Chameleon

Or

Dinosaur?

A

Study of Police

Management Culture.

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ABSTRACT.

Most of the literature on police culture has concentrated on the culture of lower rank uniformed officers, often referred to as 'cop culture'. This thesis addresses the issue of whether there is a distinctive 'management culture' in the higher levels of police forces. Quite clearly, the concept of management culture generally in organisations and specifically in the police service is a recognised and accepted one. However, the relationship between cop culture and management culture is an uncertain one.

The thesis is based on interviews with 51 superintending rank officers from eleven Forces. This data is used to analyse the content and dynamics of senior police management culture.

Over the last three decades the police service has implemented a number of changes in its structure and management style. Some of these have seen operationally self-sufficient basic command units headed by superintendents replace divisional units headed by chief superintendents. With the removal of the chief superintendent rank, superintendents are now in a hierarchical position that requires them to make policy decisions and control how they would be implemented.

The literature on rank-and-file police is voluminous. Research on chief officers, though less frequent, is increasing. Hitherto, however, there has been no research on this increasingly powerful and influential group of senior managers, although the police reforms of the last decade (and those in the pipeline) make superintendents pivotal in the policy-making process.

Contemporary changes in police organisational structure has placed this group of officers in leadership positions, with the opportunity to change both the culture of the organisation as well as within their own peer group. They are crucial if the government is to bring about its promised reform and improvement in policing services. This study provides the first systematic information about the characteristics and culture of this increasingly significant managerial tier of the police organisation. It concludes that superintendents are a particularly adaptable and pragmatic group, adjusting to necessary changes as smoothly as possible - chameleons rather than dinosaurs.

CONTENTS

List of tables.

Abbreviations.

ACPO	Association of Chief Police Officers
BCS	British Crime Survey
BCU	Basic Command Unit
CID	Criminal Investigation Department
DPP	Director of Public Prosecutions
EOSC	Employment Occupational Standards Council
GTR	Getting Things Right
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPCC	Independent Police Complaints Commission
MPA	Metropolitan Police Authority
MPA	Metropolitan Police Service
NPM	New Public Management
PACE	Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984
PCA	Police Complaints Authority
PCCG	Police Community Consultation Group
PCSO	Police Community Support Officers

To

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FOREWORD

SOME PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS BY A CHIEF OFFICER

In this thesis, the author identifies a number of inter-related issues and factors, which influence the behaviour of police superintendents and through them and their stewardship of the managerial process, the activities of police.

The police service is significantly different to most other public sector service delivery organizations. The scale of the demands placed upon the service is matched by an exceptional range of activity and most recently by very high public expectations about process and performance. These combine to make policing complex and difficult and in turn the management of policing has become equally so.

In another sense however, the police service is very similar to all organizations and manifestly, leadership and vision play a vital role. In particular, any scrutiny of the management of the service illuminates obvious examples of the general principle that the conduct and visibility of senior managers has a profound effect on the organization. In considering the activities, style and influence of the modern superintendent, the author rightly identifies the recent enhancement and importance of their role and responsibilities. A number of factors have brought this about, including reductions in overall numbers, the creeping process of devolution and devolvement and a new performance rigor, which is centred on the basic command unit within forces. The pivotal influence of the superintendent rank has therefore evolved and become more critically influential.

In his examination of the behaviours and influence of superintendents, the author notes that although much has been written about the basic organizational culture of the police service (the so-called canteen culture) little has been written about the cultural behaviour of senior managers. In the last 40 years, this has certainly changed, accelerated probably by the high percentage of graduates now found at that rank. The singularity and predictability of yesterday's senior managers have certainly been eroded. Not least because the hierarchical, risk-averse, disciplined work process has been replaced by the freedoms of devolution and entrepreneurial opportunity.

The increased importance and relevance of superintendents makes their group culture worth studying and defining. In doing this, the author notes a critical inter-relationship between the espoused values of the police service and the practiced values of the individual superintendent. In particular, he opines (rightly in my view) that the existence of espoused values alone is insufficient to influence the organization without some personal position being apparent and that these need to be aligned before maximum beneficial effect is created.

Interestingly the author concludes with a summarized description of superintendents as pragmatic realists, chameleon like and adapting to change. My own experience is that this description does indeed fit the average superintendent who has demonstrated effectiveness and tangible achievement. The scale and pace of change in the police service has forced senior managers down this route and the broader 'can do' philosophy of the service has created an expectation that they will deliver. I suspect however that if similar research had been done fifteen years ago the author might have concluded that the dinosaurs outnumbered the chameleons.

Effective management is always about making a difference, either through interventions or through presence. In the past, the police staff college has been accused of cloning senior managers in a single mould. The author's work seems to suggest that an obvious singular culture at this rank has yet to establish itself.

Perry Nove
Commissioner of Police for the City of London   March 2002

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION.

REASONS FOR THE STUDY.

Initiative-induced change in police practice: Perception or reality?

The large sociological discussion on police seems to portray police officers in conservative terms. However, more recently, discussion on what appears to be a new breed of senior officers portrays them as much more in line with new trends in management thinking and in the political and cultural avant-garde. It is claimed that these officers are primarily concerned with promotion to achieve this aim. The Police Federation has classed them as 'Butterfly men', but a less pejorative description could be chameleons, who are able to meet the exigencies of rapid change. As will be explored in the study, superintendents are a significant group in the police and a good group for assessing whether managers are chameleons or dinosaurs.

My interest in policing and police work dates back to my early childhood. I have not always harboured a desire to be a police officer, but with my grandfather and two uncles choosing the police as a career, the art of policework, albeit based in a different continent, was often discussed and at times hotly debated at family gatherings. These exchanges created in my mind some sense of awareness and, at a subconscious level, an interest and fascination about police officers and policework. However, from my early childhood through to my time at university, I had not seriously thought about what it meant to be a police officer or what the work might involve. This changed towards the end of my studies when I had decided that I would not pursue a career that involved the direct use of my Biochemistry degree, but instead had started thinking about joining the police service.

Although I had developed a strong preference for the police amongst the career options open to me, the strongest influence on my decision most to join was an initiative that a number of forces were running at the time. This was a three-day familiarisation programme that allowed potential recruits to experience some aspects of policework first-hand. This was in the early 1980s and the police service was

being very proactive and encouraging graduates to join. Although I did not actually go on one of these programmes, the description by a fellow student friend of his experience was certainly the thing that convinced me that of my many options policing was likely to provide the most enjoyment. To boot, the pay was not that bad either.

At the time, when there were a number of organisations vying for the attention of young bright things coming out of university, I thought this initiative by the police was a very clever way to capture the attention of those people that were still undecided on a career and show them the more exciting elements of policework. However, with the benefit of several years' operational experience it quickly became evident that what was on display at the familiarisation visits was not typical of everyday policing. Nevertheless, it certainly had the desired effect of attracting some young people who otherwise may not have automatically considered the police as a career.

Conversely, in the early 1980s there were a number of high profile incidents that would not have made policing an enticing career for most people. For example, media coverage and official reports on some of the major public disorders that occurred in the early to mid-1980s graphically illustrated the danger inherent in policework. These included the riots in Brixton, London in April 1981, followed by riots later that year, in Southall (London), Toxteth (Liverpool), Moss Side (Manchester) and in the West Midlands. The disturbances in Brixton, which took place over the weekend of 10-12 April 1981, resulted in 279 police officers being injured (Scarman 1986).

In addition to the danger of policework, the probity and impartiality of both individual officers and the service as a whole were called into question by the well documented corruption scandals covering four decades from 1960s to 2000. In the 60s, '70s and 80s, the types of corrupt practices that were highlighted predominantly concerned Criminal Investigation Department (CID) officers seeking personal gain through bribery, whereas in the 90s to current times there were concerned with abuses of power and position (Campbell 2002). The combination of these factors was changing the image of the police in the eyes of the public. Reiner lucidly documents

the transformation of the reputation of the police between 1959-81 from 'plods to pigs' (Reiner 1985: 61-82). He comments that "the tacit contract between police and public, so delicately drawn between the 1850s and 1950s, had begun to fray glaringly by 1981" (ibid). Further, and unusual at the time, some senior ranking and high profile officers made politically sensitive comments about suggested reforms of the organisation of the service.

Concerning the corruption scandals, in the 1950s a series of *cause celebres,* which included "disciplinary or legal proceedings involving alleged corruption that were brought against the Chief Constables of Cardiganshire, Brighton and Worcester", led to the instigation of the Royal Commission on the Police in 1960. However, the ones that were to prove more damaging to the integrity of the service were the corruption scandals involving the Metropolitan Police in the late 1960s and '70s, the most high profile and better remembered of which was the 'Operation Countryman' investigation. Despite the dramatic strategy of associated reforms that were implemented by Sir Robert Mark in the '70s, which created a hostile environment for corrupt officers and led to "some 500 policemen" leaving the force during his period as Commissioner, the problem was so deep-seated that further allegations in 1978 led to Mark's successor, Sir David McNee, setting up 'Operation Countryman'. The revelations that emerged in 1978 alleged the "involvement of detectives, including some in the Robbery Squad, in major armed robberies". The insidious nature of the corruption and the extent to which it had penetrated the force was illustrated by the lamentable outcome of the investigation. 'Operation Countryman' was set up under the direction of the Dorset Chief Constable, Arthur Hambleton, and as Reiner explained, "A staff of eighty provincial detectives worked out of a building in Surrey (to avoid Met interference) for four years, investigating more than 200 policemen. Hambleton and his team claimed on several occasions that their work was being sabotaged by corrupt Yard pressure, and by the time the Operation was wound up *only two convictions* had been achieved" (Reiner 1985: 67. My emphasis).

On the political front, as Reiner explained the overt political lobbying by the police service which began in the 1970s involved officers at the highest and lowest ranks. For example, in contrasting the dramatic change in the public announcements

by the Police Federation he comments that "The spectacle of James Anderton, Manchester's Chief Constable, and Jim Jardine of the Police Federation, preaching at the drop of a helmet about the sinking state of our national moral fibre became so familiar a sight in the 1970s that it is hard to appreciate quite how novel the departure from tradition it was" (Reiner 1985: 73). This departure from tradition was to continue unabated. "In 1975, the Police Federation launched an unprecedented campaign for 'law and order'" with the intention of mobilising "'the silent majority', to influence politicians to support the 'rule of law' and to reverse the liberalising trend in penal and social policy" (ibid). However, the campaign was condemned by many as signalling a dangerous departure from the established tradition of police non-involvement in politics. Nonetheless, the Federation continued along this path and in "1978 it relaunched the campaign specifically to influence the 1979 general election...Throughout 1978 and early 1979, a stream of strikingly similar and much-publicised pronouncements was issued both by police spokesmen (both Chief Constables and the Federation) and Tory politicians as part of what the media dubbed the 'great debate' on law and order" (Reiner 1985: 74).

Further, the operational activities of the service was dragged into the political arena "in March 1982 when the Met released its annual crime statistics, it analysed them by the race of robbers as identified by victims, highlighting the stereotype of the black mugger." Reiner commented that "This was an unprecedented use of official statistics in a manner that had clear political implications. It was widely interpreted at the time as an attempt to 'mug' Scarman" (Reiner 1985: 75).

These high profile public incidents had raised some doubts in my mind about policing as a career, but I had been impressed by the attempts that some police forces were making in the early '80s to attract higher-educated young people to join them. Convinced as I was then that these initiatives were intended to give a broader picture of policework, and thereby a better and more rounded image of the service, years later I was less convinced that these initiative had significantly increased the number of graduates joining the police. My experience then was that graduates were few amongst those joining, and even fewer were the number of black or Asian people, graduates or otherwise.

In addition to the familiarisation programmes, there were a number of advertisements designed specifically to attract more black candidates. For example, an advertisement for the Metropolitan Police during this period highlighted the diversity of the people that were joining, with headlines such as, "There is no such thing as a uniform police officer in London", over the faces of a white female officer alongside those of a black and a white male officers. Another one showed a black and a white officer in uniform under the heading, "Brothers in Law" (Benyon and Bourn 1986: Ch. 1). However, despite these initiatives, in 1985 there were still only 726 (0.6%) black police officers in England and Wales (Benyon and Bourn 1986: 29). A decade later, at the time I started the fieldwork for this study, the number of black police officers in England and Wales had risen to 2038 (1.5 %) (Home Office Digest 3 1995). By any standards this was a meagre improvement, and on reflection I realised that the lack of success of this particular police initiative in trying to increase the number of black people joining the police was not atypical.

There were other police initiatives, directed at improving operational effectiveness, that had not delivered fully the intended results and outcomes. For example, there was policing by objectives (pbo). Fashionable in the early 1980s, this was described by the authors as a systematic method that could help police managers manage their organisations more effectively and for better results. "Based on a process designed primarily for use in business and industry, pbo has been extensively modified to take into account the extraordinary management problems inherent in the police enterprise" (Lubans and Edgar 1979: iii).

What was this process? Lubans and Edgar explained that it "was a process of planning, executing and reviewing those activities of a police organisation oriented toward **specific desired results**" (Lubans and Edgar 1979: 5). As Weatheritt explained, "pbo is a thorough-going attempt to apply a rational/empirical approach to any or all aspects of a force's activity." Adding, "The planning cycle lies at the heart of pbo. It is a means by which a publicly available force policy statement – general guidelines about what a force intends to do – is successively honed to create a set of force goals, then objectives and action plans... Pbo is both dynamic and results-oriented" (Weatheritt 1989: 41). However, in a changing social and political environment in which the public was becoming more assertive towards public bodies,

the decision on the types of activities that should be used to judge effectiveness was no longer the sole preserve of the police. It is possible that the difference between the police and the public in what should be used as performance measures may have contributed to the ineffectiveness of pbo in bringing about immediate improvements (ibid). Academic studies were showing that policing was not, as had been consistently claimed by the police, predominantly about law enforcement. As Punch and Naylor explained, "because of its varied functions – covering man's social problems from birth to death – the police service has gradually, and largely unwittingly, accumulated a broad range of 'welfare' functions. Indeed, the police could well be described as the only 24 hour, fully mobile, social service" (Punch and Naylor 1973). The activities against which police effectiveness were now to be measured were more varied and some were difficult to measure because these activities, which fell under the service rather than the enforcement category, were largely unrecorded by officers. Additionally, where police activities were recorded, it appeared that the process of recording rather than the result or outcome from the activity was the measure of effectiveness. It was becoming more evident that measuring police effectiveness would no longer be synonymous with the straightforward and simple process of looking at the rise or fall of crime detection figures.

The extent to which senior managers could set performance targets and corresponding action plans, and best use their resources to achieve them were now also measures of police effectiveness (Home Office Circular 114/83). However, as much as all these initiatives were meant to change the management style of police managers and thereby the operational practices on the ground, the perspective from the frontline was that not much change was happening, it was business as usual.

Why was this? Why did it seem, at least to me, that all these well-intentioned initiatives, which were meant to improve the image, operational and managerial effectiveness of the police, were not producing the intended results? These questions and my perception that the various initiatives, some of which I have highlighted, were not bringing about significant changes in police practice were the things that drove me to start this study. However, my original plan was to use one particular police initiative to examine my perceived organisational resistance to change. I therefore

started the study with the specific aim of trying to find out why the quality of service initiative titled *'Getting Things Right'* (GTR) had not been widely adopted by the service. Additionally, I wanted to explore the reasons why it was that so many other police initiatives appeared to have had little discernible impact in changing police management style and operational practice.

In 1993, the Association of Chief Police Officer (ACPO) Quality of Service sub-committee launched the GTR initiative, with a corresponding document of the same name. The document explained that it was after the publication in 1990 of the ACPO Strategic Policy document titled, *"Setting the Standards for Policing: Meeting Community Expectation"*, which had been adopted by the police service as its blueprint for quality that the Quality of Service sub-committee was formed. The GTR document explained that the sub-committee had produced previously another document titled, 'Strategic Priorities for 1992', in which it was identified that there were six major tasks that the service needed to undertake if it was to guarantee quality policing in the 1990s (ACPO 1993a: 1).

These six areas were:
- Setting standards and measuring performance;
- Training;
- Promotion of good practice and research throughout the service;
- Meeting the needs and expectations of external customers;
- Meeting the needs and expectations of internal customers; and
- Police ethics.

The GTR initiative concentrated on one of the six areas; 'meeting the needs and expectations of internal customers'. This initiative was a counter to the numerous quantitative performance measures to which the police service had been subjected and a typical example of which was policing by objectives. GTR was clearly aimed at the quality of police leadership and management with the intention of improving the quality of service that police gave to the community. This document explained,

"It is widely accepted in the business world and the public service sector that the quality of service and customer care given to staff inside an organisation have a decisive effect on the service provided to the people outside the organisation. This report, **'Getting Things Right'**, addresses head-on the misgivings revealed by recent internal surveys about the quality of leadership and management in the police service. It defines six **Key Internal Service Areas.** It pinpoints the issues which must be tackled if the police service is to continue to move towards a 'culture' of quality, in which quality support and service are given to all staff and, through them, to our customers in the community" (ACPO 1993a: 1).

The key internal service areas were: Leading and managing people; how we communicate; internal organisation; managing resources; systems and procedures; and strategy for action.

The rationale for the initiative was described as follows.

"The report suggests that, for many years past, the police service has been obsessed with **'doing things right'** – meticulously right. Streams of standing orders and instructions have been issued to ensure that nothing goes wrong. These have instead restricted the ability of staff to use their initiative and discretion, and to treat each customer as an individual. It is, of course, important to **'do right things'**, too. That means involving staff as every level so that they have the skills – and the authority – to make decisions about the service **they** provide" (ibid).

The service invested a great deal of time, energy and resources to produce the initiative, and during its developmental stages, the intention was that it would be mandatory on all forces to implement it. However, at its launch this had changed; it was made optional for forces to implement it to the extent they felt appropriate. Good as the initiative and the corresponding report were, it was not widely adopted by forces. Those in the organisation that could have benefited most from the initiative, the superintending ranks, although they freely acknowledged that it was a good initiative which would have brought many benefits, had not shown much enthusiasm in implementing it.

Why was this? After all this was an initiative that had been developed by and solely within the service. The service 'owned' it, yet it was reluctant to embrace it. If it could take such a cold response to one of its own initiatives, then it is not unreasonable to assume that it would just as easily reject any externally conceived and developed initiative. Unless, of course, there was compelling reasons not to do so.

What were the factors that influenced the service in general and, for the purpose of this study, the superintending ranks specifically, to adopt or decline initiatives that were intended to bring about much vaunted change in management style and consequently police practice? To this question I now turn, starting with an overview of the subjects under study, the superintending ranks.

Resistance to change.

Wreckers or reformers? The Police Federation or The Superintendents' Association? Dinosaurs or chameleons? At times when an organisation faces external pressure to adapt in order to 'survive' in a changing environment, different sections within that organisation, perhaps defined by their respective sub-cultures, are likely to react differently and possibly counterproductively.

The police service has faced unrelenting calls for change and adaptation over many years, but the volume has increased over the last three decades, and the call from the present Home Secretary, David Blunkett, in *Policing A New Century: A Blueprint for Reform,* for more change, drew a strong counter-attack from the Police Federation. Strong enough for the Home Secretary to refer to some of the local leaders of the Federation as "wreckers" (*Police,* 3 March 2002). In the same *Police* article, the Federation stated that the Home Secretary had shown the "same impatience with chief officers who were challenging some of the features of the Police Bill that they see as diminutions of their independence of politics and operational autonomy." They then went on to ask, "Are they also wreckers?" However, no mention was made of Superintendents or their Association. Should one draw from this the conclusion that Superintendents, unlike the Federated ranks and Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) were not also wreckers? Further, if this was the case, could the inference reasonably be drawn that there was something

different about the group that made their outlook different from the other two? Was there something different about the collective experience of this group that created a different cultural outlook to the other two?

However, before drawing such an inference, there is one significant question, which is relevant for this study, that has been asked by one commentator; "Is there a management culture within the British police?" (Holdaway 1989).

Over the last four decades, there has been a significant increase in the number of research studies, inquiries and operational work-studies into all aspects of the British police. A sizeable proportion of these have concentrated on the 'occupational culture' of operational officers. However, most of these studies have tended, on the main, to be portrayals of the culture or cultures of the lower ranks; constables and sergeants. More specifically, the uniformed lower ranks. This could justifiably lead a casual observer of the police to assume that there was no corresponding management culture within the police service, or that if there were it was either homogeneous with that of the lower ranks or it was not significantly different to warrant specific and/or in-depth study or comment. Alternatively, it could be that one of the reasons why there has not been a correspondingly large volume of research on senior managers is because it is much harder to gain access to them. For example, in negotiating access to the officers I wanted to interview for the study, I have no doubt that the direct involvement of my chief officer in writing personally to all the chief officers of my respondents made the granting of permission much easier. At the most senior level of the service, to date there has been only two empirical studies on chief officers. One by Reiner (Reiner: 1992a) and the other by Wall (Wall: 1998).

The concept of a management culture, generally within organisations (Johnson and Gill 1993), and more specifically within the police service (Reuss-Ianni 1983, Holdaway 1989) is a recognised and accepted one. However, although the extent of the relationship between management and non-management cultures cannot be stated unequivocally, some guidance can be taken from the work of Reuss-Ianni, in her study of officers from a precinct of the New York Police Department. She explained that the emergence of a management cop culture from the previously singular police culture was the outcome of a combination of factors, one of which was the new

requirement of police managers to concentrate on accountability and productivity in the face of dwindling resources. British police managers were to face similar calls for greater management accountability in the early 1980s from central government.

Although it is readily acknowledged that the introduction of the principles of private sector management into the police service was started with the publication of Home Office Circular 114 of 1983 by the then Conservative government, one author has suggested that the demand for change in the police service goes back much further. Grange suggests that, "a history of the changes may have begun in 1974 when the last major police force restructuring created the present 43 force structure" (Grange 1992: 300). Regardless of when the process started, one certainty is that the call has been continuous and relentless.

I shall explore with my respondents some of the incidents that have led to these calls for change and the extent of any consequent changes over the years. Moreover, I shall, through examining the different ways that my respondents have dealt with and managed the changes that have undoubtedly occurred, try to explain to what extent these have shaped and/or conversely are being shaped by police management culture.

Who then are those that I shall be referring to as police managers? This group of officers with whom I shall be examining the changes that have occurred to and within the police service will be drawn exclusively from the superintending rank.

Why Superintendents?

Amongst the numerous research studies, examinations of and enquiries into police organisational structure and management functions, two have been pivotal in increasing the importance and influence of the superintending rank. These were, Audit Commission Police Paper number 9; *Reviewing the Organisation of Provincial Police Forces,* and the *Inquiry into Police Responsibilities & Rewards* that was chaired by Sir Patrick Sheehy (HMSO (1), 1993). Both reports works were continuations of the drive to improve police efficiency and effectiveness that was started in 1983 with the introduction of the then Conservative government's Financial

Management Initiative into the police service in the form of Home Office Circular 114/83.

The Audit Commission study examined the structure of provincial police forces in relation to reducing management on-costs, with the aim of improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the provision of quality policing services to local communities. Its overriding message was that Forces should review their organisational structure and form basic command units, which would be accountable to their local communities. The Paper explained that, "although many improvements can be made by forces themselves, there are constraints hindering beneficial changes which can only be addressed at national level." It offered that, "A national review of rank structure and associated pay scales should be conducted to allow more flexible approaches to management structures..." (Audit Commission 1991: 2)

From here the message was reinforced by Sir Patrick Sheehy with his Inquiry to "examine the rank structure, remuneration and conditions of service of the police in England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland" (Sheehy 1993). The Inquiry made, amongst its 272 recommendations, the following two concerning police ranks. Recommendation 4, was "that the ranks of chief inspector and chief superintendent be abolished", and recommendation 5, which advocated the "abolition of the rank of deputy chief constable".

The Inquiry Report received a hostile response from the Police Federation, and resistance from the Superintendents' Association and ACPO. One outcome of a lively 'debate' of the recommendations was that, "In October 1993 the Home Secretary, Michael Howard, announced that he no longer accepted significant sections of the Sheehy Report" (Leishman et al, 1996: 14). Nonetheless, he still abolished two of the three ranks that the Report recommended should be abolished. The one that survived was that of chief inspector.

One consequence of the combined adoption of basic command units (BCUs) and the removal of the rank of chief superintendent was that superintendents now became heads of BCUs. Consequently, the removal of the chief superintendent rank, which previously acted as the link between policy and practice (between ACPO and

operational superintendents), left superintendents with the dual role of policy makers and, as operational commanders, implementers of those policies.

With superintendents now straddling the divide between strategy and tactics this meant that they could decide on the policy and strategic direction of their Force and as BCU Commanders would have direct control of how those policies would then be implemented. Consequently, the 'new' superintendent rank had acquired a pivotal role in the new streamlined management structure of the police service.

Although their newly acquired status did not quite elevate them to the position of an elite group, nonetheless, they were now a much more powerful and influential one. This new and more powerful position, and the fact that there had been very few sociological empirical studies on officers at this rank, in contrast to the considerable amount of studies that had been carried out on the rank-and-file (Whitaker 1964 & 1979, Reiner 1978, Smith 1983, Fielding 1988, Graef 1989, to list a small number of them), and a smaller number on those at ACPO level (Reiner 1991, and Wall 1998) made the occupiers of the superintending ranks an ideal group to study. One, which to date had not been given, as often, the opportunity to express its view on policing. I saw this research as a good opportunity to obtain the views of an increasingly influential group of officers.

Who are the superintendents?

The Audit Commission Police Papers Report 9 mentioned above that called for the establishment of basic command units was published in 1991, and the Report of the Inquiry by Sir Patrick Sheehy was published in 1993. The rank of chief superintendent was abolished in 1995. Before 1995, the number of officers in the superintending rank had already been decreasing, and the trend continued after the abolition of the rank of chief superintendent. The reduction in numbers was more pronounced in 1993 and one reason for this could be that Forces were preparing to implement the modified recommendations of the Sheehy Report; to remove the rank of chief superintendent. In fact, Forces had been reducing the number of officers in the chief superintendent rank since the late 1980s through changes in organisational structure and management practices. For example, some of the organisational and structural changes had involved removing the responsibility for day-to-day policing

from divisions, which were under the command of chief superintendents, to sub-divisions, which were under the command of superintendents (Jones 1988).

Table 1, shows not only this trend in the declining number of superintendents, but also that the same thing was happening with other ranks. With the reduction in all the ranks, there would have been fewer people below them to whom superintendents could delegate work. Further, with fewer of them with responsibility to make policy and direct operational activities, it was possible that the influence and power of this group of officers were becoming greater as their numbers were becoming less. A supporting argument for this suggestion is that power and influence would have been concentrated in the hands of a smaller number of people that had acquired a broader range of responsibilities.

Table 1. Total Police Officer Strength in the Police Service in England and Wales. (Home Office (1), 2001)

Police officer strength	Chief Constables	Dep./Asst. Chief Constables	Chief/ Superintendents	Chief Inspectors	Inspectors	Sergeants	Constables	Total police strength
31 Mar 90	46	188	2,052	2,261	6,695	19,207	94,310	126,777
31 Mar 91	48	183	2,034	2,256	6,764	19,501	94,667	127,495
31 Mar 92	48	180	1,995	2,222	6,736	19,739	94,650	127,627
31 Mar 93	46	176	1,873	2,133	6,767	19,632	95,501	128,290
31 Mar 94	46	158	1,668	1,990	6,652	19,377	95,915	127,897
31 Mar 95	51	155	1,414	1,842	6,559	19,132	96,027	127,222
31 Mar 96	50	145	1,318	1,706	6,272	18,832	96,521	126,901
31 Mar 97	48	145	1,290	1,679	6,164	18,811	96,914	127,158
31 Mar 98	49	143	1,230	1,609	6,050	18,603	97,072	126,814
31 Mar 99	49	151	1,213	1,604	5,936	18,738	96,150	126,096
31 Mar 00	47	149	1,226	1,574	5,941	18,500	94,518	124,170
31 Mar 01	46	149	1,218	1,552	6,012	18,601	95,899	125,682

At the time of the field study, the superintending rank was divided into the four levels of Basic Range and Higher Ranges 1, 2 and 3. These divisions were based loosely on function and firmly on salary. In terms of function, Higher Ranges 2 and 3 were equivalent to the old chief superintendent rank, while the Basic and Higher Range 1 were equivalent to the old superintendent rank. In terms of pay, there were six pay bands within the Basic Range, two within the Higher Range 1, two within the Higher Range 2 and two within the Higher Range 3. However, in 2000, five years

after the abolition of the rank of chief superintendent, the Superintendents' Association successfully lobbied the Home Office to reinstate the rank of chief superintendent and abolish the collection of intermediary ranks that had proliferated since the abolition of the chief superintendent rank. The Association had argued that instead of streamlining the senior management hierarchy by removing chief superintendents, the converse had happened with the creation of two additional levels. This increase in the number of sub-ranks had also led to an increase in the number of pay bands; from nine to twelve. Consequently, the intended increased savings in senior management salaries that should have resulted from the removal of the chief superintendent rank had turned instead into increased management costs from the greater number of pay bands. Quite clearly the resultant increased costs and bureaucracy were not what the government had wanted or envisaged would happen. The reinstatement of the rank of chief superintendent was enabled under sections 122 to 125 of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, and came into effect on 1 September 2001.

The changing role of superintendents: Managers or leaders?

The number of officers in the superintending rank made up around 1.0% of the total number of officers in the police service after the changes in 1995. Before this date, the percentage was slightly higher at 1.5%. Managing the delivery of policing at this ratio would have been demanding, however, with the structural and political changes that placed greater emphasis on delivering effective performance, officers in these ranks were now required to display more of their leadership skills in addition to their managerial or administrative skills. In terms of police vernacular, they were now required to both 'walk the talk'.

The significance of this shift in emphasis from management to leadership, for the purpose of this study lies in the distinction between leaders and managers made by Edgar Schein. In his view, "leaders create and change cultures, while managers and administrators live within them" (Schein 1992: 5). The effectiveness of the change process depended greatly on superintendents changing elements within different levels (Schein 1992) of the culture, or sub-cultures (Chan 1996; Foster 2003; Waddington 1999a) of the service through leadership rather than maintaining the status quo through management and administration.

It is possible for senior police managers to affect the culture of the service at three different levels. They could affect the culture as individuals at a local level and within their particular areas of responsibility. They could do so collectively as a group at Force level. They could do so as a group at national level through their Association. Regardless of the level at which they affected the culture of the service, superintendents still needed to have a similar view of the world and to be able to act as a group, in order to bring about a consistent change across the service. They needed to have their own culture. The significance of this rests on Schein's explanation that,

> "The process of culture formation is, in a sense, identical to the process of group formation in that the very essence of 'groupness' or group identity, the shared patterns of thought, belief, feelings, and values that result from shared experience and common learning, results in the pattern of shared assumption. Without some shared assumptions, some minimal degree of culture, we are really talking only about an aggregate of people, not a group" (Schein 1992: 52).

I shall explore with my respondents, whether, and if so to what extent through shared experience and common learning, superintendents have developed some sense of common identity of a group. I shall use the information they provided to analyse whether this groupness had led to the development of a culture, and whether it had helped them to adapt, chameleon-like, to the changes that the service has gone through over the years, or whether they have remained entrenched, dinosaur-like, in their old familiar and comfortable ways. However, as a start and in order to examine the effect of the culture of senior police managers one has to look at the formation of this culture.

Under what conditions are leaders changing and managing culture?

I shall, with reference to the work of Edgar Schein, discuss the elements of and offer a definition of culture in chapter 3). However, as Schein explains, "a formal definition of organisational culture can tell us what culture is, but it does not tell us what cultural

assumptions are about, why they form in the first place, and why they survive" (Schein 1992: 51).

He suggests that in order to understand the content and dynamics of culture, we must develop a model of how the core elements of a culture arise and why they persist. He explains that the most relevant model to use to analyse the various dimensions of culture "is one developed by sociology and group dynamics and based on the fundamental distinction between any group's problems of (1) survival in and adaptation to its external environment and (2) integration of its internal processes to ensure the capacity to continue to survive and adapt" (ibid).

He adds that, "the issues or problems of external adaptation and survival basically specify the coping cycle that any system must be able to maintain in relation to its changing environment." The essential elements of the coping cycle consist of the following,

> "*Mission and strategy:* obtaining a shared understanding of core mission, primary task, manifest and latent functions.
> *Goals:* developing consensus on goals, as derived from the core mission.
> *Means:* developing consensus on the means to be used to attain the goal, such as the organisational structure, division of labour, reward system, and authority system.
> *Measurement:* developing consensus on the criteria to be used in measuring how well the group is doing in fulfilling its goals, such as the information and control system.
> *Correction:* developing consensus on the appropriate remedial or repair strategies to be used if goals are not being met" (Schein 1992: 52).

He explains that although "each step in the cycle is presented in sequential order, any given organisation probably works on most of them simultaneously once it is a going concern", and in conjunction with managing the problems of internal integration (ibid).

As for internal integration, he adds that, "The processes that allow a group to internally integrate itself reflect the major internal issues that any group must deal with" (Schein 1992: 70). He suggests that they include the following,

"Creating a common language and conceptual categories: If members cannot communicate with and understand each other, a group is impossible by definition.

Defining group boundaries and criteria for inclusion and exclusion: The group must be able to define itself. Who is in and who is out, and by what criteria does one determine membership?

Distributing power and status: Every group must work out its pecking order, its criteria and rules for how managers get, maintain, and lose power. Consensus in this area is crucial to help members manage feelings of aggression.

Developing norms of intimacy, friendship, and love: Every group must work out its rules of the game for peer relationships, for relationships between sexes, and for the manner in which openness and intimacy are to be handled in the context of managing the organisation's tasks. Consensus in this area is crucial to help members manage feelings of affection and love.

Defining and allocating rewards and punishments: Every group must know what its heroic and sinful behaviours are and must achieve consensus on what is a reward and what is punishment.

Explaining the unexplained – ideology and religion: Every group, like every society, faces unexplainable events that must be given meaning so that members can respond to them and avoid the anxiety of dealing with the unexplainable and uncontrollable" (Schein 1992: 70-71). The GTR initiative was firmly focused on ensuring that the internal integration of the police service was strong and capable of meeting the demands that were increasingly being placed on it.

Analysing police management culture.

Using the above model based on survival and adaptation to a changing external environment and integration of its internal processes, I shall analyse the content and

dynamics of the culture of officers in the superintending ranks through discussing their policing experience under the following topics.

- Work history;
- Police function;
- Crime and its control;
- Public disorder;
- Internal management;
- Management of change;
- Social perspective; and
- Personal background.

Summary history of the research.

I started the study with the intention of conducting an evaluation of one quality of service initiative; 'Getting Things Right'. There were inherent problems with doing this and the obvious one was that any changes that may have occurred after the implementation of the initiative could, at best, be claimed to have occurred during the period of the initiative. It would have been very difficult to attribute directly any changes in police management style and practice to the implementation of the initiative. Nonetheless, there was still the possibility of carrying out an evaluation of the initiative based on the perception of officers at every rank. I had planned to collect this information by using a combination of self-completion questionnaires, to collect quantitative data, and face to face interviews with a smaller sample to collect qualitative data. But, when it became clear that adoption of the initiative would be left to the discretion of each chief officer, and I found that it would not be adopted by most forces, I realised that it could prove difficult to collect sufficient information to produce a thesis for a Doctorate. At this point, I decided to revise the study and change the focus to examining how the social background and professional experience of officers in the superintending rank had influenced their style of management. The emphasis of the study was now redirected towards the examination of the personal and professional factors that could have contributed to creating a distinctive culture in the group, and the impact that the culture may have had on changing the management style of the service.

This broadened the scope of the study from the narrow aspect of examining the possible effects of one quality of service initiative to examining the often-voiced concern within the service that many initiatives had floundered because officers in the superintending rank had not fully supported them. If there was some validity in this observation, it raised further questions. Were they resistant to changes because through their collective years of operational and management experience they knew or suspected that the proposed initiatives would not bring about the desired change? Alternatively, they may have become highly skilled at adapting to the constantly changing external environment, so that their adoption and implementation of these initiatives were done so smoothly that they merged seamlessly with the prevailing conditions?

The calls for change to the structure, management style and ultimately culture of the police service goes back many years, but they have increased in volume and regularity in the last three decades. Undoubtedly, there have been some positive changes, but to some, these have not been enough either in terms of their extent or in terms of appropriateness. Further, the police service has been accused of being resistant to change, preferring, at worst, to maintain the status quo and, at best, to make minor changes that give the impression of no change. One possible reason for the resistance to change could be the strong influence of police culture. However, the discussion of police culture has tended to be confined to the culture of the lower ranking uniformed officers. This study has set out to examine the extent of senior management culture in the service, i.e. that of the superintending ranks.

It will analyse and discuss the dimensions of the culture of police superintendents and how, or if, they differ from the culture of the other two main operational groups; Federation and ACPO. The study will examine and discuss whether the culture supports a progressive and adaptive style of leadership that has enabled senior police managers to cope with the changing external environment and manage the inevitable internal conflicts that have arisen. Alternatively, it will examine whether the culture has created a rigid and inflexible set of managers and administrators that have found it easier to maintain tried and tested methods of

managing the service, which although may not have allowed the service to adapt adequately to contemporary demands, may have made internal integration less problematic.

Contemporary senior police managers in the superintending rank are being asked to be leaders, rather than managers or administrators. This group of officers is seen by the current Labour government as an important element in its vision to improve police performance through its reform process. As the Home Secretary said in his speech to the Superintendents' Conference in September 2001, one of the essential elements in realising this vision "will be improving leadership in the service, which is central to delivering improvements in performance. This is particularly important at Superintendent level where effective leadership plays a key role in driving up performance at local level. Superintendents are at the forefront of the process of change" (Home Office (2) 2001).

Structure of the thesis.

The thesis is divided into eleven chapters. Following this introductory chapter, in chapter two, I shall discuss the research design and the methodology that I have used to collect and analyse my data. In chapter three I shall explore the concept of culture and offer a multi-layered definition of culture based on the work of Professor Edgar Schein. I shall then use Schein's interpretation of culture to examine the elements of police culture. In chapter four I describe the social background of my respondents and explore their reasons for joining the police service. In chapter five, I shall discuss police managerialism, and highlight how this has changed over the years and how my respondents have adapted to the demands of contemporary police management problems. In chapter six I shall discuss the management of change and the methods that senior police managers have developed to manage the unrelenting number of initiatives that the service has been forced to pursue over the years. In chapters seven, eight and nine, I concentrate on three core operational policing functions. In chapter seven I shall discuss with my respondents contemporary policing issues, while in chapter eight I shall explore with them the subject of crime and its control. In chapter nine, I shall cover the topic of public disorder. In chapter ten, I shall explore the social philosophy of my respondents, through discussing broadly, the subject of

fairness and the rule of law. I shall conclude the thesis in chapter eleven with an examination of the concept of police management culture.

The importance and significance of the group of officers that currently occupy the superintending rank cannot be overstated. Equally, the challenges that they face to create and maintain a modern-day police service that meets the needs of a number of diverse and increasingly demanding stakeholders cannot be underestimated. For example, Butler explains, in light of the recommendations made in the Sheehy Inquiry for the abolition of certain ranks, that,

> "The major current challenge for the divisional (BCU) commander is to change from a style which had typically been concerned about control, direction and downward communication, to a leader mainly concerned about inspiring and encouraging people and enabling change. Unless this approach to management can be achieved and sustained, changes to structure and ranks will not in themselves improve operational effectiveness and productivity." But warns, "This approach to management is more difficult and challenging than a more control style. It requires more people skills and person-to-person communication" (Butler 1994).

Starting with the method of data collection in the next chapter, I shall assess whether contemporary superintendents have been able to make this shift in management style.

Chapter 2

METHODOLOGY.

RESEARCH DESIGN.

I started the study with the aim of evaluating an ACPO Quality of Service Committee initiative called 'Getting Things Right' (GTR). I had intended to use a combination of self-completion questionnaires to collect quantitative data and face to face interviews to collect qualitative data.

I had designed and distributed a questionnaire to 1100 officers, from constable to ACPO rank in eleven forces. From the analyses of the completed questionnaires that had been returned I soon realised that not many officers had heard of the 'GTR' initiative let alone being able to ascribe to it any change they knew or perceived had occurred in their respective place of work. It was evident that conducting an evaluative study of 'GTR' was not going to provide sufficiently varied data to meet the requirements for a doctorate.

The lack of information was not due to either the return rate of the questionnaires, which was over 60%, nor the quality of the information provided by the respondents. It was more to do with the fact that the existence and or any post implementation effects of the initiative were not widely known by most officers at all ranks.

I therefore decided that to be able to collect sufficiently varied data to meet the requirements for a doctorate I needed to redesign the study and concentrate on collecting qualitative data from a restricted section of the service and using a smaller sample. However, by reducing the number of participants from whom I would collect data, I could use a predominantly qualitative methodology.

The research design of this study is based on a qualitative paradigm. Consistent with the way Creswell defined a qualitative study it was designed to be an

inquiry into "understanding a social or human problem, based on building a complex, holistic picture, formed with words, reporting detailed views of informants, and conducted in a natural setting" (Creswell 1994: 1)

This is in comparison to a quantitative study, which would be an "inquiry into a social or human problem, based on testing a theory composed of variables, measured with numbers, and analysed with statistical procedures, in order to determine whether the predictive generalisations of the theory hold true" (Creswell 1994: 2).

However, it would be an oversimplification to suggest by this brief exposition of the distinction between qualitative and quantitative research models that this study could be placed exclusively under the heading of a qualitative model. It could not, because the design is informed by the broad notion that despite the separation by time and space of my respondents, as a group they would have had sufficient contact, also shared similar positions and views, leading to commonalities of cultural perspectives to have been able to develop shared learning, understanding, beliefs and values that could have created a culture that was particular to the group. Therefore, although the research is designed to develop an understanding of police management culture through the collection of information about my respondents' occupational experience in the police service, there is to some degree a testing of a hypothesis, on which the research is based, that commonality of experience and learning would lead to commonality in operational thinking and decision making.

Nonetheless, the study design is strongly oriented towards a qualitative paradigm. It was designed to encourage my respondents to reflect on their career in the police service, and in the process to evaluate some of the changes that had occurred during their career and the effects that some of these may have had on them as managers and individuals. Additionally, the study was designed to get them to respond intuitively to the different areas that we covered together. One of the reasons why I wanted my participants to respond intuitively was to counter any temptation to give the 'right answers' to my questions if they felt that their personal experience was somehow inadequate. I wanted to capture *their* views of policing, policework, and

police management and not what they thought their views *ought* to have been. I believe that I managed to do as the following quote illustrates.

No I think that's been interesting, I, you know, I've actually enjoyed answering some of the questions, whether I've given you the answers you expect or not I don't know. But yeah, I found the questions were thought provoking and challenging, and that was of interest. Now whether it would have helped both of us had I have had knowledge of the specific questions before hand, I don't know. Probably not because you wouldn't have got a spontaneous answer. You'd have got a more planned, considered answer, and that perhaps is not what you want because you may have actually ended up with the party line, rather than me talking to you. (R. 5).

I felt that the most effective method by which to get my respondents to respond intuitively was to interview them face to face. Some of the advantages of using this method were firstly, it enabled my respondents to give historical information that I was able to use to contextualise their responses, secondly, it provided richer insight into their perspective and thirdly, it gave me the scope to control the line of questioning (Foddy 1994: 151).

However there are limitations with this method and some of these include the fact that my presence, as the researcher, may have created bias in my respondents' response, and perhaps compounding this, not all people are equally articulate and perceptive (ibid).

The potential of my presence creating bias in my participants' response was a real one because of my personal position. The fact that I was a serving police officer, I believe, helped in getting my respondents to talk openly and freely, as exemplified by the above quote. However, at the time I held the junior management position of inspector, and this position, combined with the backing for the study from the Police Staff College and my chief officer (information that I conveyed to my respondents during the explanatory discussions that I had with them before the interviews commenced), could well have tempted them to give the 'right answers'.

The tactics that I used to counter any bias in their responses were to stress the importance that I placed on their personal views, the fact that I was not looking for right or wrong answers and the unequivocal guarantee of confidentiality.

One way of judging whether or not these tactics worked is to examine the responses from my respondents. I believe that the comments by Respondent 5, quoted above, give some indication that the tactics may have had some success in preventing biased responses.

RESEARCH TECHNIQUES.

Respondents.

The sample.

I planned to interview a sample of officers from the superintending rank from a number of different Forces. However, I knew that the number of officers that I would be able to get to participate in the study would be determined by factors such as the cost of travelling to meet them at their place of work, and depending on their work commitments the length of time I would have with them to carry out the interviews. With these possible constraints in mind, I chose to interview 51 officers from 11 Forces. I chose the Forces based on their geographical location and size, in order to achieve a representative mix of metropolitan and provincial Forces. I approached the Forces by sending two letters. One from me outlining the research proposal and seeking permission to interview officers from the Force. The second was from my chief officer giving his personal backing to the study as well as encouraging the chief officer of the Force to agree to my request to interview his/her officers. Of the original eleven Forces that I chose, two were unable to participate in the study, but I was able to replace them with two other 'similar' Forces. The reason why the two Forces could not participate in the study was that one was in the middle of conducting a large-scale survey of its staff and the other was planning to run a similar large-scale survey in the near future. Both felt that the work I was proposing to do could have adversely affected their surveys.

Having gained permission from eleven chief officers to work in their Forces, I was not able to choose the respondents from each Force as easily. The reasons for this were the combined factors of cost and access. It would have cost each Force time

and money to have a member of staff draw up a list of all the superintendents in the Force, fit them into a sampling frame, draw a random sample of officers and then ask them if they wanted to take part in the study. To overcome this difficulty I did ask the Forces whether they could send me a list of their superintending rank officers without their names. Aside from the fact that there were some concern about the security and confidentiality of doing this, this was not a straightforward task for most of the Forces and they would have incurred some cost in drawing such a list. For these reasons, I had to settle for the Forces selecting the officers who would participate in the study. My contact person at each participating Force assured me that the officers were chosen randomly, and although I have no way of verifying this, I have no reason to doubt them.

During my time with my respondents, the issue of how or why they had been chosen to participate in the study was never raised. Nonetheless, I think it is reasonable to infer that there would have been some judgement made by my contact person in each Force when deciding who to approach to participate in the study, even if that judgement was based on the availability of an officer. For these reasons, I cannot state categorically that my group of respondents is a random sample.

Composition.

I interviewed 51 superintendents from 11 Forces. The composition of the sample of officers was 49 males and 2 females, with no officer from a Black or Minority Ethnic background. This breakdown is very close to the percentage of officers in this rank nationally in terms of gender and ethnicity, at the time of my fieldwork in 1995, as Tables 2 & 3 below shows.

The number of officers in the superintending ranks is shown in Table 2. The trend from 1990 to 2001 has been a reduction in the number of officers in this rank.

Table 2. Total number of Superintendents in 43 Forces in England and Wales (includes the rank of Chief Superintendent up to 1994/95).

Year	Total	Male	Female	White	Non-white
1990	2,055	2,019	36	2,051	4
1991	2,026	1,987	39	2,020	6
1992	2,073	2,030	43	2,069	4
1993	1,693	1,654	39	1,690	3
1994	1,411	1,373	38	1,407	4
1995	1,310	1,277	33	1,308	2
1996	1,288	1,248	40	1,286	2
1997	1,237	1,189	48	1,233	4
1998	1,205	1,145	60	1,199	6
1999	1,218	1,156	62	1,210	8
2000	1,172	1,109	63	1,158	14
2001	1,229	1,151	78	1,210	19

Figures supplies by HMIC Statistical Unit at the Home Office.

Table 3 shows these figures in percentages as follows.

Table 3. Percentage of Superintendent rank officers by gender and ethnicity.

Year	Total	Male	Female	White	Non-white
1990	100.00	98.25	1.75	99.81	0.19
1991	100.00	98.08	1.92	99.70	0.30
1992	100.00	97.93	2.07	99.81	0.19
1993	100.00	97.70	2.30	99.82	0.18
1994	100.00	97.31	2.69	99.72	0.28
1995	100.00	97.48	2.52	99.85	0.15
1996	100.00	96.89	3.11	99.84	0.16
1997	100.00	96.12	3.88	99.68	0.32
1998	100.00	95.02	4.98	99.50	0.50
1999	100.00	94.90	5.10	99.34	0.66
2000	100.00	94.62	5.38	98.80	1.20
2001	100.00	93.65	6.35	98.45	1.55

The percentage distribution of my respondents in terms of gender is 4% female to 96% males. This is similar to the make up of officers in the superintending rank at the time of my fieldwork in 1995. The percentage composition of my respondents in terms of ethnicity is also very similar to the national picture; none of my respondents was from a minority ethnic group. It should be noted that 1995 had the smallest number of superintendents from an ethnic minority background compared to any other period.

However, the number of my respondents was equivalent to only 4% of all the superintendents in the 43 police forces in England and Wales, at the time of my fieldwork. Therefore, although the composition of my respondents reflects the national make-up, the small number means that any claim that they are a representative sample requires a great deal of caution.

Personal and professional profile.

I have included the following information in order to give a fuller and more detailed descriptive picture of my respondents and not for comparative purposes, because such information is not readily available for all the superintendents in all the forces in England and Wales. Additionally, the information helps to support my claim that my respondents are more likely than not to be a representative sample. Table 4 gives the year of birth, age, date of joining the police and length of service of my respondents.

Table 4. Respondents' personal details.

Respondents	Born	Age	Sex	Date of Joining	Length of Service
1	1953	43	Male	1972	24
2	1944	52	M	1964	32
3	1953	43	M	1972	24
4	1947	49	M	1969	27
5	1945	51	M	1969	27
6	1945	51	M	1965	31
7	1950	46	M	1969	27
8	1950	46	M	1969	27
9	1947	49	M	1967	31
10	1946	50	M	1966	30
11	1948	48	M	1967	31
12	1956	40	M	1975	21
13	1946	50	M	1966	30
14	1948	48	M	1967 (Cadet 1965)	31
15	1948	48	Female	1971	25
16	1954	42	M	1978	18
17	1952	44	M	1969	27
18	1949	47	M	1969	27
19	1951	45	M	1970	26
20	1943	53	M	1963	33
21	1944	52	M	1964	32
22	1947	49	M	1966	30
23	1945	51	M	1968	28
24	1939	57	M	1967	31
25	1958	38	M	1979	17
26	1944	52	M	1963	33
27	1947	49	M	1966	30
28	1948	48	M	1967 (Cadet 1965)	29
29	1944	52	M	1966	30
30	1944	52	M	1964	32
31	1945	51	M	1964	32
32	1949	47	M	1968 (Cadet 1966)	28
33	1942	54	M	1967	29
34	1947	49	M	1966	30
35	1944	52	M	1964	32
36	1944	52	M	1963 (Cadet 1960)	33
37	1945	51	M	1965	31
38	1945	51	M	1965 (Cadet 1961)	31
39	1945	51	M	1968	28
40	1947	49	M	1968	28
41	1946	50	M	1965 (Cadet 1963)	31
42	1953	43	M	1972 (Cadet 1971)	24
43	1953	43	M	1972 (Cadet 1971)	24
44	1954	42	M	1976	20
45	1943	53	M	1971	25
46	1945	51	M	1968	28
47	1953	43	Female	1980	16
48	1946	50	M	1965	31
49	1951	45	M	1971	25
50	1954	42	M	1973 (Cadet 1971)	23
51	1949	47	M	1972	24

Details of the age at which my respondents joined the police and in what capacity, and an aggregate of the percentage that joined at certain ages are shown in Tables 5 and 6 respectively below. All my respondents, like all other officers at whatever rank, joined as constables. At the time of the fieldwork, there was not the possibility of joining at a higher rank. However, at the time of writing the government had just raised in its 2004 White Paper on Police Reform titled *Building Communities, Beating Crime,* (Home Office 2004) the possibility of lateral entry in to the service

Table 5. Age at which respondents joined police service.

Respondents	Age at which joined police
1	19
2	20
3	19
4	22
5	24
6	20
7	19
8	19
9	20
10	20
11	18
12	19
13	20
14	17–Cadets. (19 joined Regulars)
15	23
16	24
17	17
18	20
19	19
20	20
21	20
22	19
23	23
24	28
25	21
26	19
27	19
28	17–Cadets. (19 joined Regulars)
29	22
30	20
31	19
32	17–Cadets. (19 joined Regulars)
33	25
34	19
35	20
36	16–Cadets. (19 joined Regulars)
37	20
38	16–Cadets. (19 joined Regulars)
39	23
40	21
41	17–Cadets. (19 joined Regulars)
42	17–Cadets. (19 joined Regulars)
43	17–Cadets. (19 joined Regulars)
44	22
45	28
46	23
47	27
48	19
49	20
50	17 – Cadet
51	23

Table 6. Age at which respondents joined the police.

Age at which joined police	No.	%
16	2	4
17	8	16
18	1	2
19	12	23
20	12	23
21	2	4
22	3	6
23	5	10
24	2	4
25	1	2
26	0	0
27	1	2
28	2	4
Total	51	100

Data collection.

I chose to collect the information from my respondents by carrying out face-to-face interviews using a semi-structured question schedule.

The interview technique was preferable for this study for a number of reasons.

- I was going to be asking numerous open-ended questions, often followed by open-ended probes, and I would be recording the answers verbatim. "Such open-ended questions are important in allowing the respondents to say what they think and to do so with greater richness and spontaneity" (Oppenheim 1992: 89).

- I could be certain that it would improve the response rate in comparison to using a self-completion postal questionnaire.

- I could give a better prepared and fuller explanation of the purpose of the study, and what I wanted from the respondents, than I could have done with a letter.

- I could develop some level of *rapport* with the respondents. Oppenheim has described rapport as, "this elusive quality, which keeps the respondent motivated and interested in answering the questions truthfully" (ibid.). Keeping my respondents motivated and interested was important because I wanted to get rich data from them and I believed that this was a way of achieving that.

To establish rapport necessitates developing good conversation skillls. Kvale suggests that the research interview is based on the conversations of daily life and is a professional conversation. He defines a semi-structured life world interview as "an interview whose purpose is to obtain descriptions of the life world of the interviewees with respect to interpreting the meaning of the described phenomenon" (Kvale 1996).

For my study, I decided to use a semi-structured interview schedule because I wanted to minimise any bias in the way I conducted the interviews with my respondents. This sounds paradoxical in light of the above statement that I wanted to build a rapport with my respondents. However, I was concerned that once we started 'discussing' the different areas contained in the question schedule and having developed a rapport with each one, I may have found it difficult to stop the conversation drifting onto areas that my respondents and I found mutually more interesting. Enjoyable as this may have been for both of us, if I was unable prevent the interview drifting it could have yielded little comparable information from all my respondents.

This concern was a rational one because although Kvale suggests that the research interview is based on professional conversations of daily life, it is not a conversation between equal partners, since the researcher defines the subject of conversation and, to a certain extent, controls the situation. In my case, although never intended, I believe that the encounters with my respondents were influenced in my favour, the researcher, for the following reasons.

Access letter. I successfully applied to the Police Staff College to carry out the work under the Bramshill Fellowship Scheme (1), after I had been accepted by the London School of Economics to pursue the study. The reasons for applying for the Scheme, which provided academic support but not financial, were twofold. The first was that it would give the study credibility in the eyes of the chief officers from whom I would have to seek permission to interview their officers. This was important because Forces were finding it harder to accommodate the number of requests they were receiving from students and scholars who wanted to carry out research on the police. Secondly, it would guarantee me the time to conduct the fieldwork, which due to the research design would prove to be extremely time-consuming. To reinforce the

credibility of the study and thereby provide further justification for chief officers to allow me to work with their officers, I added that the study was being carried out in conjunction with work that was being done by the ACPO Quality of Service Committee: The 'GTR' initiative. (A copy of this letter is shown as Appendix A). Not entirely certain that the above measures would guarantee me access to my chosen Forces, I approached my Commissioner at the time, Mr William Taylor, for his support and he added a personal letter to the one I was sending to the chief officers. (A copy of this letter is shown as Appendix B).

The combination of these two letters, the support of the Police Staff College under the Bramshill Fellowship Scheme, and the reputation of my supervisor, Professor Robert Reiner, made the offer to chief officers to use their Force as part of the study, one that was too good to refuse! In truth, these were the measures I felt I had to go through to have some certainty that I would get access to those Forces that I thought would be ideal for the study.

One ethical problem that these measures might have created for my respondents and their Forces was the possible pressure to agree to my request to work with their Force. I had to ensure that both Force and individual officers consented freely and voluntarily (Homan 1991: Ch 4).

From the Forces' perspective, I believe the fact that two Forces were prepared to turn down my request to work with their officers shows that any pressure was resistible and not unethical. From the individual's perspective, I always made it clear during the pre-interview discussion with my respondents that they did not have to participate in the study if they did not want to. I believe that if a participant was participating voluntarily then s/he was more likely to be open in their replies to the questions. The responses from my respondents clearly showed that they responded to my questions fully and openly. Additionally, one possible ethical safeguard that the combined measures offered was that I was under pressure to ensure that the way I conducted the study lived up to the reputation and integrity of the supporters of the study (Homan 1991: Ch. 1 & 7).

The reason I felt I had to employ these efforts to ensure that I secured access to my respondents was not because the police service was still remaining secretive to academic scrutiny. On the contrary, it was because the service had become so accommodating to both internal and external requests to carry out academic studies that they were becoming a drain on its resources.

Pre-interview chat. Once I had secured access to the Forces that I wanted to participate in the study, I arranged with my liaison person in each Force a time and date to meet the participants for the interviews. Before an interview, I met each one for a pre-interview chat. With some of them, we had lunch beforehand, but on every occasion I made sure that we had some time to discuss the aim of the study and policing in general before we started the interviews. The reason was to establish some level of rapport with each respondent, and deal with any concerns they may have had about participating in the study. One recurring concern my respondents expressed was whether they would be able to give me the answers that I was looking for. I explained that I did not have any pre-conceived idea of what their answers would or should be. I had certainly not formed any expectations of 'right' or 'wrong' answers. I made it clear that what I hoped for from them were their professional and personal views of the different areas we were going to cover. From this, I intended to draw together the collective perspective of policing of all the participants.

Question schedule. This was a modification of the question schedule used by Reiner in his study of chief constables (Reiner 1991: 356-361). The modifications that I made consisted of replacing Reiner's section on 'External Environment of the Police Force' with my 'Management of Change' section. This enabled me to concentrate more on activities of my respondents. I also removed some questions from the different sections that were not relevant to my study. For example, under Reiner's Section A: Work History, questions 6,7,8,14, 15 and parts of question 9 that covered his respondents' position as chief officers were omitted.

Even after removing and replacing some questions, there were still a significant number that remained the same, and in certain sections of the thesis I have been able to make some comparative analysis between both data sets. A typical example was the section on 'Crime and its Control'. I did not show my respondents the questions

before I interviewed them, because I wanted them to reply spontaneous and intuitively.

The questions (shown as Appendix C) covered the following areas:

- Work History
- The Police Function
- Crime and its Control
- Public Disorder
- Internal Management
- Management of Change
- Social Perspective
- Personal Background.

Process. I carried out the interviews between October 1995 and September 1996, and each was carried out in the respondent's Force. Each interview was tape-recorded, with the agreement of the respondent. I decided to tape-record the interviews because I felt that it would enable me to collect much richer data and the method would lead to information that is more accurate when I transcribed the tapes. Additionally, it meant that the interviews could flow easier, which would enable me to build a rapport with my respondents.

Whilst piloting different methods for recording the interviews with officers from my Force, I had tried writing the replies contemporaneously. However, I found that this method not only made the conversation slow and repetitive because I had to ask my respondent to repeat some of their answers, but when I came to analyse the data it was very sparse in comparison to other pilot interviews I had tape-recorded. I therefore decided based on the results from both methods that I would tape-record the interviews because it was likely to yield more information through a better flow of the conversation.

The interviews lasted between thirty minutes and three hours. The three-hour interview would have continued longer had it not been that I had come to the end of a second tape and was then nearly an hour late from seeing my next scheduled

respondent, and he had actually telephoned the officer I was then interviewing to ask him, jokingly, to release me!

Data analysis.

I transcribed all the tapes and used the qualitative data analysis software QSR NUD*IST (2) to analyse the data. I started using version 2 of NUD*IST, but by the time I had transcribed all the tapes, some two years later, a new version of NUD*IST had been released. The newer version – 4 – had updated software that allowed for more in-depth analysis of the collected data.

However, before settling on NUD*IST as my analytical tool, I experimented with a variety of methods for analysing the data. For example, I started listing relevant comments under the different areas of the question schedule. However, I soon realised after doing this for a couple of interviews that this would become very complex and cumbersome. I then tried to note the time on each tape where each respondent made a valuable and relevant comment. Again, I quickly realised that by winding and rewinding the tapes back and forth I ran the risk of damaging them and losing my data.

In the end, I decided that the method that was likely to yield information that is more accurate was to tape-record the interviews. The recordings were then transcribed into Microsoft Word before they were transferred onto the NUD*IST 4 software package, with which I then compared and analysed all the data.

Discussion.

Asking questions and getting answers is a much harder task than it may seem at first sight. The spoken or written word has always a residue of ambiguity, no matter how carefully we word the questions and report the answers. Yet interviewing is one of the most powerful methods by which to understand our fellow human beings. This was perhaps the main reason why I decided to use face-to-face interview to collect data from my respondents, because the common occupational background of interviewer and interviewee was likely to create the empathy and understanding that would lead to a more open and responsive discussion between both. Of course, the use of a semi-structured interview and my skills as an interviewer would not have been, in this case, the only determinants of a more open and responsive encounter. I believe that the knowledge gained as a 'participant observer' over the years as a police officer would have contributed greatly to getting the best from my respondents.

As a fellow officer, I had experienced the culture of the police service through sharing some common learning, experiences and values with my respondents. This had given me a similar world-view, which I used to adapt my responses to each officer in order to bring out the best in each encounter. However, I was also mindful that the ability to see and interpret situations in a similar way as my respondents did not necessarily mean that our world-view was an accurate one. Our way of seeing could also mean that we were not seeing some things that were perhaps more accurate.

Nonetheless, since I was not looking for 'right' or 'wrong' answers, I decided that face-to-face interview was the ideal method with which to tease out the thoughts and feelings of my respondents and it provided the best method by which to better probe the culture of this group of officers that I had decided to make the subject of my study. The next chapter will discuss the social background of my respondents and its possible effect on the culture of this group of officers.

Chapter 3

POLICE CULTURE.

INTRODUCTION.

In this chapter, I shall start by discussing the concept of culture, offering a definition based on a paradigm developed by Edgar Schein. I shall then use the definition, together with two recent studies on police culture by Chan (Chan 1996) and Waddington (Waddington 1999) to discuss the aspects of police 'cop' and 'management' culture.

The reason for starting the chapter with a definition of culture is that discussions on police culture have invariably started from a position that assumes that the reader's concept and understanding of culture is the same as the author's and consequently authors have rarely described what the term culture is meant to signify. For example, Chan offers the following descriptive aspects of culture,

> "Manning refers to the 'core skills, cognitions, and affect' that defines 'good police work'... Reiner equates it with the 'values, norms, perspectives and craft rules' that inform police conduct. Skolnick speaks of the 'working personality' of a police officer – a response to the danger of police work, the authority of the police constable, and the pressure to be 'productive' and 'efficient' in police work" (Chan 1996: 111).

Too often it is taken as a given that the concept of culture means the same thing to all readers, and therefore all that is necessary is for an author to move straight into discussing the elements and effects of police culture. This can be problematic, because if the reader does not have a clear understanding of what an author defines as culture, then there is likely to be misunderstanding and misinterpretation of the discussion. Therefore, to obviate any misunderstanding or misinterpretation it is important to offer a definition of culture before delving into the discussion.

DEVELOPING AN ANALYTICAL PARADIGM.

The word culture is a ubiquitous term that means different things to different people. For example, in everyday usage the layperson often uses it to describe someone who is educated, well mannered and sophisticated, such as when an individual is described as 'cultured'. At the other extreme and in a more formal and technical sense, anthropologists use culture to describe the rituals and customs that a particular social group has developed to guide and inform its behaviour and actions.

In the study of management theory and practice over the last two decades or so, organisational researchers and managers have used the term to describe "the climate and practices that organisations develop around their handling of people or to refer to the espoused values and credo of an organisation." (Schein 1992: 3). As Schein points out, "in this context managers speak of developing the 'right kind of culture' or a 'culture of quality,' suggesting that culture is concerned with certain values that managers are trying to inculcate in their organisations. Also implied in this usage is the assumption that there are better or worse cultures, stronger or weaker cultures, and that the 'right' kind of culture will influence how effective organisations are" (ibid).

This latter quote is a good example of the way that the police service has used the term in the recent past. ACPO Quality of Service Committee's message has been predominantly about improving the culture of the police service so that it would be better able to deal effectively with the demands and expectations that are currently placed on it (ACPO 1993a).

However, the complexity of such a simple managerial desire lies in the fact that the concept of culture can and does mean different things to different people. To some, it is a complex concept, while to others it is a simple one. For some it is a part of an organisation, for others it is the organisation. Therefore, there has not always been a consensus both internally and externally on what police culture is, or how the culture could or should be influenced to bring about desired changes. The police's own internal document (*Getting Things Right*) on how to bring about a change in management style and consequently a change in cultural perspective offers an elaborate and interrelated menu of options that is anything but straightforward in its

implementation. One of the main reasons for the complexity lies in the different meanings given to the different aspects of culture.

Schein's definition of culture helps to explain the existence of multiple meanings through the development of a three-tiered model. He suggests that, "if an abstract concept is to be useful to our thinking, it should refer to a set of events that are otherwise mysterious and not well understood". From this point of view, he adds that, "we must avoid the superficial models of culture and build on the deeper, more complex anthropological models". He argues that, "culture would be most useful as a concept if it helps us better understand the hidden and complex aspects of organisational life", and that, "this understanding cannot be obtained if we use superficial definitions" (Schein 1993: 3).

Towards a paradigm.

According to Schein, a commonly ascribed meaning of culture emphasises one of its critical aspects, which is the idea that certain things in groups are *"shared or held in common."* Some of the other major categories of phenomena that are associated with culture in this sense are the following:

1   *"Observed behavioural regularities when people interact:* the *language* they use, the *customs and traditions* that evolve, and the *rituals* they employ in a wide variety of situations." In policing terms, this category is exemplified by what Smith and Gray (1983) described as the *'working rules'* that police officers use to modify their behaviour during their interactions with members of the public. This exemplifies Waddington's (1999) appreciative description of police *oral* culture. However, as will be made clear later, this may only reflect one level of police culture and not *the* culture.

2   *"Group norms:* the implicit standards and values that evolve in working groups, such as the particular norm of a 'fair day's work for a fair day's pay' that evolved among the workers in the Bank Wiring Room in the Hawthorne studies (for example, Homans 1950)". In terms of the police, the analogy would be that officers should maintain solidarity with others of similar rank, and treat those of different ranks differently, possibly as 'outsiders'. For example, the type of situation that developed in some police precincts in New

York City following the report of the Knapp Commission on corruption in the 1970s (Reuss-Ianni and Ianni 1983).

3   *"Espoused values:* the articulated, publicly announced principles and values that the group claims to be trying to achieve, such as 'product quality' or 'price leadership'." A contemporary manifestation of this aspect of culture with reference to police management would be the publication of force values and statements of purpose.

4   *"Formal philosophy:* the broad policies and ideological principles that guide a group's actions toward stockholders, employees, customers, and other stakeholders, such as the highly publicised 'HP Way' or Hewlett-Packard." In the police service, these are now published in documents such as policing plans. A few years ago, they would have been published as Police Charters.

5   *"Rules of the game:* the implicit rules of getting along in the organisation, 'the ropes' that a newcomer must learn to become an accepted member, 'the way we do things around here'". The socialisation process to which new members are subjected in order to establish themselves in the organisation in general and their place of work in particular (Fielding 1988, Graef 1989).

6   *"Climate:* the feeling that is conveyed in a group by the physical layout and the way in which members of the organisation interact with each other, with customers, or with other outsiders." The overt display of the perception of them and us in the sense that officers perceive themselves as the protectors of the ethical and moral standards of society. Without their overt and visible presence, the fragile control and harmony this creates in society would be damaged, which would lead to chaos and anarchy. This view is typified by the argument of the 'thin blue line'.

7   *"Embedded skills:* the special competencies group members display in accomplishing certain tasks, the ability to make certain things that gets passed on from generation to generation without necessarily being articulated in writing (for example, Peters and Waterman 1982)." Recognising and respecting a good villain, and not confusing him with a 'toe-rag'. Knowing how to get a 'cough' from an offender, skills that only comes from practical experience gained through dealing with villains. The suggestion is that the skills required to perform these important tasks properly can only be gained through professional experience 'on the job' and they are not acquired easily

through book learning. One acquires them through long, hard practical operational experience.

8   *"Habits of thinking, mental models, and/or linguistic paradigms:* the shared cognitive frames that guide the perceptions, thoughts, and language used by the members of a group and are taught to new members in the early socialisation process."* There is a debate about the difference between what is articulated in the 'canteen' and what is acted out on the streets. Police officers' thoughts and words expressed in private are not translated directly into action on the street (Waddington 1999a).

9   *"Shared meanings:* the emergent understandings that are celebrated by group members as they interact with each other."*

10   *"Root metaphors" or integrating symbols:* the ideas, feelings, and images groups develop to characterise themselves, that may or may not be appreciated consciously but that become embodied in buildings, office layout, and other material artefacts of the group. This level of the culture reflects group members' emotional and aesthetic responses as contrasted with their cognitive or evaluative responses."*

Schein explains that "all of these concepts relate to culture and/or reflect culture in that they deal with things that group members share or hold in common, but none of them are 'the culture' of an organisation or group" (Schein 1992: 8). He suggests that the reason why we use the word culture instead of many of the others available to describe regular behaviour patterns such as, *"norms, values, rituals, traditions,"* is because the word *culture* adds two other critical elements to the concept of sharing. One of them is that the word implies "some level of *structural stability* in the group.

"The other element that lends stability is *patterning or integration* of the elements into a larger paradigm that ties together the various elements that lie at a deeper level. Culture somehow implies that rituals, climate, values, and behaviours bind together into a coherent whole. This patterning or integration is the *essence"* of what Schein, means by culture (ibid).

This integration of the different elements of culture in to a coherent whole comes about through the accumulated learning of a given group, and it covers the behavioural, emotional, and cognitive elements of the group members' total psychological functioning. However, "for shared learning to occur, there must be a history of shared experience, which in turn implies some stability of membership in the group." Therefore, "given such stability and shared history, the human need for parsimony, consistency, and meaning will cause the various shared elements to form into patterns that eventually can be called a culture" (ibid).

Naturally, not all groups develop integrated cultures in this sense. On the contrary, as those who have spent time with the police would have experienced, different groups from the same station will police the same area in different ways. The values and norms of these groups will not always be the same. Moreover, different ranks and functional units within the service will display different cultural elements, which may work at cross-purpose with other elements, leading to situations full of conflict and ambiguity. "This may result from insufficient stability of membership, insufficient shared experience, or the presence of many subgroups with different kinds of shared experiences" (ibid).

Equally, "ambiguity and conflict also result from the fact that each of us belongs to many groups so that what we bring to any given group is influenced by the assumptions that are appropriate to our other groups" (Schein 1992: 11). Schein suggests that if the concept of culture is to be of any use it should draw our attention to those things that are the product of our human need for stability, consistency, and meaning. The consistency of the observed behaviour that Waddington describes as the *oral* culture (Waddington 1999(1): 118)), which is common amongst officers that are separated by time and location and which as he has acknowledged consist of derogatory sexist and racist language by officers, suggest that it must provide some stability and meaning to officers' occupational environment. Schein adds, "Culture formation, therefore, is always, by definition, a *striving towards patterning and integration*, even though the actual history of experiences of many groups prevents them from ever achieving a clear-cut paradigm" (Schein 1992: 11).

The question is "if a group's culture is that group's accumulated learning, how do we describe and catalogue the content of that learning?" Schein explains that "all groups and organisational theories distinguish two major sets of problems that all groups, no matter what their size, must deal with:

1. Survival, growth, and adaptation in their environment (this is analogous to Chan's (1996) concept of 'Field'; and
2. Internal integration that permits daily functioning and the ability to adapt (this is analogous to Chan's concept of 'Habitus')."

Learning can and does take place at different levels for the individual and groups. Schein adds that "in conceptualising group learning, we have to note that because of the human capacity to abstract and to be self-conscious, learning occurs not only at the behavioural level but also at an abstract level internally. Once people have a common system of communication and a language, learning can take place at a conceptual level and shared concepts become possible." It is this deeper level of learning that Schein suggests get us to the essence of culture and which must be thought of as "shared basic assumptions" (Schein 1992: 11).

"Shared assumptions derive their power from the fact that they begin to operate outside of awareness. Furthermore, once formed and taken for granted, they become a defining property of the group that permits the group to differentiate itself from other groups, and in that process, value is attached to such assumptions. They are not only 'our' assumptions, but by virtue of our history of success, they must be right and good. In fact, we tend not to examine assumptions once we have made them but we take them for granted, and we tend not to discuss them, which make them seemingly unconscious. If we are forced to discuss them, we tend not to examine them but to defend them because we have emotionally invested in them" (Schein 1992: 12).

Towards a definition.

From his experience and study of the concept, Schein offers the following definition of culture.

"A pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group learned as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems" (Schein 1992: 12)

This definition introduces two elements that have so far not been discussed. These are *socialisation and behaviour*. The issue of socialisation concerns whether culture can be learned through anticipatory socialisation or self-socialisation, and whether new members could discover for themselves what the basic assumptions of a group are. Schein suggests that culture could be learned through both anticipatory and self-socialisation. He adds that one of the major activities of any new member when they join a group is to decipher the norms and assumptions that are operating within that group. However, this deciphering can only be successfully achieved through understanding the rewards and punishments that long-time members mete out to new members as they experiment with different kinds of behaviour. "In this sense, a teaching process is always going on, even though it may be quite implicit and unsystematic. If the group does not have shared assumptions, as is sometimes the case, the new members' interaction with old members will be a more creative process of building a culture. Once shared assumptions exist, however, the culture survives through teaching them to newcomers. In this regard culture is a mechanism of social control and can be the basis of explicitly manipulating members into perceiving, thinking, and feeling in certain ways" (Schein 1992: 13).

The definition of culture offered above does not include overt behaviour patterns, despite the fact that some such behaviour would reflect cultural assumptions, especially formal rituals. Part of the reason for this is that "overt behaviour is always determined both by the cultural predisposition (the perceptions, thoughts and feelings that are patterned) and by the situational contingencies that arise from the immediate external environment. Behavioural regularities could thus be as much a reflection of separate but similar individual experiences and/or common situational stimuli arising from the environment." Therefore, "when we observe behaviour regularities, we do not know whether we are dealing with a cultural manifestation" or an individual reaction to situational stimuli. Schein suggests that only after we have discovered the

deeper layers that he has defined as the essence of culture can we specify what is and what is not an 'artefact' that reflects the culture (Schein 1992: 14). This explanation of behavioural regularities appear at odds with most analyses of police culture, which suggest it is a result of work process interaction, where common problems structure similar modes of coping, which are then transmitted by interaction. However, using the following example, it is arguable that there is no dissonance between both explanations. Twenty years ago, it was common practice for junior officers, instinctively, to stand when a senior officer, particularly one of ACPO rank, walked into a room. Today, the practice is not as widespread nor carried out as instantly, but is still done by some officers in some forces. The reasons why today a relatively smaller group of officers still behave this way could be a reflection of separate but similar individual experiences, or a cultural manifestation, but one that is losing its significance.

Analysis of Culture.
In analysing culture, Schein separates the concept into three categories and makes a clear distinction between the superficial level he terms 'artefact' with the other, deeper levels of 'espoused values' and 'basic assumptions'. The term level is used to describe the degree to which the cultural phenomenon is visible to the observer. He uses this distinction of the different levels to explain that *"some of the confusion of definition of what culture really is results from not differentiating the levels at which it manifest itself.* These levels range from the very tangible overt manifestations that one can see and feel to the deeply embedded, unconscious basic assumptions, which he defines as the essence of culture. While in between these extremes lie 'espoused values', which are the norms, and rules of behaviour that members of the culture use as a way of depicting the culture to themselves and others" (Schein 1992: 16).

Levels of culture.
Taking an in-depth look at the three levels to which Schein adheres, they provide some objectivity to the discussion of culture.

Figure 3.1. Levels of Culture (Schein 1992: 17)

Artefacts — Visible organisational structures and processes (hard to decipher)

Espoused Values — Strategies, goals, philosophies (espoused values)

Basic Underlying Assumptions — Unconscious, taken-for-granted beliefs, perceptions, thoughts, and feelings (ultimate source of values and action)

Artefacts

This is the surface, superficial and most visible of Schein's three-level representation of culture and it consists of "all the phenomena that one sees, hears, and feels when one encounters a new group with an unfamiliar culture." It includes "its language, manners of dress, emotional displays, myths and stories told about the organisation, published list of values, observable rituals and ceremonies."

The importance of this level of the culture is that although every facet of a group's life produces artefacts, nonetheless, it is easy to observe and very difficult to decipher. This creates a problem in classifying the different descriptions of culture.

As Schein observes, *"in reading cultural descriptions, one often notes that different observers choose to report on different sorts of artefacts, leading to noncomparable descriptions"*. However, "if the observer lives in the group long enough, the meaning of artefacts gradually become clear". He warns that, *"it is especially dangerous to try to infer the deeper assumptions from artefacts alone because one's interpretations will inevitably be projections of one's own feelings and reactions"* (Schein 1992:18). (My emphases). Although not directed at his interpretation of police *oral* culture, Waddington makes a similar point when he suggests that "there is the distinct possibility that the literature on the police sub-culture tells us more about the peculiarities of academic life than it does about the distinctiveness of the police" (Waddington 1999a: 292).

Espoused Values.

This is the second level of the model and it reflects the ideals rather than the substance of the group. Schein offers an explanation of how this level is developed by suggesting that, "when a group faces a new task, issue or problem, the first solution proposed reflects some individual's own assumptions about what is right or wrong, and what will work or not work." However, whatever is proposed at this stage to deal with the new task or resolve the problem will only have the status of a value from the point of view of the group, regardless of how strongly the proponent may believe he is uttering absolute truth. "Until the group has taken some joint action and its members have together observed the outcome of that action, there is not as yet a shared basis for determining what is factual and real" (Schein 1992: 19).

If the group acts on the proposal and it is successful, in that it produces the suggested results, and if the group has a shared perception of that success, then the perceived value will gradually start a process of *"cognitive transformation.* First, it will be transformed into a *shared value or belief* and, ultimately, into a *shared assumption* (if action based on it continues to be successful)" (ibid).

However, "not all values undergo such transformation. First, the solution based on a given value may not work reliably. Only values that are susceptible to physical or social validation (i.e. that are confirmed only by the shared social experience of the group) and that continue to work reliably in

solving the group's problems will become transformed into assumptions. Second, value domains dealing with the less controllable elements of the environment or with aesthetic or moral matters may not be testable at all. In such cases consensus through social validation is still possible, but it is not automatic.

"Such values typically involve the group's internal relations, where the test of whether they work or not is how comfortable and anxiety free members are when they abide by them...A set of values that becomes embodied in an ideology or organisational philosophy thus can serve as a guide and as a way of dealing with the uncertainty of intrinsically uncontrollable or difficult events.

"Values at this conscious level will predict much of the behaviour that can be observed at the artificial level. But if those values are not based on prior learning, they may also reflect what Argyris and Schon (1978) have called espoused values, which will predict well enough what people will *say* in a variety of situations but which may be out of line with what they will actually *do* in situations where those values should in fact be operating" (Schein 1992: 21). This is the premise of Waddington's *Police (Canteen) Culture* article (Waddington 1999a).

"If the espoused values are reasonably congruent with the underlying assumptions, then the articulation of those values into a philosophy of operating can be helpful in bringing the group together, serving as a source of identity and core mission... Often such lists of values are not patterned, sometimes they are even mutually contradictory, and often they are inconsistent with observed behaviour." The consequence is that "large areas of behaviour are often left unexplained, leaving us with a feeling that we understand a piece of culture but still do not have the culture as such in hand" (Schein 1992: 21).

Basic Assumptions.

Schein defines these as assumptions that have become so taken for granted that one finds little variation within the cultural unit. Adding that,

"in fact, if a basic assumption is strongly held in a group, members will find behaviour based on any other premise inconceivable... They tend to be those we neither confront nor debate and hence are extremely difficult to change. To learn something new in this realm requires us to resurrect, re-examine, and possibly change some of the more stable portions of our cognitive structure... Such learning is intrinsically difficult because the re-examination of basic assumptions temporarily destabilises our cognitive and interpersonal world, releasing large quantities of anxiety.

"Rather than tolerating such anxiety levels we tend to want to perceive the events around us as congruent with our assumptions, even if that means distorting, denying, projecting, or in other ways falsifying to ourselves what may be going on around us. It is in this psychological process that culture has its ultimate power. Culture as a set of basic assumptions defines for us what to pay attention to, what things mean, how to react emotionally to what is going on, and what actions to take in various kinds of situations. Once we have developed an integrated set of such assumptions, which might be called a thought world or mental map, we will be maximally comfortable with others who share the same set of assumptions and very uncomfortable and vulnerable in situations where different assumptions operate either because we will not understand what is going on, or, worse, misperceive and misinterpret the actions of others.

"The human mind needs cognitive stability. Therefore, any challenge to or questioning of a basic assumption will release anxiety and defensiveness. In this sense, the shared basic assumption that make up the culture of a group can be thought of at both the individual and group levels as psychological cognitive *defence mechanisms* that permit the group to continue to function" (Schein 1992: 22). How does this definition of culture help us better

understand the concept of police culture? I shall now turn to this question in the next section of this chapter.

Police culture.

The concept of police culture is one that has been widely studied. Skolnick provided a sketch of what he described as the policeman's 'working personality', which he defined by the three central elements of, the potential of 'danger', linked to 'authority' and set within a context in which efficiency is demanded. Danger makes the officer especially attentive to signs of potential violence and lawbreaking. The requirement on the officer to enforce laws provide authority but, together with the element of danger, produces and reinforces police solidarity and social isolation. (Skolnick 2005: 264).

Van Maanen argues that the element of suspiciousness leads officers to identify and group citizens into various classifications, one of which is 'Assholes' (Van Maanan 2005: 280). The stigmatization process, he says, has three stages: 'affront', 'clarification', and 'remedy'. Affront involves some challenge to the officer's authority; clarification is the process by which the officer determines what this affront 'means'; and remedy is the course of action taken in response to the clarification of the nature of the affront. The importance of this, Van Maanen argues, is that the process is close to the heart of the patrol officer's definition of his task providing, among many other things, a practical and moral justification for his existence (ibid).

Cotterrell (1984) provides a useful summary of the different explanations of police culture, from both British and American studies, but in line with most of the studies on the topic, it covered exclusively the culture of operational police officers.

The *"locus classicus"* for discussing the analyses of the voluminous work on 'cop culture' is the *Politics of the Police* by Robert Reiner. He explains that, "The culture of the police – the values, norms, perspectives and craft rules – which inform their conduct is, of course, neither monolithic, universal nor unchanging. There are differences of outlook within police forces, according to such individual variables as personality, generation or career trajectory, and structured variations according to

rank, assignment and specialisation. The organisational styles and cultures of police forces vary between different places and periods." Adding that "The culture survives because of its 'elective affinity', its psychological fit, with the demands of the rank-and-file cop condition" (Reiner 1985: 86).

Over the years, since the above comments by Reiner, the social and political environment in which policing is carried out has changed considerably. Consequently, there have been subtle changes in some of the characteristics of police culture, but the elements that form the core culture and sub-cultures remain the same. In his syntheses of the voluminous social research on police culture, Reiner identifies the following core elements of 'cop culture'.

"Mission-Action-Cynicism-Pessimism". Where officers strongly believe that "policing is not just a job but a way of life with a worthwhile purpose, at least in principle...The purpose is not conceived of as a political enterprise, but as the preservation of a valued way of life and the protection of the weak against the predatory." For them, "The mission of policing is not regarded as irksome. It is fun, challenging, exciting, a game of wits and skill."

Despite the fun and excitement to be had in carrying out the arduous task of preserving this valued way of life, "police officers rapidly acquired a set of views, which have been rightly described as 'cynical', or 'police pessimism'. Policemen do develop a hard skin of bitterness, seeing all social trends in apocalyptic terms, with the police as a beleaguered minority about to be over-run by the forces of barbarism. This pessimistic outlook is only cynical in a sense - in the despair felt that the morality which the police officer still adheres to is being eroded on all sides" (Reiner 1985: 89).

"Suspicion." Reiner explains that, "Suspiciousness is a product of the need to keep a look-out for signs of trouble, potential danger and clues to offences. It is a response to the danger, authority and efficiency elements in the environment, as well as an outcome of the sense of mission" (Reiner 1985: 91).

"Isolation/Solidarity." These features of social isolation and internal solidarity are ones that are often discussed by observers of police activity. The feature of solidarity operates both within the organisation between different ranks and functional groups, and without the organisation between the police and those outside. With the external aspect of solidarity sometimes explained as having a malign influence on police at times of police malpractice. Therefore, "Internal solidarity is a product not only of isolation, but also the need to be able to rely on colleagues in a tight spot, and a protective armour shielding the force as a whole from public knowledge of infractions. Many studies have stressed the powerful code which enjoins officers to back each other up in the face of external investigation." (Reiner 1985: 92).

Concentrating on the aspect of solidarity and isolation that can lead to internal conflicts, Reiner explains that, "some of these are structured within the rank hierarchy and the force division of labour, say between uniform and detective branches. It is true that these internal conflicts may often be over-ridden by the need to present a united front in the face of external attacks. However, this is not always so. The fundamental division between 'street cops' and 'management cops' can be reinforced in the face of external investigation. 'Management cops' are derided by the 'street-wise' operational officers. The depth of the gulf is due to the different, often contradictory, functions of the two levels"(ibid).

In addition to this internal division between managers and the rank-and-file, the service perpetuates a broader division, between itself and the public. "The them and us outlook which is a characteristic of police culture makes clear distinctions between types of 'them' (as well as of 'us')." The different typologies of 'them' include, *Good class villains; Police property; Rubbish; Challengers; Disarmers; Do-gooders; and Politicians.*

Since the publication of these typologies in 1985 one incident has changed the social and political environment of policing and raised the status of one of the groups classified as 'them'. This is the publication in 1999 of the Report of the Inquiry into the murder of Stephen Lawrence. The Report, followed by the subsequent legislative and procedural changes on defining and dealing with both racist incidents and racist

crimes have raised the profile and status of people from minority ethnic groups. Whereas people from minority ethnic groups could unwittingly have been placed in the category of *police property* before the publication of the Report, now they can wittingly be placed in the category of *Disarmers*. The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry Report and the subsequent public interest it generated forced the government to take positive steps to address the inadequate service that black people received from public sector organisations. For the police service, the government set targets for all forces for the recruitment, retention and progression of people from minority ethnic groups to become police officers, special constables and civilian staff (Home Office 1999). Internally, the police produced comprehensive guidelines on dealing with 'hate crimes' (ACPO 2000). The sum of all these changes was the increased importance and profile of people from minority ethnic groups in their encounters with the police service.

The concept of police culture and the fact that it influences the way police officers see the world and behave in it is readily accepted. The extent of how readily attitude, verbally expressed, is translated into action is a subject of debate, (Smith and Gray 1983, Waddington 1999(1)) and it is a point to which I shall now discuss, using in particular the studies by Waddington (1999a), Chan (1996) and Schein (1992).

Similar perspective.

There are many aspects of police culture on which the highlighted three, and many other, studies agree on. These include, i) loose definition of culture, ii) the existence of sub-cultures, iii) the aspect of them and us, iv) the liberal use of derogatory language to describe some citizens, and v) core/fundamental elements of the culture and its sub-cultures. However, although there is essentially only one difference between the studies, which is the strength of the link between language and action, it is such a fundamental one that its significance overshadows the similarities. Nonetheless, I shall start with the similarities.

Loose definition. Schein is clear on this point, explaining that the concept of culture has been the subject of considerable academic debate over a number of years, and that there are various approaches to defining and studying it. However, he argues that it creates difficulties for both the scholar and practitioner if definitions are fuzzy

and uses are inconsistent. Chan reinforces this view with the observation that "the concept of police culture in the criminological literature is loosely defined" (Chan: 111). Waddington's description of an *oral* culture infers the existence of other types police cultures or sub-cultures. Although not stated explicitly, there is an implied existence of an operational and action-based sub-culture (Waddington 1999). Many of the studies of police culture acknowledge that what they are describing is the culture or sub-culture of the uniformed patrol ranks, while a much smaller number have highlighted the distinction between street cop and management culture (Holdaway 1989; and Reuss-Ianni and Ianni 1983). Nonetheless, the definition of culture remained loose.

Culture and sub-cultures. Schein's three-level model of culture allows for the existence of police sub-cultures, where the term level refers to the degree to which the cultural phenomenon is visible to the observer. Waddington's description of *police (canteen) sub-culture* and his use of the phrase *"oral* culture" (page 288) also implies the existence of sub-cultures and places this aspect of the sub-culture neatly into the espoused values level of Schein's model. One of Chan's 'four major criticisms' of the way police culture has been conceptualised is the "failure of existing definitions of police culture to account for internal differentiation and jurisdictional differences". Adding that her research in New South Wales support the suggestion by Manning of 'three sub-cultures of policing' (Chan 1996: 111).

Them and us and derogatory language. The following sentence on the identification and grouping of citizens into various classifications by Van Maanen, which Newburn (2005) describes as one of the finest opening sentence in all policing literature illustrates clearly the depth of this feeling of them and us, because no police officer would ever place him or herself in this category.

"The asshole – creep, bigmouth, bastard, animal, mope, rough, jerkoff, clown, scumbag, wiseguy, phoney, idiot, shithead, bum, fool, or any of a number of anatomical, oral, or incestuous terms – is part of everyday policeman's world" (Van Maanen 2005: 280).

Both Chan and Waddington are clear and unequivocal that patrol officers use such derogatory words to describe some citizens, as are many other studies of patrol officers, and senior officers (Reiner 1992: 205). The conditions that lead to the use of such language is fairly clear when one considers the referents of police culture, 'isolation/solidarity', 'suspicion', 'cynicism', 'pessimism', 'conservatism' and 'racial prejudice' (Reiner 1985: Ch 3). However, the reason why such language is used is debateable. Waddington suggests that it "operates as a palliative rather than as a guide to future action" (Waddington 1992(1): 295), but this explanation intuitively forces one to ask, a palliative for what? Since, as Waddington himself asks, "If policing is mundane and boring, why do police officers expend so much time trying to convince each other and themselves that it is action-packed?" (ibid: 294). Is it a palliative from the mundanity and boredom? Schein's contention that "All group and organisational theories distinguish two major sets of problems that all groups, no matter what their size, must deal with: (1) survival, growth, and adaptation in their environment and (2) internal integration that permits daily functioning and the ability to adapt" (Schein 1992: 11), offers possible support for Waddington's explanation for these aspects of police culture and sub-cultures. From Schein's own analysis of groups surviving in and adapting to their external environment he concludes that "culture ultimately reflects the group's effort to cope and learn and is the residue of that learning process" (ibid: 68). The distinction between them and us and the use of derogatory descriptive terms for some citizens could be a coping mechanism for operational officers. The sub-categorisation of 'them' (Reiner 1985: 94-97) and the process of story telling and the sharing of experiences between officers that have had dealings with different groups of 'them' and those that have not, would enable the development of a common outlook and consistently similar language among officers separated by time and space.

From his analysis of managing internal integration Schein argues that "groups must develop explanations that help members deal with unpredictable and unexplainable events, the functional equivalent of religion, mythology, and ideology" (Schein: 92). Here lies the difference between Schein and most other researchers' interpretation of the link between language and action, and Waddington's. If the use of language is a means of helping members deal with unpredictable and unexplainable events then it is inconceivable that attitude, expressed verbally, would not influence

action. It may not lead to violent or aggressive action, which may be the obvious forms of discriminatory behaviour, but logic suggests it must have some direct influence on behaviour.

Core elements.

Schein defines the core elements of culture as basic assumptions, i.e. those that "have become so taken for granted that one finds little variation within the cultural unit" (Schein 1992: 21). There is agreement among researchers of the existence of some core elements of police culture and sub-cultures. Waddington describes them as 'fundamentals', while Chan, even though she points out that her research had highlighted three sub-cultures of policing, her arguments still infer that some elements are common to all three sub-cultures. This is not to suggest that police culture is monolithic and unchanging, but it does provide an explanation for the similarity in outlook of police officers from different parts of the world (Waddington 1999b: Ch1).

Differences.

Waddington is unequivocal that the derogatory and racist language uttered by officers in the privacy of police canteen and vehicles does not manifest itself in officers' actions on the street. For him, "the talk that constitutes much of what passes for police sub-culture provides little explanation of police behaviour" (Waddington 1999(1): 289). This proposition is at odds with other studies on police culture. Now, the majority is not always right, but the weight of research studies places, at the very least, a question mark over the persuasiveness of his argument. Schein's three level model of culture could, at a stretch, offer some support for Waddington's argument, where his '*oral* culture' would fit into the level of espoused values offered by Schein. However, the support is not strong, because as Schein explains "Though the essence of a group's culture is its pattern of shared, taken-for-granted basic assumptions, the culture will manifest itself at the levels of observable artefacts and shared espoused values, norms and rules of behaviour." Warning that, "it is important to recognise in analysing cultures that artefacts are easy to observe but difficult to decipher and that values may only reflect rationalisation or aspirations. To understand a group's culture, one must attempt to get at its shared basic assumptions and one must understand the learning process by which such basic assumptions come to be" (Schein 1992: 26). Language that has little relevance to activity is meaningless, and for police

officers, separated by time and space, to use similar language and to do so consistently when it does not have a strong link to action appears illogical.

Waddington quotes research studies, and the reanalysis of those studies which support his argument that the racism expressed verbally by officers in the privacy of their patrol cars or in the canteen were not translated into racially discriminatory acts in the way those same officers dealt with incidents (Waddington 1999(1): 288). Racially discriminatory behaviour does not have to take the form of aggressive or intimidatory action, which is the type of behaviour Waddington alludes to when he argues that racist language is not translated to racist behaviour. Racist behaviour can include subjecting black and minority ethnic people to a course of action that the white majority would not be not subjected. For example, using police stop and search data, the details of black people are disproportionately record than those of white people. One explanation offered by patrol officers is that they record the details of black people because they are more likely to complain. There is some validity in this claim because according to the 2002/03 *Annual Report and Accounts of the Police Complaints Authority* there was a noticeable difference by ethnicity in the areas of stop and search and racially discriminatory behaviour. The PCA pointed out that in its 1994/95 annual report one in four of the people stopped and searched came from minority ethnic communities (page 88). Adding that "although the total number of allegations this year was relatively small (153), there continue to be a statistical over-representation of black complainants (28.8 per cent compared to 14.0 per cent in the overall breakdown of complainants). Similarly, 53.7 per cent (269) of all allegations of racially discriminatory behaviour were from black complainants, compared with 22.6 per cent (113) of allegations made by Asian complainants, 17.8 per cent (89) from white complainants..." (ibid). In essence, and with some justification from figures of recorded complaints, officers completed stop and search forms for black people for reasons of self protection. Now considering that there is no power under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 to detain – not arrest – someone for the purpose of completing their details on a stop and search form, it is a remarkably consistent practice by officers separated by time and space. Co-incidentally, it is a practice that is as consistent as the use of racist language by officers separated by time and space. The reason offered by officers for this practice is that it is done for self protection, but the consistency of the practice leaves one wondering whether the real

reason is to do with exercising control and authority over black people who are on the streets at the time when officers carryout stop and search. This combined over-representation of black complaints among those people stopped and searched and those alleging racially discriminatory behaviour lend some support to the proposition that racist and derogatory language can and does translate into behaviour.

Further, racially discriminatory behaviour on the street can take the form of inaction. This was exemplified by the behaviour of some officers who attended the scene of the attack on the black teenager Stephen Lawrence in 1993. There inaction towards Duwayne Brooks, who was with Stephen at the time he was attacked, based on stereotyping contributed to loss of valuable evidence. The Inquiry stated, "We have to conclude that no officer dealt properly at the scene with Mr Brooks." Giving the reason that they, "were driven to the conclusion that Mr Brooks was stereotyped as a young black man exhibiting unpleasant hostility and agitation, who could not be expected to help, and whose condition and status simply did not need further examination or understanding. We believe that Mr Brook's colour and such stereotyping played their part in the collective failure of those involved to treat him properly and according to his needs" (Macpherson 1999: 15). Racist language does not have to be expressed in positive action, it can manifest itself in inaction based on racist attitude.

Summary
The basis of Chan's study, which was a review of the "concept of police culture and its utility for analysing the impact of police reform", is similar to this one, which focused on the concept of police management culture for the same reason. Although I agree with much of what she has to say about police culture, in the sense that it reflects the exposition of culture offered by Schein, there are elements of what she offers as police culture that are not *the* culture, in the sense that they are not basic assumptions, but are only part of police culture, in the sense that they are either espoused values or artefacts. For example, in her critique of existing theories on police culture, she presents four major criticisms of the way police culture had been conceptualised by commentators such as Reiner, Manning and Skolnick (page 111) on the subject. The first one is that cop culture was often described as though it was a monolithic, universal and unchanging phenomenon. She quoted the study by Reuss-

Ianni and Ianni, which made the distinction between cop culture and management culture, and offered the results of her own research that was carried out in 1992 in New South Wales to argue that a theory should account for multiple cultures within a police force and variation in cultures among police forces. Using the model developed by Schein, it is possible, looking at culture at the level of espoused values, to have multiple cultures. However, at the level of basic assumptions, which is the essence of any culture, I would argue that all three highlighted studies, and other studies that describe the existence of core elements of police culture, would support the proposition that there are elements that are similar to the different police sub-cultures. However, because the sub-cultures are visible at the artefacts and espoused values levels it is relatively easier to change these levels of the culture than it is to change the basic assumption level. For example, the use of derogatory and racist language, which reflects the 'oral culture' offered by Waddington, has changed substantially over the years, from a position where officers openly used racist and derogatory language to some citizens, to the position today where, although it is still practised by some officers, it is done in 'safe' environments and by the minority not the majority. However, if one takes the element of *authority* as one of the core elements of the different sub-cultures of the police and considers the attempts that have been made to diffuse the police hold and control of it, it is evident how difficult it has been to do this. For example, the Police Federation have voiced very clearly their displeasure at the government's introduction of Police Community Support Officers (PCSO), which they have consistently argued is policing on the cheap. They have argued very strongly that they should not be given police powers, which would mean police personnel (who are not sworn officers) having the same level of authority to control citizens as regular sworn officers. ACPO have voiced their concern at suggestions that a chief officer from an adjoining force or a senior manager from an outside organisation could take over the reigns of 'failing' forces. This would lead to significant reduction in the authority of ACPO in general and chief officers in particular.

Her second criticism "relates to the implicit passivity of police officers in the acculturation process" (page 111) adding that current theories do not recognise the interpretive and active role of officers in structuring their understanding of the organisation and its environment.. This criticism could be levelled at Waddington's

exposition of police canteen sub-culture, because the implication is that officers engage in the use of is derogatory and racist language unquestioningly. The third criticism is that current theories do not situate culture in the political and social context of policing. Schein's model addresses this criticism, since it advocates that one of the conditions under which cultural changes occur is when an organisation has to adapt to changes in its environmental (which may be social or political) in order to grow or survive. Her final criticism, which is related to the first three, is that an all-powerful, homogeneous and deterministic conception of the police culture insulated from the external environment would leave little scope for a cultural change. The fact is that police culture is all these things, although not insulated from the external environment, and for this reason, it does leave little scope for change. As Schein explains, "any challenge to or questioning of a basic underlying assumption will release anxiety and defensiveness. In this sense, the shared basic assumptions that make up the culture of the group can be thought of at both the individual and group levels as psychological cognitive defence mechanisms that permit the group to continue to function. Recognising this connection is important when one thinks about changing aspects of a group's culture, for it is no easier to do than to change an individual's pattern of defence mechanisms. In either case the key is the management of the large amounts of anxiety that accompany any relearning at this level" (Schein 1992: 23). Waddington also makes this point of fundamental elements of the sub-culture acting as psychological defence mechanisms that permit the group to continue to function.

Concerning Waddington's study, he concluded from his review of the literature on police sub-culture that what occurs in the canteen is expressive talk designed to give purpose and meaning to inherently problematic occupational experience. This conclusion and the premise on which it is based is problematic in the sense that he describes the actions of officers on the street in deterministic terms and the language that officers use in the canteen in voluntaristic ones, and from this base decides that the link between what officers do and what they say is a very weak one. At best, the problem with his conclusion is that it describes police occupational culture at the artefact and espoused values level according to the definition of culture offered by Schein. At worst, it is a weak explanation of police encounters with members of the public, for the following reasons. Firstly, the nature of the majority of

police encounters with the public are not problematic or confrontational, therefore explaining the language that officers use in the canteen as "expressive talk designed to give purpose and meaning to the inherently problematic occupational experience", disregards the bulk of police/public encounters and concentrates on the exceptional ones, which are likely to be problematic and therefore could require a palliative. In essence, what Waddington does is to base his interpretation of police culture on his and other researchers' recognisable *actions* (for example, aggressive act) of officers' encounters with members of the public, instead of the far greater number of *activities* (for example, non aggressive routine stops) that officers carry out on the street. Additionally, it would be interesting to get an explanation of their perception of the nature of the police public encounter from those members of the public that officers speak so disparagingly about in private, but treat honourably in public. One intuitive question that follows from Waddington's assertions is, who is likely to be the better judge of whether an officer's behaviour has been racist during an encounter; the officer, the independent researcher, or the person on the receiving end?

Secondly, the argument that the canteen is an arena of action separated from the street, where in contrast to the street officers act before their peers is not sustainable in light of the description, given by Chan in her study, of the behaviour of officers during their encounters with aboriginal people during the making of the television programme *Cop It Sweet(a)*. Police officers, like members of any other occupational group, will behave 'naturally', in an environment that they consider to be safe – such as in a police canteen, and will modify their behaviour in an environment that is not, such as in public view (although on the face of it, this does not appear to have been the case for the officers in Redfern).

In the final analysis, my conclusion is that I support both Waddington and Chan's arguments that the taken for granted concept of police culture should be reconceptualised to "one that is 'appreciative', rather than condemnatory" (Waddington), and according to Chan, "one which recognises its interpretative and creative aspects, as well the legal and political context of police work."

I would argue, based on my analysis of the studies on culture and police culture, that *the* core elements (basic assumptions) of police culture and its sub-

culture, regardless of different ranks and functional or specialist units, are similar and conceptually could be seen as monolithic and homogeneous. The difference in the culture, or the sub-cultures as some commentators describe it, arises from the differences in espoused values and artefacts of the different ranks and functional or specialist units. I would argue that the "core referents" of police culture; "the sense of mission; authority; the desire for action and excitement; and 'Us/Them' division of the social world with its in-group isolation and solidarity on the one hand, and racist components on the other; and its suspicion and cynicism", is the same within and between Forces. I shall discuss this point in more detail in the final chapter, after I have covered, in the following chapters, the issues that have caused senior police managers to adapt to their external environment in order to survive, and to integrate the internal processes of the service to ensure the capacity to continue to survive and adapt.

Discussion.

Culture is a protean term, it can mean different things to different people. When the term has been used to describe the norms and behaviour of police officers, the description has more often been confined to the uniformed lower ranks, with the management rules used as the norm against which the indiscretions of the rank-and-file are judged.

Culture can be a useful diagnostic tool with which to examine how the service in general, and particular ranks and functional groups within it, construct their occupational world and cope with the demands, from sources both internal and external, that are placed on them. However, in order to make sense of the complexity of organisational life we must avoid the superficial models of culture to describe how organisations and groups within them function. This is one reason why I have chosen to use the analytical model of culture developed by Edgar Schein to explore the culture of police management.

Schein's model works at different levels. At the level of basic assumptions, it helps explain the significance of the core features of police culture (which I shall do later in chapter 11). Some people have used the analogy of an onion to describe the concept of culture as being layered. Inferring that as one peels off the different layers of an organisation, one peels off the different manifestations of the organisation's cultural traits, until the core of the culture of the organisation is reached.

My interpretation of Schein's model is that the basic assumptions are the elements of an organisation's culture that are common to all the different levels and functional areas of the organisation. The cognitive defence mechanisms to which individuals and the organisation turn in times of internal conflict and external pressure.

The espoused values provide the explanation for sub-cultures and the difference between different functional groups. As Reiner described, the different orientations between management and street cop "reflect the two ways police organisations have to face in a class-divided hierarchical social order. Downwards by the rank and file, to the groups controlled with varying degrees of gusto and finesse;

and upwards by the professional police chiefs, to the majority public and elite who want an acceptable face to be placed on what is done in their name" (Reiner 1992: 137).

Artefacts are the outer garments, the visible and easily interpretable features of the organisation, factors that are obvious to visualise but difficult to interpret on mere observation. For example, it is easy for a third party observer to construct the meaning of a police/public, however, it is very likely that their interpretation differ markedly from that of the person at the receiving end of such encounter. In summary, what the independent observer sees is not necessarily what the recipient at the end of the police/public encounter is getting.

Chapter 4.

PERSONAL BACKGROUND.

INTRODUCTION.

The cognitive lenses through which police officers see the social and professional world are shaped by such factors as social class and educational attainment. The depth and clarity of that vision would be affected by such factors as career progression, their hierarchical and functional positions within the organisation, and the socialisation process of the organisation (Fielding 1988).

The professional milieu in which policing is carried out can change very swiftly depending on the personal values and professional integrity of the leader of the organisation. Any sudden change in the professional mood of the organisation could have devastating consequences for an officer that was unable to recognise and readjust their behaviour accordingly or was too slow to adapt to the change. A contemporary illustration would be the case of the deputy chief constable of Surrey Police, who in September 2000 was tried and acquitted at Southwark Crown Court for offences of sexual assault that he was alleged to have committed in 1998 against female employees working at the Force's headquarters. (*Guardian*, 9 September 2000). There were strong suggestions by officers in the force that the character of the new chief officer helped change the working environment to one in which the staff felt confident to voice their allegations. Although the deputy was acquitted at Crown Court, he remained suspended from duty by his Police Authority, which later charged him under the Police Discipline Regulations with a number of similar offences. (*Guardian*, 12 September 2000). Although he never faced a disciplinary hearing, he never returned to the police service.

The character, personal and professional values and integrity of a leader, (which is what superintendents are consistently being reminded they are expected to be), can determine the credo of an organisation. This can consequently determine the occupational behaviour and working practices of individuals and groups within that organisation.

In this chapter, I shall discuss how factors such as, social background, educational attainment, professional training, occupational and general life experiences, the socialisation process of police work, and the credo of the service have contributed to the formation of a group culture, and consequently prepared my respondents for the complex and demanding role of a modern day senior police manager.

SOCIAL ORIGINS.

Age and Family background.

The year of birth, and consequently the age range of my respondents, covers a broad period from the late 1930s to the late 1950s, as illustrated in Table 7 below. However, despite their years of birth spreading over two decades, the majority of them – 82 per cent - were born between 1944 and 1954. The significance of this fact for the purpose of the study is that the majority of my respondents would have grown up under very similar social and political conditions, which may have led to them developing similar social and political outlooks.

Table 7. Range of respondents' dates of birth.

Range in year of birth. 1939-1958	No. of officers
1939	1
1940	0
1941	0
1942	1
1943	2
1944	7
1945	8
1946	4
1947	6
1948	4
1949	3
1950	2
1951	2
1952	1
1953	5
1954	3
1955	0
1956	1
1957	0
1958	1

Concerning family background, it is one means by which different studies have categorised people into different social class groups. Additionally, some commentators have written widely on the topic of people from a particular social class displaying specific class cultures. For example, in his book, *The Uses of Literacy* that was first published in 1958, Richard Hoggart describes eloquently the changes in working-class culture during the preceding thirty or forty years as they were being encouraged by mass publications (Hoggart 1992). Therefore, there is a recognised connection between social class and culture, and the concentration on my respondents' family background is done for the purpose of trying to find out what effect, if any, their social class culture has had on their occupational group culture.

Discussion of the concept of class can be a complex and problematic endeavour. Marshall et al suggests that it can be defined in a number of different ways that include, for example, ownership and non-ownership of the means of production; control of various assets within bureaucratic organisations; possession of marketable workplace skills and income. Sometimes, occupational prestige scores, arranged in hierarchical fashion or, more loosely, in terms of generalised social standing in the community at large are taken to define social class (Marshall et al 1997: 21).

One aspect of the discussion of social class that is not problematic is that, "The existence of a class structure, however this is defined, implies an unequal distribution of power and advantage" (Marshall et al 1997: 8). However, how this unequal distribution of power and advantage is translated into tangible career benefits to the individual is, once again, problematic. For example, is power or advantage, or both, directly reproduced in each case where it exists, or does each individual phenomenon or a combination of them merely influence outcomes?

The reason for using the concept of class as a framework within which to discuss the background of my respondents is to find out if inequalities in opportunities are translated into inequalities of outcomes. Alternatively, it may be that hard work, luck, or a combination of both factors had a greater influence on my respondents' career progression, rather than their social origins.

For the purpose of my discussion on the possible effects of social class, I have chosen to use Halsey's analysis suggesting that the sources of inequality are of two fundamental kinds. He argued, firstly, that individuals have particular interests in life, and because there is scarcity in the means available to satisfy those interests, these interests potentially imply conflict. Secondly, human beings are evaluating animals, and because they have preferences and distinguish between better and worse in all things, they continually compare themselves with others with respect to all human attributes, and behave accordingly towards each other. This, therefore, leads to hierarchies of virtues, taste, sexual attractiveness, occupational skill, artistic talent, sporting prowess, and so on. He concludes, "Social relations reflect these as invidious comparisons, deference and disrespect, admiration and contempt. Evaluation, given scarcity, also implies conflict" (Halsey 1986: 18).

On the nature of inequality, the concept can take one of two forms; it could mean either the inequality inherent in the different positions of the social class divisions, or the inequality of access to the different class divisions.

For the analyses of my data I shall use the definition of class based on the occupation of the fathers of my respondents, and shall focus on those occupations as indicators of the advantage and power that accrue to their holders. Put simply, I shall focus on whether inequality of access and opportunity leads directly to inequality of outcome. (However, it should be noted that the Registrar General's Classification was recently changed to use 'autonomy' in the workplace as a key indicator. This makes inter-generational comparisons problematic)

The reason is to find out whether the inequalities in power and advantage that drive social mobility in society in general were reproduced in the police service, and in particular in the career progression of my respondents. In addition, I shall attempt to assess which of the following two factors had the greater influence on their career, ascription or achievement.

For society in general, Marshall explains that, "Twenty years on we would appear to have arrived at conclusions broadly similar to those reached by the researchers who conducted the Oxford mobility inquiry. Using the data available

from the British survey for the International Social Justice Project, we have found that substantial absolute rates of upward and downward mobility coexist alongside relative class mobility chances which have remained largely unchanged throughout the years covered by the two studies – in effect most of this century up to the present day. Class boundaries seem to be neither more nor less permeable now than they have been in preceding decades. Rather, sectoral shifts towards non-manual work have created additional 'room at the top', but this has not been accompanied by greater equality in opportunities to get there from social origins embodying different degrees of class advantage" (Marshall et al 1997: 59).

Social class of respondents.

Using the Registrar General's five-class model of classification, the majority of my respondents' fathers (when my respondents were 18 years old and around the time they joined the police) were from social class C (49 per cent). Within this category, which is sub-divided into the upper C1 and lower C2 sub-classes, 8 per cent were from C1 while 41 per cent were from C2.

There were 16 per cent from social class B, and the same percentage from social class D. None of my respondents was from social class E - Unskilled Manual workers. These divisions are shown in Table 8 below.

Table 8. Social class origins of superintendents, constables, and chief constables.

Social Class	% Rank and File(a) (1978)	% Superintendents (1996)	% Chief constables(b) (1991)
Group A (I)	2.4	2	2.5
Group B (II)	14.9	16	30.0
Group C1 (III – non-manual)	16.7	8	17.5
Group C2 (III – manual)	36.9	41	45.0
Group D (IV)	19.1	16	2.5
Group E (V)	3.6	0	2.5
Police Officer/Security Guard	14	8	15
Retired/Dead	-	9	-
(Military/agricultural background)	6.5	-	-
	N=168	N=51	N=40
Total	100	100	100

(a) and (b). The explanatory notes for these headings are at the end of the thesis.

The year in brackets were when the respective studies were carried out

I have placed the figures from my study against those obtained by Reiner in his studies of the Federated ranks (Reiner 1978) and ACPO (Reiner 1991). I have not done this in order to compare the different figures because this would be meaningless, for the following reasons. The samples for all three studies were collected differently, for example for his study on chief constables Reiner's sample was virtually the population of chief officers, whereas my sample was a small fraction of the population, which I had very little control in collecting. The purpose of all three studies was different: the study of the Federated ranks was to find out about unionism in the police service; that on chief constables was researching an elite group; whilst mine was examining the culture of middle management. The periods, social and political conditions under which all three studies were carried out were also different. These reasons, individually and collectively, make any strict comparison of the data unreliable. However, since the studies were carried out on members of the same social institution, all of which would have had similar grounding in their career in the police, it is possible to use the data from all three studies to illustrate some

commonalities amongst the three distinct groups that make up the majority of the police service. (A sizeable segment consists of civilian staff and since the fieldwork an increasing number carrying out uniformed visible patrol function is now made up of Police Community Support Officers). A broad interpretation of all the data might support a prior assumption that superintendents should fit between the Federated ranks and ACPO, in terms of social class, if class as a determinant of advantage and power was directly translated into outcomes. However, this linear interpretation might be too simplistic.

Relating the figures on social class distribution of my respondents with those of chief officers and constables, the data shows that twice as many chief officers were from social class B, than either my respondents or constables; 30 per cent of chief officers compared to 16 per cent of my respondents and 15 per cent of constables. This would tend to indicate that ascription played a more influential part than achievement in the distribution of power and advantage. In contrast, the larger percentage of my respondents from social class D would indicate that achievement was more of a reason for the success of my respondents.

The number of chief officers from social class CI is similar to those for the Federated ranks (when the number of police fathers are added to this social group), but double those of my respondents. In this case, the distribution was 32 per cent for chief officers, 16 per cent for my respondents and 31 per cent for the Federated ranks. The number of chief officers from social class B, is double that from the Federated ranks and my respondents. Again, if ascription were of greater significance than achievement in the distribution of power and advantage, then we would expect chief constables to have led the three groups, followed by my respondents, with the constables in third place. This was the case. It should be noted though that the higher social class backgrounds are less likely to be directly ascription; people in this group have more opportunities to achieve. However, because of the closeness of the proportion of my respondents and constables in social class B, and the large difference in Class C1, it is reasonable to argue that although ascription may have had some influence in the distribution of power and advantage in the police service, interpreted in terms of the position held by the different groups, achievement appears to have had the stronger influence for my respondents. The above figures provide

some evidence that my respondents (repeating the caution of small non-random sample) attained their position through achievement rather than ascription.

EDUCATION AND QUALIFICATIONS.

In discussions on social mobility, it is generally acknowledged that there is a direct link between social origins, educational attainment and social destinations. However, the effect of each component on the others is not so clear-cut. For example, Marshall et al asked whether it is possible to construct a meritocratic defence of class inequalities in mobility chances by explaining the association between origins and destinations in terms of unequal distribution of ability. Some critics of social mobility have sometimes claimed that it was, and proponents of meritocracy have conventionally taken it to be an argument about the role of education in class reproduction. In answering this question, Marshall has cited the work of two different commentators on this topic to argue for and against the claim. Firstly, he offers a supporting view of this position by explaining that in the view of Talcott Parsons, "educational expansion played a crucial role in effecting the historical shift from ascription to achievement, as the principal determinant of status in advanced societies" (Marshall et al 1997: 70).

In contrast, he explains that, "From his analysis of the data gathered for the Oxford Mobility Study of 1972, A. H. Halsey concluded that among men in England and Wales there was a decreasing influence of origins on destinations and a tightening bond between educational attainment and occupational outcomes. However, Halsey also reported that an individual's class origins were increasingly associated with his or her level of educational achievement, a finding that he interprets as being inconsistent with the idea that industrial societies are characterised by a secular trend towards greater meritocracy. For this reason, although 'education is increasingly the mediator of the transmission of status between generations', still there has been no reduction in the overall influence which social origins exert on destinations" (Marshall et al 1997: 72). One is tempted to summarise these arguments as, the educated go a long way but the educated rich go even further. In addition, children of the rich will be better educated, cet. par.

With my respondents in particular, and police officers in general, education is not restricted solely to state education. In the following two sections, I shall discuss the mandatory and optional professional training that officers receive during their career. These include, for new recruits substantial legal training on criminal matters, which is reinforced and expanded when officers move on to specialist posts, such as Criminal Investigation Departments. In addition, on promotion officers receive management training of various quality and complexity, depending on their rank and the functional post that they occupy. Therefore, any discussion on education has to take into account what I shall term 'professional education' (Jarvis 1983; Southgate 1988), in addition to recognised state education. One of my respondents alluded to this concept of 'professional education' while responding to the question of what the highest education level was that he had reached. He said simply,

"Joining the Police Force." (R. 30).

The reason for concentrating on the education of my respondents is to find out whether inequality of access to education, which was possibly a result of inequality of opportunity created by social stratification, manifested itself in inequality of attainment.

Table 9, which gives the figures for my respondents alongside those for constables and chief officers, shows that the majority of my respondents went to either Secondary Modern or Grammar schools. 41 per cent went to Secondary Modern and 33 per cent to Grammar school.

Juxtaposing the data highlights some marked differences in the number of officers from the three groups who went to Grammar and Secondary Modern schools. However, the differences between the groups of those who went to other secondary educational establishments are not so great.

Table 9. Types of school attended.

Type of school	% Rank and File(c)	% Respondents	% Chief Constables (d)
Secondary Modern (Elementary)	34.0	41	5.0 (12.5)*
Comprehensive	6.5	8	-
Technical	7.7	8	5.0
High	-	4	-
Grammar (Senior secondary)	45.9	33	77.5
Public (Private)	6.0	4	5.0
Elementary	-	-	7.5
Not Known		2	-
	N=168	N=51	N=40
Total	100	100	100

*This figure is the combined Elementary and Secondary figures.

For Grammar school attendance, over twice the number of chief officers went to Grammar school in comparison to my respondents, and nearly one third more constables went to Grammar school than my respondents did. These figures, when viewed alongside the difference between the number of my respondents and chief officers from social class group CI, tend to support the position that class inequality is not related to unequal distribution of ability. Further, it is not possible to extend the claim, at least for my respondents, to cover mobility chances, firstly because my respondents, as a group, had been super mobile compared to constables. Secondly, it may be that because more of the constables were already from this higher social class group, they were content where they were and had no aspirations for further upward social mobility.

Substantially more of my respondents went to a Secondary Modern than did chief officers, 41.0 to 5.0 per cent. However, when the combined category of Secondary modern/Elementary, (the combination used by Reiner in his 1992 study) is used, the difference is reduced slightly, but it is still significant nonetheless at 41 per cent to 12.5 per cent.

The analyses of the origins of those of my respondents (33 per cent) that went to Grammar school showed that, 64 per cent were from social class C; 5 per cent from class B; 5 per cent from class A; and 11 per cent from class D. The remaining 15 per cent either were officers whose fathers were police officers or were deceased.

Nearly three quarters of my respondents were from the top three social class categories. This difference, in particular, and that for the proportion of Grammar school attendees in the three main groups in general, tended to lend support to the suggestion that class origin did lead to unequal access to education. This equates with Halsey's finding for the general population in his 1980 study (Abercrombie and Warde 1995: 362).

My data showed a bias towards the higher social classes concerning access to education, which raised the question of whether opportunity in terms of access was reflected in educational attainment. Did the fact that those from the higher social classes had greater access to educational opportunity equate to them obtaining higher and/or better qualifications? I turn to this point next.

Of the 17 officers who went to Grammar school, eight (47 per cent) ended up as graduates. Two (11 per cent) went to university straight from school, and six (35 per cent) obtained their Degrees after joining the police. This was in contrast to those that went to Secondary Modern, where none of them went to university straight from school. The seven (33 per cent) officers who went to Secondary Modern school who did obtain a degree did so after joining the police, a similar figure to the Grammar school officers that gained their degrees after joining the police. The qualifications gained by my respondents at school are shown in Table 10 below.

Table 10. Qualifications gained by respondents.

Type of school (No. of respondents)	None	CSE	O level	A level	Higher	Degree (Before)	Degree (After)	Not Known
Secondary Mod (21)	8	1	8 (+1 RSA)	0	3	0	7	3
Comprehensive (4)	0	1	1	2	1	0	1	0
Technical (4)	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	TS Cert.
High (2)	0	0	2	0	0	0	2	0
Grammar (17)	0	0	9	7		2	6	1
Public (2)	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	0
Not Known (1)	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	**10**	**2**	**22**	**11**	**4**	**4**	**16**	**4**

The first four boxes (None; CSE; O & A levels) are the qualifications obtained before leaving
secondary education. The next three boxes (Higher, Degree-before, Degree-after and the Not Known
box) are the qualifications obtained after leaving school.
In the Higher box for those that attended Secondary Modern are HNC and HND qualifications. While
for the Comprehensive pupil the qualification is Diploma in Management Studies, where the pupil left
school with only O levels.

In terms of the total qualifications obtained by my respondents, 10 had no
formal qualifications either from school or after joining the police. This is 20 per cent
of my respondents, and is a high percentage for a group of people that occupy a
significantly influential position in the police service.

The remaining 41 respondents between them had 2 CSEs, 22 'O' levels, 11
'A' levels, 4 Higher National Diplomas and 20 degrees. From these figures, I can
postulate, with reasonable confidence that for my respondents it appears that unequal
access to state education is reflected in educational attainment.

Educational attainment.

Inequality in access to state education for my respondents, although it appears a
significant factor before joining the police service, does not appear to have adversely
affected their progression through the ranks. One reason for this is probably that a
third of my respondents who went to secondary modern school were given the
opportunity, in the police service, to pursue and obtain a tertiary educational
qualification. However, some of them did mention that they felt that they may have
progressed faster and further had they had a better state education or qualification
before joining. Some went further and suggested that with a better education they
may not have joined the police. Implying that they would have pursued a higher
status occupation or career, as the following replies to the question whether they
would rejoin if they had their life over shows.

"Yes, but I would be rejoining as a better qualified person. Without sort of making excuses, my educational background was very difficult before I joined the police service. Not so much my education was difficult; my lack of education was a tremendous barrier to me. Whereas, if I had my life over again I think I would probably hopefully end up at University and then come into the job then. (R. 14)

No, I wouldn't, no. Probably not, because I wouldn't have wasted the most important years of my life. (R. 12)

Analysis of all the formal qualifications obtained by my respondents' shows clearly that they considered formal qualification of such importance that they studied for and obtained a variety of formal qualifications after joining the police. The implied reason for this appears to be that it was necessary for career progression.

Table 11 below lists some of the formal qualifications ('A' level and higher) alongside the number of my respondents who had them. The different types of formal qualifications held by officers ranged from 'O' levels, to 'credits' obtained through examinations passed for studies towards Open University Degrees.

Table 11. Formal qualifications held by respondents.

Qualification	Number of respondents	%
A level	7	14
HNC/Diploma	4	8
First Degree	15	29
Postgraduate Degree	5	10
No qualification	4	8
Others	16	31
	N=51	
Total	**51**	**100**

The importance my respondents attached to formal educational qualification was highlighted by the fact that only four (8 per cent) had no formal qualification by the time they had reached the level of superintendent. This contrasts with ten (20 per cent) who left school, and joined the police, with no formal qualifications. It may well be, as some of them claimed, that obtaining a formal qualification helped them gain promotion.

If police officers had to negotiate their careers (be it in terms of moving laterally through the different specialist posts or vertically through the ranks), relying predominantly on their formal education, then perhaps I could limit my discussion of educational attainment solely to formal qualifications. However, this is not the case because officers receive a considerable amount of professional training throughout their service, regardless of whether they remain in the same rank and post for their entire service or they move into different specialist posts at the same or different ranks. (I use the term specialist post because other than uniform territorial divisional duty any other posting, such as Traffic, Territorial Support Group or Criminal Investigation Department, is generally considered a specialist posting by police officers). An indication of the different types of training they received is shown in Table 12 below.

Table 12. Training and courses my respondents had received during their career.

Resp.	Sp Crse	Sgt.	Insp.	JCC	ICC	SCC	Carousel	Det. Trg	Pub. Order	Eq. Opps.
1		X	X	X			X			
2		X	X					X(3)		
3		X	X	X				X(3)		X
4		X	X	X	X				X	
5		X	X							
6		X	X	X	X		X			
7		X	X	X	X	X	X		X	
8		X	X				X			
9		X	X	X			X		X	
10		X	X	X	X					
11		X	X	X	X		X			
12		X	X	X						X
13		X	X	X			X		X	X
14		X	X	X	X	X				
15	X	X	X	X	X		X		X	X
16	X	X	X	X	X	X				
17		X	X	X	X	X				
18	X	X	X	X	X				X	
19		X	X	X			X			X
20		X	X	X	X			X		
21		X	X	X				X		
22		X	X	X				X		X
23		X	X	X	X	X			X	X
24		X	X	X				X		
25	X	X	X	X	X	X				
26		X	X	X				X(4)		
27	X	X	X	X	X		X		X	
28		X	X	X						X
29		X	X	X			X			
30		X	X	X	X		X	X(3)		X
31		X	X	X			X		X	
32		X	X	X	X				X	
33		X	X					X		
34		X	X	X			X	X(3)		
35		X	X	X	X		X	X(4)		
36		X	X	X			X		X	
37		X	X(2)	NO	NO			X(3)		
38		X	X	X	X		X			
39		X	X	X	X		X			
40		X	X	X				X(4)		
41		X	X	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
42		X	X	X	X		X	X(4)		
43		X	X	X						
44	X	X	X	X	X		X			X
45		X	X	X			X	X(4)		
46		X	X	X	X					
47		X	X	X					X	
48		X	X	X			X		X	X
49		X	X	X	X				X	
50		X	X	X						X
51		X	X	X			X		X	

(X=received training/course. Number in brackets indicates different level of specialist post training. Sp Crse=Special Course. JCC=Junior Command Course. ICC=Intermediate Command Course. SCC=Senior Command Course.)

The importance of training is recognised by the service, and given a high priority accordingly. In its Police Paper number 4; *The Management of Police Training,* the Audit Commission pointed out that police officers receive twice as much training a year as public sector employees. Almost two and a half times more

than private sector employees, and nearly four times more than private sector manufacturing employees (Audit Commission 1989).

Although the Paper described predominantly skills-based operational training for officers, it pointed out that "Training is especially important in the police service because it operates in a constantly changing environment." Further, it claimed that "The service is exemplary in its recognition of this and devotes around eight per cent of its resources to training." The significance of all this for this discussion is as the Paper explains, "Training is a key element in shaping the style and quality of any organisation and its ability to respond to new developments" (Page 1).

Skills-based operational training at an effective level informs officers on 'what' to do, through legal and procedural knowledge. Training on the 'how', which takes place at the affective (emotional) level, comes from the information and education in areas such as general supervisory and management skills, human awareness, interpersonal skills, cultural diversity, racial awareness, and emotional intelligence (Goleman 1996). This is my concept of professional education. Its importance here is that it is the type of learning that is more likely to affect the culture of the group.

Professional education is very important for officers. However, given a preference, most would opt for legal and procedural training, probably because their perception is that legal and procedural training gives them the tools to do the job: fighting crime and catching villains. In reality, the majority of officers' time is not spent catching villains or enforcing the law. It is spent doing the things that professional education would give them the skills to do more easily or, some would suggest, better. However, this type of policework can be demanding and problematic for officers. As illustrated by Punch quoting an officer explaining his policing preference, who stated, "I'd rather take on an armed hood than answer a call about a family squabble" (Punch 1979: 111). The message is clear and the required action simple. The training received at the cognitive level tells officers 'what' to do 'when' the law is infringed, which generally means arrest when there is sufficient evidence. However, training on knowing 'how' to deal with situations where the law is silent or ambiguous would come from professional education, but if officers have not received

this type of education then dealing with such situations would become problematic and precarious. From my professional experience, I know that changes in contemporary police training are trying to give officers more professional education.

Professional Education.

When one looks at activity analysis studies on what operational officers do, it is clear that policing is not concerned predominantly with enforcing the law. Policing is concerned principally with activities other than law enforcement. This is contrary to the views of the rank-and-file. It is also the interpretation of most observers of police occupational culture.

Maurice Punch quoted from a 1965 American study by Cumming *et al* that analysed telephone calls from the public to the police over an 82-hour period. In the study, "Cumming concluded that more than half the routine calls to the police involved demands for help and some form of support for personal and interpersonal problem." Further, he pointed out that a replication study in the United Kingdom "came to a similar conclusion with 'service' calls numbering 49.3 per cent in a new town, 61.1 per cent in an old established town, and 73.0 per cent in a country town with a rural area"(Punch 1979: 106).

A recent study by David Bayley produced similar findings. His results showed that "What the police do is strikingly similar around the world. Among the forces in the five countries studied [Australia; Canada; England; Japan; and Wales] about 60 per cent of police personnel patrol and respond to requests from the public, 15 per cent investigate crime, 9 per cent regulate traffic and 9 per cent administer" (Bayley 1996: 29). Thus law enforcement accounts for only a small part of officers' routine professional activity. Most of the time, officers are called upon to deal with situations that require professional knowledge. Therefore professional education (i.e. that gained through training at an affective level) is important as it gives officers the skill to deal with the types of situations they encounter more often.

It is likely that as they progressed up the rank officers would receive more professional education. At the level of constable, professional education would have been delivered nationally under programmes such as quality of service, human

awareness, interpersonal skills and diversity training. At a local Force-level, this type of education would have been given through initiatives such as the Metropolitan Police Service Plus Programme of the early '90s.

Up to the level of superintendent, there are certain core training courses that all officers have to attend, some of which are specific to certain ranks. For example, upon promotion, sergeants and inspectors receive supervisory and management training respectively.

For chief inspectors, the core training course for this rank was the Junior Command Course. Like the sergeants and inspectors' course, this will contain some topics and subjects that fall under my category of professional education, such as staff-development and motivational skills training.

For the rank of superintendent, the main training course was the Intermediate Command Course. For those superintendents that were destined for ACPO ranks, the core, and mandatory, course is the Strategic Command Course (formerly known as the Senior Command Course).

For the majority of my respondents, the most common course they could have taken as superintendents was the Intermediate Command Course. However, officers at this rank, unlike those in the other ranks, did not have to attend the Intermediate Command Course, and there were some of my respondents that had not attended this course. Nonetheless, these officers would have attended the other courses at the different ranks up to superintendent, which was the case with all my respondents. Every one of them had received the sergeant and inspectors' Development Courses, while only one had missed the Junior Command Course (Police Staff College 1982). This officer was an exception because he had not attended one training course at the Police Staff College during his service, which at the time of the interview was just over thirty years. This was and is highly unusual.

For the Intermediate Command Course, less than half of my respondents had attended it. Only 45 per cent of them had been on this course. Such low attendance by officers in this rank is not necessarily a problem because higher police training, of

which these Command courses are a part, also included Carousel courses. These are short duration courses on specific subjects, such as community relations, which are available to officers at chief inspector level and above. They were designed to provide "short, problem centred training in areas of direct and contemporary need" (ibid: 2). Therefore, there were other opportunities for officers who had not attended the Intermediate Command Course to gain professional education by attending some of the Carousel courses.

Slightly more of my respondents (47 per cent) had been on at least one Carousel course than had attended the Intermediate Command Course. Additionally, it appeared that some officers might have been using the Carousel courses as an alternative to the Intermediate Command Course. Because, of the two groups of officers that had attended either course only 41 per cent had attended both the Intermediate Command and a Carousel course.

Prior Work Experience.

The majority of my respondents had some experience of employment before joining the police service, as shown in Tables 13 & 14 below. Of them 67 per cent had worked before joining, either as a Cadet or as a full-time officer. This figure is similar to Reiner's figure for chief constables, where 70 per cent of his sample 'had some experience of outside employment before joining the police' (Reiner 1992: 61).

Table 13. Type of work officers did before joining police service.

Type of Work	No of resp.	% of Total
Joined as Cadet with no prior work experience	13	25.0%
Joined as Cadet with prior work experience (6 months)	2	4.0%
Total number with prior work experience	34	67.0%
Joined straight from university	2	4.0%
Breakdown of those with prior work experience		
Those with up to one year prior work experience	8	23.0%
Those with 1-4 years prior work experience	6	18.0%
Those with over 4 years prior work experience	20	59.0%
Distinction between manual and non-manual work		
Manual work	5	15.0%
Non-manual work	29	85.0%
N=51		

Table 14. Type and duration of work each officer did before joining.

Resp.	Type of Work	Duration (Yr.)
1	Clerk in DHSS	2
2	Milkman	1.5
3	Barrow boy; Shop Assistant – Before Joining Cadets	1
4	Labourer; Clerk in Solicitor's office	6
5	Clerical/Administration Assistant	8
6	Shop Assistant in a Butchers	5
7	Shop Assistant in Tescos	1
8	No	-------
9	Clerical Assistant in Gas Board	4
10	Security Guard-type role in Factory	3
11	No – Joined Cadets	------
12	No – Joined Cadets	------
13	Art Designer/Drawing for Magazine/Comic (Fleet Street)	3
14	No – Joined Cadets	------
15	Royal Air Force	5
16	Graduate; Organisation Methods Analyst	2
17	No – Joined Cadets	------
18	Labourer in Brewery; Milkman	1
19	Bank Clerk	1
20	Trainee Management with National Coal Board	5
21	Trainee Management with Pottery Company	1
22	No – Joined Cadets	------
23	Graduate; Accountancy with Deloitte Touché	1
24	Merchant Navy	11
25	Graduate	University
26	Sign Painter in Father's business	4
27	Clerical Assistant with Local Authority	8 months
28	No – Joined Cadets	------
29	Civil Service; Lorry Driver	5 (2.5; 2.5)
30	Fabricator in Engineering Company	4
31	Clerical Work with London Transport	2
32	No – Joined Cadets	------
33	Army – Guardsman	6
34	No – Straight from School but not as a Cadet	
35	Factory; Office Assistant	4 (2.5; 1.5)
36	No – Joined Cadets	------
37	GPO; Stove Enamelling in Factory	5 (3; 2)
38	No – Joined Cadets	------
39	Merchant Navy	6
40	Army – Anti-Tank Gunner	5
41	No – Joined Cadets	------
42	No – Joined Cadets	------
43	No – Joined Cadets	------
44	Graduate	University
45	Type of work not stated	8
46	Sales and Marketing in Motor Trade	8
47	DJ; Dancer; Own Business; In the Theatre	6
48	Apprentice Engineer before joining Cadets	6 months
49	Clerk in DHSS	4
50	No – Joined Cadets	------
51	Trainee Manager in Retail Store; Factory; Door to door salesman	6

Most of the work they had done before joining was neither casual nor short-term, which perhaps emphasised the strong attraction of the police as a career for those of my respondents who joined from another occupation. For example, two of the seventeen officers who joined as Cadets had been employed prior to joining the Cadets. One had worked as a Barrow Boy and a shop assistant for the combined period of a year before joining, while the other had worked as an apprentice engineer for six months before joining.

Of the 67 per cent of my respondents that had been employed before joining the police, 23 per cent had prior work experience of less than one year, 18 per cent had prior work experience of between 1-4 years, while 62 per cent had over four years experience. Generally, 15 per cent of those that had been employed before joining the police had been engaged in manual work while the remaining 85 per cent had held non-manual work.

The significance of highlighting the types of work that my respondents had done before they joined the police and the length of time they had held the jobs lies in the discussion on the education of my respondents in particular and police officers in general. In the discussion on professional education, although not openly stated, the point can be made that some previous work experience and the consequent social contact would have improved the individual's knowledge on matters such as human awareness and interpersonal skills, which forms the main part of professional education. The types of work, in contrast to work that did not involve extensive contact with other people, that most of my respondents had done would have provided this type of knowledge. These included employment in the Department of Health and Social Security dealing with claimants of social benefits; shop assistants in large supermarkets; trainee managers in public and private sector organisations; sales person in the motor trade; and working in a factory. The majority of the jobs involved working with people. These were ideal experiences for those who would later pursue an occupation where the practitioners were considered more as artisans than professionals, and where the bulk of the work involved communicating with people with the aim of maintaining order and resolving conflicts.

ORIENTATION TO WORK.

Is policing *the* job, as it is often described in police vernacular, or simply *a* job? Several years ago, it would have been considered an insult to pose such a question to a serving police officer. The majority would have castigated you for not referring correctly to policing as *the* job. Policing was seen as a vocation, dedication to a way of life. However, today the conviction is not so strong. At the time of writing I had been involved with delivering Diversity Training to every employee in my own and other forces and police training establishments nationally. During some of this training, I often heard officers, from all ranks, comment that they and their colleagues no longer viewed policing as a vocation. They saw is as just a job, like any other. The often expressed reason for this view was the Report by Sir William Macpherson into the murder of the Black teenager Stephen Lawrence. Their reasoning goes something like this: Since the publication of the Report, the police service had received an inordinate amount of criticism about the professional competence of officers in general, and about their racist attitude and its manifestation in operational street policing in particular. Officers' interpretation of the term *Institutional Racism*(e) was that it meant that each officer was a racist, who practised *direct* racial discrimination against Black people. Consequently, this meant that the police service was a racist institution. Although this explanation was given in the context of stop and search, which by implication restricted the dysfunctional attitudes and behaviours to operational officers on the street, this interpretation was not expressed solely by constables and lower rank supervisors and managers, but also by senior managers.

Officers at all levels felt that Black people, in toto, disliked and distrusted the police. This was to such an extent that if Black people were stopped in the street, regardless of whether or not it was a legitimate stop it was believed they were very likely to complain about the officer carrying out the stop. (As discussed in chapter three, the statistics published by the Police Complaints Authority on complaints against the police provides some support for this belief). According to officers, the sole reason for this was that all Black people thought that the police organisation was institutionally racist. The solution advocated by senior, middle and junior ranking officers, was *not* to stop Black people, because it was too much grief. Some junior officers added that some senior officers had instructed them to follow this course of

conduct, advising them not to stop Black people because it would inevitably result in some form of complaint against them.

The significance of this brief discussion for the purpose of the study is the revelation of uniformity in the thinking of officers from the different ranks and functional posts. In a way it questions the assertion made by officers that policing is no longer a vocation but now just a job like any other, because the reality might be that the culture of the police service is so embracing that these expressed views are in contrast to the actions of officers on the street. All officers might still feel strongly that policing is *the* job and the expressed views about not stopping black people could either be a distraction or denial of their true and deeper feelings about policing, which is seen as a mission to protect society and rid it of the 'bad' elements within. Unfortunately, young black men would appear to fall into this category of 'bad' elements in society since they are often portrayed as the main offenders for muggings (Hall et al 1978) and street crimes, which although low in numbers compared to the total number of crimes recorded, are the ones that are likely to create the greatest amount of fear. Perhaps this was one reason why the proportion of searches carried out on black and Asian people in London had grown in the last five years, despite a substantial fall in the overall numbers of searches, according to figures published by Scotland Yard, and under Section 95 of the Criminal Justice Act 1991. (*The Daily Telegraph*, 9 April 2002). These figures contradict the claims by officers on the training course that they were reluctant to stop people from Black and Minority Ethnic groups.

Reason for joining.

Taking into account the dramatic changes that have occurred over the last three decades, in terms of the change in the diversity of the population and the different demands that have been placed on the police service over this period, were the reasons why my respondents joined the police markedly different to those of today's recruits?

This question is important for a number of reasons. For example, as implied by current officers, contemporary social problems might play a significant part in the reasons why people joined the police. Secondly, if officers could fulfil whatever

ambition they had for joining the police service, it would be reasonable to expect that they would more likely be satisfied with their career in the police.

The reasons why my respondents joined the police service could be divided into the two broad categories of 'instrumental' and 'non-instrumental' ones, as described by Reiner (Reiner 1991). 'Instrumental' refers to the "extrinsic, material aspects of the job such, as pay, status, security, or career prospects, and 'non-instrumental', indicating the intrinsic features of the work itself, such as the interest or the social utility of the role." However, it would be an oversimplification to suggest that the reasons given for joining the police could clearly be placed into one or the other of the above two categories. Some of the reasons given by my respondents included a combination of both types of motive, and as Reiner points out, "Indeed all work is to some extent instrumentally motivated in a market economy, so the difference is really one of emphasis" (ibid). One thing that can be stated with certainty about my respondents is that they were not motivated by money. Only one of them mentioned pay as the reason for joining.

Most of my respondents cited predominantly non-instrumental reasons for joining the police. This was similar to Reiner's findings in his studies of chief constables and the Federated ranks. Within this category were motives such as joining for a more interesting job, the hope of excitement and variety, and the desire to be a police officer. The following quotes exemplify these motives:

The reason for joining the police I think, basically it just seemed like a pretty exciting job. It was just as simple as that really. It was something that I, I worked for three years in an office in the civil service and I just thought Christ! I couldn't do this for the rest of my life, sitting in an office. I need something that's going to offer me opportunity for career advancement, and, but at the same time offering a bit of excitement, and a challenge. (R. 49).

Yeah, I was brought up in ---- which throughout the '60s was a Borough force. They wore white helmets. They were all above six foot and it was a childhood ambition and I always wanted to be a policeman, and that was it. Very simple. (R. 3)

The predominantly instrumental reasons for joining the police, such as, housing, security, or career prospects, were expressed as follows:

Yeah, I was a young married man who lived in South London with no prospect of housing, decent housing and ---- Police offered me the prospect of decent housing. (R. 2)

I tell you exactly what it was. I was in a very boring clerical job with the North Thames Gas Board and I wanted to get married. I was looking round for somewhere to live and I had no prospect, you know, to buy a house at the time, take out a mortgage or rent one very successfully. And in the local newspaper, there was an advert for --- Police, which actually advertised a free house that went with the job and it was honestly no more than that. That actually attracted me to the police service. Totally, the wrong reasons I know, but that is why I joined, to get a house, to get married. (R. 9).

One obvious problem of trying to categorise officers' motives for joining the police into specific groups, as I have done above, is that it simplifies what in essence is a complex decision making process. One that involves considering a number of factors simultaneously, rather than considering them in a linear and sequential fashion. For example, family connection and influence, combined with the prospect of housing and pursuing a uniformed service, illustrate the complex nature of the different reasons that influence the decision to join:

Yes I was, I spent the last two years of my Army service at Pirbright, where I was an instructor at the Guards Depot and during that time I met my wife to be down there. My uncle was a serving officer in ---- Constabulary; he was also an ex-Guardsman, as was another uncle of his. But coming from a military career, I suppose you are looking for something more structured. I didn't have any educational qualifications as such, because they weren't about, certainly in my time. And I suppose coming from that environment, it was an environment that you, there was also a problem at home because I came from Derbyshire. My father was a butcher and I did go back for a short

time working with him, but at the time if I'm honest, wife to be down here,
father up there, where do your loyalties lie? (R. 33).

This quote illustrates the attraction of the police service for those people who had been in a structured environment and had grown used to that way of life and wanted to continue with it. Equally, it illustrated that the certainty and stability it offered in terms of employment security and material possession were a great attraction.

SATISFACTION WITH POLICE CAREER.

All except one of my respondents were satisfied with their careers in the police service. The officer who expressed dissatisfaction gave a reason that suggested he was dissatisfied because of a recent unsuccessful attempt to gain promotion. Here is the officer's response to the question of whether overall he was satisfied with his career in the police service.

"No. I failed to get the ACC's job a couple of weeks ago." (R. 23)

The likelihood is that had the officer got the ACC's job he would not have been dissatisfied. Should he get the post before he retires then it is likely that he would answer differently if he were asked the question again. It appears then, that the degree of satisfaction depends on the level of success an officer achieves in his career. For example,

Professionally yes, not totally because I had a, looking at my own competence
and trying to be reasonably objective about it, but I'm a qualified assessor and
practise the skills regularly, and I've recently been evaluated again by Val
Morris and come out okay, so I'm reasonably proficient. I would say that I'm
sad I didn't get the chief superintendent rank, and the fact that I didn't get it
because they did away with it that just frustrates me. And I potentially could
see me ideally as being a good ACC. I don't honestly ever see me as being a
chief. I'd be lying if I said that, it would have been nice. I've seen worse
people than me get to chief but that's not the standard to go by. But once I
had this ailment then all thoughts of going on Strategic Advance Course had

to go. So, in that sense, besides that one reservation professionally, I've got no doubts. But unfortunately on the personal side I've only achieved that level of competence, and indeed in the role that I'm in now, by sacrificing my personal life to such an extent that I regard that as to be the worse mistake I've ever made in my life. And I'm still doing it. And if ever any advice people ask me, particularly young PCs, I say, try and keep a balance between your personal and professional life. You'll be a better professional if you've got an interesting domestic and family life, including being aware about society, having friends outside the police service and everything else. University was brilliant for me in that respect, it was as though suddenly I looked this way instead of that way. And no, I've deservedly suffered because of my total and utter devotion to workload. Looking back that was a very bad thing to do personally, and it made a lot of others suffer, a lot of others suffer. (R. 18).

Although nearly all my respondents (98 per cent) expressed satisfaction with their career in the police service, when asked if they would rejoin only 70 per cent said they would. These figures are very similar to those obtained by Reiner in his study of chief constables; all of whom were satisfied with their careers and 78 per cent of who would rejoin (Reiner 1991: 70). The percentage of my respondents who would rejoin is higher than the number of Federated ranks who would do so; 51 per cent (ibid).

Despite the very high number of my respondents who were satisfied with their career in the service, and the substantial number that would rejoin if they had their life over, nearly half of them (49 per cent) had seriously considered leaving the service at some time in their career. Of those who had considered leaving, only three (12 per cent) had done so in their probationary period. The rest (88 per cent) had done so at various stages in their careers and at the different ranks from constable to chief superintendent. Overall, my respondents, as a group, expressed a high level of satisfaction with their careers, despite the fact that some careers had not always been as successful as the officers would have preferred.

Of the 30 per cent who might not rejoin, the majority would not do so because they felt the police service, as a career, was no longer held in high esteem. Besides those who were positive as to whether or not they would rejoin, there were a group who were uncertain, and the reason for the uncertainty was primarily because of the changes that had occurred within and without the service. What they had witnessed over the years was deterioration in the circumstances and content of policework. Both attitudes were illustrated by the following quotes.

I don't know if I would join today. One of my fundamental concerns is although the police force needs to be run effectively and efficiently, the drive towards running it as a business does fill me with some concern and if you're not careful that you'll, your drive through it as a business supersedes what you're trying to do as far as delivering service to people, and that area is a cause of concern to me. (R. 28).

Very interesting question, I don't know Victor, I really don't know. I often think that I could have done well in working for myself; for my own business and I often think that's probably that I'm slightly arrogant. But I think with the amount of determination and hard work I am willing to put into anything I would have been successful doing that, and sometime I think I would have liked to have been my own boss and made the decisions. That's because I actually think I know best on occasions, and because I'm willing to learn from other people I don't think I'm that arrogant that I won't listen to somebody who came up with a better idea. I don't have any problem with saying, that is a better idea... So I have to say that I don't know but if someone influenced me like my mother and father did to get me into the police service then maybe I'll do it again. (R. 47)

Even where there was a positive response in terms of rejoining, some of my respondents had some reservations. These were because of the recent changes that were being forced on the police and failure of the service to implement some necessary changes. For example:

That's always a difficult question really, I don't know how to answer that because you've got a completely different perspective and I mean if I were a youngster now, knowing what I know and the changes that have been, and the potential changes, I'll probably answer no. But there again none of us know that when we join. So if I were joining as a youngster who really didn't know much about the service, and if you talk to the youngsters, I mean I talk to the probationers fairly frequently, they're so full of life and idealism, I'm sure I would be too. So I think the answer has got to be yes, I just would. (R. 7)

Discussion.

This chapter has analysed the social origins of my respondents, their approaches to work and their degree of satisfaction with their careers. Most of my respondents came from manual working-class backgrounds, with a secondary education that was not as high, academically, as chief officers and the Federated ranks. On the face of it one would have predicted that the educational attainment of my respondents would have fitted somewhere between those of chief officers and the Federated rank. One reason for this puzzling result might be because the sample was not a random one. However, they appear to have made up the deficit on joining the police, since a proportionately higher number of them obtained a variety of secondary and tertiary formal state qualifications, in addition to 'professional qualifications' through police-delivered, and police-sponsored external training courses.

Their attraction to policing varied from the pragmatic (did not have the qualification to pursue an alternative career, or they joined to obtain good housing), to a complex combination of reasons, such as excitement, variety, family influence and childhood ambition. Whatever the reason, all my respondents expressed a considerable degree of satisfaction with their careers overall. Where there was dissatisfaction, the reasons were either temporary and would have been reversed with promotion, or frustration at the changes the police service was being forced to undertake and, paradoxically, changes that they thought the service should pursue but was not doing. In short, my respondents were a group of pragmatic realists, who used their modest social origins to achieve significant positions of influence in their chosen

career. I can claim with confidence that their achievement was down to merit. Put simply, for them success=meritocracy.

The analysis of social origins, educational attainment and career progression of my respondents would support the argument that their successful advancement in the police service has been due predominantly to merit (by which I mean intelligence plus effort) rather than wealth and social position. However, this discussion on meritocracy is set tightly within the closeted world of the British police. The gender and ethnic composition of police forces does not support the argument of meritocracy. At the time of the fieldwork (1996) the number of people from a BME background in higher education was 13 per cent compared to just over 2 per cent in the police service (Higher Education Statistics Agency; Home Office 1998). In terms of intelligence measured by higher educational learning then the percentage of BME people in the police service should have been higher than 2 per cent, if entry into and by inference career progression was based on merit: none of my respondents was from a BME background. Nonetheless, restricting the discussion to the police service in general and my respondents in particular, and adding the caveat about non-random sample, it is still tenable to propose that for my respondents success has been extricably linked to merit.

The similarity of my respondents to chief officers was (as Reiner described his chiefs) that they were, "Predominantly of working-class origin, their degree of moral identification with, commitment to, and satisfaction with their work is more akin to that of established professionals" (Reiner 1991: 73). The significance of this is that my respondents could be thought of as blue-collar workers with a white-collar mentality, and their hard work and determination helped them translate their thought processes into practical realities.

Chapter 5

POLICE MANAGERIALISM.

INTRODUCTION.

In this and the next chapter, I shall examine how police managers have dealt with the internal integration of different ranks, functional units and processes to ensure the capacity to continue to adapt and develop, by concentrating on the changes in police managerialism and the management of change. As mentioned in chapter one, this is one means by which we can analyse, and thereby understand the content and dynamics of the culture of the police service in general, and senior police managers in particular.

The form and style of police management has changed over the years. Control and discipline were the most appropriate adjectives with which to describe the style of police management from the formation of the new police to the early 1970s (Critchley: 150; Reiner 1985: Ch 2). The structure was based on the hierarchical style of militaristic ranks, and the behaviour of officers was regulated by a strong discipline code. All of which was designed to ensure strict adherence to the organisation's proclaimed norms and values. Over the years the style of management has changed, which has allowed the lower ranks the opportunity to influence policy decisions. Some would bemoan this, claiming that it has become more relaxed and participative in style and form.

In the past as individuals, officers could practise the art of practical policing on the street with relatively unfettered discretion, but in the station, their individual voices carried far less weight and influence when it came to matters of force policy. To gain some credible involvement in the determination of force policy rank and file officers had to make their contribution collectively through the Police Federation. However, even this mechanism did not guarantee significant access to policy-making forums in forces.

Consultation and the Police Federation.

Senior police managers jealously guard their prerogative to make decisions on the direction of their forces and were reluctant to allow the rank and file, through the Federation, much access to their level of control of the organisation. My respondents expressed this in a variety of ways. The overwhelming majority of them thought that it was desirable that since the Edmund-Davies Report of 1978, the rank and file, as represented by the Police Federation, had gained a more significant consultative role in the determination of force policy.

A common reason that they expressed for this aspiration was that it was better for the senior managers to be able to 'take the rank and file along' with them on their (senior managers') decisions on the direction in which they wanted to move the organisation. They typically expressed this view as follows.

Yes. If you take your staff with you and actually talk to them about what you're proposing to do, not just the Federation, I mean I think it's quite, for a guy like me who's very supportive and pro Federation, I've only had one meeting in three years with the Federation reps. Although I ask them every year would they like monthly meetings, quarterly meetings, 6 monthly meetings, they don't want one because they find me easily approachable if there's a problem, they pick up the 'phone and in any case they haven't got a problem and I've only had one problem in three years. Now I know a lot of my colleagues have sort of monthly confrontations sometimes, well you don't have to have that if you talk to them, they're only after people's welfare and rights which are given under Police Regulations. If we're abusing them as managers we ought to be called to account, they fought for those bloody Regulations and rights to actually stop exploitation and if we're ignoring them and getting round them then we should be brought to account. (R. 9).

This view was also typical of other respondents' comments, particularly in the way it made the subtle distinction between consulting and informing. The Edmund-Davies Review in 1978 recommended the implementation of a formal structure that would allow senior managers to consult with the Police Federation on the formulation

of force policy. Although the majority of my respondents expressed the view that this was a desirable aim, the language that was used to express their agreement with the recommendations suggested a desire to inform rather than to consult. For example,

If you get to the state and we had one instance recently, where we didn't do something because the Federation were against it, despite the fact it was a better approach, I think that's wrong, because we're here to manage. They're there to do, it was a bit bold as I say, I do think their view should be taken into account. We shouldn't be in a position where they're managing because we're not taking action, because they don't manage they go to the status quo, change is useful and good. (R. 8).

Nonetheless, whatever the style of language used to express their agreement with the suggestion about consulting the Federation in the formulation of force policy, my respondents' overwhelming view was that agreed with the sentiments of the recommendations. They also had the foresight to extrapolate the principles of the Edmund-Davies report to cover the contemporary conditions in the service; in particular the absence of a formal consultative mechanism for civilian staff in the service.

I think it's desirable and indeed I think it's essential in modern day management practices, where we've got away from the, you will do as you're told, to a more consultative approach, so that you actually take people with you. Sometimes I think we've gone too far with it because it does delay decisions and that's always a problem with consulting, and it also can be viewed as, they cannot make a decision. We get it now, well tell us what to do and we'll go and do it, and there is still a place for that as well I have to say in certain situations. But I think it's essential that you take on board all the consultative, or all the various bodies within any organisation. You mentioned the Federation but a significant number of employees now are non-police staff and do not have the same degree of representation as their Federated colleagues. It's not right either. (R. 6).

The art of consultation is not simply to seek and gain consensus on every single matter on which a decision has to be taken, but to be able to make an acceptable professional judgement on which matters there should be consultation. If senior officers can get this right then the suggestion that has been made by my respondents is that the rank and file would be happy to accept the notion of consultation before making policy decisions. The argument is that the rank and file do not want to be concerned with every matter of policy, but are predominantly interested in those matters that affect their personal circumstance within the service. For example,

Desirable yes. Wanted? Debatable, I would say. I think, certainly, I get a feeling of yes it's nice to be involved and we would like to have our views asked, but you've gone too far. Certainly, it's the feeling in our organisation to the extent that we're having trouble making decisions, because we're just consulting with everybody, and the rounds of consultation seem to go on in a never-ending fashion. To the extent that some officers will turn round and say, when are you going to make a bloody decision? You know, just tell us what's going on. Give us something to do and we'll go out and do it, you know, why are we keep talking about it? So, I think it is desirable and I would say that I would have liked to have played a bigger part in what we were doing when I was a younger officer and I think they do, but we must be very, very careful not to get them absolutely fed up with the process. In our desire to consult everybody, it becomes an unwieldy, long event, trying to get round to a decision and that's happening to us on an increasing number of occasions and we've got to find a way of controlling that. It's almost like saying; we're never going to do anything in this organisation 'til the whole 2,950 agree. Well it's never going to happen! So, I think that it's the skill I suppose of managers to actually sense the depth of consultation that's required on an issue. There are things dear to the heart of officers, you know. If you're going to have a, like recently most Forces have gone through the sort of baton selection and things like that, that's really important, they'd have been really hurt if they were not asked. On the other hand, there are other issues, perhaps management issues, where they couldn't care less and we've got to learn, you

know, where we stand. So I think there is a balance to be had, so the word you said, is it desirable, yes it is desirable, but beware. (R. 10).

Power and influence.

Although the majority of my respondents agreed with the idea of reaching policy decisions through consultation, the reality of the decision making-process highlighted the reluctance of senior officers to relinquish their inherent power and influence in the process. Typical examples are as follows.

Yes, I think it is. I'm almost a Jekyll and Hyde, I do sign up to the participation of empowerment, but I also believe in the legitimacy of authority, that we are not in a democracy, that I take a pragmatic approach. If you can take people with you and if your policies and decisions can be improved as a result of their contribution, then it must be better than not having them with you and not improving your decisions as a result of their contribution. So, I agree with that. The bottom line is, does it empower people to prevent progression, and the answer to that is no. So I think that's a very difficult scenario, but no I mean it's a matter of principle. So I think it's positive, although there's a lot of crap said about joint ownership and all that sort of thing. (R. 12).

Well I'd challenge whether they have in the first place.
[In theory, they're supposed to have.]
Well in theory as far as they have a Consultative Committee with the Chief Constable and his ACPO Colleagues. They, if they have a position within management meetings, you know, within policy and strategy meeting groups, I would suspect they would say that they don't, by and large because of the autonomy of Chief Officers and perhaps even the autonomy of Divisional Commanders, who whereas might be given an arena to express their views, they don't take much notice of them. (R. 43).

Who says that they've gained a more influential role in Force policy? I'm not so sure that is true.
[The whole idea of the report was to bring that about.]

I think the most thing that people remember about Edmund-Davies is the pay side of it, but certainly there is a greater involvement of all levels of the Federated ranks. I'm not so sure, I think, you know, they may have more influence as to how policy is implemented, but I'm not quite sure that I agree with the statement that they necessarily add more influence in the formulation of policy. (R. 16).

It's desirable but the extent to which it's realistic and made much impact, and again I can only speak for this Force, it's limited. (R. 23).

A consistent concern expressed by my respondents was that consultation could be used as a reason to prevent or stall decisions being made. Even where there was clear and unambiguous support by my respondents for the recommendation that senior officers should consult with rank and file officers and their representative, there was this rider that those who practised consultation should not be accused, unjustly, of being indecisive.

I think it's difficult to know how far one goes, because at the end of the day I think managers are there to manage. But I am actually by the way the Secretary of the Superintendents' Association, so clearly those issues are quite dear to my heart in terms of some of the things we've been involved in, but I think it's got to be accepted by the organisation that we've gone through a lot of change. There is a lot to do still, and if we're going to make things work, you've got to have the understanding and the desire by the people on the coal face to actually agree the principles and the way you're going and lots of issues linked to it...Yes you must involve people in decision making and get their ideas but at the end of the day there's got to be some key people making decisions like, 'OK I've heard everything you've said, I have to plan, this is where we go.' You've got to have the leadership there as well otherwise you can end up by saying, 'well what do you think?' and then you get no direction, so you've got to have the strength and leadership to take it forward. (R. 15).

Despite the substantial number of my respondents that qualified their acceptance of the proposition (39 per cent of the 46 that were asked the question)

slightly more (45 per cent) expressed their desire for consultation unequivocally. A typical example is as follows.

Yes I think it is. I think it's very important if you are going to have a committed workforce, they have to feel that anything they raise or particular issues that they raise, there is an avenue for doing that and I think there is an important element in that they also need to be consulted and encouraged to develop their own ideas and put forward their own ideas, in terms of how organisations should develop. I'm a very strong believer in that and I think there are many very good ideas that come from all levels of the organisation and I don't think it should be seen as the prerogative of one particular part of the organisation only to have the ideas or only to have the power to implement those ideas. So I think it has to be a two way process. Yes at the end of the day people have to make decisions, but they need to make decisions on the best available advice and on some issues the widest possible consultation, because it effects the day to day policing often and those officers who are actually going to carry out those particular duties. (R. 44).

Are there any problems for managers or management?

Some of my respondents' replies implied that if the process of consultation posed problems for management, then the problems lay elsewhere other than with the managers. The following quote typified their views on this subject.

Consultation hasn't posed any problems for police management. It is the case that on occasion decisions don't meet with Federation approval because we all have our own agendas and I think as managers our agenda is to get the job done. Whereas perhaps welfare and comfort issues are higher on the agenda of the Federation: Ottawa shifts for a start [Officers worked longer shifts but had more rest days]. *There are people who work them who tell me they're absolutely marvellous. From a managers' viewpoint, they're a disaster, but, you know, that's one the Federation has won and we haven't. So there are different outlooks, but if we didn't consult as frequently as we did, I'm sure we would have quite bad problems with the rank and file. (R. 36).*

Desirable as it was, practising consultation with the rank and file through the Federation did cause some problems for senior managers. For example,

Well I can answer that in a more general way. I think that whenever you make any kind of policy making participative, which is what that attempted to do, you slow down policy making. And then at the end people then sort of display schizophrenic attitudes to it. Because the Federation complain, the workforce and everyone complains that you can't get any decisions out of people when they have to make a decision, and yet participative policy making slows the decision making down. So yes, it does create difficulties for management, but I would have thought that once you've got it right the gains outweigh that because the gains are that you exploit the creativity. I mean that is the whole purpose of participative management isn't it; you exploit everyone's creativity, accepting that the top people aren't the only ones that are creative. So, if we get it right I think the gains outweigh the problems. (R. 1).

It will if we don't start to recognise their involvement and if we don't take that along with what we're trying to achieve. So there is this element, consultation's fine but you mustn't restrict it to those people that can shout the loudest. At the moment the Federation can shout the loudest because every police officer up to the rank of chief inspector is a member of the Federation, whether they've paid their dues or not, they're still a member. Now whether or not the views are properly represented by their full time representatives, that's a different argument altogether. (R. 6).

At the time of the fieldwork representative Associations such as the National Black Police Association and the British Association of Women Police officers were in existence but were not as prominent in terms of public recognition and their participation in the formulation of force and national policy as they are today. However, as mentioned by some of my respondents, at the time of the interviews, civilian staff in the police service did not have the same level of access to senior managers to be able to influence the formulation of force policy. The position is different today and the existence of all these different representative groups, that at times demand participation in the formulation of force policy, has made the work of

senior managers more challenging. It is also affecting the style of police management, contributing to a shift towards a more participative and co-operative management style.

> *Yes it has, because again it's, we've been in a culture where it's far easier to dictate what's going to happen. Told people to get on with it and bring about change and it's very hard, particularly at the top of an organisation to accept the fact that somebody down the bottom end may have better views than yourself, and I think it becomes very much a status issue and an ego problem that some people, senior managers in the organisation, have difficulty grabbing that point. So yes, I think it does pose problems. (R. 14)*

RELAXED DISCIPLINE.

The change in management style, in particular the greater degree of participation of more sections of the organisation has been construed as a relaxation in the former authoritarian disciplinary style of police management, which manifested itself in a highly structured deferential behaviour towards senior managers.

> *I think it is because if we don't have consultation, and I'm constantly talking about communication, but if we don't have that, those lines of communication, well then managing change is very difficult for a start of, introducing change is very difficult. The culture of the police is resistant to change, and I think that on a number of occasions where the Federation have actually been involved in the consultative process that a number of changes have perhaps been more easily implemented than they might have been otherwise. So I think it is important, and one has to recognise it, the Federation does represent the bulk of the police service. I think the Police Federation is more often consulted by national government and by various other bodies. I mean yesterday I was asked by one of my Federation reps here, he said, I'm going to see the HMI, is there anything you want me to mention to him? I thought well, here is one of my PCs asking me, you know, pass a message to, you know, I thought like there's something not quite right here, however, that's good. (R. 49).*

My respondents' experience of consulting with lower ranking officers was quite different from their experience of the relaxation in management style that has been a consequence of the consultation regime. Examples of the type of problems that this relaxation has caused for them were varied and for some difficult to accept.

An often-expressed problem by my respondents was erosion of the power to control officers by directing them not only to act but also how to. Although examples of the incidents they gave were minor in comparison to the operational demands that officers routinely faced, the simple fact that they felt that they had lost the power to dictate to rank and file officers how they should conduct themselves had created real tensions.

Yeah, I grew up with the old authoritarian approach and I sometimes regret the apparent passing of that approach. I think at the moment we're in a transitional period and at times there's some confusion and anxieties. I mean for instance, this is a Monday, I use this as an example, car parking on this site is, there's no clarity about it. There is insufficient car parking to cater for the number of vehicles that the staff who use this site wish to bring onto the site. We had a hierarchical priority parking system, which everybody recognised, many resented, but they knew it and they followed the rules. That was dispensed with and now there's chaos, it's like the law of the jungle, first come, first served. Lots of apparent anomalies are often debated amongst the staff, i.e., that the most recent rookie now occupies the space where the chief constable used to park and he's got to walk miles and so on and so forth in the rain, and all sorts of things that are mentioned. So if that's a reflection of the way we're moving then it's not good because it's confusing. I think what's needed is, yeah let's by all means change our, you know, let's become less authoritarian, but let's be clear about everything as well and we do sometimes lack that. (R. 29).

Yes, I mean it's that relaxed; certainly there is less distance now between the ranks than there used to be. Certainly, when I was a PC, you saw your inspector on parade and, you might see him occasionally during a tour of duty. But there was very little contact and exchange of information and

certainly if you got up to Superintendent rank, I mean you just never saw them and they always lived in a different world and you had no idea what they did, and I think that has become compressed and in some ways we've taken the mystique I suppose out of senior management, which you know, I haven't got a problem with. I think it's healthy in many ways. It means that senior officers have got to earn the respect of their officers far more so than they ever had to before. They weren't bothered before really what the rank and file thought of them because they'd had nothing to do with the rank and file. So I think when you've got that compression it's bound to be more difficult, it's more challenging, it's going to raise more problems. So, yes it's certainly become more difficult and more challenging. (R. 16).

Where senior managers have had trouble, it appears to have been due to their inability to adjust to the change from a linear one-dimensional approach to managing their people to a more complex participative multi-dimensional interaction with their staff. The most often used example was in the control and direction of officers during public order situations. Under these conditions my respondents' view was that there was no room for negotiations and interpretation of given orders. As far as they were concerned, orders by senior officers had to be obeyed and instructions had to be carried out to the letter. For example,

It has relaxed. The difficulty it poses is that there are occasions when we are militaristic, and we have to give an order without explaining it and expect it to be obeyed instantly. If you are used to consulting and discussing, it then comes as a tremendous surprise to the person when they get a direct order, go there, do that, no questions, get off. And sometimes there's a conflict between the two. It's the same conflict where you ask a constable one day to have a helmet and be walking down the high street friendly and the next minute you're putting you're wired kit on and he's there with a baton laying into a group who are attacking. (R.31).

The problems created by relaxation in the style of management tend to point to some moral dilemmas in the way senior managers are required to embrace

contemporary management practices. This leaves an impression that the reality is very different from the expressed views. The bottom line is,

> *I've seen a thin veneer of relaxation through phraseology used, but behind the curtain to power the same swingeing condemnation and statements are made about people who, apparently have aired their views, who prejudiced, purely capable, still capable of prejudice, and marked, victimised I suppose, which is popular, for something which never appears on their staff appraisals or appraisals, whatever. There's been a lot of rhetoric about the relaxation of discipline and management styles, the old liberal shaking out and being involved, and being allowed to participate. I haven't seen any great signs of it. I'm looking hopefully day after day, we could kid ourselves that we live in a lot different and more enlightened world, but it's not the case. (R. 20).*

Any benefits from relaxation in discipline?

Regardless of the difficulties that some of my respondents had with adjusting to the relaxation of management style and discipline, many of them (68 per cent of the 22 that answered the question directly) saw some benefits in this change.

> *Oh yes, I think if you manage it in the right way I think there are a lot of benefits to be had because there are people out there at constable rank, you know, and civilian at the lower grades that have got that talent and ideas and have got things to offer and if you're prepared to allow them in and to listen to them and give them the opportunity to influence things which are happening on a wider basis, well then I think it's to everyone's benefit. (R. 16).*

> *Oh yes, you will only get the full potential from people if they're happy, if they understand what's going on, they understand what they're doing is important, you'll only get to that point with consultation. When I joined, you did things and you did a lot of damn stupid things because you were told to do it, and there was absolutely no room for argument and discussion at all. (R. 31).*

CONTEMPORARY MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS

One of the changes brought about by implementation of some of the recommendations made in the Sheehy Inquiry was the removal of the rank of chief superintendent. Although the service managed to create four levels within the superintending rank, when there had been only two before the change, the number of officers within that rank was 38 per cent less at the time of my interviews than it was just before the publication of the Sheehy Inquiry Report three years earlier.

Over the same period, there was an increase in the workload; there were more reported crimes and the police were called to more incidents. The combination of the reduced number of officers in the superintending rank; structural changes in the organisation, such as the adoption of Basic Command Units, which were headed by superintendents; and the increase in workload, created additional problems for my respondents, as senior police managers. I asked them what management problems they faced generally as superintendents, in light of the above mentioned changes, and more specifically in the particular role that each occupied at the time.

New pressures on the superintendent rank.

The main general problem for my respondents in their position as superintendent came from the restriction on their ability to wield the power that once came with the rank, but which was not always available with contemporary management styles. As one respondent explained, the issue of involving staff in the decision making process can at times still created tensions for managers.

I think coming with the general relaxation there has been, as a superintendent sitting here ten years ago, you can make policy, you can decide this and decide that. You didn't need to consult with anybody unless you, you know, felt you had to. In fact, it's probably a sign of weakness if you consulted with too many people, you just made decisions and people had to live with it. So, I think the problem's come with that consultation process. Because once you start talking to people about how you do this, what should our policy be on this? What policy posts should we have? In other words what posts should we fill, come-what-may, and where should we have the shortfalls? But of course,

those questions are never, well, the question's easy, but the answer is never easy, because different people will have different views. So I think it's actually reconciling the different views that you have on the various issues, because you've asked the question, you've got lots of feedback, and then somehow you've got to work out an answer from the feedback. I think that's where the problem comes, and people expect to be consulted today! (R. 5).

On a broader note, this problem reflected the wider changes that were taking place in forces nationally. The pace of change over the last decade had been relentless. This coupled with the demands on forces to implement and work towards a number of performance indicators that would measure the extent of their effectiveness and efficiency would have left most senior managers wondering what it was that they were being asked to try and achieve, and trying to do more with less resources (in terms of finance and personnel). This was reflected in some of the responses given by my respondents.

I think probably just two. One is managing time at a personal level and there's two wings to that. One simply is there are not enough hours in the day. Since we restructured there is the same amount of work or more for fewer officers to deal with and no matter how much time you put in, there's always a demand for more. For example, I'm on the verge of a four-day weekend off, Thursday, Friday, Saturday and Sunday. Tomorrow I've got an invitation to go to an all morning meeting at Headquarters. On Thursday the Home Secretary was going to drop in to this Division for a visit, luckily he isn't. Saturday and Sunday we've got a Specials weekend, training the Specials. So I shall work one day at the weekend, so of my four-day weekend, I shall work one day, that's consistent and I mean, although I worked 12 hours yesterday and during the night I had one pager message to deal with, no two, and one 'phone call at half past midnight this morning for a PACE decision. So there are not enough hours in the day and I actually don't know the answer. The other thing I find is being on Division, people think my job is wonderful and easy and I can go out and play golf when I want to or whatever. First of all, I've given up golf about six or seven years ago! My diary is largely dictated to by others, I am not in control of my own diary, if

the Chief Officer wants to speak I've got to be available. If one of the Chief
Executives or if a Councillor or one of the MPs wants to speak to me I've got
to be available. If there are civic functions, there is an expectation I will be
there whether or not I'm on duty. I'm not complaining, it's just the time. So,
that's the main issue. The other problem is and you may come onto this
specifically, if you're going to, stop me, is managing change and that's been a
real tough problem. This Force restructured almost two years ago, seems like
yesterday. April '94 we restructured and I will say it was done in a real rush,
a dreadful rush and from my perspective, the command team I worked with
and the management team, which includes the Inspectors, we didn't know the
identities of our team until about a month before we were restructured. So, we
had no opportunity as a team to get to know each other, let alone start to plan
how we run the Division. This particular Division was formed of three former
subdivisions, which had independent commands, which were lost and quite
different working practices. The former subdivisions were former different
Divisions so there was a real radical change in terms of apron strings being
broken and a new Division being forced together and we had to look to
another group of people that we'd not formerly spoken to and the first year
was tough. It was tough for us because there was an awful lot to do and it was
tough because there was a lot of resistance by the PCs and some unhelpful
resistance, which made it even harder than it was. So, we had a difficult year
and that change is still going on, so that's been quite difficult as well. (R. 7).

This quote highlights, though not explicitly, the difficulties that can arise when
groups with different working norms and rules are brought together without sufficient
time together to agree on one main style of working. A consequence for senior
managers is the challenge of managing the internal integration of the newly formed
group.

Well generally, I would say the major problems now are associated with, I
was going to use the word planning but I suppose with the organisational
issues as against day-to-day management of your own department or your
Division. The things that are forced upon you, the need to deliver things on
time, to set targets, to achieve targets, to budget for things, to play a part in

developing policies, implementing policies, managing change. All concepts that were outside the sphere of the manager at the same level a number of years ago. Then it was very much about, is the police work getting done? What incidents occurred last night, have they been dealt with? Who's done what? Who's arrested who? Who's done a good job? What serious crime have we got? That used to be what the day was about. Now the day is about, why are we overspending in this area? Why are we not meeting our target on this? What about if I get asked about this? What about when I go to the Community Meeting tonight and I have to explain so and so, what am I going to say? So I think the whole perspective of management of someone at superintendent level has changed dramatically...from worrying about police work to worrying about the management of police work. Someone's got to do it, all the worrying about that used to go to the Centre years ago, now it's done out there where the service is delivered. So I think that's the major change. For me personally, the biggest thing I've got to do is coping with that change. (R. 10).

Well I think there's a broader problem this, a thinning out of the management structure has caused us a problem. 25% of our Superintendents got taken out, a significant number of Chief Inspectors and our workload has increased significantly and that makes life interesting and challenging but there's a fine line to be drawn.
Secondly, I think really coming to terms with some of the new management concepts in terms of business objectives and planning and all that sort of thing. So it's coming to terms with ourselves as managers, but also in being able to, if we come to terms with them and how we come to terms with them, then how we relate to other people who haven't come to terms with them and how we can pass that information on and how we get things done, to those objectives. So that's a big problem, it's an issue. I think the other management issues are prioritisation of resources. Now that ties up the first one I said about workload as well, but as a culture and I think that related back to a very early question that I answered, is that we say we prioritise, we say we're going to become more focused, but a job comes in and we still say we've got to do it. Now there's got to be some hard choices made and some of

those hard choices are not going to make us popular and you cannot do that in isolation. No one individual can adopt the prioritisation and the focus, the whole organisation has to do it. Everyone's not working, we speak the speak, talk the language but the reality is different and that is a very big problem. So it's a management of resources, the prioritisation of resources and the budgetary constraints within which you have to operate because that impacts upon budgets and I think the different stages that people are at, at understanding what's going on, that's a problem as well. (R. 12).

Regardless of the role that my respondents held, they all seemed to experience a similar problem. This was one of lack of time to deal with the increased amount of work that they are now forced to undertake. The reduction in the number of officers in the superintending rank has led to an increased amount of work for the remaining few. Equally, the reduction in the other ranks has made it difficult to delegate work without transferring more problems down to lower management levels.

As exemplified by the quotes in this chapter, according to my respondents the work of the superintending rank is becoming greater in quantity and complexity. However, a cynic might say that a group of workers that was put under pressure through a combination of reduction in their numbers and increased demand for improved outputs and outcomes, would if they were remotely politically astute, reply that their workload was becoming greater and more complex. Therefore, in this regard I do not think my respondents' comments would be different from any other group of contemporary public-sector workers. However, and more importantly, it does not mean that it is not accurate.

ACCOUNTABILITY

Police accountability takes many forms; accountability to the law; to government; and to the public (Loveday 2000: Ch 13; Reiner and Spencer 1993; Cox, 1986: Ch 13; Scarman 1986; Boateng 1985: Ch 15; Baldwin and Kinsey, 1982: Ch4). The previously described changes to the structure of police forces, in particular the change to Basic Command Units, which has created in some cases large self-sufficient autonomous units means that the subject of police accountability to the public should

perhaps be focused at the BCU level rather than force level. Although this was the case at the time of writing, with BCUs now being inspected by HMIC, it was not the case at the time of the interviews with my respondents. I explored with them the concept of accountability to outside bodies, in their particular role at the time. Other than those officers that occupied the position of divisional commanders, it was difficult for most to envisage how they could be accountable to outside bodies. For this reason, and in order to give the discussion some practical relevance rather than leaving it largely theoretical, I have concentrated on those of my respondents that occupied the positions of divisional commanders at the time.

Before turning to the types of outside bodies to which divisional commanders felt they were accountable, some comment should be made about the claim by superintendents in other posts who felt that they could not be accountable to outside bodies. Their claim is plausible because until there was a major scandal in that area of policework, which was exposed to the public either through a public inquiry or secret recording of dysfunctional activities, the officer in charge of those particular areas would not be held to account publicly. Contemporary examples would include the senior detectives involved in the botched investigation of the murder of the black teenager Stephen Lawrence, and the senior managers in charge of training, human resources and recruiting following the exposures in the *Secret Policeman* documentary that was shown on terrestrial television in June 2003. This programme exposed free and uninhibited use of racist language and behaviour by a number of new recruits at a police regional Training Centre in Northwest England.

In general, most of the work of criminal investigation departments, training, human resources, and recruiting do not interact with the public in the same way as general uniform patrol work. One consequence of this is that as the public does not have routine contact with officers working in these policing areas, they are not as aware of how the police work and would not routinely hold them to account

The different types of outside bodies to which divisional commanders see themselves as accountable include different 'Watches', such Neighbourhood and Business; local media, which included local newspapers and radio stations; and members of parliament living in their area. However, the Police Consultative

Committee Group (PCCG) was one outside body that featured consistently as the one to which most of my respondents felt that they were and had to be accountable.

I quarterly have to go to the PCCG and present to them the quarterly report on how we're getting on with our objectives. Now the Press are there, it is quite a wide representative organisation, there are local councillors on it, members of the police authority, local traders, somebody representing neighbourhood watch, victim support, youth, disabled, ethnic minorities...It's the same report, quarterly report that I put through to the Review that eventually go to the Police Authority. So yeah, there isn't anything from that point of view secretive; we put up front what our targets are. We have four nightly media conferences, two radio stations, seven different newspapers. So, from the point of view of public accountability I feel, (a) that I am, and (b) that I do respond reasonably to that. (R. 4).

I think I have a dual accountability. I know you've said outside bodies but I, we always see my prime accountability to be the Chief Officers. Then secondary to that I am accountable to the ---- [Town] Police and Community Consultative Group. They expect ---- [Town] Division to deliver on the areas that we've identified as, through consultation, as being of priorities. So, I am certainly accountable to them. Having said that I don't think PCCGs work terribly well because what they tend to deal with is low-level stuff rather than the direction that the Division is taking. I know the next time I go to the PCCG, I'll get far more questions on kids playing football outside somebody's house kicking a ball against a wall, than I will on real issues where they ought to be influencing me. But that, I can't do much about that, that's the public coming in and I've got this problem and I've got that problem, OK fine we'll sort out your problems. A part of that accountability is because the chairman of our PCCG is a member our Police Authority, as is the vice-chairman, and of course they both have the ear of the Chief Constable. So if you like there's a sort of pressure there from both sides, although they, in effect ... they don't have a sanction against me, I know that if we don't go some way to matching their expectations because they've got the ear of the Chief Constable I'll get it

from the other side. So there is that indirect pressure from a different direction. (R. 5).

Besides PCCG there are a number of other statutory bodies to which senior managers in certain role have to account for the way they perform their duty. For example, the head of a Complaints and Discipline Department (which would now come under a Professional Standards Departments) would be accountable to the Police Complaints Authority. (Since the field study was carried out, the IPCC replaced the PCA from 1 April 2004).

I deal with the PCA, the Police Complaints Authority. I regularly correspond with them; they supervise certain investigations, the more serious complaints against the Police. So I have a quite involved level of contact with the PCA. To a lesser extent also with the DPP on criminal allegations, our files go to the Director of Public Prosecutions, so we're accountable there. We're also accountable to the Police Authority Sub-Committee that looks at complaints against the Police and I have to prepare a report and I report to them on a quarterly basis about the level of complaints and what we're doing, the type of investigation we've got going. There's quite high level of accountabilities I'd say. (R. 17).

Some of my respondents gave examples of where they felt that they were accountable to non-statutory outside bodies. These included the following,

Well we are the liaison point for HMIC for example. We will meet the HMIC staff officers prior to inspection. Also my Department's responsible for our statistics and management information as well in this Department, and of course we do raise many instances direct with the Home Office and the Audit Commission. Each year the District Auditor will come into this Department and he will look at all our documents relating to the National Performance Indicators and he will verify the fact that the information we provide is accurate information because he will actually check it. What is really a source documents? Where you get this information from and I want to see it? So we spend time doing that. And again through ACPO we will be asked to

respond say to the Quality of Service Committee because we also have quality of service within the Department. Certainly activity analysis we deal with, all these kind of these, so we either directly or indirectly have a reasonable amount of contact with outside bodies through public service. (R. 22)

In the personnel world there's not direct accountability in sort of the true sense, but there is accountability to organisations such as the, what was the Personnel Standards Leads Body, it's now been renamed the Employers, I can't remember, EOSC [Employment Occupational Standards Council] anyway, EOSC is the new initials of it. They've worked very closely with ACPO in developing work to do with standards in the personnel world, and that is sort of set of standards, which we are expected to adhere to. The Commission for Racial Equality, Equal Opportunities Commission, a whole host of agencies which monitor employment practices and procedures, to test your fairness. Whilst they don't have direct, we're not directly accountable to them; clearly there is a framework there, which we are expected to work within, so there is an expected professionalism that we need to aspire to. (R. 25).

Other bodies, it's not so much accountability as co-operation with multi-agency things. The Association of Voluntary Organisations, we have a lot of dealing with them. Local Authorities and various organisations, there's an organisation called Drink Wise, Drug and Alcohol Counsel, locally. You know, the list is endless and I feel in co-operation, I mean accountability is a quid pro quo really, in a sense that, you know, we accommodate them where we can so that they will accommodate us, rather than a demanding accountability, and that's how I see that. (R. 29).

Discussion.

Structural changes to the police organisation, legislative changes in police procedures, and changes in contemporary social attitudes have created a very different work environment for modern day senior police managers. These changes have forced a

relaxation in management and discipline styles, which some of my respondents have found very difficult to come to terms with.

In addition, the reduction in the number of officers in the superintending ranks, the increase in workload, and the change in emphasis on the matters on which senior managers should concentrate have reduced the time available to them to reflect on and evaluate their efficiency and effectiveness as managers. Although some found the cumulative effects of the changes demanding personally, they nonetheless collectively were stoical about getting on with the work they were being paid good money to carry out, as they saw it. Regardless of the specific role they occupied they were confident that they were properly accountable for the much increased influence and power they now wielded.

This chapter has illustrated how senior police managers have developed a remarkably similar outlook and solution to common problems of internal integration and external pressure. The language that they used to describe the problems and their solutions to them were also very similar, despite the fact that time, space and functional and operational responsibilities separated them.

All these points support a proposition that senior police managers can reasonably be described as a group that, through some common experience of similar problems and some shared learning on how to tackle some of these problems, has developed some of the components of a group culture. For example: i) group norms such as the standards and values that they articulate around working long hours in order to keep on top of their workload; ii) informal philosophy such as their collective outlook and belief that they are accountable as individuals for their position both to internal and external stakeholders; iii) espoused values, concerning matters like consultation, with the public articulation of support for the concept of consultation with junior officers, when the reality is often the contrary. I shall return to these components in more detail in my discussion on police management culture in chapter eleven.

MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE.

INTRODUCTION.

Sir Colin Marshall, the then Deputy Chairman and Chief Executive of British Airways wrote in the foreword of the book *Ignition* that,

> "One constant factor has run all the way through my working life, from the time that I left school and put to sea as a cadet purser, through my days with Hertz and Avis car rental companies in Europe and the United States, then with Sears retail group in London and subsequently during my time at British Airways. That constant, paradoxically as it may sound, is *change*. The future holds many uncertainties, but looking ahead there is one thing of which I am sure. *Change*, and once again, excuse me if I appear to contradict myself – *is here to stay.*
>
> "I will go further than that. *Change is going to come about ever faster, and more frequently*" (Chaudhry-Lawton and Lawton 1992. My emphases).

A senior police manager, describing his experience in the police service over the last three decades could quite easily have spoken these words. Today, the pace of change in just as swift, just as frequent, and if anything more intense.

> "This policy paper, as the forerunner to police reform legislation, inevitably concentrates on those aspects of reform which are primarily matters for the police. Nevertheless, we approach radical change not from the standpoint of those delivering the service, but from those reliant on it."

This was the view of the Home Secretary in the White Paper on police reform published in 2001. He continued,

> "Our task is clear...*we will bring about change*...But the challenge of modernisation is to bring about the kind of improvements which are welcomed

by everyone – except those more concerned about protecting their comfortable ways of working. The challenge to us is to provide the means which will enable police officers and support staff to work better, and to do their job free from complicated and time consuming procedures, unnecessary to achieve results or to protect basic rights.

In the end, it will not be the statistics on crime falling, or targets met for burglary or vehicle crime, but rather the difference felt in the neighbourhood and community itself which will be judge and jury of these reforms. It is time to focus on preventing crime and protecting the victims, and to place the weight of society behind this drive to reform the police" (Home Office 2001b. My emphasis).

These words of the Home Secretary, David Blunkett, in 2001 expressed sentiments that would have been all too familiar to the police service, because it has been facing a continuous call for change since the major corruption scandals of the late 1950s (Critchley: 19). If senior police managers thought that the pace of change to which the service had been subjected was about to subside, if for no other reason than to give them the time to take stock of what the service had achieved as a result of the relentless demand for change over the years, then the police reform White Paper would have left them very disappointed. As the Home Secretary mentioned at the Police Superintendents' Conference in September 2001, "This is a time of great change in policing. From the challenges of leadership to new technologies, the police service is changing quickly" (Home Office 2001b). However, it has been doing so for a long time. As Savage explains, "From a position of relative stability through much of the post-war period, the police organisation has been confronted with a range of pressures for change and, like other areas of the public sector, has had to learn to live with change – not as something temporary or transitory but as an endemic feature of the 'post-modern' world" (Savage and Charman 1996: 39).

Since Home Office Circular 114/83, which ushered in what was to become the government's continuing programme of change, the various methods that have been adopted by different governments to bring about the desired change in police management style, operational practices, and working conditions have ranged from financial constraints, through variation of structure and function, to now greater

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accountability to the public. Regardless of the methods, it appears that none has produced exactly what any of the governments have wanted.

I think it is safe to speculate that one certainty for the police service in the coming months, perhaps years, is that the demand for change will continue unabated. Taking a positive consumerist view of this relentless demand for change, perhaps it is encouraging the police to adhere to the doctrine of 'continuous improvement'. Put simply, it will be better for the police service in the end.

The continuous demand for change in the police service has been clear. What I will discuss in this chapter is *how senior police managers have managed change*. In doing so, I shall start by looking at some of the causes of change before moving on to how they have managed the changes.

UNDER THE MICROSCOPE - CAUSES/SOURCES OF CHANGE.

Over the last two and a half decades, the police service has come under relentless and continuous pressure, from both internal and external sources, to bring about change in its structure and function. Some of these demands have been specific to the police whilst others have been general to other public sector organisations.

The sources of change in public sector organisations in general and the police in particular can be categorised under the following headings of *"economic/fiscal* on the one hand, and *political/ideological* on the other." While sources of change specific to the police service can be categorised under the headings of *crime/criminal justice* and *formative controversies"* (Savage and Charman 1996: 39). As the authors go on to explain, "While these processes by no means exhaust the myriad of factors constituting sources of and pressure for change on the police, they do form the primary elements of that framework", as they appeared also to have done for my respondents.

Economic/Fiscal

Savage and Charman explain that, "something approaching a 'crisis of public expenditure' has confronted virtually all Western economies since the mid-70s" and that this was initiated by the oil crisis of 1973.

Before this time Western economies had gone through a period described by one commentator as the "The Golden Age"; the period between the end of the Second World War and the early 1970s. Using the oil crises as an example, Hobsbawm suggests that, "One of the reasons why the Golden Age was golden was that the price of a barrel of Saudi oil averaged less than 2 US Dollars throughout the entire period from 1950 to 1973, thus making energy ridiculously cheap, and getting cheaper all the time" (Hobsbawm 1994: 262).

Savage and Charman explain that, "a long worldwide recession, characterised by a slowing down of economic growth; rising unemployment; and, in some cases, soaring rate of inflation" consolidated the reduction in public expenditure. Further, that "Britain's relatively poor economic performance throughout much of the post-war period placed it in a more vulnerable position than most" of the other Western economies. "As a consequence, the Labour government of the mid- to late- 1970s, under pressure from the International Monetary Fund, found itself having to introduce the first major round of cut-backs in public expenditure since the Second World War" (ibid: 40).

With the election of the Conservative government in 1979, there was a further shift towards a reduction in public expenditure, and the need for such further cuts were justified by two deep recessions in the 1980s. The situation was exacerbated by the Conservative government's "ideological hostility to public spending, particularly the high levels of public spending on 'welfare'" (ibid).

The first application of this new financial restriction on the police was through Home Office Circular 114/83, which required adherence to the three Es of, Efficiency; Effectiveness; and Economy. These were the prevailing conditions under which my respondents had to manage change within and to the police service before my interviews of them.

With the return to power of a Labour government in 1997, one might have expected some relaxation in the level of restriction on public expenditure. But as one reader of the *Guardian* newspaper asked in the *Notes and queries* section on Thursday 20 January 2000, "At the last general election I voted Labour, only to discover thirty months later that I had actually voted Conservatives. Can anyone account for this phenomenon?" It should be pointed out that the Labour government of the 1970s was the one that started the ball rolling, with budget cuts and reduced spending on public expenditure. Therefore, it is arguable that this was just a continuation of their policy – but in the 1970s it was forced by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), now willingly espoused by 'New Labour'.

For the police the question could read as follows. At the 1997 general election, Labour came into power with promises to move policing from a more performance/efficiency-driven style to a more community/effective one. However, six years later we find that performance indicators are more searching and demanding and the financial constraints are tighter. Have the 'Conservatives' just added more bite to their policies on reducing public expenditure? Having had the experience of working on secondment to the Home Office, I have little doubt that ministers make policies and officials devise what they see as the best methods to implement them. The police service is given significant opportunities to influence government policies through the mechanisms of consultation and sitting on advisory groups.

Political/ideological
Savage and Charman suggest that the election of the Conservative government in 1979 and the ideological framework it introduced into the public policy arena sent out two conflicting messages to the public service, which they described as follows.

i.   There was an explicit commitment to strengthen the forces of 'law and order' in the battle against crime.
ii.   There was the pledge to 'roll back the state', encourage markets and the private sector, and spread the culture of the 'business ethos' throughout the public services.

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They labelled these two messages 'neo-conservative' and 'neo-liberal', respectively, and explained that the neo-conservative message could be taken by police managers as a comforting sign that the police service would be protected and that resources would be found. While the neo-liberal message indicated reduced expenditure for public services and more scope for an expansion of 'private sector disciplines' into the management and delivery of public services. They suggested, with the caveat that it might be an oversimplification, that the former message set the agenda for the police service in the early 1980s while the latter set the agenda for the late 1980s and 1990s. An oversimplification the interpretation may have been, but it seemed to have struck a familiar note with my respondents, as some of them expressed in their answers to a question on managing change.

Oh I think there's been a significant change in that we tried and are still trying to adopt some of the good practice of businesses outside... We're actually devising better plans than what we did in the past, I mean we have had a business plan for a number of years now, but it's much more structured... So we actually look at what business is trying to do, where are we now? Where do we want to go to? How are we going to get there? What are our priorities going to be? And the big thing in the last year or so mind you, is the way we've tried to develop performance indicators that matter as opposed to counting numbers for the sake of it. (R. 15).

The concept of adopting the management principles of private sector organisations in the management of public sector organisations has been labelled 'new public management' (NPM). NPM can be characterised by the following five traits of, 'private good, public bad'; competition; centralisation of policy formation; decentralisation of delivery; and fragmentation. They explain that "NPM reflects and ideological commitment asserting the superiority of the market over the state, often underpinned by no more than a simplistic 'private good, public bad' faith" (Leishman et al 1996b: 11). This generates four further features of NPM:

1. Competition; "NPM reflects the view that greater competition between the public and private sector and within the public sector promotes greater

efficiency by making public sector agencies more consumer-responsive" (ibid).

2. Centralisation of policy; "NPM centralises the making of policy strategy (especially policy goals and budgets) increasingly in the hands of the core executive at the heart of government, embracing a closely-knit network of senior ministers and officials. It separates 'steering from rowing' leaving the centre to steer while other agencies row" (ibid).

3. Decentralisation of delivery; "NPM decentralises the delivery of public policy to a plethora of agencies, including local authorities, quangos and private contractors that exercise managerial and operational discretion within the limits of policy strategy set by the centre" (ibid).

4. Fragmentation; "NPM fragments government because of the steering/rowing split, encouraging further client/contractor and purchaser/provider splits within government" (ibid).

They conclude that although these five traits of NPM could be found in the way all public sector organisations were managed, they have had unequal impact across policy area. The police service was perhaps the last to face full exposure to NPM, but it has now hit it in force. Leishman et al (1996b) have little doubt that the ideology of new public management has formed the major source of change confronting the police service in recent years. Explaining that the ideological framework of new public management did not emerge fully-fledged from the core ideology of neo-liberalism, but developed in an incremental fashion. Further, that it had been shaped by a number of factors, one of which was the shifting political climate. They suggested that as new public management has evolved "two core overlapping ideological themes have remained pervasive. These have been on the one hand, the virtues of *competition*, while on the other, the benefits of *private sector styles of management.*

These concepts would have been prominent in the thoughts of my respondents at the time of my fieldwork. Therefore, it is reasonable to surmise that they might have had the most influence on the professional thinking of my respondents at the time of my interviews. That this was partly the case was reflected in the responses that I got from them when I posed the following question. *During the last two/three*

years, there have been a number of Inquiries and Reports on the police service, calling for change in its structure and function. The White Paper on Police Reform (1993); The Sheehy Inquiry into the Roles and Responsibilities of the Police; The Posen Enquiry into Core and Ancillary Tasks; various Audit Commission Reports; and the ACPO Quality of Service report 'Getting Things Right'. Have these demands resulted in any changes in policing or management styles?

This question falls within the causes of change that I have categorised, following Savage and Charman usage, as, *crime/criminal justice and formative controversies.* As one of my respondents explained,

> *Oh phenomenal Vic really. I mean we discussed earlier about all the work this Force has done over the last few years in terms of its Charter, in terms of the performance that it undertakes to provide to the community. In the development of Service Level Agreements internally in which we set out what each department will give one to another. In terms of the fact that we're dividing now into service providers, which I am one, and service deliverers, which are the Divisional Commanders who deliver the service to the community. And I'm actively involved in developing Service Level Agreements with outside agencies. I mean the start of that was when we introduced the witness liaison computer. We had to develop Service Level Agreements with the Courts and the Crown Prosecution Service as to the availability of this information and its freshness, and the like. So yes these are all major changes. We are no longer, we can no longer see ourselves as an island that can dictate to others. (R. 32)*

> *I mean really the whole thrust now is sort of more business driven, I mean we look at the things like the performance indicators and the national objectives, and we're talking about targets. I mean we've been given targets this year for the first time that we're going to be expected to achieve and we're working towards that, so we've become much more business driven, in everything we do. And I think in a way it's probably not a bad thing because I think we're being held much more accountable in terms of what we're spending money on. I think the police service has got away for a long time without actually having*

to focus on that. I think the Audit Commission is probably the most impactive organisation on policing, I mean what the Audit Commission say generally is attended to. I mean I like the Audit Commission in many ways, I think that the Audit Commission does make a lot of sense, because for too long the police service has done its own thing. Each of the police forces have done their own thing, there's never been any recognition of best practice, or actually looking at what we're doing. It's been more a case of each chief constable has wanted to have his own unique initiative so they he can say, look what I've done and what I'm doing. So, yes they've been very impactive, for the good in a lot of respect I think. (R. 49).

In contrast to the above expressions that these external demands and internal initiatives have produced changes in the management style of senior police officers, a sizeable number of my respondents questioned the breath and depth of the changes. A typical response was,

We have a whole range of policies now that we didn't have before, but they're fairly transparent, they really haven't changed much. I suppose on a scale of 1 to 10 we've moved to about 2, if we're looking at change, and to be anywhere near effective I would suggest we have to be about 7.5. So we've enacted all sorts of things, and I reckon we've got away with it fairly well, because people think we've done quite well. We've got a lot of good stuff going for us, but it's not actually eating into the core of management. If you really want to affect management within an organisation, and service delivery, you've got to affect the Sergeants and Inspectors. The people who are actually turning people out day in day out and have some immediate control. We haven't done that. (R. 20).

This suggestion of senior managers not delegating tasks appropriately to the lower ranks and wanting to immerse themselves in the daily task of police activities is a real issue that perhaps has its roots in the culture of policing and the structured progression of officers through the ranks. For example, in terms of the culture, the following reply from one of my respondents to the question of the general problems that they faced in their current rank and position, illustrate the point.

Well generally, I would say the major problems now are associated with the organisational issues as against day-to-day management of your own department or your Division. The things that are forced upon you, the need to deliver things on time, to set targets, to achieve targets, to budget for things, to play a part in developing policies, implementing policies, managing change. All concepts that were outside the sphere of the manager at the same level a number of years ago. Then it was very much about, is the police work getting done? What incidents occurred last night, have they been dealt with? Who's done what? Who's arrested who? Who's done a good job? What serious crime have we got? That used to be what the day was about. Now the day is about, why are we overspending in this area? Why are we not meeting our target on this? What about if I get asked about this? What about when I go to the Community Meeting tonight and I have to explain so and so, what am I going to say? So I think the whole perspective of management of someone at superintendent level has changed dramatically and some have handled it and some haven't. Some really struggle and will continue to do so no doubt. So I think there is a massive swing from the attitude that you could retire a few years ago as a superintendent and everybody would talk about you as a policeman, he's a good copper, all the arrests he had. I suspect now when you retire as a superintendent, rarely does anyone talk about you as a good copper. They talk about you in terms of he's a nice bloke, you know, and they can't actually think what you did! So, from a policeman's angle that all seems sad, because I'd like to be remembered as a policeman. I suspect I won't be, I'd like to be but I won't be and I think that just indicates the change and the swing that's occurred, from worrying about police work to worrying about the management of police work. Someone's got to do it, all the worrying about that used to go to the Centre years ago, now it's done out there where the service is delivered. So I think that's the major change. (R. 10).

The desire to remain hands-on and to judge one's success as a senior manager by the ability to do policework rather than manage it is probably a product of some of the components of 'cop culture', such as 'mission' and 'action' (Reiner 2000: 89). Additionally, when junior officers use the same measure to judge success, then it can

be a powerful determinant of a senior officer's actions. For example, the remarks of a 24-year old police constable in Roger Graef's book *Talking Blues* illustrate the significance of senior officers' thinking, and hints at the influence of the structured progression through the ranks from the base of uniform constable.

Our superintendent Ops [Operations] *is good. He's keen. He's still got his feet on the ground. He hasn't lost it – he's still a PC. He will come out walking with you, not to catch you out but because he is interested, because he wants to walk round and meet people. I am sure if something happened he would leg after them and arrest them. I'd have to do his paperwork, but he would get involved"* (Graef 1989: 464).

One thing that both these quotes illustrate is that the ability of senior managers to retain the practical skills of coppering is in the eyes of junior officers an important measure, paradoxically, of managerial competence. It seems that it does not matter to many front line officers how good senior managers were at managing resources. The real test in the eyes of those under their command was their ability to do some effective operational policework on the ground.

Reiner describes two of the core characteristics of cop culture –mission and action – as "the feeling that policing is not just a job but a way of life with a worthwhile purpose… The mission of policing is not regarded as irksome. It is fun, challenging, exciting…" (Reiner 2000: 89). The structured, linear progression of all officers through the ranks means that all my respondents would have been exposed to these core characteristics of cop culture, albeit to varying extent and length of time. This in my view could have created the perception that one measure of managerial effectiveness was operational competence. Perhaps not surprisingly, some of my respondents believed that the changes in management styles were temporary unthinking reactions to external demands. Typically,

Invariably, and most of the responses are knee jerk, and I said earlier on that we're now on maybe the third major change of policing style. We had community policing when I first joined, then we went onto Pandas and Area beat, then we went on to team policing and now we're coming back to local Area policing or BCU-type policing. So yeah I think when these papers are

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published, and there's no doubt that Sheehy was a tremendous shot across the bows, because I think there was a feeling that we were always going to be needed by the Government to keep their policies on track. But we were comparatively well looked after, but there was a failure to recognise it. But the thing that I think is a lot of the reaction are knee jerk reactions. (R. 40).

One thing that these examples illustrate is that the police service and senior police managers are capable and can adapt to assimilate changes in its structure and its working practices. However, for some senior managers it is not an easy process, particularly when they are aware that their subordinates measure their effectiveness as managers by their perceived coppering skills. These examples, however, do not address how senior police managers manage change. How can they move away from the type of response that the last quoted respondent described as 'knee-jerk', and carry out change in a structured, controlled and proactive way? Perhaps one way is to pursue the formulation and adoption of organisational values, for example. I now turn to this topic and its effect on the management of change.

MANAGING CHANGE.

One author has suggested that the history of change in the police service began as far back as 1974 when the last major police force restructuring created the present 43-force structure (Grange 1992: 300). The process of change and the demands for it have continued unabated throughout the last three decades. What I wish to consider here is the procedures and mechanism senior managers have used to manage the changes that have unquestionably happened to and within the police service.

Priorities, goals and values.

Policing by Objectives (PBO) was one popular mechanism that was adopted for managing change in the police service in the 1980s (Audit Commission 1990, Weatheritt 1989). As Grange explains it,

> "PBO demands a clear analysis of demands and statements of priorities by the chief constables – missions and goals – followed by analysis at all levels down the organisational pyramid upon objectives, demands, plans and evaluations of

plans in action. Its success was theorised to be founded upon the involvement of officers at all levels, from which commitment to the process would inevitably follow, and a comprehensive planning cycle. Locally, superintendents are the managers of the system and are responsible for its implementation and success" (Grange 1992: 310).

However, the initiative did not work as well as expected. Grange concluded that the reason was,

"PBO suffered from its rationality, it assumed that given rational analysis and clear specifications of targets, operational personnel would support it. The humanist perceptions appeared to be ignored and the internal cultures and values that bind operational officers together were apparently neither properly understood nor used to assist the introduction of the new order" (ibid).

This is important because if the ideas of PBO do not produce successful outcomes when used in operational and practical situations, then officers will not adopt or embrace the initiative. This means that it would not become part of officers' working practices and values, and consequently, part of their culture. This I would propose is perhaps part of the reason for the resistance to PBO.

The external programmes for change concentrated on measuring the quantitative aspects of policing, and to get a balanced view of the full range of police activity, the service embarked on highlighting the importance of the qualitative aspects of policework in the early 1990s with the formation of the ACPO Quality of Service sub-committee. This concentration by chief officers on the proactive aspects of policing increased the level of discussion on such matters as ethics and values. I discussed with my respondents their thoughts on the reasons the police service had adopted the concept of values. I asked them why forces were publishing statements on values - which appeared to have followed on from the publication of priorities and goals – and what effects such publications had had on the style of police management.

Their replies produced common themes that could be grouped into the broad categories of, professional integrity, professionalism; standardisation of individual

behaviour in the delivery of policing services; reaching consensus on the purpose and function of the police; and those that were unsure why. There was one common feature throughout the majority of the views expressed by my respondents; this was cynicism. They questioned the longevity of this transformational style of management. (Leban and Zulauf: 2004). Examples of typical quotes are as follows.

Professional integrity, professionalism.

One reason ACPO gave why forces should set values was that "the Police Service firmly believes that the public is right to have the highest expectations of consistent and professional standards of service to be provided by the police in all circumstances, implemented courteously and not discriminatory in any way with respect to the colour, age, sex, religion, ethnic group or social status of the persons being dealt with." Although my respondents supported the need for professionalism in the delivery of service, which was demanded by ACPO, some were nonetheless still sceptical about the efficacy of promulgating values to professionalize the service.

> *Generally because it's seen as good organisational practice and we tend to environmentally scan and pick up people's ideas several years late, and just as we are publishing our statement of values, the outside world has decided that it's a thing of the past and they've got a new idea. One of these days we might just about catch up but there comes a point where if it's seen as accepted good practice in the outside world, we are very much expected to follow suit. I mean I was quite a strong critic of the proposed Statement of Ethics I think it was called, because my approach was the original oath of attestation that you take when you become a constable, more than adequately covers the proposed new ethical code, because that talks about even handedness, non discrimination and fair treatment for all. And that was penned back in the 1850s or something and I don't see anything in that which causes me any concern and needed change. So in certain areas we've undoubtedly tried to generate things, which I don't think had any real value. But we can't sort of maintain a total ostrich syndrome and if it is seen as good practice and if it allows us to be accepted as some sort of professional organisation, then we might as well do it. (R. 25).*

I suppose over a number of years some people have questioned whether the Police are operating in a moral vacuum and in the same way as you've got the Hippocratic oath in the medical profession and those sorts of things. I suppose it's felt that we needed that, both in real terms, because perhaps we have been in a moral vacuum but also in a perceived term because others believe us to be in a moral vacuum. So I would imagine there's both a conscious element of that, the Police's own internal conscience of things, it's about time, but also a political pressure for them. A real cynic would say, and I wouldn't, but a real cynic might say that it's an attempt to professionalise the profession, no not only professionals have statements and values, all the professions have statements and values. (R. 12)

The implication is that by adopting a set of values by and through which senior managers would manage change, then the changes were likely to endure. This thinking is embodied in the Statement of Common Purpose and Values advanced by ACPO in 1990 in its *Strategic Policy Document,*

"The purpose of the Police Service is to uphold the law fairly and firmly: to prevent crime; to pursue and bring to justice those who break the law; to keep the Queen's Peace; to protect, help and reassure the community; and to be seen to do all this with integrity, common sense and sound judgement.

We must be compassionate, courteous and patient, acting without fear or favour or prejudice to the rights of other. We need to be professional, calm and restrained in the face of violence and apply only that force which is necessary to accomplish our lawful duty.

We must strive to reduce the fears of the public and, so far as we can, to reflect their priorities in the action we take. We must respond to well-founded criticism with a willingness to change" (Page 1).

Organisational acceptance and public display of these values – compassion, courteousness, patience and using only proportionate force to uphold the law – would not and have not always necessarily lead to individual adoption of them in the delivery of policing services. The document addressed this point by stressing

"That whilst statistics and opinion polls are a guide to the quality of service and public satisfaction, experience in other organisations suggests that change in behaviour and the acceptance by the organisation of the service philosophy, will only be achieved as a result of commitment and example from all strata of the organisation beginning at the very top. In turn the culture of the organisation and management style will be reflected in service delivery at all levels" (Page 13).

The development and adoption of organisational values is one way of changing the behaviour of individuals and the credo of an organisation, but as Waddington noted, values in the form of attitudes do not translate directly to behaviour. Schein explains that if the espoused values of an organisation are not based on prior learning, they may predict well enough what people will say in a variety of situations but may be out of line with what they will actually do in situations where those values should be operating (Waddington 1999b: 107, Schein 1992: 19). This point was covered in chapter 3.

Standardisation.

The Association of Chief Police Officers was clear and unequivocal on the need to standardise service delivery across all forces. In its view the police service should be "seen as a cohesive organisation with a common corporate philosophy and agreed standards of service delivery" (ACPO 1990: 6). In contrast to the vacillation over the efficacy of values in general, my respondents were more certain about using them to ensure standardisation in management style and consequently in service delivery.

If you go back to your question a little while ago when you spoke about the militaristic approach, unless we're careful we can go too far down that road and I think it is absolutely right that we actually set certain standards. If you want to call them standards, values, ethics, whatever. I think the principle is the same that we will come up and deliver a certain standard of service that we should be big enough in this day and age to say that is the standard we hope to achieve. (R. 4).

I mean partly I think there's a sort of benchmark as it were, something that, you know, we feel as an organisation that we could sign up to, and I mean certainly, when the code of ethics, which is a form of statement of values came out, one of the reaction of a lot of people was, they're there, we're already practising them, why have we got to publish them? I mean the reality is that whilst we may all like to have thought they were there, if you had asked, if you got a group of police officers together and you asked them what their values or ethics were, they would have all come up with a different set. And so I think that there was a need at National level for us to have some common values that we could all identify with. I mean I can remember when I joined, as a young PC that there were some things that I saw which I thought, that's not right, but I didn't have the guts to do anything about it as an individual because in some ways it was, I say it wasn't unexceptional, it was, I had nothing to which I could go to like a code of ethics and say, look I can clearly see that's wrong. That sounds a bit feeble in a way but I think that something like that, which is supported by senior management would give greater confidence to young officers. (R. 16).

But the set of values must be agreed by a cross section of people in the organisation for there to be some level of ownership of them. Some of the process that my respondents have used to develop mission and value statements accord with some of the suggested methods advocated in management texts. Such things as, 'working visions', consulting and negotiating with staff to create simple statement that encapsulates the vision that that group is trying to attain. (Katzenbach 1996: 63)

The purpose and function of the police.

One theme that has been consistent throughout this thesis is that the police service has faced an array of tremendous changes. Some of the calls for change have questioned what the purpose and function of police in contemporary society should be. Should the police concentrate on law enforcement (Home Office 1993), or should it pursue a broader mandate that emphasises, as strongly as law enforcement, the service delivery aspect of policing? (Joint Consultative Committee 1990). There have been no shortage of suggestions of what it is or should be. (Martin 1993; ACPO 1990;

Posen 1995; Police Foundation 1996). My respondents thought that one reason for adopting values was to produce a consensus on the purpose and function of contemporary police. A typical examples was,

I think this is something that was identified again going back through the Operational Policing Review and the perception of what the public thought we were about. And it was this concern about the level of satisfaction having significantly reduced in some of the core areas of policing and resulting from that as you quite rightly say was the ACPO strategic document that came out of that. And I think within that it was quite clearly identified that we do need to have some value statement and of course we've got the statement of common purpose and values coming out of that. Yes I think there is a need to say to the public what we're actually about because all we had prior to this was the old definition of what a Constable is. So now that's, I think the difficulty the police were in and certainly got no steer from the Centre is, what actually do you want from us as an organisation? After the Operational Policing Review, what you were crying out for was a steer from Government to say to us, at the Home Office to say, 'Right this is what we think you're about as an organisation' and come to some sort of an agreement on it. That didn't happen so the police have now had to work through for themselves and say to the public and say, this is what we believe we're about, this is what you can expect from us. (R. 22).

Cynicism.

A problem with trying to inculcate an organisation with one set of values is that those values are unlikely to be the same values that all members of the organisation hold independently. When this is the case and the rationale for adopting corporate values are not properly explained to staff they are unlikely to conform to or embrace them. Typical comments expressing doubt about the development of values include the following,

Because it's the in-thing that everybody's doing. I think it's right that one should make a statement to what our values are and what one is trying to do, I think that's absolutely correct. And I have to say I'm slightly cynical about

the reality of what's being expressed and the difference that makes into how the organisation operates. (R. 23).

The cynical would say that it sort of came out of Bramshill and ACPO, I think that's why it's happened. It seemed like a good idea and it's been pushed out, I don't think it's come up from the bottom, the need for them, I think, it's one of the few things which ACPO's put through. (R. 31).

The perceived impact of change.

For the majority of my respondents, the numerous demands for change have made a difference to the style of police management. Interestingly and paradoxically, where some of my respondents have said that these demands have not produced any change in management styles, the main reason they gave was that they, individually and collectively, were already practising what was being advocated. Typical of the types of examples given were the following,

I think marginally, because most of those service delivery standards, people will say to you, they're actually what we already do, and all we've done now is written it down. So that we can pick it up and say, when we go to a burglary that's what I'm supposed to do. When I go to a cot death, these are the parameters I can work in. But I suppose every time one is produced you actually read it and think, now have we actually got it right in that particular area. So I think they do make a difference, at the margins. (R. 5)

From a personal perspective, no, and I always think it's very difficult when it comes to values. If you start to try and impose a set of values on people, I think we will meet a degree of resistance because people will quite rightly say, well, surely I'm doing that now, or these are my own personal values anyway. Apart from which I think the personal values of individuals coming into the service should be along the lines of those, which somebody is now publishing. (R. 6)

Discussion.

Contemporary police managers are no strangers to the process of change. They have been part of and leading a service that over the last two to three decades has been certain of one thing: *change.*

The call for change has come predominantly from external sources. The internal initiatives to bring about change, which were started in the early 1990s, have been the result of calls for some recognition of the 'social' aspects of policework, instead of concentrating entirely on the quantitative and easily measurable features.

My respondents were in no doubt that the variety of external demands for change had had some success. They felt that there had been some changes to the structure of the police service and the style of management, which was unquestionable when one listened to the list of structural and procedural changes. However, the changes had been made directly in response to specific demands. They had been carried out in a 'mechanistic way' (Audit Commission 1990). The change process was reactive, and there were few examples of management of the changes. There were few examples of senior police managers displaying the attributes of 'real change leaders'. These are senior managers who are more than information transmitters, compilers, syndicators, and administrators. "They are the linchpins connecting three critical forces for organisational change and performance: top leadership aspirations (what are we trying to become?); workforce energy and productivity (how will we climb the mountain?); and the marketplace reality (what do our target customers truly seek, and what can and will our potential competitors really do?) (Katzenbach 1996: 8).

My respondents' and the service's attempt at a proactive approach to the management of change involved the adoption of explicitly espoused values. The efficacy of using defined organisational values to implement change worked at a number of levels. These included enhancing the professional integrity of individuals and the organisation for which they worked, standardising the behaviour of officers in order to ensure a consistency in the quality of service provision, and gaining some consensus on the purpose and function of the police.

The promulgation of organisational values has brought about changes to management styles, but it would appear that these changes have occurred mainly where the organisational values were similar to those of individual practitioners. Even where this has been the case, many people were still disappointed because they felt that the service was telling them what they already knew. The significance of this from the point of cultural analysis, is that if these values do not arise from shared experiences and learning, and therefore given a common meaning, they are not likely to be adopted and embedded into the culture of the group, which is the view my respondents were expressing.

However, one alternative view that was not overtly expressed was a lack of change in the content of management activity. The style may have changed, in the sense that there was an established process for producing and displaying written values, but there was little evidence of how these values would be embedded in operational practice. How it would be monitored and evaluated to ensure they were producing the 'right' behaviours throughout the service.

My respondents hinted as some of the reasons why the values may not have changed behaviour. One example is possibly that the proposed organisational values were at odds with individual values. However, one reason that was not mentioned by any of my respondents but has been expressed by Waddington, is that values expressed in the form of attitudes do not invariably translate directly into actions. I do not believe the point is weakened by the fact that I am approaching it from the opposite direction to Waddington's argument (Waddington 1999: Ch 4), as the principle is transferable. If senior managers believed that they were behaving properly, according to their values, when carrying out their duties and that their personal values were not aligned to the organisation's values, it would be understandable why they would view the use of values to drive organisational change with cynicism. The cynicism may be stronger where the proposed values were not based on any prior learning or experience amongst the officers at that location. Therefore, as Schein explains, if these values were not based on prior learning they may just be formally or presentationally espoused values, "which predict well enough what people will say in a variety of situations but which may be out of line with what they will actually do." He warns that in "analysing values one must discriminate

carefully between those that are, in effect, either rationalisations or only aspirations for the future" (Schein 1992: 21).

From the data, the values that the service is promulgating appear more to be aspirational and have not yet been turned into a philosophy of operating. Consequently, the difference between the values that the service espouses and the ones under which it operates leads to cynicism amongst some senior managers. However, one positive note is that by using values as a method to bring about change the service is taking decisive steps to make implemented changes deeply embedded and long lasting.

CONTEMPORARY POLICING ISSUES.

INRODUCTION.

This chapter and the next two will discuss three of the core concerns about policing. These three areas are important and relevant ones for the purpose of this study because the emphasis that is placed on any one of them in relation to the others, and the significance that is attached to each at any particular time will depend on the prevailing social and political environment. The three areas can, individually or collectively, change the external environment in a way that creates problems that the police service, and senior managers, have to solve or adapt to in order to grow or survive. These areas are the police function, crime, and public disorder.

What is the function of the police? The specific and general functions of the modern day public police service have been the subject of much research, considerable debate and inquiry from a diverse number of official and unofficial 'investigators'. For example: The Government's *White Paper on Police Reform*; the former Conservative Government's Strategy on Crime - *Protecting the Public;* Joint Staff Association publication *Operational Policing Review*; ACPO *Strategic Policy Document*; ACPO Quality of Service Committee initiative,*"Getting Things Right"*; *Inquiry into Police Responsibilities and Rewards* chaired by Sir Patrick Sheehy; *The Role and Responsibilities of the Police* chaired by Ingrid Posen.

However, when a group of police officers and civilian staff from a small force were asked for their opinion on the topic their replies were varied, but predictable. Predictable in that the list of things the officers mentioned consisted of the functions one would find in most sociological texts on the police. Nevertheless, those that the civilian members mentioned consisted of things that the officers present were reluctant to admit that they either practised, or rarely had first hand experience of.

The group listed activities such as, 'prevent and detect crime'; maintain public order'; protect life and property'; 'provide a service'; and 'enforce the law', while the civilian members, alone, added that police officers 'abused their powers'.

The police service clearly has a mandate to do some of these things, such as prevent and detect crime, and, frequently, has used them as a measure of its effectiveness. Some of the activities listed are relatively easy to interpret and do not need too much elaboration, for example, 'protect life'. However, although others may sound straightforward enough, they can be problematic to explain, for example, 'providing a service'. The reason is because everything that the police do could rightly be described as providing a service, at least to someone. However, because what is a service to one person might be servitude to another it becomes difficult for the police to state, without fear of contradiction, which of their functions should be categorised as important and therefore deemed core activities on which they should concentrate their resources. As an illustration, in the 1993 White Paper on Police Reform, the then Conservative government stated that two of the main functions of the police were to fight and prevent crime, adding, that the police should consider shedding some of the more service-type activities that they undertook in order to concentrate on these two activities. However, five years later, the current Labour administration has adopted a broader view with regard to dealing with crime and extended the responsibility for fighting and preventing it to other public sector services under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. In essence, it has engaged a wider range of providers, but not a broader definition of crime or of police function.

The concept of service provision is very broad and because it can mean so many things to so many people, it becomes very difficult for the police and the public to agree on what service the police should provide and to whom, since different sections of the community want different things from the police, while all sections welcome policing but disapprove of being policed. Whatever the type of activity that either the police or the public class as a service, one negative aspect of service provision that is indisputable and well documented in the literature is that the police organisation can be partisan in the type and quality of service it provides to different groups of people in society, especially the policing of people from minority ethnic groups. I shall return to this point in the next chapter.

There was one activity that the officers, from the small force, initially refused to accept occurred where they worked. But when pushed on the subject reluctantly conceded some ground and argued that although some officers from this force might have acted that way in the past, it would not happen in this force today and perhaps would only happen in some of the larger forces now. Not surprisingly, this practice was the one that the civilian employees described as 'abusing their powers'.

That the civilian members used the phrase 'abuse of their powers' as a euphemism for corruption was not in doubt. Now, although one can make a case that an abuse of power may not necessarily amount to corruption, to do so would be to engage in semantics rather than substance. Abuse of power and corruption are similar in that they both involve some element of dishonesty and a lack of integrity on the part of the practitioner, and the distinction between them rest only on the scale of the dishonesty involved. (Waddington 1999b: Chs 5 & 6).

There is a wealth of information on police malpractice (Rose 1996; Mclagan 2003; Gillard and Flynn 2004), and this is despite the fact that there has been very little empirical research on the subject. The available evidence shows nonetheless that police corruption has a long history, one that predates the 'new police'. It was present in the systems and practices under which policing was delivered before the modern police force was formed after 1829. (Morton 1993). The last Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Sir Paul Condon, who in 1998 expressed publicly that there was a hard core of over 200 officers in his force who were corrupt, was the most recent chief officer to acknowledge the problem with the intention of solving it (Campbell 2002: 137). To this end he set up large-scale operations, using some of his most experienced detectives and some of the most sophisticated investigation techniques available to try to remove what he described as a small bunch of 'bad apples' from his collection of golden delicious.

Considering the length of time that police officers have deliberately engaged in malpractice in the execution of their duties, and the number of high-ranking officers that have tried to address the problem without success, it is questionable whether police abuse of their powers is a problem that can be eradicated. Certainly

some officers question the wisdom of spending so much time and effort on a problem that in their view is an inevitable consequence of policing. Some have offered an explanation why corruption could not be eradicated from the police organisation, which is that the emergence of corrupt practices is cyclical. In their view, corruption reaches serious proportions every fifteen years, at which point the organisation goes into overdrive and takes extensive measures to try to eradicate it. After some success, the organisation diverts its attention to other problems, in the mistaken belief that corruption has been eradicated; only for it to rise up the list of problems until it acquires the prime spot of concerns fifteen years later. However, it should be noted that these explanations have tended to mean personal corruption for gain, not abuse of power or violation of rule of law, which tends to be universal.

Whatever the length of time between campaigns to remove corruption from police forces, it should not come as a surprise to anyone that corruption exists in the police service. To imagine that an activity as knotty as policing, which is carried out by complex individuals, motivated by a variety of complicated reasons, could be done simply, without deviation from the norm is nothing short of wishful thinking. There is no doubt that there are police officers that abuse their powers in the course of their duty. The reasons why some do is not as important as knowing and acknowledging that they do, and those who insist on denying that it happens are engaging in a motif that I have described as 'elegant denial' (b).

Ideas of the police function can roughly be divided into two broad categories, a wider proactive view that the police are a public service agency with a broad social control role, perhaps even with a responsibility to remedy the social sources of crime, and a narrower reactive view that they should limit themselves to law enforcement and the control of public order. These two broad categories exemplify the tension that exists in delivering policing services that meets the needs of the different communities in general and in particular the demands of the contemporary role of a superintendent (which was discussed in the last chapter). In brief, the tension arises because of the dual role that superintendents have to perform, as both policy makers and operational commanders. On a broader point, this tension reflects the difference that exists between the philosophical ideals espoused by some senior managers on the best way to deliver policing services and the practical realities faced by the majority.

In this chapter, I shall explore with my respondents the tension that exists within contemporary policework using the two broad concepts of the police function highlighted above, and in the requirements of their position as superintendents. As policy makers they have to take a long term proactive view in delivering policing services, while as divisional commanders they sometimes act instinctively in looking for an immediate solution to a problem, which often forces them to adopt a reactive approach.

POLICE FUNCTION.

Policing is a protean term; it means different things to different people, even to the professionals. This is illustrated by the views expressed by my respondents. A typical example is the following,

I think I'm going to have difficulty in answering this particular question. I think my view of the police service is that it is in a big dilemma at the moment, that it is trying to meet an agenda, which is prescribed for it nationally. That national agenda I don't think has been derived out of sufficient consultation. I accept it represents the results of national crime surveys etc., so that is why we're focusing on burglary, violence against the person etc. The key dilemma that I see is that policing is very much about identifying with the needs and expectations of local communities, and I think we're being pulled in that direction as well. Quite probably, if you're a police officer in ----, your affinity is very much to your local community who may see life in a totally different way to the national picture. So there's the dilemma. I think the dichotomy that we've got is who should we please? At the end of the day, there's a tendency to end up pleasing those who regulate you because they're the providers of the resources, so you end up valuing what's being measured, rather than actually responding to the needs of your local community. There's a mismatch there between the two extremes, which I think you can get over because a lot of those, which are quite probably identified as national issues, are also local issues, but in the locality, people don't see it as such. I think the way round it is incumbent on us to consult and negotiate far more with the public than we ever have done, and I think in doing so we've got to represent

information and facts to the public. So just by way of example, if you go along to the Community Consultative Group or to any other local forum and their problem is one of prostitution, or they perceive it as prostitution, if we can go along and say to them, okay we're telling you it's burglary because you've had 100 burglaries at houses in your area in the last month, if you present those facts to the local community, I think the local community would turn around and say, well prostitution is still a worry but we agree that burglary is the problem. So I think the shortfall at the moment is we don't represent the facts and information to the community as well as we should do. If also going along to them we turn round and say, there are not burglaries, you're absolutely right, then we should be responding to prostitution. The big problem again is that when we're measured externally, whether it's through HMIC, the auditors or the Audit Commission, they will focus upon a key set of performance indicators and they won't give us any credit for sorting out the problems of prostitution. That's where I see the dilemma. I think the other problem that we've got, again it's cultural, is that we still see ourselves as a service that is there to respond to everybody's needs rather than actually rationalising the fact that there are other people there who can help us. And I think although it's good jargon, strategic alliances are the way forward and we as an organisation have got to start to learn to let go and to actually prioritise and to negotiate with communities. To work out what the actual agenda is, to work out what business we're in. So, it's a long-winded answer but hopefully that helps. (R. 14).

Long-winded it may be, helpful it certainly is. What, amongst other things, this example illustrates is that the environment (social, political and economical) in which policing is carried out is a further complicating factor in reaching a consensus on the purpose of the police. The police function does not rely solely on the ideas of the police or the public, or the consensus between both. It relies on the aims and demands of other stakeholders such as resource providers, in this case central government, and assessors of the quality of the service provided by the police - the Audit Commission at a national level, Police Authorities at a local one. Some of the other activities on which the police concentrate their efforts that my respondents mentioned where;

- Meet an agenda that is set nationally;

- Consult and negotiate more with the public, through Police Public Consultation Meetings;

- Crime Surveys, in the sense of using the results obtained from them to set national objectives;

- Local Communities, in terms of taking note of their needs and expectations

- Regulators, in the sense of carrying out their regulatory duties through the use of performance indicators;

- Providers of resources;

- Valuing what is being measured;

- Communication, in terms of the police representing facts and information to the public;

- Culture of the police organisation, in terms of the police accepting all calls for assistance because they are available 24 hours a day;

- Forming Strategic alliances with other public sector organisations;

- Prioritising the activities they are required to undertake;

- Work out what the actual role of the police is.

Proactive or Reactive.

The division of police function into the two broad categories of proactive or reactive styles of policing was not one that my respondents were entirely happy or agreed with. Where an individual did express a clear preference for one style over the other, the explanation for that preference included some qualification, as the following examples show.

I lean, I suppose there is a continuum between the two but I would say that I lean towards the latter one [reactive]. *Albeit we have to take some softening steps, public relations steps in order to make that appear more attractive.* (R. 1).

I favour the narrower concept [reactive]. *When I joined the service the definition of Constable was given to every police officer and I thought that*

that definition defined what we were about at that stage. I'm not restricted in my views, I feel, I'm a fairly flexible character, and I feel there are in addition social areas that we need to address and we need to sell ourselves as a service... (R. 21).

I primarily favour the first concept [proactive], because it's the only way really to sort of try and get ahead of the game if you like, otherwise we're continually pouring resources into reacting. Whereas, by the involvement of others in what we do and taking people along with us, it is feasible that you can get ahead of the game. (R. 28).

The first one, I've seen law enforcement agencies at work before, and they stand slightly, they do stand apart from the public they serve. I'm not necessarily in line with the fact that we can cure the root causes of criminal activity, I'm not necessarily sure I could subscribe to that. But I'm firmly of the belief that we are a liberal democratic society and the police within a liberal democratic society ought to be a social service, if you like, more than a law enforcer. (R. 39).

These brief examples illustrated the complexity and difficulty my respondents experienced in trying to reach a decision on what the police function should be, based within the parameters of the two broad categories of proactive or reactive styles to which they were confined. The issue became more complex when they were asked to consider through which activities the broad styles of policing could be achieved.

Nationally set police agenda.
Over the last two decades the social, political and economic environment in which policing has been delivered has been continuously changing, and the rate of change has been so swift that the police have had difficulty keeping pace with it. These changes gained impetus in 1983 with the now famous Home Office Circular 114 of that year. This circular was the introduction of the government's Financial Management Initiative to the police service. The principles of which were based on a style of management that has been termed, new public management (Leishman et al 1996). Following the substantial resources that were poured into the police service

during the first few years of the then newly elected Conservative government in 1979, which at times appeared limitless, the call for restraint in the police demand for more resources coupled with the government's demand for commensurate results from the police came as a surprise to some police managers. Throughout the intervening period, including the election of a New Labour government in 1997, the call has remained loud and clear and the tone has grown gradually more demanding and prescriptive, even though it has been sent in a variety ways. In the 1980s, the message of Circular 114 was reinforced by two other Circulars, 105 of 1988, which directed the police towards civilianisation of certain police posts, and 106 of 1988, which demanded evidence of effective deployment of current resources before requests were made for additional ones.

Compared to the 1980s, in which the message for reform was delivered by a solo voice, in the 1990s the message of reform came from an ensemble. The process, and the players, started in July 1992 with an Inquiry "to examine the rank structure, remuneration and conditions of service of the police in England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland." Sir Patrick Sheehy chaired the Inquiry, which came to be commonly known as the *Sheehy Inquiry*. Its findings, which emphasised deficiencies in internal management, received a mixed response from the police service. The Association of Chief Police Officers accepted some but not all of its recommendations. The Superintendents' Association was ambivalent to the whole Report, while the Police Federation was simply hostile to it, its recommendations and its authors. In the considered opinion of the chairman of the Police Federation, he suggested that the Report would, "at a stroke...change the police service from being a vocation reserved for dedicated and committed officers to just another job." Adding that, "the report is a business analysis of 'Policing UK – plc'", further, that "the balance sheet has become the bottom line of policing" (Cited in Leishman et al 1996: 13). Leishman suggested that the "Police resistance to Sheehy was swift, well-orchestrated and effective", so much so that "In October 1993 the Home Secretary, Michael Howard, announced that he no longer accepted significant sections of the Sheehy Report". The concession made by the Home Secretary with the intention to appease predominantly the Federated ranks in the service, also satisfied some anxious Conservative backbench MPs, one of whom believed that, "If we had not moved directly against some of the worst aspects of the Sheehy report, we would not have

been able to call on the police to defend us from anarchy in future – it is as serious as that - and we would have moved away from the close bond that politicians have always had with the police" (Leishman et al 1996: 14).

In June 1993, the government published its white paper on Police Reform, titled *A Police Service for the Twenty-First Century.* Although the main theme of the Paper was to clarify the roles of chief officers, police authorities and Home Secretary in order to improve accountability and performance, it provided some guidance to senior police managers on how to change their thinking and explanations for the lack of success in police efforts to reduce crime. For example, in highlighting the substantial resources (i.e. an increase of 88% in expenditure between 1979 and 1994) that had been poured into the police service by the government, but which had not produced the expected reduction in the level of crime or the fear of crime, the government provided some comfort for the police by explaining that, "the police alone cannot tackle the problem of crime. They need the active support and involvement of the communities whom they serve" (page 1). In the 1980s the mantra of the Federation, in particular, of, give us more officers and we will reduce crime, was to take on the more restrained tone of, the police alone cannot reduce crime, following the publication of the White Paper.

The White Paper provided strong support for the concept of partnership between the police and the community by offering that, "The proposals of this White Paper will help to build a partnership between the police and the public to deliver what people want most... The aim is to ensure that the police respond better to the needs and wishes of citizens; and that people are supportive of the police in their efforts to defend the values of society" (page 1). Additionally, it was certain on what the aim of the police should be, which was to 'fight and prevent crime'. To emphasise the seriousness of the government's intentions they added that chief officers would be held accountable for the performance of their force against this aim. However, chief officers would be given greater freedom to manage the resources at their disposal. While police authorities, which would be reduced in size, but through proposed changes to their composition would be given greater local representation in order to strengthen them and make them more effective, would be held accountable

for the results the police achieved in meeting local objectives and the Government's key objectives.

The *Police and Magistrates' Court Act* that followed a year later (enacted in July1994) contained many of the recommendations of the White Paper. The broad effect of the Act was to "further centralise the steering, while decentralising the rowing of the police", through for example, the Home Secretary's power to set national objectives for the police service, which every police authority in discharging its function were to have regard (Leishman et al 1996: 16).

Finally, included on this list of contemporary initiatives designed to influence the thoughts and actions of police managers, was the Home Office team set up to 'examine the services provided by the police, to make recommendations about the most cost-effective way of delivering core police services and to assess the scope for relinquishing ancillary tasks', in short the *Posen Inquiry* (1995) as it became popularly known. This Inquiry sought to establish what tasks the police could shed without affecting their capacity to concentrate on the government's "belief that fighting crime and the protection of the public should be the top priority in police work" (White Paper 1993: 2).

These were some of the contemporary initiatives that would have set the agenda nationally on what the police should be concentrating just before and around the time I interviewed my respondents. However, as expressed in the White Paper there was a strong emphasis on the local aspect of policing and police work, which was in tune with the view expressed by one of my respondent (R. 14), quoted above.

Consultation with the public.

Consultation with the public was one of the main themes of the Conservative government's White Paper, (and a strong component of the current Labour government's Police Reform agenda – Home Office 2004), in particular, when it is carried out to obtain their views on policing priorities. It advocated a "new partnership between the public and the police", on the basis that in a "democratic country the police need the active support of every citizen if they are to maintain a peaceful society in which people are not plagued by crime." Adding that society

could not expect the police to cope successfully if they were left to deal with it alone. Further, "the concept of such a partnership is not new. It can be traced back to the roots of British policing", and more recently to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 in which one of the recommendations in the Report into the riots in Brixton in 1981 by Lord Scarman was given legislative backing. In his report Lord Scarman expresses his satisfaction "that police forces generally recognise the importance of good relations with the community they police", and was certain that, consultation and accountability were the mechanisms on which society relied to ensure that the police in their policies and operations kept in touch with, and were responsible to, the community they policed (Scarman 1986: 146). Consequently, section 106 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (now section 96 of the Police Act 1996) made police/public consultation a legal requirement. Police authorities, in consultation with their chief constables, were required to make arrangements in their area for "obtaining the views of people in that area about matters concerning the policing of the area and for obtaining their co-operation with the police in preventing crime in the area" (Zander 1995: 288).

So, the topic of public consultation had received considerable coverage in the discussion on policing for a number of years before my interview with my respondents. However, after twelve years of legislative requirement it was still being discussed in terms of something the police *should* be doing, as opposed to something that was being done and done well. The police recognise that communication with the public is one-sided, with the police telling the public what they want them to hear, and in return taking little notice of the public's response. Most senior managers will readily acknowledge that without the public's support their officers would not be able to do their work effectively and efficiently. As one of my respondents explained,

Actually somewhere between the two, which may be a diplomatic answer, but firstly I believe very strongly that the police service cannot, on its own, hope to solve the ills of society and the old idea of the police force just being reactionary in dealing with crime and that sort of thing, has been proved in recent years to be a faulty premise. We've got to adopt an holistic approach and with other local authorities and local agencies, tackle problems at root cause. Having said that, we are an organisation, which polices by consent,

and unless we take the public with us and actually consult with them to do what they want, then to a great extent we can't succeed either. Where I think we need to spend a lot more time is actually ensuring that the public themselves are better appraised of our problems, so that they can make judgements as to what they want from a more informed viewpoint, rather than pure emotion. (R. 46).

In areas where the mechanism for consultation was good, often the reason for this appeared to come down to the interpersonal skills and determination of the individual police manager as opposed to a corporate arrangement of the force. This is illustrated by the following typical quote,

The first one, public service agency, there's no doubt about that. I'm not suggesting for goodness sake that I see myself as the guardian of everybody who lives in ----[a Welsh Town] but I do have responsibility. I think that police managers in the past were very, very small minded, very narrow minded about the police function, and I can remember coming back from an Inspectors' Development Course and being interviewed by the deputy chief constable and I can remember sitting in his office, looking out over ---- and it was a lovely summer's day and saying, Sir at some stage we've got to listen to those people out there, we can't sit in these castles with the drawbridge up and just keep being prescriptive about what we do, and he nearly chucked me out of his office. He told me I was too liberal, I didn't know what I was talking about. I was naïve. I was inexperienced. I can remember leaving his office then in an absolute bloody torment and bewilderment, and I've always had that view, that we've got to be involved in the community and I suppose that's one of the reasons that they sent me to ----[Town and police division]. The previous divisional commander was of the second type, a reactive type, no pro-activity, very, very little communication with the outside community. Oh, just as much as he could barely get away with and I'm the absolute opposite. And apart from the community, I mean to give you an example, I came to this Division when the previous divisional commander was here, the chap I took over from, and I'll never forget, the first thing I did within the first month, I invited every single councillor in, rural councillor, county councillor, borough

councillor, brought them in and said, look, this is who I am, this is how I tick, these are what my views are, I need to listen to you, you're the voice of the people, you've got to tell me what the problems are, we've got to work together. I can remember, I never asked the divisional commander if I could do that and he was taken aback, he couldn't believe what I'd done. (R. 30)

Local Communities.

The comments made above under the heading of *consultation with the public*, particularly those by the government in the White Paper, which called for active support from the public, are also applicable under this heading. The point to be made here is that my respondents thought that the service should listen to and incorporate the needs and expectations of the local community when they set their priorities, and not leave the public to find out, by accident, what those needs and expectations were. Consultation ought to involve a process of negotiation between the police and the public whereby the needs and expectations of the public, the more pressing problems for the police as assessed through operational demands, and the resources available to the police are all taken into consideration in agreeing what the priorities should be for the police. This aim is more difficult to achieve than the mere passing on of information, which is what appears to happen when the police engage in what they describe as consultation. Further, where the public's wishes were incorporated into regular police activities they could appear incongruous.

I favour the first one. When we were looking at the Sheehy Report and the things that were coming from that in recent years, the last thing that I want to be is a police officer and I think the vast majority of police officers are in the same line. I don't think there's a place for us to be a small enforcement agency, because all that does is posing conflict with the public. If they only see us as the Force that comes along when you do something wrong, then I think that's to our detriment. I think the police service and it's been described many, many, times as the 24-hour Social Services, and when people are castigating us for our performance in say crime detection, dealing with crime is but one small part of our remit that we deal with. (R. 19).

Resource providers.

Central government is the main provider of resources for the police and although the public can significantly influence what the police do through calls for assistance, it is central government that dictates how the police do what they do and on what they us those resources. This point was not lost on my respondents.

> *Well I think that from a personal point of view I favour the social control model, because I think that through that we can actually become involved in negating some of the causes of problems for the police. If we're purely a reactive police force I feel that we then are very much more politically driven. I feel that we're being pushed down that road with the various financial restrictions and the way that the police service has allowed certain functions to drift away from it. I think we have to be focused on what we're doing, but certainly I think the social control model of the police service is the one that I would favour because I think we've got much flexibility in actually dealing with the causes of crime. Dealing with the social disorder, and we have an opportunity to remove a lot of the conflict that we're likely to face. (R. 49).*

Valuing what is measured.

One of the recognised and often discussed drawbacks of using performance indicators to judge the effectiveness of the police is that they tend to concentrate police efforts and resources on those things that are being measured and against which they are being judged, rather than on those things that are the right things to do, but which are not being measured. This skewed emphasis on measured activities could lead to increased police efficiency if what was being measured was actually what worked in increasing efficiency and effectiveness, whilst increasing public satisfaction in policing services. However, it was not evident that this was indeed what was happening. For example,

> *The former, I'm not sure that we can fit the role of social engineers. We are certainly social facilitators in that we can actually bring people together in things like the Police Community Liaison Groups; the Neighbourhood Watch schemes. We can bring them into life but what then happens is very much up to the community, and I don't think we can do very much more than that. But*

my philosophy has always been we are a 24-hour a day emergency social service. It brings into play a very great deal of difficulty because how do you quantify it? That is the main problem and it does concern me as you go through time with Sheehy and various others, who would tend to push you in the general direction of a very reactive performance indicator driven service. (R. 32).

24/7: The culture of the police service.

In the opinions of some of my respondents, the police service is the only 24-hour service, and one that should remain available to every member of the community 365 days of the year. This is a difficult concept to maintain in theory let alone trying to achieve in practice, but nonetheless some officers believe in the efficacy of a 24-hour service, even a social service one.

I probably favour the first one, not necessarily follow the ideologies as you've outlined it. But I probably follow the first one because I think if we look at. The traditional view of the police and how people perceive the police, I think we're about much more than enforcement. We do a lot of social work, we are the Social Services, 24-hours a day. When the social services close, if people get stranded with no money, or whatever problems they've got, domestic problems, they come to the police, whether it be 1 o'clock, 2 o'clock, 3 o'clock in the morning. In a lot of cases, actually we're acting on behalf of other agencies when they're not available, and my view is I like this idea that we give a service to the public and I think that that should continue. (R. 22).

The first. The first, I think our role is wider than law enforcement and public order. We are a helping service, we are the only emergency service that is there 24 hours a day, 365 days of the year and which never says no. If you ring, you can ring the Ambulance Service or the Fire Service and they can say, I'm sorry, you've rung the wrong number you need to ring some place else. We never do that. We take it and we either generate responses from other agencies but we never say no, and if at the end of the day we have to do something, we do it. Which means delivering babies, it means putting fires

out, it means doing all the things that everybody else does, but when the chips are down the police service delivers. (R. 41).

Forming strategic alliances with other public sector organisations.

The importance of partnership was emphasised in the 1993 White Paper on the police, which stressed that the police could not solve the problem of crime by themselves. The police took heed of this message and started talking about the benefits of collaborating with other public sector organisations, and even putting it into practice. The current Labour government has given legislative backing in the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act for police forces to work in partnership with other public sector organisations, notably in forming Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships.

I like the partnership approach that's been pulled around, I'm involved and a signed up member on two different partnerships locally where we can influence what our partners do, but we don't go out and do it. If, for example, one of the partnerships is with education, we're trying to concentrate on a pastoral influence on the socially disadvantaged local youths and prevent them becoming involved in crime in the future by identifying those who are at risk, putting more resources from the education system in to them with our influence as to what they need to do. We don't go in there and become teachers or become social workers, we try and influence the application of the resources and indeed we've been given an £800,000 grant from the single regeneration budget from the Government over eight years to apply resources to that, not our resources, all I have to put into that is my time as a management committee. The other things that we do, we influence the Council into CCTV on certain hot spots. We don't go out and put the CCTV up, we don't work out what's the best approach, we just influence into that arena. (R. 8).

Perhaps if you turn the clock back and you'd asked me that some years ago, I would have favoured the very reactive sets, mainly because you're not aware of the politics behind the issue. You tend to see the police service as the be all and end all, that it can actually survive quite adequately operating in its own

little sphere. I think then as you migrate up through the rank structure, because of your own involvement with other agencies, other perceptions, you find that there's a lot within the organisation that is beyond your control. So, therefore, if you want to have any influence as to the direction that you're going, you have to work with other agencies otherwise you're going to be left behind. (R. 27).

Service priorities.

With the number of incidents reported to the police increasing all the time, they do not have the resources to deal with everything. They certainly do not have the luxury to consider themselves a 24-hour social service, even if they thought it was the best way to gain public support. The reality is that the police service has to prioritise and deal with those things that it considers more important, and this was clearly recognised by my respondents.

I favour the narrower concept. When I joined the service the definition of Constable was given to every police officer and I thought that that definition defined what we were about at that stage. I'm not restricted in my views, I'm a fairly flexible character, and I feel there are in addition social areas that we need to address and we need to sell ourselves as a service. We need to get into areas of public service that can assist us, we need to project our image, we need to do all these things. But in doing that we can't get away from our primary role or primary function, which is the enforcement of the law, the maintenance of the peace and that's what people want us to do. (R. 21).

I probably favour the latter, only because and I'm not sitting on the fence here. I don't think we can cure the social ills on our own; it's got to be a multi-agency approach. So, I actually would go for the latter. We are here for law enforcement purposes and that in itself with diminishing budgets and limitations on manpower is hard enough. I accept there is an area where we have to get involved and the social aspects but I think we have to consider what is the core role of policing today. (R. 35).

Determining the role of the police.

We return to the point on which we started this chapter, the function of the police. When push came to shove, there were no simple answers to the question and my respondents' views of the police function were as varied as the individuals themselves.

I suppose there is a continuum between the two but I would say that I lean towards the latter one. All be it we have to take some softening steps, public relations step in order to make that appear more attractive. But I have very serious ethical concerns about the police intervening in social change, and I remember, and this isn't an original idea, I do remember one of my chief officers, some years ago, he was still a chief officer here doing a lecture on a course I was on, one of the external things, self developmental courses I was on, talking about the role of the police in society and I remember him likening it to a boxing ring, I don't know if you have heard this analogy.

[No.]

He, and it was at a time just after that chap Alderson, [John Alderson, former chief constable of Devon and Cornwall] *in Devon and Cornwall, really got deeply into community policing, and he actually argued that that kind of style of policing which really was quite interventionist and it pulled a load of public services together, swapping information, he reckoned that was a slippery slope towards a police state. And he said, now really what are the police about, are the police there about bringing about change or are they about holding the ring, the boxing ring whilst everyone else sorts out change, and he got the boxing ring and he said society continually evolves and within that evolution, you know, and we have conflicts and people fighting with each other, you know, all different competing interest. And really the debate is, are we in there as one of the competing interests fighting with the others, and intervening and helping one side to win, or are we almost like the ring itself, where we merely hold that conflict within reasonable constraints. The actual outcomes of the conflicts are not our problem, that's society's problem, our job is to provide civilisation and a set of rules that conflict can take place within. And I tend to lean towards that idea. So, in that sense we are about*

enforcement and control, but in an acceptable and accountable consensual way. (R. 1)

I favour the first concept because I think the narrower concept would put us into the situation where we are not sufficiently involved in developing society and responding to the needs of the problem of society. One of the big problems in recent years in the whole of the time that I've been in it, is it has been wholly reactive. It has been too arrogant, too detached, not playing its part in areas where it should be influential, much of that has been to do with the fact that we did not have people who could be influential in their own right. We've had academics, we've had all sorts of arrogant bastards, we've had people posturing and prettying, but haven't gone out there and actually played their part effectively amongst the organs of control and influence. That has actually not just meant that we haven't played our part in society. It also means that we haven't advanced our own image, advanced and developed our own sense of purpose and done justice to our own role and to the people who work with us, for us and of which we are a part within the Police Service. It's been an overall failure to communicate within the Service and outside, I think we've lost our role, we haven't had an anchor and we've drifted and we've been buffeted and pushed around, picking up all sorts of agendas that basically could have been shovelled off to other people. (R. 20).

The two quotes provide support for the aims of ACPO stated in the *Strategic Policy Document* (1990). The message was that the police service should be more engaging with the public, work collaboratively and not in a controlling way. It should reinforce its strengths while at the same time acknowledge and tackle its weaknesses. The notion that the service had failed to do either with any certainty has created confusion in its role and position with the public. As ACPO explained, "The improvement made in our Service and the excellence we have maintained are frequently overwhelmed by new demands and a decline of self-regulation in society that exposes the vulnerability and ineffectiveness inherent in our form of policing. Unfortunately, there are also good grounds to believe that far too many of the complaints, especially those about attitude and behaviour, are well founded; many remain unreported but simmer in the minds of reasonable people who when

confronted with news about major allegations, proven or not, are conditioned to think the worst. The paradox and what lies behind it imposes an imperative on the Service itself to question the policing style and service to the public that has resulted. That is why no matter how unpalatable and uncomfortable in the short term, we have to engage in self-analysis and respond with urgency to the result" (ACPO 1990: Foreword).

COMMUNITY POLICING.

As has been shown above ideas of the police function can vary so much that a discussion of the topic is invariably not a straightforward and consensus-based activity. Nonetheless, one would logically expect a discussion of one activity that can rightly be deemed part of the police function to be an easier endeavour. However, sometimes using the term logic in the context of police activity is an oxymoron. That one activity, community policing, can also mean different things to different people. For example, it could mean the following,

i)   improved communication between police and the community

ii) an emphasis on problem-oriented policing (Goldstein 2005)

iii) collaborating with the community in setting police priorities

iv) helping neighbourhoods solve crime through crime prevention measures

v)   structural changes in police organisation that dedicate officers to patrol on foot and bicycles in specific locations

vi) using the 'extended police family' to deliver policing at a neighbourhood level. However, "unlike previous community policing initiatives, the new style of policing being advanced by the Government in partnership with the police service will not just be about delivering public reassurance, as important as that is. Excellent police forces today can and should be about reassuring the public and preventing and detecting crime." (Home Office 2004: 48)

vii) people in 'authority' showing neighbourhoods that they care (Wilson and Kelling: 460).

Or, as Weatheritt combines the various aspects of community policing initiatives to explain that it "attempts to reorganise patrols in ways which are thought

to be more acceptable to the public and to encourage behaviour more in line with public expectations; and approaches to crime prevention which involve the police working with other people and institutions to reduce opportunities for crime, or the motivation to commit crime" (Weatheritt 1989: 36).

Reinforcing the point of the multifarious meanings of community policing, other commentators have suggested that "In a definitional sense, community policing is not something one can easily characterize" (Skogan and Hartnett 2005: 428). They explain that "It involves reforming decision-making processes and creating new cultures within police departments...Community policing relies upon organisational decentralisation and a reorientation of patrol in order to facilitate two-way communication between police and the public. It assumes commitment to broadly focused, problem-oriented policing and requires that police be responsive to citizens' demands when they decide what local problems are and set priorities" (ibid).

The fundamental concept on which community policing is based in that of partnership, and in the previous section a number of my respondents mentioned partnership and expressed the necessity for the police and public to form partnerships to tackle a variety of social problems. They also offered a number of interpretations of partnerships that were given a variety of names, one of which was, 'strategic alliance'. Whatever the terminology, interpretation or arrangement of partnerships, the reason for forming them reflected one of two main philosophical aspects of community policing: Consultation and collaboration, between the police and the community.

As one commentator explained, the organisational aspect of community police is decentralisation, in the sense of devolving operational command and authority to small self-sufficient units. The practical aspects of community policing include the operational activities of engaging in consultative groups; foot patrols; neighbourhood watches; and targeted patrols. Bennett suggest that, "on the basis of the descriptions of the relationship between the police and the public found in the literature, the main elements of a community policing philosophy might be summarised in a single sentence as, a belief or intention held by the police that they should consult with and take account of the wishes of the public in determining and evaluating operational

policing and that they should collaborate with the public in identifying and solving local problems" (Bennett 1994: 229).

The police do believe in the philosophy of community policing, however, the problems are that different emphasis have been placed on different aspects of it and its translation into practice has not come easily or instantly. For example, for some it has meant putting more officers on foot patrol (Gordon 1987) whilst for others it has meant restructuring large sections of a force to provide community-style policing (Leigh et al 1996:12). Further, translating philosophy into practice has been patchy and inconsistent (Leigh et al). The drivers for consultation and collaboration has been external encouragement, and where this has not produced the desired effect it has been forced, through legislative requirement, on the police. For example, in the case of consultation, which was expressed widely by my respondents and discussed specifically under the heading of *consult and negotiate more with the public* above, although my respondents saw it as a necessary activity in which the police should engage if they are to deliver an effective and efficient service, it took legislation to force the police to do so regularly (Crime and Disorder Act). However, it is readily acknowledged that regular consultation has not led to better consultation (Morgan and Maggs 1984 and 1985).

With regard to collaboration, referred to by my respondents specifically under the heading of, *Local Communities, taking note of their needs and expectations,* from my professional experience the associations that have been formed under such initiatives as crime prevention panels, have not proved particularly successful in producing the desired aims that the initiatives were trying to achieve, such as reducing crime.

Police research studies have shown that the philosophy of community policing is based on the principles of consultation and consent, supported by the goals of accountability, problem identification and problem solving. (Wilson and Kelling 2005). Nevertheless, is this academic and theoretical explanation borne out by the practical experiences of my respondents? Here are some of their views of what the phrase community policing meant to them.

The first thing it means to me is that it is one of those sacred cow words that if you put it into a sentence you get ten points. It's a bit like partnership and all these other sacred words. I'm quite cynical. It doesn't mean to me certain stereotypes like, policemen on the beat, neighbourhood beat officers or whatever they're called in different forces, it doesn't mean that and it doesn't mean a soft option. What it means to me is really the consent issue, I suppose, and it's really what the contract between the public and the police is about; that we are their police and we take account, take account and do not, take account of what they say. It really grates on me when I see people having community policing departments. They seem to separate out a particular type of police activity from another type of police activity. I think the whole system of British policing is community policing because of its consent approach. Because it is by consent, because there're not many of us. That's how I see it really and I really am quite cynical about the words. (R. 1).

I'm not sure it actually means anything, I think it's like a lot of modern terms, it is a label given to what hopefully we've always been trying to do. What else do we police if we don't police communities? And what are we if we are not community policemen, and women? So, I suppose I think Alderson, the guy, ex-Commandant of the Police College from way back who wound up as the chief constable of Devon and Cornwall, he was the guy who used to paint 'community police' on the side of his police vehicles. And he was the first person to raise the flag of community policing, but I think it's a fairly hollow term. (R. 2).

The notion that community policing is something that most managers were practising anyway echoes the indignant announcement of one chief constable, who at the time was President of ACPO, in the early 1980s who said, "I've been employing community policing for years. The difference between me and John Alderson is that I don't go around shouting it from the rooftops" (Gordon 1987:133).

I think community policing to me is getting closer to the community, getting to know the needs and expectations of them, trying to respond in a prioritised way, explaining why we can't actually deliver on something and being honest

with the community. Making it clear to our own police officers what it is we're trying to achieve as well so there's no doubt in people's minds. And at the end of it all, making sure that the communities are actually working with us towards achieving the ends of making a safer community. So I don't see community policing as purely the prerogative group, the Police service, it is a partnership towards making the community safer. (R. 14).

Community Policing in a broad sense means that you are actually in consultation and co-operation with your local community. And that's really what, we like a lot of other Forces I believe have always been a community Police Force. We're a small Force, we've always been very close to the community, we've always taken the community's views into account. We can't always act as the community wishes us to act because we can't be a panacea for all ills and we can't cover all the issues that the community wishes to cover. It's certainly more important now because we're into strategic plans, we're into costing policing plans and we're certainly into Divisional plans and all these things are inter-linked, and the Divisional policing plan should be based upon consultation with the local community and what they see to be local policing issues. The same applies because we now certainly canvas the public much more, we have a whole programme of surveys that we do to ask them about the service they receive from the Police and what they see to be the important policing issues that we should take into account, and these are built into the local policing plans. (R. 22).

These last two quotes from professional practitioners reflected somewhat the ideal aspects of community policing (Skogan and Hartnett). However, one commentator has pointed out that regardless of the large amount of research that has done on community policing, we are not certain which one of these factors make community policing successful. Fielding explain that over the past decade, a multitude of studies have examined a variety of factors that could have affected the success of community policing initiatives. He points out that "everything in the social world (senior police, frontline officers, 'the community')" has been examined and consequently the findings are that, "everything in the social world has something to do with the success or otherwise of community policing." (Fielding 2002: 154). Also,

he adds, "the relevant 'factors', the things whose adjustments brings about predicted effects, have been identified. For community policing, they are: organisational, operational and individual...There are lots of 'factors'; indeed they are 'myriad'. Since our research has told us that everything in the social world is relevant to community policing it is not surprising that if we want to make changes with predictable (or testable) results then we can choose from as many factors as the police institution has facets" (ibid). This has no doubt been reflected in the ubiquitousness of community policing in contemporary policing strategies. For example, one commentator has suggested that the philosophy of community policing could be converted into practice through compatible organisational structures and operational strategies, where the organisational structures that best supported community policing were those involving decentralisation, while the operational strategies were such things as community meetings and contact, and community crime prevention and proactive policing. These general operational strategies should be supported by specific operational strategies such as consultative groups; foot patrols; community constables; police surgeries; Neighbourhood watch; property markings; problem-oriented policing; and targeted patrols. However, as Bennett points out "these organisational structures and operational strategies do not in themselves represent community policing as they could exist equally well within the context of a different policing philosophy..." But it is "when they are implemented within a community policing paradigm they become community policing structures and strategies" (Bennett 1994). Perhaps those respondents quoted above did not specifically categorise what they did as community policing because they did not do it under a strategy of community policing. When senior officers implemented some of these general and specific operational strategies within an organisational structure that fitted into a community policing paradigm the result was a graphic illustration of what public consultation, collaboration and service ought to be, as the following example shows,

Well, I think it's about policing with consent, primarily. Again, if you go back to the Alderson model, you could take his particular line, but maybe for many people he went too far in one direction in compromising our autonomy. For me, in the big 1990s I think the sort of model that we are in the process of building here is for community policing to be spread out, it's actually about

community safety. It's a broad concept it's not just crime prevention. It's not just the bobby on the beat, it's actually about, if you like, the feel-good factor, the quality of life issues. So, it may well be as well as dealing with the drug dealers, hitting the big criminals and reducing burglary and so on. It's actually about improving people's well being, and that may well be dealing with street nuisance, noise, aggravation from neighbours, and things like that. So, I am in the process of setting up in this Division the biggest combination of territory and numbers that we've got, we've got three Districts: ----; ---- and ----. Three very different towns, three very strong communities, so each will actually have a Community Safety Strategy Panel working on crime prevention initiatives with 'Action Groups', very much along the way say the City might create it, even more probably. We're actually developing a much broader concept of what is the community, of what is safety, rather than just focusing on the crime issue. So, I guess for me that's where we're going now in terms of community policing. Beat Teams, we run here, we will have a Divisional Tactical Team pursing, based on intelligence, criminals and so on. But a very high level of input on prevention, dealing with those issues that affect people at a very low level and these are things that tended in the '70s to be regarded as rubbish, nothing to do with the police. I actually think they are the things that we should be worrying about and we have to produce, we have to find ways of producing volume detections designed to hit targets and demonstrate within the new form of management that we are efficient and actually get down to the real issues of the things that affect Joe Bloggs. .(R. 3).

However, in the type of community policing that was practised by my respondents the twin principles of consultation and collaboration were evident, it would appear, only as operational aspirations.

Well I think it means just what I've said actually, the opportunity to interact with the community. We are heavily into it these days, seeking the views of the community as to how we police. Do we meet their expectations? Do we provide them with what they want, and all those sorts of things? As you'll recognise that doesn't make our job any easier, because, of course, if you ask questions of the community, you actually find out that their priority are not

always what you think the priorities ought to be, and then you are left with this professional dilemma: Do you abandon what you think to be right, in favour of what the community wants? But, I think we are here to police on behalf of the community, police the community on behalf of the community, and I think that is what it is about. I think most of us these days, and you'll probably recognise this from the City, most of us actually travel into work from elsewhere. So my ties with ----, yes they do extend outside my working hours, but bearing in mind I actually live twenty five miles away, I know far more about what happens socially in ---- than what I perhaps know what happens in ----. And unless I actually make an effort to interact with the community and the people that run ----, there's a great sort of chasm between us really, so I think we do have to work quite hard at it. (R. 5).

Although the underlying principle of community policing combines consultation and collaboration, sometimes there could be a hard edge to the interpretation and implementation of community policing.

When I came to this Division, we had 27 community policing police officers. They were divided both within and outside the service as being people who went out and played the guitar in old folks' homes and things like that, bear in mind 27 is like 15% of the staff on this Division at constable level. We could not afford that sort of approach, they didn't arrest people, they didn't deal with policing issues, they went out and made the police look good. That I think is what most people think of when they think of community policing, people who go out and make the police look good.
I actually think community policing should have both words in the phrase. What I've now done is, I don't have community police officers and label them beat officers under the traditional approach, they are people who have an area and the whole Division is divided into the 27 beats, each one of them has an area and he's responsible for the policing of that area, not the community of that area. Now as an individual they're allowed to work where they want and they must have an eye to what the community is doing. They get involved, they go into the school, but their function is to identify crime problems, public order problems, even the traffic problems on their beat and set up

programmes to deal with it. Some of those programmes might be to call in reserves, if they have an off licence that's continually selling to underage and that's causing drinking, they will get the licensing unit involved upon negotiation with that supervisor. If they have a number of street corners that are getting rowdy behaviour late at night, they will adjust their patrol times to visit those street corners. They will also have access to Special Constables who can for a week at a time spend two hours at eleven o'clock at night on that street corner and keep an eye on the problem. They are also expected to turn in an arrest rate, not just go out and arrest people for the sake of it but deal with crime in that way and gain the respect of the communities because that's what the people out there really want. They all talk about community policing but when you speak to them as individuals, they want the bad guy who's causing them hassle to be nicked and when we take 15% of our people away to put them onto doing non-policing duties and we have a stretched limit of officers anyway, we're not doing what we're paid for. So, I may have given you an idea I'm against community policing, I'm against what it is seen as. I still think we should have the approach that gives people access to their officer who they know, but the reason they have that access is to give him information about what's happening so he can go and deal with it. (R. 8).

To me it means policing the community. It does not mean being social workers, teachers, it means policing, the emphasis is on policing. Don't assume that means heavy handed, riot shield tactics, it means walking around the beat but focusing on crime, prevention, detection and social control, not guitars in schools and that sort of stuff. So, I would say policing the community, but in a way that works with the consent of the community in the areas we should be focusing on. (R. 12).

Regardless of the ideal arrangements that some of my respondents wanted to implement within their sphere of authority, in general the reality was that what they wanted or would have liked was different from what they eventually had to do. Further, when they were able to implement the type of community policing model that they wanted, often the reason why they were able to do so was not down to choice.

I know what it means to me. It actually means that police officers are recognised within the community and for their skills, for the virtues and values that they actually have and it means that they will find a way of being embraced by most communities. It won't happen all the time, there will always be resistance and difficulty. It also means that there is a degree of tolerance, credibility and non-partisanship shown by those who are actually involved with the role. Officially what it means is that we, certainly now in this Force, they talk about community policing and it's just a handle to try and convince themselves and the communities outside that we're making an effort to reach out towards them and police them, to some sort of consensus. That doesn't happen, it's just a handle, it's a superficial nonsense that really isn't taking place. Community Officers are the first to get pulled in to fill up the roles and functions. If you want to look at this Force any time round the clock, and you look at the community officer and see how many are actually in place, not many. The percentage of absentees from those sorts of roles is far higher than any other position. So, community policing is something which the police service hangs its hat on but actually doesn't come up to proof on, and that's certainly something that happens here. It should be, if we've got to have a sense of consensus, if we're going to have joint developments and believe in the first concept that we spoke about, instead of the reactive Fire Brigade approach to policing, it has got to be, well policing a community. You can't separate the two if you're going to operate in some sensible and effective way and actually be influential, because you need to be more influential at times on the streets than you do in the board rooms, with the people who are now saying, well let's get in there, let's have a few hundred thousand, let's have the partnerships and all the rest of it. One of my fears now is we might put far more effort into doing that for purposes of revenue than ever we have done by actually investing time and effort and understanding the concerns of some streets and communities. (R. 20).

The literature (Leigh et al) tends to support the views expressed in this last quote, which is perhaps closer to the reality than the previous quote. This raises the question of whether the majority of my respondents were engaging, consciously or

otherwise, in the motif I have termed 'elegant denial'? In this case, expressing a corporate ideal whilst shutting out the local reality of the situation.

TRADITIONAL POLICING.

In trying to elicit from my respondents their views on different policing styles, I inferred in my questions that there was a clear distinction between the two styles of community and traditional policing, without offering a definition for traditional policing. The reason was that I wanted my respondents' view on whether they accepted my inferred distinction, and if they did, what they conceived represented traditional policing. On speaking with them it became apparent that perhaps the distinction is not so clear, as one of my respondents highlighted,

> *Well we use that a lot in this Force area. We either use the phrase community policing or traditional policing, and as I see it in its purist form, it's the embodiment of the single police officer, who's able to discharge his or her duty through consent and primarily through resolving issues and persuasion, as opposed to pure law enforcement and the hard side of policing, like arresting, or whatever, and taking formal action. Nevertheless, we do have to do that as well obviously, but that's the way that I envisage it; that the police officer is known more or less within this community and knows the community as well and is involved with those levers within that community, which makes that community a society that makes it the way that it is. That's how I see it in its purist form. Mitigated against that there are of course changes; postings, turnover of personnel, staff, other demands on the system, which means you never reach the pure form, or very rarely do, but you strive to do that. (R. 29).*

Concentrating on traditional policing, the same respondent offered the following interpretation,

> *I tend to regard them* [community and traditional policing] *as being the same thing. I mean again was there ever a time when there was traditional policing? I mean you can always ask that question, I mean we tend to refer back and the Service tends to refer back and say, oh in those days we used to do this. When you actually think about it, even 30 years ago when I first*

joined, we didn't actually do all the things we thought we did. It was more of an ideal and perhaps we practice more of it now than we did then to some degree. But I mean these are the concepts that the officer goes out unarmed into a society and can and should by and large operate on their own and get results if you want. Be a symbol of the law, be a symbol of common sense and good judgement, and influence the society in which he or she operates. That's the idea in my view. (R. 29).

This interpretation of traditional policing is very similar to the one articulated at the highest policy level in the service. The *ACPO Strategic Policy Document* described traditional policing as follow;

"British traditional policing is relatively low on number, low on power and high on accountability; it is undertaken with public consent which does not mean acquiescence but a broad tolerance indicating a satisfaction with both the helping and enforcement roles of policing. Its structure allows the public to express their policing wants and needs though changes in social attitudes and methods of social control may occur, the culture of policing remains intact" (ACPO 1990: 2).

This is perhaps an idealistic view of traditional policing; one which goes some way to making tangible the notion of policing during a golden age. Some commentators have questioned this notion of a golden age of policing (Reiner 1992, Benyon and Bourn 1986: Ch.1); the age of George Dixon, when officers could clip young mischievous malcontents across the back of the head before taking them home where their fathers, after showing gratitude to the officer, administered the real punishment on his offspring for his erroneous ways.

Traditional policing is perhaps this view of the Dixon of Dock Green, that's perhaps the best way of putting it that people perceive this guy who is there, high visibility policing, is walking up and down the street, speaking to members of the public. I can't put myself into the mind of members of the public, but I think generally that's the kind of view they have, of this

traditional uniformed officer who's on patrol, who adopts this friendly attitude

towards them, who will listen to their problems and be there for them. (R. 22).

I'm not really sure of that, I mean in the eyes of the public traditional policing
is very much the visible side of police work, you know, the patrol in the streets.
I mean it probably means to a lot of members of the public, you know, clipping
kids around the ear as we were talking about earlier. I'm not actually sure
whether that isn't just a myth, you know, it's the thing about a policeman
being on every corner, you know. In the good old days and where policemen
used to sort of deal with young lads for raiding the orchards and things like,
you know. David Phillips, the Chief Constable of Kent, once wrote an article
on it in Police magazine and he said it was a total myth, it just never existed
other than in people's minds and I'm not so sure if traditional policing isn't
just a more posh way of describing that myth really. (R. 16).

The view of traditional policing by ACPO highlighted above is not one that
some of my respondents readily registered with. For example,

I don't know what traditional policing is. It's almost this rosy view of
something that happened in the past that we probably never had. Sometimes I
get quite passionate about this and when people talk to me about traditional
policing I say what you mean when we were all bent, for taking bribes, didn't
take on the middle classes and so on and so forth. You know, things weren't
rosy or fair in the past from what I've read and so it appears, so I have a
problem with traditional policing. (R. 1).

Traditional policing is what everybody tells me they want every time I go to a
public meeting. Traditional policing are expectations, which we can't meet.
They want to see a policeman walking down every street who will stop and
talk to everybody and spend lots of time and at the same time they expect a
policeman to arrive in a marked car with horns blaring and lights going the
minute they push the panic button. (R. 7).

The majority of my respondents viewed traditional policing as the public's desire for uniform foot patrol, an activity that has been euphemistically referred to as Bobbies on the beat. Although they saw the need to try and give the public what they desired, most of them saw the idea of unfocused policing as an unmitigated waste of valuable and scarce resources.

> *Traditional policing as far as the public is concerned, there are different perceptions as to what traditional policing is all about. I think from my experience as an Area Commander, traditional policing is, they want to see police officers in uniform with helmets on walking round the street at all hours of the day and night. Now if that's what they want, then to an extent we've got to meet that. It would be foolish of us to ignore that and say, 'well we know better, we know from research that the prospects of a police officer walking the beat, of him actually coming across a crime or preventing crime taking place are quite minimal, but the fact is you're talking about a feel good factor and I think we have to recognise that. (R. 17).*

The concept of traditional policing had many similar characteristics for many of my respondents. They found it very difficult to explain what this policing style called traditional policing was, but they were at ease to offer what they saw as the public's explanation of what traditional policing was. This was that traditional policing meant the uniformed constable who patrolled his beat upholding the law, giving advice and reassuring the community. In modern day parlance, he is the much requested and highly desirable 'bobby on the beat.' In essence he was a paternal authority figure to whom everyone could turn in times of uncertainty and need, and in today's terms he is the embodiment of reassurance and order, whose presence is certain to alleviate the anxiety and fear of the community. Nonetheless, in my respondents' view he is neither effective nor efficient and has no place in a modern police service that is saddled with an unquestionable remit to solve crime.

To the majority of my respondents the concept of traditional policing, epitomised by the fictitious image of George Dixon, was nothing more than a myth, and in any event it was a luxury that could not be afforded in the police service of today that is tightly tied to a performance regime. In their view, traditional policing

was about aimless patrolling, which was at odds with focused, targeted and intelligence-led policing.

Traditional policing to me is your Dixon of Dock Green. Do you remember Dixon of Dock Green? Well that's what I would say traditional policing is where an officer is, walking round a predetermined area and he or she is seen to be out there. It's what members, some members of the public want, traditional policing. To me it's an illusion and I'm sure that all the research that's been done proves it to be an illusion really and truly, but people still like it. We as a Police service should be saying something via the media to combat that because it's far to target where you should put your resources and whether you should have them covert, overt or what other resources we should be using to tackle the problems. We have got to be putting officers where they can be best making inroads into whatever problems the public want us to look at, and not only what the public want us to look at, what we also think we should be looking at. (R. 48).

I don't know what it means. Again I think there's a lot of folklore about policing, I think there's a lot of myths that we had the Dixon of Dock Green, I don't know if we ever did, you've heard those debates. I think people want to feel safe and in a mythical time gone by there's a perception of feeling safe. I don't think there is any more, and I think if they want to hang onto traditional policing in terms of the beat bobby and those reassurance type patrolling, then fine, but I'm not so sure it was ever there. I think it's linked to social change, social upheaval, social problems, that are perhaps more prevalent now than they were then. Plus the fact you can't have a war in there somewhere, a war tends to bring people together every now and again and in a perverse way it tends to give them social cohesion. So, we haven't had one of those to speak of, not that I would advocate one! (R. 42).

My respondents see traditional policing, and according to them so does the public, as typifying the uniformed officer on the beat administering the law fairly, without fear or favour, at a time when the public respected the police, who performed their duties with integrity. As some of my respondents' have expressed about the

public's perception of how much better policing used to be, the reality was quite different from the memory. Perhaps it will not come as a surprise that some of my respondents' idea of officers in the past going out and talking to people and establishing community contact is nothing more than a case of 'elegant denial' by many. For example,

Traditional policing was, it's funny isn't it when we look back to the Dixon of Dock Green, did he ever exist? What was traditional policing? Traditional policing was about going out with a uniform on and not talking. I now am the Divisional Commander here, I was Head of Complaints and Discipline and I look back through the old discipline books and the number of officers that were booked, put in the discipline book for idle gossiping. I can remember being given the bollocking of my life by a sergeant who'd left the Station at 6am in the morning and he gave me a new probationer, he had just started that morning and he gave me the probationer, told me to walk along my beat, the probationer was on the next beat to me and to give him an insight into what was expected of him. And I can remember I walked the length of my beat, and I was trying to pass on as much experience as I could to him. It was his first day out and I can remember being right on the end of my beat and it was 7 o'clock, and the sergeant then had come out of the Station to do his visits and when he drew up to us and saw that the probationer was still with me after an hour, he got out of that car and gave me the biggest bollocking of my life for idle gossiping and he was going to put me on the book. Now that's what I talk about, when we talk about this thing about old policing styles, oh it was dreadful. It was restrictive, you weren't allowed to go off the main beat, the supervisors had brains as big as peas. As long as they could see you and book you a visit they didn't care what you did, and I wonder why? I've never looked at it, I wonder through research whether anybody's looked at, what did they do in those days? What were the results? I mean I can't remember anybody ever discussing results with me, and when I look at what we're doing now, when I look at an officer who is proactively involved in, in the Community, in what he does, in the way he does it and the way right from senior management down we're involved with the men, I just wonder what was going on in those days. (R. 30).

Discussion.

What is policing? Actually, as Waddington's anecdotal evidence suggests, the answer to this question is quite straightforward. Policing is "the same the whole world over." Describing his experiences in patrolling with officers from Chicago Police Department and Reading, part of Thames Valley Police in the England, he explained that the situations that officers were asked to deal with were remarkably similar. However, as he pointed out, "True, complainants in Reading do not usually have guns and neither do the police, but police officers share the experience of finding themselves enmeshed in complex quarrels as well as ejecting unruly drunks from bars" (Waddington 1999: 3).

As he goes on to claim, "Social scientists have become so familiar with amalgamating research from such a broad diversity of social, economic, political, cultural and historical conditions there is the danger that we lose sight of the genuinely remarkable consistency midst diversity that research reveals. When Banton compared the police in Edinburgh in Scotland with a police department in North Carolina, it was the *similarities* between them that allowed him to discuss *generally* what policing entailed. We need to keep this consistency across apparently diverse conditions firmly in mind lest we slide into parochial and particular explanations for why policing takes the form it does" (ibid). From this explanation of consistency in policing, it is easy to use it to support an argument for a singular basic culture in the police service, certainly nationally, which allows for the similarity in the delivery of policing services.

Although what is similar is consistent among the providers of the service, however, what the police *ought* to be doing, as interpreted by the receivers of the service, is not so consistent. It is the different demands on and from the police service by the different stakeholders, which has made policing sometimes problematic for senior police managers. The situation is made more challenging when it is realised that some of the stakeholders are making their demands not from information gained first-hand, but often second and third-hand, and occasionally from fictitious sources. However, some of the stakeholders are very well informed and influential and they used their knowledge to support their demands on the police, in particular on what

they think that senior managers ought to be concentrating. This often leaves senior managers in a dilemma over their use of resources, since there is not enough with which to address all the calls that are made on them. All these factors make managing and leading a complex social institution that is required to tackle a variety, and sometimes complex, social problems a difficult and arduous one.

My respondents in this chapter highlighted the difficulty and challenges of dealing with general contemporary policing issues. Their replies on how they dealt with the problems were, as Waddington found from his experience of policing across international boundaries, remarkably consistent. This leads me to assert that the common experience of similar policing problems that senior managers faced in their different geographical area and functional or specialist post gave them the opportunity to develop similar occupational outlooks, and since this is one dimension of culture it adds strength to the proposition of the formation of a culture amongst this group of officers.

<center>Chapter 8</center>

<center>## CRIME AND ITS CONTROL.</center>

THE EXTENT AND CAUSES OF CRIME.

The difficulty with discussing the subject of crime is that it is so broad an area that most discussions tend to concentrate on parts of the whole. For example, on the extent of crime, should it be decided, or more appropriately estimated, from officially recorded police figures? Or would national surveys that include unreported crimes by victims and unrecorded ones by the police (such as those captured annually in the British Crime Survey (BCS) be a more accurate guide?

However, crime surveys conducted within certain localities, such as the Islington Crime Survey, have given different and inflated figures for particular crimes in comparison to the BCS. So, do these types of surveys measure the extent of crime more accurately? In essence, could results from local surveys be extrapolated to explain national situations and trends, or are local surveys only able to reflect the situations that exist at local levels?

Regardless of which measure one decides to use to express the extent of crime, there is another factor that affects people's perception of its effect and prevalence, and that is the fear of crime: described by one author as, "the anxieties and worries about crime as expressed by the population" (Pantazis 2000). Nonetheless, despite this working definition of the concept, there is much confusion in the literature on the precise meaning of 'fear of crime'. Part of the confusion surrounds equating fear with anxiety, where fear of crime is used to refer to levels of worry and anxiety about both becoming a victim of crime and the individual's perceptions of the risk of crime (ibid).

Recent BCS have shown that despite a fall in the number of reported and recorded crimes such as burglary, vehicle related thefts and violent crime over the four years up to the year 2000 (as measured by two BCS), the 2000 BCS did not find a comparable reduction in the fear of crime. The fear of crime, like crime itself,

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affects certain groups within society disproportionately, for example, women, and people living in old age or poverty are generally more fearful than others, but the groups suffering disproportionately from victimisation and from fear are different and almost opposite. Some of the reasons that have been suggested for the disproportionate fear of crime by certain groups have included either the inability of those in fear to defend themselves, due to their physical size or health, or their social and economic position (ibid).

On the topic of crime itself, from the literature a list of suggested causes would include such things as, unemployment; recession; poverty; homelessness; affluence; low IQ; lone parenting; illegitimacy; drugs; insufficient formal and informal deterrents. Along with these suggested causes of crime there is an equally full array of proposed remedies: full employment; improved social amenities; economic equality; access to and better education; better parenting; rehabilitative treatments; community service; more policing; imprisonment; and corporal punishment. All these suggested causes and remedies have some effect on crime, for sure, but none of them can be claimed to be solely responsible, or a remedy. Although they are inextricably linked, they can contribute in a cumulative way to the causes of crime, while others can ameliorate, either individually or collectively, the problem of crime.

In this chapter, I start the discussion of crime with my respondents from a broad base, exploring their perceptions of the extent and seriousness of crime. I then focus the discussion, firstly, on their views of the social features that might affect crime problems, before concentrating on the effect of police activities on crime. Next, we examined the question of additional legal powers to deal with the problem of crime. Finally, we considered the efficacy of concentrating policing efforts on a particular social group, one that is perceived in the literature to be disproportionately involved in the commission of crime, and whether some crime problems could be resolved by such tactics.

Before discussing my respondents' views on crime and its problems, I first consider the difficulty of agreeing on the concept of crime. This helps to contextualise the different angles from which my respondents approached the subject.

CRIME TRENDS

The problem of crime.

I start my discussion of crime from the premise that the concept of crime is one on which there is general agreement by all those interested in the subject. However, from the literature it is clear that this is not necessarily the case. The behaviours or activities that are acceptable to one generation or one group might not be so readily acceptable to different ones. This point was alluded to by one of my respondents, whose view on the question of whether crime was a greater problem today than in the past was as follows:

> *I suspect not. What I think has happened of course is that...we've become more of a political football. Crime's become a big issue, and so it's closely analysed, the media and media definitions of crime tend to blow things out of all proportions. My gut feeling is that the problem is probably aren't as great today as they were then, trends are different. There are particular things that are problems now that weren't then, but other things have dropped out of the framework. (R. 3).*

Though the media can be and often are influential in defining the behaviours that ought to be classified as criminal, they are not the only social institution, nor the most influential one, that has the ability or capacity to do so. Muncie and McLaughlin offer the following interpretations of the different definitions of crime over the years.(a) (Muncie & McLauglin 1996: 6).

Crime as criminal law violation. In this context, certain activities and behaviour are linked to substantive criminal law, for example, 'an act is only a crime when it violates the prevailing legal code of the jurisdiction in which it occurs.'

Crime as norm infraction. In this context, it is only those behaviours that are socially abnormal, whether or not they are specifically defined as illegal by statutes that can be defined as crimes.

Crime as social construct. Here, the emphasis is placed on the labelling of an individual's behaviour as criminal.

Crime as ideological censure. Here the definition of what is criminal is not simply a question of any number of interest groups acting in competition with each other, it is based on the systematic and consistent empowerment of some groups to the detriment of others.

Crime as historical invention. Although crime is a fairly recent method of social disapproval, troublesome behaviours have been defined as 'crimes' for so long that the concept is routinely applied in condemnation of the 'unwanted' and the 'undesirable'. For example, civil law and religion dealt with behaviours that are now deemed criminal. In other words, there was less 'crime' and more 'sin'.

As this brief illustration of the various definitions of what constitutes a crime highlights, defining what is a crime is not a straightforward exercise. The interpretation that one uses to define what is a crime will affect how one reacts to the problem. The importance of this for my purpose is that the definition that my respondents, consciously or otherwise, use to determine what is a crime may influence how they respond both strategically and operationally to the problem. As one of my respondents asked in reply to the question of whether crime is a greater problem now than in the past:

"For whom, is it for the community or for the police? A greater problem for whom? (R. 12).

The police and the community are not the only two parties for which crime is a problem. It is a problem for central government, local authorities, the courts; and the news media, to list a few. For central government, it is a good barometer of the social welfare of society; for local government it is a good measure of its ability to devise and implement policies and initiatives that lead to integration and cohesion, rather than disintegration and exclusion of certain sections of the community. For the courts, it is a measure of their ability to stay in touch with the 'real world', since lenient sentences are synonymous, in the public's mind, with being out of touch with reality. Crime reporting forms a substantial part of media reports, so much so that the level of media reports of crime coupled with the type of crimes that are reported – the more serious bodily injury types – can give a false impression of the prevalence and seriousness of crime (Reiner 2001, Sparks 2001, Chadee 2001, Roberts 2001). What

were my respondent's views on the nature, extent and causes of crime based on their professional experience?

The extent of crime.

Data on the number of crimes as recorded by the police has been collected since 1857 (Kershaw et al 2000: 2). But using post World War II figures and concentrating on those collected after 1981, when data for the British Crime Survey (BCS) started to be compiled, the trend in the number of recorded crime has generally been upwards. "Broadly speaking, the amount of crime recorded by the police in England and Wales increased tenfold between 1950 and 1993", and "For comparable offences the British Crime Surveys confirmed a rise in crime between 1981 and 1993" (Smith 1996; Reiner 2000).

Between 1993 and 1995 police recorded crime fell, while BCS figures started to level off. Between 1995 and 1997 both sets of data showed comparable falls, while between 1997 and 1999, although for both sets of data the trend was still downwards, there was a greater fall in BCS crime (Kershaw et al 2000: iii). Since then both have tended to fall. For example, in 2004 crime had fallen by 30 per cent since 1997. (Home Office 2004: Foreword)

So, although the trend has been downwards in the number of crimes recorded by the police and BCS since 1995, up to 1996, the period when I conducted my fieldwork, the trend was upwards. With the greatest increase occurring in the 1980s, when between 1979 and 1992 the number of notifiable offences recorded by the police more than doubled from 2.4 to 5.4 million. From the data the obvious conclusion that would have been reached by all those interested in the topic, including my respondents, would have been that more crimes were being committed generally.

Not surprisingly the majority of my respondents held this perception and expressed the view that crime had become a greater problem, with most of them equating greater problem with greater quantity. However, there were variations in the views expressed. Those of my respondents that were definite that crime was a greater problem were more ready to offer a reason why this was so, and I will discuss some of these reasons in the next section.

Those that expressed some ambivalence or uncertainty as to whether crime was a greater problem suggested that the *perception* and/or the *fear of crime* were greater problems, for example:

The perception of crime is a greater problem than it was; yes, there's a greater fear of crime. Do you know how many robberies we had in ---- [a county] last year? 365. I think we've got 6 million people in ---- [a county], Jesus Christ, I'm terrified of going out because I'm gonna get robbed! What a load of crap! So, it's the fear of crime, the problem there has increased. There has also been an increase in crime, but I think some of that is as a result of bureaucratic systems rather than a real increase in crime. For instance, more people getting insurance, more people getting cars and, therefore, more actual crime is reported and that makes it all look like crime's going up. (R. 12).

Although most of my respondents were certain that recorded crime had increased, many saw this as a reflection of greater reporting and better recording by the police. There were two aspects of crime on which there was overwhelming consensus, and these were *violence* and *illegal drugs*.

The problem of violence was seen both in term of its use in the commission of other crimes, and the commission of violent crimes per se. While the drugs problem comprised both greater misuse, and the commission of other crimes in order to purchase illegal drugs. Thus, typical responses from my respondents included the following:

Well there's more of it, but then you'd expect that, there's more property, there's more possessions, there's more people, there's less jobs. I would say that, I have a particular concern about the link between, I suppose I'd have to answer that by plucking out one thing and say the thing that really concerns me is violence. I mean when you look, I mean in this Force, things like armed robberies are going down. There's all sorts of sophisticated means of stopping it, but violence as a crime itself, I think would be my biggest concern

and I would see that as the biggest change that's occurred. So you asked whether it a sort of a greater concern about it?

Yes.

I suspect there is, because nothing creates more fear than the fear of violence. (R. 10).

I think violent crimes have become more difficult to detect and there's more violent crime obviously than there used to be. Again, when I joined there wasn't a drugs problem in the country; there is a drugs problem now. (R. 14).

Pure statistics, there's a lot more of it, without doubt there's a lot more of it, but there are a lot more different types of crime. Bearing in mind I joined the county force, but I was initially working in quite a big town in ---- which is a typical Northern town with plenty of violence, plenty of fights, plenty of drinking-type offences and burglaries. But certainly not on the same scale and not driven by drugs as most crimes seem to be at the moment. That's the biggest change, the actual weight of crime and the underlying drugs thing at the moment. (R. 36)

It depends how you define crime. I think crime is worse now than what it was. Although again in my day, we cuffed that much of it, we didn't know what there was but yes we had burglaries, but we didn't have the volume, then. And we didn't have the spectacular crimes that we have now like the job in Scotland the other day, [the shooting of a number of school children at a primary school in Dunblane, Scotland] *I mean that just wasn't, or Neilsen or the Ripper or anything, all those sorts of things thirty years ago, we didn't have. (R. 41).*

Not only are some of the offences that have been highlighted exceptional, my respondents as a group saw them as exceptional, and 'spectacular', and the high profile media reporting of them would certainly have made them spectacular. In all honesty, they were spectacular by any standard, and it was perhaps this feature that attracted the media to them, from whence they ensured that they remained spectacular in the way they were reported. Whichever version is closer to the

truth, the fact is some of my respondents felt that not only did the media distort reality; they created a problem with regard to crime where perhaps there either was none, or if there was it was not as serious as it was portrayed. Further, where there might have been some real problem the media exaggerated it. Indirectly, the greater ease by which people could communicate and receive information contributed to making crime a greater problem (Rose 2001). Many respondents were cautious about whether crime had actually risen. This quote summarises the reasons for suspicion.

I don't think so, no, I really don't. People are saturated now with a whole range of problems that they think that every time they turn the radio on or television or pick up newspapers, communications are that much more focused and sharp, and hysterical, unfortunately. I think the problem's always been there, the recording systems is better, the public awareness is greater, the demand, the policy's greater, people's aspirations are that much greater, it's always been there, we can talk about these enormous increases... There were too many misconceptions and too many pay cheques hanging on the end, not just police pay cheques, but media pay cheques, all sorts of pay cheques, hanging on the end of producing results, inspiring or frightening people to do, and it's the wonderful media communications. The art of, let's say 32 years ago, if there was an enormous catastrophe the other side of the world, even then it might have taken a long time to find out about it, now we can get it in 25 minutes can't we? (R. 20).

CRIME CAUSATION.

Explanations of the recorded crime increase.

In addition to the media, my respondents suggested that the following factors might have contributed to the perception that crime is a greater problem now than in the past. Firstly, the ease with which victims and witnesses could contact the police to report crime, i.e. telephone ownership both at home and on the move, which has made it easier to report offences to and summon help from the police. Secondly, the police are more accessible and 'user friendly', possibly as a result of them pursuing and adopting more consumerist approach to service delivery in the 1990s, with the then

concentration on the provision of 'quality of service'. In addition, there are greater demands for Forces to become more accessible (HMIC 2001). Thirdly, there are more consumer goods being purchased by a more affluent society, which leads to the availability of more stealable goods. Finally, demographic changes and an increase in the number of young people in the population could lead to an increase in the number of crimes. In addition to these factors, my respondents suggested other social features that could contribute to making crime a greater problem, and these are discussed next.

Social sources of crime.

As illustrated at the beginning of this chapter a number of factors have been offered by commentators as possible causes of crime, such as unemployment; poverty; affluence; and drugs. My respondents appeared to be in tune with various academic thinking and research finding in this area. (Fitzgerald et al; Borrell and Cashinella; Muncie and McLaughlin). This should not come as a surprise as one would expect officers at this level to have some knowledge of the sociological research findings in this area, if not directly through training or personal studies, then through the multitude of professional journals on policing that are now available. The relevance for this study is the extent to which these theoretical findings translate into respondents' analysis of the causes of crime. The complexity of the subject precludes simplistic discussion, as one of my respondents explained.

> *I think there are features in all societies that aggravate crime problems, and that will include everything from the personality and culture of people. There are clearly race issues that will come into play in different areas, there could be economic factors that could aggravate crime problems, and maybe we've just seen some of them. In fact, if you look at some of the old police research that plots rises in crime with economic troughs both in Europe and around the World, there's an uncanny correspondence. Well there could be many factors that influence it. It could just be the pure numbers of the population; unemployment; all those things can aggravate crime at any given time. And it's an area that, having worked with ---- ---, our chief for two years, on the national scene, dealing with Sheehy, the Royal Commission, Kenneth Clarke's reform package taken over by Michael Howard, and seeing all that close up, seeing the inside of the Home Office and some of the ideas, just seeing all*

those issues rattling around all the time, and at any given moment some will grab one aspect and say this is the cause of crime or this is actually making things worse and I think there are many factors and it's a very, very complex area. (R. 3).

In addition, one needs to ask the question of the direction of any causal links:

I mean is crime a symptom of the individual and his genetic propensities, or is it a feature of society's affect upon the individual, or is it interaction between the two? I think most of us would say that probably it is the latter of those three. (R. 43).

However, regardless of the fact that some of my respondents thought that this might be a difficult subject that required a thoughtful and perhaps complex approach, there were some social features that most of them thought were aggravating factors. These in a way simplified the discussion and helped to contain and focus it. The two social features most frequently mentioned as ones that could affect crime problems were, broadly, *illegal drugs* and *unemployment.* I state broadly, because other features were mentioned which are closely associated with unemployment, such as, social exclusion and the division between the haves and the have-nots, i.e. inequality and the wealth gap.

Illegal Drugs.

May 2001, the feeling of deja vu was overwhelming as one witnessed on the front page of a national free tabloid newspaper the horrific picture of 19-year old Lorna Spinks, who had died from the effects of two ecstasy tablets (*Metro*, 9 May 2001). Lorna, who was described by her grandmother as a 'golden girl' was very similar in many respects to another young girl whose death, also from taking ecstasy, was well publicised in 1996; that of Leah Betts.

The horror of drugs were conveyed graphically by both examples, and the reason why both parents had authorised the publication of these disturbing pictures of their dead daughters in national newspapers – to prevent other young people suffering

the fate of their cherished daughters – had, it would appear at least in the case of the Betts family, gone unheeded.

What could have been the reasons for this disinterest by young people to the warning? Was it that the older generation was out of touch with the contemporary desires and understanding of today's young people concerning the use of illegal drugs? On the other hand, do young people actually take note of these messages and warnings, but simply decided in this case, as perhaps they would with other potential hazards in life, that it would not happen to them? Conversely, was it an over-reaction by two families to a social activity (especially for a drug that is closely associated with pleasure and enjoyment by young people, particularly in terms of the club scene) that young people considered commonplace and uneventful by contemporary standards?

Whatever the reasons why some young people did not heed the warnings of those who had suffered the consequences of illegal drugs, both directly and indirectly, the fact is that drug use and its availability has increased substantially over the second half of the 20th century (South 1997).

At the time of the fieldwork, the death of Leah Betts was prominently reported and widely discussed in the media. The subject of illegal drugs was at the top of the agenda of social problems that society, and in particular the government, needed to tackle and resolve, for a number of reasons, some of which included, as indicated above, the personal loss suffered by individual families.

My respondents were attuned to society's fears and concerns about the wide availability of illegal drugs, and in particular drugs such as ecstasy that were popular amongst the young. Perhaps the fear was accentuated by the fact that ecstasy was not associated with some of the social stigma attached to other illegal drugs were. For example, cannabis is associated with a 'foreign' culture; heroin with the filth and depravation that comes with users sharing 'unclean' needles used to inject the drug; cocaine with the violence surrounding the distribution of crack; and LSD with the irresponsible and anti-establishment behaviour of the radical 'children' of the 1960s. Ecstasy is still free from any such malign associations, which perhaps has encouraged

some people to call for legal acceptance of its production and use. For example, the mother of Leah was quoted as suggesting a more liberal approach by the authorities, saying that, "In Switzerland [where both parents were residing at the time of the tragedy] in venues like this [nightclubs], there is a chemist who tests the pills. If Leah had her tablets tested she would still, perhaps, be here" (*Metro*, 9 May 2001). My respondents, collectively, echoed some of these views:

I think the greater availability of drugs and more of an attitude that they don't matter. That is perhaps the difference.

[Drugs don't matter?]

Drugs don't matter, yes, I mean, I've got teenage daughters and I talk to their friends. My daughters tend to have what I regard as the right attitude, but I talk to their friends who say, well Ecstasy would be all right if it was legal because it would be quality controlled. But there's no suggestion that the drug that Leah Betts took was false or fake in any way, it was believed to be a proper Ecstasy tablet, to which she suffered an adverse reaction and that happens far too often for me to say well it would be all right if it was quality controlled. (R. 8).

Drugs, there's no doubt about that. We're seeing it so much more and more and more, and the priority for 96/97 within this Force, it's not just national, that has got to be drugs. It's like a canker in society. (R. 30).

Unemployment.

Unemployment for a number of reasons has a link, if not directly then indirectly, to offending. The social controls of work/employment create bonds for the individual and social groups that alleviate the temptation to offend. For the individual, Fox has suggested that there are 'two great alternative meanings' to work. The first is that it is an end in itself, in that it is an activity that is of 'central importance' to the development of the individual's personality and life fulfilment. The second is that it is little more than the means to acquire the necessary resources for survival or leisure and pleasure. However, from studies of the unemployed it is clear that work means more than this narrow instrumental view. Fox describes eight ways in which work can be important to the individual, in addition to its importance as a source of income. "It provides opportunities to relate to society, and opportunities for interaction with

others; it sustains status and self-respect, and offers a sense of personal identity; it structures the passage of time and distracts from private worries, fears and disappointment; and it provides scope for the satisfaction of 'achievement', and offers the possibility of identifying with a transcendent cause" (Fox 1984: 133).

One commentator has suggested that "lengthy periods of high unemployment, by breaking an important social bond, may create a group of young people who are more likely to commit offences" (Smith 1996: 1). Over the preceding seventeen years to the date of my field study, the period of time the Conservative government had been in power, their policies had expanded the division in personal wealth to such a degree, partly through a rise in the number of the unemployed, that Bottoms and Wiles explained that; "As the highest income earners earn more and the lowest earners proportionately less, a disadvantaged 'underclass' may emerge which might either result in an increase in crime...or develop into a culture of hopelessness" (Bottom and Wiles 1996: 15).

However, it would be too simplistic to suggest that being unemployed generally leads directly to offending. There are other contributory factors in addition to 'economic growth, unemployment, and deprivation', that lead to offending. These include 'informal controls, relationships, and self-discipline'; 'urban ways of life'; 'families'; 'opportunity'; and 'law enforcement' (Smith 1996: 10).

My respondents were aware of the subtle link between unemployment and offending and did not point up unemployment as a direct cause of offending:

Yeah, I firmly believe unemployment does. I think it does create desperation and a need to survive and a need for money, a need to break away somehow I think. So I think well unemployment inasmuch that it tends to link to a lack of resources; no job no money. (R. 10).

In my view yes there are. I mean there are different schools of thought as to what impacts upon crime and I can only say from my professional experience as an Area Commander what I believe to have an impact on crime, and from my own studies, doing my own degree into causes and affects of crime, I've got some idea. I mean there's always been this thought that politicians have,

thought, steered clear of it, that you link unemployment and so on with crime. Or social depravation with crime and they say 'well it didn't happen in the war and it didn't happen in the 18th century, whatever'. But it would be my personal opinion that there is a clear link between high unemployment, especially youth unemployment, and levels of crime. (R. 17).

Well I mean the debate about unemployment and things like this, prejudice, all these sort of things, yes, I mean they must have some influence. I mean idle hands, you know; the devil makes work for idle hands. You've got to believe that if people haven't got a job, I mean the things that tie people into society and into the norms of society, family and employment, because they take the bulk of people's energy and time. Now if the family ties are loose and if the, or employment is not there then those ties break down and, you know, they will give more opportunity for crime. I mean I've always believed that and I still do. Dealing with people who are arrested for crime and being processed for crime, it's a common factor, the custody record nearly always shows unemployed in the case of an adult. (R. 29).

The general view was that unemployment was one of a number of factors that lead to offending, but it would be an unsophisticated exaggeration to claim that it is *the* cause of crime. However, the relevance for commonality of culture in the expressed views of my respondents is that despite differences in their professional experience their interpretation and outlook are remarkably similar.

POLICING CRIME

The influence of the Audit Commission.

Since its establishment in 1983 with a remit to appoint and regulate the external auditors of local authorities, the Audit Commission has increasingly influenced the thinking and activities on which the police service concentrates its resources. Over the years senior police managers have come to place great value on the advice and recommendations contained in the Commission's reports on the police, and the Commission is very much aware of this fact. For example, on their research on the

Audit Commission, Savage et al (2000) quotes two officials from the Commission who stated:

> *"The take-up of our recommendations is much higher in the police world than it is in the rest of the local authority sector or in the health service ..."*

Additionally,

> *"...The work we've done on the police has been some of our smartest work. We think it's been some of our most influential work."*

In effect, the relationship between the police and the Audit Commission has developed into a symbiotic one. Part of the reason for this is that, "The Audit Commission is highly dependent upon the police service (and particularly ACPO) for information, expertise, support, and implementation; and consequently it tends to work with (as opposed to against) the police service in its investigations", and the police benefit from a relatively supportive independent examination of the efficiency and effectiveness of their activities. (Savage et al 2000: 36). One outcome of this symbiotic relationship is that the police service is usually aware of the recommendations the Commission is likely to make in its reports before it is made public, and therefore they do not come as a surprise. This appeared to be borne out by the discussions with my respondents, the overwhelming majority of whom agreed with the recommendations in the particular Audit Commission report to which I referred: *Streetwise. Effective Police Patrol.* Where there were some reservations with the findings and recommendations of the report this appeared to be because of some misunderstanding of its content, in particular because some of those who had reservations had not read the report. Coincidentally, some of the responses by those who agreed with the findings and recommendations of the report echoed the views of those expressing some reservations. This perhaps highlights a difficulty of trying to spread good practice; what might seem an obvious solution to a national problem may not be so obvious when it comes to implementing it under local conditions. For example, one of my respondents suggested:

To an extent yes, you'll never get a straight yes or a no! The qualifications that I'd put in there are that first of all, let's just return to the community policing issue. I think what the communities actually need, sorry not what they need, what they're actually asking for, is somebody who is highly visible, high profile policing. That's something that they want and I think that's something we can provide in a reasonably simple way. They are reassured even by the sight of a, not even, but they're reassured by the sight of a traffic warden or a Special Constable, who don't undergo the degree of training to every police officer. So I think we could make ourselves more effective by spending less on our officers and putting them out on the streets in a more limited fashion than the omnicompetent constable who we're putting out there, so I think there's scope for that. I think you've got to actually meet public expectations as much as possible, and getting to know your community and I think that type of police officer that I've just described could actually achieve that. Then over and above that you do need your specialist officers, but you need to utilise your specialist officers in the most effective and efficient way possible and that I think is really a case of identifying what the problems are and how you're going to divert your resources to deal with those. So almost there is a two-tier approach, one trying to keep the generality of community life going and the other in a mode that deals specifically with the issues in an order of priority. So in that way, I think you probably could meet the two extremes that are started there at the beginning, what is nationally required and what is locally desirable as well, so I see that as the way forward. I think at the moment following up the Audit Commission's recommendations, again I keep returning to this lovely word, culture. We're scoring own goals because we're trying to cling on to too much rather than sharing it with other agencies. For years and years and years we've seen ourselves as the only people who are going to tackle the drug problem, which is a nonsense because the only reason we're going to tackle the drug problem is because there's plenty of it out there and we're congratulating ourselves because we keep arresting more and more people for it, but it's not reducing the problem at all. If we work with the other agencies, the other agencies have probably got the lead role as the Government's drug strategy now is identifying other agencies

have got a far greater role to play than us, what we need to do is to work
closer with those agencies and bring that about. (R. 14).

Typical of the comments from some of the other respondents who had some
reservations with the report is the following one, although they agreed with its
findings,

Up to a point, but I disagree with the Audit Commission's approach in that,
and this is where I'm a bit of a traditionalist, I think policing is like justice, it
has to be seen to be done, as well as being done. And I don't think we have a
very clear view of what our job is. For example, let's take domestic burglary,
in ----[a county] at the moment something like only 12% of domestic
burglaries are cleared up by primary means, the rest that are cleared up are
cleared up on prison visit. And that whole system as you know is questionable
in some people's eyes. So the reality is that when someone gets burgled,
which for most people is a pretty traumatic experience having their home
entered and people using and stealing their property. The chances of the
police who come to investigate it actually clearing up the crime are very
small, that doesn't mean that it is wrong to try, because I think you must try.
And you could only, for example, say 12% of people with a particular disease
you could rescue, you'd still want to put some effort in and save the 12%. So I
don't think our small rate of success means that you shouldn't try in any way
... So when people like the Audit Commission come along and they do their
sums and they say, the policeman on the beat don't naturally do very much, in
measurable terms, therefore he's not cost-effective. Ask the public if they
don't want no policemen to be on the street, and see what they think? They're
the people, they're the customers. (R. 2).

Some others (26 of the 41 of the respondents that answered the question: 63
per cent) agreed with the report's recommendations unreservedly. Typical examples
included the following views:

Absolutely, without question. It goes back to what I was saying earlier on.
We could put every police officer that we've got in ----[a county] out on the

streets, walking round, and having been briefed and being up to the mark, knowing what they're doing, but you have to question how effective they would be. We need to be targeting known criminals, using intelligence; we need to be going to specific locations at certain times to do certain things. We've got to get into surveillance, we've got to get into all the high tech ways of dealing with crime and not just putting on a uniform and walking around saying to the public, 'well look I'm here, I'm looking after your interests', it may make them feel good, but I doubt it will have an affect upon levels of crime. (R. 17)

These expressions, whether they were qualified or unreserved agreements with the recommendations of the report, reflected the content of the report. For example, the report points out that, "The police, like other parts of the public sector, face competing demands for their services. They are expected to tackle crime effectively and provide a fast response to emergencies, while at the same time meeting an almost insatiable pubic appetite for visible patrol – 'bobbies on the beat'." Further, that, "Surveys consistently show that the public attaches great value to police patrol," and explains that this is because, "It provides a sense of security and symbolises lawful authority at a time when there are increasing concerns about an erosion of authority." Paradoxically, "despite the high degree of satisfaction with most aspects of policing, the Commission's own survey of the public's view reinforces the message of dissatisfaction with current levels of foot patrol." They asked, "Why, despite their best intentions, are the police not meeting public expectations in this key area?" The answer was contained in the three points that the study highlighted:

- "public expectations are not wholly realistic;
- in many forces there are opportunities to manage existing demand better; officers spend much of their available time awaiting deployment to incidents or dealing with incidents which do not merit police attendance; and
- what time there is between incidents is not always used effectively, and could be better targeted and more productive."

As shown by the comments by my respondents they were already aware of these points, and it did not require the Audit Commission to conduct a study to bring them to the forefront of their thinking. Perhaps the main benefits of the study were, firstly, that it was able to provide objective evidence collected through a systematic and methodologically sound process to support what police managers already knew through operational experience. Secondly, as one of my respondents explained, the Commission produces its findings, on policy areas of police activity, in practical and useable ways:

I didn't find that there was anything in there that was terribly surprising, and I suspect you wouldn't either. There are telling sections in there that we've not heard before and there are plenty of research around that I've read and I'm sure that you've read, we can sit here talking about them for hours, that indicate that a policeman can walk around the plot for eight years and not come across a burglar. But I think the Audit Commission have pulled it off in terms of practice, because that's the way they operate and I think it's very strong. I mean things like 'Cheques and Balances'; 'Tackling Crime Effectively'; and so on, I mean very helpful documents. (R. 3).

Legal powers and crime control.

Changing the structure of the organisation and working 'smarter' as opposed to harder could help the police provide a more effective and efficient service. However, the police can only operate within the law, and the lack of certain laws could contribute to police inefficiency and ineffectiveness. I discussed this possibility with my respondents by asking them if there were any legal powers that the police required to control crime effectively but did not have at present.

If legal powers are to the police what weapons are to the soldier then the police have had a substantial addition to their arsenal over the last two decades. These have ranged from the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 to the most recent Police Reform Act 2002.

In the recent past the Police Federation has expressed an unquestionable desire for more powers, offering the reason that without adequate powers officers would not

be able to deliver the level and quality of policing that the public deserve and demand. The message has been that more powers will lead to better results, which crudely equates to more crimes detected and cleared up.

However, my respondents were equivocal as to whether the police would benefit from having more legal powers. The consensus was that the police had sufficient powers to enable them to deal with the demands society made on them and what was needed was simplification of the vast array of legal powers currently available. Some went further and suggested that the large number of legal powers might confuse some officers and make them less efficient:

> *What I would say is, we've got such a myriad of powers in different documents, it would make good sense to me if they were simplified because beat officers now have got so many powers with so many caveats and conditions, they're confused, or they don't understand them, or they're frightened of getting them wrong and I believe that the powers are not always used. So I would like to see what we've got simplified so stop and search was in one place only and the power of arrest was simplified; it's a real nightmare to learn. So, I'd go for simplification rather than additions. (R. 7).*

POLCING, CRIME, AND MINORITIES
Pathological social groups and crime problems.
The police could change its structure to produce the most effective and efficient units possible to deal with crime. They could be given all the legal powers they need to deter people from committing crimes, and catching and prosecuting offenders who do commit crimes. However, it is possible that these measures would not stop every one, or groups from offending, because there are some people and groups that have a pathological desire to commit crime.

There is abundant anecdotal discussions within the police service claiming that such groups exist, and that they specialise in the commission of particular crimes. For example, 'Gypsies' (not the Romanies) are regarded as thieves; West Africans are fraudsters (this group is officially recognised as such through the existence of a West

African Crime Squad at New Scotland Yard); young black African-Caribbean men are muggers. The importance of these stereotypical portrayals of certain social groups is the influence (though some people would question the existence of any influence) they have on the way these groups are policed. One commentator has described this phenomenon of 'targeted' policing of certain social groups as 'racial profiling' (Cashmore 2000).

This section of the interview was an uncomfortable one for some of my respondents, for a number of reasons. Although the question was asked about a 'social group', because of the comment at the time by the then Commissioner for the Metropolitan Police that most muggings in London were committed by young black men (or at least that was the way his message was interpreted and reported by the media), the phrase 'social group' could have been taken by my respondents as a euphemism for 'racial group'. This in itself would have caused some discomfort for some senior officers, especially taking into account the context in which it was being asked; a serving police officer carrying out a research study from a well-known and respected University, and whose chief officer had written personally to the chief officer of the Force of the respondent. The Police Staff College had backed the research. The interviewer held a middle management rank in the service and, through conversations before the interview had struck up a good rapport with the respondent, but was a black West African by birth. They could have been forgiven for suspecting that this was some elaborate integrity test!

This discomfort was illustrated by the reply of one of my respondents to the question of whether it would help clear up more crimes if people from a particular social group with a disproportionately high criminal record were stopped and searched more often. He expressed the view that he did not have a large population of black or Asian people within his area, but that if he had they would not have been treated any differently to the majority population. No sooner had he mentioned this than we were interrupted by one of his officers who wanted to let him know that a group of 'Gypsies' was travelling towards his divisional area. His reply was to keep them moving; he did not want them to settle on his Division. The reason? These people were responsible for a large amount of thefts wherever they settle. However,

he was not the only one to express these sentiments. Other typical examples included the following.

Probably, yeah. In this county, you may even remember, one part of the county, two parts, but one part over this side has got a very high proportion of Gypsies. Quite frequently Gypsies are responsible for 'bogus official' jobs, 'distraction burglaries', call them what you will. (R. 37).

The same explanation was also valid for socially deprived groups, such as those living on council estates:

I'd question that; I mean it could be counter-productive to be honest. Yeah, it might well be the case that if we looked at a particular social group and targeted it that we could have some success. I am aware of the reports coming from the Met. Are they not? Where they are saying, 'in my area, X-percent of the crime is committed by that particular racial group, for instance, and if that's where the crime is being committed, yes we should be stopping and checking within reason. I don't hold with stopping and checking for no reason, but I'm at, operations on my borders with the neighbouring area because most of the thieves that thieve on my area come from a council estate just the other side of the road. And we regularly put on high visibility policing patrols purely to stop and check people that we know damn well are up to no good in my patch and when we do that, that has a marked effect on the amount of crime that's committed. We don't always lock up, don't always succeed in detecting crime but we certainly prevent it. I've got to point out in my area we don't have any racial minorities whatsoever. We have a very small Sikh community, very small, who are no problem whatsoever, but that's about it. (R. 36).

I would suggest that the discomfort does not arise simply because of the concentration on a particular social group. It perhaps arises from a perception that the practice is motivated by racial stereotyping and not on evidence based on objective information and intelligence. An additional reason for any discomfort might be that although most of my respondents confirmed that acts of, and on many occasions

agreed with, targeting of people from a particular social group did occur and explained why this was so on the grounds of law enforcement, the underlying reason why it is done might really be due to order maintenance by the officers. The notion of keeping certain people in their rightful place within the social hierarchy, those groups that occupy a level on the social hierarchy from which the police can comfortably draw their 'property'.

It would all depend what the decision for doing that was. If the decision or the strategy was that your task in life was to keep the lid on the dustbin, and that was your strategy, then yes. If you are wanting naturally to get to the root of the problem, then nothing could be worse. If you need to search somebody, if you need to do something like that, it should be on an individual basis, not because the study or type is, that, you know all black men, you know Robert, or people who have short hair and wear a baseball hat back to front are TWOCers, you know. And there is, but it's a great deal easier for an organisation to attribute certain things to certain groups because it makes things clear and it comes back to what we were talking about, briefing. Part of the briefing to my mind should include what your attitude is towards certain things, and our attitude towards, I mean a good example is prostitution to me, you know, why does the police services lock up the women and does nothing with the men? It's because actually as a group the prostitutes are easier to have a go at, and they're easier to pick up, they're identifiable, they're standing there night after night, they're causing bother, the local community's up in arms about it and so you can be seen to be doing something. Where in actual fact if you pick up some of the men, it may cause you a bit of embarrassment, whoever you pick up. So, they're an easy target, but if you really want to influence the thing, you'd pick on the punter. (R. 40)

No. I'm not a great believer in stop checking as a way of law enforcement anyway. It's random, it's counter productive, it's not a good use of resources in general terms.
Just upsets people. The Police Service relies on information and co-operation, going back to community policing. If everybody below the age of 21 who can drive was turned over at monotonous intervals for no good

reason, that's hardly a way of creating a climate in which those people as they get older will actually talk to us, and give us the information which we need to function properly. (R. 31).

Nonetheless, people from certain social groups are 'turned over' at monotonous intervals and most of them would claim this was for no good reason. The available data show considerable disproportionality in the level of stops and searches recorded by the police. Using the quantitative data from the *Statistics on Race and the Criminal Justice System* published under Section 95 of the Criminal Justice Act 1991 to illustrate the disproportionate use of the powers of stops and search it is clear that recorded stops and searches show significant bias in the use of the power. I have chosen to set the figures out in tabular form to show differences between different ethnic groups, because it highlights the disparity more starkly than would have been the case by describing it. I chose the police recorded figures that showed the use of the powers around the time I would have been conducting the fieldwork.

Table 15. Stop and searches of persons in 1997/98 relative to population.

Ethnic Group	All	%	MPS	%	City	%
			1997/98 – Stop and Search			
White	818,939	**81.00**	199,304	**59.10**	2,372	**67.30**
Black	110,890	**11.00**	89,068	**26.40**	570	**16.20**
Asian	54,646	**5.40**	31,765	**9.40**	370	**10.50**
Other	9,528	**0.90**	5,905	**1.80**	122	**3.50**
Not Known	17,530	**1.70**	11,279	**3.30**	91	**2.50**
Total	1,011,533	100.00	337,339	100.00	3,525	100.00

Ethnic Group	All	White	Black	Asian	Other	Total
		Estimated population aged 10 and over				
Numbers-All	45,453,800	42,918,200	779,200	1,221,400	534,900	
% - All		**94.40***	**1.70***	**2.70***	**1.20***	100.00
Numbers-MPS	6,573,400	5,319,000	494,600	484,100	275,700	
% - MPS		**80.90***	**7.50***	**7.40***	**4.20***	100.00
Numbers-City	4,700	4,400	0	100	200	
% - City		**92.70***	**0.90***	**2.40***	**4.00***	100.00

Table 16. Stop and searches of persons in 1998/99 and estimated population figures.

Ethnic Group	All	%	1998/99 – Stop and Search MPS	%	City	%
White	865,484	83.40	182,032	61.50	1,604	61.00
Black	94,774	9.10	73,880	25.00	489	18.60
Asian	51,305	5.00	27,627	9.30	304	11.60
Other	10,042	1.00	5,040	1.70	117	4.50
Not Known	15,666	1.50	7,493	2.50	113	4.30
Total	1,037,271	100.00	296,072	100.00	2,627	100.00

	Estimated population aged 10 and over					
Ethnic Group	All	White	Black	Asian	Other	
Numbers- All	45,722,900	43,215,900	797,800	1,223,400	485,700	
% - All		94.50*	1.70*	2.70*	1.10*	100.00
Numbers-MPS	6,635,800	5,465,700	498,200	431,000	240,900	
% - MPS		82.40*	7.50*	6.50*	3.60*	100.00
Numbers-City	4,700	4,300	#	100	200	
% - City		92.60*	0.90*	2.40*	4.00*	100.00

Table 17. Stop and searches of persons in 1999/2000 and estimated population figures.

Ethnic Group	All	%	1999/20 – Stop and Search MPS	%	City	%
White	697,067	85.20	107,142	60.10	1,066	58.40
Black	66,787	8.20	47,968	26.90	302	16.50
Asian	36,199	4.40	16,102	9.00	209	11.50
Other	7,538	0.90	3,042	1.70	105	5.80
Not Known	10,612	1.30	4,026	2.30	143	7.80
Total	818,203	100.00	178,280	100.00	1,825	100.00

	Estimated population aged 10 and over					
Ethnic Group	All	White	Black	Asian	Other	
Numbers- All	46,028,500	43,496,300	807,500	1,233,700	491,100	
% - All		94.50*	1.70*	2.70*	1.10*	100.00
Numbers-MPS	6,743,400	5,554,300	506,300	437,900	244,800	
% - MPS		82.40*	7.50*	6.50*	3.60*	100.00
Numbers-City	5,400	5,000	#	100	200	
% - City		92.60*	0.90*	2.40*	4.00*	100.00

(Details taken from *Statistics on Race and the Criminal Justice System. A Home Office publication under section 95 of the Criminal Justice Act 1991.*) [*-I have rounded these figures to the first decimal place. #-Fewer than 50]

What is the likelihood of being stopped if you are a black or Asian person? Using these figures supplied by Forces to the Home Office, we get the following:

Table 18. Likelihood of being stopped within and outside London.

Year– 1997/98	Black & Asian	Asian	Black
All	4	2	6.5
Within MPS	2	1	3.5
Within City	8	4	18
1998/99			
All	3	2	5
MPS	2	3	3
City	9	5	20
1999/00			
All	3	1.5	5
MPS	2.5	1.5	3.5
City	8.5	4	18

These figures represent the number of people within the particular ethnic group that are stopped compared to the number of people from the ethnic group in the population in that area.

These figures illustrate the level of disparity in the recorded use of section 1 PACE powers by the police since 1996. Officers must have reasonable suspicion before they can use the section 1 PACE power, whereas none is need before an officer can stop and search someone under section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000, for example. Officers must reasonably suspect that someone had committed an offence on had something on them that they could use to commit and offence, or were carrying an offensive weapon (PACE Codes of Practice Code A). The Codes stipulate that reasonable suspicion could not be formed based on a person's ethnicity, age or from the fact that he had previous convictions. Therefore, officers should have some objective grounds before stopping and searching a person under the section 1 PACE power. If officers were using this power appropriately then it would be reasonable to infer that one reason why significantly more black were stopped and searched is because they are more crime prone.

Graphic as these figures are, they do not give any indication of the reasons why black and Asian people are stopped and searched so much more that white people by the police, or at least why their stops and searches are recorded more. As mentioned above one commentator has offered 'racial profiling' as a reason, which is exacerbated by the external pressures on the police to attain performance targets. He argues that police officers are not inherently racist or bigoted in their application of the powers available to them; the disproportionality comes through the instrumental requirements of modern day police work (Cashmore 2000).

Another explanation why the disproportional stops of black and Asian people might not be due to individual prejudice practised by officers is based on the population 'available' to be stopped and searched, at the times officers have the opportunities to carry out proactive work (MVA 2000, FitzGerald 1999). This view of the 'attendant circumstances' was expressed by some of my respondents, for example:

That's something I've done some research on myself on in this Force, the year before last. It is the case in this Force, where the ethnic minority groups are clearly, take ----[a town] for example, I think the proportion of the ethnic minority groups is about 5 or 6% of the population, but they're concentrated in certain areas of the town. Now if you look at the stop search statistics, what you're finding is in certain parts of the town at certain times of the day, the searches will reflect a higher level of searches of ethnic minorities than they would whites. Now that was sort of a concern for us in this Force and we wanted to find out, well why was that the case, and I think what you find is you can't just look at statistics and say, 'well the police have differentiated between white and black' whatever, you've got to look at the attendant circumstances, and if you look at the location and you say, well okay there are some stop searches, but they're in this area where crime is going on and the majority of the people in that area are from an ethnic background, then equally you could say, over on this other estate where there are many members of the ethnic minorities, they're predominantly white. So, you know, I think you've got to look at the location and you've got to look at the times when it's being done, you've got to take into account all sorts of other factors.

For example, in ----[a town], they've got night-clubs, seven night-clubs and
there are members of the ethnic minority groups coming from all round the
Midlands to the night-clubs, from Coventry and Birmingham and so on. So,
you get a highly artificial situation in a very localised part of the town, where
for a few hours into the night the numbers are far greater because you've got
people moving in. They go back when the nightclubs shut, but people are
being stopped and searched. So I think you've got to look at all the factors. Is
it the resident population? Where is the location? To what extent are the
figures affected by a transient population? There's are all sorts of reasons
why that is. Coming back to your question whether or not it's a, as I
understood it it's a tactic that the police should adopt. I would say that
providing it could be justified and it has to be justified, then I would say, and
it's explained to the public why we're doing what we're doing, then it's a
legitimate tactic. (R. 17).

The practice of telling people the reason why they have been stopped and
conducting the stops in a sensitive and dignified way helps alleviate any mistrust that
the person stopped might have about the encounter. Stone and Pettigrew (2000)
found in their research that for those respondents that had positive experiences of
being stopped, the stops were characterised by:

- "being given an acceptable reason for the stop;
- where the officers were polite;
- where the stop did not last a long time; and
- where people did not feel unfairly targeted."

These are not difficult issues to grasp, for the police, senior or junior officers.
In reality, police officers recognise and articulate the 'proper' way to police particular
criminogenic groups and the responsibilities on the junior and senior ranking officers
to ensure propriety:

I suppose there's a possibility, but it's the delicate balance isn't it? It's
obviously in relation to ethnic minorities, and some instances there's a
possibility that one particular area of committing offences, it was Sir Paul

Condon's attack on street muggings where he was saying that they were predominantly carried out by young black males. So on that basis they would concentrate their work in that area. It's a very dodgy way, I can understand why he's doing it and I would support what he's saying, but it's got to be done in a very, very sensitive way because the vast majority of that community, young Afro-Caribbean males, are law abiding and you've got to be very careful that you're not sending the wrong message to officers that everybody from this particular group has got to be a young black mugger. If the intelligence dictates that the offenders are from this group, then obviously we've got to look at that, but it's got to be done in a very, very careful way because what you might find you're doing is antagonising an element of our society that are essentially law abiding people. Just by sort of sectioning them as being, because they're black, because they're young, because they're Afro-Caribbean, they must be a street mugger, which is something, and it's important for senior management to ensure that our officers that go out on the street go out with that clearly in their mind. It is difficult, but there are always elements in this country that will jump on the bandwagon and accuse the police of being racist and we're by no means perfect, they're obviously elements in the police service who do behave in a racist manner. It is for us as managers to make sure that we rip them out, we don't tolerate it, but we'd be naive to say that it doesn't happen. Any senior officer who says it doesn't happen is kidding himself or herself. So it's just making sure that if we targeting a particular crime, it matters not whether they're black, white or yellow. If the intelligence dictates that the offences in the main are being committed by this section, then we would be wrong not to direct it towards it, but we need to direct it with a very clear mind that you can't just say because they're from this label you're offenders. (R. 19).

The responsibility should not end with recognising, and perhaps agonising over, the problem, if that is how it is seen. It should extend to doing something about it to reduce or, preferably, eliminating it:

It's difficult because we have, in the one section here, we have 20%, no it's not only that, in actual fact it's approaching 30%, of the population that are

ethnic. And we did a stop search study about 18 months ago and we found that disproportionately the numbers of blacks being stopped searched were greater on a percentage basis of a population than the whites. When we looked at it we discovered out of the ones we stopped from the ethnic community, the number arrested were way up in comparison to the number of whites we arrested, not arrested stopping, stopping. Now balanced against this, and again we have to be so careful, apart from this section which is the South of the Division, we've got the town centre. ----[A town] particularly, has got a public order problem in relation to the clubs and the proximity and number of clubs. We have something like eight, nine clubs all chucking out at 1am in the morning, and there's thousands upon thousands. Now the point I'm making is this, linking it back to what we were talking about, that people who attend these clubs come from all over, and we get a lot of the people who are stopped and searched who are visiting the club, they're not from ----[a town], they're from Bristol, they're from Slough, they're from Cardiff. And a number of the people who are stopped searched up in the town centre are from the ethnic community, known people from outside of the area. And it bumps the number; it bumps disproportionately the numbers. We can weigh up and say, well hang on that shouldn't matter, they're from the ethnic community whatever. But we see it as a different problem up in the town centre than we do down there. Now, I have a concern about us dealing with the ethnic community in a different way to those that we treat the whites. So when I came here, when I came back to the Division and took over, I got hold of the full time project leader from GREC and asked him to come in and do some work with us, and Manny came in and did a number of briefing presentations. Talking through the problems of prejudice what have you and dealing with people. What we have done as a Division, I've got two sergeants who have been to Turvey. I got them to do a full time full week's course with the officers in this section, based on Turvey, on the problems of dealing with the ethnic community. And we've linked in with that the project worker from the present GREC. At the same time as doing that we've set up, and this is only in two months, three months, we've set up within the Division a multi-agency forum for dealing with racial harassment. Not that we see it as a problem, but to get an objective view of the way we are dealing with harassment. So yes I think

the argument could be levelled, going back to the original question, the argument could be levelled at us that we do stop disproportionately the ethnic community in relation to whatever, but we try to address that as an organisation and as a Division, by taking them through the problems of prejudice and how they should, and we're going to see what happens after that. (R. 30).

The importance of disproportional policing, with the police occupying the 'gate keeping' end of the criminal justice system, is that the unfavourable bias created by the police is exacerbated by the activities of other agents in the system as members of the particular social group are processed by them. One of the outcomes is that the criminal justice process creates a feedback loop with people from a particular social group: The greater number of convictions of people from the social group provides evidence and justification for increased stops, searches and arrests of members of that group:

I was actually present when the Lord Chief Justice spoke to a group of the Race Issues Advisory Committee at ----[a town], some time ago, when he made a very valid point that if discrimination occurs at the point of service delivery, that's where the constable interacts with the individual, what tends to happen is that distortion is amplified as you go through the Criminal Justice system. Therefore, is there is a discriminatory tendency, then it will result in a larger proportion of a particular group within the relation gaining criminal records and things of that sort. And, therefore, police officers say, well hold on, that's a criminal group, and they would then focus their attention more on that particular group and of course you get a spiral, which results in an increasing tendency for that particular group to become criminalized, as against other groups. Now heaven forbid that process should start to occur in ----[a county], but that is the way I could see it happening. And so the essence of it all and we are actually tackling this within the Quality Service Management Group, which came out of the ACPO and CRE joint document, that was published a couple of years ago. We're tackling the whole issues through that group and trying to look at the statistics and the trends to avoid that particular chain of events developing.. (R. 32).

Discussion.

Crime is a problem for the police service not only because they are one of the recognised social institutions with a mandate to deal with it, but because the police have linked their efficiency, effectiveness and professional integrity in a direct way to the solution of crime. They have done this by making crime a core function of their activities and claiming a direct cause and effect on the level of crime with the number of officers on the beat. This claim has so often been expressed that other agents in the criminal justice system have repeated the same claims in their official capacity. For example, in sentencing a young man who had been caught and attacked by the owner of a car he was trying to steal, Judge Hubert Dunn is quoted as describing the case as "the perfect example of what happens when there are not enough police on the street" (*The Times*, 24 May 2001).

A general problem with crime is that it is a protean term. Not only does it mean different things to different people but also it can mean different things to the same people at different times. The types of crime and level of opprobrium associated with their commission can change with changes in the moral tolerance of society. A contemporary example is the offence of drink drive. A decade or two ago the drunken driver was more likely to be viewed generally as the victim and the police officer who stopped them as the villain. Today, drivers who drink and drive are judged far more severely by society.

My respondents appeared very much in tune with the contemporary moral and social problems facing society at the time of my fieldwork. In fact, some of these problems, such as the misuse of illegal drugs, have been brought into sharper focus and more time, effort and resources have been directed by central government in the intervening years into resolving them.

However, as with society in general, and the police service in particular, my respondents exhibited some discomfort around the issue of disproportionality in the targeted policing of some social groups. This again is another subject that has been brought into sharper focus since I conducted my fieldwork, with the publication of the Report by Sir William McPherson into the murder of the black teenager Stephen Lawrence. The police are doing a lot of work around the subject of race specifically,

and diversity generally. However, the often expressed views by senior officers that the service has carried out a great deal of positive work which is claimed to have brought about real changes in police practices can often appear to be no more than platitudes. The reality is that when scrutinised the changes appear superficial: Police culture, be it that of the managers or the rank and file, remains stable and powerful.

It is unfortunate that it took the tragic death of a young man to return the police to a journey they were forced to start nineteen years previously with the publication of the Report by Lord Scarman into the riots in Brixton and other inner city areas in the summer of 1981. Though his suggestions to the police on ways of improving relations with certain groups in society were not revolutionary, sadly, nineteen years later Sir William has had to repeat very similar suggestions.

The circumstances that led to the inquiry by Lord Scarman centred round order maintenance, while those that led to the inquiry by Sir William centred round crime investigation. However, the police functions of crime control and order maintenance are not exclusive; one affects the other and in practice it is not always easy to distinguish which one the practitioner is pursuing.

Crime and its control are challenging problems for society in general and the police in particular, and this point was expressed by my respondents in our discussion of the different causes and solutions to crime. The views expressed by my respondents were highly sophisticated compared to those of senior officers from previous generations. They showed a good deal of theoretical and sociological awareness of the difficulties of finding solutions to the causes and effects of crime in this particular case, and other contemporary social problems in general. The style and content of the language used in the explanation and discussion of the topics reflected that used in academic social science discourse. The importance of this observation is that the contemporary language of my respondents is in marked contrast to those used by senior officers interviewed for other studies, where although they displayed some awareness of the sociology of policing the language used was more strident and the explanations comparatively simpler (Reiner 1991).

However, this greater theoretical and sociological awareness of my respondents on matters of police efficiency and effectiveness, in this case concentrating on crime, does not appear to have been translated into operational practices when judged by police figures of stops and searches.

Here is the rub; my respondents' outlook and the language they used are relatively more sophisticated in comparison to previous studies of senior police managers. They point to some collective group development and advanced professional maturity and thinking. This could reasonably be interpreted as a modification to a changing contemporary social environment, rather than a rigid adherence to old habits, ways of thinking and responding to challenges. In short, it is tempting to assert that contemporary senior managers were more flexible and adaptable to the demands placed on them. However, if the effectiveness of the perceived new flexibility and adaptability were judged in terms of change of operational practice on the ground, for example, using the data on stop and search, then the flexibility and adaptability appears presentational rather than changes in basic underlying assumptions. In essence what seems like a chameleon-like change in reality looks more like a dinosaur-like adherence to old ways of operating cloaked in a superficial chameleon-like exterior.

Chapter 9

PUBLIC ORDER.

INRODUCTION.

In contemporary police discourse 1981 was to public disorder what 1983 was to managerial accountability in the police service. There were seminal enquiries into the events that sparked the disorders in 1981, and reports in 1983 highlighting concerns about the adequacy of police managerialism. In both areas, these proved pivotal in bringing about changes in the style and form of service delivery.

In 1983, the police service received Home Office Circular 114, which is generally accepted as the introduction of the principles of New Public Management into the police. This Circular 'offered' a new option to senior police managers on how to manage their resources, primarily in a more business-like way. The principles contained in Circular 114/83 have been developed over the years and are today reflected in the current public sector management initiative that is also being applied to the police: The Best Value regime.

The incidents of public disorder in 1981 were a watershed in contemporary discussion of the policing of public disorders. The report by Lord Scarman (1986) into the most publicly known of the many incidents of public disorder that occurred in various parts of the country in 1981, the Brixton Disorders, was an influential one, on many levels. The collective disorders in Brixton in 1981 are used as the standard to which all other major public disorders are compared in contemporary police discourse.

The disorders occupy one end on a continuum of different levels and seriousness of public disorders. At the other end is the relatively low-level, low-intensity types of disorder involving small groups, euphemistically referred to as middle Englanders, that publicly express their disapproval of certain public policy decisions on environmental or animal welfare matters, such as the export of live veal.

Also occupying this lower end of the continuum are the local Saturday night, Sunday morning skirmishes that occurred regularly in most major city centres in the '80s when nightclubs turned out. However, these types of incidents seemed to cause more angst for the government and the police. As Fielding observes, "Public disorder need not be riotous to provoke official hand-wringing". For example, "When police clashed with drunken youths in large numbers in 1987, and an early conflict was in the Home Secretary's constituency, Ministers perceived an increasing problem of drink-related violence in semi-rural towns, and ordered research. They had in mind the incident at Crowborough where 200 youths 'ran amok' after being asked to leave a wine bar, the riot of 170 youths in Lincoln in 1987, and the battle of two gangs in High Wycombe over New Year 1988. ACPO reported that there were 251 incidents of public disorder involving 36,300 people in 1987, and that alcohol featured in 90 per cent."

Predictably, "The commissioned Home Office research revealed that rather than affluent 'yuppie yobboes' the mayhem was caused by the usual suspects: young, poorly educated workers in low-status jobs" (Fielding 1991: 111). Today the issues remain essentially unchanged, although the causes are attributed to binge drinking. These low level, low intensity types of disorders are in contrast to the major large-scale disorders that used to occur regularly at events such as Notting Hill Carnival.

The stereotypical police view of particular demonstrators is sometimes reflected in the ease or discomfort with which they deal with different types of demonstrations. In essence, it is arguable that the tactics the police adopt to contain and control major disorders are tailored to reflect the social make-up of the demonstrators. However, this is not as straightforward as it appears, because when groups of demonstrators do not conform to the police's stereotypical image of them, this can lead to public censure and disapproval of the police where they have mistakenly adopted 'routine' tactics to deal with the disorder. In this sense alone, the policing of public disorder can be a complex and thorny problem for senior managers.

CONTROLLING DISORDER.

The police control and management of public disorder have changed significantly over the years. (Reiner 1997). The managerial control of incidents of disorder is a relatively more complex exercise today, partly because senior managers are now better trained and they are often specialists in public order management and control. Additionally, the management of disorders is more challenging because senior managers need more than operational and tactical skills and knowledge to deal with such incidents. They need constantly to be aware of the ease and speed at which their performance could be transmitted nationally and internationally which could influence the occurrence of similar incidents elsewhere. My respondents recognised some of the pit falls. For example, take this typical response from one of them to the question of whether policing public disorder was much more difficult for the police now than in the past.

Yes, I would say that it is, and again I think that it's partly because there isn't, undoubtedly, there isn't the sort of same respect for the police as there was many years ago. And also I think we are far more under the microscope than we were some years ago, and rightly so. You know, I'm not arguing against it, but I think that some of the ways that maybe we controlled or we maintained public order a few years ago wouldn't be tolerated now. Certainly if you look back to the Trafalgar Square riots and you saw the behaviour of some of the police officers there, you can see that, you know, we are a more disciplined organisation than we were then; our tactics are certainly far improved. (R. 16).

As indicated above, although senior managers and officers under their charge are better trained to deal with major disorders, nonetheless the control of public disorder is not a simple process, for a number of reasons. One of these is that policing incidents of public disorder is a morally ambiguous activity. For example, contrasting the difference between policing crime with public order, Waddington explains that, "the criminal occupies a position outside the moral community, whereas protestors, pickets and possibly even rioters may be considered the moral equals of other citizens," which can lead to the situation "when police battle with protestors and

rioters, not only are they likely to be physically injured, the police organisation is also likely to suffer harm" (Waddington 2000: 156).

Another reason, alluded to above, is that different groups of people who are demonstrating against different causes, uses different means to do so, which can result in the display of different levels of violence against the police. An example would be the 'environmental' demonstrations that took place in Newbury, Berkshire and at Manchester Airport during '80s and early 90s. Nonetheless, regardless of the type of disorder the police are called to control, tactically their response might be very similar. This could be due to their adoption of standardised methods that have been formulated over time as they gained more knowledge and experience through dealing with more incidents. That said, despite the adoption of standardised procedures, such as the conflict resolution model to deal with both low and high level incidents of disorder, the police still experience difficulties in policing disorders. Recent incidents have included the disorders in Oldham and Bradford in the summer of 2001, and the anti-globalisation protest in central London in May 2001, where the police tactic was to corral everyone in the vicinity of the main protestors for several hours. Although this tactic proved very effective in preventing serious damage to property and a repetition of the scenes that were witnessed in the City of London in June 1999 during another anti-globalisation demonstration, the Metropolitan Police Service was criticised by some civil liberties groups (*Daily Telegraph*, 3 March 2001).

This difficulty with trying to use a single standardised method to police different types of demonstrations and demonstrators was highlighted by one of my respondents in his reply to the question of whether public disorder was more difficult to deal with now than in the past:

> *It depends on what sort of scale you're at. The majority of public disorder in this country emanates from drink related offences, late at night on town centres where officers, by the demands upon them are probably not there in the numbers that they've been in the past. I've always felt, there can be two reactions really, it's the delicate balance. The hefty police presence can sometimes provoke a response from the public, in the fact that they find it provocative and they take you on. Resources on the ground where they're*

under strength, can also provoke a response and they think, we can do this and get away with it. It's the delicate balance where you're strong on the ground, sending the message that, look we don't want to stop you from enjoying yourself, but if you do do anything wrong, there's enough of us here to deal with you. When you move to the higher echelons of public disorder, this is very, very difficult, because there are many people looking at you, how you behave, you'll be videod, because they'll be video cameras from the press. The size that are demonstrating in large-scale public disorder come equipped with their video cameras. So they're watching everything that we do, then it's the delicate balance of dealing with it professionally, using the force that's reasonable in the circumstances and not being seen to do anything that's inappropriate. (R. 19).

Both the City of London and the Metropolitan Police were accused by some sections of the public and the media for using inappropriate methods to deal with the large-scale anti-globalisation demonstrations that took place on their respective policing areas. The City force allowed the demonstrators too much freedom, which enabled them to cause serious damage to property in the City, while the Metropolitan Police treated everyone within the vicinity of the demonstration as a homogenous mass. Although they prevented the level of damage and chaos that occurred in the City, they were nevertheless still judged to have got it wrong (*Financial Times*, 3 March 2001).

Operational control.

The two incidents highlighted above occurred some years after I interviewed my respondents. Nonetheless, the topic of public disorder would have been prominent in their minds at the time of the interviews. In more recent times there had been rioting on the streets of London in 1990 (the anti-poll tax riots), and in Brixton in 1995. With these events still fresh in the memories of my respondents, combined with the experience and learning from the industrial disputes in the 1970s and major public disorders in the 1980s, and the increased regularity of training, it was not surprising for them to suggest that the policing of public disorder was more sophisticated and measured now than simply being either more or less difficult to deal with.

Developments in policing contemporary local, large-group disorders.

My respondents consistently expressed the view that the policing of public disorder was not more difficult now than in the past, rather that it was *different*. For fear of getting lost in the semantics of describing the contemporary problems with policing public disorder, I ought to stress that my respondents held the view that there was some difficulty with policing public disorder, but the difficulty did not arise directly from what the police did but from how they did it. For example, it would not have mattered that officers in riot gear physically removed demonstrators blocking a carriageway, but when those demonstrators were middle aged, middle class members of society whose physical appearance one would not normally associate with violence, then the police's actions were often censured by the media. This could be explained by the moral ambiguity the police face when policing public order, which was highlighted by Waddington (2000). He contrasts the different moral positions of the criminal and protester, explaining that "the criminal occupies a position outside the moral community, whereas protesters, pickets and possibly even rioters may be considered the moral equals of other citizens." (Waddington: 156). The policing of pubic order is further complicated where protesters are doing so for a moral purpose. For example, "The series of confrontations that took place during early 1995 between police and protesters aiming to halt the export of live animals to Continental Europe illustrates the general point" (ibid). The sight of officers using heavy-handed tactics to remove protesters from blocking the free passage of the lorries used to export livestock led to the police being accused of partiality in controlling the protesters. Typically my respondents explained the difficulties inherent in policing public situations today as follows,

In practical terms no, we've never been better equipped or trained to deal with disorder and we are very effective at it, or we can be if we choose to be, if we deploy properly and so on. But as to whether it is more acceptable now than in the past, I guess in some ways it has always been a dilemma for us, you know, again thinking historically, our interventions have always been welcomed. But experience in this county has been, this is where we're dealing with what we might call the middle classes or middle England, and with the Animal Rights protest at [a port town].

We really were under the cosh really because again middle class values were applied and middle class assumptions were made about things like if it's middle England down here protesting therefore we must be right. If it was them down the road, that would be different. But we're middle England and we pay your wages, why is it you're moving us on, even though what they was doing was clearly unlawful, clearly undemocratic and so on. We really, that is a problem, so when we are in conflict with the middle class on what we might call middle class issues, you know Animal Rights and so on.

It does present us with, I don't know whether they are new difficulties. (R. 1).

It is a truism that over the years the police service has developed more effective and sophisticated equipment with which to police public disorders. Some of these more aggressive looking equipment may have exacerbated certain situations and led to accusations of over-reaction (Northam 1988). At the individual level officers are much better instructed to follow a systematic and incrementally forceful sequence of actions to deal with low level local public disorders. Officers have new, different and more effective equipment, some of which, inadvertently, have turned out to be extremely effective deterrents to those who may have physically confronted them in the past. In this respect the sight and sound of officers rachetting an 'ASP' (the extendable metal batons made by Armament Systems and Procedure Inc., which have replaced the wooden truncheon in some Forces) to ready it for use has had a salutary effect on would be demonstrators.

The individual officer with his array of new equipment, such as the long-handled baton (an alternative to the ASP); pepper spray; and Quik-kuffs, is much better equipped now to deal with disorderly behaviours. Collectively, the militaristic style of training given to groups of officers working in teams, gives them the appearance of a well-drilled, well-organised units that are better managed and controlled under 'superior' command to deal with most situations. (Waddington 2000). My respondents consistently expressed the view that the much better equipment and training that officers now received had made the operational aspect of public order policing easier. For example,

No I don't think so, it's different. We've just gone through the introduction of the Asp, and introducing a conflict management continuum which starts from talking to them, and working up and down the continuum depending on how people behave; distancing yourself from some. Now we are better equipped to handle today's problems than we have been for a long time in my view. So I don't think it's any more difficult, I think it's changed. Quite clearly if you looked at the bigger public disorder scenarios, we are far better equipped now to deal with those than we were before, what I'm saying is that we're better equipped than we've ever been. We're certainly, speaking for I, I am certainly more aware than I was twenty years ago about the dynamics of being with people, non-verbal communications, about distance, about the sorts of problems that officers can get into, about the different options, tactical options and strategic options we now have right the way from talking to people, right the way up to actually calling out an ARV [Armed Response Vehicle] *and Tactical Firearms Team to deal with a situation.* (R. 3).

Not all my respondents shared the view that policing public disorders had become easier operationally. Those that thought that it was more difficult now offered a number of reasons why this was so. However, a common reason expressed by most of them concerned the media. They held the view that the media reported public disorders more often now, and coupled with their perception that some demonstrators were skilled at using the media to their advantage, this made policing these events more challenging and demanding. For example,

It's probably more difficult. It's more difficult because more and more people I think are prepared to protest to try and get what they see isn't right. So some people protest for the right reason, some to try and gain what they can't legally get, and the other factor which makes it more difficult is media attention. A lot of protest groups are very skilled with media use and so now if a bobby goes up even to a local dispute, where there is for example one man protesting outside a supermarket because he was sold a bad joint of beef or if we go to a field where two or three gypsy caravans have arrived and apparently broken down a gate to get access, when the bobby arrives to deal with it, if I'd have arrived as a bobby years ago, I'd have arrived, been

confronted with the situation, had time to think about it, talk to those involved, make up my mind or seek advice. These days when a bobby gets there, he's just as likely to be there at the same time or after a television reporter or a local radio station or a cameraman and that actually makes his job tougher because he can't have private conversations. If he takes any actions it's going to get recorded or broadcast or photographed and that can be shown out of context, or again it may just intimidate him, so in some ways it's easier, some ways it's tougher. (R. 7).

National large-scale disorder.

The problems that beset officers at the local level are the same that affects a Force, or Forces working together through mutual aid, at a national level. The media interest remains problematic. However, according to my respondents there are additional factors at this level, such as the fact that demonstrators are more aware of the law and their rights, and, like the general public, are less deferential to authority and authority figures.

I think it probably is and I would say that's largely down to a better-informed, more intellectual type of protester if you want to put it like that. People now are far more aware of their rights, they know what they can do, what they can't do and the media are more inclined to follow demonstrations now. Look what's happening in Newbury and elsewhere, which the police didn't really have to contend with too much in the past I suspect. The Miners' strike was again, and the Wapping dispute, which really brought public demonstration and public disorder into National focus, and I think it has made it more difficult but it's also meant that the police have had to respond more professionally than we've done in the past. So I think the answer to the question is, yes, it is more difficult now, but I think we're better trained and we're better equipped to deal with it. (R. 17).

I think it's made more difficult by the nature of protest now, the sort of middle classisation of protests; Newbury, Animal Lib., that sort of thing makes, has turned it away from the Miners' strike sort of policing issues, into other type of people. We do 70-odd year old people who have never ever been in trouble

with the police before suddenly find themselves assaulting police officers and being locked up. And I think in that sense it is more difficult for the police because there's more variety in it now. (R. 41).

Media response.

Several respondents suggested that the media interest in public disorder was a major influencing factor on the nature and outcome of disorder.

I think we certainly seem to have a more co-ordinated approach now to major public disorder than we ever did, but I don't see that it's any easier or more difficult now than it was certainly in my younger day. Or indeed if you go back to the early part of the twentieth century when there were major riots in London. I don't think things have changed that much, there will always be public disorder, public disquiet, the big issue now I think is that they're far more publicised so people are far more aware of them than they ever were before. (R. 6).

Social consequences.

My respondents' awareness, gained through professional experience, of some of the causes of public disorder, even where some of these had only occurred at a local level, was matched by their desire to find solutions to prevent them happening in the future.

No, I don't think so. I think the nature of disorder has changed. If I could reflect back, 30 years, in that yes there was disorder, there was violence but it was perhaps more sporadic and perhaps more based on entertainment for want of a better way of putting it. Alcohol will also have an issue; it will always be there. And there are certain licensed houses and outlets that would cause you more problems than another. And even the area where those licensed outlets were would always be there. There would always be the pressure groups and perhaps policing styles contributing a lot towards the public disorder. I think we're far more mindful now of our actions and how it can escalate problems and actually have knock on effect and cause more problems for the future. It's not a question of taking the soft option or treat people with kid gloves, we've actually got to think, well if we take a certain option and actually police an event or an incident in a certain way, are we

looking at all the wrangles of what could be the issues that come out of it? So I think the two things have moved together. Perhaps the absence of real serious public disorder over the last five years is testimonies to where both sides have backed off a little, how much is reality, I mean, I look at a neighbour of ours in a particular housing estate, which I've known that estate for many, many years, and we still can't police it. Yes, it's always been a council estate, parts of it with criminal propensity. Gradually employment, social depravation has come about and it flared up, at one stage, which I think is a sense of anxiety, frustration against the whole series of issues, but really when you look at it, the actual disorder was confined to two streets. And actually had more to do with the people in those streets than actually the issues they were complaining about. So I think the media had a lot to play in this as well. You know, things being blown out of proportion on both sides of the equation and I think we are perhaps as a profession, far better to play down certain aspects and get our own voice across, like more open with the media. (R. 27).

This example raises some parallels with the changes in the way the Notting Hill Carnival in London has been policed in recent years. Waddington (1994) described how the police managed to exert extensive control over the way Carnival was policed by engaging in negotiations with the organisers of the events, local authority, local communities and those that they saw as organisers of the protests. (Waddington 1994: Ch 4). He suggested that the first imperative of the police was to bring the organisers of the demonstration into negotiations, preferably on police premises. As soon as the organisers consented to visit police premises the police acquired the "home ground advantage." (ibid: 75). Explaining that being a visitor to a police station had many compliance-inducing features. The police were seeking maximum control over the event and attempted to persuade the organisers to see the wisdom of their viewpoint. The structural setting made the organisers a guest of the police in the unfamiliar environment in which movement was controlled. By regular meetings with key stakeholders in the process of staging Carnival the police were able to gain their 'consent' and thereby attained their goal of achieving far more control over the event than the law allowed, and did so without risk of review by the courts because it was obtained by consent. (Waddington: Ch. 4)

FREQUENCY AND VIOLENT NATURE OF DISORDERS.

There is a strong temptation to suggest that one reason why police managers found public disorders easier to police now than in the past was because incidents of disorder occurred more frequently, which meant that they had more opportunities to practise their tactics and thereby refine and improve them. When I discussed with my respondent whether or not incidents of public disorder were occurring more frequently now than in the past, again their response was more sophisticated and detailed than a simple choice of yes or no.

> *I don't believe it is something, which is on a linear scale. I believe it's cyclical and I think if you go through history we have periods of time where disorder is very common, and then you'll go into a relatively quiet period of time. So, and I don't know where we are in the cycle at the moment but it's something which comes and goes and I don't think it's particularly worse now than it has been through history. (R. 31).*

The last quote was a typical view of my respondents, and pointed up the fact that for most of my respondents their perception of the extent of public disorder were informed by the general media, because their direct experience of incidents of disorder was minimal. They often expressed the view, sometimes apologetically, that their Force area was not prone to incidents of serious public disorder. For those that did have recent experience or were at the time involved in policing public disorders, the types of incidents that they were dealing with were long running ones.

> *I would say probably not, probably not, I mean again, you know, I'm speaking from my experience in [a Northern town], and we don't have much experience quite honestly in major public disorder. So I'm just talking from what I sort of see in the press and read, but I don't think there are, there are one or two sort of fringe subversive groups that are extremely violent. I sort of think of the SWP and Combat 18 these people, but the British National Party and all those real extreme group, but apart from that I think the vast majority of people are fairly reasonable and aren't prone to violence. The major demonstrations we've had, you know, the animal rights and all that, apart from the*

involvement of one or two of these fringe individuals, most people are passive,

it's not a violent protest, it's sort of peaceful passive protest. (R. 25).

Perceptions of violence.

Although they expressed the view that it was difficult to quantify whether or not incidents of disorder were occurring more frequently, their perception was that although they were sure that incidents of disorder were not occurring more frequently people were more likely to use violence now than in the past. For example,

I think society is more violent, whether that is by virtue of media influence and television, cinema, sort of also what's available through videos and what have you, right from an early age it is the accepted norm, whether that's in fact, again I'm not a sociologist, but I wouldn't discount it. (R. 27).

Yeah, I mean we get the one to one every Friday and Saturday night as you can imagine, that's part of the culture. But in terms of large scale, no I don't think it has, I mean we had those peaks didn't we when those inner city, so called inner city riots in the early '80s, '81 I think was the peak year. No, I mean we've not experienced a lot of that, in fact we haven't had a lot of public disorder in this area, we've gone on mutual aid to other areas by and large, that's our history in my service. I mean I remember the Springboks tour of 1969, when South African tourists came over to play in the British Isles and there was incredible demonstrations against that, and we went from this Force to many Regional Centres, Bristol, Gloucester, I went myself personally to all those places. Swansea, Cardiff, locally in Newport, Ebwvale, you know, in response to that, so historically this Force has been one which has supplied mutual aid for public disorder rather than have to deploy it locally. I don't think that there is, I mean it's like the animal business, you know, the live exports, we haven't had local problems on that. I mean the South East and the Ports, that's a more difficult one to police in my view, because there you have the general public sympathy to the cause of the demonstrators and it's difficult for the public to perceive that the police appear to take sides, and say, well that the exporters are also acting lawfully so they have a right to be protected,

so that's a very difficult one for the Police to market their actions in that. (R. 29)

The frequency of incidents of disorder may not have increased, but the situation with the level and extent of violence used during incidents of disorder was a different proposition all together for my respondents. The vast majority of them were sure that the level of violence was higher now than in the past.

Their responses were intuitive and the information on which they based their answers came from personal knowledge. Even where contemporary incidents were compared with past occurrences, the recent incidents came from personal and operational experience rather than statistical or academic sources.

The similarity of the examples given and the parameters within which the discussion was contained were uncanny. Most of the examples concerned violence directed at police officers during small-scale local incidents of disorder, and the most frequently mentioned weapon of offence was a knife.
Typical examples included.

Yeah definitely, I mean we had a situation, we trialled long batons in this town purely because of the level of assaults on officers. We had some really nasty assaults, it was baiting time, everytime they got in a large group, they felt safe. They felt immune and the officers were approached, two officers were baited into the middle and the whole group would close round them and the boots and fists would come flying and then all run away, all heroes. They'd given the officers a good kicking and they'd be away on their. (R. 9).

Yeah, yeah, we had a lad here I don't know how many years ago, but on the bridge, just in town Saturday night, sadly we had a young lad stabbed and killed and that was just two groups, it wasn't racial, it wasn't gang, it wasn't drugs, it was just a couple of kids, there were 17, 18, 16 year olds, two groups exchanged derogatory remarks to each other, it just grew, got to the railway bridge and the stabbing occurred. I think the degree of violence is a lot higher than it's ever been before and, I promise you I won't get into sort of folklore

and war stories, but when I was a young constable as a probationer, I could stop a car, well I suppose there was a degree of being young and foolish and not thinking, but it really wasn't an issue then, I would stop a car with four young men in, I would search the boot and I never had the powers that we have today, but I'd do all that, just by my personality and to some extent the uniform would be enough. It wouldn't happen today I'm sure, you'd be calling for backup, rightly so, they would be very careful how they dealt with it and rightly so. So I am convinced it is a lot more violent than it was when I first joined twenty-four years ago. (R. 42).

Even on the rare occasions that some of my respondents explained that incidents of disorder were no more violent now than in the past, the way they expressed the view was ambiguous. For example,

It's difficult to say, I think we've been through the mill with this really, going right back to things like Grosvenor Square. Yes okay we've had petrol bombs, we've had scaffolding poles, we've had all sorts of very, very unpleasant treatment of police officers; televisions dropped off of balconies, things like that. But we seem to have come through it. I don't think they're particularly more violent now, and in some ways I think because of our expertise and undoubted professionalism, because we put a lot of resources into training and indeed equipping, and if you think back to the days of the St Paul's riots when policemen were fending off missiles with milk crates, we've gone on a long, long way since then. And we have got our medics, we have got the fire extinguishers, we have got the shields, we've got the flameproof clothing. I think that investment I suppose has paid off, even if it is more violent, I think we're in a very, very much better position to deal with it. (R. 45).

Not at this stage, but I'm wondering what the next stage may be. We are I think in control again to a certain extent, but that is only for now and whether tactics on the opposition side may change in the next riots, certainly I'm aware of, we've now covered the petrol bomb situation, they're no longer, everybody was worried about petrol bombing. It really isn't a problem anymore, when we talk to our Support Units now. They're trained in it, they

haven't got a problem, but they are worried about certain other areas, they are worried about crossbows, things like that and that isn't an area which has come to the fore in our public order, but it wouldn't take too many idiots to discover that that might be a way of causing us mayhem. (R. 46).

These examples were typical of incidents that occurred at a local level. What about large-scale incidents at a national level?

In the, when you're talking about the reactive type of public disorder, it happens in pubs and clubs, it's becoming serious in the way that people are generally armed with weapons or either knives or that sort of thing or with firearms. And I think that's the serious side of it, and that then brings in the vicious element of it as well. (R. 34).

If the reality was that people were more likely to resort to more violent means to achieve their aims then one could reasonably expect the police to adopt a more co-ordinated, structured and disciplined approach to tackle these types of disorders, where weapons were now more likely to be used.

UPPING THE ANTE: TOWARDS A MILITARISTIC STYLE OF POLICING.

The police response to disorder has become more sophisticated, robust and forceful in recent years, a trend often described as 'militaristic' policing. I posed this proposition as a given to my respondents and asked them to speculate why it had occurred. The majority agreed that the policing of public order incidents had undergone a gradual transformation over the years. Developing from what can best be described as organised chaos to well briefed and highly disciplined units. Even when some of my respondents questioned the usefulness of the term 'militaristic' policing, their discussion of my proposal highlighted elements of paramilitarism. For example,

I wouldn't necessarily agree with the statement anyway. If you go back to the Miners' dispute, taking it back that far and working on from there, I can understand why people would call that militaristic because we went there as a body of men, and women, and we could have well looked militaristic in the

way that we would leave the vehicles and approached things. But equally I would say with the sort of violence that a lot of them were facing that was the right way to do it, it was more professional. (R. 4)

The concept of militaristic policing is not restricted to the physical appearance of public order policing units. It extends to the training, organisation and deployment of these units of officers that receive regular public order training, as well as other groups that only receive intermittent training. As some of those respondents that agreed with the proposition explained,

Well I think it's inevitably because of the improved equipment, the improved training, it's everything that we would say is good. And I think the reality is that, back in the early part of '84, we were undisciplined, relatively ill equipped to cope with those sorts of riots. And, it's the old thing about what sort of a Police Force do you want? You cannot have a Force, which is well equipped, well drilled, and disciplined to respond to that without going down the sort of militaristic route. (R. 16).

Responding to public demand and reacting to the increasingly organised tactics of demonstrators is only part of the reason for the police's development of more sophisticated measures to deal with incidents of major disorder.
ACPO's involvement in guiding the service towards paramilitary policing should not be underestimated.

It's not by accident. It may have occurred simply because we've now got, for example, an ACPO public order manual which for the first time. I mean that's been there probably about ten years, but that does set out signs and symptoms of disorder and sets out in different sub-chapters all the sorts of different levels of response you can think about participating in. So there's now a manual, which lays down all the public order options, plus through, I referred to public order when you asked me about courses. I've done a public order commander's course in Kent, an original one, which I think is compulsory for the rank and you do the public order courses and you are taught the options. So, I am now familiar with options. Personally, that perhaps years ago people

in my position wouldn't have been. So I think there's been a heightened awareness. The other change there's been and this was about 1985, we introduced shields for the first time and there was a huge debate about shields but we've introduced shields, we've introduced helmets, fireproof overalls. Gradually one thing at a time and we've gradually got to the point now where officers have actually got good protective equipment. They're trained in its use and in this County we even now put, I think most Forces do, in each of the response cars we actually have a couple of smaller shields. So, if officers do find themselves in a tough situation, with somebody with a weapon of some sort, they've actually got some immediate protection. So I certainly think there's been just a gradual escalation where we have responded to the heightened public order by better equipment and better training, though I'd say it's been fairly gradual over the past ten or fifteen years. (R. 7).

In the Background section of the *Guide to Public Order Policing Manual* published by the Association of Chief Police Officers in 1993 it is explained that the "original Manual was the product of the Community Disorder, Tactical Options Inter-Force Working Group, which was set up by ACPO, with Home Office support, after the rioting of the summer of 1981." And that the "Group's origins arose from an agreed need for some national common minimum standards in public order training."

It explained that the reason for the Manual was because, "Experience of extended industrial disputes, violent demonstrations and serious riots has reinforced the knowledge that is such matters the police of England and Wales are mutually inter-dependent. The use of Mutual Aid reinforcements to bolster individual Force resources to cope with such phenomena has amply illustrated the need for common standards in order to enable contingents to operate together with effect. Initially recognised in the field of tactics and tactical training, there is now recognition that the need for a uniform approach extends also to commonality of terminology, planning procedure, command structure, logistics, mobilisation and organisation."

The Manual encouraged the adoption of a systematic method for dealing with incidents of public disorder. The general tenet of the Manual was that incidents of disorder usually followed a build up of events until a 'trigger incident' hastened the

act of disorder. This reflects the interpretation by Waddington et al. (1989) of how public disorders occurred. For example the Manual offered a model showing the theoretical progression of incrementally disorderly activities leading to a pinnacle of what it described as 'Lethal Rioting': "Normality – High Tension – Sporadic Disorder – Riot – Serious Riot – Lethal Riot" and then decreasing to "Immediate Post Disorder – Community Unrest – Normality."

This sociological explanation of the causes and stages of public disorders was repeated by some of my respondents. Clearly, a product of similar training received by most of them. However, the main reason expressed by the majority of them for the sophisticated equipment that officers can now use to police public disorders was the need to protect them. As the following quotes illustrate,

Well I think it's evolved because of the level of violence that was shown to the police and officers were found to be inadequately protected. You look at, started probably with Toxteth and Brixton in 1981, where officers were picking dustbin lids to protect themselves and they got more and more police issue helmets on and they were being hit on the face, officers in danger of being seriously hurt. The trouble is when you move to protective equipment, you escalate the situation as well; it's the delicate balance of how we put that on. I think it's absolutely necessary when we start looking at Health and Safety issues, we've got a duty to protect the young men and women that we ask to police in difficult situations. In a perfect world, I wouldn't want to see officers with shields and Nato helmets and flameproof overalls. But if we've got to go out to meet violence, where they are petrol bombing and throwing bricks at us, then its incumbent on me as a senior manager to make sure my officers go out properly trained and properly equipped to meet that. But I think as a senior officer and I think it's seen many times in the demonstrations in London, will always start off with officers in normal uniform and we'll have a contingency whereby we've got public order equipped officers to respond. (R. 19).

Health and safety is one of the reasons. The emphasis change from trying to maintain the traditional Bobbies that have nothing but just a short truncheon

and your helmet and perhaps little more etc. It was desperate measures in the early days in my service. Now the emphasis is very much, oh we have to protect our men to the ultimate, it means you are giving longer staffs and better handcuffs and more protection etc. And the inevitable result of that is you change how they appear. (R. 23).

I think the primary is probably officer protection, probably. If you're expecting people to be involved in violent confrontations, and particularly bear in mind what I've just said about having the usual programme methods, you know if there are definite limits to what force or reasonable force we can use, we need to have some sort of protection ourselves to ensure that people who are using unreasonable force against us don't get the upper hand. Protective clothing, which is what it is, it's not aggressive clothing, but it can only be accommodated to a certain extent within the traditional uniform, sort of presentation of an officer. (R. 25).

Self-preservation I think, more than anything else. If you put people into large-scale conflict, or even smaller conflict actually, might be better prepared. If it's not controlled in an objective and rational way, human nature will actually allow police officers, they're no different, to actually go over the top. If they're poorly trained, poorly controlled and poorly equipped, you'll have problems. (R. 27).

In publishing the *Guide to Public Order Policing* in 1983 ACPO clearly recognised that the nature of public protest and demonstration was changing. The extent of the change was such that the police needed to make significant and fundamental alteration to the way they dealt with public disorder incidents, if they were to retain the 'high ground'. Since the publication of the Manual, it has been revised and updated and the service has gained greater knowledge and experience in dealing the disorders. To the present day these changes, on both sides, continue as the different methods used to police the demonstrations against global capitalism in the City of London in 1999 and the Metropolitan Police area in 2001 have shown.

Although both these demonstrations occurred a long time after I had discussed the subject with my respondents, at the time of our discussions they were attuned to the changing and evolving nature public conflict and disorder. This is shown by the following quotes, which were responses to the question of whether they thought the trend of militaristic policing of public disorder would continue.

I regret to say I'm sure it will. I mean there's got to be a point where it stops. I'd hate to get to the point where we use water cannons, I'd hate to get to the point where we actually had or regularly were using plastic bullets or CS gas in riots, but if things don't calm down from a protestors point of view, then I regret there may be. (R. 7).

Regrettably I do, I do and I don't see it as too far off until police officers as a routine are carrying firearms, wearing stab-proof vests and all the rest of it, I think it's regrettable but it will come to that I'm sure of it. (R. 17).

Yes I hope it does, because we need to be professional, we have to be very, very careful and we see it on the television, we train and train and train, it's when that bloody red mist comes down and please, I haven't been in any situations like they have in London and it must be frightening for the police officers but I've seen some of them flailing on a bloody staffs and whatsits round and I think, oh my goodness me, the red, you know, the red mist really has come down and once we get to that stage, we've lost it. We have to be effective, we have to be positive, we have to go forward, but we've got to stop, we've got to train so that bloody red mist doesn't come down. (R. 30).

As this last quote illustrates, like most of his contemporaries this senior police manager believed that it is inevitable that the trend of moving towards a more militaristic style of policing of public disorder would continue. However, he expressed more overtly the underlying feeling of his colleagues, which was that the intention of moving towards this style of public order policing was to reduce the level of harm caused to the demonstrators and the police. They saw the increased militarisation of public order policing as altruistic.

Discussion.

The policing and management of incidents of public disorder has changed dramatically over recent years. For the officers that police incidents of disorder their training has become more regular, sophisticated and intense. Their equipment, both for personal group use, has become more sophisticated and is now more openly displayed. For example, the code of dress for officers policing potential public order situations is to wear their utility belts with their equipment attached over their reflective jackets. This public and overt display of the 'tools' with which they can quell a disturbance has prevented rather than exacerbated encounters that in the past could have developed into incidents of disorder. The improved and structured training now given to operational officers, together with the improved and more effective equipment with which they can deal with incidents of disorder have made the management of such incidents more complex for senior managers.

Although most of my respondents did not have recent operational experience of dealing with incidents of major public disorder, they were acutely aware of the nature and extent of lower-level incidents of disorder that had occurred in their Force area. Part of the reason for this is because some of them would have had to manage officers who had either had to deal with local incidents of disorder or suffered as victims at the hands of local groups or people that have been engaged in local incidents of disorder. Regardless of the means by which they had gained their experiences of incidents of public disorder, as a group my respondents had accumulated very similar experiences of incidents of public disorder, and through their responses to my questions it was evident that they had developed a very similar outlook to problems associated with dealing with and managing incidents of disorder. The relevance of this for the purpose of this study is that the information gleaned from my respondents showed that there had been a substantial amount of common shared experiences and learning around the policing of public disorder, which had been translated into common language in the way they expressed their views about the topic. Clearly, this area of policing has been one that has helped senior police managers develop some of the components of a group culture.

Chapter 10

SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY.

INTRODUCTION.

The year of birth and consequently the formative years of my respondents cover a period of great social and political change. The oldest was born in 1942 and the youngest in 1958. However, the majority, 57% were born between 1944 and 1948. This means that the social and political conditions that prevailed during the time span my respondents were born were very different. From the austere and difficult social conditions of the pre Second World War years to the relatively wealthy, liberal and easy-going social conditions of the post war years (Morgan 1989). Over half of them were born during the time of war when their fathers and other able-bodied adult male relatives would have been away defending the nation and their mothers, grand parents and neighbours would have been experiencing very difficult times coping on limited incomes and resources, while still expected to do their bit for the War effort. Politically, the situation for the parents of my respondents would have been just as difficult and demanding as it was socially.

Although the specific social and political conditions would have been different for groups of them, one constant for all them would have been the continuous shift in the social and political environment. All would have experienced a similar continuous flux in their professional environment during their managerial period in the police service.

How would their experience of the different social, political and economical conditions of their childhood, coupled with their experience of similar occupational backgrounds shape their outlook as professional senior police managers? I explored the potential effects of these factors with my respondents by discussing social harmony, social inequality and the concept of the rule of law.

SOCIAL HARMONY.

For the decades of the '70s, '80s and part of the '90s the police service experienced a significant amount of social, legal and professional change. Socially, during this period there appeared to be continuous social conflict, which was typified by a number of major public disorders. In 1976 and 1977 there were serious public disorders at the Notting Hill carnival. In 1979, there was the death of Blair Peach during a pubic demonstration in Southall. In 1980, there were riots in St Pauls, Bristol. In 1981 there were rioting in Toxteth, Liverpool; Brixton, London; and Handsworth, Birmingham. In 1984, there was the Miners' Strike. In 1985, there were incidents of serious disorder during the industrial dispute in Wapping, East London; serious public disorders in a number of areas in London: Broadwater Farm, Tottenham and Brixton.

Legally, the successes that the police service had achieved in convicting the Guildford Four, the Maguire Seven and the Birmingham pub bombers were publicly and humiliatingly overturned through successful challenges in the early 90s by the 'guilty' perpetrators of these offences at the Court of Appeal. Concerns about the integrity of the police service were raised and debated publicly.

These were some of the specific challenges that confronted my respondents as they progressed from Bobbies on the beat to senior police managers. More generally, both in their social and occupational capacities, they would have grown up in a period in history when, "most working class people, the vast majority of the population, viewed the years since 1945 as much the best that had been generally known since the late-Victorian heyday. Wages rose to 30 per cent above their 1938 level. There were higher living standards, guaranteed employment, more satisfying environmental and educational facilities" (Morgan 1989: 119). With this backdrop, how did my respondents view my assertion that society was more harmonious now than in the past?

Well, a hell of an assumption about whether it ever was. Trick questions there. I wouldn't have thought that there's been any change. No society is harmonious, I mean that's looking at the past through rose-coloured spectacles. Society is and has always been a hotchpotch of competing interests. So I don't see that as being the case. (R. 1).

Well can I come back with, who says it was a harmonious society? I mean have I got to accept that to start with?

[No]

You see we're not are we? We've got this United Kingdom of Great Britain, all those bits. We're not harmonious at all are we? We've got Northern Ireland who've got a distinct identity. We've got Scotland that has got a distinct identity. We've got Wales who are something different, and then if you go to Birmingham, that's something different from ----. So I've never seen that we have been a harmonious society. I see what's happening, is that it's become more apparent that we're not, because of the communications thing. Because it's all there for us to see, and it's splashed across our television screens, we are brought into contact with the other, if you like, sort of sub-cultures within the country. Far more than we ever were before. If we go back fifty years, someone who lived in ----[SE town] had no idea of what happened in Yorkshire, because they didn't have the communications means. So I don't think we ever were, and I don't think we've changed very much. (R. 5).

Well that assumes that Britain, say, 'do you still beat your wife?'

That's my response. Used to be a harmonious society? Well I'm not sure that's true. Yeah I mean we were a very class ridden society. I mean nobody would dispute that and can a class-ridden society be a harmonious society? People have a very, very simplistic view of society. I think the nature of the relationships has changed, different things have become more relevant or more pertinent. Class probably has become less important, it's still important, but less important. Race has become more of an issue, as has sex, no I didn't say gender, sex. So I think the focus has probably changed. (R. 12).

Although the majority of my respondents expressed the view that society was no more violent today than it was in the past, they were keen to emphasise that there was a difference in contemporary society, which made such simple comparison unrealistic. For example, with the vastly developed methods of communication it was now easier and quicker to convey news of significant events to the populace. However, this is not to suggest that there were no tensions in society today, there certainly are, and some of these are responsible for creating social divisions.

My respondents were promoted to the position of superintendents during the time of the Thatcher governments. In fact they spent a sizeable proportion of their time in a managerial position during the period of her different governments, and therefore would have been attuned to the legacy of her governments' social policy over the years.

The historian Kenneth Morgan described one of her government's legacies as follows. "In the June 1987 election, despite a vigorous Labour campaign under the new leader, Neil Kinnock, the Conservatives again won an easy victory with 375 seats as against 229 for Labour and only 22 for a flagging and disintegrating Liberal/Social Democrat Alliance...The Conservatives made much in the campaign for their claims to have restored national prosperity... However, the regional gulf in Britain revealed by the election returns was very plain. The sweeping Conservative gains came in the South and the Midlands. They lost ground in the industrial cities of the North; there was a 5 per cent swing to Labour in Wales; and a 7.5 per cent swing in Scotland. Indeed, in Scotland, where devolutionist or separatist sentiment remained strong, the Conservatives came close to total annihilation. There was much talk of a basic social divide in the land, between an increasingly prosperous and complacent South, and a decaying, declining North, with endemic unemployment, urban dereliction, and collapsing public services. All political parties, the victorious Conservatives no less than Labour, recognised the need to bridge the inequalities deep within British society. The 'two nations', described in Disraeli's novels in the 1840s, were still much in evidence" (Morgan 1989: 141).

SOCIAL INEQUALITY.

In our discussion of this point, my respondents mentioned a number of social features that they considered were responsible for creating social divisions. The two that they mentioned most frequently were the *wealth gap*, the difference between the *haves* and *have-nots*. Other features that they mentioned were *racial prejudice* and the social disadvantage that results from it. For example,

I think contemporary racism is a problem and without making a big judgement about the cause of that I mean I think it is a problem. I suppose another one would be the 'have and have-nots' really. (R. 1).

Those that have and those that haven't. Again within the county there don't seem to be the extremes, but there are extremes around the country. There is depravation, poverty and I feel that it's the poverty, the person who haven't, compared with people like us, those that have. I can't think of anything more significant. (R. 6).

Wealth, as I said the haves and the have-nots. I mean I think that's probably the one, yes certainly if you maybe look in other areas, you may talk about the race, or social depravation, which is obviously an aspect of wealth, but certainly there aren't too many racial problems in this part of the world. (R. 16).

I think race remains an issue, particularly in those disharmonious areas. Unemployment, poverty, is a big social division. I think that the sort of gender issue is less of a division than it used to be, certainly sexuality I think is much less of a division than it used to be. You know, lesbian, gay, all sorts of approaches to sexuality are much more open now and much more acceptable to the general public. I think that's been a major, quite how it's been achieved I don't know, but it's been a major improvement in recent years. And you know I would hope that the race issue has become more harmonious, but I'm conscious that in certain, sort of hard line areas it is still a major issue. And then the poverty, unemployment seems to pervade everywhere really. (R. 25).

Some of the other features that were mentioned by my respondents as creating social divisions included such things as, *social class*, *education*, and *employment*. Other social factors that were mentioned include the following.

Social Class, Education and Employment.

The inequalities in terms of employment, wealth, educational attainment, power and influence and in gaining the social and professional skills with which to achieve social mobility, caused by differences in social class was seen as a significant factor in creating social division. The difference in wealth exacerbated policing problems, with the suggestion that those at the lower end of the class system, the notional 'underclass', were being forced to commit acquisitive crimes, which increased the level of crime and pressure on police managers to solve them. On the flip side, the potential misuse by some people of their social position also caused my respondents real concerns. For example,

I think class is still a real problem, there is still a class barrier in Britain, when you come out into the shire county of ----, you know, and I mean it's still a shire county and there are, we have some people who because of their role in society have disproportionate power in their hands and it really pisses me off, nothing annoys me more. (R. 9).

As far as I'm concerned it's not ethnic, it's class. I'll never forget, I was a DC and I was in the ---- Police Choir and we were going to Cornwall on tour for the weekend, and one of the superintendents, I think he was in Personnel, no he wasn't he was an inspector then and had a Bramshill Scholarship, and he brought this chap down who was on the Course with him at the College and he was an American and he came to me and said, would you look after him for the weekend, he's going on tour with you. I said, yeah, in this coach going down to Cornwall and I pose a question to him and I said to him, what's the biggest difference between society here and in the States? And he said, I've no doubt, it smacks you in the face as soon as you get here or within a very short time he said, it's your class, they told me about it, I didn't realise the extent of it. He said the vast difference between the classes, and he said, it doesn't help, it doesn't help at all. I had this raised consciousness then about

how divisive and, I mean my father was a socialist and I've always been a socialist, I'm still a socialist, but there was this awareness, this heightening of awareness, of this big gap and I can remember being in, he's just retired the superintendent. I was working with a DC who was a staunch blue Conservative, and we used to have dreadful rows about the juxtaposition between him and me and society and class and what have you. But this really brought it home to me, and yeah I could see it in people. People believing it was something they've earned, and this underclass, and we've got this underclass there's no doubt about it, and even more so now since 1979, since Maggie Thatcher. (R. 30).

Social divisions I would put mainly, it's becoming more and more apparent, those who are in work and those who aren't. Within those who are not in work, there is a high proportion of people who are inner city. Who have attended what are perceived to be poor schools... and I think that is leading towards difficulty as well, lack of discipline. (R. 34).

Yeah, I think it's the disenfranchised. I think it's those who are in a cycle of depravation, poor education, poor motivation, poor likelihood of jobs. And what do you do for a 16 year old lad or lass who's got no qualifications, who comes from parents who never had any qualifications? Regardless of what their intelligence or intellect might actually be, their potential might be. How do you drag people out of that?. (R. 39).

Trends in social divisions.

I asked my respondents whether the social divisions were becoming greater, less great or remaining the same. Concerning wealth and race, the majority of them felt that inequality was becoming greater.

I think the haves and have-nots are becoming greater. The people who have-not, the unemployed for instance, have been unemployed a hell of a long time. And are now getting more comfortable being unemployed, I say more comfortable, more used to being unemployed, I think that's going to get worse

rather than better. I think more people are likely to end up in the have-nots pile, the unemployed pile than not. (R. 36).

I think it's getting greater, again if I look back over my lifetime I was never, and perhaps again it was how I was brought up and the area I was brought up in, but I certainly wasn't aware as a lad of between 15 and 20 of the depravation that exists around the country. Now again it may be because the media is now in a position where it highlights that more than it ever did before. But, you know, I lived in Battersea for 15 years, now there's an area now where you could actually say, is that a deprived area, or certainly if you're talking about Balham, Brixton and Vauxhall, places like that, is that a deprived area? I would never have considered it as a deprived area when I was there, but I might do now in comparison with what we've got out here. So, you know, I think the gulf is getting wider and certainly whether or not the percentage in each grouping has changed I don't know. But I do think the gulf of those that, take my life style and compare it with other people's right at the bottom end if you like of the social scale, there's a tremendous gap. (R. 6).

On the other features, class, employment and education, the sentiments were the same. These divisions were getting greater.

If you go into every Police Force they'll have areas that are deprived where the vast majority of people that live in them are decent folks. Just because you're unemployed and haven't got any money, doesn't necessarily mean you're a criminal, but there are elements within those societies that are vigorous on the crime front, which gets the society tarred with the same brush. The Government never like to admit it but if more jobs were available for young people, and I'm talking about young people who haven't done quite so well at school, they want a manual job and if they could get them with a reasonable rate of pay it would keep them out of the criminal fraternity. There are elements in our society that are always committing crimes, if you had full employment they'd be people who were committing crimes wouldn't there? Because that's by the very nature of how they're made up, but I think that's one of the problems of the country, there is an underclass developing. The

rich seem to be getting richer and the poor seem to be standing still or getting worse, but the Government never like to admit it do they? (R. 19).

I think they're getting greater. Money comes to money. If you've got the money you can afford to look after it, keep it. So yeah, I feel that they're getting worse and I think that in the future employment will become increasingly difficult. Take us to information technology and you will have two distinct classes of employment, you will have high tech, high skill, probably high reward and you will have a labouring class and you'll have unemployed. I hope it doesn't sound too bleak a picture but I think that's inevitable and I think we should be planning for that. (R. 31).

I think money and education is greater. Yeah I mean we're trying to put more people through university but all we're doing is probably diluting the worth of a lot of Degrees, you know, by just introducing more and more. But I think money rules far more than it should now, you can get a decent education if you've got the money. And the divisions in inner cities and the rural areas, I think are becoming more and more marked. Race, yeah. I think there's a lot of perception issues there as well. You know if you're looking at black versus white, yes I think there's a real division, but there's a lot of others I mean Kurds, and Turks and everything else, and there's a lot of factions who've come in and brought a lot of their traditional disharmony with them. So it isn't necessarily just because of British society, I think it's just the way it's evolved and it's historical. But I think the two biggies for me are the division of poverty and education. (R. 51).

THE RULE OF LAW.

I asked my respondents if they thought there was any truth in the adage that 'there is one law for the rich and one for the poor?'

I think the political answer would be no, but I'm not so sure if that's right. I think the rich have access to advice that the poor don't have. I think there are various examples that could be cited that you think now how the devil did that

individual get away with that? Whereas if it had been somebody that did not have the means to defend themselves, they would go and get legal advice under the legal aid system and probably be told just put your hands up. So whilst there might not be a law for one and a law for the other, I think the quality of the advice that they get is significantly different, which leads it on to the fact that there must be a law for one and one for the other. (R. 6).

The only thing that I feel there is is a rule for the rich and a rule for the poor, is the fact that if you've got a lot of money you can object to something, you can take an injunction out. If you haven't got any money you can sometimes still do, because everyone helps you with legal aid. The people in the middle, usually the people like you and me, who haven't got that much money that we can fight for a cause, can't get legal aid because we're earning too much money, we have to poke up with it and it's actually middle England who suffer, not the poor and the rich, I think when it comes to things like that, there is a way for poor people to prosecute if they want to and it they're advised right and there's a way for rich people, there always has been and always will be, but it's the people in the middle who are disfranchised or whatever you call it, inasmuch as they can't afford to prosecute but they've got too much money to get legal aid, so they have to poke up with it and it's those sort of people which is your majority and that's why it's always annoying because they have to poke up with it and they're the ones who always feel they get bum advice and no help, so I don't think there's one rule for the rich and one for the poor, I think there's a rule for the rich and the poor and a rule for the rest of us in the middle because they're the ones who are disadvantaged. Perhaps that's how it should be I don't know, perhaps it should be that the majority of people should not be given access to millions and millions of legal aid, I don't know, we should be intelligent enough to deal with a problem I suppose, that's the way to look at it, interesting isn't it. (R. 9).

The sentiments expressed by this respondent are similar to those expressed by the overwhelming majority. They felt that the law was the same for everyone, but the rich had better and easier access to resources of knowledge and influence with which to use or manipulate the rules for administering the law.

This view chimes with Cotterrell's discussion on the concept of the rule of law. He explained that, "Weber, followed by many more recent observers, stressed the fundamental difference in the quality of justice dispensed to different social classes by the higher English courts and the lowly justices' (magistrates') courts. While the upper and rising middle classes could make use of the relatively rational legal processes of the former, the lower classes met 'the law' only in caricature form in the processes of the latter, which Weber scathingly termed 'Khadi justice' – decision-making based on subjective reaction to the individual case rather than on the careful application of known legal rules and procedures. For Weber, this two-tier system amounted to a systematic denial of justice to the poor." He continues, "That the professional expertise necessary to ensure that legal procedures are governed by the highest legal standards is more likely to be found at higher levels of the court system, and that those with greater resources of knowledge, wealth and influence are most likely to be able to make use of those higher levels, seems obvious. In this way the rule of law is available to the 'haves' to a far greater extent than to the 'have-nots'" (Cotterrell 1984: 169).

I think there are occasions, it's not what you know it's who you know, but whether money has anything to do with it I don't know. Let's try and test that. Let's have a look at someone who commits a fraud and gets away with several million pounds, if they get convicted they actually get quite a short sentence compared with someone who's got perhaps a long conviction of thefts. Long conviction of thefts might actually end up with eight years for some shoplifting, because of their record, and the total of what they've done and they might not have harmed any particular person, might only be Marks and Sparks who suffered as a result of all these years. But someone has done a long term fraud because they turn round is this a white-collar crime, might only get three years, yes Saunders the Guinness man, yes there is! I'm off the fence, I'm there! Yes. (R. 39).

I'm almost certain. The people who can afford good representation, the people who can afford to, you know, circumvent things or have people speak on their behalf, it exists, it's there and to say otherwise is flying in the face of

truth. But like I say, experience tells you that if they're well represented,
they're well connected, the chances are that they're going to walk. And that's
from a jury's point of view as well. If you've got a jury trial and you get a
CPS appointed Barrister who's on £25 a day and the other guy is Michael
Mansfield, QC, then it doesn't matter what the evidence is. (R. 40).

Though my respondents were prepared to accept manipulation of the law at
the court proceedings level of the legal process, they had some reservation about
accepting that the manipulation can occur so easily at the enforcement level. In their
view, police officers enforced the law impartially, and although this might not always
have been the case in the past, it is less likely to happen today. In any event, my
respondents suggested that were other officers who may not have acted impartially,
they would never have done.

I suppose there is really, I have to say that I mean it would be nonsense to say
otherwise wouldn't it? Yeah I mean I can't think of any Chief Officers who
would want to know the general man whose shotgun certificate has run out,
and yet does if it's say, titled nobility, and things get properly squared. That's
just very small beer indeed, you know, what I mean look at the whole policing
they get, it's the future of any society without a shadow of a doubt and if
you're right on the bottom end of the scale you have to go through far more
shit than anybody else, no doubt about that. (R. 20).

Absolutely. Prime example? You won't remember it I don't suppose: Sir
Gerald Nabarro, an MP, bid handlebar moustache. Sir Gerald was
disqualified from driving, he got disqualified for drinking and driving. He had
a chauffeur, he had a Bentley and he had some company or other, engineering
works or wood yards or whatever. Police officer saw him driving his Bentley
to work with his chauffeur sat at the side of him. You could not mistake Sir
Gerald Nabarro and his chauffeur, they were like chalk and cheese, and,
because Sir Gerald has a handlebar moustache, like an RAF-type moustache.
Two police officers saw it, they arrested him for driving whilst disqualified, he
denied it, he pleaded 'no guilty', he got good counsel, went to court and
convinced the jury that he wasn't driving. He came out of court, on the steps

his comment was, a rich man will always secure justice, a poor man rarely. And I've always remembered that, and I've seen it happen so many times. The Maxwells, kids, they have it made, it happens all the time. And that again is another reason that it undermines, it undermines what we do and what other social agencies do, because people look at it and say, ahh yes of course it's happening again. (R. 41).

Yes. I think the majority of police officers try to enforce the law impartially, you get the odd one who won't, but I think the vast majority will. And perhaps as the majority of police officers come from middle or lower classes I believe in society, they might actually get a secret grin for arresting somebody in a Rolls Royce. I think the change comes when you actually get into the justice system, and your unemployed guy is relying on your local Legal Aid, your rich citizen is employing the best legal brains in the country, and like most things in life you actually get what you pay for. If you pay for £50 quid an hour, you won't get walloped than if you pay £5,000 an hour. Depressing isn't it? (R. 31).

Yes I mean again it's a simplistic statement that you've got to really dismantle, but just to take the lid off of that a little bit, I don't think that it's the law because the law is the law, but there is work in the system and how, or one works within the legal framework that you are given, that actually makes the difference. So if you are Builder Joe and you are in a position where you find yourself in front of the judicial process, you will only have through the layperson probably a limited amount of help to you. Whereas if you are British Gas Chief Executive and you find yourself in exactly the same position, then through your financial status, you have a tremendous amount of resources that you can call upon to extricate yourself from that position or at least lessen the impact of it. Same law it's just how you work within it. (R. 43).

Discussion.

My respondents were erudite pragmatic managers who can aptly be described as individuals with a soft social centre covered by a hard exterior police vernacular. They were attuned to contemporary social problems with which different sections of society have to deal and which have significant impact on policework.

The broad age-range of my respondents provided variety and subtlety to their social outlook, while similarity of social background offered cohesion and consistency to that outlook. In terms of social harmony, they were firm in their view that society was no more harmonious today than it was in the past. One major factor that influenced this perception of contemporary society was modern methods of communication, which they saw as bringing information to the masses instantly: the familiar concept of the global village.

Modern methods of communication may have improved social awareness but it had not improved social inequality. My respondents felt that there was a real division between the wealthy and the poor; the haves and the have-nots. One social consequence of this division, which they perceived was getting wider, was that the poor, whose lowly status was exacerbated by poor education and unemployment, were being forced into committing crimes to try and alleviate their circumstances.

Equally, they expressed the view that the rich were not only getting richer but that they could and did use their position to manipulate the legal system to their advantage. This did not mean that the *haves* were privileged to a different legal code. However, when they did fall foul to the law they had ready access to those with the knowledge and power to manipulate the system to their advantage. As my respondents saw it, it was a case of the *haves* enjoying a condition of double advantage.

Chapter 11

POLICE MANAGEMENT CULTURE and CONCLUSION.

POLICE MANAGEMENT CULTURE.

With the structural, legal and procedural changes that have been forced upon and undertaken by the great social institution that is the police over the last three decades, senior police managers are today more than ever before seen as leaders (Blunkett 2001). Leaders of an institution that will continue to face intense and frequent calls for change and adaptation to the demands of contemporary communities.

The changes and the call for them are not merely external. The reduced 'perks' of the job and the changed occupational outlook of new recruits has created career expectations for contemporary joiners that are vastly different from those of most of my respondents. For example, the loss of housing allowance or the alternative free police accommodation, coupled with the option (as opposed to what was previously mandatory) to join the police pension scheme (a scheme that was good enough for officers to describe themselves as 'pension slaves', because once they had served a certain amount of years it would have resulted in a substantial personal financial loss if the individual left the Service), meant that today's recruits see the police more as an occupation than a vocation.

These issues and problems of contemporary policing were common to all my respondents regardless of where in the country they worked or the functional post they held. I analysed the culture of this group of officers by examining, through using a structured interview technique, how they dealt with the dual problems of survival in and adaptation to a changing external environment, and integration of the internal processes of the service to ensure the capacity to continue to deliver an efficient and effective service.

The relevance of studying the culture of this group of officers is that as leaders of major functional areas in their respective Forces, they now occupy a pivotal

position in the Service, which leaves them well placed, collectively, to change the culture of the police. As Schein explains, "the dynamic processes of culture creation and management are the essence of leadership and this makes one realise that leadership and culture are two sides of the same coin", and adds, "that the creation and management of culture is uniquely associated with leadership" (Schein 1992: 2).

He believes "that cultures begin with leaders who impose their own values and assumptions on a group. If that group is successful and the assumptions come to be taken for granted, we have then a culture that will define for later generations of members what kinds of leadership are acceptable. The culture now defines leadership. However, as the group encounters adaptive difficulties, as its environment changes to the point where some of its assumptions are no longer valid, leadership comes into play once more. Leadership is the ability to step outside the culture that created the leader and to start evolutionary change processes that are more adaptive. This ability to perceive the limitations of one's own culture and to develop the culture adaptively is the essence and ultimate challenge of leadership" (ibid).

I found from my study that there were certain components of the culture that were not only shared or held in common by my group of senior police managers, but were shared or held in common with the lower and higher ranks in the service. Reiner has claimed of the police that, "the values, norms, perspective and craft rules – which inform their conduct is, of course, neither monolithic, universal nor unchanging" (Reiner 1985:86). However, from my study and using Schein's explanation of the different levels of culture, I would argue that police culture and its sub-cultures could at the 'basic assumption' level be consistent, universal and unchanging. Various studies on police have listed the core elements of its culture and sub-cultures, such as mission, isolation, solidarity, conservatism and pragmatism. (Skolnick 2005; Van Maanen 2005; Reuss-Ianni and Ianni 1983; Chan 1996; Waddington 1999a; Reiner 2000: Ch. 3) However, for the purpose of the study, the relevance is whether these elements have enabled police superintendents, over the years, to develop and adapt, chameleon-like, to meet the demands that have been placed on them, or whether they have constrained them to maintaining the status quo? Before examining the effects of some of these elements in more detail, I shall elaborate on my conceptual and figurative use of the terms chameleon and dinosaur in describing the cultural and sub-

cultural changes that superintendents have gone through to meet contemporary demands for change that have been placed on them.

Chameleon or Dinosaur.

Chameleon. *"fig.* (esp. = inconstant or variable person.). He was a chameleon to the hand that fed him. He coloured himself, as it were, with the King's character.

Conscience is then your plea...But yours is much of the chameleon hue, to change the dye with every different view" (Simpson and Weiner 1989(1): 5).

Dinosaur. "Someone or something that has not adapted to changing circumstances..." (Simpson and Weiner 1989(2): 685).

The question of whether senior police managers responded to external threats to the Service or the need for internal integration to enable the provision of a better policing service either in a chameleonic or dinosaurian way did not arise as a hypothesis to be tested through qualitative research. Rather, from the analysis of the first set of interviews with my respondents, it arose as an ideological explanation of the way they claimed to have responded to the demands for change over the years.

The calls for change in police culture and sub-cultures and in its management style to enable this change have come from different quarters. It has come directly from central government, specific groups in contemporary society and the combined changing social and educational make up of new recruits with their different concept of employment as police officers. Additionally, the need for change has also come, indirectly, from changes in the social and political environment.

I shall outline some of the changes that have been made to address concerns raised about the quality of management control and the culture and sub-cultures of the service, before discussing how senior police managers have responded, whether chameleonic or dinosaurian, to these calls. The call for change in the style of management of the service dates back to the post Second World War period. As one commentator noted, "The last six decades have seen three royal commissions consider aspects of policing – though only one directly on the police – and numerous other

inquiries that have sought to explore and, in some respect, reform policing. Legislation affecting policing has been so extensive as to be almost impossible to summarise." (Newburn 2003: 84) However, I shall contain the discussion to the changes that have occurred during the professional lifetime of my respondents, because these would have directly influenced their experience of policing what became, during their service, a multi-cultural and increasingly challenging public.

The first of the major changes that were implemented during this period came from a Royal Commission on the Police. In January 1960 a Royal Commission was appointed under the chairmanship of Sir Henry Willink, Q.C., with a terms of reference that included,

> "To review the constitutional position of the police throughout Great Britain, the arrangements for their control and administration and, in particular, to consider:
>
> 1) the status and accountability of members of police forces, including chief officers of police;
>
> 2) the relationship of the police with the public and the means of ensuring that complaints by the public against the police are effectively dealt with; and
>
> 3) the broad principles which should govern the remuneration of the constable, having regard to the nature and extent of police duties and responsibilities and the need to attract and retain an adequate number of recruits with proper qualifications" (Critchley 1967: 275).

There were a number of incidents that led to the eventual appointment of the Commission and the first of these occurred in 1956. It concerned the disciplinary action taken against the Chief Constable of Cardiganshire following allegations that his force was not being properly administered. The outcome was the amalgamation of the Cardigan and Carmarthen police forces. The following year criminal proceedings were taken against the Chief Constable of Brighton and senior members of his force. Two of the senior managers were found guilty on charges of corruption and sentenced to imprisonment. Another incident occurred in December 1958 when a PC Eastmond stopped the actor-manager of the Whitehall Theatre, Mr Brian Rix, for exceeding the speed limit across Putney Heath. Mr Garratt, a civil servant, who had been driving

behind the police car stopped and spoke to Mr Rix. "An argument developed, followed by mutual allegations of assault. Mr Garratt was taken to the police station to be charged with an offence, but the station officer refused to accept the charge and Mr Garratt was released. He instituted civil proceedings against PC Eastmond, claiming damages for assault and battery and for false imprisonment. The facts were never established, because the Metropolitan Police Commissioner paid £300 into Court without admission of liability, and the plaintiff took the sum in settlement of the claim. It was then announced that no disciplinary proceedings would be taken against PC Eastmond" (Critchley: 273). The matter was debated in Parliament in November 1959 and the main point of concern was why £300 of public money had been paid out unless PC Eastmond had done wrong, and if he had done wrong why he had not been disciplined. The cumulative effect of these incidents was the appointment of the Royal Commission, which was to inquire into, amongst other things, "concern about the means of controlling the police and bringing them to account when things went wrong…" (Critchley: 274).

Government intervention in policing dates back to the inception of the modern police. According to Newburn, "In some respects the most obvious and consistent trend in the history of policing since 1829 is the gradual centralisation of control as government, largely through the Home Office, established greater control over chief officers and their constabularies" (Newburn 2003: 91). He points out that there are at least four major ways in which this process of centralisation may be seen in the post war years, and one of the four is, "The increase in government oversight of, and influence over, policing via legislative change and new managerial reforms." (ibid.)

Another source of change in police managerialism, culture and sub-culture has been the changing nature of the relationship between the service and people from Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) communities. The most widely researched and documented groups within BME communities, and the ones to which most of the comments will be referred are people whose ancestry lies in Asia, Africa and the 'islands of the sea' (Bowling and Phillips 2003: 528). Bowling and Phillips point out that "The experience of black and Asian communities in British society has undergone a fundamental transformation in recent years." Furthermore, The communities', and consequently, central government's reaction to these experiences

have resulted in significant changes in the number of people from BME communities joining the police service, and also in police procedures and management styles. These authors add that, "Until well into the 1960s while there were a few people from ethnic minority communities represented in sport, business, politics and the civil service, there were no black and Asian police officers whatsoever." (ibid.) One author has argued that the reason for this was a deliberate policy decision by senior officers in the 1950s and '60s not to employ black and Asian people in the police service. (Whitfield 2004).

The strained relationship between the police and BME communities continued through the 1970s and collapsed in the early 1980s, resulting in violent public disorders in Bristol in 1980, in the London neighbourhood of Brixton in 1981, followed by Manchester, Liverpool and Birmingham later that year. Lord Scarman (1986) was appointed to chair the public inquiry into the riots in Brixton. According to Bowling and Phillips "He interpreted the cause of the riots as, 'essentially an outburst of anger and resentment by young black people against the police'. Although he noted that not all the people involved in the disturbance were black, Scarman identified a problem of policing 'a multi-racial community in a deprived inner city area where unemployment, especially among young black people, is high and hopes are low'". Bowling and Phillips add that, "Scarman recommended identifying racial prejudice among police recruits, efforts to recruit more ethnic minority police officers, improving community relations and handling public disorder, closer supervision of front-line constables, improvements in the management training of inspectors and sergeants (especially conducting stop and search operations), and making display of racially prejudiced behaviour a dismissal offence." (Bowling and Phillips: 531). The consequent changes included wider police accountability to the public through Community Consultative Groups and greater scrutiny of police practice through the use of lay visitors to examine the conditions under which detained people were held in police cells. It should be noted that the effectiveness of Police Community Consultative Groups in expanding police accountability has been called into question by research into their implementation and operation. (Morgan and Maggs 1984 and 1985).

Just over a decade after the Scarman Inquiry, in 1993 an 18-year old black man, Stephen Lawrence, was stabbed to death in Eltham, South London. This gave rise four years later to another significant inquiry into policing. Newburn notes that, "the verdict of the inquest jury was that 'Stephen Lawrence was unlawfully killed in a completely unprovoked attack by five white youths'. The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry concluded memorably, and in contrast with Scarman, that: 'There is no doubt but that there were fundamental errors. The investigation was marred by a combination of professional incompetence, institutional racism and a failure of leadership by senior officers'" (Bowling and Phillips: 531).

The link between leadership and management style and the nature and quality of treatment of people from BME communities, in this case employees, was highlighted in another public inquiry into the police. The Morris Inquiry (2004), which was an independent inquiry established by the Metropolitan Police Authority (MPA) to consider professional standards and employment matters in the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS), strongly criticised the force's management style. The inquiry accused the MPS of discriminating against ethnic minority officers, its lack of understanding of diversity issues and the way it handled disciplinary and communications issues. (Morris Inquiry 2004). Although the Inquiry was on the MPS, its findings and comments could easily and accurately be directed at any of the other 42 Home Office police forces.

The Inquiry highlighted discriminatory practices inside the police service, which added to the list of well documented accounts of discriminatory attitudes of officers towards people from BME communities. Some authors have argued these attitudes are not translated into action when officers interact with people from BME communities (Waddington 1999(1); Smith and Gray 1985: Ch. XV), whilst some are equivocal about racially discriminatory behaviour (Greenhill 1985; Bowling and Phillips 2003) and others are unequivocal about discriminatory actions and practices by officers (Cashmore 2000; Chan 1996; Holdaway and Barron 1997; HMIC 1997). One point on which there is widespread agreement is that that police officers stereotype people from BME communities, and the language that they use to describe BME people is openly expressed in the workplace. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to assume that senior officers would be aware of the use of stereotypical language to

describe people from BME communities. Consequently, it becomes an issue that they have a professional and managerial obligation to address if the Service was going to be able to create an image that would attract and retain people from BME communities as employees.

The changes in the way officers behaved towards BME people, in the relationship between the police service and people from BME communities (some of which resulted in public inquiries into mishandling of major incidents), in the more intrusive and interventionist involvement in police management by central government, the structural changes within the service, and in the social and political circumstances of different groups in society have created challenges and demands on the senior managers to adapt their management styles, and the culture and sub-cultures of the service to meet these demands and challenges. That there have been significant changes in the environment – both internally and externally – in which the police operate and consequently pressure on senior managers to adapt to meet these changes cannot be underestimated.

The police manager in the 1970s faced the problem of managing public disquiet from the revelations of police malpractice in the late '50s and '60s, and dealing with some of the most significant industrial disputes in modern times. In the wake of the oil crisis of the early '70s Britain experienced soaring inflation, rising unemployment, and – following the terms set by the International Monetary Fund for its 'bail-out' loan to the Labour government in 1976 – retrenchment in public service and government demands for pay restraint. "The decade witnessed mounting levels of industrial and social conflict. A power workers' strike in the early 1970s resulted in cuts in supply and a three-day week. The miners went on strike in 1972 and 1974, contributing on the latter occasion to the fall of the Conservative government. In 1977, a bitter and protracted dispute over union recognition took place at the Grunwick film processing plant in London. And a series of strikes by low-paid public sector workers in 1978-9 (in what was dubbed 'the winter of discontent') helped bring about the demise in May 1979 of James Callaghan's minority Labour administration. By the time that government left office, the far right had come to acquire a foothold in electoral politics and violent clashes between racist and anti-racist groups – in Red Lion Square, Lewisham, Southall – had returned to the streets

of Britain." (Loader and Mulcahy 2003:9). In addition to the experiences that senior managers gained from dealing with these industrial disputes and violent disorders, and the knowledge acquired from learning lessons from them, throughout the 1970s the police lobbied with increasing vociferousness for more powers to deal with 'the fight against crime' and to resist 'political' control. This period witnessed a change in overall policing tactic towards a more coercive 'fire brigade' style. (Reiner 1985: 197).

In the 1980s, when 25 per cent of my respondents were promoted to the rank of superintendent, senior managers faced a number of dilemmas, and according to one commentator, foremost among which was the increasing pressure to account for the use of expensive resources when they were conscious that their control of those resources were, at best, tenuous and their mission unclear and controversial. (Plumridge 1985: 173). Plumridge grouped the scenarios from which the dilemma sprang into different sections. For example, they consisted of,

1. "A rapidly changing society that presented a range of new policing problems". He then listed the changes, some of which included, "the development of pluralism in society bringing an increased number of often vociferous minority groups into being, and increasing pressure from representatives of the public at a local level for more police accountability and more consultation over policing strategies" (Plumridge: 174).

2. "The rapid development of information processing potential leading to a greatly enhanced research effort, both within and outside the Service, which ensures a better informed public and demands research conscious police managers. Decisions taken intuitively or on the basis of experience alone are becoming increasingly vulnerable to both internal and external validation.

3. "As problems become more complex, and as the body of knowledge grows, so the myth of the omniscient, omnipotent police managers evaporates. Police organisations become more differentiated and more complex and the role of the manager shift from that of the unilateral decision-maker to that of the co-ordinator and team leader who can develop collaborative and creative decision-making.

4. "As the volume and diversity of information penetrates all homes and workplaces through the medium of radio and television more and more police officers become drawn into the public debates on organisational and management effectiveness, and their knowledge of, and interest in managerial methods has been aroused.

5. "The enhancement of the status of the police officer in recent years, coupled with the growth of unemployment in society, has created a highly favourable recruiting situation. The resultant selectivity is leading to the recruitment of a new generation of well-educated, questioning constables" (ibid.)

A decade of trouble, as one commentator described it (Graef 1989: 24), the problems that originated in the '80s continued into the 1900s. In the 1990s, when 75 per cent of my respondents were promoted in to and within the superintending ranks, the call for root-and-branch review of the police service that was made in the 1980s continued. "There were repeated calls for a Royal Commission to be established to lead the process, as in the case of previous police reforms." Leishman et al 1996: 12). Although the then Conservative government did not favour the appointment of a Royal Commission, it did introduce forms of New Public Management (NPM) to the police. Leishman et al suggested that the introduction of forms of NPM to the police reflected a "quantum change from the halcyon days of the early 1980s when the police enjoyed not merely the confidence but the largesse of the first Thatcher administration" (ibid.) The 1990s was the decade of police reform. It started with the Inquiry into Police Responsibilities and Rewards by Sir Patrick Sheehy (Sheehy Inquiry 1993) and ended with the publication of the Report of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry.

During the period from when some of my respondents joined the police service to the time I interviewed them for this study, there had been significant changes in police management style, the structure of the service and changes in its culture and sub-cultures. Structural changes were due, predominantly, to the intervention of central government through measures such as the Sheehy Inquiry. Whereas the change in management style and possibly culture and sub-cultures have been attributed to change that were taking place in society anyway. As modern social formations have been altered by the pluralizing and fragmenting forces of

postmodernity so the police has come to reflect this process, which has been the hallmarks of the postmodern. (Reiner 2005). However, another commentator has argued the converse, stating that "some of the changes now being attributed to postmodern influences are intelligible not as the impact of postmodernity on modernist organisations but more plausibly as the effect of managerially led efforts to turn police into a modern institution." (O'Malley 2005: 700).

In summarising the decades of the '80s and '90s one commentator observed, "In the early 1990s the police stood at a lower ebb in public trust and esteem than at any other time since they were established in the nineteenth century. They had been rocked by scandals revealing gross miscarriages of justice. At the same time the police appeared increasingly less able to protect people from criminal victimization, which was rising at record speed. Serious disorder, on a scale without precedent since the Second World War, developed during the 1980s in a variety of contexts, including political and industrial conflict and a miscellany of leisure pursuits from football to 'joyriding', and continued in the 1990s, although more spasmodically. The militarization of the police in response undermined police legitimacy without stemming the rise of disorder. In the first half of the 1980s, the police were pigs in the middle of sharply polarized political debate. They were the darlings of the Tories and in conflict with Labour-controlled police authorities, to which the national Labour Party threatened to make them more accountable. Gone were the halcyon days of consensus, when the police stood above the party fray as beloved totems of the nation." (Reiner 2000: 11).

By the time of my field work in 1996, "the configuration had changed. Seeking to be 'tough on crime and tough on the causes of crime', New Labour courted police assiduously, while the Tories sought to apply tough 'businesslike' market-based rigours to their management and accountability. There was good news and bad news for the police. The good news was the return of a degree of consensus about policing, and about their symbolic importance to a vital objective for any government. This was reflected in a stabilisation of public confidence in the police, following its precipitous decline up to the early 1990s. The bad news was the new consensus view that

the police were failing badly on almost every front, and in need of drastic reform. It was increasingly apparent that the police feel trapped in a time warp. They were intent on reform. However, the impact of reforms on public perceptions of the police is continuously being undercut by scandalous revelations, as well as unrealistic expectations of performance and probity built up in the bygone era when the lid was shut tight on scandals" (ibid.) This was the context in which the participants had been managing policing services as supervisors, junior and senior managers.

Changing police culture (Chan 1996). *'Field' and 'habitus'*. It is undeniable that the 'field' of policing has undergone a tremendous change during the professional lifetime of my respondents. This has been the case not only within the locale of their immediate managerial experience in the United Kingdom, but wider, including areas with similar social and political environments. As Jones and Newburn explain, "In recent years, there has been growing consensus that the policing systems of Western industrial societies are experiencing profound changes", and these have included "the expansion of private security, the growing importance of 'transnational' policing organisations and practices, changes in the organisation and management of public police forces, the impact of new technologies upon policing and crime control and the emergence of new 'risk-based' policing strategies." Crucially, the authors note that, "it has been suggested that we are currently seeing a transformation in policing of a magnitude at least as great as occurred with the introduction of the New Police in the early nineteenth century." (Jones and Newburn 2005: 733). The knowledge and experiences senior managers gained of how to manage this changing environment came from UK policing and beyond.

The transformational idea advocated by Bayley and Shearing (2005) advocates an epochal change that it characterised by the two developments of, pluralizing of policing and the search for identity by the public police for an appropriate role. They explain that "policing is no longer monopolised by the public police, that is, the police created by government. Policing is now being widely offered by institutions other than the state, most importantly by private companies on a commercial basis and by communities on a volunteer basis. Secondly, the public police are going through an intense period of self-questioning, indeed, a true identity crisis. No longer confident

that they are either effective or efficient in controlling crime, they are anxiously examining every aspect of their performance – objectives, strategies, organisation, management, discipline, and accountability. These movements, one inside and the other outside the police, amount to the restructuring of policing in contemporary democratic societies." (Bayley and Shearing: 715).

The change in the 'habitus' has been equally dramatic. From the erosion of the image of an efficient, disciplined bureaucracy following the major corruption scandals in the late 1950s (Reiner 1985 and 2005) to the dilution of police 'authority' in the pluralizing of policing in the 1990s (Bayley and Shearing). The police service has shown a willingness to learn from these incidents; setting up procedures, such as tenure policies that restrict the length of time officers spend in specialist posts to prevent repetition of the types of corruption scandals revealed in the 1950s, and the establishment of Independent Advisory Groups by many forces, which is intended to improve the quality of interaction between the service and predominantly Black and Minority Ethnic communities.

Police (Canteen) Sub-culture. (Waddington 1999b). Like with the 'field' and 'habitus', there has been tremendous change in the 'canteen sub-culture' of the police. The overt use of racist language in the presence of researchers experienced by Smith and Gray in their seminal work in the Metropolitan Police in 1983, Waddington's study in 1999, would not be heard today. Today a researcher would have to go undercover to elicit language of a similar tone. (Daly 2003). Waddington argues that the discriminatory and offensive language used in private by officers is not converted into discriminatory action on the street. This implausible argument is rendered incomprehensible by the revelations in the *Secret Policeman(b)* documentary. He explains that, "Because the canteen is a 'backstage' area it does not mean that officers are not staging performances. On the contrary, the canteen offers one of the rare opportunities for officers, whose actions on the street are normally 'invisible', to engage in displays before their colleagues. Here officers retail versions of events that affirm their worldview: the canteen is the 'repair shop' of policing and jokes, banter and anecdotes the tools" (Waddington 1999b: 295). From professional experience, the reality is not so sanguine. The canteen is the 'backstage' area in

which officers fine tune their skills for the 'performance' on the street. It is the 'repair shop' of mistakes and easy candour, secrecy and trust the tools.

These are the changing and fluid 'field', 'habitus' and 'canteen' in which contemporary senior managers are required to manage the complex social institution that is the police. The fact that my respondents occupied the positions they did, it's arguable this meant that they had been able to meet most of these challenges. But had they done so in a chameleonic or dinosaurian way? I shall use some of the core referents of police culture and sub-cultures (Mission/Action/Cynicism; Racial Prejudice; and Pragmatism (Reiner 2000:89)) to examine how they have managed the demands and challenges.

Mission-Action-Cynicism.

Mission is described as a core feature of cop culture. Reiner suggests that it is the "feeling that policing is not just a job but a way of life with a worthwhile purpose, at least in principle" (Reiner 2000:89). The realisation of the sense of mission is the protection of life, and of the weak against the predatory. This element of police culture is common in equal measure in the main groups in the service. For example,

> "PC1: We get Police Orders twice a week, and usually the front page on that will be a commendation for a successful trial, or saving a life, outstanding bravery, dedication to duty. It's not actually in our job description, you know, we don't come into the job saying 'I will definitely put my life on the line to save other people'
> "WPC 1: Three lads on our relief went to a fire. One of them ended up getting carried out by a fireman because he was overcome by smoke. They couldn't go in any further. The other two had gone in and rescued this woman. Actually all three of them got up to the top floor and threw the woman out of the window. That was about four floors up. The other two PCs then jumped and one of them was really quite badly injured. It took a lot of nerve. It's quite a way up. The jumped from two floors up and one of them ended up with a shattered leg and a lot of internal injuries. There was a little bit in the *Standard* the next day: 'Three Paddington officers save a woman's life ...

'but that was it." **A group of Met PCs and WPCs, average age 23, average service two years.** (Graef: 39).

"Yeah I'm head of Operational Support Department. Part of the problem is that I'm responsible, the area's responsibility now was previously the responsibility of a chief superintendent, two superintendents and a number of chief inspectors. It's now me and one chief inspector, now that does pose me a lot of problems because I've got such a wide area of responsibility, along a number of major policy making areas such as firearms, public order I'm responsible for, Force Control Room, Traffic Department, Dog Section, Emergency Planning. Now to keep a grip on all those things, the policy making level is pretty difficult quite frankly and because of the slimming down of the ranks, that has certainly posed I think problems for those senior managers who are left." **My respondent.** (R. 28).

"As a superintendent I have to say that the responsibilities now placed upon the rank are far more now than they were when I was first promoted even 4 years ago. There are far fewer superintendents about now. This Force had in 1990 or thereabouts, 25-plus superintending ranks, that included Chief Superintendent, we've now got 13. The workload hasn't gone away, in fact we're doing more work now than we did before. So I think far, far more is expected now of superintendents than ever was the case before." **My respondent.** (R. 17)

"Time, there's just too much to do and no time to do it. When you've got that conflict, quality must go... I'm here from 7.30/8 o'clock nearly every morning.. I don't object to the work, work is exciting and vibrant, it's great fun and it's stimulating and it's given me a new lease of life, but..." **My respondent.** (R. 11)

The stress caused by the increased workload on the superintending ranks reflect the typical comments above made by my respondents. "By contrast, superintendent in England and Wales were more likely to complain...about having to take work home, conflicting demands, changes in the way the job is done and

problems to do with the organisation's structure. As one officer commented: 'An organisation that is in a constant state of flux can only invoke in its employees feelings of instability and uncertainty. We exist on adrenalin, anti-depressants and tranquillisers. We are asked to achieve the unachievable – and then criticised because of our inadequacies." (Brown 1992).

Nonetheless, despite being expected to achieve the unachievable and engaging in life threatening activities, officers at the 'street cop' and 'management' levels still commit themselves to the job in ways that clearly show that it is "not just a job but a way of life with a worthwhile purpose, at least in principle". (Reiner 2000: 89). The driver for this similar behaviour between both groups, I would argue, is the same; the sense of mission, which is 'fun', 'challenging', 'exciting' (ibid), however, it manifests itself differently in both groups. At the street level, it is action-centred, although officers are cynical about the level of appreciation shown by the 'public'. At the management level, it is displayed as an unflinching commitment to the cause despite the genuine threat to the officers' health and well being. At the basic assumption level the elements of 'cop' and 'management' culture are the same, but at the artefact and espoused levels, the visible elements of the culture of both groups is clearly different.

Racial Prejudice.
The incidents that led to the seminal report by Lord Scarman in 1981 and the publication of the report of the public inquiry into the imperfect investigation of the murder of the black teenager Stephen Lawrence nearly two decades later were arguably caused by police racist attitude. For Scarman the emphasis was on individual racist attitude whereas for Macpherson it was institutionalised. The reality is that it was both. It was real, attitudinal and behavioural. As expressed by police officers themselves,

"One night a call came over the radio to stop a purple Cortina. All the message said was that it was suspected of being involved in drugs. So I stopped it and there were four West Indians in the car and there weren't very happy. All I said was, 'Look here, I've stopped you because a police officer has asked me to do so. The police officer is going to come and have a word

with you.' The police officer got on the radio and said, 'Oh, just turn the car over will you? I think they've got drugs on them.' I said, 'No, I won't. You saw the car, you get down here and do it.' He wouldn't, but another police officer I was working with came over and we did a check driver's licence and things like that. These people were thoroughly annoyed by this. I said, 'You were seen coming out of a club in Greek Street.' They said they hadn't been anywhere near there. They had just come down from Luton. The driver pulled out a slip showing he'd been stopped by police earlier that night on the A1 – literally half an hour earlier, the time was written on the form – so they couldn't have been anywhere near the club. The other people in the car were getting really stroppy because they felt the police were victimizing them – and essentially we were! They said, 'We're not puttin' up with this. We're going.'

"Because West Indians are a very physical race, they stand too close to police officers. They were standing too near to the face of the police officer I was with. They were pointing their fingers in his face and he just lost his nerve. He flipped and called for 'Urgent Assistance'. So half the Met turned up, you know, at three in the morning. Then it was, 'Right, you're all nicked for a drugs search – everybody into the back of the van.'

"We got back to the station and dragged these people into the charge room. They were lived. The Station Officer asked me what these people were in for and I said, 'Don't ask me. They have got nothing to do with me. As far as I'm concerned, they haven't done anything.' He said, 'Get elsewhere.' It's his job to find out why they'd all been arrested. The original PC made up some story about drugs, I don't know whether it was true or not. I suspect it wasn't. Anyway, they were searched and the car was turned over and there were no drugs. I had a stand-up row with this PC who had put up the message on the radio. He said, 'You should never let these West Indians take the piss out of you. You are a police officer in uniform.' Basically, he had asked me to stop that car because it was four coons driving along at three in the morning.

"Later I bumped into one of these chaps. I was off duty at St Thomas' Hospital, he recognised me and I thought, 'Oh my God!' He was a doctor! Anyway he came up and said I was the only decent police officer he'd met

that night. I'd thought he was going to hit me because they were really mad when they left the police station. I said, 'Yeah, the whole thing was really unfortunate.' He said, 'Do you realize what happened when we left the police station?' They had gone through Trafalgar Square and down Whitehall and were stopped! Four coons in a car. They were stopped three times in less than four hours!" **Met PC, age 25, seven years service. Now in South London.** (Graef: 126)

"Coloured policemen get a hard time. There are racists – a lot of policemen are very racist.

"An Indian PC that I worked with came onto Crime Squad shortly after me. The first day he walked into the police station. The first day he walked into the police station, an old Inspector called him a 'black fucking gupta'. I've never ever known him to be called anything since then – just 'Gupta'! The guy came onto the Crime Squad and immediately was gunned for, to get him off. On a Crime Squad you work a partner system. A lot of people go through their whole Crime Squad with the same partner. This guy had about six partners, because nobody would work with him. No reflection on his ability, in fact he's just been promoted. It's got to be all credit to the guy, because he is a brilliant copper." **Met Detective Constable, age 28, six years service. Now in South London.** (Graef: 135).

"As far as blacks are concerned, I suppose they would argue that they're picked on. But in a particular area, if the officers are happy that it is the greater likelihood that a particular colour, race, or dress is more likely to be carrying drugs, or dangerous implements, one must expect those people to be stopped more than others. It's just a fact of life…These are not new problems. The Jewish community in London and various other immigrant groups had problems but you grow through those in generations. But I'm not sure the colour problem can be grown through. I mean, white Jews and Hungarians and Poles can be assimilated within a prejudiced society – and let's make no doubt about it, we are a prejudiced society – because of their looks. They are no longer fairly apparent. But it's a problem we're going to have for many years. It's all worse because of the deprived situation within the inner cities

where these people tend to congregate or reside ... Yes, there are racial attacks. But they are what I call football hooligan type of thing, and they're given a label 'race' because colours are involved. We had one here last Saturday night: six coloureds against six whites. If they were Coventry supporters and Liverpool supporters, it would have been the same sort of thing. I think there is much more racial hatred from coloureds for whites ... The basis of racial hatred in many ways is a threat, when one sees a different race as a threat. I don't think these white youths see the West Indians as a threat. They see the Indians as more of a threat, in terms of education. And they have that facility for making money and pulling themselves out of the community to live a prosperous life. It's a pity there can't be a great sort of assimilation within the population. Because if you go to places like Norfolk and some places like that you don't see coloured people. And places here where we've got them there's not much of a problem because nobody sees them as a threat. It's something I won't be able to solve." **Chief officer.** (Reiner1992: 206).

In response to a question of whether it would clear up more crimes if a particular social group that with disproportionately more criminal records were more often stopped and questioned and searched, of the 44 people that answered the question an equal number, 23 per cent, answered unequivocally 'yes' as answered unequivocally 'no'. A higher number, 43 per cent qualified their 'no' than the11 per cent that qualified their 'yes' reply. Typically my respondents replied,

"Well I suppose in theory if you had a straight correlation, if you believe correlations, yes. I mean if you are talking about the problem in London of young blacks and the problem of yes we stop more of them, because they commit more of the crime. I think it might be a little bit of a vicious circle, I mean which comes first, you know is it the stopping of the crime or is it? So, maybe I don't know enough myself but I don't think society does as well." **My respondent. (R. 51)**

"If you accept all the publicity of the Met. and their stop and search policy. I suppose if I sat here and was really blunt and said, well you know if, we used

to do the same to gypsies and to all sorts of groups; someone driving certain types of car, hippies, beatniks, the rockers, the mods and of course you go on to race and colour as well. I suppose what you can't stop is the belief that a group is responsible for crime. When I was a 20-year old policeman, no one would have convinced me that gypsies didn't go out and steal everyday. Now that was a very unfair judgement because a lot of them are very, very hard working and did whatever, but you got indoctrinated with the feeling the gypsies steal. So if I saw a vehicle that was obviously of a gypsy type going down the road I'd stop it, and have a look at it. I suppose in a way you can't stop that and I suppose if you take it on to the publicity in London, if you can't seem to extract from the minds of the officers that a certain race or colour of people are responsible for crime, they will pursue that angle, and the rights and wrongs of it actually get almost dismissed out of hand." **My respondent.** (R. 10)

The majority of my respondents, 66 per cent, did not support the proposition that stopping a particular social more often would help solve more crime if that group had disproportionately more criminal record. It should be noted that the majority of the chief officers that Reiner interviewed also did not support the proposition. From the quoted example of the behaviour of the 'street cops' it is clear that not all officers directly put into action their racist attitude. In this example it was done by proxy. The fact is, even though the racist attitude manifests itself in different ways, it is evident that officers at the three different levels – Federated ranks, superintending ranks and ACPO – have at best vestigial racist attitudes, however, this is visible differently at the espoused value and artefact levels to the observer.

Pragmatism.

Police officers, at whatever level, are pragmatic people. They have a down-to-earth attitude, with an emphasis on getting things done. Action, results and outcomes are preferable to theory, reflection and prevarication. Like the Nike strap line, which I believe must have been coined by a police officer, officers believe in, 'Just do it'. You might be doing it the wrong way, but we are pragmatic people, so just do it. For example,

"For years and years they said: 'We wont issue women with truncheons because there's a danger that they could be taken off them and uses against them.' Now everybody's decided: 'We'll give them a little one – so it will only hurt them a little bit if it's used against them.' Bollocks – no one's told me how to use it, though they've shown us how to wear it. I'm not taking it out – I'd rather use a good kick in the groin to protect myself." **WPC in a Midlands force, age 30, eight years service. Now in racially mixed suburb.** (Graef: 195).

"I think we've just got so many powers at times, and there's one of bit of legislation after another and no sooner than we try to introduce the one before. I don't honestly feel that as practical people it's additional powers that we need, I actually believe we need less. But I would like to think that by producing less we can bring a bit of clarity to the...we're just overwhelmed with police powers, rules, regulations, if we could just have, if you like codes of conduct, and some very very simple set of rules and regulations that everybody could work to, that everybody could understood, that had clarity, not only in terms of policing but also throughout the criminal justice system." **My respondent.** (R. 3)

The core element of pragmatism drives police officers, at whatever level, to do the right thing within the prevailing social and political environment. However, at times getting things right has been the more appropriate approach to achieve sustainable change, but it has not always been the approach that was followed. (ACPO 1993a)

These are some examples of the similarity in the core element of police culture and sub-cultures, and consequently similarities in the basic assumptions level of the three main groups in the service. I believe with more research on ACPO, the additional data can be used to make a more in-depth comparative analysis of its culture and sub-cultures with that of the lower ranks. The difference in outlook within police forces and according to such individual variables as personality, generation or career trajectory, and structured variations according to rank,

assignment and specialisation are due to differences in espoused values and artefacts of the different sub-groups, and not down to differences in the basic assumptions.

The similarity in the core elements that form the basic assumption level of police culture and sub-cultures has enabled senior police managers to sustain operational credibility in the eyes of some of those under their charge, which has helped them gain their officers' support in driving through necessary changes. The flip side is that it has in some areas of police activity left them hidebound, and they appear not be able to change police attitude and behaviour in relation to aspects such as racial prejudice. They have appeared dinosaurian in their response to this aspect of police behaviour.

The proposition by Waddington (1999b) of focusing on the explanatory power of police culture rather than relying on its condemnatory potential is one with which I concur unreservedly because it provides a powerful driver for forcing the police service to continue to reflect and evaluate its activities and performance. Importantly, to do so from an explanatory perspective rather than a condemnatory and defensive one.

Senior police managers have shown themselves willing and capable of adapting chameleon-like to the tremendous amount of changes that have occurred, both internally and externally, in their professional lifetime. They have done this through changes at the artefact and espoused value levels of their sub-culture. Sadly, the lack of substantial change in some aspects of police activity, which has come from the dinosaurian adherence to some core elements of the sub-culture (racial prejudice) have raised doubts about their ability and willingness to change, fully.

CONCLUSION.

The starting point for this study was the question of whether there is a management culture in the British police service, because the majority of the literature on police culture has concentrated on examinations and explanations of rank and file 'cop culture'. Quite clearly, the concept of management culture generally in organisations and specifically in the police service is a recognised and accepted one. However, the relationship between cop culture and management culture is an uncertain one. Interesting as it would have been to analyse the basis of the difference, what I wanted to examine through this study was how management culture, at the superintending level, affected and reflected the changes that the police service was undergoing and had been undergoing since the late 1950s. The structural and legal changes that created operationally self-sufficient Basic Command Units headed by superintendents, made officers in the rank ideal candidates for an in-depth sociological study.

The literature on the rank-and-file is voluminous, while that on chief officers, though considerably smaller, was increasing. However, there remained very little on this now increasingly powerful and influential group of senior managers in the important social institution that is the police. The contemporary changes in police organisational structure has placed this group of officers in leadership positions, with the opportunity to change both the culture of the organisation as well as within their own peer group.

Though they are influential and powerful, they are, at present, not sufficiently powerful to be considered a power elite, according to the criteria suggested by Mills. "In his classic study, *The Power Elite*, C. Wright Mills suggested three criteria for concluding that a number of elite individuals at the top of different institutions in fact constituted a unitary elite. The first is a 'psychological similarity and social intermingling'. The second criterion is 'structural blending of commanding position and common interest'. Finally, Mills asks, is there a 'unity of a more explicit co-ordination' between the elites?' Do the factors of common background, career patterns, social intermingling, and shared interest produce a common outlook, and sometimes coalesce into united action?" (Reiner 1992: 346). Similar to his findings in his study of chief officers, the evidence from my study suggests that my respondents

had developed common outlooks on a variety of policing and social issues. Equally, there was evidence to suggest that some factors of a common background, and shared interest had produced a common outlook that could coalesce into united action.

Most of my respondents came from a manual working-class background and had modest educational achievement. However, what they lacked in educational qualification they made up for in determination and hard work. They made up for their lack of educational qualification before joining the police by obtaining secondary and tertiary qualifications in service.

The reasons why they joined the police varied from the pragmatic (did not have the qualification to pursue another career, or only joined to obtain good housing), to a complex combination of reasons, such as excitement, variety and childhood ambition. Whatever the reason, they all expressed a considerable degree of satisfaction with their careers. They are a group of pragmatic realists, who used their modest social origins to achieve significant positions of influence in their chosen career. Importantly, their successful progression in their careers can be attributed to achievement rather than ascription.

On aspects of operational policing issues they expressed a common view, which was that the police function was a complex and multifaceted task that required a holistic approach to have any success in delivering the service that the public wanted and deserved. Although they discussed the solutions to contemporary policing problems in an idealistic and proactive way, the practical methods that they adopted to deal with these issues were typically reactive and conventional, which led me to label the apparent contradiction as 'elegant denial'. Contemporary policing issues were covered in chapter 7.

Chapters 8 and 9 covered their views on the core police tasks of crime and public order respectively. Crime and its control are complex problems for society in general and the police in particular, and this point was clearly articulated by my respondents in our discussion of the different causes and solutions to crime. Actually, my respondents' expressed views on crime were sophisticated compared with those of senior officers from previous generations (Reiner 1991). My respondents showed a

good deal of theoretical and social awareness of the complexities of finding solutions to the causes and effects of crime. However, this greater awareness does not appear to have been translated into operational practices when judged, for example, by the police figures on stops and searches.

On public order, my respondents thought the problems were more complex to deal with now than in the past, rather than being more frequent. Some of the reasons for this included the fact that the media attention was far greater now, which exposed officers dealing with public order situation to instant public scrutiny, and people from all walks of life were more prone to take to the street and demonstrate about a variety of issues, which did not happen so often in the past. The fact that officers were now better trained and equipped to deal with local small-scale public disturbances as well as large-scale public disorders did not make policing public disorders any easier to manage for senior officers.

In chapter 10, I explored with my respondents their social philosophy, through discussing such topic as social harmony, social inequality and the rule of law. They were well aware of contemporary social problems with which different sections of society had to contend, and which had significant impact on policework. My respondents could aptly be described as individuals with a soft social centre covered by a hard exterior police vernacular. They were socially articulate professionals with a sound understanding and acceptance of the constraints created by limited budgets and the real requirements to adhere to stringent performance measures.

The topics of police management and managing change were covered in chapters 5 and 6 respectively. On the topic of police managerialism, structural changes to the police organisation, legislative changes in police procedures, and changes in contemporary social attitudes had created a very different working environment for modern day senior police managers. The consequent relaxation in disciplinary styles, which some of my respondents found difficult to come to terms with, had forced them to adopt a more participative and consultative style of management.

Although the reduction in the number of superintendents, the increased workload and the change in emphasis on the matters on which they were required to concentrate, such as a greater involvement in budget management, objective setting and wider public consultation and participation in the provision of policing services at a local level had proved very demanding for most of them, nonetheless, they were all determined to do the work that they, in their words, were being paid good money to carry out. On the topic of management of change, my respondents were no strangers to the process of change and there were in no doubt that the variety of external demands for change had had some success, and that it would continue.

One of the methods that the service had tried to use to manage change proactively was the adoption of the principles of organisational values. The efficacy of using defined organisational values to implement change worked on a number of levels. These included enhancing the professional integrity of individuals and the organisation; standardising the behaviour of officers, in order to ensure that they consistently delivered high quality policing services; and gaining some consensus on the core function of the police.

The promulgation of organisational values had brought about changes to management styles. However, it appeared that the changes had occurred mainly where the organisational values matched those of the individual practitioners. Even where this was the case, many officers still expressed disappointment that the service had to tell them what they already knew and practised.

As managers, my respondents have always had to deal with calls for change, from both external and internal sources. Over the years, they have developed mechanisms to cope with and manage the changes. Operationally some of these mechanisms for coping have been reactive and unsophisticated, but on the matter of the changing social, political and occupational environment, they had maintained an astute awareness of what had been happening. The demands and problems that they faced in the rank of superintendent had given them a common outlook on coping with the relentless call to adapt and change. Although some of them had found some of the demands problematic, this had not diminished their desire to continue what has been for the majority a successful and enjoyable career.

In conclusion, as a group they had adapted well to contemporary social and policing problems. There is evidence of dinosaurian attitudes and behaviours is some police activities and the management of those activities, however, the predominant view of senior police managers is one mainly of chameleons adapting with varying ease to the changing social, legal and political landscape.

NOTES and APPENDICES.

Chapter 1 – Introduction.

(1). In suggesting types of structural reorganisation in provincial police forces, the Audit Commission describes the structures of Basic Command Units as follows. "Beats and section stations can be combined into basic command units (BCUs) which are self-sufficient to meet day-to-day policing needs without becoming so large that effective management control cannot be maintained, contact with the local community is lost, and service standards suffer unacceptably.

"The lowest level in the organisation which has the capacity required in these respects is the sub-division in many forces. Whatever the basic command unit is called, the existence of an intermediary layer of line management between it and force headquarters should be questioned. Where the function of divisional management is purely to act as a filter between BCU commanders and the ACC (Ops), its rationale should be carefully reconsidered: it is unlikely to make a convincing case except in very large forces." (Audit Commission 1991: 24).

Chapter 2 - Methodology

(1). The Bramshill Fellowship Scheme is designed to encourage police officers (at the time negotiations were in hand for the Scheme to be extended to police support staff) of any rank to register with a bona fide research establishment in order to conduct research into current police problems. The research must lead to a higher degree awarded by the research establishment.

(2). QSR stands for Qualitative Solutions and Research, a software development company in Melbourne, Australia.

NUD*IST stands for Non-numerical Unstructured Data Indexing Searching and Theorising.

QSR NUD*IST is a computer package designed to aid users in handling Non-numerical and Unstructured Data in qualitative analysis, by supporting processes of coding data in an Index System, Searching text or searching patterns of coding and Theorising about the data.

Chapter 3 – Culture – an analytical paradigm.

(a)   *Cop It Sweet* was a television documentary, made in 1992, that depicted the harsh reality of police work in Redfern, one of the most socially disadvantaged areas in inner Sydney with a high concentration of Aboriginal population.

Chapter 4 – Social background

(a)   These figures are taken from *The Blue Coated Worker. A sociological study of police unionism.* Robert Reiner. 1978. P150. Cambridge University Press. Although the categories used by Reiner are not identical to mine, the main class divisions, which form the basis of the comparison and discussion, are the same. Reiner poses the question "Are the police a separate or distinctive group in the community, in terms of social background and career experiences?" Because, "It has often been alleged that the police stand apart from the rest of society, and that this gulf is encouraged by peculiarities of origin."

He found that," Policemen today [1977] are drawn primarily from working-class origins, most often skilled ones. Their backgrounds, in terms of social class of their fathers, roughly mirror the population as a whole...The majority of the men came from social class III, mainly from the manual rather than non-manual sections of it. By comparison with the general population, the top and bottom of the social scale are somewhat under-represented." (p. 149)

(b)   These figures are taken from *Chief Constable.* Robert Reiner. 1992. P 57. Oxford University Press. The main categories of social class used by Reiner are the same as mine. He found that "The social class backgrounds are broadly representative of the population as a whole for their generation." (p. 57)

(c)   These figures are taken from *The Blue Coated Worker,* by R. Reiner.

(d)   These figures are taken from *Chief Constables* by R. Reiner. Page 76.

(e)   Institutional Racism. In chapter 6 of *The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry Report by Sir William Macpherson,* paragraph 6.34, the Inquiry team expressed their concept of institutional racism as;

The collective failure of an organisation to provide appropriate and professional service to people because of their colour, culture, or ethnic origin. It can be seen or detected in processes, attitudes and behaviour which amount to discrimination through unwitting prejudice, ignorance, thoughtlessness and racist stereotyping which disadvantage minority ethnic people.

In paragraph 6.46, the Inquiry team stresses that,

We hope and believe that the average police officer and average member of the public will accept that we do not suggest that all police officers are racist and will both understand and accept the distinction we draw between overt individual racism and the pernicious and persistent institutional racism which we have described.

Further, in paragraph 6.47, they add that, "Nor do we say that in its policies the MPS is racist."

As can be seen police officers' interpretation and meaning of *institutional racism* is the opposite of the meaning given the phrase by the Inquiry team.

Chapter 7 – Policing Issues.

(a)   This is one example of this uncertainty and confusion; what to call civilian employees in the police.   In some forces they are referred to as 'civilian support staff', while in others they are 'support staff'. These are the formal terms for civilians in the service, the informal terms are, predictably, less flattering, supportive on inclusive. Terms some officers would sooner explain away as banter than acknowledge are offensive and degrading.

Terms such as 'stinking civvies' and fucking civvies'. Just banter!

(b)   In describing the use of "links, extension and prose style" in the construction of compound sentences in his book *Guide to Written English,* Aitchison explains that, "As a general rule, it is normally safer to use the simplest, least demonstrative linking device. If you strive for more elaborate links your prose style may begin to seem strained and contrived. You may also fall into the trap known ironically as 'elegant' variation, that is, a determination to avoid

repeating a key word or phrase, even when the result of the avoidance is more obvious and more stilted than the repetition." He goes on to give the following example, "a newspaper reporter writing about a photographer colleague who had won an award referred to the man first as *a prize-winning photographer,* a factual statement in standard English; then as *the ace lensman,* which is an instant journalistic cliché; as *the super snapper,* which is catchy, alliterative and colloquial but not standard English; and finally as *the prince of the pics,* a phrase chosen for its alliteration rather than its meaning. The news item would have been more effective if the reporter had avoided variation and instead had repeated the word *photographer,* the photographer's name and the personal pronoun *he.* As you can see from that example, the term 'elegant' variation is ironic because the variation is inelegant." (Aitchison 1994: 200).

The analogy with the police service is that senior managers use so many variations of a standard explanation to deny the reality of what is happening or not happening in terms of policing styles and consequent outcomes that the denials become obvious and stilted. What appears elegant on the surface is in fact on examination, inelegant.

Chapter 8 – Crime.

(a) For a fuller discussion of the different definitions of crime, see *The Problem of Crime.* Edited by John Muncie and Eugene McLaughlin (1996), especially Chapter 2 titled *What is Crime? Competing definitions.*

Chapter 11 – Discussion – Police Management Culture, and Conclusion

(a) These factsheets, which were designed to inform the public of the success the police were achieving and to explain the reasons where the service was not achieving in certain areas, included the following titles. *Your Police: The evidence,* the factsheet concentrated on crime, and the financial and social cost of it; *Your Police: A Service to Value,* which covered a broad area, comparing the cost of public and private policing, more officers on the beat, core policing

tasks, and coping with change; *Your Police: Your police are making a difference,* which addressed how the police was managing the increased demand for its service, the fear of crime and working in partnership with other organisations.

(b)   *The Secret Policeman.* In 2002 a BBC undercover journalist – Mark Daly - joined Greater Manchester Police to find out the extent of racism amongst police officers. In 1999 the Macpherson Report branded London's Metropolitan Police institutionally racist. The report, which followed the Met's failure to successfully prosecute a gang of white youths for the murder of Stephen Lawrence, found ethnic minorities in Britain felt under-protected as victims and over-policed as suspects. The year before, the then chief constable of Greater Manchester Police took the bold step of admitting that his own force was institutionally racist.

The BBC/journalist wanted to see what steps were being taken to eradicate this. But more importantly, "we needed to see if they were working. The only way we could find out what was really happening was to become a police officer - asking questions openly as a journalist would not have uncovered the truth.

Working undercover using the latest hi-tech covert filming equipment meant I could expose any of my fellow officers who held racist views or behaved in a racist manner.

And on 27 January this year, I had my first day of training as PC 2210 Daly. After five months of intensive training I was, for eight weeks, a fully operational PC working the beat."

(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/magazine/3210614.stm). The documentary which was shown on BBC 1 in 2004 contained some of the most shocking scenes of racist language and behaviour by serving police officers.

APPENDICES.

APPENDIX A

CITY OF LONDON POLICE

Management Services
26 Old Jewry
London
EC2R 8DJ

15 September 1995

Mr A T Burden, Esq. , Q.P .M.
Chief Constable
Gwent Constabulary
Croesyceiliog
Cwmbran
Gwent NP44 2XJ

Dear Mr Burden

Under the Bramshill Fellowship Scheme, I am currently researching the Culture of Police Management and its Responsiveness to Change.

The study, which is in support of the various work being carried out on the ACPO Quality of Service Committee' s initiative " Getting Things Right ", will be supervised by Professor Robert Reiner at the London School of Economics and Political Science.

A major part of the research will involve the use of self-completion questionnaires to find out the level of officers' perception of the initiative, and to what extent it has affected the quality of service officers give to colleagues. A questionnaire will take, on average, fifteen minutes to complete.

I plan to follow up the self-completion questionnaire survey of 3250 officers from 14 forces, with one hour interviews of 50 Superintendents from the same forces. A summary of the results will be forwarded to the participating forces by September 1996, with a full report to follow at a later date.

This letter is to obtain your permission to conduct a survey of officers up to ACPO level by use of self-completion questionnaires, and to interview officers of superintendent rank.

The number of officers to be surveyed will be one in ten of the total police personnel (110) and the number of Superintendents will be either 3 or 4, and both surveys will be carried out at a time arranged with a nominated officer in your Force.

I would like to assure you that all information obtained will be treated in the strictest confidence, and non of it can lead to the identification of an individual officer or the Force.

I look forward to hearing from your force shortly.

Yours sincerely,

Victor Olisa, Inspector

APPENDIX B

Telephone: 0171-601-2001

Fax: 0171-601-2060

Our Ref: OLISA/QRU

Your Ref:

CITY OF LONDON POLICE

Headquarters
26 Old Jewry
London
EC2R 8DJ

William Taylor, QPM
Commissioner

15 September 1995

Mr B B D Shaw, Esq., B.A.. (Hons)
Chief Constable
Cleveland Constabulary
P.O. Box No. 70
Ladgate Lane
Middlesborough
Cleveland. TSS 9EH.

Barry,

Enclosed with this letter is a request for assistance on a project which has the support of the Quality of Service Committee. It will also give direct help to Inspector Olisa who is studying under the Bramshill Fellowship Scheme.

I appreciate we all receive many requests for this type of assistance and we have to take care not to burden officers or divert valuable resources. I hope you can agree to help in this case for two reasons. First the outcome will be of benefit to the Service as a whole and second there is need to support our own officers (perhaps ahead of others) seeking development under a scheme to which we all subscribe.

The 'burden' has been kept to a minimum, consistent with a valid survey. I hope you will be able to agree this particular research.

Sincerely

W Taylor
Commissioner

APPENDIX C

Chameleon or Dinosaur. A study of police management culture

Interview of superintendents

The Question Schedule.

Areas to cover.

A.   Work History
B.   The Police Function
C.   Crime and its Control
D.   Public Order
E.   Internal Management
F.   Management of Change
G.   Social Perspective
H.   Personal Background

Reduce areas to cover as shown when informing potential interviewees and their respective Forces of topics that will be covered in the interviews.

1.   Work history and personal background
2.   The Police Function
3.   Crime control and public order
4.   Internal management and management of change

A.   WORK HISTORY

To start, I wonder whether you would mind telling me some things about your career so far?

1(a)   In which year did you join a police force, and which constabulary was it?
(b)   Can you recall what attracted you to the police force?

2.   Had you previously been employed at all outside the police?
        [If yes, ask Q3. If No, go to Q4]

3(a)   What was the last employment you had before you took up work as a policeman/policewoman?
(b)   When did you have that job?
(c)   For how long did you have it?
(d)   Did you have any other jobs before the police?
        [If yes: What were these?
                    When and for how long did you have each job?

4   Did you first enter the police as a cadet?

5 When were you promoted to superintendent?
[or chief superintendent, where applicable]

6 When were you promoted to the different ranks up to superintendent?
[or chief superintendent]
     (i) [Superintendent
     (ii) Chief Inspector
     (iii) Inspector
     (iv) Sergeant

7 In what other police forces have you worked, and what posts did you hold?
[*If required*: Between what years were these appointments?]

8 In which specialists departments have you worked (i.e. other than territorial uniform divisions?)

9 What training courses have you been on, other than probationary training?

10 Have you ever thought seriously about leaving the police at any time during your career?
[*If yes*: When and why?]

B. **THE POLICE FUNCTION.**
I would like now to discuss your view of what the purpose and priorities of policing are.

1. Ideas of the police function can roughly be divided into broad categories, first, a wider proactive view that the police are a public service agency with a broad social control role, perhaps even with a responsibility to remedy the social sources of crime; and, a narrow reactive view that the police should limit themselves to law enforcement and the control of public order.
Which of these concepts do you favour, and why?

2 What, if anything, does the phrase 'community policing' mean to you?

3 Currently, there is much public discussion on maintaining 'traditional policing'.
What does this phrase mean to you?

C **CRIME AND ITS CONTROL**
In this section, I want to talk about your views of crime, its sources and control.

1 Do you feel that crime is now a greater problem than when you joined the police?
What evidence do you have to support your view?
If a greater problem: Why do you think crime has become a greater problem?

2   Are there any features of our society, which are likely to aggravate crime problems?

3   A recent study by the Audit Commission has suggested that traditional methods of patrol and detection have a limited impact on crime, and that increasing resources devoted to them would not significantly reduce crime.
Do you agree? Why?

4   Are there any legal powers, which the police require for effective crime control, but do not have at present?
If yes: What powers? Should the police have them?

5   If a particular social group disproportionately have criminal records, would it help clear up more offences if they were more often stopped and questioned and searched?

D   **PUBLIC ORDER**

I would like to discuss next some issues about the police control of collective public disorder.

1   Is the control of public disorder more difficult for the police now than in the past?
If yes: Why?

2   Has public disorder become –
(a) more frequent?
(b) more serious or violent?
If yes: Why had disorder increased?

3   On what evidence do you base your views?

4   The police response to disorder has become more sophisticated, robust, and forceful in recent years, a trend often described as militaristic policing.
Why has this occurred?

5   Do you think this trend will continue?

E   **INTERNAL MANAGEMENT**

1   Since the Edmund-Davies Report of 1978, the rank and file, as represented by the Police Federation, has gained a more significant consultative role in the determination of force policy.
Is this desirable?
Has it posed any problems for police management?
If yes: In what way?

2   The style of management and discipline in police forces has been said to have relaxed in recent years

What management problems does this pose, if any?
Are there any benefits?

3   What are the main management problems facing you,
(a) generally, as a superintendent, and
(b) in your current post?

4   In what way(s) do you feel that in your current role you are accountable to outside bodies (e.g. Police Authority, Consultative Committee, PCA?)

F   MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE

During the last two/three years there has been a number of Inquiries and Reports on the police service calling for change in its structure and function. (White Paper on Police Reform; Sheehy Inquiry into the Roles and Responsibilities of the Police; Posen Enquiry into Core and Ancillary Tasks; Audit Commission Report into Uniform Patrol; ACPO Quality of Service report 'Getting Things Right'.)

1   Have these demands resulted in any changes in policing or management styles?
If yes: In what way?

2   In addition to 'priorities' and 'goals', Forces are now publishing statements on 'Values'.
Why has this occurred? AND
What effects have these had on the styles of management?

2   Is your Force working toward a quality of service initiative at present?
[If yes, ask Q4. If no, go to Q5.]

3   Which?
How long is it since the Force embarked on the initiative?
What effects has it had on the styles of management?

4   Has the Force considered working toward any quality of service initiative?
If yes: Which? AND
Why was it, or were they, not adopted?

G.   SOCIAL PERSPECTIVE

1   Britain used to be regarded as a harmonious society. Do you think it is still so?
What makes you say this?

2   What are the most important social divisions in our society?
        Are they becoming greater, less great, or remaining the same?

3   Is there any truth in the adage, 'there is one law for the rich and one for the
        poor?

H   PERSONAL BACKGROUND
Finally, I would like to ask you a little about your background.

1   In what year were you born?

2   Are you married?

3   Have you any children?
        If yes: How many?
        How old is each?
        What do they do?

4   What was the highest education level you reached?
        If degree: What subject was it in?
        When and where did you do it?

5   What type of school did you attend?

6   When did you leave school?

7   What type of work did you father (or guardian) do when you were 18?
        Had he been in that type of work most of his life?
        If no: What were the main jobs he had before then?

8   Overall, are you satisfied with your career in the police service?
        Would you rejoin if you had your life over?

9   Finally, are there any comments you would like to make about the interview?

May I thank you for your co-operation.

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