did not go much beyond the CJTF arrangement, which was seen as a key NATO achievement in ESDI: the rapid deployment of the most appropriate forces from different states to match the specific requirements of individual missions. CJTF was not based on a proactive approach to altering the military capabilities of contributing states. The maximalist solution, which was floated on occasion by Joschka Fischer, for instance in January 1999, was a common European army (as envisaged in the European Defence Community proposal in the 1950s). However, this idea was off the agenda. The German Defence Ministry identified the more urgent and

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practical issue as how to make progress in achieving readiness, deployability and sustainability and in giving coherent and operational form to 'collective capability goals' like C3, intelligence and transport. They were seen as the critical tasks for the new EUMC, the EUMS and the Council of Defence Ministers.

- CESDP lacked clear priorities for budgetary spending to support this force structure. There were no clear convergence criteria on defence/GDP spending (on the Maastricht EMU model) or targets for research and development investment. The new Council of Defence Ministers lacked the authority of ECOFIN in operating processes of monitoring by peer review (like, for instance, 'naming and shaming' weak contributors), let alone a common EU defence budget. The proposal in the Draft Constitution of the European Convention in 2003 for a European Armaments, Research and Military Capabilities Agency was an attempt to move in this direction. Fischer pushed this issue within the Convention. However, there was a failure to match the commitment to CESDP with increased public expenditure on defence, notably in reforming the Bundeswehr.

- CESDP lacked a clear strategy for strengthening and rationalising the European defence industry around areas where the EU has a significant technological base and where harmonised procurement projects would enable European forces to operate autonomously. There were some signs of merger activity, notably the Franco-German EADS (Aérospatiale/ Matra-DASA). There were also high-profile collaborative projects, like the Meteor air-to-air missile and the A-400M military transport aircraft. However, they were fraught with difficulties, not least on the German side over meeting commitments to purchase the A-400M. These difficulties were in part budgetary. The German government was deeply reluctant to pay the price for creating an autonomous European defence capability. They were also the product of America's huge lead in military technologies and the consequent perception - notably within the British government - that merger and joint projects with US defence companies would yield higher value-added for European forces. Hence CESDP was not backed by a strong armaments policy.

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Against this background Europeanisation was more a bottom-up than a top-down process. This combination of voluntarism in European integration with bottom-up Europeanisation was consistent with the interests of successive German Defence Ministers who sought to avoid a significant 'misfit' with European requirements. Their interest was in avoiding a 'misfit' that would force transformation of the Bundeswehr away from the conscription model for territorial defence and generate serious domestic political costs for their careers and their governments. Hence German Defence Ministers shied away from a CESDP that was based on clear strategic goals and proven military capabilities and preferred pursuing ESDI in the framework of NATO.

This points to a key contrast with Atlanticisation. The post-Cold War period was associated with new uncertainties and hesitations about NATO's role. Nevertheless, as early as the Rome Declaration of November 1991, the North Atlantic Council was attempting to define a new Strategic Concept; by December 1992 NATO was endorsing 'out-of-area' operations; and in January 1994 it agreed on the idea of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs). The CJTF concept served to tether the WEU firmly in the NATO orbit, thereby ensuring that Europeanisation of European defence and security was embedded within Atlanticisation. Also, by deciding on accelerated enlargement of NATO to east and central European states like Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, the NATO-orientation of these EU applicant states was secured. Their Atlanticisation through NATO membership preceded their Europeanisation through EU membership. In this way the building blocks were put in place for a long-term framing of European defence within NATO, enhancing the prospect that CESDP under the auspices of the EU would prove to be the de facto 'NATO-isation' of the EU. Moreover, Atlanticisation was more of a top-down process than Europeanisation through CESDP. The resulting risks of a 'misfit' between Atlantic requirements and German policies encouraged a great deal of activism by Rühe. He played a key role in uploading German policy preferences into the WEU (the Petersburg tasks) and in defining the terms on which 'out-of-area' operations were decided (under the authority of the UN Security Council and on a case-by-case basis, as agreed at the Brussels North Atlantic Council meeting in December 1992).
6.2 Europeanisation: Top-Down and Bottom-Up Approaches

Over the last decade there has been an explosion of academic interest in the Europeanisation of public policy, though with a lag in examining institutional and political aspects. More recently, the concept of Europeanisation has been applied to Germany in a systematic way, including foreign and defence policies. There is a broad consensus that Europeanisation is concerned with the domestic political and policy effects of European integration. However, Dyson and Goetz have argued that there is much less agreement about how these effects are best understood. In a somewhat stylised way, developing on Dyson and Goetz, it is possible to identify three different approaches to Europeanisation. From the perspective of this thesis, each approach can be seen as having different implications for how policy leadership is conceived.

The first two approaches can be seen as different variants of the top-down perspective on Europeanisation. This perspective was outlined by Robert Ladrech: ‘An incremental process re-orientating the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organisational logic of national politics and policy-making.’ These two approaches are the 'fusion' thesis and the 'misfit' thesis. Wessels and Rometsch argue that the growth of the EU as a political system has led to a fusion of institutional arrangements across several levels

of government and administration in Germany with those of the EU. Domestic policy makers look to Brussels to attempt to maintain a high degree of influence on policies that will affect the domestic level. In consequence, the EU has experienced a 'bureaucratization' with the 'intensive propensity of national politicians and civil servants toward comprehensive participation in preparing, making and implementing and controlling EU decisions that can affect them directly'. As Wessels states: 'Without being pressed into one uniform model, the involvement in the EU has led in nearly all member states to a Europeanisation of daily activities and to a functional and sectoral decentralisation and a political de-parliamentarisation.' Europeanisation is associated with 'comprehensive mobilization and a co-existence of decentralization and co-ordination'. According to the 'fusion' thesis domestic institutional and policy traditions are losing their distinctiveness. This suggests that the Federal Defence Ministry would devote many more resources to EU business, that the Bundeswehr would converge with its EU counterparts through CESDP, and that the characteristics that it had developed in the 1950s would be become increasingly attenuated. The 'fusion' thesis generates the perspective that Europeanisation will be associated with institutional and policy convergence.

In practice, Europeanisation effects from CESDP are shaped by the very distinctive nature of defence policy in Germany both as an exclusive function of the federal level (and hence not bound up in domestic 'co-operative' federalism) and as deeply embedded into NATO and Atlanticisation. To the extent that the culture of the Bundeswehr is open, flexible and collegial in its dealings with EU partners, this culture owes less to the mores of domestic 'co-operative' federalism and its congruence and easy fusion with EU institutional arrangements and ways of doing business than Wessels and Rometsch suggest. The familiarity of Federal Defence Ministry officials with multi-level governance is rooted in NATO and Atlanticisation, and CESDP can be seen as an additional layer in this complex multi-level Atlanticist game rather than in the games of 'co-operative' federalism. What makes the game difficult for Federal Defence Ministry officials is the difference of institutional cultures between NATO and the EU. Hence given the historical priority of

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Atlanticisation over Europeanisation - of NATO over CESDP - CESDP has proved a challenge for the Defence Ministry and the Bundeswehr (though not an entirely new situation). The Federal Defence Ministry has shown less sign than any other federal ministry of developing specialized EU units at division or section levels. In contrast to the Finance Ministry (with EMU) or even the Interior Ministry (with Interior and Justice) the Defence Ministry has been a striking laggard in matching structural changes to CESDP.

As we saw above, within the Defence Ministry the 'fusion' thesis only applies in a qualified way. At the administrative level, both Europeanisation and Atlanticisation are complementary with the role of the ministry as the epicentre of the Bundeswehr policy subsystem and of its strongly developed sense of a distinctive policy identity as an indispensable core component of the post-war political order and identity of Germany. This militates against a comprehensive mobilisation of the ministerial administration behind Atlanticisation or Europeanisation. At the political level, federal defence ministers are bound up in a configuration of party, parliamentary, governmental and electoral factors that offer little incentive to seek to Atlanticise or Europeanise Bundeswehr reform. The domestic political opportunity structure does not support active use of Europeanisation or Atlanticisation as top-down requirements for reform because these key institutional and political arenas are not bound up in an effective multi-level system reaching up to NATO and the EU. Hence the 'fusion' thesis has limited explanatory power as a means of understanding the Europeanisation of German defence and security policy. It is by no means obvious that it is generating a convergence of military policy outcomes.

The other approach to Europeanisation as a top-down process focuses not on fusion but on 'fit'/misfit', the consequent way in which European requirements impose adaptational pressures on the domestic level, and the very different manners in which domestic institutions shape the outcomes which vary from accommodation, through

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transformation, to inertia and retrenchment. The perspective that Europeanisation will lead to convergence is rejected in favour of the differential impact of Europe. The Helsinki Headline Goal of CESDP can be seen as a trigger for Bundeswehr reform. The question was whether the Bundeswehr could accommodate these requirements, would be forced to transform, or would display inertia or resistance. The independent variable is 'fit' or 'misfit' between the two levels: fit means no adaptational pressure and accommodation; a high degree of 'misfit' increases the prospect of inertia and resistance to change; whilst a low or medium degree of 'misfit' triggers transformation. Domestic variables - like capacity for political leadership, nature of institutional veto points, and extent of public support for the European idea in conceptions of identity - are treated as intervening variables in shaping outcomes. This approach emphasises Europeanisation as a vertical and hierarchical process of institutional requirements and constraints that come from above, with 'misfit' as the trigger for change. Implicit is a rather narrow conceptualisation of policy leadership as a process of managing the implications of 'misfit' by negotiating change through a particular structure of domestic institutional veto points, subject to the constraints of wider public attitudes towards European unification.

Despite this focus on 'misfits', Risse gives a great deal of emphasis to the intervening variables in shaping the impacts of Europeanisation. Firstly, domestic political and governmental structures enable or block adaptational change. A key question is whether they provide multiple veto points, which make the achievement of consensus harder. Despite its status as a federal institution the Bundeswehr has not been able to avoid the 'joint decision trap' of the German federal structure (notably over base closures, see chapters 4 and 5). The second intervening variable is formal institutions, which frame the reaction to pressures for change from the EU and the strategies of actors responding to adaptational pressures within these institutions. Institutions can provide actors with the resources and information to initiate policy change and can ameliorate the effects of multiple veto points. The third variable is political and organisational cultures. These cultures define the setting

within which actors respond to Europeanisation and determine the strength of the logic of appropriateness that is challenged, or perhaps reinforced, by Europeanisation.

The entrenchment of organisational culture is often a product of a much deeper factor: national state identity and the extent to which it is in symbiosis with ideas of European order and progressive European integration. In the case of the Bundeswehr the traditional model of a conscript army for territorial defence is deeply rooted in deep core political beliefs about post-war national identity. This model competes with the idea of European unification at this deep core level of political culture.

These three intervening variables have been applied in past studies of the Bundeswehr and of CESDP.¹⁹

Less attention has been given to Risse's fourth intervening variable - agency.

Risse identifies the role of agency in Europeanisation in two main ways. Firstly, European integration leads to a differential empowerment of actors, reshaping the power structure at the domestic level. It produces winners and losers. Thus CESDP can be seen as empowering those advocating deep-seated Bundeswehr reform - like the Weizsäcker Commission. Secondly, Europeanisation is associated with learning, which induces changes in the interests and identities of actors. Risse distinguishes between 'single loop' and 'double loop' learning; 'Single loop learning' refers to situations where actors simply adjust their strategies to achieve their goals and preferences. This is 'simple' learning about how to cope with Europeanisation. 'Double loop' learning involves paradigmatic change to the goals and preferences of actors and is reflected in a discontinuity in institutional development with a transformation of rules and norms.²⁰

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See also Laird, F. (1999) ‘Rethinking Learning’ Policy Currents, No.9, Vol3, pp.3-7
and as simple learning to cope underlines how it is a resource available to policy leaders and is consistent with an actor-centred account. 'Double loop' learning and institutional development focus on Europeanisation as a cognitive structure that shapes the preferences and practices of policy actors.

Despite its top-down basis in a 'fit'/misfit' account, Risse develops a sophisticated analysis of the domestic variables affecting Europeanisation which leaves space for considering how domestic actors use European integration. In this respect, this account and the bottom-up approach have a substantial area of overlap. Also, though Risse's account was developed from a different academic context, it closely parallels some of the analytical perspectives about policy change developed in this thesis from public policy theory. His 'misfit' thesis is close to the perspective about external perturbations and policy change. His stress on differential empowerment has affinities with the perspective about advocacy coalitions and policy change. His emphasis on learning overlaps with the perspective about policy-oriented learning. The key point is that public policy theory has much to contribute to strengthening this type of account of Europeanisation, not least by specifying under what conditions policy learning occurs (including the role of professional forums), by highlighting the role of institutional venue management, and by identifying different policy leadership roles. Not least, and again consistent with public policy theory, Risse attempts to identify the complex relations between structure and agency in his account of Europeanisation. The weakness is that his account of structure is better developed than his account of agency.

The second approach to Europeanisation is represented by studies that focus on how domestic actors frame and use Europe to pursue particular policy beliefs and to gain power over policy in the context of domestic political opportunity structures and the incentives that actors face. In this view of Europeanisation as a bottom-up process the focus is on how domestic actors create 'misfits' and use the EU to strengthen their domestic political power, to pursue institutional interests (for instance in more competences and resources), and to legitimate policy reforms and develop new policy
solutions. 'Misfits' are seen not as givens but as manufactured and managed for
domestic political purposes. Europeanisation is a resource in the hands of policy
leaders. An example is the Weizsäcker Commission's definition of a problem of
adaptation to an emerging CESDP and the learning processes that it triggered, both
within the Commission and externally (see chapter 5).

Conversely, Rühe and later Scharping were keen to minimize adaptational
requirements on the Bundeswehr's structure by negotiating a close fit between an
emerging CESDP and the traditional role conceptions of the Bundeswehr. For the
Federal Defence Ministry it was important to define a strategic vision for CESDP that
would not require major force restructuring away from a conscript Bundeswehr. In
this approach the central question is how domestic actors use European integration in
the debate about Bundeswehr reform and how they seek to upload domestic
institutional models and policy preferences to the European level. In this way they can
either increase or reduce adaptational pressures on the Bundeswehr. The bottom-up
approach allows for a more expansive conception of policy leadership in which
Europe is a resource that is used to expand or contract the scope for domestic policy
reforms.

Christoph Knill has argued that this bottom-up approach is more useful than the
'misfit' thesis (or the 'fusion' thesis) for understanding how Europeanisation works in
policy areas where there are no clear prescriptive EU institutional models to
download. For this reason the bottom-up approach seems more appropriate for
understanding CESDP. As the Iraq crisis revealed, CESDP did not rapidly evolve as a
clear vision of the EU's security interests, a model of an appropriate force structure to
ensure that the necessary military capability was in place, a clear statement of
priorities, and a clear strategy for rationalising the European defence industry. The
Helsinki Headline Goals were essentially limited, and there was a hesitation to press
the model of convergence criteria and mutual surveillance and peer pressure - let

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21 Goetz, K.H. 'European Integration and National Executives, A Cause in Search of an Effect' in Hix,
Cass), pp.211-231
Public Policy, Vol. 18 (1) pp.1-28
Public Policy, Vol. 18 (1) pp.1-28
alone 'hard' sanctions that had been used to develop EMU. The stress was on voluntarism in a policy field that was seen as touching on the very core of state sovereignty. Defence was if anything even more politically sensitive than fiscal and tax policies and revealed the great diversity of conceptions of strategic culture within Europe. Hence the main mechanisms of Europeanisation were 'soft' rather than coercive: the trans-national exchange of ideas and practices amongst military professionals and mimetic behaviour through benchmarking best practice.\(^2\)

However, CESDP served less to import new ideas, for instance about force structures, and more to legitimate particular domestic policy arguments about how to modernise the Bundeswehr and its nature as a force. In this respect CESDP fits well with a bottom-up approach to Europeanisation. 'Soft' mechanisms of Europeanisation offered more scope either to protect the traditional Bundeswehr model or to limit and control the scope and pace of policy change in the Bundeswehr. Notably neither Rühe nor Scharping - despite their endorsement of CESDP - pressed the case for 'hard' mechanisms of Europeanisation. They recognized that such mechanisms could accentuate a 'misfit' between the Bundeswehr and CESDP that would heighten top-down adaptational pressure.

Following and broadening the consensus-seeking definition of Europeanisation by Dyson and Goetz, Atlanticisation and Europeanisation are best seen as complex sets of interactive top-down and bottom-up processes through which domestic politics is affected by NATO and by European integration around the EU respectively.\(^3\) This definition suggests a range of opportunities for policy leadership in shaping and managing these processes, which can be seen as enabling constraints.\(^4\) The account in this section points to the risks in a rather stylised juxtaposition of the top-down and bottom-up approaches. In practice, there is a large area of overlap and common ground between these approaches. Though he comes from a more top-down position


that reflects his intellectual origins in international relations, Risse has a sophisticated view of how 'misfit' operates that opens up substantial space to consider the domestic aspects of Europeanisation. However, the advantage of the bottom-up approach is that it focuses attention on how domestic policy leaders - in this case Federal Defence Ministers - manage 'fit' so that adaptational pressures are minimized. It has a particular value in the context of studying Atlanticisation and Europeanisation in a policy field like defence and security where - especially in Europeanisation - there are not the clear prescriptive institutional models that trigger top-down change through 'misfits'.

6.3 Europeanisation of German Defence and Security Policy

Studies of the Europeanisation of German defence and security policy have reflected the greater knowledge about the Foreign Ministry than the Defence Ministry. There has been a tendency to analyse from the European perspective of the Foreign Ministry as the senior co-ordinating ministry pursuing the agenda of European integration. In substantial part because of problems of access to an intensely secretive area, the Defence Ministry has been neglected. Another reason is that till recently the Defence Ministry has been an observer rather than active participant in EU integration. At the same time, little has been written on the Atlanticisation of German policy, with the major exception of Hanrieder's influential 'penetration' thesis which suggests deep fusion in the Atlantic Alliance and its structures. The Defence Ministry seems to support Wessels's portrait of the 'opening of the state' better than any other ministry.26 The Defence Ministry appears to have played a more active role in Atlanticisation and Europeanisation than any other ministry.

This chapter seeks to create a more balanced picture by focusing on the Federal Defence Ministry and the case of Bundeswehr reform. What emerges is a picture of a ministry that is only imperfectly Atlanticised, and even less perfectly Europeanised, but rather locked into domestic political structures that give little incentive to Atlanticise or Europeanise the Bundeswehr. More striking is the active leadership role of Rühe and Scharping in seeking to shape and use Atlanticisation and Europeanisation in the interests of their own essentially domestic political interests and agendas.

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Studies of Europeanisation have had much to say about the nature and problems of European policy co-ordination in Germany. ESDI and CESDP raise interesting questions about how this machinery functions in relation to defence and security. More importantly, questions arise about how policy leadership at ministerial level interacts with this co-ordinating machinery, affecting how German policy on defence and security has been projected at the European level. Accounts of European policy co-ordination converge in identifying it as horizontal and negative rather than vertical and positive, *ex post* rather than *ex ante*. It is seen as the product of pronounced sectoral fragmentation and the lack of an authoritative 'ringmaster', and as resulting in German negotiating positions emerging at a late stage. In practice, the EU policy competence of the Federal Chancellor's Office remained weak, at least till the second Schröder government, with powerful constraints set by ministerial autonomy and coalition politics.

The key co-ordinating mechanisms were the monthly meetings of the Committee of European State Secretaries, chaired by the Foreign Ministry; the bi-weekly meetings of the European division heads; and the weekly meetings of the heads of European units dealing with EU issues. The Defence Ministry has traditionally stood aloof from this structure as spectator rather than active player. Rühe's strategy was to define ESDI as a NATO-based issue, thus falling outside the European co-ordinating structure. To the extent that WEU had been drawn towards the EU orbit with the Maastricht Treaty, the strategy of Defence Ministers was to work at the highest political level through the Chancellor to prevent the Foreign Ministry being drawn into Franco-German initiatives that excluded the Defence Ministry (as before Maastricht) and threatened to damage the Atlantic Alliance and the partnership with the US. This twin-track strategy diminished the opportunities for the European policy co-ordinating machinery to address defence-related issues. These issues were seen as sensitive matters of high politics.

However, as we shall see later, between the Cologne and Nice European Councils, the
design of the institutional architecture for the CESDP led to new turf battles between
the Defence and Foreign Ministries. How this was resolved at the EU level - notably
the extent to which CESDP was subordinated to the General Affairs Council and the
Political and Security Committee (PSC) - had implications for the relations between
the Defence Ministry and the traditional co-ordinating machinery in Berlin.\(^{29}\) The
trade off for the Defence Ministry was greater enmeshment in domestic EU co-
ordination (though it could still seek protection behind the traditional principle of
ministerial autonomy) in return for a stronger role for the new Council of Defence
Ministers and an upgrading of the importance of the EU Military Committee (EUMC)
and the EU Military Staff (EUMS) as sources of military advice.

The Defence Ministry has sought to carve out a high degree of sectoral specialization
in CESDP in a manner consistent with traditional German arrangements for managing
EU business. By seeking to manage the institutional venues in this way the strategy is
to retain as much control as possible over the agenda of CESDP and to prevent the
Foreign Ministry - which is less attached to the conscription, territorial defence model
- from using CESDP to create a problem of misfit that places serious adaptational
pressures on the Bundeswehr. This suggests that more than bureaucratic fusion is at
work in CESDP.\(^{30}\) Critically, ministerial policy leadership seeks to shape CESDP so
that the Bundeswehr does not become a domestic political problem.

The most sophisticated account of the Europeanisation of German foreign, defence
and security policy is by Miskimmon and Paterson.\(^{31}\) They provide a multi-variable
explanation of uploading and downloading processes within CFSP and CESDP that
stresses their interconnections. Miskimmon and Paterson utilise Michael Smith's
framework of domestic adaptation to European foreign policy. This framework
identifies four factors that act as a yardstick by which to assess how far 'EC political

\(^{29}\) Jopp, M. (2000) 'Gemeinsame europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik' in Wiedenfield,

\(^{30}\) Wessels, W. and Rometsch, D. 'Conclusions: EU and National Institutions' in Wessels, W. and
(Manchester, Manchester University Press) pp.328-265

\(^{31}\) Miskimmon, A. and Paterson, W. 'The Europeanisation of German Foreign and Security Policy. On
the Cusp Between Transformation and Accommodation' in Dyson, K.H. and Goetz, K.H. (Eds.) (2003)
*Germany, Europe and the Politics of Constraint* (Oxford, Oxford University Press) pp.325-345
dynamics become part of the organisational logic of national politics and policy making’ - the extent of elite socialisation, bureaucratic reorganization, constitutional change, and increase in public support for European integration.\textsuperscript{32} Checkel’s concept of ‘persuasion’ is used as an additional tool to help explain the extent to which Germany has influenced the shape of both CFSP and CESDP. Miskimmon and Paterson conclude that Germany has been both an agent (‘uploader’) for Europeanisation and an object (‘downloader’) of the process. Its role as object was evident in elite socialisation, bureaucratic reorganisation, constitutional change and support of public opinion for CFSP and CESDP as an aspect of European political unification.\textsuperscript{33}

Germany’s role as an agent is shown in five key ways:

- ideational export in Germany’s promotion of the Petersburg tasks as the basis for CESDP
- example setting in providing the greatest number of troops for the European Rapid Reaction Force
- practical steps to strengthen co-operation through the Franco-German Corps and Eurocorps
- cognitive leadership and discursive influence by attempting to promote public debate about CESDP
- promotion of multilateralism through a strong role in institution building (European Rapid Reaction Force - ERRF, the EU Stability Pact for south-eastern Europe, the Political and Security Committee, the EU Military Committee and the EU Military Staff).

Miskimmon and Paterson conclude that Germany played a strong role in uploading its policy preferences to the EU level. This role was facilitated by strong public and elite support, the lack of sectoral interests opposing CSFP, and the important role of the strongly Europeanised Foreign Ministry and Fischer’s policy entrepreneurship on behalf of CFSP. Factors limiting the uploading process include the reliance of the


Foreign Ministry on strong ministerial leadership, the role of the Chancellor in providing strategic direction (in Schröder’s case his role as a ‘normaliser’), and the Defence Ministry’s ‘Atlanticist’ orientation predisposing it to look to NATO as the key institution of German defence policy. According to Miskimmon and Paterson, internal and external factors limit the process of Europeanisation in Germany. Internally, the lack of co-ordination between ministries, which represent ‘little empires’, leads to a mixed policy discourse and resistance to the communitarisation of CSFP within the Foreign Ministry. The lack of a sectoral interest pushing for CSFP also serves to temper German activism in this policy area. Two external factors act to limit top-down Europeanisation: the lack of an authoritative EU body to force increased co-operation on CFSP, and the braking effect of the process of renegotiation of EU treaties.

This chapter concurs with the thesis of Miskimmon and Paterson that, although Germany plays a strong role as an ‘agent’ in uploading its policy preferences to the EU level, it is to only a very limited extent an object of Europeanisation in defence and security policy. Despite the rhetoric from the Foreign Ministry, the Federal Chancellor’s Office and the Defence Ministry about Germany’s commitment to developing a functioning CESDP, German defence policy remains emphatically NATO-oriented. Atlanticisation frames and qualifies how Europeanisation shapes German defence and security policies. The Defence Ministry has been the institutional guarantor that a balancing of Atlanticisation and Europeanisation would be sustained in domestic bureaucratic politics within the federal core executive.

However, this chapter differs in two respects from Miskimmon and Paterson. Firstly, it questions just how far Atlanticisation affects defence and security policy by stressing the context of the domestic political opportunity structure and incentives. Secondly, it provides a different explanation for limited Europeanisation that is rooted in public policy theory. It stresses the distinctiveness of policy subsystems like the Bundeswehr, the resilience of core policy beliefs to change, the long-term nature of policy-oriented learning, and the role of design and management of institutional

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venues. It also draws out the role of policy leaders in shaping, managing and using ‘uploading’ and ‘downloading’ processes, whether as policy entrepreneurs, brokers or veto players. Knill and Risse stress the importance of institutional and strategic cultures as mediating factors in the extent to which a state engages in ‘downloading’ from the EU level. The chapter argues that an interactionist account of leadership offers a more subtle insight into the complex dynamics of structure and agency in Europeanisation.

The advocacy coalition framework asks questions about the role of policy-orientated learning in informing the bottom-up and top-down processes of Europeanisation. To what extent does policy learning in committees and daily interaction on the international level affect policy making on the domestic level? Of interest here is the role played by the Weizsäcker Commission as a professional forum in defining and translating adaptational pressures from the EU level into policy change on the domestic level. Punctuated equilibrium theory also provides an interesting contribution to understanding the bottom-up process of Europeanisation by alerting us to the role played by policy leaders in seeking to use and influence Europeanisation. This role can take the form of setting in place a process of ‘positive feedback’ or conversely protecting the dominance of a policy monopoly and policy image by seeking to control institutional venues through the control of information and policy-orientated learning. Policy leaders can use institutional venues to block or to facilitate adaptational change.

6.4 The EU and German Defence and Security Policy under the Kohl Chancellorship

The attempt to develop a common European security and defence policy is not simply a phenomenon associated with the post-Cold War environment. From the early stages of the European integration process the ambition to create a political identity through common defence - and not just closer economic integration - was evident. This

ambition surfaced in the European Defence Community proposal (which perished in the French Assembly in 1954), in De Gaulle's vision of Franco-German leadership (which caused serious domestic political difficulties for Chancellor Adenauer), and in the abortive Fouchet Plan on European political union of 1961. It surfaced again in the Genscher-Colombo Plan of 1981; an early draft proposed a council of defence ministers. The French Fouchet Plan sought to incorporate defence into the EEC on an intergovernmental basis. A central problem, especially once De Gaulle became French President in 1958, was the association of French-inspired plans for common European defence with challenge both to US hegemony (represented by NATO) and to the idea of a supranational Europe. In particular, they threatened to wreck what was conceived as the central German national interests in a privileged relationship to the US in defence (through the NATO framework) and in supranational integration.

Hence, though the Elysée Treaty on Franco-German Co-operation of 1963 committed France and Germany to bilateral defence co-operation, the Bundestag insisted on inserting - in the face of Adenauer's opposition - an Atlanticist preamble stressing collective defence within the framework of the North Atlantic Alliance. De Gaulle's withdrawal of French forces from NATO's integrated structure in 1966 further reduced the credibility of French proposals on common defence to German policy makers who remained wedded to NATO and made the Elysée Treaty provisions redundant. Out of the failures of these years emerged one structure that represented a supranational approach to defence and security - the Western European Union (WEU). Its relative success was the result of the fact that it emerged out of US demands for the Federal Republic to join NATO and rearm. WEU was a potential building block for later initiatives, notably the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, the Petersburg Declaration of 1992, and the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997. It was one on which German negotiators seized in the Maastricht negotiations and after.

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The early abortive efforts were followed by a slowly evolving framework of foreign policy co-operation that created a diplomatic context in which defence co-operation could be seen as more credible. From the outset Germany played a key role as initiator and supporter of efforts at foreign policy co-ordination, aligning itself with a supranational approach that aimed at effectiveness and speed through qualified majority voting. However, this larger framework evolved with great difficulty, leaving a gap between German ambitions for the EU and what practically could be negotiated. It proved difficult to gain agreement on Europe's strategic interests or an institutional structure that avoided national vetoes. Where such agreement was forthcoming - as eventually over Bosnia and then over Kosovo - it lacked credibility without military capability. Above all, in relation to defence and security, Germany had to reconcile its Atlanticist and its European interests.

The Harmel Report of 1967 on the future tasks of the Alliance gave initial impetus to this larger diplomatic framework. By drawing attention to the importance of the political context of security it contributed to instilling the idea of the value of European foreign policy co-operation. The first practical step was European Political Co-operation (EPC), which was strongly backed by Chancellor Willy Brandt, agreed at the Hague Summit of 1969, and came into force in 1970. EPC was conceived as a structure within which foreign policy stances could be co-ordinated. It put in place a mechanism through which European foreign ministers, officials and diplomats were able to meet on a regular basis for this purpose. However, EPC was not tied to the institutions and agenda of the EC and was completely intergovernmental, only playing an outside role in European foreign policy during the 1980s. It was marginally successful in formulating a common European position on such areas as Middle East policy and policy to Asia and South America. The most important role of the EPC was in elite socialisation and as a forum within which policy learning could take place. It helped to facilitate a deeper knowledge and mutual understanding between EC states, putting in place the habits and structures of mutual consultation that could

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later be strengthened in the context of later external shocks and crises. These shocks and crises - like Bosnia, Kosovo and Iraq - clarified the need for deeper European foreign policy co-ordination and for the credibility that comes from an autonomous military capability. German governments consistently supported the development of EPC away from intergovernmentalism towards the Community method.

President Francois Mitterrand was important in trying to give a new impetus to Franco-German defence collaboration as the motor for a wider European defence co-operation. Beginning in 1983, he sought to encourage Franco-German discussion of defence matters of mutual concern. Mitterrand's defence initiatives were made much more credible to the German government by his explicit and strong support for the Kohl government's decision to implement the NATO dual-track decision on stationing Cruise and Pershing missiles in Germany. This support was delivered in a speech to the Bundestag, despite strong domestic opposition in Germany not least from the Social Democratic Party (with which Mitterrand's Socialist Party was linked). Another factor was Franco-German agreement that Gorbachov represented a new opportunity to bring peace and stability to Europe. A third factor was German Foreign Ministry thinking that bilateral initiatives on European security policy could compensate for the poor progress with EPC.

Hence in 1986-87 Mitterrand and Kohl developed a series of initiatives. They sought to revive the WEU as a key component of European political unification with its new Platform on European Security Interests in October 1987. This spoke of 'a more cohesive European defence identity'. The 25th anniversary celebrations of the Elysée Treaty in 1988 were used to launch a Franco-German Defence Council. This initiative derived from the Federal Chancellor's Office as a device for binding France more strongly to the territorial defence of Germany. The new protocol to the 1963 Treaty spoke of the conviction of the need 'to develop a European identity in the field of defence and security', in conformity with the WEU declaration at The Hague in October 1987. The new Franco-German Brigade - created in October 1990 - was

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meant to symbolise this new positive view of bilateral defence collaboration as the 'core of European corps'.

However, these Franco-German initiatives on defence co-operation under Mitterrand and Kohl were stronger on symbolism and declaration than on substance. They were without deep effects on the Bundeswehr. The Bundeswehr's operational tasks were bound up with NATO, from which France remained distant. Moreover, these initiatives were not linked to the mobilising effect of shock or crisis. Hence they lacked a sense of urgency. This situation was transformed in 1989-90 by the shock of German unification and Mitterrand's conviction that the effects of this shock were best contained by deepening European political as well as economic and monetary integration. Defence was seen as a key component of stronger European political union to ensure that a stronger Germany was bound more tightly into European structures.

The Maastricht Treaty, which was negotiated in the two intergovernmental conferences of 1991, was for German negotiators an historic opportunity in the wake of Germany's rapid unification to underline her commitment to accelerating European unification and making it irreversible. A common European defence policy caused particular problems for the Kohl government. It raised difficult issues about how to reconcile paying off the political debts owed to both the Americans and the French with respect to their support for German unification. The difficulty stemmed from the importance that Mitterrand attached to this aspect of the Maastricht Treaty. Kohl was caught between the desire to respond positively to Mitterrand on a common defence policy as a logical next step in making European unification irreversible and the desire to accommodate American concerns by continuing to promote the traditional German 'bridge' concept. Defence was negotiated in and around the IGC on political union, with foreign ministry officials in the driving seat. The key question centred on the role of the WEU, which German negotiators identified as the decisive institutional venue for gradually giving the EU a role in defence and security.

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The German negotiating position was to strengthen the WEU's role, but to confine this role to crisis-management operations. Collective defence was to remain the function of NATO. Hence WEU/EU and NATO would have complementary functions. In this way German negotiators carved out a balancing role between two views. According to the British and the Dutch, the WEU should be a bridge linking the EU and NATO, but with the WEU remaining as the European pillar of NATO. In the French view, the WEU should be an instrument for the gradual transfer of various functions - including collective defence - from NATO to the EU, acquiring an autonomous operational capability and the right to operate outside and within NATO.\(^{48}\) The Kohl government offered ambivalent support to the French position. The German Foreign Ministry worked with its French counterpart (leaving aside the German Defence Ministry) to table a joint Franco-German proposal on defence. It proposed an 'organic' link between the WEU and the EU and the transformation of the Franco-German Brigade (created in 1990) into the Eurocorps as the basis for an integrated European military structure.\(^{49}\) Nevertheless, Kohl stressed the importance of getting NATO on side and attached key importance to the Rome summit of NATO. Here the new NATO 'Strategic Concept' endorsed the development of European multilateral forces whilst reaffirming the primacy of NATO as the forum for defence co-operation.

The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was created by the Maastricht Treaty as a separate intergovernmental pillar of the EU, whilst the role of the WEU was cast in ambivalent language. There was reference to 'the eventual framing of a common defence policy' as one of the goals of the EU in Article B. However, Article J.4(1) offered an opportunity to slow down the development of this policy when it spoke of 'the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence.' This Treaty provision underlined the absence of a political will behind a European defence policy, especially on the part of staunch Atlanticists like the British and the Dutch. Some progress was made in putting in place an institutional structure to provide a military capability for the EU. The WEU was elevated as 'an integral part of the development of the EU' (Article J.4.2), and its secretariat


reinforced and moved from London and Paris to Brussels. It was to 'elaborate and implement decisions and actions' of the EU that have defence implications. The problem was that the WEU had no forces of its own, relying on its member states to contribute troops and materials. Also, this limited integration of defence and military policy into the EU was not accompanied by a clear binding link between the EU and the WEU.

During the Maastricht negotiations defence ministries, including the German, had been marginalized in favour of foreign ministers and their officials who occupied the key role in the IGC on political union. The German defence ministry looked to the NATO Rome summit of November 1990 and its new 'Strategic Concept' to protect its interests, in this way effectively neutralising the hastily prepared Franco-German proposal on defence that had bypassed them. The foreign ministry's idea of a closer 'organic link between the WEU and the EU was kept off the agenda. Another factor in limiting progress towards a common European defence was the intransigence of Atlanticist states, which led to major friction between the French government and the Dutch over whether the Dutch had been using their EU presidency to pursue their own agenda on defence and institutional issues. Irritated by British and Dutch obstruction, Mitterrand had convened a separate EU summit in Paris on defence outside the framework of the IGC and hence away from Dutch chairing. The outcome at Maastricht was unsatisfactory to the French, but helpful to Kohl in not opening up a domestic split between Atlanticists and Europeanists. Kohl was acutely conscious that it was equally important for the German government to pay off political debts over German unification to the US as well as to the French.

During the period after unification Germany was keen to show itself a reliable international partner that would not return to a German 'Sonderweg' both to the French (as partners in developing the EU) and to the US (as partners in NATO). The problem was how to reconcile and balance the twin priorities to Europeanisation and Atlanticisation. This problem had reverberations within the federal core executive. Within the context of a general policy commitment to balancing these two priorities -

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50 Hendriks and Morgan (2001) *The Franco-German Axis in European Integration* (Cheltenham, Elgar) p.109
guarded over by the Chancellor - the Defence Ministry had an institutional bias
towards Atlanticisation, the Foreign Ministry to Europeanisation.\textsuperscript{52} This phenomenon
had exhibited itself during the IGC negotiations on defence. For the Defence Ministry
the key was to keep the Chancellor focused on NATO summits, as in Rome in
November 1991, and on the value of substantial operational policy statements (like
the new NATO 'Strategic Concept') over declaratory Franco-German statements that
could jeopardise transatlantic relations. The key theme was the development of 'a new
European security architecture' through NATO in the form of an ESDI, notably at the
NATO Brussels meeting in January 1994, which linked ESDI to Combined Joint Task
Forces (CJTF).

The pressure of events in eastern and south-eastern Europe combined with the
opportunities that were offered by the Maastricht Treaty to open a window of
opportunity for Rühe to play an activist policy leadership role in ESDI. In the face of
new security challenges Rühe could argue that faith in German promotion of 'soft'
security through support for economic development was not enough. He developed
the argument for a stronger defence component within German foreign policy,
working both through NATO and the WEU. This position challenged the Foreign
Ministry. Rühe sought to carve out a key role through the negotiations leading to the
WEU ministerial meeting in Bonn in June 1992 at which the Petersburg Declaration
was agreed. This agreement outlined a distinctive interventionist role for the WEU in
peacekeeping, peacemaking and humanitarian operations, giving a strongly German
emphasis to its tasks. Not least, Rühe, like many within the CDU, realized that
Germany was going to have to take a more active role in the international community
under pressure from its international partners, especially the United States, to take a
greater share of the security ‘burden’.\textsuperscript{53} The Karlsruhe ruling of 1994 on 'out-of-area'
operations offered a further opportunity for Rühe to act as a policy entrepreneur to
promote a stronger defence and security dimension for the EU. He was aware that
defence and security co-operation was going to be a key issue in the future of the EU

\textsuperscript{52} Bulmer, S, Jeffrey, C and Paterson, W. (2000) \textit{Germany's European Diplomacy} (Manchester, MUP),
p.25
\textsuperscript{53} See 'Frieden und Stabilität' by Volker Rühe in MIT, July-August 1996 pp.14-15, see also 'Politiker
mit Overdrive' Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt, 03/06/1002
and was confident of Kohl's support in actively promoting this dimension of European integration.\textsuperscript{54}

Rühe's activism on ESDI was partly motivated by his interest in making sure that the process of Europeanisation was not controlled by the Foreign Ministry.\textsuperscript{55} Foreign Ministry control threatened to create a problem of 'misfit' that would lead to difficult problems of adaptation, not least for the Bundeswehr. Hence he was keen to ensure that he had a strong voice in determining the substance of any initiatives on ESDI that would have top-down effects on the Defence Ministry. Also, whilst Rühe was a strong advocate of ESDI, he was wary of challenging the primacy of NATO as the key framework for German policy. Rühe was very careful to place ESDI within the context of the relationship with the US. He stressed that it was in the interests of both the US and the EU that the EU should begin to take more responsibility for security issues: 'Nur ein geeintes Europa ist für die USA ein gleichrangiger Partner'.\textsuperscript{56} Rühe emphasised that, in the context of a broader spectrum of risks, the key to future European security was going to be an increased emphasis on crisis management.

In Rühe's eyes, Bosnia and the Srebrenica massacre of 1995 were key events that demonstrated the need to put in place European structures that would ensure that such an event could not happen again. His goal was to create an EU that could deal with crises such as those in the former Yugoslavia, without recourse to the United States – but only in situations where the US was happy to let Europe 'go it alone' (‘Hier wird wirklich europäisch gedacht’).\textsuperscript{57} Rühe was also keen to promote the necessary military

\textsuperscript{54} Kohl's Mann für den Notfall, Frankfurter Rundschau, 02/04/1992;
\textsuperscript{55} Gerangel zwischen richtigem und möchtegern-Aussenminister, Der Tagesspiegel, 30/08/1996, See also Klaus Kinkel quoted in SPD Biography of Rühe, 'German Foreign Policy will be determined by me, not Mr. Rühe'. See also, 'The ambitious foreign policy specialist at the Hardthöhe profits from the fact that there is no imaginative thinking about foreign policy from either the opposition or the Foreign Ministry; he has a free field and rules it with a reserved form of ambition', Die Woche, 05/10/1995; see also 'In all detailed military work Rühe has remained a parliamentary politician and above all foreign policy specialist...This creates unrest in Bonn and Klaus Kinkel is uncomfortable with this, seeing in Rühe his greatest competition' In 'Bei Hofe ist er wieder wer' Berliner Zeitung, 09/12/1995'; see also 'Rühe's latent claims to the Foreign Ministry' in 'Die Erfolgsgeschichte eines Querdenkers', General Anzeiger, 26/06/1998 See also 'Kronprinz in Feldgrau', Die Woche, 06/10/1995 for how Rühe 'applied the brakes' to Kinkel over potential Bundeswehreinsätze in Angola, Kuwait and Haiti
\textsuperscript{56} Rühe, V. 'Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik, Die Rolle der Bundeswehr', Internationale Politik 4/1995, p.27
\textsuperscript{57} 'Hier wird wirklich Europäisch gedacht', Rheinische Merkur/Christ und Welt 29\textsuperscript{th}. December 1995
capabilities for such structures, stressing priority to greater co-operation in armament production and procurement in Europe.58

As chapter 5 showed, Rühe's activist policy leadership in promoting the development of crisis reaction capabilities at NATO, EU and German levels was constrained. Above all, he was wary of challenging the idea of territorial and alliance defence as the core principle on which the Bundeswehr was structured. The development of an ESDI threatened to lead to new EU institutional models that could create adaptational pressures through 'misfit' and initiate a process of 'positive feedback' within the policy subsystem of German defence and security policy by highlighting the failure of a policy based on territorial defence and conscription. The strategic political context made Rühe unwilling and unable to act as a policy entrepreneur for ESDI outside the context of NATO. Part of his caution in acting as policy entrepreneur on behalf of a crisis management role for the Bundeswehr stemmed from perceptions of Rühe within the CDU/CSU as the 'crown prince' and likely successor to Kohl.59 His political ambitions meant that he was unwilling to take unnecessary risks as Defence Minister. Also, and paradoxically, Rühe lacked a strong level of support within his own party (coming from Hamburg, which was predominantly SPD), Hence Rühe was heavily dependent on the support of the Chancellor, which constrained his decisional assertiveness.

Nevertheless, Rühe was active on ESDI when and where he saw an opportunity that was consistent with this strategic context. Rühe was aware that: 'It must be clear to the Europeans: there will be no more automatic American engagement in Europe. In the future there will be conflicts where the Europeans have to act alone'.60 Within strategic constraints, in particular the lack of support within his own party for a change to the policy monopoly, Rühe demonstrated a high level of activism. He played the role of policy broker on behalf of ESDI, seeking to enhance Germany’s ability to engage in crisis reaction capabilities within this framework, whilst ensuring the continued dominance of the policy monopoly by stressing the primacy of territorial and alliance defence as the core task of the German armed forces. Within

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58 'Rühe für enge Rüstungskooperation in Europa – gegen US Konkurrenz', DPA 261137 April 1995
59 'Kronprinz in Feldgrau' in Die Woche, 06/10/1995, see also 'Auf dem Weg zum Gipfel', Die Woche, 14/08/1998
60 'Hier wird wirklich Europäisch gedacht', Rheinische Merkur/Christ und Welt, 29th December 1995
the context of a weak Foreign Ministry under Klaus Kinkel, he was able to mobilize the support of Chancellor Kohl behind his efforts to control the uploading of Germany preferences into ESDI and thereby the top-down effects on his Defence Ministry.61

Central to Rühe's activism was his call for a new transatlantic partnership, based on three pillars: political, economic and security. A stronger Europe within the security partnership was the solution to the failure of the UN evident in the Bosnian crisis. The future role of Germany in this new security environment was going to be 'from net importer to contributor' to the WEU, NATO and UN.62 Rühe was active in advocating this position not only within Germany but also in the US, notably on a visit to Washington in March 1995. As the Frankfurter Allgemeine recognized: Rühe had 'access to the most important Americans', allowing an active role not only in defence but also in foreign policy on his visit to the US.63 He was notably effective in using US support to strengthen his domestic position vis-à-vis Kinkel, especially over an acceleration of NATO enlargement.64

Rühe was aware of the sensitivity of the issue of giving a military dimension to CFSP. Within the context of the multiple veto points in the German political system, his salami tactics had been carefully deployed to bring on board key members of the opposition and of his coalition partner, the FDP, especially over monitoring the UN embargo on Serbia and Montenegro in 1993-96 and over Bosnia. The development of a common European defence policy had to be carefully managed within Germany. Rühe acted as a policy broker within his own party and the subsystem of defence and security policy. Rather than engaging in entrepreneurship on behalf of a common European defence policy, he was convinced that it could only be realised by salami tactics and a gradual move towards this goal.65

61 'Die konzeptionellen Defizite von Bundesaussenminister Klaus Kinkel', in 'neue Transatlantische Partnerschaft', Handelsblatt, 2nd March 1995; see also 'Gerangel zwischen richtigen und Möchtegern-Aussenminister, Rühe stiehlt Kinkel die Schau', Der Tagesspiegel, 30/07/1996
62 Rühe, V. 'Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik, Die Rolle der Bundeswehr', Internationale Politik 4/1995, p.28
63 Frankfurter Allgemeine article quoted in 'Behutsam in den Krieg', Der Spiegel, 12 June 1995
65 'Immer waren seine Schritte dem Konsensus ein kleines Stück voraus', in 'Herr der Tmppe ohne Tmppe', Die Zeit 18/10/1996, see also 'Meister der Salamitaktik' in 'Verteidigung ist der Beste Angriff', Süddeutsche Zeitung, 17/10/1996
As a first step Rühe was keen to transform the Franco-German Brigade into Eurocorps (made operational in November 1995) and to strengthen Eurocorps as a multinational force of 50,000, joined by the Belgians and the Spanish. It was a first step towards the development of a European army that would give substance to CFSP and provide an insurance against US withdrawal of its forces from Europe. He also supported the strengthening of the German-Netherlands Corps in Münster.66

Furthermore, Rühe backed strongly the assignment of the Eurocorps to the WEU, for whose future use it was 'made available'.67 However, above all he was keen to secure these moves to strengthen WEU as part of an emerging ESDI within the trans-Atlantic partnership. Hence Rühe did not follow the French in pressing for a rapid merger of the WEU into the EU. This approach helped to protect him against potential attack from Atlanticist members of his own party. It also ensured that this incremental development of a common European defence policy as a crisis-management capability under WEU auspices could be reconciled with the retention of territorial defence as the core policy image through NATO. In NATO and the WEU the Defence Ministry had greater potential to control policy outcomes than in the EU framework where foreign ministers were likely to be far more influential. A development of common European defence policy through WEU/NATO offered a better guarantee that the principle of a conscript Bundeswehr could be defended.

Rühe's policy initiative was also designed to take the initiative from the French in developing a common European defence policy and thereby ensure that moves in this direction were consistent with German strategic interests. By leaving the initiative to the French government the prospects of painful embarrassments and difficult choices for the German government would be increased. The French conception of a common European defence policy was much more about moving away from the reliance on the US and NATO as a security provider. Rühe and Kohl did not see NATO, the US and a common European defence policy as mutually exclusive.68 Having at first 'sounded

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66 'Höchste Zeit für eine grundlegende Reform', Das Parlament, 1-8 September 1995
68 Hendriks and Morgan (2001) The Franco-German Axis in European Integration, p.112. See also Interview with Volker Rühe in 'Hier wird wirklich Europäisch gedacht', Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt, 29/12/1995, Interviewer, 'The Europeans alone?' Rühe, 'Yes, also alone. Therefore I am for a strengthening of European capabilities, a strengthening that does not go against the US but also complements US capabilities'.
out' and reassured the Americans by visiting the US, Rühe called for the strengthening of European capabilities to respond to crises within Europe, to ensure that 'a situation such as Yugoslavia would not be allowed to develop in the first place'.

He was conscious that the period leading up to the Treaty of Amsterdam would set the context for any agreement on how Europe was going to move toward a common defence policy. Consequently, in Rühe's eyes, how the Bosnia crisis was handled and the lessons that were learnt from the wars of succession in the former Yugoslavia were of great importance to the future development of the EU.

Rühe began to use the rhetoric of Kohl before the Maastricht summit, and stressed how the EU was a 'matter of war and peace'. According to this logic, Rühe argued that the next step for the great 'Friedensmaschine' of the EU was to give up sovereignty in the area of the armed forces. Rühe and Kohl hoped that the WEU would provide a framework within which the tensions between Atlanticists and Europeanists could be reconciled, with the WEU acting as a bridge between the NATO and the EU. Hence Rühe supported the Combined Joint Task Forces proposal in 1994 because it opened up the possibility for NATO command and control structures to be placed under WEU operational command in the conduct of missions supporting the Petersburg tasks.

1995-96 was a critical juncture for ESDI. Jacques Chirac's election as French President in May 1995 was associated with a characteristically Gaullist attempt to make defence the key axis of French EU policy. This had a number of advantages. It resonated with hostile views against US hegemony in defence across the political spectrum. Also, it built European integration around a defence pillar where France was seen as having a comparative advantage, not least over Germany. It was, however, clear from past experience that any French initiative on European defence that was built on hostility to the US would fail. In December 1995 President Chirac closed the gap between French and German thinking by accepting that CESDP must

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69 'Hier wird wirklich Europäisch gedacht', Rheinische Merkur/Christ und Welt 29th December 1995
70 'Deutsche Kontingent bis 2000 Mann – Einsatz im Juli', Welt am Sonntag 11th June 1995
71 'Hier wird wirklich Europäisch gedacht', Rheinische Merkur/Christ und Welt 29th December 1995
72 'Hier wird wirklich Europäisch gedacht', Rheinische Merkur/Christ und Welt 29th December 1995
73 'Neue transatlantische Partnerschaft: Volker Rühe zimmert an einem aussenpolitischen Konzept', Handelsblatt, 01/03/1995
be built from within NATO through Europeanising NATO\textsuperscript{74}. This redefinition of the French position suited the CDU/CSU very well as it allowed the development of a crisis reaction capability, whilst retaining the dominant policy monopoly and image of territorial defence and conscription. At the July 1996 NATO council in Berlin the US accepted this agenda and stipulated that the WEU could be asked to carry out a military role in purely European conflicts.

This French move facilitated the Franco-German ‘common strategic concept’ of December 1996. For the first time they jointly defined the objectives of a common defence policy. Crucially, the French government conceded the principle of ‘parity’ between French and Germany and discussion of the role of nuclear deterrence within ESDI. The signal was that Franco-German defence co-operation could be pursued in multilateral structures and that France rejected a special leadership role. Germany was happy to embrace NATO reform, bringing it closer to OSCE and thereby allay Russian fears. The basis for a joint Franco-German concept of ESDI was laid, reducing dependence on, but not seeking independence from the US.\textsuperscript{75}

These external changes were critical in shifting the debate in Germany. By these interlinked French and NATO moves Rühe was emboldened to become a policy broker and seek a revision of German positions on CESDP. He redefined CESDP as a means of increasing German weight and influence vis-à-vis the United States in the post-Cold War world, without disrupting this strategic partnership. Similarly, through ESDI he saw a means of strengthening the Federal Defence Ministry's domestic weight and influence within the federal core executive, in particular by upgrading the importance of defence as a component of a more active German diplomacy on the international stage.\textsuperscript{76} Underpinning this political strategy for ESDI was an attempt to project an image of Rühe as an active, world-rank politician who was the number one foreign policy expert of the CDU and a candidate for the highest office once Kohl retired.\textsuperscript{77}

\textsuperscript{74} Cole, A (2001) \textit{Franco-German Relations} (Pearson, Longman), p.118
\textsuperscript{75} Cole, A (2001) \textit{Franco-German Relations} (Pearson, Longman), p.104-118
\textsuperscript{76} ‘Gerangel zwischen richtigen und möchtegern-Aussenminister’, Der Tagesspiegel, 30/08/1996
\textsuperscript{77} ‘Kronprinz in Feldgrau’ in Die Woche, 06/10/1995, see also ‘Auf dem Weg zum Gipfel’, Die Woche, 14/08/1998
Whilst Rühe was keen to act as policy entrepreneur on behalf of ESDI, he was much more cautious about how it should be given substance. He used the Bosnia crisis - and especially events in Srebrenica - to argue that the time had come for Germany to actively stand against genocide in Europe and that such a strategy for Germany required being part of a European military structure that was capable of acting in a crisis prevention role. However, in developing his ideas on ESDI in a more practical form, Rühe was very much the policy broker who was keen to ensure that an ESDI did not challenge the dominant domestic policy monopoly of territorial and alliance defence. He proved a very skilful policy leader in the strategic context that faced him, heroic in vision, but humdrum on detail. This leadership mix was reconciled in his consistent salami tactics in developing a crisis prevention role for the Bundeswehr, whilst not challenging a domestic political context that was deeply wedded to territorial defence and conscription.

Crucial to the way in which Rühe conceived ESDI was his shared view with Kohl that Germany was historically deeply indebted to the United States, and that the unqualified support of the Bush Administration for rapid German unification in 1989-90 had increased this indebtedness. Hence Kohl was not prepared to be used by the French government to develop an ESDI in opposition to the United States. Rather, first and foremost, ESDI must emerge from the process of Europeanisation of NATO, with US support at every stage. For Rühe NATO and the WEU were the prime institutional venues in which ESDI would develop. He instrumentalised the WEU to give operational expression to European policy and project the role of the Defence Ministry. This position suited the bureaucratic interests and reflected the established institutional culture and identity of the Federal Defence Ministry. It was the condition under which Rühe could sponsor and support ESDI without conceding political weight and influence to the Foreign Ministry. Above all, Rühe ensured an optimal ‘uploading’ of German policy preferences and practices in the WEU's Petersburg tasks. This conception supported role change in the Bundeswehr without challenging the continuance of territorial defence and conscription as the primary rationale and

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basis of the German armed forces. In the context of a public that was sensitive to the issue of intervention and a constraining domestic political context, the use of NATO - and WEU as a bridge to the EU - as the institution in which the first steps toward a stronger ESDI was to be taken enabled Rühe to reconcile new and traditional roles. In this way the creation of an ESDI would not threaten the dominant policy monopoly within Germany.

This policy leadership role depended on Rühe's skills in routing ESDI through the institutional venues of NATO and WEU. In this way he could keep ESDI business away from the regular meetings of the European State Secretaries, which were chaired by the Foreign Ministry. Once CESDP business got into the European State Secretaries Committee, it was much more likely to escape out of the defence and security policy subsystem into the macro-political context. A change of institutional venue increased the prospects of a more radical approach to ESDI with a consequent threatening 'misfit' between EU requirements and the Bundeswehr's operational capabilities.

The control of information and promotion of policy-orientated learning was crucial to Rühe's policy broker role. Within the Defence Ministry and NATO these processes were facilitated by figures such as Naumann and Manfred Wörner. As secretary-general of NATO, with very close contacts to Naumann, Wörner was important in working with the WEU to secure the definition of the Petersburg tasks. Naumann and Wörner were also important in ensuring that policy learning about the need for a stronger crisis prevention role did not lead to a 'politics of punctuation', affecting core policy beliefs, but instead altered only 'secondary aspects' of the domestic policy monopoly and image. As shown in chapter 4, Rühe was also active in seeking to promote policy-orientated learning within the coalition parties and also the opposition parties. Rühe's leadership traits and style were an important part of his broker role. Despite his reputation as a 'yob', Rühe demonstrated important conciliatory and mobilizing skills, combining the cultivation of agreement around clear policy goals with decisional assertiveness.

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80 Interviews, NATO, Brussels, 16th and 17th. September 2002
In conclusion, Rühe's policy leadership skills were vital to the way in which Europeanisation affected the Bundeswehr. He played an active role in seeking to 'uploading' German policy preferences and practices in such a way that 'misfit' and major adaptational pressure to the core policy beliefs about the Bundeswehr were avoided. CESDP was carefully managed by keeping it within the institutional venues of NATO and the WEU where the Defence Ministry was the primary player and the Committee of European State Secretaries could be kept on the margins. This institutional venue management ensured that Rühe retained privileged access to Kohl, especially in preparing key NATO Council meetings where the role of the WEU was discussed (notably in Brussels in January 1994, Berlin in June 1996, and Madrid in July 1997). The Berlin meeting was especially important in gaining approval for Rühe's concept of building a ESDI within NATO through the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) structure, including its reference to 'the use of separable but not separate military capabilities in operations led by the WEU'. Rühe's view of the prime need to embed ESDI in the Atlantic framework of NATO was upheld in that the United States would still have an effective veto on any WEU-led operations through the need for North Atlantic Council approval for the use of NATO assets.

Rühe was determined that the Defence Ministry should not be as marginalized in the definition of German positions during 1996 for the IGC preparing the Amsterdam Treaty as it had during the Maastricht negotiations. Kohl was determined to make progress towards a 'Communitarisation' of CFSP as a key to closer European political union, notably through the extension of qualified majority voting. Crucially, strengthening CFSP commanded wide domestic political consensus across party boundaries and high public support.\(^{81}\) Kohl also saw an opportunity to put the opposition SPD and Greens under pressure at a time when they lacked internal consensus about developing a common European defence policy, with many key figures rejecting a 'militarisation' of the EU. The Defence Ministry's influence in the development of German negotiating positions was apparent in the emphasis on constructing European capabilities in defence and security policy within the European pillar of NATO. The Foreign Ministry's contribution was seen in the longer-term

perspective of a common defence through incorporation of the Petersburg tasks in the EU Treaty, the step-by-step integration of the WEU into the EU, and the introduction of a solidarity clause. However, crucially, the idea of a phased fusion of the WEU into the EU collapsed because of British resistance.

6.5 Fischer, Scharping and the Europeanisation of Defence and Security Policy: The Legacy of Opposition

Crucial to the relationship over ESDP between Joschka Fischer, the Foreign Minister, and Rudolf Scharping, the Defence Minister, in the Schröder government was the different directions in which they had led their parties in foreign and security policy in the opposition period. Before the 1998 federal elections both had sought to position the Greens and the SPD respectively as governments-in-waiting. Scharping's key objective was to Atlanticise the SDP by promoting ESDI within the NATO framework. In this process his relationship with Solana, the NATO general secretary, was important. Above all for electoral strategic reasons, Scharping sought respectability for the SPD as a party to be trusted to handle defence and security within government. This was to be achieved by the aligning the SPD with the theme of Europeanising NATO. For Fischer the central issue was a European defence and security policy within the framework of the EU's CFSP. This framework offered a better opportunity to pursue the Green's agenda of a strong civilian and crisis-prevention dimension to defence and security through multilateral agreement and action. Fischer's commitment was evident in his first speech to the European Parliament on 12 January 1999 when he referred to ESDP as the next important stage in the deepening of the EU after the Single Market programme and Economic and Monetary Union. Accordingly, neither Fischer nor Scharping challenged

82 See 'Solana, NATO-Einsätze ohne mandat der UN sind möglich' 20/01/1998 and see also 'Die NATO als Dreh- und Angelpunkt: Das Transatlantische Verhältnis war Thema einer Konferenz der SPD-Bundestagsfraktion im Berliner Willy-Brandt-Haus', Neues Deutschland, 21/01/1998. For the role of Karsten Voigt and Rudolf Scharping in fashioning Atlanticist consensus in SPD see also 'In Germany, a formal Burial for Anti-NATO Past', International Herald Tribune, 21.01.1998. See also 'Aussenpolitischer Kongress: Herausforderung des 21. Jahrhunderts', 18/06/1997 for internal debate within SPD.
83 Interview, Jürgen Schnappertz, SPD Bundestagsfraktion, Referent, Office of Peter Struck, Berlin, 5th August 2002, see also 'NATO Generalsekretär bei Scharping', SPD Pressemitteilung, 01/02/1996
84 Fischer: Meine Partei kann sich nicht beschweren: Mit Schröder einig in der Europapolitik', Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 15.01.1999
departmental thinking. Scharping was not a minister who was ever likely to challenge the Defence Ministry to become more Europeanised by reorientating its strategic thinking and force structures around the EU. Conversely, Fischer's thinking was consistent with thinking within the planning staff of the Foreign Ministry where officials were pressing for a stronger element of EU strategic thinking in defence and security policy and wishing to move away from conscription.  

However, Fischer's policy leadership role was constrained by three factors. Firstly, the Green party emerged from the 1998 federal elections as very much the junior coalition partner, having underperformed in relation to the electoral potential exhibited before the pre-election party conference. Fischer was successful in getting top priority to CFSP in the coalition agreement, but an end to conscription was ruled out. Secondly, Schröder had no background or interest in defence and security policy and was content to place a politician in whom he had little confidence and trust in the Defence Ministry. Thirdly, Scharping had little, if any political credit and support on which to draw in coalition and party negotiations. He brought no extra political leverage to the Defence Ministry. Fischer had greater leverage as both the leading figure in the Green party and deputy Chancellor and consistently the most popular figure in the federal government. Even so, it was difficult to translate these advantages into policy entrepreneurship over defence and security policy where Scharping guarded the competence of the Defence Ministry. For Scharping and his ministry the Foreign Ministry could legitimately focus on the institutional questions thrown up by designing ESDP. However, capability questions were a matter for the Defence Ministry. This division of competence was seen as essential if territorial defence and conscription were to be retained as the essential pillars of the Bundeswehr.

‘Die Geschichte hat die Entscheidung zur EU-Erweiterung gefällt. Wir müssen sie jetzt vollziehen’, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 16.01.99
See also ‘Fischer: Nach Euro muss Europa Verteidigungsnität aufbauen’, DPA, 171340, November 1998

85 See ‘On Wednesday the Staaatsminister in the Foreign Ministry, Ludger Volmer (Green) registered the claims of his Ministry to influence on the reform. Volmer stated: ’The Foreign Ministry has overall control over security policy, and in the discussions about the consequences of the reform for security policy we have one or two words to say’. in ‘Auswärtiges Amt pocht auf Mitsprache bei Bundeswehrreform’ Berliner Zeitung, 25.05.2000

86 Interview, Chancellor’s Office, Berlin, 2nd September 2002

87 ‘Fischer is as popular as Rau: Federal-Joschka: In the west of the Republic, he was always the star and he has now made it it the east. 62% of all those asked see the Foreign Minister as the most trustworthy politician in the country’ , Der Tagesspiegel, 25.03.2003
An active German role in developing ESDP in 1999 - led by Fischer - was surprising given these constraints, a past German reluctance to lead on military issues, and a Red/Green coalition containing a pronounced pacifist tradition. A key factor was the transition of the SPD and the Greens from opposition parties to government. This shift of macro-political realities altered the framework in which defence and security policy was considered. There were top-down pressures from within NATO and the EU to which the new government had to respond. A second factor was the steepness of the learning curve because on 1 January 1999 the new Schröder government had to assume the EU Presidency. In doing so they were confronted by the new opportunity that was opened by the Franco-British St. Malo Declaration to give a central role to ESDP in the EU Presidency. Crucially, the learning curve was made even steeper by the Kosovo crisis and war, which forced urgent and very difficult decisions about whether and how to engage the Bundeswehr. Clear positions could not be evaded. Like earlier events in Bosnia – especially the Srebrenica massacre of 1995 – the Kosovo War was vital in altering the debate on ESDP within the SPD and the Green party. It provided a window of opportunity for advocates of a more active German policy in developing a European crisis reaction capability to create a 'crisis consciousness'. This policy could be more readily legitimated within the political Left by situating it within the context of the development of an ESDP that was the next stage in European political unification. Kosovo was a critical event in enabling the SPD and Green leaderships to carve out a defence and security policy within a European framework. Though there were considerable difficulties with pacifist

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88 See ‘Less than eight months from national elections the Social Democrats believe they can win, the intent could not be clearer. The party took aim at a domestic audience and tried to say again, with a few nuances, that it has undergone a conversion, definitively endorsing the mainstream of the Atlantic Alliance viewpoints’, in ‘In Germany, a formal Burial for Anti-NATO Past’, International Herald Tribune, 21.01.1998.


views, notably in the Greens, the result was a new domestic consensus, which was ratified at the SPD’s Berlin party conference in December 1999. This emerging consensus formed the basis for a newly active German role over ESDP at the Cologne and Helsinki European Councils in 1999. Indeed, the Helsinki European Council marked the symbolic turning point from ESDI to CESDP, to agreement on developing a common European security and defence policy within the framework of the EU.92

Even without the Kosovo war, the new Schröder government coincided with the implications of agenda-setting on European defence in the Franco-British St. Malo Declaration of 4 December 1998. On the one hand, this event caused some political embarrassment for Schröder who had indicated in the federal election campaign that he would be giving greater stress to Anglo-German relations within the EU. Here, in a key issue area, France and Britain were setting the agenda for the new German EU Presidency. The St. Malo Declaration was a challenge to flesh out how the European Council should assume the responsibility to decide on the progressive framing of a common defence policy within the framework of the Amsterdam Treaty's provisions on CFSP. On the other hand, the St. Malo Declaration represented a window of opportunity to pursue traditional German policy interests in strengthening CFSP by giving it a military component.93

Hence the Schröder government was confronted with three pressing challenges: the EU Presidency, the St. Malo Declaration, and the Kosovo crisis and war. Its response was framed within the emphasis laid on continuity in the government's policy statements on foreign and European policies. ESDP continued to be seen as a necessary and desirable aspect of the European political union that was Germany's top priority. However, it was also bound up with differences of view within the new government about the Franco-German relationship. For Fischer the Franco-German relationship remained the essential motor for European unification, and ESDP was the next main project in this process.94 For some in the Chancellor's Office - notably

around Hombach, its new head - other relationships - especially with the British -
ofered an opportunity for a more influential German role.\(^5\) The key problem for
Fischer was the difference between French and German strategic cultures. The
civilian-based German concept of security (reinforced by the Greens) contrasted with
the more realist and military-based French approach.\(^6\) Also, the German 'bridge'
concept of ESDP was difficult to reconcile with French distance from NATO and
identification of ESDP with independence from the US. German caution stemmed
from fear that France might tempt Germany into a European initiative that
undermined NATO and the German security partnership with the US. The earlier
Franco-German initiatives of the Kohl-Mitterrand period – the Franco-German
Defence Council, the Franco-German brigade and the Eurocorps – had been accepted
on condition that they did not threaten NATO.

The past policy leadership of Chancellor Kohl on ESDI was crucial in setting the
terms in which the new Red/Green government debated ESDP in the framework of
the Kosovo war and of the St. Malo Declaration. For Kohl ESDI had to be part of a
Europeanisation of NATO. Rühe's policy brokerage and 'salami tactics' on behalf of
a stronger ESDI and the Franco-German recognition that an ESDI had be achieved
through the WEU and the Europeanisation of NATO offered Kohl an opportunity to
put pressure on the SPD and Greens as 'unreliable' in European policy.\(^7\) Rühe and
Kohl acted to shift the consensus. In turn, this combination of external changes with
the use made of this issue by the Kohl government made it possible for Scharping and
Fischer to act as policy leaders on ESDI within their parties. By March 1996 Oskar
Lafontaine as new SPD chair had convened a joint study group on security with the
French Socialist Party. This study group advocated a concentration on strengthening
and rationalizing the European armament industry as a precondition for ESDI.

Lafontaine's attempt to push for greater Franco-German co-operation in generating
new policy ideas brought out the profound ambivalence in SPD attitudes to defence
and security. On the one hand, Lafontaine was ideologically committed to European
political union around the Franco-German motor and wanted to give it a new centre-

\(^5\) Interview, Chancellor’s Office, Berlin, 2\(^{nd}\) September 2002
left dimension. He also saw electoral strategic advantage in the domestic legitimation of new policy thinking by stressing its European dimension. On the other hand, Lafontaine was uncomfortable with French strategic culture. On matters of defence and security he - like Heidemarie Wieczoreck-Zeul - was closer to Swedish and Finnish ideas about the importance of the civilian dimension. In consequence, Lafontaine hesitated to pursue the Franco-German motor in defence and security policy, preferring to align the SPD with Swedish and Finnish proposals in the negotiation of the Amsterdam Treaty.  

More pressingly, events in Bosnia offered Kohl and Rühe an opportunity to label the SPD and the Greens as unreliable. As chapter 4 showed, the main turning point was the Bundestag debates of 13 and 30 June 1995. Fischer, as the Green's parliamentary speaker, spelt out the limitations of a pacifist policy, referring to Germany's historic and moral responsibility to confront ethnic cleansing in Europe. Even so, despite Fischer's policy entrepreneurship, the Green's official position had been an essentially civilian approach based on the OSCE and WEU, rather than NATO. As late as the European Parliamentary election of 1999 the Green's manifesto stressed that the EU does not require a military arm. However, deteriorating opinion poll figures before the 1998 federal elections encouraged Fischer to be more forceful in its rejection of a 'go-it-alone' pacifist policy. The exigencies of stages a recovery before the federal elections and ensuring that the Greens were koalitionsfähig with the SPD strengthened his hand on Green security policy. Hence in the coalition agreement of October 1998 there was no problem of signing the Greens up to creating an ESDI, including the further development of the WEU, within the framework of a strengthened, 'more Communaritised' CFSP. The fact that CFSP was the only EU policy area that was the subject of an individual chapter in the Red/Green coalition agreement indicated that the new government was likely to prioritise an active role in this area. However, Kosovo was to test the unity of the Greens/Bündnis 90 to its limit, with Fischer forced to plead his case before a special party conference. For Fischer ESDP was a response to a policy problem - genocide in Europe - and part of the politics of sustaining coalition with the SPD.

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98 Interview, Axel Schneider, Referent, Arbeitsgruppe Sicherheit, SPD Bundestagsfraktion, Berlin, 4th. September 2002
In government, as foreign minister, Fischer again played the role of policy leader on behalf of CESDP. Fischer used the Kosovo crisis to bring home to Germans that the issue was not one of whether Germany joins in an ESDI dedicated to working for peace and preventing humanitarian disasters. It was about Germany playing a leading role in this process because of its special historical responsibility. Fischer's role as entrepreneur was facilitated by his position as leader of the smaller coalition partner in government and by his ongoing identification with this issue, over which he had scored a resounding victory over the pacifist wing within his own party.

Above all, the St. Malo Declaration and the Kosovo war provided him with the opportunity as new Foreign Minister to make ESDP a central agenda item for the informal meeting of EU foreign ministers on 13-14 March in Reinhartshausen, the Franco-German summit in Toulouse on 29 May, and the Cologne European Council in June 1999. At the March meeting he gained agreement for an EU Military Committee and for the future Political and Security Committee, as well as pressed for the integration of the WEU into the EU. The symbiosis between Fischer's policy ambitions and the Europeanist bias of the Foreign Ministry created a facilitative environment to act as a policy entrepreneur on this issue. Fischer was constrained by the coalition agreement, which stipulated that the Greens would not make the abolition of conscription a coalition issue. At the same time neither he nor his party had a stake in the retention of the policy monopoly of territorial defence and conscription. Thus Fischer's strategic political context meant that he was in a position to advocate a stronger emphasis upon EU crisis prevention forces, without having to face the consequences of the resulting 'top-down' pressures from the EU. These pressures would fall instead upon the Defence Minister, Rudolf Scharping, and Finance Minister, Hans Eichel. The SPD was more vulnerable to the implications of pursuing ESDP.

Scharping had played a different kind of leadership role in opposition - as policy broker rather than entrepreneur. This matched his less heroic leadership style than

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Fischer's. As chapter 4 showed, the debate in the SPD about the use of force had been triggered by the Gulf War. Lafontaine aligned himself with the pacifist left; Scharping spoke to the centrist majority in limiting any German involvement to UN peacekeeping operations; whilst a sizeable minority was prepared to envisage a German military involvement under a UN Security Council resolution. Scharping backed the SPD's appeal of the issue of 'out-of-area' intervention to the Federal Constitutional Court in 1994 as a means of breaking the intra-party deadlock. This ruling - and Bosnia - played a catalytic role in helping a grouping around Scharping, Verheugen and Voigt to create a new consensus within the SPD. The lack of a consensus was clear in the Bundestag vote on Bosnia in June 1995. 55 SPD deputies voted against German participation in IFOR.

The SPD's federal executive established the **ZukunftsKommission** under Scharping with two functions: to establish a new consensus in the SPD on European security, and to ensure consensus with the Kohl government so that the SPD did not expose a weak flank that the CDU/CSU could attack in the 1998 federal elections. The crisis in Bosnia had led to a polarization between the old left, who opposed German military involvement unless it was under a UN mandate, and reformers such as Scharping and Voigt who argued that Germany had a special moral responsibility to act to stop genocide. The Commission was a tool with which to help forge a consensus within the SPD to avoid a similar situation to the SPD party conference in 1995 where foreign policy issues polarized the party between Lafontaine and Scharping. By the May 1997 SPD European conference Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, deputy party chair, was using the joint Swedish/Finnish initiative on European security to seek out a consensus on bringing the WEU into the EU. Hence she advocated the inclusion of the Petersburg tasks in the forthcoming Amsterdam Treaty and stressed the importance of developing the civilian capabilities of the EU in crisis prevention and

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102 Interview, Rudolf Scharping, Berlin, 5th June 2003
103 'Die SPD schafft sich ein Guetesiegel: Der neue aussenpolitische Ansatz soll der Partei Profil geben', Saarbrücker Zeitung, 19/06/1997; 'Sozialdemokraten setzen auf eine berechenbare Aussenpolitik,' Handelsblatt, 19/06/1997; 'SPD sucht neues aussenpolitisches Profil', Frankfurter Rundschau, 19/06/1997
104 'Parteitag der SPD in Mannheim, 14-17 November 1995,' Beschlüsse
conflict resolution. By appealing in this way to two 'neutrals' as models, she situated the SPD in a framework more acceptable to the pacifist wing of the party.\(^{105}\)

The work of the Scharping Commission was supplemented by a number of conferences and by visits from prominent figures to provide it with information and analysis. In particular, as mentioned above, the *Aussenpolitischer Kongress: Herausforderungen des 21. Jahrhunderts* (Foreign Policy Congress: The Challenges of the 21\(^{st}\) Century) in 1997 was an important event, showing a new public face to SPD foreign and security policy.\(^ {106}\) These events continued into 1998 with a public symposium on the trans-Atlantic relationship in January 1998, including John Kornblum, the US Ambassador. An important visitor at this symposium was NATO General Secretary Javier Solana, who had previously visited Scharping and the SPD Bundestag parliamentary party in February 1996. The symposium was important for Scharping and Voigt as a means by which to place increasing pressure on traditionalists within the SPD who did not fully endorse mainstream Atlantic alliance viewpoints. Scharping and Voigt were keen to ensure that the party publicly sustained its image as competent on issues of foreign and security policy by narrowing differences with Kohl. According to others within the SPD, Solana (a former Socialist foreign minister in Spain and earlier an opponent of Spanish entry into NATO) proved to be a very influential figure within the SPD. He brought home the necessity for the SPD to consider acting outside of a UN mandate, thereby helping to put in place the building blocks for the SPD's involvement in Kosovo.\(^ {107}\)

At the November 1997 SPD conference the Scharping Commission's report was adopted. It recommended that the WEU should be built up as the European pillar of NATO, allowing a greater role for Europe if the US should lose the will to intervene in European crises. On this basis ESDI was included in the Red/Green coalition agreement, especially strengthening of the WEU within the EU framework, reforming

\(^{105}\) Interview, Axel Schneider, Referent, SPD Bundestagsfraktion, Arbeitsgruppe Verteidigung, Berlin, 10th. September 2002

\(^{106}\) 'Die SPD befürwortet die erweiterung von NATO und EU', Frankfurter Allgemeine, 19/07/1997 and 'SPD auf neuem aussepolitischem Kurs: Scharping für grossere Beteiligung der Bundeswehr bei Auslandseinsätzen – Kongress in Bonn', Die Welt, 19/06/1997

\(^{107}\) Interview with Jürgen Schnappertz, Referent, Büro Peter Struck, Berlin, 5th August 2002; also Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 'Solana, NATO-Einsätze ohne Mandat der UN sind möglich', 20 January 1998
NATO so that its aims were more consistent with the OSCE and the UN Charter, and reforming the Bundeswehr on the basis of a broader concept of security.

Whilst the SPD was forced to modernise its defence and security policy as a result of Rühe's salami tactics and of changes in the security environment, it remained wary of "positive feedback" that might undermine the dominant policy monopoly of territorial defence. The potential costs to the SPD were too uncertain. Thus, despite the reservations of Verheugen and Heidemarie Wiezoreck-Zeul about conscription, this question and the critical issue of Bundeswehr reform were postponed until after the 1998 elections (see chapter 4). As within the Defence Ministry under Rühe, it was safer for the party leadership to empower traditionalists who defended the policy monopoly. Scharping's role as policy broker rather than entrepreneur was shown in the way in which he adopted a more conservative position on conscription than he had originally advocated. Nevertheless, as chapter 4 showed, the effect of the debate within the SPD before the 1998 federal elections was to stimulate policy-orientated learning. This learning did not affect "deep core" policy beliefs, and thereby cause a "politics of punctuation", but it did extend to secondary aspects and to the policy core of the belief systems within the SPD.

Thus, during the period of presenting the SPD as a government-in-waiting, Scharping and Voigt played an important role in modernizing its defence and security policy. An important part of this role was the promotion of policy-orientated learning within the SPD. After the Bosnia crisis and Srebrenica massacre the SPD was more receptive to learning. Taking advantage of this opportunity, Scharping and Voigt promoted policy-orientated learning through conferences and visits of high-level international politicians and representatives of international institutions, notably Solana. However, Scharping had been keen to ensure that the SPD did not move towards the French conception of CESDP - as a challenge to the primacy of NATO. Scharping's central objective was to get the party to accept the Atlanticist position and recognize NATO as the core institution of German defence and security policy. In so far as Scharping can be labelled a policy entrepreneur, his entrepreneurship was about

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108 Interview, Herr Kristian Gaiser (Head of European Policy, SPD Parteivorstand), Berlin, 12th November 2001.

109 Interview, Rudolf Scharping, 5th June 2003.
promoting NATO as a security organization and ESDI as part of the WEU and the 'European pillar' of NATO, able to act if the US lost interest in Europe.\footnote{Integration statt isolation', Vorwärts, February, 1998; see also Rudolf Scharping in 'Eine notwendige Partnerschaft für das 21. Jahrhundert, Nur eine nach aussen handlungs- und führungsfähige EU bei der Bewältigung der globalen Herausforderung ein starker Partner Amerikas sein kann', 19/01/1998}

The legacy of opposition was a Red/Green government in which Fischer and Scharping represented different strands of thought about European defence and security policy. The new Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, had been out of the internal SPD circuit reviewing defence and security. His contribution was to frame the new importance of ESDP, consequent on the St. Malo Declaration and Kosovo, within a policy discourse that emphasised a more self-confident German role in Europe. Schröder saw in ESDP an instrument to give a new international profile to Germany by working together with the two major European military powers, Britain and France, in designing this new initiative. The combined German Presidencies of the EU and of the WEU in early 1999 offered a window of opportunity to achieve this profile through prioritising ESDP. Germany could play a special role as bridge between the European and the transatlantic dimensions of ESDP. Also, it was essential for Germany to be an active player in any core or leadership group that might be emerging in a fast-changing Europe. Such a group might well have a military dimension. However, Schröder was not prepared to make a linkage between ESDP and radical reform of the role and structures of the Bundeswehr away from a conscription force because of the potential domestic political costs. Both were secondary to the budget consolidation programme of the Finance Minister. The result was that by 2000 any notion of Germany as a leading player in developing ESDP had evaporated.

6.6 The Effects of CESDP on the Bundeswehr: The Weizsäcker Commission as Agent of Europeanisation

Before the Helsinki European Council of December 1999 the influence of the EU on the Bundeswehr had been limited. CFSP had had little substantive effect on its roles and structures. The most concrete developments were the creation of the Franco-German Brigade and then Eurocorps in 1995. However as we have seen, Kosovo and
the wars of succession in the former Yugoslavia opened up the opportunity for those within the SPD and Greens pushing for a stronger defence dimension in the EU. The St. Malo Declaration of Britain and France in December 1998 and the Kosovo War of 1999 acted to give momentum to the development of a European Rapid Reaction Force, so that Europe would be able to respond effectively to crises in the future.

Thus at Helsinki European Council in 1999 it was agreed that governments would commit themselves to Headline Goals and Capabilities Goals. The Headline Goals involved the development of a 'militarily self-sustaining' force - by 2003 - consisting of 50,000-60,0000 troops (15 brigades), deployable within 60 days, and able to remain in the field for up to 12 months. Its 'rapid response' elements were to be available and deployable far more quickly. Under the Capabilities Goals the governments pledged to increase and develop the capabilities of the troops involved in common operations, in areas such as the enhancement of European airlift resources, air transport command and naval support.

The Helsinki meeting of the European Council also set up new civil and military committees on the European level to co-ordinate the CESDP. The Political Committee for the CFSP became the Political and Security Committee (PSC), composed of national representatives of senior/ambassadorial level and meeting on a regular basis. Advice to the PSC was to be provided by the EU Military Committee (EUMC), made up of the domestic chiefs of defence and their military delegates. The EU Military Staff (EUMS) in the Council worked to the EUMC.. The role of the EUMS was to give 'early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning for Petersburg tasks including identification of European and multinational forces'. The institutions were voluntary and not attached formally to the Commission, but instead to the Council of Ministers.

The practical effects of Germany's commitment to the Helsinki Headline Goals and the Capabilities Goals (goals that were mirrored in NATO's Defence Capabilities Initiative) were to force a rethink about the roles and structures of the German armed forces. The Helsinki Headline Goals in effect codified the lessons of the Kosovo War, namely that the German armed forces were not in a situation to be able to carry out crisis-management tasks effectively. The conflict in Kosovo also served as a reminder to the Germans that common capabilities were critical to any potential European
defence and security policy. The job of determining the future roles and structure of the Bundeswehr and interpreting the implications of the Kosovo War was given to the Commission 'Common Security and the Future of the Bundeswehr' under former federal president Richard von Weizsäcker. This Commission acted as the key agency of Europeanisation of the Bundeswehr.

The implications of the CESDP for the Bundeswehr were recognized in the Weizsäcker Commission's findings, which stressed the need for the Bundeswehr to orientate itself to the crisis-management tasks set out in the Helsinki Headline Goals. The 'European perspective' was of great importance to the Commission members, and hence its proposals were designed to enable the Bundeswehr to be increasingly used in operations under the auspices of the EU. This objective was embodied in chapter two of the report, entitled the 'European Imperative', which recognized that the future international credibility of the EU would depend on its ability to respond effectively to crisis situations. The Kosovo War demonstrated the extent to which Germany and its European partners had fallen behind the US in areas such as high-technology weapons, leadership structure and communications systems, making joint operations with the US difficult.

In the Weizsäcker Commission's view, the development of CESDP created two crucial challenges for German defence policy: co-operation and convergence in the procurement of weapons systems and force structures. Hence it recommended that the German government should launch a European political initiative, similar to the Maastricht convergence criteria for EMU, to harmonise European armed force reforms and reach joint European agreements on procurement of weapons systems. In this way the Commission signalled that the participation of German armed forces within a European Rapid Reaction Force was on an equal footing to their commitments within the NATO alliance. However, the Commission did not see the commitments to NATO and the EU as mutually exclusive: the Defence Capabilities Initiative of NATO - affirmed at its summit in Washington DC in April 1999 - called

111 Gemeinsame Sicherheit und Zukunft der Bundeswehr: Bericht der Kommission an die Bundesregierung, Bonn, May 2000, Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, II 'Der europäische Imperativ'.
112 Gemeinsame Sicherheit und Zukunft der Bundeswehr: Bericht der Kommission an die Bundesregierung, Bonn, May 2000, Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, II 'Der europäische Imperativ'.
for similar procurement to the Capabilities Goals of the EU. The Helsinki commitments were fully compatible with NATO requirements.

For the Weizsäcker Commission, it was not only the commitments entered into at the European level that necessitated a ‘fundamental renewal’ of the German armed forces. This requirement was a consequence of the reality of increased involvement of the Bundeswehr in crisis-management tasks since the Karlsruhe ruling of 1994. The Helsinki Headline Goals acted to provide a European framework within which the Commission could legitimately recommend that German armed forces needed to be restructured – not only as part of NATO and UN requirements but also as a crucial element of the next step in European unification.

As a result of these combined pressures – from NATO, the EU and the practical experiences of crisis-management operations in the 1990s - the Commission determined that the armed forces should be re-structured to engage in crisis-management tasks. They were to comprise an operational forces component of 140,000 troops, a peacetime strength of 240,000 troops, with 30,000 conscripts and build-up potential of 3000,000 troops, with a manpower reserve of 100,000. The Commission recommended that civilian posts be reduced to around 80,000 in order to free-up funds, which were to be used to increase investment in equipment for the Bundeswehr – it was estimated that DM2-3 billion a year would be necessary for its adequate equipment.

Command structures were also to be made more efficient in order to increase the effectiveness of operational control. This took the form of an enhancement of the responsibility of the Chief of Staff for planning, command and control, and acquisition, and the centralisation of all ministerial functions in Berlin. In line with the Helsinki Headline Goals, multinationalisation of operational forces was to promoted by seeking integration along the lines of the NATO Airborne Early Warning Forces and the pooling of European lift, reconnaissance and air defence resources. Equipment was also recognized as in need for modernization for the new crisis-management tasks, however only in co-operation with European partners. In line with the EU’s Capabilities Goals and NATO’s Defence Capabilities Initiative the Commission recommended that, in future, all equipment should be procured in
agreement with EU partners and that large-scale equipment be procured and used mutually. The Commission also recommended that - in order to achieve savings for investment in the Bundeswehr - services in co-operation, maintenance, development, acquisition, logistics and training should be privatised.\textsuperscript{113}

For the Weizsäcker Commission the Helsinki Headlines Goals and the EU had a decisive influence as the imperative driving the reform. This demonstrates the important role that can be played by policy forums in the process of 'Europeanisation'. The Weizsäcker Commission played a dual role in this process. Firstly, it acted as a conduit through which the EU was exerting top-down influence; the EU's goals were brought to bear on the reform debate. Secondly, the Commission (led here by Weizsäcker) used European requirements as a means with which to place pressure upon the dominant policy image of territorial defence.\textsuperscript{114} It did so by providing not only a new policy image (crisis reaction) but also a new institution within which this new policy image could find a home (the EU). It was, in short, an agent of bottom-up Europeanisation. However, as chapter five illustrates, its influence as a policy forum for Europeanisation was limited because it did not include members of the macro-political system who carried responsibility for implementing its conclusions. The rapid internal learning process that Europeanised the work of the Commission (where Weizsäcker's role was critical) was not matched within the wider political system which was only very limitedly Europeanised.

\textsuperscript{113} Gemeinsame Sicherheit und Zukunft der Bundeswehr: Bericht der Kommission an die Bundesregierung, Bonn, May 2000, Bundesministerium der Verteidigung
\textsuperscript{114} Interview, Professor Helga Haftendorn, Otto Suhr Institute, FU, Berlin (Mitglied Komission Gemeinsame Sicherheit und Zukunft der Bundeswehr), Berlin, 27th. May 2003 Interviews, Defence Ministry, Bonn, 23rd. September 2002. For von Weizsäcker's views (remarkably similar to the conclusion of the Commission) see interview with Richard von Weizsäcker in 'Europa muss erwachsen werden' Die Zeit 21.10.1999, where he states, 'In ten years we must be in the situation to take care of stability in our own continent. Of course there will still be national armed forces. However, in the areas of early warning, logistics and air transport – in the areas necessary for a Rapid Reaction Force – we can finally begin. We can no longer afford to be so completely dependent [on the USA]. Certainly not when we have to reckon with such a unilateralism from the USA'.
6.7 CESDP and the Problem of Institutional Credibility: Europeanisation versus Atlanticisation in the Defence Ministry

Whilst the Helsinki Headline Goals had an important, if not critical effect upon the report of the Weizsäcker Commission, the same cannot be said of the reform proposed by Defence Minister Scharping. The Helsinki Headline Goals were not an ‘imperative’ in Scharping’s reform concept. The Wiezsiäcker Commission stressed how Germany faced ‘no threat to its territory from its neighbours’ and recommended that the ‘yardstick for the Bundeswehr should be the capability to participate in two crisis-response operations’. However, Scharping’s reform concept continued to stress territorial defence as the ‘core task of the German armed forces’, a task that could only be fulfilled through the continuance of conscription. According to Scharping’s reform concept: ‘Territorial defence allows us to fulfill our obligations to the NATO alliance. It also provides the capabilities necessary for peace-making and peace-keeping operations’.

As we have seen in chapter five, a number of factors combined to marginalise the Weizsäcker Commission’s recommendations. In turn, they help to explain why Europeanisation - as both a top-down and a bottom-up process - had little impact on Bundeswehr reform. The Helsinki Headline Goals had been agreed by foreign ministers in intergovernmental negotiations on the EU level. The ‘bottom-up’ process of Europeanisation – Germany as an agent of Europeanisation - was a product of the main domestic players in intergovernmental negotiations, most importantly the Foreign Minister and his supportive institutional apparatus, the Foreign Office, under the strategic guidance of the Chancellor’s Office and the Chancellor. This interaction between structure and agency is crucial in determining the model of CESDP promoted by Germany on the EU level. It is well known that the Foreign Ministry embodies a political and organizational culture that is ‘Europeanist”, perceiving the EU as the key institutional framework for German foreign policy.

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115 Gemeinsame Sicherheit und Zukunft der Bundeswehr: Bericht der Kommission an die Bundesregierung, Bonn, May 2000, Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Points 1 and 7
However organizational culture cannot be seen as the sole determinant of policy – it does not stand alone and is reproduced and altered by the actions of actors. As has been highlighted above, the Foreign Ministry’s Europeanist outlook is a result of the symbiosis between the enabling strategic context of a foreign minister as leader of a smaller coalition partner and the ministry’s European bias, with both acting to reinforce the other. The position of Fischer and earlier Genscher as important leaders of their respective parties allowed for greater risk-taking and entrepreneurship within the Foreign Ministry in EU policy. Successive foreign ministers - Genscher, Kinkel (to a more limited extent) and Fischer - have been keen to press for increased cooperation in the field of foreign and security policy and the extension of this cooperation into defence.

Whilst Joschka Fischer and the Foreign Ministry were central in driving the agenda of CESDP and shaping its institutional structures, the implementation of the Helsinki Headline Goals fell on the Defence Ministry. In the context of Germany as an ‘object’ of Europeanisation, the Defence Ministry was the crucial institution; the key actor was Rudolf Scharping. However, in order to understand the process fully, the net must be cast wider for a number of domestic political factors also served to influence the extent to which German defence and security policy was influenced by the creation of new institutions on the EU level.

The Defence Ministry’s strong Atlanticist orientation meant that NATO rather than the EU was viewed as the most robust and crucial pillar of German defence and security policy. However, organizational and political culture does not provide as complete an explanation as constructivists posit.\(^\text{118}\) Again, we must turn to the role played by agency and the theme of policy leadership. After the discursive stagnation of the Denkverbot under the last two years of Volker Rühe’s stewardship,

conservative figures within the Defence Ministry were dominant. They opposed a shift away from conscription that would have freed up the resources and provided the professional soldiers able to spend a number of months abroad, thereby restructuring the German armed forces to fully take part in crisis-management tasks.

Key figures within the Defence Ministry (notably Kujat, Schneiderhan, Langer, von Kirchbach) were prone to mistrust the new institutions on the EU level. Rather than being seen as complimentary to NATO, the PSC and other new EU structures in the Council were perceived as lacking the necessary credibility to inform the restructuring of the German armed forces. Without close co-ordination between the institutions of the EU and NATO, particularly in the area of force planning negotiations, figures within the Defence Ministry were sceptical of the value of the new EU structures.

There were regular meetings between German NATO and EU officials in Berlin, with the aim of promoting an exchange of ideas and developing common concepts. However, the essential problem for the EU in defence and security policy was that it was seen as a threat to NATO within the *Führungsstab* of the Defence Ministry. Arguably, no other area of EU policy faces such institutional competition as CESDP. Added to this, the Helsinki Headline Goals are not enforceable by the European Court of Justice, and no other policy area is more jealously guarded by nation states than defence and security. As Miskimmon and Paterson highlight, the lack of an external body to enforce co-ordination and of a sectoral interest providing extra impetus to CESDP serves to limits the scope of Europeanisation of the policy area.

In this context the issue of institutional credibility is important in understanding why the Defence Ministry was unreceptive to the EU as a forum for the development of German defence and security policy. The greater institutional credibility of NATO

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120 In one interview with a high ranking General in the Planning Staff on 6th August 2002 when asked the question: 'What level of 'top down' pressure is felt in the Defence Ministry from the EU to adapt to the Helsinki Headline Goals and develop a more EU-orientated security policy', the answer given was simply: 'None'. Whilst this may be an exception it demonstrates the intractability of some leading figures to contemplate any challenge to the leading role of NATO. These finding were also supported by interviews in NATO, September 2002. Also, during a number of informal conversations with high-ranking officials in the EU the summer of 2002, a high degree of pessimism and disappointment was expressed about the difficulties encountered by the EU in altering the NATO-orientated mindset of some within the Defence Ministry.
within the Defence Ministry is more than just a product of elite socialization and 'strategic culture'. The institutional credibility of NATO stems from policy leadership, namely the unwillingness of both Rühe and Scharping to appoint or promote pro-Europeanist 'Vordenkers' within the Defence Ministry. This is not to imply that the EU had no influence upon German defence policy. Within the Defence Ministry, compliance with the Helsinki Headline Goals and Capabilities Goals was seen as being complimentary to NATO requirements. Under NATO force proposals, the German armed forces were committed to be capable of participating in three operations: interoperability, flexibility and speedy deployment were the catchwords. Also, the Capabilities Goals outlined by the EU were in close accordance with those outlined by NATO's Defence Capabilities Initiative. It was not the Helsinki Headline Goals that was perceived as a threat to NATO but the longer-term consequences of a stronger European defence dimension, consequences that were spelt out by the Weizsäcker Commission. Hence, whilst Germany adapted its armed forces to be able to participate in a European reaction force of 50-60,000 troops available at 60 days notice, this commitment and deployment did not represent a 'Europeanisation' of the Defence Ministry.

Whilst Miskimmon and Paterson highlight the importance of Smith's processes of 'elite socialisation' and 'bureaucratic reorganisation', policy leadership must take centre stage. The new Military Committee and the Military Staff set up on the EU level has led to a process of limited elite socialization. However, the quality of elite socialization taking place within the NATO context is much higher and crucially a long-standing pillar of the organizational and institutional culture of the Defence Ministry. Furthermore, this pillar had been strengthened during the 1990s. However, organizational culture and elite socialization are not 'stand-alone' concepts; they are supported, adapted or challenged by policy leaders. During the 1990s Volker Rühe exploited the Atlanticist orientation of the Defence Ministry as a framework within which to practise his 'salami tactics'. He was skilled in manipulating the

123 Interviews, NATO, Brussels, 16th and 17th September 2002; Defence Ministry, Berlin, 6th. August 2002
124 Interview, Herr Bernd Weber (Referent, CDU/CSU Bundestagsfraktion, Arbeitsgruppe Verteidigung), Berlin, 26th. August 2002
organizational culture of the Defence Ministry to stall forces for change during the Denkverbot, by placing conservative figures in key positions and thereby hindering the process of policy-orientated learning. The presence of former Defence Minister Manfred Wörner at NATO and of Klaus Naumann as General Inspector of the Bundeswehr, along with a supportive domestic political context, meant that NATO could provide adaptation to the new post-Cold War security environment by developing the ability to engage in crisis management.¹²⁵

Concomitantly, when domestic political factors unfavourable to further reforms of the German armed forces narrowed Rühe’s strategic political context, he used the Atlanticist organizational culture to stress the importance of territorial defence and collective defence, empowering traditionalist figures within the ministry and discouraging ‘Vordenkers’.¹²⁶ The ‘mediating factors’ of institutional culture and the role of individuals are thus intertwined. Actors play a key role in promoting new policy images or policy stasis within institutions, drawing analysis back to the role of individual policy leadership as a key variable in the process of Europeanisation.

When Scharping was appointed Defence Minister, he perpetuated the discursive stagnation by working with rather than replacing key figures appointed by Volker Rühe.¹²⁷ Rather than instigating wide debate within the Defence Ministry about the institutional frameworks of German defence policy, reform was dominated by conservative voices. An example was von Kirchbach’s conservative internal reform concept, which led to his dismissal by Scharping. The Atlanticist orientation of such figures and their conservative worldview meant that the EU crisis-reaction capabilities were seen as a threat to the deeply embedded, traditional policy image of territorial defence, conscription and the even spatial distribution of the armed forces. By challenging the policy image of territorial defence, the EU also threatened large-scale base closures and troop reductions.

¹²⁵ Buchholtz, D. ‘Soldat in bewegter Zeit: General Naumann prägte die Bundeswehr im Umbruch’, IFDT, 1/1996; see also Naumann, K. ‘Bundeswehr vor neue Herausforderungen’ in Soldat und Technik, 1/1995; see also ‘Abscheid eines politischen Kopfs’, Der Tagesspiegel, 06/02/1996
¹²⁷ Interviews, SPD Bundestagsfraktion, Berlin, August/September 2002
On the other hand, NATO was a far less threatening institution to the Defence Ministry. Whilst NATO pressurised Germany to restructure its forces to enable it to engage in crisis-reaction capabilities, it presented no threat to territorial and collective defence as the core task of the German armed forces. NATO was an institution within which the increasing pressure for crisis-reaction capabilities could be reconciled with the domestic pressures upon Rühe and Scharping to prevent significant ‘positive feedback’ and a ‘punctuated equilibrium’. Figures such as Manfred Wörner and Klaus Naumann focused on spearheading the adaptation of NATO to crisis reaction capabilities. However, unlike the concept of a European Rapid Reaction Force, NATO did not threaten the main raison d’être of the German armed forces as territorial defence. In contrast, there was considerable resistance to the ‘top-down’ pressures of Europeanisation within the Defence Ministry.

NATO was endowed with a high degree of credibility by history. Not only had it been the framework within which Germany had weathered the Cold War, but it had also been championed successfully by Volker Rühe during the 1990s as the framework within which Germany was to engage in its first international military engagements since the Second World War. It was an institution within which Germany had been engaging in force planning for over 50 years and a trusted forum of elite socialization. The proposals of the Weizsäcker Commission were simply ‘too European’ for the Defence Ministry.\textsuperscript{128}

Domestic political factors served to weaken the ‘European imperative’ in the Weizsäcker Report, providing no real incentive for the Defence Minister to justify Bundeswehr reform in these terms. As has been highlighted, Scharping had a much broader and more complex follower need satisfaction than Joschka Fischer. Fischer was secure as leader of the Green party and in a position to engage in policy entrepreneurship on CESDP. In contrast, Scharping’s political ambitions, most notably of being Chancellor, meant that he had to take into account the effects of his policy upon his personal standing within the SPD. As far as he was concerned, a radical reshaping of the Bundeswehr that would free up funds for long-term investment was out of the question because it meant high short- to medium-term costs

\textsuperscript{128} Interview, Defence Ministry, Bonn, 23\textsuperscript{rd}. September 2002
for broader SPD goals (notably budget consolidation and a strong welfare state). Base closures would create many political enemies within his own party.\textsuperscript{129}

Scharping was unable to escape the constraints of the budget consolidation, resulting from Germany's commitment to staying within the 3% fiscal deficit limit in the EU's Stability and Growth Pact. The Weizsäcker Commission and the EU's focus upon crisis-reaction capabilities suggested increased government spending. A full implementation of the Weizsäcker Commission would have placed a question mark over the system of \textit{Ersatzdienst}. The short- to medium-term costs to the social system from an end to \textit{Zivildienst} would have undermined any attempt at budget consolidation and threatened basic pillars of the SPD's party programme (as outlined in chapter 5). It is also important to note how the Europeanisation of one policy area: - monetary policy and fiscal rules - has a negative effect upon a state's willingness and ability to adapt in other areas of European policy.

Whilst Scharping's reform concept was championed as an '\textit{Erneuerung vom Grund auf}' (Fundamental Renewal) it was in effect a compromise. On the one hand, it sought to take account of the pressures emanating from the EU, stressing the necessity for the adaptation of structures to crisis-reaction tasks, and crucially an end to conscription (in order to free up resources in the long term for investment in equipment needed for such tasks). On the other, it accommodated to the pressures for a continuance with territorial defence as the dominant policy image shaping the structure of the German armed forces. Whilst the reform concept presented by Scharping allowed Germany to contribute to the limited proposals of the Helsinki Headline Goals, it did not free resources for investment in new equipment.

The 'top-down' Europeanisation of the German armed forces was hindered by the unwillingness of Scharping to take political risks on behalf of crisis-reaction capabilities. Political leadership plays a key role in the Europeanisation process. Whilst Fischer's strategic context allowed him to act as a policy entrepreneur in CESDP, Scharping faced a much more constraining strategic context which confined him to the role of policy broker - and, seen from the Weizsäcker Commission's

\textsuperscript{129} Interview, Herr van den Busche, Referent, Büro Volker Kröning, Berlin, 15th. August 2002
perspective, of 'veto player' on relating Bundeswehr reform to CESDP. Scharping had welcomed the Helsinki Headline Goals as compatible with NATO requirements and had hoped that they might herald a greater share of the budget. However, he hesitated when faced with the implications of further European integration in the area of CESDP as spelt out by the Weizsäcker Commission - a change to the policy monopoly. Scharping's policy brokerage role on behalf of a common European defence policy had taken shape during the SPD's period in opposition, and, akin to Rühe, involved the development of a European crisis-reaction capability as part of a European pillar of NATO. This position did not change as a result of the Kosovo conflict.

6.8 Conclusion

Successive German Defence Ministers were successful in ensuring only a very limited Europeanisation of Bundeswehr policy. Their policy leadership was directed at managing both Atlanticisation and Europeanisation so as to minimise 'misfit', potential top-down adaptational pressures and a revision of the assumptions on which Bundeswehr policy had been based. EU effects on the structures of the Defence Ministry were even more negligible. In structural terms it remained the least European of German ministries. Moreover, there was only a very limited increase in the Europeanness of values and in the willingness to exploit EU institutional venues. The Defence Ministry was, in short, reactive in dealing with CESDP. This strongly reactive role, and limited Europeanisation, had its roots in a traditional deep commitment to NATO as the prime multilateral institution for collective defence. Even then, Atlanticisation was carefully managed so that it did not challenge traditional policy assumptions about the Bundeswehr.

German policy towards CESDP was characterised by a weak 'co-ordinative' discourse at elite levels about its aims and objectives, with the Foreign Ministry being far bolder than the Defence Ministry. The tensions between Atlanticisation and Europeanisation and the problems of reconciling the notion of an autonomous European defence

capability with the traditional 'bridge' concept made it difficult to forge and sustain a 'common language and framework through which key policy makers can come to agreement in the construction of a policy programme'.\textsuperscript{131} Fischer saw CESDP as essentially a European project that depended on working closely with the French. It was part of the integrationist logic of the Foreign Ministry. Scharping saw CESDP as a limited venue that had nothing to do with the main Defence Ministry business of collective defence. For him CESDP raised sensitive and critical issues of force readiness, deployability and sustainability and, not least, of designing appropriate structures and procedures for consultation with NATO, especially on military capacity and the transfer of assets. Crucially, the Foreign and Defence Ministries differed in the way in which they defined the point at which CESDP might compromise the relationship with the US. The Defence Ministry - reflecting its NATO orientation - was much more cautious. Hence German policy towards CESDP lacked the unified 'co-ordinative' discourse of French policy makers or British policy makers. It was more difficult for other EU partners to interpret. The Foreign Ministry was closer to French positions, the Defence Ministry to British positions.

This disjointed 'co-ordinative' discourse made for difficulties for policy leaders in engaging in 'communicative' discourse on CESDP: that is, in seeking to persuade the German public 'through discussion and deliberation) that the policies developed at the co-ordinative phase are necessary (cognitive function) and appropriate (normative function)'\textsuperscript{132} CESDP did not achieve a high-profile role in policy leadership under the Kohl and first Schröder governments because there was not sufficient consensus on its necessity (in terms of the problems in NATO) and on its appropriateness (given the risks to Germany's traditional bridge role between the Atlantic Alliance and Europe). Hence policy leaders were reluctant to justify radical Bundeswehr reform as necessary or appropriate to the future requirements of CESDP. The Weizsäcker Commission developed a communicative discourse about Bundeswehr reform that stressed CESDP, but this approach lacked wider political resonance.


The process of Europeanisation was mediated and delayed by a Defence Ministry that was deeply committed to the primacy of NATO for collective defence and that saw in NATO a more secure shield for retaining traditional assumptions about the role and structure of the Bundeswehr. However, the Defence Ministry did not have a single coherent identity that shaped how its policy leaders behaved. Atlanticisation vied with the notion of the Bundeswehr as a citizens' army of conscripts that was committed to territorial defence. Policy leaders manoeuvred within, as well as were shaped by, this complex identity context. Atlanticisation was not primarily a top-down process. Defence Ministry policy leaders instrumentalised it for the purpose of protecting inherited notions about the Bundeswehr. The reform of the Bundeswehr does not, consequently, reveal a 'penetrated' German polity - whether by NATO or the EU - but a polity with a complex set of post-war identities that provide the context for policy leadership.
Chapter 7: Conclusion

7.1 The Main Findings

This thesis has applied public policy theory to explain how German defence and security policy has changed in the period 1990-2002, within the 'policy subsystem' of the Bundeswehr. It focuses on the roles, styles and strategies of leadership in policy change in the context of examining five analytical perspectives about policy change that are derived from public policy theory:

Perspective 1. The context and opportunity for major policy change is provided by significant perturbations external to the policy subsystem, notably the effects of international crises, governmental changes, 'public opinion' shocks for instance as manifested in Länder elections, changes emanating from other policy subsystems including international institutions like NATO and the EU (NATO-isation and Europeanisation), and court rulings on Bundeswehr reform.

Perspective 1.1: Significant perturbations external to the subsystem are a necessary, but not sufficient, cause of change in the policy core attributes

Perspective 2. Policy change requires a shift within the policy subsystem in the coalition in power so that new beliefs are brought to bear on policy.

Perspective 3. Policy change is a long-term process, requiring policy-oriented learning by means of technical information and analysis of the nature and magnitude of problems, their causes, and the probable impacts of different policy solutions.

Perspective 4. Policy change requires skilful policy entrepreneurs, capable of manipulating short-term 'windows of opportunity' to bring new ideas to bear. These windows are opened by 'compelling problems' or by events in the 'politics' stream.
Perspective 5. *Policy change requires a shift of institutional venue, bringing in new actors and ideas and changing the decisional bias.*

In particular, attention is paid to the three leadership roles of policy entrepreneur, policy broker and policy veto player with reference to the governments of Helmut Kohl and Gerhard Schröder and the Federal Defence Ministers Volker Rühe (1992-98) and Rudolf Scharping (1998-2002), in contrast to the 'contextualist' consensus that dominates the literature on German defence and security policy crediting structure, culture and inheritance from the past with explanatory power, the thesis has demonstrated how 'political culture' is also a product of agency. The thesis has utilised an interactionist approach to policy leadership that draws out the complex relationship between leadership skills and strategic political context.

The thesis has broken new ground in German defence and security studies by testing the value of explanations drawn from public policy theory and in particular by examining whether they allow a clearer understanding of the causal mechanisms at work in determining policy change. Policy theory is concerned with understanding the role played by ideas in policy change, the precise mechanisms through which some ideas are successful and others not, and crucially the role of agency in this process. Hence the thesis has provided a clearer understanding of the relationship between structure and agency. Public policy theory is well adapted to this task because it is concerned with the transmission of ideas and argument, in short with the cognitive basis of policy.

Thus the initial chapter set out the methodological and theoretical approach of the thesis, examining the concept of policy leadership. The chapter set out a set of analytical perspectives based upon public policy theory and developed the 'interactionist' approach to leadership. It argued that in order to understand policy change we must look deeper into the relationship between structure and agency – that to the extent that policy change in German defence and security policy is culturally conditioned, culture is an accomplishment of actors who are not simply a product of their institutional environments. The conceptual approach outlined in Chapter 1 therefore unites the insights of public policy theories: advocacy coalition theory, multiple streams theory and punctuated equilibrium theory and illustrates the
important role of policy leadership, either as policy entrepreneurs, adopting often radical policy solutions and changing the policy image, policy broker, negotiating a consensus between competing policy beliefs or policy veto-player, minimising the political costs of pressures for policy change emanating from the policy subsystem. Leaders are demonstrated as being vital to policy-making, through the use of policy orientated learning by using information to reframe issues or appointing particular figures in key positions to act as 'gatekeepers' of policy orientated learning, selecting policy forums or changing institutional venues. It is argued that this approach gives a clearer account of the causal mechanisms involved in the process of policy change.

Chapter 2 set the context for the case study of Bundeswehr reform from 1990-2002 by focusing on the characteristics of the policy subsystem and how the institutional organization of the armed forces, defence and security policy, foreign policy and budgetary policy, and not least the relationship to NATO and to the European Union, determines the scope for, and nature of, policy leadership in Bundeswehr reform. The chapter argues that the institutional context of the policy subsystem influences the types of leadership styles employed by policy leaders, favouring policy brokerage and veto-playing over policy entrepreneurship, circumscribing the room for and potential gains of policy entrepreneurship.

Chapter three applies the theoretical approach to the Bundeswehr during the Cold War and sets the scene for the case study of the period 1990-2002 by explaining the post-Cold War context of Bundeswehr reform. The chapter uses the advocacy coalition and punctuated equilibrium theory approaches to conceptualise the Bundeswehr policy subsystem, identifying three contending coalitions: the freedom coalition, peace coalition and the 'outsider' pacifist coalition. The freedom coalition was centred around the CDU/CSU and right of the SPD with a shared policy core belief in the Western way of life and Atlanticist in approach. The peace coalition was rooted in the 'realist' wing of the Green Party and centre left of the SPD. Its deep core beliefs were a commitment to peace, internationally negotiated disarmament and arms control. The third coalition, the pacifist coalition was characterised by a deep core belief in its fundamental opposition to war, advocating unilateral disarmament and neutrality and found its home within the fundamentalist wing of the Green Party.
The chapter argues that the dominant coalition was the freedom coalition. However, despite the overall adversarial contest about defence and security policy, the chapter argues that Bundeswehr policy subsystem during this period can be understood in terms of punctuated equilibrium theory. It was dominated by a policy monopoly with a supportive and deeply entrenched policy image of Landes- and Bündnisverteidigung, of conscription and of 'citizens in uniform'. The policy monopoly was spread widely across the Federal Defence Ministry, the Chancellor’s Office, the Foreign Ministry, the two main ‘catch-all’ parties (Volksparteien) of the CDU/CSU the SPD, the Free Democratic Party (FDP), Länder governments and a range of social institutions like the churches and the trade unions and was supported by the international institutions in which Germany was embedded. Thus the Chapter argues that the policy monopoly was not only supported by the policy subsystem but also the wider political system, the external constraints of the international treaty system, the Federal Constitutional Court, Länder interest in maintaining military bases and several other constraints. The chapter also demonstrates the importance of Adenauer’s choice of policy brokerage as a leadership role, founding the Bundeswehr upon careful cross-party management and consensus ensuring a policy monopoly on the Bundeswehr.

Therefore chapter three argues that policy change during the Cold War period was 'third order change', focusing on the adaptation of existing policy instrument such as the length of conscription rather than the creation of new policy instruments.

The chapter also points to limitations with the ACF: the difficulty of fitting all actors and institutions into particular coalitions; the lack of co-ordinated behaviour over a long period of time despite common policy beliefs, highlighted by the way in which the FDP and Green parties both came to support a professional Bundeswehr without much co-ordinated action. Finally, and most importantly, the chapter demonstrates that it is individual actors who seek out leadership roles in policy-making, not advocacy coalitions.

The fourth chapter illustrated the post-Cold War period of the Kohl Chancellorship (1990-1998) and the change of the Bundeswehr to an issue of 'second order change', though changes in the security environment and the responses of key policy leaders.
The chapter tests the analytical perspectives of policy change against original empirical material, shining light in particular upon the role of policy entrepreneurs, shifts of institutional venue, and policy-oriented learning as variables in explaining change. The chapter is an examination of policy leadership, especially the traits, styles and strategic context, highlighting how policy leaders negotiated the complex domestic institutional context and international security environment. The chapter also highlights the importance of the cross-fertilisation approach of the thesis and the importance of allowing the analytical perspectives of public policy theory to complement each other. However, above all, the chapter is demonstrative of the role of the policy leader and agency in the policy making process.

The chapter found that policy leadership under the Kohl Chancellorship took the form of organising or blocking policy orientated learning and managing institutional venues, with policy leaders seeking to control the flow of ideas. Leaders from the wider political system, the CDU/CSU and SPD party leadership played important roles in intervening to halt new ideas developing with the Bundeswehr policy subsystem which would have negative consequences for the electoral fortunes of the CDU/CSU and SPD. Thus pressures for change which emanated form the policy subsystem as a consequence of policy-orientated learning was blocked by the macro-political level, meaning Rühe, Kinkel, Verheugen and Wiezorek-Zeul were unable to act as successful policy entrepreneurs on conscription.

The chapter finds that the CDU/CSU were reluctant to open up a debate about Landes- and Bundesverteidigung for several reasons:

- the potential political costs of further base closures and the internal strife and image of disunity that could be occasioned within the CDU/CSU
- the desire to avoid internal coalition conflict with the FDP
- the macro-economic situation and EMU commitments which combined to restrict the defence budget and place a premium on the peace dividend
- the economic and social consequences of abolishing conscription, and the abolition of Zivildienst, were far too uncertain
- the deep political sensitivity to debating conscription because it touched on fundamental and entrenched beliefs about the German polity and citizenship.

Hence Ruhe's reform of 1994 outlined a Bundeswehr of 340,000, containing 140,000 conscripts and 53,600 crisis reaction troops deployable at short notice, with a military service of 10 months, allowing the Bundeswehr a limited crisis reaction role without threatening the policy monopoly of Landesverteidigung and conscription. The chapter illustrates how Rühe's policy leadership was the crucial factor within a macro-political context of electoral-strategic interests and ideological factors. Rühe demonstrated much skill in practising a form of salami tactics that brought SPD members of the Bundestag Defence Committee on board with his evolving policy on out-of-area operations. Rühe's skill was evident in the way in which he carefully kept a consensus whilst using Europeanisation as a basis for moving the consensus towards a redefined role for the Bundeswehr. Rühe also demonstrated skill in adapting his leadership role and style to changing assessments of the electoral-strategic interests of the CDU/CSU and to the necessity for internal party unity. In particular, Rühe was at pains not to anger regional leaders through severe base closures or court problems with the social wing of the CDU by putting Zivildienst in question.

Hence chapter 4 highlights how strategic culture can provide only a partial understanding of Bundeswehr policy change. The chapter demonstrates that Rühe was able to use German strategic culture selectively to provide himself with a political rationale, either to promote policy change (as consistent with Germany's European vocation) or to block change (as leading to a 'pure intervention' Bundeswehr).

Strategic culture cannot illustrate the pragmatism of policy leaders in dealing with external events and developments and relating them to generational change, electoral-strategic interests and ideological renewal. The chapter clearly demonstrates that cultural approaches neglect the characteristics of the Bundeswehr as a policy subsystem and how it relates to the defence and security policy subsystem in which it is embedded. In particular, the policy-orientated learning that followed from out-of-area operations meant that the pressures for change were greater from within the policy subsystem than in the wider political system. The chapter also shows how core policy beliefs about the Bundeswehr are intertwined in a complicated symbiotic
relationship with the dynamics of electoral-strategic interests in securing party unity and governmental power and are also closely bound to core policy beliefs in related policy subsystems, especially budgetary policy and social policy. The linkage to European policy was associated with the increasingly important theme of Europeanisation. The chapter illustrates how such connections between policy subsystems, combined with electoral-strategic interests, are key to shaping the potential scope for change and define the boundaries of policy leadership.

Rational choice institutionalism, a part dependency form of historical institutionalism or a constructivist account in terms of strategic culture cannot explain the changes in Rühe’s leadership role and style over Bundeswehr reform. Initially in the period 1992-94 he sought change to the policy core of the Bundeswehr, facilitated by the presence of a key Vordenker, General Naumann, who encouraged policy orientated learning about its roles and structures. Thus the Defence Ministry began to develop its own dynamics of change which threatened to escape political control. In order to regain political control, and reduce electoral-strategic risks, Rühe replaced and marginalized key agents of change within the Defence Ministry. Hence more was at work than just strategic culture acting as a constraining variable on policy change. The flow of policy ideas was manipulated by the leadership in order to promote and protect their own political interests. In short, policy leadership was important in defining the direction, scope and pace of policy change.

The fifth chapter applied the theoretical approach in the context of the Red/Green government and discovered that the legislative period encompassing the Schröder/Fischer administration was illustrative primarily of the importance of the policy leader, in particular the role of the ‘policy broker’. Whilst leadership played an important role, the strategic context within which Scharping was operating made policy entrepreneurship impossible. The domestic politics stream could not be coupled with the problems and policies streams. The international context of the Helsinki Headline Goals militated against a ‘policy veto’ role thus the strategic context constrained Scharping into his role as policy broker, making humdrum leadership the optimum strategy for Scharping and the SPD.
Whilst policy brokerage would normally be associated with the context of competing coalitions and advocacy coalition theory, the Schröder/Fischer period saw policy brokerage acting within a context best explained by perspective five: punctuated equilibrium theory. The period 1998-2002 did see the development of a ‘nascent’ advocacy coalition advocating from common deep core beliefs. However, there was a clear ‘policy monopoly’ supportive of the policy image of territorial defence. It was in the interests of Schröder and Scharping to ensure that the ‘politics of punctuation’ did not take place and to maintain the ‘policy monopoly’.

A number of factors militated in favour of a continuation of the policy monopoly:

- The unwillingness of Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer to put his full political weight behind the Weizsäcker Report, particularly given the continuing sensitivities within the Green Party about ‘out-of-area’ deployments.
- The unwillingness of the CDU/CSU opposition (unlike the FDP) to embrace and mobilize around the new policy image of a professional, crisis-prevention Bundeswehr.
- Scharping's conception of the difficulties of managing policy change within the defence and security and the Bundeswehr policy subsystems.
- The lack of political power and influence of Scharping, not least vis-à-vis Schröder.
- The primacy that Schröder gave to backing Eichel’s budget consolidation programme, with consequent strict financial constraints on the Bundeswehr.
- The deep political sensitivities within the social care policy subsystem about the vital role of ziviler Ersatzdienst as a central pillar of social policy and fear that the end of conscription would lead to the collapse of this pillar, with large transitional and short to medium term financial and human costs.
- The electoral strategic constraints that faced the SPD/Green government, with a number of sensitive mid-term Länder elections. The SPD federal executive and the Federal Chancellor's Office hesitated in dealing with the political 'fall out' from large-scale base closures.
The vested interests within the Federal Defence Ministry, notably within the Führungsstab, which consisted of many Rühe appointees who continued to oppose the reductions in personnel that a large-scale Bundeswehr reform would bring.

Scharping was unwilling to act as a sponsor for radical reform and differed from his predecessor, Volker Rühe, in two key ways: his leadership style and context. There were two key contextual differences: Scharping had to contend with the radical proposals of the Weizsäcker Commission. The concept of an expert commission had been developed during the period of opposition as a way of covering over and delaying internal party conflict about SPD Bundeswehr policy before the election campaign of. However, the Commission created a problem of managing unintended consequences for the federal government and the SPD. Scharping's leadership role was defined by the attempt to manage these unintended consequences. The second critical contextual difference was the Scharping's position as a former party rival of Schröder. Whereas Volker Rühe had enjoyed Kohl's support, there was a high level of mistrust between Scharping and Schröder.

Scharping also contrasted in style to Rühe, as he was unable to develop and sustain the cross-party and even internal party confidence that Rühe had achieved. Scharping was not able to establish his authority within the Bundestag Defence Committee or within the federal government, demonstrating a combative and aggressive leadership style. Rühe framed the terms in which the SPD debated Bundeswehr reform through 'salami-slicing' tactics, Scharping was less important than the Weizsäcker Commission in framing the later terms of debate.

Scharping and the new SPD/Green government faced an important new window of opportunity opened by the Franco-British initiative at St. Malo. The Schröder government was able to use the WEU presidency and the EU presidency in the first half of 1999 to situate the role and structure of the Bundeswehr within a revived debate about European defence and security identity. Also, the Kosovo war gave Scharping an early opportunity to pursue agenda change about the Bundeswehr. However, he did not adopt a leadership role as policy entrepreneur despite the windows of opportunity opened by the Franco-British German initiative of St. Malo, the WEU and EU presidency of 1999. Scharping's unwillingness to act heroically on
behalf of a radical Bundeswehr reform stemmed in part from problems in the 'politics stream', making it unattractive for him to try to couple policies for a reformed Bundeswehr with urgent defence and security problems. It was also due to his lack of personal and political authority to take on such a role. Thus Scharping defended the policy monopoly, with its image of territorial defence and conscription, from the negative feedback of the Weizsäcker Commission which recommended that the Bundeswehr be reduced to 240,000 with 30,000 conscripts with a 10 month term of service.

When seen from the perspective of conscription, what seemed like a policy brokerage role turns out on closer examination to be a veto-playing role. Scharping's perceived the Weizsäcker Commission's recommendations as too politically dangerous for his own ambitions. Hence the Weizsäcker Commission played a brokerage role by providing a forum for policy-oriented learning. This forum was starved of political support by seeking a compromise that was based upon and sustained the traditional policy monopoly and image.

Hence chapter five also illustrates the importance of perspective three: policy-orientated learning, in particular through the work of the Weizsäcker Commission. However, again, the importance of the policy leader in acting on policy-orientated learning was shown to be crucial. Policy-orientated learning can only spark policy core change if key macro-political figures are prepared to act on its behalf. The success of a policy forum is dependent upon it containing members of the macro-political system responsible for the implementation of the reform. The chapter demonstrates how this willingness is determined by the strategic context of policy leaders and their own particular leadership traits. Scharping was unwilling to create a crisis consciousness and to couple the streams of 'problems, politics and policies' in an unfavourable political climate.

Nevertheless, the policy monopoly did not completely escape the effects of policy-orientated learning. Whilst the results of the Weizsäcker Commission had to a great extent been marginalized, the Commission started its work in the context of a mutually unacceptable stalemate. It was evident to all interests that the Bundeswehr needed a fundamental renewal to meet new challenges such as Kosovo and CESDP. Scharping was forced to move the German armed forces a small step closer to 'crisis-
prevention forces' by reducing the number of troops to 280,000 and the number of conscripts to 77,000. Scharping started to use the discourse of crisis prevention, signifying changes to the secondary aspects of the policy monopoly. The policy monopoly was experiencing changes to the secondary and core policy aspects of its policy image of territorial defence. The need for crisis prevention forces was being taken seriously, and the armed forces were being designed to some extent with the Helsinki Headline Goals in mind. However, the deep core of territorial defence remained in the form of 77,000 conscripts, tying the hands of the Bundeswehr, stretching its finances further and constraining it in meeting its growing tasks in crisis management.

The dominant constructivist account of German defence and security policy argues that institutions embody specific norms and practises; that 'strategic culture' is the key determinant of German defence and security policy. However, chapter five acts to demonstrate that agency and policy leadership plays a much more important role in German defence and security policy than constructivist approaches argue. Actors and institutions interact in a symbiotic relationship. Leadership, however, is the key variable determining the norms and practises that pervade a ministry. Within the Defence Ministry, Scharping's approach to leadership and retention of many of Rühe's appointees was important in maintaining the policy monopoly and 'negative feedback'. Chapter 5 demonstrates the usefulness of the analytical tools of public policy theory and the concept of policy leadership in opening up the 'black box' of policy making, providing a much more satisfying and nuanced account of the policy process than the concept of strategic culture alone.

Chapter Six tackled the question of the extent to which, and the ways in which, the dynamics of Atlanticisation and Europeanisation affected Bundeswehr reform, shaping the scope and pace of domestic policy change. The chapter shows how public policy theory can offer new insights into the processes of Atlanticisation and Europeanisation, especially by highlighting the role of domestic policy leadership and suggests the value of public policy analysis in shifting attention from its dominant institutionalist perspective. In contrast to the emphasis on 'misfit' between domestic and European institutional requirements as the trigger for domestic change, the chapter illustrated the role of domestic policy leadership in determining the extent to
which, and the manner in which, German defence and security policy is Atlanticised and Europeanised.

The chapter illustrates the extent to which German defence ministers acted successfully to ensure only a partial Europeanisation of Bundeswehr policy and how policy leadership played an important role in managing Europeanisation and Atlanticisation to minimise top down pressure for adaptation. The Defence Ministry is found to have been reactive in dealing with the CESDP and to the extent that it was strongly Atlanticist in outlook with a commitment to NATO as the pre-eminent multilateral institution, this Atlanticisation was carefully managed so as not to threaten the policy monopoly. Indeed the Foreign Ministry with its strong Europeanist commitment and integrationist logic was more proactive on the issue of CESDP and was viewed by Fischer as a European project necessitating strong cooperation with the French. Scharping, on the other hand, viewed CESDP as a threat, raising sensitive issue of force structures, deployability and structures for consultation with NATO.

Most importantly, the Defence ministry was cautious about CESDP due to the ramifications for Germany’s relationship with the US. Thus rather than a strong ‘co-ordinative’ discourse between the Foreign and Defence Ministries as in France, CESDP in Germany was met by weak, disjointed co-ordinative discourse, with the Foreign Ministry closer to French positions, the Defence Ministry closer to the British.

As a consequence of this disjointed discourse, it was difficult for policy leaders to engage in communicative discourse with the German public. Under the Kohl and Schröder Chancellorships CESDP was not allocated high priority and profile due to a lack of agreement upon its necessity and appropriateness and it was not therefore subject to policy leadership. Bundeswehr reform would not be justified as necessary or appropriate to the future requirements of CESDP. Whilst the Weizsäcker developed a communicative discourse about CESDP, the process of Europeanisation was mediated and delayed by the Defence Ministry, which was committed to NATO as the key institution of German defence and security policy and reluctant to open itself up to the process of negative feedback which CESDP entailed.
However, the Defence Ministry did not have a single consistent identity that shaped the behaviour of its policy leaders. Atlanticisation competed with the concept of the Bundeswehr as a citizens' army of conscripts committed to territorial defence. Policy leaders worked within, as well as were shaped by, this complex identity context. Atlanticisation was not primarily a top-down process. Defence Ministry policy leaders used it in order to protect inherited ideas about the Bundeswehr. The chapter demonstrates that the reform of the Bundeswehr does not, therefore, highlight a 'penetrated' German polity - whether by NATO or the EU - but a polity with a complex set of post-war identities providing the context for policy leadership.

7.2 The Value of this Research

This thesis has engaged in two key tasks: to uncover new empirical material and improve theory on German defence and security policy. In doing so, the thesis has also developed new insights into the study of public policy theory and policy leadership.

The empirical content has added to an increasingly important field as the reform of the Bundeswehr, and its readiness to engage in crisis prevention tasks and European-wide pooling of military resources and capabilities is a key barometer of the German willingness to address the 'capabilities-expectations gap' that continues to beset the European Union. Thus the research makes a small but significant contribution to this question.

The thesis makes a valuable contribution to the theories of German defence and security policy. Over the past decade the constructivist approach to German defence policy has become dominant, arguing that strategic culture, social constructivism and sociological institutionalism provides the best means of understanding change, or policy stasis in German defence and security policy and Bundeswehr reform. This thesis has questioned this school of thought and has developed a deeper understanding of the relationship between structure and agency by using insights from public policy with a 'cross-fertilisation' approach and arguing for the importance of the policy leader in the process of policy change, as policy entrepreneur, veto player or broker. In doing so the thesis fills a gap in leadership studies in Germany. Whereas previous
work has focussed upon the role of the Chancellor, and the Kanzleramt, the thesis
focuses upon the role played by ministers and high ranking officials, using the
analytical tools offered by public policy theory to open up the 'black box' of policy
making in Germany in a more nuanced fashion than previous accounts.¹

Thus, in applying a new theoretical approach the thesis has not only uncovered the
weaknesses of strategic culture in conceptualising German defence and security
policy but also improve upon current work on public policy theory by using
Bundeswehr reform as a means with such to test the strengths and weaknesses of
public policy theory and the concept of policy leadership. This has ramifications not
only for the study of German defence and security policy but for the entire study of
public policy theories. In particular, the cross-fertilisation approach to public policy
theory in the context of an interactionist approach to policy leadership represents an
interesting way of developing public policy and overcoming some of its weaknesses.
It is to the implications of this thesis for public policy theory and policy leadership
that I will now turn.

7.3 The Implications for Public Policy Theory, the Study of Policy Leadership
and Europeanisation

The conceptual framework has ramifications, not only for the study of German
defence and security policy but also for the application of public policy theory to
other areas of study. In testing the analytical perspectives of policy change derived
from public policy theory it has become evident that the three main public policy
theories: the ACF, multiple streams and punctuated equilibrium theory are best
viewed not as distinct and separate theories but applied in a cross-fertilisation
approach. This provides an excellent basis from which to employ the 'interactionist'
approach to leadership, which stresses the interaction between a leader's skills and
his/her strategic and institutional context. Such a framework is able to provide a clear
understanding of the relationship between structure and agency by providing a
comprehensive set of analytical tools with which to understand the means through
which policy change takes place.

¹ See for example, Padgett, S. (ed.) (1994) Adenauer to Kohl: The Development of the German
Chancellorship (London, Hurst)
The cross-fertilisation uncovers a number of weaknesses with public policy theory. Most importantly, it is clear that an individual theory cannot satisfactorily explain policy change in the policy subsystem of Bundeswehr reform. Whilst certain aspects such as external crises, perturbations, professional forums, institutional venues, venue shopping and policy entrepreneurs/brokers are common to the three main public policy theories, public policy theory is in disagreement about the time scale of policy change, the causal mechanisms of policy change and the relationship between structure and agency. In particular PPT does not share a common understanding of leadership.

However, the cross-fertilisation approach is nevertheless not without its own weaknesses. The thesis could be accused however of arbitrariness in ‘picking’ theories to suit the empirical material. However not to do so could also lead to accusations of dogmatism and of attempting to find empirical material to suit the theoretical approach. The core principal of the theoretical approach is that previous accounts of German defence and security policy have been too structure-heavy. In attempting to uncover the complex relationship between actors and institutions it is best to employ a theoretical approach that allows flexibility. Thus the thesis is closest to ‘historical institutionalism’ where policy change is seen as ‘as the consequence… of strategic action…filtered through perceptions of an institutional context that favours certain strategies, actors and perceptions over others’. Instead of seeking to apply one theory to German defence policy the thesis has worked upon the premise that the policy making process is too complicated to apply one single approach. In the same way that the application of sociological and rational choice institutionalism privilege structure and agency respectively and would be too rigid to help open up the black box of policy making, the application of one single public policy approach would have similarly constraining effects.

Rather than develop an ‘agency-centred’ approach to policy change the interactionist approach’ to policy leadership based within the cross-fertilisation of public policy theories helps map out the relationship between structure and agency. Whereas strategic culture and constructivist accounts are vague when understanding the precise mechanisms through which policy change comes about, the application of the
interactionist approach to policy leadership set within the context of a cross-fertilisation of public policy theories provides the necessary conceptual tools with which to unpack the complexity of the policy process. To attempt this with one theory alone or a narrow sociological/rational choice institutional framework would be akin to doctor undertaking an examination of a patient without all the necessary instruments: it could well lead to a misdiagnosis.

The consequences for public policy theory as a field are potentially quite significant. The advocacy coalition framework, multiple streams theory and punctuated equilibrium theory are all inadequate as stand-alone explanations of policy change. The concept of coalitions spanning government and society united by shared deep core, policy core and secondary aspects is fraught with problems. There are no doubt cases where coalitions are clear-cut such as during the ‘peace’, ‘freedom’ and ‘pacifist’ coalitions during the Cold War. However, the ACF was found wanting in the post-Cold War period. It was impossible to identify competing coalitions in the post-Cold War world. However, one important aspect of the ACF was of continued relevance throughout the thesis: policy orientated learning.

In understanding the relationship between structure and agency, policy orientated learning was found to be critical. The control of learning through key figures within a ministry is an important mechanism through which ministers (notably Rühe and Scharping) induce policy change or encourage policy stasis. This is of great benefit to the multiple streams and punctuated equilibrium approaches which although are more agent-centred policy-orientated learning is a concept which helps fill key gaps in explaining how an entrepreneur goes about coupling the three streams of politics, policies and problems and sheds more light upon positive or negative feedback processes occur in punctuated equilibrium theory.

Weaknesses and potential improvements were also found within the concept of policy orientated learning itself as outlined by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, who outline four criteria necessary for a successful policy forum: composition, funding, duration and the context of a mutually unacceptable policy stalemate. However, in studying the Weizsäcker Commission as a policy forum a fifth criterion was discovered: a policy forum must not only include members of a policy subsystem but members of the
macro-political policy system who are ultimately responsible for implementing the conclusions of a policy forum.

The research has also made an important contribution to the study of policy leadership. Studies of policy leadership in Germany have mainly focused on the role of the Chancellor and neglected the role of ministers and key ministerial figures. The thesis has analysed leadership at the level of the policy subsystem and has much to say about the determinants of policy change.

Drawing on public policy theory, the thesis has provided case studies of policy leaders as entrepreneurs, veto players and brokers. The use of aspects of public policy theory has proved to be helpful in understanding the role policy leaders play in policy change, demonstrating that to the extent that strategic culture is a determinant of German defence and security policy, it is reproduced or adapted by policy leaders. The interaction between an actor's personal leadership traits and skills and strategic context act to determine the leadership role pursued. In particular, electoral constraints and repercussions for the political ambitions of the policy leaders studied have proved to be key leadership traits.

To the extent that a single case study can lead to generalisable conclusions, the research has found that certain leadership traits and skills are critical to the success of policy entrepreneurship, brokerage and veto playing. Multiple streams theory describes how the ability of an entrepreneur to coupling the streams of politics, problems and policy is crucial but is thin on the detail of the precise mechanisms: the traits and skills needed in the execution of this task. A more detailed examination of the policy leader as animateur and entrepreneur is provided by enquiring into these aspects. In particular, the study of Volker Rühe illustrates the importance of policy-orientated learning in 'coupling'. Rühe's salami tactic was achieved through the control of policy orientated learning, using well-honed mobilisatory and conciliatory skills and the appointment of key figures within institutions to set in place a process of policy orientated learning that caused policy-core change. Without cross-fertilisation the thesis would be bereft of the ACF's conceptualisation of policy orientated learning which is of great use in distinguishing between change to secondary aspects, policy core and the deep core of actors beliefs system.
Simultaneously, punctuated equilibrium theory helps provide a broader conceptualisation of the broader context within which entrepreneurship and policy learning takes place. Hence in this instance, change is couched in terms of policy entrepreneurship acting to instigate a process of positive feedback to the policy image supporting a policy monopoly of Landes/Bundnisverteidigung and Wehrpflicht, the extent of which is determined by the level of policy orientated learning initiated through the leadership traits and skills of the policy leader as entrepreneur.

However, when the interaction between a policy leader's policy leadership traits and strategic context change the form of policy leadership alters dramatically. This leads to another important aspect of the thesis: the notion of the policy leader as veto player, providing an immobile form of policy leadership, impeding policy change. This concept, which most closely approximates to punctuated equilibrium theory again becomes more illuminating of the precise mechanisms involved in policy stasis when cross-fertilisation is used. Once more policy orientated-learning is crucial. Volker Rühe's salami-tactic was halted when his control of the process of policy orientated learning threatened to spiral out of control and effect his own political ambitions and the electoral success of the CDU/CSU due to the repercussions for sensitive issues such as base closures and social policy and the necessity to stay within the Maastricht convergence criteria. The replacement of General Naumann with the more conservative General Hartmut Bagger was the first step to act to encourage a process of negative feedback to the policy image, ensuring that whilst change to the policy monopoly had occurred on the level of secondary aspects and policy-core beliefs, the deep core beliefs ie. policy monopoly of Wehrpflicht and supportive policy image of Landes und Bundes-Verteidigung were not threatened and that no further 'positive feedback' occurred. Rühe's Denkverbot was about stalling the process of policy-orientated learning. Strategic culture, rather than informing the policy choices of Rühe as policy leader was used as a tool with which to control the policy process and his institutional contexts.

The study also gives greater depth to the concept of the leader as policy broker and the role played by professional forums in the policy making process, notably the necessity for a policy forum to contain members of the wider political system responsible for translating the recommendations of the policy forum into policy or
sponsors to exist in the political system with the power and willingness to act successfully on behalf of the proposals of a commission. Scharping’s role as a policy broker on Bundeswehr reform and veto role in conscription was a result of the interaction between Scharping’s leadership traits and skills and his strategic political context. Again, policy orientated learning proved to be critical in the policy process.

The research has provided an account of three forms of policy leadership and in doing so has explored how policy leadership can be improved as a concept and illustrates the benefits of situating the study of policy leadership within a context that allows for a thorough exploration of the relationship between actors and institutions ie. historical institutionalism. Public policy theory provides a range of tools which when applied in a cross-fertilisation approach in support of an interactionist approach to policy leadership gives a comprehensive understanding of the relationship between actors and institutions. Concepts such as policy orientated learning and the control of institutional venues all help to further elucidate the role of the policy leader in the policy process. In examining the policy leadership traits and skills of an actor and how they interact with the strategic political context of the actor in question, the interactionist approach helps develop a better understanding of the motives and precise mechanisms involved in the policy making process.

The thesis has also demonstrated that the growing literature on Europeanisation can benefit from the application of public policy theory by highlighting the role of policy leaders in managing institutional venues and controlling policy orientated learning. An interactionist approach to leadership can help provide a more nuanced and subtle understanding of the interaction between structure and agency in the process of Europeanisation. Policy leaders played a key role in the Europeanisation process as entrepreneurs, brokers or veto players.

This represents a new avenue of investigation for studies of Europeanisation and merits greater investigation. The theoretical approach could be well applied to the process of armed forces reform in France for example and this has already been recognised to some extent by Irondelle. France experienced 'heroic' leadership on the issue of armed forces reform by President Jacques Chirac and Prime Minister

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Alain Juppe who acted as policy entrepreneurs on behalf of an emerging advocacy coalition in favour of a professional armed force generating a sense of crisis consciousness and putting in place a process of positive feedback and policy orientated learning, challenging the dominant policy monopoly of ‘national sanctuary’. This advocacy coalition was formed as a result of policy learning kick-started by experiences of the 1991 Gulf War and the difficulties of employing a conscript-based army in an age of high-technology, rapid-response warfare, policy learning that was promoted by key policy leaders acting as policy entrepreneurs. 3 In contrast to Germany, France lacked a strong civil service supporting the welfare state. Some argued an end to conscription would swell the ranks of youth unemployed. However, as Irondelle concludes: ‘The reform of the armed forces in 1995-1996 directly originated in defence budget cuts...the European argument was the sledgehammer argument. They were confronted with the ‘principe de realite’ of the convergence criteria’. 4

In France the top down, indirect pressures emanating from the European Union were used as a means of inducing policy change by actors on the domestic level, initiating a process of ‘positive feedback’ challenging the old policy image of territorial defence and conscription. 5 Whereas EU pressures in Germany threatened to topple Zivildienst, a pillar of the welfare state, creating problems for the political standing of the defence minister, finance minister and chancellor they provided an opportunity for heroic leadership on the issue of armed forces reform. Irondelle describes a Europeanisation of French defence and security policy without the European Union where the idea of a ‘European security Community’ and the pressures of adhering to the Maastricht Criteria were used by key actors (Chirac and Juppe) to generate a sense of ‘crisis consciousness’.

The strong incentives for reform on the domestic level strengthened the reform coalition, marginalising the ‘national sanctuary’ coalition and empowering advocates of radical reform to utilise the ‘indirect pressures’ from the EU to promote a

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professional armed force. Whereas in Germany Volker Rühe placed conservative figures in key positions in the defence ministry and implemented a 'Denkverbot' to discourage a process of 'positive feedback', by 1995 in France the reform coalition occupied the key strategic positions within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defence Ministry. Many of those in key positions were from the advisory staff of the foreign minister between 1993-1995, Alain Juppe, who became Prime Minister in May 1995 and along with Chirac, acted as a policy entrepreneur for radical reform and actively encouraged policy learning and change to the policy and deep core beliefs about conscription and territorial defence. This also points to the nature of the French political system with the dominance of the President in defence and security policy and consequent lack of potential 'veto players' making policy entrepreneurship a more desirable strategy.

Thus the interactionist approach to policy leadership not only improves upon current theories of German defence and security policy but also has the potential to be applied to other states and to deepen our understanding of the domestic policy process and the phenomena of Europeanisation and Atlanticisation. The further testing of the conceptual approach through examinations of other military reforms and a wider variety of policy areas would illustrate more of the weaknesses of an interactionist approach to policy leadership. This would no doubt suggest improvements and provide a more consistent and coherent theory of policy change which seeks to unify the divergent approaches within the field of public policy theory and create a theory which recognises the necessity of allowing for the interplay between structure and agency and the importance of basing policy studies within the school of historical institutionalism, providing greater depth to the concept and role of policy orientated learning and use of institutional venues.
Appendix: Principal Interviewees

The thesis involved a number of confidential interviews, including 10 interviews in the Leadership Staff and Planning Staff of the Defence Ministry in Bonn (23rd September 2002) and Berlin (6th, 14th and 30th August 2002) 6 interviews in the Finance Ministry in Bonn (28th August 2002) and Berlin (18th August 2002) and 2 interviews in the Chancellor's Office (14th. November 2001 and 2nd. September 2002) I also undertook 5 confidential interviews at NATO (16th and 17th September 2002) including the German Representation and Germans amongst the NATO staff.

My research also benefited from a number of informal conversations with figures in the EU military staff, with a number of academics from the Free University, Humboldt University and Potsdam University and researchers in the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik and Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik.

The fieldwork research benefited greatly from a period spent in the SPD parliamentary party's working group on foreign policy (October-December 2001) This gave me the opportunity to attend several specialist conferences and workshops on defence and security policy, notably in the wake of September 11, 2001. In this way I was able to listen to senior politicians and policy experts expound their views off the record and directly experience the content, style and quality of debates. I was also fortunate to be invited to similar conferences and workshops organized by the CDU and by the Greens. In consequence, I gained ready access to a range of politicians and officials.

Frau Margit Hellwig-Bottle (Referent, SPD Bundestagsfraktion, Arbeitsgruppe Aussen und Sicherheitspolitik) Berlin, 9th. November 2001

Herr Kristian Gaiser (Head of European Policy, SPD Parteivorstand) Berlin, 12th. November 2001
Herr Stephan Bökenförde (Research Assistant, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik)

Dr. Alrun Deutschmann (Research Assistant, SWP, Forschungsgruppe IV,

Dr. Peter Schmidt, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (Head of Forschungsgruppe 1,

Herr Michael Alvarez (Heinrich Böll Stiftung, Presse und Öffentlichkeitsarbeit)
Berlin, 13th. November 2001

Herr Olav Göhs (Head of European Policy, CDU Bundesgeschäftsstelle) Berlin, 21st.
November 2001

Herr Thomas Schiller (CDU/CSU Bundestagsfraktion, Mitarbeiter, Office of Karl
Lamers MdB, CDU/CSU Bundestagsfraktion, Arbeitsgruppe Aussenpolitik) (Two
interviews) Berlin, November 15th. 2001 and 14th. February 2002

Herr Dirk Sawitzky (SPD Bundestagsfraktion, Mitarbeiter, Office of Gerot Erler

Herr Helmut Hüber (Green/Bündnis90 Bundestagsfraktion, Mitarbeiter, Office of
Anglika Beer MdB) Berlin, 18th. July 2002

Herr Jürgen Schnappertz (Referent, SPD Bundestagsfraktion, Office of Peter Struck
MdB.) Berlin, 5th. August 2002

Herr Marcus Lackamp (CDU Bundesgeschäftsstelle, Bereich Politische Programmen
und Analysen) Berlin, 6th. August 2002

Herr Van der Busche (SPD Bundestagsfraktion, Arbeitsgruppe Haushalt, Referent,
Office of Volker Kröning MdB. Arbeitsgruppe Haushalt) Berlin, 15th. August 2002
Dr. Jasper Wieck (Mitarbeiter, CDU/CSU Bundestagsfraktion, Arbeitsgruppe Verteidigung) Berlin, 16th. August 2002

Herr Vöringer (Mitarbeiter, Büro Oswald Metzger, MdB.) Berlin, 18th August, 2002

Herr Bernd Weber (Referent, CDU/CSU Bundestagsfraktion, Arbeitsgruppe Verteidigung) Berlin, 26th. August 2002

Herr Rüdiger Huth (CDU/CSU Bundestagsfraktion, Mitarbeiter Volker Rühe MdB.) Berlin, 26th. August 2002

Dr. Wolfgang Biermann (Head of International Policy, SPD Parteivorstand) Berlin, 3rd. September 2002

Mr. Paul Williams, British Embassy, Berlin (Political-Military Affairs Division) Berlin, 9th. September 2002


Herr Axel Schneider (Referent, SPD Arbeitsgruppe Sicherheitspolitik Offices of Peter Zumkly, Heidmarie Wiezoreck-Zeul, MdBs.) (Two Interviews) Berlin, 4th and 10th. September 2002

Professor Helga Haftendorn, Otto Suhr Institute, FU, Berlin (Mitglied Komission Gemeinsame Sicherheit und Zukunft der Bundeswehr) Berlin, 27th. May 2003

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